# 1

## A. Interpretation- “In the United States” means the geographical United States- excludes foreign territory

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(Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 7, June 29, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf

7 FAM 1112 WHAT IS BIRTH “IN THE UNITED STATES”?, lmm)

a. INA 101(a)(38) (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(38)) provides **that “the term „United States,‟ when used in a geographical sense, means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.”** U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 7 - Consular Affairs 7 FAM 1110 Page 4 of 13 b. On November 3, 1986, Public Law 94-241, “approving the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America”, (Section 506(c)),took effect. From that point on, the Northern Mariana Islands have been treated as part of the United States for the purposes of INA 301 (8 U.S.C. 1401) and INA 308 (8 U.S.C. 1408). (See 7 FAM 1120 Acquisition of U.S. Nationality in U.S. Territories and Possessions.) c. The Nationality Act of 1940 (NA), Section 101(d) (54 Statutes at Large 1172) (effective January 13, 1941 until December 23, 1952) provided that “the term „United States‟ when used in a geographical sense means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.” The 1940 Act did not include Guam or the Northern Mariana Islands as coming within the definition of “United States.” See the text of the 1940 Act on the CA/OCS Intranet, Acquisition of Citizenship, Legal and Regulatory Documents. d. Prior to January 13, 1941, there was no statutory definition of “the United States” for citizenship purposes. **The phrase “in the United States” as used in Section 1993 of the Revised Statues of 1878 clearly includes states that have been admitted to the Union**. (See 7 FAM 1119 b.) e. INA 304 (8 U.S.C. 1404) and INA 305 (8 U.S.C. 1405) provide a basis for citizenship of persons born in Alaska and Hawaii, respectively, while they were territories of the United States. f. See 7 FAM 1100 Appendix B (under development) for guidance as to what constitutes evidence of birth in the United States. 7 FAM 1113 **NOT INCLUDED IN THE MEANING OF "IN THE UNITED STATES"** (CT:CON-314; 08-21-2009) a. Birth **on U.S. Registered Vessel On High Seas or in the Exclusive Economic Zone:** A U.S.-registered or documented ship on the high seas or in the exclusive economic zone is not considered to be part of the United States. Under the law of the sea, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a maritime zone over which a State has special rights over the exploration and use of natural resources. The Exclusive Economic Zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline. A child born on such a vessel does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of the place of birth (Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir., 1928)). U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 7 - Consular Affairs 7 FAM 1110 Page 5 of 13 NOTE: This concept of allotting nations EEZs to give better control of maritime affairs outside territorial limits gained acceptance in the late 20th century and was given binding international recognition by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. Part V, Article 55 of the Convention states: Specific legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. b. A **U.S.-registered aircraft outside U.S. airspace is not considered to be part of U.S. territory**. A child born on such an aircraft outside U.S. airspace does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of the place of birth. NOTE: The United States of America is not a party to the U.N. Convention on Reduction of Statelessness (1961). Article 3 of the Convention does not apply to the United States. Article 3 provides “For the purpose of determining the obligations of Contracting States under this Convention, birth on a ship or in an aircraft shall be deemed to have taken place in the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies or in the territory of the State in which the aircraft is registered, as the case may be.” This is a frequently asked question. c. Birth on **U.S. Military Base Outside of the United States or Birth on U.S. Embassy or Consulate Premises Abroad**

(1) Despite widespread popular belief, U.S. military installations abroad and U.S. diplomatic or consular facilities abroad are not part of the United States within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. A child born on the premises of such a facility is not born in the United States and does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of birth. (2) The status of diplomatic and consular premises arises from the rules of law relating to immunity from the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of the receiving State; the premises are not part of the territory of the United States of America. (See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 466, Comment a and c (1987). See also, Persinger v. Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984). U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 7 - Consular Affairs 7 FAM 1110 Page 6 of 13 d. Birth on Foreign Ships In Foreign Government Non-Commercial Service: (1) **A child born on a foreign merchant ship or privately owned vessel in U.S. internal waters is considered as having been born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States**. (See U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.) (2) **Foreign warships, naval auxiliaries, and other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used for governmental non-commercial service are not subject to jurisdiction of the United States**. Persons born on such vessels while in U.S. internal waters (or, of course, anywhere else) do not acquire U.S. citizenship by virtue of place of birth. e. Alien Enemies During Hostile Occupation: (1) **If part of the United States were occupied by foreign armed forces against the wishes of the United States, children born to enemy aliens in the occupied areas would not be subject to U.S. jurisdiction and would not acquire U.S. citizenship at birth. (2) Children born to persons other than enemy aliens in an area temporarily occupied by hostile forces would acquire U.S. citizenship at birth because sovereignty would not have been transferred to the other country**. (See U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.) 7 FAM 1114 BIRTH IN U.S. INTERNAL WATERS AND TERRITORIAL SEA (CT:CON-407; 06-29-2012) a. Persons born on **ships located within U.S. internal waters (except as provided in section 1113 d above) are considered to have been** born **in the United States**. Such persons will acquire U.S. citizenship at birth if they are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Internal waters include the ports, harbors, bays, and other enclosed areas of the sea along the U.S. coast. As noted above, a child born on a foreign merchant ship or privately owned vessel in U.S. internal waters is considered as having been born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. (See U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.) b. **Twelve Nautical Mile Limit**: The territorial sea of the United States was formerly three nautical miles. (See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122, 43 S. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed. 894 (1923).) However, the three-mile rule was changed by a Presidential Proclamation in 1988, implementing the territorial-sea provision of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Presidential Proclamation 5928, signed December U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 7 - Consular Affairs 7 FAM 1110 Page 7 of 13 27, 1988, published at 54 Federal Register 777, January 9, 1989.) As decreed by that Proclamation, the territorial sea of the United States henceforth extends to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the United States determined in accordance with international law. (The Proclamation also stated that the jurisdiction of the United States extends to the airspace over the territorial sea.) (See Gordon, Immigration Law and Procedure, Part 8 Nationality and Citizenship, 92.03(2)(b) territorial limits.) c. FAM guidance up until 1995 (7 FAM 1116.1-2 In U.S. Waters TL:CON-64; 11-30-95) advised that persons born within the 3-mile limit of the U.S. territorial sea were born “within the United States” and could be documented as U.S. citizens if they were also born subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Some commentators took this view as well, such as Gordon. Analysis of this issue undertaken in 1994-1995 revealed, however, that there is a substantial legal question whether persons born outside the internal waters of the United States but within the territorial sea are in fact born “within the United States” for purposes of the 14th Amendment and the INA. Note: Cases involving persons born outside the internal waters but within the U.S. territorial sea should therefore be submitted to the Department (CA/OCS) for adjudication, upon coordination by CA/OCS/L with L/CA and L/OES and other appropriate offices within the United States Government. U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad should consult CA/OCS/L (Ask-OCS-L-Dom-Post@state.gov). Domestic U.S. passport agencies and centers should contact CA/PPT/L/LA (CAPPTAdjQ@state.gov), which will confer with CA/OCS/L and L/CA.

## B. Violation- Plan text in a vacuum does not target subdermal tech to only “in the United States”- allows market adoption anywhere

## C. Standards-

## 1. Predictable limits- thousands of affs could target foreign energy production- explodes the topic and makes it an unreasonable

## 2. Negative Ground- the phrase “In the US” in the plan text guarantees cp competition for trade disads. Foreign energy sources makes it impossible to garner offense because best links on the topic are based off of domestic production.

