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### 1nc aspec

#### The aff has failed to specify their agent, doing so in the 2ac is to late because the 1nc is our prime time for offense, voting issue for negative ground, they can shift their advocacy and prevent agent cp discussion which is critical to informed policy

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Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy Annual Review of Energy

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The ultimate effectiveness of any policy is largely dependent on the individual efficacy and coordination of the agents or agencies that implement it. There are ample illustrations of the truth of this premise in the recent attempts by the Administration and Congress to formulate and implement a national energy policy, as a result, that policy, irrespective of any intrinsic soundness, could inevitably become trapped in a quagmire of regulatory policies and practices. The difficulties that energy policymakers in the United States have experienced in 1974 and 1975 arc in many respects symptomatic of the very problem that they have intended to resolve—the lack of a comprehensive and coordinated national energy policy. Decisions concerning energy supply and general policy that have been made over the years have contributed to the creation of areas of special concern and interest, institutionalized them, and nourished them through dedicated sponsorship by either the Congress, the Executive Branch, the independent federal agencies, or industry. The difficulties that stymied congressional consideration and executive implementation of an effective energy policy in 1974 and the first half of 1975 mirror this state of affairs.

### 1nc immigration reform

#### CIR will pass---but fights are coming

Miami Herald 2/5 (“Will immigration reform go the distance?” http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/02/05/v-print/3218867/will-immigration-reform-go-the.html

Immigration reform is having a “Kumbaya” moment, with support from the White House, a bipartisan contingent in Congress, business and labor. The Republicans are petrified after their dismal showing among the fastest-growing slices of the electorate, Hispanics and Asians; President Barack Obama wants to reward the loyalty of those voters. Business and labor, as well as many politicians, want to fix a dysfunctional system. There are more than 11 million undocumented immigrants, 5 percent of the work force. Many of these people live in fear of discovery, while jobs go unfilled in some areas. Hold the champagne. When it comes to immigration laws, the concept is always easier than the reality. Change failed to happen six years ago, even with a push from a high-powered coalition led by President George W. Bush and Senators John McCain and Edward M. Kennedy. The dynamics are more favorable today. Still, the same obstacles persist; the powerful countervailing considerations include: • A Pathway to Where? There’s a fairly broad consensus for ending the illegal status of the undocumented. The White House, Hispanic groups and most Senate supporters insist that any reform must lead to a pathway to citizenship. That approach faces great resistance. Some lawmakers demand that any move toward citizenship must come second to solving the border-security problem, at a minimum. For some, this is a political cover; under the Obama administration, resources for border security have been increased sharply, including the use of drones. And deportations of undocumented immigrants are at a record high. A border-security trigger is realistic if it includes quantifiable goals, such as the number of new Border Patrol agents, the amount of resources allocated and the new technologies utilized. It isn’t reasonable if it requires meeting an amorphous standard such as “operational control” of a border that is always changing. Hispanic groups assert that the real motive for such demands is to unreasonably stretch out any possibility of granting citizenship. “There would be a backlash if citizenship is delayed for 15 or 20 years,” warns Gary Segura, a Stanford University professor and co-founder of Latino Decisions, a research organization on Hispanic public opinion. • A Fragile Coalition: Equally contentious is the question of future flows of immigrants. One proposal would link the number of legal immigrants to economic conditions: more would be let in when times are good, fewer in tougher times. That sounds easier than it is. There will be clashes over how great a priority should be given to those with high-tech skills or to agricultural workers or to family reunification. Small businesses will rebel against any costly verification plan. Most independent studies show that immigration is a decided economic plus, bringing in revenue and increasing productivity and innovation. Yet the arguments of the populist right may resonate more as the debate heats up. NumbersUSA, a leading anti-immigration group, is reviving charges that immigration reform would drive down wages for middle- and low-income workers. Kris Kobach, the Kansas secretary of state who authored anti-immigration measures in several states and the Republican Party’s platform position on the issue last summer, charges taxpayers would be hit with $2.6 trillion in added food stamp, Medicare and Medicaid and welfare costs. That estimate is refuted by reliable studies; it still cuts. • The Ghost of Dennis Hastert: The former Republican speaker of the House decreed that any bill must command majority support among majority party members. Last month, House Speaker John Boehner, Ohio, waived the rule twice: To pass a measure avoiding the automatic spending cuts and tax increases known as the fiscal cliff and then for aid to victims of Hurricane Sandy. Boehner, along with most party leaders, understands his party’s serious difficulties with Hispanic voters and fears making matters worse by blocking an overhaul. Two of the most virulent anti-immigration Republicans in the House, Lamar Smith of Texas and Steve King of Iowa, no longer hold important committee chairmanships. Yet with anti-immigration sentiment still running high among many Republican rank-and-file voters, it’s tough to imagine a majority of the party’s House members backing a comprehensive bill, even if, as is certain, the Senate goes first. Boehner’s only option might be to let a bill pass primarily with Democratic votes. To do that, he would need the support of House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and the whip, Kevin McCarthy; there’s no shrewder politician than McCarthy, who is always attuned to the party’s base. He’s also from California where, after Gov. Pete Wilson played the anti-immigration card in 1994, the Democrats completely dominate politics. • Who is the Ted Kennedy or Rahm Emanuel? The successful, if flawed, passage of Obama’s health-care measure probably wouldn’t have been possible without the savvy hand of former White House Chief of Staff Emanuel. Congressional Democrats and some outside advocates see no Emanuel counterpart in the current White House; privately, some say they would like the White House to enlist a special envoy — perhaps former Housing Secretary and San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros or former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle — to shepherd the legislation. There was no more capable legislator or deal-maker than the late Senator Kennedy. Egos and tensions already are surfacing among supporters of reform; Republicans don’t trust the White House, and some Democrats worry that Marco Rubio, the ambitious young Republican senator from Florida, will look for a reason to peel off as he comes under pressure from his party’s right wing. There is no senator today who possesses Kennedy’s skill for navigating these shoals. It’s still a slightly better bet that a big immigration bill will be enacted in this Congress. Getting there will be ugly, and the measure will seem to die more than once as it battles these cross pressures.

Energy push requires massive political capital---Obama doesn’t have time and energy to get energy and immigration reform

Davenport-energy correspondent for National Journal-12/6/12

How Obama and Congress Could Find Common Ground on Energy

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/how-obama-and-congress-could-find-common-ground-on-energy-20121206>

AGAINST THE CLOCK One big obstacle is time. A second-term president has about two years to push through major legislation before the next presidential campaign begins. In addition, two huge issues are already on the docket: immigration and tax reform. A sweeping overhaul of the nation’s tax code, which could easily absorb Congress through 2014, offers the first opportunity for major energy reform. Some lawmakers will probably insert a carbon-tax swap proposal in a broader tax-reform package, although for now the carbon tax seems unlikely to succeed. Democrats will also try to end tax breaks for the oil industry while extending those for renewable energy. But if the tax-reform debate ends without comprehensive new energy provisions, it may be too late to enact an energy overhaul. “If President Obama has victories on immigration and the deficit, that’s two potentially momentous victories for the president in a second term, where victories are not typical,” says historian Alfred Zacher, author of Trial and Triumph: Presidential Power in the Second Term. “It’s difficult to believe he’d win three.” Still, Zacher says, “because of his desire for a legacy, and the fact that he won’t need to worry about his base or reelection, he could come up with some unexpected environmental solutions. He’ll have to be a very capable politician, but if he can pull it off, he’ll be revered.” Ultimately, as Dorgan puts it, “there needs to be a will to do it, and it needs to come from the president and the leaders of Congress. If there’s not a will on the part of the president and the leaders of the House and Senate, it won’t happen. He needs to make it a priority.” If President Obama wants a legacy on energy, he’ll have to bring to the issue the same passion that candidate Obama once did.

Political capital is key

Weigant 1/23 (Chris WeigantPolitical writer and blogger at ChrisWeigant.com “Handicapping Obama's Second Term Agenda”

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/obama-second-term\_b\_2537802.html

The second big agenda item is immigration reform. President Obama holds virtually all the cards, politically, on this one. All Republicans who can read either demographics or polling numbers know full well that this may be their party's last chance not to go the way of the Whigs. Their support among Latinos is dismal, and even that's putting it politely. Some Republicans think they have come up with a perfect solution on how to defuse the issue, but they are going to be proven sadly mistaken in the end, I believe. The Republican plan will be announced by Senator Marco Rubio at some point, and it will seem to mirror the Democratic plan -- with one key difference. Republicans -- even the ones who know their party has to do something on the immigration problem -- are balking at including a "path to citizenship" for the 11 million undocumented immigrants who are already in America. The Republicans are trying to have their cake and eat it too -- and it's not going to work. "Sure," they say, "we'll give some sort of papers to these folks, let them stay, and even let them work... but there's no need to give them the hope of ever becoming a full citizen." This just isn't going to be good enough, though. There are essentially two things citizens can do which green card holders cannot: serve on juries, and vote. The Republicans are not worried about tainted juries, in case that's not clear enough. Republicans will bend over backwards in an effort to convince Latinos that their proposal will work out just fine for everyone. Latinos, however, aren't stupid. They know that being denied any path to citizenship equals an effort to minimize their voice on the national political stage. Which is why, as I said, Obama holds all the cards in this fight. Because this is the one issue in his agenda which Republicans also have a big vested interest in making happen. Obama and the Democrats will, I believe, hold firm on their insistence on a path to citizenship, and I think a comprehensive immigration bill will likely pass some time this year, perhaps before the summer congressional break. The path to citizenship it includes will be long, expensive and difficult (Republicans will insist on at least that), but it will be there. On gun control, I think Obama will win a partial victory. On immigration, I think he will win an almost-total victory. On global warming, however, he's going to be disappointed. In fact, I doubt -- no matter how much "bully pulpiting" Obama does -- that any bill will even appear out of a committee in either house of Congress. This will be seen as Obama's "overreach" -- a bridge too far for the current political climate. Anyone expecting big legislative action on global warming is very likely going to be massively disappointed, to put it quite bluntly. In fact, Obama will signal this in the next few months, as he approves the Keystone XL pipeline -- much to the dismay of a lot of his supporters. Of course, I could be wrong about any or all of these predictions. I have no special knowledge of how things will work out in Congress in the immediate future. I'm merely making educated guesses about what Obama will be able to achieve in at least the first few years of his second term. Obama has a lot of political capital right now, but that could easily change soon. The House Republicans seem almost demoralized right now, and Obama has successfully splintered them and called their bluff on two big issues already -- but they could regroup and decide to block everything the White House wants, and damn the political consequences. Unseen issues will pop up both on the domestic and foreign policy stages, as they always do. But, for now, this is my take on how the next few years are going to play out in Washington. Time will tell whether I've been too optimistic or too pessimistic on any or all of Obama's main agenda items. We'll just have to wait and see.

#### Immigration reform expands skilled labor—spurs relations and economic growth in China and India.

LA Times 11/9/12 [Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html]

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US-Indian relations avert South Asian nuclear war.

Schaffer 2 [Spring 2002, Teresita—Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, Lexis]

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

#### We turn technological innovation and competitiveness

Farrell 12/13/12 (Chris, a contributing editor for Bloomberg Businessweek. From 1986-97, he was on the magazine's staff, as a corporate finance staff and department editor and then as an economics editor. Farrell wrote Right on the Money: Taking Control of Your Personal Finances and Deflation: What Happens When Prices Fall? Among Farrell's many awards are a National Magazine Award, two Loeb Awards, and the Edward R. Murrow Award. Farrell is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Stanford University. “Obama’s Next Act: Immigration Reform” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/obamas-next-act-immigration-reform>)

Washington won’t get much of a reprieve from verbal pyrotechnics once the drama of the fiscal cliff is over. Up next: major immigration reform. President Obama has made it clear that a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s badly frayed immigration system is a second-term priority. Many Republican lawmakers are convinced the big takeaway from the 2012 election results is that conservatives need to rethink their hard-line stance on immigration—including illegal immigrants. Here’s what Washington should do before tackling the tough job of rewriting the immigration laws: Create a quicksilver path to citizenship for the 11 million to 12 million undocumented workers in the U.S. (excluding the small number convicted of violent crimes or multiple felonies). The shift in status acknowledges that these foreign-born newcomers, like previous generations of immigrants, overcame significant obstacles to come to the U.S. to make a better life for their families. Illegal immigrants are neighbors heading off to work, sending their kids to school, and attending church. Their everyday lives would vastly improve by moving from the shadows of society into the mainstream. More important from a public-policy perspective, the change would give a boost to the economy’s underlying dynamism. “What you’re doing in the short run is making it easier for workers to move between jobs, a relatively small effect,” says Gordon Hanson, a professor of economics at the University of California at San Diego. “The larger effect from eliminating uncertainty for these immigrants is creating incentives for them to make long-term investments in careers, entrepreneurship, education, homes, and community.” Let’s state the obvious: A rapid transformation of illegal immigrants into legal immigrants isn’t in the cards. Amnesty—let alone citizenship—is an anathema to large parts of the electorate. Too bad, since the scholarly evidence is compelling that immigrants—documented or not, legal or illegal—are a boon to the net economy. “Competition fosters economic growth,” says Michael Clemens, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington. The economic return from attracting skilled immigrants to the U.S. is well known. Foreign-born newcomers account for some 13 percent of the population, yet they are responsible for one-third of U.S. patented innovations. The nation’s high-tech regions such as Silicon Valley, the Silicon Hills of Austin, Tex., and Boston’s Route 128 rely on immigrant scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and employees. Better yet, economist Enrico Moretti at the University of California at Berkeley calculates that a 1 percent increase in the share of college-educated immigrants in a city hikes productivity and wages for others in the city. Less appreciated is how much the economy gains from the efforts of less-skilled immigrants, including illegal workers. Throughout the country, foreign-born newcomers have revived beaten-down neighborhoods as immigrant entrepreneurs have opened small businesses and immigrant families have put down stakes. Immigrant workers have played a vital role keeping a number of industries competitive, such as agriculture and meatpacking. Cities with lots of immigrants have seen their per capita tax base go up, according to David Card, an economist at UC Berkeley. Despite the popular impression that a rising tide of immigrants is associated with higher crime rates, research by Robert Sampson of Harvard University and others offer a compelling case that it’s no coincidence that the growing ranks of immigrants tracks the reduction in crime in the U.S.

