### 1NC

#### ---Securitizing nuclear proliferation roots the affirmative in colonial knowledge production --- The claim that new proliferation is categorically distinct from the existing risk reifies the orientalist binary that structures modern international relations and violently represents the global south.

Gusterson 1999

Hugh, prof anthro @ George Mason, “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination”

According to the literature on risk in anthropology, **shared fears often re- veal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the ac- tual dangers that are feared** (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). **The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back**, at least, **to the Non-Proliferation Treaty** of 1970. The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five coun- tries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. Accord- ing to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 promised to assist other signa- tories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international in- spections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). **One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nu- clear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4**-designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers**-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly le- gitimated in Western public discourse** in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, **a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. mili- tary programs in the post-Cold War world** since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995). **Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western dis- course on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "ver- tical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals** (the development of new and im- proved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) **from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem."** Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weap- ons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back ap- peals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basi- cally formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). **The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Oth- erness separating Third World from Western countries.6 This inscription of Third World** (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) **nations as ineradicably dif- ferent from our own has,** in a different context, **been labeled "Orientalism"** by Edward Said (1978). Said argues **that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impul- sive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to an- cient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found,** as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, **in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development** or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contempo- rary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.Following Anthony Giddens (1979), I define ideology as a way of con- structing political ideas, institutions, and behavior which (1) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and na- tions appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially con- structed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination. **The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problematizing at- tempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underde- veloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers**.

#### ---Causes global war --- **Creates a paranoid logic that utilizes the presumption of American innocence to justify incalculable violence.**

Gusterson 2012

Hugh, professor of anthropology at George Mason University, Designed for Death: Helen Caldicott interviews Hugh Gusterson, http://www.guernicamag.com/interviews/designed-for-death/

Helen Caldicott: It’s totally hypocritical for the United States, even if they’re not replacing their warheads, to lecture other countries about not developing their own warheads, when America still has in stockpile, ready to go, thousands of hydrogen bombs, which could induce nuclear winter and the end of most life on Earth. Hugh Gusterson: When the United States ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, one of the things they ratified was Article 6, which committed the established nuclear powers to negotiate, in good faith, ending the arms race and eliminating all nuclear weapons. In 1970 they agreed to a prompt cessation of the nuclear arms program. I don’t think many people would think that waiting until 1992 to end nuclear testing was a prompt cessation of the nuclear arms race. People from countries that don’t have nuclear weapons are getting increasingly impatient with the United States, especially, but with all the nuclear powers, wondering when they’re going to get serious about honoring their obligations under Article 6. The United States was busy proposing sanctions against Iran, which was enriching uranium. There are innocent and less innocent reasons for enriching uranium. Iran is allowed under the terms of the treaty to enrich uranium for nuclear energy plants. But the United States was proposing sanctions on Iran for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty, when I think any detached, objective observer would say that by far the largest violators of the treaty must have been the Russians and the Americans for sitting on these enormous stockpiles in spite of Article 6 commitments. I found, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most people in the nuclear weapons labs were unaware of Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I remember having conversations with very well-educated nuclear warhead designers, and one of them told me, flat out, I was wrong in saying that the United States and Russia had any commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty to end the arms race. I was so angry that I went home and Xeroxed the treaty and mailed it to him. Those commitments under the treaty have been much better reported by the U.S. press more recently. In the last five or six years knowledgeable Americans have become more aware of how the rest of the world feels about them. As an anthropologist, I find it particularly offensive when you talk to weapons scientists, or to other kinds of nuclear weapons professionals, that there’s a uniform assumption that Americans are the only people who can be uniquely trusted with nuclear weapons in a way that black and brown people, non-Christians in particular, cannot. You hear it said that only Americans and Europeans have the strength required of people to have nuclear weapons. This flies in the face of the evidence, since the United States is the only country ever to abuse weapons. Helen Caldicott: Is this the projection of the dark side by these Americans onto others? Hugh Gusterson: All of this is a struggle with our unconscious persona that we find difficult to come to terms with, and then project onto other people. It’s been well established by psychologists as part of the process that makes it possible to wage war on other people. You don’t have to go to a nuclear weapons lab to find this kind of casual racism. You can open the opinion page of any American newspaper and find it there at least once a week, about Iraq or Iran or North Korea. It’s become something not even necessary to justify.

#### **---Defining nuclear energy implementation in terms of national interest and leadership removes the political context of reactors, their promotion of US reactors over others promotes international accidents**

Dufner 11 (Dr. Ulrike Dufner, director of the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Istanbul, “Nationalism and Nuclear Energy in the International Political Discourse” http://www.tr.boell.org/web/51-1412.html)

The catastrophe at the nuclear power plants of Japan last year is still present in our memory: every day we could follow the details on TV of the horrible consequences of the catastrophe; e.g. huge areas had to be abandoned because of contamination, nuclear clouds bearing the risk of spreading the contamination to regions far from Japan. Never before were weather reports, especially wind reports, of such a great concern as after the accident in Fukushima. And even later, when media interest shifted to other events around the globe, the tragedy in Japan continued. Recently, Japan had to close all its nuclear power plants, which produced 30% of Japan’s energy. Within the framework of its foreign policy program, HBSD organized several meetings with civil society representatives from other countries. One example was the Ani Dialogue II meeting of young CSO members from Armenia and Turkey in July 2011. Another example was the round table on “Pipelines and Politics” at the international conference, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Decoded”, held in December 2011. At all these formal and informal meetings, which were held after (!) the accident in Fukushima, we were confronted with very similar arguments: a) “It is our right to have nuclear power plants. Nobody can prevent us from possessing this technology and deny our right of development. Nuclear energy becomes a matter of national interest and pride”. If we think this attitude out, it means that to expose a society to an incalculable risk is considered a national right. By questioning nuclear energy, you can then easily be on par with a national enemy. b) Some even argue that the refusal of nuclear energy is part of an international imperialist conspiracy against developing countries. Interestingly, they do not even discuss in whose interest the very expensive and economically unreasonable technology lies. The direct costs of the Fukushima catastrophe are calculated to be around 50 billion dollars, keeping aside the costs of the next decades. From an economic point of view, nuclear energy is not efficient – even without calculating the costs of such a catastrophic accident. c) “Nuclear energy is necessary to fill the energy gap; we do not have other energy sources; we are much too dependent on the foreign energy supply; we have to diversify our energy supply and go nuclear”. Interestingly, when asking about alternative scenarios and the potential of renewable or energy efficiency, one rarely gets an answer. Some even argue, we would have to cut off the lights. Although Japan was relying heavily on nuclear energy, the country was able to phase out nuclear energy. It would be worthwhile to examine the examples of Japan or Germany. But instead, without even looking at their policies, new arguments are put forward about why these two countries are so different and the local conditions are not comparable. d) Others claim Fukushima will not happen in “our” nuclear power plants, we (will) use better, newer technology, hereby expressing some kind of “national pride” and fully ignoring the fact that the quality of the accident in Fukushima was far beyond all worst case scenarios projected by experts. As soon as issues are equated with the so-called “national interest” there seems to be a deadlock of thinking. The deep-rooted – and historically explainable – mistrust against “arguments stemming from the industrialized world” is, in a way, instrumentalized to impede further arguments. The question of why nuclear energy companies should be working more in the interest of the developing countries is completely left out of the argument. How such a highly dangerous technology could be in the “interest of a nation” is not even questioned. A similar deadlock can be observed when debating the issue of the nuclear program of Iran. Here, once again, to possess peaceful nuclear technology is taken for granted and once more defined as a “right”. Even the critics of the regime strongly defend the “national right to possess nuclear energy”. When disagreeing with this logic, as Iran is one of the leading energy exporting countries, I was confronted with the reply: “This is a very German perspective”. Let us ignore the fact that this is not a German discourse. What is striking is that national arguments are even put forward from those who have to seek refuge from their own country. Concerning Iran, one reason for this commonly shared attitude might be the debate about the nuclear weapons program, Iran’s obligation to allow inspections by the IAEA according to the NPT and the sanctions imposed as Iran does not fulfill these obligations. There also seems to be a broad consensus among critics of the Iranian regime on the refusal of sanctions. Furthermore, it is argued that according to the NPT, a nuclear weapons program is prohibited, but not a nuclear energy program. Therefore, Iran has the right to possess this technology program. Insisting on this legal argument seems to impede any critical debate about advantages and disadvantages. Although this juridical argument is in itself correct, the debate about nuclear energy is not a debate about legal rights; it is much more a debate about sustainable energy policies and the risks of nuclear energy. As the debate about nuclear energy is framed alongside a discourse of “rights of nations”, I would propose to shift the notion in the debate towards the “interest of societies and people”. This might open ways to end the impasse in the discussion and to overcome the mental deadlock. The issue is not the denial of rights, but the search for an intelligent energy policy that does not put societies at risk. As could be seen from Chernobyl and Fukushima, nuclear power plants are not only a risk for the countries where they are established, the effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders. We have to overcome nationalist discourses and think in categories that provide answers to the challenges of global concern, such as energy politics.

