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#### ------The phrase “The United States federal government should” requires the affirmative to defend material policy change.

Ericson 2003

Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### ---Restrictions are congressionally imposed limits.

Cambridge Dictionary Online 2004

<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/restriction>

an official limit on something

import/export/currency restrictions

speed/parking restrictions

At the turn of the century, Congress imposed/placed a height restriction of 13 storeys on all buildings in Washington.

The president urged other countries to lift the trade restrictions.

#### ---Solar power is electricity generation from panels

AE News no date (“Solar Power,” http://www.alternative-energy-news.info/technology/solar-power/)

Solar power is produced by collecting sunlight and converting it into electricity. This is done by using solar panels, which are large flat panels made up of many individual solar cells. It is most often used in remote locations, although it is becoming more popular in urban areas as well. This page contains articles that explore advances in solar energy technology.

#### Solar energy is distinct

Everblue Training no date (“Solar Energy Defined,”

http://www.everblue.edu/renewable-energy-training/getting-started-with-solar-and-wind-energy)

The definition of solar energy is that it is the radiant light and heat from the sun that has been harnessed by humans to create energy. The definition of solar power is electrical generation by means of heat engines or photovoltaics. Uses for solar power include but are not limited to: space heating and cooling, water distillation, daylighting, hot water, thermal energy for cooking, and more.

#### ---Violation --- The affirmative does not defend an advocacy mutually exclusive with our offense against increasing federal energy production.

#### ---Standards

#### (A.) Education --- Resolution based policy debate enables the ideological clash key to critical thinking, argument development & real world policymaking skills.

Mitchell 2010

Gordon R., Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchell2010.pdf

Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.” 54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. this would by no means sideline or even exclude scientiic assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation. 55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.” 56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public debate” 57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical beneit for student participants, and irst-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientiic artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production. 58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication ield’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a dif erent route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English ield’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.

#### (B.) Predictable Ground --- Resolution focused debate is key to pre-round research, argument development and equitable access to the debate space.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

Galloway (2007) also advances an argument concerning the privileging of the resolution as a basis for debating. Galloway (2007) cites three pedagogical advantages to seeing the resolution and the first affirmative constructive as an invitation to dialogue. “First, all teams have equal access to the resolution. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. Finally, the resolution represents a community consensus of worthwhile and equitably debatable topics rooted in a collective history and experience of debate” (p. 13). An important starting point for conversation, the resolution helps frame political conversations humanely. It preserves basic means for equality of access to base research and argumentation. Having a year-long stable resolution invites depth of argument and continuously rewards adaptive research once various topics have surfaced through practice or at debate tournaments.

#### ---Political planning is inevitable --- The affirmative’s refusal of government politics ignores the interconnected nature of waste and order; placing excess at the head of a new totalitarian project towards the future. Only our framework allows for the planned planlessness necessary for authentic meaning.

Stoekl 1990

Allan, Truman's Apotheosis: Bataille, "Planisme," and Headlessness, Yale French Studies, No. 78, On Bataille (1990), pp. 181-205

In both of these cases-the Aztec priest and the gangster-one notes that the figure's violence and subversion is doubled by erection centrality, and order; the Aztec's pyramid, the skyscraper associated with the gangster, are the organizing principles, the metonyms, of societies that are brutal and deliriously forceful, even if in decline. And one could say exactly the same thing about the "acephale": "he" is a figure that bears death, but at the same time "he" is a perfectly coherent and traditional "sacred figure" around which a society, albeit one of conspirators, can be established. "He" is not only the figure of an order, but (like the pyramid or skyscraper) a principle of order. One sees the representation of this political ambivalence-for want of a better word-in the famous "Acephale" drawing of 1936, by Andre Masson (VE, 180): while the head is clearly missing, the stars (nipples), bowels and death's head (genitals) only go to create another face, another "figure humaine." Further, the death's head itself has a miniature face.... The "acephale," in other words, has lost a head, a principle of organization and order, only to mutate and develop an- other, more hypnotic, doubled and doubling (replicating) face. It is no coincidence that, after the outbreak of the war, Bataille gave up the "whim" of starting a new religion and a new "order."22 As we see from the American example, "sacred figures and myths" seem to have a way of reversing themselves and turning into icons of centrality and oppression. Bataille's later fragmentary writings, in the Somme Atheologique, bear witness to his recognition of the need to disrupt any coherent movement, doctrine, or representation, no matter how "acephalic" it might be. But a renunciation of the marginal or elite "order" in Bataille's case returns him, surprisingly enough, in the last chapter of The Accursed Share (1949), to a certain affirmation of "planisme," and specifically to a celebration of the very culture that his Aztec priests and Chicago mobsters had seemed in principle to subvert: the planned American economy of the "New Deal." Does this mean that Bataille was simply jumping from one proto- fascism to another? After all, as Zeev Sternhell has shown, the links between "planisme," Lagardelle (the editor of Plans), "Ordre Nouveau," Henri de Man and, finally, collaboration with the Nazis are clear enough. By jettisoning democratic safeguards, and valorizing a conciliatory social "fusion" at the expense of the proletariat and the class struggle, "socialist" thinkers (and political leaders) like Henri de centrally directed as a de Man would have wished, whose net effect was to involve the government actively on the side of poor workers and farmers, thereby coopting (as the European "planistes" hoped to do) "harder core" Socialists and Communists. Thus the New Deal was much more interested in class cooperation than class conflict: the directors of the famous FSA photographic project, for example, sent Walker Evans and many others out into the field-literally-to record southern poverty, and the photographs they made were then seen by northern workers, with the resulting (at least hoped-for) bond of fraternity motivating both groups to vote for Roosevelt. The important thing, here, is that they would vote: the New Deal was never as authoritarian or as centralized as the "Plans" of the de Mans and Dandieus; some form of representative democracy was retained. Of course at the time many groups on both the left and the right in Europe considered post-1933 Washington, D.C. to be just another fascist, or at least totalitarian, capital.24 The very haphazardness of Roosevelt's "try anything" approach, however, and the retention and even strengthening of democracy by the New Deal and its avatars (the Voting Rights Act of 1965) disproved that. Pace Sternhell, then, a "planisme" could be, and was, developed in the prewar period that did not necessarily lead to fascism, that was "centralized" but was not authoritarian. One can argue that there is nothing intrinsically "fascist" in "planisme"; it can just as easily be "acephalic" as rigidly hierarchical. Indeed it was Roosevelt's successor, Truman, who, after the war, came to replace the "acephale" for Bataille as the figure of political and economic (disiorganization. "end" of planning is planlessness, the "self-consciousness" that has "nothing as its object," that is the "nothing of pure expenditure" (AS, 190). Bataille here, at the end of the chapter, reiterates the argument from "The Psychological Structure of Fascism": accumulation is sub-ordination to some future goal. (It is, in the terms of that essay, homo- geneous.) But Bataillean self-consciousness is a "becoming conscious of the decisive meaning of an instant in which increase (the acquisition of something) will resolve into expenditure" (AS, 190). Just as the most elaborately conceived planning is inseparable from potlatch, so too the most integrated, nonindividuated consciousness (the consciousness that arises at the end of history, through an impossible "awareness" of the [non] "object" of the Marshall Plan) is indissociable from the nothingness it "knows." At this point one can see how Bataille's economic project folds back into the secular mystical experience of the Somme Atheologique.

#### ---We solve their offense --- It’s all written in reference to European style socialism whereas the American political system we defend is thoroughly permeated by excess & waste which Bataille thought was the beez kneez.

Stoekl 1990

Allan, Truman's Apotheosis: Bataille, "Planisme," and Headlessness, Yale French Studies, No. 78, On Bataille (1990), pp. 181-205

Bataille has discarded his earlier fetishes, such as the proletariat in the street ("The solving of social problems no longer depends on street uprisings" [AS, 186]) and "'visions,' divinities and myths" (AS, 189). Now lucidity will guarantee both economic development, peace, and the end of economic selfishness. Finally, the very necessity of central planning will make America look like the Soviet Union in that the former will accord more importance to state-planned and financed production. "It [the US] defends free enterprise, but it thereby increases the importance of the state. It is only advancing, as slowly as it can, toward a point where the USSR rushed headlong" (AS, 186). Some form of socialism will be developed in the US, then, as the opposing parties come to resemble each other. But, implicitly at least, Bataille is arguing that an American Stalinism will not arise from this situation, because this state control is devoted not to accumulation (as in Russia) but to expenditure. If the Marshall Plan, and the similar plans that will follow, necessarily negate purely individual concerns and enterprises, then socialist state planning will be inseparable from the giving away of massive amounts of wealth, from potlatch. Even though law and directives will determine activity, the Stalinist "head" will be replaced by a "headlessness." Or we can say, following Bataille's logic, that this nonauthoritarian direction, this "acephalite," is already in place in America, since the Marshall Plan has been set in motion not by a "head," an oppressive command, but by Roosevelt's successor, who is precisely unaware of what he is doing: "Today Truman would appear to be blindly preparing for the final-and secret-apotheosis" (AS, 190). Confrontation will continue between the superpowers-it is integral to the model of potlatch, which is now being elaborated on an international scale-but coercive control, at least in America, seems a thing of the past.

#### Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

### 1NC

#### ---The affirmative’s gender neutral account of sacrifice masks the appropriation of female reproductive power and violence against women.

Roberts-Hughes 2008

Rebecca, Erotic transgression and sexual difference in Georges Bataille, Kings College, http://kcl.academia.edu/RebeccaRobertsHughes/Papers/139881/Erotic\_Transgression\_and\_Sexual\_Difference\_in\_Georges\_Bataille

As well as being sacrificial victims, in much of Bataille’s work women are related to and represent death and thus they often pave the path of transgression. In many poems Bataille explicitly links the female form with sex and death and often in his fiction the text reaches its climax (or one of its climaxes) in the suicide of a female lover of the protagonist, such as Marcelle in *Story of the Eye* or the protagonist’s mother in *My Mother*. In *Madame Edwarda* a prostitute claims she is God, and the sacred for Bataille is the realm outside humanity – the realm of death and continuity. That women are so central to eroticism and death in Bataille’s work is not surprising, since we have witnessed how he characterized them as the luxury used to forge the boundaries of society and upon which the incest taboo, which created human erotic activity, was placed. Secondly, like champagne they are a luxury excluded from the patriarchal world of work; this means they are a transgression: they are they path to continuity, they are death. Further, through their reproductive capacity, women are associated with the nature that humanity excludes; menstrual blood terrifies man because it reminds him of his natural, corporeal birth. As *erotic objects* and as *the embodiment of nature* women dissolve the boundaries of the subject since they are both *desirable* and *horrific*. This is how they come to represent (erotic) death for Bataille. For Irigaray this process is not the act of eroticism alone but the act performed by male theorists of eroticism, who have used women to create a self-glorifying conception of Eros that does not allow for sexual difference. In *Thinking the Difference* Irigaray states that our “path to reciprocal love between individuals has been lost, especially with respect to eroticism.” She holds that the dominant theory of Eros as “chaos, darkness, bestiality, sin, annihilation” and so on is a male form of experience which, in accessing the void and annihilating the subject, violently dissolves any potential for sexual difference. What Bataille venerates as a transitory state reached by eroticism (and the sacrifice of and fusion with the ‘female’), Irigaray disparages as the stagnant pit our erotic lives have fallen into. In limiting his account to male experience, and therefore to only one pole of sexual difference, Bataille fell into his own, male abyss corresponding not to any genuine otherness but to “the lack of rhythm and harmony of male desires, which specifically refuse any manifestation of the difference between the sexes so they can appropriate the fertility of the mother’s body.” Bataille’s male subject therefore not only sacrifices the female subject to reach his own dissolution and continuity but also to appropriate *in* this continuity, this realm of totality and fusion, her specifically female powers. Reproduction, as man’s corporeal tie to nature, has thus been appropriated by the male subject in a final denial of both nature *and* women. Reproduction has become the non-corporeal production of mankind, the (re)production of his community. The sacred is a new realm through which man relates himself to his surroundings, and takes the form of chaos because he imposes his own subjectivity upon the erotic ‘encounter’. In short, “man immerses himself in chaos because he refuses to make love *with* an other, to be *two* making love, to experience sexual attraction with tenderness and respect.” We have thus uncovered another problem in Bataille’s account of erotic transgression. We already understand that women are not subjects and therefore do not experience transgression outside subjectivity. Following Irigaray’s critique of Eros, we must add that the sacred realm outside subjectivity is a ‘continuity’ further denying women her difference, her own existence. Bataille wants to explore different relations to otherness that do not involve blindly denying that which we find horrific; subsuming otherness is not a way of achieving this. In terms of sacrifice, we must conclude that there is a threefold sacrifice of women. Mankind emerges because woman does not. Woman is sacrificed for society to exist (‘pledged to communication’) *and* for transgression to occur (she is murdered and he fuses with her death) *and* in the sacred realm of transgression (for the sake of his ecstatic communication with the universe, an ‘other’ part of himself woman came to represent to him) in which there can only be totality and no difference.

