# Round 2 Northwestern NEG vs Michigan DH

## 1NC

### China

#### China is assuming leadership role over new nuclear power innovation, commercialization, and exports.

Froggatt 6/6/12

http://nuclearexportcontrols.blogspot.com/2012/06/chinese-nuclear-goes-global.html

Chinese Nuclear Goes Global

In the space of a couple of decades, China has become a major player in the global nuclear sector. With by far the largest number of reactors under construction of any country in the world, and further reactors on order, it is seen as a vital market for uranium, a testing ground for new reactors designs and, increasingly, a potential partner for nuclear developments across the world. But the Fukushima crisis in Japan has had a significant – and under reported – impact on Chinese nuclear developments, triggering a freeze on the start of new construction, a re-consideration of the safety standards of domestic designs and unprecedentedly visible opposition to the building of new, inland nuclear plants. While an announcement was made by the State Council last week that the ban will be lifted shortly, the events of the last 15 months will still result in a failure to meet China’s current five-year plan on nuclear development and, depending on how things develop, its 2020 objectives as well. The global clout of China’s nuclear sector is such that the impacts of its decisions stretch far beyond the nation’s borders. From France to Namibia, from reactor designers to uranium-mining firms, the industry will be waiting anxiously for news from China. China came relatively late to the civil nuclear industry: it started construction of its first commercial reactor only in 1985. As of May this year, the country had 16 reactors in operation, which in 2011 provided 1.85% of the country’s electricity, the lowest share of any country with nuclear power. But, despite its late arrival to the party, China was – until Fukushima – proving an energetic player, with an impressive recent history of construction starts. Today, it has 26 reactors under construction, representing 39% of global new build. But Fukushima changed the picture. Three days after the 2011 tsunami triggered equipment failures at the Japanese plant, Xie Zhenhua, vice chairman of China’s top economic planning body, the National Development and Reform Commission, was quoted by Bloomberg as saying “[e]valuation of nuclear safety and the monitoring of plants will be definitely strengthened.” Then, an account of a meeting of the State Council, chaired by premier Wen Jiabao, in mid-March 2011 included the following: “We will temporarily suspend approval of nuclear-power projects, including those in the preliminary stages of development....We must fully grasp the importance and urgency of nuclear safety, and development of nuclear power must make safety the top priority.” As a result, a new China National Plan for Nuclear Safety with short-, medium- and long-term actions was ordered, and the construction of new plants suspended pending its approval. A May 31 meeting of the State Council is said to have given provisional approval to both the safety plan and a set of goals for 2020. If implemented, these proposals will require some of the existing reactors to undertake safety modifications to meet new standards on earthquakes and flooding. However, it is still unclear when construction on new projects might begin again, or when the proposal for a new safety standard will be released for public comments. It is suggested the delay has been partly caused by uncertainty over the strategic direction for future reactor designs, and in particular whether future construction would be dominated by China’s second-generation CPR 1000 design or move towards greater deployment of third-generation designs from overseas. China has not yet fully developed its own third-generation design and would have to rely initially on the European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) or the American AP1000 reactor. The potential move towards much greater, or even total, dependence on the most modern design is affected by conflicting concerns: the higher costs of the international design and greater confidence in the safety standard. Tange Zede, a member of China’s State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC), was reported in Nuclear Intelligence Weekly as saying the domestically designed CPR-1000 could not even meet the national safety standards issued in 2004, let alone the most up-to-date international standards. Zede stated that “unless the constructed second generation reactors are renovated, they should not be allowed to load fuel and start operation.” Historically, international nuclear vendors have sought to construct their latest models in China. Russia’s reactor-exporting company Atomstroyexport provided its latest design, the AES-91, and equipment for units one and two at Jiangsu province’s Tianwan power plant, which was completed in 2007. It is said that two further reactors will be commissioned, but no date has been set for construction. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL) built two of its heavy-water reactors at theQinshan phase-three plant in Zhejiang, on China’s east coast, but despite the fact these were completed in 2002 and 2003 respectively, no further orders have been placed. Finally, the French utility EDF was engaged in the construction of two reactors at Daya Bay, south China, which were completed in 1994 using technology from French firm Framatome, now AREVA. Two further reactors at phase one of the Ling Ao plant in Shenzhen, also in the south, were built using Framatome equipment, though with a larger domestic contribution. But by the time it came to phase two, a domestic Chinese design was used. Today, the world’s major international reactor vendors, notably AREVA and Westinghouse, are building their most advanced designs in China. In the case of Westinghouse, the AP1000 is the company’s flagship third-generation design, and China is its only sale. The contract, worth around US$5.3 billion (34 billion yuan), is for construction of four reactors, including transfer of both reactor technology and back-end services, particularly waste management. Construction of these four units, two at Sanmen in Zhejiang province and two at Haiyang, further north in Shandong province, is under way, though delays of six to 12 months are reported. For the first unit at Sanmen, the slippage is said to be due to design changes post-Fukushima. For the remaining three units, supply-chain issues relating to the increased use of local components are blamed. If reports are accurate, use of domestic parts across the series of the four reactors will increase from 30% to 70%, and any future reactors will be built with Chinese components alone. The estimated construction costs of the AP1000 are also quoted as rising. In 2009, it was said they would cost US$1,940 per kilowatt (12,400 yuan), but the latest figures range from US$2,300 to US$2,600 per kilowatt. While this is far below the estimated costs of any other third-generation project, globally it is higher than the reported costs for China’s CPR 1000 at US$1,800 per kilowatt. In November 2007, AREVA announced the signing of an €8 billion (US$11.6 billion) contract with China Guangdong Nuclear (CGN) for the construction of two EPRs in Taishan, in south China’s Guangdong province, and said it would provide all the materials and services required to operate them. The Taishan project is owned by Guangdong Taishan Nuclear Power Joint Venture Company Limited, a hook-up between EDF (30%) and CGN. First concrete was poured in October 2009, and unit one was expected to begin operating in 2013, followed by a second unit in 2014. Two other EPR reactors are being built in Europe, one in Finland and one inFrance, but are both running at least 100% over budget and four to five years behind schedule. The delays are such that the Chinese reactors may now be operational before those being built in Europe. Completing the EPRs in China to time and budget will be a vital test for AREVA, which the company will hope can offset its bad experience in Europe. Troubles closer to home are said to be contributing to its lack of sales in other parts of the world, such as the United Arab Emirates. China is also stepping up its nuclear export activity. The most consistent example is Pakistan, which China has supplied with equipment for two reactors at Chashma in Punjab. Construction of units three and four reportedly began at the end of 2011, with China Zhongyuan Engineering as the general contractor and China Nuclear Industry No. 5 Construction Company as the installer. Finance is also coming from China. It doesn’t stop with Pakistan. In recent months, the Chinese industry has been linked with many other projects around the world. The visit of Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to Beijing in April was used to discuss China’s assistance for a proposed nuclear-power station at the Turkish city of Sinop. Other possible deals include the sale of a plant to South Africa and a nuclear co-operation agreement in Saudi Arabia, while there has been speculation over potential Chinese ownership of the energy company Horizon Nuclear Power, established by utilities Eon and RWE to build nuclear plants in the United Kingdom, but now up for sale. To fuel the country’s expectation of a rapidly growing nuclear sector, two companies – CGN and China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) – are permitted to import uranium. To meet official fuel requirements, they are set to increase imports from around 3,600 tonnes per year in 2010 to some 10,000 tonnes in 2020. Of the two firms, CGN has been the more successful over recent years and has signed a number of deals. In November 2010, its leaders inked a 10-year agreement for the supply of 24,200 tonnes of uranium from Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom. In addition, CGN and Chinese equity funds each have a 24.5% share in AREVA’s mines in Namibia, South Africa and the Central African Republic, which could provide an additional 40,000 tonnes of uranium starting in 2022. CGN signed another deal in November 2010 with Cameco of Canada for the supply of 13,000 tonnes of uranium through 2025. More recently, in February this year, CGN completed a takeover of Extract Resources, which is developing Africa’s largest known uranium resource. CGN, together with the China-Africa Development fund paid €2.2 billion (US$2.7 billion) for the company and associated companies, such as Kalahari Minerals. The CGN activity contrasts starkly with the limited success of CNNC, which has secured little supply outside of China despite attempts in Mongolia, Kazakhstan and Niger. Though, in light of its ambition to secure 2,500 tonnes of uranium a year by 2015, CNNC is likely to increase its activity in the market, and there are suggestions it might take a stake in AREVA’s new project in Niger. Prior to the accident at Fukushima, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan anticipated 43 gigawatts of nuclear power in operation by the end of 2015. Meeting this target would have required the completion of all reactors under construction at the end of 2010, plus those scheduled to start in 2011. It therefore cannot be met. A report on implementation of the 12th Five-Year Plan, published by the China Electricity Council in March estimated that China’s nuclear-generating capacity would reach 80 gigawatts by 2020. But the suspension of the start of new construction and the uncertainty over the strategic direction for future designs make meeting this 2020 target highly unlikely. Public opinion could also pose an obstacle. In a poll carried out by research agency Ipsos MORI after Fukushima, 42% of those surveyed in China were supportive of nuclear power – but 48% were opposed. It is also reported that public opposition and environmental concerns have led to the delay in construction of three inland nuclear power sites. In March this year, oppositionto the proposed Pengze power plant in Jiangxi erupted into the public sphere on a scale not previously seen when local authority documents critical of the project were posted on the internet. Given nuclear’s small contribution to China’s electricity supply, a doubling or trebling of new-build capacity won’t significantly alter the electricity mix or, for that matter, Chinese emission trajectories. However, the future direction of its choice of reactor design domestically could fundamentally change the number of orders for a particular manufacturer. This is something global companies are well aware of, though they should note that – so far – China has not deployed any foreign reactor design at scale, rather ordering a couple and then largely carrying on with domestic designs. Fukushima has already had a significant impact on the Chinese nuclear sector and, more than 15 months after the accident, the moratorium on new construction starts remains in place. The questions are now, one, will future orders be placed at the pre-Fukushima rate? And, two, what new design safety standards are required? The answers to these questions are not only eagerly awaited in Paris and Tokyo, the homes of AREVA and Westinghouse, but also uranium suppliers in Africa and prospective nuclear builders in the United Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to name but a few. China’s nuclear developments probably matter more to the rest of the world than they do to China.

China leapfrogging US on IFR

Halper-Guardian-7/20/12

Richard Branson urges Obama to back next-generation nuclear technology

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jul/20/richard-branson-obama-nuclear-technology>

Sir Richard Branson is urging the US government to help commercialise a controversial class of nuclear reactor, according to a letter seen by the Guardian asking for a meeting with President Barack Obama and US energy secretary Steven Chu. The White House declined the meeting to discuss integral fast reactors (IFRs), which proponents say offer a way of dealing with nuclear waste, although no working commercial reactors are in operation. But the move brings the intriguing prospect of a race to develop nuclear technology between Branson and Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates, whose new company TerraPower is developing another type of next-generation nuclear technology known as the travelling wave reactor. "Obviously we urgently need to come up with a clean effective way of supplying our energy since not only are the dirty ways like oil running out but we need to do so to help avoid the world heating up," Branson told the Guardian. That opinion echoes Branson's letter to Obama, co-signed by two others including Eric Loewen, the chief engineer for GE-Hitachi's Prism reactor, which along with fuel recycling facilities would constitute an IFR. Loewen signed the letter in his capacity as president of the American Nuclear Society, not as the Prism boss. A new generation of nuclear reactors could consume Britain's radioactive waste. Prism and other IFRs could burn plutonium and uranium left over from other nuclear processes, as a useful way to dispose of the dangerous substance and to minimise the "proliferation" risk of making nuclear weapons from the material. GE-Hitachi in 2011 proposed using Prism to burn the UK's 100 tonnes of plutonium, a stockpile that subsequently grew when Britain last week took control of an additional four tonnes from Germany. The letter's other co-signer was Columbia University adjunct professor James Hansen, who is also the head of Nasa's Goddard Institute and a renowned campaigner against man-made climate change. "Unlike today's nuclear reactor, the IFR can generate unlimited amounts of inexpensive clean power for hundreds of thousands of years," the letter states. "It provides an excellent solution for what to do with our nuclear waste because it can use our existing nuclear waste for fuel and it is significantly more proliferation-resistant than other methods of dealing with nuclear waste. "The IFR is also inherently safe. In an emergency, unlike today's reactors, it shuts down without human intervention and without requiring electric power … Hundreds of nuclear scientists believe this technology has the ability to generate carbon-free power at a cost per kW less than coal." Not everyone agrees that IFRs and other "fast" reactors are safe. Japan's Monju fast reactor suffered a leak and fire in 1995, and incurred another accident in 2010 when a fuel replacement device fell into the reactor. It is currently shut down. Under physicist Charles Till's direction, the US developed and operated a prototype integral fast reactor known as the Experimental Breeder Reactor II from 1964 until 1994. Congress withdrew funding in part for safety concerns and also because opponents argued that – because IFRs can be used to "breed" as well as burn plutonium – the reactor would actually increase the potential of weapons proliferation, rather than decrease it. The Branson letter criticises the 1994 cut. "Our point was to draw attention to the insanity of shutting off R&D," co-signer Hansen told the Guardian. Unlike today's conventional reactors, IFRs do not slow down neutrons that split out during the fission process. The process can be difficult to control. But it is these hot neutrons that provide the heat that drive turbines, making fast reactors potentially more efficient and less wasteful than conventional "moderated" reactors because they use more of the available neutrons. The World Nuclear Association believes that China will rely heavily on fast reactors by 2050. China connected a small test reactor to the grid last summer, and Gates has discussed sharing his travelling wave technology with China National Nuclear Corp.

#### US regulatory climate causing shift to China to develop next generation reactors

Hall-Energy Digital-1/23/12

US to Explore Small Nuclear Reactor Designs

<http://www.energydigital.com/green_technology/us-to-explore-small-nuclear-reactor-designs>

In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster last year, technology companies are stepping up to develop safer, more economical nuclear reactors in an attempt to wean dependence on conventional, large-scale nuclear used all over the world today. After Bill Gates took his concepts to China—where regulations on nuclear plants are less stringent and innovations gain support—the DOE's announcement is a positive step in spurring more US manufacturing. “America’s choice is clear - we can either develop the next generation of clean energy technologies, which will help create thousands of new jobs and export opportunities here in America, or we can wait for other countries to take the lead,” said Energy Secretary Steven Chu. “The funding opportunity announced today is a significant step forward in designing, manufacturing, and exporting U.S. small modular reactors, advancing our competitive edge in the global clean energy race.”

#### Revitalizing the US industry undermines Chinese export markets

Ferguson 10—President of the Federation of American Scientists. Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and an Adjunct Lecturer in the National Security Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University. (Charles, Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: The Implications of Expanded Nuclear Energy in Asia, in Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose, Ed Tellis, Marble and Tanner, 146)

Although China began to develop commercial nuclear energy a decade or two after Japan and South Korea, Beijing is emulating the course charted by Tokyo and Seoul. If China achieves its ambitious goal of more than one hundred operating commercial reactors by 2030, it will likely become the state with the most nuclear power plants in the world unless a major surge in construction occurs in the United States. China may also emerge by then as a major supplier of nuclear technologies and may garner clients in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

Chinese nuclear exports key to soft power

Blank-prof strategic studies institute, Army War College-6/16/10

China puts down marker in nuclear power race<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LF16Cb01.html>

Therefore, China's recent nuclear exports to Pakistan and the future of its nuclear exports in general need to be examined in these three contexts. The first context is that of the overall growth of the assertiveness of China's diplomacy in general and efforts to use nuclear power and military instruments like missiles as sources of influence abroad. In the case of exports to Pakistan, a second context is the long-standing geopolitical rivalry among India, China and Pakistan in which China's "all-weather" friendship with Pakistan has been a deliberate and conscious Chinese strategy to inhibit the growth of Indian power. Finally, we must keep in mind that China is not only an exporter of nuclear energy, it also is a consumer of that energy and so it will be a key market for other exports from the likes of Russia, the United States, France, South Korea, and Japan. As an importer, it obviously will welcome the rivalry of exporters who wish to sell to it so that it can obtain more favorable terms. However, as an exporter of nuclear energy and a power that wants to export more of it for both economic and political gain, it cannot afford to let either its rivals outpace it in Asia or in other areas that China deems as essential to the pursuit of its larger strategic goals.

#### Chinese soft power key to international security and resolving all global problems

Zhang-professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations-9/4/12

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm

The rise of China's political soft power

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

And, fast expansion of domestic nuclear power necessary to reduce carbon emissions and avoid environmental harms of coal dependence

Boey-Research Analyst at the Energy Studies Institute, National University of Singapore-2/27/12

<http://www.japanfocus.org/-Augustin-Boey/3698>

Nuclear Power and China’s Energy Future: Limited Options

China’s energy needs, climate change and nuclear power As a growing superpower, China has been making its presence felt in a variety of international arenas. It has long been the world’s most populous country, with over 1.3 billion people. China’s burgeoning economy, with annual GDP growth around ten percent since the 1980s, allowed it to surpass Japan in 2010 to become the world’s second largest economy after the US. As the “world’s factory,” China has become the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide since overtaking the US in 2006 in annual volume of emissions, although China’s carbon dioxide emitted per capita remains significantly lower than that in the US. Since China’s economic opening and reform program in the 1970s, the demographic, economic and environmental shift that has occurred has necessarily built upon a commensurate growth in electricity demand. Most of the electricity produced in China has thus far been supplied by coal, which provided 2,940,525 GWh of electricity in 2009 and constituted almost 80 percent of the total electricity generation mix.3 However, the combustion of coal also produces a large quantity of greenhouse gases and other pollutants and is as such a distinctly environmentally-unfriendly fuel, particularly as it is used in conventional coal-burning power plants. With climate change becoming an increasingly important issue on environmental and political fronts, China’s energy policy must therefore simultaneously confront the twin challenges of ensuring energy security and climate change mitigation. Amongst China’s energy security issues is the pressing need to ensure that domestic power demands are met. China’s power generation capacity has increased rapidly, as has its electricity infrastructure, but this growth in supply has only unevenly met the growing demands for electricity.4 This growth is predicted to continue in coming decades – the International Energy Agency has projected that China’s total electricity generation will increase by a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.9 percent from 2009 to 2035.5 Of this total, coal is projected to increase by a CAGR of 2.5 percent while nuclear power, which has a much smaller base, is projected to increase by a CAGR of 10.6 percent in the same period.6 The need to meet the sustained increase in electricity demand is unlikely to let up as China’s economy continues to grow. This represents a perennial energy policy challenge.7 Recent reports indicate that China’s power supply in 2012 will again be strained by the low capacity additions relative to growth in power consumption.8 China’s unrelenting consumption of electricity is complicated by its quest for energy self-sufficiency. While China does possess substantial fossil fuel reserves, and indeed used to export oil and coal, it has become a net importer of fossil fuels and has extended its geopolitical reach in part to feed its growing power demands.9 The government’s decision to continue its nuclear power programme can thus be seen as a combination of realism about the growing requirements of its electricity grid and belief that the viability and safety of nuclear power technology has not been seriously compromised by the Fukushima nuclear disaster which, unlike Chernobyl or Three Mile Island, was triggered by natural disaster rather than human error.10 Nuclear power has also been legitimized in China’s public policy due to its favourable greenhouse gas profile. Nuclear power produces almost zero carbon directly and its substitution for fossil fuel plants reduces the net greenhouse gas emissions emanating from electricity production.11 Greenhouse gas emissions in China are largely produced by the power sector due to its heavy use of coal.12 China’s need to quickly reduce carbon emissions in power generation is highlighted by the government’s objective to reduce the ratio of GDP to carbon dioxide emissions by 40-45 percent between 2005 and 2020.13 Furthermore, the heavy reliance upon coal fired power generation causes immediate local health and environmental problems. Pollutants released from coal combustion have been identified as causing the rise of respiratory illnesses and has precipitated increased occurrences of acid rain and a consequent degradation in soil quality.14 These factors enhance nuclear power’s appeal as a means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve environmental quality.

China key to global emissions reductions-comparatively more important than the plan

Ekstrom-Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change MIT-5/24/12

Report: China’s actions are crucial on climate change

http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/china-focus-addressing-climate-change.html

As climate negotiators wrap-up talks in Bonn, Germany, this week, a major point of contention is who needs to do what to slow global warming. Nations such as China and the United States have held back from making substantial emission reduction pledges in the past, as both nations waited for the other to act. But new research out of MIT shows the importance of all major nations taking part in global efforts to reduce emissions — and in particular, finds China's role to be crucial. The report — titled "The Role of China in Mitigating Climate Change" — published in the journal Energy Economics, compares the impact of a stringent emissions reduction policy with and without China's participation. It finds that China's actions are "essential." "As the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, without China, climate goals — like the 2 degrees Celsius target that most agree is necessary to prevent serious irreversible consequences — are out of reach," says Sergey Paltsev, the lead author of the study and the assistant director for economic research at MIT's Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. Specifically, the study finds that with China's help the global community is able to limit warming to 2 degrees Celsius, relative to pre-industrial levels. But without China, we miss that mark by about 1 degree Celsius. Not only will it be close to impossible to achieve the 2 degrees mark without China's participation, but emissions reductions will also be more expensive because substantial costs would shift to only some countries.

### Politics

CIR will pass---bipartisan support but congressional backlash empirically ruins the deal.

CNBC 1/27 (“Obama Turns Focus This Week to Immigration Reform” http://www.cnbc.com/id/100410666)

Immigration reform will take center stage this week with President Barack Obama giving a major policy speech to relaunch his push for reform while a bipartisan group of senators is also expected to release its own ideas for new legislation. Amid the fiercely partisan discussions over fiscal issues that have dominated Washington since the election, there are indications of solid cross-party support for some form of immigration reform, with several leading Republicans urging the party to back significant changes. The center piece of any new legislation is likely to be the establishment of a mechanism for the estimated 11 million illegal immigrants currently in the US to obtain legal status. However, previous reform efforts have foundered despite enjoying strong support, and the tense atmosphere between the White House and some congressional Republicans could yet present an insurmountable obstacle. Mr Obama, who pledged to introduce new legislation during the election campaign, will give a speech on immigration reform on Tuesday in Las Vegas, the first major policy address of his second term. Bob Menendez, the New Jersey senator who met the president on Friday to discuss the issue, said Mr Obama had made it clear that it was "a top legislative priority for him in this session of the Congress" and that creating a pathway to "earned legalization" would be a central part of any immigration reform bill. Mr Menendez is part of a group of six senators from both parties expected this week to introduce their own set of ideas for what a reform package will contain. On the Republican side, some of the groundwork has already been laid by Florida senator Marco Rubio. "There's a new appreciation on both sides of the aisle including, maybe more importantly on the Republican side of the aisle, that we have to enact comprehensive immigration reform," John McCain, another of the Republican senators in the bipartisan group, said on ABC's This Week. Mr McCain added: "Look at the last election. We are losing dramatically the Hispanic vote, which we think should be ours, for a variety of reasons, and we've got to understand that."

#### Plan sparks political battles – constituencies and Kerry.

Blees 2008

Tom, Prescription for the Planet, p345-346, president of the Science Council for Global Initiatives, http://www.thesciencecouncil.com/pdfs/P4TP4U.pdf

Clinton’s hatchet man in the Senate was none other than John Kerry, who came loaded for bear. During the debate on the Senate floor he put on an impassioned presentation to convince his fellow senators to terminate the IFR project. But since there were no good reasons to terminate the program—and many reasons not to—other than political posturing on the part of himself and Clinton, Kerry pulled out all the tools of the desperate debater: misinformation, misdirection, appeals to authority, and cherry-picking of reports and data. With an overbundance of fairness to Kerry (considering his behavior) it might be pointed out that politicians are automatically in a sticky position by virtue of the nature of their jobs. A majority of Kerry’s constituents were (and probably still are) almost assuredly dead-set against nuclear power. When people vote for someone to represent them in Washington, the assumption is that their representative will faithfully represent their wishes on policy matters. So what is a politician to do if he finds himself in the awkward position of believing that a policy position the majority of his constituents finds abhorrent is actually a good thing? Does he vote according to his belief, or does he take the position that his constituents would have him take? In cases of high emotion and intense activism (like nuclear power, in many states), repudiating his constituents’ wishes can lead to electoral defeat. “It was for your own good” isn’t something voters want to hear when their leaders have been dismissive of their clear wishes. I have no personal ax to grind against John Kerry (except for this issue). I voted for the guy! Not only that, but I agree with the majority of his votes in Congress. Nor am I about to put words in his mouth. I am prepared, however, to use his own words pulled verbatim from the Congressional Record, and then to refute the bogus arguments he used in order to rob them of any credibility they might conceivably have in future debates. Those senators who successfully refuted Kerry’s arguments and carried the day (alas, only in the Senate) are senators no longer. Kerry, on the other hand, is not only still there but has grown in stature and influence over the years. While I would like to think that in the intervening years he would have investigated the subject and might have a more nuanced and educated view of the different types of nuclear power, I have every reason to believe that this is not the case.

Obama needs political capital to pass comprehensive reform---Democrats will block high skilled only legislation

Politico.com 1/15/13

HEADLINE: Lawmakers divided over immigration Jessica Meyers

Key lawmakers see opportunity this session to address immigration reform but remain stymied on a central issue: whether to tackle it in chunks or in one complete package. "Every member of Congress will find something in a comprehensive bill that they will not like," Rep. Raul Labrador (R-Idaho) said at Tuesday's POLITICO Pro Tech Deep Dive focused on Immigration, Technology and the 113th Congress. "We should have a series of bills -- four, five or six bills -- that we debate separately but that we vote together on the House floor." (PHOTOS: 20 quotes on immigration reform) Labrador accused the White House of aiming for a "political victory" instead of a "policy victory." Silicon Valley Democrat Zoe Lofgren redirected the blame to Congress. "I have had Republicans say they don't want Obama to do a bill because they want flexibility, but if he doesn't do a bill, he's criticized," she said. "I'm waiting for a signal from the speaker on what he wants to do. It's not that tough, it's just the decision to do it." Tech companies are lobbying hard for immigration reforms that would allow foreign employees to fill unmet demand and ensure they maintain global competitiveness. And all three lawmakers agree the system needs fixing. The difficulty lies in figuring out how to do it. But the issue is a special challenge for Republicans, who must reconcile shifting demographics and a history of no-mercy enforcement. "The Republicans have been really pathetic, quite frankly, to communicate our position on this," Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah) said. Chaffetz pushed a bill last session that would have lifted the country caps on visas for high-skilled workers. Tech companies like Microsoft and Google embraced the bill. The legislation passed the House but failed in the Senate. And Labrador has become a leading GOP voice on immigration changes, saying his decision to run for governor hinges on whether Congress implements reforms. He and Chaffetz advocated last session for legislation that would have granted up to 55,000 visas to noncitizens who complete certain science, technology, engineering and math degrees at American universities. Democrats lambasted the bill, known as the STEM Jobs Act, as a token Republican move to garner minority support. The Senate shot the bill down. "I want us to be known as the pro-immigration party," Labrador said. "I want us to be known that we welcome people to this country, that we want people to be successful. I want our party to take this lead on immigration reform." Democrats in both chambers are pushing for more overarching legislation, calling smaller attempts political posturing. "Everybody wants their piece," Lofgren said. "You talk to the ag people, you can't do the tech thing because we need migrant farm workers. You've got husbands and wives separated for half a decade. What's that do for our country? We have 2 million migrant farm workers who don't have their papers, and without them we don't have an agricultural industry." Lofgren has advocated for encompassing legislation that would grant citizenship to some undocumented immigrants who came to the United States at an early age and go on to college or the military. "I know these guys want to get something done," she said. "The Republicans are going to lose, lose, lose if they don't change on this issue. But it's not the same political calculation within districts." President Barack Obama has vowed to prioritize the issue this session, likely in one comprehensive bill. This would avoid Republican attempts to break it into smaller bits and address highly skilled workers, younger illegal immigrant and farm workers in separate bills. Immigration groups have voiced angst that the president has not moved faster to enact substantial reform. The administration has deported record numbers of illegal immigrants. But it also has started to make significant strides to expedite changes -- even without Congress. Obama signed an executive order in June that ordered Homeland Security officials to halt deportation proceedings against immigrants who entered the country as children and who have finished high school or joined the military. Similar legislation known as the DREAM Act has stalled in Congress. Obama is expected to lay out his plans as soon as his State of the Union speech next month. A bipartisan group of senators also is working on a reform bill.

#### Comprehensive immigration reform is key to the economy and highly skilled workers

Farrell 12/13/12 (Chris, a contributing editor for Bloomberg Businessweek. From 1986-97, he was on the magazine's staff, as a corporate finance staff and department editor and then as an economics editor. Farrell wrote Right on the Money: Taking Control of Your Personal Finances and Deflation: What Happens When Prices Fall? Among Farrell's many awards are a National Magazine Award, two Loeb Awards, and the Edward R. Murrow Award. Farrell is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Stanford University. “Obama’s Next Act: Immigration Reform” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/obamas-next-act-immigration-reform>)

Washington won’t get much of a reprieve from verbal pyrotechnics once the drama of the fiscal cliff is over. Up next: major immigration reform. President Obama has made it clear that a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s badly frayed immigration system is a second-term priority. Many Republican lawmakers are convinced the big takeaway from the 2012 election results is that conservatives need to rethink their hard-line stance on immigration—including illegal immigrants. Here’s what Washington should do before tackling the tough job of rewriting the immigration laws: Create a quicksilver path to citizenship for the 11 million to 12 million undocumented workers in the U.S. (excluding the small number convicted of violent crimes or multiple felonies). The shift in status acknowledges that these foreign-born newcomers, like previous generations of immigrants, overcame significant obstacles to come to the U.S. to make a better life for their families. Illegal immigrants are neighbors heading off to work, sending their kids to school, and attending church. Their everyday lives would vastly improve by moving from the shadows of society into the mainstream. More important from a public-policy perspective, the change would give a boost to the economy’s underlying dynamism. “What you’re doing in the short run is making it easier for workers to move between jobs, a relatively small effect,” says Gordon Hanson, a professor of economics at the University of California at San Diego. “The larger effect from eliminating uncertainty for these immigrants is creating incentives for them to make long-term investments in careers, entrepreneurship, education, homes, and community.” Let’s state the obvious: A rapid transformation of illegal immigrants into legal immigrants isn’t in the cards. Amnesty—let alone citizenship—is an anathema to large parts of the electorate. Too bad, since the scholarly evidence is compelling that immigrants—documented or not, legal or illegal—are a boon to the net economy. “Competition fosters economic growth,” says Michael Clemens, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington. The economic return from attracting skilled immigrants to the U.S. is well known. Foreign-born newcomers account for some 13 percent of the population, yet they are responsible for one-third of U.S. patented innovations. The nation’s high-tech regions such as Silicon Valley, the Silicon Hills of Austin, Tex., and Boston’s Route 128 rely on immigrant scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and employees. Better yet, economist Enrico Moretti at the University of California at Berkeley calculates that a 1 percent increase in the share of college-educated immigrants in a city hikes productivity and wages for others in the city. Less appreciated is how much the economy gains from the efforts of less-skilled immigrants, including illegal workers. Throughout the country, foreign-born newcomers have revived beaten-down neighborhoods as immigrant entrepreneurs have opened small businesses and immigrant families have put down stakes. Immigrant workers have played a vital role keeping a number of industries competitive, such as agriculture and meatpacking. Cities with lots of immigrants have seen their per capita tax base go up, according to David Card, an economist at UC Berkeley. Despite the popular impression that a rising tide of immigrants is associated with higher crime rates, research by Robert Sampson of Harvard University and others offer a compelling case that it’s no coincidence that the growing ranks of immigrants tracks the reduction in crime in the U.S. But don’t newcomers—legal and illegal—drive down wages and job opportunities for American workers? Not really. A cottage industry of economic studies doesn’t find any negative effect on native-born wages and employment on the local level. On the national level the research shows the impact on native-born Americans doesn’t drift far from zero, either positively or negatively. “In both cases, immigrants are more likely to complement the job prospects of U.S.-born citizens than they are to compete for the same jobs as U.S.-born citizens,” Giovanni Peri, an economist at the University of California at Davis, writes in Rationalizing U.S. Immigration Policy: Reforms for Simplicity, Fairness, and Economic Growth. The counterintuitive results reflect a numbers of factors. Immigrants expand the size of the economic pie by creating new businesses, new jobs, and new consumers. Middle-class families find it easier to focus on careers with affordable immigrant labor offering gardening, child care, and other services. Many illegal immigrants aren’t fluent in English, so they don’t compete for the same jobs as native-born workers. Another factor behind the lack of direct competition is the higher educational level of native-born Americans. In 1960 about half of U.S.-born working-age adults hadn’t completed high school, while the comparable figure today is about 8 percent. The real downside concern is on the fiscal side of the immigrant ledger. Yes, more taxes would go into Social Security, Medicare, and the like with legalization, but more people would qualify for Medicaid, welfare, and other benefits. At the local level, many school districts are strained financially from educating immigrant children, legal and illegal. That said, the prospect of fiscal costs would diminish as newly legalized immigrant workers move freely around the country seeking jobs, entrepreneurs are comfortable expanding their payrolls, and immigrant parents push their children to live the American Dream. “Over time, as entrepreneurs emerge and families are better able to get their kids through high school and college, you’re reducing the long-run fiscal claim of the group,” says Hanson. There is no economic evidence that making roughly 6 percent of the workforce illegal will benefit the economy. Plenty of research supports the opposite case. A fast track to legality offers Washington a rare twofer: a just move that’s economically efficient.

**Decline goes nuclear**

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Mathew, and Jennifer “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

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#### ---Securitizing nuclear proliferation roots the affirmative in colonial knowledge production --- The claim that new proliferation is categorically distinct from the existing risk reifies the orientalist binary that structures modern international relations and violently represents the global south.

Gusterson 1999

Hugh, prof anthro @ George Mason, “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination”

According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often re- veal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the ac- tual dangers that are feared (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970. The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five coun- tries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. Accord- ing to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 promised to assist other signa- tories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international in- spections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nu- clear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4-designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly le- gitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. mili- tary programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995). Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western dis- course on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "ver- tical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and im- proved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weap- ons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back ap- peals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basi- cally formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Oth- erness separating Third World from Western countries.6 This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably dif- ferent from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impul- sive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to an- cient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contempo- rary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse. Following Anthony Giddens (1979), I define ideology as a way of con- structing political ideas, institutions, and behavior which (1) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and na- tions appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially con- structed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination. The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problematizing at- tempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underde- veloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers.

#### ---Causes global war --- **Creates a paranoid logic that utilizes the presumption of American innocence to justify incalculable violence.**

Gusterson 2012

Hugh, professor of anthropology at George Mason University, Designed for Death: Helen Caldicott interviews Hugh Gusterson, http://www.guernicamag.com/interviews/designed-for-death/

Helen Caldicott: It’s totally hypocritical for the United States, even if they’re not replacing their warheads, to lecture other countries about not developing their own warheads, when America still has in stockpile, ready to go, thousands of hydrogen bombs, which could induce nuclear winter and the end of most life on Earth. Hugh Gusterson: When the United States ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, one of the things they ratified was Article 6, which committed the established nuclear powers to negotiate, in good faith, ending the arms race and eliminating all nuclear weapons. In 1970 they agreed to a prompt cessation of the nuclear arms program. I don’t think many people would think that waiting until 1992 to end nuclear testing was a prompt cessation of the nuclear arms race. People from countries that don’t have nuclear weapons are getting increasingly impatient with the United States, especially, but with all the nuclear powers, wondering when they’re going to get serious about honoring their obligations under Article 6. The United States was busy proposing sanctions against Iran, which was enriching uranium. There are innocent and less innocent reasons for enriching uranium. Iran is allowed under the terms of the treaty to enrich uranium for nuclear energy plants. But the United States was proposing sanctions on Iran for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty, when I think any detached, objective observer would say that by far the largest violators of the treaty must have been the Russians and the Americans for sitting on these enormous stockpiles in spite of Article 6 commitments. I found, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most people in the nuclear weapons labs were unaware of Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I remember having conversations with very well-educated nuclear warhead designers, and one of them told me, flat out, I was wrong in saying that the United States and Russia had any commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty to end the arms race. I was so angry that I went home and Xeroxed the treaty and mailed it to him. Those commitments under the treaty have been much better reported by the U.S. press more recently. In the last five or six years knowledgeable Americans have become more aware of how the rest of the world feels about them. As an anthropologist, I find it particularly offensive when you talk to weapons scientists, or to other kinds of nuclear weapons professionals, that there’s a uniform assumption that Americans are the only people who can be uniquely trusted with nuclear weapons in a way that black and brown people, non-Christians in particular, cannot. You hear it said that only Americans and Europeans have the strength required of people to have nuclear weapons. This flies in the face of the evidence, since the United States is the only country ever to abuse weapons. Helen Caldicott: Is this the projection of the dark side by these Americans onto others? Hugh Gusterson: All of this is a struggle with our unconscious persona that we find difficult to come to terms with, and then project onto other people. It’s been well established by psychologists as part of the process that makes it possible to wage war on other people. You don’t have to go to a nuclear weapons lab to find this kind of casual racism. You can open the opinion page of any American newspaper and find it there at least once a week, about Iraq or Iran or North Korea. It’s become something not even necessary to justify.

#### ---Security framing must be rejected --- Insecurity is inevitable; debating within the lens of “security for all” naturalizes specific political ideologies and privilege. Only rejection re-politicizes notions of ‘the good’ by eliminating security’s determinist stranglehold over energy policy.

Neocleous 2008

Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 185-6

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

### Proliferation

#### Technology doesn’t equate to non-proliferation – political considerations outweigh

Feiveson 1 (Harold, currently serves as the Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation of American Scientists Council and is a Senior Research Policy Scientist of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. “The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power” http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n5/nuclear.htm )

It should be recognized straight away that many in the nuclear industry worldwide believe that intrinsic or technical proliferation resistance should not be given much attention in the development of nuclear power. Their arguments are several. For example: Proliferation is manifestly a political problem. Therefore, it is counterproductive to impose technical constraints on the development of nuclear power except in a few problem countries, such as Iraq and North Korea. If countries are determined to obtain nuclear weapons they can do so most directly via a dedicated program and not through civil nuclear power. Institutional constraints - that is, the entire nonproliferation regime defined by the NPT, safeguards agreements, supplier agreements, etc. � are adequate and could be improved further without imposing technical constraints on nuclear power. The shape of technology, international politics, and ways people think about weapons of mass destruction are impossible to gauge over the long term. Indeed, nuclear weapons may in the future be far less a matter of concern than other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we cannot sensibly attempt today to design a proliferation-resistant nuclear future for the long term. In practice, it will be extraordinarily difficult to contrive an effective proliferation- resistant nuclear fuel cycle for sophisticated states, and difficult even to do so for unsophisticated states. To a point, there is merit in all of these arguments, and taken together they underscore the truth that the civilian nuclear fuel cycle is only a part, possibly even a small part, of the greater problem of addressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

#### The US will not exercise leadership

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2/7/12, Obama's Nuclear Mistake, www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/290330

What prompted Obama to kick this political nest? A stunning inattention to nuclear-export realities, his own nuclear-control rhetoric, and history. In 2008, President Bush negotiated a nuclear-cooperative agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This agreement featured two new and important nonproliferation conditions. The first required the UAE to forswear making nuclear fuel — a process that can bring states to the very brink of acquiring bombs. The second stipulated that the UAE must open its nuclear facilities to intrusive nuclear inspections authorized under a special international understanding known as the Additional Protocol. While it negotiated this agreement with the UAE, the Bush administration also peddled its new, tougher conditions to existing and prospective U.S. civilian-nuclear-technology recipients, including Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. Initially, this effort enjoyed President Obama’s support after he succeeded Bush: He put the final touches on the UAE deal and in 2009 sold it as the new nonproliferation “Gold Standard” for future civilian nuclear-cooperation deals. After a year’s effort trying to get Jordan, Vietnam, and South Korea to forswear making nuclear fuel, though, Team Obama started to go wobbly. First, in the late summer of 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the U.S. had initialed a nuclear deal with Vietnam that lacked the Gold Standard conditions. The Hill went nuts. Letters were sent to the secretary of state, and State quietly put the Vietnam agreement on ice while the National Security Council ordered an interagency policy review. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, who wanted to uphold the standard, fought Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, who did not. Nothing was decided. Then, in July of 2011, Steinberg left the government. In short order, Poneman prevailed over remaining resistance within State. Late last year, State resumed nuclear cooperation talks with Vietnam. Anxious to notify the Hill, as required by law, Undersecretary of State Eileen Tauscher and Deputy Secretary Poneman tried to arrange a private, classified briefing with the House and Senate foreign-affairs committee chairmen and ranking members. But all the important members were out of town. So instead, the two officials sent them a short note. It was a knee-slapper. First, it said the administration had decided that pushing the Bush administration’s Gold Standard would actually risk undermining nuclear nonproliferation. “We are concerned,” Tauscher and Poneman argued, that pushing this standard would “reduce[ ] the number of future U.S. partners, minimizing our nonproliferation influence.” Second, they noted that “France and Russia in particular are very aggressive in pursuing nuclear business,” that “neither imposes enrichment or reprocessing conditions in their agreements,” and that for every billion dollars of exports, the U.S. is able to support 10,000 jobs. So, if we want jobs, we have to back off pushing nuclear nonproliferation? That seems to be the letter’s conclusion. Yet it’s unclear if there are any significant U.S. reactor exports to be made, or any truly American vendors to make them. Nearly 80 percent of Westinghouse’s nuclear division is now Japanese- and Kazakhstani-owned; roughly half of General Electric’s is Japanese-owned. As for nuclear manufacturing, nearly all of that is now done overseas. Also, the Fukushima tsunami disaster has endangered whatever U.S. nuclear reactor or component exports might otherwise be left. Certainly prospective foreign customers have been loath to forswear suing U.S. nuclear firms in the case of a nuclear accident. Yet without such a pledge, U.S. vendors will not sell. The letter’s most egregious error, though, is its misreading of the nuclear market. Contrary to the two officials’ suggestion, the most profitable nuclear sales prospect is not overseas reactors, where profit margins can be negative. Instead, it’s supplying nuclear fuel to run the U.S.’s 104 power reactors, the world’s largest fleet. Russia and France are eager to penetrate this market. France is building a $4.8 billion fuel-fabrication plant in Georgia for the U.S. Department of Energy and has secured a $2 billion conditional federal loan guarantee to enrich uranium in Idaho. Russia would like to establish a similar U.S. enrichment project. Bottom line: If the U.S. wants to make a nuclear buck, doing so while maintaining nonproliferation standards depends far less on what other nuclear suppliers are doing overseas than those foreign suppliers’ export profits depend on securing U.S. taxpayer funds and loan guarantees. So far, however, Team Obama has avoided exploiting this leverage. Impatient, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has reported out a bill (H.R. 1280) to push the Gold Standard by increasing congressional oversight over U.S. civilian nuclear-cooperative agreements. The Senate has yet to act.