### 1nc K

#### ---Assessment of energy security on the outer continental shelf cannot be separated from the desire for an exceptionalist national identity to be secured. Their advantage scenarios are not objective assessments of facts but rather a form of militarized knowledge production that lies at the intersection of a desire for coherence and sovereign power.

Martens 2011

Emily, Masters in Geography graduate at University of Miami, The Discourses of Energy and Environmental Security in the Debate Over Offshore Oil Drilling Policy in Florida, Open Access Theses. Paper 254, http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa\_theses

The term energy security has become an engrained and seemingly unquestioned term within the contemporary political arena since earlier articulation under President Carter. The definition of the term seems to change according to shifting agendas and the socio-political zeitgeist, as evidenced in the previous historical narrative. In the United States energy security has encompassed a plethora of meanings that are the result of divergent understandings of the functioning of political and economic structures, as well as the social or ‘national’ significance of key energy resources, such as oil (Barton et al. 2004). From the consumer standpoint, oil (or in its refined form as gasoline), particularly cheap oil, is not simply the fuel for transportation and production, but also a signifier of the “American Way of Life”, a symbol of American exceptionalism and status within the global community (Huber 2009; Moran and Russell 2009). Traditionally, security has been conceptualized in terms of border protection, as well as the protection and promotion of ideologies and values both domestically and abroad. In reference to Foucault, Dalby alleges that there is a “political impulse to secure” through the invocation of “effective discourses of danger… contained within widely shared geopolitical imaginaries”, which serve to unify identities and justify State action (Dalby 2002: 146). Here it is a national identity contained within the discourse of energy security, and the popular rhetoric of “drill, baby, drill” that manages to thwart environmental sustainability efforts, thereby increasing incentives to expand domestic drilling sites. Resources have, historically, been at the heart of many quarrels, whereby certain types of natural resources available only in specific areas, become essential ingredients for the productive process. An adequate supply of these resources must be assured, and so the commercial tentacles of the productive unit must expand, until in some instances it draws upon supplies extracted from every corner of the planet. Inasmuch as every productive unit becomes dependent upon its sources of raw materials, every actual or potential denial of access to them represents a threat to the maintenance of that unit and to the well-being of its beneficiaries (Leiss 1994:156-157). Therefore, state security begins to encompass the productive process to ensure access to those resources which have become embedded within the daily functioning of the State’s commercial, social and political activities. The State security apparatus, therefore, must step in to protect and ensure sufficient access to oil as a means of ensuring its own survival and economic wellbeing

(Barton et al. 2004; Muller-Kraener 2008; Ciuta 2010). The term security, therefore, “does not refer to an external, objective reality, but establishes a security situation by itself. It is the enunciation of the signifier which constitutes an (in)security condition…organiz[ing] social relations into security relations” for the purpose of protecting State interests (Dalby 2002: 12). The discourse of US energy security operates under the pretense of national security interests to ensure the protection and sufficient flow of key resources. Now whether an actually supply problem or political motives dictate the decision to create another offshore well is often difficult to determine. However, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the nationalistic, “Buy American” political sentiment increased drastically, with some gas stations claiming to sell only domestic, or “terrorist-free”, oil, thus creating an incentive to increase domestic production in one of the few remaining spaces for extraction and production: the outer continental shelf (Huber 2009).

#### ---Securitizing natural gas supply creates a self-fulfilling prophecy --- Externalizes danger risking miscalculation and war.

Lowth 2011

Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies

Gas security has become synonymous with gas supply. Indeed the former has been established, and institutionalised, as the preferred term. Like Lakoff’s elephant, the connection between gas and security is today not only persistent, it is also irresistible. This conflation of security and supply has created, and through common usage perpetuates, a presumption that gas supply is intrinsically insecure, survival is at stake, special measures are necessary, and specific security actors are thereby empowered: When a particular [...] designation is accepted and taken for granted, something akin to a paradigm exists. When one paradigm and its adherents become the ultimate arbiter of “reality” in society, we say a hegemony of definition exists (Conrad and Schneider, 1992:181). Strategic thinking about gas supply has become security thinking. Formerly commercial and economic outcomes have been translated into security outcomes,30 sought in extremis by hard security or military means, often usurping compromises in other areas,31 and contradicting market fundamentals.32 Securitization of the gas market has also disrupted ‘consumer/producer’ or ‘customer/supplier’ relations, privileging instead ‘friend and foe’ (ie. opposition beyond mere competition): ‘while casting an issue as one of ‘security’ may help elevate its position on the political agenda, it also risks placing that issue within the logic of threat and decision, and potentially within the contrast of friend and enemy’ (Williams, 2003:523). One of the unintended consequences of this elevation, and shift in emphasis from the economic to the security spheres, has been to frustrate EU attempts to enhance its status, and collective bargaining power, as a gas consumer (the largest in the world). While, from as early as 2006, member states have supported in principle the notion of a common energy policy, many have been reluctant in practice to cede authority for security of gas supplies to the EU: ‘In [the economic domain] ... securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 115). So, despite their ‘communitarian rhetoric’ (Aliboni, 2008:4), member states – touched by the perceived threat of gas shortages – have chosen to act unilaterally to safeguard their own interests: ‘the broad consensus over the need for a more integrated energy policy ran parallel with EU member states’ reinforced trend to affirm their own national energy policies,’ (Natorski and Surrallés, 2008:72). Germany, for example, has struck bilateral agreements with Russia that include both long-term supply contracts and also the construction of North European Gas Pipeline (Nordstream) that will enhance Germany’s future gas security – but not necessarily serve the collective interests of the EU most effectively. In the south, where the EU is planning to construct its own Nabucco pipeline, Hungary and Italy have struck deals with Gazprom to build a South Stream pipeline in direct competition. Securitization has promoted self-interested or ‘narrow minded’ – and, in a community-sense, somewhat hypocritical – national thinking (Umbach, 2010:1239): ‘In [the economic domain] ... securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 115). In short, securitization has had a paradoxical effect on strategic thinking. While economic logic and EU competence favours collective EU action, the spectre of insecurity – understood and interpreted differently by individual states – has prevented the requisite solidarity and mobilization: ‘What unites the discourse of all member states is the emphasis on their competencies in determining their national strategies for security of supply ... [S]ecurity framing of energy is precisely what justified [member states’] reluctance to ... transfer competencies to the supranational level’ (ibid: 82,83). Externalization Securitization ‘externalizes’ strategic thinking about gas supplies in three interrelated ways: it establishes gas security as an intrinsically external problem; it prejudices cooperative relations with other gas stakeholders; and it introduces the prospect of reciprocal defensive strategies by other states, especially suppliers such as Russia, with unforeseeable consequences. Constructing gas supply as a security issue creates the perception that states are entitled to receive adequate gas, in the same way that they are entitled to enjoy national security (of which gas security is portrayed as an integral part). Any actual or potential shortfall in gas supply is therefore treated as if it were (rather than because it necessarily is) an existential threat.

At the same time, in common with other threats to national security, the danger is deemed to exist outside. Self is threatened by other. The overall effect is powerful: the state is entitled to supplies of gas (akin, as well as contributing, to national security) and ‘they’, out there, are endangering those supplies. One of the consequences of conceptualising ‘gas for the EU’ as a security of supply issue, is that insecurity is thereby framed as something that is ‘done to’ the EU – a victim, threatened by aggressive producer/suppliers (Belyi, 2009). This externalization diverts thinking away from domestic aspects of the problem, and displaces potential internal solutions (which appear irrelevant compared with tackling the external threat). One of the principal and relentless critics of the EU’s securitization of gas supply, Pierre Noël, of the Cambridge Energy Policy Research Group, has argued continually in favour of internal EU market solutions to ensure adequate supplies of gas to member states.33 Successful securitization has, however, left little analytical space for his contention that ‘[economic rather than security] risks require that we let the markets work’ (Noel, 2008:1). His proposition forms the basis of a possible re-framing of energy security at the end of this section.

#### ---The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s knee-jerk call for technocratic energy production in favor of repoliticizing energy security shifting the debate from a question of how to generate the most amount of energy to how to organize our energy structures in an egalitarian manner. Only the alternative’s step back from energy policy can stop it from becoming a rigged game requiring environmental destruction and the exploitation of billions.

Hillyard et. al. 12

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012-Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

In sum, encouraging a rational debate about “energy security” necessitates understanding what is meant not only by the phrase, but also by its composite parts. The term “energy,” despite its apparent simplicity, presents particular challenges. During the past two centuries, the vernacular, varied, lower-case “energies” of commons regimes have been joined by a new, abstract, upper-case Energy evolved in industrialised societies. Exploring the difference between “energies” and Energy is crucial to understanding the international politics of “energy security”. Abstract, monolithic, seemingly limitless Energy is something that only became possible with fossil-fuelled productivism and the machines, networks and institutions that came with it. This Energy, like lowercase “energies”, can deliver the basic necessities of life, at least to some, lending a certain plausibility to politicians’ claims that their worries about “energy security” centre on keeping the lights on and homes warm. But its underlying logic is different. Upper-case Energy is a transformation and commensuration of specific energies into a general capacity to maximise the ability of human bodies to make stuff. As the First Law of Thermodynamics (developed at the same time as industrial capitalism) recognises, any form of energy can be transformed into others and used to do work (but cannot be created or destroyed). Just as the invention of an absolute Time independent of daylight variations and traditional holidays helped discipline early industrial workers into the regular rhythm of a long working day, so too the subsequent development of an abstract Energy was key to intensifying their productivity further and harnessing them to the pace of the machine. For this upper-case Energy, survival is incidental except insofar as it supports the production imperative. Whereas specific “energies” know their limits, of Energy there can never be too much. Other things being equal, the more there is, the more can be produced, and the more money business can make, without limit. Lower-case “energies” and Big-E Energy are not only different: they are also, in many senses, enemies to each other. In order that fragmented “energies” do not become an obstacle to the mobilisation of economic value, they have to be folded into abstract Energy under the care of dedicated disciplines and institutions (bureaucrats, engineers, statisticians, laboratories, economics departments, inventors, investors, armies). Obsessed with quantitative growth for growth’s sake, Energy tends to treat the right of all to a warm home (or a cool one in hotter climes), cooked food, electric light as a nuisance. It heralds a world that is not only unequal, but also unable to respect the common right to subsistence. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of agrofuels, whose “interchangeability” with oil under the rubric of a unitary Energy makes routine the replacement of subsistence agriculture with industrial cropping aimed at fuelling cars and airplanes. It is also plain in India’s development plans, which call for US$100 billion to be spent on a burgeoning number of large Energy projects – coal, oil, hydropower and renewables – that will serve above all to boost the profits of industrialists but leave less than 2 per cent for the household use of the 700 million who lack modern services. And it can be seen in South Africa’s policy of providing some of the cheapest electricity in the world to smelting companies while many township residents are forced to pirate electricity illegally because the price is out of their reach. Well over a century into the era of electrification, more than a billion people, about one-quarter of the world’s population, have no access to electricity or other non-biotic forms of energy (and many will never have under fossil-fuelled capitalism). If fossil-fuelled capitalism has defined what we mean by energy, then merely to use the word uncritically is to make a commitment to certain assumptions about scarcity, foreclose certain alternatives and cover up some of the most important issues that need to be discussed. Paradoxically, having a serious discussion about “energy security” requires taking a therapeutic step back from the modern concept of Energy itself. For example, the seemingly innocent query “How can we have energy security in a post-fossil world?” is not so much a question as an ultimatum. The question implies that however we organise our societies in future, it will have to be on the model that fossil capitalism built, with its threats to the right to survive of both humans and nonhumans (and the associated threats to “security” itself, on a commons understanding). A more fruitful question would be: “Is the world that is defined (in part) by the modern concept of Energy the world that we want?” It is just such questions that policymakers and social movements must ask when initiating any discussion of energy security.

### 1NC Horse Trade CP

#### Text:

#### The United States President should enter into prior and binding consultation with the United States Congress over reducing production restrictions on federal lands in the Outer Continental Shelf for conventional natural gas production. The President should offer to support reducing production restrictions on federal lands in the Outer Continental Shelf for conventional natural gas production, if Congress agrees to invest 90 percent of federal revenues from the resulting production into clean energy research and development.

#### Observation One: Theory. The Counterplan is legitimate. It is grounded in the topic literature making it predictable and educational. Net benefits prove it is a germane policy making consideration.

#### Observation Two: Net Benefits

#### First, the counterplan solves the case and avoids politics-Leveraging the removal of restrictions effectively builds bipartisan support for investing in clean energy research and development.

[Jenkins](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Jesse-Jenkins) [and Borofsky](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Yael-Borofsky)-Breakthrough Institute-4/10

After "Drill, Baby, Drill," Obama Should Embrace Another GOP Energy Plan

http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/after\_drill\_baby\_drill\_obama\_s

So while the expansion of offshore drilling may seem like we're taking a step back from a future free from oil, investing the royalty revenues in clean tech RD&D could amount to a big leap forward in the transition to a clean energy economy by securing a revenue source for clean tech that is not tied to embattled efforts to establish a carbon price -- all while beginning the urgent work of securing America's clean tech competitiveness and ensuring our energy security. Nearly the entire Republican caucus, not to mention a handful of Democrats, are already on record voting for this concept in the August 2008 vote on the New Energy Reform Act, introduced by the so-called Gang of 10 during the height of the oil price spikes in 2008. If offshore drilling is to move forward over the next few years, the Obama Administration and Congressional Democrats should waste no time in embracing this clean energy investment plan.