#### ---Reject the affirmative --- Only a strategy of feminist separatism can challenge the drive towards global destruction.

Weedon 1999

Chris, the Chair of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory at Cardiff University, Feminism, theory, and the politics of difference, p. 90-93

In the order of reason which has governed Western thought since the rise of Ancient Greek philosophy, feminine otherness is denied and reconstituted as a male-defined otherness. This results in the denial of subjectivity to potentially non-male-defined women. A maternal feminine subjectivity, were it to be realized, would enable women to step outside of patriarchal definitions of the feminine and become subjects in their own right. Whereas the unconscious in Freud and Lacan lays claim to fixed universal status, for Irigaray its actual form and content is a product of history. Thus, however patriarchal the symbolic order may be in Lacan, it is open to change. The question is how this change might be brought about. For Irigaray, the key to change is the development of a female imaginary. This can only be achieved under patriarchy in a fragmented way, as what she terms the excess that is realized in margins of the dominant culture. The move towards a female imaginary would also entail the transformation of the symbolic, since the relationship between the two is one of mutual shaping. This would enable women to assume subjectivity in their own right. Although, for Irigaray, the imaginary and the symbolic are both historical and changeable, this does not mean that, after thousands of years of repression and exclusion, change is easy. In a move not unlike that of ecofeminists, Irigaray suggests that the symbolic order, men and masculinity are shaped by patriarchy in ways which are immensely problematic not just for women but also for the future of the planet. The apparently objective, gender-neutral discourses of science and philosophy — the discourses of a male subject — have led to the threat of global nuclear destruction. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993; original 1984), Irigaray suggests that the patriarchal male subject is himself shaped by the loss of the maternal feminine which motivates a desire for mastery: Man's self-affect depends on the woman who has given him being and birth, who has born/e him, enveloped him, warmed him, fed him. Love of self would seemingly take the form of a long return to and through the other. A unique female other, who is forever lost and must be sought in many others, an infinite number of others. The distance for this return can be conquered by the transcendence of God. The (female) other who is sought and cherished may be assimilated to the unique god. The (female) other is mingled or confused with God or the gods. (Irigaray 1993: 60-1; original 1984) Irigaray takes this theme further in Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution (1994; original 1989) when she suggests that the desire for godlike mastery and transcendence has dire consequences for the world: Huge amounts of capital are allocated to the development of death machines in order to ensure peace, we are told. This warlike method of organising society is not self-evident. It has its m origin in patriarchy. It has a sex. But the age of technology has given weapons of war a power that exceeds the conflicts and risks taken among patriarchs. Women, children, all living things, including elemental matter, are drawn into the maelstrom. And death and destruction cannot be associated solely with war. They are part of the physical and mental aggression to which we are constantly subjected. What we need is an overall cultural transformation. Mankind [le peuple des homines] wages war everywhere all the time with a perfectly clear conscience. Mankind is traditionally carnivorous, sometimes cannibalistic. So men must eat to kill, must increase their domination of nature in order to live or to survive, must seek on the most distant stars what no longer exists here, must defend by any means the small patch of land they are exploiting here or over there. Men always go further, exploit further, seize more, without really knowing where they are going. Men seek what they think they need without considering who they are and how their identity is defined by what they do. To overcome this ignorance, I think that mankind needs those who are persons in their own right to help them understand and find their limits. Only women can play this role. Women are not genuinely responsible subjects in the patriarchal community. That is why it may be possible for them to interpret this culture in which they have less involvement and fewer interests than do men, and of which they are not themselves products to the point where they have been blinded by it. Given their relative exclusion from society, women may, from their outside perspective, reflect back a more objective image of society than can men. (Irigaray 1994: 4—5; original 1989) The destructive force of the patriarchal symbolic order makes all the more pressing Irigaray's project of creating a female imaginary and symbolic, specific to women, which might in its turn transform the male-defined symbolic order in the West, in which women figure only as lesser men. In this process, separatism becomes a strategy in the struggle for a nonpatriarchal society in which sexual difference is both voiced and valued: Let women tacitly go on strike, avoid men long enough to learn to defend their desire notably by their speech, let them discover the love of other women protected from that imperious choice of men which puts them in a position of rival goods, let them forge a social status which demands recognition, let them earn their living in order to leave behind their condition of prostitute — these are certainly indispensable steps in their effort to escape their proletarianization on the trade market. But if their goal is to reverse the existing order - even if that were possible - history would simply repeat itself and return to phallocratism, where neither women's sex, their imaginary, nor their language can exist. (1994: 106; original 1989)

### Case

#### They are an example of bad scholarship

#### ---Bataille’s sociological account of excess affirms a primitivism that decontextualizes events and ignores the importance of utility to such acts.

Wolin 1996

Richard, LEFT FASCISM: GEORGES BATAILLE AND THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, Constellations Volume 2, Number 3, <http://courses.ucsd.edu/nbryson/Graduate%20Readings/BatailleLeftFascism.pdf>

Yet, in his celebratory discussions of sacrifice, potlatch, and so forth, Bataille fundamentally misconstrues the historical and contextual parameters of such ritual practices. One could even go so far as to say that, in a certain measure, Bataille’s understanding of these phenomena succumbs to a type of “primitivism”: he decontextualizes the cultural practices he analyzes in order the better to incorporate them within his own theoretical agenda of his own critique of modernity. Here, Bataille seeks nothing less than “an anthropology that will itself provide a living - and orgiastic – myth to overturn, through its experience on a collective level, ‘modern’ sterile bourgeois society . **”51** Bataille chooses to view sacrifice and gift-giving in the first instance as gratuitous, non-utilitarian, or, as he puts it, “having no ends beyond themselves” - but this is far from the case. While he is correct in characterizing such practices as unrelated to the production of wealth, they are very much oriented toward ***the reproduction*** of ***existing relations*** of ***power.*** The act of human sacrifice as practiced among the Aztecs redounds to the credit of the sacrificer(s): it reinforces existing relations of authority, viz., the authority of those who are empowered to commission a sacrifice (in this case, the priests and aristocracy). It provides those in authority with a quasi-divine power to preside over life and death. In this sense, it is misleading to claim that sacrifice has no end beyond itself. An analogous criticism may be made of Bataille’s discussion of potlatch - the public, demonstrative destruction of wealth - and gift-giving. Only those who possess great wealth can in reality afford to destroy it. Consequently, the option to engage in potlatch does not exist for the poorer strata of such societies.52 Acts of potlatch are no less implicated in the reproduction of an existing social hierarchy. At issue is the reinforcement of the social status or prestige of the one who destroys his or her wealth. In almost all cases, those who practice potlatch are drawn from the upper strata of society. Those who must witness the potlatch are in effect humiliated: they are vividly reminded of their lowly rank in the social order. The same, of course, is true of the practice of gift-giving. The gifts in question are not freely bestowed, as it were, with no ulterior end in view. Bataille seizes on the aspect of gift-giving that serves his purposes. For, strictly speaking, gift-giving is not an economic transaction. It is neither an act of barter, nor does it aim at the enhancement of social wealth. Instead, with the gift it is ***social relations*** among persons that are in the first instance at issue. But the ***types*** of social relations at stake are relations of power. When given in accordance with social ritual, they always come with strings attached: unless the gift can be returned in kind, its social function is to humiliate the recipient. In fact, the entire object of gift-giving as a social ritual is to derogate and shame the recipient by virtue of his or her inability to return a gift of equal value. Gift-giving, too, then must be classified as a ritual practice that is in no sense gratuitous or free. Far from being an end in itself, as Bataille claims, it is fully implicated in the production and reproduction of social power. Such insights are amply confirmed in the writings of Mauss as well as in those of other ethnographers. To quote Mauss: But the motives of such excessive gifts and reckless consumption, such mad losses and destruction of wealth, especially in these potlatch societies, are in no way disinterested. Between vassals and chiefs, between vassals and their henchmen, *the hierarchy* is *established by means of these gifts.* To give is to show one’s superiority, to show that one is something more and higher, that one is *magister.* To accept without returning or repaying more is to face subordination, to become a client and subservient, to become *mit~ister.’~*

#### ---The existence of the sun does not prove their argument --- Energy provides an ontological basis for grace and ethics not waste and squander.

**Irwin** 200**2**

Alexander, Saints of the impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the politics of the sacred, pg 69

Weil’s notes on e4conomics of psychic and physical energy use the term “force” in a manner initially less indebted to military metaphors than to natural science. “Here below in the sensible universe there are only two forces: gravity on the one hand, and on the other all the energies that permit us to counterbalance gravity, and which all […] proceed from the sun, that is to say from the same source as light” (*C3*, 187). However, scientific ideas of force concern Weil above all because they enable an understanding of spiritual realities. It is “literally true” that “solar energy descends into plants and thus into abnimals, in such a way that we can eat it after having killed it” (198-99). Yet this literal truth encloses a deeper and more important insight. It concretely symbolizes divine grace, God’s endless self-giving. “We cannot capture solar energy. It is the energy that spontaneously transforms itself and takes a form in which we can seize it. This is an act of grace” (199). Weil’s analysis provides an intriguing counterpoint to Georges Bataille’s glorification of solar self-squandering. In his article on Van Gogh and automutilation (as in numerous other texts), Bataille had presented the sun’s endless outpouring of energy as the archetype of sacred (useless, irrational, self-expending) behavior. Weil, too, sees in the sun’s activity a sacrificial gesture readable simultaneously as physical fact and moral-religious allegory. Yet Weil downplays the gratuitous quality of the sun’s self-giving that so fascinated Bataille. Instead, Weil emphasizes the practical benefits that accrue to earthly creatures through the sun’s pouring forth of warmth and light. For Weil, the sun’s radiance becomes not a metaphor for irrational, violent excess, but a sacramental symbol expressive of God’s love.

#### ---Embracing sacrifice as a refusal of transcendent meaning follows the logic of catholic appropriation of sacrificial practices. The affirmative’s idealism opens the door for fundamentalist violence.

