# 1

## Financial incentives are grants or loans—government purchases and tax credits are distinct.

**Czinkota et al., Georgetown Business professor, 2009**

(Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, pg 69, ldg)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. Fiscal incentives are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. Financial incentives offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. Nonfinancial incentives include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

## B. Violation: plan uses a government procurement to purchase military SMRs

## Vote Negative:

## 1. Limits - Broad definitions could include 40 different mechanisms

**Moran, Center for Global Development non-resident fellow, 1986**

(Theodore, Investing in Development: New Roles for Private Capital?, pg 29, ldg)

Guisinger finds that if “incentives” are broadly defined to include tariffs and trade controls along with tax holidays, subsidized loans, cash grants, and other fiscal measures, they comprise more than forty separate kinds of measures. Moreover, the author emphasizes, the value of an incentive package is just one of several means that governments use to lure foreign investors. Other methods—for example, promotional activities (advertising, representative offices) and subsidized government services—also influence investors’ location decisions. The author points out that empirical research so far has been unable to distinguish the relative importance of fundamental economic factors and of government policies in decisions concerning the location of foreign investment—let alone to determine the effectiveness of individual government instruments.

## 2. Ground – They do not spend federal money, this eliminates key ground on spending, politics, and trade-off debates – it also allows them to have highly specific evidence about their mechanism – they acquire additional solvency.

# 2

## Debt ceiling compromise likely now but Obama has to maintain the political upper hand to avoid economic collapse.

**Klein, Washington Post politics writer, 1-2-13**

(Ezra, “The lessons of the fiscal cliff”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/the-lessons-of-the-fiscal-cliff/?wprss=rss_ezra-klein>, DOA: 1-4-13, ldg)

There is a narrative in American politics that goes something like this: The White House can’t negotiate. House Republicans can’t be reasoned with. And so the country is caught between pragmatists who can’t hold their ground and radicals who can’t compromise. **The last few days complicate those narratives.** The White House didn’t hold firm on their promise to let the Bush tax cuts expire for all income over $250,000. They agreed to a $450,000 threshold instead. But at the same time, they pocketed more than $600 billion in revenue, $30 billion in extended unemployment benefits and five years of stimulus tax credits without giving up any real spending cuts. Speaker John Boehner, negotiating on behalf of House Republicans, rejected the White House’s offers for a bigger deal that included big spending cuts and watched his “plan B” die on the House floor. But, with the support of many of his members, he ended up shepherding the McConnell-Biden package towards final passage. Republicans realized they couldn’t be blamed for pushing the country over the cliff. The question of who “won” the fiscal cliff won’t be answered till we know what happens when Congress reaches the debt ceiling. The White House says that there’ll be no negotiations over the debt ceiling, and that if Republicans want further spending cuts, their only chance is to hand over more tax revenue. If they’re right and they do manage to enforce a 1:1 ratio of tax hikes to spending cuts in the next deal, they’re going to look like geniuses. Republicans swear they are crazy enough to push the country into default, and they promise that the White House isn’t strong enough to stand by and let it happen. If they’re right, and the White House agrees to big spending cuts absent significant tax increases in order to avert default, then Republicans will have held taxes far lower than anyone thought possible. But both Republicans and Democrats can’t be right. If we take the lessons of this negotiation, here’s what will happen: The White House will negotiate over the debt ceiling. They’ll say they’re not negotiating over the debt ceiling, and in the end, they may well refuse to be held hostage over the debt ceiling, but the debt ceiling will be part of the pressure Republicans use to force the next deal. The White House fears default, and in the end, they always negotiate. That said, the Republicans aren’t quite as crazy as they’d like the Democrats to believe. They were scared to take the country over the fiscal cliff. They’re going to be terrified to force the country into default, as the economic consequences would be calamitous. They know they need to offer the White House a deal that the White House can actually take — or at least a deal that, if the White House doesn’t take it, doesn’t lead to Republicans shouldering the blame for crashing the global economy. That deal will have to include taxes, though the tax increases could come through reform rather than higher rates. The Republicans also have a problem the White House doesn’t: The public broadly believes they’re less reasonable and willing to negotiate than the Democrats are. The White House has a reputation for, if anything, being too quick to fold. They have more room to avoid blame for a default than the Republicans do. In the end, if the White House holds its ground, Republicans will likely compromi**se** — though only after the White House has done quite a bit of compromising, too. The final moments of the fiscal cliff offered evidence that both sides see how this is going to go. In his remarks tonight, President Obama signaled he would hold firm on the debt ceiling. “While I will negotiate over many things, I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills they’ve already racked up through the laws they have passed,” he said. And Boehner signaled that he knows tax reform will have to be part of the next deal. The post-deal press release his office sent out had the headline, “2013 Must Be About Cutting Spending and Reforming the Tax Code.” That said, the final days of the fiscal cliff, in which the deal almost broke apart a half-dozen times for a hal-dozen reasons, is a reminder that these tense, deadline negotiations can easily go awry. And so there’s a third possibility, too: That the White House is wrong about the Republicans will compromise, that the Republicans are wrong that the White House will fold, and so we really will breach the debt ceiling, unleashing economic havoc.

## Top of the docket and PC is key

**Feehery, Quinn Gillespie and Associates government affairs director, 1-2-13**

(John, “The Clock”, <http://www.thefeeherytheory.com/2013/01/02/the-clock/>, DOA: 1-4-13, ldg)

The small tax agreement passed by the House last night makes it harder for Obama to do other things with his time in the White House. That is the inevitable truth that seems lost on conservatives who opposed a deal to make permanent 98% of the Bush tax cuts. Mitch McConnell is a master at clock management, and as minority leader, his job is to make it as hard as possible for the President to enact his left-wing agenda. As I wrote yesterday, McConnell was the master strategist who decided that the Congress would deal first with taxes and then with spending. Conservative leaders (well, the ones most desperate to raise money attacking Republicans) are professionally apoplectic. They can’t believe that Republicans didn’t get any spending cuts included in this deal, after they torpedoed John Boehner’s plan which included massive spending cuts and popular tax provisions. But Plan C wasn’t designed to include spending cuts, you blithering idiots. That comes later, in the fight over the debt limit. The President has already declared that the debt limit is off the table, but of course, we all know that **he is posturing. Nothing is off the table**, and the fact of the matter is that Republicans need to come up with substantial spending cuts if they are to gain the respect of their political base. After the fight on the debt limit will come a fight on sequester. After the fight on the sequester will come a fight on the 2013 Appropriations bills. All of these fights will take the time and attention of the President himself. All of these fights will take political capital and energy and promises. By focusing on the budget issues, Republicans make it harder for the President to focus on other things, like immigration and gun control, and whatever crazy left-wing agenda items he might want to add to the list. Imagine if last night, the grand bargain came together, and Republicans and Democrats cleared up everything in one vote. The President wouldn’t have high-fived the Speaker and said, “my job is done here.” He would have moved on to gun control. He can’t do that now. Now he has to talk exclusively about the debt limit. He has to burn up political capital on an issue that dove-tails quite nicely with out-of-control spending. The clock is running out on the Obama White House, and the more time we talk about fiscal issues, the less time he has to get his left-wing agenda through the Congress.

**DOD alternative energy investment draws Congressional opposition-empirics**

**Wilder, Clean Edge contributing editor, 12**

(Clint, Clean Edge, a research and strategy firm in the San Francisco Bay Area and Portland, Oregon, "On Clean Energy, the Military's Biggest Fight is with Congress," 8-30-12, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/08/on-clean-energy-the-militarys-biggest-fight-is-with-congress, accessed 11-3-12, mtf)

The Pentagon has ambitious goals to reduce fossil-fuel use in both combat operations and on bases; the Navy and Air Force, for example, both aim to get half their fuel from non-petroleum sources by 2020. And with good reason: fuel convoys to supply infantry in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven to be one of the most vulnerable aspects in the war theater. In an all-too-common example on July 18, a bomb planted by the Taliban destroyed 22 NATO tanker trucks in northern Afghanistan. This occurred in the same week as the Navy’s Great Green Fleet exercises occurred in Hawaii, showcasing a better way. **But now, in Congress, a great deal of this may be in jeopardy**. In various hearings over the past few months, **Senators** James Inhofe (R-Okla.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) and U.S. Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.), among others, **have opposed the military’s biofuels usage because of high costs**. I’m skeptical that other aspects of defense spending are receiving the same fiscal scrutiny–these members of Congress are in the same party whose presumptive presidential nominee Mitt Romney is on record stating, “I will not cut the military budget.” The Congressional opponents argue that today’s next-generation biofuels, from algae, waste streams, and other feedstocks, are significantly more expensive than fossil fuels, and that is certainly true. But **they also argue that it’s not the Pentagon’s role to pay a premium to help bring new tech**nologies **to commercial scale that would bring costs down**, and that argument conveniently ignores, oh, about 150 years of U.S. military history. As Navy Secretary Ray Mabus often says, “Since the 1850s, the Navy has moved from sail power to coal to oil to nuclear. And every time we changed, plenty of people said the new energy source was too expensive, too hard, and too unproven. But every time, we made a better Navy.”