#### Second, turns the case---the counterplan is key to energy diversification and security

[Jenkins](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Jesse-Jenkins) [and Borofsky](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Yael-Borofsky)-Breakthrough Institute-4/10

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After all, we simply cannot drill our way to energy security. The New York Times reports that at current rates of consumption, estimates show that there could be as much as a three-year supply of oil and around a two-year supply of natural gas in the OCS areas. That's not exactly a long-term 'fix' for an oil-addicted nation, which is why Obama noted Wednesday in his speech at Andrews Air Force Base that offshore drilling is meant merely to aid in the "transition to cleaner energy sources;" drilling is no alternative. We can, however, invest and invent our way to freedom from oil. That's where (somewhat ironically!) the Republicans 'all of the above' energy plan, AKA the "American Energy Act," has a leg up on the President -- at least for now. Under the GOP proposal, put forth by House Republicans in June 2009, 90% of the federal share "of the revenues created by OCS exploration would go to a renewable energy trust fund to pay for a variety of renewable, alternative and advanced energy programs." This "American Renewable and Alternative Energy Trust Fund" would be dedicated to efforts accelerating the development of clean energy technologies that can truly help end America's oil addiction. If the federal government retained 75% of the royalty revenues from new OCS and Alaskan Coastal Plain production, this formula could represent an infusion of over $110 billion for critical clean energy investments over the next twenty years.

#### Critical to solve warming

Rigg, citing the IPCC, 11 (Kelly Rigg is the Executive Director of the GCCA, a global alliance of 300 organizations cooperating under the banner of the tcktcktck campaign “IPCC Report: Renewable Energy Key to Solving Climate Change” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kelly-rigg/ipcc-report-renewable-ene\_b\_859426.html)

A new IPCC report is hot off the press this time focused on the potential of renewable energy sources to solve the climate crisis. Given the UN climate science panel's proclivity for producing scenarios guaranteed to make any thinking person lose sleep at night, the good news take-home message was a welcome cause for celebration. From a technological standpoint, renewables can more than meet our global energy demands. By 2050, nearly 80 percent of our energy needs can be met by renewables with existing technologies. So it's clear that whatever challenges and difficulties lay ahead, they are entirely within our power to overcome, simply by adopting the right policy incentives. A myriad of facts about the amazing rise of renewable energy can be found in the press releases of Greenpeace, WWF and the IPCC itself.

#### Renewable transition solves extinction from climate change and great power war

Klarevas 09

[Louis Klarevas, Professor for Center for Global Affairs at New York University, “Securing American Primacy While Tackling Climate Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy\_b\_393223.html]

As national leaders from around the world are gathering in Copenhagen, Denmark, to attend the United Nations Climate Change Conference, the time is ripe to re-assess America's current energy policies - but within the larger framework of how a new approach on the environment will stave off global warming and shore up American primacy. By not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is squandering an opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to come. To do this, though, the U.S. must rely on innovation to help the world escape the coming environmental meltdown. Developing the key technologies that will save the planet from global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver potential great power rivals seeking to replace it as the international system's hegemon. But the greening of American strategy must occur soon. The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time, unable to move beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals. Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount environmental issues as they are not seen as advancing national interests in a way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system: Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might very well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews narrowly defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is, above all, to protect and promote American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green fighting machine, the U.S. can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every nation, while at the same time, secur[e]ing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not just your traditional hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon. Hegemons are countries that dominate the international system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the most important international institutions, and covering the costs that result from free-riding and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the United States. Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S., emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar (and current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from America's new-found hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the impending systemic crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way that will benefit both the international community collectively and the U.S. selfishly. The current problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities between the major powers. The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum contest could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens American primacy and global stability. Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions. So long as the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are predicting as much as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years. That likely means more devastating water shortages, droughts, forest fires, floods, and storms. In other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability. Oil arguably has been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The key resource for this century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power. Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this, the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must drastically increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice, committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently being spent. By promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles; improving public transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will not only provide alternatives to oil, they will also give the U.S. an edge in the global competition for hegemony. If the U.S. is able to produce technologies that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will eventually have no choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a tremendous economic boom, while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that can be employed to keep potential foes in check. The bottom-line is that the U.S. needs to become green energy dominant as opposed to black energy independent - and the best approach for achieving this is to promote a national strategy of greengemony.

#### Warming causes extinction---outweighs nuclear war

Deibel 7 [Terry L., Professor of IR @ National War College, “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft”, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today]

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serious the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

### 1NC Manufacturing

#### No price spike – high stocks of gas

Saefong 2/7/13 (Myra P., staffwriter for Marketwatch, “Natural-gas prices fall further after EIA data” <http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-02-07/markets/36962139_1_natural-gas-prices-fall-cubic-feet-eia-data>)

SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- Natural-gas futures fell Thursday after the Energy Information Administration reported a decline in U.S. inventories that was smaller than expected. Supplies fell 118 billion cubic feet for the week ended Feb. 1, the EIA said. Analysts polled by Platts forecast a decline between 122 billion and 126 billion cubic feet. Total stocks now stand at 2.864 trillion cubic feet, down 226 billion cubic feet from the year-ago level and 351 billion cubic feet above the five-year average, the government said. March natural gas (US:ngh13) was at $3.35 per million British thermal units, down 6 cents, or 1.9%. It was trading around $3.41 shortly before the data.

#### No spike – no winter demand

Everly 2/6/13 (Steve, staffwriter for the Kansas City Starr, “Natural gas prices stay low, giving customers a break” <http://www.kansascity.com/2013/02/06/4052868/natural-gas-prices-stay-low-giving.html>)

Winter is into its final stretch, and it looks like another heating season without big spikes in natural gas prices. Ample production and supplies helped keep a lid on prices, which peaked in October on the New York Mercantile Exchange at $4.02 for 1,000 cubic feet, less than at that time a year earlier. Natural gas on Wednesday was $3.44. Prices did rise in March last year, but there’s optimism that won’t happen this year. “The way things are headed right now, we don’t see that,” said Jim Bartling, a spokesman for Atmos Energy, which has customers on the Kansas side of the metro area. Area utilities pass on to customers their cost of gas, which is what the utilities paid for the gas, plus some transportation and storage charges. Atmos customers for all of 2012 paid about 10 percent less for a unit of gas compared with the previous year. And this January and February, the cost was down just over 1 percent compared to what was paid for the same months in 2012. Though this winter hasn’t had long frigid spells, it still has been colder than the previous one, which was unusually warm. That could cause heating bills to increase some — because homes will use more gas — even though the cost of gas has been down or about the same. The cost of gas for Missouri Gas Energy’s customers was $6.47 per 1,000 cubic feet, compared with $6.16 at the start of last winter, which declined to $5.27 last February, said Jason Fulp, a spokesman for the utility. Dawn Ewing of Kansas Gas Service said customer bills this winter had been comparable to bills during last year’s heating season. “We’re anticipating this will remain true for the rest of the winter,” she said. Supplies remained good as the production of shale gas continued to climb. And natural gas in storage hit an all-time record in November and has remained higher than the five-year average. The Energy Information Administration expects wholesale gas prices, which averaged $2.75 in 2012, to rise to $3.74 in 2013 and $3.90 in 2014.

#### Supply and production will always be high – use it or lose it leases

Tverberg 3/23/12 (Gail, an actuary interested in finite world issues - oil depletion, natural gas depletion, water shortages, and climate change. The financial system is also likely to be affected. “Why US natural gas prices are so low – Are changes needed?” <http://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/03/23/why-us-natural-gas-prices-are-so-low-are-changes-needed/>)

3. Supply doesn’t drop quickly. Natural gas supply (Figure 5, above) does not drop very quickly when prices drop too low because long lead times and large investment is needed to bring supply on-line. Natural gas producers have debt to service and are often faced with “use it or lose it” leases, so are hesitant to stop, for fear of not being able to make use of their investment. A decline in price may be hedged, so the producer does not feel the effect as quickly as otherwise, and take appropriate action. Profitability of individual wells is based on estimates of long-term future production and future costs–things which are not at all certain. Some small producers may not even be aware of how unprofitable current prices really are. There is also the issue of large oil and gas companies having difficulty “replacing their oil reserves,” and needing natural gas reserves to substitute for oil reserves. These large oil companies are willing to buy natural gas companies, even if the cost would seem to be far too high, given recent prices. These willing buyers allow production to keep expanding, creating a greater over-supply situation before a shake-out occurs.

#### Chemical industry isn’t going to collapse – if the U.S. loses comparative advantage the industry will be able to produce awesome toothpaste products in other countries and people can buy those products at Wal-Mart

#### Technological leadership and innovation inevitable

Potocnik 2006

Janez, European Commissioner for Science and Research, 3/7/2006. “Between cooperation and Competition - Science and Research as a Transatlantic Bridge Builder”, http://www.iterfan.org/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=139&Itemid=2

Cooperation shortens the path leading from science to innovation and from knowledge to solutions in areas such as nanotech, biotech, environment, climate and cybersecurity. In all these areas, and in many more, we share information, knowledge, practices and results. In nanotechnology, for example, the Commission works together with the National Science Foundation to exchange information and organise seminars and workshops. Coordinated calls for joint EU-US research proposals have been launched since 1999, to draw on the best expertise on both side of the Atlantic. We work together because we realise that it is in the interest of both Europe and the US to do so. And often, of course, it is also in the interest of many other countries around the globe, whether they are directly involved in the cooperation, or not. But – of course – we also cooperate simply because that is what scientists do. Naturally, spontaneously and, often, effectively. Scientists are, by the mere nature of their work, mobile and outward looking. Research does not know of any national frontiers and scientists simply work where and with those that offer the best opportunities. But perhaps even more important for our transatlantic links is the dynamism and creativity that competition brings. Competition is part of our natural disposition as social individuals, and also an imperative of the societies we live in. Whether it’s the market share of our companies that we have at heart, or the wellbeing of our people, or the next breakthrough in science and technology, or - indeed, all of the above - competition is the name of the game. We compete because we know that today’s discoveries will most probably underpin tomorrow’s economic achievements. And we compete because – in the US as much as in Europe – we draw healthy stimuli and encouragement from comparing our respective figures. Numbers of science and engineering graduates, researchers as percentage of the workforce, figures for R&D investment, numbers of publications and patents and so on... This mix of cooperation and competition is a key engine of progress. That’s how we discover and advance. How we set and reach objectives, improve performances and achieve results. By finding the right mix or the right balance between cooperation and competition. Be it between individuals, organisations, economies or societies. And isn’t this also what scientists spontaneously do? They compete for excellence, for recognition, for results and for funds. They strive to be the first to publish or to patent. But they also learn from one another. They compare and exchange and they join forces aiming for common achievements. The same is true for companies and other organisations, for which a balanced mix of cooperation and competition is often the key to performance and achievement.

#### And the defense industrial base will always have demand from the military – overcomes the necessity for lower electricity prices as a result of natural gas

#### Globalization inevitable even without natural gas – people are already trading to access resources because of comparative advantage – that already significantly reduces the risk for conflict

#### No Resource Wars

Emily Meireding, University of Chicago PhD student, 2-22-2007, “Strategic Substitution and the Declining Likelihood of International Resource Wars,” Draft, prepared for the International Studies Association Conference 2007.

In the last fifty years, the costs of product, process, and project substitution for national natural resource needs have declined. Since the costs of territorial conquest, states’ “default” acquisition strategy, have been constant or increased over the same time period, the relative appeal of violent conquest as a means of satisfying natural resource demands has declined. States are less likely to attempt to seize the resources they need. This change in preferences has led to a reduction in international violence over the last five decades and, I argue, will continue to moderate the likelihood of interstate conflict in the future. International resource wars are unlikely.

#### Hegemony doesn’t solve war

Fettweis 2011

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### No lashout scenario

Parent and MacDonald 2011

Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” http://www.ihavenet.com/World-United-States-The-Wisdom-of-Retrenchment-America-Must-Cut-Back-to-Move-Forward-Foreign-Affairs.html

A somewhat more compelling concern raised by opponents of retrenchment is that the policy might undermine deterrence. Reducing the defense budget or repositioning forces would make the United States look weak and embolden upstarts, they argue. "The very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies," Kaplan worries. This anxiety is rooted in the assumption that the best barrier to adventurism by adversaries is forward defenses -- the deployment of military assets in large bases near enemy borders, which serve as tripwires or, to some eyes, a Great Wall of America. There are many problems with this position. For starters, the policies that have gotten the United States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran's regional power. NATO's expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified Russia's ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention. Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. The biggest menace to a superpower is not **the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch**. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall.

**Naval power is not key to deterrence**

**Goure 10**—Vice President, Lexington Institute, PhD (Daniel, 2 July 2010, Can The Case Be Made For Naval Power?,<http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171>, RBatra)  
This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers. While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy **this is many years off**. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others, including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required **to reopen the waterway**? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses.  
More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

#### Plan results in a glut – causes exports

Schwartz 6/20/12 (Shelly K., staffwriter for CNBC “Can the Natural Gas Sector Save the US Economy?” <http://www.cnbc.com/id/47280026>)

Opportunity Abroad Apart from job creation and capital investment from industry, the glut of natural gas on the market is also creating export opportunities for drilling companies, says Canonica. That would contribute further to GDP. Just how much, remains unclear. “There are 10 proposed export projects planned in the U.S. right now, so assuming politicians allow them to do it and we expect them to, it’s almost certain that natural gas companies will begin exporting to Asia and Europe,” he says, noting exports could begin as early as 2016. That’s assuming prices don’t remain below $3 per mcf for long. “The price of natural gas has to be high enough for these companies to continue drilling,” says Canonica. “In many locations, it’s not economical to drill when the price is below $3.50 per mcf.”