Arnould 1996

Elisabeth, lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, “The Impossible Sacrifice of Poetry: Bataille and the Nancian Critique of Sacrifice,” Diacritics 26.2

Sacrifice is unquestionably the most prominent model in Bataille's thinking of finitude. But it is also, if one accepts Nancy's allegations, the most problematic. While hoping to find in the exemplarity of sacrifice a new paradigm for the thinking of finitude, Nancy explains in "The Unsacrificeable," Bataille does nothing but resubmit this finitude to the most traditional determinations of ontotheology. Sacrifice remains, in Bataille's thought, a deficient model for finitude insofar as it continues to be conceptually dependent on traditional philosophical and Christian interpretations of sacrifice. Thus, Nancy asserts that the characteristic valorization Bataille grants to the finite and cruel moment of immolation in his rethinking of sacrifice does nothing but repeat, by simply inverting its valence, the classical interpretation of an occidental sacrifice that conceives itself as the ideal sublation of this same moment. The philosophical and Christian version of sacrifice is understood as the spiritual transformation of a sacrificial moment the finite nature of which it denounces even as it appropriates its power. The Bataillian version, on the contrary, insists upon this finite moment in order to escape the dialectical comedy that transforms sacrifice into an ideal process. Performed in the name of spiritual rebirth, the sacrifices of Plato and Christ, for instance, reappropriate death by transfiguring it as resurrection. Grotesque and replete with horrors, death in Bataille appears alone on a stage whose cruelty is neither explained nor redeemed through transfiguration. Thus, Bataille withholds nothing from the scene of sacrifice but lets it emerge in the fullness of its amorphous violence. He valorizes its sanguinary horror in order to denounce the dialectic idealization of a death nothing should domesticate. He exhibits it "as it is": opaque, silent, and without meaning. According to Nancy, however, the valorization itself remains caught in the sacrificial logic of the idealist tradition. For, he argues, only in light of its ontotheological conceptualization can sacrifice become at once the infinite process of dialectical sublation and the blood-spattered moment this process both negates and sublates, simultaneously [End Page 87] avers and contests. The Bataillian thesis, granting efficacy and truth (reality) to sacrificial cruelty, is irremediably linked to the processes of dialecticization and spiritualization through which the philosophical and Christian West appropriates the power of sacrifice. It is the cruel counterpart of its idealization. And if this conception gives to sacrificial death an importance proportionally opposite to that which it receives from the Christian and philosophical transfiguration--since the finite truth of death plays at present the role of the infinite truth of resurrection--it still does nothing but repeat its ontotheological scheme. For it also pretends to find, on the cruel stage of sacrifice, a singular and more "real" truth of death. The stage of the torment is, for Bataille, that place where death appears with the full strength of a nonmeaning that can be exposed only through the immolation of the sacrificial victim. If this is so, then should we not suppose that this immolation pretending to give us the "inappropriable" truth of death's rapture appropriates in its turn the excess of the "excessive" meaning of this rapture? Does it not transform its excess into an "excessive truth," to be sure a negative one, though no less absolute than the philosophical and spiritual truths to which it opposes itself? At the heart of modern theories of sacrifice is thus, as Nancy puts it, a "transappropriation of sacrifice" by itself, even when, as is the case for Bataille, this theory tries to overcome sacrifice's spiritual operation through an excessive and volatile negativity. As soon as sacrifice thinks itself as revelation, be it that of a spiritual beyond or its negative counterpart, it remains a sacrifice in the name of its own transcendence, a loophole to a finitude powerless to think itself in terms other than those of a revelation: the revelation of a clear or obscure god, symbol of resurrection or of death's blind horror. If one wants to think finitude according to a model different from that of its sacrificial appropriation, one should think "apart from" sacrifice. If finitude is, as Bataille has himself wanted to think, an "access without access to a moment of disappropriation," then we must also call it "unsacrificeable" [Nancy 30].

#### ---Bataille’s celebration of violence for violence sake is a form of anthropological romanticism that surrenders the political to fascism.

Wolin 1996

Richard, LEFT FASCISM: GEORGES BATAILLE AND THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, Constellations Volume 2, Number 3, <http://courses.ucsd.edu/nbryson/Graduate%20Readings/BatailleLeftFascism.pdf>

In the worldview of both Bataille and that of German young conservatives, war plays an essential, positive role. It serves as a means of dissolving the principium individuationis: the principle of bourgeois subjectivity, on which the homogeneous order of society - a world of loneliness and fragmentation - depends. For, according to Bataille, “the general movement of life is . . . accomplished beyond the demands of individual^."^^ It is in precisely this spirit that he celebrates the non-utilitarian nature of “combat” or “war” as a type of aestheticist end in itself: “Glory . . . expresses a movement of senseless frenzy, of measureless expenditure of energy, which the fervor of combat presupposes. Combat is glorious in that it is always beyond calculation at some moment.”33 For the same reasons, Bataille eulogizes those premodern “wamer societies in which ure, uncalculated violence and ostentatious forms of combat held sway.” For under such conditions, war was not made subservient to the vulgar ends of enterprise and accumulation, as is the case for modern-day imperialism, but served as a glorious end in itself. Yet, in the early 1930s, it was precisely this aestheticist celebration of “violence for violence’s sake,” or “war for war’s sake,” that Benjamin viewed as the essence of modem fascism. As he remarks in a well known passage : “Fiat arspereat mundus,” says fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. . . . Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which fascism is rendering ae~thetic.~’ In Bataille’s thought war serves as the harbinger of a cultural transfiguration in which the primacy of self-subsistent subjectivity would be replaced by the values of an “unavowable” or “ecstatic community”: that is, a community that would no longer be governed by the goals of a “visual culture” - transparency, self-identity, etc. - but instead, those of self-laceration, difference, and finitude. In fact, this Bataille-inspired program of an ecstatic community has been quite explicitly carried forth and explored in the political writings of Maurice Blanchot (La Communautk inavouable; 1983) and Jean-Luc Nancy (La Communautk dboeuvrke; 1985). Via his theory of “general economics” - which stands opposed to the “restricted,” rational-purposive orientation of a capitalist economy - Bataille, too, embraces a type of vitalism. In The Accursed Share, for example, he speaks confidently from the standpoint of “the exuberance of life,” of “the exuberance of living matter as a whole.”36 Yet, his is less a philosophical vitalism than that of a theorist of culture who allows himself to be guided by a certain anthropological romanticism: by a tendency to project anachronistically contemporary society’s need for wholeness and unity upon premodern forms of life that are on this account viewed in a quasi-utopian light. Bataille’s understanding of the prospects for a return of the sacred is relatively pluralistic. The revitalization of any one of a number of rites and occult practices that have been summarily banned by the rise of modernity’s “instrumentally rationalist culture” (Weber) will do. Thus, in Bataille’s theory of “expenditure” (dkpense), war is only one of a number of possibilities for radical cultural transgression; other possibilities include: luxury, mourning, war, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse sexual activity (i.e., deflected from genital finality)” - all of these are, according to Bataille, “activities which, at least in primitive circumstances, have no end beyond themselve~.”~~ Yet, in addition to his endorsement of varieties of non-purposive ritual, Bataille is of sorts a disciple of negative theology. As a counterweight to modernity he is in favor of generalized profanation: any practice that furthers the ends of a “general” rather than “restricted economy” (where “economy” is anthropologically defined in terms of the general circulationof persons, goods, and symbols) will do. All instances of profanation that gratuitously disrupt the smooth functioning of productive consumption - the reign of the Tuuschprinzip - are eagerly welcomed. Hence, in Bataille’s work “the heterogeneous” (along with “sovereignty”) can best be defined ex negativo: as whatever stands opposed to or helps to undermine our modern cult of the homogeneous: contemporary capitalism and its anodyne cultural analogues (such as “art for art’s sake”), which know no wanton expenditure, but instead adhere to the bourgeois principle of equivalent exchange. However, as a result of the ethos of transgression that is propagated in Bataille’s work - a quasi-aestheticist valorization of transgression for transgression’s sake - one encounters serious normative lacunae. One might even go so far as to say, echoing Tony Judt, that aspects of Bataille’s thought are redolent of a more general and long-standing “vacuum at the heart of public ethics in France,” “the marked absence of a concern with public ethics or political morality.”38 I have already spoken of his work as an unsurpassable normative point of reference for much of post-structuralism. Here, “anti-normativism” itself becomes “normative,” insofar as rejection of the “norm” becomes itself a source of normativity. In recent years, as poststructuralists have begun meditating on the problem of how one would go about constituting a non-totalitarian political community - a communautk inavouable (Blanchot) or dksoeuvrke (J-L. Nancy), as it has been called - it is, unsurprisingly, to Bataille’s work that they have immediately turned.39 Yet, as Bernard-Henri LCvy has cautioned in relation to this avowedly illiberal, new “organicism” or “communitarianism”: Organicism. Naturalism. Refusal of universal values. Denial of values purely and simply. . . . It is on these bases, on this mute foundation, that one deploys a cover of horror that is more somber and infinitely more clamorous. . . . I will have attained my objective when I have succeeded in convincing that fascism is not in the first instance barbarism; that is it not essentially and to begin with the apocalypse; that it does not always and of necessity mean storms of iron and blood. Instead, it is in the first instance a type of society, a model of community, a manner of thinking and of organizing the social bond.40 It is precisely Bataille’s ecstatic model of community, his manner of “thinking and of organizing the social bond,” that I wish to call into question. It is a model that, fundamentally and undeniably, seeks to establish the normative basis of social action on an aesthetic foundation. As such its guiding ethos would be an aesthetics of transgression. Bataille’s ecstatic community would also be an aesthetic community: it would be a community in which the type of social action that would be valued above all would be action that yielded “no return,” action that - in the manner of art for art’s sake - had no end beyond itself. In the last analysis, the celebration of transgression for transgression’s sake remains unnuanced, unqualified, and uncritical. In lieu of a conceptual articulation of how one would begin to differentiate between, shall we say, salutary and retrograde instances of transgression, we are left with an ethos of shock, rupture, and disruption, purely and simply. In essence, Bataille - and those who have followed in his footsteps - seeks to ground an ethics of postmodernity in an avant-garde cultural practice that draws heavily on precapitalist forms of social life, precisely those forms that have been scorned and tabooed by the process of modernization. Indeed, the very desideratum of an adequate “conceptual articulation” of Bataillesque concepts such as “sovereignty,” “heterogeneity,” “expenditure,” and so forth would amount to a contrudictio in adjecto. In Bataille’s sense, the very call for principled legitimation would stand convicted a priori of indebtedness to the logic of “productive consumption,” to the values of a society predicated on instrumental reason and equivalent exchange. Such considerations return us to Habermas’s claim concerning the affinities between poststructuralism and the “young conservatives.” Both “transpose the spontaneous power of the imagination, the experience of self and affectivity, into the remote and the archaic; and in Manichean fashion, they counterpose to instrumental reason a principle only accessible via ‘evocation’: be it the will to power or sovereignty, Being or the Dionysian power of the poetic.” In other words, both “ground an intransigent antimodernism through a modernist attitude.”

#### ---The affirmative is in a double bind --- Either (a.) sacrifice is meaningless & there’s no impact or (b.) sacrifice has substance to open new forms of thought legitimizing genocide.