#### ---The alternative is to re-politicize energy policy shifting the focus away from production in favor of mutually exclusive competing visions of life. Increasing energy production cannot reform structural inequalities. Only challenging seemingly innocuous concepts like [energy/security] can prevent globalization from becoming a bloodbath.

Flipo 2008

Fabrice, Energy: prometheus bound or unbound? A conceptual approach, SAPIENS, 1.2 | 2008 : Vol.1 / n°2, http://sapiens.revues.org/248

In the end, the problem is not so much to liberate or chain Prometheus as it is to stop believing in the myth of humanity as homo faber with its warehouse of materials affirming a predetermined future that will be glorious for all. This myth prevents us from seeing the real issues. Growth does not automatically lead to progress for everyone and the reasons for this have been known for a long time. As shown by Ivan Illich (Illich, 1973), they concern the materiality of the human condition, which is reaffirmed today in the ecological world view. The development that is taking place can only benefit a minority of the world’s population; it is therefore urgent to rethink the energy issue in this context, rather than by sector or in a reductionist manner. Energy is the fire that brings machines to life. Without it, there would be no armies of mechanical slaves or non-unionized workers working relentlessly, day after day, without complaining. There would remain only physical power and energy derived from the sun, wind, biomass, etc. There is no energy source that is clean, free or unlimited. They all give rise to some disadvantages that may be more or less serious or irreversible. Knowing who will be subjected to these disadvantages is as important as knowing who will benefit from the advantages, or if these advantages will increase at a given point in time. Machines are not necessarily useful: although they can reduce fatigue and suffering, they can also increase the production of weapons, become the source of destruction or be used to serve the interests of only a few. The real issue is to rethink the common good. It is clear that economic growth alone is leading us down the path to ruin. The trends described by trend scenarios are clear and support one another (WEC, 2000; UNPD, 2000). Unless various technological miracles are expected to occur—which, once again will be the responsibility of future generations—the world is headed for serious crises. The issue is not the standard of living or comfort levels: numerous scenarios have shown that it is technically possible to attain a comfortable standard of living without compromising the well-being of others5. Places such as Sri Lanka or Kerala, in India, have attained very high levels of well-being while having a very minimal impact on the environment (cf. Figure 1). Mechanization no longer frees humanity from work. The effort expended today is for the most part devoted to the production of disposable objects or the creation of extra needs. This, in fact, has been the justification for putting human beings to work. We no longer have time for anything; everything moves too fast; we never stop running from one job to the next, never stop producing, consuming, filling out papers, etc. Other cultures have generally worked much less than ours, considering that their economic needs were met, as was shown by anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (Sahlins, 1976). Truly, the issue lies elsewhere. We must explore new avenues of cooperation founded on sharing and the recognition of others and not on exploitation and consumption. This leads to the questioning of the meaning of life for individuals and for communities: do we really need everything that we consume? Are we prepared to pay the price for our unrestrained over-consumption: police state, global apartheid, conflicts, ecological imbalances, etc.? Or do we want another world for ourselves? If that is the case, the creation of this other world starts with individuals: we must initiate the changes we would like to see take place in the world. Reducing our consumption means working less; it means taking part in the creation of a world that is more just and more united. As Gandhi once said, “There is enough on this earth to meet everyone’s need but not everyone’s greed.” The issue of needs must therefore be brought up once again, before the appetite of a few ends up devouring everyone else. This particularly involves raising questions about human nature. Yes, we must speak out forcefully against Bush and his consorts; justice requires that we assert that “our way of life is negotiable”. This must be done to prevent globalization from turning into a bloodbath. Homo economicus, whohas an insatiable appetite, is a fiction who has become dangerous. Progress no longer entails producing and consuming; it involves building sustainable societies that live in harmony with their natural environment. The means necessary to achieve this are stated in the triptych “moderation, energy efficiency and renewable energy”6 and are at the service of justice. This is not a question of GDP points, but rather, an issue concerning civilization.

### 2NC

#### ---Privileging nuclear power treats radioactive material as interchangeable objects to be controlled and manipulated. This technocratic rationalization makes nuclear war inevitable.

Kovel 1984

Joel, The Culture of Technocracy, Against the State of Nuclear Terror, pg 107, http://www.colorado.edu/ReligiousStudies/chernus/4820-ColdWarCulture/Readings/AgainstTheStateOfNuclearTerror.pdf

Nuclear weaponry is not just an aberration but the logical result of an entire attitude toward the world. This becomes even clearer when we consider the intermediate stage comprised by the saga of industrial and commercial nuclear power .21 Again, it would be too far afield to consider this story in any detail. But its bare essentials should be pointed out. The nuclear industry arose as a twofold effort to turn the discovery of nuclear technology to the further advantage of the ruling system of power-two lines of approach that have been, we might add, frequently combined in the history of capitalist society. One was to make the whole business of destruction seem legitimate and benign: hence arose "atoms for peace" as a handy slogan to temper the brutal reality of the technology. And the other was the irresistible impulse to turn a profit by squeezing the new source of power into the shape of a commodity-by boiling water with it and using the steam to generate electricity, which could of course be sold. The grim story of this venture need not be recounted here. But it is worth re-emphasizing that the failings of nuclear power arose out of the peculiar delusion that any and all parts of nature could be tamed by the human master. Thus, just as the unimaginable ferocity of nuclear weapons breaks down the political ends served by the use of technology in warfare, so does the malignancy of uncontrolled radioactivity make a mockery of the fantasy that there are no limits to the sources of commodities and profits. And as nuclear weapons continue to proliferate, while plutonium accumulates in reactors, we face the breakdown of "atoms for peace." It appears inevitable that the proposed U.S. build-up must draw on spent reactor fuel. Meanwhile, the nuclear power industry itself becomes militarized, in large measure because of the tre-mendous risks associated with its source of energy. A good example of this is the recently disclosed fact that U.S. Army Green Berets have been stationed at nuclear power plants, ostensibly to check on whether these leviathans are vulnerable to sabotage .22 Thus the two lines of nuclear development find each other once more contributing to the heightening of nuclear terror but also to the dissolution of one of its stage props. As we have noted, the triumph of the economic means the triumph of the principle of exchange as the guiding standard of human reason. Roughly put, this means making the whole world into a market, where everything has its price, a monetary value through which it can be equated, and so exchanged, 1 with anything else. The exchange principle makes the rule of the economic sphere coincide with the rule of money. The other side of the principle of exchange is the loss of what is unique and cannot be exchanged. As capitalist economics rose, the sacred was lost. Out of this loss arose the unchecked power of the rationalized market mentality. The mentality of the market is but the economic form of technocratic rationalization. The same animal goes under different names depending on its habitat 23 -market mentality, technocratic rationalization, instrumental reason (as a general philosophical category), positivism (as a philosophy of science), or pragmatism (as an ethical code of conduct). If we emphasize technocracy here, it is because it is the form of the animal most closely implicated with the nuclear crisis. All of the forms, however, are variations on the exchange principle and the stripping of value from the boundary between humanity and nature. Since there are no bounds to what this mentality thinks it can do with the principle of exchange, the way is left open for the nuclear power industry and the making of nuclear weapons. But the principle also implies the inevitable use of the bomb, since its effects are deemed equivalent to something else, say, the intimidation of an adversary .24 Therefore, state managers have never really gone beyond a simple calculation of what advantage and what risk could be wrought by the use of nuclear weapons, and a weighing of the results in the balance of possible actions. Because of this attitude, there was never any serious question of whether or not to drop the bomb on Hiroshima.