## D. Voting issue for fairness, education and jurisdiction

# 2

## Humanism and status quo philosophical thought is based on the fungibility of the slave – supposed revolutionary discourses rely on the death of the slave

Wilderson, University of California, Irvine professor of the African America studies and drama , ‘10

(Frank B. III “Red, White & Black” pg. 19-22 accessed: 12-21-12 mlb)

Again, what is important for us to glean from these historians is that the pre-Columbian period, the late Middle Ages, reveals no archive of debate on these three questions as they might be related to that massive group of black-skinned people south of the Sahara. Eltis suggests that there was indeed massive debate which ultimately led to Britain taking the lead in the abolition of slavery, but he reminds us that that debate did not have its roots in the late Middle Ages, the post-Columbian period of the 1500s or the Virginia colony period of the 1600s. It was, he asserts, an outgrowth of the mid- to late eighteenth-century emancipatory thrust— intra-Human disputes such as the French and American revolutions— that swept through Europe. But Eltis does not take his analysis further than this. Therefore, it is important that we not be swayed by his optimism about the Enlightenment and its subsequent abolitionist discourses. It is highly conceivable that the discourse that elaborates the justification for freeing the slave is not the product of the Human being having suddenly and miraculously recognized the slave. Rather, as Saidiya Hartman argues, emancipatory discourses present themselves to us as further evidence of the Slave's fungibility: "The figurative capacities of blackness enable white flights of fancy while increasing the likelihood of the captive's disappearance."27 First, the questions of Humanism were elaborated in contradistinction to the human void, to the African qua chattel (the 1200s to the end of the 1600s). Second, as the presence of Black chattel in the midst of exploited and unexploited Humans (workers and bosses, respectively) became a fact of the world, exploited Humans (in the throes of class conflict with unexploited Humans) seized the image of the Slave as an enabling vehicle that animated the evolving discourses of their own emancipation, just as unexploited Humans had seized the flesh of the Slave to increase their profits Without this gratuitous violence, a violence that marks everyone ex-perientially until the late Middle Ages when it starts to mark the Black onto logically, the so-called great emancipatory discourses of modernity— Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, sexual liberation, and the ecology movement—political discourses predicated on grammars of suffering and whose constituent elements are exploitation and alienation, might not have developed.28 Chattel slavery did not simply reterritorialize the ontology of the African. It also created the Human out of culturally disparate entities from Europe to the East. I am not suggesting that across the globe Humanism developed in the same way regardless of region or culture; what I am saying is that the late Middle Ages gave rise to an ontological category—an ensemble of common existential concerns—which made and continues to make possible both war and peace, conflict and resolution, between the disparate members of the human race, East and West. Senator Thomas Hart Benton intuited this notion of the existential commons when he wrote that though the "Yellow race" and its culture had been "torpid and stationary for thousands of years . . . [Whites and Asians] must talk together, and trade together, and marry together. Commerce is a great civilizer—social intercourse as great—and marriage greater."29 Eltis points out that as late as the seventeenth century, "prisoners taken in the course of European military action... could expect death if they were leaders, or banishment if they were deemed followers, but never enslavement.... Detention followed by prisoner exchanges or ransoming was common." "By the seventeenth century, enslavement of fellow Europeans was beyond the limits" of Humanism's existential commons, even in times of war.30 Slave status "was reserved for non-Christians. Even the latter group however . . . had some prospect of release in exchange for Christians held by rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and other Mediterranean Muslim powers."31 But though the practice of enslaving the vanquished was beyond the limit of wars among Western peoples and only practiced provisionally in East-West conflicts, the baseness of the option was not debated when it came to the African. The race of Humanism (White, Asian, South Asian, and Arab) could not have produced itself without the simultaneous production of that walking destruction which became known as the Black. Put another way, through chattel slavery the world gave birth and coherence to both its joys of domesticity and to its struggles of political discontent; and with these joys and struggles the Human was born, but not before it murdered the Black, forging a symbiosis between the political ontology of Humanity and the social death of Blacks. In his essay "To 'Corroborate Our Claims': Public Positioning and the Slavery Metaphor in Revolutionary America," Peter Dorsey (in his concurrence with the cultural historians F. Nwabueze Okoye and Patricia Bradley) suggests that in mid- to late eighteenth-century America Blackness was such a fungible commodity that it was traded as freely between the exploited (workers who did not "own" slaves) as it was between the unexploited (planters who did). This was due to the effective uses to which Whites could put the Slave as both flesh and metaphor. For the revolutionaries, "slavery represented a nightmare' that white Americans were trying to avoid."32 Dorsey's claim is provocative, but not unsupported: he maintains that had Blacks-as-Slaves not been in the White field of vision on a daily basis that it would have been virtually impossible for Whites to transform themselves from colonial subjects into revolutionaries: Especially prominent in the rhetoric and reality of the [revolutionary] era, the concepts of freedom and slavery were applied to a wide variety of events and values and were constantly being defined and redefined. ... Early understandings of American freedom were in many ways dependent on the existence of chattel slavery. . . . [We should] see slavery in revolutionary discourse, not merely as a hyperbolic rhetorical device but as a crucial and fluid [fungible] concept that had a major impact on the way early Americans thought about their political future. . . . The slavery metaphor destabilized previously accepted categories of thought about politics, race, and the early republic.33 Though the idea of "taxation without representation" may have spoken concretely to the idiom of power that marked the British/American relation as being structurally unethical, it did not provide metaphors powerful and fungible enough for Whites to meditate and move on when resisting the structure of their own subordination at the hands of "unchecked political power."34 The most salient feature of Dorsey's findings is not his understanding of the way Blackness, as a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society, impacts and destabilizes previously accepted categories of intra-White thought. Most important, instead, is his contribution to the evidence that, even when Blackness is deployed to stretch the elasticity of civil society to the point of civil war, that expansion is never elastic enough to embrace the very Black who catalyzed the expansion. In fact, Dorsey, building on Bradley's historical research, asserts that just the opposite is true. The more the political imagination of civil society is enabled by the fungibility of the slave metaphor, the less legible the condition of the slave becomes: "Focusing primarily on colonial newspapers . . . Bradley finds that the slavery metaphor 'served to distance the patriot agenda from the antislavery movement.' If anything, Bradley states, widespread use of the metaphor 'gave first evidence that the issue of real slavery was not to have a part in the revolutionary messages.'"35 And Eltis believes that this philosophical incongruity between the image of the Slave and freedom for the Slave begins in Europe and predates the American Revolution by at least one hundred years: "The [European] countries least likely to enslave their own had the harshest and most sophisticated system of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans. Overall, the English and Dutch conception of the role of the individual in metropolitan society ensured the accelerated development of African chattel slavery in the Americas ... because their own subjects could not become chattel slaves or even convicts for life."36 Furthermore, the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g., the French, English, and American revolutions) produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore.

## The ethical demands of Black and Red Bodies as triangulated by the myriad of structurally violent antagonisms that position those bodies within Civil Society

**Wilderson, Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine, 2010**

(Frank B., Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,” Pages 1-2. pdf, Written in 2010, Accessed 08-08-2012, AJH)

**WHEN** i **WAS** a young student at Columbia University in New York there was a Black woman who used to stand outside the gate and yell at Whites, Latinos, and East and South Asian students, staff, and faculty as they entered the university. She accused them of having stolen her sofa and of selling her into slavery. She always winked at the Blacks, though we didn't wink back. Some of us thought her outbursts bigoted and out of step with the burgeoning ethos of multicultural-ism and "rainbow coalitions." But others did not wink back because we were too fearful of the possibility that her isolation would become our isolation, and we had come to Columbia for the precise, though largely assumed and unspoken, purpose of foreclosing on that peril. Besides, people said she was crazy. Later, when I attended the University of California at Berkeley, I saw a Native American man sitting on the sidewalk of Telegraph Avenue. On the ground in front of him was an upside-down hat and a sign informing pedestrians that here they could settle the "Land Lease Accounts" that they had neglected to settle all of their lives. He, too, was "crazy." Leaving aside for the moment their state of mind, it would seem that the structure, that is to say the rebar, or better still the grammar of their demands—and, by extension, the grammar of their suffering—was indeed an ethical grammar. Perhaps it is the only ethical grammar available to modern politics and modernity writ large, for it draws our attention not to how space and time are used and abused by enfranchised and violently powerful interests, but to the violence that underwrites the modern world's capacity to think, act, and exist spatially and temporally. The violence that robbed her of her body and him of his land provided the stage on which other violent and consensual dramas could be enacted. Thus, they would have to be crazy, crazy enough to call not merely the actions of the world but the world itself to account, and to account for ***them*** no less! The woman at Columbia was not demanding to be a participant in an unethical network of distribution: she was not demanding a place within capital, a piece of the pie (the demand for her sofa notwithstanding). Rather, she was articulating a triangulation between two things. On the one hand was the loss of her body, the very dereliction of her corporeal integrity, what Hortense Spillers charts as the transition from being a being to becoming a ***"being for*** the captor,"1 the drama of value (the stage on which surplus value is extracted from labor power through commodity production and sale). On the other was the corporeal integrity that, once ripped from her body, fortified and extended the corporeal integrity of everyone else on the street. She gave birth to the commodity and to the Human, yet she had neither subjectivity nor a sofa to show for it. In her eyes, the world—not its myriad discriminatory practices, but the world itself—was unethical. And yet, the world passes by her without the slightest inclination to stop and disabuse her of her claim. Instead, it calls her "crazy." And to what does the world attribute the Native American mans insanity? "He's crazy if he thinks he's getting any money out of us"? Surely, that doesn't make him crazy. Rather it is simply an indication that he does not have a big enough gun.