Minkoff 2007

C. Michael, “Existence is Sacrificeable, But It Is Not Sacrifice,” April 25, http://smartech.gatech.edu/dspace/bitstream/1853/14446/8/Michael%20Minkoff--LCC%204100--Animal\_Sacrifice.pdf

What Nancy admits is that “strictly speaking we know nothing decisive about the old sacrifice” and that “the Western economy of sacrifice has come to a close…it is closed by the decomposition of the sacrificial apparatus itself” (Nancy, 35). These confessions are significant because it indicates the fear that Nancy has of appropriating a symbol which has a remainder and a vector he cannot predict or control. What Bataille wanted from sacrifice was one thing, but Nancy fears that sacrifice carries its own valence. It is like the art that accedes to extinction, but suspends above it indefinitely. The force to accede to extinction is not guaranteed to suspend. The force that Bataille borrows from sacrifice is not guaranteed to behave in the way atheism dictates. Nancy reasserts that Western sacrifice always knew it sacrificed to nothing, but this latent knowledge makes the institution of sacrifice absurd, and Nancy is not willing to deny that sacrifice “sustained and gave meaning to billions of individual and collective existences” (Nancy, 35) What Nancy fears is this ignorance. He knows he does not understand the significance of the old sacrifice. If sacrifice was to no one and everyone knew it; why was and is it so universal and why have so many been tempted into believing its significance? But if one assumes that there is no one to whom one sacrifices, Bataille may not use sacrifice as the centerpiece of his philosophy because if sacrifice is not to anyone, it is not truly significant. If it is not significant or meaningful, it has no power. It becomes comedic. And it becomes massacre. That is why Nancy spends much of his time talking about the sacrifice of the Jews at Auschwitz. Without over-determining the significance, the sacrifice becomes a genocide or a holocaust. Bataille is trapped between two uncomfortable positions—let the blood continue to spill to make sacrifice real and significant and concrete, or deny the death the status of sacrifice, which in Bataille’s mind, would be to deny it realization. Nancy asks if Bataille’s “dialectical negativity expunges blood or whether, on the contrary, blood must ineluctably continue to spurt” (Nancy, 27). If Bataille spiritualizes sacrifice, it no longer has the power of real death, the concreteness of finiteness and the ability to rupture finitude. But if Bataille insists on the real death, he necessitates the constant spilling of blood in mimetic repetition until history is completed.

#### Modern subjectivity makes sacrifice redundant and their obsession with combining secular society with premodern material violence is the foundation for Nazism.

Zizek 1996

Slavoj, The indivisible remainder: an essay on Schelling and related matters, pg 124-125

This notion of the modern, Cartesian subject *qua* the radical negativity of the double (self-relating) sacrifice also enables us to demarcate the paradoxical place of the theories of Georges Bataille, that is, of Bataille’s fascination with the ‘real,’ material sacrifice, with the different forms of holocaust and of the excessive destruction of (economic, social, etc.) reality. On the one hand, of course, Bataille’s topic is modern subjectivity, the radical negativity implied in the position of the pure transcendental subject. On the other hand, Bataille’s universe remains the pre-Newtonian universe of balanced circular movement or – to put it in a different way – his notion of subjectivity is definitely pre-Kantian: Bataille’s ‘subject’ is not yet the pure void (the transcendental point of self-relating negativity), but remains an *inner-worldly*, *positive force*. Within these co-ordinates, the negativity which characterizes the modern subject can express itself only in the guise of a violent destruction which throws the entire circuit of nature off the rails. It is as if, in a kind of unique short circuit, *Bataille* *projects the negativity of the modern subject backwards, into the ‘closed’ pre modern Aristotelian universe of balanced circular movement, within which this negativity can materialize itself only as an ‘irrational’, excessive, non-economical expenditure*. In short, what Bataille fails to take note of is that the modern (Cartesian) subject no longer needs to sacrifice goat’s intestines, his children, and so on, since *his very existence already entails the most radical (redoubled, self-relating) sacrifice, the sacrifice of the very kernel of his being*. Incidentally, this failure of Bataille also throws a new light on the sacrificial violence, the obsession with the ultimate twilight of the universe, at work in Nazism: in it, we also encounter the reinscription of the radical negativity characteristic of the modern subject into the closed ‘pagan’ universe in which the stability of the social order is guaranteed by some kind of repeated sacrificial gesture – what we encounter in the libidinal economy of Nazism is *the modern subjectivity perceived from the standpoint of the pre-modern ‘pagan’ universe.*

#### ---Productivity is a sovereign value --- The expression of human potential breaks free from the normative constraints of subjectivity in favor of new forms of emotional intensity.

Badhwar 2007

Neera K., Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma, Friendship and Commercial Societies, Forthcoming in *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics*, http://praxeology.net/guest-badhwar1.htm

None of this is to deny that when the means to an end is not a human being or a human relationship, and the end in question is morally permissible, the end is unqualifiedly more important than the means, since the value of the means derives from the value of the end. Hence, if economic production were only a means to the ends of survival, comfort, pleasure, personal relationships etc., then it could fairly be said to be lower on the scale of value than these ends. But there is no reason to think that production is only a means to these ends (although its role as a means is hardly negligible in the absence of a regular delivery of manna from heaven). To relegate it to a lower realm of human existence, as Schwarzenbach and other critics do, is to show a serious misunderstanding of its role in a good human life. People engage in economic production for many of the same sorts of reasons that they engage in intellectual or artistic production – proving theorems, writing treatises, making music - or, indeed, building friendships: for the sake of exercising their creative or productive powers in worthwhile enterprises. Although Fromm fails to appreciate this about economic production, he appreciates better than even some defenders of free markets the meaning and importance of productiveness as such. “Productiveness,” he states, “is man’s ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him” (1949: 84), and again, “[p]roductiveness means that he experiences himself as the embodiment of his powers and as the `actor’; that he feels himself one with his powers and at the same time that they are not masked and alienated from him” (86). When productiveness is understood as a positive expression of human potentiality and not simply as a means to the ends of survival, comfort, or wealth, we can appreciate the entrepreneurial and creative spirit that animates all worthwhile activities, including market activities. And then we can understand why, for instance, a philosophy Ph.D. would find satisfaction in the enterprise of producing skateboards “adorned with uplifting art.”[34] Worthwhile activity in any sphere exercises our imaginative, emotional, and intellectual powers to create things of worth and, thereby, engages and re-shapes our identity. This is at least one reason why the failure of a business enterprise can be as devastating as the failure of a long-term scientific enterprise - or of a long-term friendship. Seeing commercial activities as “poiesis” and friendship as “praxis” distorts the nature of both business enterprises and friendships.

## 2nc

### OVERVIEW

#### The aff is not a topical act of increasing energy production, solar energy is generation of electricity for solar panels this is critical to core negative generics such as energy DAs and competition for counterplans.

Limits are awesome---first, UX---cannot discuss everything because of time constraints trying to do so makes us ultimately discuss nothing because any possible issue can come up for discussion, that prevents adequate preparation to have a meaningful and impactful discussion with robust research, that means they don’t resolve any of their offense, try or die neg.

Next, participation, this is empirically proven, a study mirrored a debate tournament that had no topic or rules other than speech times

#### The vast majority of students thought it was unfair.

Preston 3—Thomas Preston, Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis [Summer 2003, “No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions,” http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf]

The study involved forty-three students and nine critics who participated in a parliamentary debate tournament where no topic was assigned for the fourth round debates. True to the idea of openness, no rules regarding the topic were announced; no topic, or written instructions other than time limits and judging instruction, were provided. In this spirit, the participants first provided anecdotal reactions to the no-topic debate, so that the data from this study could emerge from discussion. Second, respondents provided demographic data so that patterns could be compared along three dimensions. These dimensions, the independent variables for the student portion of the study, involved three items: 1) level of debate experience; 2) whether NPDA was the only format of parliamentary debate the students had experienced; and 3) whether students had participated in NDT or CEDA policy debate. Third, the questions were to determine how students rated the debates based on criteria for good debate-educational value, clash, and a fair division of ground. Students were also asked two general questions: whether they would try the no-topic debate again, and whether they liked the no-topic round. These questions constituted the dependent variables for the student study. Because the sample was small, descriptive statistical data were gathered from critics. Taking into account the experience of the critics, additional questions concerning items such as whether no-topic debating deepened discussion. Both students and critics were asked which side they thought the no-topic approach favored, and the students with NDT/ CEDA policy debating experience were asked if a no-topic debating season would be good for policy debate.For the objective items, critics and students were asked to circle a number between 1 and 7 to indicate the strength of reaction to each item (Appendix I and Appendix II). In scoring responses, the most favorable rating received the highest score of seven and the least favorable rating a score of one. In some instances, values that were circled on the sheet were reversed such that the most favorable reaction to that category received the higher score. Frequency distributions and statistics were then tabulated for each question, and the anecdotal remarks were tabulated. For the student empirical data, t-tests were conducted to determine whether overall debate experience, NPDA experience, or policy experience affected how the students reacted to an item. As a test for significance, p was set to less than or equal to .05. Finally, of the 43 responses, 35, or 81.4 per cent, felt that the no-topic debate skewed the outcome of the debate toward one side or the other. Of those responses, 32 (91.4 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 74.4 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Government. Three (8.6 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 7.0 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Opposition.

#### And---participation decreased, proves we have a brain drain DA which turns all of their offense

Preston 3—Thomas Preston, Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis [Summer 2003, “No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions,” http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf]

For the overall student data, each the mean of each item was slightly below 4.0, but mostly, the kurtosis figures were negative, and the standard deviations high, indicating a bipolar response to each question. The frequency tables bear out strong negative reactions, but a number of positive reactions which tended to be less strong. On the one hand, a substantial number of students and critics felt very strongly that the experience was negative, with the mode=l for each item on the survey; however, on others, a substantial number of respondents rated aspects of the experience at 4 and above. The educational value had the highest central tendencies (mean=3.65, median=4.0, and mode=1.0), whereas the question over whether the students liked the experience was the lowest (mean=3.19, median=3.0, mode=1.0). Although there was a weak positive pole to the responses, those who had NDT/CEDA experience strongly opposed the idea of a no-topic year of debating in those organizations (mean=2.77, median =1.00, mode=1.00). cont. Reduced to absurdity, the notion of no rules for a debate tournament would result in chaos, bringing up an infinite regress into whether or not chaos is a good thing! At least on the surface, the results of this particular study would seem to discourage repeating this experiment as conducted for the present study. A number of participants may not want to return to the tournament because of the confusion and perceived lack of educational value. However, an exact representation and t-tests between results could help not only assess the validity and reliability of the instrument, but whether attitudes and perceptions have changed toward no-topic debating. Therefore, whereas Option III may seem to be out of the questions, benefits can still be gained from it in terms of studying the evolution of parliamentary debate form.

third, limits are key to creativity, being forced within some confines spurs innovation.

Mayer 6 – Marissa Ann Mayer, vice-president for search products and user experience at Google, February 13, 2006, “Creativity Loves Constraints,” online: http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06\_07/b3971144.htm?chan=gl

When people think about creativity, they think about artistic work -- unbridled, unguided effort that leads to beautiful effect. But if you look deeper, you'll find that some of the most inspiring art forms, such as haikus, sonatas, and religious paintings, are fraught with constraints. They are beautiful because creativity triumphed over the "rules." Constraints shape and focus problems and provide clear challenges to overcome. Creativity thrives best when constrained.But constraints must be balanced with a healthy disregard for the impossible. Too many curbs can lead to pessimism and despair. Disregarding the bounds of what we know or accept gives rise to ideas that are non-obvious, unconventional, or unexplored. The creativity realized in this balance between constraint and disregard for the impossible is fueled by passion and leads to revolutionary change. A few years ago, I met Paul Beckett, a talented designer who makes sculptural clocks. When I asked him why not do just sculptures, Paul said he liked the challenge of making something artistically beautiful that also had to perform as a clock. Framing the task in that way freed his creative force. Paul reflected that he also found it easier to paint on a canvas that had a mark on it rather than starting with one that was entirely clean and white. This resonated with me. It is often easier to direct your energy when you start with constrained challenges (a sculpture that must be a clock) or constrained possibilities (a canvas that is marked).

### 2AC weigh like da

#### Not an argument – if they win an impact turn then fine. Counterinterpretation – the aff must present a topical advocacy.

