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### 1NC – T in the US

#### A. Definition-The United States includes the 50 states and D.C.

Dictionary.com

[http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united+states](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united%2Bstates)

United States

noun

a republic in the N Western Hemisphere comprising 48 conterminous states, the District of Columbia, and Alaska in North America, and Hawaii in the N Pacific. 267,954,767; conterminous United States, 3,022,387 sq. mi. (7,827,982 sq. km); with Alaska and Hawaii, 3,615,122 sq. mi. (9,363,166 sq. km). Capital: Washington, D.C. Abbreviation: U.S., US

### 1NC – T Procurement

#### A. Financial incentives exclude procurement

Menz, 5 **-** Faculty of Economics and Finance, School of Business, Clarkson University, Bertrand H. Snell Hall, Potsdam, NY, also from the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo (CICERO), Norway (Fredric, “Green electricity policies in the United States: case study,” Energy Policy, December, Science Direct) **Italics in original**

There is considerable variation among states in both their regulatory environments and the policies that have been implemented to promote green electricity. In the following discussion, state and local policy instruments are categorized as financial incentives, rules and regulations, and voluntary measures.[7](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0301421504001648#fn7)Financial incentives include various subsidies and/or funding in direct support of green electricity projects, tax incentives (credits, deductions, or exemptions), and provisions for zero-interest or low-interest loans. Rules and regulations include requirements that utilities distribute a minimum share of electricity from renewable or green energy sources, green power purchase requirements for government entities, and net-metering requirements for consumers with small renewable generating facilities. Voluntary measures include green power products aimed at electricity consumers, green power certificate programs, and other programs to increase market support for renewable energy technologies.

### 1NC – Obama DA

Immigration reform will pass – Obama’s political capital is key

CT Post 3/28 (“Immigration reform gaining support in Congress,” http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Immigration-reform-gaining-support-in-Congress-4393187.php)

A Republican Party in desperate search for relevance to Latino voters. An expanded Democratic advantage in the Senate. A second-term President with his legacy on the line. Does all that add up to enough to break decades of impasse and produce comprehensive immigration reform? As expectations -- and tensions -- rise, the answer won't be long in coming. A bipartisan bill could be filed in the Senate as early as next week, followed in relatively short order by a House bill, also crafted by a bipartisan group, aiming at a compromise on the key issue of citizenship. The efforts are being applauded by President Barack Obama, who is using every ounce of his political clout to try to get comprehensive reform. Obama said the time has come "to work up the political courage to do what's required to be done." "I expect a bill to be put forward. I expect a debate to begin next month. I want to sign that bill into law as soon as possible," Obama said at a White House naturalization ceremony. In addition to the issue of eventual citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants, Congress is expected to address the need for temporary or guest worker programs. Congress last passed comprehensive bipartisan reform legislation in 1986, when President Ronald Reagan signed a law that granted citizenship to several million undocumented immigrants and created a guest worker program. Up until now, Republicans have opposed citizenship programs as an "amnesty" for lawbreakers who entered the country illegally, and labor has chafed at guest worker programs. But Republican losses in the 2012 elections and increased public support for reform have many in the GOP talking compromise. "If there is one issue that the two parties could produce something meaningful on in this Congress, it would be immigration," said Stephen Hess, a political expert at The Brookings Institution. Hess said an eventual bill "will have lots of provisos, and it will go back and forth, but it would be hard not to produce something given the general feeling that something has to be produced." More and more Republicans are moving toward immigration-reform measures as the party seeks to reach out to Latinos, the nation's largest -- and growing -- minority voting bloc. Public opinion is behind them. A recent poll showed 63 percent of Americans supported a path to citizenship for undocumented workers provided they meet certain requirements, according to a survey by the Public Religion Research Institute. Notable Republicans who have recently spoken in favor of compromise on citizenship proposals include Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky.; former Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour; and Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis. And a March report by the National Republican Committee, considered a "post mortem" on the 2012 elections, recommended the GOP embrace comprehensive immigration reform to shore up its shaky standing with minorities -- Latinos, in particular. Roy Beck, executive director of Numbers USA, which advocates lower numerical numbers on immigration, predicted a majority of Republican senators would oppose citizenship. Groups like Numbers USA are working to hold GOP senators in line. They sent 13,000 emails to Kentucky voters that claimed Paul's position was "more radical and pro-immigration than anything proposed by President Obama." The group has targeted Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., one of the "Gang of Eight" senators writing the Senate bipartisan bill, as a lawmaker who favors foreign workers over unemployed South Carolinians. Democrats from conservative-leaning states could also feel political heat. Beck said if five to 10 Democrats in the Senate oppose a bill, proponents would need 10 to 15 Republicans to reach the 60 votes needed to cut off debate and vote on legislation. "You do the math," Beck said. In 2007, an effort to cut off debate on a Senate immigration reform bill died on a 46-53 vote. But immigrant reform proponents, such as America's Voice, say there is a "tectonic shift" in the GOP, and the Democrats also have expanded their Senate majority to 53-45, plus two independents who caucus with them. They predict the Senate will muster the votes necessary to pass a reform bill. Still, it won't be easy. "We will have not only a few potholes, but a few near-death experiences along the way," said Frank Sharry, America's Voice executive director. All eyes are on Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a Republican who like Paul was elected with Tea Party support. Cruz joined Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, who is up for re-election in 2014, in a measure to stall the fast-moving process in the Senate. Both say they oppose "amnesty." In a letter to Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., the Texas Republicans urged the chairman of the Judiciary Committee to open up the legislative process with hearings. The "Gang of Eight" senators -- four Democrats and four Republicans -- are expected to introduce their bill when Congress returns from Easter recess. Overall, the new Senate bill is expected to grant undocumented immigrants a path to citizenship within 13 years, similar to a proposal put forth by the White House, according to those familiar with the discussions. Undocumented immigrants would have to pay fines, back taxes, learn English and have no criminal record to work legally and become eligible for naturalization. Although no specific details have been released, senators involved in the process say the citizenship proposals would be contingent upon border-security benchmarks and high-tech measures to curb illegal crossings. Congress will return to an expected throng of thousands of immigrants, labor and immigrant rights supporters on the West Lawn of the Capitol next week. Advocates are also holding more than 200 events in 35 states during the congressional recess to rally support, said Sue Chinn, campaign manager for Alliance for Citizenship.

#### Plans unpopular

CNN 12 (“Military's plan for a "green" future has Congress seeing red” http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/08/militarys-plan-for-a-green-future-has-congress-seeing-red/)

The Defense Department has a grand vision for the U.S. military's energy future, including "green"-powered fleets, jets and trucks. But members of Congress are hung up on the dollar signs that come with going green. Language in the House and Senate versions of the defense budget largely bans the use of alternative energy like biofuels, prohibiting the military from purchasing any alternative fuel that costs more than traditional fossil fuels like oil. The catch: Biofuels are always more expensive than oil, about four times more. "To have the military, whose sole job is to defend this country, spending extra money simply on flying their airplanes with fuel that's available at a cheaper price, again on these restraints and the resource restraints that we find ourselves in, makes no sense to me," said Rep. Mike Conaway, R-Texas, who introduced the amendment. The Defense Department says it needs to invest in diversifying the sources of energy that fuel almost every piece of military equipment. The biofuels are considered a "drop-in fuel," meaning no changes to equipment engines are necessary. "As a major consumer, probably the world's single largest consumer, of liquid fuels, we have an interest in making sure we have fuels for the future as well," said Sharon E. Burke, assistant secretary of defense for operational energy plans and programs. "So we're opposed to any efforts that restrict our options in this area." It's been an Obama administration priority to decrease the U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The Defense Department sees energy independence as a national security objective. Since August 2009, the Defense Department has spent $42 million to purchase 1.1 million gallons of biofuels for testing purposes. "Many of those sources of which we are absolutely dependent are in volatile or potentially volatile places on Earth, and some of those oil suppliers probably don't have our best interests at heart," Navy Secretary Ray Mabus said at a Senate hearing. "We would never depend on those oil suppliers to build our ships, our aircraft, our ground equipment, but we give them a say in whether the ships sail, the aircraft fly or the ground vehicles operate, because we depend on them for fuel." Last year, the Navy spent $12 million for 450,000 gallons of biofuel, the largest purchase of biofuel ever in the U.S. The service, which has been a leading force behind the military's green initiatives, plans on using that fuel to power a carrier strike group during a two-day demonstration this summer. A green fleet will be ready for deployment in 2016. What the congressional restriction would do to those plans is unclear. Pentagon spokeswoman Lt. Col. Melinda Morgan said the Navy will move forward as planned but warned that if the provisions are enacted, "they could affect some of the Navy's biofuels goals and restrict DoD's ability to increase our resilience against potential supply disruptions and future price volatility of petroleum products." "The Great Green Fleet doesn't have an environmental agenda," Mabus said. "It's about maintaining America's military and economic leadership across the globe in the 21st century." Every time the price of a barrel of oil goes up by one dollar, it costs the military $130 million, according to the Pentagon. "When anyone says we can't afford to invest in developing alternative sources of energy, my reply is, we can't afford not to," he said. "We can't afford to wait until price shocks or supply shocks leave us no alternative." Mabus is not blind to the large price tag of $26 a gallon that comes with the green fuel but says simple economics can solve the issue. "Alternative fuels can't become competitive with oil unless there's demand for them," he said. "But demand at commercial scale will never be possible unless there's a supply to meet that demand." The Defense Department's purchase of small amounts of biofuel for research and development has dramatically reduced the price of biofuels, cutting the cost in half in two years, according to Mabus. And the Navy is investing $170 million in the production of advanced "drop-in" aviation and marine biofuels to kick-start the U.S. alternative energy sector. "It's really about investment today for pay off tomorrow," said clean energy advocate Phyllis Cuttino of Pew Charitable Trusts. "How much did the first pair of night vision goggles cost us? A lot more probably than they cost now." But Conaway says it's not the military's job to get an industry off the ground. "Is it the federal government's responsibility to start that industry? And I would argue that no, it is the private sector's out there, that's great at doing these kinds of things," Conaway said. "It's got to be, Southwest Airlines and American Airlines gotta be buying that fuel. And when that happens? Great. The Department of the Navy can buy it as well." With the amendment passing in both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Conaway expects the restriction to be a part of the final defense budget.

#### Reform is key to Indian relations

LA Times 11/9/12 [Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html]

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### Nuclear war

Schaffer 2 [Spring 2002, Teresita—Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, Lexis]

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

### 1NC – China DA

#### China is leading in nuclear power

Xinhuna 13 (“China building nuclear power plant with fourth-generation features,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/754006.shtml)

China has broken ground on a 3 billion-yuan ($476 million) nuclear power project that will be the first in the world to put a reactor with fourth-generation features into commercial use, a Chinese energy company said Sunday. It also marks China's latest move to speed up nuclear power development, which came to a halt after the Fukushima nuclear crisis in Japan in 2011. Construction of the project at Shidao Bay in the coastal city of Rongcheng, east China's Shandong Province, began last month, Xinhua learned from Huaneng Shandong Shidao Bay Nuclear Power Co., Ltd. (HSNPC), the builder and operator of the plant. With a designed capacity of 200 megawatts and "the characteristics of fourth-generation nuclear energy systems," the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor will start generating power by the end of 2017, the HSNPC said in a statement sent to Xinhua via email. Independently developed by China's Tsinghua University, the reactor has the features of "inherent safety" and "passive nuclear safety" in line with the fourth-generation concept, meaning it can shut down safely in the event of an emergency without causing a reactor core meltdown or massive leakage of radioactive material, according to the statement. The reactor can have an outlet temperature of 750 degrees Celsius, compared with 1,000 degrees Celsius that can be reached by the very-high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, an internationally-accepted fourth-generation reactor concept. It can also raise electricity generation efficiency to around 40 percent from the current 30-percent level of second- and third-generation reactors, said the statement. If it is commercially successful, the reactor's technology and equipment can be exported to other countries in the future, said an HSNPC public relations officer who declined to be named. "That will be a great boost to China's nuclear industry, as a very high percentage of the equipment is produced domestically instead of being imported," the official told Xinhua by telephone.

#### The plan commercializes nuclear power

Marqusee 12 Jeffrey, Executive director at the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program at the DOD, “Military Installations and Energy Technology Innovations”, Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, March, PDF online

Conclusion¶ DoD has been an enormous engine of innovation in America, driving the development of both defense technologies and, ultimately, very large sectors of commercial activity. In addition to its traditional focus on conventional military hardware, there is now great interest in applying those capabilities to energy innovation, an area of activity that can have enormous benefits both to the United States military and to the country as a whole. In thinking about this question, it is worth considering the two different (but complementary) models of innovation at DoD: the well-known Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) model, which has produced extraordinary technological breakthroughs (at great cost) that have allowed America to dominate the battlefield; and the more recent SERDP and ESTCP model, which focuses less on cost-insensitive breakthroughs and more on developing and demonstrating cost-effective technologies that can enhance the effectiveness of the overall fighting force. The SERDP and ESTCP’s test bed cost-consciousness and ability to work across the spectrum from basic to applied research and demonstration makes it uniquely effective at assisting innovative technologies across the Valley of Death and into commercial viability. While the extraordinary “leap-ahead” innovations of DARPA more easily capture the imagination, the ability of the ESTCP’s test bed program to improve the overall energy efficiency of the United States military—and the civilian economy—should not be overlooked. ESTCP offers both the military and the nation an effective approach that can leverage the large investments in energy technology developments at DOE and the private sector, and result in a real energy revolution.