#### 1. Proliferation is stable – history proves

Dratler 10 (Jay, Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, Emeritus Ph.D. degrees in physics from the University of California (San Diego), and a J.D. degree from Harvard Law School, where he was articles editor of the Harvard Law Review. “The Case for Nuclear Proliferation” <http://jaydiatribe.blogspot.com/2010/04/case-for-nuclear-proliferation.html>)

**The strongest argument for nuclear proliferation is** not speculation, but history**. Since the first and only use of nuclear weapons** (against Japan in 1945), **no one has invaded a country that had them,** with the possible exception of Israel. **Besides brief border skirmishes, all significant armed conflicts since 1945 but one have involved nuclear haves fighting in nuclear have-nots**, or have-nots fighting among themselves. Here’s the list: 1947: India (have-not) and Pakistan (have-not) over partition and Kashmir (have not) 1950-53: North Korea (have-not) in South Korea (have-not) 1950-53: US (have) and allies in South Korea (have-not) against North Korea (have-not) and China (have) 1950-53: China (have) in North Korea (have-not) and South Korea (have-not) against US (have) 1954-63: France (have) in Indochina (have-not) 1965: India (have-not) in Pakistan (have-not) over Kashmir (have-not) 1967: Soviet Union (have) in Hungary (have-not) 1968: Soviet Union (have) in Czechoslovakia (have-not) 1971: India (have-not) in Pakistan (have-not), creating Bangladesh (have-not) 1964-75: US (have) in Vietnam (have-not) 1979-89: Soviet Union (have) in Afghanistan (have-not) 1982: UK (have) in Falklands (have-not) against Argentina (have-not) 1983: US (have) in Grenada (have-not) 1989: US (have) in Panama (have-not) 1991: US (have) in Iraq (have-not) (Operation Desert Storm) 1995: US (have) and NATO (have) in bombing campaign in Bosnia and Kosovo (have-nots) 2001-present: US (have) in Iraq (have-not) (Operation Iraqi Freedom) 2001-present: US (have) in Afghanistan (have-not) 2008: Russia (have) in Georgia (have-not) [Other colonial actions, which involved haves against colonized have-nots, are not listed. Nor are civil wars and conflicts in Africa, all of whose nations are nuclear have-nots.] **The only exception** known to me **is Pakistan’s brief invasion of India** (in 1999, over Kashmir, as usual). That invasion occurred when both nations had nuclear weapons. But India’s strong conventional response and enormous international pressure stopped it. Other possible but unproven exceptions involved foreign invasions of Israel in 1967 and 1973, when Israel may have had nuclear weapons but, if it did, didn’t reveal or use them. The conclusion that follows from this list in inescapable. Since the development of nuclear weapons, major powers possessing them (except for India and Pakistan) were too prudent or too civilized to make war among themselves. **The unbroken record of military carnage that had preoccupied and devastated Eurasia and most of the “civilized” world for the previous two centuries stopped in its tracks**. But **the record of carnage continued in smaller countries lacking nuclear weapons**, either because they fought among themselves, or (more often) because they were invaded or fought over by nuclear powers. Looking at these data, **an unbiased observer has to conclude that nuclear weapons, with their unthinkable potential consequences, don’t cause wars.** They prevent them**.** The destructive power of nuclear weapons is war’s reductio ad absurdum. It demonstrates graphically how pointless, senseless and useless war is. That is a lesson that Europe and the rest of the world should have learned (but didn’t) from World War I, a serious attempt at mutual genocide that accomplished absolutely nothing. Better late than never.

#### Even “rogue states” won’t cause conflict with nukes

Dratler 10 (Jay, Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, Emeritus Ph.D. degrees in physics from the University of California (San Diego), and a J.D. degree from Harvard Law School, where he was articles editor of the Harvard Law Review. “The Case for Nuclear Proliferation” <http://jaydiatribe.blogspot.com/2010/04/case-for-nuclear-proliferation.html>)

Rogue Regimes After terrorists and crazies, **rogue regimes are the next strongest argument against nuclear proliferation**. **What would happen, conventional wisdom screams, if a terrible tyrant got nuclear weapons**? Conventional wisdom acts as if this question highlights a mere hypothetical future peril. But it doesn’t. Terrible tyrants have had and have nuclear weapons, and nothing extraordinary has happened. With the possible exception of Hitler, **Stalin was the worst** tyrant in human history. He was certainly the most paranoid. Yet he had nuclear weapons for four years before he died. **He didn’t use them**. Nor did his Soviet successors. **North Korea’s Kim Jong Il is every bit as paranoid as Stalin and far more prone to making idle external threats. Yet he has done nothing rash** and is unlikely to do so. Why? Because he knows that a single 50-megaton thermonuclear bomb could erase Pyongyang and his regime forever, even if he and a few select leaders managed to survive in some deep bunker. He also knows that his four-million-strong starving army is no proof against the atom’s awesome power. So Kim waits and occasionally blusters. Waits for what? If he or his minions have any semblance of wisdom, they will exploit the reduction in paranoia that their small nuclear arsenal permits and begin improving their civilian economy. If and as that happens, the long-suffering North Korean people will begin a gradual and painful climb toward a better life. It may take decades. It may take a century. But eventually **cooler and wiser heads will prevail amidst the stalemate of multilateral nuclear deterrence. Conventional wisdom acts as if there were some easy external “solution” to localized tyrannies,** if only they didn’t have nuclear weapons. But **history reveals that view as nonsense**. The Castro brothers, Kim, and Mugabe have been around for decades. They are all likely to die peacefully, of old age. No external force seriously challenged them during their (and Kim’s father’s) long reigns. No external force seriously challenges them now although only Kim has an arguable nuclear deterrent. What would change if each of them had a small nuclear arsenal? Their countries are small enough to be easy subjects for others’ nuclear deterrence. **A few missiles could literally annihilate their entire nations. The only real difference a small nuclear arsenal might make would be giving the lie to the paranoid fear of foreign invasion that they use to keep their own people’s aspirations in check**. The proof of the pudding is Iraq. Part of our justification for invading was removing the tyrant Saddam. That wasn’t the main reason; Israel and oil were. But never mind. It was a reason with which every supporter of the war—left or right—(including me, before the blunders started) could agree. Soon we will have spent well over a trillion dollars in direct and indirect costs. We will have suffered over 4,000 dead and 30,000 wounded to remove a tyrant who we thought had weapons of mass destruction but didn’t. That expense and the enormous economic drain of two wars are among the principal reasons for our national decline. With our sad example in mind, the rest of the world is unlikely to challenge local tyrants by conventional invasion for a century, if ever. Certainly the world’s most rapidly rising power (China) will not. And we have found it like pulling teeth to get our NATO allies to contribute to the supposedly agreeable mission of fighting the tyrannical Taliban in Afghanistan. So the notion that rogue regimes would be more susceptible to external “regime change” without than with nuclear weapons is sheer fantasy. **The notion that local tyrants would commit personal and national suicide by starting a nuclear war is equally absurd.** The Castro brothers, Kim Jong Il, and Robert Mugabe will die peaceably of old age, and their successors will change their policies. **Or their smarter underlings or people will remove them. It is impossible to foresee, let alone predict, that their possession of nuclear weapons would make any difference at all**. The only difference it might make is assuaging their paranoia enough to let them spend less on tools of war and more on their people, if only to improve the chances of their regimes’ survival against mutiny or popular revolt.

#### No miscalculation – cost/benefit analysis

Waltz 95—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate”, p. 45, direct access to original source was not available, ZBurdette)

Third, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation diffi­cult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman Angeil argued that war could not occur because it would not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some countries at the ex­pense of others. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell’s dictum becomes persuasive. When the ac­tive use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One must expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them?

#### ---No risk of Iran Strikes --- 4 reasons.

Shahidi February 8th 2013

M. Jay, business owner and human-rights activist living in Minnetonka. He is cofounder and current president of Iranian-American Society of Minnesota, U.S., Israel, Iran work to build better relationship, http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/190467961.html?refer=y

Finally, a glimmer of hope is shining from the end of the tunnel of distrust, intimidation and threats. After 33 years of wild accusations, hostile attitudes, belligerent posturing, terrorism and war planning, relations between the United States and Israel vs. their nemesis Iran, have, perhaps, reached a turning point. Maybe a catastrophic war of destruction, chaos and misery for millions now can be postponed or even avoided. I have been warning of impending disaster since President George W. Bush called Iran part of the "Axis of Evil" in 2002, followed by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's jumping on the world's political stage in 2004 by wishing to "wipe Israel off the map." In the past three weeks, however, I am beginning to modify my predictions. Here are my reasons for hope: • President Obama's appointment of John Kerry and Chuck Hagel to the most important cabinet posts in the United States is of utmost significance. It heralds a sharp break from the past -- a change of course from the one based on the neoconservative philosophy of world hegemony and military conquest pursued by Bush. It establishes an Obama Doctrine -- a set of plans and policies of engagement, entreaty, inclusion, persuasion and rewards as well as sticks. Kerry and Hagel are the type of visionary personalities who appear more capable of piercing inside the collective psyche of the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A few months ago, Obama stood up to the demand of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had rushed to Washington to persuade the president to begin military strikes against Iranian nuclear and military sites. It was a rare action. Netanyahu could not hide his disappointment and anger. • The sanctions imposed on Iran are biting not only ordinary people but business and professional groups as well. When the merchants of Tehran's Grand Bazaar feel the pinch and complain, the government must pay attention. Therefore, the rulers of Iran are flashing signs of new interest in meeting the West on the issue of nuclear energy and other grievances. Ahmadinejad's second term will come to an end by this summer. Even though he has been only a managerial president with no real power, he has known that by pinching the United States and needling Israel, he would get everyone's attention, including his powerful opponents inside the Islamic Republic who have already begun to sideline him. • A growing number of intelligence and military experts in Israel and United States are calling a military strike on Iran at this time counterproductive. No credible or tangible evidence has been found to demonstrate the existence of a nuclear weapon or weapons program in Iran. The statements by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency reflect only "suspicion" based on distrust and conjecture. • An increasing number of Jewish leaders in Israel and the United States are challenging the assertion that Israel faces an existential threat from Iran. Are the ayatollahs suicidal? • The Arab Spring, resulting in the ascent to power of more independent and less U.S.-friendly governments has become a warning to the United States that its long-term interests lie with the masses, not dictators. • Israel's recent elections weakened Netanyahu somewhat. They also have dampened his motivation to exaggerate the Iranian threat for domestic political purposes. Recent data confirm that most Iranians feel no animosity toward Israel and respect Judaism as a religion. Iranians support the Palestinians in their struggle for a homeland, but they do not wish or expect to dismantle Israel. They are strongly pro-American-culture and much more critical of their own government than of those of the United States and Israel. But, if attacked, they will unite feverishly and unequivocally to defend their land, heritage and honor. That is the reason that Iran, the land of the Aryans, the heart of Persia, founded by Cyrus the Great, has survived as a nation for 2,600 years.

### Warming

#### No impact to warming-most recent data proves the c02 escapes

Taylor 11 (James, is a senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News. “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/>)

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict.

#### **Warming won’t destroy the world---their models are empirically false**

Fuller 10 (Thomas, SF Environmental Policy Examiner, Mar 3, <http://www.climatechangefraud.com/climate-reports/6518-global-warming-is-real-but-effects-have-been-exaggerated-and-we-dont-know-the-future>)

Temperatures have risen 0.7 degrees Celsius over the past century, which is about twice the rate of the previous century. Even if Anthony Watts and Steve McIntyre are absolutely correct about urban heat island effects and paleoclimatic temperature reconstructions, the earth has warmed--and both Watts and McIntyre have said so on their websites repeatedly. This is not really part of the controversy at all. Nor is the reality of the greenhouse effect. Nor is the capability of CO2 contributing to the greenhouse effect. Nor is the reality of human contributions of large amounts of CO2. Almost all skeptics agree with the scientific consensus about this. (It is very convenient for the climate establishment to say they 'deny' this, but the skeptics mostly don't.) What many (not just skeptics) disagree on is the observed effects to date and the future effects as estimated. The Effects Have Been Exaggerated The current warming began around 1880 (give or take a decade) upon the conclusion of the Little Ice Age. The warming has not been even or steady--it accelerates and decelerates for reasons we don't really understand. Those who cry for political action to combat global warming have described some effects of it that they claim have already occurred. In almost every case, their claims have proven to be exaggerated. The 'poster children' for global warming have been polar bears, Himalayan glaciers, African agriculture, increased damage and destruction due to hurricanes and floods, Amazonian rainforests and Arctic ice. Polar bears face an uncertain future. Climate change is just one of many factors that are changing for them. Other factors include human encroachment on their habitat, the response of other wildlife to changes, and most importantly, hunting. Some of the sub-populations of polar bears are decreasing. Some are increasing and some are staying the same. The single most important contribution we could make to helping the population of polar bears increase is to stop shooting them. If we were serious about preserving large numbers of polar bears, we would limit the expansion of human activities throughout their habitat, which would make polar bears less of a threat to people and remove one of the reasons for our killing them. Polar bears have lived through periods of higher temperatures than now, including periods of zero Arctic ice cover. They can swim 200 miles without resting, and Arctic ice loss in and of itself is not a threat to polar bears. Arctic ice comes and goes. We're not sure exactly why, and we're not sure exactly of the cycles that govern its increase and decrease. The most recent decrease was dramatic, but only because it was the first decrease we were able to photograph from satellites. We now know that much of the reason for the 2007 low point of ice cover was that winds and currents pushed Arctic ice out of the Arctic to warmer parts of the Atlantic, where it then melted normally. It has since recovered dramatically. Himalayan glaciers increase and decrease, and always have, just like glaciers all over the world. Claims in the IPCC report that they will disappear by 2035 are flat out wrong. The error was caused because for years the area of Himalayan glaciers were measured in November, when snow cover made them look bigger. When the time of measurement was switched to September, they amazingly looked smaller. Although Indian scientists understood this, the journalists whose comments were hijacked for the IPCC report did not. The Amazonian rain forest can be compared to polar bears. The biggest threat it faces is encroachment of humans on its territory. The Amazon is being torn down for firewood, hardwood furniture and living space. It is being burned for slash and burn agriculture--some of that to grow biofuels to combat global warming. Like all forests, it is vulnerable to drought--being rainforest, it is more vulnerable than some other forests. If global warming produces drought in the Amazon, it will have an impact. However, the computer models that project scenarios of global warming cannot produce sufficient detail to say whether global warming will bring drought to the Amazon. The most that models can say is that overall precipitation worldwide should increase by 5%. Hurricanes and floods cause damage. Loss of life due to them has been reduced by between 95% and 99%, due to better weather predictions, but damage has increased. But none of the increase is attributable to climate change. Rather, a host of papers have shown that all of the increased damages due to hurricanes and floods is easily explained by richer people building more expensive property in areas vulnerable to storms and floods. African agriculture is, like agriculture anywhere, vulnerable to drought--just like the Amazon rainforest. However, a single report examining the possible effects of drought on cereal production on irrigated farms in 3 African countries was taken by the IPCC and reported as the probable future for all agricultural production throughout all the continent. The report was incorrect. African agricultural production is increasing and is expected to increase in the future. The Future Is Not Likely To Be As Desperate As We Are Told The rate of temperature rise has slowed, from about 2 degrees C per century (1975-19998) to about 1.2 degrees C per century (1995-2009). However, the recent slowdown is over too short a period to be statistically significant. Nonetheless, this is quite different from projections of accelerating temperature rises. This is what Phil Jones, director at CRU and a staunch advocate of the global warming establishment, said in an interview last week. Flaws in recent scientific studies have been found which make it distinctly possible that the temperature rises we have experienced are not unique--not even unusual. Keith Briffa, a member of the CRU team and a staunch advocate of the global warming establishment, said that he thought temperatures had been warmer than today 1,000 years ago in an email that was part of the Climategate release of emails and documents. Arctic ice has recovered about 25% of the ice it lost in 2007. Hurricanes are predicted to be less frequent in future--although it is possible that some will be stronger. The Amazon and polar bears both need our help and attention--but the current threats to them are from sources other than climate change, and we can easily make both strong enough to resist climate change if we change our current bad habits of shooting polar bears and burning down forests. Global warming is predicted to provide net benefits to many parts of the world, especially in the first few decades of this century. Generally speaking, cold kills more people than heat (although this is not a straightforward issue), CO2 is often good for many crops (but not all, and it's good for weeds as well), and the natural progress of economic development will strengthen the communities of people who are currently very poor enough that, like the Amazon and the polar bear, they will be better able to resist the effects of climate change after 2050. A generation of politicians supported by a cadre of scientists have consistently exaggerated the extent of the effects of past and projected climate change due to human contributions of CO2. This has distorted the debate, caused enormous expenditures of taxpayers' money on green projects that will have little or no effect on global warming and led to scientific misbehaviour that threatens public confidence in the best way we have for understanding the world around us. The scientists and politicians who have performed this disservice need to be held accountable for this. It has badly distracted us from doing the right things at the right times to take better care of each other and the planet we live on.

## 2NC

### Ov

China expansion solves US nuclear transition---can export technology

Kadak-Prof Nuclear Science, MIT-6

<http://web.mit.edu/pebble-bed/papers1_files/Made%20in%20China.pdf>

Nuclear Power: “Made in China”

Summary China is emerging not only as a super economic power but also as the leader in the deployment and development of new nuclear energy plants. China’s energy needs are enormous, and its path forward in terms of providing sufficient electricity calls for a dramatic expansion of the use of nuclear energy. The Chinese government has determined that, based on its experience and ongoing concern with the environmental consequences of burning coal and other fossil fuels, China needs to aggressively deploy more than 50 plants in the next several decades. Of concern is whether the Chinese can manage this expansion with the quality needed to assure that plants are operated safely, with personnel trained in the proper safety culture. Based on observations to date, 15the Chinese appear to understand the challenges and are addressing them in order to assure the safe operation of the plants. As the United States and other nations have learned, such a task requires vigilance and a dedication to safe operations. With such rapid growth, it has yet to be seen whether or not the safety culture can be transferred to the next generation of operators and engineers. In terms of proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, the choice is one of foreign policy rather than technology. The development of China’s commercial nuclear industry can be done without fear of proliferation of nuclear weapons, provided China does not transfer the weapons sensitive technologies (enrichment and reprocessing) to less-than-trustworthy countries. As in all nations operating nuclear plants and defense facilities, the issue of nuclear waste disposal will be resolved on a country-by-country basis. It is fortunate that China has large areas (such as the Gobi Desert) where waste can be safely disposed of in geological formations. As China aggressively deploys its light water reactors, develops pebble bed reactors for electricity, and processes heat applications, we in the United States are still waiting for our nuclear “renaissance” to occur. It is not inconceivable that as we wait and watch, we may, in the future, be buying reactors “Made in China”

### Turns prolif

China is a better nonprolif leader---

They support it MORE than the US---proven by a laundry list of treaty violations

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Changing the Guard? China and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

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It is noteworthy that China’s commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime continued to deepen despite the negative environment engendered by a number of American policies pursued under President George W. Bush. The American approach to multilateralism during his term in ofﬁce was of great concern to Chinese authorities (Kent, 2008, pp. 65–66). The actions of the United States that were poorly received in China included the American withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (commonly referred to as the ABM Treaty) in 2002, its withdrawal of formal support for the CTBT, and the negotiating of the United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative–Bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 179). These concerns have been reinforced by the American National Missile Defense program, which as well as being widely regarded in China as directed against it, has considerable potential to encourage further horizontal nuclear proliferation (Graham & LaVera, 2002, pp. 240–241). The Chinese government stated in 2008 that this “global missile defense program will . . . have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament” (Zhang, 2010, p. 149). The adoption of a more positive approach to nonproliferation multilateralism under President Obama will help to assuage Chinese concerns, but some aspects of American nonproliferation policy remain questionable from a Chinese perspective. While a number of issues—such as perceived general American efforts to dominate and circumvent multilateral nonproliferation mechanisms, the American emphasis on counter-proliferation, and its missile defense program—had and in some cases still have considerable potential to reinforce established Chinese suspicions of multilateralism, this has not resulted in a reversion to China’s former approach to the nonproliferation regime. Chinese authorities continue to harbor some reservations about the regime where issues of objectivity and the rules of engagement of suspected or conﬁrmed proliferators are concerned, and they send mixed signals on nonproliferation on occasion as a result. China remains a less enthusiastic supporter of the imposition of sanctions on actual or suspected proliferators than many other states, but in a remarkable policy transformation, China emerged as a supporter of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the face of considerable internal threats to its integrity and effectiveness. This demonstrates the importance of multilateral nonproliferation instruments to the Chinese government and the depth of its commitment to this approach.

THE US is unequal in implementation---perceived as neonuclear apartheid making it useless

Kazmi-graduate student at the Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad-8/30/12

Letter from Pakistan: How an unfair non-proliferation regime undermines nuclear security

<http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/letter-pakistan-how-unfair-non-proliferation-regime-undermines-nuclear-security>

In a September 1967 speech, V.C. Trivedi, the Indian Ambassador to an early UN arms control effort known as the Eighteen Nations Committee on Disarmament, said that developing countries could tolerate nuclear weapons apartheid, but not an atomic apartheid that prevented them from attaining the economic progress that civilian nuclear power can bring. Regrettably, today's global nonproliferation architecture is being applied with such selectivity that it can truly be called the neo-nuclear apartheid. That architecture not only works against the peaceful use of nuclear energy in developing countries, it also undermines global nuclear security. The Nuclear Security Summit process -- which in recent years has been a focus of US nuclear proliferation policy -- professes to tackle robust concerns. The Seoul summit held earlier this year, for example, addressed not just nuclear security, but nuclear safety, the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. But the positive elements of the Nuclear Security Summit initiative pale in comparison with the selective application of the nonproliferation regime to states that seek to create a nuclear power industry. The inequity of the nonproliferation regime is illustrated by its disparate treatment of developing countries. India rejected the NPT and tested nuclear weapons -- but still managed to be treated well under the nonproliferation regime, with the Nuclear Suppliers Group granting it a waiver to trade in nuclear materials in 2008. Because it is a signatory of the NPT, Iran has limited access to peaceful nuclear technology through Russia, even though Tehran stands accused of covertly attempting to develop nuclear weapons. And North Korea -- a nuclear-armed state that withdrew from the NPT and threatens its neighbors -- has been offered help with civilian power reactors during negotiations over its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Pakistan -- which has gone to great lengths to support the global nuclear nonproliferation regime -- has been denied membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a decision that greatly hampers Islamabad's efforts to develop a commercial nuclear energy program. Though the NPT is considered the pivot point of the nonproliferation system, the nuclear states outside the treaty are major players in the international security system, and they affect the world's nuclear balance. It will be difficult for the Nuclear Security Summit process and other similar initiatives to gain global acceptance until the nuclear nonproliferation regime is applied with at least a semblance of fairness. If the overall nonproliferation system is to become equitable and therefore effective, it must allow the non-NPT nuclear weapon states to participate in nuclear export-control cartels, so long as they contribute to controlling the proliferation of nuclear materials. Such a policy change would, as a byproduct, create transparency in the nuclear programs of non-NPT states and thereby enhance overall strategic stability. The Pakistan example. Few outside of South Asia are familiar with the tribulations Pakistan has faced as it has attempted to support international nuclear security and grow a nuclear power industry. Despite media and political claims to the contrary, Pakistan has supported the Nuclear Security Summit initiative and encouraged international cooperation and voluntary actions to ensure nuclear security. Furthermore, Pakistan observes nonproliferation norms in their letter and spirit. Islamabad's nuclear security and safety structure rests on four pillars: a robust command and control system under the National Command Authority, a thorough safety and security regulatory regime, a comprehensive system of export control management, and an extensive program of international cooperation. Since the 2010 summit in Washington, Islamabad has taken eight steps to buttress the Nuclear Security Summit initiative: To prevent non-state actors from gaining access to nuclear materials, Islamabad vigorously enforces UN Security Council Resolution 1540 PDF on WMD proliferation. The Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences offers a specialization in nuclear security, while the School of Nuclear Radiation Safety conducts courses in nuclear safety. During the 2010 summit, Pakistan, among other countries, announced that it would host a "center of excellence" -- that is, a collaborative hub where innovative approaches will be developed to strengthen the nuclear security process. In April 2012, Islamabad announced that it has opened a Strategic Plans Division Training Academy, and at the Seoul Summit in March, Pakistan's former Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani offered nuclear security training to the international community. To prevent nuclear terrorism, Pakistan constructively participates in Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism-related events and has helped develop guidelines on nuclear-detection architecture. In a significant development, Pakistan has announced it will add 8,000 highly skilled officials to its team of security professionals, including the creation of a special response force. The first batch of security personnel graduated from the Strategic Plans Division Training Academy in April 2012. This special response force, which supplements an existing SPD security force, has been termed a "qualitative milestone in … rapid response capability" for safeguarding Pakistan's strategic assets. Islamabad and the IAEA conduct joint seminars and workshops on nuclear security. Pakistan supports the spirit of the Proliferation Security Initiative by participating in its exercises as an observer. The United States launched this initiative in 2003 as an effort to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Through its Exports Control Act, Pakistan continues to strengthen UNSC Resolution 1540 via measures that include a recent revision of its national control list to support the global efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To augment its export controls, Pakistan is deploying special nuclear material portals at key border points to deter and detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. Despite this exemplary record, Pakistan's nuclear power industry has faced severe challenges in dealing with the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which, because of Pakistan's limited cooperation with China in nuclear matters, would not grant membership in the cartel. (In this realm, Pakistan started cooperating with China in 1986, before China participated in the NSG.) A refusal to let Pakistan participate in the export control cartels, and especially the NSG, would seriously limit the country's efforts to meet its growing energy needs through nuclear energy. According to Pakistan's Energy Security Plan of 2050, its needs to build nuclear power plants that will produce 8,800 megawatts of electricity within the next two decades. Participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group is essential if Pakistan is to be able to acquire the equipment and expertise needed to build the nuclear plants that will fill this power gap. India -- which, like Pakistan, has not signed the NPT -- was given an exemption by the NSG, and it has been able to advance its civilian nuclear power industry, relieving pressure on its challenged electric utility system and cementing strategic and economic partnerships with other countries. This differential treatment of India and Pakistan under the international nonproliferation regime is simply unfair. Equity means security. The legacy of the Seoul Summit is a determination among state participants that their commitments toward nuclear security will remain "voluntary" until the states find the world nonproliferation regime equitable. The glaring inequities of the nonproliferation regime keep countries like Pakistan from meeting their energy needs and, thereby, harm their overall development. The unfairness of the nonproliferation regime is also keeping the world community from coming together around a common set of verifiable nuclear security standards. The sooner the nuclear nonproliferation regime ends its neo-nuclear apartheid policies and puts all countries on an equal footing, the more stabilizing the nonproliferation regime will become, and the safer the world will be.

AND only china can influence the ASIAN market

Lieggi-Monterey Institute’s Center for Non­proliferation Studies-10

From Proliferator to Model Citizen? Strategic Studies Quarterly

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/summer/lieggi.pdf>

The extent to which China assisted weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs in countries like Pakistan and Iran has been well documented. Part of China’s past behavior stemmed from a fundamental disagreement with the Cold War structure of the nonproliferation regime; this ambivalence towards nonproliferation led China to undertake politically motivated proliferation activities that meshed with Beijing’s foreign policy needs at the time. In later years, particularly after China’s economy began to open in the 1980s, economic motivations also pushed Chinese entities to transfer WMD–related technologies abroad with little consideration for the ramiications on the nonproliferation regime. As China’s view of the international community (and its own place in it) changed, so too did its policy towards the proliferation of WMD. Much of this change was brought about by a mixture of factors touching on various issues facing Beijing, such as national security interests, economic stability, and international prestige. The factors that most affected China’s actions included signiicant international (particularly US) pressure placed on Beijing in the 1990s to adopt stronger nonproliferation policies, Beijing’s growing recognition that proliferation of WMD was detrimental to its own security interests, and concern within the Chinese leadership about the impact of China-based proliferation on Beijing’s acceptance as a responsible member of the world community. One of the areas within the nonproliferation regime where China has most notably changed in recent years is the field of nonproliferation related trade controls, particularly export controls. 1 In the 1980s and 1990s, China had very little in the way of controls on military-related trade; however, this began to change by the late 1990s. Between 1998 and 2002, China worked to revamp its export control system. Over the course of a few months in 2002, it promulgated a comprehensive set of export control measures for sensitive items related to WMD and other military programs. Most analysts agree that China’s system has improved since the comprehensive rules were adopted and that the system, at least on paper, is in line with international supplier regime standards. 2 Despite the legislative improvements, sales of sensitive dual-use items by Chinese companies to proliferating countries continued to concern the international community and the United States in particular. Many of the problems in the system are caused by insufficient Chinese capacity to enforce its controls. The weakest link in the Chinese export control system, as with many developing systems, is in its ability (and, some would say, political will) to enforce the restrictions that have been laid out in its legis­ lation. his area of China’s export control system has not traditionally been transparent, a fact that has added to uncertainties about Beijing’s will with regards to nonproliferation-related trade control enforcement. Beijing has been hesitant to discuss violation cases publicly, leaving many questions unanswered about its enforcement activities. Beijing has, however, made a few public announcements about export control violations since its system was revamped in 2002. hree such an­ nouncements made between 2006 and 2008 shed some light on the inner workings of China’s export control enforcement, as well as on the chal­ lenges facing it. Each of these three cases is reviewed to assess the status of China’s current enforcement capabilities. The three companies—Zibo CHEMET Equipment Company, Shanghai Smart Chemicals, Ltd., and Jilin Tumen Chemical Light Manufacturing Company—were punished for chemical-related exports, likely to Iran and North Korea. Additionally, a more recent case involving a seized shipment of dual-use materials at a border crossing with North Korea appears to show some improvements in China’s risk assessment and contraband interdiction abilities. his case is also examined. As the case studies show, China is slowly getting over the hurdles of establishing a viable export control system. Its progress in this field can be seen as a model for other countries—particularly those in Asia who face some of the same circumstances and challenges China had in the past decade. At the moment, while Beijing moves closer—however slowly—to international standards in the area of nonproliferation, many countries in Asia have yet to even begin the process of strengthening their systems. The lack of capacity in many Asian countries has had negative implications on the nonproliferation regime. The A. Q. Khan and other proliferation networks have exempliied how Asian nations with weak nonproliferation related controls can become key transshipment points for proliferators, or, as in the case of Malaysia and the Khan network, manufacturing hubs. Therefore, key areas will be identified so other Asian countries might learn from China’s experience while building their own strategic trade control frameworks. In this way, China’s system may prove to be an example for other countries in the region to selectively emulate when strengthening their own export control systems.

#### The turn is bigger than their solvency---Asia is a key hub for proliferation-related exports

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<http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/summer/lieggi.pdf>

Similar to China’s pre-2002 export controls, many countries in South­east Asia have systems that are weak and undefined. 54 Until recently, nonproliferation-related trade controls have not been a significant priority for these countries. 55 Similar to Beijing’s earlier views, countries in the region believe export controls strengthen the supplier country’s economies while denying the developing world much-needed technology for economic development. States in the region have also argued that their lack of domestic WMD-relevant programs means that they cannot produce items sensitive enough to justify creating stringent trade control systems. However, the changing state of the world economy and global security is making the establishment of sufficient controls throughout Asia a growing priority. 56 Revelations about Southeast Asian connections in known illicit WMD trafficking networks, both as production nodes and as transshipment points, have highlighted the importance of creating viable nonproliferation-related trade controls in the region. For example, as part of the A. Q. Khan network’s efforts to supply Libya with a nuclear weapons program, a production node was established in Malaysia. The Malaysian owners of the facilities and their workers thought that the contract they were selling was for equipment related to the oil and gas industry; however, under the direction of a number of Khan’s associates, the items being produced were actually centrifuge components. 57 As technological capabilities within the region—particularly within Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states—expand, so too does their capacity to be a source of sensitive dual use equipment. Possibly even more urgent than controls on exports is the strengthening in the region of controls on transshipment and transiting cargo. ASEAN countries have some of the largest ports in the world, and many have been used as transshipment hubs for WMD-related trafficking. 58 Asian complacency on nonproliferation-related trade controls has been challenged by the changing nature of international security. The issue of nonstate actors and their ability to gain access to WMD-related materials has been an increasing fear, and a number of international mechanisms have been established to cope with this threat to global security. One such mechanism is UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), which was adopted in 2004 and is binding on all UN member states. This resolution mandates all states to “establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate efective national export and transshipment controls over” WMD and related dual-use items. 59 Southeast Asian nations have been somewhat suspicious of UNSCR 1540, seeing it as an unfunded mandate forced upon them by the supplier states. 60 However, as part of the resolution, states are encouraged to assist others with creating systems that can comply with the resolution. The United States and Japan have been particularly active with 1540-related training in Southeast Asia, which has helped wear down some of the resistance in the region to this resolution.

### 2nc t/warming

#### Chinese emissions are sufficient to cause extinction---makes this an external impact

John Copeland Nagle 11, the John N. Matthews Professor, Notre Dame Law School, Spring 2011, “How Much Should China Pollute?,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 12 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 591

Third, the rest of the world suffers because of the inability of China and the United States to agree on a method for reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Even if the rest of the world were to reach such an agreement, the failure to include China and the United States would doom the project from the start. Together, China and the United States account for forty-one percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions. [FN19] Left unchecked, China's emissions alone could result in many of the harms associated with climate change. [FN20] That is why many observers believe that “[t]he decisions taken in Beijing, more than anywhere else, [will] determine whether humanity thrive[s] or perishe[s].”

Turn-Compulsory licensing

A. China pushes compulsory licensing for clean technology-the US is against

Financial Times 11/23/09

China, India push for 'patent free' green tech

<http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/china-india-push-patent-free-gre-news-223054>

As world leaders prepare for climate talks in Copenhagen next month, developing nations have tabled a controversial proposal which would effectively end patent protection for clean technologies. China and India have floated the idea of making new green technology subject to 'compulsory licensing', which critics say amounts to waiving intellectual property rights. The idea of adapting or liberalising patent rules for crucial new inventions which can help reduce carbon emissions is not new, but the EU and US are unhappy with compulsory licensing, fearing it would dramatically reduce the incentive for businesses to innovate and stifle green job creation. Compulsory licensing has to date only been used in emergency situations where patent-protected pharmaceuticals were seen as prohibitively expensive. The Thai government used the mechanism to allow local medicines factories produce HIV drugs at a fraction of the cost. Now, the group of 77 developing nations, led de facto by China, wants to apply the same logic to the climate crisis.

B. Turns the case-key to global dissemination of clean technology

Caprotti-assistant professor in human geography at University College-7/30/09

<http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/intellectual_property_who_owns_green_tech/>

CATALYST / BY VERONIQUE GREENWOOD /FIVE EXPERTS DISCUSS HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CAN BE ADAPTED TO SPREAD GREEN TECH, WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM PASTEUR, AND HOW TO INSPIRE

The rationale behind patenting technology is clear: Patents and IP rights protect a corporation responsible for innovation, allowing it to invest in R&D without fearing that another company will steal its innovation and bring it to market without bearing any of the development costs. Proponents of “green and clean IP” rightly point to the fact that more than 70 percent of global R&D in green tech is spent by private companies that want to protect their investments. That is why, for example, Toyota has patented more than 1,000 systems and components on its third-generation Prius hybrid car. The situation is clear when all we’re talking about is a car. Or a hybrid engine. Or the gearing components of a wind turbine. However, it is far less clear when the issue is about climate change and sustainability, not about specific components, technologies, and firms. The pressing issue of climate change forces us to start thinking past our own borders and past the narrow concerns of individual companies. In short, we have to start thinking past the private good in order to achieve the public good. It may be worthwhile to think of some of the greatest technological breakthroughs which have benefited humanity—and which happened without the benefits of patenting and IP. When Louis Pasteur developed the first vaccine against rabies—a disease which still kills upwards of 50,000 people a year—he did not patent his discovery, nor work for profit, but disseminated his knowledge for the public good. Indeed, in the case of the environment, rarely has the market unequivocally “worked” in eliminating the negative impacts—or “externalities”—of fossil fuel use, pollution, and environmental inequalities. It would be naive to suggest that all green technologies should be free. However, a recent high-profile report by University College London suggests that climate change is the biggest threat to global health in the 21st century. Developing a broader green IP framework is therefore crucial to the success of international climate treaties and emissions reductions standards. It is also crucial for developing countries, which are set to bear the brunt of the projected increased incidence and spread of diseases, extreme weather events, and warming. One promising avenue is the establishment of an international licensing mechanism focused on green tech and clean tech. This would enable companies and governments in the developing world to use established technologies for a fee, while protecting innovator firms. This already happens in the case of various technologies, from engine components to airliners. However, if the common good and the issue of climate change are to be kept in mind, the licensing of green tech needs to include a fee mechanism. This will enable economies at different stages of development—such as the US, China, and Bangladesh—to afford to use the same licensed technologies to promote sustainability and cleaner production. Ideally, this fee mechanism should account for the fact that several green technologies—from wind turbines to solar film—are manufactured in developing countries, taking advantage of low labor costs and incentives derived from those governments that the Green IP lobby is active in criticizing. At the same time, the new “green licensing” scheme should focus on established, not cutting-edge or proof-of-concept technologies. This is because it is crucial for countries to start reducing emissions now—not in 20 years. Parallel to this, international agreements should increasingly encourage the joint development of green tech by firms from developed and developing economies. Examples of this already exist: Vestas, the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer, sources 90 percent of the components for its new turbine from Chinese companies (see pdf). In turn, the turbine is manufactured in China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region so that it can easily reach the Chinese market. A licensing mechanism which allows for the spread of established green tech today will help developing countries to act on national environmental strategies, while allowing for the protection of innovators and investors in advanced economies.

### Coal da

#### U.S. coal exports to China are low, but downward pressure on domestic demand expands them massively

Bryan Walsh 12, Senior Editor at TIME, May 31, 2012, “Drawing Battle Lines Over American Coal Exports to Asia,” online: http://science.time.com/2012/05/31/drawing-battle-lines-over-american-coal-exports-to-asia/

But across the Pacific Ocean, the demand for coal has never been hotter, with China burning 4.1 billion tons in 2010 alone, far more than any other country in the world. That insatiable demand forced China in 2009 to become a net coal importer for the first time, in part because congested rail infrastructure raised the cost of transporting coal from the mines of the country’s northwest to its booming southern cities. In April, Chinese coal imports nearly doubled from a year earlier. Right now Australia and Indonesia supply much of China’s foreign coal. U.S. coal from the Powder River Basin could be a perfect addition to the Chinese market. Montana and Wyoming are just short train trips to ports on the Pacific Northwest coast, and from there it’s a container ship away from Asian megacities where coal doesn’t have to compete with cheap natural gas and air-pollution regulations are far weaker than in the U.S. To a wounded Big Coal, China is a potential savior.¶ As I write in the new edition of TIME, there’s just one problem: right now, ports on the West Coast lack the infrastructure needed to transfer coal from railcars into container ships. (Just 7 million of the 107 million tons of U.S.-exported coal left the country via Pacific Ocean ports last year.) That’s why coal companies like Peabody and Ambre Energy are ready to spend millions to build coal-export facilities at a handful of ports in Washington and Oregon. If all those plans go forward, as much as 150 million tons of coal could be exported from the Northwest annually—-nearly all of it coming from the Powder -River -Basin and headed to Asia. Even if the U.S. kept burning less and less coal at home, it would have a reason to keep mining it.

#### IFRs cause coal plant retiring

Kirsch 11/25/09

Why We Should Build an Integral Fast Reactor Now

http://skirsch.wordpress.com/

The only technology we have with a realistic potential to save the planet. Eliminating carbon emissions from coal plants worldwide is required to prevent a climate catastrophe. But using carbon capture adds cost and may not be practical or viable. The IFR, on the other hand, can replace the burner in an existing coal plant while reducing operating costs. So countries will actually want to eliminate their carbon emissions because they’ll save money. This is why the IFR is one of Jim Hansen’s top five priorities for saving the planet: because the IFR is the only viable solution we know of today can eliminate CO2 emissions from coal plants without increasing energy costs.

#### U.S. exports lock in expanded Chinese coal capacity---causes warming over the tipping point---it’s unique because absent U.S. exports the rising cost of coal will cause a shift to clean energy

Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,” <http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf>

The cumulative impact of these coal port proposals on coal consumption in Asia could be much larger than even that implied by the two pending proposals. If Arch, Peabody, and other western U.S. coal producers’ projections of the competitiveness of western coal in Asia are correct, facilitating the opening of the development of West Coast coal ports could have a very large impact on the supply of coal to China and the rest of Asia.

6.4 The Long-term Implications of Fueling Additional Coal-Fired Electric Generation

Although the economic life of coal-fired generators is often given as 30 or 35 years, a permitted, operating, electric generator is kept on line a lot longer than that, as long as 50 or more years through ongoing renovations and upgrades. Because of that long operating life, the impact of the lower Asian coal prices and costs triggered by PRB coal competing with other coal sources cannot be measured by the number of tons of coal exported each year. Those lower coal costs will lead to commitments to more coal being burned for a half-century going forward.