#### Topicality is not a disad it is an a priori issue that structures how the debate unfolds.

#### POLITICS MUST HAVE PRIMACY

#### The preservation of clash comes before the evaluation of the affirmative --- The impossibility of objective knowledge means the political clash informs the basis for representations, discourse, epistemology and ontology; not the other way around.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 33, Issue 3, pages 601–620

Political struggles are central in shaping alternative or different trajectories of socio-metabolic change and the construction of new and emancipatory urban environmental geographies. All manner of critical social-theoretical analyses have been mobilized to account for these processes. Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, environmental justice arguments, deconstructionist and poststructural musings, science/technology studies, complexity theory, postcolonial, feminist and Latourian views, among others, have attempted to produce what I would ultimately be tempted to call a ‘sociological’ analysis of urban political-ecological transformations. What they share, despite their different — and often radically opposed — ontological and epistemological claims, is the view that critical social theory will offer an entry into strategies, mechanisms, technologies of resistance, transformation and emancipatory political tactics. In other words, the implicit assumption of this sociological edifice is that ‘the political’ is instituted by the social, that political configurations, arrangements and tactics arise out of the social condition or process or, in other words, that the social colonizes ‘the political’ (Arendt, 1968). The properly political moment is assumed to flow from this ‘sociological’ understanding or analysis of the process. Or in other words, the ‘political’ emerges, both theoretically and practically, from the social process, a process that only knowledge has access to. Put differently, most urban political ecological perspectives assume the political to arise from analysis, but neither theorizes nor operationalizes the properly political within a political ecological analysis. This opens a theoretical and practical gap as the properly political is evacuated from the theoretical considerations that have shaped (urban) political ecology thus far. This ‘retreat of the political’ (Lefort, 1988; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997) requires urgent attention. This retreat of the properly political as a theoretical and practical object stands in strange contrast to the insistence of urban political ecology that urban socio-environmental conditions and processes are profoundly political ones and that, consequently, the production of different socio-environmental urban trajectories is a decidedly political process. Considering the properly political is indeed all the more urgent as environmental politics increasingly express a postpolitical consensual naturalization of the political. As argued by Swyngedouw (2007a), Žižek (2002 [1992]) and Debruyne (2007), among others, the present consensual vision that the environmental condition presents a clear and present danger that requires urgent techno-managerial re-alignments and a change in the practices of governance and of regulation, also annuls the properly political moment and contributes to what these and other authors have defined as the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical condition. These will be the key themes I shall develop in this contribution. First, I shall explore what might be meant by the ‘properly’ political. In conversation with, and taking my cue from, political philosophers and theorists like Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Claude Lefort, David Crouch, Mustafa Dikeç, Chantalle Mouffe and Peter Hallward, I attempt to theorize and re-centre the political as a key moment in political-ecological processes. What these perspectives share is not only the refusal to accept the social as the foundation of the political, but, more profoundly, the view that the absence of a foundation for the social (or, in other words, the ‘social’ being constitutively split, inherently incoherent, ruptured by all manner of tensions and conflicts) calls into being ‘the political’ as the instituting moment of the social (see, e.g., Marchart, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2007). Put differently, it is through the political that ‘society’ comes into being, achieves a certain coherence and ‘sustainability’. Prioritizing ‘the political’ as the foundational gesture that permits ‘the social’ maintains ‘absolutely the separation of science and politics, of analytic description and political prescription’ (Badiou, quoted in Hallward, 2003a: 394). This is not to say, of course, that politics and science are not enmeshed (on the contrary, they are and increasingly so), but rather that unravelling the science/politics imbroglios (as pursued by, among others, critical sociologies of science, science and technology studies, science-discourse analysis and the like) does not in itself permit opening up either the notion or the terrain of the political. The aim of this article, in contrast, is to recover the notion of the political and of the political polis from the debris of contemporary obsessions with governing, management, urban polic(y)ing and its associated technologies (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997).

### 2AC – we affirm

#### They don’t meet – the aff doesn’t present a topical advocacy

#### 1 usfg is in dc

Princeton University, 2008, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/United+States+government

Noun 1.United States government - the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States

U.S., U.S. government, US Government, United States

Federal government - a government with strong central powers

Executive branch, Executive Office of the President - the branch of the United States government that is responsible for carrying out the laws

Legislative branch - the branch of the United States government that has the power of legislating

Judicial branch - the branch of the United States government responsible for the administration of justice

#### 2 energy production is production of electricity

NASA S&T Info Project no date

(NASA Scientific and Technical Information Project, “Scope and Subject Category Guide,” http://www.sti.nasa.gov/sscg/44.html

Definition

Energy Production – The production of electricity, combustible fuels, nuclear and thermonuclear fuels, and heating and cooling by renewable resources.

#### 3 Restrictions are direct governmental limitations on production.their interp is not exclusive

Annamaria Viterbo 12 , Assistant Professor in International Law at the University of Torino, PhD in International Economic Law from Bocconi University and Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, 2012, International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to States' Sovereignty and Dispute, p. 166

In order to distinguish an exchange restriction from a trade measure, the Fund chose not to give relevance to the purposes or the effects of the measure and to adopt, instead, a technical criterion that focuses on the method followed to design said measure.

An interpretation that considered the economic effects and purposes of the measures (taking into account the fact that the measure was introduced for balance of payments reasons or to preserve foreign currency reserves) would have inevitably extended the Fund's jurisdiction to trade restrictions, blurring the boundaries between the IMF and the GATT. The result of such a choice would have been that a quantitative restriction on imports imposed for balance of payments reasons would have fallen within the competence of the Fund.

After lengthy discussions, in 1960 the IMF Executive Board adopted Decision No. 1034-(60/27).46 This Decision clarified that the distinctive feature of a restriction on payments and transfers for current international transactions is "whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such\*.47 This is a limitation imposed directly on the use of currency in itself, for all purposes.

#### THEY DO NOT READ AN INTERPRETATION OF ANY OF THESE WORDS. Terminal impact is PRECISION – unless

### A/T Stockpiling

#### 1 their stoekl evidence is literally about why fossil fuel productionism is bad which proves that there is a topical version of the affirmative, literal solar or wind trades off with fossil fuels and solves their stockpiling arguments.

#### ---Working within technocratic structure to reform the production process is the only way to hold corporate energy interests accountable for their crimes and democratize American energy policy.

Rahman 2011

K. Sabeel, A.B., Harvard College, 2005; M.Sc., Economics for Development, Oxford University, 2006; M.St., Sociolegal Studies, Oxford University, 2007; J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, Class of 2012; Ph.D. Candidate, Government, Harvard University, ENVISIONING THE REGULATORY STATE: TECHNOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTATION IN THE 2010 FINANCIAL REFORM AND OIL SPILL STATUTES, http://www.harvardjol.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Rahman\_Note.pdf

These weaknesses of the technocratic model create a fundamental challenge for the modern regulatory state. One response to this challenge might be to abandon the project of regulatory public policy altogether. This is the familiar response from laissez-faire ideologies and anti-government conservatism. Yet the social goals that regulation aims to advance remain vital, even if the technocratic model itself proves problematic. As a society, we still need some form of accountability for the actions of powerful private entities like oil and financial corporations. We also require systems to protect against broad social risks like financial crisis and ecological disaster. In short, we require a form of collective self-rule against crises and social evils. Rather than rejecting the goal of mitigating these challenges, the weaknesses of technocratic regulation drive us towards the need to develop an alternative democratic paradigm of regulation. Indeed, these weaknesses of the technocratic impulse—disparities in interest representation, obfuscation of normative debates, demobilization of engagement—share three key features that suggest the need for and viability of a more democratic framework for regulatory politics. First, each of these weaknesses can be overcome through a more democratic regulatory structure. Second, this turn to democracy need not involve a rejection of expertise; rather, some form of democratic politics can coexist with a role for technical expertise. Third, each of these weaknesses arises out of an effort to rationalize regulatory policy. This rationalization effort aims to protect policymaking from the influence of politics, subsuming questions of values and interests into a more coherent process of regulatory policymaking. This good governance ideal is attractive, but the effort to sterilize policy of politics threatens deeper ideals of democracy, responsiveness, and legitimacy. Further, as critics of the modern regulatory state have noted, the involvement of politics is inescapable; regulatory agencies should be structured not to avoid politics but rather to engage with the reality of political disagreement openly. Instead of focusing on the narrow question of agency discretion and constraint with an eye towards promoting rationality of policymaking, the central question should be bringing the foci of political debate to the forefront and engaging in those debates in a democratic manner. Rather than attempting to sterilize policy of politics, this approach looks for ways to constitute a dynamic political process, one that leaves ample room for the representation and engagement of different values.

### 2ac politics bad

#### ---Here’s the tiebreaker --- Bataille’s criticism is an attempt to point towards life’s fullness not break with usefulness and teleology which he saw as inevitable. Prefer this argument as it’s comparative and corrects the affirmative’s reading of Bataille.

Goldhammer 2007

Jesse, Dare to know, Dare to sacrifice, Reading Bataille Now, pg 19

The absurdity of Bataille’s position on the Marshall Plan notwithstanding, it does illustrate two key points that also serve as an excellent frame for Bataille’s prewar theories. First, in seeking an alternative to nuclear war, Bataille clearly indicates his aversion to nihilism. The value that Bataille places on wasteful sacri¤ce, violence, or death is not absolute and should not be considered a renunciation of all values. That Bataille relishes the experience of life up until the point of death, that he calls for a life unfettered by abstractions such as humanism, progress, justice, or democracy, is not a denial of existence so much as an affirmation of its potential fullness. Second, as Bataille explains at the end of the Preface to The Accursed Share, one intent of the book is to “solve political problems” (1991a, 14). Despite Bataille’s theoretical aversion to usefulness and teleology, he imbues his postwar work with a modicum of practicality, direction, and purpose. And though obviously a performative contradiction, Bataille’s interest in usefully solving political problems in the postwar period refracts the spirit of his prewar work, which ultimately sought to challenge and reconfigure enervated left-wing ideas.

### 2AC – 4 – flesh of usfg

#### I think the aff literally made this up. There’s no evidence indicating that there is a second government. Even if this is true it proves our interpretation, if there are two federal governments BEING THE ONE IN DC IS ABSOLUTELY KEY TO GROUND. There’s no evidence to this, no intent to define. It’s about sovereignity in the sense of Bataille not the state.

#### The “flesh of the bodies of the condemned” is not an institution – it is a concept applied to underprivileged people. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO AFFIRM THAT?

### 2AC – rethink body

#### This links to the aff worse – they separate the institution of the USFG from the bodies that make it up. Institutions are made by individuals which is a fact not grappled with in the 1AC.

#### There’s no impact to this argument

### 2ac must be topical

#### Yes we agree

### 2AC – 6

#### This is literally just kritiks are educational. This is bushleague shit. They read Zwarenstein here, means they can’t indict any of our evidence. Reading ks on the neg solves all their offense and none of ours.