#### That kills Chinese export markets

Ferguson 10—President of the Federation of American Scientists. Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and an Adjunct Lecturer in the National Security Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University. (Charles, Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: The Implications of Expanded Nuclear Energy in Asia, in Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose, Ed Tellis, Marble and Tanner, 146)

Although China began to develop commercial nuclear energy a decade or two after Japan and South Korea, Beijing is emulating the course charted by Tokyo and Seoul. If China achieves its ambitious goal of more than one hundred operating commercial reactors by 2030, it will likely become the state with the most nuclear power plants in the world unless a major surge in construction occurs in the United States. China may also emerge by then as a major supplier of nuclear technologies and may garner clients in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

That’s key to Chinese soft power

Blank-prof strategic studies institute, Army War College-6/16/10

China puts down marker in nuclear power race<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LF16Cb01.html>

Therefore, China's recent nuclear exports to Pakistan and the future of its nuclear exports in general need to be examined in these three contexts. The first context is that of the overall growth of the assertiveness of China's diplomacy in general and efforts to use nuclear power and military instruments like missiles as sources of influence abroad. In the case of exports to Pakistan, a second context is the long-standing geopolitical rivalry among India, China and Pakistan in which China's "all-weather" friendship with Pakistan has been a deliberate and conscious Chinese strategy to inhibit the growth of Indian power. Finally, we must keep in mind that China is not only an exporter of nuclear energy, it also is a consumer of that energy and so it will be a key market for other exports from the likes of Russia, the United States, France, South Korea, and Japan. As an importer, it obviously will welcome the rivalry of exporters who wish to sell to it so that it can obtain more favorable terms. However, as an exporter of nuclear energy and a power that wants to export more of it for both economic and political gain, it cannot afford to let either its rivals outpace it in Asia or in other areas that China deems as essential to the pursuit of its larger strategic goals.

#### Solves US/China Conflict

Shuli 13 (Hu Shuli is editor-in-chief of Caixin Media Company, editor-in-chief of the weekly magazine Century Weekly, executive editor-in-chief of the monthly journal China Reform and dean of the School of Communication and Design at Sun Yat-sen University. “A Sino-US relationship that competes on values,” http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1139455/sino-us-relationship-competes-values)

A new phase of Sino-American relations is poised to begin, now that Xi Jinping has been confirmed as China's next leader and Barack Obama re-elected US president. In both countries, the debate about foreign policy options has been robust, particularly on the bilateral relationship. This is the time to reflect on the past and look ahead to the future. The transfer of power has been smooth for both, with no noticeable change in the conduct of either's foreign policy. Over the past year, China has advocated a win-win relationship of mutual respect between a superpower and an emerging power. It was the approach Xi outlined on his visit to the US last February, and reiterated at November's party congress. Meanwhile, Obama introduced the policy of rebalancing in his first term and has been taking steps to effect this "pivot" towards Asia. The Sino-US relationship has never been more important, and hope is high that Obama and the new team of Xi and Li Keqiang will do more to forge a relationship of co-operation, rather than confrontation. The relationship has been highly transparent so far, and we've not seen the kind of misunderstanding, friction or behaviour to "test the water" so common with new administrations. But the lack of strategic trust remains a huge challenge for both. From Beijing's standpoint, Washington's rebalancing strategy has brought uncertainty to the region. The disputes over Scarborough Shoal and the Diaoyu Islands, as well other rows between China and its neighbours, can be understood in this context. America's determination to be a key player in Asian security has emboldened regional countries to lean on it. The result is, when involved in a row with China, these countries have become less likely to compromise. The US has repeatedly said it takes no side in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyus. But if Japan had not been a US ally, would it have acted the way it did? Of course, without the US security guarantees, nationalism in Japan might grow even stronger and the calls to rearm through a change in the constitution might get even louder, and that would destabilise the region. The US presence in Asia will only grow, now that the Americans are slowly extricating themselves from the Middle East and Afghanistan. This is throwing a spanner in the works of China's relationship with the rest of Asia, particularly its neighbours. US officials and analysts like to describe the bilateral relationship as one of co-operation and competition; in the context of China's relations in its neighbourhood, Washington and Beijing are clear rivals. China is prepared to meet the challenge, but it should also fully prepare for any crisis. Moreover, Chinese diplomacy in the region must be more proactive to shore up the country's influence. Sino-US rivalry is risky, and leaders on either side are well aware that any mishandling could lead to devastating conflict. This is why, over the past year, China has been clear that it is seeking a new path. As President Hu Jintao urged at last year's strategic and economic dialogue, the two countries should "prove that the traditional belief that big powers are bound to enter into confrontation and conflicts is wrong, and seek new ways of developing relations between major countries in the era of economic globalisation". The striking feature of a rising power is its expanding interests, which may easily lead to conflict with the dominant power. As the world's two largest economies, China and the US must seek new ways of relating that benefit not only themselves but the rest of the world. How, then, should China respond to the US pivot to Asia? It has been China's policy to base its relationship with its neighbours on economic opportunities. Through trade and investment, China has sought to share the fruit of its growth with others in the region, and has thus built a foundation for peaceful co-operation. This effort must continue. But, as the challenges thrown up by America's strategic rebalancing have shown, a relationship built strictly on economic co-operation is not enough, and political and security concerns must also be addressed. In fact, a close economic relationship often creates such concerns. America's policy in Asia is founded not on economics, but on a vision of a secure and stable strategic order in the region. It is not surprising that this vision of a common good - coupled with the values that America likes to champion - is attractive to countries in the region. Thus, in some sense, the Sino-US rivalry is really one fought on values. In this regard, China needs to strengthen dialogue with its neighbours on politics and security matters, establish bilateral or multilateral security mechanisms, and do much more to dispel their doubts and worries. This is nothing short of a competition between the American Dream and the Chinese Dream. China has to adjust, elaborate and strengthen the substance of its Chinese Dream, to increase its moral appeal to others. Once this missing piece of the puzzle is in place, Chinese diplomacy will have found a new lease of life.

#### Nuclear war

Gross December 2012 (Donald Gross, a Pacific Forum CSIS Senior Associate, is a former White House and State Department official whose new book, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, was published in October by Bloomsbury.

Now is the time to rethink America’s policy toward China. The United States can benefit economically from China’s rise, strengthen Chinese advocates of human rights and democracy, and avoid a new Cold War. We urgently need a national debate about U.S.–China policy to prevent doing permanent damage to American interests in Asia. Fortunately, this is a propitious period to have that debate. In the United States, President Barack Obama will shortly embark on his second term in office, so will be able to guide American foreign policy without the ever-present political pressures of a re-election campaign. In China, a new generation of leaders are coming to power with a mandate to address the country’s daunting domestic challenges—including corruption and cronyism within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), environmental degradation, frequent “mass incidents” of social unrest, inflation, and glaring social inequalities. The leaders who take office in March—including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang—know firsthand some of the worst excesses of the CCP. They were victims of Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, when an entire generation of young people—many from prominent families—were “sent down” to rural areas to perform backbreaking manual labor for years. Having experienced and survived the widespread human rights abuses that occurred between 1966 and 1976, the year of Mao’s death, China’s new leadership will be more receptive to calls for political reform from the country’s middle class and liberal intellectuals, who are highly critical of increasing corruption and cronyism within the CCCP. China’s new leaders will welcome overtures from the United States that aim to assist China in meeting its challenges. But harsh American trade measures or heightened military pressure will likely be met with a tough response, as the new leaders seek to prove their mettle and their capability to defend China’s national interests. Increased tensions with China could have dire consequences. They could lead to a military conflict over Taiwan’s political status, over whether Japan or China holds sovereignty to a group of uninhabitable islands and offshore energy resources in the East China Sea or over the ownership of small islands and energy resources in the South China Sea. In a worst case scenario, those conflicts could escalate, by accident or by design, to a nuclear exchange. It is essential to remember that China’s rise strengthens America’s economy and future prosperity. Today, China is the largest growth market in the world for U.S. goods and services. Trade with China, America’s third-largest export market and the leading market for U.S. agricultural products, has helped America’s recovery from the global financial crisis.

### 1NC – Critique

#### ---Greening military energy consumption is a depoliticizing act which reifies structures of persistent conflict that make affirmative impact claims inevitable.

Sirota 2011

David, best-selling author of the new book "Back to Our Future: How the 1980s Explain the World We Live In Now," co-hosts The Rundown with Sirota & Brown on AM630 KHOW, http://www.salon.com/2011/05/23/greenwashing\_military/

Yes, military brass led by U.S. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus have lately been mounting a PR campaign to convince America that the gas-guzzling armed forces are now helping solve burgeoning environmental crises by “going green.” Officials are specifically touting their success reducing energy and water consumption at bases, and they are promoting an initiative to make sure “half of all energy that the navy and marines use afloat, ashore and in the air will come from non-fossil fuel sources.” For this effort, they have been landing periodic — and fawning — coverage in the New York Times, USA Today and National Public Radio, among others. Coming from a Pentagon that is the largest single consumer of energy in America, these modest steps are long overdue and commendable. But absent deeper behavioral change, these initiatives are laudable only in the sense that it’s laudable, say, for a wealthy Hollywood star to retrofit one of his seven Hummers or for a growing coal company to donate a drop of its profits to a tree-planting charity. In other words, it’s good in a very limited way, because sans behavioral change, it’s still fundamentally an act of greenwashing. In this case, it’s a greenwashing that tries to hide the fact that maintaining an empire at the barrel of a gun requires an enormous amount of energy, and will continue requiring an enormous amount of energy — much of it not so clean — no matter how many “Military Going Green” stories the Pentagon’s spinmeisters land in the media. To know this is to behold just two data points from the major military occupations of the last decade. In Iraq, the Atlantic Monthly reported in 2005 that the military uses “about 1.7 million gallons of fuel a day” which translates into “each of the 150,000 soldiers on the ground consumes roughly nine gallons of fuel a day.” Similarly, in Afghanistan, energy analyst Sohbet Karbuz crunched numbers from the Defense Logistics Agency to find that by 2006, Operation Enduring Freedom had already consumed “more than 2.2 billion gallons of fuel.” While some of that oil would have still been consumed by the military without the Iraq or Afghanistan wars, a lot of it would have been saved. That means if the military was as serious as it claims to be about protecting the environment and using less energy, it would be initiating a much different conversation right now. It would probably be spending a lot less time promoting pie-in-the-sky plans to Prius-ize some of its tanks (a la Schwarzenegger hydrogen-izing his Hummer) and a lot more time talking about how to end what it’s own leaders call an “era of persistent conflict”. Because, as the numbers imply, the fastest, most immediate and most efficient way for the Pentagon to mitigate the environmental crises that come from energy consumption is to simply move America away from its energy-draining policy of permanent war. This revelation — and the fact that few military leaders are talking about it — shows why this really is greenwashing in the purest sense of that marketing term. The Pentagon is not really about going green to protect the planet or even to prevent against the national security threats that military leaders say global climate change create. It’s mostly about the Pentagon channeling Schwarzenegger in selling the idea that it can continue its same old behavior and posture. Indeed, the military’s message is designed to have us believe that the Pentagon can somehow continue the energy-expensive environmentally destructive policy of permanent war while conserving energy. It’s as fantastical a notion as an oil company saying it aims to help reduce carbon emissions by producing more oil, but the propaganda has a goal: making war that much more acceptable to a frugal public.

#### ---Energy green-washing locks the military in a self-fulfilling quest for resources and risks extinction.

Nevins 2010

Joseph, teaches geography at Vassar College, Greenwashing the Pentagon, http://climateandcapitalism.com/2010/06/15/greenwashing-the-pentagon/

Such “greenwashing” helps to mask the fact that the Pentagon devours about 330,000 barrels of oil per day (a barrel has 42 gallons), more than the vast majority of the world’s countries. If the U.S. military were a nation-state, it would be ranked number 37 in terms of oil consumption—ahead of the likes of the Philippines, Portugal, and Nigeria—according to the CIA Factbook. And although much of the military’s technology has become far more fuel-efficient over the last few decades, the amount of oil consumed per soldier per day in war-time has increased by 175 percent since Vietnam, given the Pentagon’s increasing use and number of motorized vehicles. A 2010 study by Deloitte, the financial services company, reports that the Pentagon uses 22 gallons of oil per soldier per day deployed in its wars, a figure that is expected to grow 1.5 percent annually though 2017.[5] The worst offender is the Air Force, which consumes 2.5 billion gallons of aviation fuel a year, and accounts for more than half of the Pentagon’s energy use. Under normal flight conditions, a F-16 fighter jet burns up to 2,000 gallons of fuel per flight hour. The resulting detrimental impact on the Earth’s climate system is much greater per mile traveled than motorized ground transport due to the height at which planes fly combined with the mixture of gases and particles they emit.[6] Among the ironies of all this, given that a central goal of U.S. military strategy is to ensure the smooth flow of oil to the United States, is that the Pentagon’s voracious appetite for energy helps to justify its very existence and seemingly never-ending growth. In a direct sense, war and militarism produce landscapes and ecosystems of violence—and violated bodies. In Laos, unexploded ordnance from Washington’s illegal and covert bombing litters the countryside, and has killed and maimed thousands since the war’s end, and continues to do so at the rate of almost one person per day. In Vietnam, about 500,000 Vietnamese children have been born since the mid-1970s with birth defects believed to be related to the defoliant Agent Orange that the Pentagon dumped on the country. And in war-torn Fallujah, the aftermath of two U.S. sieges of the Iraqi city in 2004 has seen a huge rise in the number of chronic deformities among infants and a spike in early-age cancer.[7] Beyond locations directly targeted by war, the ill effects of military consumption of environmental resources do not respect territorial boundaries. They exacerbate a growing environmental crisis on a global scale. From the degradation of the world’s oceans, to a steep decline in biodiversity and intensifying climate destabilization, war and militarism threaten humanity and life more broadly in unprecedented ways. Such ecological “costs” are certainly not limited to the activities of the U.S. military. But given its engagement in multiple wars, a network of hundreds of military bases around the world and dozens more in the United States, and a budget now roughly the equivalent of all of the rest of the world’s militaries combined, the Pentagon must be the central focus of efforts to protect the biosphere by challenging war and militarism. More than ever, humanity—and Mother Earth—can no long afford them.