That time-frame is very important. During exactly this time frame, the next half-century, the nations of the world will have to get their greenhouse gas emission stabilized and then reduced or the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may pass a point that will make it very difficult to avoid massive, ongoing, negative climate impacts. Taking actions now that encourage fifty-years of more coal consumption around the world is not a minor matter. Put more positively, allowing coal prices to rise (and more closely approximate their full cost, including “external” costs) will encourage extensive investments in improving the efficiency with which coal is used and the shift to cleaner sources of energy. This will lead to long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will also last well into the next half-century. 57

#### Increasing demand for Chinese coal production causes water shortages which threaten economic collapse and political instability.

Schneider 11 (Keith, senior editor for Circle of Blue-a nonprofit focusing on resource shortages founded in 2000, Choke Point: China—Confronting Water Scarcity and Energy Demand in the World’s Largest Country, Feb 15, http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2011/world/choke-point-china%E2%80%94confronting-water-scarcity-and-energy-demand-in-the-world%E2%80%99s-largest-country/)

By any measure, conventional and otherwise, China’s tireless advance to international economic prominence has been nothing less than astonishing. Over the last decade alone, 70 million new jobs emerged from an economy that this year, according to the World Bank and other authorities, generated the world’s largest markets for cars, steel, cement, glass, housing, energy, power plants, wind turbines, solar panels, highways, high-speed rail systems, airports, and other basic supplies and civic equipment to support a modern economy. Yet, like a tectonic fault line, underlying China’s new standing in the world is an increasingly fierce competition between energy and water that threatens to upend China’s progress. Simply put, according to Chinese authorities and government reports, China’s demand for energy, particularly for coal, is outpacing its freshwater supply. Students of Chinese history and geography, of course, understand that tight supplies of fresh water are nothing new in a nation where 80 percent of the rainfall and snowmelt occurs in the south, while just 20 percent of the moisture occurs in the mostly desert regions of the north and west. What’s new is that China’s surging economic growth is prompting the expanding industrial sector, which consumes 70 percent of the nation’s energy, to call on the government to tap new energy supplies, particularly the enormous reserves of coal in the dry north. The problem, say government officials, is that there is not enough water to mine, process, and consume those reserves, and still develop the modern cities and manufacturing centers that China envisions for the region. “Water shortage is the most important challenge to China right now, the biggest problem for future growth,” said Wang Yahua, deputy director of the Center for China Study at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “It’s a puzzle that the country has to solve.” The consequences of diminishing water reserves and rising energy demand have been a special focus of Circle of Blue’s attention for more than a year. In 2010, in our Choke Point: U.S. series, Circle of Blue found that rising energy demand and diminishing freshwater reserves are two trends moving in opposing direction across America. Moreover, the speed and force of the confrontation is occurring in the places where growth is highest and water resources are under the most stress—California, the Southwest, the Rocky Mountain West, and the Southeast. Modernization vs. Water Resources In December, we expanded our reporting to China. Circle of Blue—in collaboration with the China Environment Forum (CEF) at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars—dispatched four teams of researchers and photographers to 10 Chinese provinces. Their assignment: to report on how the world’s largest nation and second-largest economy is achieving its swift modernization, despite scarce and declining reserves of clean fresh water. In essence, Circle of Blue and CEF completed a national tour of the extensive water circulatory system and vast energy production musculature that makes China go. The result of our reporting is Choke Point: China. In a dozen chapters—starting today and posted weekly online through April—Choke Point: China will report in text, photographs, and interactive graphics the powerful evidence of a potentially ruinous confrontation between growth, water, and fuel that is already visible across China and is virtually certain to grow more dire over the next decade. Choke Point: China, though, is not a narrative of doom. Rather, our journalists and photographers found a powerful narrative in two parts and never before told. The first important finding—left largely unsaid in and outside China—is how effectively the national and provincial governments enacted and enforced a range of water conservation and efficiency measures. Circle of Blue met the engineers, plant managers, and workers who operate China’s robust and often state-of-the-art energy and water installations. We interviewed the academics and government executives who oversee the globally significant water conservation policies and practices that have been essential to China’s new prosperity. Those policies, we found, sharply reduced waste, shifted water from agriculture to industry, and slowed the growth in national water consumption. Though China’s economy has grown almost eight-fold since the mid-1990s, water consumption has increased 15 percent, or 1 percent annually. China’s major cities, including Beijing, are retrofitting their sewage treatment systems to recycle wastewater for use in washing clothes, flushing toilets, and other grey-water applications. Here in Baotou, a desert city of 1.5 million in Inner Mongolia, the giant Baotou Iron and Steel Company plant, one of the world’s largest, produces 10 million metric tons of steel annually in a region that receives mere inches of rainfall a year. The plant—which is 49 square kilometers and employs 50,000 workers—recycles 98 percent of its water, a requirement of a 1997 law that prompted owners of industrial plants to conserve water. Three Trends Converging We also discovered a second vital narrative that most industrial executives and government authorities we interviewed were either not fully aware of or were reluctant to acknowledge: the tightening choke point between rising energy demand and declining freshwater reserves that forms the central story line of the next era of China’s unfolding development. Stripped to its essence, China’s globally significant choke point is caused by three converging trends:Production of coal has tripled since 2000 to 3.15 billion metric tons a year. Government analysts project that China’s energy companies will need to produce an additional billion metric tons of coal annually by 2020, representing a 30 percent increase. Fresh water needed for mining, processing, and consuming coal accounts for the largest share of industrial water use in China, or roughly 120 billion cubic meters a year, a fifth of all the water consumed nationally. Though national conservation policies have helped to limit increases, water consumption nevertheless has climbed to a record 599 billion cubic meters annually, which is 50 billion cubic meters (13 trillion gallons) more than in 2000. Over the next decade, according to government projections, China’s water consumption, driven in large part by increasing coal-fired power production, may reach 670 billion cubic meters annually — 71 billion cubic meters a year more than today. China’s total water resource, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, has dropped 13 percent since the start of the century. In other words China’s water supply is 350 billion cubic meters (93 trillion gallons) less than it was at the start of the century. That’s as much water lost to China each year as flows through the mouth of the Mississippi River in nine months. Chinese climatologists and hydrologists attribute much of the drop to climate change, which is disrupting patterns of rain and snowfall. “It’s just impossible, if you haven’t lived it or experienced it, to understand change in China over the past 25 years, and especially since 1992,” said Kang Wu, a senior fellow and China energy scholar at East-West Center in Hawaii. “It’s a new world. It’s a new country. The worry in China and in the rest of the world is can they sustain it? They want to double the size of the economy again in 10 years. How can they do that? It’s a paradox from an economic point of view. They need a resource balance to meet demand, short-term and long-term. If you look out 10, 20, 30 years, it just looks like it’s not possible.” Rapid GDP Growth Will Continue In interviews, national and provincial government leaders, as well as energy industry executives, said China has every intention of continuing its 10 percent annual economic growth. “We believe that this is possible and we can do this with new technology, new ways to use water and energy,” said Xiangkun Ren, who oversees the coal-to-liquids program for Shenhua Group, the largest coal company in the world. Xiangkun acknowledged that avoiding the looming choke point will not be easy. The tightening loop is already visible in the jammed rail lines, huge coal truck traffic jams, and buckling roads that Circle of Blue encountered in Inner Mongolia—the country’s largest coal producer—and which are responsible for transporting billions of tons of coal from existing mines to market. Energy prices are steadily rising, putting new inflationary pressure on the economy. Even as China has launched enormous new programs of solar, wind, hydro, and seawater-cooled nuclear power, all of which use much less fresh water, energy market conditions will get worse without new supplies of coal, the source of 70 percent of the nation’s energy. China’s economy and the new social contract with its citizens, who have come to expect rising incomes and improving opportunities, is at risk, say some authorities.

#### Chinese economic collapse causes Asian and Middle East conflict- China will turn outwardly aggressive.

Newmeyer 09 DR. JACQUELINE NEWMYER - LONG TERM STRATEGY GROUP- THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY “ECONOMIC CRISIS: IMPACT ON CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION” APRIL 8, 2009, http://cnponline.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/12503

 So I think either way, either because of the insecurity that is stoked by what’s happening inside China and perceptions about economic slowdown, and/or because of demonization issues and popular discourse, I think that there’s a real chance that the Chinese leadership could feel compelled, for reasons of state security, to take actions that appear more belligerent abroad. And that could have effects leading up to possibly even military conflict or the use of military force against outside actors in addition to whatever force is used inside China to maintain stability. So I think that would be a real, kind of operational test for the PLA, a modernized force now. So, in conclusion, what struck me in thinking about and preparing for this presentation was there was less divergence between the sort of steady state and the more dramatic impact of the economic downturn scenarios than I expected. Either way, I think there is a chance, or a likelihood, of increased friction between China and other external countries, particular countries, that would affected in the case of increased arm transfers, actors in the Middle East would be affected, possibly also the U.S., and in the case of more serious concern about internal unrest in China, I think China’s relations with the West, and with India, or with Japan would be implicated there. So I think contrary to our hopes which would be that the downturn would have the effect of causing China to turn inwards and reduce the chances for any kind of external problem, I think, in fact, there’s reason to think, and to worry, that the downturn would lead to a greater chance of conflict abroad for China.

#### And, pollution from coal causes environmental protests that threaten CCP rule.

LeVine 12 (Steve, author of The Oil and the Glory, Foreign Policy contributor, CHINA The Cost of Coal , The Weekly Wrap -- Aug. 3, 2012, <http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/03/the_weekly_wrap_aug_3_2012_part_i>)

China's moment of coal truth: A question that has vexed us for some time is when we will witness an inflection point in ordinary Chinese tolerance for the coal-borne pollution in their air. At that time, we have argued, we will likely also see a sharp turn away from coal consumption, and more use of cleaner natural gas -- Communist Party leaders will see to it for reasons of political survival. With this shift will come important knock-on events, including a materially smaller increase in projected global CO2 emissions. According to Bernstein Research, that tipping point may now be past. In a note to clients yesterday, Michael W. Parker and Alex Leung argue that the moment of truth became apparent to them in two pollution protests over the last month in the cities of Shifang and Qidong. In the former, violent July protests resulted in the scrapping of a planned metals plant; in the latter last week, the ax fell on a waste pipeline connected to a paper mill, again because of an agitated local citizenry. Their paper's title -- Who Are You Going to Believe: Me or Your Smog-Irritated, Burning, Weeping, Lying Eyes? -- is a reference to what the authors regard as a general outside blindness to a conspicuous new political day. One reason no one is noticing, they say, is the curse of history itself. The record of surging economies -- comparing China with, say Japan -- suggests that a burning aspiration for cleaner surroundings over economic betterment should reach critical mass in China only in about a decade. Yet, "the clear signal from Shifang and Qidong is that China has reached the point today, where the population is ready to take to the streets in protest of worsening environmental conditions," the two researchers write. They go on: Since we all agree that the Chinese government is focused on social harmony, the practical implication is that the government will do whatever is required to ensure that people aren't in the streets protesting not just food prices or lack of jobs, but also the environment. Few observers seem to classify the environment as the kind of issue that could excite the Chinese population into the street or the kind of issue that could result in changing political decision making and economic outcomes. And yet that is exactly what we are seeing.

#### Those pollution protests causes Chinese instability and CCP lashout

Nankivell 05 (Nathan, Senior Researcher @ Office of the Special Advisor Policy, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, Canadian Department of National Defence, China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and Regional Stability, China Brief Vol: 5 Issue: 22, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=3904&tx\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=195&no\_cache=1)

As the impact of pollution on human health becomes more obvious and widespread, it is leading to greater political mobilization and social unrest from those citizens who suffer the most. The latest statement from the October 2005 Central Committee meeting in Shanghai illustrates Beijing’s increasing concern regarding the correlation between unrest and pollution issues. There were more than 74,000 incidents of protest and unrest recorded in China in 2004, up from 58,000 the year before (Asia Times, November 16, 2004). While there are no clear statistics linking this number of protests, riots, and unrest specifically to pollution issues, the fact that pollution was one of four social problems linked to disharmony by the Central Committee implies that there is at least the perception of a strong correlation. For the CCP and neighboring states, social unrest must be viewed as a primary security concern for three reasons: it is creating greater political mobilization, it threatens to forge linkages with democracy movements, and demonstrations are proving more difficult to contain. These three factors have the potential to challenge the CCP’s total political control, thus potentially destabilizing a state with a huge military arsenal and a history of violent, internal conflict that cannot be downplayed or ignored. Protests are uniting a variety of actors throughout local communities. Pollution issues are indiscriminate. The effects, though not equally felt by each person within a community, impact rich and poor, farmers and businessmen, families and individuals alike. As local communities respond to pollution issues through united opposition, it is leaving Beijing with no easy target upon which to blame unrest, and no simple option for how to quell whole communities with a common grievance. Moreover, protests serve as a venue for the politically disaffected who are unhappy with the current state of governance, and may be open to considering alternative forms of political rule. Environmental experts like Elizabeth Economy note that protests afford an opportunity for the environmental movement to forge linkages with democracy advocates. She notes in her book, The River Runs Black, that several environmentalists argue that change is only possible through greater democratization and notes that the environmental and democracy movements united in Eastern Europe prior to the end of the Cold War. It is conceivable that in this way, environmentally-motivated protests might help to spread democracy and undermine CCP rule. A further key challenge is trying to contain protests once they begin. The steady introduction of new media like cell phones, email, and text messaging are preventing China’s authorities from silencing and hiding unrest. Moreover, the ability to send and receive information ensures that domestic and international observers will be made aware of unrest, making it far more difficult for local authorities to employ state-sanctioned force. The security ramifications of greater social unrest cannot be overlooked. Linkages between environmental and democracy advocates potentially challenge the Party’s monolithic control of power. In the past, similar challenges by Falun Gong and the Tiananmen protestors have been met by force and detainment. In an extreme situation, such as national water shortages, social unrest could generate widespread, coordinated action and political mobilization that would serve as a midwife to anti-CCP political challenges, create divisions within the Party over how to deal with the environment, or lead to a massive show of force. Any of these outcomes would mark an erosion or alteration to the CCP’s current power dynamic. And while many would treat political change in China, especially the implosion of the Party, as a welcome development, it must be noted that any slippage of the Party’s dominance would most likely be accompanied by a period of transitional violence. Though most violence would be directed toward dissident Chinese, a ripple effect would be felt in neighboring states through immigration, impediments to trade, and an increased military presence along the Chinese border. All of these situations would alter security assumptions in the region.

#### This causes the CCP to launch WMDs and kill billions to try to hold onto power

Renxin 05 Renxin, Journalist, 8-3-2K5 (San, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death,” Epoch Times, www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives. As the CCP is known to be a clique with a closed system, it is extraordinary for it to reveal its top secret on its own. One might ask: what is the CCP’s purpose to make public its gambling plan on its deathbed? The answer is: the “speech” would have the effect of killing three birds with one stone. Its intentions are the following: Expressing the CCP’s resolve that it “not be buried by either heaven or earth” (direct quote from the “speech”). But then, isn’t the CCP opposed to the universe if it claims not to be buried by heaven and earth? Feeling the urgent need to harden its image as a soft egg in the face of the Nine Commentaries. Preparing publicity for its final battle with mankind by threatening war and trumpeting violence. So, strictly speaking, what the CCP has leaked out is more of an attempt to clutch at straws to save its life rather than to launch a trial balloon. Of course, the way the “speech” was presented had been carefully prepared. It did not have a usual opening or ending, and the audience, time, place, and background related to the “speech” were all kept unidentified. One may speculate or imagine as one may, but never verify. The aim was obviously to create a mysterious setting. In short, the “speech” came out as something one finds difficult to tell whether it is false or true.

#### And, Chinese pollution causes nuclear war with Russia

Nankivell 05 (Nathan, Senior Researcher @ Office of the Special Advisor Policy, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, Canadian Department of National Defence, China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and Regional Stability, China Brief Vol: 5 Issue: 22, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=3904&tx\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=195&no\_cache=1)

In addition to the concerns already mentioned, pollution, if linked to a specific issue like water shortage, could have important geopolitical ramifications. China’s northern plains, home to hundreds of millions, face acute water shortages. Growing demand, a decade of drought, inefficient delivery methods, and increasing water pollution have reduced per capita water holdings to critical levels. Although Beijing hopes to relieve some of the pressures via the North-South Water Diversion project, it requires tens of billions of dollars and its completion is, at best, still several years away and, at worst, impossible. Yet just to the north lies one of the most under-populated areas in Asia, the Russian Far East. While there is little agreement among scholars about whether resource shortages lead to greater cooperation or conflict, either scenario encompasses security considerations. Russian politicians already allege possible Chinese territorial designs on the region. They note Russia’s falling population in the Far East, currently estimated at some 6 to 7 million, and argue that the growing Chinese population along the border, more than 80 million, may soon take over. While these concerns smack of inflated nationalism and scare tactics, there could be some truth to them. The method by which China might annex the territory can only be speculated upon, but would surely result in full-scale war between two powerful, nuclear-equipped nations.

### brook

China has aggressive fast breeder program---successful transition key to survival

Brook-Brave New Climate-11

Summary of China’s fast reactor programme

<http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/11/27/china-fr-summary/>

China is looking seriously at a range of nuclear options. From the commercial side of things, the country is building over 25 light water reactors, including four of the new US-designed AP1000. The Chinese are also pursuing a range of advanced reactor programmes, including gas-cooled pebble-bed modular reactors (the 210 MWe HTR-PM), a thorium-focused research initiative based on the molten-salt reactor, and an ambitious fast spectrum reactor research, demonstration and deployment (RD&D) plan. It is the latter that I wish to discuss here. Some of you would already know that the Chinese are in the late stages of planning the construction of two Russian-designed BN-800 sodium-cooled fast reactors, to be located at a site on China’s east coast. These are scaled-up (880 MWe) versions of the BN-600, which has run successfully in Russia for a number of decades. There is also the Chinese Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR), a 25 MWe demonstration unit near Beijing. Before I get to the main point of this post, it is worth reproducing this WNA summary of the current Chinese builds: In China, R&D on fast neutron reactors started in 1964. A 65 MWt fast neutron reactor – the Chinese Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR) – was designed by 2003 and built near Beijing by Russia’s OKBM Afrikantov in collaboration with OKB Gidropress, NIKIET and Kurchatov Institute. It achieved first criticality in July 2010, can generate 20 MWe and was grid connected in July 2011 at 40% of power, to ramp up to 20 MWe by December. Core height is 45 cm, and it has 150 kg Pu (98 kg Pu-239). Temperature reactivity and power reactivity are both negative. A 1000 MWe Chinese prototype fast reactor (CDFR) based on CEFR is envisaged with construction start in 2017 and commissioning as the next step in CIAE’s program. This will be a 3-loop 2500 MWt pool-type, use MOX fuel with average 66 GWd/t burn-up, run at 544°C, have breeding ratio 1.2, with 316 core fuel assemblies and 255 blanket ones, and a 40-year life. This is CIAE’s “project one” CDFR. It will have active and passive shutdown systems and passive decay heat removal. This may be developed into a CCFR of about the same size by 2030, using MOX + actinide or metal + actinide fuel. MOX is seen only as an interim fuel, the target arrangement is metal fuel in closed cycle. However, in October 2009 an agreement was signed with Russia’s Atomstroyexport to start pre-project and design works for a commercial nuclear power plant with two BN-800 reactors in China, referred to by CIAE as ‘project 2′ Chinese Demonstration Fast Reactors (CDFR) – in China, with construction to start in 2013 and commissioning 2018-19. These would be similar to the OKBM Afrikantov design being built at Beloyarsk 4 and due to start up in 2012. In contrast to the intention in Russia, these will use ceramic MOX fuel pellets. The project is expected to lead to bilateral cooperation of fuel cycles for fast reactors. The CIAE’s CDFR 1000 is to be followed by a 1200 MWe CDFBR by about 2028, conforming to Gen IV criteria. This will have U-Pu-Zr fuel with 120 GWd/t burn-up and breeding ratio of 1.5, or less with minor actinide and long-lived fission product recycle. CIAE projections show fast reactors progressively increasing from 2020 to at least 200 GWe by 2050, and 1400 GWe by 2100. For those with an engineering bent, further technical papers on this programme are available here, a timeline of the CEFR is here, and a short tabular summary here. Although both the BN-800 and CEFR are oxide-fueled designs, sources tell me that the Chinese are interested in metal fuel (a U-Pu-Zr ternary alloy) and pyroprocessing by the time they reach commercial fast reactors. CEFR actually uses uranium oxide (fabricated in Russia) since they do not have the MOX (mixed Pu-U oxide fuel) capability. My sources tell me that they cannot use metal fuel yet since they do not have the technology, nor fabrication facility. However, they are planning to develop the metal fuel capability and hopefully apply to CDFR. The plan is to start with MOX and then gradually switch to metal core and also to pyroprocessing for fuel recycling. Xu Mi So, what of the detail behind China’s future plans? In my opinion, the best summary is a 43-slide presentation given by Xu Mi (Chief Engineer, China Institute of Atomic Energy), entitled “Fast Reactor Technology Development for Sustainable Supply of Nuclear Energy in China“, delivered at the China International Nuclear Symposium, November 23-25, 2010, Beijing. (Note: there is also related 50-slide presentation here). Xu Mi has also written a short paper called “Fast Reactor technology R&D activities in China“. Here are some particularly interesting slides (click to enlarge): As you can see, China’s ambition in both Generation III and Generation IV reactors is substantial (as is India’s). Let’s hope, for the sake of a stable climate system and long-term environmental sustainability of the human enterprise, that the economic rise of these two 21st century superpowers is fueled by advanced nuclear (uranium- and thorium-based) and renewable energy (where competitive), and NOT built on the same fossil-fueled 19th century technology that underpinned the development of the West. Frankly, either this works out, with China and India as clean energy leaders, or our goose is cooked.

### Soft power asia Impact

#### Chinese soft power is key to Asian stability.

Wiggin 2010

Stuart, columnist in Beijing, writing primarily for China Radio International, American Dream now a Chinese reality, August 10, 2010, http://english.people.com.cn/99977/100372/7099072.html

As part of the commentary which focuses upon the general relationship between the developed and developing world, more often than not a clear delineation is drawn between the way of life pursued by the people in the Eastern hemisphere and that of the developed Western world, while Africa is generally left out altogether. Although it is necessary to acknowledge differences during any analysis of East and West, the reality is that the most powerful country in the 'new' Eastern/Asian bloc, i.e. China, has inherited many of the characteristics that made America into the power it is today. The number of similarities between the two societies is astounding. China is not only on the verge of becoming an equal partner within the world balance of power over the next 50 years; it is also set to take America's place as a beacon for prosperity and opportunity. The United States of America, as we know it today, came to being as a result of the culmination of the 1929 Wall Street Crash and the Second World War. These two events allowed America to emerge as the world’s strongest power and accelerated the decline of former colonial powers Britain, France and Germany. At this time, Asia was not even part of the equation. Today, however, it is possible to see a very similar situation. This time it is China that remains well afloat within a sea of global recession and Middle Eastern skirmishes. The fact that China holds huge dollar-denominated assets as part of their foreign exchange reserves reaffirms America’s remaining importance within the global financial system, but it is generally accepted by all that China will eventually balance America in terms of both hard and soft power. The soft power that China cultivates often exists within the developing world and is often seen as a rallying bloc contrasted against the self-seeking interests of developed nations. Building soft power was a priority for America post 1949 as it is for China going into the 21st Century. China is going through the same stages of formation, albeit at an accelerated pace, that the United States went through from the 1920s onwards. Disregarding the question of history (i.e. that China boasts a 5000 year history which nobody below the age of 50 is willing to study in-depth, and America only possesses around 200 years of modern history, most of which they would rather forget to a large extent), the similarities are quite clear to see. Not unlike America, China has become home to many people from outside of its borders. Many people have set up a home here in hope of pursuing what is fast becoming the Chinese dream: making their fortune. In Guangzhou, a 10-square-kilometer area centered around Hongqiao, affectionately referred to by locals as Chocolate City, serves as home to a mix of Chinese and foreign dwellers, the majority of which are of African descent. According to Guangzhou Daily, the total number of Africans in this city alone is thought to be almost 100,000, and is only set to rise further. This influx is, at this moment in time, a novel feature of certain cities for many Chinese people, but so too was the influx of immigrants to America in the 1920s. What is more, it is not only immigrants expecting to find fortune in China. As Lester R. Brown, President of Earth Policy Institute in Washington has stated, "for China's 1.3 billion people, the American dream is fast becoming the Chinese dream…Millions of Chinese are living like Americans: eating more meat, driving cars, traveling abroad, and otherwise spending their fast-rising incomes much as Americans do." In this sense, China bears a greater resemblance to the America of the 1920s and 30s than modern America does today. Aside from demographic or financial similarities between China and the United States, one must also acknowledge the general similarity between the psyche of the American and Chinese peoples. Both peoples are generally insular, largely unconcerned with foreign affairs, and their grasp of geography outside of their respective continents is rather poor. Forays into foreign countries are usually the result of humanitarian efforts or as part of their search for natural resources, glaring examples being China’s involvement in Africa and America’s obvious involvement in Iraq. There is no working class sentiment in China or America, and both countries are fiercely patriotic. Patriotism seems to have filled the void of any class sentimentality and it is for this reason that the hope of one People's Daily writer of restructuring Chinese growth in the context of globalization, as stated in the recent article "Why can't China climb up the value chain?," will always be constrained so long as unions are non-existent and labor remains cheap. Though the creation of a "Chinese Dream" may seem like an achievement for the country, there is also the idea that the American Dream could become a Chinese nightmare (USA Today, June 2005), with the possibility that consumption could outstrip global output. And even though the above paragraphs detail the likenesses that exist between the two countries, vast differences remain, mostly in political terms. It is no secret that the two countries have endured a tumultuous relationship, which has most recently been seen when the United States came to China with its tail between its legs regarding a global economic bailout. China, meanwhile, is the arbiter of East Asian stability and is often a thorn in America's side in their pursuit of Western-led initiatives. Hilary Clinton said that global issues could not be solved by the United States or China alone, but without participation of the two countries, no problems would likely be solved. As it turns out, when they do work together nothing gets done, hence the stalemate with the South Korean Yellow Sea missile, a result of a strategic alliance between China and North Korea.

#### Most likely scenario for nuclear escalation

Nye et al., Professor @ Harvard, 2K

[Joseph S. Nye, Professor Emeritus @ The John F. Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard University, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard L. Armitage, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Michael J. Green, Advisor & Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Associate Professor @ The Walsh School of Foreign Service, Kurt M. Campbell, Fellow @ The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Frank Jannuzi, Minority Staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Edward J. Lincoln, Fellow @ The Brookings Institution, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” The Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 11th 2000, http://homepage2.nifty.com/moru/lib/nichibei-anpo/pdf/INSS%20Special%20Report.pdf]

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy.

### Chinese export controls

China developing strong nuclear safety culture---American assistance captures their US key warrants

Kadak-Prof Nuclear Science, MIT-6

http://web.mit.edu/pebble-bed/papers1\_files/Made%20in%20China.pdf

Nuclear Power: “Made in China”

The senior management of the Guangdong Nuclear Power Company believes that much can be learned from U.S. plant experience to improve their overall performance. To that end, they have engaged the services of a U.S. group of experienced managers and engineers to assist them in instituting U.S. processes and procedures, in order to instill the operating regime and culture required for safe long-term operations. This team spends two weeks per year at the Daya Bay plants reviewing operating results, events, procedures, staffing levels, corrective action programs, engineering, safety culture, etc. The objective is not to inspect but to mentor. As a member of this team, my personal observation in over two years of engagement has been very positive. The management of the company is committed to change and is taking advantage of U.S. lessons in operations, engineering, safety, oversight, and training. Each bi-yearly visit starts with a review of past findings and recommendations, with actions taken by the staff to address the issues identified. The responsiveness of the management has resulted in the institution of a U.S.-like corrective action program, the use of traditional “root cause” analysis in senior management reviews of events, the use of probabilistic safety analysis in engineering and operations, the installation of a safety monitor in the control room, and changes to training and maintenance programs and control room operator practices, to name just of few of the recommendations accepted and implemented by the management. The team has unrestricted access to all parts of the plant with visits scheduled during refueling outages as well as during normal operations to observe work practices. There is free access to management and working engineers. This openness to improvement is a positive sign for the future of China’s nuclear expansion plans. The issue of safety culture, which demands a critical approach, is also a challenge for the Chinese system. Asian culture, in general, respects authority and rarely questions it. In the Chinese political system, this challenge is exacerbated. The management of the Daya Bay stations recognizes this problem and has an active safety culture awareness effort underway that encourages staff to come forward with identified problems without retaliation. Management supports the process of questioning and having open discussions concerning differing professional opinions. Such lively discussions have been witnessed at Daya Bay Corrective Action Review Board committee meetings, where major safety issues are raised with resolutions agreed upon by management and staff. New programs have been instituted to monitor the resolution of concerns and to assign responsibility and accountability for problem resolution. While worker protections similar to those in the United States do not exist, China is developing a nuclear safety culture that requires constant reinforcement by management to be successful.

## 1NR

### Prolif S

#### IFRs can be manipulated too

Green 2010 (Jim, PhD in Science and Technology Studies, Australian Coordinator of the Beyond Nuclear Initiative, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR POWER & INTEGRAL FAST REACTORS <http://foe.org.au/sites/default/files/IFR-FoEA-web-Feb2010.pdf>)

In theory, there is much to like about the idea of conventional reprocessing with the use of separated plutonium as fuel (in breeders or mixed uranium/plutonium 'MOX' reactors). In theory, it has many of the same potential benefits as IFRs including drawing down fissile material stockpiles. In practice, reprocessing has increased rather than decreased proliferation risks. Very little plutonium has been used as reactor fuel in breeders or MOX reactors. But the separation of plutonium from spent fuel continues apace such that stockpiles of separated 'civil' plutonium − which can be used directly in weapons − are increasing by about five tonnes annually and amount to over 270 tonnes, enough for 27,000 nuclear weapons. IFR advocates demonstrate little or no understanding of the realpolitik responsible for, amongst other things, turning attractive theories into the problem of plutonium stockpiling and the failure to take the simplest steps to address the problem – namely, suspending or reducing the rate of reprocessing such that plutonium stockpiles are drawn down rather than continually increasing. If IFR technology is developed and deployed, it will be in an environment where crass commercial and political imperatives have demonstrably prevented even the simplest steps being taken to reduce weapons proliferation risks. IFR advocate Tom Blees argues that: "Privatized nuclear power should be outlawed worldwide, with complete international control of not only the entire fuel cycle but also the engineering, construction, and operation of all nuclear power plants. Only in this way will safety and proliferation issues be satisfactorily dealt with. Anything short of that opens up a Pandora's box of inevitable problems." He also argues that: "The shadowy threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism virtually requires us to either internationalize or ban nuclear power."

### Prolif !

#### Even “rogue states” won’t cause conflict with nukes

Dratler 10 (Jay, Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, Emeritus Ph.D. degrees in physics from the University of California (San Diego), and a J.D. degree from Harvard Law School, where he was articles editor of the Harvard Law Review. “The Case for Nuclear Proliferation” <http://jaydiatribe.blogspot.com/2010/04/case-for-nuclear-proliferation.html>)

Rogue Regimes After terrorists and crazies, **rogue regimes are the next strongest argument against nuclear proliferation**. **What would happen, conventional wisdom screams, if a terrible tyrant got nuclear weapons**? Conventional wisdom acts as if this question highlights a mere hypothetical future peril. But it doesn’t. Terrible tyrants have had and have nuclear weapons, and nothing extraordinary has happened. With the possible exception of Hitler, **Stalin was the worst** tyrant in human history. He was certainly the most paranoid. Yet he had nuclear weapons for four years before he died. **He didn’t use them**. Nor did his Soviet successors. **North Korea’s Kim Jong Il is every bit as paranoid as Stalin and far more prone to making idle external threats. Yet he has done nothing rash** and is unlikely to do so. Why? Because he knows that a single 50-megaton thermonuclear bomb could erase Pyongyang and his regime forever, even if he and a few select leaders managed to survive in some deep bunker. He also knows that his four-million-strong starving army is no proof against the atom’s awesome power. So Kim waits and occasionally blusters. Waits for what? If he or his minions have any semblance of wisdom, they will exploit the reduction in paranoia that their small nuclear arsenal permits and begin improving their civilian economy. If and as that happens, the long-suffering North Korean people will begin a gradual and painful climb toward a better life. It may take decades. It may take a century. But eventually **cooler and wiser heads will prevail amidst the stalemate of multilateral nuclear deterrence. Conventional wisdom acts as if there were some easy external “solution” to localized tyrannies,** if only they didn’t have nuclear weapons. But **history reveals that view as nonsense**. The Castro brothers, Kim, and Mugabe have been around for decades. They are all likely to die peacefully, of old age. No external force seriously challenged them during their (and Kim’s father’s) long reigns. No external force seriously challenges them now although only Kim has an arguable nuclear deterrent. What would change if each of them had a small nuclear arsenal? Their countries are small enough to be easy subjects for others’ nuclear deterrence. **A few missiles could literally annihilate their entire nations. The only real difference a small nuclear arsenal might make would be giving the lie to the paranoid fear of foreign invasion that they use to keep their own people’s aspirations in check**. The proof of the pudding is Iraq. Part of our justification for invading was removing the tyrant Saddam. That wasn’t the main reason; Israel and oil were. But never mind. It was a reason with which every supporter of the war—left or right—(including me, before the blunders started) could agree. Soon we will have spent well over a trillion dollars in direct and indirect costs. We will have suffered over 4,000 dead and 30,000 wounded to remove a tyrant who we thought had weapons of mass destruction but didn’t. That expense and the enormous economic drain of two wars are among the principal reasons for our national decline. With our sad example in mind, the rest of the world is unlikely to challenge local tyrants by conventional invasion for a century, if ever. Certainly the world’s most rapidly rising power (China) will not. And we have found it like pulling teeth to get our NATO allies to contribute to the supposedly agreeable mission of fighting the tyrannical Taliban in Afghanistan. So the notion that rogue regimes would be more susceptible to external “regime change” without than with nuclear weapons is sheer fantasy. **The notion that local tyrants would commit personal and national suicide by starting a nuclear war is equally absurd.** The Castro brothers, Kim Jong Il, and Robert Mugabe will die peaceably of old age, and their successors will change their policies. **Or their smarter underlings or people will remove them. It is impossible to foresee, let alone predict, that their possession of nuclear weapons would make any difference at all**. The only difference it might make is assuaging their paranoia enough to let them spend less on tools of war and more on their people, if only to improve the chances of their regimes’ survival against mutiny or popular revolt.

#### Iran has a nuclear program, not a nuclear weapons program. There’s a difference.

Milaninia and Alimagham 2012

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The PAAIA report initially stated that sanctions have created "challenges in developing nuclear weapons" and still notes that "many experts still doubt that severe and sustained economic pressure will be sufficient to persuade Iran to abandon its drive for nuclear weapons capability." These assertions create the underlying assumption that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons program, a misperception commonly used by advocates of military strikes. The reality is far more complicated. Both Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies have consistently found that Iran has not made the decision to pursue nuclear weapons. In remarks to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 31, 2012, James R. Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence noted that "We do not know . . . if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." A few months later, in an interview with the Israeli newspaper Haartz, General Benny Gantz, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, explained that while "[Iran is] going step by step to the place where it will be able to decide whether to manufacture a nuclear bomb. It hasn't yet decided whether to go the extra mile." While Iran's nuclear hedging is certainly a cause for serious international concern, a nuclear program does not necessarily equate a nuclear weapon, a misconception created by the sensationalized statements in the report. That Iran has not decided to develop nuclear weapons also emphasizes the importance of exhausting all diplomatic means.

Decision-making and empirics mean no accidental conflict

Quinlan 05- former senior fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies

(Sir Michael, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons,” <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/WHP41_QUINLAN.pdf>, first published in 1997, reedited in 2005,)

Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm or misunderstanding. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misinterpreted. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—more good fortune, the critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from perhaps hundreds of events stretching over fifty years of experience presents itself once more: that the **probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is hugely remote**. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognises the vast gravity of any launch, decision sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. (And even at the height of the Cold War no Western nuclear power had a launch-on-warning policy—that is, an intention to initiate nuclear retaliation on perceived evidence of impending rather than provenly-actual attack.) To convey that because an early step was prompted we somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole. History anyway scarcely offers ready examples of major war started by accident (miscalculation is another matter, not at issue here) even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution

### Isreal

#### ---No Strikes --- All parties have turned towards multilateral diplomacy, not war.

Rahman February 9th 2013

Mohammad Atique, Iran's nuclear puzzle game: Rhetoric vs. pragmatism, The Daily Star, http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=268371

However, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu often talks about possible attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities but President Shimon Peres vowed not to act alone on Iran's nuclear issue. In his speech at the newly elected Parliament on February 3, 2013, President Peres talked about forming wide coalition, which is combined with diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions against Iran. This changing tone has clearly confirmed that the re-elected President Obama and his new Secretary of State John Kerry initiated pragmatic approach to deal with Iran' nuclear programme. The only superpower has eschewed the unilateralism and sought after multilateral negotiations. This brought back a sense of confidence among the Iranian leaders on the international norms and principles. The year-long policy of denying Iran's nuclear capacity by the Israelis and other world powers has come to an end. Iranian leaders are now optimistic about their legitimate rights to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In response to the US and Israeli leaders' renewed policy, Tehran announced new talks on nuclear programmes.

Defensive military

Darling 10 (Daniel, is an international military markets analyst with Forecast International Inc., an aerospace and defense research company. “Just How Powerful is the Iranian Military” http://thefastertimes.com/defensespending/2010/04/28/iranian-smoke-and-mirrors/ //Donnie)

Though militarily capable enough to match its Arab neighbors, an Iranian first-strike against these countries is at best a remote possibility, particularly with U.S. forces stationed in the region. There are also economic concerns that render direct aggression unlikely, including the $12 billion in trade conducted between the UAE and Iran. And despite its provocative statements about blocking the Strait of Hormuz, such an action -- if Iran could indeed pull it off -- would itself damage the Iranian economy by choking off the channel through which most of its own oil exports pass. Instead Iranian conventional military strength is publicly amplified for intimidation purposes through martial displays and military exercises, while serpentine measures are used to expand Iran’s regional influence. This bifurcated strategy has ably served Iran, allowing it to extend its reach beyond its immediate borders while intimidating its Gulf neighbors. Its ballistic missile capabilities notwithstanding, in truth the Iranian military is better suited to play defense than to launch an offensive against its neighbors. On its own turf the IRGC presents a formidable foe whose use of asymmetrical warfare would prove damaging to any invader. But outside its own boundaries Iran seems content to stick to its game plan, which is to bleed its adversaries through use of proxies and to promote itself as the implacable foe of Western interference in the Muslim world.

### Arsenal

**Russia and China can’t power balance the US – we’re too far ahead economicall, militarily, technologically, and geopolitically, regional powers would counterbalance their counterbalancing attempts, and their relations with the US are too important**

**Carlson 7** [Brian G. Carlson; M.A. student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), is a 2006-07 U.S. Fulbright Graduate Fellow based at the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty, Kazakhstan ; The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in Central Asia; <http://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2007/8.pdf> //AnthonyOgbuli]

Even if other powers such as Russia and China sought to engage in serious balancing against the United States, they would face daunting obstacles. The United States is the first leading state in modern history that is dominant in all aspects of power: economic, military, technological, and geopolitical (Wohlforth 1999, 7; Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 23). Other states are unlikely to take actions that would invite what William C. Wohlforth calls the “focused enmity” of the United States (Wohlforth 1999, 26). If other candidates for polar status, including Russia and China, sought to balance U.S. power through military buildups and alliances, they would spark counterbalancing actions by other countries in their regions before they were able to mount an effective challenge to U.S. primacy (Wohlforth 1999, 8; Ikenberry 2003). Despite Russia and China’s convergent interests, their strategic partnership does not constitute power balancing

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 as predicted by structural realist theory. Although both countries have endured strains in their relations with Washington, neither country has risked a sharp rupture with the superpower. Rather, both countries have to a large extent bandwagoned with Washington, recognizing that the economic strength of the United States is crucial to their own efforts at modernization and economic growth (Voskressenski 2000, 132-134; Lampton 2001, 232; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 83-84).

. Second Strike

K. Scott McMahon is a National Security Analyst with the Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation in Arlington, Virginia [http://www.fas.org/news/usa/1997/03/bmd970331d.htm]Pursuit of the Shield
The U.S. Quest for Limited Ballistic Missile Defense - Executive Summary 1997

A cooperative U.S.-Russian approach to reducing strategic offensive arsenals and deploying BMD systems will reinforce peace and strategic stability. If a future confrontation nonetheless occurs**, it would be unlikely to escalate as deterrence and crisis stability would prevail**: Neither side could expect to launch a successful first strike using its limited BMD system for protection. In fact, even if the attacker found its victim's strategic forces at a peacetime level of preparedness (a heroically optimistic scenario) and destroyed a large portion of them, the attacker would still suffer a devastating retaliatory blow. This will be the case with the reduced force levels envisioned in the 1991 and 1993 START accords and at even lower strategic force levels

B. MAD between them is stable

Blair et al 10 (Bruce Blair Ph.D., Col.-Gen. (Ret.) Victor Esin Ph.D., Matthew McKinzie Ph.D., Col.

(Ret.) Valery Yarynich Ph.D., and Maj.-Gen. (Ret.) Pavel Zolotarev Ph.D. “One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses” <http://www.globalzero.org/files/FA_appendix.pdf> //Donnie)

A stable nuclear deterrent is a situation where both the United States and Russia would not rationally choose to strike first with nuclear weapons, because doing so could cause unacceptable death and destruction from nuclear retaliation. In a stable nuclear deterrent situation, neither the United States nor Russia could easily attain nuclear dominance. Deterrence falters if either the United States or Russia has a credible nuclear attack capability (an ability to attack without fear of reprisal), which could also be used as a threat. Deterrence in our view is the possibility of keeping a sufficient size of retaliation at a given probability. The specter of retaliation is the foundation of deterrence. Uncertainty is an important aspect of nuclear conflict that bolsters the fear of retaliation to attack. However, if we wish to reduce nuclear arms to low levels, this uncertainty must be specified well enough to impart knowledge of the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. The stability of deterrence depends strongly on the configuration and capabilities of forces on both sides. The current status of nuclear deterrence – including a significant launch on warning capability from a sizable portion of the nuclear arsenals on alert – is stable, in that neither the United States nor Russia could strike first without the risk of devastating retaliation: neither country could mount a disarming first strike. A solution to a stable nuclear deterrent with all forces off alert, put forward here, is to divide the nuclear forces of both countries into distinct groups, termed Echelons, with different degrees of reduced combat readiness (i.e., different generation times to launch-ready status). By “echeloning” the forces, a stable nuclear deterrent whole is constructed from more vulnerable, de-alerted parts.