#### That pushes Russia out of the global market

Kohl 3/28/12 (Keith, Energy and Capital Editor Keith Kohl reports on oil and energy to over 150,000 readers. A true insider in the energy markets, Keith's research has helped thousands of investors capitalize off the rapidly-changing face of energy... For over a year, Keith covered the massive domestic Bakken oil formation — and the companies that would rake in profits — before news broke to the mainstream press. He was there for the Haynesville Shale formation and also for the Marcellus natural gas formation, talking to company execs and insiders, uncovering the real stories on the ground... and the real investment opportunities. Keith is one of the only financial reporters around who's actually visited Alberta's remote tar sands region to personally meet every major player in the booming Canadian oil operation. In addition, Keith shares his vast knowledge of fossil fuels the opportunities for wealth within those energy markets with readers of the Energy Investor. “Investors Are Betting Against U.S. LNG” <http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/investors-against-lng/2138>)

Russia's fears boil down to LNG exports, because shipping our future natural gas supply to both Asia and Europe would weaken Russia's control... This is a country used to wielding their natural gas supplies like a weapon. If European countries don't want to pay up, Putin and friends have no reservations over cutting them off. When U.S. LNG enters the scene, Russia's share in the Western European gas market may fall to less than 13% over the next few decades.

#### That’s key to the Russian economy

Shiyakov 11 (E., CEIC Analyst - \*CEIC - The First Comprehensive Resource for Russian Economy Time Series Data in English CEIC Russia Premium, our third specialized country database, follows the same concept as the CEIC China Premium and India Premium databases and showcases our continuing commitment to increased coverage of the BRIC economies. CEIC Russia Premium database is designed for professionals whose interests require greater depth and breadth of information. • Extensive coverage of over 110,000 time series • Unrivalled depth and breadth of national, regional and city level data, distinguished into: 13 major macroeconomic sectors 11 most important and rapidly growing industrial sectors • Exclusive data sourced directly from prime sources, which almost 80% originally in Russian • Backed by “on the ground” customer service and support • Delivered on an easy to use CDM platform [“Russia to Increase Natural Gas Exports to Europe via Nord Stream Pipeline” http://blog.securities.com/2011/11/russia-to-increase-natural-gas-exports-to-europe-via-nord-stream-pipeline](file:///C:\Users\Debate%209\Documents\)) MFR

Russia Data Talk: A new natural gas pipeline, Nord Stream, was launched on 8 November 2011. The pipeline will deliver Russian gas to Germany via the Baltic Sea, bypassing the key transit countries of Ukraine and Belarus. Russia provides up to 25% of the gas consumed in Europe. Russian gas giant Gazprom, which holds 51% of the Nord Stream pipeline, has already signed long-term contracts on gas deliveries via the Nord Stream pipeline with several European countries, including Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Great Britain. Gazprom has a gas mining monopoly on the domestic market and is the leading company on the world gas market. During 2005-2009, Gazprom extracted 80%-85% of all natural gas mined in Russia; in January 2010, Gazprom extracted 50.9 billion out of the 64 billion cubic meter total natural gas mined in Russia. The other 15%-20% were mined by the second largest Russian gas mining company NOVATEK and by oil companies that extract associated gas together with crude oil. In 2010, NOVATEK acquired several gas fields from Gazprom and other oil companies, which reduced Gazprom’s share of gas mining to 73.7% in September 2011. Regardless, no one can compete with Gazprom on the domestic market. Stable natural gas exports are crucial for the Russian economy as oil and gas revenues are a key element of the federal budget. Gazprom, as the only Russian company exporting gas, permanently wrestles with the dilemma of whether to meet the increasing domestic demand for gas at affordable prices or to increase its gas exports abroad, mainly to Europe The new Nord Stream pipeline is expected to cut transportation costs and increase the share of Russian gas in Europe up to 30% by 2013. Natural gas exports depend on the volume of gas extraction and contract obligations. Gas exports reach their peak during winter months due to high demand: 23.6 billion cubic meters in January 2011 against 10.3 billion cubic meters in August 2011. The monthly share of exported gas is normally 25%-30% of all natural gas mining.

#### Russian collapse causes global nuclear war.

David 1999 (Steven R., Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University, “Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, LN)

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate nonRussians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

### 1NC Arctic Warfare

#### Alt cause – icebreakers and lack of Naval deterrence encourage conflict

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." But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it lacks ships able to operate in or near Arctic ice, support facilities and adequate communications. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers.

#### More evidence – the 1AC says that icebreakers are critical to maintain U.S. leadership, but there’s no funding – plan can’t solve

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Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) insists it's time for America to become the world role model for international Arctic development. "As an Arctic nation, I think the United States needs to be more aggressive," she said. "When we talk about an Arctic policy, it really needs to be more than just, 'How are we going to fund a new icebreaker?' I want us to assume the role of a lead nation on the Arctic issues that are important to the United States and important to the Arctic region as a whole."

#### **a.) Deterrence is working and norms check**

Klotz 12 (Frank Klotz is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC, and the author of America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues. “American Interests in Antarctica” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/american-interests-antarctica-6365>, Donnie)

America’s sizable presence and wide-ranging activities give it a substantial voice in international diplomacy related to Antarctica. This is no trivial matter. Seven nations have staked claims to portions of the continent, some of which overlap. Others—including the United States and Russia—maintain a “basis of claim.” In other parts of the world, disputes over territory often lead to conflict. Thanks to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, all claims have been put on hold, and unrestricted access for science and other peaceful pursuits is guaranteed. A robust system of multilateral consultation has evolved to deal with resource and environmental issues. All this has been accomplished without resort to military force. The United States was able to play a leading role in establishing the so-called Antarctic Treaty System precisely because it had the largest presence in the area. The total bill for U.S. Antarctic stations—as well as the logistics lifeline that sustains them—is under $300 million a year. This funding will no doubt come under close scrutiny in the current fiscal environment. In fact, last summer the Obama administration commissioned a high-level blue-ribbon panel to help guide decision making on the Antarctic program’s budget. Its report is due early this year. Lawmakers should resist any temptation to cut the program too deeply and thereby jeopardize the U.S. position in the region. For the foreseeable future, peaceful collaboration will no doubt continue to be the norm. This happy state of affairs should never be taken for granted. The policy and budgetary choices made today concerning the American presence in the region will affect the ability to influence Antarctic diplomacy in the future. That influence will in turn help determine whether Antarctica will remain a model of international cooperation. In this respect, the investment in the U.S. Antarctic program pays a huge dividend and is well worth the price.

#### **b.) Military spending and proximity**

Byres 11 (Michael Byers holds a Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in Global Politics and International Law at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia. Prior to 2004, he was a professor of law and Director of Canadian Studies at Duke University; from 1996-1999, he was a research fellow at Jesus College, Oxford University. “Cooling Things Down: The Legalization of Arctic Security” <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0102.html>, Donnie)

Twenty years after the Cold War, the threat of interstate conflict in the Arctic is dramatically reduced. Russia is a member of the G20, the Arctic Council, and a soon-to-be member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Its largest trading partner is the European Union, which is made up mostly of NATO states. In 2010, Russian military spending was just a small fraction of that of the United States ($ 58.7 billion USD versus $ 698 billion USD).23 China likewise does not pose a military threat, especially in the Arctic which is remote from its shores. The world's largest trading nation, China, is a member of the WTO. It has also ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and is using the same provision of that treaty as Arctic countries—in its case, to assert sovereign rights over an extended continental shelf in the East China Sea. And while China's military budget is growing, in 2010 it was just $119 billion USD, less than one fifth of U.S. expenditures, and less than that of France and Germany combined.24 These assessments about Arctic security are shared by NATO leaders. In May 2010, Admiral Gary Roughead, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, issued a memorandum on "Naval Strategic Objectives for the Arctic" that stated "the potential for conflict in the Arctic is low."25 "The Arctic is a peaceful region where any issues that arise can be resolved in accordance with international law,"26 said Prime Minister Stoltenberg of Norway later that summer. And in August 2010, the Government of Canada's Statement on Arctic Foreign Policy said: "Canada does not anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic and believes that the region is well managed through existing institutions, particularly the Arctic Council."27

#### **c.) All territory issues have been resolved**

Byres 11 (Michael Byers holds a Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in Global Politics and International Law at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia. Prior to 2004, he was a professor of law and Director of Canadian Studies at Duke University; from 1996-1999, he was a research fellow at Jesus College, Oxford University. “Cooling Things Down: The Legalization of Arctic Security” <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0102.html>, Donnie)

More recently, climate change and rising oil prices have given rise to concerns about possible struggles for territory and resources. In August 2007, Artur Chilingarov, the deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, caused a media frenzy by planting a titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole and declaring "the Arctic is Russian."1 Canadian foreign minister Peter MacKay responded: "Look, this isn't the fifteenth century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory.' Our claims over our Arctic are very well established."2 In October 2008, the European Parliament stirred things up further by calling for a new multilateral convention modeled on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.3 In doing so, it was implicitly questioning the extensive rights of Arctic Ocean coastal states under the law of the sea. That same year, Scott Borgerson wrote: "The combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in possible oil and gas resources, and a poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for a toxic brew."4 Cooler heads have since prevailed. One of the Russian scientists involved in the North Pole flag plant admitted that it was a publicity stunt lacking in legal relevance. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig invited his counterparts from the other four Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.) to Ilulissat, Greenland, where they reaffirmed their commitment to resolving disputes within an existing framework of international law.5 The European Union issued an Arctic policy that recognized the primacy of the law of the sea in a region which, unlike the Antarctic, is centered on an ocean.6 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of the need for Arctic countries to work together: "We need all hands on deck because there is a huge amount to do, and not much time to do it."7 And in May 2011, the Arctic countries signed a multilateral search-and-rescue treaty, the first legal instrument negotiated within the framework of the Arctic Council.8 They also created a permanent secretariat for the Council, thus transforming it from an inter-governmental forum into a fully-fledged international organization. As the following review will demonstrate, all this cooperation is made easier by the fact that most Arctic sovereignty disputes have either been resolved or are actively being negotiated. In short, there is no competition for territory or resources in the Arctic, and no prospect of conflict either.

They don’t access extinction from biodiversity —empirics prove

Jablonski 1 (Prof @ Department of Geophysical Sciences, University of Chicago “Lessons from the past: Evolutionary impacts of mass extinctions” May 16. http://www.pnas.org/content/98/10/5393.full//Donnie)

Mass extinctions have never entirely reset the evolutionary clock: even the huge losses at the end of the Permian, which appear to have permanently restructured marine and terrestrial communities, left enough taxa and functional groups standing to seed the recovery process without the origin of new phyla ([39](file:///C:\Users\Debate%2013\Downloads\impact%20defense-earth%20destruction-or-disease%20(1).doc#ref-39)). One key to understanding the past and future evolutionary role of extinctions will involve the factors that permit the persistence of certain biological trends or patterns—e.g., net expansion or contraction of clades or directional shifts in morphology—in the face of extensive taxonomic loss and ecological disruption. Besides extinction, at least four evolutionary patterns can be seen in the fossil record. These are: (i) unbroken continuity, (ii) continuity with setbacks, (iii) survival without recovery (“dead clade walking”), and (v) unbridled diversification.

Not key to anything

Dodds 2k (Donald, M.S. P.E., President of North Pacific Research, 2000, <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:X8s-Gaf_5r0J:northpacificresearch.com/downloads/The_myth_of_biodiversity.doc+the+planet+was+microbial+and+not+diverse.+Thus,+the+first+unexplainable+fact+is+that+the+earth+existed+for+3.5+billion+years&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>)

Biodiversity is a corner stone of the environmental movement. But there is no proof that biodiversity is important to the environment. Something without basis in scientific fact is called a Myth. Lets examine biodiversity through out the history of the earth. The earth has been a around for about 4 billion years. Life did not develop until about 500 million years later. Thus for the first 500 million years bio diversity was zero. The planet somehow survived this lack of biodiversity. For the next 3 billion years, the only life on the planet was microbial and not diverse. Thus, the first unexplainable fact is that the earth existed for 3.5 billion years, 87.5% of its existence, without biodiversity. Somewhere around 500 million years ago life began to diversify and multiple celled species appeared. Because these species were partially composed of sold material they left better geologic records, and the number of species and genera could be cataloged and counted. The number of genera on the planet is a indication of the biodiversity of the planet. Figure 1 is a plot of the number of genera on the planet over the last 550 million years. The little black line outside of the left edge of the graph is 10 million years. Notice the left end of this graph. Biodiversity has never been higher than it is today.

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#### ---Imagining solutions to scenarios of global energy crisis serves as a numbing device preserving a childish naiveté that encourages us to fiddle while the planet burns --- The inherent tension between their imminent scenarios for extinction and the at least decade long timeframe before education can induce material change reveals the affirmative’s commitment to the status quo.

