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### 1

#### ---The affirmative’s view of energy collapses the political by obfuscating structures of consumption. Energy policy becomes a rigged game requiring the annihilation of the environment, poverty and exploitation of billions.

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

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In sum, encouraging a rational debate about “energy security” necessitates understanding what is meant not only by the phrase, but also by its composite parts. The term “energy,” despite its apparent simplicity, presents particular challenges. During the past two centuries, the vernacular, varied, lower-case “energies” of commons regimes have been joined by a new, abstract, upper-case Energy evolved in industrialised societies. Exploring the difference between “energies” and Energy is crucial to understanding the international politics of “energy security”. Abstract, monolithic, seemingly limitless Energy is something that only became possible with fossil-fuelled productivism and the machines, networks and institutions that came with it. This Energy, like lowercase “energies”, can deliver the basic necessities of life, at least to some, lending a certain plausibility to politicians’ claims that their worries about “energy security” centre on keeping the lights on and homes warm. But its underlying logic is different. Upper-case Energy is a transformation and commensuration of specific energies into a general capacity to maximise the ability of human bodies to make stuff. As the First Law of Thermodynamics (developed at the same time as industrial capitalism) recognises, any form of energy can be transformed into others and used to do work (but cannot be created or destroyed). Just as the invention of an absolute Time independent of daylight variations and traditional holidays helped discipline early industrial workers into the regular rhythm of a long working day, so too the subsequent development of an abstract Energy was key to intensifying their productivity further and harnessing them to the pace of the machine. For this upper-case Energy, survival is incidental except insofar as it supports the production imperative. Whereas specific “energies” know their limits, of Energy there can never be too much. Other things being equal, the more there is, the more can be produced, and the more money business can make, without limit. Lower-case “energies” and Big-E Energy are not only different: they are also, in many senses, enemies to each other. In order that fragmented “energies” do not become an obstacle to the mobilisation of economic value, they have to be folded into abstract Energy under the care of dedicated disciplines and institutions (bureaucrats, engineers, statisticians, laboratories, economics departments, inventors, investors, armies). Obsessed with quantitative growth for growth’s sake, Energy tends to treat the right of all to a warm home (or a cool one in hotter climes), cooked food, electric light as a nuisance. It heralds a world that is not only unequal, but also unable to respect the common right to subsistence. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of agrofuels, whose “interchangeability” with oil under the rubric of a unitary Energy makes routine the replacement of subsistence agriculture with industrial cropping aimed at fuelling cars and airplanes. It is also plain in India’s development plans, which call for US$100 billion to be spent on a burgeoning number of large Energy projects – coal, oil, hydropower and renewables – that will serve above all to boost the profits of industrialists but leave less than 2 per cent for the household use of the 700 million who lack modern services. And it can be seen in South Africa’s policy of providing some of the cheapest electricity in the world to smelting companies while many township residents are forced to pirate electricity illegally because the price is out of their reach. Well over a century into the era of electrification, more than a billion people, about one-quarter of the world’s population, have no access to electricity or other non-biotic forms of energy (and many will never have under fossil-fuelled capitalism). If fossil-fuelled capitalism has defined what we mean by energy, then merely to use the word uncritically is to make a commitment to certain assumptions about scarcity, foreclose certain alternatives and cover up some of the most important issues that need to be discussed. Paradoxically, having a serious discussion about “energy security” requires taking a therapeutic step back from the modern concept of Energy itself. For example, the seemingly innocent query “How can we have energy security in a post-fossil world?” is not so much a question as an ultimatum. The question implies that however we organise our societies in future, it will have to be on the model that fossil capitalism built, with its threats to the right to survive of both humans and nonhumans (and the associated threats to “security” itself, on a commons understanding). A more fruitful question would be: “Is the world that is defined (in part) by the modern concept of Energy the world that we want?” It is just such questions that policymakers and social movements must ask when initiating any discussion of energy security.