Faith in nuclear power to resolve all social ills is technocratic and privileges the same technological solutions that cause their impacts

Byrne and Martinez 96 (Cecilia, is currently the Director of the Center for Earth, Energy and Democracy at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. John, “Science, Society and the State: The Nuclear Project and the Transformation of the American Political Economy” http://www.ceep.udel.edu/publications/politicalecology/publications/1996\_pe\_atom\_chap3.pdf) []=gendered language correction

Less than two decades after the Manhattan Project, there was little doubt, either in the nation's leadership or the public, that the future of the United States depended upon its scientific and technological standing in the international order. As Kevles notes, science as it was constructed in the post-war era, as well as the scientists themselves, were credited with being the progenitors of a progressive technological era. It was an age, according to Kevles when (1987: 391-392):[Scientists were identified not only as the makers of bombs and rockets but as the progenitors of jet planes, computers, and direct dial telephoning, of transistor radios, stereophonic phonographs, and color television; when research and development, in what President Clark of the University of California called this "age of the knowledge industry", was believed to generate endless economic expansion; when electronic and computer firms were assumed to follow close upon the heels of local Ph.D. programs; when Governor Edmund G. Brown of California reported that, on the basis of an experiment in his state, space and defense scientists could solve problems of smog, sewage or waste disposal, and transportation. Given the thrall of science, and the priority assigned to the country's over half-century commitment to atomic weapons and nuclear power, it is not perhaps surprising that the institutions which gave us bombs and electricity played a central role in postwar science-based industrialization. Micro-electronics, communications systems, computer technologies, laser devices, composite materials, computer-aided design and manufacture, robotics, radiology and many other industrial fields are directly indebted for their existence to the efforts of the atomic energy and weapons consortium One of the architects of the nuclear age expressed the enthusiasm for science and technology that has pervaded postwar society, and in particular, captured the imagination of the nuclear dreamer (Weinberg, 1956: 302): I do not think it unreasonable to propose that much of [hu]mankind's social and political tradition will become obsolete with the full flowering of the Scientific Era simply because all of the traditional doctrines were conceived in an economic and technological era which bears little relation to the age of abundance and moderation which I envisage . . . The bitterness which has been assumed to be part of all political struggle — whether intra- or international — will be mitigated because the basic conditions of life have become easier. The results of the Manhattan Project and the Atoms for Peace Program have failed to coincide with the prospects envisioned by Weinberg. Instead, the technology has produced a litany of social ills, ranging from the nuclear arms race, to the disaster at Chernobyl and near-disaster at Three Mile Island, and the unresolved problems of bomb plant clean-up and civilian plant waste disposal and decommissioning. Equally important, the nuclear dream has resulted in the marginalization of democratic forms of governance. In this respect, the reinvigoration of democracy is, perhaps, *the most significant challenge* facing society in a post-nuclear age.

#### ---The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s suspect imperial narrative --- <American hegemony> relies on epistemologically flawed colonial stereotypes of racial inferiority that whitewashes American imperialism while constructing a universal notion of humanity that enables a self-defeating genocidal politics in the name of stability.

Kaplan 2003

Amy, Professor of English at University of Pennsylvania, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,” American Quarterly 56.1

Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the "reluctant imperialist." 10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an [End Page 4] uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society." 11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image. This is also a narrative about race. The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from earlier colonial discourses about races who are incapable of governing themselves, Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law," or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society," in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "The American Empire," Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Burden" but insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden." 12 Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism. These narratives of the origins of the current empire—that is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionist—have much in common. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberalism, and democracy, the "indispensable nation," in Madeleine Albright's words. In this logic, the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong" for everyone [End Page 5] else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others." 13 Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus deems the entire world a potential site of intervention. Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems. According to this logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather, resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values. Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As part of the "coming-out" narrative, the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. We've always been interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty.' Let's just be ourselves." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign—one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future." 14 Historians of the United States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S. interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms, in relation to other historical changes and movements across the globe. The struggle over history also entails a struggle over language and culture. It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks words [End Page 6] such as freedom, democracy, and liberty. It's imperative that we draw on our knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and transnational sources. Today's reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power," the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. As Ignatieff writes, "America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires." 15 The work of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of global culture is not a one-way street, but a process of transnational exchange, conflict, and transformation, which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by empire. In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, those whose dreams are different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself. As one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote, "when you adopt a way of terror you've excused yourself from the community of human beings." 16 Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act, the accusation of terrorism alone, without due process and proof, is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity. As scholars of American studies, we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical, literary, and visual representations about the way such exclusions from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

#### ---Their conflict scenarios are false and have only been constructed due to imperialist knowledge production, as an academic you have an ethical obligation to reject this epistemology

San Juan 1995 Professor of English and Comparative Literature at UConn, Hegemony and Strategies of Transgression, pg 1-2

Scenes of carnage in Somalia, East Timor, Haiti, in the occupied territories of Palestine and in all the fragments of what was once Yugoslavia. . . . Images of violent confrontations in South Africa, and not too long ago in Los Angeles, and now in Yemen and Rwanda. . . . The year 1994 opened with the uprising of the Indian communities led by the Zapatista National Liberation Front in Chiapas. Mexico, just after the signing of the North America Free Trade Agreement. Signs of the apocalypse? Or of the long-awaited devolution from the age of the superpowers? In the prologue to Tlie Rules Are No Game, Anthony Wilden (1987) has given us a background to this landscape of horrendous waste, disfigurations of pieties and ressentimeni. Connecting "local knowledges" with their overarching reality, Noam Chomsky (1991) has rendered in bold strokes the lessons of the paradigmatic First World (United States)-Third World (Vietnam) encounter in our time, recalling what Mark Twain (1992), in his "To the Person Sitting in Darkness," did for his audience at the turn of the century. Faced with this multitudinous reality, the practitioners of "humane letters" in the United States—quite a separate tribe from the aforementioned disturbers of the peace—have displayed erudition and ingenuity in theorizing but have failed to engage with crude, sublunary happenings. Why? Because all (except for those skeptics on the fringe and other scandalous but marginalized cottscietilicizers) have refused to understand exactly what is meant by the dominant, expansive, and virtually inescapable stranglehold of the United States—its economic, political, and cultural hegemony—over the world system in terms of the everyday lives of masses of people in what is called the "Third World." Although the term "cultural imperialism" has been domesticated for ideology-critique (Tomlinson 1991) and token criticism of certain government policies is the standard tare for liberals, still the majority of U.S. intellectuals and arbiters of taste function today without any thought of how their words and actions, whether they know it or not. "represent" the claims to (cultural/racial) superiority of a nation-state whose interventions in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East have brought disaster and misery to millions since the nineteenth century. Edward Said's recent Culture and Imperialism is just one reminder of that record. Unless there is some sophisticated criticism and disavowal of this complicity, I am afraid that the activities of U.S. academics can only serve to advance transnational capital's ascendancy for now and throughout the next century.

### 1NC – Counterplan

#### The United States federal government should

#### -ratify and implement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

#### -discontinue its use of HEU

#### It solves the case-boost US leadership and solves proliferation

Joseph, Senior Democratic Foreign Policy Staffer in the United States Senate, ‘9 (Jofi, April, “Renew the Drive for CTBT Ratification” Washington Quarterly)

The 1999 vote fell short of an absolute majority, much less the two-thirds majority required for treaty ratification under the U.S. Constitution. This failure undercut traditional U.S. leadership on nuclear nonproliferation issues, and offered an easy justification for China to continue to refuse to ratify the CTBT, as well as for India and Pakistan to avoid signing the treaty altogether. An announcement in Obama’s first year in office that he will call on the Senate to initiate the consideration of the CTBT by holding the appropriate hearings over the next year, with the goal of scheduling a ratification vote prior to the end of his first term in 2012, will send an unmistakable signal that the United States is once again committed to multilateral, rules-based cooperation with the international community to advance mutual interests. It will reenergize a flagging nonproliferation regime and offer the United States important leverage on key challenges like Iran and North Korea. With a healthy majority of Democratic senators in place, and close relationships with key moderate Republicans, Obama is within reach of the 67 votes necessary to secure ratification, and accomplish a significant foreign policy and national security goal.

### 1NC Iran

#### ---Long timeframe --- Iran is years away from a bomb.

Kahl 2012

Colin H., security studies prof at Georgetown, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, “Not Time to Attack Iran”, January 17, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran?page=show

Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented Iranian efforts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them. In arguing for a six-month horizon, Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons-grade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear device and considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weapons-grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The IAEA would thus detect such activity with sufficient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years off.

#### No strike

Kam 2011

Ephraim, PhD IR Harvard, deputy director for the Institute for National Security Studies, “A Green Light on Iran?” Strategic Assessment Vol. 13, No. 4, January

The question is, which of the threats would military action seek to address? If there is sufficient basis to the assessment that Iran is liable to attack Israel with nuclear weapons, then military action can be weighed as a means to prevent an extreme danger on this level. However, if the basic assumption is that Iran would not launch a nuclear strike against Israel but that Israel would be required to confront threats of the second level, it is doubtful they would justify military action and convince other countries of the necessity of the action. Though important and significant threats, they are not existential, and Israel could cope with them. It is true that in the past Israel conducted many military actions and also went to war in order to remove threats that were not necessarily existential. But the problematic nature of military action against Iran and the exceptional risks it involves, as well as the US administration’s reservations, raise doubts as to whether it would be correct to take such action, if its entire goal would be to confront the second level threats.

#### No adventurism

Akhlaghi 2010

Reza, senior writer for Foreign Policy Association Blogs, Reza, “Turkish Geopolitical Ascendancy and the Iranian Decline,” http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/09/04/turkish-geopolitical-ascendancy-and-the-iranian-decline/

The new emerging Turkish foreign policy and geo-strategic doctrine is putting Iran on the periphery and contributing to Tehran’s decline in its ability to exert leadership in the region. Equipped with a new foreign policy doctrine and a well-established private economic sector, Turkey is deeply cognizant of its emerging strategic advantages over Iran and will leverage these advantages by further strengthening its ties with the Muslim world and filling the void where Iran is seen as a destabilizing force. These efforts by Turkey are poised to effectively strip Iran of its ability to exert political and economic influence in the region.

No middle east war

Maloney and Takeyh 7 [Susan Maloney and Ray Takeyh, 6/28/2007. Senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Studies at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast,” International Herald Tribune, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0628iraq\_maloney.aspx].

Yet, **the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and other s are very unlikely to go to war** either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, **Middle Eastern leaders**, like politicians everywhere, **are primarily interested in** one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. **Unlike in the 1990s,** when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, **Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries**. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, **there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved.** The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. **The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight**. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. **The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.**

No great power war

Dr. Gwynne Dyer (lecturer on international affairs) October 21 2001 “The World Turned Upside Down?”, International Affairs, http://peernet.lbpc.ca/thelink/102502/04IntAffDyer.html

How bad could it get? Very bad." Yet Dyer concluded by pointing out a number of significantly positive indications: that the terrorists are probably not going to succeed in stampeding the Americans into any truly stupid reaction; that direct physical threat from terrorism was statistically less of a threat than smoking (though over-reaction to terrorism could pose a threat to civil liberties); and that the conflict in the Middle East is likely to stay confined to the region because the connections outward have been dismantled. Most significantly, he explained, the larger trends are promising in that "there are no enemies among the Great Powers. World War III has been cancelled." The number of democratic countries has doubled in the lifetime of our Pearson College students, and "democratic countries don’t fight wars with each other." A kind of global culture of values has been emerging. Things are actually changing for the better.

#### ---Economic decline does not cause war.

Miller 2000

Morris, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

No spillover or attack

Layne 6 (Christopher Layne is Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a member of the Board of Directors of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. “Iran: The Logic of Deterrence” http://www.amconmag.com/article/2006/apr/10/00007/ //Donnie)

For the same reason, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options to attack or intimidate its neighbors. Just as it did during the Cold War, the U.S. can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Turkey. American security guarantees will not only dissuade Iran from acting recklessly but also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to build their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming U.S. advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging America’s security commitments in the region. In this sense, dealing with the Iranian “nuclear threat” is actually one of the easier strategic challenges the United States faces. It is a threat that can be handled by an offshore balancing strategy that relies on missile, air, and naval power well away from the volatile Persian Gulf, thus reducing the American poltico-military footprint in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran is hardly desirable, neither is it “intolerable,” because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the United States.

Prolif stable

Walt 11 (Stephen, IR prof @ Harvard, he’s kinda stupid smart #CONONDRUM! “Stopping an Iranian bomb” <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/15/stopping_an_iranian_bomb>, Donnie)

Second, and equally important, Iran has by far the greatest power potential of any country in the Persian Gulf. It has more people, more economic potential, and plenty of oil and gas too. If it ever had competent political leadership it would easily be the strongest conventional power in its neighborhood. But if it gets an overt nuclear capability, that act would raise the likelihood that other states in the region (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, even Iraq) would follow suit. It is far from certain that they would, but it would certainly make it more likely. And if they do, this step would partially negate Iran's conventional advantages.