## Violence against the slave exceeds all other violence – ripped apart until only a body remains.

Ba, American Cultural Studies Masters, ‘11

(Saer Maty, PhD in Film “ The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation” Cultural Studies Reivew 17.2 Sep. 11 381-391 accessed: 12-26-12 mlb)

As we shall see below, blacks in the US cannot and do not have ontology, or so Wilderson argues, denying with the same breath the workability of analogy as a method, because analogy can only be a ruse. Thus, what he calls 'the ruse of analogy' grants those who fall for it, for example, 'Black film theorists' or Black academics, an opportunity to reflect on (black) cinema only after some form of structural alteration. (38) Analogy does seem tricky if one follows Wilderson's line of thought, that is, the Holocaust/Jews and slavery/Africans. Jews entered and came out of Auschwitz as Jews whereas Africans emerged from the slave ships as Blacks.2 Two types of holocaust: the first 'Human', the second 'Human and metaphysical', something which leads to Wilderson saying that 'the Jews have the Dead ... among them; the Dead have the Black among them'. (38) It bears reiterating that for Wilderson, blacks are socially and ontologically dead in the sense that the black body has been violently turned into flesh, 'ripped apart literally and imaginatively', that it is a body vulnerably open, 'an object made available (fungible) for any subject' and 'not in the world' or civil society the way white bodies are. (38)."

## Alternative: A paradigmatic analysis of the underlying antagonism's of the 1AC

## Paradigmatic analysis is key – other alternatives give up the power to question

Wilderson, University of California, Irvine professor of the African America studies and drama , ‘10

(Frank B. III “Red, White & Black” pg. IX-X accessed: 12-21-12 mlb)

**STRANGE AS** it might seem, this book project began in South Africa. During the last years of apartheid I worked for revolutionary change in both an underground and above-ground capacity, for the Charterist Movement in general and the ANC in particular. During this period, I began to see how essential an unflinching paradigmatic analysis is to a movement dedicated to the complete overthrow of an existing order. The neoliberal compromises that the radical elements of the Chartist Movement made with the moderate elements were due, in large part, to our inability or unwillingness to hold the moderates' feet to the fire of a political agenda predicated on an unflinching paradigmatic analysis. Instead, we allowed our energies and points of attention to be displaced by and onto pragmatic considerations. Simply put, we abdicated the power to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all. Elsewhere, I have written about this unfortunate turn of events ***(Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid),*** so I'll not rehearse the details here. Suffice it to say, this book germinated in the many political and academic discussions and debates that I was fortunate enough to be a part of at a historic moment and in a place where the word revolution was spoken in earnest, free of qualifiers and irony. For their past and ongoing ideas and interventions, I extend solidarity and appreciation to comrades Amanda Alexander, Franco Barchiesi, Teresa Barnes, Patrick Bond, Ashwin Desai, Nigel Gibson, Steven Greenberg, Allan Horowitz, Bushy Kelebonye (deceased), Tefu Kelebonye, Ulrike Kistner, Kamogelo Lekubu, Andile Mngxitama, Prishani Naidoo, John Shai, and S'bu Zulu.

## Recognition of the object status of the slave is key – the presence of the object disarticulates the system of anti-blackness and civil society which is built upon the ignorance of that violence.

Wilderson, University of California, Irvine professor of the African America studies and drama , ‘10

(Frank B. III “Red, White & Black” pg. 39-44 accessed: 12-21-12 mlb)

Ronald Judy's book ***(Dis)Forming the American Canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the Vernacular*** and his essay "On the Ques- tion of Nigga Authenticity" critique the Black intelligentsia for building aesthetic canons out of slave narratives and hardcore rap on the belief that Blacks can "write [themselves] into being."11 Judy acknowledges that in such projects one finds genuine and rigorous attention to the issue that concerns Blacks as a social formation, namely, resistance. But he is less than sanguine about the power of resistance which so many Black scholars impute to the slave narrative in particular and, by extension, to the "canon" of Black literature, Black music, and Black film: In writing the death of the African body, Equiano['s eighteenth-century slave narrative] gains voice and emerges from the abject muteness of objectivity into productive subjectivity. It should not be forgotten that the abject muteness of the body is not to not exist, to be without effect. The abject body is the very stuff, the material, of experiential effect. Writing the death of the African body is an enforced abstraction. It is an interdiction of the African, a censorship to be inarticulate, to not compel, to have no capacity to move, to be without effect, without agency, without thought. The muted African body is overwritten by the Negro, and the Negro that emerges in the ink flow of Equiano's pen is that which has overwritten itself and so becomes the representation of the very body it sits on.12 Judy is an Afro-pessimist, not an Afrocentrist. For him the Negro is a symbol that cannot "enable the representation of meaning [because] it has no referent."13 Such is the gratuitousness of the violence that made the Negro. But it is precisely to this illusive symbolic resistance (an aspiration to "productive subjectivity"), as opposed to the Negro's "abject muteness," and certainly not to the Slave's gratuitous violence, that many Black scholars in general, and Black film theorists in particular, aspire when interpreting their cultural objects. My claim regarding Black film theory, modeled on Judy's claim concerning Black studies more broadly, is that it tries to chart a project of resistance with an ensemble of questions that fortify and extend the interlocutory life of what might be called a Black film canon. But herein lies the rub, in the form of a structural adjustment imposed on Black film scholars themselves. "Resistance through canon formation," Judy writes, must be "legitimated on the grounds of conservation, the conservation of authenticity's integrity."14 A tenet that threads through Judy's work is that throughout modernity and postmodernity (or postindustrial society, as Judy's echoing of Antonio Negri prefers) "Black authenticity" is an oxymoron, a notion as absurd as "rebellious property,"15 for it requires the kind of ontological integrity which the Slave cannot claim. The structural adjustment imposed on Black academics is, however, vital to the well-being of civil society. It provides the political economy of academia with a stable "collegial" atmosphere in which the selection of topics, the distribution of concerns, esprit de corps, emphasis, and the bounding of debate within acceptable limits appear to be "shared" by all because all admit to sharing them. But Judy suggests that the mere presence of the Black and his or her project, albeit adjusted structurally, threatens the fabric of this "stable" economy by threatening its structure of exchange: "Not only are the conjunctive operations of discourses of knowledge and power that so define the way in which academic fields get authenticated implicated in the academic instituting of Afro-American studies, but so is the instability entailed in the nature of academic work. That instability is discernable even in the university's function as conservator."16 This academy-wide instability, predicated on the mere presence of the Black and his or her object, has three crisis-prone elements which Blackness, should it ever become unadjusted, could unleash. First, African American studies cannot delimit "a unique object field" (i.e., a set of literary texts, or a Black film canon) which threatens the nature of academic work, for Black studies itself is indexical of the fact that "the object field-that is, the texts—has no ontological status, but issues from specific historical discursive practices and aesthetics." Second, these "specific historical discursive practices and aesthetics," heterogeneous as they might be at the level of content, are homogeneous to the extent that their genealogies cannot recognize and incorporate the figure of the Slave. As a result, "interjecting the slave narrative into the privileged site of literary expression achieves, in effect, a (dis)formation of the field of American literary history" and, by extension, the field of Black film studies. "The slave narrative as a process by which a textual economy is constituted—as a topography through which the African American achieves an emancipatory subversion of the propriety of slavery—jeopardizes the genealogy of Reason."17 Once Reason's very genealogy is jeopardized then its content, for example, the idea of "dominium," has no ground to stand on. We will see, below, how and why "dominion" is recognized as a constituent ele- merit of the Indians subjectivity and how this recognition enables partial incorporation. A third point, however, proves just as unsettling, if not more so, than a crisis in the genealogy of Reason. For if Slave narratives as an object field have "no ontological status," such that the field's insertion into the field of literary history can disform not just the field of literary studies but the field of knowledge itself (the paradigm of exchange within the political economy of academia), and (dis)form the hegemony of Reasons genealogy, then what does this tell us about the ontological status of narrating Slave themselves? This question awaits both the Black filmmaker and the Black film theorist. It is menacing and unbearable. The intensity of its ethicality is so terrifying that, as a space to be inhabited and terror to be embraced, it can be seized by a significant number of Black artists and theorists only at those moments when a critical mass of Slaves have embraced this terror in the streets. Normally, in moments such as the present (with no such mass movement in the streets), the "effect of delineating a peculiar African American historiography" seems menacing and unbearable to the lone Black scholar; and so the Black scholar labors—unwittingly, Judy implies—to adjust the structure of his or her own "nonrecuperable negativity" in order to tell "a story of an emerging subjectivity's triumphant struggle to discover its identity" and thereby ascend "from the abject muteness of objectivity into productive subjectivity."18 The dread under which such aspirations to Human capacity labor (a labor of disavowal) is catalyzed by the knowledge, however u