#### ---This violence comparatively outweighs the aff in terms of both magnitude and probability --- Collapse of the political makes enmity invisible and genocidal.

Reinhard 2004

Kenneth, UCLA, Towards a Political-Theology of the Neighbor (Draft), Google Cache

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stablility, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous – forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

#### c.) A focus on policy relevance precludes the structural change necessary to establish energy security for more than just the privileged few.

Levy 2012

Gabriel, Deconstructing “energy security”: some questions, People and Nature, http://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/deconstructing-energy-security-some-questions/

– On the other hand, the report repeatedly refers to “policymakers” – which to my mind is a generalisation almost as woolly and meaningless as “energy security”. Usually, this word conjours up a picture of besuited smart-alecs in parliamentary offices: the politicians, the assistants who work for them, the academics who construct arguments for them and the lobbyists who lobby them. The idea that such people will effect social change is ridiculous. More insidious, though, is the danger that social movements will get channelled into narrow “political” campaigns, inspired by illusions that “policymakers” can at least be our levers … whereas the big issues posed by the report – e.g. the achievement of energy security as the use of energy by all – can only be addressed by much more sweeping social transformations.

#### ---Focusing on energy production creates a policymaking euphoria that distracts from real lived experiences in favor of technical management that precludes political change.

Byrne & Toly 2006

John, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (CEEP) and Distinguished Professor of Public Policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, research associate and Ph.D. candidate in the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Delaware, Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse, *Transforming Power: Energy, Environment and Society in Conflict*, pg 1-3

With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector’s performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of “energy futures” that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices. One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who, early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg, 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner “too cheap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, cited in the *New York Times* 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the “magical fire” or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize “inherently safe reactors” (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in “sustainable energy alternatives” that constitute a second euphoric steam. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, “green” energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy “haves” and “have-nots.” In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291), “today’s nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people” as “micropower meets village power.” Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a “solar global economy… can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world’s cultural diversity” (Scheer, 2002: 34). The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet’s climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime’s operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume *Myth of the Machine*, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (1934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a life-harming dead end (1961: 263, 248): …an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations… The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity—here are the enemies. The living organism demands a life-sustaining environment. Modernity’s formula for two centuries has been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity’s supporters would seek to derail present-tense evaluations of the era’s social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the “democratic-authoritarian bargain” (1964: 6). In which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce “every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority” on the condition that society demands only what the regime is capable and willing to offer. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premise of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford’s work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the patterns of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### Policy framing determines energy policy --- Empirical studies conclude framing defines implementation and policy response.

Pralle & Boscarino 2011

Sarah, Jessica, Framing Trade-offs: The Politics of Nuclear Power and Wind Energy in the Age of Global Climate Change, Review of Policy Research, Volume 28, Issue 4, pages 323–346

Policy scholars have spent considerable effort attempting to understand strategies of issue framing and their impact on the policy process. The concept of framing has been summarized by Callaghan and Schnell (2005, p. 2) as the “process by which all political players, including the media, use linguistic cues to define and give meaning to issues and connect them to the larger political environment. . . . Essentially, frames set the boundaries of public policy debates.” Frames, like a photographer's lens, focus on some aspects of reality while minimizing, obscuring, or excluding other aspects. As such, they suggest a particular way of thinking about a public problem or solution by defining what the essential issue is (Kinder, 2003; see also Entman, 1993). Frames are strategically employed by political actors; however, they also exist as cognitive structures which, according to Kinder and Nelson (2005, p. 103), “provide order and meaning, making the world beyond direct experience seem natural.” Research in political communications points to the power of frames in shaping people's policy opinions and preferences. Several decades of “framing effects” research shows that individuals' attitudes and opinions about policy issues can vary depending on what aspect of an issue is emphasized (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). In the policy field, scholars have suggested that different frames can lead to different levels of interest and attention to a problem, increased or decreased mobilization around an issue, and support for (or opposition to) policy reform (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 1988). For Riker (1986), reframing is a key way that legislators and other policymakers try to structure a conflict so they can win. By introducing a new dimension to an issue, policy makers may be able to attract new supporters and therefore change the balance of power in favor of one's preferred policy. A real-world example of this is when anti-death penalty activists introduced a new “innocence” frame into the debate over capital punishment, which over time influenced public opinion and led to decreases in state executions (Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun, 2008). Much of the policy framing literature examines how policy makers and advocacy groups attempt to reframe particular policy issues by emphasizing some aspects of an issue over others, or by re-categorizing problems. But there is another aspect of framing that receives less attention, what we might call decision frames or what Pralle (2006b) refers to as policy principles. A policy principle is the stated or unstated, formal or informal basis upon which policy makers deliberate and make decisions. These principals provide rationales and mental frameworks which policy makers and the public may use to reach a decision on a particular policy matter, such as whether to support a proposed policy solution or not.

#### ---This knowledge production views China through the position of the bomber and enables nuclear annihilation.

Chow 2006

Rey, the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities and Professor of Modern Culture & Media Studies at Brown University, The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, p. 40-42

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special “areas” became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war – if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes – is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to “know” the other cultures? Can “knowledge” that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipresence of the sovereign “self” / “eye” – the “I” that is the United States, the other will have no choice but to remain just that – a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber – such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter – will never receive the attention that is due to them. “Knowledge,” however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by “the absence of a definable object” – and by “the problem of the vanishing object.”

#### ---Politics comes first --- Contestation must have unconditional primacy in the assessment of knowledge construction.

Swyngedouw 2011

Erik, Geography, School of Environment and Development University of Manchester, Depoliticized Environments: The End of Nature, Climate Change and the Post-Political Condition, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement (2011), 69 : pp 253-274

A genuine politics, in contrast, emerges in ‘the moment in which a particular demand is not simply part of the negotiation of interests but aims at something more, and starts to function as the metaphoric condensation of the global restructuring of the entire social space’ (Žižek, 1999b: 208). It is about the recognition of conflict as constitutive of the social condition, and the naming of the socio-ecological spaces that can become without this process being grounded in the universalizing notions of the social (in the sense of community, unity or cohesion) and of a singular notion of nature/ecology. The political becomes, for Žižek and Rancière, the space of litigation (Žižek, 1998), the space for those who are not ‘All’, who are uncounted and unnamed, not part of the ‘police’ (symbolic or state) order. A true political space is always a space of contestation for those who have no name or no place. As Diken and Laustsen (2004: 9) put it: ‘Politics in this sense is the ability to debate, question and renew the fundament on which political struggle unfolds, the ability to radically criticize a given order and to fight for a new and better one. In a nutshell, then, politics necessitates accepting conflict’. A radical-progressive position ‘should insist on the unconditional primacy of the inherent antagonism as constitutive of the political’ (Žižek, 1999a: 29). The beginning of politics proper emerged with the demos as an active agent in the Greek polis, with, as Žižek (2006b: 69–70) puts it: the emergence of a group which, although it [is] without a fixed place in the social edifice (or, at best, occupying a subordinate place), demanded to be included in the public sphere, to be heard on an equal footing with ruling oligarchy or aristrocracy, i.e. recognized as a partner in political dialogue and the exercise of power . . . Political struggle proper is therefore not a rational debate between multiple interests, but, simultaneously, the struggle for one's voice to be recognized as the voice of a legitimate partner . . . Furthermore, in protesting the wrong (le tort) they suffered, they also presented themselves as the immediate embodiment of society as such, as the stand-in for the Whole of Society in its universality . . . Politics proper thus always involves a kind of short-circuit between the Universal and the Particular: the paradox of a singular which appears as a stand-in for the Universal, destabilizing the ‘natural’ functional order of relations in the social body. The elementary gesture of proper politicization is ‘[t]his identification of the non-part with the Whole, of the part of society with no properly defined place within it (or resisting the allocated place within it) with the Universal, . . . discernible in all great democratic events’ (Žižek, 2006b: 70). Such new symbolizations through which, what is considered to be noise by the police, is turned into speech, is where a proper politicization of the urban should start from, where the re-politicization of public civic space in the polis resides. Reclaiming proper democracy and proper democratic public spaces (as spaces for the enunciation of agonistic dispute) become a foundation for and condition of possibility for sustainability, one that is predicated upon the symbolization of a positively embodied egalibertarian socio-ecological future that is immediately realizable. These symbolizations should start from the premise that equality is being ‘wronged’ by the given socio-environmental police order and are about claiming a metaphorical and material space for those who are unaccounted for, unnamed and whose fictions are only registered as noise.