### EUROPE

#### Eurozone collapse inevitable

O’Brien 2013

Dan, Irish Times Economics Editor, Angela Merkel is not working - for EU or Berlin, January 7 2013, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2013/0107/1224328506486.html

OPINION: The chancellor is bad for Europe and bad for Germany, where voters would be doing us all a favour if they kicked her out ‘A cluster of insignificant states under insignificant princelings”. That was one near-contemporaneous description of Germany of the 1850s. A little more than a decade later, after the power politics of the continent had been transformed by the unification of those states, it had become commonplace to speak of all diplomatic roads in Europe leading to Berlin. The rapid rise of Germany at that juncture is reflected in our own times. A decade ago, Germany was derided as being part of “old Europe” and its economy written off as sclerotic – along with Italy and Portugal, it had been the slowest growing in Europe over the previous 10-year period. But since the euro crisis erupted three years ago a sea change has taken place and derision has again turned to awe. Germany’s strong (if often exaggerated) rebound from the 2008-09 Great Recession, its low unemployment, high export levels and unindebted private sector have given the inhabitants of Europe’s largest economy a sense of prosperity, security and progress that few others in the rich world have enjoyed in recent years. Compared to all the other (smaller) major economies in Europe – Britain, France, Italy and Spain – Germany has fewer weaknesses and faces fewer challenges. This relative strength – and its long-term anchor role in European monetary affairs – has put Germany centre stage in redesigning the euro edifice, which is fundamentally flawed and will collapse without major change. As the crisis of the euro has dominated the continent’s politics for three years, all roads in European diplomacy have, once again, converged on Berlin. But among the greatest differences between the 1870s and the 2010s has been leadership. Otto von Bismarck, newly unified Germany’s first chancellor, managed the challenges of his fast-changing country and continent with great creativity and constructive diplomacy. ‘Iron Chancellor’ He was the main architect of unification, was pragmatic when it came to putting in place the world’s first welfare state, granted universal male suffrage (despite being an unconvinced democrat) and his diplomacy remains the stuff of legend. The “Iron Chancellor” is rightly regarded as one of the finest statesmen Europe has produced. His distant successor, Angela Merkel, has been very different. Her role in by far the greatest crisis in European Union history has been almost unrelentingly negative, in her rejection of proposals from others and in reluctantly agreeing to suggestions after much credibility-destroying delay. When Merkel has appeared to lead – as she did when calling for political union to ensure enhanced democratic accountability in the euro zone – little detail and no strategic vision emerge to suggest she is serious about taking bold action.

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 And, in the starkest contrast of all with Bismarck, Merkel has built few if any durable alliances with other European leaders, thus presiding over her country’s dangerous isolation. Among Merkel’s few innovations has been the fiscal treaty, aimed at embedding German budgetary procedures in the domestic policy frameworks of all EU member states. Though not at all a bad thing in its own right, it was never going to contribute much to solving this crisis and was more about providing Merkel with domestic political cover. Despite being accorded that cover by all other euro zone members, she did not use it. Merkel’s minimalism and backsliding in dealing with the euro crisis cannot be explained by the domestic political environment. Unlike her counterparts in other creditor countries – Austria, Finland and the Netherlands – she faces no threat from opposition parties hostile to Europe generally and/or willing to exploit public disquiet about bailing out the periphery. On the contrary. The main opposition party, the Social Democrats, has advocated going further and faster in addressing the crisis.

#### Merkel won’t forgive any debt – makes Greek default and EU collapse inevitable.

Skidelsky 2011

Robert, Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at Warwick University, The consequences of Angela Merkel, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-09/23/content\_13776358.htm

LONDON – Germany has been leading the opposition in the European Union to any write-down of troubled eurozone members' sovereign debt. Instead, it has agreed to establish bailout mechanisms such as the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, which can lend up to €500 billion ($680 billion) combined, with the International Monetary Fund providing an additional €250 billion. These are essentially refinancing mechanisms. Heavily indebted eurozone members can apply to borrow from them at less than the commercial rate, conditional on their committing to ever more drastic fiscal austerity. Principal and interest on outstanding debt have been left intact. Thus, creditors – mainly German and French banks – are not expected to suffer losses on their existing loans, while borrowers gain more time to "put their houses in order." That, at least, is the theory. So far, three countries – Greece, Ireland, and Portugal – have availed themselves of this facility. In mid-July 2011, Greece's sovereign debt stood at €350 billion (160% of GDP). The Greek government currently must pay 25% for its ten-year bonds, which are trading at a 50% discount in the secondary market. In other words, investors are expecting to receive only about half of what they are owed. The hope is that the reduction in borrowing costs on new loans, plus the austerity programs promised by governments, will enable bond prices to recover to par without the need for the creditor banks to take a hit. This is pie in the sky. Unless a large part of its debt is forgiven, Greece will not regain creditworthiness. (Indeed, by most accounts, it is about to default.) And the same is true, albeit to a lesser degree, for other heavily indebted sovereigns. Any credible bailout plan must require creditor banks to accept that they will lose at least half of their money. In the United States' successful Brady Bond plan in 1989, the debtors – Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil – agreed to pay what they could. The banks that had loaned them the money replaced the old debt with new bonds at par value, which averaged 50% of the old bonds, and the US government provided some sweeteners. It was write-offs and devaluations, not austerity programs, that allowed bond prices to recover. In the Greek case, creditors have yet to accept the need for write-offs, and European governments have provided them with no incentives to do so. Germany's opposition to debt forgiveness is thus bad economics, bad politics (except at home), and bad history. The Germans should remember the reparations fiasco of the 1920's. In the Treaty of Versailles, the victorious Allies insisted that Germany should pay for "the cost of the war." They added up the figures, and in 1921 they presented the bill: Germany "owed" the victors £6.6 billion (85% of its GDP), payable in 30 annual installments. This amounted to transferring annually 8-10% of Germany's national income, or 65-76% of its exports. Within a year, Germany had asked for, and obtained, a moratorium. New bond issues, following a big debt write-down in 1924 (the Dawes Plan), enabled Germany to borrow the money to resume payments. There then followed a crazy system: Germany borrowed money from the US in order to repay Britain, France, and Belgium, while France and Belgium used a bit of it to pay back Britain, and Britain used more of it to pay back the US. This whole tangle of debts was finally de facto written off in 1932 in the middle of the global slump. But, until 1980, Germany continued repaying the loans that it had incurred to pay the reparations. From the start, the economist John Maynard Keynes had been a fierce critic of the reparations policy imposed on Germany. He made three main points: Germany didn't have the capacity to pay were it to regain anything like a normal standard of living; any attempt to force it to reduce its standard of living would produce revolution; and to the extent that Germany was able to increase its exports to pay reparations, this would be at the expense of the recipients' exports. What was needed was cancelation of reparations and inter-Allied war debts as a whole, together with a big reconstruction loan to put the shattered European economies back on their feet. In 1919, Keynes produced a grand plan for comprehensive debt cancellation, plus a new bond issue, guaranteed by the Allied powers, whose proceeds would go to victors and vanquished alike. The Americans, who would have had to provide most of the money, vetoed the plan. The point to which Keynes kept returning was that the attempt to extract debt payments over many years would have disastrous social consequences. "The policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions of human beings, and of depriving a whole nation of happiness should be abhorrent and detestable," he wrote, "even if it does not sow the decay of the whole civilized life of Europe." History never repeats itself exactly, but there are lessons to be learned from that episode. Germans today would say that, unlike reparations, the Greek and Mediterranean debts were voluntarily incurred, not coerced. This raises the question of justice, but not the economic consequences of insisting on payment. Moreover, there is a fallacy of composition: if there are too many debt collectors, they will impoverish the very people on whom their own prosperity depends. In the 1920's, Germany ended up having to pay only a small fraction of its reparation bill, but the long time it took to get to that point prevented the full recovery of Europe, made Germany itself the most conspicuous victim of the Great Depression, and bred widespread resentment, with dire political consequences. German Chancellor Angela Merkel would do well to ponder that history.

#### Austerity kills growth.

Kuttner 2012

Robert, co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect magazine, as well as a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the think tank Demos, Can Merkel be Moved?, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/can-merkel-be-moved\_b\_1567342.html

Obviously, not every nation can enjoy an export surplus, and if every other major economy is shrinking, even Germany starts losing the market for its products. But Merkel continues to pursue Germany's narrow self-interest. This past week, Merkel and her ministers rejected pleas to loosen the screws on Spain, whose banking system is in dire crisis. The German position is that in exchange for assistance from Europe's common bailout fund, the 500 billion Euro European Stability Mechanism, Spain will be expected to impose even more economic austerity in order to meet the deficit targets required by the stability and growth pact and its predecessor treaty. Speaking Thursday in Brussels, the European Union's Vice President and Commissioner in charge of economic affairs, Olli Rehn, a Finn who closely follows Merkel's lead, made a big deal of the fact that Spain will be given an extra year to meet the target of a deficit of 3 percent of GDP. But because austerity policies cut growth and reduce revenues, any sane person expects that Spain's deficit this year and next cannot avoid being in double digits. Rehn even took a swipe at France's deficit. As Merkel speaks grandly of a closer European Union and a common (very austere) European fiscal policy, her flawed vision and blunt use of German economic power are destroying the European project. And because Germany, uniquely among European nations, is enjoying an economic boom, it will take real courage for the German Social Democrats to propose a fundamentally different course. Alert readers may have noticed some parallels and differences with the budgetary politics of the United States. Merkel's perverse view of the need for budget balance in a recession and the need for sanctions for sinners sounds eerily like the Bowles-Simpson Commission. The reluctance of the German Social Democrats to challenge the logic and the entire approach calls to mind the fiscally conservative American Democrats who have pushed President Obama into the austerity camp.

#### natural gas dependency is key to Russia-EU cooperation and Russian growth.

Closson 2008

Stacy, Visiting Professor at the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Russia’s key customer: Europe. http://www.rect.muni.cz/summerschool/International\_Security/Module%203/Closson\_89\_108.pdf

Media reporting and Western security discourse lend to portray Russia as the aggressor in its energy relations, increasingly able to convert its hydrocarbon supply lo Europe into economic and political capital. Likewise, many Western scholarly works and analytical reports suggest that Europe is dangerously dependent on Russia.1 Some NATO members have even urged the creation of an "energy NATO" or suggested that the alliance define a shutoff of energy by Russia as an attack justifying the invocation of Article V on collective defense.1 Part of this perception has to do with the way Russia is pursuing business interests in Europe, a policy once described by Russian President Vladimir Putin as "energy supremacy."1 Russia's tactics regarding the pricing of gas to its Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) customers and related shutoffs of gas and oil transiting Belarus and Ukraine to Europe, as well as its subsequent championing of transit options that bolster its near monopoly of gas supplies to Europe, concern many end users Moreover, Russia's continued recalcitrance toward ratifying the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and its recent effort to limit foreign investment in upstream ventures, such as Kovykta and Sakhalin, are viewed by some as unwarranted, given its demands for access to markets in Europe.\* However, as alarming as these recent developments have been for Europe and the US, the warnings emphasizing an encroaching Russian energy giant do not consider the strong interdependency between Russia and Europe that benefit both parties. This interdependency will remain well into the future, creating conditions that favor cooperation over confrontation. While it is recognized that in the near-term, Russia will remain Europe's single most important source of hydrocarbons, particularly for natural gas, Russia's share of the European market will decline over time, increasing Russia's dependency on Europe. Already, the quality of the relationship makes Europe indispensable to Russia in terms of overall trade volumes The European Union <EU) in 2005 accounted for some 56 percent of Russia's exports and around 45 percent of its imports, with Russia's exports to the EU generally being confined to oil and natural gas. Around two-thirds of Russian gas and oil exports currently go to EU member states, the rest to other European countries and the CIS states. These exports have been critical to Russia's welfare, as one-third of all Russian GDP growth over the recent period has come from the natural resources sector, with taxation of oil and gas providing almost 50 percent of federal government fiscal revenue.5 Moreover, Russia's dependence on hydrocarbon exports is likely to grow, as Russia has failed to invest its energy profits in sectors that would ensure long-term, sustainable economic development. This lack of investment could especially hurt the development of Russia's hydrocarbon sector, as the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts require energy investment at around €800 billion by 2030. In order to meet this requirement, Russia would have to supplement domestic funds by encouraging more foreign investment through a revised legal framework that provides secure property rights for the assets of foreign companies operating in Russia.6 Meanwhile, as European states are making moves to diversify their hydrocarbon resources, Russia appears to be less active in securing alternative markets beyond the West. Europe is strengthening relations with African producers, developing liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets, and moving toward greater use of renewable resources. Russia, on the other hand, continues to make business arrangements to construct more pipelines linking its oil and gas fields westwards, obtain rights for the use of gas storage sites in Europe, and sign long-term purchase guarantees with European customers. These plans are taking priority over the construction of pipelines to Asia, investment in upstream gas sector projects, and construction of the infrastructure required for exporting LNG globally. Given these developments, Russia will remain a major player in the European market in the foreseeable future, accounting for roughly a quarter of EU hydrocarbon consumption or 40 percent of imports. Nevertheless, even with the Russian energy sector concentrated on the European market, it will not be able to meet European demand for gas, which is forecast to grow 70 percent by 2030,' The disjuncture between, on the one hand, the actual interdependency between Russia and Europe and, on the other hand, the portrayal of Russia as the aggressor and Europe as the dependent actor, may be more the result of semantics than of facts. Since the early 2000s, the Russian government has tended to understand the context of its energy business in Europe better than Europeans understand Russia. Russia has done a good job of playing a weak hand by engaging with individual European states and their mostly nationally-owned companies to create a series of business arrangements that suit the interests of both sides. Today, Russian and European energy companies are creating joint stock companies, constructing oil and gas pipelines within the EU, investing in hubs and storage facilities, refineries, and terminals, and swapping Russian sales to customers on Europe's market for European exploration and technology in upstream projects in the Russian Far East. This has created a visible map of Russian state-owned assets dotted across Europe and North Africa.1 It is this visual that concerns many in Europe and America and contributes to calls for less dependency on Russia.

#### Russia’s nationalist ambitions are modest – they don’t want to become imperialist

Pravda 9 - Director of the Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford University

(Alex, House of Commons Defence Committee, 10 July 2009 “Russia: a new confrontation?” http://www.contracts.mod.uk/pdfs/5.pdf)

I disagree in some respects with what my colleague just said. I think the notion of any state having a coherent overall foreign policy strategy long-term is a diYcult one to sustain in practice. Russia has struggled more than most states with incoherence of strategy. It has various visions, set out in long documents which are readily issued, both on security and foreign policy. It has tactics, at which it is quite adept, in a chess-playing way, selfconsciously. It often lacks the middle, which is the strategic element of how to match the visions with means. Things have improved somewhat and we conventionally compare the incoherence of the Yeltsin 1990s with the increasing coherence and control of the Putin two administrations, and that goes through to, in most people’s analyses, the Putin-Medvedev tandem era. However, I think that the two regional conflicts, the armed conflict with Georgia, the gas conflict with Ukraine, and the handling of the global crisis with which Russia has been trying to grapple, show up the very important elements of lack of co-ordination between various agencies, the high degree of personalisation and decision-making, sometimes the improvisation of decisions, because obviously crises tend to bring that out even more strongly. I do not think one wants to look for enormous diVerences among decision makers, but one wants to be realistic about the degree of improvisation they have to undertake. From their view of things, as often from inside, things look much more chaotic than any smooth advance towards a strategic aim. He increasingly comments on what they are aiming to achieve, the vision. The vision is not a Soviet vision. No one I think in Russia wants to spend what they saw as needless resources on maintaining some sort of semblance of global reach. The moves to send warships to Venezuela and so on, echoes of global ambition, are often more criticised than supported in Moscow and they are very tentative. The aim of the exercise—and this relates to the question you finished your last session with: Russia’s pride—is to be acknowledged as a senior great power, not just any great power on a par with France and Germany. Not a superpower, because that is too expensive and beyond Russia’s reach and ambition in a global sense, but a senior great power which has particular droit de regard in the former of Soviet space, dealing in a very diYcult way with post-Imperial situations. We have to at least emphasise—not sympathise— with the diYculties of dealing with states that were part of an imperial structure, linked up in gas pipelines, security arrangements, mental outlooks, ethnic blood links; so dealing with all that and yet achieving an equal great power status with the large senior great powers of the world, and inclusion in the clubs of senior great powers to work within the system.

No escalation

A. Economics

Ahari—Ph.D. and Specialist in Great Power Relations—10 Ehsan Ahrari, Ph.D. is a specialist in great power relations and transnational security. His latest book on great power relations is entitled, The Great Powers and the Hegemon: Strategic Maneuvers. “China, the US and Clashing Aims” September 17. <http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2701&Itemid=171> //Donnie)

Two important questions for the second decade of the 21st Century are whether China can be satisfied even by becoming a coequal of the United States; and whether the latter would be amenable to accepting China as its coequal? A very important, but a tacit, aspect related to the latter question is that the United States should also be ready for the scenario of China becoming number one among the hierarchy of nations within a decade or so. Those are hard questions to answer because the United States never had a coequal during the heyday of the Cold War. The former Soviet Union was arguably America's coequal in the ownership of nuclear arsenals. In the realm of economics, however, the USSR was very much a Third World country. China, on the contrary, has turned the Soviet template on its head by becoming an economic power first, then using its economic wealth to become a military superpower. That may be why the United States remains so concerned about China's rise. As long as China's economy remains as vibrant as it has been for a decade or so, its rise as a superpower appears inexorable. Despite the rising spirals of competition between them, neither the US nor China appears disposed to seek confrontation that has a high potential of rapidly escalating. Both – especially the latter – have a lot to lose if a war breaks out between the two. China has accomplished much in the past three decades. It is the "world's largest trading nation." In the words of Zheng Bijian of the China Reform Forum, "The most significant strategic choice the Chinese have made was to embrace economic globalization rather than detach themselves from it." And it has not shown any intention of risking such magnificent gains. In view of their clashing aspirations, their mutual ties "will never be warm. But they could well be 'workmanlike." The best hope for the world is that the U.S.-China's Janus-faced cooperative and competitive strategic ties always remain manageable and open for frequently recurring rapprochements.

#### Trade war won’t happen.

Fletcher 2010

Ian, Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, former Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council, The Mythical Concept of Trade War, April 2nd 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/the-mythical-concept-of-t\_b\_523864.html

As Americans ponder how to get the U.S. out of its current trade mess, we are constantly warned to do nothing - like impose a tariff to neutralize Chinese currency manipulation - that would trigger a "trade war." Supposedly, no matter how bad our problems with our trading partners get, they are less bad than the spiraling catastrophe that would ensue if we walked a single inch away from our current policy of unilateral free trade. But the curious thing about the concept of trade war is that, unlike actual shooting war, it has no historical precedent. In fact, the reality is that there has never been a significant trade war, "significant" in the sense of having done serious economic damage. All history records are minor skirmishes at best. The standard example free traders give is that America's Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 either caused the Great Depression or made it spread around the world. But this canard does not survive serious examination, and has actually been denied by almost every economist who has actually researched the question in depth--a group ranging from Paul Krugman on the left to Milton Friedman on the right. The Depression's cause was monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe. Trade had nothing to do with it. As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect. For a start, it only applied to about one-third of America's trade: about 1.3 percent of our GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent--not a terribly big jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide without tariff increases. Neither does the myth of a death spiral of retaliation by foreign nations hold water. According to the official State Department report on this question in 1931: With the exception of discriminations in France, the extent of discrimination against American commerce is very slight...By far the largest number of countries do not discriminate against the commerce of the United States in any way. "Notorious" Smoot-Hawley is a deliberately fabricated myth, plain and simple. There is a basic unresolved paradox at the bottom of the very concept of trade war. If, as free traders insist, free trade is beneficial whether or not one's trading partners reciprocate, then why would any rational nation start one, no matter how provoked? The only way to explain this is to assume that major national governments like the Chinese and the U.S.--governments which, whatever bad things they may have done, have managed to hold nuclear weapons for decades without nuking each other over trivial spats--are not players of realpolitik, but schoolchildren. When the moneymen in Beijing, Tokyo, Berlin, and the other nations currently running trade surpluses against the U.S. start to ponder the financial realpolitik of exaggerated retaliation against the U.S. for any measures we may employ to bring our trade back into balance, they will discover the advantage is with us, not them. Because they are the ones with trade surpluses to lose, not us. So our position of weakness is actually a position of strength. Supposedly, China can suddenly stop buying our Treasury Debt if we rock the boat. But this would immediately reduce the value of the trillion or so they already hold--not to mention destroying, by making their hostility overt, the fragile (and desperately-tended) delusion in the U.S. that America and China are still benign economic "partners" in a win-win economic relationship. At the end of the day, China cannot force us to do anything economically that we don't choose to. America is still a nuclear power. We can--an irresponsible but not impossible scenario--repudiate our debt to them (or stop paying the interest) as the ultimate countermove to anything they might contemplate. More plausibly, we might simply restore the tax on the interest on foreign-held bonds that was repealed in 1984 thanks to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan. A certain amount of back-and-forth token retaliation (and loud squealing) is indeed likely if America starts defending its interests in trade as diligently as our trading partners have been defending theirs, but that's it. After all, the world trading system has survived their trade barriers long enough without collapsing.

### Warm

#### **Warming won’t destroy the world---their models are empirically false**

Fuller 10 (Thomas, SF Environmental Policy Examiner, Mar 3, <http://www.climatechangefraud.com/climate-reports/6518-global-warming-is-real-but-effects-have-been-exaggerated-and-we-dont-know-the-future>)

Temperatures have risen 0.7 degrees Celsius over the past century, which is about twice the rate of the previous century. Even if Anthony Watts and Steve McIntyre are absolutely correct about urban heat island effects and paleoclimatic temperature reconstructions, the earth has warmed--and both Watts and McIntyre have said so on their websites repeatedly. This is not really part of the controversy at all. Nor is the reality of the greenhouse effect. Nor is the capability of CO2 contributing to the greenhouse effect. Nor is the reality of human contributions of large amounts of CO2. Almost all skeptics agree with the scientific consensus about this. (It is very convenient for the climate establishment to say they 'deny' this, but the skeptics mostly don't.) What many (not just skeptics) disagree on is the observed effects to date and the future effects as estimated. The Effects Have Been Exaggerated The current warming began around 1880 (give or take a decade) upon the conclusion of the Little Ice Age. The warming has not been even or steady--it accelerates and decelerates for reasons we don't really understand. Those who cry for political action to combat global warming have described some effects of it that they claim have already occurred. In almost every case, their claims have proven to be exaggerated. The 'poster children' for global warming have been polar bears, Himalayan glaciers, African agriculture, increased damage and destruction due to hurricanes and floods, Amazonian rainforests and Arctic ice. Polar bears face an uncertain future. Climate change is just one of many factors that are changing for them. Other factors include human encroachment on their habitat, the response of other wildlife to changes, and most importantly, hunting. Some of the sub-populations of polar bears are decreasing. Some are increasing and some are staying the same. The single most important contribution we could make to helping the population of polar bears increase is to stop shooting them. If we were serious about preserving large numbers of polar bears, we would limit the expansion of human activities throughout their habitat, which would make polar bears less of a threat to people and remove one of the reasons for our killing them. Polar bears have lived through periods of higher temperatures than now, including periods of zero Arctic ice cover. They can swim 200 miles without resting, and Arctic ice loss in and of itself is not a threat to polar bears. Arctic ice comes and goes. We're not sure exactly why, and we're not sure exactly of the cycles that govern its increase and decrease. The most recent decrease was dramatic, but only because it was the first decrease we were able to photograph from satellites. We now know that much of the reason for the 2007 low point of ice cover was that winds and currents pushed Arctic ice out of the Arctic to warmer parts of the Atlantic, where it then melted normally. It has since recovered dramatically. Himalayan glaciers increase and decrease, and always have, just like glaciers all over the world. Claims in the IPCC report that they will disappear by 2035 are flat out wrong. The error was caused because for years the area of Himalayan glaciers were measured in November, when snow cover made them look bigger. When the time of measurement was switched to September, they amazingly looked smaller. Although Indian scientists understood this, the journalists whose comments were hijacked for the IPCC report did not. The Amazonian rain forest can be compared to polar bears. The biggest threat it faces is encroachment of humans on its territory. The Amazon is being torn down for firewood, hardwood furniture and living space. It is being burned for slash and burn agriculture--some of that to grow biofuels to combat global warming. Like all forests, it is vulnerable to drought--being rainforest, it is more vulnerable than some other forests. If global warming produces drought in the Amazon, it will have an impact. However, the computer models that project scenarios of global warming cannot produce sufficient detail to say whether global warming will bring drought to the Amazon. The most that models can say is that overall precipitation worldwide should increase by 5%. Hurricanes and floods cause damage. Loss of life due to them has been reduced by between 95% and 99%, due to better weather predictions, but damage has increased. But none of the increase is attributable to climate change. Rather, a host of papers have shown that all of the increased damages due to hurricanes and floods is easily explained by richer people building more expensive property in areas vulnerable to storms and floods. African agriculture is, like agriculture anywhere, vulnerable to drought--just like the Amazon rainforest. However, a single report examining the possible effects of drought on cereal production on irrigated farms in 3 African countries was taken by the IPCC and reported as the probable future for all agricultural production throughout all the continent. The report was incorrect. African agricultural production is increasing and is expected to increase in the future. The Future Is Not Likely To Be As Desperate As We Are Told The rate of temperature rise has slowed, from about 2 degrees C per century (1975-19998) to about 1.2 degrees C per century (1995-2009). However, the recent slowdown is over too short a period to be statistically significant. Nonetheless, this is quite different from projections of accelerating temperature rises. This is what Phil Jones, director at CRU and a staunch advocate of the global warming establishment, said in an interview last week. Flaws in recent scientific studies have been found which make it distinctly possible that the temperature rises we have experienced are not unique--not even unusual. Keith Briffa, a member of the CRU team and a staunch advocate of the global warming establishment, said that he thought temperatures had been warmer than today 1,000 years ago in an email that was part of the Climategate release of emails and documents. Arctic ice has recovered about 25% of the ice it lost in 2007. Hurricanes are predicted to be less frequent in future--although it is possible that some will be stronger. The Amazon and polar bears both need our help and attention--but the current threats to them are from sources other than climate change, and we can easily make both strong enough to resist climate change if we change our current bad habits of shooting polar bears and burning down forests. Global warming is predicted to provide net benefits to many parts of the world, especially in the first few decades of this century. Generally speaking, cold kills more people than heat (although this is not a straightforward issue), CO2 is often good for many crops (but not all, and it's good for weeds as well), and the natural progress of economic development will strengthen the communities of people who are currently very poor enough that, like the Amazon and the polar bear, they will be better able to resist the effects of climate change after 2050. A generation of politicians supported by a cadre of scientists have consistently exaggerated the extent of the effects of past and projected climate change due to human contributions of CO2. This has distorted the debate, caused enormous expenditures of taxpayers' money on green projects that will have little or no effect on global warming and led to scientific misbehaviour that threatens public confidence in the best way we have for understanding the world around us. The scientists and politicians who have performed this disservice need to be held accountable for this. It has badly distracted us from doing the right things at the right times to take better care of each other and the planet we live on.

#### Icecore extractions prove warming is fake

Idso 11 (Craig D. Idso, Ph.D. (cidso@co2science.org), is lead author of Climate Change Reconsidered, published by the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). An earlier version of this article appeared on the NIPCC Web site. Subscriptions to the NIPCC email distribution list are free of charge and can be ordered at <http://www.nipccreport.org/about/emailsignupform.html>. “ Arctic Study Finds No Recent Warming” <http://www.heartland.org/full/29549/Arctic_Study_Finds_No_Recent_Warming.html>)

Climate alarmists contend the earth's near-surface air temperatures of the past decade were unprecedentedly high relative to the warmth of the entire past millennium, due primarily to human carbon dioxide emissions. They also claim this warming has been most strongly expressed throughout the Arctic, which they often describe as the planet's "canary in a coal mine," for the planet as a whole. Working with an ice core that retrieved from the Akademii Nauk (AN) ice cap (~80°31'N, 94°49'E) of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago (which is located in the central Russian Arctic between the Kara and Laptev Seas), scientists used oxygen isotopes to reconstruct temperatures covering the period 1883-1998.

 After confirming “good correlations and similarities” between their oxygen isotope data and 15 temperature stations distributed throughout the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic, the scientists reported the oxygen isotope data “show pronounced 20th-century temperature changes, with a strong rise about 1920 and the absolute temperature maximum in the 1930s," the scientists reported. Accordingly, **the data show there was no net warming of the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic over the entire last 80 years of the 20th century**. The findings, published in the peer-reviewed *Journal of Glaciology*, cast doubt on alarmist assertions of alarming recent global temperature rise given the Arctic is expected to be the first place on the planet to exhibit anthropogenic-induced global warming, and is expected to exhibit that warming more strongly than other regions of the globe.

# Round 4 NEG vs Whitman BM

## 1NC

### 1

#### CIR will pass---but fights are coming

Miami Herald 2/5 (“Will immigration reform go the distance?” http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/02/05/v-print/3218867/will-immigration-reform-go-the.html

Immigration reform is having a “Kumbaya” moment, with support from the White House, a bipartisan contingent in Congress, business and labor. The Republicans are petrified after their dismal showing among the fastest-growing slices of the electorate, Hispanics and Asians; President Barack Obama wants to reward the loyalty of those voters. Business and labor, as well as many politicians, want to fix a dysfunctional system. There are more than 11 million undocumented immigrants, 5 percent of the work force. Many of these people live in fear of discovery, while jobs go unfilled in some areas. Hold the champagne. When it comes to immigration laws, the concept is always easier than the reality. Change failed to happen six years ago, even with a push from a high-powered coalition led by President George W. Bush and Senators John McCain and Edward M. Kennedy. The dynamics are more favorable today. Still, the same obstacles persist; the powerful countervailing considerations include: • A Pathway to Where? There’s a fairly broad consensus for ending the illegal status of the undocumented. The White House, Hispanic groups and most Senate supporters insist that any reform must lead to a pathway to citizenship. That approach faces great resistance. Some lawmakers demand that any move toward citizenship must come second to solving the border-security problem, at a minimum. For some, this is a political cover; under the Obama administration, resources for border security have been increased sharply, including the use of drones. And deportations of undocumented immigrants are at a record high. A border-security trigger is realistic if it includes quantifiable goals, such as the number of new Border Patrol agents, the amount of resources allocated and the new technologies utilized. It isn’t reasonable if it requires meeting an amorphous standard such as “operational control” of a border that is always changing. Hispanic groups assert that the real motive for such demands is to unreasonably stretch out any possibility of granting citizenship. “There would be a backlash if citizenship is delayed for 15 or 20 years,” warns Gary Segura, a Stanford University professor and co-founder of Latino Decisions, a research organization on Hispanic public opinion. • A Fragile Coalition: Equally contentious is the question of future flows of immigrants. One proposal would link the number of legal immigrants to economic conditions: more would be let in when times are good, fewer in tougher times. That sounds easier than it is. There will be clashes over how great a priority should be given to those with high-tech skills or to agricultural workers or to family reunification. Small businesses will rebel against any costly verification plan. Most independent studies show that immigration is a decided economic plus, bringing in revenue and increasing productivity and innovation. Yet the arguments of the populist right may resonate more as the debate heats up. NumbersUSA, a leading anti-immigration group, is reviving charges that immigration reform would drive down wages for middle- and low-income workers. Kris Kobach, the Kansas secretary of state who authored anti-immigration measures in several states and the Republican Party’s platform position on the issue last summer, charges taxpayers would be hit with $2.6 trillion in added food stamp, Medicare and Medicaid and welfare costs. That estimate is refuted by reliable studies; it still cuts. • The Ghost of Dennis Hastert: The former Republican speaker of the House decreed that any bill must command majority support among majority party members. Last month, House Speaker John Boehner, Ohio, waived the rule twice: To pass a measure avoiding the automatic spending cuts and tax increases known as the fiscal cliff and then for aid to victims of Hurricane Sandy. Boehner, along with most party leaders, understands his party’s serious difficulties with Hispanic voters and fears making matters worse by blocking an overhaul. Two of the most virulent anti-immigration Republicans in the House, Lamar Smith of Texas and Steve King of Iowa, no longer hold important committee chairmanships. Yet with anti-immigration sentiment still running high among many Republican rank-and-file voters, it’s tough to imagine a majority of the party’s House members backing a comprehensive bill, even if, as is certain, the Senate goes first. Boehner’s only option might be to let a bill pass primarily with Democratic votes. To do that, he would need the support of House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and the whip, Kevin McCarthy; there’s no shrewder politician than McCarthy, who is always attuned to the party’s base. He’s also from California where, after Gov. Pete Wilson played the anti-immigration card in 1994, the Democrats completely dominate politics. • Who is the Ted Kennedy or Rahm Emanuel? The successful, if flawed, passage of Obama’s health-care measure probably wouldn’t have been possible without the savvy hand of former White House Chief of Staff Emanuel. Congressional Democrats and some outside advocates see no Emanuel counterpart in the current White House; privately, some say they would like the White House to enlist a special envoy — perhaps former Housing Secretary and San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros or former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle — to shepherd the legislation. There was no more capable legislator or deal-maker than the late Senator Kennedy. Egos and tensions already are surfacing among supporters of reform; Republicans don’t trust the White House, and some Democrats worry that Marco Rubio, the ambitious young Republican senator from Florida, will look for a reason to peel off as he comes under pressure from his party’s right wing. There is no senator today who possesses Kennedy’s skill for navigating these shoals. It’s still a slightly better bet that a big immigration bill will be enacted in this Congress. Getting there will be ugly, and the measure will seem to die more than once as it battles these cross pressures.

Energy push requires massive political capital---Obama doesn’t have time and energy to get energy and immigration reform

Davenport-energy correspondent for National Journal-12/6/12

How Obama and Congress Could Find Common Ground on Energy

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/how-obama-and-congress-could-find-common-ground-on-energy-20121206>

AGAINST THE CLOCK One big obstacle is time. A second-term president has about two years to push through major legislation before the next presidential campaign begins. In addition, two huge issues are already on the docket: immigration and tax reform. A sweeping overhaul of the nation’s tax code, which could easily absorb Congress through 2014, offers the first opportunity for major energy reform. Some lawmakers will probably insert a carbon-tax swap proposal in a broader tax-reform package, although for now the carbon tax seems unlikely to succeed. Democrats will also try to end tax breaks for the oil industry while extending those for renewable energy. But if the tax-reform debate ends without comprehensive new energy provisions, it may be too late to enact an energy overhaul. “If President Obama has victories on immigration and the deficit, that’s two potentially momentous victories for the president in a second term, where victories are not typical,” says historian Alfred Zacher, author of Trial and Triumph: Presidential Power in the Second Term. “It’s difficult to believe he’d win three.” Still, Zacher says, “because of his desire for a legacy, and the fact that he won’t need to worry about his base or reelection, he could come up with some unexpected environmental solutions. He’ll have to be a very capable politician, but if he can pull it off, he’ll be revered.” Ultimately, as Dorgan puts it, “there needs to be a will to do it, and it needs to come from the president and the leaders of Congress. If there’s not a will on the part of the president and the leaders of the House and Senate, it won’t happen. He needs to make it a priority.” If President Obama wants a legacy on energy, he’ll have to bring to the issue the same passion that candidate Obama once did.

Political capital is key

Weigant 1/23 (Chris WeigantPolitical writer and blogger at ChrisWeigant.com “Handicapping Obama's Second Term Agenda”

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/obama-second-term\_b\_2537802.html

The second big agenda item is immigration reform. President Obama holds virtually all the cards, politically, on this one. All Republicans who can read either demographics or polling numbers know full well that this may be their party's last chance not to go the way of the Whigs. Their support among Latinos is dismal, and even that's putting it politely. Some Republicans think they have come up with a perfect solution on how to defuse the issue, but they are going to be proven sadly mistaken in the end, I believe. The Republican plan will be announced by Senator Marco Rubio at some point, and it will seem to mirror the Democratic plan -- with one key difference. Republicans -- even the ones who know their party has to do something on the immigration problem -- are balking at including a "path to citizenship" for the 11 million undocumented immigrants who are already in America. The Republicans are trying to have their cake and eat it too -- and it's not going to work. "Sure," they say, "we'll give some sort of papers to these folks, let them stay, and even let them work... but there's no need to give them the hope of ever becoming a full citizen." This just isn't going to be good enough, though. There are essentially two things citizens can do which green card holders cannot: serve on juries, and vote. The Republicans are not worried about tainted juries, in case that's not clear enough. Republicans will bend over backwards in an effort to convince Latinos that their proposal will work out just fine for everyone. Latinos, however, aren't stupid. They know that being denied any path to citizenship equals an effort to minimize their voice on the national political stage. Which is why, as I said, Obama holds all the cards in this fight. Because this is the one issue in his agenda which Republicans also have a big vested interest in making happen. Obama and the Democrats will, I believe, hold firm on their insistence on a path to citizenship, and I think a comprehensive immigration bill will likely pass some time this year, perhaps before the summer congressional break. The path to citizenship it includes will be long, expensive and difficult (Republicans will insist on at least that), but it will be there. On gun control, I think Obama will win a partial victory. On immigration, I think he will win an almost-total victory. On global warming, however, he's going to be disappointed. In fact, I doubt -- no matter how much "bully pulpiting" Obama does -- that any bill will even appear out of a committee in either house of Congress. This will be seen as Obama's "overreach" -- a bridge too far for the current political climate. Anyone expecting big legislative action on global warming is very likely going to be massively disappointed, to put it quite bluntly. In fact, Obama will signal this in the next few months, as he approves the Keystone XL pipeline -- much to the dismay of a lot of his supporters. Of course, I could be wrong about any or all of these predictions. I have no special knowledge of how things will work out in Congress in the immediate future. I'm merely making educated guesses about what Obama will be able to achieve in at least the first few years of his second term. Obama has a lot of political capital right now, but that could easily change soon. The House Republicans seem almost demoralized right now, and Obama has successfully splintered them and called their bluff on two big issues already -- but they could regroup and decide to block everything the White House wants, and damn the political consequences. Unseen issues will pop up both on the domestic and foreign policy stages, as they always do. But, for now, this is my take on how the next few years are going to play out in Washington. Time will tell whether I've been too optimistic or too pessimistic on any or all of Obama's main agenda items. We'll just have to wait and see.

#### Comprehensive immigration reform is key to the economy and highly skilled workers

Farrell 12/13/12 (Chris, a contributing editor for Bloomberg Businessweek. From 1986-97, he was on the magazine's staff, as a corporate finance staff and department editor and then as an economics editor. Farrell wrote Right on the Money: Taking Control of Your Personal Finances and Deflation: What Happens When Prices Fall? Among Farrell's many awards are a National Magazine Award, two Loeb Awards, and the Edward R. Murrow Award. Farrell is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Stanford University. “Obama’s Next Act: Immigration Reform” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/obamas-next-act-immigration-reform>)

Washington won’t get much of a reprieve from verbal pyrotechnics once the drama of the fiscal cliff is over. Up next: major immigration reform. President Obama has made it clear that a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s badly frayed immigration system is a second-term priority. Many Republican lawmakers are convinced the big takeaway from the 2012 election results is that conservatives need to rethink their hard-line stance on immigration—including illegal immigrants. Here’s what Washington should do before tackling the tough job of rewriting the immigration laws: Create a quicksilver path to citizenship for the 11 million to 12 million undocumented workers in the U.S. (excluding the small number convicted of violent crimes or multiple felonies). The shift in status acknowledges that these foreign-born newcomers, like previous generations of immigrants, overcame significant obstacles to come to the U.S. to make a better life for their families. Illegal immigrants are neighbors heading off to work, sending their kids to school, and attending church. Their everyday lives would vastly improve by moving from the shadows of society into the mainstream. More important from a public-policy perspective, the change would give a boost to the economy’s underlying dynamism. “What you’re doing in the short run is making it easier for workers to move between jobs, a relatively small effect,” says Gordon Hanson, a professor of economics at the University of California at San Diego. “The larger effect from eliminating uncertainty for these immigrants is creating incentives for them to make long-term investments in careers, entrepreneurship, education, homes, and community.” Let’s state the obvious: A rapid transformation of illegal immigrants into legal immigrants isn’t in the cards. Amnesty—let alone citizenship—is an anathema to large parts of the electorate. Too bad, since the scholarly evidence is compelling that immigrants—documented or not, legal or illegal—are a boon to the net economy. “Competition fosters economic growth,” says Michael Clemens, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington. The economic return from attracting skilled immigrants to the U.S. is well known. Foreign-born newcomers account for some 13 percent of the population, yet they are responsible for one-third of U.S. patented innovations. The nation’s high-tech regions such as Silicon Valley, the Silicon Hills of Austin, Tex., and Boston’s Route 128 rely on immigrant scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and employees. Better yet, economist Enrico Moretti at the University of California at Berkeley calculates that a 1 percent increase in the share of college-educated immigrants in a city hikes productivity and wages for others in the city. Less appreciated is how much the economy gains from the efforts of less-skilled immigrants, including illegal workers. Throughout the country, foreign-born newcomers have revived beaten-down neighborhoods as immigrant entrepreneurs have opened small businesses and immigrant families have put down stakes. Immigrant workers have played a vital role keeping a number of industries competitive, such as agriculture and meatpacking. Cities with lots of immigrants have seen their per capita tax base go up, according to David Card, an economist at UC Berkeley. Despite the popular impression that a rising tide of immigrants is associated with higher crime rates, research by Robert Sampson of Harvard University and others offer a compelling case that it’s no coincidence that the growing ranks of immigrants tracks the reduction in crime in the U.S. But don’t newcomers—legal and illegal—drive down wages and job opportunities for American workers? Not really. A cottage industry of economic studies doesn’t find any negative effect on native-born wages and employment on the local level. On the national level the research shows the impact on native-born Americans doesn’t drift far from zero, either positively or negatively. “In both cases, immigrants are more likely to complement the job prospects of U.S.-born citizens than they are to compete for the same jobs as U.S.-born citizens,” Giovanni Peri, an economist at the University of California at Davis, writes in Rationalizing U.S. Immigration Policy: Reforms for Simplicity, Fairness, and Economic Growth. The counterintuitive results reflect a numbers of factors. Immigrants expand the size of the economic pie by creating new businesses, new jobs, and new consumers. Middle-class families find it easier to focus on careers with affordable immigrant labor offering gardening, child care, and other services. Many illegal immigrants aren’t fluent in English, so they don’t compete for the same jobs as native-born workers. Another factor behind the lack of direct competition is the higher educational level of native-born Americans. In 1960 about half of U.S.-born working-age adults hadn’t completed high school, while the comparable figure today is about 8 percent. The real downside concern is on the fiscal side of the immigrant ledger. Yes, more taxes would go into Social Security, Medicare, and the like with legalization, but more people would qualify for Medicaid, welfare, and other benefits. At the local level, many school districts are strained financially from educating immigrant children, legal and illegal. That said, the prospect of fiscal costs would diminish as newly legalized immigrant workers move freely around the country seeking jobs, entrepreneurs are comfortable expanding their payrolls, and immigrant parents push their children to live the American Dream. “Over time, as entrepreneurs emerge and families are better able to get their kids through high school and college, you’re reducing the long-run fiscal claim of the group,” says Hanson. There is no economic evidence that making roughly 6 percent of the workforce illegal will benefit the economy. Plenty of research supports the opposite case. A fast track to legality offers Washington a rare twofer: a just move that’s economically efficient.