nconscious, that civil society is held together by a structural prohibition against recognizing and incorporating a being that is dead, despite the fact that this being is sentient and so appears to be very much alive. Civil society cannot embrace what Saidiya Hartman calls "the abject status of the will-less object."19 Explicating the rhetorical and philosophical impossibility of such an embrace, Judy writes: The assumption of the Negro's transcendent worth as a human presupposes the Negro's being comprehensible in Western modernity's terms. Put somewhat more crudely, but nonetheless to the point, the humanization in writing achieved in the slave narrative require [s] the conversion of the incomprehensible African into the comprehensible Negro. The historical mode of conversion was the linguistic representation of slavery: the slave narrative [or Black film and Black film theory]. By providing heuristic evidence of the Negro's humanity the slave narrative begins to write the history of Negro culture in terms of the history of an extra-African self-reflective consciousness.20 But this exercise is as liberating, as "productive of subjectivity," as a dog chasing its tail. For "precisely at the point at which this intervention appears to succeed in its determination of a black agent, however, it is subject to appropriation by a rather homeostatic thought: the Negro."21 And the Negro, as Fanon illustrates throughout Black Skin, White Masks, "is comparison," nothing more and certainly nothing less, for what is less than comparison? Fanon strikes at the heart of this tail-chasing and the dread it catalyzes when he writes: "No one knows yet who [the Negro] is, but he knows that fear will fill the world when the world finds out. And when the world knows the world always expects something of the Negro. He is afraid lest the world know, he is afraid of the fear that the world would feel if the world knew."22 By aspiring to the very ontological capacity which modernity foreclosed to them—in other words, by attempting to "write themselves into being"—Black film theorists and many Black films experience as unbearable a tenet shared by Judy and other Afro-pessimists that "humanity recognizes itself in the Other that it is not."23 This makes the labor of disavowal in Black scholarly and aesthetic production doubly burdensome, for it is triggered by a dread of both being "discovered," and of discovering oneself, as ontological incapacity. Thus, through borrowed institutionality—the feigned capacity to be essentially exploited and alienated (rather than accumulated and fungible) in the first ontological instance (in other words, a fantasy to be just like everyone else, which is a fantasy to be)—the work of Black film theory operates through a myriad of compensatory gestures in which the Black theorist assumes subjective capacity to be universal and thus "finds" it everywhere. We all got it bad, don't we, Massa. We can say that White film theory is hobbled in much the same style as Black film theory, but it is burdened by a completely different set of stakes, or more precisely with nothing at all at stake onto logically. In chapter 2 I will show how dependent the explanatory power of White film theory is on the Lacanian insistence that the Subject (Lacans analy-sand) is a universal entity who exists, a priori, within a community of what Lacan calls "contemporaries" (what I dub civil society) and does not reside on what Hortense Spillers calls "the slave estate."24 Bound up in the notion of prior existing contemporaries is the assumption that relationality itself is not in question (which is always the question for the Slave). What is in question instead is the status of those prior existing relations—whether, in Lacans vernacular, the relation is sutured by "empty speech," the monumentalization of the ego, or "full speech," an encounter between beings who live either under the neurotic yoke of the moi (ego) or in a liberated or deconstructive relation to the ego. Other touchstones of cohesion that bound and elaborate these theoretical analyses of film include a sense of the universality of a domestic scene (again, I would note, slaves have quarters but not homes), and of subjective positioning by way of the symbolic order, an understanding of positioning in which violence plays a contingent as opposed to originary or gratuitous role, in the ontological schema of the subject. Due to the presence of prior existing relations in a world of contemporaries, no "fear of the fear of the world" is at stake when White theorists meditate ontologically (whether through a cultural object such as film or on a set of intellectual protocols) and find—as do their Black colleagues—capacity everywhere. It would be more accurate to say not that they find capacity everywhere, since they do not look everywhere, but that they find it where they are, among their "contemporaries," and assume its ubiquity. Unlike the Negro, there is nothing homeostatic about the White (or other Humans). If the Black is death personified, the White is the personification of diversity, of life itself. As Richard Dyer reminds us, "The invisibility of whiteness as a racial position in white ... discourse is of a piece with its ubiquity. When I said above that this book wasn't merely seeking to fill a gap in the analysis of racial imagery, I reproduced the idea that there is no discussion of white people. In fact for most of the time white people speak about nothing but white people, it's just that we couch it in terms of 'people' in general. . . . Yet precisely because of this and their placing as norm [Whites] seem not to be represented to themselves as whites but as people who are variously gendered, classed, sexua-lised and abled."25 Thus the threat of discovering oneself in one's own scholarly or artistic endeavors as "comparison" is not a fate that awaits White academics. White academics' disavowal of Black death as modernity's condition of possibility (their inability to imagine their productive subjectivity as an effect of the Negro)26 stems not from the unbearable terror of that (non)self-discovery alawaiting the Black, but from the fact that, save brief and infrequent conjunctures of large-scale Black violence (eighteenth- and nineteenth-century slave revolts and twentieth-century "urban unrest"), the socius provides no catalyst for White avowal. In short, thought—essential, ontological thought—is all but impossible in White cultural and political theory—but it is not (as we will see with Monsters Ball in part 4) impossible in the unconscious of the White film itself. This state of affairs, the unbearable hydraulics of Black disavowal and the sweetness and light of White disavowal, is best encapsulated in the shorthand expression "social stability," for it guarantees the civility of civil society. Put anecdotally, but nonetheless to the point, when pulled individually by the button, both inmate and guard might be in favor of "criminal rehabilitation," both might even believe that the warden is a "swell guy,"27 and in their enthusiasm they both might even take for granted that by "criminal" they are speaking of the inmates and not the guards, or for that matter the warden. However, while the shared experiences in the political economy of the prison—a common policy agenda, that is, rehabilitation—or the shared identifications in the libidinal economy of prison—the unconscious captation of both inmate and guard by the image of the warden—may certainly be important to any meditation on either prison economy, they are certainly not essential to such reflection. This means that they cannot break in on the mutually exclusive constituent elements that make the positions of inmate and guard irreconcilable, at least, not with such a force as to rupture that positional exclusivity and bring about the end of the (prison) world. This holds true regardless of the fact that the mobility of symbolic material, that is, the idea of "criminal rehabilitation" and the agreement on who constitutes a criminal, and the mobility of imaginary captation, that is, the image of the warden, are both without limit in their capacity for transgression.

# 3

## Engaging political questions corrupts our relationship to god

**Copeland, University of Miami School of Law associate professor, 9**

(Charlton C., "God-Talk in the Age of Obama: Theology and Religious Political Engagement," Denver University Law Review, 86 Denv. U.L. Rev. 663, 2009, l/n, accessed 1-27-12, mss)

The rejection of the social order and its culture as a response to the call of Jesus Christ represents the separatist resolution to the problem of Christ and Culture. Based on its theological interpretation of both the identity and activity of Jesus Christ and the social order as impossibly at odds, the exclusivist Christian articulates a resolution that places Christ against culture. The exclusivist reads the gap between Christ and culture as unbridgeable, and resolves that **the social order must be rejected, if Christ is to be retained**. **The rejection of "the world" and abdication of responsibility for its transformation is the outcome** of the exclusivist's theological worldview. Adherents of the exclusivist type foreground Jesus' identity as the founder of a new law. The exclusivist's interpretation of the meaning of the life of Jesus emphasizes the power, authority, and love of God, as evidenced in the person of Jesus, and the command that man respond to God through love of neighbor. n16 Jesus inaugurates a new order at whose root lies love. To the extent that the "new creation" requires a changed community, the evidence of the community's authentic commitment to the sovereignty of Jesus is its response to the commands of God in its actions. This chasm between the new creation and the social order is evident in the gap between the norms that govern each domain. In contrast to the "new creations" norm of love, the social order is governed and maintained by power, violence, and threat. n17 Richard Niebuhr describes the exclusivist type's view of the created order is "a realm under the power of evil." n18 The relationships in the realm of the world "characterized by the prevalence in it of lies, hatred, and murder; it is the heir of Cain." n19 The exclusivist's separation of Christ from culture is parasitic upon his understanding of the "nature and prevalence of sin." The exclusive Christian is required to reject the world because it continues to be a place in which sin persists. In fact, the world is not merely the place in which sin is resident, but the exclusivist maintains that sin is endemic to the world. Rather than explaining the prevalence of sin by locating it in hu [\*669] man nature, the exclusivist sites the explanation for sin's continued prevalence in the corrupted culture in which humanity resided. By distinction, those who are members of the community marked by the sovereign lordship of Jesus "have passed from the darkness [of the culture] into the light," and must separate from the world in order to maintain the purity and integrity of this community. n20 The exclusivist discourages Christian involvement in political life. Political life is envisaged as brutish and base. Political life in the social order is seen as involving nothing more than the pursuit and deployment of power. **The state and its maintenance through political life are incompatible with Christianity.** Beyond the merely neutral recognition of the state as necessary for the constraint of an otherwise sinful order, the exclusivist sees the state as "the chief offender against life." n21 The only safety against its domination is "nonparticpation." Thus the only appropriate resolution to the conflict between life in Christ and life in culture is near-complete separation of the two realms.