#### ---The permutation’s pragmatic combination fails because it still allows the debate to be framed by “energy production” which taints the affirmative’s ability to define problems and create solutions outside of existing structures of global inequality.

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

For time-pressed, slogan-bound, “must-be-ready-with-a-response” policy analysts and politicians, the invitation to reconsider such a seemingly settled concept as “energy” may look like an irksome invitation to navel-gaze. What does it matter if many societies – perhaps even the bulk of humanity – do not view a charcoal fire and a bullock drawing a plough through a field as twin instances of “energy consumption”? Far more important is the plight of the 2.7 billion people who rely on traditional biomass for cooking at the expense of forests and health; the 1.3 billion people who do not have access to electricity and thus the means to be “productive citizens”;2 the increasing competition for energy resources as the middle classes in China, India and Brazil weigh into the global mêlée for consumer goods; the need to assuage worried (Northern) consumers that the lights will not go out; and, above all, the threat that resource scarcities pose to continued economic growth. Who cares how or why fossil-fuelled capitalism is tied up with the evolution of a novel conception of energy? What matters is whether this gas pipeline should be built, that nuclear plant commissioned, or that LNG terminal financed. The pressing task is how to make the distasteful tradeoffs dictated by the realpolitik of securing energy for the future – human rights versus access to gas, maintaining jobs versus permitting pollution, leaving future generations with irresolvable problems of nuclear waste versus cutting carbon dioxide emissions. Such apparent pragmatism is understandable – but, in the end, unpragmatic. In today’s world, “energy” is about far more than pipelines and power stations, transmission lines and oil contracts: it is a system of economic and political relationships that weaves and reweaves the connections between corporations, governments, investors, human rights activists, environmentalists, the military, scientists, the media, trade unions and consumers alike into constantly shifting networks of power that serve to reproduce “the world that Energy begat”. No decision related to upper-case or abstract Energy (see pp.12ff) can escape the influences that such networks of power exert: Energy with a capital “E” not only frames the decision; it structures the solution, trapping the critical and the uncritical alike. To respond only to the daily froth of upper-case Energy talk – which power station? where? fuelled by gas or coal? – is to remain hostage to a dynamic that simply reinforces and reproduces the problems that Energy represents. Such “pragmatism” has helped shape an “energy security” agenda that mischaracterises the many energy scarcities – and insecurities – experienced by poorer people; promotes a response that has little to do with ensuring that everyone has the energy to meet their basic needs and everything to do with creating new sources of accumulation; and that disrespects the limits posed by climate change and resource depletion to endless economic growth. The result is a wave of new enclosures that, in addition to creating new scarcities (not only of energy but also of food, water, land and other necessities of life) are making a transition away from fossil fuels far harder to achieve.

#### ---Permutations themselves are a link --- The knee jerk reaction to combine fundamentally opposed positions into one happy consensus and replaces the antagonisms constitutive of political space with the vacuous notion of a “best policy option.” Permutations can only steamroll true politics because in its rush to include everything, it leaves no space for opposition or dissensus.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, Geography @ School of Environment and Development Manchester University, Climate Change as Post-Political and Post-Democratic Populism, Paper presented at DVPW conference, Kiel, Germany, 22-25 September

Consensually established concerns, like climate change, structured around ecologies of fear -- threats that may ultimately undermine the co-ordinates of daily life – and sustained by a universalising populist discourse express and sustain the deepening of a post-political condition. The latter is, in turn, institutionalised through forms of post-democratic governing. Post-politics is marked by the predominance of a managerial logic in all aspects of life, the reduction of the political to administration where decision-making is increasingly considered to be a question of expert knowledge and not of political position. It is accompanied by the diffusion of governance into a host of non-state or quasi-state institutional forms and actors, and fosters consensual understandings of political action and the particularization of political demands. Post-politics refers to a politics in which ideological or dissensual contestation and struggles are replaced by techno-managerial planning, expert management and administration, “whereby the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives is the primary goal” (Žižek, 1999). Whereas the proper democratic political recognizes the constitutive split of the people, the inherent antagonisms and heterogeneities that cut through the social, while presuming the quality of each and everyone qua speaking beings, the post-political disavows these antagonisms by displacing conflict and disagreement on to the terrain of consensually manageable problems, expert knowledge, and interest intermediation (Swyngedouw, 2009a). ‘Doing politics’ is reduced to a form of institutionalized social management and to the mobilization of governmental technologies where difficulties and problems are dealt with by administrative and techno-organizational means (Nancy, cited in (Marchart, 2007: 68). In other words, politics as policy-makings (la politique) have sutured the space of the political as expressions of disagreement/dissensus (le politique) (Dikeç, 2005). Such post-political arrangement signals a depoliticised (in the sense of the disappearance of the democratic agonistic struggle over the content and direction of socio-ecological life) public space whereby adminsistrative governance defines the zero-level of politics (see (Marquand, 2004) (Swyngedouw, 2009d)). Proper political choice as the agonistic confrontation of competing visions of different socio-ecological order is foreclosed as the spaces of the political or sutured by totalising threats that permit only one choice or direction, one that can be ‘managed’ through dialogical consensual practices (Mouffe, 2005). Post-politics reject ideological divisions and the explicit universalisation of particular political demands (Žižek, 1999: 198). Post-politics is thus about the administration (policing) of social, economic, ecological or other issues, and they remain of course fully within the realm of the possible, of existing social relations, they are ‘the partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2001). “The ultimate sign of post-politics in all Western countries”, (Žižek, 2002: 303) argues, “is the growth of a managerial approach to government: government is reconceived as a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension”. “In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists …) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological visions behind and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into account” (Žižek, 1999: 198). “The political (the space of litigation in which the excluded can protest the wrong/injustice done to them), [is] foreclosed … It is crucial to perceive … the post-political suspension of the political in the reduction of the state to a mere police agent servicing the (consensually established) needs of the market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism” (Žižek, 2006b: 72). Post-politics refuses politicization in the classical Greek sense, that is, as the metaphorical universalization of particular demands, which aims at “more” than negotiation of interests. Politics becomes something one can do without making decisions that divide and separate (Thomson, 2003). Difficulties and problems, which are generally staged and accepted as problematic, have to be dealt with by means of compromise and the production of consensus. The key feature of consensus is “the annulment of dissensus ….. the ‘end of politics’” (Rancière, 2001: §32). Of course, this post-political world eludes choice and freedom (other than those tolerated by the consensus) and effaces the proper political from the spaces of public encounter. For Rancière, this disavowal of the political and the staging of politics as a form of consensual management of the givens of the situation as one of the tactics through which spaces of conflict and antagonism are smoothened and displaced (Rancière, 1998). This ‘re-treat of the political’ (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 1997) and its replacement by consensual policing arrangements is organised through post-democratic institutions of governance, like the Kyoto protocol and other public-private bodies, that increasingly replace the political institutions of government (see (Crouch, 2004)). Post-democratic institutional arrangements are the performative expression of a post-political condition. For Rancière (Rancière, 1998: 102), “Postdemocracy is … a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, the miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests.” Urbaniti defines these post-democratic institutions of ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ (see (Swyngedouw, 2005)) as follows: “Governance entails an explicit reference to ‘mechanisms’ or ‘organized’ and ‘coordinated activities’ appropriate to the solution of some specific problems. Unlike government, governance refers to ‘policies’ rather than ‘politics’ … . Its recipients are not ‘the people’ as collective political subject, but ‘the population’ that can be affected by global issues such as the environment, migration, or the use of natural resources” ((Urbinati, 2003: 80), cited in (Mouffe, 2005)). This post-democratic constitution reconfigures the act of governing to a stakeholder based arrangement of multi-scalar governance in which the traditional state forms partake together with experts, NGOs, and other ‘responsible’ partners (while ‘irresponsible’ partners are excluded). They operate with a generally accepted consensus of a global and largely (neo-)liberal capitalism, the right of individual choice, an ecological awareness and the necessity to continue this, to sustain the state of the situation (that is allegedly in serious danger). Discussion and dispute are tolerated, even encouraged, in so far the general frame is not contested. Not only are radical dissent, critique, and fundamental conflict evacuated from the political arena (and relegated to the terrain of ‘extra-political’ and unauthorised violence), but the parameters of democratic governing itself are being shifted, announcing new forms of governmentality, in which traditional disciplinary society is transfigured into a society of control through democratically disembedded networks (like ‘the Kyoto Protocol’; ‘the Dublin Statement’, the ‘Rio Summit’, etc….). Conclusion: re-thinking the political environment “Against thoughts of the end and catastrophe, I believe it is possible and necessary to oppose a thought of political precariousness” (Rancière, 2004: 8). We have argued that the particular framing of climate change and its associated populist politics as outlined above foreclose (or at least attempt to do so) politicization and evacuates dissent through the formation of a particular regimes of environmental governance that revolves around consensus, agreement, participatory negotiation of different interests, and technocratic expert management in the context of a non-disputed management of market-based socio-economic organization. Even a cursory analysis of ‘green politics’, whether from the perspective of environmental movements (like Greenpeace) or environmental parties (the German Greens are a classic case), over the past few decades would signal their rapid transformation from engaging in a politics of contestation, organized acting, radical disagreement, and developing visionary alternatives to their integration into stakeholder based negotiation arrangements aimed at delivering a negotiated policy. A consensual post-politics emerges here, one that either eliminates fundamental conflict or elevates it to antithetical ultra-politics. The consensual times we are currently living in have thus eliminated a genuine political space of disagreement. These post-political climate change policies rest on the following foundations. First, the social and ecological problems caused by modernity/capitalism are external side-effects; they are not an inherent and integral part of the relations of liberal politics and capitalist economies. Second, a strictly populist politics emerges here; one that elevates the interest of an imaginary ‘the People’, Nature, or ‘the environment’ to the level of the universal rather than opening spaces that permit to universalize the claims of particular socio-natures, environments, or social groups or classes. Third, these side-effects are constituted as global, universal, and threatening. Fourth, the ‘enemy’ or the target of concern is continuously externalized and becomes socially disembodied, is always vague, ambiguous, unnamed and uncounted, and ultimately empty. Fifth, the target of concern can be managed through a consensual dialogical politics whereby demands become depoliticized and politics naturalized within a given socio-ecological order for which there is ostensibly no real alternative (Swyngedouw, 2007). The post-political environmental consensus, therefore, is one that is radically reactionary, one that forestalls the articulation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajectories of future socio-environmental possibilities and of human-human and human-nature articulations and assemblages. It holds on to a harmonious view of nature that can be recaptured while re-producing if not solidifying a liberal-capitalist order for which there seems to be no alternative. Much of the sustainability argument has evacuated the politics of the possible, the radical contestation of alternative future socio-environmental possibilities and socio-natural arrangements, and silences the antagonisms and conflicts that are constitutive of our socio-natural orders by externalising conflict. It is inherently reactionary. As Badiou (Badiou, 2005) argues, ‘proper’ politics must revolve around the construction of great new fictions that create real possibilities for constructing different socio-environmental futures. To the extent that the current post-political condition that combines apocalyptic environmental visions with a hegemonic neoliberal view of social ordering constitutes one particular fiction (one that in fact forecloses dissent, conflict, and the possibility of a different future), there is an urgent need for different stories and fictions that can be mobilised for realisation. This requires foregrounding and naming different socio-environmental futures and recognizing conflict, difference, and struggle over the naming and trajectories of these futures. Socio-environmental conflict, therefore, should not be subsumed under the homogenizing mantle of a populist environmentalist-sustainability discourse, but should be legitimised as constitutive of a democratic order. This, of course, turns the climate question into a question of democracy and its meaning. It asserts the horizon of a recuperated democracy as the terrain (space) for expressing conflict, for nurturing agonistic debate and disagreement, and, most importantly, for the naming different possible socio-environmental futures.