## Global economic crisis causes another nuclear war

**Merlini, Center on the United States and Europe nonresident senior fellow, 2011**

(Cesare, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, 53.2, ebsco, ldg)

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for **peace and democracy** similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the **unlimited exercise of national sovereignty,** exclusive **self-interest** and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, **empty**ing, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of **multilateralism**, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as **unbridled nationalism.**

# 3

## Nuclear production locks in production-ism through obsession with finance, competitiveness and technological solutions

**Maciejewska et al., Wroclaw Sociology and Faculty of Social Sciences institute, 2011**

(Malgorzata, “Lack of power or lack of democracy: the case of the projected nuclear power plant in Poland”, Economic and Environmental Studies, 11.3, project muse, ldg)

The mainstream discourse on nuclear power rarely takes up the question of how the global energy industry is organized. In the modern economy the production of energy around the world, which is supposed to be a kind of public good and to guarantee sustainable development, is planned and arranged under free market conditions. As a part of the global chain of extraction, production and trading, it is subordinated to the neoliberal logic on terms of which the society and economy is governed as a business enterprise with the logic of maximum interest and minimum loss. This imposes on different actors (from the international corporations to individual households) the discipline of competitiveness and profitability, resulting in the growth of existing inequalities as ‘the invisible hand’ of the free market economy legitimizes those subjects which are already in power. The modern global economy is based on irrational production and social inequalities where one can observe the processes of work intensification and the cheapening of labor. The markets are dominated by the unproductive virtual economy (See Peterson, 2002) where the major players are the financial institutions which, by means of sophisticated financial tools, buy and sell virtual products (currencies, stocks, insurances, debts and its derivatives). In effect, the major actors in the capitalist economy are the international investors who have the capability of financial liquidity, and operate with those sophisticated financial tools on the global stock market. Even when they lose those capacities because of indebtedness, the states and international organizations seem often to be willing to repair the damage by transferring the taxes paid by citizens. (This is actually happening now, during the financial crisis, when southern and western European countries are subjected to shock therapy under which governments introduce austerity measures.) The praxis of nuclear power producers and the discourse which legitimizes it is therefore reduced to one goal – increasing financial revenues. The Polish plan to build the atomic power plant seems to be another element of the competitiveness strategy. In the authorities’ mind set it could put Poland into the position of more a competitive, more dynamic economy, as expected by the European Union and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. The welfare of Poland’s or Niger’s society does not fit into that picture. The nuclear establishment does not take into account the most important aspect of sustainable development: the overall reduction of energy consumption and therefore of energy production. Such a policy could bring a wide range of profits to the societies, the ecosystem, as well as the economy. On the contrary, the increase of power production and power use is one of the core concepts of pro-atomic discourse. This dogmatic belief draws the ideological line indicated at the beginning: the question of energy use and the ideas for solving this problem are seen only as a matter of technological challenges and the amount of financial and material means which have to be invested in them, but not as an effort to re-organize and restructure the modern economy.

## Unmitigated market competition makes extinction inevitable and turns case

**Wise et al., Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas development studies professor, 2010**

 Raúl, “Reframing the debate on migration, development and human rights: fundamental elements”, October, [www.migracionydesarrollo.org](http://www.migracionydesarrollo.org), DOA: 10-13-12, ldg)

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, a general crisis centered in the United States affected the global capitalist system on several levels (Márquez, 2009 and 2010). The consequences have been varied: Financial. The overflowing of financial capital leads to speculative bubbles that affect the socioeconomic framework and result in global economic depressions. Speculative bubbles involve the bidding up of market prices of such commodities as real estate or electronic innovations far beyond their real value, leading inevitable to a subsequent slump (Foster and Magdof, 2009; Bello, 2006). Overproduction. Overproduction crises emerge when the surplus capital in the global economy is not channeled into production processes due to a fall in profit margins and a slump in effective demand, the latter mainly a consequence of wage containment across all sectors of the population (Bello, 2006). Environmental. Environmental degradation, climate change and a predatory approach to natural resources contribute to the destruction of the latter, along with a fundamental undermining of the material bases for production and human reproduction (Fola- dori and Pierri, 2005; Hinkelammert and Mora, 2008). Social. Growing social inequalities, the dismantling of the welfare state and dwindling means of subsistence accentuate problems such as poverty, unemployment, violence, insecurity and labor precariousness, increasing the pressure to emigrate (Harvey, 2007; Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006). The crisis raises questions about the prevailing model of globalization and, in a deeper sense, the systemic global order, which currently undermines our main sources of wealth—labor and nature—and overexploits them to the extent that civilization itself is at risk. The responses to the crisis by the governments of developed countries and international agencies promoting globalization have been short-sighted and exclusivist. Instead of addressing the root causes of the crisis, they have implemented limited strategies that seek to rescue financial and manufacturing corporations facing bankruptcy. In addition, government policies of labor flexibilization and fiscal adjustment have affected the living and working conditions of most of the population. These measures are desperate attempts to prolong the privileges of ruling elites at the risk of imminent and increasingly severe crises. In these conditions, migrants have been made into scapegoats, leading to repressive anti- immigrant legislation and policies (Massey and Sánchez, 2006). A significant number of jobs have been lost while the conditions of remaining jobs deteriorate and deportations increase. Migrants’ living standards have drastically deteriorated but, contrary to expectations, there have been neither massive return flows nor a collapse in remittances, though there is evidence that migrant worker flows have indeed diminished.

## The alternative is to embrace commons instead of enclosures

## Discourse of the commons solves-creates space to challenge neoliberalism

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2003**

(Massimo, “Reflections on alternatives, commons and communities”, Winter, <http://www.commoner.org.uk/deangelis06.pdf>, DOA: 7-2-12, ldg)