## Your ultimate concern ought to be how to be properly related to God- it’s the only worthwhile source of value

**Craig, Talbot School of Theology philosophy research professor, 4**

(Dr. William Lane, Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Birmingham (England), Th.D. under from the University of Munich, "Does God Exist?" 2004, delveintojesus.com/Articles/64/Does-God-Exist.aspx, accessed 11-20-11, mss)

C. S. Lewis once remarked that God is not the sort of thing one can be moderately interested in. After all, if God does not exist, there's no reason to be interested in God at all. On the other hand, if God does exist, then this is of paramount interest, and our **ultimate concern** ought to be how to be **properly related** to this being upon whom we depend moment by moment for our very existence. So people who shrug their shoulders and say, "What difference does it make if God exists?" merely show that they haven't yet thought very deeply about this problem. Even atheist philosophers like Sartre and Camus who have thought very seriously about this problem admit that the existence of God makes a tremendous difference for man. Let me mention just three reasons why it makes a big difference whether God exists. 1. If God does not exist, **life is** ultimately **meaningless**. If your life is doomed to end in death, then ultimately it does not matter how you live. In the end it makes no ultimate difference whether you existed or not. Sure, your life might have a relative significance in that you influenced others or affected the course of history. But **ultimately [hu]mankind is doomed to perish in the heat death of the universe.** Ultimately it makes no difference who you are or what you do. Your life is inconsequential. Thus, the contributions of the scientist to the advance of human knowledge, the research of the doctor to alleviate pain and suffering, the efforts of the diplomat to secure peace in the world, the sacrifices of good people everywhere to better the lot of the human race ultimately all these come to nothing. Thus, if atheism is true, life is ultimately meaningless. 2. If God does not exist, then we must ultimately live without hope. If there is no God, then there is ultimately no hope for deliverance from the shortcomings of our finite existence. For example, there is no hope for deliverance from evil. Although many people ask how God could create a world involving so much evil, by far most of the suffering in the world is due to man's own inhumanity to man. The horror of two world wars during the last century effectively destroyed the 19th century's naive optimism about human progress. If God does not exist, then we are locked without hope in a world filled with gratuitous and unredeemed suffering, and there is no hope for deliverance from evil. Or again, if there is no God, there is no hope of deliverance from aging, disease, and death. Although it may be hard for you as university students to contemplate, the sober fact is that unless you die young, someday you you yourselfwill be an old man or an old woman, fighting a losing battle with aging, struggling against the inevitable advance of deterioration, disease, perhaps senility. And finally and inevitably you will die. There is no afterlife beyond the grave. Atheism is thus a philosophy without hope. 3. On the other hand, if God does exist, then not only is there meaning and hope, but there is also the possibility of coming to know God and His love personally. Think of it! That the **infinite God** should love you and want to be your personal friend! This **would be the highest status a human being could enjoy**! Clearly, if God exists, it makes not only a tremendous difference for mankind in general, but it could make a life-changing difference for you as well. Now admittedly none of this shows that God exists. But does show that it makes a tremendous difference whether God exists. Therefore, even if the evidence for and against the existence of God were absolutely equal, the rational thing to do, I think, is to believe in Him. That is to say, it seems to me positively irrational when the evidence is equal to prefer death, futility, and despair over hope, meaningfulness and happiness.

[Matt note: gender-paraphrased]

# On Case

## Aff’s logic of incentives presumes universal rationality and drives for profit-re-entrenches neoliberalism.

**Reno, Michigan anthropology PhD, 2011**

(Joshua, “Motivated Markets: Instruments and Ideologies of Clean Energy in the United Kingdom”, Cultural Anthropology Volume 26, Issue 3, pages 389–413, August 2011, Wiley, ldg)

To grapple with these ongoing efforts of social transformation, I focus on the Renewables Obligation (RO) of England and Wales, which involves the creation of a government-sponsored market in virtual “renewability” to subsidize the production of renewable energy and generate demand for it. Although there are many ways of accomplishing these goals, Euro-American economists and government officials tend to favor polices that utilize financial incentives. Like markets in carbon offsets, renewable energy policy in the United Kingdom is a form of neoliberal governance; rather than merely force compliance it seeks to motivate individuals through financial incentives. Such policies rely on assumptions about how individuals can be motivated to act in accordance with policy directives. Economic interests, it is thought, can be harnessed as a political mechanism to bolster green virtues; the assumption being that the actors in question possess a desire for wealth that can be channeled into reform: Homo economicus and Homo ecologicus are made one through market design. According to the material sociology of finance, broadly associated with the work of Michel Callon (1998, 2009) and Donald MacKenzie (2009) among others, individual actors in a market can approximate the “economically rational” self-interest described by economists with the help of the various technical devices they have at their disposal. A person at a grocery store, for example, is not alone, but may be accompanied by an itemized list, a calculator, coupons, signs advertizing special deals, price tags, a receipt, and so on. “Interests are not given,” writes MacKenzie, “they are calculated” as part of larger sociotechnical arrangements of persons and an assortment of market devices (2009:25). I discuss the relationship between participants in the United Kingdom's renewable energy sector and different environmental and economic devices that facilitate their actions, focusing in particular on the different ways market devices channel environmental and economic motivations as well as reshape them into new and potentially alienating forms.

## Neoliberalism orders the world that renders economically vulnerable societies disposable-creates structural violence and war

**Giroux, McMaster cultural studies professor, 2008**

(Henry, “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age”, Social Identities; Sep2008, Vol. 14 Issue 5, p587-620, ebsco, ldg)

The mutually determining forces of every deepening inequality and an emerging repressive state apparatus have become the defining features of neoliberalism at the beginning of the new millennium. Wealth is now redistributed upwards to produce record high levels of inequality, and corporate power is simultaneously consolidated at a speed that threatens to erase the most critical gains made over the last fifty years to curb the anti-democratic power of corporations. Draconian policies aimed at hollowing out the social state are now matched by an increase in repressive legislation to curb the unrest that might explode among those populations falling into the despair and suffering unleashed by a ‘savage, fanatical capitalism’ that now constitutes the neoliberal war against the public good, the welfare state, and ‘social citizenship’ (Davis & Monk, 2007, p. ix). Privatization, commodification, corporate mergers, and asset stripping go hand in hand with the curbing of civil liberties, the increasing criminalization of social problems, and the fashioning of the prison as the preeminent space of racial containment (one in nine black males between the ages of 20 and 34 are incarcerated) (Associated Press, 2008). The alleged morality of market freedom is now secured through the ongoing immorality of a militarized state that embraces torture, war, and violence as legitimate functions of political sovereignty and the ordering of daily life. As the rich get richer, corporations become more powerful, and the reach of the punishing state extends itself further, those forces and public spheres that once provided a modicum of protection for workers, the poor, sick, aged, and young are undermined, leaving large numbers of people impoverished and with little hope for the future. David Harvey (2005) refers to this primary feature of neoliberalism as ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which he enumerates as all of those processes such as the privatization and commodification of public assets, deregulation of the financial sector, and the use of the state to direct the flow of wealth upward through, among other practices, tax policies that favor the rich and cut back the social wage (p. 7). As Harvey (2005) points out, ‘All of these processes amount to the transfer of assets from the public and popular realms to the private and class privileged domains’, and the overwhelming of political institutions by powerful corporations that keep them in check (p. 161). Zygmunt Bauman (2007) goes further and argues that not only does capitalism draw its life blood from the relentless process of asset stripping, but it produces ‘the acute crisis of the ‘‘human waste’’ disposal industry, as each new outpost conquered by capitalist markets adds new thousands or millions to the mass of men and women already deprived of their lands, workshops, and communal safety nets’ (p. 28). The upshot of such policies is that larger segments of the population are now struggling under the burden of massive debts, unemployment, lack of adequate health care, and a brooding sense of hopelessness. What is unique about this type of neoliberal market fundamentalism is not merely the antidemocratic notion that the market should be the guide for all human actions, but also the sheer hatred for any form of sovereignty in which the government could promote the general welfare. As Thom Hartmann (2005) points out, governance under the regime of neoliberalism has given way to punishment as one of the central features of politics. He describes the policies endorsed by neoliberals as follows: Government should punish, they agree, but it should never nurture, protect, or defend individuals. Nurturing and protecting, they suggest, is the more appropriate role of religious institutions, private charities, families, and perhaps most important corporations. Let the corporations handle your old-age pension. Let the corporations decide how much protection we and our environment need from their toxins. Let the corporations decide what we’re paid. Let the corporations decide what doctor we can see, when, and for what purpose But the punishing state does more than substitute charity and private aid for government backed social provisions, or criminalize a range of existing social problems; it also cultivates a culture of fear and suspicion towards all those others immigrants, refugees, Muslims, youth, minorities of class and color, and the elderly who in the absence of dense social networks and social supports fall prey to unprecedented levels of displaced resentment from the media, public scorn for their vulnerability, and increased criminalization because they are both considered dangerous and unfit for integration into American society. Coupled with this rewriting of the obligations of sovereign state power and the transfer of sovereignty to the market is a widely endorsed assumption that regardless of the suffering, misery, and problems faced by human beings, they ultimately are not only responsible for their fate but are reduced to relying on their own sense of survival. There is more at stake here than the vengeful return of an older colonial fantasy that regarded the natives as less than human, or the emerging figure of the disposable worker as a prototypical figure of the neoliberal order though the histories of racist exclusion inform the withdrawal of moral and ethical concerns from these populations. 10 There is also the unleashing of a powerfully regressive symbolic and corporeal violence against all those individuals and groups who have been ‘othered’ because their very presence undermines the engines of wealth and inequality that drive the neoliberal dreams of consumption, power, and profitability. What is distinct about these complex registers of sovereignty is the emergence of a fundamentally new mode of politics in which state power not only takes on a different register but in many ways has been modified by the sovereignty of the market. While the state still has the power of the law to reduce individuals to impoverishment and to strip them of civic rights, due process, and civil liberties, neoliberalism increasingly wields its own form of sovereignty through the invisible hand of the market, which now has the power to produce new configurations of control, regulate social health, and alter human life in new and profound ways. This shift in sovereignty, power, and the political order points to the importance of biopolitics as an attempt to think through not only how politics uses power to mediate the convergence of life and death, but also how sovereign power proliferates those conditions in which individuals marginalized by race, class, and gender configurations are ‘stripped of political significance and exposed to murderous violence’ (Ziarek, 2008, p. 90).