#### ---Securitizing terrorism is a self-fulfilling prophecy --- Worst-case thinking replaces democratic risk analysis with potential imagined futures encouraging over militarized responses that increase the magnitude and vulnerabilities to terrorism.

Schneier 2010

Bruce, internationally renowned security technologist and author, MA CS American University, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case\_thin.html

At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios." There's a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes. Second, it's based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland's volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don't, organs won’t arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don't invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's quote? "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Ignorance isn't a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can't wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities. Risk assessment is devalued. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can't know what's likely to go wrong, let's speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we're not appalled that they're harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can't be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet's television broadcasts because they're radiating into space? It isn't hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it's a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn't really a principle; it's a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don't need to refute counterarguments, there's no point in listening to them.

#### **---Discursive understanding of nuclear policy is critical to policy formulation---we turn all of their education arguments**

Pilibaityte 2010 (Vaida PILIBAITYTE for the degree of Master of Science and entitled: Nuclear Energy Discourses Lithuania and Belarus, pdf)

As noted above, there seems to be some recent surge of interest in nuclear discourse studies, especially in the light of the so-called revival, climate change and energy security debates. Some researchers analyze more specific issues such as a high level waste management and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Most of them utilize policy documents and expert interviews as their main source of data, while others look explicitly at the debate covered by the media, books or leaflets. As mentioned earlier, Scrase and Ockwell (2009) advocate for the discursive approach to policy analysis. These authors strongly believe in the importance of linguistic framing and its constraining and enabling effects for the policy change especially in the context of sustainable energy transitions. By 'framing" they imply the assumptions made and the "constructing" power of the public debate. In the recently published book "Energy fir the future: a new agenda" edited by Scrase and MacKerron (2009) they review a number of policy documents to demonstrate how the government of the UK consistently favoured the new nuclear build in 2006-2007 while at the same time holding on to the position of indecisiveness on the issue. They analyze the energy policy process through four central goals pursued by the government: access, security, efficiency and environmental acceptability, and argue that each of them has been discursively constructed to highlight shifts in discourse according to certain interests (Scrase and MacKerron 2009). The study shows that when it comes to energy security it is not framed around justice or equity in the UK which was a storyline prevalent previously during the post-war era, but around defending the national interest under international pressures. It is also discursively constructed, according to the authors, as essential to sustaining economic growth. Against the backdrop of the depletion of North Sea oil and gas it has been moved the center of the government's rhetoric. The study shows changes in discursive framing from "energy supplies" depending on imports in 2003 to the dependent "tve" — implying a more personal threat; similarly, while in 2003 development of renewable energy was presented as a "major opportunity" for the UK business, in 2006 their development was seen as an "obligation", though renewables were "notyet enough by themselves" to secure supplies. Scrase and Ockwell (2009) argue that this discursive shift was "central to reframing investment in nuclear electricity as necessary in the UK". The storylines around nuclear portrayed the UK threatened by the activities of foreign nations, international terrorism included, implying domestic energy source as the only viable way to ensure security. Historically resonant metaphors of a 'fleet" of nuclear power stations were used alluding to Britain once defending its shores with mighty naval ships. The nuclear lobby played an important role in promoting this rhetoric. However, the authors underline, such emphasis on the new nuclear build was not grounded in any new empirical analysis indicating a major energy gap that occurred in those three years. Therefore thev come to the conclusion that the energy policy debate was characterized by increasing fears around energy security and rhetorical fabrication of a non-existing energy gap (Scrase and Ockwell 2009a).

### 1NR

Uranium is abundant

Rubin 13 (Jeff Rubin is the former chief economist of CIBC World Markets and the author of the award-winning Why Your World Is About To Get A Whole Lot Smaller. “Jeff Rubin: Fracking for yellowcake: The next frontier?” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/jeff-rubin-fracking-for-yellowcake-the-next-frontier/article8244721/)

The world isn’t exactly running short of uranium. Prices tell you that much. Uranium prices have plunged from more than $90 a pound before the last recession to just more than $40 a pound following the Fukushima disaster. Friendly countries like Canada and Australia are able to ramp up supply, as can less friendly countries like Kazakhstan. Yellowcake is also exported by Niger (part of the reason, according to some, that nuclear-powered France is taking such an interest in neighbouring Mali right now.)