#### ---Resolution based policy debate foster critical thinking skills that empirically undermine the basis for American Exceptionalism.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

The background of many conversations relating to secondary education concerns the appropriateness of teaching politics. As referenced in chapter two, Daily (2006) and White (2009) stress the importance of early political identity formation. While the American polity recognizes the necessity of a political education both in the home and in the schools, the education received may not be as authentic as perceived. One immense benefit to the policy debate experience may relate to the time and space given to political identity formation (for those without an identity), re-formation (for those with a dissonant identity), or solidification of an existing identity (for those with a consistent identity). Switch-side debating combined with the personal distance from argument, provides a relatively safe space for playing with argumentation. Policy debate participation may uniquely answer White’s (2009) concern regarding the indoctrination of unquestioned patriotism, religiosity, and militarism in American schools. Participation in policy debate forces an intelligent academic defense, unraveling, or navigation through these concerns. Many debaters unlearn their ‘America can do no wrong’ perspective and develop an ability to understand and qualify American policy decisions both at home and abroad. This practice is inherently and genuinely political. As Colby (2008) concurs, political leaning does not compromise one’s political ideology but rather aids in intellectual integrity and clear critical thinking (p. 6). Revisiting Galloway (2007) emphasis on dialogue, debate helps students realize positions outside their own have meaning. This practice opens students up to new intellectual and academic perspectives and values. Overall, this study finds debate may help aid the development of an authentic political identity. “Evaluating competing arguments in this way causes students to think harder about things they have previously taken for granted” (Colby, Beaumont, Ehrlich, and Corngold, 2007, p. 115).

### 2AC – 7 at limits bad

#### Framework does not beg the question of the aff. Implicit in all their arguments is excess must be defined by limits. Without framework we cannot determine what goes beyond it. That’s not a reason the affirmative is a good idea. The negative does not reject excess, rejection would be if you voted neg after the 1NC. Framework is an attempt to grapple with excess and strike a balance.

#### ---Doesn’t disprove our limits claims --- The most generous reading of their evidence says that limits cause more weird affs. There’s no impact since judges can just vote against those teams. Our limits claim is not that the affirmative shouldn’t be allowed to speak but that they shouldn’t be awarded the win.

#### ---This is a negative argument --- Limits are a precondition for difference & excess.

Stoekl 2007

Allan, professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University, “Bataille's Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” pg. 43

And yet, if we think a bit more deeply about these two approaches to human expenditure (both LeBlanc and Bataille are, ultimately, theorists of human violence), we start to see notable points in common. Despite ap- pearing to be a theorist of human and ecological scarcity, LeBianc neverthe- less presupposes one basic fact: there is always a tendency for there to be too many humans in a given population. Certainly populations grow at differ- ent rates for different reasons, but they always seem to outstrip their envi- ronments: there is, in essence, always an excess of humans that has to be burned off. Conversely, Bataille is a thinker of limits to growth, precisely because he always presupposes a limit—if there were no limit, after all, there could be no excess of anything (yet the limit would be meaningless if there were not always already an excess, for the excess opens the possibility of the limit). As we know, for Bataille too there is never a steady state: en- ergy (wealth) can be reinvested, which results in growth; when growth is no longer possible, when the limits to growth have been reached, the excess muse be destroyed. If it is not, it will only return to cause us to destroy our- selves: war.

#### ---Limits provide a basis for wisdom on knowledge and prevents global catastrophe.

Shearman & Smith 2007

David, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC, Joseph Wayne, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism. He is the author of Global Meltdown (Praeger, 1998) and Healing in a Wounded World (Praeger, 1997), THE CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGE AND THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY, pg 145

Wisdom has been translated into the environmental context by David Orr as part of “slow knowledge” that is accumulated during evolution in the process of cultural maturation.6 It involves how to do practical things; it is the careful conservation and increase of knowledge over many generations. It constructs a society on the basis of wisdom rather than cleverness, and it recognizes that the careless application of knowledge can destroy all knowledge, for example by nuclear or biological warfare. Indeed education that is knowledge only, without wisdom, may allow people to become greater and greater destroyers of ecological services. Indigenous people display wisdom that is knowledge and the interpretation of that knowledge, passed down through generations in stories and fables. Such wisdom exists in all cultures, although we may find it more difficult to recognize it in cultures that are alien to us. But in Western cultures we recognize many instances in the professions. The practice of medicine is regarded as an art as well as a science for it requires wisdom and judgment to deliver outcomes based on medical science. The consequences of these discussions are as follows: The freedom to pursue knowledge as the individual sees fit is a mistake, for freedom must be considered in the context of the needs of society as a whole. There must be judgment and wisdom. Freedom of research has been a holy grail for those pursuing the idea of a liberal university. It follows that the Real University will have an agenda, which includes priorities for those tasks to be pursued that are essential to the future well-being of humanity.

### A/T Hatred of Chance

#### Hatred of chance links to the aff, its written before the round. This is the same thing as the argument above. WITHOUT LIMITS THERE CANNOT BE EXCESS. Means none of their limits arguments generate excess. Just because people will inevitably not be topical doesn’t mean it’s good – it means they should lose. Framework is not WHO can participate, it is what knowledge production is good.

#### New affs and addons solve, creates a happy medium wherein the neg can rely on core generics but there are still moments of rupture which solve their impact.

### 2AC – 9 Stoekl

#### Sacrificing producing energy is irrelevant, it’s not solar panels, there’s no elimination of restrictions, this is retarded.

### A/T education thing

#### This card is very clearly about a model of education where an active teacher imparts objective truth to a passive student. This is in no way descriptive of debate, the judge is an adult in a position of power where the students (debaters) are speaking.

#### Turn – unbridled affirmation creates the monological education they critique.

Hanghoj 2008

Thorkild, researcher for the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

### At policy bad

#### ---Abdication of government political strategies makes political change impossible.

Stevenson 2009

Ruth, PhD, senior lecturer and independent consultant – Graduate School of the Environment @ Centre for Alternative Technology, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, pg. 512-526

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus. Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69). Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.

#### ---Decision-making skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics.

Hager 1992

Carol J., professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda. Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

## 1nr

### OV

#### **extend weedon- absent the alternative nuclear war is inevitable**

#### **The impact is physical & mental annihilation of difference.**

Irigaray 1994 Luce,Thinking the difference: for a peaceful revolution,pg 4-7

What does it mean for our entire culture to be threatened with destruction? There are, of course, declared stakes connected with threats of war. According to the types of discourse whose economy is at issue here, such threats are the sole means of maintaining international equilibrium. I shall come back to this point. Huge amounts of capital are allocated to the development of death machines in order to ensure peace, we are told. This warlike method of organizing society is not self-evident. It has its origin in patriarchy. It has a sex. But the age of technology has given weapons of war a power that exceeds the conflicts and risks taken among patriarchs. Women, children, all living things, including elemental matter, are drawn into the maelstorm. And death and destruction cannot be associated solely with war. They are part of the physical and mental aggression to which we are constantly subjected. What we need is an overall **cultural transformation, not just a decision about war** *per se*. Patriarchal culture is based on sacrifice, crime and war. It is a culture that makes it men's duty or right to fight in order to feed themselves, to inhabit a place, and to defend their property. From time to time, patriarchy must make decision concerning war, but that is far from what is required to ensure a cultural transformation. Mankind [*le peuple des hommes*] wages war everywhere all the time with a perfectly clear conscience. Mankind is traditionally carnivorous, sometimes cannibalistic. So men must kill to eat, must increase their domination of nature in order to live or to survive, must seek on the most distant stars what no longer exists here, must defend by any means the small patch of land they are exploiting here or over there. Men always go further, exploit further, seize more, without really knowing where they are going. Men seek what they think they need without considering who they are and how their identity is defined by what they do. To overcome this ignorance, I think that mankind needs those who are persons in their own right to help them understand themselves and find their limits. Only women can play this role. Women are not genuinely responsible subjects in the patriarchal community. That is why it may be possible for them to interpret this culture in which they have less involvement and fewer interests than do men, and of which they are not themselves products to the point where they have been blinded by it. Given their relative exclusive from society, women may, from their outside perspective, reflect back a more objective image of society than can men. Moreover, in theory, women should not be in a hierarchical relationship to men. All other types of minorities potentially are. It is with a thoroughly patriarchal condescension, either unconscious or cynical, that politicians and theoreticians take an interest in them, while exploiting them, with every possible risk of the master-slave relationship being overturned. This dialectic – or absence thereof – is built into father-son relationships, and has been since the inception of patriarchy. It is doomed to failure as a means of liberation and peace because it is based on (1) *lines of descent* insufficiently counterbalanced by a horizontal relationship between the genders and (2) *exclusively male lines of descent* making any kind of dialectic between male and female ancestries and masculine and feminine genders impossible. The possibility of sex-specific cultural and political ethics is our best chance today. The world's economic and religious equilibrium is precarious. Moreover, the development of technology is subjecting our bodies to such trials that we are threatened with **physical and mental annihilation**, that our living conditions leave us no time to rest or think, whatever real leisure time we may have, and that we are continually overwhelmed, forgetful, distracted. Men's science is less concerned with prevention or the present than with curing. For objective reasons of accumulation of property, for reasons of the subjective economy of the male subject, it allows disorder and pollution to grow, while funding various types of curative medicine. Men's science helps destroy, then attempts to fix things up. But a body that has suffered is no longer the same. It bears the traces of physical and moral trauma, despair, desire for revenge, recurrent inertia. The entire male economy demonstrates a forgetting of life, a lack of recognition of debt to the mother, of maternal ancestry, of the women who do the work of producing and maintaining life. Tremendous vital resources are wasted for the sake of money. But what good is money if it is not used for life? Despite policies that encourage the birth rate for economic reasons, or sometimes for religious ones, destroying life seems to be as compulsory as giving life.

#### Alt means we solve the understanding of flesh better than the affirmative- absent acceptance of sexual difference man never understands the loss of flesh because he only sacrifices the female flesh.

#### We cannot make sense of human subjectivity absent realization of sexuate difference, aff advantages are incoherent calls to maintain a detrimental ontological relationship making the critique a logical prior question

**Jones 11** (Emma, a dissertation, Presented to the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy “SPEAKING AT THE LIMIT: THE ONTOLOGY OF LUCE IRIGARAY’S ETHICS, IN DIALOGUE WITH LACAN AND HEIDEGGER” https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/11542/Jones\_Emma\_Reed\_phd2011sp.pdf, Donnie)