## Engagements with technology lead to a more controlling influence it has over the Other – the more we use it the more dependent we grow. There is no longer a bifurcation of nature because we are no longer a part of nature

Hershock, 1999

(Peter D., Project Fellow at the EastWest Center, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Hawaii, "Changing the Way Society Changes: Transposing Social Activism into a Dramatic Key", Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6, p 158-160, http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.pdf) cnb

I have argued at some length (Hershock, 1999) that evaluating technologies on the basis of the tools they generate commits us to taking individual users and not the dramatic patterns of our lived interdependence as the primary locus of evaluation. In doing so, we effectively exclude from consideration precisely that domain in which the values informing our technological bias have the most direct bearing on the quality of our personal and communal conduct — the movement of our shared narration. This has led to a stubborn and at times even righteous blindness regarding our slippage into a new era of colonization--a colonization, not of lands or cultural spheres, but of consciousness as such. Indeed, the disposition to ignore the critical space of interdependence has been so thoroughly prevalent that the conditions of possibility for this new form of colonialism are widely championed--in both the "developed" and the "developing" world--as essential to establishing and safeguarding our individual and collective dignity, a crucial component of our growing equality and autonomy.

By using the same information technologies employed by those individuals and institutions perpetrating and perpetuating the inequitable distribution of power and wealth, social activists may have enjoyed the opportunity to “beat them at their own game.” However, they have also insured that everyone remains on the same playing field, playing the same game. Social activist successes have in this way blinded us to our deepening submission to technologies of control and the consequent depletion of precisely those attentive resources needed to meaningfully accord with our changing circumstances and contribute to them as needed.

The costs of such blindness are practically limitless. The more “successful” a technology is, the more indispensable it becomes. That is, all technologies are liable to crossing thresholds beyond which they generate more new problems than they solve. Because technologies arise as patterns of value-driven conduct, they function as ambient amplifiers of our individual and cultural karma — our experience-conditioning, intentional activity. In crossing the threshold of their utility, technologies create the karmic equivalent of a gravitational black hole, funneling all available attention-energy into themselves. For the dominant technological lineage correlated with the rise of liberal democracy and the imperative for social activism, this has meant an intensification of our karma for both controlling and being controlled. The more successfully we extend the limits of control, the more we extend the range of what can and must be controlled. In capsule form: the better we get at getting what we want, the better we get at wanting; but the better we get at wanting, the better we get at getting what we want, though we won’t want what we get. This karmic circularity is pernicious, and the attention-energy invested in it to date has already brought about an epidemic depletion of precisely those resources needed for realizing dramatically satisfying — and not merely factually sufficient — solutions to our troubles, both personal and communal.

The methodological irony of social activism is that it does not free us from dependence, but rather sustains its very possibility. This is not as paradoxical as it might sound. Insuring our independence by means of restructuring the institutions that mediate our contact with one another renders us dependent on those institutions — on the structure, and hence the technologies, of our mediation. In consequence, our freedom comes to be increasingly dependent on the rationalization and regulation of our relationships with one another — the realization of secure and yet generic co-existence. Just as the technology-driven transformation of societies in the industrial and post-industrial eras has involved an ever more detailed refinement of class divisions and labor categories, social activism advances through an ever more varied identification of populations in need of guaranteed freedoms.

In valorizing both autonomy and equality, social activism denies our dramatic interdependence and tacitly endorses not-seeing (avidyà) or not-attending to the full set of conditions sponsoring our present situation. Although unique and deeply local patterns of injustice may be important in building a legal case, the work of social activism is not to encourage our liberating intimacy with such patterns. Rather, it consists of constructing legal mechanisms for exerting reformative control over institutional structures and the processes by means of which (generically) given individuals play or are forced to play particular roles

therein.

Unfortunately, as generic ‘women’, ‘children’, ‘workers’, or ‘minorities ‘, the beneficiaries of social activism are effectively cut off from precisely those aspects of their circumstances, relationships, and self-understanding which provide them with the resources necessary for locally realizing meaningful — and not merely factual — alternatives to the patterns of injustice in which they find themselves embedded. Among the products of social activism are thus virtual communities of individuals having no immediate and dramatically responsive relationship with one another — individuals who have relinquished or been deprived of intimate connection with the causes and conditions of both their troubles and those troubles’ meaningful resolution.

With no intended disregard of the passion many activists bring to their work, social activism has aimed at globally re-engineering our political, economic and societal environments in much the same way that our dominant technological lineage has been committed to re-making our world — progressively “humanizing” and “rationalizing” the abundantly capricious natural circumstances into which we human beings have found ourselves “thrown.” This shared strategic genealogy is particularly disturbing, suggesting that — like all technologies oriented toward control — social activism is liable to rendering itself indispensable. If the history of social activism is inseparable from the rise and spread of influential technologies and subject to similar accelerating and retarding conditions, so is its future.

While it has become common practice to decry the excessive legalism of contemporary societies, the ramifications of strategic collusion between social activism and the way we have technically and legally tooled our factual co-existence have remained largely unattended. In part, this is because the legal bias of social activism has appeared so incontestably “practical. “ Legislation allows for directly restructuring power relations and negotiating justice at the “highest” possible levels. The legislative process has also become the dominant technology for mediating divergent claims about the facts of our (often troubled) co-existence and for preserving “fair” definitions of ‘being right’ and ‘being wronged’.

**Queers are considered futureless; they are a group of sexual nihilists who stand in the way of securing a bright and hopeful future. Death becomes intimately tied to queerness while life becomes identified with heterosexuality. This accommodation ensures that the structure of heteronormativity stays in place, requiring the maintenance of other queer and stigmatized people.**

**Schotten 09** (C. Heike, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Boston, Nietzsche’s Revolution: Decadence,

Politics, and Sexuality, p. 202-3, CW, accessed on 2/27/11)