What’s more, the emergence of cheap natural gas from shale plays is making nuclear energy less attractive to U.S. power utilities. Many are considering shuttering some high cost nuclear stations and switching to cheaper natural gas, just as they’ve been doing with a number of coal plants in recent years.

#### ---Predictions of nuclear ‘proliferation’ are framed within a biological metaphor of self propulsion that causes policy analysts to continually overestimate the risk and of nuclear acquisition. Their inability to explain why countries would voluntarily give up the bomb means you should view their impact claims with skepticism.

Pelopidas 2011

Benoıˆt, THE ORACLES OF PROLIFERATION: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy Innovation, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, March, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_18-1\_pelopidas.pdf

Whether pessimistic or optimistic, linear or nonlinear, the proliferation paradigm also implies retrospective illusion and labeling. Indeed, while the debate about nuclear weapons was not framed in terms of proliferation until the late 1950s or early 1960s, proliferation experts anachronistically label the Soviet decision to go nuclear as ‘‘the first case of proliferation’’ because of their understanding of what would come next. 18 This retrospective illusion also has an impact on the ex post understanding of past surprises. It leads to remembering the unexpected cases of nuclear acquisition while neglecting the numerous surprises of states deciding not to go nuclear; the states that gave up their nuclear ambitions or weapons would be forgotten for the same reasons. 19 The persistent excessive pessimism of forecasters in terms of the pace of proliferation as well as the number of actors predicted to cross the nuclear threshold in the years after the assessment suggests that the favorable surprises were far more numerous. 20 Even the exceptional South African case of dismantlement of an existing arsenal took the intelligence services and the experts by surprise. President F.W. de Klerk announced on March 24, 1993 that the South African arsenal had been dismantled, but the intelligence community remained suspicious long after the end of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. 21 Similarly, when nuclear weapons were not found in Iraq in 2003, the first reaction of the experts was not to contemplate absence but rather to build scenarios in which the weapons could have been transferred to Syria or destroyed just before the US invasion. Even when these scenarios were considered improbable, the possibility of the weapons being buried somewhere or stolen was often mentioned. 22 These cases show that when an anomaly occurs vis-a`-vis the proliferation paradigm, experts tend to deny the anomaly. The reactions in both the Iraqi and South African cases show how hard it is to go against the proliferation paradigm because the absence of evidence can never incontrovertibly become evidence of absence. It therefore seems obvious why Harald Mu¨ller and Andreas Schmidt consider ‘‘the story of deproliferation’’ as ‘‘little known.’’ 23 The consensus surrounding the proliferation paradigm cannot be fully explained by the argument that the individuals who adhere to it are ‘‘problem-solving’’ experts, and that members of a more marginal group will do the critical-thinking work. 24 In fact, as seen in the case of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, most of those who were advocating disarmament or abolition accepted the proliferation paradigm and used it to complain about the lack of progress. The Metaphor of Proliferation as a Cognitive Framework for the Proliferation Paradigm The numerous different versions of that predominant analysis now have to be related to the expert community’s systematic use of the metaphor of ‘‘proliferation’’ in order to understand how it can lead to the general consensus analyzed in the previous section. Indeed, this use has prevailed at least since policy analyst and strategist Albert Wohlstetter applied the term to nuclear weapons in April 1961 as the cognitive framework through which this interpretation of nuclear history has been imparted. This is all the more important because the strongest biases attached to the proliferation paradigm can be traced to the careless use of this metaphor. The shift from the term ‘‘dissemination’’ to ‘‘proliferation’’ establishes the metaphor that will shape the most prevalent interpretation of the phenomenon. The ‘‘problem of the N"1 country,’’ as Wohlstetter termed it, began to be addressed in university circles between 1958 and 1962 at the exact time when the term ‘‘proliferation’’ was transposed by Wohlstetter into its new domain. 26 What might have remained a mere simile was concentrated into a metaphor: the increase in the number of actors with nuclear weapons is not like proliferation; it is proliferation. Metaphors bring certain attributes to the fore while adding or deleting others; they limit the cognitive framework through which one conceives the phenomenon in question. By describing a battle using terms taken from the vocabulary of chess, for instance, one removes the emotional facet of war. 27 While the legitimacy of using metaphors in scientific discourse has been acknowledged, this requires either that nothing be deduced from the components of the metaphor or that scientists continue to maintain a reflexive relationship with it. 28 To understand how the metaphor of proliferation lays the foundations for a belief in an inevitable increase in the number of nuclear weapon states, therefore, it is important to examine what exactly can be deduced from it. First, it is worth addressing the strictly pathological connotations of the term ‘‘proliferation’’ as employed in the lexical field of biology, where it has been associated with cancer since the early twentieth century. 29 The process of cellular reproduction is monitored from outside, and when this monitoring fails, degeneration occurs and cancer develops, sometimes to the point of killing the organism in question. The pessimistic version of the paradigm can therefore find a starting point in this aspect of the metaphor; if you want to monitor proliferation, the biological metaphor suggests that an external interuention is necessary. The pathological connotation related to the circulation of weapons then spread to those states that sought to acquire nuclear weapons following the Cold War. 30 Second, it must be noted that the expression ‘‘proliferation of nuclear weapons’’ underlines the element of self-begetting that is present in the phenomenon in question. This meaning appears in English even before the pathological element is introduced; indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition, which first appeared in the 1860s: ‘‘the formation or development of cells by budding or division.’’ 31 When transposed into the nuclear domain, the term retains the connotation of an automatic process and leaves no room for the political factor, which had no relevance in cellular reproduction. Do the weapons themselves breed more weapons? It seems unlikely, but the metaphor disregards this fact. The biological metaphor of proliferation applied to the nuclear domain therefore results in a purely quantitative approach to the phenomenon and ultimately leads to a type of technological and economic determinism. This reasoning is a major source of the proliferation paradigm and lies behind the fears associated with the notion of ‘‘nuclear latency’’ that reemerges in the literature. If one accords the metaphor its full value, then civilian nuclear programs serve as a halfway house in the multiplication of military nuclear arsenals. Such technological and economic teleology can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it could be suggested that this attitude is born of prudence. In this case, since nuclear proliferation was identified on January 31, 1992 by the UN Security Council as a threat to international peace and security, the most reliable policy for achieving nonproliferation is to prevent actors from acquiring the means to build a bomb by erecting technical barriers to that process. 33 This option removes the need to identify the proliferators and to uncover their motives. On the other hand, one could suggest that the effectiveness of the metaphor of proliferation in the political domain is even greater if it implies that the bomb is seen as intrinsically desirable. However extreme it may seem, the latter interpretation of the metaphor\*which is tantamount to asserting that states do not proliferate merely because they are able to do so\*is not uncommon. 34 This analysis is compatible with the two main versions of the realist approach, one of which sees the bomb as being thoroughly desirable, while the other recognizes that it has drawbacks as well as advantages. Indeed, as international relations scholar Jacques Hymans has put it, ‘‘soft’’ realism can readily become ‘‘hard’’ realism to the extent that the security guarantee will always be treated with some degree of suspicion. 35 The economic approach of Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator also demonstrates the desirability of the bomb when the authors state that ‘‘as the cost of nuclear weapons falls, . . . there will be new nuclear states unless new policies increase this cost.’’ 36 A variation on this same theme is found in the widespread belief that chemical and biological weapons are the poor man’s atom bomb. Third, the metaphor also implies a chain reaction. This element seems to be underlined later in the 1960s in the writings of physicist Sir John Cockcroft. 38 Just as cellular proliferation is a phenomenon that continues to occur following an initial division, nuclear proliferation is imagined in terms of a chain reaction once one party crosses the nuclear threshold. This also marks the beginning of a linear approach in terms of speed, which presents a series of waves as periods of temporary acceleration in the phenomenon of proliferation. When a state proliferates, the most widespread analyses argue that other states in the region will do the same in order to maintain a certain strategic balance. Today, most experts subscribe to the image of the ‘‘strategic chain reaction.’’ 39 Even political science scholar Etel Solingen, who criticizes the approach, occasionally succumbs to the fear of a chain reaction of proliferation in Southeast Asia. Though it has been established that the proliferation paradigm relies on the careless use of the metaphor of proliferation, this view of history remains to be tested. It is important to note, however, that the argument presented above does not imply that a historical discourse devoid of all metaphor is actually possible. Rather, I need only posit that a reflexive approach to the metaphor in question remains a possibility. The Proliferation Paradigm in Light of Nuclear History Before examining the implications of the proliferation paradigm, it is useful to address the deductions arising from the metaphor that leads to that approach. Let me briefly list them: the pathological connotation related to the phenomenon of proliferation and transposed to those entities that represent it; the self-begetting nature of the phenomenon, which ultimately leads to capacity determinism; and, finally, the logic of a chain reaction, which suggests that the bomb represents the most appropriate response to a security threat posed by proliferation on the part of a neighbor.