This movement has posed the question of a plurality of “alternatives” to the social processes and arrangements that produce the horrors of modern global capital. In order to take the many calls for and practices of alternatives seriously, we have to make them relevant to the real people at the fringe or outside the movement. In other words, we want to move from movement to society not so much by persuading people to “join” our movement, but through a language and a political practice that by tracing the connections between diverse practices attempts to dissolve the distinctions between inside and outside the movement, i.e., actually moves ‘from movement to society’. To make the possibility of a new world that contains many worlds an actuality, we have to be able to shape our own discourse in such a way as to echo the needs and aspirations coming from below. We have to give coherence to their plurality, without imposing a model or reiterating dead ideologies. We need a discourse that helps to articulate the many alternatives that spring out of the points of crises of neoliberal capital, which seriously threaten to dispossess people of their livelihood and impose on them new or more intensified commodified patterns of life. We need a discourse that builds on the plurality of the many concrete struggles and their methods and help us to articulate a vision – not a plan – of the whole. Then we can better evaluate what are the global implications of our local struggles, as well as the local implications of global struggles for the building of a world that contains many worlds. But most of all, we need a discourse that recognizes the power we have to shape alternatives, at every level in society, that sets out from the simple fact that, contrarily to common belief, alternatives do exist, are everywhere and plural. To clarify, I think that every social node, that is every individual or network of individuals is a bearer of alternatives. This is evident not only when struggles erupt in any of the waged or unwaged local and trans-local nodes of social production. We just need to look around in the relative normality of daily routines to see that every social node “knows” of different ways to do things within its life-world and sphere of action longs for a different space in which things can be done in different ways. Each social node expresses needs and aspirations that are the basis of alternatives. For example: the alternative to working 10 hours a day is working 6; the alternative to poverty is access to the means of existence; the alternative to indignity is dignity; the alternative to building that dam and uprooting communities is not building that dam and leaving communities where they are; the alternative to tomatoes going rotten while transported on the back of an old woman for 20 miles is not GM tomatoes that do not rot, but access to land near home, or a home, or a road and a truck. Since every social node is aware of a spectrum of alternatives, the problem is simply how to make these alternatives actual? What resources are needed? How to coordinate alternatives in such a way that they are not pitted against each other as is the case of the competitive markets’ understanding of alternatives? How to solve the many existing problems without relying on the alienating coordinating mechanism of the market and creating instead social relations of mutual enrichment, dignity, and respect? These are I believe the bottom line questions on which a new political discourse must be based. Once we acknowledge the existence of the galaxy of alternatives as they emerge from concrete needs and aspirations, we can ground today’s new political discourse in the thinking and practice of the actualization and the coordination of alternatives, so as each social node and each individual within it has the power to decide and take control over their lives. It is this actualization and this coordination that rescues existing alternatives from the cloud of their invisibility, because alternatives, as with any human product, are social products, and they need to be recognized and validated socially. Our political projects must push their way through beyond the existing forms of coordination, beyond the visible fist of the state, beyond the invisible hand of competitive markets, and beyond the hard realities of their interconnections that express themselves in today forms of neoliberal governance, promoting cooperation through competition and community through disempowerment. As I will argue, this new political discourse is based on the project of defending and extending the space of commons, at the same time building and strengthening communities through the social fields.

# Case

# Solvency

## SMRs are too costly – stunts industry growth

**Daryan Energy, 2012**

(January 3rd, 2012. “Part 10 – Small modular reactors and mass production options”, http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-10-smallreactors-mass-prod/, 8/30/12, atl)

So there are a host of practical factors in favour smaller reactors. But what’s the down side? Firstly, economies of scale. With a small reactor, we have all the excess baggage that comes with each power station, all the fixed costs and a much smaller pay-off. As I noted earlier, even thought many smaller reactors are a lot safer than large LWR’s (even a small LWR is somewhat safer!) you would still need to put them under a containment dome. It’s this process of concrete pouring that is often a bottle neck in nuclear reactor construction. We could get around the problem by clustering reactors together, i.e putting 2 or 4 reactors not only on the same site but under the same containment dome. The one downside here is that if one reactor has a problem, it will likely spread to its neighbours. How much of a showstopper this fact is depends on which type of reactors we are discussing.¶ A proposed modular reactor design with four 250 MWth reactors within the same containment building working a shared pair of turbines to produce 500 MWe¶ Also, in the shorter term small reactors would be slower to build, especially many of those we’ve been discussing, given that they are often made out of non-standard materials. Only a few facilities in the world could build them as the entire nuclear manufacturing industry is currently geared towards large LWR’s. Turning that juggernaut around would take decades. So by opting for small reactors while we’d get safer more flexible reactors, we be paying for it, as these reactors would be slower to build (initially anyway) and probably more expensive too.

## The DOD is modernizing to focus on Asia now --- budget cuts threaten to undermine the pivot

**Chaffin, National Bureau of Asian Research intern, 2012**

(Greg, “An Interview with Thomas G. Mahnken”, 7-30, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=265>, DOA: 9-27-12, ldg)

The current debate over U.S. defense spending and calls to cut the U.S. defense budget undercut the Obama administration’s announced pivot to or rebalancing toward Asia. This was apparent in reactions in the region to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. The rise of China and Chinese military modernization, combined with constraints on the U.S. defense budget, mean that in coming years the United States is likely to face an increase in both the operational risk to its forces and the strategic risk to U.S. interests. It will take greater effort to protect our historic interests in the region. Failure to adjust the structure and posture of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific threatens to open up a widening gap between our capabilities and commitments. However, if complacency in the face of growing threats would be unwarranted, so too would be despair. There is no need to accept a narrower conception of the American role in the world. The United States has it in its power to field forces that will safeguard U.S. interests at an acceptable level of risk. What is required first and foremost is the political will to explain not just the costs but also the benefits of a vigorous U.S. role in Asia, to seek adequate funding for an enhanced U.S. presence in the region, and to work with U.S. allies and friends to make that posture a reality.

[Note-Thomas Mahnken, currently Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College]

## DOD purchasing inflates the cost of energy—cause tradeoffs with key capabilities undermining the military and independently takes out solvency- makes prices not competitive

**Spencer, Heritage Economic Policy Studies nuclear energy research fellow, 2011**

(Jack, “Capability, Not Politics, Should Drive DOD Energy Research” 6-22, [www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/capability-not-politics-should-drive-dod-energy-research](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/capability-not-politics-should-drive-dod-energy-research), DOA: 9-26-12, ldg)

Do not establish long-term contracts based on price floors. Many purveyors of expensive energy want the Pentagon to engage in long term contracts with energy suppliers that set price floors.This has two negative impacts. First, it would cost the military more to fuel its operations. Setting price floors signals to the market that certain fuel producers do not have to compete. Second, prices would never fall below the floor even if production costs allow for lower pricing or superior alternatives exist at lower prices. The Pentagon is a massive fuel consumer that can help fuel suppliers make substantial profits. But fuel suppliers should have to compete for the Pentagon’s business. Long-term contracts should be used to guarantee that the Pentagon has the supplies it needs, not to provide a guaranteed market for expensive fuel producers. Establish a capabilities-based determination on the best way to ensure secure domestic base energy supplies. An over-reliance on the U.S. electricity grid is emerging as a concern for some military planners. An attack on the civilian grid could leave domestic military bases without power. While this fear may be legitimate, by itself it does not justify alternative energy investments. End renewable energy mandates. According to Section 2911(e) of Title 10 of the United States Code, the DOD is obligated to generate 25 percent of its electricity using renewable sources by 2025. This mandate should be ended immediately. Such mandates will cause the Pentagon to expend an increasing amount of its resources on renewable energy rather than on increasing capability. Plus, mandates undermine the incentive for renewable energy producers to provide competitively priced products, thus actually impeding the ultimate availability of oil alternatives. Do not mandate more expensive alternatives to oil. Oil products may be expensive, but they are the least expensive option currently available. Forcing the military to purchase more expensive alternatives would leave fewer resources for training, modernization, and recapitalization, resulting is a less capable military.

## Pivot is key to contain China`s rise and prevent Asian instability.

**Colby, Center for Naval Analyses research analyst, 2011**

(Elbridge, “Why the U.S. Needs its Liberal Empire,” 8-10, <http://thediplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needs-its-liberal-empire>, DOA: 9-27-12, ldg)

 But, in part due to poor decision-making in Washington, this system is under strain, particularly in East Asia, where the security situation has become tenser even as the region continues to become the centre of the global economy. A nuclear North Korea’s violent behaviour threatens South Korea and Japan, as well as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyang’s development of a road mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, moreover, brings into sight the day when North Korea could threaten the United States itself with nuclear attack, a prospect that will further imperil stability in the region. More broadly, the rise of China – and especially its rapid and opaque military build-up – combined with its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes is troubling to the United States and its allies and partners across the region. Particularly relevant to the US military presence in the western Pacific is the development of Beijing’s anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines, torpedoes, and other assets. While Beijing remains a constructive contributor on a range of matters, these capabilities will give China the growing power to deny the United States the ability to operate effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to undermine the US-guaranteed security substructure that has defined littoral East Asia since World War II. Even if China says today it won’t exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrow or the next day will bring? Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific in response to future Chinese force improvements must be coupled with efforts to engage Beijing as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrained military posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. In short, the United States must increase its involvement in East Asia rather than decrease it. Simply maintaining the military balance in the western Pacific will, however, involve substantial investments to improve US capabilities. It will also require augmented contributions to the common defence by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under the US security umbrella. This won’t be cheap, for these requirements can’t be met simply by incremental additions to the existing posture, but will have to include advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and other expensive high-tech capabilities. Yet such efforts are vital, for East Asia represents the economic future, and its strategic developments will determine which country or countries set the international rules that shape that economic future. Conversely, US interventions in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in south-eastern Europe have been driven by far more ambitious and aspirational conceptions of the national interest, encompassing the proposition that failing or illiberally governed peripheral states can contribute to an instability that nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether this proposition is true, the effort is rightly seen by the new political tide not to be worth the benefits gained. Moreover, the United States can scale (and has scaled) back nation-building plans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interests in ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing terrorism. The lesson to be drawn from recent years is not, then, that the United States should scale back or shun overseas commitments as such, but rather that we must be more discriminating in making and acting upon them. A total US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led structure, leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos or dominance by others who could not be counted on to look out for US interests. We need to focus on making the right interventions, not forswearing them completely. In practice, this means a more substantial focus on East Asia and the serious security challenges there, and less emphasis on the Middle East.