What I wonder, instead, is if Lee Edelman offers us one possible way of inaugurating this post revolutionary temporality, a temporality of revo­lutionary desire that lacks *both* a "revolutionary mechanism" the pro­hibition on its gratification. Indeed, in a discordantly Marcusian echo, Edelmans revolution is *all about* gratification. Edelman has recently and provocatively argued that there is indeed no future for queer politics, but this is because politics itself is what designates feminists and queers (and anyone else radically outside the social order) as futureless. Defined as abor­tionists and nonreproductive sexual nihilists, the positioning of feminists and queers as culture’s utterly self-indulgent, sex-obsessed death drive in fact functions to secure the health, happiness, and adult normality of heterosexually reproducing humanity. Edelman argues that this relationship between death and life, futurelessness and futurity, is secured ideologically and iconographically through the image of the Child, that embodiment of all futurity and hope.109 Although, in the end, Edelman really only considers white gay men (i.e., "homosexuals") as this deathly threat,110 we can easily and consistently add to his list, insofar as "queer" in his usage indicates anyone who does not abide by the rules of social temporality or sacrifices the future for the sake of the present (rather than vice versa).111 "Queer," then, names a broad array of misfits and perverts along the lines of Cathy Cohens promised coalition of "Punks, Bull-Daggers and Wel­fare Queens,"112 including within its purview the "inherently criminal," the *uncontrollably* reproductive (e.g., immigrants, Cadillac-driving wel­fare queens), or—as Jasbir Puar has recently argued—Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Africans cast by Islamophobia and homonationalism alike as terrorist threats, all of whom function as ominous harbingers of the death of all futurity and social well-being.113 Edelman recognizes that the very resistance made possible by politics is only what remains within its terms. He also recognizes that politics offers marriage and children—and, it must be added, citizenship and upward mobility—as the enticement for perpetuating this logic of abjec­tion. Mainstream U.S. progressive politics has largely fallen prey to this seduction, taking the bait of futurity in its proliferation of gay marriage, gay adoption, gay patriotism, gay priesthood, gays in the military, gay veterans, gay victims of 9/11, and gay police officers. As Puar argues, this political visibility has gone hand-in-hand with the infinite detention of perverse terrorist bodies,114 the routine incarceration and disenfran-chisement of people of color, in particular African-American men; the elimination of welfare "as we know it"; the linking of U.S. foreign aid and international AIDS funding to marriage-promotion initiatives and absti­nence programs,115 and Islamophobia. This tandem development illus­trates the way in which the logic of no future can deftly accommodate the "homosexual" at the price of foisting off culture's death drive onto some other, stigmatized, "futureless" population, an illustration that bolster's Edelmans argument rather than undermines it

**Futurism necessitates the elimination of the queer in hopes of reaching perfection**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis, Lacanian Psychoanalyst, Lacan and the Political, p. 99-101, Questia, CW, accessed on 2/26/11)

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modem universalism—a universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground ofapre-modem aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of Utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural *milieu* entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies.- Today, talk about Utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, Utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: "Utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being9 (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Bemeri's book *Journey through Utopia,* warn—taking into account experiences like the Second World War—of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being 'how can we realise our Utopias?9, the crucial question has become 'how can we prevent their final realisation?.... [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free9 (Berdiaev in Bemeri, 1971:3 09) - It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of Utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the Utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of Utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Let's start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of Utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of Utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for Utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it 'all Utopias strive to negate the negative.. .in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of Utopia necessary9 (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More's *Utopia* (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his Utopian community 'Harmony9 and that the name of the Owenite Utopian community in the New World was 'New Harmony9. As Marin has put it, Utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the Utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of Utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every Utopian fantasy construction needs a 'scapegoat9 in order to constitute itself—the Nazi Utopian fantasy and the production of the 'Jew9 is a good example, especially as pointed out in Zizek analysis.- Every Utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in Utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of Utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of Utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all Utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if Utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name Utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is 'driven out through the door comes back through the window9 (is not this a 'precursor9 of Lacan's *dictum* that 'what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real9?—VII: 131)." The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modem anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this Utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on *The Formations of the Unconscious,* Lacan identified the Utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958).

**Life becomes a hollow shell under futurism as it is only important interms of its place in the future.**

**Edelman 04** (Lee, Prof @ Tuffman University, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, P. 47-9, CW, accessed on 2/27/11)

The death drive as which the queer fig­ures, then, refuses the calcification of form that is reproductive futurism, since the Lacanian death drive, as Zizek observes, "is precisely the ulti­mate Freudian name for the dimension traditional metaphysics desig­nated as that of immortality—for a drive, a 'thrust,' which persists beyond the (biological) cycle of generation and corruption, beyond the 'way of all flesh.' In other words, in the death drive, the concept 'dead' functions in exactly the same way as 'heimlich' in the Freudian unheimlich, as coincid­ing with its negation: the 'death drive' designates the dimension of what horror fiction calls the 'undead,' a strange, immortal, indestructible life that persists beyond death."27 Such immortality pertains to what the Symbolic constitutively fore­closes: not reality, not the subject, not the future, not the Child, but the substance of jouissance itself, the Lacanian lamella, on which the sinthomosexual lives and against which social organization wields the weapon of futurity to keep the place of life empty—merely a hollow, inanimate form—the better to sustain the fantasy of its endurance in time to come. The death drive's "immortality," then, refers to a persis­tent negation that offers assurance of nothing at all: neither identity, nor survival, nor any promise of a future. Instead, it insists both on and as the impossibility of Symbolic closure, the absence of any Other to affirm the Symbolic order's truth, and hence the illusory status of meaning as defense against the self-negating substance of jouissance. Make no mistake, then: Tiny Tim survives at our expense in a culture that always sustains itself on the threat that he might die. And we, the sinthomosexuals who, however often we try to assert that we're "more" than what we do with our genitals, are nonetheless convicted from the outset of stealing his childhood, endangering his welfare, and, ulti­mately, destroying his life, must respond by insisting that Tiny Tim is always already dead, mortified into a fetish animated only by the collec­tive fantasy wherein he doesn't rise up and ask in reproach, "Father, don't you see I'm burning?"28 Because there isn't now, and never has been, much doubt about who killed him, because his death can always be traced to the sinthomosexual's jouissance, why not acknowledge our kinship at last with the Scrooge who, unregenerate, refuses the social imperative to grasp futurity in the form of the Child, for the sake of whom, as the token of accession to Imaginary wholeness, everything else in the world, by force if needed, must give way?

## Science fiction defines human in opposition what is a monster, an animal – this emphasizes the idea that our ability to escape from our bodies into the realm of thought is the affirmation of our humanity

## Ramirez, assistant professor at the Department of American Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, 04

Catherine, March 18, 2004, ““She Did Not Own Herself Any Longer” Slavery and the Promise of Humanism in Octavia E. Butler’s Science Fiction”, “Stitch and Split. Selves and Territories in Science Fiction”, Universidad Internacional de Andalucía-UNIA, 1/5/12, atl]

Throughout the Parable novels, Butler repeatedly returns to the query prominent in much science fiction: Who (or what) is a human being? In Sower, human is defined in terms of its inverse: one is not human if one is a ‘monster’; if one derives pleasure from another’s suffering; and if one is an ‘animal’. Olamina describes her violent, selfish brother, Keith, as a monster. Moreover, she refers to “paints”, dangerous, pyromaniac junkies who shave and paint their entire bodies and kill for fun, as “people who aren’t human any more” After a gang of paints raids and destroys her neighborhood, she and two other survivors decide to head north. As they walk along California’s derelict highways, Olamina and her companions confront wild dogs, thieves, rapists, murderers, cannibals, and more paints. Because they are forced to steal or starve and must kill or be killed, one of her companions fears that they, too, will “turn into animals”. In Talents, Butler closely examines the relationship between humanity, “infrahumanity”, and slavery. The Crusaders who invade Acorn deny Olamina and other Earthseed followers their humanity by referring to them as “heathens” and “dogs”. As slaves, she and her companions are forced to wear electronic collars, which are also known as “dog collars” and “choke chains”. As long as the collars are activated, they are unable to escape from Camp Christian (“Get a certain distance from the control unit and the collar chokes you.”), to attack their masters, or to defend themselves or anyone else. Additionally, the slavers can and do use the collars to sick slaves on one another. Olamina’s brother, Marc, warns that a collar “makes you turn traitor against your kind, against your freedom, against yourself”. Finally, the collars are used to torture and execute their wearers. After she is brutally electronically ‘lashed’ for attempting to kill one of her captors, Olamina suffers from temporary amnesia and is transformed into “a zombie for several days”. She is shocked and dismayed when she realizes the power the slavers have over her: “I knew that strangers could appear and steal or destroy everything and everyone I loved. People and possessions could be snatched away. But somehow, it had not occurred to me that…bits of my own mind could be snatched away too”. Throughout Talents, Butler stresses that slavery involves both physical and psychic domination of another. Olamina compares the wearing of a collar to hyperempathy, “except that instead of sharing what other people feel, the wearer feels whatever the person holding the control unit wants him to feel…After a while, needing the pleasure, fearing the pain, and always being desperate to please the master could become a person’s whole life”. In addition, she witnesses a few Earthseed followers convert to Christianity. Some do so to appease their captors; Olamina herself poses as a Christian in order to protect herself. However, others slowly and truly reject their beliefs and values in favor of those of their masters. As an act of self-preservation, Olamina manages to write in her journal on Sundays, the day that the Crusaders leave her and the other slaves alone. She finds that writing provides her with a necessary sense of interiority and privacy: “My writing is a way for me to remind myself that I am human, that God is Change, and that I will escape this place”. In short, it reminds her of who and what she is, of her beliefs and values, and of her hope for the future. Above all, writing reminds Olamina that, even though her body, will, and memories can be stolen from her, she is still human. At first glance, Talents seems to define “human” in terms of the cerebral and in opposition to the carnal. Although Olamina has lost ownership of her body, she is human because she still has her mind. She is unable to escape from Camp Christian, but she is able to escape to the realm of thought, at least one day per week. In other words, Olamina thinks, therefore, she is. However, upon further investigation, one finds that she is human not so much because she thinks, but because she feels. Indeed, the Parable novels define human in terms of empathy. Empathy, the identification with or vicarious experiencing of another’s feelings, thoughts, or attitudes, is precisely what makes one human. **That is**, the ability to step outside of oneself – rather than self alone – defines “human”. Olamina’s hyperempathy makes her painfully human and prevents her from becoming a “monster” or “animal”. In Butler’s nightmarish twenty-first century, slavers use the electronic collars not only to control their slaves’ bodies, but to rob them of that which makes them human: the ability to empathize. As the Parable series illustrates, Butler’s definition of “human” differs greatly from some Enlightenment-era definitions. First, Butler’s human is not the subject of reason exclusively. Instead, Butler’s human thinks and feels. Nor is Butler’s human a closed, autonomous actor. Rather, Butler defines self in relation to others, rather than in and of itself. She does so through her exploration of empathy and her emphasis on community, both of which erase boundaries between individuals. In all of her novels, not just the Parable series, Butler’s protagonists must learn to forge new communities. In Sower, for example, after her parents and siblings are murdered and her home is destroyed, Olamina gathers people around her, most of whom have lost loved ones to slavery and/or murder, and realizes, “In spite of your loss and pain, you aren’t alone. You still have people who care about you and want you to be all right. You still have family”. Likewise, in Talents, Olamina once again builds a new family after the Crusaders demolish Acorn, kill her husband, and kidnap Larkin, her infant daughter. Even though she is reunited with her brother, Marc (who she thought was dead in Sower), and, ultimately, with her adult daughter, Olamina continues to define community in terms of affinity, rather than essence. As Larkin bitterly observes, “All Earthseed was her family. We never were, Uncle Marc and I”. In contrast, Larkin and Marc define family exclusively in terms of ‘blood’. Marc invites his niece to live with him because, as he tells her, “[Y]ou’re family – the only family I have”.