#### NO Iranian hegemony

**Walt 10** (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/09/more_silly_arguments_about_irans_bomb_this_time_from_the_other_side> //Donnie)

In fact, [**history suggests**](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/01/iran_arms_races_and_war) that an Iranian bomb would have a far more modest impact than either side of this debate is now suggesting. Getting the bomb didn't transform Red China or North Korea into great world powers overnight; it was economic modernization that did the trick for Beijing, while North Korea remains a basket case with virtually no global influence. The mighty Soviet Union couldn't blackmail anyone despite having tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and having a few hundred nuclear weapons doesn't enable Israel to simply dictate to its neighbors either. You may have also noticed that America's own nuclear arsenal hasn't given Washington the capacity to compel everyone to do its bidding either. As Kenneth Waltz once put, if a state like Iran does get the bomb someday, it will "cramp our style." In other words, it would make a direct military attacks on Iran a riskier proposition, though it would hardly prevent us from resisting Iranian aggression against vital U.S. interests. Contrary to Lawther's pollyannish views, an Iranian bomb would not be a good thing and the United States and its allies are correct in trying to discourage Tehran from developing one. (Of course, by continuing to threaten Iran, the United States and its allies are merely increasing Iran's incentive to get an actual deterrent.) But it's not going to be the end of the world if Iran does get a weapon one day, and I expect Iran's neighbors **(including Israel) would get used to it rather quickly**. (Note: Lawther eventually makes this point too and here he is on firmer ground, except that it undercuts all of his other claims.)

Nuclear Iran solves miscalc

Lowther 10 (Adam B. Lowther is a defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute. “Iran’s Two-Edged Bomb” Feb. 9. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/opinion/09lowther.html> //Donnie)

What about the downside — that an unstable, anti-American regime would be able to start a nuclear war? Actually, that’s less of a risk than most people think. Unless the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, and his Guardian Council chart a course that no other nuclear power has ever taken, Iran should become more responsible once it acquires nuclear weapons rather than less. The 50-year standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States was called the cold war thanks to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. There is reason to believe that the initial shock of a nuclear Iran would soon be followed a new regional dynamic strikingly like that of cold-war Europe. Saudi Arabia and Iraq would be united along with their smaller neighbors by their fear of Iran; the United States would take the lead in creating a stable regional security environment. In addition, our reluctant European allies, and possibly even China and Russia, would have a much harder time justifying sales of goods and technology to Tehran, further isolating the Islamic Republic. Iran may think its enrichment plans will put fear into the hearts of Americans. In fact, it should give us hopes of a renaissance of American influence in the Middle East.

### 1NC HEU

#### No risk of terrorism

Mueller 10 John Mueller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University, “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters” Issues Online in Science and Technology, Winter 2010 <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>

The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

Conventional weapons first

John Mueller is a professor of political science at Ohio State “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD” Jan. 1. 2008. Accessed July 19, 2010. <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF> //Donnie

Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005) The degree to which al-Qaeda has pursued a nuclear weapons program may have been exaggerated--often by the same slam dunkers who alarmingly warned us about Saddam Hussein's WMD development. Meanwhile, the media, following conventional patterns, dutifully and mostly uncritically transmit the assertions put forward. In was on a November 14, 2004, 60 Minutes telecast, for example, that former CIA spook Michael Scheuer assured his rapt CBS interviewer that the explosion of a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb in the United States was "probably a near thing."

No escalation

Crowley 10 (Michael Senior Editor the New Republic, January, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, <http://www.tnr.com/node/72263>]

The Los Angeles Times ran an [important story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04%2C0%2C2198537%2Cfull.story) yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. **A core issue under debate**, officials said, **is whether the U**nited **S**tates **should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances**, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some **experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally**. And **the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case**. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. **The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we**, for instance, **actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that** a President **Obama--**or any president, for that matter--**would go through with it.**

No extinction

Frost 5(Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

An existential threat. **When applied to nuclear terrorism, the phrase ‘existential threat’ implies that a state such as the United States could be destroyed by terrorists wielding nuclear weapons. Yet to destroy the United States or any other large industrial state**, in the sense of inflicting such damage to its government, economy, population and infrastructure that it could no longer function as a coherent political and economic entity, **would require a large number of well-placed nuclear weapons with yields in the tens or hundreds of kilotons. It is unlikely that terrorists could successfully obtain, emplace and detonate a single nuclear weapon, while no plausible radiological device or devices could do any significant damage on a national level.**

#### **---Not unstable – caution**

Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, UC Berkeley, 3-22-2007, “A nuclear Iran: promoting stability or courting disaster?”, Columbia University Debate, nexis

First, nuclear proliferation is not a problem because nuclear weapons have not proliferated. "Proliferation" means to spread like wildfire. We have had nuclear military capability for over fifty years, and we have a total of nine militarily capable nuclear states. That's hardly proliferation; that is, indeed, glacial spread. If another country gets nuclear weapons**,** and if it does so for good reasons, then that isn't an object of great worry. Every once in a while, some prominent person says something that'sobviously true. Recently, Jacques Chirac [president of France] said that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a danger. Well, he was right. Of course, he had to quickly retract it and say, "Oh no, that slipped out, I didn't know the microphone was on!" Second, it doesn't matter who has nuclear weapons. Conversely, thespread of conventional weapons makes a great deal of difference. Forinstance, if a Hitler-type begins to establish conventional superiority, it becomes very difficult to contain and deter him. But, with nuclear weapons, it's been proven without exception that whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation. Every country--whether they are countries we trust and think of as being highly responsible, like Britain, or countries that we distrust greatly, and for very good reasons, like China during the Cultural Revolution behaves with such caution. It is now fashionable for political scientists to test hypotheses.Well, I have one: If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than fifty years. Pretty impressive.

#### Accidents don’t happen and wouldn’t escalate

Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003, p. 115-116

Another question is whether India and Pakistan can firmly control and safely deploy nuclear forces sufficient to deter. Because I have already said enough about the ease of deterrence, I shall concentrate on questions of safety and control. Sagan claims that “the emerging history of nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan strongly supports the pessimistic predictions of organizational theorists” (Ch. 3, p. 90). Yet the evidence, accumulated over five decades, shows that nuclear states fight with nuclear states only at low levels, that accidents seldom occur, and that when they do they never have bad effects. If nuclear pessimists were right, nuclear deterrence would have failed again and again. Nuclear pessimists deal with the potential causes of catastrophe; optimists, with the effects the causes do not produce. Since the evidence fails to support the predictions of pessimists, one wonders why the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia should have bad rather than good effects. What differences in the situation of India and Pakistan may cause their fates to depart from the nuclear norm? If they and their situations are different, then the happy history of the nuclear past does not forecast their futures. American commentators dwell on the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union earlier and India and Pakistan today. Among the seeming differences, these are given prominence: differences in the states involved, differences in their histories of conflict, and differences in the distance between the competing parties. I consider them in turn.

#### Naval cuts inevitable – kills leverage .

O’Brien 2012

Robert C., senior foreign policy advisor to GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney http://www.newsmax.com/US/Obama-debate-aircraft-carrier/2012/10/30/id/462127#ixzz2FiJbDG2X

What the President failed to mention is that in December of this year, we’ll have one less of those things “called aircraft carriers” when the USS Enterprise is retired. In 2013, the U.S. Navy will have fewer carriers — 10 — than the Congressionally-mandated fleet. Assuming that sequestration and additional Obama defense cuts are implemented, defense experts believe that it is likely that the carrier fleet will shrink further still. One defense contractor who manages the building of new carriers told BusinessWeek that the cuts are an “end-of-earth scenario.” Of those 10 carriers still in the fleet, using today’s deployments as a model, just four would be at sea at any given time. Only one — the USS George Washington — would be forward deployed in Asia. The other three would likely be found in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea (supporting U.S. forces in Afghanistan) and involved in training exercises. Of the remaining six carriers, two would be in post-deployment status in their home ports and four would be in short, medium, or long term maintenance and unavailable during a crisis. As Governor Romney correctly pointed out in the debate, the U.S. Navy is the smallest it has been since World War I, standing some 28 warships below the minimum 313 warships that the Navy has said are necessary to fulfill its global missions.

**Naval power is not key to leverage**

**Goure 10**—Vice President, Lexington Institute, PhD (Daniel, 2 July 2010, Can The Case Be Made For Naval Power?,<http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171>, RBatra)
This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers. While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy **this is many years off**. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others, including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required **to reopen the waterway**? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses.
More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

#### ---Empirical data concludes Naval doesn’t prevent proliferation.

Mearsheimer 2011

John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis

One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

## \*\*\*2NC

### \*\*\*China DA

### AT HR Abuse Guts Soft Power

#### ---Guagchen solves human rights abuses---China is moving away from that

Economy 12 (Elizabeth Economy is Director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on China-U.S. relations and Chinese domestic and foreign policy, “China’s Real Soft Power: Chen Guangcheng,” http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/05/31/chinas-real-soft-power-chen-guangcheng/)

Politicians and pundits in Washington have it all wrong. Chinese activist Chen Guangcheng is not going to be a political football in U.S. election-year politics or a poster boy for one side of a domestic debate or another. Rather, Chen has the potential to emerge as the most potent weapon in China’s otherwise fairly dismal arsenal of soft power. In his moving and often profound commentary on May 31 here at the Council on Foreign Relations, Chen revealed himself as an optimist and a Chinese patriot: optimistic about his own future and ability to travel back and forth between China and the rest of the world; optimistic about the inherent goodness of the Chinese people, who want to do the right thing; and optimistic that democracy—in one form or another—will emerge sooner rather than later in China. Of course, part of Chen’s story underscores the dark side of contemporary Chinese political life: the extreme and pervasive levels of corruption and violence—who knew that a senior Shandong official blew up his mistress of thirteen years with a remote-control bomb?—the continued threats to the safety and well-being of Chen’s own family members who remain in China, and the utter system of lawlessness that pervades the local system of governance. Yet, Chen, in his remarks, never wavered in his belief that time was on the side of right. For the United States, Chen’s message was clear: keep human rights at the top of the agenda in the bilateral relationship. He didn’t call for Washington to ignore the broader relationship, but for him, human rights is the most essential value when compared to any other interest. Moreover, as he noted, China is in the midst of an historic transition and external pressure can play an important and positive role. For the most part, however, Chen, like many Chinese and outside observers, recognizes that change in China will be fundamentally a function of the Chinese people—the path they choose, and the steps they take. And here too, he is an optimist, noting that the ability of the Chinese people to disseminate information means that change will come quickly. In the end, Chen accomplished in an hour of free speech what the billions of dollars behind China’s go-out media strategy have never achieved: a balanced and nuanced portrayal of this complex country that left his audience with not only a better understanding of China but also a greater admiration for the Chinese people themselves. Now it is just up to Beijing to live up to Chen’s faith.

#### ---They have causality the wrong way, soft power solves human rights abuses

Tsoi 12 (Samuel, Master of Science in Public Affairs International Relations Track John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies University of Massachusetts Boston “Confucius Goes Global: Chinese Soft Power and Implications for Global Governance,”

Understanding China's soft power will allow concerned major powers and others in the international community to work with the PRC to deepen its commitments where Beijing's foreign policy, universalistic aspects of Confucian worldview and development practices converge with global norms. This might mean the West's human rights and democracy megaphone will be somewhat muffled. However, as problem-solving with China matures, the opportunities for influencing its population toward demanding justice and rights, and the government itself toward good governance will expand. The increasingly multipolar world where power is more diffused among states, institutions and society, soft power engagement will open up learning opportunities for great powers to compete based on good governance, proactively engage in areas of common interest and mitigate potential areas of conflict.

### \*\*\*Kritik

### Alternative

#### Reject the affirmatives call to action to solve proliferation and call into question the validity of their knowledge claims

Pelopidas 11 (Benoît Pelopidas, PhD, is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University.“THE ORACLES OF PROLIFERATION How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy Innovation,” http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_18-1\_pelopidas.pdf)

The proliferation paradigm prevents political innovation and is based on a view of history that strongly overestimates the historical role and appeal of nuclear weapons, leading to ill-conceived policies.66 It is a fundamentally non-political approach that does not take into account the possibility of change over time in the role and appeal of nuclear weapons. What needs to be done? In light of the preceding analysis, at least three changes would seem helpful: a reassessment of nuclear history countering the biases of the proliferation paradigm, a reaffirmation of the political dimension of decisions in the realm of nuclear weapons, and a change in what is expected from knowledge providers, be they experts or intelligence agencies.

The first change consists of realizing that nuclear weapons are not, and have never been, intrinsically desirable\*and it is wrong to reduce that fact to a lack of capability or security threat. Changing the metaphor and returning to the term ‘‘dissemination’’ instead of ‘‘proliferation’’ might remind policy makers to be more careful in the way they connect facts. However, this change in terminology is not a magical solution. Indeed, the metaphor was the core of this view of history, but not its only source. Getting rid of the metaphor may help but will not solve the problem. Even Kenneth Waltz, the leading proponent of the optimistic version of the proliferation paradigm, believes that the term proliferation is less than apt.67

Second, political responsibility should be reaffirmed. This implies a recognition that political decisions have to be made in a situation of irreducible uncertainty about the intent and the capability of the other; they are bets based on a hierarchy of values and priorities. When questions about whether nations will acquire nuclear weapons are considered, there cannot be an objective answer, even if advisers present their solutions as absolute truths. Policy makers should not try to escape the tragedy of this situation; they should instead start to think that decision makers on the other side are facing the same kinds of dilemmas. The fact that US presidents have subordinated nonproliferation concerns to other policy priorities in the cases of Israel or Pakistan, for example, in the same way that other nuclear powers have, should be considered carefully. Such consideration calls for a political understanding of nuclear history, rather than the supposed irresistible appeal of nuclear weapons, on the side of suspected states.68 These words might sound very general, but taken seriously, they lead to a realization that worst case assumptions and ‘‘speeding conservatism’’ are neither the only nor the true answers to a political problem, even if they are often presented as such.