I utilize the term “ethics” in several senses. On the one hand, I believe that Irigaray’s reformulation of subjectivity by way of relational ontology is “ethical” in the Aristotelian sense that Irigaray thinks the human being as one who must enact itself to the fullest of its potential, and in the most “excellent” or virtuous way. xvii The event of being as relation, of which I spoke earlier, does not simply announce what “is,” but rather calls upon the human subject to respond in and to this relation (as I elaborate in Chapters IV and V). Thus, on the other hand, this vision is also “ethical” in the sense that to become actualized as a subject is to recognize oneself as always already related to another, di erent subject—the sexuate other. As, I argue, Irigaray’s most recent works (in particular Sharing the World) explicitly show, this self-actualization of humanity is shared between two subjects who are mutually and continually formed and re-formed as a result of this process. Therefore **if the relation between the two is askew**—*if it is violent*, *dehumanizing, or* otherwise *detrimental*—**our very understanding of human subjectivity** **and all that goes with it is harmed.** This shared self-actualization process is the essence of the concept “relational limitation.” I illustrate this in Chapter V of the dissertation through my exploration of the figure of “place” in Irigaray’s writing. I speak there of place as a dialogical figure that encapsulates Irigaray’s ethical transformation of subjectivity. What it means to be a subject for Irigaray, I argue, is to perpetually move, in language, toward the “place” of the other and back into the “place” of the self, at once motivated and restricted by the “relational limit” that both connects and separates the two. The thinking of this limit, again, encompasses Irigaray’s reformulations of ontology, language, and ethics as interrelated and as shared. With regard to Irigaray’s explicitly formulated ethics of sexuate difference, however, some commentators have worried that, in focusing on the “relation” between sexuate subjects, Irigaray’s work is only applicable to intimate or sexual relations between men and women. This is the substance of Judith Butler’s critique of Irigaray, for instance, in the Diacritics interview, where she even quips that Irigaray’s work should be filed under “heterosexual studies.” However, as I hope my discussion of ontology above has already shown, when Irigaray speaks about the “relation” of sexuate subjects, she does not only mean a specific intimate relation between men and women. Rather, the relation takes place at the ontological level, such that the event of being is already an event of relation between-two, and the “subject” also comes to be re-defined as two: internally limited-by and perpetually moved-toward the sexuate other. As Gail Schwab (2007) notes (and as I explain further in Chapter V), we can thus draw a distinction between an “empirical” relation between the sexes and an “ontological” one. Schwab quotes Irigaray in To Be Two, who writes: “Certainly, I can decide to become woman while suspending my empirical relationship with the other gender [...] but [...] to be woman necessarily involves [...] **to be in relation with man, at least ontologically**.” (TBT: 34; Schwab, 32). Schwab interprets this quote to say that “[a]lthough generically, to be woman requires a relation to the other man, just as to be a man requires a relation to the other woman, becoming a woman at the level of the individual is not dependent upon a heterosexual love choice” (32). Thus, while the ethics of relationality proposed by Irigaray would certainly be applicable to empirical heterosexual love relations, it is certainly not limited to this sphere, and instead concerns the relation between male and female genres (the French term translated as “genders”) as a whole—a relation that, in turn, affects all of our empirical relations. Thus, as I will discuss in Chapter V, the ethical practice of dialogue as the enactment of a relational limit is applicable to all human relationships. Nonetheless, for Irigaray, **it is critical to transform the ontological relation of sexuate difference** (a transformation that, I argue, must be pursued through dialogues with all sexuate others) ***first and foremost*** if these relationships are to thrive. Stating that the definitions of sexuate subjects are intimately bound up with the status of an ontological relation thus does not mean that we can only actualize as sexuate subjects through entering into specific empirical relations with members of the “other” sex. Instead, it means that there is always an underlying ontological relation between “masculine” and “feminine” subjectivity as a whole. This underlying relation may be more or less violently skewed or repressed in a variety of ways, as Irigaray’s work attempts to reveal. And while this underlying relation certainly affects empirical relations between the sexes, the two are not interchangeable. Nonetheless, it is important to note the empirical effects that the repression or skewing of this ontological relation has. Indeed, from Irigaray’s point of view, we can view the oppression of women as the failure of an ethically-enabling relationality—the ongoing erasure of their subjective place as women. As I will discuss in Chapter V, this is manifest in such global problems as domestic violence and unequal division of labor between the sexes. These examples indeed remind us of the force of Irigaray’s vision, in that men and women, on the whole, do have to “share the world” together—**regardless of their individual, empirical relationships—and manifestly must learn to do so more ethically**. xviii

#### **Sexual difference is a prior question**

Casey 97

(Damien Casey Australian Catholic University, Brisbane “Maximus and Irigaray: Metaphysics and Difference” <http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/staffhome/dacasey/Maximus&Irigaray.pdf>, Donnie)

For Irigaray, however, the meaning and significance of sexual difference is not something established in the beginning as some norm to which we should comply. Rather it shows the way forward, inviting us to become co-creators in a manner that goes beyond simply procreation, which would be simply to reduce creation to its material basis. Irigaray’s insistence upon the priority of sexual difference is, in a sense, **strategic**. How can we approach the question of the other without considering the most basic of differences by which human society is structured? 11 Sexual difference then is exemplary of all difference. But to define the other by their biological difference is both to deny the other as an independent source of self understanding and to put obstacles on the path to the spiritualisation of matter, to deny that the flesh might become word.

#### Our K proves the Aff doesn’t solve

Surkis, 1996.

(Judith, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault, *Diacritics* 26.2 (1996) 18-30)

**An analysis of the gendered positions inscribed in Bataille's theory of transgression calls into question the possibility and even viability of the total self-loss that is upheld as its goal**. [11](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/journals/diacritics/v026/26.2surkis.html#FOOT11) This, it appears to me, is exactly why Foucault consistently effaces the role of gendered partners in eroticism. **An account of the gendering of Bataille's transgression demonstrates how it remains within a specular and speculative economy in which the writing subject is always at a certain distance from what he "sees**." **While he might *desire* to totally lose himself in the loss of another, the writing subject always remains conscious enough of that loss to theorize. Bataille's transgression may thus be read against itself in** **[End Page 29]** **order to demonstrate that the "masculine" writing subject always maintains his position vis-à-vis a witnessed "feminine" loss**, which explains why Foucault shies away from the consideration of gender. We therefore need to examine how transgression underwrites the theoretical/philosophical subject in the process of purportedly undermining it and hence to account for the writing subject's position rather than deny its continued existence.

**An interrogation of the gendering operative in transgression then raises a number of further questions concerning the radicality of gestures toward self-loss** (a series of questions that, in his attempt to proclaim the disruptiveness of transgression, Foucault cannot afford to address). Does this desire for self-dissolution, which is founded on the "image" of another's loss, in fact strengthen or reinscribe the position of the "masculine" witness rather than radically disable it? An examination of the gendered dynamic of transgression raises the problem of *who* is really lost. Who benefits from the enactment of self-loss? Who witnesses and theorizes about the simultaneous appearance of the limit and its transgression? Who loses an eye?

### LINK

#### 4 LINKS

#### 1- SACRAFICE

#### Batialle’s basis of sacrifice is predicated upon the male experience- we don’t sacrifice ourselves; we sacrifice the female body to the male experience. It’s no coincidence that

#### Their Hansen & Stepputat 05 evidence says that man is in his natural state reveling in an uninhibited sexual experience-

). Sovereignty resides in every human being and shows itself in the desire to enjoy and revel in brief moments of careless freedom, in sexual ecstasy, in moments of simple nonanticipatory existence, when an individual experiences "the miraculous sensation of having the world at his disposal" (199). This was the original condition of man in "his non-alienated condition

#### Bataille always writes of women being raped as the sacrificial man, its because his entire theory is predicated upon a finding pleasure in a male experience.

#### their 1ac Stoekl evidence says that

“the standing reserve is there, at the ready; raw materials are there to be used for ~~Man’s~~ [Humanity’s] survival and comfort.”

#### That standing reserve IS the female body. Extend Roberts-Hughes - There is a threefold sacrifice of women. Woman is sacrificed for society to exist and for transgression to occur and in the sacred realm of transgression (in which there can only be totality and no difference.

#### 2- MUSCLE POWER

#### They argue for MUSCULAR energy predicated upon a masculine experience- silencing female perspectives. not only in 1ac CX but also in their Stoekl evidence. they argue that we need

Just as there are two energetic sources of economic value, then — muscle power and inanimate fuel power—so too there are two kinds of expenditure. The stored and available energy derived from fossil or inanimate fuel expenditure, for production or destruction, is different in quality, not merely in quantity, from muscular energy. The latter is profoundly more and other than the mere “power to do work.” No intimacy

#### 3-TRANSGRESSION

#### Bataille’s gender neutral account of transgression ignores masculine bias --- Their challenge to utility gains intelligibility only though the destruction of passive feminine subjects. That’s **Surkis 1996**

#### Bataille’s theory of erotic transgression presumes a universal masculine subject

**Surkis, 1996.** (Judith, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault**,** *Diacritics* 26.2 (1996) 18-30)

The vision of erotic transgression set forth in *Erotism* concentrates on the experience of the "discontinuous subject" in his attempt to transgress the limits of individual existence by leaping or falling into the realm of continuity or limitless being in order to access the zone of death. [2](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/journals/diacritics/v026/26.2surkis.html" \l "FOOT2) For Bataille this experience of continuity should not be confused with absolute and final death; he stresses that "continuity is what we are after, but generally only if that continuity which the death of discontinuous beings can alone establish is not the victor in the long run" [18-19]. The experience of death in eroticism is, by definition, always only proximate- simultaneously rupturing and maintaining the limits of individual existence. Bataille insists: "At all costs we need to transcend [limits], but we should like to transcend them and maintain them simultaneously" [141]. The transgressive experience is thus organized and produced by the imposition of a limit always existing in relation to it, even and especially at the moment of its rupture. The sensation of transgression is conditioned by a cognizance of the taboo and is, as a result, fundamentally "duplicitous," performing "a reconciliation of what seems impossible to reconcile, respect for the law and violation of the law . . . " [36]. **[End Page 19]** Transgression thus *heightens* orcreatesanawareness of the law. As Bataille writes: "If we observe the taboo, if we submit to it, we are no longer conscious of it. But in the act of violating it we feel the anguish of mind without which the taboo could not exist . . . That experience leads to the completed transgression which, in maintaining the prohibition, maintains it in order to benefit by it [*pour en jouir*]" [38; *OC* 42]. Since the pleasures or *jouissance* of eroticism are intimately related to the injunctions that prohibit them, the subject must always be aware of the existence of the law in order to experience limitless being in the moment of transgression; he must be sensitive "to the anguish at the heart of the taboo no less great than the desire which leads him to infringe it" [38-39]. This is the fundamental structure of Bataille's transgression, and, as Carolyn Dean has argued, this paradoxical dynamic is integral to his understanding of the subject. Because his self-loss actually makes him aware of the law, it is "lived as the constituent moment of self-hood" [242; see also Hollier]. However, Dean questions the universal applicability of a subjectivity founded by its own dissolution. She argues that it presumes a "masculine" subject who initially possesses a position or self to transgress or lose. Dean suggests that, for Bataille, the reconciliation of "manhood" and castration are constitutive of his notion of the "virile" rather than incompatible with it. In effect, the "wholeness" of Bataille's virile man is, as she writes, "paradoxically linked to an experience of transgressing limits rather than of containment within boundaries that would demarcate his being." If this virility is repeatedly produced in and by self-dissolution of a masculine subject, Dean wonders where "women figure in this scheme of things**"** [244-45]. [3](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/journals/diacritics/v026/26.2surkis.html#FOOT3) Upon reading *Erotism*, we find that images of women's self-loss are prominent in Bataille's theory of erotic transgression; they are instrumental to the enactment of masculine self-loss.

#### 4-LOSS

#### Bataille’s account of loss relies on essentialized gender divisions that collapse the political space necessary for true femininity.

Surkis 1996

Judith, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault, *Diacritics*m Vol 26, No 2, Georges Bataille: an occasion for Misunderstanding, pg 18-30

Bataille's introductory discussion of the process by which individual discontinuity is ruptured-the mise en oeuvre of eroticism-relies on an initial, gendered difference between erotic partners. Bataille writes: The transition from the normal state to that of erotic desire presupposes a partial dissolution of the person as he exists in the realm of discontinuity .... In the process of dissolution, the masculine partner [partenaire masculin] has generally an active role, while the feminine part [partie f6minine] is passive. The passive, female side is essentially the one that is dissolved as a separate entity [en tant qu'etre continue]. But for the male partner the dissolution of the passive partner means one thing only: it is paving the way for a fusion where both are mingled, attaining at length the same degree of dissolution. [17; OC 23] A fundamental division is enacted here between the "masculine partner" and the "feminine part"; the feminine side is already lost as a subject, a partial object from the beginning. In order for the masculine side to lose himself, the passive, feminine side must be always already dissolved as a continuous being: her loss initiates his fall into continuity. In the meantime, the masculine partner is only "relatively dissolved," remaining "discontinuous" enough to derive meaning and sense from her imaged annihilation. The feminine dissolution is thus necessarily prior to the masculine, with his experience of continuity predicated on her prior and total self-loss. Bataille elaborates on what is "seen" by the masculine partner in this scenario, outlining how an "aura of death" is necessary in order to "denote" erotic passion. To whom is this passion denoted? The beloved is repeatedly inscribed as significant for the lover; the scenario functions within a specular economy in which her image of dissolution appears as a meaningful sign for him. Bataille writes: "Only in the violation, through death if need be, of the individual's solitariness can there appear that image of the beloved object which has for the lover the sense of all that is [qu'apparait cette image de l'e'tre aime qui a pour l'amant le sens de tout ce qui est]" [20-21; OC 26]. This image of the beloved is, paradoxically, transparent, a window onto a world of limitless being: "The beloved is for the lover the transparency of the world. Through the beloved appears... full and limitless being, which does not limit, which no longer limits personal discontinuity [l'etre plein et illimite, que ne limite, que ne limite plus la discontinuite personelle]" [21; OC 26]. Full and limitless being "appears" to the lover through the beloved's transparency-her present absence. This being is "glimpsed as a deliverance through the person of the perceived being [l'etre aperCue]" [21; OC 26]. Continuous being arises as a possibility only when seen through the transparency of the beloved; she renders limitlessness to the lover. This limitlessness is then always perceived by the lover; he remains "discontinuous" and distanced enough to sense her loss. It is unclear what the beloved ever "sees." Or rather, the point is precisely that the beloved sees nothing.