Sumrell & Varnelis 2009

Robert, production designer, educator, writer & teaches at the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Kazys, Director of the Network Architecture Lab at the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Personal Lubricants: Shell Oil and Scenario Planning, New Geographies 2: Landscapes of Energy, pg 127-132

Suddenly, everything's grim. In the face of the current global environmental and financial crisis, the future no longer promises boundless economic growth and technological innovation, but resembles a strangely familiar landscape fraught with potential danger and imminent collapse. lf green shoots offer hope, only the most naive proceed with the reckless abandon of previous years. Global economic crises-like the Great Depression and the stagflation of the late 1960s and early 1970s-are tied to the internal contradictions of capitalism; overinvestment and overproduction produce an unsustainable bubble that eventually bursts. After a crash, overproduction typically inspires a shift in planning from the physical to the temporal. Realizing that it did not plan ahead properly, society concerns itself not with designing and producing things but rather with drawing up plans to safeguard that such crises do not recur in the future. Manfredo Tafuri observes that during the Great Depression, such a shift forced the avant-garde to understand that only economic planning, not physical planning, could cure the problems of modern life: "architecture as the ideology of the Plan is swept away by the reality of the Plan the moment the plan came down from utopia and became an operant mechanism."lTafuri himself wrote in 1969, at the staft of the second great crisis of the twentieth century, a new era of limlts when modern architecture itself was called into question. As architects turn, once again, to temporal planning, we need to come to an understanding of the deeper significance of such methodologies. ln this essay, we examine the history of one such approach, scenario planning. By the postwar era, Royal Dutch/Shell Oil was a diverse body of allied companies with stakes in oil, natural gas, hydrocarbons, petrochemicals, agriculture, and plastics. Under the planned economy of high Fordism, a long sustained boom led to an explosion of automobile ownership and use that drove huge growth for Shell. As one of the “Seven Sisters,” Shell was one of the world’s largest petroleum companies, but it was also the smallest of these and chronically extracted more oil than it added to its reserves. Shell realized it needed a strategy to direct its future growth. Since the end of World War II, both the price of oil and the growth in demand had been remarkably stable, and few oil executives had the foresight to imagine that things would ever change. By the late 1960s, Shell had developed a complex forecasting tool called the Unified Planning Machinery to predict growth in energy demand and upcoming oil prices. UPM-derived strategy used previous sales and cost projections to anticipate the price of crude and demand in detail for one year and more generally for six years. Using that information, the company could generate strategies for investment in infrastructure as well as for trade. Although the UPM was effective when crude prices were stable and demand was steadily rising, it was not flexible enough to anticipate adverse events that could affect the company outside of its general business operations. By the early 1960s most senior Shell executives had experience only with a long economic boom, but threats were mounting. Not only was overproduction looming, but also overt European colonialism was coming to an end and with it, the loss of Western control over oil reserves in the developing world. Realizing that even in this time of growth, the landscape was quickly changing, some employees of the Shell planning department – among them Ted Newland – sought more flexible methods of planning for uncertainty in the future, and turned to the scenario planning methods devised by Herman Kahn and the Hudson Institute. A decade before, at the RAND Corporation, Kahn began using systems theory and game theory to model the effects of massive nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Kahn did not just employ standard projections. Instead, he wrote multiple histories of near future events as if from a more distant future vantage point. Instead of accurate forecasts, however, Kahn sought to write compelling fictions demonstrating threats and opportunities together with the means by which his audience could anticipate them. These scenarios, Kahn believed, served as myths for the modern day. Literary qualities were so important to Kahn that later, at the Hudson Institute, he hired novelist William Gaddis to rewrite the institute’s reports. To describe such stories, Leo Rosten, another writer who freelanced at RAND, suggested the term “scenario,” a poetic but antiquated term that Hollywood employed to refer to screenplays during silent movie days. Kahn loved the term precisely for its evocation of poetry and myth-making. The two decades at the state of the Cold War were marked by a fervent interest in the future. Science fiction of this era was generally optimistic about our ability to solve problems with technology. By the late 1950s, however, sharp advances in everyday technology, a proliferation of commercial goods, and futuristic military and space technologies closed the gap with science fiction. Modernization was complete. If this diluted modernism permeated everything. Utopian projections were no longer plausible. It was time to envision the future again, outside of Utopia, this time not as a radically different whole but from the contemporary condition or even from an imagined past. Still, the Cold War was a time of deep instability and individuals needed fantasy to comprehend the difficulties of the world. Carl Jung’s practice of analytical psychology became popular, especially in art and literature, offering a system of archetypes and the symbolic use of dreams, fairly tales, and myths to comprehend the world. Also during this period, J. R. R. Tolkien completed The Lord of the Rings trilogy while C. S. Lewis wrote The Chronicles of Narnia. Together, both works established the modern genre of fantasy writing while making clear the importance and difficulty of epic struggles between good and evil. Similarly, Walt Disney left behind the familiar, comical animated adventures of Mickey Mouse, Goofy, and Donald Duck for the more romantic visions of Cinderella and Sleeping Beauty, fairy tales he appropriated from the Brothers Grimm. The potential of nuclear war threatened to end the future itself, a possibility made vivid by Nevil Shute, an aeronautical engineer, in his 1957 On the Beach. Shute described the effects of fallout after a massive war on the last survivors as devastating and inevitable, yet did so without any great expression of emotion: characters generally took pleasure in small things and waited for the end. Kahn found On the Beach an “interesting, but badly researched book.” Still, the novel broke new ground by imagining what had previously been deemed to horrible to think. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, U.S. nuclear policy was based on the idea that the country’s capability for massive retaliation with nuclear weapons made both conventional and limited nuclear war unthinkable for the Soviet Union. Using game theory to prove his point, Kahn argued otherwise. First, he suggested that the policy of massive retaliation encouraged the Soviet Union to launch a first strike to disable the United States’ ability to strike. Second, he argued that when pressed, neither country would engage in all-out war and, even if they did, life-and with it, warfare-would continue afterward, however damaged. As forecasting life past a nuclear holocaust was considered unthinkable at the time, Kahn called his projections "thinking the unthinkable"' He concluded that the United States should avoid threatening nuclear war, ensure a second-strike capability to adequately deter further aggression, and draft plans for continuing war after a nuclear exchange. Kahn's 1961 book, On Thermonuclear War, galvanized both policymakers and the public. Kahn's projections compelled John E Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to shift U. S. military strategy to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, which relied on a second-strike capability. In part, Kahn's success was due not only to his argument but also to his intense but comic presentation style. Kahn would frequently joke about nuclear war to get the audience's attention and keep them listening. Many, however, were disturbed by the very topic and outraged by Kahn's propensity to joke about nuclear war. A rival military strategist at RAND, Bernard Brodie, advocated massive retaliation, believing it necessary to keep nuclear war unthinkable. For him, Kahn's project was grotesque, an improper coupling: "Something [was] illegitimately in something else ...Things that should be kept apart [were] fused together." ln contrast, the founder of communitarianism, Amitai Etzioni, applauded him: "Kahn does for nuclear arms what free-love advocates did for sex: he speaks candidly of acts which others whisper behind close doors.” As Etzioni observed, horror and disgust at thinking the unthinkable galvanized opposition to nuclear war. Stanley Kubrick would echo Kahn's tactics in his 1964 black comedy, Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, even as he immortalized Kahn as (at least a partial inspiration for) the character of film's Dr. Strangelove.l0 The Limits to Growth Amid growing tensions with RAND, Kahn left and founded the Hudson lnstitute. There, he investigated nonmilitary futures and honed a doctrine of futurology that posited unending growth for capitalism and technology.tl The first decade of work at the Hudson lnstitute culminated in the 1967 book, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years, set out to identify the challenges faced by the United States from a changing geopolitical context and the transitions to a postindustrial society. Soon, The Year 2000 began to circulate at Shell and with it the idea that the world's demand for oil would rise exponentially by the end of the century. Beginning in the late 1960s, Shell's London based planning group, led by Ted Newland and Pierre Wack, began generating scenarios to understand risks-both political and general. Newland and Kahn soon became friends. After successfully convincing Shell's Committee of Managing Directors that the UPM could not adequately cope with such changes, Newland assembled a team to generate scenarios.1 ln 1971, Newland was joined in Shell's Planning Department by Pierre Wack. Trained as a public administrator, Wack was a disciple of the mystic G. l. Gurdjieff during World War ll. Gurdjieff believed that people lived their lives in a state close to somnambulism and sought to teach his disciples how to wake up and see the world. One way of doing this. Gurdjieff suggested, was to seek out "remarkable peoplel'r3 Similarly, Wack believed that turning to conventional sources was a mistake, as they were already well known to the stakeholders involved. He found one of these remarkable people in Kahn, whose writings he had become acquainted and whom he had visited at the Hudson lnstitute.14 To understand the fate of oil in the year 2000, Newland assembled a team in Shell's Group Planning division to map the risks by developing six initial scenarios. Unlike Kahn, the scenario planners at Shell sought not the big picture but rather a focused vision of the future for oil. Even more than Kahn's faith in the powers of scenarios as fictional devices, Wack and Newland believed in the mythological role of scenarios that had the compelling and memorable qualities of fairy tales. Shell planner Arie de Geus would write "ln the telling ..., the story line becomes stronger. Scenarios act as a signal-to-noise filter. The driving forces sharpen. The events depicted enter the mind with less background noise and thus with a stronger profile and clearer outlines."ls One scenario focused on the changing ownership of energy supplies. Prior to the foundation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1960s, oil reserves were divided among three regions, the United States (which had import restrictions), the self-sufficient communist world, and everywhere else, known simply as the "international oil industry" or "the World Outside the Communist Area and North America" (WOCANA).16Within the WOCANA nations, national interests owned only 8 percent of their crude oil, with the rest owned by the Seven Sisters as well as a few aspiring independents. lt quickly became clear to Wack and Newland that the oil industry could lose its control over oil prices in many of the WOCANA nations. Shell's directors agreed that a crisis in oil production would come, but were unwilling to break with the path followed by the oil companies and stuck steadfastly to UPM projections. Wack was disturbed by this and realized that their scenarios were too prosaic. Scenarios had to, he concluded, make it possible to "change our managers' view of reality."l7 ln other words, scenario planning was important less as an analytical tool and more as a rhetorical device. Scenario planning, Peter Schwartz writes, merely allows people to see what they are blind to.18 A successful scenario, he explains, "resonates in some ways with what they already know, and then leads them from that resonance to reperceive the world."19 De Geus himself explains that scenario planning served as a form of transitional object, a term that he borrowed from psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott.2o For Winnicott, the transitional object designated "the intermediate area of experience, between the thumb and the teddy bear, between the oral erotism and the true object-relationship, between primary creative activity and projection of what has already been introjected." Not necessarily a thing at all, the transitional object is more often an action, a sound, or some other phenomena. As an intermediate condition, it provides a means by which the child moves from an oceanic phase to a grasp of the world and consciousness.2l But instead of a fetish, over time, such objects would be decathected, relegated to limbo after losing their meaning. Winnicott suggested that such objects "diffused...spread out over the ... whole cultural field!'z2 Here Winnicott could suggest a return: "lt is assumed here that the task of reality acceptance is never completed, that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience ... which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.).This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is 'lost' in playl'23Thus for de Geus scenario planning served not so much to anticipate the future as to stimulate thought about it. Even after processing the scenarios. Shell did not anticipate an energy crisis from the seller's market before 1980 because of long-term contracts the major oil producers had signed with OPEC.24 Still, based on the results of the Year 2000 study, Shell diversified, expanding into coal and nuclear power generation and metal production. Shell made many aspects of its scenarios public, thus launching an international discussion on the looming "oil crisis." In America, there was reason for concern. The country's rapid economic growth during the preceding decades meant that internal oil production had not kept pace with demand, peaking in 1970. Although there was still oil within the country's borders, bringing it to the surface was not as cost effective as importing it. To ensure that the growing demand would continue to be met, the U.S. government slowly reduced its restrictions on imported oil until it finally abolished them in 1973, deepening American reliance on foreign oil.25 ln the ten years following 1968, oil imports to the United States increased 193 percent while domestic oil production dropped 3 percent. Both Shell and the industry were aware of this possibility decades beforehand. ln 1956, Marion King Hubbert, a geophysicist working in Shell's Houston office, predicted that the United States would reach peak oil production between 1965 and 1970 while the world would do so around the year 2000.26 Hubbert's predictions were deeply unpopular, so much so that after Shell's head office learned that he would be presenting his research at the American Petroleum lnstitute, representatives called to ask him to withdraw his presentation.2T Since it would have required a massive shift away from existing investments, Hubbert's work was simply too dramatic for oil companies to take seriously. Although Hubbert was ignored by Shell and the industry, the idea of a resource-limited future steadily became more acceptable. A group of public officials, economists. and scientists met in Rome in 1968 to examine the future broadly.They published their results in 1972 asThe Limits to Growth. Like Hubber1, the authors of the study concluded that global resource extraction-not only of oil, but also of many crucial metals-would peak around the year 2000. The Limits to Growth questioned the viability of the current rate of consumption of the planet's resources.28 For Shell, The Limits to Growth meant that the environmental question was no longer a set of localized issues and reactions but rather a global problem that affected the company's public image. By making public Newland and Wack's Year 2000 study, Shell appeared to be in the forefront of such thinking, but they still underestimated how quickly change would happen. The Arab-lsraeli crisis of 1973 triggered the anticipated crisis over non-Western controlled oil. The result was an increase in the price of a barrel of oil from $2.90 in September to $5.10 in December to $11.65 on January 1, 1974.30 The new geopolitical landscape prompted the U.S. government to seek new means of conservation and alternative energy sources to prevent American dependency on foreign oil. The potential drop in demand, it became clear, could be as dangerous to an oil company's bottom line as any threat from overseas. Shell's scenarios did not predict the events of the OPEC energy crisis or how soon a crisis would take place, but as their scenarios suggesting a potential shift of power in oil resources had been made public prior to the crisis unfolding, the company appeared to have anticipated it.31 Even though no specific management decisions could be directly attributed to Shell's use of scenarios, scenario planning was a convenient means of fostering an image of Shell as having anticipated the future.3 lmpressed by the relevance of theYear 2000 scenarios, Shell continued to employ the scenario plan strategy, and by 1977 the planning group was running a number of scenarios including one focusing on lran, where much of the Seven Sisters' remaining oil supply was located. Within the scenarios, they anticipated that growing fundamentalist sentiments could bring a shift in power, upsetting the region and possibly turning it against the West, thus causing a steep rise in oil prices.33 Again, sooner than Shell expected, events unfolded that caused a second oil crisis. The 1979 lranian revolution and the subsequent lran/lraq war caused barrel prices to double.3a Shell had already been looking to diversify its holdings further and pursue new sources of oil, particularly to offshore deposits identified in the 1960s. Until this second price spike, many of these options were too expensive to develop. The new oil prices made offshore drilling profitable, and soon Shell focused much of its attention to the offshore industry and construction of new types of rigs and platforms.35 This was widely perceived as Shell's second success with scenarios. Shell had risen from the least profitable to the most profitable of the Seven Sisters. The planning department was widely integrated into the corporate and management structure. Any major new projects taken on at Shell had to be run successfully against all of the ongoing scenarios, thereby attempting to guarantee that new plans would have as much success as possible, regardless of the way events unfold.36 The third oil crisis occurred as a combination of massive investments in supply infrastructure in the 1970s and cutbacks in demand due to energy conservation. ln 1986, prices collapsed and stayed low for some twenty years.37 Still, Shell's 1985 "Oil Price Collapse" scenario anticipated the drop, allowing the company to immediately put its most expensive exploratory projects on hold while developing new technologies such as three-dimensional seismic technology and horizontal drilling to more efficiently produce oil from mature fields and existing wells. Through the scenarios, Shell also anticipated the opening and deregulation of global markets.3s At the same time, the scenario team began to feel pressure to prove its own strategic value. The link to corporate success and the planning department's work was not quantifiable. Many managers could not fully understand the group's value. While Shell's executives acknowledged the accuracy of many of the Shell scenarios, they nevertheless saw the program as expensive and wasteful. By design, most of the scenarios developed by the group would never unfold in real life, and it was impossible to tell whether the planning department's ideas were actually having any effect on the decision-making process of management.39 For every valuable fiction scripted, there were many scenarios that would never come to pass-indeed one of the reasons that Hubbert's peak oil had been discounted was that such predictions had been made for decades beforehand- producing unrecouped expenses. Yet some scenarios proved misleading. Only a few years before, acting on the advice of scenario team, Shell entered into the nuclear and coal industries. Neither venture proved successful, both were controversial, and eventually Shell abandoned them.a0 ln 1986 de Geus began to reexamine and audit the planning department's strategies. As a result, the planning team turned toward the idea of Shell as a learning company, setting up a computer conferencing system among scenario planners while enlisting Stewart Brand, the founder of The Whole Earth Catalog, to organize a series of "learning conferences" that drew heavily from countercultural influences, cybernetics, systems theory, and computer technology. During the 1990s, the culture at large turned toward hopefulness about the impact of impendlng technological advances on the proximate future. The crisis model upon which many of the earlier scenarios depended had eased and the focus changed to seizing opportunity in emerging global markets and new technologies. So, too, as the internet made vast quantities of information easily available, it became difficult for investors to believe that anyone could produce genuinely new knowledge. Scenario planners turned inward, codifying their methodology; Peter Schwaftz. Kees van der Heijden, and Arie de Geus all released books on the methodology of scenario planning, arguing for its deployment in both professional decisions and everyday life. At this point, scenario planning was sold not as something done by a select group of remarkable people but rather as a technique that everyone could employ for personal growth and advancement, a strategy for an uncertain but rapidly expanding marketplace. There ls No Alternative Throughout the 1990s, Shell's scenarios focused on the concept "There ls No Alternative" (TINA). An echo of Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History and the Last Mani' TINA projected the increasing liberalization and globalization of markets together with a greater decline in the power of national interests and more reliance and dependence on new technology. a1 As neoliberal government policies spurred on deregulation, new financial instruments began to serve the function of scenarios, helping companies and investors guard against unforeseen conditions. Through tradable futures, options, derivatives, credit default swaps, and hedge funds, the future itself could be marketed and commodified.a2 Since 2001 , a steady stream of crises have come to pass that have radically shaken public faith in the market economy and Shell's own confidence in theTlNA concept. First, the terrorist attacks of September 11 , 2001 , growing tensions in the Middle East, and the lraq War threatened the illusion of relative peace, reliability of foreign oil supply, and free rein for globalization. Second, Shell faced scandal in 2004. Because investment depends on future returns, truthful disclosure of a company's assets is a prerequisite. Shell, however, overstated its reserves by 20 percent, prompting widespread outrage among investors.43The reality of the future undid its fiction. Combined, these threats prompted a reevaluation of TINA known as "There Are No ldeal Answers" (TANIA) to confront the need to transition to a sustainable source of energy. Scenario planning does not focus on the future but rather on the present. Peak oil, global warming, and the fragility of speculative bubbles are imminent threats. But the massive capital already invested by companies like Shell in existing infrastructure makes it impossible for them to abandon standard industry practices, even if they know that the consequences of business as usual will be dire once things hit a tipping point. Like fairy tales, scenarios present carefully crafted stories that indirectly illustrate the dangers of the world to an audience that isn't ready for them. They allow us to prepare for the future, even if we feel powerless against the forces of the world around us, by providing a context for speaking about the unspeakable. The lessons of fairy tales are gentle and distant, they may only make sense later, when the codified dangers from the stories appear in reality. This helps preserve a childlike naiveté and enables the continued drive toward pleasure in the face of fear and doubt. As Bruno Bettelheim wrote: "The figures and events of fairy tales also personify and illustrate inner conflicts, but they suggest ever so subtly how these conflicts may be solved, and what the next steps in the development toward a higher humanity might be. The fairy tale is presented in a simple, homely way; no demands are made on the listener. This prevents even the smallest child from feeling compelled to act in specific ways, and he is never made to feel inferior. Far from making demands, the fairy tale reassures, gives hope for the future, and holds out the promise of a happy ending." By providing a forum where fear and anxiety can both be discussed, fairy tales provide listeners with a sense of importance, even if they do not yet have agency.46 ln Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Sigmund Freud hypothesized that since organisms come into being from a plenum of inanimate matter, they carry with them the death drive or "pleasure principle” a desire to return to this undifferentiated state. lf, however, the organism responds with an "influx of fresh amounts of stimulus" through a traumatic event, it can awake again and go on living or, if the stimulus is strong enough, reproduce.4T In this light, scenario planning functions more as a rhetorical device and therapy than as a method of planning or accurate forecast. The shock of the actual event is necessary to allow change to occur. But scenario planning allows participants to continue playing even though they know better. Like psychoanalysis, there is no end or goal to the process of gaming; its value is the sensation that comes from playing the game.