#### ---Criticism must start with the images involved in discussing proliferation; only the critique reveals that the aff’s assumptions are neither innocent nor productive. This proceeds plan-focus because the way they understand the problem and solution is intimately tied to representations.

Mutimer 2003

David, Professor of Political Science at York University, Critical Security Studies, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” pg. 215-6

First, we must recognize that the metaphors with which a security problem is understood will shape the nature of the problem and its solutions, focusing on the aspects that are highlighted and marginalizing or ignoring those that are downplayed or hidden in the metaphors’ entailments. In a critical security study, our task is to reveal those metaphors and to detail their entailments. In particular, we must draw out those aspects of security problems that are downplayed or hidden by the metaphors. In doing so, we can reconnect security and security policy—so often considered as distinct and isolated realms—to the rest of the fabric of international politics and global society. The image of proliferation hides both the economic interests driving arms export and the location of arms production in the industrialization of the Third World. What is hidden or downplayed by the other metaphors in which we think and speak security? Indeed, what are the entailments of the metaphor of “security” itself? The highlighting and hiding of aspects of complex security problems by the metaphors in which they are thought and acted are not innocent. Thus, for a critical security study, the examination of metaphors provides the basis for political involvement. Such an examination can form the basis of an immanent critique. Efforts at proliferation control are liable to fall short of expectations because the aspects of the problem hidden by the proliferation image will undermine supply-side controls. There is, however, also the basis for a more profound, transformatory critique. The image of proliferation, constructing a problem of technological movement outward from a source that is to be addressed by restricting that technology to the source, clearly masks the interests of the advanced industrial states. These states have the technologies of concern, providing them with economic and military advantages, and these states will continue to enjoy these advantages under a policy of supplier control. Analysis of the metaphorical basis of security policy can thus serve to reveal the constructed nature of international security. It is a construction of the imagination, but of the political imagination. It therefore matters a great deal who is doing the imagining, and what the implications are of the resultant image. We cannot eliminate metaphor from the practice of security. However, by including its analysis within the critical study of security, we can reveal these foundational imaginings and normative commitments of those choosing particular metaphors. Ultimately, the analysis of metaphor is a route to the opening of alternatives in international security, alternatives that are rooted in the commitments of those making the choice of metaphors. The focus on metaphor, then, begins to address at least two of the concerns of a critical security study: it provides a methodological tool for understanding security as a historically specific construction, and it serves to return politics to a study depoliticized by the epistemological assumptions of the traditional approaches.

#### ---The rhetoric of nuclear “accidents” serves to depoliticize military-industrial structure eroding responsibility and creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Chaloupka 1992

William, Chair of Political Science @ Colorado State, Knowing Nukes, pgs. 12-16

Even our best signs of stability are easily inverted into signs of chaos and entropy. The only dependable stasis refuses to be static; interpretation de- mands a role, despite our wishes it would recede. This absurd outcome may be most evident when we consider those major destabilizers in the nuclear world that come under the classification of "accidents." The term "accident" is of obvious interest to nuclear criticism. In a discourse that allocates responsibilities pervasively, "accident" is a free spot, without cause or conspiracy. In the case of nuclear power, the notion of accident had already become visible in the late 1970s, after nuclear critics and Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials sparred over the vocabulary appropriate to Three Mile Island. To officialdom, accident was obviously an appropriate label for these events, since there was never any suggestion of malevolence or subversion. To critics, it was just as obvious that when societies produce electricity by placing ornately complex plants around the landscape, radiation releases are so in- evitable that the word "accident" reveals an evasion of responsibility. In another case, compatriots of the Iran Air 655 victims insisted that its destruction must have been intentional, simply because the powerful American technology could not possibly have "made a mistake" (or "had an accident") of such magnitude. Meanwhile, critics in the United States —more familiar with technological failures —argued that placing a weapon such as the U.S.S. Vincennes in a place such as the Persian Gulf invited tragedy so openly as to defy the categories "mistake" and "accident." Noting the radical reversibility of such analyses—the ease with which they are inverted —we might begin to suspect that "accident" is a special term in the debate over nukes. Indeed, "accident" has even served as a sign of stability, as in the oft-repeated analysis that the paradoxes of deterrence are so stable that the real danger of nuclear war comes from the chance of accident. So-called accidents may attain this special status because of the role the rhetoric of "accident" necessarily preserves for a rhetoric of agency. To call something an "accident" is to claim (or hope) that there is no harbor for responsibility, even though we continually use rhetorical devices that allocate causality when we talk about politics. This double character gives the formulation "nuclear accident" an extraordinary power. Hypo- thetically, such an accident could destroy all life; if that weren't enough, the formulation draws attention to the provisional, constituted character of American discourse about agency and authority.Richard Klein and William B. Warner presented the Korean Air Lines downing as a case that illustrates the ambivalence of accidents.36 As they suggest, we have long known that designating something an "accident" is an implement of international diplomacy. Such a designation can be (and often is) constructed after the event in question, for purposes not neces- sarily connected to the "facts" of the event. Statesmen make events into accidents (or, conversely, attribute a conscious purpose to an inadvertent event) depending on the geopolitical move they want to make. In the case of nuclear war, which has no "after the fact," these determinations would have to be made very quickly, and "this determination of the character of the incident, before it happens, may itself initiate a war."37 In such a situation, it might well be impossible for the participants to map all of the contingencies required to produce reliable clarity. Indeed, clarity on causation, responsibility, and accident has often been an artifact of "the luxurious time of diplomatic distance," not some obvious feature of the event in question. And clarity, as it pertains to nukes, is no abstract exercise; it is a precondition for continuing at all. One failure and the rubble bounces, as the saying goes.The case of KAL 007 is illustrative. This time, there was an "after," so we have the usual and predictable diplomatic interpretations to examine. The Soviets cried foul, charging conspiracy. The Reagan administration renewed its claim that the U.S.S.R. was an evil empire and used the event to justify weapons requests. No surprises. Klein and Warner's point, how- ever, is that in the heat of this particular night, it would not be even slightly implausibleto suggest that hugely different interpretations of this event could have prevailed in Washington and Moscow, whatever the "actual" facts and motivations were. This is an interpretive moment, and these interpretations tend to diverge, not to converge in some safe and reassuring way. From the Soviet vantage point it hardly seems an accident that the course of KAL 007 happened to coincide with the course of a U.S. RC-135 spy plane. But from the vantage point of the U.S., the flight "deviation" of this particular plane does not seem so surprising at all; it may in fact be inevitable given the thousands of flights along this Pacific route. . . . Thus, what seems a telling coincidence to the collective subjectivity defined by Soviet leadership seems merely accidental to observers . . . who do not share the same national subjectivity.38Klein and Warner use literary interpretations to show how utterly incom- prehensible this "fact" may have been in its unfolding. One can even imagine that KAL O07's James Bond—like name imparted confusion. That name could have been seen as proof that this was no spy mission (obvi- ously, they wouldn't have named it thai), or proof that it was such a mission (they'd never suspect this), or evidence or a classic spy's slip, be- trayed by "what he has taken every conceivable rational precaution to conceal."39 The indeterminacy of language and the characteristically linguistic, interpretive nature of such politics take away any reassurance we could be offered that, despite all our critical complaints, we have only "accidents" to fear now. Or, in slightly different form, we can imagine an interpretive moment —fraught with levels and complexities —far more difficult, even, than an episode in which one had to "get the facts." "The injured party will not enjoy the luxurious time of diplomatic distance from the event that allows one to choose" a course of action. Instead, the injured party finds himself in an almost inevitablycatastrophic position, trying "to de- termine in these swiftly passing moments, before the end, whether he is not actually already at war," knowing, perhaps, that his attempts to de- termine "the character of the incident. . . may itself initiate a war."40 To demarcate something as "an accident" is to imply that it is outside the rationalist realm of planning and decision that supposedly lies at the core of the national defense. Actual events, however, fail to honor such demarcations; a successful political actor manipulates them and gains benefit. The "accident," then, exposes the presumptions of nuclearist positions that propose that such events are all that remain to fear. Indeed, we should have long ago seen through the rhetoric of "accident." As Garry Wills has explained, the entire nuclearist project suffers from a reversal of Clausewitz, who "understood that the very conditions of war tend to break down the effective conduct of war."41 Presuming that "everything works" ignores Clausewitz's advice that a sizable margin of error must be assumed. On the battlefield, even the most dependable moves will break down. "Danger, of itself, takes a toll, in apprehension or despair, in height- ened alertness or the racing of one's pulse. And danger, says Clausewitz, is the very air one breathes in war. It charges the atmosphere, giddying a per- son, unsettling judgment."42 Nuclear strategy has veered sharply away from the master strategist's insight, even while our intimacy with danger has in- tensified.43 Not only do we presume that our devices will work (and SDI raises that presumption to new levels), we even base our strategy —in the case of "window of vulnerability" scenarios —on the assumption that the Soviets also will act on the assumption that their own weaponry is infalli- ble.44 Seeking managerial control in the form of deterrence, nuclearism strays off course, elevating the "accident" to a new, reified status. In this new context, accidents will happen —continually taunting the managers' forget- fulness of Clausewitz's most obvious points.It is not technological bugs, then, that deliver us to perilous times, so much as it is confusions of agency and misunderstandings about the role of plans and strategies. Citizens and nuclear strategists alike have blithely ignored some long-understood tenets of politics and war, and the traces of that forgetfulness can be identified within nuclearist discourse itself, as the case of "accident" shows. This gives the era a hallucinatory quality, when the master-in-control reveals his own foibles. And, as Klein and Warner conclude, "Hallucinatory effects and effects of coincidence acquire, in this space, uncanny power to become the bases for fateful decisions."45