The third move that would prove helpful is to reshape what is expected from the experts. Willingly or unwillingly, their judgments are political because they are driven by an understanding of history that is, most often, the proliferation paradigm. So, instead of expecting from them the truth about what is to be done, policy makers would benefit much more from asking for three specific things: as much factual accuracy as possible, recognition of the limits of what can be known, and a much more challenging attitude visa`-vis what sounds like consensual truth.69 Overestimations of what can be known as well as a tendency toward confirmation bias have already been diagnosed as responsible for two major intelligence failures: the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003 and the lack of anticipation of the attack on Israel in 1973.70 This last point is not to deny that knowledge informs policy. The point of this article is to say that certainty prevents imagination and creativity in politics and surely prevents any kind of shift from hope to audacity. It is far less sure that this need for certainty coupled with fear and mistrust provides the best guide for prudence

### A2: Framework

#### ---Framing determines policy effectiveness --- 90% of policy errors emerge from the flawed and deterministic lens of security.

Lowth 2011

Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies

A frame is ‘a perspective from which a problematic situation can be made sense of’.4 Framing sets a particular context. It shapes perceptions, and influences thinking and behaviour (Haider-Markel et al, 2006; Bradley, 2011).5 The re-framing of issues (ie. ‘reinterpreting their meaning and re-perceiving the situation’ (ibid)) is also potentially transformative.6 Much mistaken thinking and associated flawed behaviour is attributed, with authority, to mis-perception: ‘Around 90% of errors in thinking ... arise from errors of perception (Carr, 2010:5).7 Indeed some afford perceptions not just a primary but an exclusive explanatory role: ‘Perception is all there is’ (Peters and Austin, 1994:71). The ways in which problems are articulated and interpreted, in terms of their essential ‘form or origin’, fundamentally affects the strategies developed to resolve them (Goffman, 1986:10). The process of framing influences strategic thinking because it shapes a priori understanding, organisation and explanation: ‘Problems arise as much from the meaning that people involved give them as from the facts of the situation’ (Martin, 2002:28). Framed thinking is inherently convergent, focused and directed as if by a lens, but the process is neither objective nor universal; it varies between individuals and communities, and alters over time. Framing involves (re)definition. Words are critical and their impact, albeit invariably subconscious, can be profound: ‘There is nothing outside the text’ (Derrida, 1976:158). The cognitive linguist George Lakoff challenged his students not to think of an elephant – but none could avoid doing so. The word alone created an irresistible frame: Every word, like elephant, evokes a frame, which can be an image or other kinds of knowledge ... the word is defined relative to that frame (Lakoff, 2004:3). Framing is more than just associative, however; it also tends to be partial: When the word tax is added to relief, the result is a metaphor: Taxation is an affliction, the person who takes it away is a hero, and anyone who tries to stop him is a bad guy. This is a frame ... made up of ideas, like affliction and hero (ibid). Moreover, framing – as a form of linguistic construction – can be purposefully partial: Framing is about language that fits your worldview, [but] it is not just language. Ideas are primary — and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas (ibid). The language of security is similarly evocative, partial and inherently political. The theory of securitization within international relations – the use of the term ‘security’ to elevate an issue above and beyond normal politics – is remarkably similar to that of framing: The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure ... the staging of existential issues as of supreme priority. The process ... a speech-act ... causes the actor to operate in a different mode than he would have otherwise (Buzan et al, 1998:26,30). Both the generic process of framing and the specific example of securitization: ‘construct discourses through which the world comes to be perceived’ (Henry, 2002:68). They are both potentially powerful forms of sense-making. And yet, curiously, the two are seldom connected explicitly.8 Debates about securitisation are conducted within the milieu of security studies; they tend to focus on how issues become characterised as threats, rather than on the ramifications. Those concerned about framing, on the other hand, operating principally within psychology and its fields of application (behavioural sciences, sociology, media studies etc) tend to address much more keenly the cognitive implications, especially the creation of alternative world views, the colouring of perceptions, and associated influences on decision-making. This paper draws upon both fields of research to explore the framing effect of securitization on strategic thinking.9 Starting from the premise that: ‘By saying the word [security], something is done’ (Wæver, 1995:55), it is argued that: − (A part of) what securitization – as a form of discourse – ‘does’, is frame − In the context of strategy, this matters (so strategists should be aware). thinking. − A conscious process of de-securitization can re-frame thinking (with potentially beneficial results). The increasing breadth of affairs portrayed as ‘security issues’ – food, water, the environment, as well as energy – makes it imperative, in an ‘era of security obsessionism’ (Charrett, 2009:11), for policy makers and strategists to appreciate the cognitive influence of securitization. However, while both framing and securitization are periodically characterised as negative, this dissertation makes no such judgment – either in general, or in relation to European energy supply. The intention here is to demonstrate instead that securitization does frame strategic thinking, and that this matters: ‘Designating an issue as a matter of security is not just a theoretical question but caries ‘real-world’ significance’ (Hough, 2004:14).

### A2: Perm

#### Step back is critical

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

For time-pressed, slogan-bound, “must-be-ready-with-a-response” policy analysts and politicians, the invitation to reconsider such a seemingly settled concept as “energy” may look like an irksome invitation to navel-gaze. What does it matter if many societies – perhaps even the bulk of humanity – do not view a charcoal fire and a bullock drawing a plough through a field as twin instances of “energy consumption”? Far more important is the plight of the 2.7 billion people who rely on traditional biomass for cooking at the expense of forests and health; the 1.3 billion people who do not have access to electricity and thus the means to be “productive citizens”;2 the increasing competition for energy resources as the middle classes in China, India and Brazil weigh into the global mêlée for consumer goods; the need to assuage worried (Northern) consumers that the lights will not go out; and, above all, the threat that resource scarcities pose to continued economic growth. Who cares how or why fossil-fuelled capitalism is tied up with the evolution of a novel conception of energy? What matters is whether this gas pipeline should be built, that nuclear plant commissioned, or that LNG terminal financed. The pressing task is how to make the distasteful tradeoffs dictated by the realpolitik of securing energy for the future – human rights versus access to gas, maintaining jobs versus permitting pollution, leaving future generations with irresolvable problems of nuclear waste versus cutting carbon dioxide emissions. Such apparent pragmatism is understandable – but, in the end, unpragmatic. In today’s world, “energy” is about far more than pipelines and power stations, transmission lines and oil contracts: it is a system of economic and political relationships that weaves and reweaves the connections between corporations, governments, investors, human rights activists, environmentalists, the military, scientists, the media, trade unions and consumers alike into constantly shifting networks of power that serve to reproduce “the world that Energy begat”. No decision related to upper-case or abstract Energy (see pp.12ff) can escape the influences that such networks of power exert: Energy with a capital “E” not only frames the decision; it structures the solution, trapping the critical and the uncritical alike. To respond only to the daily froth of upper-case Energy talk – which power station? where? fuelled by gas or coal? – is to remain hostage to a dynamic that simply reinforces and reproduces the problems that Energy represents. Such “pragmatism” has helped shape an “energy security” agenda that mischaracterises the many energy scarcities – and insecurities – experienced by poorer people; promotes a response that has little to do with ensuring that everyone has the energy to meet their basic needs and everything to do with creating new sources of accumulation; and that disrespects the limits posed by climate change and resource depletion to endless economic growth. The result is a wave of new enclosures that, in addition to creating new scarcities (not only of energy but also of food, water, land and other necessities of life) are making a transition away from fossil fuels far harder to achieve

### A2: Prolif

#### The discourse of nonproliferation produces a violent dichotomy between mature and immature states – the anxieties we have about our own possession of nuclear weapons are displaced onto Orientalized subjects

GUSTERSON **Professor of Anthropology – MIT** 1999

Cultural Anthropology 1999

These falsely obvious arguments about the political unreliability of Third World nuclear powers are, I have been arguing, part of a broader orientalist rhetoric that seeks to bury disturbing similarities between "us" and "them" in a discourse that systematically produces the Third World as Other. In the process of producing the Third World, we also produce ourselves, for the Orient, one of the West's "deepest and most recurring images of the other," is essential in defining the West "as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (Said 1978:1-2). The particular images and metaphors that recur in the discourse on proliferation represent Third World nations as criminals, women, and children. But these recurrent images and metaphors, all of which pertain in some way to disorder, can also be read as telling hints about the facets of our own psychology and culture which we find especially troubling in regard to our custodianship over nuclear weapons. The metaphors and images are part of the ideological armor the West wears in the nuclear age, but they are also clues that suggest buried, denied, and troubling parts of ourselves that have mysteriously surfaced in our distorted representations of the Other. As Akhil Gupta has argued in his analysis of a different orientalist discourse, the discourse on development, "within development discourse...lies its shadowy double...a virtual presence, inappropriate objects that serve to open up the ‘developed world’ itself as an inappropriate object"(1998:4). In the era of so-called rogue states, one recurrent theme in this system of representations is that of the thief, liar, and criminal: the very attempt to come into possession of nuclear weapons is often cast in terms of racketeering and crime. After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, one newspaper headline read, "G-8 Nations Move to Punish Nuclear Outlaws" (Reid 1998:1), characterizing the two countries as criminals even though neither had signed -- and hence violated -- either the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When British customs officers intercepted a shipment of krytrons destined for Iraq's nuclear weapons program, one newspaper account said that Saddam Hussein was "caught red-handed trying to steal atomic detonators" (Perlmutter 1990, emphasis added) -- a curious choice of words given that Iraq had paid good money to buy the krytrons from the company EG&G. (In fact, if any nation can be accused of theft here, surely it is the United States, which took $650 million from Pakistan for a shipment of F-16s, cancelled the shipment when the Bush administration determined that Pakistan was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, but never refunded the money.) According to an article in the New York Times, "it required more than three decades, a global network of theft and espionage, and uncounted millions for Pakistan, one of the world's poorest countries, to explode that bomb" (Weiner 1998:6). Meanwhile the same paper's editorial page lamented that "for years Pakistan has lied to the U.S. about not having a nuclear weapons program" and insists that the United States "punish Pakistan's perfidy on the Bomb" (New York Times 1987a:A34, 1987b:A34). And Representative Steven Solarz (Democrat, New York) warns us that the Bomb will give Pakistan "the nuclear equivalent of a Saturday Night Special" (Smith 1988:38). The image of the Saturday night special assimilates Pakistan symbolically to the disorderly underworld of ghetto hoodlums who rob corner stores and fight gang wars. U.S. nuclear weapons are, presumably, more like the "legitimate" weapons carried by the police to maintain order and keep the peace. Reacting angrily to this system of representations, the scientist in charge of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, said, “Anything which we do is claimed by the West as stolen and we are never given credit except for the things like heroin....You think that we people who also got education are stupid, ignorant. Things which you could do fifty years ago, don't you think that we cannot do them now” (NNI-News 1998). Third World nations acquiring nuclear weapons are also described in terms of passions escaping control. In Western discourse the passionate, or instinctual, has long been identified with women and animals and implicitly contrasted with male human rationality (Haraway 1990a; Merchant 1980; Rosaldo 1974). Thus certain recurrent figures of speech in the Western discourse on proliferation cast proliferant nations in the Third World in imagery that carries a subtle feminine or subhuman connotation. Whereas the United States is spoken of as having "vital interests" and "legitimate security needs," Third World nations have "passions," "longings," and "yearnings" for nuclear weapons which must be controlled and contained by the strong male and adult hand of America. Pakistan has "an evident ardor for the Bomb," says a New York Times editorial (1987a:A34). Peter Rosenfeld, writing in the Washington Post, worries that the United States cannot forever "stifle [Pakistan's] nuclear longings" (1987:A27). Representative Ed Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts), agreeing, warns in a letter to the Washington Post that America's weakness in its relationship with Pakistan means that the Pakistanis "can feed nuclear passions at home and still receive massive military aid from America" (1987:A22). The image is of the unfaithful wife sponging off her cuckolded husband. But throwing the woman out may cause even more disorder: the Washington Post editorial page, having described Pakistan's nuclear weapons program -- in an allusion to the ultimate symbol of Muslim femininity -- as concealed "behind a veil of secrecy," goes on to warn that there are "advantages to...having Pakistan stay in a close and constraining security relationship with the United States rather than be cast out by an aid cutoff into a loneliness in which its passion could only grow" (Washington Post 1987:A22). Thus, even though American intelligence had by 1986 concluded that the Pakistani uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta "had gone all the way" (Smith 1988:104), and even though the president can no longer, as he is required by law, "certify Pakistan's nuclear purity" (Molander 1986), the disobedient, emotive femininity of Pakistan is likely to be less disruptive if it is kept within the bounds of its uneasy relationship with the United States.