### US best

#### ---Their defense of American hegemony relies on epistemologically flawed colonial stereotypes of racial inferiority that whitewashes American imperialism while constructing a universal notion of humanity that enables a self-defeating genocidal politics in the name of stability.

Kaplan 2003

Amy, Professor of English at University of Pennsylvania, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,” American Quarterly 56.1

Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the "reluctant imperialist." 10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an [End Page 4] uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society." 11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image. This is also a narrative about race. The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from earlier colonial discourses about races who are incapable of governing themselves, Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law," or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society," in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "The American Empire," Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Burden" but insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden." 12 Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism. These narratives of the origins of the current empire—that is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionist—have much in common. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberalism, and democracy, the "indispensable nation," in Madeleine Albright's words. In this logic, the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong" for everyone [End Page 5] else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others." 13 Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus deems the entire world a potential site of intervention. Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems. According to this logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather, resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values. Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As part of the "coming-out" narrative, the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. We've always been interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty.' Let's just be ourselves." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign—one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future." 14 Historians of the United States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S. interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms, in relation to other historical changes and movements across the globe. The struggle over history also entails a struggle over language and culture. It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks words [End Page 6] such as freedom, democracy, and liberty. It's imperative that we draw on our knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and transnational sources. Today's reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power," the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. As Ignatieff writes, "America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires." 15 The work of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of global culture is not a one-way street, but a process of transnational exchange, conflict, and transformation, which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by empire. In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, those whose dreams are different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself. As one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote, "when you adopt a way of terror you've excused yourself from the community of human beings." 16 Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act, the accusation of terrorism alone, without due process and proof, is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity. As scholars of American studies, we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical, literary, and visual representations about the way such exclusions from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

### Security good

#### ---Security mobilized activism is bad ---

#### (A.) Framing policies through a lens of fear causes paralysis, partying, praying or preparing, NOT the creation of preventative solutions.

Gross & Gilles 2012

Matthew Barrett, editor of the Glen Canyon Reader and media strategist who has worked for Howard Dean's 2004 presidential campaign and Jon Tester's successful campaign for U.S. Senate in Montana, Mel, writer and a former advocate for victims of domestic abuse, From “The Last Myth: What the Rise of Apocalyptic Thinking Tells Us About America,” How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-taking-political-action/255758/

The deeper we entangle the challenges of the 21st century with apocalyptic fantasy, the more likely we are to paralyze ourselves with inaction -- or with the wrong course of action. We react to the idea of the apocalypse -- rather than to the underlying issues activating the apocalyptic storyline to begin with -- by either denying its reality ("global warming isn't real") or by despairing at its inevitability ("why bother recycling when the whole world is burning up?"). We react to apocalyptic threats by either partying (assuaging our apocalyptic anxiety through increased consumerism, reasoning that if it all may be gone tomorrow, we might as well enjoy it today), praying (in hopes that divine intervention or mere time will allow us to avoid confronting the challenges before us), or preparing (packing "bugout" packs for a quick escape or stocking up on gold, guns, and canned food, as though the transformative moment we anticipate will be but a brief interlude, a bad winter storm that might trap us indoors for a few days or weeks but that will eventually melt away). None of these responses avert, nor even mitigate, the very threats that have elicited our apocalyptic anxiety in the first place. Buying an electric car doesn't solve the problem of a culture dependent on endless growth in a finite world; building a bunker to defend against the zombie hordes doesn't solve the growing inequities between the rich and poor; praying for deliverance from the trials of history doesn't change that we must live in the times in which we were born. Indeed, neither partying, nor preparing, nor praying achieves what should be the natural goal when we perceive a threat on the horizon: we should not seek to ignore it, or simply brace for it, but to avert it.

### A2 Permutation --- 2nc Politics

#### ---The permutation’s pragmatic combination fails because it still allows the debate to be framed by “energy production” which taints the affirmative’s ability to define problems and create solutions outside of existing structures of global inequality.

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

For time-pressed, slogan-bound, “must-be-ready-with-a-response” policy analysts and politicians, the invitation to reconsider such a seemingly settled concept as “energy” may look like an irksome invitation to navel-gaze. What does it matter if many societies – perhaps even the bulk of humanity – do not view a charcoal fire and a bullock drawing a plough through a field as twin instances of “energy consumption”? Far more important is the plight of the 2.7 billion people who rely on traditional biomass for cooking at the expense of forests and health; the 1.3 billion people who do not have access to electricity and thus the means to be “productive citizens”;2 the increasing competition for energy resources as the middle classes in China, India and Brazil weigh into the global mêlée for consumer goods; the need to assuage worried (Northern) consumers that the lights will not go out; and, above all, the threat that resource scarcities pose to continued economic growth. Who cares how or why fossil-fuelled capitalism is tied up with the evolution of a novel conception of energy? What matters is whether this gas pipeline should be built, that nuclear plant commissioned, or that LNG terminal financed. The pressing task is how to make the distasteful tradeoffs dictated by the realpolitik of securing energy for the future – human rights versus access to gas, maintaining jobs versus permitting pollution, leaving future generations with irresolvable problems of nuclear waste versus cutting carbon dioxide emissions. Such apparent pragmatism is understandable – but, in the end, unpragmatic. In today’s world, “energy” is about far more than pipelines and power stations, transmission lines and oil contracts: it is a system of economic and political relationships that weaves and reweaves the connections between corporations, governments, investors, human rights activists, environmentalists, the military, scientists, the media, trade unions and consumers alike into constantly shifting networks of power that serve to reproduce “the world that Energy begat”. No decision related to upper-case or abstract Energy (see pp.12ff) can escape the influences that such networks of power exert: Energy with a capital “E” not only frames the decision; it structures the solution, trapping the critical and the uncritical alike. To respond only to the daily froth of upper-case Energy talk – which power station? where? fuelled by gas or coal? – is to remain hostage to a dynamic that simply reinforces and reproduces the problems that Energy represents. Such “pragmatism” has helped shape an “energy security” agenda that mischaracterises the many energy scarcities – and insecurities – experienced by poorer people; promotes a response that has little to do with ensuring that everyone has the energy to meet their basic needs and everything to do with creating new sources of accumulation; and that disrespects the limits posed by climate change and resource depletion to endless economic growth. The result is a wave of new enclosures that, in addition to creating new scarcities (not only of energy but also of food, water, land and other necessities of life) are making a transition away from fossil fuels far harder to achieve.

### Utopian

#### ---Energy scenario predictions fail --- The reliance on empirical correlation is empirically unable to anticipate change or predict deviations in production trajectory --- Reject their impact analysis as a form of ideological blackmail that limits our response to business as usual because it can’t imagine anything different.

Labban 2010

Mazen, Preempting Possibility: Critical Assessment of IEA’s *World Energy Outlook 2010*, International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2010, Paris: International Energy Agency, http://www.academia.edu/1424109/Preempting\_Possibility\_Critical\_Assessment\_of\_the\_IEAs\_World\_Energy\_Outlook\_2010