### A2 Permutation --- 2nc Feminism

#### ---The permutation is the link --- Their attempt to reduce all perspectives to one neatly packaged advocacy is the foundation of sexual indifference.

Xu 1995

Ping, Irigaray's Mimicry and the Problem of Essentialism, Hypatia, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 76-89

At the beginning of her essay "Sexual Difference," Irigaray writes: "Sexual difference is one of the important questions of our age, if not in fact the burning issue. According to Heidegger, each age is preoccupied with one thing, and one alone. Sexual difference is probably that issue in our own age which could be our salvation on an intellectual level" (Irigaray 1991a, 165). For Irigaray, one of the reasons why an elaboration of sexual difference becomes necessary, even urgent, is the apparent failure of traditional feminism to resist being reabsorbed into the existing male-dominated order that is actually characterized by sexual indifference. Here lies the fundamental difference between Irigaray and Simone de Beauvoir, as Irigaray clearly indicates in her essay written for the occasion of the death of de Beauvoir (Irigaray 1992, 9-14). Why is traditional feminism so readily reabsorbed into the existing male- dominated order? For Irigaray, the answer is that the goal of traditional feminism has been to demand equality to men, thereby it has been complicit with the existing male-dominated order, which is characterized by "its power to reduce all others to the economy of the Same" and "its power to eradicate the difference between the sexes in systems that are self-representative of a 'masculine subject' " (Irigaray 1985a, 74). In this sense, traditional feminism represents what Irigaray calls "a direct feminine challenge" to the existing order, which means "demanding to speak as a (masculine), 'subject', that is, it means to postulate a relation to the intelligible that would maintain sexual indifference" (Irigaray 1991a, 124).

#### ---The combination of feminism and postmodernism cripples the alternative --- Abandons the oppressed in favor of middle-class indifference.

Bondi & Dornosh 1992

L., Department of Geography, University of Edinburgh, M. Department of Geography, Florida Atlantic University, Other figures in other places: on feminism, postmodernism and geography, Environment rmd Planning D: Society and Space, volumo 10, pnqoa 199-213

Thus, the apparent symmetry of the encounter outlined by Fraser and Nicholson (1988) conceals some important asymmetries likely to render the proposed marriage of feminism to postmodernism at least as unhappy as that earlier liaison between feminism and Marxism (Hartmann, 1979). Hartsock (1987, page 196) expresses doubts shared by many feminists: "Somehow it seems highly suspicious that it is at this moment in history, when so many groups are engaged in 'nationalisms' which involve redefinitions of the marginalized Others, that doubt arises in the academy about the nature of the 'subject', about the possibilities for a general theory which can describe the world, about historical 'progress'. Why is it, exactly at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes 'problematic'? Just when we are forming our own theories about the world, uncertainty emerges about whether the world can be adequately theorized? Just when we are talking about the changes we want, ideas of progress and the possibility of 'meaningfully' organizing human society become suspect? And why is it only now that critiques are made of the will to power inherent in the effort to create theory?" Hartsock does not interpret postmodernism as a conspiracy consciously designed to undercut 'marginalized Others'. Nor does she defend totalizing discourses, whether advanced by dominant or subordinate groups\* Rather she traces through the texts of white, Western, middle-class, male theorists the imprint of the structural position from which they start. Although their moves to abandon the centre for the margins and to relinquish their previously assumed authority to speak for others are to be welcomed, the marginalized and subordinated have occupied different positions and must therefore make different moves. Attempts by postmodernists to define the ground on which these others move is unacceptable and hypocritical (see also Ricci, 1987). Hartsock's suspicions stem from a consideration of the context within which postmodernism is discussed, and the effect of that context on the writing and reading of specific texts. Most importantly, she foregrounds relations of power. From this perspective the postmodernist project, conceived by a dominant, powerful group attempting to 'deal with\* threats to their legitimacy, is simply not an appropriate starting place for feminists attempting to challenge the power relations of gender from a position of subordination, and to grapple with power differences (of class, \*race\ ethnicity) among women (Ramazanoglu, 1989; Spelman, 1990). The failure of postmodernism to deal adequately with questions of power, including its own and that of its chief advocates, alerts us to serious dangers in liaisons between feminism and postmodernism. Given the peripheral position of feminism within geography, together with the continuing subordination of women within its division of labour (Lee, L990; McDowell and Pcake, 1990), caution is particularly appropriate. In particular, we must resist moves to assimilate feminist geography within postmodernism.

### Essent

#### ---The alternative is to view the debate space as a place to separate from patriarchal culture and practice feminine difference. Only this move can change thinking & facilitate the development of effective political strategies.

Bell 1993

Linda A., Professor of philosophy @ Georgia State University, Rethinking Ethics in the Midst of Violence: a Feminist Approach to Freedom, pg 63-64

Tactical separatism affirms separation as a limited strategy, as a temporary expedient, necessary if certain ends are to be achieved. Such separatism is regarded as absolutely unavoidable by most feminist theorists. Representative of these is Luce Irigaray when she states, For women to undertake tactical strikes, to keep themselves apart from men long enough to learn to defend their desire, especially through speech, to discover the love of other women while sheltered from men's imperious choices that put them in the position of rival commodities, to forge for themselves a social status that compels recognition, to earn their living in order to escape from the condition of prostitute...these are certainly indispensable stages in the escape from their proletarization on the exchange market. 29 Even more basically, as Marilyn Frye argues, the creation of separate spaces “somewhat sheltered from the prevailing winds of patriarchal culture” is necessary for an individual's sense of body and self: “[O]ne needs space to *practice* an erect posture; one cannot just will it to happen. To retrain one's body one needs physical freedom from what are, in the last analysis, physical forces misshaping it to the contours of the subordinate. Separation is necessary, too, “to avoid being demoralized.” As Sarah Hoagland says, at least separation dispels “the illusion that we are equal participants in these events, [thus] we can avoid claiming responsibility for something over which we have no control.” This seems particularly important to recognize in a society that has developed into a fine art the technique of distorting power relations by blaming the victim, the one who is relatively powerless. Separation may be necessary if one is to understand what is going on, since it offers “a way of pulling back from the existing conceptual framework, noting its patterns, and understanding their function regardless of the mythology espoused within the framework.” Perhaps, too, only with some pulling away from the systems of oppression surrounding us can we begin to free our thinking and our imaginations to devise practical strategies and alternatives.

#### No essentialism – your authors are basing their claims on a shoddy translation. In French the female and the feminine are the same word but have entirely different meanings – we don’t essentialize identity but essentialism in the academy is inevitable until we embrace difference feminists.

Holliday-Karre 2011 (Erin; *The Seduction of Feminist Theory*; PhD English Literature from Loyola University Chicago; May; Proquest)

According to some feminists, women are socially and culturally subordinated through essentializing claims about their physical, biological, class, and cultural difference from men. Theorizing about “difference” varies along a pendulum of opposing extremes: from assertions that deny difference between men and women, asserting women’s equality to men on masculine terms, to a rejection of masculine terms in an attempt to elevate the feminine as both different from and superior to the masculine, to a recognition of the differences between women which rejects essentializing about what constitutes both “woman” and the “feminine.” Feminists who reject the concept of difference by arguing for male and female equality will be addressed in chapter 2. Here I would like to focus on French feminists Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray who sought to create a female writing and speech (respectively) in ways that would celebrate and empower women based on their difference, and in an effort to privilege writing over the materialism of bourgeois egalitarian feminism. In the late 1970s French feminism brought about a change in language, from talking about “the female” to talking about “the feminine” (the French language makes no distinction between the two). Initially this set up a divide between the French and the Anglo/American feminists who saw the French feminists who focused on difference as supporting the male/female dichotomy. I would argue that this divide results primarily from productive reading practices: feminists who search for a coherent ideology and a rational unifying argument, who accept the value of writing to the extent that it remains rigorous in a linear quest for meaning. These are, of course, exactly the productive practices that Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray are struggling against with their experimental texts regarding écriture féminine and parole de femme respectively. Until feminism recognizes the importance of the linguistic shift, we too will continue to perpetuate the writing and reading strategies of domination and hierarchy, as I will explain.

#### False dilemma—your authors presume that because our theory of identity is not based environmentally, it must be essentialist

**Gatens** **1996**, (Moira, “Imaginary Bodies: ethics, power, and corporeality” p 4-5)

Before presenting a critique of the sex/gender distinction I should clarify what I take to be the central issue at stake. It would appear that one of the most burning issues in the contemporary women's movement is that of sexual equality versus sexual difference. It is arguable that this debate brings to a crisis both feminism's association with socialism and feminism's association with (male) homosexual groups. Both associations are often predicated upon an assumed 'essential' or possible equality, in the sense of 'sameness' between the sexes. It is against the backdrop of this question that this essay is situated. I would maintain that the proponents of sexual equality consistently mischaracterize and distort the position of those feminists who favour a politics of sexual difference. The fault may well lie with those feminists who have not made clear what they mean by a 'politics of difference'. This essay is an attempt to amend this situation and, in addition, to quell once and for all the tired (and tiring, if not tiresome) charges of essentialism and biologism so often levelled at theories of sexual difference. [9](http://www.questia.com/read/109451678) Critics of feminists of difference tend to divide the entire theoretical field of social enquiry into an exclusive disjunction: social theory is either environmentalist or it is essentialist. [10](http://www.questia.com/read/109451678) Therefore, and it follows quite logically from this premise, if feminist theories of difference are not environmentalist then they must be essentialist. The task remains, then, to reopen the field of social theory from its forced containment in this disjunction and to demonstrate the practical and theoretical viability of a politics of difference. The latter task shall be effected indirectly, by way of a critique of 'degendering' proposals.

#### No link--Irigaray doesn’t create static identities or victimize women

#### Whitford, 1991, (Margaret, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, p 11)

The complexity of her work is nicely illustrated by the fact that whereas for some women, her work provides a celebration of femininity (Kuykendall 1984; Suleiman 1986), however problematic, for others she falls into the trap of victimology,2 and fatally ends up presenting woman as innocent and untainted by any trace of phalloccntric culture (Berg 1982: 18); for others again, she may not even deserve the name of feminist (Plaza 1978). It's possible that some of the range of views ascribed to her are largely preoccupations of the ascribers; the opacity of her texts elicits a considerable degree of projection and imaginary identification, or aggressive rejection. My own view is that it is a mistake to attribute to Irigaray a static notion of 'woman' or 'femininity' - whether it is woman as essence, woman as morally pure victim, woman as outside history, woman as closer to the imaginary, and so on. Where, then, does Irigaray stand in relation to feminism?