#### ---The impact is extinction --- Collapse of politics proper risks hyper-industrial Armageddon.

Illich 1974

Ivan, Austrian philosopher, Roman Catholic priest, and "maverick social critic" of the institutions of contemporary western culture, *Energy and Equity*, http://worldstreets.wordpress.com/2010/09/29/energy-and-equity-ivan-illich/

I will argue here that technocracy must prevail as soon as the ratio of mechanical power to metabolic energy oversteps a definite, identifiable threshold. The order of magnitude within which this threshold lies is largely independent of the level of technology applied, yet its very existence has slipped into the blind-spot of social imagination in both rich and medium-rich countries. Both the United States and Mexico have passed the critical divide. In both countries, further energy inputs increase inequality, inefficiency, and personal impotence. Although one country has a per capita income of $500 and the other, one of nearly $5,000, huge vested interest in an industrial infrastructure prods both of them to further escalate the use of energy. As a result, both North American and Mexican ideologues put the label of “energy crisis” on their frustration, and both countries are blinded to the fact that the threat of social breakdown is due neither to a shortage of fuel nor to the wasteful, polluting, and irrational use of available wattage, but to the attempt of industries to gorge society with energy quanta that inevitably degrade, deprive, and frustrate most people. A people can be just as dangerously overpowered by the wattage of its tools as by the caloric content of its foods, but it is much harder to confess to a national overindulgence in wattage than to a sickening diet. The per capita wattage that is critical for social well-being lies within an order of magnitude which is far above the horsepower known to four-fifths of humanity and far below the power commanded by any Volkswagen driver. It eludes the underconsumer and the overconsumer alike. Neither is willing to face the facts. For the primitive, the elimination of slavery and drudgery depends on the introduction of appropriate modern technology, and for the rich, the avoidance of an even more horrible degradation depends on the effective recognition of a threshold in energy consumption beyond which technical processes begin to dictate social relations. Calories are both biologically and socially healthy only as long as they stay within the narrow range that separates enough from too much. The so-called energy crisis is, then, a politically ambiguous issue. Public interest in the quantity of power and in the distribution of controls over the use of energy can lead in two opposite directions. On the one hand, questions can be posed that would open the way to political reconstruction by unblocking the search for a postindustrial, labor-intensive, low-energy and high-equity economy. On the other hand, hysterical concern with machine fodder can reinforce the present escalation of capital-intensive institutional growth, and carry us past the last turnoff from a hyperindustrial Armageddon. Political reconstruction presupposes the recognition of the fact that there exist critical per capita quanta beyond which energy can no longer be controlled by political process. A universal social straitjacket will be the inevitable outcome of ecological restraints on total energy use imposed by industrial-minded planners bent on keeping industrial production at some hypothetical maximum.

#### ---The alternative is to repoliticize energy politics; shifting the focus from perfecting structures of energy security to debating energy security for who exposes and transforms oppressive structures.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 33, Issue 3, pages 601–620