Growing uncertainty about energy markets following the crises of the 1970s boosted long-term energy forecasting as a planning device to prepare for an increasingly unpredictable future, on one hand, and as a techno-scientiﬁc(read: politically neutral and respectable) support for public policies ostensibly aimed at increasing energy security and environmental protection, on the other. Long-range forecasts, however, have invariably failed to produce accurate predictions about all aspects of energy markets: primary energy supplies, energy substitutions, the relative shares of different fuels in the energy mix, aggregate and sectoral energy demand, as well as carbon emissions. 6 Because they rely on trend projections, forecasts also rely on an assumption that the future is a smooth, gradual extension of the present at a constant rate with no structural changes or major interruptions or aberrations. They also rely on empirical correlation rather than causality and cannot therefore explain underlying forces that drive demand, price, etc. **Thus forecasts cannot predict a future that looks very different from the present, let alone explain how possible futures might unfold, which makes them useful only in short-term, business-as-usual projections**. Because of such inherent limitations, which prevent forecasts from accurately predicting long-term technical developments, capital markets and investment climates, let alone even more unpredictable processes such as government policies and geopolitical conﬂict, energy analysts, including the economists at the IEA, have shifted from long-range predictive forecasts towards more normative scenario building in the analysis of long-range energy-related developments. This technical move has a political dimension that is worth pondering in order to shed critical light on the signiﬁcance of the WEO 2010 scenarios. Scenario analysis has its origins in corporate and military strategic planning. 7 It was developed by Herman Kahn at the RAND corporation in the1950s — to help the US Air Force think about ‘the unthinkable’ — and pioneered by Shell in the early 1960s, initially as an internal communications vehicle, to help the company respond more readily to unexpected develop-ments in energy markets that might affect the price of oil. Whereas forecasts predict what is most likely to happen in the future given current trends and projections, scenarios contemplate what is possible if certain choices are made from within a hypothetical range of possibilities which typically includes a reference case describing what would happen if no action is takento alter the existing state of affairs in any fundamental manner. For this reason, scenarios not only describe hypothetical futures but must also prescribe pathways and roadmaps, policies and actions, and identify ways and meansto arrive at a desirable future and avoid undesirable fate. Unlike forecasts,in which the future is determined by projections of current trends, scenar-ios assume a less deterministic development that allows subjects to makechoices and whose agency, not the correlation of empirical facts, determines possible futures. Scenarios are ‘desiring machines’, to borrow a term from Deleuze and Guattari (1983): at the same time that they produce the desired future, they also produce the subject and mechanism by which to actualize it. This occasionally operates in the form of blackmail: coercing action in the present by showing the dire consequences of not acting. Despite obvious differences and assertions to the contrary, energy scenarios are one type of predictive forecast which, however, does not treat current circumstances and trends as immutable, therefore allowing itself ﬂexibility in projecting into the future (and an about-face if the future turns out differ-ently) in order to effect change in the present. For one, energy scenarios rely on forecasts about economic growth, population growth, energy demand, production and generation capacities, prices and costs, etc., hence the possibilities they construct are based on a set of predictions. Also, forecasting is often negatively implicit in scenario analysis. The authors of WEO 2010, as of other Outlooks, are adamant that their scenarios are not forecasts. Yet, all three WEO 2010 scenarios are forecasts about the state of the global economy in that they assume continued economic growth. They also assert that no matter what it will look like, the future is certainly not going to look like the present because WEO 2010 predicts that governments will act on their policy promises, no matter how weakly, and in predictable manner: ‘it is certain that energy and climate policies in many — if not most — countries will change, possibly in the way we assume in the New Policies Scenario’(p. 62). Thus, eliminating the abominable which is also impossible, WEO 2010 scenarios lay out two alternative futures that differ only quantitatively — one desirable, the other ‘realistic’, or likely. The possible becomes what ensues from action according to the scenario’s prescriptions or from absolute lack of action and this is effected by actualizing future events and processes that may or may not occur, depending on what course of action governments take or fail to take in the present. Scenarios limit what is possible to what is desirable for their authors, or to its exact opposite, and exclude possibilities that do not fall within this range. At the moment that scenarios produce possibilities they negate the very notion of possibility.x

### A2 Energy Inev --- 2nc Politics

#### ---“Energy” is not inevitable --- The modern conception of energy is a social construction that emerged in the late 1800s and is not a historical predetermined.

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

Outside the fossil-fuelled world, energy has always also been tied to a multitude of disparate but particular activities that have no omnibus category or abstract quantity linking them all. There was seldom any reason, for example, to treat heat and mechanical energy as equivalent or exchangeable, physically or economically. As economic historian Joel Mokyr notes: “the equivalence of the two forms was not suspected by people in the eighteenth century; the notion that a horse pulling a treadmill and a coal fire heating a lime kiln were in some sense doing the same thing would have appeared absurd to them.”s22 Agriculture was driven by sunlight and muscles, long-range trade by wind and water currents. Cooking and heating depended on wood and sometimes coal, which, together with charcoal and falling water, helped power industry. People did not think of themselves as “energy constrained” in the contemporary sense: an energy unbounded by seasons and the land still lay in the future. Capital “E” Energy as we know it today was in fact nowhere to be found. What we now recognise as Energy was also embedded in particular places in a fairly non-flexible geographical pattern. In European countries, grain-milling was scattered across the countryside, depending on where rivers could provide sufficient mechanical energy. As late as 1838, water still powered one-quarter of Britain’s cotton factories (and even the coal-powered upstarts were nevertheless called “mills” in a mark of their watery heritage). The size of towns depended on how much firewood was available within range of horse-powered transport. Global trade relied on understanding geographically specific wind patterns that had to be worked with, not against. Energy was not mobile, liquid, transferable in large quantities over long distances. The age of Btus, kilojoules and oil-equivalents lay in an unimagined future.23 As a result, there was no politics of energy of the kind that has become familiar in the fossil-fuel era. Controlling muscles meant controlling people and animals. Amassing power over production meant, above all, amassing human bodies – through slavery, for example. Exploitation of firewood and charcoal depended on access to land. How energy was used was subject to different kinds of monitoring: for example, the practices of millers scattered along rivers were vulnerable, to a certain extent, to surveillance by the local peasants whose business they sought. One person could control only limited quantities of energy, both in absolute terms and relative to others.

## \*\*\*1NR

### \*\*\*Horse-Trade CP

### 1NR A2: Consult Theory

#### ---Literature-the counterplan is identified as an important and competitive option in the energy literature. Its predictable and a germane policy option – outweighs aff ground

American Energy Innovation Council ‘11

Catalyzing Ingenuity Chapter 3

<http://americanenergyinnovation.org/catalyzing-ingenuity-chapter-3/>

Domestic Energy Production

The U.S. has an abundance of natural resources, including sizable oil and natural gas reserves. The energy sector is an enormous revenue generator for the government, which collects a variety of taxes and fees from the many companies that produce, refine, and deliver energy to consumers and businesses. Going forward, any expansion of domestic production offers an opportunity to reevaluate the revenue sharing associated with the extraction of U.S. natural resources.

With continued, and likely expanded, off-shore oil and gas exploration, shale gas production on federal lands, and enhanced oil recovery in the coming years, reorienting a portion of the current suite of domestic energy production fees - including royalty payments, lease sales, bonus bids and other charges - presents a real opportunity to raise new revenue for the federal government that could fund innovation in new energy technologies.

### 1NR a2: Congress Says No

---The CP builds strong bipartisan support-solves the case and avoids politics

Muro-Brookings-1/25/12

<http://www.brookings.edu/up-front/posts/2012/01/25-sotu-energy-muro-fikri>

The Missing Link in the State of the Union Energy Agenda

It was good to hear strong shout-outs for clean and renewable energy sourcing as part of the balanced energy stance promoted in President Obama’s State of the Union speech this week. We’ve long agreed that the “all of the above” energy approach Obama championed last night could be desirable so long as it is just that—oriented to the balanced development of all sources including American renewable and clean energy as well as fossil fuel resources. In that nexus lies a politically defensible sweet-spot notwithstanding the tough politics of the energy debate. And yet, the president left out a crucial link in his renewed commitments to both clean energy and increased conventional energy: He missed the opportunity to tie the revenues from fossil fuel drilling permits and licenses to investment in energy innovation. In this respect, a truly potent “all of the above” stance would move to link reasonable continued fossil fuel exploitation to investments in the innovation necessary to accelerate the widespread adoption of clean new energy technologies. Along these lines, a smart “all of the above” approach to the nation’s energy challenges might channel the royalties and fees associated with increased off-shore and inland fossil fuel extraction into programs like ARPA-e, the Energy Innovation Hubs, or more generally into basic and applied clean energy research and deployment. And as it happens, such a linkage once had (and may again garner!) bipartisan support. After all, not so long ago Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), now speaker, introduced the House Republicans’ American Energy Act of 2009 and in it proposed a bargain that would have paired expanded oil and gas drilling with new investments in renewable and alternative energy. The bill proposed putting hundreds of billions of anticipated new oil and gas revenues (and that even before the shale gas boom) into a trust fund to accelerate clean energy innovation. The upshot: For a few fleeting months that broad outline pointed to an intriguing way forward. Now, maybe that grand trade beckons again. Yet to make it a truly productive agreement the Obama team needs to remember that “all of the above” should entail a true trade. Here is hoping that the forthcoming elaboration of the new stance backs up the president’s stated commitments with a commonsense proposal for linking stepped-up fossil fuel extraction to revenue-raising for investments in new and cleaner energy technologies.

---The CP generates bipartisan support---Avoids their generic arguments about renewable energy-Boehner will push to make the deal

Muro-Brookings-11/9/10

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2010/11/09-energy-muro>

Moving Forward on Energy and Climate Policy

So Washington is speculating what comes next for energy policy. And of course, the hot topic is the location (if it exists) of common ground between President Obama and a Congress now controlled on the House side by Republicans and with increased seats in the Senate. Will deals be made around natural gas development, domestic production of electric cars, and nuclear power, topics that President Obama threw out in his post-drubbing news conference? What about energy efficiency in buildings and appliances? What about subsidies for renewables or a national renewable electricity or portfolio standard (RES or RPS)? In this climate, it’s safe to say we won’t be seeing a return of cap-and-trade legislation to raise the price and so lower the amount of carbon emissions in the next two years, as Obama acknowledged in his remarks to reporters. And of course, many progressive commentators such as Joe Romm are extremely pessimistic about the possibilities for meaningful progress of any kind, let alone on any sort of comprehensive carbon pricing or emissions reduction scheme. Over at Grist, for example, Chris Mims assesses the prospects pretty succinctly as “zero action on anything substantial.” For my part, I’m pretty pessimistic too—at least in the short run of this Congress—but not entirely so. It’s true that Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) does not seem real eager to collaborate on clean energy topics. And for that matter, the massive GOP freshman class coming into the next Congress is dominated by legislators who, according to a report by the Center for American Progress’ ThinkProgress, either deny the existence of climate change or are opposed to any climate change legislation that increases government revenue. However, the fact remains that there is no shortage of possible convergence points for the next Congress should the GOP choose the path of cooperation in the coming months. CAP’s Daniel Weiss has laid out one expansive menu of incremental to-dos that are mostly deficit-neutral and have enjoyed bipartisan and business support. Along these lines Weiss calls out as possible such items as tax credits for the purchase of natural-gas-fueled vehicles, piloting electric car changing infrastructure, tax incentives for home and business energy retrofits, and oil spill response and accountability. Weiss even mentions RES / RPS which some might say would move beyond the incremental yet which had four GOP co-sponsors in the 11th Congress. Meanwhile, I recently helped frame another potential road map for keeping things moving on climate and energy by focusing on cleantech innovation. Worked out in a dialogue with colleagues at the American Enterprise Institute and the Breakthrough Institute, our proposed cooperation agenda goes beyond the incremental to suggest a fairly deep-going push to put some $25 billion a year into intensified and reinvented research supporting new energy technologies, paid for by a modest tax on carbon, increased oil and gas royalties, or other energy-sector revenue-raisers. Central to the plan is the rationale for an energy research step change and the programmatic detail for making sure it’s carried out in new ways offered by the Brookings proposal for the development of energy discovery-innovation institutes. While no substitute for more comprehensive action, I do think this architecture furnishes one important piece of the now-necessary era of making progress not by comprehensive grand strokes but in “chunks.” The biggest problem: Twenty-five billion a year for energy R&D is obviously a tall order for bipartisan compromise any time soon given the depressing failure of the last Congress to deliver the modest sums requested by the Obama administration to launch a network of energy innovation hubs similar to Brookings’ discovery institutes. And yet, even then, hope springs eternal, and is somewhat encouraged by something called the American Energy Act, the 2009 energy plan introduced by House Republicans last year under the leadership of Rep. John Boehner, soon to be the new speaker of the House. At the center of that plan was a proposed bargain that would have paired expanded oil and gas drilling and nuclear development with new investments in renewable and alternative energy. To fund the latter the bill proposed putting hundreds of billions of the anticipated new oil and gas royalties into a trust fund to accelerate clean energy innovation. Sound familiar? The bargain has something of the architecture of cleantech innovation push I’ve been talking about. Moreover, the costs of investment would be internalized across the energy sector, and “dirty” exploitation would be utilized to fund clean innovation. Now, who knows? The Republican counter of 2009 to the big Democratic push on cap-and-trade may well have been rhetorical then, may not be on offer in early 2011. But still, it has its points. And here’s the kicker: It took the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe in the Gulf to fully scotch such a deal last spring. Now, one wonders if the Democrats’ current “deep water” will bring such a deal back, along with other deals. No, none of it’s ideal, or by any means assured, but perhaps it’s possible. So here, for now, are two cheers for the Boehner energy plan of 2009.