## Speciesism makes possible “systematic beastilization” which justifies non-criminal putting to death of the other – turns the aff

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(Manuela, “To the Dogs: Companion speciesism and the new feminist materialism”, text and image Volume 3, September, <http://intertheory.org/rossini>, ldg)

What is equally sobering, however, is the fact that the most radical metaposthumanists (and the humanities more broadly) do not quite manage to make an epistemological break with liberal humanism, insofar as their writing is also marked by an unquestioned “speciesism”; i.e., in the definition of ethicist Peter Singer who popularised the term three decades ago in his book Animal Liberation, “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.”[17] Both postcolonial, feminist and queer theories and discussion of subjectivity, identity, and difference as well as the claims on the right to freedom by new social movements have recourse to an Enlightenment concept of the subject whose conditio sine qua non is the absolute control of that subject over the life of nonhuman others/objects. The rhetorical strategy of radically separating non-white, non-male and non-heterosexual human beings from animals in order to have the subject status of these members of the human species recognised was and is successful and also legitimate – given that the racist, sexist and homophobic discourse of animality or an animalistic „nature“ has hitherto served to exclude most individuals of those groups of people from many privileges – but the speciesist logic of the dominance of human animals over nonhuman animals has remained in place. If we fight racism and (hetero)sexism because we declare discrimination on the basis of specific and identifiable characteristics – such as “black“, “woman” or “lesbian“ to be wrong and unjust, then we should also vehemently oppose the exploitation, imprisoning, killing and eating of nonhuman animals on the basis of their species identity. Moreover, if our research and teaching as cultural critics endeavours to do justice to the diversity of human experience and life styles and feel responsible towards marginalised others, should we then not seriously think about Cary Wolfe’s question „how must our work itself change when the other to which it tries to do justice is no longer human?“[18] Wolfe is not making a claim for animal rights here – at least not primarily. This is also why his book puns on “rites/rights“: Animal Rites is the intervention of the anti-speciesist cultural critic who scrutinizes the rituals that human beings form around the figures of animals, including the literary and cinematic enactments of cannibalism, monstrosity and normativity. Wolfe subsumes all of these stagings under the heading the discourse of species, with “discourse“ understood in the sense of Michel Foucault as not only a rhetoric but above all as the condition for the production and ordering of meaning and knowledge in institutions like medicine, the law, the church, the family or universities. In addition, Wolfe wants to sharpen our awareness that a speciesist metaphysics has also a deadly impact on human animals, especially because speciesism is grounded in the juridical state apparatus: “the full transcendence of the ‘human‘ requires the sacrifice of the ‘animal‘ and the animalistic, which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy in which we engage in what Derrida [calls] a ‚non-criminal putting to death‘ of other humans as well by marking them as animal.“[19] The dog lies buried in the singular: “The animal – what a word!”, Derrida exclaims: “[t]he animal is a word, it is an appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and authority to give to another living creature [à l'autre vivant].” [20] In order to problematise this naming, Derrida has created the neologism l'animot: I would like to have the plural of animals heard in the singular. […] We have to envisage the existence of ‘living creatures’ whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply opposed to humanity. […] The suffix mot in l’animot should bring us back to the word […]. It opens onto the referential experience of the thing as such, as what it is in its being, and therefore to the reference point by means of which one has always sought to draw the limit, the unique and indivisible limit held to separate man from animal. As I propose in what follows, this clearly defined caesura of the „anthropological machine”,[21] which according to Giorgio Agamben was already set in motion by the old Greeks and the messianic thinkers and then accelerated by scientific taxonomies and the birth of anthropology, can be bridged with the help of a zoontological approach and companion speciesism. Posthumanist zoontologies The desperate cry of the historical person Joseph Carey Merrick (in the movie The Elephant Man of 1980), “I am not an animal! I am a human being! I...am...a man!” – for recognition of his human identity through which he claims his right to social integration and personal integrity, is very understandable and hurts. But his words nevertheless reflect the poverty of the humanist stance, insofar as traditional humanism can only secure the “proper” essence of humanitas via a rigid separation from animalitas. If one reads the reports by the victims and witnesses of the tortures in the military prison of Abu Ghraib, it seems to me that it is precisely the continued insistence and reinforcement of the animal-human boundary that legitimises the committed atrocities: Some of the things they did was make me sit down like a dog, … and … bark like a dog and they were laughing at me … One of the police was telling me to crawl … A few days before [this], … the guy who wears glasses, he put red woman's underwear over my head … pissing on me and laughing on me … he put a part of his stick … inside my ass … she was playing with my dick … And they were taking pictures of me during all these instances. … [Another prisoner] was forced to insert a finger into his anus and lick it. He was also forced to lick and chew a shoe. … He was then told to insert his finger in his nose during questioning … his other arm in the air. The Arab interpreter told him he looked like an elephant. [They were] given badges with the letter ‘C’ on it.[22] The US soldiers reduce their prisoners to their corporeal being, to animal being, and then make fun of this “bare life“[23] Instead of accepting their own vulnerability and mortality that they share with their victims as well as with other living beings, the torturers use the “systematic bestialization“[24] of the prisoners to strengthen their own sense of freedom and autonomy and to concomitantly withdraw the right to protection guaranteed by the humanitarian rights of the Geneva Conventions; after all, as barking dogs, crawling insects and ‘elephant men’, these ‘creatures’ cannot respond to the name, the word, the interpellation “human.“ The implicit and explicit analogies between racism, sexism, homophobia that accompany the above description of the torture methods, confirm that the power of the “discourse of species” to affect human others depends on the prior acceptance of the institution “speciesism;” i.e. on taking for granted that the inflicting of pain and the killing of nonhuman animals by human animals does not constitute a criminal act but, on the contrary, is legal. This is why Derrida speaks of the “carnophallogocentrism“[25] of Western metaphysics. And here Wolfe’s argument comes full circle: [Since] the humanist discourse of species will always be available for use by some humans against other humans as well, to countenance violence against the social other of whatever species – or gender, or race, or class, or sexual difference. . . we need to understand that the ethical and philosophical urgency of confronting the institution of speciesism and crafting a posthumanist theory of the subject has nothing to do with whether you like animals. We all, human and nonhuman alike, have a stake in the discourse and institution of speciesism; it is by no means limited to its overwhelmingly direct and disproportionate effects on animals.[26]