#### Reject the affirmatives call to action to solve proliferation. instead of expecting the truth about what is to be done, policy makers would benefit much through recognition of the limits of what can be known. The search for precise knowledge is impossible and causes policy calamities like Iraq---it’s impossible to know true intentions of development and all of their expert knowledge is ideological and political, by definition, it can’t be objective

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The proliferation paradigm prevents political innovation and is based on a view of history that strongly overestimates the historical role and appeal of nuclear weapons, leading to ill-conceived policies.66 It is a fundamentally non-political approach that does not take into account the possibility of change over time in the role and appeal of nuclear weapons. What needs to be done? In light of the preceding analysis, at least three changes would seem helpful: a reassessment of nuclear history countering the biases of the proliferation paradigm, a reaffirmation of the political dimension of decisions in the realm of nuclear weapons, and a change in what is expected from knowledge providers, be they experts or intelligence agencies.

The first change consists of realizing that nuclear weapons are not, and have never been, intrinsically desirable\*and it is wrong to reduce that fact to a lack of capability or security threat. Changing the metaphor and returning to the term ‘‘dissemination’’ instead of ‘‘proliferation’’ might remind policy makers to be more careful in the way they connect facts. However, this change in terminology is not a magical solution. Indeed, the metaphor was the core of this view of history, but not its only source. Getting rid of the metaphor may help but will not solve the problem. Even Kenneth Waltz, the leading proponent of the optimistic version of the proliferation paradigm, believes that the term proliferation is less than apt.67

Second, political responsibility should be reaffirmed. This implies a recognition that political decisions have to be made in a situation of irreducible uncertainty about the intent and the capability of the other; they are bets based on a hierarchy of values and priorities. When questions about whether nations will acquire nuclear weapons are considered, there cannot be an objective answer, even if advisers present their solutions as absolute truths. Policy makers should not try to escape the tragedy of this situation; they should instead start to think that decision makers on the other side are facing the same kinds of dilemmas. The fact that US presidents have subordinated nonproliferation concerns to other policy priorities in the cases of Israel or Pakistan, for example, in the same way that other nuclear powers have, should be considered carefully. Such consideration calls for a political understanding of nuclear history, rather than the supposed irresistible appeal of nuclear weapons, on the side of suspected states.68 These words might sound very general, but taken seriously, they lead to a realization that worst case assumptions and ‘‘speeding conservatism’’ are neither the only nor the true answers to a political problem, even if they are often presented as such.

The third move that would prove helpful is to reshape what is expected from the experts. Willingly or unwillingly, their judgments are political because they are driven by an understanding of history that is, most often, the proliferation paradigm. So, instead of expecting from them the truth about what is to be done, policy makers would benefit much more from asking for three specific things: as much factual accuracy as possible, recognition of the limits of what can be known, and a much more challenging attitude visa`-vis what sounds like consensual truth.69 Overestimations of what can be known as well as a tendency toward confirmation bias have already been diagnosed as responsible for two major intelligence failures: the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003 and the lack of anticipation of the attack on Israel in 1973.70 This last point is not to deny that knowledge informs policy. The point of this article is to say that certainty prevents imagination and creativity in politics and surely prevents any kind of shift from hope to audacity. It is far less sure that this need for certainty coupled with fear and mistrust provides the best guide for prudence

### A2: Action

#### ---Imagining solutions to scenarios of global energy crisis serves as a numbing device preserving a childish naiveté that encourages us to fiddle while the planet burns --- The inherent tension between their imminent scenarios for extinction and the at least decade long timeframe before education can induce material change reveals the affirmative’s commitment to the status quo.