## Licensing and public opinion prevent investment

**Fahring, Texas Law School JD, 2011**

(TL, “Nuclear Uncertainty: A Look at the Uncertainties of a U.S. Nuclear Renaissance”, 41 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 279, lexis, ldg)

V. Potential Problems with the Combined Government Measures to Promote New Nuclear Construction In 2007, a developer filed with the NRC the first application for a new reactor in nearly thirty years. n263 To date, the NRC has received eighteen COL applications for twenty-eight reactors. n264 The NRC has granted four ESPs and four Standard Design Certifications. n265 Applicants have filed seventeen applications for a Standard Design Certification. n266 The DOE has another seven Standard Design Certifications under review. n267 This recent spate of licensing activity after so long a dry-spell arguably owes much to the measures the United States has taken as of late to promote new nuclear [\*303] development. To the extent that these applications have been filed, these measures have been a success. But this initial success does not necessarily ensure that new nuclear construction will take place: In announcing the new reactor license applications ... utilities have made clear that they are not committed to actually building the reactors, even if the licenses are approved. Large uncertainties about nuclear plant construction costs still remain ... All those problems helped cause the long cessation of U.S. reactor orders and will need to be addressed before financing for new multibillion-dollar nuclear power plants is likely to be obtained. n268 A number of obstacles, thus, still might stand in the way of new nuclear construction in the United States. A. Developers Have Not Followed the Ideal Sequence in the NRC's Streamlined Licensing Process First, developers have failed to follow the ideal steps of the NRC's streamlined licensing process. n269 NRC Commissioner Gregory Jaczko explains: The idea was that utilities could get a plant design completed and certified and a site reviewed first ... They could then submit an application that simply references an already certified design and an approved early site permit. But almost no one is following that ideal process. Instead, we are once again doing everything in parallel ... n270 Developers also are delaying review of their applications. n271 They have put four of the seventeen COL applications filed with the NRC on hold. n272 They also have yet to complete the seventeen applications for designs filed with the NRC and are continuing to revise the four designs under review. n273 A possible explanation for the problems with the streamlined licensing process is that much of 2005 EPACT provides incentives only for the first few developers to proceed with new nuclear construction. In particular, the production tax credits, as construed by the IRS, were available only for the first 6,000 megawatts of additional nameplate capacity filed through COL applications with the NRC. n274 All COL applications that the NRC has received were filed after IRS Notice 2006-40, which provided this guidance. n275 "The deadline for automatic eligibility for the tax credit appears to [have provided] a strong incentive for nuclear plant applicants to file with the NRC by [\*304] the end of 2008 ..." n276 Given this incentive, developers might have filed quickly and with incomplete information, in the process failing to follow the NRC's ideal streamlined licensing sequence. n277 These problems with the licensing process could be detrimental to continued nuclear development. Defects in the licensing process led to cost overruns in the 1970s and 1980s, which dissuaded developers from undertaking any new nuclear construction for nearly thirty years. n278 Continued problems would constitute an input cost uncertainty to developers who have not yet filed applications, which might cause them to further delay new construction. B. The Reduction in Reactor Licensing Hearing Formality Might Cause a Public Backlash Second, insofar as the NRC's reduction in nuclear licensing hearing formality limits public participation in the licensing process, it could lead to a public backlash. "Public involvement has two basic functions: it permits the raising of issues that will improve the safety of nuclear power plants, and it enhances the transparency and level of confidence and trust that the public can have in nuclear regulation and decision-making." n279 Measures that limit public participation in the nuclear licensing process undermine both of these functions. n280 As noted in the overview of the history of U.S. nuclear construction above, nuclear construction has always been extremely sensitive to changes in public opinion. In 2009, a majority of the American public favored nuclear power. n281 However, only a minority of the public favored new nuclear construction in the area in which they live. n282 After the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan, U.S. public support for nuclear power fell sharply, with polls showing that many feared a major nuclear accident in this country. n283 Limiting public participation in the licensing process could decrease public support by undermining any trust that the public has in the regulatory system. This defect could lead to more litigation and a repeat of U.S. nuclear construction's nightmarish cost overruns of the 1970s and 1980s, thus increasing input cost uncertainty to developers. n284 [\*305] C. Costs for Nuclear Construction Still Might Rise Over Time Third, much of 2005 EPACT is animated by the belief that costs will be highest for the first few reactors to be built: as developers build subsequent units, costs will go down. n285 The history of U.S. nuclear development shows this assumption not necessarily to be the case. n286 Historically, costs of nuclear construction rose over time. Nothing indicates that the costs of nuclear construction will do otherwise now. n287 D. The Production Tax Credit Might Not Be Sufficient to Reduce Costs of Construction in a Reactor Series Fourth, even if conditions are such that costs will decrease over time, the production tax credits in 2005 EPACT might not be sufficient to reduce costs in a reactor series. n288 The credits go to those first reactors up to 6,000 megawatts in nameplate capacity filed with the NRC. n289 However, at the time of this note, the NRC has approved four standard design certifications. n290 Because each COL has a reactor with a nameplate capacity between 1,200-1,500 megawatts, at most only four to five reactors would be covered. n291 Therefore, only one or two reactors from each design certification would be built that would qualify for the credit. n292 Thus, this tax credit might not be enough to reduce costs through series production so that subsequent units would be economically viable without a tax credit. n293 Moreover, the production tax credit does not have any adjustment for inflation, which could decrease its benefits to the first new plant to come online. n294 Because the benefit of the production tax credit is uncertain, developers have less incentive to go through with new construction.

## SMR procurement sends a global signal of impending U.S. military aggression---causes resentment against U.S. unilateralism

**Smith, CSIS William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy research assistant, 2011**

(Terrence, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”, 2-16, <http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations>, DOA: 9-27-12, ldg)

The report repeatedly emphasizes the point that “DOD’s “’first mover’ pursuit of small reactors could have a profound influence on the development of the industry,” and cautions that “if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.” The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking. Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it (or have it), is what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today. It is a mentality I think we should avoid. I do not mean to say this report ignores the risks. In fact they explicitly say, “We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors.” For example it says, Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors. The report also points out that “from a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies of scale.” These issues, which were briefly mentioned, hardly seem like small potatoes. The reports answer to the issues raised: “making reliable projections about these reactors’ economic and technical performance while they are still on paper is a significant challenge,” and “Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple.” On the other hand, the report argues, “failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD.” “First, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries.” Yes these are important issue for a business stand, but I don’t find them to be the primary concern. The reactors are purely for energy purposes, but in a world that seems to be growing tired of U.S. military intervention, the idea of ensuring our ability to do so through the proliferation of mobile nuclear reactors will hardly quell any hostile sentiment. In addition, it can only add fire to the “nuclear = good” flame. So, while even under best case scenario, the reactors are completely proliferation proof and pose no direct threat to the nonproliferation cause (ignoring the spreading of nuclear tech and knowledge in general), I have a tough time seeing how it helps. The report concludes that the DoD “should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors.” Since the 1970s, the report says, “in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well.” For now, the plans for small nuclear reactors are “unfortunately,” for the most part, “caught between the drawing board and production.” My point is, maybe that is where they should stay.

## The U.S. is pursuing a grand strategy of multilateral legitimacy now---perception of a swing back toward unilateral military primacy collapses heg

**Fujimoto, US Army Lt. Colonel, 2012**

(Kevin, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct”, 1-11, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11>, DOA: 9-27-12, ldg)

The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to our national security. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and non-hegemonic, its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict that argument. With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the United States should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.11 Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate. Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous administration: “preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order. Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18 Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.20 Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.