Boehner key to the agenda

Cincinnati.com 1/22/11 Obama agenda? Meet Boehner's gavel

<http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20110122/NEWS0108/101230301/Obama-agenda-Meet-Boehner-s-gavel>

WASHINGTON - If you watch Tuesday night's State of the Union speech, you'll see House Speaker John Boehner of West Chester standing behind the president, just over Barack Obama's left shoulder. But don't expect Boehner to stand behind many of the policies Obama lays out in his hour long speech. The interplay between the two men will determine what happens over the next two years - how much the governments spends, what happens to the health care law Obama signed last March, how the government tackles (or fails to tackle) long-term fiscal challenges like Social Security or Medicare spending. Whatever laws Obama and the Democrat-controlled Senate hope to enact will have to pass through the Boehner-controlled Republican House. And that leaves Boehner with a tricky balancing act: Acquiesce to the anti-Obama, tea party-inspired faction of his GOP membership, or work with the president to achieve bipartisan compromise on legislation, like he did during the recent lame-duck session. Complicating everything further: The shooting of Arizona Rep. Gabrielle Giffords has brought new attention to the idea of "civility" in Washington, forcing Boehner to tone down some of his party's rhetoric. Cooperate or confront? For Boehner and Obama, the chief issue lurking behind the scenes is the fact that Boehner's goal is to maintain GOP control of the House, expand Republican control to the Senate and help his party win back the White House. Meanwhile, Obama will be looking toward his 2012 campaign for a second term and hoping to help Democrats regain lost ground in Congress. It's unclear whether those political realities will result in cooperation or confrontation, although political experts say the latter is more likely. "I don't believe Boehner has any incentive to work with the president over the coming year," said Thomas Mann, a congressional scholar at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "Congressional leaders are under enormous pressure from tea party and other conservative activists to stick to their principles and avoid any compromise." But if the last few weeks of 2010 are a guide, then cooperation is possible. That's when congressional Republicans and the White House came together on a bipartisan deal to extend the Bush-era tax cuts. The compromise extended tax cuts to everyone, even wealthy individuals, which is what Republicans wanted. But it also extended unemployment insurance and enacted a Social Security payroll tax break for working Americans, things that Democrats had sought. However, if the first few weeks of the 2011 legislative session are a guide, then that compromise may be the first and last forged between Republicans and the president. House Republicans kicked off the year by passing a bill last week to repeal the health care law, one of Obama's top political achievements. The bill is not likely to be taken up in the Democrat-controlled Senate. The next day, Boehner announced that his party's next goal was passing a bill that would ensure that no federal money will be used to pay for abortions, calling the issue "one of our highest legislative priorities." Lawmakers who support abortion rights, including most Democrats, say the existing health care law already bans federal funding on abortions. Like the health care repeal bill that Republicans passed last week, the abortion issue is mostly symbolic, since it's unlikely that it'll get consideration in the Senate. Both of these issues show the extent to which Boehner is willing to cater to the large class of freshman Republicans, many of them tea party backers who won on an anti-Obama platform, instead of moving forward on legislation that has a chance of passage. "He has the right instincts, but I'm not sure if the Republican conference is going to let him do what he wants," said Scott Lilly, who worked for Democratic lawmakers in Congress for 30 years before joining the left-leaning Center for American Progress. Avoiding gridlock When Republicans were in the minority, Boehner won over his conference by leading his party in uniform opposition to Obama's policies. He succeeded in getting every Republican in the House to vote against both the economic stimulus and health care bills. Now that Republicans control a chamber of Congress, they'll need to show that they can get things done - or risk being blamed for the gridlock in Washington.s

#### ---Consultation builds congressional support for the plan

Hamilton-Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs-99

(Lee H.-, Dem. Congressman from Indiana, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Oct. 14, Elliot School Lecture @ G.W.U., “Foreign Policy Consultation between the President and Congress”)

That kind of failure is to be anticipated in our system of government. Congress has a responsibility to challenge executive branch proposals with which it disagrees. Good consultation will not, and should not, always be correlated with congressional support, But more often than not, good consultation will help an administration gain greater backing in Congress- It will almost always strengthen polity The power of the presidency is such that the President will usually be given the initiative on foreign policy matters. When the President keeps Congress involved in the policymaking process, and consults sufficiently, his chances for success with Congress increase. It is not easy to make our constitutional system for conducting foreign policy work. But, if both the President and the Congress understand their respective roles, take a greater effort to work together, and put our national interests ahead of partisan personal concerns, the country will be well served because a stronger, better foreign policy will emerge.

### 1NR A2: Delay DA

#### ---Turn-Failure to engage in the consultative process triggers congressional backlash that will undermine implementation of the plan

Collier-Congressional Research Service-83

(Ellen C.-, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy @ the Congressional Research Service, *Foreign Affairs Committee Print*, P. 72)

For the most part, consultation is not an end in itself but a means toward building an effective policy. Nevertheless, consultation itself may be an objective to the extent that it represents a satisfactory working relationship between two branches constituting a mutual recognition that each branch has a legitimate role to play in foreign policy. Certainly the cost of lack of adequate consultation has an occasion proved extremely high in terms of impairing relations. Failure of the Nixon administration to consult with Congress during the crisis in Cyprus in 1974 contributed to the decision of Congress to impose the Turkish arms embargo in 1975. Unilateral announcement by the Carter administration at the end of 1978 that it was terminating the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan added to tension between the branches that led to a court suit. Congress responded to an executive branch decision to vote for U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia by passing a law prohibiting the United States from complete compliance with the sanctions. With little consultation taking place, there were 14 years of legislative-executive tension on the Rhodesia issue.

#### ---Negotiations will be quick

Koh**-**Prof. of Poli Sci and Former Dean @ Yale-90 *The National Security Constitution*

I reject the notion that more intense legal scrutiny of executive decision would necedsarily foster presidential paralsis when world events demand a prompt response. Most foreign-policy decisions are implemented over the course of months and years, not moments. Excepting, perhaps, a response to a nuclear strikem the occasions are exceedingly rare when the president would jeopardize the nation by considering legality before committig the nation to a course of intentional action. Nor can I accept that requiring the president to act lawfully would confine him or her to conducting foreign poicy through inefficient, existing cabinet bureaucracies. As the Cuban missile and the Iranian hostage crises illustrated, presidents can quickly respond to pressing interational crisies, even through ad hoc nonbureaucratic channels, without offending core constutional principles or forgoing the expert advice of legal counsel.

### 1NR A2: PDCP

#### ---And, substantial reduction implies real or tangible reduction-the permutation is a conditional not substantive reduction.

Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, 1996 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/substantially)

1 a : of or relating to substance b : not illusory : having merit substantial constitutional claim> c : having importance or significance : MATERIAL substantial step had not been taken toward commission of the crime —W. Railroad LaFave and A. W. Scott, Junior>

2 : considerable in quantity : significantly great substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter —U.S. Code> —compare DE MINIMIS — sub•stan•ti•al•i•ty /-"stan-chE-'a-l&-tE/ noun — sub•stan•tial•ly adverb

#### ---And, should is mandatory

A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, Bryan A Garner, scholar of the English Language, March 2001

Should. Oddly, should, like may, q.v., is sometimes used to create mandatory standards, as in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. In that code, in which “[t]he canons...establish mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated,” six of the seven canons begin, “A Judge should...” See ought (b) & shall.

#### ---Should implies probability

Google Dictionary, 2011

Used to indicate what is probable

#### ---And, Resolved means to make a firm deicison

[Allwords.com](http://Allwords.com/) 2003

http://www.allwords.com/query.php?SearchType=3&Keyword=Resolved&goquery=Find+it%21&Language=ENG

1. To decide firmly or to determine to do it.

Form: resolve on something (usually)

Form: resolve to do something

### 1NR A2: Terrorism

#### Terrorists wont use WMD’s like their impact card says—they like conventional weapons

John Mueller is a professor of political science at Ohio State “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD” Jan. 1. 2008. Accessed July 19, 2010. <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF> //Donnie

Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005) The degree to which al-Qaeda has pursued a nuclear weapons program may have been exaggerated--often by the same slam dunkers who alarmingly warned us about Saddam Hussein's WMD development. Meanwhile, the media, following conventional patterns, dutifully and mostly uncritically transmit the assertions put forward. In was on a November 14, 2004, 60 Minutes telecast, for example, that former CIA spook Michael Scheuer assured his rapt CBS interviewer that the explosion of a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb in the United States was "probably a near thing."

### 1NR Impact Overview

#### Renewable power solves natural gas prices and their manufacturing advantage

**Berry**, **5** (David, Energy Project, Western Resource Advocates, Energy Policy, “Renewable Energy as a Natural Gas Price Hedge: The Case of Wind,”April, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 799-807)

3. Renewable energy as a price hedge

Renewable energy with **low and stable prices** can serve as a hedge against natural gas price volatility and against natural gas price increases. Table 1 shows the major non-hydro renewable energy technologies in the United States as of early 2003. Biomass technologies comprise the most generating capacity and much of that capacity is located at industrial or agricultural sites, using timber residue or agricultural waste as fuel. Wind is second in terms of generating capacity. About 60% of the US wind generating capacity in early 2003 was located in California and Texas. Other states with over 100 MW of wind capacity on line in mid-2003 are: Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, Iowa, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Kansas. Geothermal energy is currently concentrated in California, Nevada, Utah, and Hawaii. Nearly all of the solar electric generation is found at one solar thermal project in California, with the rest consisting mostly of photovoltaic generating capacity, the majority of which is located in Arizona and California. Table 1. Generating capacity of US non-hydro renewable energy projects Of these major non-hydro renewable energy resources, wind energy is among the lowest cost per kWh generated in 2003, assuming continuation of the production tax credit, and it is expected to be the largest component of growth of renewable energy in the next few years (Navigant Consulting, Inc., 2003, p. 11, 17). Other low cost technologies include landfill gas (included in biomass in Table 1), and biomass co-firing with coal ( Navigant Consulting, Inc., 2003, p. 11). Any low cost renewable energy technology with stable prices that displaces significant volumes of natural gas could be used as a price hedge. Because wind energy is expected to grow rapidly in the next few years, it is reasonable to evaluate wind energy as a price hedge. A hedge is a mechanism to reduce the risk of paying high prices for natural gas in the future. However, wind is not a perfect substitute for gas-fired energy. Wind does not blow on demand and is available only intermittently. Thus, wind energy can only be used when it is available and cannot reliably displace all gas generation. The hedge provided by wind is similar to a financial swap (Bolinger et al., 2002) in that a resource with a stable price is substituted for a resource with a highly volatile price. If a utility uses wind as a hedge against volatile natural gas prices, it foregoes savings when gas prices are low but avoids paying high prices when gas prices are high. A wind hedge, as it has developed so far, does not provide the utility with the option of taking wind energy only when gas prices are high. As discussed further below, utilities typically take all the energy output from a wind facility regardless of gas prices

#### More evidence –we solve the root cause of manufacturing competitiveness

Capertons 10/10/12 (Richard W., Director of Clean Energy Investment at American Progress. In this role, he leads the Energy Opportunity team’s work on renewable energy finance, electricity markets, and clean energy infrastructure. Caperton is a native of rural America, growing up in Virginia and Missouri. He received his M.B.A. from Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business and a B.A. in politics from Pomona College. “Wind Power Helps to Lower Electricity Prices” <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2012/10/10/41100/wind-power-helps-to-lower-electricity-prices/>)

The production tax credit is a government investment success story. Since the creation of the credit, wind energy deployment has boomed while costs have come down an astonishing 90 percent. With a stable investment environment enabled by a long-term extension in 2009, the amount of wind energy used in this country has doubled in the last four years. This has helped the wind manufacturing sector take off, with more than 60 percent of the value of a turbine now added domestically. But the production tax credit is under attack by companies that are harmed by wind power, which has serious implications for our economy. Wind is helping to drive down power prices, which benefits consumers. Wind is also helping put people back to work, and these jobs are at risk if the credit is allowed to expire. According to Navigant Consulting, expiration would put 37,000 people out of work, and we’re already seeing the beginnings of these layoffs. Unfortunately, some companies—like Exelon—that benefit from higher power prices have decided to argue against the production tax credit. Their arguments are flawed, however, and should not convince policymakers to do the wrong thing and let the credit expire.

#### Climate change causes war over Arctic resources

Macalister 10. Terry, writer for the Guardian citing Natio commander, Admiral James G Stavridis. Climate change could lead to Arctic conflict, warns senior Nato commander. 10 October 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/oct/11/nato-conflict-arctic-resources>

One of [Nato](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/nato)'s most senior commanders has warned that global warming and a race for resources could lead to conflict in the [Arctic](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/arctic). The comments, by Admiral James G Stavridis, supreme allied commander for Europe, come as Nato countries convene on Wednesday for [groundbreaking talks on environmental security in the Arctic Ocean](http://www.nrf.is/images/stories/news_pdf/nato-arw_draft_agenda_environmental_security_in_the_arctic_ocean_15sep10.pdf). The discussions, in the format of a "workshop", with joint Russian leadership, are an attempt to create dialogue with Moscow aimed at averting a second cold war. "For now, the disputes in the north have been dealt with peacefully, but[climate change](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/climate-change) could alter the equilibrium over the coming years in the race of temptation for exploitation of more readily accessible natural resources," said Stavridis. The US naval admiral believes military forces have an important role to play in the area – but mainly for specialist assistance around commercial and other interests. "The cascading interests and broad implications stemming from the effects of climate change should cause today's global leaders to take stock, and unify their efforts to ensure the Arctic remains a zone of co-operation – rather than proceed down the icy slope towards a zone of competition, or worse a zone of conflict," he added. Stavridis made his views known in a foreword to a Whitehall paper, entitled [Environmental security in the Arctic Ocean: promoting co-operation and preventing conflict](http://www.rusi.org/publications/whitehall/ref:I4CA4506CA6EBA/), written by Prof [Paul Berkman](http://www.spri.cam.ac.uk/people/berkman/), head of the Arctic Ocean geopolitics programme at the University of Cambridge. The discussions, which take place at the Scott Polar Institute where Berkman is based, have been given impetus by the speed of change around the north pole where the ice cap is melting and [oil](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/oil) and other minerals are becoming available for extraction. In recent weeks, [Cairn Energy has announced the first oil and gas discoveries off Greenland](http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/sep/21/cairn-energy-oil-find-greenland) and a wave of new mining licences are about to be awarded there. There are similar moves to produce [gas](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/gas) in the far north of Russia and Norway, all in the shadow of [BP's Gulf of Mexico's oil spill](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/bp-oil-spill). Vladimir Putin, the Russian prime minister, spoke about our "common responsibility" [at the international forum on the Arctic in Moscow two weeks ago](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/23/putin-arctic-claims-international-law). He is aware the melting ice offers access to reserves of oil and minerals, as well as new shipping lanes, but that the Arctic is [an "area for co-operation and dialogue](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/23/putin-arctic-claims-international-law)". Berkman, a key figure in organising the workshop, with funding from the Nato science for peace and security programme, said the challenge is to balance national and common interests in the Arctic Ocean in the interests of all humankind. "Strategic long-range ballistic missiles or other such military assets for national security purposes in the Arctic Ocean are no less dangerous today than they were during the cold war. In effect, the cold war never ended in the Arctic Ocean." One of the first speakers at the workshop will be Prof Alexander Vylegzhanin, who is codirecting the workshop from the Russian Academy of Sciences. He will be followed by former US ambassador Kenneth Yalowitz; European Parliament vice-president, Diana Wallis; and Canadian high commissioner, James Wright. There will also be contributions from senior British, Danish, Finnish, Icelandic and Norwegian delegates with participants from 16 nations. Building on the interdisciplinary discussions with academics, government administrators, politicians, and industry representatives, Berkman said the workshop should be a major first step towards building a dialogue that both considers strategies to promote co-operation as well as prevent conflict in the Arctic Ocean. As Stavridis noted: "Melting of the polar ice cap is a global concern because it has the potential to alter the geopolitical balance in the Arctic heretofore frozen in time."

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