#### ---The impact is extinction.

Zupancic 2000

Alenka, Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan, March, p. 96-7

“Another problem still remains, however: the question of the possibility of (performing) an ethical act. Is it at all possible for a human subject to accomplish an (ethical) act - or, more precisely, is it possible that something like an Act actually occurs in (empirical) reality? Or does it exists only in a series of failures which only some supreme Being can see as a whole, as an Act? If we are to break. out of the `logic of fantasy', framed by the postulates of immortality and God (the point of view of the Supreme Being), we have to assert that Acts do in fact occur in reality. In other words, we have to `attack' Kant on his exclusion of the `highest good' and the `highest (or diabolical) evil' as impossible for human agents. But does this not mean that we thereby give in to another fantasy, and simply substitute one fantasy for another? Would this kind of claim not imply that we have to `phenomenalize' the Law, abolish the internal division or alienation of human will, and assert the existence of devilish and/or angelic beings? This point was in fact made by Joan Copjec,16 who defends Kant against critics who reproach him for - as she puts it - `lack of intellectual nerve,' for not having enough courage to admit the possibility of diabolical evil. The attempt to think diabolical evil (as a real possibility) turns out, according to this argument, to be another attempt to deny the will's self-alienation, and to make of the will a pure, positive force. This amounts to a voluntarist reading of Kant's philosophy, combined with the romantic notion of the possibility of a refusal of the Law. We do not contest the validity of this argument per se. But the problem is that it leaves us with an image of Kantian ethics which is not very far from what we might call an `ethics of tragic resignation': a man is only a man; he is finite, divided in himself - and therein lies his uniqueness, his tragic glory. A man is not God, and he should not try to act like God, because if he does, he will inevitably cause evil. The problem with this stance is that it fails to recognize the real source of evil (in the common sense of the word). Let us take the example which is most frequently used, the Holocaust: what made it possible for the Nazis to torture and kill millions of Jews was not simply that they thought they were gods, and could therefore decide who would live and who would die, but the fact that they saw themselves as instruments of God (or some other Idea), who had already decided who could live and who must die. Indeed, what is most dangerous is not an insignificant bureaucrat who thinks he is God but, rather, the God who pretends to be an insignificant bureaucrat. One could even say that, for the subject, the most difficult thing is to accept that, in a certain sense, she is `God', that she has a choice. Hence the right answer to the religious promise of immortality is not the pathos of the finite; the basis of ethics cannot be an imperative which commands us to endorse our finitude and renounce our `higher', `impossible' aspirations but, rather, an imperative which invites us to recognize as our own the `infinite' which can occur as something that is `essentially a by-product' of our actions.

#### ---Securitizing North Korea naturalizes a discursive framework for knowing the other that reduces North Korea to a reflection of American interests resulting in miscalculation and conflict escalation.

Shim 2008

David, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290\_index.html

Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001: chapter 2) concept of hegemony, which is used here, rely on a notion developed by Antonio Gramsci (1971). Gramsci broadened the traditional notion of hegemony beyond the view of mapping hegemony in terms of leadership and dominance, which are based on material capabilities, by introducing inter-subjective and ideological aspects into this concept. Accordingly, hegemony contains the ability of a class (bourgeois) to project the world view over another (workers, peasantry) in terms of the former, so that it is accepted as common sense or reality. His merit was to conceptualize hegemony in terms of power without the use of force to reach consent by the dominated class through education and, what he calls, the role of intellectuals (“men of letters”) such as philosophers, journalists and artists (Gramsci 1971: 5-43). The process of fixing meaning, that is, in terms of Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 105), when an element (sign with unfixed meaning) is transformed through articulation into a moment (sign with fixed meaning), is hegemonic, since it reduces the range of possibilities and excludes alternative meanings by determining the ways in which the signs are related to each other. That is to say, when meaning is fixed, i.e. hegemonized, it determines, what can be thought, said or done in a meaningful way. 13 Applied to this case, the exclusive character of a hegemonic discourse makes it unintelligible to make sense of North Korea’s nuclear program in terms of, for instance, energy needs, because – as it is argued – practices of problematization hegemonized the ways of thinking, acting and speaking about North Korea. Discursive hegemony can be regarded as the result of certain practices, in which a particular understanding or interpretation appears to be the natural order of things (Laclau/Mouffe 2001). This naturalization consolidates a specific idea, which is taken for granted by involved actors and makes sense of the(ir) world. As Hall (1998: 1055-7) argues, common sense resembles a hegemonic discourse, which is a dominant interpretation and representation of reality and therefore accepted to be the valid truth and knowledge. Referring to the productive character of discursive hegemony, the Six-Party Talks can be regarded as an outcome of the dominating interpretation of reality (cf. also Jackson 2005: 20; Cox 1983; Hajer 2005). The hegemonic discourse regarding North Korea provides the framework for a specific interpretation in which the words, actions or policies of it are attached with meaning, that is, are problematized. As Jacob Torfing argues “a discursive truth regime […] specifies the criteria for judging something to be true of false”, and further states, that within such a discursive framework the criteria for acknowledging something as true, right or good are negotiated and defined (Torfing 2005a: 14; 19; cf. also Mills 2004: 14-20). However, important to note is, if one is able to define this yardstick, not only one is able to define what is right, good or true, but also what kinds of action are possible. In other words, if you can mark someone or something with a specific label, then certain kinds of acts become feasible.14 Basically, it can be stated that discursive hegemony depends on the interpretation and representation by actors of real events since the interpretation of non-existent facts would not make sense. But the existence of real events does not necessarily have to be a prerequisite for hegemonizing interpretational and representational practices because actions do not need to be carried out, thus, to become a material fact, in order to be interpreted and represented in a certain way (Campbell 1998: 3). Suh Jae-Jung (2004: 155) gives an example of this practice. In 1999 US intelligence agencies indicated to preparing measures taken by North Korea to test fire a missile. Although the action was not yet executed, it was treated as a fact, which involved and enabled certain implications and material consequences such as the public criticism of North Korea, the issuance of statements, diplomatic activity and efforts to hegemonize and secure this certain kind of reality, i.e. to build a broad majority to confirm this view on North Korea. In other words, the practices of problematizing North Korea took place even before an action was done.