**Decline goes nuclear**

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Mathew, and Jennifer “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 2

#### ---Government energy incentives are self-defeating --- The affirmative’s political planning lays the foundation for a new totalitarian priesthood.

Epstein 2009

Alex, founder and director of the Center for Industrial Progress, Energy at the Speed of Thought: The Original Alternative Energy Market, TOS Vol. 4, No. 2.

What is the solution? We just need the right government “energy plan,” leading politicians, intellectuals, and businessmen tell us. Of course “planners” such as Barack Obama, John McCain, Al Gore, Thomas L. Friedman, T. Boone Pickens, and countless others favor different plans with different permutations and combinations of their favorite energy sources (solar, wind, biomass, ethanol, geothermal, occasionally nuclear and natural gas) and distribution networks (from decentralized home solar generators to a national centralized so-called smart grid). But each agrees that there must be a plan—that the government must lead the energy industry using its power to subsidize, mandate, inhibit, and prohibit. And each claims that his plan will lead to technological breakthroughs, more plentiful energy, and therefore a higher standard of living. Consider Nobel Peace Prize winner Al Gore, who claims that if only we follow his “repower American plan”—which calls for the government to ban and replace all carbon-emitting energy (currently 80 percent of overall energy and almost 100 percent of fuel energy)4 in ten years—we would be using fuels that are not expensive, don’t cause pollution and are abundantly available right here at home. . . . We have such fuels. Scientists have confirmed that enough solar energy falls on the surface of the earth every 40 minutes to meet 100 percent of the entire world’s energy needs for a full year. Tapping just a small portion of this solar energy could provide all of the electricity America uses. And enough wind power blows through the Midwest corridor every day to also meet 100 percent of US electricity demand. Geothermal energy, similarly, is capable of providing enormous supplies of electricity for America. . . . [W]e can start right now using solar power, wind power and geothermal power to make electricity for our homes and businesses.5 And Gore claims that, under his plan, our vehicles will run on “renewable sources that can give us the equivalent of $1 per gallon gasoline.”6 Another revered thinker, Thomas L. Friedman, also speaks of the transformative power of government planning, in the form of a government-engineered “green economy.” In a recent book, he enthusiastically quotes an investor who claims: “The green economy is poised to be the mother of all markets, the economic investment opportunity of a lifetime.”7 Friedman calls for “a system that will stimulate massive amounts of innovation and deployment of abundant, clean, reliable, and cheap electrons.”8 How? Friedman tells us that there are two ways to stimulate innovation—one is short-term and the other is long-term—and we need to be doing much more of both. . . . First, there is innovation that happens naturally by the massive deployment of technologies we already have [he stresses solar and wind]. . . . The way you stimulate this kind of innovation—which comes from learning more about what you already know and doing it better and cheaper—is by generous tax incentives, regulatory incentives, renewable energy mandates, and other market-shaping mechanisms that create durable demand for these existing clean power technologies. . . . And second, there is innovation that happens by way of eureka breakthroughs from someone’s lab due to research and experimentation. The way you stimulate that is by increasing government-funded research. . . .9 The problem with such plans and claims: Politicians and their intellectual allies have been making and trying to implement them for decades—with nothing positive (and much negative) to show for it. For example, in the late 1970s, Jimmy Carter heralded his “comprehensive energy policy,” claiming it would “develop permanent and reliable new energy sources.” In particular, he (like many today) favored “solar energy, for which most of the technology is already available.” All the technology needed, he said, “is some initiative to initiate the growth of a large new market in our country.”10 Since then, the government has heavily subsidized solar, wind, and other favored “alternatives,” and embarked on grand research initiatives to change our energy sources—claiming that new fossil fuel and nuclear development is unnecessary and undesirable. The result? Not one single, practical, scalable source of energy. Americans get a piddling 1.1 percent of their power from solar and wind sources,11 and only that much because of national and state laws subsidizing and mandating them. There have been no “eureka breakthroughs,” despite many Friedmanesque schemes to induce them, including conveniently forgotten debacles such as government fusion projects,12 the Liquid Fast Metal Breeder Reactor Program,13 and the Synfuels Corporation.14 Many good books and articles have been written—though not enough, and not widely enough read—chronicling the failures of various government-sponsored energy plans, particularly those that sought to develop “alternative energies,” over the past several decades.15 Unfortunately, the lesson that many take from this is that we must relinquish hope for dramatic breakthroughs, lower our sights, and learn to make do with the increasing scarcity of energy. But the past failures do not warrant cynicism about the future of energy; they warrant cynicism only about the future of energy under government planning. Indeed, history provides us ample grounds for optimism about the potential for a dynamic energy market with life-changing breakthroughs—because America once had exactly such a market. For most of the 1800s, an energy market existed unlike any we have seen in our lifetimes, a market devoid of government meddling. With every passing decade, consumers could buy cheaper, safer, and more convenient energy, thanks to continual breakthroughs in technology and efficiency—topped off by the discovery and mass availability of an alternative source of energy that, through its incredible cheapness and abundance, literally lengthened and improved the lives of nearly everyone in America and millions more around the world. That alternative energy was called petroleum. By studying the rise of oil, and the market in which it rose, we will see what a dynamic energy market looks like and what makes it possible. Many claim to want the “next oil”; to that end, what could be more important than understanding the conditions that gave rise to the first oil? Today, we know oil primarily as a source of energy for transportation. But oil first rose to prominence as a form of energy for a different purpose: illumination. For millennia, men had limited success overcoming the darkness of the night with man-made light. As a result, the day span for most was limited to the number of hours during which the sun shone—often fewer than ten in the winter. Even as late as the early 1800s, the quality and availability of artificial light was little better than it had been in Greek and Roman times—which is to say that men could choose between various grades of expensive lamp oils or candles made from animal fats.16 But all of this began to change in the 1820s. Americans found that lighting their homes was becoming increasingly affordable—so much so that by the mid-1860s, even poor, rural Americans could afford to brighten their homes, and therefore their lives, at night, adding hours of life to their every day.17 What made the difference? Individual freedom, which liberated individual ingenuity. The Enlightenment and its apex, the founding of the United States of America, marked the establishment of an unprecedented form of government, one established explicitly on the principle of individual rights. According to this principle, each individual has a right to live his own life solely according to the guidance of his own mind—including the crucial right to earn, acquire, use, and dispose of the physical property, the wealth, on which his survival depends. Enlightenment America, and to a large extent Enlightenment Europe, gave men unprecedented freedom in the intellectual and economic realms. Intellectually, individuals were free to experiment and theorize without restrictions by the state. This made possible an unprecedented expansion in scientific inquiry—including the development by Joseph Priestly and Antoine Lavoisier of modern chemistry, critical to future improvements in illumination.18 Economically, this freedom enabled individuals to put scientific discoveries and methods into wealth-creating practice, harnessing the world around them in new, profitable ways—from textile manufacturing to steelmaking to coal-fired steam engines to illuminants. There had always been a strong desire for illumination, and therefore a large potential market for anyone who could deliver it affordably—but no one had been able to actualize this potential. In the 1820s, however, new scientists and entrepreneurs entered the field with new knowledge and methods that would enable them to harness nature efficiently to create better, cheaper illuminants at a profit. Contrary to those who believe that the government is necessary to stimulate, invest in, or plan the development of new energy sources, history shows us that all that is required is an opportunity to profit. That said, profiting in the illumination industry was no easy task. The entrenched, animal-based illuminants of the time, whatever their shortcomings, had long histories, good reputations, refined production processes, established transportation networks and marketing channels, and a large user base who had invested in the requisite lamps. In other words, animal-based illuminants were practical. For a new illumination venture to be profitable, it would have to create more value (as judged by its customers) than it consumed. A successful alternative would not only have to be a theoretical source of energy, or even work better in the laboratory; it would have to be produced, refined, transported, and marketed efficiently—or it would be worthless. Unlike today, no government bureaucrats were writing big checks for snazzy, speculative PowerPoint presentations or eye-popping statistics about the hypothetical potential of a given energy source. Thus, scientists and entrepreneurs developed illumination technologies with an eye toward creating real value on the market. They began exploring all manner of potential production materials—animal, vegetable, and mineral—and methods of production and distribution. Many of their attempts failed, such as forays into fish oils and certain plant oils that proved unprofitable for reasons such as unbearable smell, high cost of mass production, and low-quality light.19 But, out of this torrent of entrepreneurial exploration and experimentation, three illumination breakthroughs emerged. One, called camphene, came from the work of the enterprising scientist Isaiah Jennings, who experimented with turpentine. If turpentine could create a quality illuminant, he believed, the product held tremendous commercial potential as the lowest-cost illuminant on the market: Unlike animal fat, turpentine was neither in demand as a food product nor as a lubricant. Jennings was successful in the lab, and in 1830, he took out a patent for the process of refining turpentine into camphene. The process he patented was a form of distillation—boiling at different temperatures in order to separate different components—a procedure that is vital to the energy industry to this day. Before camphene could succeed on the market, Jennings and others had to solve numerous practical problems. For example, they discovered that camphene posed the threat of explosion when used in a standard (animal) oil lamp. The initial solution was to design new lamps specifically for use with camphene—but this solution was inadequate because the money saved using camphene would barely defray the expense of a new lamp. So, producers devised methods that enabled customers to inexpensively modify their existing lamps to be camphene-safe. The payoff: In the 1840s, camphene was the leading lamp oil, while use of animal oils, the higher-cost product, as illuminants declined in favor of their use as lubricants. Camphene was the cheapest source of light to date, creating many new customers who were grateful for its “remarkable intensity and high lighting power.”20 Second, whereas Jennings had focused on developing a brand-new source of illumination, another group of entrepreneurs—from, of all places, the Cincinnati hog industry—saw an opportunity to profitably improve the quality of light generated from animal lard, an already widely used source of illumination. At the time, the premium illuminant in the market was sperm whale oil, renowned for yielding a safe, consistent, beautiful light—at prices only the wealthy could afford. In the 1830s, soap makers within the hog industry set out to make traditional lard as useful for illumination as the much scarcer sperm whale oil. They devised a method of heating lard with soda alkali, which generated two desirable by-products that were as good as their sperm equivalents but less expensive: a new lard oil, dubbed stearin oil, for lamps and stearic acid for candles. This method, combined with a solid business model employing Cincinnati’s feedstock of hogs, created a booming industry that sold 2 million pounds of stearin products annually. The price of stearin oil was one third less than that of sperm whale oil, making premium light available to many more Americans.21 Thus camphene and stearin became leaders in the market for lamps and candles—both portable sources ofillumination. The third and final new form of illumination that emerged in the early 1800s was a bright, high-quality source of illumination delivered via fixed pipes to permanent light fixtures installed in homes and businesses. In the 17th century, scientists had discovered that coal, when heated to extremely high temperatures (around 1600 degrees), turns into a combustible gas that creates a bright light when brought to flame. In 1802, coal gas was used for the first time for commercial purposes in the famous factory of Boulton & Watt, near Birmingham, England.22 Soon thereafter, U.S. entrepreneurs offered coal gas illumination to many industrial concerns—making possible a major extension of the productive day for businesses, and thus increasing productivity throughout American industry. Initially, the high cost of the pipes and fixtures required by gas lighting precluded its use in homes. But entrepreneurs devised more efficient methods of installing pipes in order to bring gas into urban homes, and soon city dwellers in Baltimore, Boston, and New York would get more useful hours out of their days. Once the infrastructure was in place, the light was often cheaper than sperm whale oil, and was reliable, safe, and convenient. As a result, during the 1830s and 1840s, the coal-gas industry grew at a phenomenal rate; new firms sprang up in Brooklyn, Bristol (Rhode Island), Louisville, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia.23 By the 1840s, after untold investing, risk-taking, thinking, experimentation, trial, error, failures, and success, coal gas, camphene, and stearin producers had proven their products to be the best, most practical illuminants of the time—and customers eagerly bought them so as to bring more light to their lives than ever before. But this was only the beginning. Because the market was totally free, the new leaders could not be complacent; they could not prevent better ideas and plans from taking hold in the marketplace. Unlike the static industries fantasized by today’s “planners,” where some government-determined mix of technologies produces some static quantity deemed “the energy Americans need,” progress knew no ceiling. The market in the 19th century was a continuous process of improvement, which included a constant flow of newcomers who offered unexpected substitutes that could dramatically alter Americans’ idea of what was possible and therefore what was “needed.” In the early 1850s, entrepreneurs caused just such a disruption with a now-forgotten product called coal oil.24 Coal oil initially emerged in Europe, which at the time also enjoyed a great deal of economic freedom. Scientists and entrepreneurs in the field of illumination were particularly inclined to look for illuminants in coals and other minerals because of the relative scarcity of animal and vegetable fats, and correspondingly high prices for both. Beginning with the French chemist A. F. Selligue, and continuing with the British entrepreneur James Young, Europeans made great strides in distilling coal at low heat (as against the high heat used to create coal gas) to liquefy it, and then distilling it (as Jennings had distilled turpentine into camphene) to make lamp oil and lubricants that were just as good as those from animal sources. Coal was plentiful, easy to extract in large quantities, and therefore cheap. The primary use of coal oil in Europe, however, was as a lubricant. In North America, the primary use would be as an illuminant. Beginning in the 1840s, a Canadian physician named Abraham Gesner, inspired by the Europeans, conducted experiments with coal and was able to distill a quantity of illuminating oil therefrom. Gesner conceived a business plan (like so many scientists of the day, he was entrepreneurial), and teamed with a businessman named Thomas Cochrane to purchase an Alberta mining property from which he could extract a form of coal (asphaltum), refine it at high quality, and sell it below the going price for camphene. But in 1852 the project was aborted—not because the owners lost the means or will to see it through, but because the Canadian government forbade it. The government denied that the subsurface minerals belonged to those who harnessed their value; it held that they were owned by the Crown, which did not approve of this particular use. Gesner’s experience in Canada highlights a vital precondition of the rapid development of the American illumination energy industry: the security of property rights. All of the industries had been free to acquire and develop the physical land and materials necessary to create the technologies, make the products, and bring them to market based on the entrepreneurs’ best judgment. They had been free to cut down trees for camphene, raise hogs for stearin, and mine coal and build piping for gas lighting, so long as they were using honestly acquired property. And this freedom was recognized as a right, which governments were forbidden to abrogate in the name of some “higher” cause, be it the Crown or “the people” or the snail darter or protests by those who say, “Not in my backyard” about other people’s property. Because property rights were recognized, nothing stopped them from acting on their productive ideas. Had property rights not been recognized, all their brilliant ideas would have been like Gesner’s under Canadian rule: worthless. Not surprisingly, Gesner moved to the United States. He set up a firm, the New York Kerosene Company, whose coal-oil illuminant, kerosene, was safer and 15 percent less expensive than camphene, more than 50 percent less expensive than coal gas, 75 percent less expensive than lard oil, and 86 percent less expensive than sperm whale oil. Unfortunately, this was not enough for Gesner to succeed. His product suffered from many problems, such as low yields and bad odor, and was not profitable. However, his limited successes had demonstrated that coal’s abundance and ease of refining made it potentially superior to animal and vegetable sources. That potential was fully actualized by a businessman named Samuel Downer and his highly competent technical partners, Joshua Merrill and Luther Atwood. Downer had devoted an existing company to harnessing a product called “coup oil,” the properties of which rendered it uncompetitive with other oils. Recognizing the hopelessness of coup oil, Downer set his sights on coal-oil kerosene. Downer’s firm made major advances in refining technology, including the discovery of a more efficient means of treating refined oil with sulfuric acid, and of a process called “cracking”—also known as “destructive distillation”—which uses high heat to break down larger molecules into smaller ones, yielding higher amounts of the desired substance, in this case kerosene. (Unbeknownst to all involved, these discoveries would be vital to the undreamed of petroleum industry, which would emerge in the near future.) By 1859, after much effort went into developing effective refining processes and an efficient business model, Downer’s firm was able to make large profits by selling kerosene at $1.35 a gallon—a price that enabled more and more Americans to light their houses more of the time. Others quickly followed suit, and by decade’s end, businessmen had started major coal-oil refineries in Kentucky, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. The industry had attracted millions in investment by 1860, and was generating revenues of $5 million a year via coal oil—a growing competitor to coal gas, which was generating revenues of $17 million a year and had attracted $56 million (more than $1 billion in today’s dollars) in investment.25 As the 1850s drew to a close, coal oil and coal gas were the two leading illuminants. These new technologies brightened the world for Americans and, had the evolution of illumination innovation ended here, most Americans of the time would have died content. Their quality of life had improved dramatically under this energy revolution—indeed, so dramatically that, were a comparable improvement to occur today, it would dwarf even the most extravagant fantasies of today’s central planners. This points to a crucial fact that central planners cannot, do not, or will not understand: The source of an industry’s progress is a free market—a market with real economic planning, profit-driven individual planning. The revolution in illumination was a process of thousands of entrepreneurs, scientists, inventors, and laborers using their best judgment to conceive and execute plans to make profits—that is, to create the most valuable illuminant at the lowest cost—with the best plans continually winning out and raising the bar. As a result, the state of the market as a whole reflected the best discoveries and creativity of thousands of minds—a hyperintelligent integration of individual thinking that no single mind, no matter how brilliant, could have foreseen or directed. Who knew in 1820 that, of all the substances surrounding man, coal—given its physical properties, natural quantities, and costs of extraction and production—would be the best source for inexpensive illumination? Who knew all the thousands of minute, efficiency-producing details that would be reflected in the operations of the Samuel Downer Company—operations developed both by the company and by decades of trial and error on the market? Consider, then, what it would have meant for an Al Gore or Thomas Friedman or Barack Obama to “plan” the illumination energy market. It would have meant pretending to know the best technologies and most efficient ways of harnessing them and then imposing a “plan.” And, given that neither Gore nor Friedman nor anyone else could possibly possess all the knowledge necessary to devise a workable plan, what would their “plan” consist of? It would consist of what all central planners’ “plans” consist of: prohibition, wealth transfers, and dictates from ignorance. Depending on when the “planners” began their meddling and who was whispering in their ear, they might subsidize tallow candles or camphene, thereby pricing better alternatives out of the market or limiting lighting choices to explosive lamps. Thankfully, there was no such “planner”—there were only free individuals seeking profit and free individuals seeking the best products for their money. That freedom enabled the greatest “eureka” of them all—from an unlikely source. George Bissell was the last person anyone would have bet on to change the course of industrial history. Yet this young lawyer and modest entrepreneur began to do just that in 1854 when he traveled to his alma mater, Dartmouth College, in search of investors for a venture in pavement and railway materials.26 While visiting a friend, he noticed a bottle of Seneca Oil—petroleum—which at that time was sold as medicine. People had known of petroleum for thousands of years, but thought it existed only in small quantities. This particular bottle came from an oil spring on the land of physician Dr. Francis Beattie Brewer in Titusville, Pennsylvania, which was lumber country. At some point during or soon after the encounter, Bissell became obsessed with petroleum, and thought that he could make a great business selling it as an illuminant if, first, it could be refined to produce a high quality illuminant, and, second, it existed in substantial quantities. Few had considered the first possibility, and most would have thought the second out of the question. The small oil springs or seeps men had observed throughout history were thought to be the mere “drippings” of coal, necessarily tiny in quantity relative to their source. But Bissell needed no one’s approval or agreement—except that of the handful of initial investors he would need to persuade to finance his idea. The most important of these was Brewer, who sold him one hundred acres of property in exchange for $5,000 in stock in Bissell’s newly formed Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company of New York. To raise sufficient funds to complete the project, Bissell knew that he would have to demonstrate at minimum that petroleum could be refined into a good illuminant. He solicited Benjamin Silliman Jr., a renowned Yale chemist, who worked with the petroleum, refined it, and tested its properties for various functions, including illumination. After collecting a $500 commission (which the crash-strapped firm could barely put together), Silliman delivered his glowing report: 50 percent of crude petroleum could be refined into a fine illuminant and 90 percent of the crude could be useful in some form or another. Proof of concept in hand, Bissell raised just enough money to enact the second part of his plan: to see if oil could be found in ample quantities. According to the general consensus, his plan—to drill for oil—was unlikely to uncover anything. (One of Bissell’s investors, banker James Townsend, recalled his friends saying, “Oh, Townsend, oil coming out of the ground, pumping oil out of the earth as you pump water? Nonsense! You’re crazy.”) But Bissell’s organization had reason to suspect that the consensus was wrong—mostly because saltwater driller Samuel Kier had inadvertently found modest quantities of oil apart from known coal deposits, which contradicted the coal-drippings theory. And so Bissell proceeded, albeit with great uncertainty and very little money. He sent Edwin Drake, a former railroad conductor and jack-of-many-trades, to Titusville to find oil. Drake and his hired hands spent two years and all the funds the company could muster, but after drilling to 69.5 feet with his self-made, steam-powered rig, he found nothing. Fortunately, just as the investors told Drake to wrap up the project, his crew noticed oil seeping out of the rig. Ecstatic, they attempted to pump the oil out of the well—and succeeded. With that, a new industry was born. That is, a new potential industry was born. In hindsight we know that oil existed in quantities and had physical qualities that would enable it to supplant every other illuminant available at the time. But this was discovered only later by entrepreneurs with the foresight to invest time and money in the petroleum industry. Bissell and other oilmen faced a difficult battle. They had to extract, refine, transport, and market at a profit this new, little-understood material, whose ultimate quantities were completely unknown—while vying for market share with well-established competitors. Fortunately, they were up to the task, and many others would follow their lead. When word got out about Drake’s discovery, a “black gold” rush began, a rush to buy land and drill the earth for as much of this oil as possible. For example, upon seeing Drake’s discovery, Jonathan Watson, a lumber worker on Brewer’s land, bought what would become millions of dollars worth of oil land. George Bissell did the same. Participants included men in the lumber industry, salt borers turned oil borers, and others eager to take advantage of this new opportunity.27 Progress in this new industry was messy and chaotic—and staggering. In 1859, a few thousand barrels were produced; in 1860, more than 200,000; and in 1861, more than 2 million.28 Capital poured in from investors seeking to tap into the profits. In the industry’s first five years, private capitalists invested $580 million—$7 billion in today’s dollars.29 Even in the middle of the 19th century, when wealth was relatively scarce, the supposed problem of attracting capital to fund the development of a promising energy source did not exist so long as the energy source was truly promising. As producers demonstrated that enormous quantities of oil existed, they created a huge profit opportunity for others to build businesses performing various functions necessary to bring oil to market. At first, would-be transporters were hardly eager to build rail lines to Titusville, and would-be refiners were hardly eager to risk money on distillation machines (“stills”) that might not see use. As such, the oil industry was not functioning efficiently, and much of the oil produced in the first three years went to waste. The oil that did not go to waste was expensive to bring to market, requiring wagon-driving teamsters to haul it 20–40 miles to the nearest railroad station in costly 360-pound barrels.30 But once production reached high levels, driving crude oil prices down, the transportation, refining, and distribution of oil attracted much investment and talent. An early, price-slashing solution to transportation problems was “pond fresheting.” Entrepreneurial boatmen on Oil Creek and the Alleghany River, which led to Pittsburgh, determined that they could offer cheaper transportation by strapping barrels of oils on rafts and floating them down the river. But this only worked half the year; the rest of the time, water levels were too low. The ingenious workaround they devised was to pay local dam owners to release water (“freshet”) at certain points in the year in order to raise water levels, thereby enabling them to float their rafts downstream. The method worked, and Pittsburgh quickly became the petroleum refining capital of America.31 Railroads entered the picture as well, building lines to new cities, which allowed them to become refining cities. In 1863, the Lake Shore Railroad built a line to Cleveland, inspiring many entrepreneurs to establish refineries there—including a 23-year-old named John Rockefeller.32 Another innovation in oil transport was “gathering lines”—small several-mile-long pipelines that connected drilling sites to local storage facilities or railroads. At first, gathering lines were halted by the Pennsylvania government’s lax enforcement of property rights; the politically-influential teamsters would tear down new pipelines, and the government would look the other way. But once rights were protected, gathering lines could be constructed quickly for any promising drilling site, enabling sites to pump oil directly to storage facilities or transportation centers without the loss, danger, and expense of using barrels and teamsters. Still another innovation was the tank car. These special railroad cars could carry far more oil than could normal boxcars loaded with barrels, and, once certain problems were solved (wood cars were replaced by iron cars and measures were taken to prevent explosion), they became the most efficient means of transportation.33 In the area of refining, innovation was tremendous. Certain industry leaders, such as Joshua Merrill of the Samuel Downer Company and Samuel Andrews of Clark, Rockefeller, and Andrews (later to be named Standard Oil), continuously experimented to solve difficulties associated with the refining process. To refine crude oil is to extract from it one or more of its valuable “fractions,” such as kerosene for illumination, paraffin wax for candles, and gasoline for fuel. The process employs a still to heat crude oil at multiple, increasing temperatures to boil off and separate the different fractions, each of which has a different boiling point. Distillation is simple in concept and basic execution, but to boil off and bottle kerosene was hugely problematic: Impure kerosene could be highly noxious and highly explosive. Additionally, early stills did not last very long, yielded small amounts of kerosene per unit, took hours upon hours to cool between batches, and raised numerous other challenges. Throughout the 1860s, the leading refiners experimented with all aspects of the refining process: Should stills be shaped horizontally or vertically? How should heat be applied for evenness of temperature? How can the life of the still be maximized? How can the tar residue at the bottom be cleaned quickly and with as little damage to the still as possible? What procedures should one employ to purify the kerosene once distillation has been performed? When the process involves a chemical treatment, how much of that treatment should be used? Is it profitable to “crack” the oil, heating it at high temperature to create more kerosene molecules, which creates more kerosene per barrel but takes longer and requires expensive purification procedures? The leading refiners progressively asked and answered these questions, and profited immensely from the knowledge they gained. By the end of the 1860s, the basics of refining technology had been laid down,34 though it would not be until the 1870s—the Rockefeller era—that they would be employed industry-wide. On the marketing and distribution end, kerosene became a widely available good. Refining firms made arrangements with end sellers, most notably wholesale grocers and wholesale druggists, to sell their product. Rockefeller’s firm was a pioneer in international sales, setting up a New York office to sell kerosene all around the world—where it was in high demand thanks to its quality and cheapness, and to the lack of alternatives.35 The pace of growth of the oil industry was truly phenomenal. Within five years of its inception, with no modern communication or construction technology, the industry had made light accessible to even some of the poorest Americans. In 1864, a chemist wrote: Kerosene has, in one sense, increased the length of life among the agricultural population. Those who, on account of the dearness or inefficiency of whale oil, were accustomed to go to bed soon after the sunset and spend almost half their time in sleep, now occupy a portion of the night in reading and other amusements.36 Within five years, an unknown technology and an unimagined industry had become a source of staggering wealth creation. Had the early days of this industry been somehow filmed, one would see oilmen in every aspect of the business building up an enormous industry, moving as if the film were being fast-forwarded. Almost nothing in history rivals this pace of development, and it is inconceivable today that any construction-heavy industry could progress as quickly. It now takes more than five years just to get a permit to start building an oil derrick, let alone to complete the derrick, much less thousands of them. But in the mid-1800s, no drilling permits or other government permissions were required to engage in productive activity. This did not mean that oilmen could pollute at will—property rights laws prohibited polluting others’ property (though some governments, unfortunately, were lax in their enforcement of such laws). It did mean that, for the most part, they were treated as innocent until proven guilty; and they knew that so long as they followed clearly defined laws, their projects would be safe.37 Anyone with an idea could implement it as quickly as his abilities permitted. If he thought a forest contained a valuable mineral, he could buy it. If he thought drilling was the best means of extracting the mineral, he could set up a drilling operation. If he thought a railroad or a pipeline was economical, he could acquire the relevant rights-of-way, clear the land, and build one. If he thought he could do something better than others, he could try—and let the market be the judge. And he could do all of these things by right, without delay—in effect, developing energy at the speed of thought. As one prominent journalist wrote: It is certain . . . the development [of the petroleum industry] could never have gone on at anything like the speed that it did except under the American system of free opportunity. Men did not wait to ask if they might go into the Oil Region: they went. They did not ask how to put down a well: they quickly took the processes which other men had developed for other purposes and adapted them to their purpose. . . . Taken as a whole, a truer exhibit of what must be expected of men working without other regulation than that they voluntarily give themselves is not to be found in our industrial history.38 Imagine if George Bissell and Edwin Drake were to pursue the idea of drilling for oil in today’s political context. At minimum, they would have to go through a multiyear approval process in which they would be required to do environmental impact studies documenting the expected impact on every form of local plant and animal life. Then, of course, they would have to contend with zoning laws, massive taxes, and government subsidies handed to their competitors. More likely, the EPA would simply ax the project, declaring Titusville “protected” government land (the fate of one-third of the land in the United States today). More likely still, Bissell would not even seriously consider such a venture, knowing that the government apparatus would wreck it with unbearable costs and delays, or a bureaucratic veto. The speed of progress depends on two things: the speed at which men can conceive of profitable means of creating new value—and the speed at which they can implement their ideas. Since future discoveries depend on the knowledge and skills gained from past discoveries, delays in market activity retard both the application and the discovery of new knowledge. In 1865, members of the oil industry experienced a tiny fraction of the government interference with which the modern industry regularly contends: the Civil War’s Revenue Act of 1865. This was a $1 per barrel tax on crude inventory—approximately 13 percent of the price. This Act “slowed drilling to a virtual standstill” and “put hundreds of marginal producers out of business” by eating into businesses’ investment and working capital.39 Remarkably, the damage done by the Act scared the government away from taxing crude and oil products for decades, an effective apologyforits previous violation of property rights. Such was the general economic climate of the time. After the brief but crushing bout of confiscatory taxation, the economic freedom that made possible the rise of the oil industry resumed, as did the industry’s explosive growth. In 1865, kerosene cost 58 cents a gallon, much less expensive than any prior product had been—and half the price of coal oil.40 But entrepreneurs did not have time to revel in the successes of the past. They were too busy planning superior ventures for the future—knowing that with creativity they could always come up with something better, and that customers would always reward better, cheaper products. The paragon of this relentless drive to improve was Rockefeller, who developed a new business structure that would bring the efficiency of oil refining—and ultimately, the whole process of producing and selling oil—to new heights. Rockefeller was obsessed with efficiency and with careful accounting of profit and loss. In seeking to maximize his efficiency, he had one central realization that steered the fate of his company: Tremendous efficiency could be achieved through scale. From his first investment in a refinery in 1863, when he built the largest refinery in Cleveland, to his continual borrowing to expand the size of his operations, Rockefeller realized that the more oil he refined, the more he could invest in expensive but efficient devices and practices whose often-high costs could be spread over a large number of units. He created barrel-making facilities that cut his barrel costs from $3 to $1 each. He built large-scale refineries that required less labor per barrel. He purchased a fleet of tank cars, and created an arrangement with a railroad that lowered his costs from $900,000 to $300,000 a trip. (Such savings are the real basis of Rockefeller’s much-maligned rebates from railroads.) Rockefeller’s improvements, which can be enumerated almost indefinitely, helped lower the prevailing per-gallon price of kerosene from 58 cents in 1865, to 26 cents in 1870—a price at which most of his competitors could not afford to stay in business—to 8 cents in 1880. These incredible prices represented the continuous breakthroughs that the Rockefeller-led industry was making. Every five years marked another period of dramatic progress—whether through long-distance pipelines that eased distribution or through advances in refining that made use of vast deposits of previously unrefinable oil. Oil’s potential was so staggering that no alternative was necessary. But then someone conceived of one: the electric lightbulb. Actually, many men had conceived of electric lightbulbs in one form or another; but Thomas Edison, beginning in the late 1870s, was the first to successfully develop one that was practical and potentially profitable. Edison’s lightbulb lasted hundreds of hours, and was conceived as part of a practical distribution network—the Edison system, the first electrical utility and distribution grid. As wonderful as kerosene was, it generated heat and soot and odor and smoke and had the potential to explode; lightbulbs did not. Thus, as soon as Edison’s lightbulb was announced, the stock prices of publicly traded oil refiners plummeted. Oil, it appeared, was no longer the future of illumination energy; electricity was. This fact, and the competitive pressures it placed on the oil industry, prompted entrepreneurs to figure out whether their product could enjoy comparable consumer demand in any other sphere, inside or outside of the energy industry. They worked to expand the market for oil as a lubricant and as a fuel for railroads and tankers. But the fate of the industry would hinge on the rise of the automobile in the 1890s.41 It is little known that most builders of automobiles did not intend them to run on gasoline. Given the growth and popularity of electricity at the time, many cars were designed to run on electric batteries, whereas other cars ran on steam or ethanol. Gasoline’s dominance was not a fait accompli. If the market had not been free, the electric car would likely have been subsidized into victory, given the obsession with electricity at the time. But when the technologies were tested in an open market, oil/gasoline won out—because of the incredible efficiency of the Rockefeller-led industry coupled with gasoline’s energy density. Per unit of mass and volume, it could take a car farther than an electric battery or a pile of coal or a vat of ethanol (something that remains true to this day). Indeed, Thomas Edison himself explained this to Henry Ford, in a story told by electricity entrepreneur Samuel Insull. “He asked me no end of details,” to use Mr. Ford’s own language, “and I sketched everything for him; for I have always found that I could convey an idea quicker by sketching than by just describing it.” When the conversation ended, Mr. Edison brought his fist down on the table with a bang, and said: “Young man, that’s the thing; you have it. Keep at it. Electric cars must keep near to power stations. The storage battery is too heavy. Steam cars won’t do, either, for they require a boiler and fire. Your car is self-contained—carries its own power plant—no fire, no boiler, no smoke and no steam. You have the thing. Keep at it.”. . . And this at a time when all the electrical engineers took it as an established fact that there could be nothing new and worthwhile that did not run by electricity.42 By 1912, gasoline had become a staple of life—and was on the way to changing it even more than kerosene had. A trade journal from 1912, Gasoline—The Modern Necessity, read: It seems almost unbelievable that there was once a time when the refiners and manufacturers of petroleum products concerned themselves seriously with finding a market for the higher distillates. At the present time it is the higher distillate known as gasoline that is giving not alone the refiners grave concern but modern civilization as well. Then it was how to find an adequate and profitable market for it; now it is how to meet the ever-increasing demand for it.43 Oil was the ultimate alternative energy—first for illumination, then for locomotion. In a mere half century, oil went from being useless black goo to the chief energy source leading the illumination and mobilization of the world. Young couples filling up their automobiles in 1910 had nary a clue as to how much thought and knowledge went into their ability to power their horseless carriages so cheaply and safely. Nor did most appreciate that all of this depended on a political system in which the government’s recognition and protection of the right to property and contract enabled businessmen to develop the world around them, risk their time and money on any innovation they chose, and profit from the results. If we compare today’s “planned” energy market to the rights-respecting energy market that brought about the emergence of oil, we can see in concrete fact the practicality of a genuinely free market. Instead of protecting property rights and unleashing the producers of energy to discover the best forms of energy and determine how best to deploy them (which includes genuine privatization of the electricity grid and other transcontinental development),44 our government randomly dictates what the future is to be. Today, we are told, as if it were written in the stars, that plug-in hybrids powered by solar and wind on a “smart grid” are the way to go—a claim that has no more validity than an 1860s claim that a network of wagon drivers should deliver coal oil nationwide. What sources of energy are best pursued and how best to pursue them can be discovered only by millions of minds acting and interacting freely in the marketplace—where anyone with a better idea is free to prove it and unable to force others to fund his pursuit. When the government interferes in the marketplace, countless productive possibilities are precluded from coming into existence. Today’s government as “energy planner” not only thwarts the market by coercively subsidizing the “right” energy technologies; it damages the market by opposing or even banning the “wrong” energy technologies or business models. Today’s energy policy severely restricts the production of every single practical, scalable form of energy: coal, natural gas, oil, and, above all, nuclear. Nuclear energy deserves special mention because it has tremendous proven potential, the result of its incredible energy density: more than one million times that of any fossil fuel—which, unlike oil, coal, or natural gas, has never been allowed to develop in anything resembling a free market. Thanks to environmentalist hysteria, this proven-safe source of energy has been virtually banned in the United States. And when nuclear plants have been permitted, construction costs and downtime losses have been multiplied many times over by multi-decade regulatory delays. Even in other countries, where nuclear power is much more welcome, it is under the yoke of governments and is therefore progressing at a fraction of its potential. If the scientists, engineers, and businessmen in the nuclear power industry had been able to pursue their ideas and develop their products in a free market—as oilmen once were able to do—how much better would our lives be today? What further technologies would have blossomed from that fertile foundation? Would automobiles even be running on gasoline? Would coal be used for anything anymore? And if entrepreneurs with other, perhaps even better, energy ideas had been free to put them into practice as quickly as their talents would allow—just as their 19th-century forebears had—might we by now have realized the dream of supplanting nuclear fission with nuclear fusion, which many consider the holy grail of energy potential? The fact is, we cannot even dream of what innovations would have developed or what torrents of energy would have been unleashed. As the history of the original alternative energy industry illustrates, no one can predict the revolutionary outcomes of a market process. Happily, however, with respect to the future, we can do better than dream: We can see for ourselves what kind of untapped energy potential exists, by learning from the 19th century. We can—and must—remove the political impediments to energy progress by limiting the government to the protection of rights. Then, we will witness something truly spectacular: energy at the speed of 21st-century thought.

#### ---The alternative is a question of ethics --- Reject the affirmative’s managerial self-hatred for the creative freedom of the market.

Romar 2008

Edward J., Lecturer with honors at Boston College of Management, Noble Markets: The Noble/Slave Ethic in Hayek’s Free Market Capitalism, Journal of Business Ethics, DOI 10.1007/s10551-008-9748-6

The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from the triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value posting eye—this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction (Nietzsche, 1989b, pp. 36–37, italics in the original.) What connects the master/slave moralities is the ‘‘will to power.’’ Nietzsche considered this the primary psychological driving force of human behavior (Kaufman, 1974, p. 183). There are several references to the ‘‘will to power’’ in Beyond Good and Evil (Kaufman, 1989a, p. 203), On the Genealogy of Morals, where he likens the ‘‘will to power’’ to ‘‘an instinct for freedom’’ (Kaufman, 1989b, p. 87, italics in the original,), in Zarathustra where, according to Kaufmann, Nietzsche introduces the ‘‘will to power for the first time’’ (Kaufman, 1954, p. 7) and in The Will to Power, where it is discussed in depth. The ‘‘will to power’’ is found in both slave and master moralities. Nietzsche uses the term power in several ways. The term is used to describe the moral right of the masters to liberation and the creation of new values. The term is used to illustrate how slave morality weakens the noble and, by forcing society to accept slave morality, it leads society into decay, dependency and despair (Kaufman, 1968, p. 37). Finally, the ‘‘will to power’’ is used as a description of the noble as an individual who seeks excellence and self overcoming (Kaufman, 1974, pp. 201, 203). Power is not simply for the control of the herd, though it must play that role. The fundamental use of power is the freedom that allows individuals to be creative, to fulfill their potentiality and be their own master. In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek analyzes the major reasons why some societies descended into the tragedy of totalitarianism. He argues that these societies, in a false quest for utopia, were seduced by the promise of central planning to abandoned freedom in favor of distributive justice. Hayek analyses the practice of central planning and argues that any implementation of planning, even the most innocuous, will lead inevitably to totalitarianism. To the economist perhaps, what planning does to the economy and the production of wealth is of central importance. While this is important to the ethicist, too, what drives this choice is of equal importance. For Hayek, however, the driving force for planning and central control of the economy is the ‘‘demand for an equal distribution of wealth’’ (Hayek, 1994, p. 30). Distributive justice is offered as the road to freedom. By destroying private property it becomes the road to subservience where individual freedom is exchanged for some unachievable absolute security. Socialism is the doctrine of the slave and herd: all the docile, and gullible, who have no strong convictions of their own but are prepared to accept a ready-made system of values if it is only drummed into their ears sufficiently loudly and frequently. It will be those whose vague and imperfectly formed ideas are easily swayed and whose passions and emotions are readily aroused who will thus swell the ranks of the totalitarian party…It seems to be almost a law of human nature that it is easier for people to agree on a negative program—on the hatred of an enemy, on the envy of those better off—than on any positive task. (Hayek, 1994, p. 153) Over time this need for subservience will create a psychological dependency which will erode further freedom and independence. (T)he most important change which extensive governmental control produces is a psychological change, an alteration in the character of the people. This is necessarily a slow affair, a process which extends not over a few years but perhaps over one or two generations. The important point is that the political ideals of a people and its attitude toward authority are much the effect as the cause of the political institutions under which it lives. (Hayek, 1994, p. xxxix) For Hayek, socialism is not the only slave morality. He has equal contempt for conservatism and what he calls modern liberalism as solutions to the problem of political organization. Conservatism is found wanting because it offers only resistance to change but no alternative vision. It is fearful of change, ‘‘appeals to the timid mind’’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 400), and has a ‘‘fondness for authority’’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 400). Similarly, modern liberalism, the liberalism of Continental Europe and the English utilitarians, is found wanting because ‘‘socialist influences…have intruded into it’’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 409). If socialism, conservativism, and modern liberalism are false, Hayek is left to offer a positive moral foundation for his ‘‘Old Whig’’ society. He must offer a way to move forward toward his ideal society. For Hayek, the solution is free market capitalism as the foundation for conditions of individual freedom. For free markets to function effectively minimum regulation is required to allow for the maximum freedom. Therefore, what is needed is general agreement by all members of society to accept a minimum set of rules, which allow for maximum freedom. These rules protecting private property, individual choice and so forth, allow the greatest area for individual action. It requires individuals to be responsible for their own actions and to develop their own moral foundation. If socialism leads to a psychology of dependency, free market capitalism requires a psychology of independence. It demands that individuals take responsibility for themselves and achieve their potential. Progress and human fulfillment must be found in the crucible of market competition. Whether one succeeds or fails is immaterial; one must rejoice in the freedom to achieve one’s capabilities. The risk of success and failure are the essence of free market competition; one must take the risk and not wallow in self-pity.