## Plan results in utility companies credit downgrade-takes out solvency.

**Texas Institute, 11**

(“Impact of Nuclear Power Projects on Credit Ratings and Creditor Recoveries Following Default of Investor Owned Utilities Sponsoring Nuclear Projects”, Texas Institute Research Study, September 1, 2011, 8/16/12, atl)

A credit rating is a formal opinion given by a rating agency of the potential default risk faced by investing in a particular issue of debt securities. Moody's is one of the three general purpose nationally recognized statistical rating organizations in the U.S. (See Table 7 for Moody's definition of rating scale). The rating process begins when a rating agency receives a formal request from an entity planning to issue a bond. The request for a rating is made because without one, it would be difficult for the entity to market a bond issue to the public. Once a credit rating is assigned, the rating agency monitors the credit quality of the issuer and can reassign a different credit rating to the bond. An "upgrade" occurs when there is an improvement in the credit quality of an issue; a "downgrade" occurs then there is deterioration in the credit quality of an issue. A downgrade of an issue or issuer may increase the credit spread and result in a decline in the market price of the issuer's bonds. Conclusion From a credit perspective, the risks of building new nuclear plants are notable, entailing significantly higher operating risk, with very high capital costs, and vulnerability to potential shifts in energy policy. Historically, 69% nuclear power project sponsoring utilities suffered rating downgrades while building these facilities and 52% of the nuclear power sponsors received their lowest rating during the construction period. Technical Summary and Charts As shown in Exhibit 1, 69% of investor-owned utilities suffered rating downgrades while constructing nuclear power plants. Of 52 utilities that completed nuclear plants (operating and shutdown, but not including test sites) during their construction period, seven utilities received rating upgrades, nine utilities were unchanged and the other 36 suffered downgrades. The issuers on average fell 3 credit rating notches and the issuer with the greatest rating change, Long Island Lighting Company, fell 12 notches, from Aa2 in 1972 to B2 in 1984. All of these ratings were evaluated on Moody’s assigned issuer rating, which is the issuer’s senior long term debt rating using the update algorithm. We define a utility’s nuclear plant construction period as from the date a construction permit was issued to the date of commercial operation. We examined the data from 1960 to February 2011 and discovered that half (52%) of the nuclear power sponsors received their lowest rating during their nuclear plant construction period. The average length of time needed to build a nuclear power facility is 104.6 months, which is approximately 17% of the time period reviewed. There were 46 utilities that eventually canceled at least one of their planned nuclear reactors. Eight of those utilities canceled their only planned reactor. That is, these 8 utilities merely announced plans to build nuclear plants but did not receive a construction license to begin any nuclear plant construction. The credit rating trend for these 8 utilities is normal, although the small sample size prevents statistically meaningful conclusions. Historical data suggests that nuclear power announcements did not necessarily bring negative rating impact on sponsors, but the actual construction activities did increase ratings pressure on sponsors. This is consistent with the hypothesis that very large capital expenditures required for nuclear power plant construction combined with the uncertainty associated with the last nuclear plant construction cycle would materially increase the sponsor’s operating risk in the view of rating agencies (See rating criteria for rating agencies and banks in Table 5 of Appendix). A further specific examination on Moody's rating methodology of regulated electric utilities and unregulated electric utilities (Table 6 of Appendix) clearly illustrates that although nuclear power construction may enjoy some political and regulatory support, the issuer's rating would be seriously affected by a number of other factors, especially the financial metrics. The multi-billion size of the investments and sizeable sunk costs could undoubtedly introduce material financial distress for almost any issuer. These impacts could overcome regulatory support in the form of rate of return regulation and service area monopolies, as well as tax incentives and other financial support available as a result of the job creation and tax base expansion likely to result from new nuclear plant construction.

## Military personal don’t have the knowledge

**Parthemore et al., CNAS Bacevich Fellow, 2010**

(Christine, “Broadening Horizons: Climate Change and the U.S. Armed Forces”, April, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Broadening%20Horizons_Carmen%20Parthemore%20Rogers.pdf>, DOA: 9-23-12, ldg)

Many serious complications must be weighed as well. Military base personnel often do not have the necessary training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials. Nuclear reactors would necessitate additional qualified personnel and improved physical security requirements to meet the 24/7 operations needs. As with siting for all energy production, local public resistance could be problematic. When considering the impact of a reactor casualty, the resulting impact on the operational mission effectiveness of the tenant commands on the base must also be considered so as to avoid a single point vulnerability that disables all military operations on site. And while many private companies are touting new designs for small reactors that would work well in this capacity, the technology may still be years away from fully meeting technical requirements and federal regulatory standards.13 Proliferation considerations would also need to be part of any adjudication of what types of reactors are most suitable for these purposes.

## Multiple barriers to SMRs on military bases and risk theft overseas

**Andres, NWC national security strategy professor, 2011**

(Richard, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”, February, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20262%20Andres.pdf, DOA: 9-23-12, ldg)

Small reactors used on domestic military bases are likely to face a number of additional siting hurdles. As a distributed energy source, they are likely to face substantial “not-in-my-backyard” battles. Moreover, dispersing a large number of reactors leads to questions about longterm nuclear waste disposal.27 Arguably, reactors should be relatively safe on domestic military installations, certainly more secure than, for instance, the reactors situated in developing countries or intended for processing tar sands. Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple. Institutional and technical uncertainties—such as the security of sealed modules, the potential and unintended social and environmental consequences, or the design of reliable safeguards—make dispersing reactors across the country challenging. Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors, and determining whether Permissive Action Links technology could be used to safeguard them. Using the emerging technology at expeditionary locations carries far greater risks. Besides the concerns outlined above, forward located reactors could be subject to attack. Today, forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan are regularly subjected to mortar attacks, suggesting that reactors at such locations could make these bases prime targets for attack. Since forward bases are also subject to capture, any design proposal that envisions deployment at forward operating bases must incorporate contingency plans in the event that reactors fall into enemy hands.

# Heg

## 1. Grid is resilient and sustainable

**Clark, Chenega Federal Systems senior analyst, 2012**

(Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack”, 4-28, <http://americanmilitary.academia.edu/PaulClark/Papers/1600738/The_Risk_of_Disruption_or_Destruction_of_Critical_U.S._Infrastructure_by_an_Offensive_Cyber_Attack>, DOA: 9-26-12, ldg)

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred – trees shorted a power line and caused a fault – that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis 2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars, brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other catastrophic events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the fragility of the U.S. energy grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context of the robustness of the electrical grid. When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was unlikely to succeed because of the “huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult” (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the U.S. grid fails frequently. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always present. Power outages that affect more than 50,000 people have occurred steadily over the last 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev 2009). The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010). Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, the economy is affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like that caused by Hurricane Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis 2010). Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security challenge” (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

## 2. No risk of cyberattack and no impact

**Birch, former AP foreign correspondent, 10-1-12**

(Douglas, “Forget Revolution”, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget_revolution?page=full>, DOA: 10-12-12, ldg)

"That's a good example of what some kind of attacks would be like," he said. "You don't want to overestimate the risks. You don't want somebody to be able to do this whenever they felt like it, which is the situation now. But this is not the end of the world." The question of how seriously to take the threat of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure surfaced recently, after Congress rejected a White House measure to require businesses to adopt stringent­ new regulations to protect their computer networks from intrusions. The bill would have required industries to report cyber security breaches, toughen criminal penalties against hacking and granted legal immunity to companies cooperating with government investigations. Critics worried about regulatory overreach. But the potential cost to industry also seems to be a major factor in the bill's rejection. A January study by Bloomberg reported that banks, utilities, and phone carriers would have to increase their spending on cyber security by a factor of nine, to $45.3 billion a year, in order to protect themselves against 95 percent of cyber intrusions. Likewise, some of the bill's advocates suspect that in the aftermath of a truly successful cyber attack, the government would have to bail the utilities out anyway. Joe Weiss, a cyber security professional and an authority on industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid, argued that a well-prepared, sophisticated cyber attack could have far more serious consequences than this summer's blackouts. "The reason we are so concerned is that cyber could take out the grid for nine to 18 months," he said. "This isn't a one to five day outage. We're prepared for that. We can handle that." But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ­­-- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks because hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. But investigators typically come up with key suspects, if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in potential retaliation when planning their operations.