Sumrell & Varnelis 2009

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Suddenly, everything's grim. In the face of the current global environmental and financial crisis, the future no longer promises boundless economic growth and technological innovation, but resembles a strangely familiar landscape fraught with potential danger and imminent collapse. lf green shoots offer hope, only the most naive proceed with the reckless abandon of previous years. Global economic crises-like the Great Depression and the stagflation of the late 1960s and early 1970s-are tied to the internal contradictions of capitalism; overinvestment and overproduction produce an unsustainable bubble that eventually bursts. After a crash, overproduction typically inspires a shift in planning from the physical to the temporal. Realizing that it did not plan ahead properly, society concerns itself not with designing and producing things but rather with drawing up plans to safeguard that such crises do not recur in the future. Manfredo Tafuri observes that during the Great Depression, such a shift forced the avant-garde to understand that only economic planning, not physical planning, could cure the problems of modern life: "architecture as the ideology of the Plan is swept away by the reality of the Plan the moment the plan came down from utopia and became an operant mechanism."lTafuri himself wrote in 1969, at the staft of the second great crisis of the twentieth century, a new era of limlts when modern architecture itself was called into question. As architects turn, once again, to temporal planning, we need to come to an understanding of the deeper significance of such methodologies. ln this essay, we examine the history of one such approach, scenario planning. By the postwar era, Royal Dutch/Shell Oil was a diverse body of allied companies with stakes in oil, natural gas, hydrocarbons, petrochemicals, agriculture, and plastics. Under the planned economy of high Fordism, a long sustained boom led to an explosion of automobile ownership and use that drove huge growth for Shell. As one of the “Seven Sisters,” Shell was one of the world’s largest petroleum companies, but it was also the smallest of these and chronically extracted more oil than it added to its reserves. Shell realized it needed a strategy to direct its future growth. Since the end of World War II, both the price of oil and the growth in demand had been remarkably stable, and few oil executives had the foresight to imagine that things would ever change. By the late 1960s, Shell had developed a complex forecasting tool called the Unified Planning Machinery to predict growth in energy demand and upcoming oil prices. UPM-derived strategy used previous sales and cost projections to anticipate the price of crude and demand in detail for one year and more generally for six years. Using that information, the company could generate strategies for investment in infrastructure as well as for trade. Although the UPM was effective when crude prices were stable and demand was steadily rising, it was not flexible enough to anticipate adverse events that could affect the company outside of its general business operations. By the early 1960s most senior Shell executives had experience only with a long economic boom, but threats were mounting. Not only was overproduction looming, but also overt European colonialism was coming to an end and with it, the loss of Western control over oil reserves in the developing world. Realizing that even in this time of growth, the landscape was quickly changing, some employees of the Shell planning department – among them Ted Newland – sought more flexible methods of planning for uncertainty in the future, and turned to the scenario planning methods devised by Herman Kahn and the Hudson Institute. A decade before, at the RAND Corporation, Kahn began using systems theory and game theory to model the effects of massive nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Kahn did not just employ standard projections. Instead, he wrote multiple histories of near future events as if from a more distant future vantage point. Instead of accurate forecasts, however, Kahn sought to write compelling fictions demonstrating threats and opportunities together with the means by which his audience could anticipate them. These scenarios, Kahn believed, served as myths for the modern day. Literary qualities were so important to Kahn that later, at the Hudson Institute, he hired novelist William Gaddis to rewrite the institute’s reports. To describe such stories, Leo Rosten, another writer who freelanced at RAND, suggested the term “scenario,” a poetic but antiquated term that Hollywood employed to refer to screenplays during silent movie days. Kahn loved the term precisely for its evocation of poetry and myth-making. The two decades at the state of the Cold War were marked by a fervent interest in the future. Science fiction of this era was generally optimistic about our ability to solve problems with technology. By the late 1950s, however, sharp advances in everyday technology, a proliferation of commercial goods, and futuristic military and space technologies closed the gap with science fiction. Modernization was complete. If this diluted modernism permeated everything. Utopian projections were no longer plausible. It was time to envision the future again, outside of Utopia, this time not as a radically different whole but from the contemporary condition or even from an imagined past. Still, the Cold War was a time of deep instability and individuals needed fantasy to comprehend the difficulties of the world. Carl Jung’s practice of analytical psychology became popular, especially in art and literature, offering a system of archetypes and the symbolic use of dreams, fairly tales, and myths to comprehend the world. Also during this period, J. R. R. Tolkien completed The Lord of the Rings trilogy while C. S. Lewis wrote The Chronicles of Narnia. Together, both works established the modern genre of fantasy writing while making clear the importance and difficulty of epic struggles between good and evil. Similarly, Walt Disney left behind the familiar, comical animated adventures of Mickey Mouse, Goofy, and Donald Duck for the more romantic visions of Cinderella and Sleeping Beauty, fairy tales he appropriated from the Brothers Grimm. The potential of nuclear war threatened to end the future itself, a possibility made vivid by Nevil Shute, an aeronautical engineer, in his 1957 On the Beach. Shute described the effects of fallout after a massive war on the last survivors as devastating and inevitable, yet did so without any great expression of emotion: characters generally took pleasure in small things and waited for the end. Kahn found On the Beach an “interesting, but badly researched book.” Still, the novel broke new ground by imagining what had previously been deemed to horrible to think. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, U.S. nuclear policy was based on the idea that the country’s capability for massive retaliation with nuclear weapons made both conventional and limited nuclear war unthinkable for the Soviet Union. Using game theory to prove his point, Kahn argued otherwise. First, he suggested that the policy of massive retaliation encouraged the Soviet Union to launch a first strike to disable the United States’ ability to strike. Second, he argued that when pressed, neither country would engage in all-out war and, even if they did, life-and with it, warfare-would continue afterward, however damaged. As forecasting life past a nuclear holocaust was considered unthinkable at the time, Kahn called his projections "thinking the unthinkable"' He concluded that the United States should avoid threatening nuclear war, ensure a second-strike capability to adequately deter further aggression, and draft plans for continuing war after a nuclear exchange. Kahn's 1961 book, On Thermonuclear War, galvanized both policymakers and the public. Kahn's projections compelled John E Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to shift U. S. military strategy to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, which relied on a second-strike capability. In part, Kahn's success was due not only to his argument but also to his intense but comic presentation style. Kahn would frequently joke about nuclear war to get the audience's attention and keep them listening. Many, however, were disturbed by the very topic and outraged by Kahn's propensity to joke about nuclear war. A rival military strategist at RAND, Bernard Brodie, advocated massive retaliation, believing it necessary to keep nuclear war unthinkable. For him, Kahn's project was grotesque, an improper coupling: "Something [was] illegitimately in something else ...Things that should be kept apart [were] fused together." ln contrast, the founder of communitarianism, Amitai Etzioni, applauded him: "Kahn does for nuclear arms what free-love advocates did for sex: he speaks candidly of acts which others whisper behind close doors.” As Etzioni observed, horror and disgust at thinking the unthinkable galvanized opposition to nuclear war. Stanley Kubrick would echo Kahn's tactics in his 1964 black comedy, Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, even as he immortalized Kahn as (at least a partial inspiration for) the character of film's Dr. Strangelove.l0 The Limits to Growth Amid growing tensions with RAND, Kahn left and founded the Hudson lnstitute. There, he investigated nonmilitary futures and honed a doctrine of futurology that posited unending growth for capitalism and technology.tl The first decade of work at the Hudson lnstitute culminated in the 1967 book, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years, set out to identify the challenges faced by the United States from a changing geopolitical context and the transitions to a postindustrial society. Soon, The Year 2000 began to circulate at Shell and with it the idea that the world's demand for oil would rise exponentially by the end of the century. Beginning in the late 1960s, Shell's London based planning group, led by Ted Newland and Pierre Wack, began generating scenarios to understand risks-both political and general. Newland and Kahn soon became friends. After successfully convincing Shell's Committee of Managing Directors that the UPM could not adequately cope with such changes, Newland assembled a team to generate scenarios.1 ln 1971, Newland was joined in Shell's Planning Department by Pierre Wack. Trained as a public administrator, Wack was a disciple of the mystic G. l. Gurdjieff during World War ll. Gurdjieff believed that people lived their lives in a state close to somnambulism and sought to teach his disciples how to wake up and see the world. One way of doing this. Gurdjieff suggested, was to seek out "remarkable peoplel'r3 Similarly, Wack believed that turning to conventional sources was a mistake, as they were already well known to the stakeholders involved. He found one of these remarkable people in Kahn, whose writings he had become acquainted and whom he had visited at the Hudson lnstitute.14 To understand the fate of oil in the year 2000, Newland assembled a team in Shell's Group Planning division to map the risks by developing six initial scenarios. Unlike Kahn, the scenario planners at Shell sought not the big picture but rather a focused vision of the future for oil. Even more than Kahn's faith in the powers of scenarios as fictional devices, Wack and Newland believed in the mythological role of scenarios that had the compelling and memorable qualities of fairy tales. Shell planner Arie de Geus would write "ln the telling ..., the story line becomes stronger. Scenarios act as a signal-to-noise filter. The driving forces sharpen. The events depicted enter the mind with less background noise and thus with a stronger profile and clearer outlines."ls One scenario focused on the changing ownership of energy supplies. Prior to the foundation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1960s, oil reserves were divided among three regions, the United States (which had import restrictions), the self-sufficient communist world, and everywhere else, known simply as the "international oil industry" or "the World Outside the Communist Area and North America" (WOCANA).16Within the WOCANA nations, national interests owned only 8 percent of their crude oil, with the rest owned by the Seven Sisters as well as a few aspiring independents. lt quickly became clear to Wack and Newland that the oil industry could lose its control over oil prices in many of the WOCANA nations. Shell's directors agreed that a crisis in oil production would come, but were unwilling to break with the path followed by the oil companies and stuck steadfastly to UPM projections. Wack was disturbed by this and realized that their scenarios were too prosaic. Scenarios had to, he concluded, make it possible to "change our managers' view of reality."l7 ln other words, scenario planning was important less as an analytical tool and more as a rhetorical device. Scenario planning, Peter Schwartz writes, merely allows people to see what they are blind to.18 A successful scenario, he explains, "resonates in some ways with what they already know, and then leads them from that resonance to reperceive the world."19 De Geus himself explains that scenario planning served as a form of transitional object, a term that he borrowed from psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott.2o For Winnicott, the transitional object designated "the intermediate area of experience, between the thumb and the teddy bear, between the oral erotism and the true object-relationship, between primary creative activity and projection of what has already been introjected." Not necessarily a thing at all, the transitional object is more often an action, a sound, or some other phenomena. As an intermediate condition, it provides a means by which the child moves from an oceanic phase to a grasp of the world and consciousness.2l But instead of a fetish, over time, such objects would be decathected, relegated to limbo after losing their meaning. Winnicott suggested that such objects "diffused...spread out over the ... whole cultural field!'z2 Here Winnicott could suggest a return: "lt is assumed here that the task of reality acceptance is never completed, that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience ... which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.).This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is 'lost' in playl'23Thus for de Geus scenario planning served not so much to anticipate the future as to stimulate thought about it. Even after processing the scenarios. Shell did not anticipate an energy crisis from the seller's market before 1980 because of long-term contracts the major oil producers had signed with OPEC.24 Still, based on the results of the Year 2000 study, Shell diversified, expanding into coal and nuclear power generation and metal production. Shell made many aspects of its scenarios public, thus launching an international discussion on the looming "oil crisis." In America, there was reason for concern. The country's rapid economic growth during the preceding decades meant that internal oil production had not kept pace with demand, peaking in 1970. Although there was still oil within the country's borders, bringing it to the surface was not as cost effective as importing it. To ensure that the growing demand would continue to be met, the U.S. government slowly reduced its restrictions on imported oil until it finally abolished them in 1973, deepening American reliance on foreign oil.25 ln the ten years following 1968, oil imports to the United States increased 193 percent while domestic oil production dropped 3 percent. Both Shell and the industry were aware of this possibility decades beforehand. ln 1956, Marion King Hubbert, a geophysicist working in Shell's Houston office, predicted that the United States would reach peak oil production between 1965 and 1970 while the world would do so around the year 2000.26 Hubbert's predictions were deeply unpopular, so much so that after Shell's head office learned that he would be presenting his research at the American Petroleum lnstitute, representatives called to ask him to withdraw his presentation.2T Since it would have required a massive shift away from existing investments, Hubbert's work was simply too dramatic for oil companies to take seriously. Although Hubbert was ignored by Shell and the industry, the idea of a resource-limited future steadily became more acceptable. A group of public officials, economists. and scientists met in Rome in 1968 to examine the future broadly.They published their results in 1972 asThe Limits to Growth. Like Hubber1, the authors of the study concluded that global resource extraction-not only of oil, but also of many crucial metals-would peak around the year 2000. The Limits to Growth questioned the viability of the current rate of consumption of the planet's resources.28 For Shell, The Limits to Growth meant that the environmental question was no longer a set of localized issues and reactions but rather a global problem that affected the company's public image. By making public Newland and Wack's Year 2000 study, Shell appeared to be in the forefront of such thinking, but they still underestimated how quickly change would happen. The Arab-lsraeli crisis of 1973 triggered the anticipated crisis over non-Western controlled oil. The result was an increase in the price of a barrel of oil from $2.90 in September to $5.10 in December to $11.65 on January 1, 1974.30 The new geopolitical landscape prompted the U.S. government to seek new means of conservation and alternative energy sources to prevent American dependency on foreign oil. The potential drop in demand, it became clear, could be as dangerous to an oil company's bottom line as any threat from overseas. Shell's scenarios did not predict the events of the OPEC energy crisis or how soon a crisis would take place, but as their scenarios suggesting a potential shift of power in oil resources had been made public prior to the crisis unfolding, the company appeared to have anticipated it.31 Even though no specific management decisions could be directly attributed to Shell's use of scenarios, scenario planning was a convenient means of fostering an image of Shell as having anticipated the future.3 lmpressed by the relevance of theYear 2000 scenarios, Shell continued to employ the scenario plan strategy, and by 1977 the planning group was running a number of scenarios including one focusing on lran, where much of the Seven Sisters' remaining oil supply was located. Within the scenarios, they anticipated that growing fundamentalist sentiments could bring a shift in power, upsetting the region and possibly turning it against the West, thus causing a steep rise in oil prices.33 Again, sooner than Shell expected, events unfolded that caused a second oil crisis. The 1979 lranian revolution and the subsequent lran/lraq war caused barrel prices to double.3a Shell had already been looking to diversify its holdings further and pursue new sources of oil, particularly to offshore deposits identified in the 1960s. Until this second price spike, many of these options were too expensive to develop. The new oil prices made offshore drilling profitable, and soon Shell focused much of its attention to the offshore industry and construction of new types of rigs and platforms.35 This was widely perceived as Shell's second success with scenarios. Shell had risen from the least profitable to the most profitable of the Seven Sisters. The planning department was widely integrated into the corporate and management structure. Any major new projects taken on at Shell had to be run successfully against all of the ongoing scenarios, thereby attempting to guarantee that new plans would have as much success as possible, regardless of the way events unfold.36 The third oil crisis occurred as a combination of massive investments in supply infrastructure in the 1970s and cutbacks in demand due to energy conservation. ln 1986, prices collapsed and stayed low for some twenty years.37 Still, Shell's 1985 "Oil Price Collapse" scenario anticipated the drop, allowing the company to immediately put its most expensive exploratory projects on hold while developing new technologies such as three-dimensional seismic technology and horizontal drilling to more efficiently produce oil from mature fields and existing wells. Through the scenarios, Shell also anticipated the opening and deregulation of global markets.3s At the same time, the scenario team began to feel pressure to prove its own strategic value. The link to corporate success and the planning department's work was not quantifiable. Many managers could not fully understand the group's value. While Shell's executives acknowledged the accuracy of many of the Shell scenarios, they nevertheless saw the program as expensive and wasteful. By design, most of the scenarios developed by the group would never unfold in real life, and it was impossible to tell whether the planning department's ideas were actually having any effect on the decision-making process of management.39 For every valuable fiction scripted, there were many scenarios that would never come to pass-indeed one of the reasons that Hubbert's peak oil had been discounted was that such predictions had been made for decades beforehand- producing unrecouped expenses. Yet some scenarios proved misleading. Only a few years before, acting on the advice of scenario team, Shell entered into the nuclear and coal industries. Neither venture proved successful, both were controversial, and eventually Shell abandoned them.a0 ln 1986 de Geus began to reexamine and audit the planning department's strategies. As a result, the planning team turned toward the idea of Shell as a learning company, setting up a computer conferencing system among scenario planners while enlisting Stewart Brand, the founder of The Whole Earth Catalog, to organize a series of "learning conferences" that drew heavily from countercultural influences, cybernetics, systems theory, and computer technology. During the 1990s, the culture at large turned toward hopefulness about the impact of impendlng technological advances on the proximate future. The crisis model upon which many of the earlier scenarios depended had eased and the focus changed to seizing opportunity in emerging global markets and new technologies. So, too, as the internet made vast quantities of information easily available, it became difficult for investors to believe that anyone could produce genuinely new knowledge. Scenario planners turned inward, codifying their methodology; Peter Schwaftz. Kees van der Heijden, and Arie de Geus all released books on the methodology of scenario planning, arguing for its deployment in both professional decisions and everyday life. At this point, scenario planning was sold not as something done by a select group of remarkable people but rather as a technique that everyone could employ for personal growth and advancement, a strategy for an uncertain but rapidly expanding marketplace. There ls No Alternative Throughout the 1990s, Shell's scenarios focused on the concept "There ls No Alternative" (TINA). An echo of Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History and the Last Mani' TINA projected the increasing liberalization and globalization of markets together with a greater decline in the power of national interests and more reliance and dependence on new technology. a1 As neoliberal government policies spurred on deregulation, new financial instruments began to serve the function of scenarios, helping companies and investors guard against unforeseen conditions. Through tradable futures, options, derivatives, credit default swaps, and hedge funds, the future itself could be marketed and commodified.a2 Since 2001 , a steady stream of crises have come to pass that have radically shaken public faith in the market economy and Shell's own confidence in theTlNA concept. First, the terrorist attacks of September 11 , 2001 , growing tensions in the Middle East, and the lraq War threatened the illusion of relative peace, reliability of foreign oil supply, and free rein for globalization. Second, Shell faced scandal in 2004. Because investment depends on future returns, truthful disclosure of a company's assets is a prerequisite. Shell, however, overstated its reserves by 20 percent, prompting widespread outrage among investors.43The reality of the future undid its fiction. Combined, these threats prompted a reevaluation of TINA known as "There Are No ldeal Answers" (TANIA) to confront the need to transition to a sustainable source of energy. Scenario planning does not focus on the future but rather on the present. Peak oil, global warming, and the fragility of speculative bubbles are imminent threats. But the massive capital already invested by companies like Shell in existing infrastructure makes it impossible for them to abandon standard industry practices, even if they know that the consequences of business as usual will be dire once things hit a tipping point. Like fairy tales, scenarios present carefully crafted stories that indirectly illustrate the dangers of the world to an audience that isn't ready for them. They allow us to prepare for the future, even if we feel powerless against the forces of the world around us, by providing a context for speaking about the unspeakable. The lessons of fairy tales are gentle and distant, they may only make sense later, when the codified dangers from the stories appear in reality. This helps preserve a childlike naiveté and enables the continued drive toward pleasure in the face of fear and doubt. As Bruno Bettelheim wrote: "The figures and events of fairy tales also personify and illustrate inner conflicts, but they suggest ever so subtly how these conflicts may be solved, and what the next steps in the development toward a higher humanity might be. The fairy tale is presented in a simple, homely way; no demands are made on the listener. This prevents even the smallest child from feeling compelled to act in specific ways, and he is never made to feel inferior. Far from making demands, the fairy tale reassures, gives hope for the future, and holds out the promise of a happy ending." By providing a forum where fear and anxiety can both be discussed, fairy tales provide listeners with a sense of importance, even if they do not yet have agency.46 ln Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Sigmund Freud hypothesized that since organisms come into being from a plenum of inanimate matter, they carry with them the death drive or "pleasure principle” a desire to return to this undifferentiated state. lf, however, the organism responds with an "influx of fresh amounts of stimulus" through a traumatic event, it can awake again and go on living or, if the stimulus is strong enough, reproduce.4T In this light, scenario planning functions more as a rhetorical device and therapy than as a method of planning or accurate forecast. The shock of the actual event is necessary to allow change to occur. But scenario planning allows participants to continue playing even though they know better. Like psychoanalysis, there is no end or goal to the process of gaming; its value is the sensation that comes from playing the game.

#### This means the affirmative is incapable of predicting energy markets, their assumption that the future is an extension of the status quo means they cannot account for scenerios that are not desirable for their authors,

Labban 2010

Mazen, Preempting Possibility: Critical Assessment of IEA’s *World Energy Outlook 2010*, International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2010, Paris: International Energy Agency, http://www.academia.edu/1424109/Preempting\_Possibility\_Critical\_Assessment\_of\_the\_IEAs\_World\_Energy\_Outlook\_2010

Growing uncertainty about energy markets following the crises of the 1970s boosted long-term energy forecasting as a planning device to prepare for an increasingly unpredictable future, on one hand, and as a techno-scientiﬁc(read: politically neutral and respectable) support for public policies ostensibly aimed at increasing energy security and environmental protection, on the other. Long-range forecasts, however, have invariably failed to produce accurate predictions about all aspects of energy markets: primary energy supplies, energy substitutions, the relative shares of different fuels in the energy mix, aggregate and sectoral energy demand, as well as carbon emissions. 6 Because they rely on trend projections, forecasts also rely on an assumption that the future is a smooth, gradual extension of the present at a constant rate with no structural changes or major interruptions or aberrations. They also rely on empirical correlation rather than causality and cannot therefore explain underlying forces that drive demand, price, etc. **Thus forecasts cannot predict a future that looks very different from the present, let alone explain how possible futures might unfold, which makes them useful only in short-term, business-as-usual projections**. Because of such inherent limitations, which prevent forecasts from accurately predicting long-term technical developments, capital markets and investment climates, let alone even more unpredictable processes such as government policies and geopolitical conﬂict, energy analysts, including the economists at the IEA, have shifted from long-range predictive forecasts towards more normative scenario building in the analysis of long-range energy-related developments. This technical move has a political dimension that is worth pondering in order to shed critical light on the signiﬁcance of the WEO 2010 scenarios. Scenario analysis has its origins in corporate and military strategic planning. 7 It was developed by Herman Kahn at the RAND corporation in the1950s — to help the US Air Force think about ‘the unthinkable’ — and pioneered by Shell in the early 1960s, initially as an internal communications vehicle, to help the company respond more readily to unexpected develop-ments in energy markets that might affect the price of oil. Whereas forecasts predict what is most likely to happen in the future given current trends and projections, scenarios contemplate what is possible if certain choices are made from within a hypothetical range of possibilities which typically includes a reference case describing what would happen if no action is takento alter the existing state of affairs in any fundamental manner. For this reason, scenarios not only describe hypothetical futures but must also prescribe pathways and roadmaps, policies and actions, and identify ways and meansto arrive at a desirable future and avoid undesirable fate. Unlike forecasts,in which the future is determined by projections of current trends, scenar-ios assume a less deterministic development that allows subjects to makechoices and whose agency, not the correlation of empirical facts, determines possible futures. Scenarios are ‘desiring machines’, to borrow a term from Deleuze and Guattari (1983): at the same time that they produce the desired future, they also produce the subject and mechanism by which to actualize it. This occasionally operates in the form of blackmail: coercing action in the present by showing the dire consequences of not acting. Despite obvious differences and assertions to the contrary, energy scenarios are one type of predictive forecast which, however, does not treat current circumstances and trends as immutable, therefore allowing itself ﬂexibility in projecting into the future (and an about-face if the future turns out differ-ently) in order to effect change in the present. For one, energy scenarios rely on forecasts about economic growth, population growth, energy demand, production and generation capacities, prices and costs, etc., hence the possibilities they construct are based on a set of predictions. Also, forecasting is often negatively implicit in scenario analysis. The authors of WEO 2010, as of other Outlooks, are adamant that their scenarios are not forecasts. Yet, all three WEO 2010 scenarios are forecasts about the state of the global economy in that they assume continued economic growth. They also assert that no matter what it will look like, the future is certainly not going to look like the present because WEO 2010 predicts that governments will act on their policy promises, no matter how weakly, and in predictable manner: ‘it is certain that energy and climate policies in many — if not most — countries will change, possibly in the way we assume in the New Policies Scenario’(p. 62). Thus, eliminating the abominable which is also impossible, WEO 2010 scenarios lay out two alternative futures that differ only quantitatively — one desirable, the other ‘realistic’, or likely. The possible becomes what ensues from action according to the scenario’s prescriptions or from absolute lack of action and this is effected by actualizing future events and processes that may or may not occur, depending on what course of action governments take or fail to take in the present. Scenarios limit what is possible to what is desirable for their authors, or to its exact opposite, and exclude possibilities that do not fall within this range. At the moment that scenarios produce possibilities they negate the very notion of possibility.x