### 3

#### China is assuming leadership role over new nuclear power innovation, commercialization, and exports.

Froggatt 6/6/12

http://nuclearexportcontrols.blogspot.com/2012/06/chinese-nuclear-goes-global.html

Chinese Nuclear Goes Global

In the space of a couple of decades, China has become a major player in the global nuclear sector. With by far the largest number of reactors under construction of any country in the world, and further reactors on order, it is seen as a vital market for uranium, a testing ground for new reactors designs and, increasingly, a potential partner for nuclear developments across the world. But the Fukushima crisis in Japan has had a significant – and under reported – impact on Chinese nuclear developments, triggering a freeze on the start of new construction, a re-consideration of the safety standards of domestic designs and unprecedentedly visible opposition to the building of new, inland nuclear plants. While an announcement was made by the State Council last week that the ban will be lifted shortly, the events of the last 15 months will still result in a failure to meet China’s current five-year plan on nuclear development and, depending on how things develop, its 2020 objectives as well. The global clout of China’s nuclear sector is such that the impacts of its decisions stretch far beyond the nation’s borders. From France to Namibia, from reactor designers to uranium-mining firms, the industry will be waiting anxiously for news from China. China came relatively late to the civil nuclear industry: it started construction of its first commercial reactor only in 1985. As of May this year, the country had 16 reactors in operation, which in 2011 provided 1.85% of the country’s electricity, the lowest share of any country with nuclear power. But, despite its late arrival to the party, China was – until Fukushima – proving an energetic player, with an impressive recent history of construction starts. Today, it has 26 reactors under construction, representing 39% of global new build. But Fukushima changed the picture. Three days after the 2011 tsunami triggered equipment failures at the Japanese plant, Xie Zhenhua, vice chairman of China’s top economic planning body, the National Development and Reform Commission, was quoted by Bloomberg as saying “[e]valuation of nuclear safety and the monitoring of plants will be definitely strengthened.” Then, an account of a meeting of the State Council, chaired by premier Wen Jiabao, in mid-March 2011 included the following: “We will temporarily suspend approval of nuclear-power projects, including those in the preliminary stages of development....We must fully grasp the importance and urgency of nuclear safety, and development of nuclear power must make safety the top priority.” As a result, a new China National Plan for Nuclear Safety with short-, medium- and long-term actions was ordered, and the construction of new plants suspended pending its approval. A May 31 meeting of the State Council is said to have given provisional approval to both the safety plan and a set of goals for 2020. If implemented, these proposals will require some of the existing reactors to undertake safety modifications to meet new standards on earthquakes and flooding. However, it is still unclear when construction on new projects might begin again, or when the proposal for a new safety standard will be released for public comments. It is suggested the delay has been partly caused by uncertainty over the strategic direction for future reactor designs, and in particular whether future construction would be dominated by China’s second-generation CPR 1000 design or move towards greater deployment of third-generation designs from overseas. China has not yet fully developed its own third-generation design and would have to rely initially on the European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) or the American AP1000 reactor. The potential move towards much greater, or even total, dependence on the most modern design is affected by conflicting concerns: the higher costs of the international design and greater confidence in the safety standard. Tange Zede, a member of China’s State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC), was reported in Nuclear Intelligence Weekly as saying the domestically designed CPR-1000 could not even meet the national safety standards issued in 2004, let alone the most up-to-date international standards. Zede stated that “unless the constructed second generation reactors are renovated, they should not be allowed to load fuel and start operation.” Historically, international nuclear vendors have sought to construct their latest models in China. Russia’s reactor-exporting company Atomstroyexport provided its latest design, the AES-91, and equipment for units one and two at Jiangsu province’s Tianwan power plant, which was completed in 2007. It is said that two further reactors will be commissioned, but no date has been set for construction. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL) built two of its heavy-water reactors at theQinshan phase-three plant in Zhejiang, on China’s east coast, but despite the fact these were completed in 2002 and 2003 respectively, no further orders have been placed. Finally, the French utility EDF was engaged in the construction of two reactors at Daya Bay, south China, which were completed in 1994 using technology from French firm Framatome, now AREVA. Two further reactors at phase one of the Ling Ao plant in Shenzhen, also in the south, were built using Framatome equipment, though with a larger domestic contribution. But by the time it came to phase two, a domestic Chinese design was used. Today, the world’s major international reactor vendors, notably AREVA and Westinghouse, are building their most advanced designs in China. In the case of Westinghouse, the AP1000 is the company’s flagship third-generation design, and China is its only sale. The contract, worth around US$5.3 billion (34 billion yuan), is for construction of four reactors, including transfer of both reactor technology and back-end services, particularly waste management. Construction of these four units, two at Sanmen in Zhejiang province and two at Haiyang, further north in Shandong province, is under way, though delays of six to 12 months are reported. For the first unit at Sanmen, the slippage is said to be due to design changes post-Fukushima. For the remaining three units, supply-chain issues relating to the increased use of local components are blamed. If reports are accurate, use of domestic parts across the series of the four reactors will increase from 30% to 70%, and any future reactors will be built with Chinese components alone. The estimated construction costs of the AP1000 are also quoted as rising. In 2009, it was said they would cost US$1,940 per kilowatt (12,400 yuan), but the latest figures range from US$2,300 to US$2,600 per kilowatt. While this is far below the estimated costs of any other third-generation project, globally it is higher than the reported costs for China’s CPR 1000 at US$1,800 per kilowatt. In November 2007, AREVA announced the signing of an €8 billion (US$11.6 billion) contract with China Guangdong Nuclear (CGN) for the construction of two EPRs in Taishan, in south China’s Guangdong province, and said it would provide all the materials and services required to operate them. The Taishan project is owned by Guangdong Taishan Nuclear Power Joint Venture Company Limited, a hook-up between EDF (30%) and CGN. First concrete was poured in October 2009, and unit one was expected to begin operating in 2013, followed by a second unit in 2014. Two other EPR reactors are being built in Europe, one in Finland and one inFrance, but are both running at least 100% over budget and four to five years behind schedule. The delays are such that the Chinese reactors may now be operational before those being built in Europe. Completing the EPRs in China to time and budget will be a vital test for AREVA, which the company will hope can offset its bad experience in Europe. Troubles closer to home are said to be contributing to its lack of sales in other parts of the world, such as the United Arab Emirates. China is also stepping up its nuclear export activity. The most consistent example is Pakistan, which China has supplied with equipment for two reactors at Chashma in Punjab. Construction of units three and four reportedly began at the end of 2011, with China Zhongyuan Engineering as the general contractor and China Nuclear Industry No. 5 Construction Company as the installer. Finance is also coming from China. It doesn’t stop with Pakistan. In recent months, the Chinese industry has been linked with many other projects around the world. The visit of Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to Beijing in April was used to discuss China’s assistance for a proposed nuclear-power station at the Turkish city of Sinop. Other possible deals include the sale of a plant to South Africa and a nuclear co-operation agreement in Saudi Arabia, while there has been speculation over potential Chinese ownership of the energy company Horizon Nuclear Power, established by utilities Eon and RWE to build nuclear plants in the United Kingdom, but now up for sale. To fuel the country’s expectation of a rapidly growing nuclear sector, two companies – CGN and China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) – are permitted to import uranium. To meet official fuel requirements, they are set to increase imports from around 3,600 tonnes per year in 2010 to some 10,000 tonnes in 2020. Of the two firms, CGN has been the more successful over recent years and has signed a number of deals. In November 2010, its leaders inked a 10-year agreement for the supply of 24,200 tonnes of uranium from Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom. In addition, CGN and Chinese equity funds each have a 24.5% share in AREVA’s mines in Namibia, South Africa and the Central African Republic, which could provide an additional 40,000 tonnes of uranium starting in 2022. CGN signed another deal in November 2010 with Cameco of Canada for the supply of 13,000 tonnes of uranium through 2025. More recently, in February this year, CGN completed a takeover of Extract Resources, which is developing Africa’s largest known uranium resource. CGN, together with the China-Africa Development fund paid €2.2 billion (US$2.7 billion) for the company and associated companies, such as Kalahari Minerals. The CGN activity contrasts starkly with the limited success of CNNC, which has secured little supply outside of China despite attempts in Mongolia, Kazakhstan and Niger. Though, in light of its ambition to secure 2,500 tonnes of uranium a year by 2015, CNNC is likely to increase its activity in the market, and there are suggestions it might take a stake in AREVA’s new project in Niger. Prior to the accident at Fukushima, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan anticipated 43 gigawatts of nuclear power in operation by the end of 2015. Meeting this target would have required the completion of all reactors under construction at the end of 2010, plus those scheduled to start in 2011. It therefore cannot be met. A report on implementation of the 12th Five-Year Plan, published by the China Electricity Council in March estimated that China’s nuclear-generating capacity would reach 80 gigawatts by 2020. But the suspension of the start of new construction and the uncertainty over the strategic direction for future designs make meeting this 2020 target highly unlikely. Public opinion could also pose an obstacle. In a poll carried out by research agency Ipsos MORI after Fukushima, 42% of those surveyed in China were supportive of nuclear power – but 48% were opposed. It is also reported that public opposition and environmental concerns have led to the delay in construction of three inland nuclear power sites. In March this year, oppositionto the proposed Pengze power plant in Jiangxi erupted into the public sphere on a scale not previously seen when local authority documents critical of the project were posted on the internet. Given nuclear’s small contribution to China’s electricity supply, a doubling or trebling of new-build capacity won’t significantly alter the electricity mix or, for that matter, Chinese emission trajectories. However, the future direction of its choice of reactor design domestically could fundamentally change the number of orders for a particular manufacturer. This is something global companies are well aware of, though they should note that – so far – China has not deployed any foreign reactor design at scale, rather ordering a couple and then largely carrying on with domestic designs. Fukushima has already had a significant impact on the Chinese nuclear sector and, more than 15 months after the accident, the moratorium on new construction starts remains in place. The questions are now, one, will future orders be placed at the pre-Fukushima rate? And, two, what new design safety standards are required? The answers to these questions are not only eagerly awaited in Paris and Tokyo, the homes of AREVA and Westinghouse, but also uranium suppliers in Africa and prospective nuclear builders in the United Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to name but a few. China’s nuclear developments probably matter more to the rest of the world than they do to China.

#### US regulatory climate causing shift to China to develop next generation reactors

Hall-Energy Digital-1/23/12

US to Explore Small Nuclear Reactor Designs

<http://www.energydigital.com/green_technology/us-to-explore-small-nuclear-reactor-designs>

In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster last year, technology companies are stepping up to develop safer, more economical nuclear reactors in an attempt to wean dependence on conventional, large-scale nuclear used all over the world today. After Bill Gates took his concepts to China—where regulations on nuclear plants are less stringent and innovations gain support—the DOE's announcement is a positive step in spurring more US manufacturing. “America’s choice is clear - we can either develop the next generation of clean energy technologies, which will help create thousands of new jobs and export opportunities here in America, or we can wait for other countries to take the lead,” said Energy Secretary Steven Chu. “The funding opportunity announced today is a significant step forward in designing, manufacturing, and exporting U.S. small modular reactors, advancing our competitive edge in the global clean energy race.”

#### Revitalizing the US industry undermines Chinese export markets

Ferguson 10—President of the Federation of American Scientists. Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and an Adjunct Lecturer in the National Security Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University. (Charles, Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: The Implications of Expanded Nuclear Energy in Asia, in Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose, Ed Tellis, Marble and Tanner, 146)

Although China began to develop commercial nuclear energy a decade or two after Japan and South Korea, Beijing is emulating the course charted by Tokyo and Seoul. If China achieves its ambitious goal of more than one hundred operating commercial reactors by 2030, it will likely become the state with the most nuclear power plants in the world unless a major surge in construction occurs in the United States. China may also emerge by then as a major supplier of nuclear technologies and may garner clients in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

#### **Chinese nuclear exports key to soft power**

Blank-prof strategic studies institute, Army War College-6/16/10

China puts down marker in nuclear power race<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LF16Cb01.html>

Therefore, China's recent nuclear exports to Pakistan and the future of its nuclear exports in general need to be examined in these three contexts. The first context is that of the overall growth of the assertiveness of China's diplomacy in general and efforts to use nuclear power and military instruments like missiles as sources of influence abroad. In the case of exports to Pakistan, a second context is the long-standing geopolitical rivalry among India, China and Pakistan in which China's "all-weather" friendship with Pakistan has been a deliberate and conscious Chinese strategy to inhibit the growth of Indian power. Finally, we must keep in mind that China is not only an exporter of nuclear energy, it also is a consumer of that energy and so it will be a key market for other exports from the likes of Russia, the United States, France, South Korea, and Japan. As an importer, it obviously will welcome the rivalry of exporters who wish to sell to it so that it can obtain more favorable terms. However, as an exporter of nuclear energy and a power that wants to export more of it for both economic and political gain, it cannot afford to let either its rivals outpace it in Asia or in other areas that China deems as essential to the pursuit of its larger strategic goals.

#### Chinese soft power key to international security and resolving all global problems

Zhang-professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations-9/4/12

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm

The rise of China's political soft power

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

### 1NC – Gas

#### No impact to warming-most recent data proves the c02 escapes

Taylor 11 (James, is a senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News. “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/>)

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict.

#### **Warming won’t destroy the world---their models are empirically false**

Fuller 10 (Thomas, SF Environmental Policy Examiner, Mar 3, <http://www.climatechangefraud.com/climate-reports/6518-global-warming-is-real-but-effects-have-been-exaggerated-and-we-dont-know-the-future>)

Temperatures have risen 0.7 degrees Celsius over the past century, which is about twice the rate of the previous century. Even if Anthony Watts and Steve McIntyre are absolutely correct about urban heat island effects and paleoclimatic temperature reconstructions, the earth has warmed--and both Watts and McIntyre have said so on their websites repeatedly. This is not really part of the controversy at all. Nor is the reality of the greenhouse effect. Nor is the capability of CO2 contributing to the greenhouse effect. Nor is the reality of human contributions of large amounts of CO2. Almost all skeptics agree with the scientific consensus about this. (It is very convenient for the climate establishment to say they 'deny' this, but the skeptics mostly don't.) What many (not just skeptics) disagree on is the observed effects to date and the future effects as estimated. The Effects Have Been Exaggerated The current warming began around 1880 (give or take a decade) upon the conclusion of the Little Ice Age. The warming has not been even or steady--it accelerates and decelerates for reasons we don't really understand. Those who cry for political action to combat global warming have described some effects of it that they claim have already occurred. In almost every case, their claims have proven to be exaggerated. The 'poster children' for global warming have been polar bears, Himalayan glaciers, African agriculture, increased damage and destruction due to hurricanes and floods, Amazonian rainforests and Arctic ice. Polar bears face an uncertain future. Climate change is just one of many factors that are changing for them. Other factors include human encroachment on their habitat, the response of other wildlife to changes, and most importantly, hunting. Some of the sub-populations of polar bears are decreasing. Some are increasing and some are staying the same. The single most important contribution we could make to helping the population of polar bears increase is to stop shooting them. If we were serious about preserving large numbers of polar bears, we would limit the expansion of human activities throughout their habitat, which would make polar bears less of a threat to people and remove one of the reasons for our killing them. Polar bears have lived through periods of higher temperatures than now, including periods of zero Arctic ice cover. They can swim 200 miles without resting, and Arctic ice loss in and of itself is not a threat to polar bears. Arctic ice comes and goes. We're not sure exactly why, and we're not sure exactly of the cycles that govern its increase and decrease. The most recent decrease was dramatic, but only because it was the first decrease we were able to photograph from satellites. We now know that much of the reason for the 2007 low point of ice cover was that winds and currents pushed Arctic ice out of the Arctic to warmer parts of the Atlantic, where it then melted normally. It has since recovered dramatically. Himalayan glaciers increase and decrease, and always have, just like glaciers all over the world. Claims in the IPCC report that they will disappear by 2035 are flat out wrong. The error was caused because for years the area of Himalayan glaciers were measured in November, when snow cover made them look bigger. When the time of measurement was switched to September, they amazingly looked smaller. Although Indian scientists understood this, the journalists whose comments were hijacked for the IPCC report did not. The Amazonian rain forest can be compared to polar bears. The biggest threat it faces is encroachment of humans on its territory. The Amazon is being torn down for firewood, hardwood furniture and living space. It is being burned for slash and burn agriculture--some of that to grow biofuels to combat global warming. Like all forests, it is vulnerable to drought--being rainforest, it is more vulnerable than some other forests. If global warming produces drought in the Amazon, it will have an impact. However, the computer models that project scenarios of global warming cannot produce sufficient detail to say whether global warming will bring drought to the Amazon. The most that models can say is that overall precipitation worldwide should increase by 5%. Hurricanes and floods cause damage. Loss of life due to them has been reduced by between 95% and 99%, due to better weather predictions, but damage has increased. But none of the increase is attributable to climate change. Rather, a host of papers have shown that all of the increased damages due to hurricanes and floods is easily explained by richer people building more expensive property in areas vulnerable to storms and floods. African agriculture is, like agriculture anywhere, vulnerable to drought--just like the Amazon rainforest. However, a single report examining the possible effects of drought on cereal production on irrigated farms in 3 African countries was taken by the IPCC and reported as the probable future for all agricultural production throughout all the continent. The report was incorrect. African agricultural production is increasing and is expected to increase in the future. The Future Is Not Likely To Be As Desperate As We Are Told The rate of temperature rise has slowed, from about 2 degrees C per century (1975-19998) to about 1.2 degrees C per century (1995-2009). However, the recent slowdown is over too short a period to be statistically significant. Nonetheless, this is quite different from projections of accelerating temperature rises. This is what Phil Jones, director at CRU and a staunch advocate of the global warming establishment, said in an interview last week. Flaws in recent scientific studies have been found which make it distinctly possible that the temperature rises we have experienced are not unique--not even unusual. Keith Briffa, a member of the CRU team and a staunch advocate of the global warming establishment, said that he thought temperatures had been warmer than today 1,000 years ago in an email that was part of the Climategate release of emails and documents. Arctic ice has recovered about 25% of the ice it lost in 2007. Hurricanes are predicted to be less frequent in future--although it is possible that some will be stronger. The Amazon and polar bears both need our help and attention--but the current threats to them are from sources other than climate change, and we can easily make both strong enough to resist climate change if we change our current bad habits of shooting polar bears and burning down forests. Global warming is predicted to provide net benefits to many parts of the world, especially in the first few decades of this century. Generally speaking, cold kills more people than heat (although this is not a straightforward issue), CO2 is often good for many crops (but not all, and it's good for weeds as well), and the natural progress of economic development will strengthen the communities of people who are currently very poor enough that, like the Amazon and the polar bear, they will be better able to resist the effects of climate change after 2050. A generation of politicians supported by a cadre of scientists have consistently exaggerated the extent of the effects of past and projected climate change due to human contributions of CO2. This has distorted the debate, caused enormous expenditures of taxpayers' money on green projects that will have little or no effect on global warming and led to scientific misbehaviour that threatens public confidence in the best way we have for understanding the world around us. The scientists and politicians who have performed this disservice need to be held accountable for this. It has badly distracted us from doing the right things at the right times to take better care of each other and the planet we live on.

#### Even if it did, no extinction

Green 11 (Roedy, PHD from British Colombia, “Extinction of Man”, http://mindprod.com/environment/extinction.html//umich-mp)

Mankind is embarking on a strange ecological experiment. Over a couple of centuries, man is burning the carbon accumulated over millions of years by plants. The CO₂ levels are now at the level of the Permian extinction. There have been two mass extinctions in earth history, the Permian, 230 million years ago, was the worst. 70% of all species were lost. It was caused by natural global warming when volcanoes released greenhouse gases. (The other extinction event more familiar to most people was the more recent KT Cretaceous-Tertiary Mass Extinction event, 65 million years ago. It was caused when an asteroid plunged into the earth at Chicxulub Mexico wiping out the dinosaurs and half of earth’s species.) We are re-experiencing the same global warming conditions that triggered the more devastating Permian extinction, only this time it is man made. When it gets too hot, plants die. When it gets too hot and dry, massive fires ravage huge areas. When plants die, insects and herbivores die. When insects die, even heat-resistant plant’s don’t get pollinated and die. Birds die without insects to eat. Carnivores die without herbivores to eat, all triggered by what seems so innocuous — heat. Similarly, in the oceans, when they get just a few degrees too warm, corals expel their symbiotic algae and die soon thereafter. When coral reefs die, the fish that live on them die, triggering extinction chains. Satellites can chart the loss of vegetation over the planet. We are losing 4 species per hour, a rate on the same scale as the Permian and KT extinction events. Man has no ability to live without the support of other species. We are committing suicide and killing the family of life on earth along with us. The question is, will we wipe ourselves out along with the rest of the planet’s ecology? Man (sic) is very adaptable. He (sic) will destroy his food supply on land and in the oceans as a result, but some people will survive. That is not complete extinction.

#### Icecore extractions prove warming is fake

Idso 11 (Craig D. Idso, Ph.D. (cidso@co2science.org), is lead author of Climate Change Reconsidered, published by the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). An earlier version of this article appeared on the NIPCC Web site. Subscriptions to the NIPCC email distribution list are free of charge and can be ordered at <http://www.nipccreport.org/about/emailsignupform.html>. “ Arctic Study Finds No Recent Warming” <http://www.heartland.org/full/29549/Arctic_Study_Finds_No_Recent_Warming.html>)

Climate alarmists contend the earth's near-surface air temperatures of the past decade were unprecedentedly high relative to the warmth of the entire past millennium, due primarily to human carbon dioxide emissions. They also claim this warming has been most strongly expressed throughout the Arctic, which they often describe as the planet's "canary in a coal mine," for the planet as a whole. Working with an ice core that retrieved from the Akademii Nauk (AN) ice cap (~80°31'N, 94°49'E) of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago (which is located in the central Russian Arctic between the Kara and Laptev Seas), scientists used oxygen isotopes to reconstruct temperatures covering the period 1883-1998. After confirming “good correlations and similarities” between their oxygen isotope data and 15 temperature stations distributed throughout the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic, the scientists reported the oxygen isotope data “show pronounced 20th-century temperature changes, with a strong rise about 1920 and the absolute temperature maximum in the 1930s," the scientists reported. Accordingly, **the data show there was no net warming of the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic over the entire last 80 years of the 20th century**. The findings, published in the peer-reviewed *Journal of Glaciology*, cast doubt on alarmist assertions of alarming recent global temperature rise given the Arctic is expected to be the first place on the planet to exhibit anthropogenic-induced global warming, and is expected to exhibit that warming more strongly than other regions of the globe.

#### Nations will not bandwagon with the US

Kupchan 12

Charles A., Senior fellow at CFR and Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown, Second Mates, National Journal, 3-16-2012, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/is-american-primacy-really-diminishing—20120315

But Washington simply can’t expect emerging powers other than China to line up on its side. History suggests that a more equal distribution of power will produce fluid alignments, not fixed alliances. During the late 19th century, for example, the onset of a multi­polar Europe produced a continually shifting network of pacts. Large and small powers alike jockeyed for advantage in an uncertain environment. Only after imperial Germany’s military buildup threatened to overturn the equilibrium did Europe’s nations group into the competing alliances that ultimately faced off in World War I. As the 21st century unfolds, China is more likely than other emerging nations to threaten U.S. interests. But unless or until the rest of the world is forced to choose sides, most developing countries will keep their options open, not obediently follow America’s lead. Already, rising powers are showing that they’ll chart their own courses. Turkey for decades oriented its statecraft westward, focusing almost exclusively on its ties to the United States and Europe. Now, Ankara looks primarily east and south, seeking to extend its sway throughout the Middle East. Its secular bent has given way to Islamist leanings; its traditionally close connection with Israel is on the rocks; and its relations with Washington, although steadier of late, have never recovered from the rift over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. India is supposedly America’s newest strategic partner. Relations have certainly improved since the 2005 agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, and the two nations see eye to eye on checking China’s regional intentions. But on many other fronts, Washington and New Delhi are miles apart. India frets, for instance, that the U.S. will give Pakistan too much sway in Afghanistan. On the most pressing national security issue of the day—Iran’s nuclear program—India is more of a hindrance than a help, defying Washington’s effort to isolate Iran through tighter economic sanctions. And the two democracies have long been at loggerheads over trade and market access. Nations such as Turkey and India, which Kagan argues will be either geopolitically irrelevant or solid American supporters, are already pushing back against Washington. And they are doing so while the United States still wields a pronounced preponderance of power. Imagine how things will look when the playing field has truly leveled out.

#### Decline of Japan and Germany kills resiliency.

Kupchan 12

Charles A., Senior fellow at CFR and Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown, Second Mates, National Journal, 3-16-2012, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/is-american-primacy-really-diminishing—20120315

American primacy is not as resilient as Kagan thinks. His most serious error is his argument that Americans need not worry about the ascent of new powers because only Europe and Japan are losing ground to them; the United States is keeping pace. It’s true that the U.S. share of global output has held at roughly 25 percent for several decades. It’s also the case that “the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations … has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy.” But this is not, as Kagan implies, good news for the United States. The long run of Western hegemony has been the product of teamwork, not of America acting alone. Through the 19th century and up until World War II, Europe led the effort to spread liberal democracy and capitalism—and to guide Western nations to a position of global dominance. Not until the postwar era did the United States take over stewardship of the West. Pax Britannica set the stage for Pax Americana, and Washington inherited from its European allies a liberal international order that rested on solid commercial and strategic foundations. Moreover, America’s many successes during the past 70 years would not have been possible without the power and purpose of Europe and Japan by its side. Whether defeating communism, liberalizing the global economy, combating nuclear proliferation, or delivering humanitarian assistance, Western allies formed a winning coalition that made effective action possible. The collective strength of the West is, however, on the way down. During the Cold War, the Western allies often accounted for more than two-thirds of global output. Now they represent about half of output—and soon much less. As of 2010, four of the top five economies in the world were still from the developed world (the United States, Japan, Germany, and France). From the developing world, only China made the grade, coming in at No. 2. By 2050, according to Goldman Sachs, four of the top five economies will come from the developing world (China, India, Brazil, and Russia). Only the United States will make the cut; it will rank second, and its economy will be about half the size of China’s. Moreover, the turnabout will be rapid: Goldman Sachs predicts that the collective economic output of the top four developing countries—Brazil, China, India, and Russia—will match that of the G-7 countries by 2032. Kagan is right that the United States will hold its own amid this coming revolution. But he is certainly misguided to think that the relative decline of Europe and Japan won’t matter. Their falling fortunes will compromise America’s ability to maintain global sway. Indeed, Kagan seems to admit as much when he acknowledges, “Germany and Japan were and are close democratic allies, key pillars of the American world order.”

### Gas=/=warming

#### Romm uses flawed studies

Levi, CFR energy fellow, ‘12

(Michael, “Why Allowing Natural Gas Exports Is Probably Good for Climate Change,” 8-17-12, <http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/08/17/why-allowing-natural-gas-exports-is-probably-good-for-climate-change/>, accessed 9-23-12) PM

Romm begins with this:¶ The NY Times piece asserts offers [sic] this paragraph as the sole defense to the well-known charge that LNG exports are bad for the climate:¶ “At the same time, exports would likely reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the small price increases that would result from allowing exports would have at most a marginal impact on the use of natural gas as fuel for cars and trucks. Blocking exports wouldn’t push natural gas into automobiles — it would mostly keep it in the ground, because there would be less incentive to extract it.”¶ The argument about cars and trucks is a red herring (at best) since replacing gasoline with natural gas in vehicles is pretty clearly a loser from a global warming perspective — and always will be – as a major 2012 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences study makes clear.¶ There are three problems here. First, as Romm knows, I justify my claim on climate at length in a recent study, which is mentioned and linked to in the op-ed.¶ Second, as the broader op-ed makes clear, the discussion of automobiles is not intended to have anything to do with climate. I note earlier in the piece that many worry that exports would undermine efforts to put natural gas in cars and trucks. The discussion of autos here is addressed at that.¶ Third, the PNAS study that Romm references assumes a 20 percent efficiency penalty for CNG vehicles. That is a decade or so out of date. There is a lot of great stuff in the PNAS paper, but this is a major flaw, and its undermines its conclusions on CNG. In any case, none of this has anything to do with my LNG argument.

#### No impact to methane

Levi, CFR energy fellow, ‘12

(Michael, “Why Allowing Natural Gas Exports Is Probably Good for Climate Change,” 8-17-12, <http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/08/17/why-allowing-natural-gas-exports-is-probably-good-for-climate-change/>, accessed 9-23-12) PM

Onward with Romm’s analysis:¶ It is head-scratching to say the least to claim that exports would reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions when the Times acknowledges that blocking exports would leave this fossil fuel in the ground! Burning natural gas releases GHGs. We need to slash global GHGs 50% in four decades merely to have a shot at keeping total warming anywhere near 2°C (3.6°F), a point beyond which risks to human civilization multiply exponentially.¶ This is not head-scratching in the least. Exported natural gas would most likely primarily replace coal in Asia. Burning gas releases fewer GHGs than burning coal. This is not complicated – it is the same thing that is happening in the United States.¶ Worse, natural gas extraction is leaky, and natural gas is mostly methane, a highly potent GHG (with some one hundred times the global warming potential of carbon dioxide over a 20-year period). Most of the new natural gas in this country comes from hydraulic fracturing, which is widely thought to be leakier than conventional gas extraction.¶ And? Analysis after analysis – including the PNAS study Romm references – has concluded that, in the long run, this barely makes a dent in the greenhouse gas advantages of natural gas over coal.

### Heg Defense

#### Domestic politics means the US won’t exercise hegemony – means no impact.

Kupchan 2011

Charles A., professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, The false promise of unipolarity: constraints on the exercise of American power, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 24, Number 2, June 2011

A final chink in the armour of Brooks and Wohlforth concerns their disregard of domestic politics in the United States. As realists, the authors consider unproblematic potential variation in the choices that Americans may make about how to deploy their preponderant power; the United States is the unipole, and will act accordingly. But just as political choice and practice in China, Russia, or Europe can alter the characteristics of unipolarity, so too can political choice in the United States.With the collapse of America’s political centre and the erosion of bipartisanship on matters of foreign policy, US statecraft may prove far more unpredictable and unsteady than during the decades since World War II (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007a). Brooks and Wohlforth do to some extent address the issue of domestic stewardship when they examine whether the Iraq War and US unilateralism constrained US power due to reputational concerns and the loss of legitimacy. The excesses of the Bush administration’s brand of unilateralism, they contend, cost the United States little in terms of its influence abroad. With its surfeit of power, the United States could afford to make mistakes. The challenge in this decade, however, may be not too much US power and resolve, but an unsteady America that grows weary of the burdens of unipolarity. Brooks and Wohlforth assume that the United States will as a matter of course continue to deploy its preponderant power on a global basis; the unipole will automatically defend unipolarity. But in the aftermath of the draining wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic duress and ballooning deficits associated with the global financial crisis, the United States may lose some of its enthusiasm for serving as the global guardian of last resort. Democrats and Republicans are divided on issues ranging from the war in Afghanistan to climate change to arms control. If a political compromise is to be struck, it may well entail fashioning a more modest and less costly strategy of retrenchment (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007b). At a minimum, US grand strategy may swing between stark alternatives depending upon which party is in power. In broad terms, the Republicans favour the use of force and shun institutionalized multilateralism. Meanwhile, the Democrats favour multilateralism and engagement rather than the exercise of force. Even if unipolarity persists, its international effects may be overridden by the unpredictable choices Americans may make about when and how to deploy their national power.

#### No great power war – liberal order and nuclear weapons check.

Ikenberry 2011

G. John, professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton, America’s Challenge: The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal International Order, New American Foundation, July 2011, http://asp.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Ikenberry,%20John%20-%20Americas%20Challenge%20-%20The%20Rise%20of%20China%20and%20the%20Future%20of%20Liberal%20International%20Order.pdf

In particular, three features of the American-led international order seem distinctive – features that have contributed to its success and longevity. First, more so than with imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and norms of non-discrimination and market openness – creating conditions for rising states to participate within the order and advance their expanding economic and political goals within it. Across history, international orders have varied widely in terms of whether the material benefits that are generated accrue disproportionately to the leading state or the material benefits of participation within the order are more widely shared. In the Western system, the barriers to economic entry are low and the potential benefits are high. China has already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible through operating within this open market system. A second feature of the Western order is the coalition-based character of its leadership. This is an order in which a group of advanced liberal democratic states work together and assert collective leadership. It is not just an American order; a wider group of states are bound together and govern the system. These leading states do not always agree but they are engaged in a continuous process of give and take over economics, politics, and security. This too is distinctive. Past orders have tended to be dominated by one state. The stakeholders in the current order include a coalition of status quo great powers that are arrayed around the old hegemonic state. This is important. Power transitions are typically seen as playing out in dyadic fashion between two countries: a rising state and a declining hegemon. This larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states – and the resulting aggregation of geopolitical power – shifts the balance back in favor of the old order. A final feature of the Western order is its unusually dense, encompassing, and agreed upon rules and institutions. International order can be rigidly hierarchical and governed by coercive domination exercised by the leading state or it can be relatively open and organized around reciprocal, consensual and rule-based relations. The postwar Western order has been more open and rule-based than any previous order. State sovereignty and the rule of law are not just norms enshrined in the United Nations charter. They are part of the deep operating logic of the order. To be sure, these norms are evolving, and America itself has historically been ambivalent about binding itself to international law and institutions, and at no time more than today. But the overall system is remarkably dense with multilateral rules and institutions – global, regional, economic, political, and security. These institutional creations are one of the great breakthroughs of the postwar era: establishing the basis for greater levels of cooperation and shared authority and governance of the global system. Together these features of Western order give it an unusual capacity to accommodate rising powers. Its sprawling landscape of rules, institutions, and networks provide newer entrants into the system with opportunities for status, authority, and a share in the governance of the order. Access points and mechanisms for political communication and reciprocal influence abound. China has incentives and opportunities to join in while, at the same time, the possibilities of actually overturning or subverting this order are small or nonexistent. This is particularly the case because of one other feature of the order: the United States, China and other great powers have nuclear weapons. In the past, old international orders were ultimately overturned through hegemonic war. In the age of nuclear weapons and great power deterrence, this mechanism of historical change – thankfully – is taken away. War-driven change is removed as a historical process. These characteristics of the Western order have implications for how a rising China makes choices, increasing incentives to join rather than seek to overturn it. Seen in this light, the modern international order is not really American or Western. It is both wider and deeper. American hegemonic leadership did become a critical feature of liberal international order in the postwar era. But the foundations, rules, and institutions that constitute that order have preceded the American-era of leadership and go well beyond it. We can look more closely at the principles and institutions of this modern order, focusing specifically on how its features might attract and accommodate a rising China.

### Terror

No extinction

Frost 5(Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

An existential threat. **When applied to nuclear terrorism, the phrase ‘existential threat’ implies that a state such as the United States could be destroyed by terrorists wielding nuclear weapons. Yet to destroy the United States or any other large industrial state**, in the sense of inflicting such damage to its government, economy, population and infrastructure that it could no longer function as a coherent political and economic entity, **would require a large number of well-placed nuclear weapons with yields in the tens or hundreds of kilotons. It is unlikely that terrorists could successfully obtain, emplace and detonate a single nuclear weapon, while no plausible radiological device or devices could do any significant damage on a national level.**

Terrorists wont use WMD’s like their impact card says—they like conventional weapons

John Mueller is a professor of political science at Ohio State “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD” Jan. 1. 2008. Accessed July 19, 2010. <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF> //Donnie

Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005) The degree to which al-Qaeda has pursued a nuclear weapons program may have been exaggerated--often by the same slam dunkers who alarmingly warned us about Saddam Hussein's WMD development. Meanwhile, the media, following conventional patterns, dutifully and mostly uncritically transmit the assertions put forward. In was on a November 14, 2004, 60 Minutes telecast, for example, that former CIA spook Michael Scheuer assured his rapt CBS interviewer that the explosion of a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb in the United States was "probably a near thing."

Obama wont retaliate

Crowley 10 (Michael Senior Editor the New Republic, January, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, <http://www.tnr.com/node/72263>]

The Los Angeles Times ran an [important story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04%2C0%2C2198537%2Cfull.story) yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. **A core issue under debate**, officials said, **is whether the U**nited **S**tates **should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances**, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some **experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally**. And **the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case**. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. **The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we**, for instance, **actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that** a President **Obama--**or any president, for that matter--**would go through with it.**

**No risk of nuclear terror- too many hurdles**

Chapman ‘8 Steve Chapman, The Implausibility of Nuclear Terror, The Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 2008, LN

But remember: After 9/11, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple - say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb - it's reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen consist of a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, because weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally - for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their lives. The terrorists, notes Mr. Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a haven and advanced equipment - plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time - but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mr. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

### 1NC – Prolif

#### Linear risk of causing prolif – latent proliferation.

Koplow 2011

Doug, Founder of Earth Track Inc, MBA from Harvard, has worked on energy subsidy policy for 20 years, Union of Concerned Scientists sponsored publication, Nuclear Power: Still not Viable Without Subsidies, February 2011 http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/nuclear\_subsidies\_report.pdf

The spread of nuclear materials throughout the world is a major security concern—the link between nuclear power development and nuclear weapons proliferation is widely recognized—and a growing civilian nuclear sector makes the situation even worse. 94 The International Security Advisory Board of the U.S. Department of State agrees, noting that, “The rise in nuclear power worldwide, and particularly within Third World nations, inevitably increases the risks of proliferation” (ISAB 2008: 1). This risk is much greater if the chosen path for civilian nuclear involves enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, something that “represent[s] quite dangerous paths to proliferation that are not effectively addressed by current international law or treaties,” according to the board (ISAB 2008: 3). Subsidies to nuclear reactor technology exacerbate proliferation concerns both by boosting the “latent proliferation” risk and by increasing opportunities for illicit diversion. 95 Latent proliferation exists if a company does not actually build any weapons but establishes the capabilities to build them. Under a latent proliferation scenario, “a nation’s nuclear power facilities give it the capability to quickly make nuclear weapons” (Gronlund et al. 2007). Nuclear proliferation expert Henry Sokolski notes that, “A large reactor program brings any nation quite a ways down the road to acquiring an option to build bombs” (Grossman 2008). If the diversion or theft of materials from the civilian sector cannot be detected quickly or at all, the latent proliferation concern from nuclear power expansion can become an active one. Proliferation conduits involve far more than just physical infrastructure. The increased number of people trained in closely related fields and the ability of a country to mask purchases of suspect materials through civilian activities are just as important.

#### Subsidies create pressure for bad exports.

Koplow 2011

Doug, Founder of Earth Track Inc, MBA from Harvard, has worked on energy subsidy policy for 20 years, Union of Concerned Scientists sponsored publication, Nuclear Power: Still not Viable Without Subsidies, February 2011 http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/nuclear\_subsidies\_report.pdf

However, moving from recognition of the linkage to actually quantifying the proliferation costs of nuclear power expansion is not easy. There are plausible arguments that the incremental proliferation risks of conventional reactors within the United States are fairly small, but if this country pursues subsidized reactor construction, many other nations may follow suit. The “low-incremental-risk” arguments work only in countries with a pre-existing base of fuel-cycle facilities, nuclear weapons, and strong oversight of both civilian and military sectors. Such arguments cannot be made for the promotion of reprocessing; for the construction of subsidized reactors or fuel-cycle facilities in countries lacking in governance, technical capabilities, or the rule of law; or for the export of technology that may enhance latent proliferation risks even from low-incremental-risk countries. Large subsidies are clearly a main factor driving the renewed utility interest in nuclear power, both in the United States and Europe. Subsidies probably underlie much of the Asian investment as well, though transparency of government operations in Asia is not nearly as advanced as in some western nations. Along with the expected surge in reactors is a renewed interest in expanding enrichment capabilities and constructing new reprocessing plants. All three areas are capital-intensive production systems. Once they are built, operators are under immense pressure to utilize them heavily, perhaps resulting in questionable decisions regarding the exportation of resulting products or technologies.