## Long-term generators and microgrids ensure DoD is resilient – Katrina proves no impact

Aimone, Business Enterprise Integration Director, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 12

(Michael, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, , Testimony Before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, 9-12-12, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf, accessed 12-21-12, ara)

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense 2 Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk. 1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has standby generators in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the generators are primed and ready to work, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery. Next Generation Microgrids Although the Department will continue to maintain its fleet of on-site and mobile backup generators, we are moving aggressively to adopt next generation microgrids. Advanced microgrids, combined with on-site energy generation (e.g., solar or geothermal) and energy storage, offer a more robust and cost effective approach to ensuring installation energy security than the current solution (backup generators). Although microgrid systems are in use today, they are relatively unsophisticated, with limited ability to integrate renewable and other distributed energy sources, little or no energy storage capability, uncontrolled load demands, and “dumb” distribution that is subject to excessive energy losses. By contrast, we envision advanced (or “smart”) microgrids as local power networks that can utilize distributed energy, manage local energy supply and demand, and operate seamlessly both in parallel to the grid and in “island” mode. Advanced microgrids are a “triple play” for DoD’s installations: First, they will facilitate the incorporation of renewable and other on-site energy generation. Second, they will reduce installation energy costs on a day-to-day basis by allowing for load balancing and demand response—i.e., the ability to curtail load or increase on-site generation in response to a request from the grid operator. Third, and most importantly, the combination of on-site energy and storage, together with the microgrid’s ability to manage local energy supply and demand, will allow an installation to shed non-essential loads and maintain mission-critical loads if and when the grid goes down.

## No impact to cyberterror – media exaggeration

**Valeriano and Maness, Foreign Affairs Contributors, 12**

(Brandon, Lecturer of Social and Political Sciences at University of Glasgow, and Ryan, PhD Candidate at University of Illinois, “The Fog of Cyberwar”, [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138443/brandon-valeriano-and-ryan-maness/the-fog-of-cyberwar?page=2#](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138443/brandon-valeriano-and-ryan-maness/the-fog-of-cyberwar?page=2), 11/21/2012, da: 12/17/2012, lmm)

The Stuxnet and Flame attacks, however, are not the danger signs that some have made them out to be. First of all, the viruses needed to be physically injected into Iranian networks, likely by U.S. or Israeli operatives, suggesting that the tactic still requires traditional intelligence and military operation methods. Second, Stuxnet derailed Iran’s nuclear program for only a short period, if at all. And Flame did nothing to slow Iran’s nuclear progression directly, because it seems to have been only a data-collection operation. Some cyberattacks over the past decade have briefly affected state strategic plans, but none has resulted in death or lasting damage. For example, the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia by Russia shut down networks and government websites and disrupted commerce for a few days, but things swiftly went back to normal. The majority of cyberattacks worldwide have been minor: easily corrected annoyances such as website defacements or basic data theft -- basically the least a state can do when challenged diplomatically. Our research shows that although warnings about cyberwarfare have become more severe, the actual magnitude and pace of attacks do not match popular perception. Only 20 of 124 active rivals -- defined as the most conflict-prone pairs of states in the system -- engaged in cyberconflict between 2001 and 2011. And there were only 95 total cyberattacks among these 20 rivals. The number of observed attacks pales in comparison to other ongoing threats: a state is 600 times more likely to be the target of a terrorist attack than a cyberattack. We used a severity score ranging from five, which is minimal damage, to one, where death occurs as a direct result from cyberwarfare. Of all 95 cyberattacks in our analysis, the highest score -- that of Stuxnet and Flame -- was only a three.

## Heg doesn’t solve war or conflict- empirically proven

**Mearsheimer**, University of Chicago political science professor, 20**11**

[John, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and member of the Advisory Council of The National Interest, The National Interest, "Imperial by Design," Jan/Feb, l/n, accessed 3-9-11, mss]

One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. **The U**nited **S**tates **has** also **been unable to solve** three other **major foreign-policy problems**. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

## No cyber “Pearl Harbor”

**Arquilla, Chairman of Defense Analysis Department, 12**

(John, “Panetta’s Wrong About a Cyber ‘Pearl Harbor’”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/19/panettas_wrong_about_a_cyber_pearl_harbor?page=0,0>, 11/19/2012, da: 12/17/2012, lmm)

 In December 1941, a great deal of American naval power was concentrated at Pearl Harbor and Japan dealt it a sharp blow, enabling Imperial forces to pursue their expansionist aims for a while. Of the eight U.S. Navy battleships that were there, four were sunk and the other four were seriously damaged. And if the Kido Butai, the Japanese carrier strike force, had caught the three American aircraft carriers deployed to the Pacific in port -- they were out to sea at the time of the attack -- or had blown up the base's massive fuel storage tanks, the damage would have been catastrophic. Pearl Harbor was a true "single point of failure." Nothing like this exists in cyberspace. Indeed, part of the logic behind the creation of the Internet, going back more than 40 years now, was to ensure continued communications even in the wake of a nuclear war. Redundancy and resilience are the key notions that shaped the structure of cyberspace. Yes, there are very important nodes here and there; but workarounds and fallbacks abound. yberspace is more like the oceans that cover two-thirds of the world: it has its choke points, but there are always alternate routes.

**US can’t deploy heg- internal division and paradox of action**

**Talmadge, Harvard International Review staff writer, 6**

(Caitlin, Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "The Restrained Hegemon," 5-6-06, Harvard International Review, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://hir.harvard.edu/intelligence/the-restrained-hegemon, accessed 3-17-11, mtf)

First, the domestic politics of the United States limit its international freedom of action. Although the president may have the world’s finest military at his command, he often **lacks the** combination of **public and congressional support he needs** to maximize its advantages. Foreign policy surveys show that US citizens remain casualty-averse unless vital US interests such as preventing terrorism seem to be at stake. And except for a brief period of bipartisanship after September 11, the notion of politics stopping at the water’s edge now seems as quaint and obsolete as Cold War air raid drills. **Internal divisions frequently prevent the U**nited States **from acting as quickly, decisively, or forcefully as its material resources would allow.** **This reality** **does not go unnoticed** by other nations: what seems like democratic debate to US citizens may appear to others as a lack of resolve or an opportunity for political manipulation, further complicating the execution of US foreign policy. Second, the complexity of international politics poses a serious challenge to the exercise of US power. Despite its military prowess, the United States remains fundamentally dependent on support from local allies when it operates abroad. The geographic position of a weak state may endow it with a powerful bargaining chip when the United States needs basing rights or access to airspace. This leverage requires diplomatic finesse and sensitivity to those foreign leaders’ own domestic constraints. Political skill turns out to be just as important as military strength—and, unfortunately for the United States, much more evenly distributed. Even relatively weak states can often exploit political cracks in the United States’ relationships with its allies, providing third parties with leverage over the United States despite their material inferiority. Third, even when the United States is capable of capturing an advantage by acting unilaterally, it often finds itself trapped in what Bruce Conin has called the “**paradox of hegemony**.” The United States certainly has the ability to act as a great power and pursue its short-term interest in a particular case: for example, by intervening in a foreign country to secure oil. **Actually doing so**, however, **would undermine its role as a hegemon** trying to lead the international system according to a set of rules (in this case, the UN Charter) which benefit its long-term interests and help legitimize its power. Moreover, in pursuing its short-term interest of securing oil, the hegemon would undermine its provision of the public good of law and order that helps other states tolerate the hegemon’s power. Other states might then begin to balance more actively against the hegemon, hastening its decline. To stave off this type of backlash, which would damage broader US interests, the United States often **imposes limits upon its own actions** or gives in to the demands of weaker states. In order to remain the sole superpower, the United States avoids acting like one.