### A2: Nuclear Power Inevitable

#### ---Their claim that nuclear power is inevitable collapses the future into the present tense and makes extinction inevitable by equating

Sofia 1984

Zoe, Exterminating Fetuses: Abortion, Disarmament, and the Sexo-Semiotics of Extraterrestialism, Diacritics, Vol. 14, No 2, Nuclear Criticism. pg. 47-59

The collapsed future tense lies at the heart of our culture of space and time travel. It is the “bound to be” of the ideology of progress, operative in the discourse of those who tell us that since nuclear reactors, deep-sea mining, Star Wars, and space colonies are inevitable parts of our future, we might as well quit griping about their bad side-effects and get on with making the future happen; after all, there’s no time like the present. Trouble is, the collapse of the future leaves the present with no time, and we live with the sense of the pre-apocalyptic moment, the inevitability of everything happening at once. The perversity of the collapsed future tense lies in its ability at once to invoke and deny the future. For if the future is already upon us, we have no need to consider the survival needs of future generations: we are the future generations. The collapse of adulthood into the fetus-world symbol helps render extinction conscionable by reductively equating the megadeath of the cosmic unborn with the individual deaths we all know we must face. The pro-life position is therefore continuous with all of those other discourses of future collapse which work to paralyze people into inaction in the face of the extraterrestrial and exterminist technologies which seem destined to take over our lives.

## Landmines k

#### ---THE AFF CREATES A CLASS OF “LEGITIMATE” WEAPONS BY ASCRIBING AGENCY TO WEAPONS RATHER THAN THE PEOPLE WHO USE THEM— THIS MAINTAINS MILITARISM OVERALL AND THREATENS EXTINCTION

**DAUPHINÉE 2001** (Elizabeth, Researcher for CSIS and Doctoral Candidate in Political Science at York University, “Broadening the Ban,” YCISS Occasional Paper, October www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP68-Dauphinee.pdf)

It is not the intent of this paper to belittle the achievements of the Ottawa Convention. There is little doubt but that the conclusion of the treaty will, as noted already, preserve the lives of those who would otherwise be killed by future landmine use. What I have tried to suggest throughout, however, is that the achievements of the ban on landmines should not be exaggerated or rendered as a transformative event in the progress of humanitarian thought and its ensuing practices. The Ottawa Convention differs little from previous weapons bans in that it does not actually advance an understanding of humanitarianism that is vested in the desire to prevent human suffering more generally as a result of state security practices. In this respect, it is clear that “[t]he general taboo [surrounding landmines] does not lend well to a prohibition on other state exercises of violence effecting civilian populations, so that one is left to wonder whence we would go from a total ban on landmines.”

Most western militaries are undeniably capable of fielding any number of technologically advanced weapons systems, such that the Ottawa Convention is unlikely to seriously undermine their ability to wage terrorising military campaigns. Disassociating themselves from the use of AP landmines does not affect advanced states from engaging in decisive, devastating warfare which imperils human life. The Convention has also failed, through its rendering of the landmine-as-agent, to identify loci of accountability and responsibility outside of the weapon itself. By advancing de facto the argument that landmines are problematic because of their indiscriminacy and inhumanity, the Convention has actually helped to discursively codify other weapons (i.e., those that are not included in the ban) as not indiscriminate and not inhumane. Such an articulation has inadvertently contributed to the legitimation of (non-AP) weapons which result in similar devastating consequences. By reifying an understanding of the landmine-as-agent, the Convention has also lent itself to the suggestion that intentionality is of crucial importance in determining what/which weapons and practices are acceptable in warfare. To that end, the Convention has not advanced any claim that killing, maiming, or wounding people is inherently problematic. The (unintended) results of this have been: 1) to effect a closure on the possibility of adding other, equally devastating weapons to the list of proscribed agents under the rubric of the Ottawa Convention and, 2) to leave unproblematised and unscrutinised those militarised state security practices that imperil human life more generally.

#### ---CRITIQUING THEIR REPRESENTATIONS OF LANDMINE AGENCY EXPOSES MILITARISM AND ALLOWS AN EFFECTIVE TOTAL CRITIQUE OF STATE VIOLENCE

**DAUPHINÉE 2001** (Elizabeth, Researcher for CSIS and Doctoral Candidate in Political Science at York University, “Broadening the Ban,” YCISS Occasional Paper, October www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP68-Dauphinee.pdf)

A reevaluation of the impact of state security practices is crucial if we, in the post-Cold War environment, really wish to engage in discourses that have at their core humanitarian concerns. Any attempt to formulate adequate responses to humanitarian concerns would seem to entail a discussion of ethical possibilities that are not the central focus of this study. However, in identifying where humanitarian practices are conceptually and theoretically weak or limiting, we can start to posit suggestions that may provide a framework for a broadening and/or deepening of our understanding of the practices that render people insecure and imperiled more generally. In the context of the ban on landmines, this would seem to require a rearticulation of agency such that states and militaries would become the primary focus of scrutiny with respect to weapons use. Accordingly, shifting responsibility from particular weapons to those who use them could provide a breadth of analysis that would extend beyond the discursive construction of inhumane weapons to include those security practices which imperil human life more generally. Such a shift would also extend the parameters of humanitarian discourse to potentially encompass any and all categories of weapons and weapons use and would almost necessarily render problematic the militarised practices that facilitate this use. A further suggestion lies in what I would argue should be the jettisoning of conceptual qualifiers such as discriminacy and indiscriminacy, intentionality and unintentionality. Simplistic and unsophisticated as the suggestion may appear, a more fruitful and expansive course of analysis would reject the qualifying terms of discourse that preclude or supercede discussion of the effects of militarisation and weapons use in the context of their humanitarian implications. At best, such a shift in the focus of analysis would render problematic all forms of state security practices that have violence at their core. At the very least, it would provide the basis for a broadening of the ban to include weapons that replicate the effects of AP landmines which have been discursively rendered so inhumane.

## \*\*\*1NR

### \*\*\*IN THE US

### 1NR A2: W/M

**theres also a distinction between vessels inside the U.S. and outside the U.S.**

US Code 12 10 USC CHAPTER 633 - NAVAL VESSELS

http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/10C633.txt

REPAIR OF VESSELS IN FOREIGN SHIPYARDS Pub. L. 99-500, Sec. 101(c) [title IX, Sec. 9101], Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783-82, 1783-118, and Pub. L. 99-591, Sec. 101(c) [title IX, Sec. 9101], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-82, 3341-118, provided that: "No naval vessel or any vessel owned and operated by the Department of Defense homeported in the United States may be overhauled, repaired, or maintained in a foreign owned and operated shipyard located outside of the United States, except for voyage repairs."

More evidence – vessels aren’t topical

Marolda, Senior Historian, Naval Historical Center-no date

http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/sword-shield.htm

Port operations in the United States, Europe, and Saudi Arabia that involved the joint Transportation Command, Navy and Army commands in the United States and overseas, and the governments and military forces of many European and Arab nations were anything but smooth. Some ships arrived late at ports of embarkation while others arrived before there were cargoes for them. At several sites the port groups took too long to load ships, stowed cargo improperly, or scattered the equipment of one ground unit among a number of ships.

#### ---Their interpretation conflates extraterritorial jurisdiction and “in the United States”

MILITARY EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT OF 2000

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ523/html/PLAW-106publ523.htm>

To amend title 18, United States Code, to establish Federal jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the United States by persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces, or by members of the Armed Forces who are released or separated from active duty prior to being identified and prosecuted for the commission of such offenses, and for other purposes. <<NOTE: Nov. 22, 2000 - [S. 768]>>

#### Their interpretation explodes the topic

Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territory>

United States territory is any extent of region under the jurisdiction of the federal government of the United States,[1] including all waters[2] (around islands or continental tracts) and all U.S. Naval vessels. The United States has traditionally proclaimed the sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing its territory.[3] This extent of territory is all the area belonging to, and under the dominion of, the United States federal government (which includes tracts lying at a distance from the country) for administrative and other purposes.[1] The United States total territory includes a subset of political divisions. The U.S. government is a government with delegated powers under the United States Constitution. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" by the Tenth Amendment.

#### ---The EIA makes a distinction between United States and its territories and possessions.

EIA Glossary

<http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=U>

United States: The 50 States and the District of Columbia. Note: The United States has varying degrees of jurisdiction over a number of territories and other political entities outside the 50 States and the District of Columbia, including Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, Johnston Atoll, Midway Islands, Wake Island, and the Northern Mariana Islands. EIA data programs may include data from some or all of these areas in U.S. totals. For these programs, data products will contain notes explaining the extent of geographic coverage included under the term "United States."

#### Prefer our source-The Energy Information Administration is the most qualified source

Amadeo-no date

U.S. Energy Information Administration (DOE EIA)

<http://useconomy.about.com/od/governmentagencies/p/DOE_EIA.htm>

What the US Energy Information Administration Is:

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) is an independent statistical agency of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). It was created by Congress in 1977 to support the government’s decision-making ability by providing policy-neutral data. What the US Energy Information Administration Does: The EIA provides energy data, forecasts, and analyses that can be used to understand how energy is used in the U.S. Its reports covers oil and gasoline, natural gas, coal, electricity, nuclear energy and alternative fuels. It provides up to date information about prices, supply, reserves, production and estimated demand. It also provides both short-term and long-term forecasts of energy use, supply and prices. How the U.S. Energy Information Administration Affects the U.S. Economy: The EIA provides the data needed by the DOE to make policy decisions. It also provides analyses to Congress to help make decisions on important energy and conservation bills. How the US Energy Information Administration Affects You: The EIA web site is a great place to learn anything you’d ever want to know about how energy is used in this country. It has everything from an easy-to-use introduction to energy use to complicated Congressional analyses. The energy prices and forecasts can help you make good decisions about what type of car to buy, what heating system would be effective for your home, and which states would be the cheapest places in terms of home heating costs.

### 1NR A2: C/I Territories

#### ---Allowing military cases all over the world explodes the topic

Pike Research 12

<http://www.pikeresearch.com/research/renewable-energy-for-military-applications>

Military investment in renewable energy and related technologies, in many cases, holds the potential to bridge the “valley of death” that lies between research & development and full commercialization of these technologies. As such, the myriad of DOD initiatives focused on fostering cleantech is anticipated to have a substantial impact on the development and growth of the industry as a whole. With projects ranging from the utilization of solar and wind power for electricity generation, to the adoption of fuel cells for portable power, to the deployment of microgrids for forward base operations and the use of alternative fuels for land, air, and sea transport, all branches of the U.S. military – and many other military and defense entities around the world – are major players in the global cleantech industry.

This Pike Research report provides a comprehensive examination of military applications for renewable energy and related clean technologies including solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, hydrokinetic energy, biofuels and synfuels, fuel cells, microgrids, smart meters, and energy efficiency, among others. The study analyzes the economics and performance characteristics of emerging energy technologies across a host of application areas within the facilities, transport, and portable power domains. It includes detailed profiles of key industry players and provides detailed market forecasts through 2030.

### \*\*\*A2: Naval Power Add-on

### 1NR A2: Naval Power Add-on

#### ---Retrenchment won’t lead to great power war.

Parent and MacDonald 2011

Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” http://www.ihavenet.com/World-United-States-The-Wisdom-of-Retrenchment-America-Must-Cut-Back-to-Move-Forward-Foreign-Affairs.html

A somewhat more compelling concern raised by opponents of retrenchment is that the policy might undermine deterrence. Reducing the defense budget or repositioning forces would make the United States look weak and embolden upstarts, they argue. "The very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies," Kaplan worries. This anxiety is rooted in the assumption that the best barrier to adventurism by adversaries is forward defenses -- the deployment of military assets in large bases near enemy borders, which serve as tripwires or, to some eyes, a Great Wall of America. There are many problems with this position. For starters, the policies that have gotten the United States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran's regional power. NATO's expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified Russia's ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention. Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. The biggest menace to a superpower is not **the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch**. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall.

#### ---Statistical data disproves the necessity of hegemony\*\*\*

Fettweis 2011

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.