#### Nuclear energy kills the NPT – haves and have nots.

Hall 2006

Xanthe, disarmament expert and international campaigner at the German section of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Spreading the Nuclear Disease, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Bulletin 26 http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/inesap\_old/bulletin26/art02.htm

The civilian and military uses of nuclear energy are so inextricably linked that ultimately the situation that was recognised by the Acheson-Lilienthal Committee in 1946 has only worsened in the last 60 years. Despite the development of new detection technologies, tightened export controls and strengthened safeguards, the world is still dependent on the good intentions of states for its security. The answer to the problem cannot therefore be found in technical solutions, and the idea of multilateral uranium centres would worsen the perception of states that they are being excluded from having independent access to nuclear energy. The only solution is the phasing out of nuclear power and the development of sustainable energy. While on the one hand, the nuclear industry is trying to sell the myth of a return to “Atoms for Peace” as a palliative for environmental catastrophe, Iran’s argument that it wants to develop this energy resource to cover its domestic energy needs is dismissed as not being credible. The nuclear industry is trying to sell nuclear energy as economically viable, environmentally safe and proliferation resistant – none of which it is. But in order to sell the third claim, it needs to introduce a new system that directly contradicts Article IV of the NPT – the inalienable right of all parties to civilian nuclear energy. That new system, however, divides the world into another one of “haves” and “have-nots” creating further tensions that will, for certain, tear the NPT apart and could even lead to war.

#### Technology doesn’t equate to non-proliferation – political considerations outweigh

Feiveson 1 (Harold, currently serves as the Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation of American Scientists Council and is a Senior Research Policy Scientist of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. “The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power” http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n5/nuclear.htm )

It should be recognized straight away that many in the nuclear industry worldwide believe that intrinsic or technical proliferation resistance should not be given much attention in the development of nuclear power. Their arguments are several. For example: Proliferation is manifestly a political problem. Therefore, it is counterproductive to impose technical constraints on the development of nuclear power except in a few problem countries, such as Iraq and North Korea. If countries are determined to obtain nuclear weapons they can do so most directly via a dedicated program and not through civil nuclear power. Institutional constraints - that is, the entire nonproliferation regime defined by the NPT, safeguards agreements, supplier agreements, etc. � are adequate and could be improved further without imposing technical constraints on nuclear power. The shape of technology, international politics, and ways people think about weapons of mass destruction are impossible to gauge over the long term. Indeed, nuclear weapons may in the future be far less a matter of concern than other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we cannot sensibly attempt today to design a proliferation-resistant nuclear future for the long term. In practice, it will be extraordinarily difficult to contrive an effective proliferation- resistant nuclear fuel cycle for sophisticated states, and difficult even to do so for unsophisticated states. To a point, there is merit in all of these arguments, and taken together they underscore the truth that the civilian nuclear fuel cycle is only a part, possibly even a small part, of the greater problem of addressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

#### The US will not exercise leadership

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2/7/12, Obama's Nuclear Mistake, www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/290330

What prompted Obama to kick this political nest? A stunning inattention to nuclear-export realities, his own nuclear-control rhetoric, and history. In 2008, President Bush negotiated a nuclear-cooperative agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This agreement featured two new and important nonproliferation conditions. The first required the UAE to forswear making nuclear fuel — a process that can bring states to the very brink of acquiring bombs. The second stipulated that the UAE must open its nuclear facilities to intrusive nuclear inspections authorized under a special international understanding known as the Additional Protocol. While it negotiated this agreement with the UAE, the Bush administration also peddled its new, tougher conditions to existing and prospective U.S. civilian-nuclear-technology recipients, including Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. Initially, this effort enjoyed President Obama’s support after he succeeded Bush: He put the final touches on the UAE deal and in 2009 sold it as the new nonproliferation “Gold Standard” for future civilian nuclear-cooperation deals. After a year’s effort trying to get Jordan, Vietnam, and South Korea to forswear making nuclear fuel, though, Team Obama started to go wobbly. First, in the late summer of 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the U.S. had initialed a nuclear deal with Vietnam that lacked the Gold Standard conditions. The Hill went nuts. Letters were sent to the secretary of state, and State quietly put the Vietnam agreement on ice while the National Security Council ordered an interagency policy review. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, who wanted to uphold the standard, fought Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, who did not. Nothing was decided. Then, in July of 2011, Steinberg left the government. In short order, Poneman prevailed over remaining resistance within State. Late last year, State resumed nuclear cooperation talks with Vietnam. Anxious to notify the Hill, as required by law, Undersecretary of State Eileen Tauscher and Deputy Secretary Poneman tried to arrange a private, classified briefing with the House and Senate foreign-affairs committee chairmen and ranking members. But all the important members were out of town. So instead, the two officials sent them a short note. It was a knee-slapper. First, it said the administration had decided that pushing the Bush administration’s Gold Standard would actually risk undermining nuclear nonproliferation. “We are concerned,” Tauscher and Poneman argued, that pushing this standard would “reduce[ ] the number of future U.S. partners, minimizing our nonproliferation influence.” Second, they noted that “France and Russia in particular are very aggressive in pursuing nuclear business,” that “neither imposes enrichment or reprocessing conditions in their agreements,” and that for every billion dollars of exports, the U.S. is able to support 10,000 jobs. So, if we want jobs, we have to back off pushing nuclear nonproliferation? That seems to be the letter’s conclusion. Yet it’s unclear if there are any significant U.S. reactor exports to be made, or any truly American vendors to make them. Nearly 80 percent of Westinghouse’s nuclear division is now Japanese- and Kazakhstani-owned; roughly half of General Electric’s is Japanese-owned. As for nuclear manufacturing, nearly all of that is now done overseas. Also, the Fukushima tsunami disaster has endangered whatever U.S. nuclear reactor or component exports might otherwise be left. Certainly prospective foreign customers have been loath to forswear suing U.S. nuclear firms in the case of a nuclear accident. Yet without such a pledge, U.S. vendors will not sell. The letter’s most egregious error, though, is its misreading of the nuclear market. Contrary to the two officials’ suggestion, the most profitable nuclear sales prospect is not overseas reactors, where profit margins can be negative. Instead, it’s supplying nuclear fuel to run the U.S.’s 104 power reactors, the world’s largest fleet. Russia and France are eager to penetrate this market. France is building a $4.8 billion fuel-fabrication plant in Georgia for the U.S. Department of Energy and has secured a $2 billion conditional federal loan guarantee to enrich uranium in Idaho. Russia would like to establish a similar U.S. enrichment project. Bottom line: If the U.S. wants to make a nuclear buck, doing so while maintaining nonproliferation standards depends far less on what other nuclear suppliers are doing overseas than those foreign suppliers’ export profits depend on securing U.S. taxpayer funds and loan guarantees. So far, however, Team Obama has avoided exploiting this leverage. Impatient, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has reported out a bill (H.R. 1280) to push the Gold Standard by increasing congressional oversight over U.S. civilian nuclear-cooperative agreements. The Senate has yet to act.

#### Prolif doesn’t increase the risk of nuclear terrorism

Michael Wesley, PhD IR, Dir. Asia Inst. At Griffith, September 2005, “It’s time to scrap the NPT,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, v. 59, iss. 3, p. informa

A final concern is that by allowing nuclear weapons to spread to more states, the end of the NPT raises the chances that nuclear or radiological materials will pass into the hands of terrorist groups. Once again, we need to be cautious about such doomsday scenarios. Despite intense scrutiny, there is no evidence that even the most determined state sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria and Iran, have passed chemical or biological weapons to their terrorist clients. Having refused to pass on lower-stakes chemical and biological weapons, there is little reason to fear that they would hand over nuclear or radiological materials. Also, international advances in tracing the responsibility for terrorist attacks will have badly eroded such regimes' confidence that they could allow a client group to carry out a nuclear or radiological attack and escape major retaliation. Such concerns have over time seen such regimes exercise tighter control over the groups they support, and to use such groups more as a deterrent than an offensive foreign policy option.8 Further, if regimes such as Iran and Syria had decided to rely on terrorist groups to deliver their WMD threats against their targets, they would not have spent millions acquiring ballistic missile technology. Thus there seems to be little reason to believe that ending the NPT will increase the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists. Indeed as I have argued above, the NPT's side effects of opaque and transnational proliferation represent a much more dangerous set of conditions for diagonal proliferation.

### 1NC – Solvency

#### Turn – loan guarantees cause trade-offs with better projects.

De Rugy 2012

Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program, Testimony Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Jun 19, 2012, http://mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program

3. Mal-investments Loan guarantee programs can also have an impact on the economy beyond their cost to taxpayers. Mal-investment—the misallocation of capital and labor—may result from these loan guarantee programs. In theory, banks lend money to the projects with the highest probability of being repaid. These projects are often the ones likely to produce larger profits and, in turn, more economic growth. However, considering that there isn’t an infi- nite amount of capital available at a given interest rate, loan guarantee programs could displace resources from non-politically motivated projects to politically motivated ones. Think about it this way: When the government reduces a lender’s exposure to fund a project it wouldn’t have funded otherwise, it reduces the amount of money available for projects that would have been viable without subsidies. This government involvement can distort the market signals further. For instance, the data shows that private investors tend to congregate toward government guarantee projects, independently of the merits of the projects, taking capital away from unsubsidized projects that have a better probability of success without subsidy and a more viable business plan. As the Government Accountability Office noted, “Guarantees would make projects [the federal government] assists financially more attractive to private capital than conservation projects not backed by federal guarantees. Thus both its loans and its guarantees will siphon private capital away.”[26] This reallocation of resources by private investors away from viable projects may even take place within the same industry—that is, one green energy project might trade off with another, more viable green energy project. More importantly, once the government subsidizes a portion of the market, the object of the subsidy becomes a safe asset. Safety in the market, however, often means low return on investments, which is likely to turn venture capitalists away. As a result, capital investments will likely dry out and innovation rates will go down.[27] In fact, the data show that in cases in which the federal government introduced few distortions, private inves- tors were more than happy to take risks and invest their money even in projects that required high initial capital requirements. The Alaska pipeline project, for instance, was privately financed at the cost of $35 billion, making it one of the most expensive energy projects undertaken by private enterprise.[28] The project was ultimately aban- doned in 2011 because of weak customer demand and the development of shale gas resources outside Alaska. [29] However, this proves that the private sector invests money even when there is a chance that it could lose it. Private investment in U.S. clean energy totaled $34 billion in 2010, up 51 percent from the previous year.[30] Finally, when the government picks winners and losers in the form of a technology or a company, it often fails. First, the government does not have perfect or even better information or technology advantage over private agents. In addition, decision-makers are insulated from market signals and won’t learn important and necessary lessons about the technology or what customers want. Second, the resources that the government offers are so addictive that companies may reorient themselves away from producing what customers want, toward pleasing the government officials.

#### Loan guarantees don’t raise capital – nuclear is just that bad.

Lovins 2010

Amory B., Cofounder and Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, 1993 MacArthur Fellow, one of the TIME 100 most influential people and Foreign Policy 100 Influential thinkers, Energy subsidies—of any kind—are bad business, Weekly Standard, October 25, 2010, Vol. 16, No. 06, http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/nuclear-socialism.pdf

Given Americans’ increasing anxiety over made-in-Washington socialism, it’s a wonder that the nuclear power industry has escaped scrutiny for so long. The federal government socializes the risk of investing in nuclear power while pri-vatizing profits. This same formula drove the frenzied speculation that cratered the housing and financial markets. What might it cause with nuclear power? We got a taste three decades ago. Congress grew infatuated with the promises of nuclear promoters. It overrode the risk assessment of private capital markets, and expanded subsidies for nuclear projects to $0.08 per kilowatt-hour—often more than investors risked or than the power could be sold for. This seduced previously prudent utilities and regulators into a nuclear binge that Forbes in 1985 called “the largest managerial disaster in business history.” Threefold cost overruns amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars. Three-fifths of the ordered plants were abandoned. Many others proved uncompetitive. Steep debt downgrades hit four in five nuclear utilities. Some went broke. Through 1978, 253 U.S. reactors were ordered (none since). Only 104 survive. Two-fifths of those have failed for a year or more at least once. New nuclear plants, we’re assured, are different—novel enough to merit technology-demonstration subsidies, yet proven enough that investors can rest easy. They’re allegedly so much safer than deep-sea oil drilling that we needn’t fret, yet so risky that one major nuclear operator insured itself eleven times more against nuclear accidents’ consequences than its potential liability to the public. New reactors are supposedly so cheap they crush competitors, yet so costly they need subsidies of 100 percent or more. That’s right: $0.04-$0.06 of new 2005-07 subsidies, plus $0.01-$0.04 of remaining old subsidies, brings total federal support for new nuclear plants, built by private utility companies, to $0.05-$0.10 for a kilowatt-hour worth $0.06. Some people are outraged that the federal government is subsidizing the new Chevrolet Volt, retailing at $41,000, with a tax credit of $7,500. Imagine if the tax credit were $50,000! If new reactors can produce competitive power, they don’t need subsidies; if not, they don’t deserve subsidies. Yet nuclear subsidies to some of the world’s largest corporations have become shockingly large. A Maryland reactor’s developer reckoned just its requested federal loan guarantee would transfer $14.8 billion of net present value, comparable to its construction cost, from American taxpayers to the project’s 50/50 owners—Électricité de France (EDF), 84 percent owned by the French government, and a private utility 9.5 percent owned by EDF. The project’s builder, AREVA, is 93 percent owned by the French state, yet has been promised a $2 billion U.S. loan guarantee for a fuel plant competing with an American one. EDF just booked a billion-euro loss provision, mainly over the Maryland plant’s deteriorating prospects. AREVA’s construction fiascoes in Finland and France have “seriously shaken” confidence, says EDF’s ex-chairman, and four nations’ safety regulators have criticized the design. Meanwhile, the chairman of Exelon, the top U.S. nuclear operator, says cheap natural gas will postpone new nuclear plants for a decade or two. Slack electricity demand and unpriced carbon emissions further weaken the nuclear case. Markets would therefore charge a risk premium. But U.S. nuclear power evades market discipline—or did until October 8, 2010, when the Maryland promoter shelved the project because, for its $7.5 billion federal loan guarantee, it would have to have paid an “unworkable” $0.88 billion fee, or 11.6 percent, to cover the default risk to taxpayers. Another $8.3 billion of the $18.5 billion nuclear loan guarantees authorized in 2007 was provisionally issued in February to two Georgia reactors. Taxpayers will be on the hook for about $100 per American family. To offset that risk, the Department of Energy proposed to charge a default fee that’s only a small fraction of the likely loss rate that the Congressional Budget Office and Government Accountability Office have estimated. In bankruptcy, taxpayers wouldn’t even recover before private lenders—not that there are any private lenders. The Treasury’s Federal Financing Bank, financed by new Treasury debt, would issue the DOE-guaranteed loan. Failure would cost taxpayers $8.2 billion net. The developer keeps any upside. The Georgia project’s loan-guarantee default fee is much lower than the Maryland plant’s, partly because the Georgia developers have already shifted more of their remaining risks to ratepayers. Their project is 54 percent owned by municipal utilities and rural co-ops with access to cheaper financing than private utilities, including subsidized stimulus bonds. Some of these munis and co-ops signed 50-year contracts with the nuclear operators that would put them and their customers on the hook even for power not needed or wanted. In 1982-83, the analo-gously financed five-reactor WPPSS (“Whoops”) project in the Northwest defaulted on municipal bonds, vaporizing $3-$4 billion in today’s dollars. Moreover, a few southeastern states now make utility customers finance new reactors in advance—often whatever they cost, whether they ever run, no questions asked, plus a return to the utilities for risks that they no longer bear. This scraps all five bedrock principles of utility regulation: payment only for service delivered and only for used and useful assets; accountability for cost and prudence; return matching risk; and no commission able to bind its successors. Such laws re-create for nuclear power the same moral hazard that just shredded America’s financial sector. With such juicy incentives, why won’t private investors finance reactors? In 2005-08, with the strongest subsidies, capital markets, and nuclear politics in history, why couldn’t 34 proposed reactors raise any private capital? Because there’s no business case. As a recent study by Citibank U.K. is titled “New Nuclear—the Economics Say No.” That’s why central planners bought all 61 reactors now under construction worldwide. None were free-market transactions. Subsidies can’t reverse bleak fundamentals. A defibrillated corpse will jump but won’t revive. American taxpayers already reimburse nuclear power developers for legal and regulatory delays. A unique law caps liability for accidents at a present value only one-third that of BP’s $20 billion trust fund for oil-spill costs; any bigger damages fall on citizens. Yet the competitive risks facing new reactors are uninsured, high, and escalating. Since 2000, as nuclear power’s cost projections have more than tripled, its share of global electricity generation has fallen from 17 percent to 13 percent. That of cogeneration (making electricity together with useful heat in factories or buildings) and renewables (excluding big hydropower projects) rose from 13 percent to 18 percent.

#### Other uncertainty overwhelms solvency

Sullivan 2010

Paul, Professor of Economics – National Defense University, Loan guarantees are not enough, January 13 2010 http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2010/01/should-taxpayers-back-new-nucl.php

Policy uncertainty in one part of the energy industry can spread to other parts of the industry given that many different forms of energy production are substitutable to some extent. Solar, wind, coal, natural gas, geothermal, nuclear and more are far more connected in policy implications than many would like to think. Policy uncertainties are also connected internationally as well as locally. There are many recursive and wide spread policy implications to many of the policies now being considered. Giving loan guarantees seems like a very simple solution to a very complex problem, and likely will have less of an impact than many may think. Until overall energy policy is clarified many of the major investors in the nuclear industry may still be sitting on the fence. These are smart people. Many of them also face other investment opportunities outside of the nuclear industry. The smart money goes with the best investments. Investments that have lots of uncertainty, particularly multibillion dollar ones like a nuclear plant, make many investors skittish. Also, these investors could send their funds to invest in nuclear plants or other energy or non-energy developments in another country rather easily. We should expect, given the huge costs involved in developing a nuclear power plant, that many of the future plants will have investors that will be part of large international coalitions. So far this seems to be a building trend. If this will help start a safer, more effective, efficient and environmentally friendly nuclear industry then so be it. However, we also need to be aware of the concerns of the public, our national security institutions and others about foreign investments in nuclear technologies. However, we should not sacrifice our energy, environment and national securities to the false altar of xenophobia.

## 2NC

### Aero

#### Airpower isn’t key to deterrence

Allan, Air Force National Defense Fellow at the CSIS, 94 (Charles, "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?" Washington Quarterly, Summer)

Information*.* As we have seen, imperfect information about a defender's commitment may be present for both the defender and the attacker. Prior to the crisis, the "intended deterrees [themselves] will not know how much of a politically and technically credible threat it would take to deter them" (Gray 1991, 14). In addition, as Arquilla and Davis point **out** (Arquilla and Davis 1992; Davis and Arquilla 1991), adversaries have historically discounted key elements of U.S. power such as strategic mobility, precision weapons, maritime power, and airpower due to lack of familiarity with these systems. Without understanding these elements of U.S. military strength, the regional aggressor will view the absence of U.S. heavy ground forces as evidence of a lack of both capability and commitment. Moreover, Adam Garfinkle (1992) asserts that third world leaders are frequently misled into overly optimistic views of their own forces' capabilities. Without clear recognition of U.S. power, deterrence cannot hold.

**Kosovo proves—air war is not effective, civilian risks restrict operations.**

**Lambeth 2001** (Benjamin, Senior Staff Member, RAND) NATO'S Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment p. 1

Between March 24 and June 9, 1999 , NATO, led by the United States , conducted an air war against Yugoslavia in an effort to halt and reverse the continuing human-rights abuses that were being committed against the citizens of its Kosovo province (see the Frontispiece, Map of Kosovo) by Yugoslavia's elected president, Slobodan Milosevic. As it turned out, that 78-day effort, called Operation Allied Force, represented the third time in a row during the 1990s, after Operations Desert Storm and Deliberate Force, in which air power proved pivotal in determining the outcome of a regional conflict. Yet notwithstanding its ultimate success, what began as a hopeful gambit for producing quick compliance on Milosevic's part soon devolved, for a time at least, into a seemingly ineffectual bombing experiment with no clear end in sight . Not only was the operation's execution hampered by uncooperative weather and a surprisingly resilient opponent, it was further afflicted by persistent hesitancy on the part of U.S. and NATO decisionmakers that was prompted by fears of inadvertently killing civilians and losing friendly aircrews as well as by sharp differences of opinion within the most senior U.S. command element over the best way of applying allied air power against Serb assets to achieve the desired effects. All of that and more, however unavoidable some aspects of it may have been, made NATO's air war for Kosovo a substantial step backward in efficiency when compared to Desert Storm.

**Air power makes the US vulnerable and predicable, can’t solve war or heg**

**Lundy, 2002**, Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations

(Derek, , LA Times, 1/13, <http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=4291>]

In addition to this uneven track record, there is a strong practical reason why it would be unwise for policymakers to rely exclusively on air power to achieve U.S. objectives overseas— the high level of interdependence among U.S. military forces. With no land or sea support, not only would U.S. airmen be more exposed to enemy air defenses, but our military response to crises would be one-sided, predictable and thus vulnerable to future challenges. Bombs alone shouldn't shape our foreign policy.

## China

### OW

#### Disad outweighs, Chinese soft power is a structural issue that shapes how you should view the debate. Zhang indicates solves the root cause of terrorism which is the EXPORT OF THE US DEMOCRATIC MODEL means we have internal links to MOTIVES as well as MEANS whereas the aff can only access one. China is a neutral party seen as able to broker peace deals where the US has failed.

### 2nc t/prolif

China is a better nonprolif leader---

They support it MORE than the US---proven by a laundry list of treaty violations

Boutin-School of International and Political Studies, Deakin University-11

Changing the Guard? China and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 3, Number 3—Pages 349–364

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2011.01275.x/pdf>

It is noteworthy that China’s commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime continued to deepen despite the negative environment engendered by a number of American policies pursued under President George W. Bush. The American approach to multilateralism during his term in ofﬁce was of great concern to Chinese authorities (Kent, 2008, pp. 65–66). The actions of the United States that were poorly received in China included the American withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (commonly referred to as the ABM Treaty) in 2002, its withdrawal of formal support for the CTBT, and the negotiating of the United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative–Bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 179). These concerns have been reinforced by the American National Missile Defense program, which as well as being widely regarded in China as directed against it, has considerable potential to encourage further horizontal nuclear proliferation (Graham & LaVera, 2002, pp. 240–241). The Chinese government stated in 2008 that this “global missile defense program will . . . have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament” (Zhang, 2010, p. 149). The adoption of a more positive approach to nonproliferation multilateralism under President Obama will help to assuage Chinese concerns, but some aspects of American nonproliferation policy remain questionable from a Chinese perspective. While a number of issues—such as perceived general American efforts to dominate and circumvent multilateral nonproliferation mechanisms, the American emphasis on counter-proliferation, and its missile defense program—had and in some cases still have considerable potential to reinforce established Chinese suspicions of multilateralism, this has not resulted in a reversion to China’s former approach to the nonproliferation regime. Chinese authorities continue to harbor some reservations about the regime where issues of objectivity and the rules of engagement of suspected or conﬁrmed proliferators are concerned, and they send mixed signals on nonproliferation on occasion as a result. China remains a less enthusiastic supporter of the imposition of sanctions on actual or suspected proliferators than many other states, but in a remarkable policy transformation, China emerged as a supporter of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the face of considerable internal threats to its integrity and effectiveness. This demonstrates the importance of multilateral nonproliferation instruments to the Chinese government and the depth of its commitment to this approach.

THE US is unequal in implementation---perceived as neonuclear apartheid making it useless

Kazmi-graduate student at the Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad-8/30/12

Letter from Pakistan: How an unfair non-proliferation regime undermines nuclear security

<http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/letter-pakistan-how-unfair-non-proliferation-regime-undermines-nuclear-security>

In a September 1967 speech, V.C. Trivedi, the Indian Ambassador to an early UN arms control effort known as the Eighteen Nations Committee on Disarmament, said that developing countries could tolerate nuclear weapons apartheid, but not an atomic apartheid that prevented them from attaining the economic progress that civilian nuclear power can bring. Regrettably, today's global nonproliferation architecture is being applied with such selectivity that it can truly be called the neo-nuclear apartheid. That architecture not only works against the peaceful use of nuclear energy in developing countries, it also undermines global nuclear security. The Nuclear Security Summit process -- which in recent years has been a focus of US nuclear proliferation policy -- professes to tackle robust concerns. The Seoul summit held earlier this year, for example, addressed not just nuclear security, but nuclear safety, the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. But the positive elements of the Nuclear Security Summit initiative pale in comparison with the selective application of the nonproliferation regime to states that seek to create a nuclear power industry. The inequity of the nonproliferation regime is illustrated by its disparate treatment of developing countries. India rejected the NPT and tested nuclear weapons -- but still managed to be treated well under the nonproliferation regime, with the Nuclear Suppliers Group granting it a waiver to trade in nuclear materials in 2008. Because it is a signatory of the NPT, Iran has limited access to peaceful nuclear technology through Russia, even though Tehran stands accused of covertly attempting to develop nuclear weapons. And North Korea -- a nuclear-armed state that withdrew from the NPT and threatens its neighbors -- has been offered help with civilian power reactors during negotiations over its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Pakistan -- which has gone to great lengths to support the global nuclear nonproliferation regime -- has been denied membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a decision that greatly hampers Islamabad's efforts to develop a commercial nuclear energy program. Though the NPT is considered the pivot point of the nonproliferation system, the nuclear states outside the treaty are major players in the international security system, and they affect the world's nuclear balance. It will be difficult for the Nuclear Security Summit process and other similar initiatives to gain global acceptance until the nuclear nonproliferation regime is applied with at least a semblance of fairness. If the overall nonproliferation system is to become equitable and therefore effective, it must allow the non-NPT nuclear weapon states to participate in nuclear export-control cartels, so long as they contribute to controlling the proliferation of nuclear materials. Such a policy change would, as a byproduct, create transparency in the nuclear programs of non-NPT states and thereby enhance overall strategic stability. The Pakistan example. Few outside of South Asia are familiar with the tribulations Pakistan has faced as it has attempted to support international nuclear security and grow a nuclear power industry. Despite media and political claims to the contrary, Pakistan has supported the Nuclear Security Summit initiative and encouraged international cooperation and voluntary actions to ensure nuclear security. Furthermore, Pakistan observes nonproliferation norms in their letter and spirit. Islamabad's nuclear security and safety structure rests on four pillars: a robust command and control system under the National Command Authority, a thorough safety and security regulatory regime, a comprehensive system of export control management, and an extensive program of international cooperation. Since the 2010 summit in Washington, Islamabad has taken eight steps to buttress the Nuclear Security Summit initiative: To prevent non-state actors from gaining access to nuclear materials, Islamabad vigorously enforces UN Security Council Resolution 1540 PDF on WMD proliferation. The Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences offers a specialization in nuclear security, while the School of Nuclear Radiation Safety conducts courses in nuclear safety. During the 2010 summit, Pakistan, among other countries, announced that it would host a "center of excellence" -- that is, a collaborative hub where innovative approaches will be developed to strengthen the nuclear security process. In April 2012, Islamabad announced that it has opened a Strategic Plans Division Training Academy, and at the Seoul Summit in March, Pakistan's former Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani offered nuclear security training to the international community. To prevent nuclear terrorism, Pakistan constructively participates in Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism-related events and has helped develop guidelines on nuclear-detection architecture. In a significant development, Pakistan has announced it will add 8,000 highly skilled officials to its team of security professionals, including the creation of a special response force. The first batch of security personnel graduated from the Strategic Plans Division Training Academy in April 2012. This special response force, which supplements an existing SPD security force, has been termed a "qualitative milestone in … rapid response capability" for safeguarding Pakistan's strategic assets. Islamabad and the IAEA conduct joint seminars and workshops on nuclear security. Pakistan supports the spirit of the Proliferation Security Initiative by participating in its exercises as an observer. The United States launched this initiative in 2003 as an effort to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Through its Exports Control Act, Pakistan continues to strengthen UNSC Resolution 1540 via measures that include a recent revision of its national control list to support the global efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To augment its export controls, Pakistan is deploying special nuclear material portals at key border points to deter and detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. Despite this exemplary record, Pakistan's nuclear power industry has faced severe challenges in dealing with the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which, because of Pakistan's limited cooperation with China in nuclear matters, would not grant membership in the cartel. (In this realm, Pakistan started cooperating with China in 1986, before China participated in the NSG.) A refusal to let Pakistan participate in the export control cartels, and especially the NSG, would seriously limit the country's efforts to meet its growing energy needs through nuclear energy. According to Pakistan's Energy Security Plan of 2050, its needs to build nuclear power plants that will produce 8,800 megawatts of electricity within the next two decades. Participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group is essential if Pakistan is to be able to acquire the equipment and expertise needed to build the nuclear plants that will fill this power gap. India -- which, like Pakistan, has not signed the NPT -- was given an exemption by the NSG, and it has been able to advance its civilian nuclear power industry, relieving pressure on its challenged electric utility system and cementing strategic and economic partnerships with other countries. This differential treatment of India and Pakistan under the international nonproliferation regime is simply unfair. Equity means security. The legacy of the Seoul Summit is a determination among state participants that their commitments toward nuclear security will remain "voluntary" until the states find the world nonproliferation regime equitable. The glaring inequities of the nonproliferation regime keep countries like Pakistan from meeting their energy needs and, thereby, harm their overall development. The unfairness of the nonproliferation regime is also keeping the world community from coming together around a common set of verifiable nuclear security standards. The sooner the nuclear nonproliferation regime ends its neo-nuclear apartheid policies and puts all countries on an equal footing, the more stabilizing the nonproliferation regime will become, and the safer the world will be.

AND only china can influence the ASIAN market

Lieggi-Monterey Institute’s Center for Non­proliferation Studies-10

From Proliferator to Model Citizen? Strategic Studies Quarterly

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/summer/lieggi.pdf>

The extent to which China assisted weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs in countries like Pakistan and Iran has been well documented. Part of China’s past behavior stemmed from a fundamental disagreement with the Cold War structure of the nonproliferation regime; this ambivalence towards nonproliferation led China to undertake politically motivated proliferation activities that meshed with Beijing’s foreign policy needs at the time. In later years, particularly after China’s economy began to open in the 1980s, economic motivations also pushed Chinese entities to transfer WMD–related technologies abroad with little consideration for the ramiications on the nonproliferation regime. As China’s view of the international community (and its own place in it) changed, so too did its policy towards the proliferation of WMD. Much of this change was brought about by a mixture of factors touching on various issues facing Beijing, such as national security interests, economic stability, and international prestige. The factors that most affected China’s actions included signiicant international (particularly US) pressure placed on Beijing in the 1990s to adopt stronger nonproliferation policies, Beijing’s growing recognition that proliferation of WMD was detrimental to its own security interests, and concern within the Chinese leadership about the impact of China-based proliferation on Beijing’s acceptance as a responsible member of the world community. One of the areas within the nonproliferation regime where China has most notably changed in recent years is the field of nonproliferation related trade controls, particularly export controls. 1 In the 1980s and 1990s, China had very little in the way of controls on military-related trade; however, this began to change by the late 1990s. Between 1998 and 2002, China worked to revamp its export control system. Over the course of a few months in 2002, it promulgated a comprehensive set of export control measures for sensitive items related to WMD and other military programs. Most analysts agree that China’s system has improved since the comprehensive rules were adopted and that the system, at least on paper, is in line with international supplier regime standards. 2 Despite the legislative improvements, sales of sensitive dual-use items by Chinese companies to proliferating countries continued to concern the international community and the United States in particular. Many of the problems in the system are caused by insufficient Chinese capacity to enforce its controls. The weakest link in the Chinese export control system, as with many developing systems, is in its ability (and, some would say, political will) to enforce the restrictions that have been laid out in its legis­ lation. his area of China’s export control system has not traditionally been transparent, a fact that has added to uncertainties about Beijing’s will with regards to nonproliferation-related trade control enforcement. Beijing has been hesitant to discuss violation cases publicly, leaving many questions unanswered about its enforcement activities. Beijing has, however, made a few public announcements about export control violations since its system was revamped in 2002. hree such an­ nouncements made between 2006 and 2008 shed some light on the inner workings of China’s export control enforcement, as well as on the chal­ lenges facing it. Each of these three cases is reviewed to assess the status of China’s current enforcement capabilities. The three companies—Zibo CHEMET Equipment Company, Shanghai Smart Chemicals, Ltd., and Jilin Tumen Chemical Light Manufacturing Company—were punished for chemical-related exports, likely to Iran and North Korea. Additionally, a more recent case involving a seized shipment of dual-use materials at a border crossing with North Korea appears to show some improvements in China’s risk assessment and contraband interdiction abilities. his case is also examined. As the case studies show, China is slowly getting over the hurdles of establishing a viable export control system. Its progress in this field can be seen as a model for other countries—particularly those in Asia who face some of the same circumstances and challenges China had in the past decade. At the moment, while Beijing moves closer—however slowly—to international standards in the area of nonproliferation, many countries in Asia have yet to even begin the process of strengthening their systems. The lack of capacity in many Asian countries has had negative implications on the nonproliferation regime. The A. Q. Khan and other proliferation networks have exempliied how Asian nations with weak nonproliferation related controls can become key transshipment points for proliferators, or, as in the case of Malaysia and the Khan network, manufacturing hubs. Therefore, key areas will be identified so other Asian countries might learn from China’s experience while building their own strategic trade control frameworks. In this way, China’s system may prove to be an example for other countries in the region to selectively emulate when strengthening their own export control systems.

#### The turn is bigger than their solvency---Asia is a key hub for proliferation-related exports

Lieggi-Monterey Institute’s Center for Non­proliferation Studies-10

From Proliferator to Model Citizen? Strategic Studies Quarterly

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/summer/lieggi.pdf>

Similar to China’s pre-2002 export controls, many countries in South­east Asia have systems that are weak and undefined. 54 Until recently, nonproliferation-related trade controls have not been a significant priority for these countries. 55 Similar to Beijing’s earlier views, countries in the region believe export controls strengthen the supplier country’s economies while denying the developing world much-needed technology for economic development. States in the region have also argued that their lack of domestic WMD-relevant programs means that they cannot produce items sensitive enough to justify creating stringent trade control systems. However, the changing state of the world economy and global security is making the establishment of sufficient controls throughout Asia a growing priority. 56 Revelations about Southeast Asian connections in known illicit WMD trafficking networks, both as production nodes and as transshipment points, have highlighted the importance of creating viable nonproliferation-related trade controls in the region. For example, as part of the A. Q. Khan network’s efforts to supply Libya with a nuclear weapons program, a production node was established in Malaysia. The Malaysian owners of the facilities and their workers thought that the contract they were selling was for equipment related to the oil and gas industry; however, under the direction of a number of Khan’s associates, the items being produced were actually centrifuge components. 57 As technological capabilities within the region—particularly within Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states—expand, so too does their capacity to be a source of sensitive dual use equipment. Possibly even more urgent than controls on exports is the strengthening in the region of controls on transshipment and transiting cargo. ASEAN countries have some of the largest ports in the world, and many have been used as transshipment hubs for WMD-related trafficking. 58 Asian complacency on nonproliferation-related trade controls has been challenged by the changing nature of international security. The issue of nonstate actors and their ability to gain access to WMD-related materials has been an increasing fear, and a number of international mechanisms have been established to cope with this threat to global security. One such mechanism is UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), which was adopted in 2004 and is binding on all UN member states. This resolution mandates all states to “establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate efective national export and transshipment controls over” WMD and related dual-use items. 59 Southeast Asian nations have been somewhat suspicious of UNSCR 1540, seeing it as an unfunded mandate forced upon them by the supplier states. 60 However, as part of the resolution, states are encouraged to assist others with creating systems that can comply with the resolution. The United States and Japan have been particularly active with 1540-related training in Southeast Asia, which has helped wear down some of the resistance in the region to this resolution.

### 2nc t/warming

#### Chinese nuclear power leadership is the only way to solve warming----

China key to global emissions reductions-comparatively more important than the plan

Ekstrom-Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change MIT-5/24/12

Report: China’s actions are crucial on climate change

http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/china-focus-addressing-climate-change.html

As climate negotiators wrap-up talks in Bonn, Germany, this week, a major point of contention is who needs to do what to slow global warming. Nations such as China and the United States have held back from making substantial emission reduction pledges in the past, as both nations waited for the other to act. But new research out of MIT shows the importance of all major nations taking part in global efforts to reduce emissions — and in particular, finds China's role to be crucial. The report — titled "The Role of China in Mitigating Climate Change" — published in the journal Energy Economics, compares the impact of a stringent emissions reduction policy with and without China's participation. It finds that China's actions are "essential." "As the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, without China, climate goals — like the 2 degrees Celsius target that most agree is necessary to prevent serious irreversible consequences — are out of reach," says Sergey Paltsev, the lead author of the study and the assistant director for economic research at MIT's Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. Specifically, the study finds that with China's help the global community is able to limit warming to 2 degrees Celsius, relative to pre-industrial levels. But without China, we miss that mark by about 1 degree Celsius. Not only will it be close to impossible to achieve the 2 degrees mark without China's participation, but emissions reductions will also be more expensive because substantial costs would shift to only some countries.

#### Modeling, developing countries most critical to emission reductions ONLY look to china as a model for environmental policy due to profound economic similarities, Chinese soft power from nuclear export leadership is critical to give them leverage to build coalitions, that’s zhang.

#### This is net offense, even though there is warming in the SQ china offers the best method to stop it, only their leadership is sufficient because it forces action from the rest of the world.

#### Chinese emissions are sufficient to cause extinction---makes this an external impact

John Copeland Nagle 11, the John N. Matthews Professor, Notre Dame Law School, Spring 2011, “How Much Should China Pollute?,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 12 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 591

Third, the rest of the world suffers because of the inability of China and the United States to agree on a method for reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Even if the rest of the world were to reach such an agreement, the failure to include China and the United States would doom the project from the start. Together, China and the United States account for forty-one percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions. [FN19] Left unchecked, China's emissions alone could result in many of the harms associated with climate change. [FN20] That is why many observers believe that “[t]he decisions taken in Beijing, more than anywhere else, [will] determine whether humanity thrive[s] or perishe[s].”

Turn-Compulsory licensing

A. China pushes compulsory licensing for clean technology-the US is against

Financial Times 11/23/09

China, India push for 'patent free' green tech

<http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/china-india-push-patent-free-gre-news-223054>

As world leaders prepare for climate talks in Copenhagen next month, developing nations have tabled a controversial proposal which would effectively end patent protection for clean technologies. China and India have floated the idea of making new green technology subject to 'compulsory licensing', which critics say amounts to waiving intellectual property rights. The idea of adapting or liberalising patent rules for crucial new inventions which can help reduce carbon emissions is not new, but the EU and US are unhappy with compulsory licensing, fearing it would dramatically reduce the incentive for businesses to innovate and stifle green job creation. Compulsory licensing has to date only been used in emergency situations where patent-protected pharmaceuticals were seen as prohibitively expensive. The Thai government used the mechanism to allow local medicines factories produce HIV drugs at a fraction of the cost. Now, the group of 77 developing nations, led de facto by China, wants to apply the same logic to the climate crisis.

B. Turns the case-key to global dissemination of clean technology

Caprotti-assistant professor in human geography at University College-7/30/09

<http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/intellectual_property_who_owns_green_tech/>

CATALYST / BY VERONIQUE GREENWOOD /FIVE EXPERTS DISCUSS HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CAN BE ADAPTED TO SPREAD GREEN TECH, WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM PASTEUR, AND HOW TO INSPIRE

The rationale behind patenting technology is clear: Patents and IP rights protect a corporation responsible for innovation, allowing it to invest in R&D without fearing that another company will steal its innovation and bring it to market without bearing any of the development costs. Proponents of “green and clean IP” rightly point to the fact that more than 70 percent of global R&D in green tech is spent by private companies that want to protect their investments. That is why, for example, Toyota has patented more than 1,000 systems and components on its third-generation Prius hybrid car. The situation is clear when all we’re talking about is a car. Or a hybrid engine. Or the gearing components of a wind turbine. However, it is far less clear when the issue is about climate change and sustainability, not about specific components, technologies, and firms. The pressing issue of climate change forces us to start thinking past our own borders and past the narrow concerns of individual companies. In short, we have to start thinking past the private good in order to achieve the public good. It may be worthwhile to think of some of the greatest technological breakthroughs which have benefited humanity—and which happened without the benefits of patenting and IP. When Louis Pasteur developed the first vaccine against rabies—a disease which still kills upwards of 50,000 people a year—he did not patent his discovery, nor work for profit, but disseminated his knowledge for the public good. Indeed, in the case of the environment, rarely has the market unequivocally “worked” in eliminating the negative impacts—or “externalities”—of fossil fuel use, pollution, and environmental inequalities. It would be naive to suggest that all green technologies should be free. However, a recent high-profile report by University College London suggests that climate change is the biggest threat to global health in the 21st century. Developing a broader green IP framework is therefore crucial to the success of international climate treaties and emissions reductions standards. It is also crucial for developing countries, which are set to bear the brunt of the projected increased incidence and spread of diseases, extreme weather events, and warming. One promising avenue is the establishment of an international licensing mechanism focused on green tech and clean tech. This would enable companies and governments in the developing world to use established technologies for a fee, while protecting innovator firms. This already happens in the case of various technologies, from engine components to airliners. However, if the common good and the issue of climate change are to be kept in mind, the licensing of green tech needs to include a fee mechanism. This will enable economies at different stages of development—such as the US, China, and Bangladesh—to afford to use the same licensed technologies to promote sustainability and cleaner production. Ideally, this fee mechanism should account for the fact that several green technologies—from wind turbines to solar film—are manufactured in developing countries, taking advantage of low labor costs and incentives derived from those governments that the Green IP lobby is active in criticizing. At the same time, the new “green licensing” scheme should focus on established, not cutting-edge or proof-of-concept technologies. This is because it is crucial for countries to start reducing emissions now—not in 20 years. Parallel to this, international agreements should increasingly encourage the joint development of green tech by firms from developed and developing economies. Examples of this already exist: Vestas, the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer, sources 90 percent of the components for its new turbine from Chinese companies (see pdf). In turn, the turbine is manufactured in China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region so that it can easily reach the Chinese market. A licensing mechanism which allows for the spread of established green tech today will help developing countries to act on national environmental strategies, while allowing for the protection of innovators and investors in advanced economies.