## Zero risk of Korean conflict

**Rowland, Troy IR masters, 2010**

(Ashley, “Despite threats, war not likely in Korea, experts say”, 12-3, <http://www.stripes.com/news/despite-threats-war-not-likely-in-korea-experts-say-1.127344?localLinksEnabled=false>, DOA: 9-23-11, ldg)

Despite increasingly belligerent threats to respond swiftly and strongly to military attacks, analysts say there is one thing both North Korea and South Korea want to avoid: an escalation into war. The latest promise to retaliate with violence came Friday, when South Korea’s defense minister-to-be said during a confirmation hearing that he supports airstrikes against North Korea in the case of future provocations from the communist country. “In case the enemy attacks our territory and people again, we will thoroughly retaliate to ensure that the enemy cannot provoke again,” Kim Kwan-jin said, according to The Associated Press. The hearing was a formality because South Korea’s National Assembly does not have the power to reject South Korean president Lee Myung-bak’s appointment. Kim’s comments came 10 days after North Korea bombarded South Korea’s Yeonpyeong island near the maritime border, killing two marines and two civilians — the first North Korean attack against civilians since the Korean War. South Korea responded by firing 80 rounds, less than half of the 170 fired by North Korea. It was the second deadly provocation from the North this year. In March, a North Korean torpedo sank the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing 46 sailors, although North Korea has denied involvement in the incident. The South launched a series of military exercises, some with U.S. participation, intended to show its military strength following the attack. John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University in Seoul, said South Korea is using “textbook posturing” to deter another attack by emphasizing that it is tough and firm. But it’s hard to predict how the South would respond to another attack. The country usually errs on the side of restraint, he said. “I think they’re trying to send a very clear signal to North Korea: Don’t push us again,” Delury said. “For all of the criticism of the initial South Korean response that it was too weak, in the end I think people don’t want another hot conflict. I think the strategy is to rattle the sabers a bit to prevent another incident.” Meanwhile, Yonhap News reported Friday that North Korea recently added multiple-launch rockets that are capable of hitting Seoul, located about 31 miles from the border. The report was based on comments from an unnamed South Korean military source who said the North now has 5,200 multiple-launch rockets. A spokesman for South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff would not comment on the accuracy of the report because of the sensitivity of the information. Experts say it is a question of when — not if — North Korea will launch another attack. But those experts doubt the situation will escalate into full-scale war. “I think that it’s certainly possible, but I think that what North Korea wants, as well as South Korea, is to contain this,” said Bruce Bechtol, author of “Defiant Failed State: The North Korean Threat to International Security” and an associate professor of political science at Angelo State University in Texas. He said North Korea typically launches small, surprise attacks that can be contained — not ones that are likely to escalate. Delury said both Koreas want to avoid war, and North Korea’s leaders have a particular interest in avoiding conflict — they know the first people to be hit in a full-scale fight would be the elites KORUS Answers – Impact – A2: Alliance

# Water Wars

**No water wars- trade, treaties and virtual water solve**

**Shafer**, 200**9**

[Jack, "The Water-War Myth," Slate, http://www.slate.com/id/2215263/, accessed 10-14-10, mss]

The Water-War Myth

Attention foreign-desk editors and those in charge of the environmental beat: Before assigning any pieces about impending wars between countries battling over this essential, scarce resource, read Wendy Barnaby's essay in Nature, "Do Nations Go to War Over Water?" (paid). She writes: **Countries do not go to war over water, they solve their water shortages through trade and international agreements**. Barnaby discovered this enduring truth after being approached by a publisher to write a book about water wars. It seemed logical enough. If countries were prepared to fight over oil, which makes modern life possible, why not water, without which there would be no life? And it's not a fringe idea, she notes. NGO leaders, academics, and journalists have all predicted that water struggles will inevitably turn into shooting wars when countries can no longer cover the demands of agriculture, industry, and citizens for the resource. In this scenario, Canada is the Saudi Arabia of the water world, drawing immense power from its surplus—and in the process becoming the target of a military strike by less-liquid nations. Barnaby, the editor of the British Science Association magazine People & Science, started lining up sources for the book, but her thinking shifted after being introduced to the concept of "embedded" or "virtual" water. It takes an average of about 1,000 cubic meters of water to grow enough food to feed one person for one year. Arid nations that can't muster that amount for each person can navigate around water scarcity by importing food, which contains "virtual" water from the land where it was grown. Barnaby writes: Ten million people now live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. If they were to be self-sufficient in food, they would need ten billion cubic metres of water per year. As it is, they have only about one-third of that: enough to grow 15-20% of their food. They import the rest in the form of food. Water scarcity in the region results in "conflict and tension," Barnaby adds, but the Israeli and the Palestinian officials have successfully used a committee (controlled by the Israelis) to peacefully resolve problems. In other places where competition for water should theoretically escalate into violence, Barnaby finds similar resolution. Egypt has become more fluid in its relations with its water neighbors because it wants to improve the climate for trade. Similarly, India and Pakistan, which war with each other with the same frequency that other nations exchange sister cities, have so far used a World Bank-arbitrated treaty to make water peace. Barnaby wanted to revise the thesis for her water book, but her publisher pointed out that "predicting an absence of war over water would not sell" many copies. So she bagged the idea. Despite Barnaby's findings, other writers sense water wars in the making. The March 31 issue of The Nation includes a feature titled "Blue Gold: Have the Next Resource Wars Begun?" that cites a report (PDF) by the British nonprofit International Alert that names 46 countries "where water and climate stress could ignite violent conflict by 2025" and quotes U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as saying, "The consequences for humanity are grave. Water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict." Last month, a new U.N. water study about water scarcity warning of "a global water crisis … leading to political insecurity at various levels" prompted ominous coverage around the world (the Independent, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Bangkok Post, Bloomberg News, AFP, and elsewhere). None of my skepticism should imply that I think everybody everywhere has all the clean, cheap water they need. Water, like all resources, is scarce, and I accept that scarcity can cause conflict. But before anyone starts frightening themselves about impending water wars, they might want to consider Barnaby's observation that in the last five decades there have been no "formal declarations of war over water." Although Israel has fought wars with Egypt and Jordan, Barnaby notes, it has never fought one over water, and "more 'virtual' water flows into the Middle East each year embedded in grain than flows down the Nile to Egyptian farmers."

 [Matt note: Barnaby = Wendy Barnaby, the editor of the British Science Association magazine People & Science]

## Massive desalination expansion now

SBI Energy, 2011

(SBI Energy is a division of MarketResearch.com, publishes research reports in the industrial, energy, building/construction, and automotive/transportation markets, August 23, “Global Desalination Market will Grow 320.3% by 2020, Driven by Reverse Osmosis,” <http://www.sbireports.com/about/release.asp?id=2267>, d/a 1-6-13, ads)

Depleting water supplies, coupled with increasing water demand, are driving the global market for desalination technology, which is expected to reach $52.4 billion by 2020, up 320.3% from $12.5 billion in 2010. According to a recent report from energy research publisher SBI Energy, membrane technology reverse osmosis will see the largest growth, reaching $39.46 billion by 2020. The increasing world population, which is estimated to reach 7.52 billion by 2020, up from 6.85 billion in 2010, is depleting a limited fresh water supply with agricultural demands and urbanization leading to more water consumption per person across the globe. According to the report, industrialization is spreading advanced water extraction technology, which is quickly diminishing water resources. "Economic and population growth are the largest drivers for desalination technology," said Shelly Carr, publisher of SBI Energy. "The explosive growth of this market is due to a solution-based alternative to the diminishing supply of the world's most important resource." Desalination technology involves extracting salt and other unwanted minerals from saltwater or brackish water in order to produce fresh water. There are two types of technologies: thermal which relies on heat, and membrane which utilizes semi-permeable membranes to separate salt from seawater and brackish water. According to the report, the cost of desalination is highly influenced by the amount of energy consumed, causing energy efficient membrane technologies, specifically reverse osmosis, to be the most viable option. "The lower operating costs of membrane technologies, which include reverse osmosis, microfiltration, ultrafiltration and nanofiltration, make them a more attractive option," notes Carr. "This segment will grow significantly more than its thermal counterpart." SBI Energy's report, World Desalination Components and Technologies, provides segmented market data for desalination technologies, exhibiting where the growth will occur through 2020. It profiles fifteen major companies, examines major projects and positions of specific countries, and analyzes trends and growth drivers. It is available at:

## Desal can’t solve – too expensive to ship water to the places that need it most

**Increasing Population 2010**

(“Fresh Water”, 1-22, <http://increasingpopulation.blogspot.com/2010/01/fresh-water.html>, DOA: 10-13-12, ldg)

Fresh water can be obtained from salt water by desalination. For example, Malta derives two thirds of its freshwater by desalination. A number of nuclear powered desalination plants exist, and physicists agree that there are billions of years of nuclear fuel available. But the high costs of desalination, especially for poor countries, make impractical the transport of large amounts of desalinated seawater to interiors of large countries. The cost of desalinization varies; Israel is now desalinating water for a cost of 53 cents per cubic meter, Singapore at 49 cents per cubic meter. In the United States, the cost is 81 cents per cubic meter ($3.06 for 1,000 gallons). According to a 2004 study by Zhoua and Tolb, "one needs to lift the water by 2000 m, or transport it over more than 1600 km to get transport costs equal to the desalination costs. Desalinated water is expensive in places that are both somewhat far from the sea and somewhat high, such as Riyadh and Harare. In other places, the dominant cost is desalination, not transport. This leads to somewhat lower costs in places like Beijing, Bangkok, Zaragoza, Phoenix, and, of course, coastal cities like Tripoli." Thus while the study is generally positive about the technology for affluent areas that are proximate to oceans, it concludes that "Desalinated water may be a solution for some water-stress regions, but not for places that are poor, deep in the interior of a continent, or at high elevation. Unfortunately, that includes some of the places with biggest water problems." Another potential problem with desalination is the byproduction of saline brine, which can be a major cause of marine pollution when dumped back into the oceans at high temperatures."

## No India-Pakistan war – India has no preconditions for talks and the prime minister wants effective dialogue

Polgreen and Goodman, 2011

(Lydia and J. David, NY Times, "India and Pakistan Agree to Resume Talks Derailed by 2008 Terrorist Attacks," 2-11-11, lexis, accessed 3-19-11, mtf)

NEW DELHI -- India and Pakistan announced Thursday that they would resume peace talks that had been stalled since 2008, when Pakistani militants staged coordinated terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The agreement, announced by both governments, followed meetings on Sunday between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan. It appeared to set the stage for high-level, open-ended talks on a variety of contentious issues like counterterrorism and improving economic relations. The renewal of talks is likely to be welcomed by the United States, which has been eager to ease tensions between the two countries so that Pakistan can divert troops from its border with India to its frontier with Afghanistan and aid the American fight against Taliban insurgents. India had previously balked at restarting talks unless Pakistan demonstrated that it was cracking down on terrorist groups within its borders and aggressively prosecuting the planners of the Mumbai attacks, which left at least 163 people dead. But Thursday's announcement made no mention of those issues, leading analysts here to conclude that India decided it was better to engage Pakistan without preconditions. Indian hard-liners have argued that India must not begin talks with Pakistan unless the Pakistanis take visible steps against terrorist groups that threaten India. But others, including India's prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who was born before the partition of India in a part of Punjab that is now in Pakistan, have argued that avoiding dialogue is folly. ''I think the prime minister genuinely wants to give it a last shot,'' said Amitabh Mattoo, a professor of strategic affairs at Jawarharlal Nehru University. ''He has been able to convince the establishment that a policy of nonengagement has not delivered.'' As part of the agreement, Pakistan's foreign minister, Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, will visit India in July to review the progress of the discussions, which will include meetings focused on defusing tensions over the disputed border region of Kashmir. Each side holds a portion of Kashmir but claims the entire region, and Pakistan-based militants have waged an insurgency inside India aimed at breaking the province away. Pakistan was created when Britain partitioned colonial India in 1947, and the two countries have fought three wars since then, two of them over Kashmir. They have also clashed over water rights, trade and even a barren chunk of glacier high in the Himalayas. The talks are expected to address less contentious issues before moving on to Kashmir. The Pakistan-India peace talks were initiated in early 2004, after the armies of the nuclear-armed neighbors nearly went to war in 2001, but the talks were abruptly terminated in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. Secret talks in 2007 came close to resolving some of the most difficult issues, including the status of Kashmir. But they lapsed as the president of Pakistan at the time, Pervez Musharraf, lost his grip on power, and the attacks the following year plunged relations into their worst freeze since 2001. The Mumbai attackers belonged to a terrorist group whose main aim was to take over the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir.

## No war in the Middle East – stagnation is the most likely option

**Itar-Tass, Russian News Agency, 2010**

( “ No Big War In Mideast Due, But Instability To Last – Analyst”, 9-16, <http://www.biyokulule.com/view_content.php?articleid=3010>, 7-3-2011, jag)

In the near future a big war in the Middle East should not be expected, but the instability in the region will continue, the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Vitaly Naumkin told Itar-Tass following the VII Congress of Russia`s Orientalists, which closed on Thursday. On the final day of the congress Naumkin was elected president and organizer of the Russian Society of Orientalists. In response to a request from Itar-Tass to forecast developments in the Middle East in the near future, Naumkin said: “Today, the Middle East region is seething. The significance of the Middle East goes beyond regional issues. Thus, the issue of Muslim diasporas in Europe - it is a problem of Europe, of the European Union, and not of the Middle East.” As for the countries of the region proper, “there are lots of issues, firstly, those related with the demographic situation, the economic situation, and oil, and it is on this set of issues that their development depends.” “In the region there is a bundle of military and geostrategic problems. The crisis over Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” Naumkin said. “I do not see any immediate prospects for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I think the situation would be frozen in the best case, or there will be some temporary solutions, which will look like some movement forward, but they will not solve the problem completely.” “The most likely scenario for Iran is this. I believe that in the short term nothing will happen,” said the scholar. “The option that is on everybody`s tongue these days - a military action against Iran - will not materialize. As for Iran, it will keep quietly doing what is has done all the way - gradually normalizing relations with the West.” “If we talk about Afghanistan, some sort of stagnation is the most likely scenario there. But the question of Iraq is not clear to me,” said the expert. “On one hand, there are signs of serious improvement. I do not assume that nothing has been done there at all. I do believe in the potential of the Iraqi people. It can succeed in stabilizing the situation. Nevertheless, it remains very explosive, and I do not exclude the possibility that it may explode once again from within.” “With regard to Yemen, the complexity of the situation in that country is exaggerated. Yemen is far from turning into a “failed state”, Naumkin said. “The authorities are in control of the situation there.” “There has been much talk about Al-Qaeda in Yemen. But it has always been there, and nothing new has happened,” he believes. “The center of attention has been shifted there, and that`s all. Why? Because the Americans had hoped that they would be able to stabilize the situation there with heavy injections into training local security forces and by the direct intervention of its experts, who were supposed to solve the problems of security in the tribal areas. That did not happen, so there is a tendency to viewing Yemen as a “failed state” and to mounting powerful international pressure on it, including that by Arab countries.” “I think that Yemen will stand, the government there can stand, but it needs to solve the problem of curbing the violence. It`s kind of settled now, there is a truce, but for how long it may last is anyone`s guess. There remains a long-standing problem - the problem between the North and the South. But I hope that Yemen will be able to maintain its integrity. Although it must brace up for interference by regional players,” Naumkin predicts. “In Somalia, there is a completely hopeless situation,” he believes. “Somalia is a “failed state”, which has broken up into several entities. And by and large everyone, including the European Union and the African Union, just does not care. Somalia was not a hindrance to anyone. That had been so until just recently, when attacks by pirates began and there emerged a hotbed of radical Islamism,” he recalled. “From there support for radical groups may come. But that support is not very great. Nevertheless, it is a hotbed of the worst forms of extremism. As for piracy, it can be eliminated only by radically restructuring the country and achieving reconciliation of the warring clans. But how one can go about this business I just cannot imagine. So in the short term nothing will change in Somalia.” “On the whole, the region sees a certain period of stagnation with some explosive elements present at certain points,” says Naumkin. “A big war there is not going to happen, but instability in the region will persist, as well as hotbeds of tension. Some big changes may follow only when there occurs a change of leadership in some countries. The generational change is on. In particular it is very important, what will happen to Egypt. That is a key country in North Africa. Also it is very important to see what will be happening in Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries in the region.”