C. Key internal link for warming

Collier-visiting scholar at the Center for Environmental Public Policy-9

<http://gspp.berkeley.edu/IPR/whoowns.pdf>

Who Owns the Clean Tech Revolution? Intellectual Property Rights and

International Cooperation in the U.N. Climate Negotiations

The outcome of the IPR dispute will determine the future of the global clean tech revolution. Without the rapid diffusion and adoption of emissions-reducing, energy saving technologies across the planet, especially in poorer nations, there will be little hope of halting or significantly slowing the advance of climate change.

### 2ac 1 2nc t/hegemony

#### Overall US hegemony is resilient---giving china the advantage on nuclear power will not tank US power projection capabilities, it will only give them more credibility in energy in East Asia, any challenger that would have been emboldened by that move was going to challenge the US inevitably, anyone deterrable by better US nuclear exports was going to be deterred by the HUGE conventional military the US has.

Parent and MacDonald 11 (Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” http://www.ihavenet.com/World-United-States-The-Wisdom-of-Retrenchment-America-Must-Cut-Back-to-Move-Forward-Foreign-Affairs.html, Donnie)

A somewhat more compelling concern raised by opponents of retrenchment is that the policy might undermine deterrence. Reducing the defense budget or repositioning forces would make the United States look weak and embolden upstarts, they argue. "The very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies," Kaplan worries. This anxiety is rooted in the assumption that the best barrier to adventurism by adversaries is forward defenses -- the deployment of military assets in large bases near enemy borders, which serve as tripwires or, to some eyes, a Great Wall of America. There are many problems with this position. For starters, the policies that have gotten the United States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran's regional power. NATO's expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified Russia's ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention. Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. The biggest menace to a superpower is not **the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch**. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall.

#### Weak china is worse than a strong one---destroys the US

YEE AND STOREY 2002

– PROF IR @ HONG KONG U AND DEAKIN U- *THE CHINA THREAT: PERCEPTIONS, MYTHS, AND REALITY*, PAGE 59

American influence over internal outcomes in China, though far from decisive, could nonetheless prove significant. Despite widespread unease about the implications of a more powerful China, an internally unstable China is potentially far more dangerous to American interests. Indifferent or sluggish economic performance could produce internal instability and weakness, possibly triggering a more assertive, overtly nationalistic foreign and defence policy. A wary, weaker leadership would also very likely have fewer incentives to pursue accommodation with its neighbours, much less with the United States.

### At ambassadors

#### Internal link claim is non-existant ambassadors are in no way key, neither are crackdowns. They concede that the US model is unattractive.

### Group uniqueness

#### THEY DON’T MAKE A TECH KEY ARGUMENT, HOLD THE LINE

#### China taking lead on next generation technology

Kadak-Prof Nuclear Science, MIT-6

<http://web.mit.edu/pebble-bed/papers1_files/Made%20in%20China.pdf>

Nuclear Power: “Made in China”

 Planning for the long-term, China has also taken the lead in developing advanced nuclear technologies. 16 Chinese scientists and engineers, trained in Germany at the Juelich Research Institute, have introduced high temperature pebble bed reactor technology into China. Pebble bed reactors are considered to be the first of the so-called “Generation IV” nuclear technologies that are expected to come to use in the next 10 to 20 years. China’s view is that these reactors can provide supplemental electric power for densely and sparsely populated regions and forprocessing heavy oil and coal to reduce air pollution. 17 The Juelich Research Institute is where the first pebble bed research reactor was operated for over 22 years. Tsinghua University’s Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology (INET), with the assistance of German engineers, designed and built a 10 megawatt thermal (Mwth) high temperature helium-cooled pebble bed reactor capable of producing four megawatts of electricity using a steam turbine generator. The reactor began operations in December of 2000 and has demonstrated its inherent safety characteristics by completing significant safety tests. At present, it is the only operating pebble bed reactor in the world. China has advanced this technology to the point where a full scale 190 megawatt electrical (Mwe) demonstration plant has been approved by the Chinese government to be built at Weihai in Shandong province, with construction beginning in 2007 and operations starting in 2011. 18 An artist rendering of the proposed site is shown on Figure 4.

China will fill in for US exports---solves global expansion

Goncharuk-Research Fellow, National Research Nuclear University, Russia-11

Chinese Nuclear Expansion: Are We Growing a New Rival?

<http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=333:chinese-nuclear-expansion-are-we-growing-a-new-rival&catid=121:contentenergysecurity1111&Itemid=386>

In attempting to answer the question broached in the title of this article "Is China a competitor on the nuclear market?" there is no simple answer. At present Westinghouse, AREVA, Rosatom, TVEL, Tenex are the big serious players on the nuclear technologies market. They are hugely experienced; they provide the highest standards and are true brand names. We are incapable of saying the same about the Chinese. Their companies still have a long way to go. Currently we are witnessing many clashes of interest between the Chinese Atomic Energy Agency and other nuclear exporting countries and corporations. China is developing rapidly and will soon catch up with the world’s top nuclear exporting powers. The situation will get tougher within 10 years as China gains operational experience with its new technologies. Market will see new nuclear offers coming forward from this nation. China is not satisfied to stand still; the rest of the world should take note.

China becoming global exporter

Hibbs-Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program-4/27/10

Pakistan Deal Signals China's Growing Nuclear Assertiveness

<https://www.carnegieendowment.org/2010/04/27/pakistan-deal-signals-china-s-growing-nuclear-assertiveness/4su>

The United States and other NSG states may object to the pending transaction but they cannot prevent China from exporting the reactors. Senior officials in NSG states friendly to the United States said this month they expect that President Barack Obama will not openly criticize the Chinese export because Washington, in the context of a bilateral security dialogue with Islamabad, may be sensitive to Pakistan’s desire for civilian nuclear cooperation in the wake of the sweeping U.S.–India nuclear deal which entered into force in 2008 after considerable arm-twisting of NSG states by the United States, France, and Russia. The United States may also tolerate China’s new nuclear deal with Pakistan because Obama wants China’s support for United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran this spring. The pending Sino–Pakistan reactor deal reflects the growing confidence and assertiveness of China’s nuclear energy program as it establishes a track record of reliability in reactor construction and operation. Chinese nuclear entities are wary of interference from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in their programs and are keen to establish their freedom of action vis-à-vis cooperating foreign governments and firms. China within a few years also wants to become a global nuclear equipment exporter. After years of bilateral disputes over nonproliferation issues, in 1998 the U.S. Congress allowed a 1985 Sino–U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement to enter into force. After that, U.S. nuclear cooperation with China dramatically increased, culminating in China’s 2006 selection of a consortium of companies led by Westinghouse to build four AP1000 power reactors in China. Westinghouse bested bidders from France and Russia in a competition set up by China to determine which of the three would provide the technology blueprint for the future standardized development of China’s nuclear power industry. China chose Westinghouse after it agreed to transfer to China ownership of the technology for the new and untried 1,000-MW reactor. China then awarded contracts to Westinghouse and its partners to build four AP1000s in China. The first two are scheduled to be finished in 2013. Westinghouse scored another coup when in 2008 China selected AP1000 for China’s first raft of inland power reactors. Westinghouse’s apparent emergence as primus inter pares among foreign reactor vendors in China in 2006 was linked to the fortunes of the State Nuclear Power Technology Co. (Snptc). It was set up by China’s State Council of Ministers to take charge of technology selection and transfer for China’s future nuclear power program, after two decades during which China organized a handful of “boutique” reactor projects in cooperation with Canada, France, Japan, and Russia. Right now, China operates only eleven reactors representing about 9 gigawatts (GW) of installed generating capacity, but these have established a record of reliability, and have convinced China’s leaders that nuclear power is safe, efficient, and profitable. Fed by galloping energy demand and concerns for global warming among Chinese leaders, China’s appetite for nuclear power is now increasing. In 2005 China expected to have 40 GW on line by 2020. Chinese officials and executives now routinely assert that by 2020 China will have a total installed capacity over 70 GW. If China succeeds, ten years from now it will likely become the world’s second-biggest nuclear power generator after the United States. Shortly after China selected Westinghouse to shape its nuclear future, rival Areva made a separate deal with China to build two of its new EPR reactors in Guangdong Province in China’s southeast, where French nuclear firms have been engaged since the late 1980s. Unlike Westinghouse, Areva also offered China a suite of fuel cycle technology options, and French officials hoped that a mammoth fuel cycle deal would coax China to continue building the EPR. In line with plans by China to build more reactors, China promulgated that it would follow the path of France, Russia, and Japan and embark on commercial-scale plutonium separation from China’s spent fuel, and recycle of the plutonium as reactor fuel. Areva offered China to help set up a reprocessing industry in China, modeled on its own experience in France. More recently, Russia has made a counteroffer to do the same, vowing to integrate Chinese labs into advanced fuel cycle R&D work now ongoing in Russian centers. China will certainly build more reactors than it anticipated when beginning in 2003 it organized the competition leading to selection of Westinghouse. But many or most of these set up this decade will likely not be AP1000s or EPRs but instead be based on the original French design built in Guangdong and now dubbed China Pressurized Water Reactor or CPR-1000. To meet China’s higher targets for more nuclear capacity, China is now replicating these CPRs. Rumors in Beijing circulated last month that China will therefore go back on its plan to permit Westinghouse to build all of the first group of inland power reactors in the country. Chinese officials won’t confirm that, but utility executives―including at China Power Investment Corp. (CPI), a major AP1000 investor—said that China through 2020 will shift resources away from more AP1000s and instead toward cookie-cutter construction of the CPR at many Chinese locations, including at inland sites. In the meantime, the ambitious construction schedule for the U.S.-designed reactors in China has come under heavy pressure. In part out of Chinese concern to keep construction on track, China’s nuclear regulator, the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), will not agree to a proposal, favored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Westinghouse, to modify the design of the containment structure of the AP1000 to provide improved protection against an air crash. In the United States, NRC, after a design review prompted by post-9/11 concerns about terrorist threats, asked Westinghouse to change the design of a shield building which is part of the containment and to use stronger materials. Westinghouse then urged China to also follow that advice. China will not do that, Beijing officials said last month after consultations with Westinghouse and U.S. regulators. “China will build Revision 15,” the AP1000 design version originally approved for construction in both the United States and in China, one official said. “It will not approve Revision 17,” which incorporates the changes sought by NRC and Westinghouse, he said. Changing the AP1000 design now would require construction in China to be halted and delayed. China also does not share NRC’s view that a terrorist attack on reactors, using a hijacked passenger aircraft as a weapon, is a realistic enough scenario to warrant modifying the design. The Westinghouse project has encountered other challenges which, so far, have not caused schedule delays. Last year, a key firm which is part of the technology transfer program, China First Heavy Industries (CFHI), failed to produce forgings to the required quality standard for the AP1000. Project executives said CFHI had difficulty handling the demanding steel material called for in critical components. The schedule was not set back because a Westinghouse partner in Korea, Doosan, had a stock of prototype forgings it had made earlier. The AP1000 has also encountered problems in main coolant pumps, which are of a unique design. Chinese officials said last year that further deployment of the AP1000 would depend on successful demonstration of these pumps, which were a critical feature of the passive cooling system billed as one of the key advantages of this reactor model. According to diplomats there have also been some Chinese bureaucratic delays for certain AP1000 project approvals. Nearly immediately after partnering with Westinghouse, Snptc demanded the U.S. firm aggressively localize AP1000 production at a pace Westinghouse would not agree to, including for safety reasons. Snptc and Westinghouse then compromised, but utility investors say that the AP1000 program cannot go fast enough to localize and at the same time supply China’s growing nuclear power needs, and that China has continued to pressure Westinghouse to accelerate the localization program. Because production of CPRs in China is already highly localized after about 15 years of Chinese experience, domestic politics in China favors building more of these reactors. Snptc also wants Westinghouse to increase the power of the reactor to 1,400 MW and then to 1,700 MW, matching the EPR. According to Snptc last month the 1,400-MW design will be ready for construction by 2013. Many foreign executives are skeptical that schedule will hold up. China’s nuclear power program has become more aggressive, politically organized, and independent of its foreign partners in the wake of recent changes in China’s decision-making structure. Those at the top of this pinnacle are now watching how Snptc delivers in tandem with Westinghouse.

### Solves Whole Aff

China expansion solves US nuclear transition---can export technology

Kadak-Prof Nuclear Science, MIT-6

<http://web.mit.edu/pebble-bed/papers1_files/Made%20in%20China.pdf>

Nuclear Power: “Made in China”

Summary China is emerging not only as a super economic power but also as the leader in the deployment and development of new nuclear energy plants. China’s energy needs are enormous, and its path forward in terms of providing sufficient electricity calls for a dramatic expansion of the use of nuclear energy. The Chinese government has determined that, based on its experience and ongoing concern with the environmental consequences of burning coal and other fossil fuels, China needs to aggressively deploy more than 50 plants in the next several decades. Of concern is whether the Chinese can manage this expansion with the quality needed to assure that plants are operated safely, with personnel trained in the proper safety culture. Based on observations to date, 15the Chinese appear to understand the challenges and are addressing them in order to assure the safe operation of the plants. As the United States and other nations have learned, such a task requires vigilance and a dedication to safe operations. With such rapid growth, it has yet to be seen whether or not the safety culture can be transferred to the next generation of operators and engineers. In terms of proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, the choice is one of foreign policy rather than technology. The development of China’s commercial nuclear industry can be done without fear of proliferation of nuclear weapons, provided China does not transfer the weapons sensitive technologies (enrichment and reprocessing) to less-than-trustworthy countries. As in all nations operating nuclear plants and defense facilities, the issue of nuclear waste disposal will be resolved on a country-by-country basis. It is fortunate that China has large areas (such as the Gobi Desert) where waste can be safely disposed of in geological formations. As China aggressively deploys its light water reactors, develops pebble bed reactors for electricity, and processes heat applications, we in the United States are still waiting for our nuclear “renaissance” to occur. It is not inconceivable that as we wait and watch, we may, in the future, be buying reactors “Made in China”

China key to commercialization in developing world---turns the case

Zhou-Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program

The Nonproliferation Review, Harvard-10

THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY EXPANSION

<http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/the_security_implications_of_chinas_nuclear_energy_expansion.pdf>

Although China has been an active nuclear supplier, it has also been an active participant in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime since the 1980s, joining the IAEA, the NPT, the Zangger Committee, and most recently, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 29 China agreed to limited-scope safeguards over its nuclear exports rather than full-scope safeguards when it joined the IAEA, and it maintained this level of obligation when it signed the NPT, allowing it to continue nuclear trade with Pakistan and Iran. China’s ascension to the NSG required it to apply formal full-scope safeguards as a condition for supplying items on NSG control lists to non-nuclear weapon states, further committing itself to nonproliferation. However, China’s nuclear expansion ambitions are likely to lead to the export of its own nuclear technologies. Potential recipients of these exports include non-nuclear countries\*especially countries that cannot afford to buy the technologies directly from Western countries or are prohibited from purchasing items for political reasons. These countries are likely to view China as less rigid than Western countries, and China has an interest in maintaining its leadership among developing countries and representing their rights to build peaceful nuclear programs.

China key to global nuclear power expansion

Buijs-Clingendael International Energy Programme-3/12

China and the Future of New Energy Technologies

<http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2012/201203_ciep_paper_buijs_china_future_new_energy_technologies.pdf>

The importance of China as one of very few major expansion centres for the nuclear power industry can hardly be overstated. Out of all 63 reactors that are under construction worldwide, 27 reactors (43%) are located in China, and the country accounts for about one‐third of all nuclear power plants that are in planning or proposal stages globally. 150 Especially in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in Japan in March 2011, the perspectives on renewed growth for nuclear power have diminished in quite a number of places. 151 Even though it is not sure whether this reaction to the incident will be long‐lasting or just temporary, the outlook for a ‘nuclear renaissance’ has dimmed. China halted the approval of new nuclear power plants after the Fukushima incident and issued comprehensive safety checks on reactors in operation and those under construction to re‐ evaluate safety conditions. Resumption of approvals has been suspended until a new nuclear safety plan comes into force. However, the general expectation is that the ambitious targets that have been issued for nuclear power will remain in place, as they are an essential element for China to meet its carbon‐intensity and non‐fossil‐fuel‐share goals. 152 The China’s plans for nuclear power are ambitious indeed. As of 2011, it has 14 reactors in operation, together accounting for 11.3 GW of power generating capacity. The plans are to increase its nuclear capacity to 40 GW by 2015 and to 75‐80 GW by 2020: by then it would have the second largest nuclear power fleet after the US (101 GW), surpassing France (63 GW) and Japan (49 GW). 153 This should then raise the share of nuclear power in China’s electricity mix to 5 percent. For the nuclear industry the message is clear: the choice is between being active in China and risking the loss of a lot of business. One of the consequences of the limited growth in nuclear power worldwide since the 1980s has been a trend towards consolidation. Only a limited number of firms are active as global players in the nuclear power industry, including Areva (France), Toshiba‐Westinghouse (Japan‐US), GE‐Hitachi (US‐Japan) and Atomstroyexport (Russia). 154 There is, however, the strong expectation that China will emerge as a major player in the nuclear industry, increasing global competition. 155

### South East Asia

#### Chinese soft power is key to South East Asian regionalism.

Zheng 2009

Denise, Program coordinator of the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, China’s Use of Soft Power in the Developing World, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305\_mcgiffert\_chinesesoftpower\_web.pdf

China realizes the primacy of establishing good relations with its periphery for regional economic and security stability. It aims to acquire soft power by resolving border disputes, which in some cases have involved Chinese territorial concessions. China actively participates in or has assumed leadership roles in the creation of regional organizations for economic and security cooperation, including the East Asian Summit, the Asian Development Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and ASEAN. It has contracted numerous large-scale infrastructure projects to build roads, bridges, pipelines, and power-generating facilities, particularly in Southeast Asia and Central Asian countries formerly part of the Soviet Union. Especially in Southeast Asia, China wields power in the region through its skillful diplomacy, the region s admiration of China as a model for development, and by emphasizing shared Asian values. Southeast Asia is arguably the region where China's soft power is strongest. The assistance that China offered in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when the United States was missing in action, has played a significant role in the transformation of the region's attitude toward China. The depth of China's trade, investment, and aid relationships with countries on its periphery grants China significant influence in Asia.

#### Prevents nuclear war.

Rajaratnam 1992

S., Former Deputy Prime Minister – Singapore, “ASEAN: The Way Ahead” , 9-1, http://www.aseansec.org/13991.htm

Should regionalism collapse, then ASEAN too will go the way of earlier regional attempts like SEATO, ASA and MAPHlLlNDO. All that remains today of these earlier experiments are their bleached bones. Should the new regional efforts collapse, then globalism, the final stage of historical development, will also fall apart. Then we will inevitably enter another Dark Ages and World War III, fought this time not with gun-powder, but with nuclear weapons far more devastating than those exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

## Gas

### Warming

#### Gas doesn’t cause warming and they cannot solve. Long term internal link.

#### Natural gas reduces emissions – alternative is coal which is way worse

Bryce, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, 7-17-12

(Robert, “Inside the strange world of 'green energy' politics and how it's ruining the US,” http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/07/17/inside-strange-world-green-energy-politics-and-how-it-ruining-us/, accessed 7-17-12, CMM)

The United States is leading the world in reducing its emissions of carbon dioxide. And it’s doing so by a wide margin.¶ Yes, you read that right. The United States – the country that is routinely vilified by the Green/Left for refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol or impose carbon taxes or institute a cap-and-trade system – is dramatically cutting its production of carbon dioxide. Proof of that has come from both the International Energy Agency in Paris and the Energy Information Administration in Washington.¶ But you won’t hear about America’s success at cutting carbon dioxide emissions from groups like the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, or the leftist Center for American Progress. That’s because those very same groups are opposing production of the fuel that’s making those reductions possible: natural gas.¶ Welcome to the strange world of “green” energy politics where fossil fuels – all of them – are vilified because, well, they aren’t wind, and they aren’t solar. Nevertheless, the facts are readily available for anyone who cares to look at them.¶ On May 24, the IEA reported that US carbon dioxide emissions “have now fallen by 430 million tons (7.7 percent) since 2006, the largest reduction of all countries or regions.” The reasons for that big reduction, said the IEA were: lower oil use, the economic downturn, “and a substantial shift from coal to gas in the power sector.”¶ Indeed, thanks to a flood of low-cost natural gas, which is the direct result of the shale revolution, electricity producers throughout the country are shutting down their aging coal plants and replacing them with more efficient natural gas-fired units. And they’re doing so, not because of mandates, taxes, or cap-and-trade schemes, but because of market forces. It’s simply cheaper for them to use gas than it is to burn coal. ¶ That’s reflected in the latest data from the IEA: during the first four months of this year, coal-fired electricity generation in the US fell by 21 percent compared to the same period last year, while gas-fired generation soared by 34 percent.¶ The result: a steep drop in carbon dioxide emissions. During the first quarter of the year, US carbon dioxide emissions totaled 1.34 billion tons. That’s a reduction of 7.8 percent compared to the first quarter of 2011.¶ Meanwhile, consider what’s happening in Europe, where the EU’s failed emissions trading scheme has created a perverse incentive: utilities are burning more coal because it’s cheaper for them to buy emissions credits than to use natural gas. On July 3, Bloomberg reported that coal-fired generation in the EU has jumped by more than 3 percent this year while gas-fired electricity production is falling.¶ In addition, earlier this month, Lawrence M. Cathles, a professor of earth and atmospheric sciences at Cornell University, published a new study which found that utilizing natural gas to displace coal would be far faster and cheaper than attempting to use nuclear energy and renewables, and better yet, could reduce global carbon emissions by as much as 40 percent.¶ “The most important message of the calculations reported here is that substituting natural gas for coal and oil is a significant way to reduce greenhouse forcing, regardless of how long the substitution takes,” says the study, which was published in the peer-reviewed journal Geochemistry, Geophysics and Geosystems. “A faster transition to low-carbon energy sources would decrease greenhouse warming further, but the substitution of natural gas for other fossil fuels is equally beneficial in percentage terms no matter how fast the transition.”

### Not real

#### Prefer our authors –

#### A subpoint – confirmation bias

Hoffman 2012

Doug L., adjunct Professor of Computer Science at Hendrix College and the University of Central Arkansas, focus in modeling of complex systems, New Climate Models Fall Short, 5-29-2012, The Resilient Earth, http://theresilientearth.com/?q=content/new-climate-models-fall-short

Lastly, I would like to mention an interesting piece of commentary that appeared in Nature in the same issue as the Tollefson report. In “Beware the creeping cracks of bias,” Daniel Sarewitz, co-director of the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes at Arizona State University, talks about one of those subjects that is usually taboo in scientific circles: the threat to science by researcher's own bias. Sarewitz issued this blunt warning: “Alarming cracks are starting to penetrate deep into the scientific edifice. They threaten the status of science and its value to society. And they cannot be blamed on the usual suspects — inadequate funding, misconduct, political interference, an illiterate public. Their cause is bias, and the threat they pose goes to the heart of research.” Though Sarewitz is specifically concerned with biomedical research, his warning should be taken as a general one. All areas of scientific endeavor can be affected by peer pressure, by group think, by consensus. When an idea becomes generally accepted, there is a natural tendency for the scientific community to respond positively to new results that reinforce current thinking. Conversely, papers that present a negative result, attacking or diminishing the currently held theory, often find a cold welcome and may not be published at all. Bias is natural and pervasive, and antithetical to good science. Here is how Sarewitz describes it: How can we explain such pervasive bias? Like a magnetic field that pulls iron filings into alignment, a powerful cultural belief is aligning multiple sources of scientific bias in the same direction. The belief is that progress in science means the continual production of positive findings. All involved benefit from positive results, and from the appearance of progress. Scientists are rewarded both intellectually and professionally, science administrators are empowered and the public desire for a better world is answered. The lack of incentives to report negative results, replicate experiments or recognize inconsistencies, ambiguities and uncertainties is widely appreciated — but the necessary cultural change is incredibly difficult to achieve. The presence of bias in the global warming debate should be obvious to the most casual of observers. The paucity of published articles that contradict the existing paradigm, the reliance on “consensus” when arguing for the accepted dogma and the ad hominin attacks on scientists bold enough to decry the AGW party line all highlight the bias of the climate science community. Yet as we have seen above there are still gaping holes in our knowledge of Earth's climate system. The old models have been shown to be inadequate and the new ones are not in agreement—unsurprising given that aerosol effects are only crudely estimated and we still do not understand the carbon cycle in sufficient detail. All of this confronts climate science with some fundamental questions. “In the end, the climate community must confront a basic question about models,” reports Tollefson. Michael Winton, a modeler at the GFD puts it more succinctly: “If you made a model and it matched the observations perfectly, would you claim success?” What can be said for a model that matches recent climate fluctuation accurately but does so for the wrong reasons? More fundamentally, how do you know what the right answer is? As we have seen in the past, the right answer is decided by “consensus,” which is to say by the bias and expectations of the clique of climate scientists. “A biased scientific result is no different from a useless one,” states Sarewitz, “neither can be turned into a real-world application.” Yet that is precisely what the IPCC modelers are claiming, that we should accept the uncertain output of incomplete models, created to satisfy the bias of the greater climate science community, as a factual representation of the Earth system. Starting in 2013, the IPCC will strive to achieve consensus, basically the same consensus they promoted in the previous report, but all they will be doing is codifying the bias of a group of scientists with no real answers.

#### B subpoint – incentives and intimidation

Allegre et al 2012

Claude Allegre, former director of the Institute for the Study of the Earth, University of Paris; J. Scott Armstrong, cofounder of the Journal of Forecasting and the International Journal of Forecasting; Jan Breslow, head of the Laboratory of Biochemical Genetics and Metabolism, Rockefeller University; Roger Cohen, fellow, American Physical Society; Edward David, member, National Academy of Engineering and National Academy of Sciences; William Happer, professor of physics, Princeton; Michael Kelly, professor of technology, University of Cambridge, U.K.; William Kininmonth, former head of climate research at the Australian Bureau of Meteorology; Richard Lindzen, professor of atmospheric sciences, MIT; James McGrath, professor of chemistry, Virginia Technical University; Rodney Nichols, former president and CEO of the New York Academy of Sciences; Burt Rutan, aerospace engineer, designer of Voyager and SpaceShipOne; Harrison H. Schmitt, Apollo 17 astronaut and former U.S. senator; Nir Shaviv, professor of astrophysics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Henk Tennekes, former director, Royal Dutch Meteorological Service; Antonio Zichichi, president of the World Federation of Scientists, Geneva. No Need to Panic About Global Warming, Wall Street Journal, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html>

A candidate for public office in any contemporary democracy may have to consider what, if anything, to do about "global warming." Candidates should understand that the oft-repeated claim that nearly all scientists demand that something dramatic be done to stop global warming is not true. In fact, a large and growing number of distinguished scientists and engineers do not agree that drastic actions on global warming are needed. In September, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Ivar Giaever, a supporter of President Obama in the last election, publicly resigned from the American Physical Society (APS) with a letter that begins: "I did not renew [my membership] because I cannot live with the [APS policy] statement: 'The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring. If no mitigating actions are taken, significant disruptions in the Earth's physical and ecological systems, social systems, security and human health are likely to occur. We must reduce emissions of greenhouse gases beginning now.' In the APS it is OK to discuss whether the mass of the proton changes over time and how a multi-universe behaves, but the evidence of global warming is incontrovertible?" In spite of a multidecade international campaign to enforce the message that increasing amounts of the "pollutant" carbon dioxide will destroy civilization, large numbers of scientists, many very prominent, share the opinions of Dr. Giaever. And the number of scientific "heretics" is growing with each passing year. The reason is a collection of stubborn scientific facts. Perhaps the most inconvenient fact is the lack of global warming for well over 10 years now. This is known to the warming establishment, as one can see from the 2009 "Climategate" email of climate scientist Kevin Trenberth: "The fact is that we can't account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can't." But the warming is only missing if one believes computer models where so-called feedbacks involving water vapor and clouds greatly amplify the small effect of CO2. The lack of warming for more than a decade—indeed, the smaller-than-predicted warming over the 22 years since the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) began issuing projections—suggests that computer models have greatly exaggerated how much warming additional CO2 can cause. Faced with this embarrassment, those promoting alarm have shifted their drumbeat from warming to weather extremes, to enable anything unusual that happens in our chaotic climate to be ascribed to CO2. The fact is that CO2 is not a pollutant. CO2 is a colorless and odorless gas, exhaled at high concentrations by each of us, and a key component of the biosphere's life cycle. Plants do so much better with more CO2 that greenhouse operators often increase the CO2 concentrations by factors of three or four to get better growth. This is no surprise since plants and animals evolved when CO2 concentrations were about 10 times larger than they are today. Better plant varieties, chemical fertilizers and agricultural management contributed to the great increase in agricultural yields of the past century, but part of the increase almost certainly came from additional CO2 in the atmosphere. Although the number of publicly dissenting scientists is growing, many young scientists furtively say that while they also have serious doubts about the global-warming message, they are afraid to speak up for fear of not being promoted—or worse. They have good reason to worry. In 2003, Dr. Chris de Freitas, the editor of the journal Climate Research, dared to publish a peer-reviewed article with the politically incorrect (but factually correct) conclusion that the recent warming is not unusual in the context of climate changes over the past thousand years. The international warming establishment quickly mounted a determined campaign to have Dr. de Freitas removed from his editorial job and fired from his university position. Fortunately, Dr. de Freitas was able to keep his university job. This is not the way science is supposed to work, but we have seen it before—for example, in the frightening period when Trofim Lysenko hijacked biology in the Soviet Union. Soviet biologists who revealed that they believed in genes, which Lysenko maintained were a bourgeois fiction, were fired from their jobs. Many were sent to the gulag and some were condemned to death. Why is there so much passion about global warming, and why has the issue become so vexing that the American Physical Society, from which Dr. Giaever resigned a few months ago, refused the seemingly reasonable request by many of its members to remove the word "incontrovertible" from its description of a scientific issue? There are several reasons, but a good place to start is the old question "cui bono?" Or the modern update, "Follow the money." Alarmism over climate is of great benefit to many, providing government funding for academic research and a reason for government bureaucracies to grow. Alarmism also offers an excuse for governments to raise taxes, taxpayer-funded subsidies for businesses that understand how to work the political system, and a lure for big donations to charitable foundations promising to save the planet. Lysenko and his team lived very well, and they fiercely defended their dogma and the privileges it brought them. Speaking for many scientists and engineers who have looked carefully and independently at the science of climate, we have a message to any candidate for public office: There is no compelling scientific argument for drastic action to "decarbonize" the world's economy. Even if one accepts the inflated climate forecasts of the IPCC, aggressive greenhouse-gas control policies are not justified economically. A recent study of a wide variety of policy options by Yale economist William Nordhaus showed that nearly the highest benefit-to-cost ratio is achieved for a policy that allows 50 more years of economic growth unimpeded by greenhouse gas controls. This would be especially beneficial to the less-developed parts of the world that would like to share some of the same advantages of material well-being, health and life expectancy that the fully developed parts of the world enjoy now. Many other policy responses would have a negative return on investment. And it is likely that more CO2 and the modest warming that may come with it will be an overall benefit to the planet.

#### C subpoint – peer review fails.

Eisen 2011

Michael, Associate Professor of Genetics, Genomics and Development @ UC Berkeley, Peer review is f\*\*\*ed up – let’s fix it, 10-28-2011, it is NOT junk, http://www.michaeleisen.org/blog/?p=694

Peer review is ostensibly one of the central pillars of modern science. A paper is not taken seriously by other scientists unless it is published in a “peer reviewed” journal. Jobs, grants and tenure are parceled out, in no small part, on the basis of lists of “peer reviewed” papers. The public has been trained to accept as established truth any science that has gone through the gauntlet of “peer review”. And any attempt to upend, reform or even tinker with it is regarded as an apostasy. But the truth is that peer review as practiced in the 21st century biomedical research poisons science. It is conservative, cumbersome, capricious and intrusive. It slows down the communication of new ideas and discoveries, while failing to accomplish most of what it purports to do. And, worst of all, the mythical veneer of peer review has created the perception that a handful of journals stand as gatekeepers of success in science, ceding undue power to them, and thereby stifling innovation in scientific communication. This has to stop. In honor of Open Access Week, I am going to lay out what is wrong with peer review, how its persistence in its current form harms science, scientists and the public, and how we can restructure peer review to everyone’s benefit. [These ideas have emerged from over a decades worth of conspiring on this topic with Pat Brown, as well as myriad discussions with Harold Varmus, David Lipman, Vitek Tracz, my brother Jonathan, Gerry Rubin, Sean Eddy, other board members and staff at PLoS, and various and sundry people at meeting bars]. Peer review and its problems To understand what’s wrong with peer review, you have to understand at least the basics of how it works. When a scientist has a result they want to share with their colleagues they write a paper and submit it to one of nearly 10,000 biomedical research journals. The choice of journal is governed by many factors, but most scientists try to get their papers into the highest profile journal that covers their field and will accept it. Authors with the highest aspirations for their work send it to one of the wide circulation general science journals Science and Nature, or to a handful of high impact field-specific journals. In my field, molecular genetics/genomics, this would be Cell and PLoS Biology (a journal we started in 2003 to provide an open access alterative to these other three). In more clinical fields this would be something like the New England Journal of Medicine. [I want to make it clear that I am not endorsing these choices, just describing what people do]. When any of these top-tier journals receive a paper, it is evaluated by a professional editor (usually a Ph.D. scientist) who makes an initial judgment as to its suitability for their journal. They’re not trying to determine if the paper is technically sound – they are trying to figure out if the work described represents a sufficiently significant advance to warrant one of the coveted spots in their journal. If they think it might, they send the paper to 3 or 4 scientists – usually, but not always lab heads – who are knowledgeable about the subject at hand, and ask them to read and comment on the manuscript. The reviewers are asked to comment on several things: The technical merits of the paper: are the methods sounds, the experiments reproducible, the data believable, the proper controls included, the conclusions justified – that is, is it a valid work of science. The presentation: is the writing understandable, are the figures clear, is relevant earlier work properly cited. Are the results and conclusions of the paper sufficiently important for the journal for which it is being reviewed. For most journals, the reviewers address these questions in a freeform review, which they send to the editor, who weighs their various comments to arrive at a decision. Reviews come in essentially three flavors: Outright acceptance (rare), outright rejection (common for high tier journals), and rejection with the option to address the reviewers’ objections and resubmit. Often the editors and reviewers demand a series of additional experiments that might lead them to accept an otherwise unacceptable paper. Papers that are rejected have to go through the process over again at another journal. There are too many things that are wrong with this process, but I want to focus on two here: 1) The process takes a really long time. In my experience, the first round of reviews rarely takes less than a month, and often take a lot longer, with papers sitting on reviewers’ desks the primary rate-limiting step. But even more time consuming is what happens after the initial round of review, when papers have to be rewritten, often with new data collected and analyses done. For typical papers from my lab it takes 6 to 9 months from initial submission to publication. The scientific enterprise is all about building on the results of others – but this can’t be done if the results of others are languishing in the hands of reviewers, or suffering through multiple rounds of peer review. There can be little doubt that this delay slows down scientific discovery and the introduction to the public of new ways to diagnose and treat disease [this is something Pat Brown and I have talked about trying to quantify, but I don't have anything yet]. Of course this might be worth it if this manifestation of peer review were an essential part of the scientific enterprise that somehow made the ultimate product better, in spite of – of even because of – the delays. But this leads to: 2) The system is not very good at what it purports to do. The values that people primarily ascribe to peer review are maintaining the integrity of the scientific literature by preventing the publication of flawed science; filtering of the mass of papers into to identify those one should read; and providing a system for evaluating the contribution of individual scientists for hiring, funding and promotion. But it doesn’t actually do any of these things effectively. The kind of flawed science that people are most worried about are deceptive or fraudulent papers, especially those dealing with clinical topics. And while I am sure that some egregious papers are prevented from being published by peer review, the reality is that with 10,000 or so journals out there, most papers that are not obviously flawed will ultimately get published if the authors are sufficiently persistent. The peer reviewed literature is filled with all manner of crappy papers – especially in more clinical fields. And even the supposedly more rigorous standards of the elite journals fail to prevent flawed papers from being published (witness the recent Arsenic paper published by Science). So, while it might be a nice idea to imagine peer review as some kind of defender of scientific integrity – it isn’t. And even if you believed that peer review could do this – several aspects of the current system make it more difficult. First, the focus on the importance of a paper in the publishing decision often deemphasizes technical issues. And, more importantly, the current system relies on three reviewers judging the technical merits of a paper under a fairly strict time constraint – conditions that are not ideally suited to recognize anything but the most obvious flaws. In my experience the most important technical flaws are uncovered after papers are published. And yet, because we have a system that places so much emphasis on where a paper is published, we have no effective way to annotate previously published papers that turn out to be wrong: once a Nature paper, always a Nature paper. And as for classification, does anyone really think that assigning every paper to one journal, organized in a loose and chaotic hierarchy of topics and importance, is really the best way to help people browse the literature? It made some sense when journals had to be printed and mailed – but with virtually all dissemination of the literature now done electronically, this system no longer makes any sense whatsoever. While some people still read journals cover to cover – most people now find papers by searching for them in PubMed, Google Scholar or the equivalent. While the classification into journals has some value, it certainly doesn’t justify the delays in publication that it currently requires. I could go on about the problems with our current peer review system, but I’m 1,500 words into this thing and I want to stop kvetching about the problem and get to the solution.

### Hegemony

#### Domestic politics means the US won’t exercise heg – the public is getting tired of warfare, they want politicians to focus on domestic issues. Even if Obama tries to take action partisanship means it won’t be firm, can’t get the GOP on board, means gridlock and no action internationally. That’s Kupchan, prefer it –

#### FIRST peer reviewed, best standard for evaluating truth shows the claim holds water.

#### SECOND recent, assumes domestic politics over the debt deal and Libya which showed how messed up Congress is.

#### The aff can’t solve this, lack of will domestically means deterrence isn’t credible.

McDevitt 2011

Michael, Vice President and Director, CNA Strategic Studies, Brookings Institute, Deterring North Korean Provocations, Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary | Number 46, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/02\_north\_korea\_mcdevitt.aspx

For either of these forms of deterrence to be successful what is threatened in response to aggression or a hostile act must be believable, or as it is commonly cast, must be credible. Credibility in turn, derives from a combination of military capability and a belief in the minds of North Korean leaders that the alliance has the political will to act. There is no doubt that the U.S.-ROK allies have the political will to respond to an invasion; hence the conditions necessary for a credible deterrent, capability and political will, are met.

#### And Obama won’t exercise heg – empirics prove.

Pletka and Gottlieb 2011

Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at AEI. Stuart Gottlieb is a former Senate foreign policy adviser and speechwriter and teaches US foreign policy and national security at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, Shrinking America's Role In the World Is the True Obama Doctrine, http://www.aei.org/article/104308

After months of mixed messages, President Barack Obama has chosen to draw down to virtually zero troops in Iraq when the deadline for withdrawal expires on December 31. Some will label the decision politics; other will label it ideology. What is clear is that shrinking America's role in the world is the true Obama doctrine. Earlier this year, the administration agreed to renegotiate a deal to leave forces in Iraq past 2011. U.S. commanders reportedly asked for at least 10,000 troops to secure Iraq's hard won peace. Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained that remaining "sends a powerful signal to the region," a sentiment shared strongly by his successor, Leon Panetta. But the Pentagon's assessment was not shared by the president's inner circle of political advisers, who reportedly insisted that no more than 3,000 troops be left on the ground. And even that slimmed down number has been whittled to near nothing. Why? The president's critics will say this is further proof Mr. Obama is ashamed of American power. Others will say he is simply appeasing his political base. His supporters are quick to point out that Mr. Obama is as willing to use force as any of his predecessors--witness the demise of Usama bin Laden and an ever-growing number of his senior operatives. Whether or not the president is actually "ashamed" of American power, it is hard to escape the conclusion he is deeply leery of its exercise. This helps explain the unusual rollout of Mr. Obama's Afghanistan surge strategy in December 2009, where in the same breath he announced an increase in U.S. troops he also promised to begin their withdrawal 18 months later. The merits of the president's counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan can be debated, but under no scenario did signaling withdrawal assist the military mission. More examples come from Libya, and the Arab Spring more broadly. Far from an unwillingness to commit force, President Obama appeared unwilling to so much as opine regarding the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya that exploded in late 2010. And while administration officials have attempted to portray the president's reticence as a deliberate policy of "leading from behind," it can as easily be construed as an unwillingness to lead at all. It is a stretch to say the fortunes of Muammar Qaddafi are a vital national interest to the United States. Europe is more directly affected, and European states should act accordingly. Nonetheless, both the British and French governments grumbled publicly (and more angrily privately) that the United States was failing to support NATO's efforts in Libya. And then there's Syria. What might be explained as cautiousness in the case of Qaddafi has been paralysis in the case of confronting Bashir el-Assad over the systematic murder of his citizens. Even staunch supporters of the president--including the New York Times editorial board--have criticized Mr. Obama's unwillingness to take a stand against the Syrian dictator. Nor was the exercise of hard power in question--far from it. Even those most eager for the U.S. to stand with the Syrian opposition have not called for any kind of military intervention. Two years ago, the president was doubtful enough about the application of hard power in Afghanistan to insist upon an arbitrary deadline for withdrawal of U.S. troops. Now, he appears doubtful about even a rhetorical commitment of American leadership. Mr. Obama is right to be concerned that projection of hard power may come with corresponding costs--to America's image and its fiscal well-being. What he neglects is the price of failing to lead. Indeed, it appears that the president's aim is to withdraw from the world--to subcontract foreign policy where possible, to ignore challenges if manageable, and to hazard only de minimis American commitment when imperative. Even his heavy reliance on drones--evidence to his supporters that he well understands hard power--can as easily be seen as an antiseptic remote control alternative to actual American leadership. That brings us back to Iraq. While steady security and political gains have been made since 2007, Iraq is not yet ready to stand on its own against external pressure from Iran or internal threats from Al Qaeda and other violent groups. Some in the White House will no doubt blame the Iraqis for failing to move quickly enough, as if only Iraqi interests are in play. But the Obama administration's willingness to jettison hard fought gains in Iraq, and abandon opportunities to project power toward Iran and the Gulf can only be viewed as another step toward relinquishing U.S. global leadership. And that, it appears, is Barack Obama's goal.