Live Earth concerts, waving the banner of climate change and urging the world's leaders to take immediate and serious action, were beamed across the airwaves from 8 major cities on 8 July 2007, watched by an estimated record number of 3 billion people. Cheered on by Al Gore and riding on the popular success of his unsettling ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ documentary, the concerts — exquisite expressions of contemporary spectacularized city life — re-enforced the consensual view that nature, the climate and the environment are in clear and present danger, threatening the life and sustainability of all the world's peoples, in particular the poorer ones, and whipping up a moral crusade for a more energy-selective and carbon-sparse code of socio-economic conduct. It is of course ironic that these concerts took the urban as their stage, while it is exactly the socio-metabolic functioning of cities that requires gigantic energy resources to sustain their socio-metabolic processes, while pumping an accelerating volume of CO2 into the atmosphere (Swyngedouw, 2006). Cities produce 80% of the world's greenhouse gases, express often the most pervasive forms of socio-environmental injustices and are central to producing more sustainable environmental futures (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Sze, 2006; Doucet, 2007). Indeed, the environmental question has become one that mobilizes and galvanizes political energies, and around which a political consensus has emerged, one that has literally ‘naturalized the political’ (see Debruyne, 2007: 2). Indeed, a scientific consensus, most vividly illustrated by the successive Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, fused with a pervasive apocalyptic imaginary, and combined with asserting the intrinsic value of a nature that has to be retro-fitted to regain a ‘sustainable’ configuration, has taken hold (Swyngedouw, 2007a). Environmental politics is a politics legitimated by a scientific consensus which, in turn, translates into a political consensus. The world is in clear and present danger and urgent, sustained and consensual action is required. This is a politics that ‘legitimizes itself by means of a direct reference to the scientific status of its knowledge’ (Žižek, 2006c: 188) or, in other words, it is a politics reduced to the administration and management of processes whose parameters are defined by consensual socio-scientific knowledges. This reduction of the political to the policing of environmental change, so I shall argue, evacuates if not forecloses the properly political and becomes part and parcel of the consolidation of a postpolitical and postdemocratic polity. The depoliticized contradictions of such postpolitical environmentalism exploded with acute force in 2008, when energy prices, and in particular oil, spiralled upwards to quadruple in a few months' time. Irrespective of the reasons behind this spectacular rise in oil prices (whether driven by extremely profitable financial speculation in the futures markets after the speculative land-bubble had imploded or by a combination of peak-oil conditions and rising demand of China and India, or a combination of both, remains disputed), the implications in terms of urban environmental justice became clear quickly. Hailed by some environmentalists as finally opening a window to bring oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions down, poor people around the world suddenly saw food prices spiral out of reach, food crops replaced by bio-fuels, access to energy curtailed and the cost of moving around going up. While seemingly offering an opening towards a more sustainable postcarbon society, the contradictory effects rapidly came to the boil. Urban riots in Haiti, Mexico, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, China and elsewhere signalled that the environment is indeed a deeply political matter, one cut through by all manner of social antagonisms, radical disputes and profound disagreements. In recent years, urban research has become increasingly concerned with the social, political and economic implications of the techno-political and socio-scientific consensus that the present unsustainable and unjust environmental conditions require a transformation of the way urban life is organized. This special issue testifies to this concern and, in particular, to the socially highly uneven consequences of both the increasingly unsustainable environmental practices and the feeble attempts to ‘rectify’ the problem, to retrofit a nature that science suggests is out of synch with its own internal balancing act. A flurry of writing in recent years has begun to interrogate the close relationship between urban processes and environmental transformations (see Bickerstaff et al., 2009, this issue, for a review). Social environmental research has by now convincingly argued and demonstrated that physical-ecological processes are not independent from socio-economic and cultural processes. While such political and socio-ecological perspectives were originally primarily concerned with the degradation of ‘natural’ conditions (like soil erosion, deforestation, climate change or resource depletion), recent work has increasingly concentrated on the pivotal role of the urban in political ecological processes (see, e.g., Bell et al., 1998; Braun and Castree, 1998; Forsyth, 2002; Robbins, 2004; Castree, 2005; Heynen et al., 2005; 2007). Prompted by David Harvey's counter-intuitive comment that there is nothing unnatural about New York City, urban political ecologists insisted that urban environments, like any other socio-physical assemblage, are produced through combined social and ecological processes that shape particular socio-geographical conditions and manufacture the architecture of the socio-metabolic circulations and transformations that shape everyday urban life (Harvey, 1996). Neil Smith's (1984) ‘production of nature’ thesis has been expanded and reformulated in an attempt to let ecological processes re-enter our perspectives on nature and on the city (see, e.g., Gandy, 2003; Desfor and Keil, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004; Kaika, 2005). In In the Nature of Cities, a range of urban political ecologists argued indeed that cities are produced socio-metabolic assemblages and their analyses insisted on the ‘produced’ character of urban environments, including the distribution of social roles and positions, the socio-ecological flows of materials and the metabolic re-working of socio-physical processes into the fabric of what is defined as a city (Heynen et al., 2005). In short, urban environmental conditions are seen as dynamic, socio-physical, power-laden and co-evolutionary1 constructions. Uneven consequences of socio-environmental change, the distribution of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’, and the rhizomatic networks that relate local urban ecological transformations with distant socio-ecological processes are now commonly understood as combined social and physical entanglements. Political struggles are central in shaping alternative or different trajectories of socio-metabolic change and the construction of new and emancipatory urban environmental geographies. All manner of critical social-theoretical analyses have been mobilized to account for these processes. Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, environmental justice arguments, deconstructionist and poststructural musings, science/technology studies, complexity theory, postcolonial, feminist and Latourian views, among others, have attempted to produce what I would ultimately be tempted to call a ‘sociological’ analysis of urban political-ecological transformations. What they share, despite their different — and often radically opposed — ontological and epistemological claims, is the view that critical social theory will offer an entry into strategies, mechanisms, technologies of resistance, transformation and emancipatory political tactics. In other words, the implicit assumption of this sociological edifice is that ‘the political’ is instituted by the social, that political configurations, arrangements and tactics arise out of the social condition or process or, in other words, that the social colonizes ‘the political’ (Arendt, 1968). The properly political moment is assumed to flow from this ‘sociological’ understanding or analysis of the process. Or in other words, the ‘political’ emerges, both theoretically and practically, from the social process, a process that only knowledge has access to. Put differently, most urban political ecological perspectives assume the political to arise from analysis, but neither theorizes nor operationalizes the properly political within a political ecological analysis. This opens a theoretical and practical gap as the properly political is evacuated from the theoretical considerations that have shaped (urban) political ecology thus far. This ‘retreat of the political’ (Lefort, 1988; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997) requires urgent attention. This retreat of the properly political as a theoretical and practical object stands in strange contrast to the insistence of urban political ecology that urban socio-environmental conditions and processes are profoundly political ones and that, consequently, the production of different socio-environmental urban trajectories is a decidedly political process. Considering the properly political is indeed all the more urgent as environmental politics increasingly express a postpolitical consensual naturalization of the political. As argued by Swyngedouw (2007a), Žižek (2002 [1992]) and Debruyne (2007), among others, the present consensual vision that the environmental condition presents a clear and present danger that requires urgent techno-managerial re-alignments and a change in the practices of governance and of regulation, also annuls the properly political moment and contributes to what these and other authors have defined as the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical condition. These will be the key themes I shall develop in this contribution. First, I shall explore what might be meant by the ‘properly’ political. In conversation with, and taking my cue from, political philosophers and theorists like Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Claude Lefort, David Crouch, Mustafa Dikeç, Chantalle Mouffe and Peter Hallward, I attempt to theorize and re-centre the political as a key moment in political-ecological processes. What these perspectives share is not only the refusal to accept the social as the foundation of the political, but, more profoundly, the view that the absence of a foundation for the social (or, in other words, the ‘social’ being constitutively split, inherently incoherent, ruptured by all manner of tensions and conflicts) calls into being ‘the political’ as the instituting moment of the social (see, e.g., Marchart, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2007). Put differently, it is through the political that ‘society’ comes into being, achieves a certain coherence and ‘sustainability’. Prioritizing ‘the political’ as the foundational gesture that permits ‘the social’ maintains ‘absolutely the separation of science and politics, of analytic description and political prescription’ (Badiou, quoted in Hallward, 2003a: 394). This is not to say, of course, that politics and science are not enmeshed (on the contrary, they are and increasingly so), but rather that unravelling the science/politics imbroglios (as pursued by, among others, critical sociologies of science, science and technology studies, science-discourse analysis and the like) does not in itself permit opening up either the notion or the terrain of the political. The aim of this article, in contrast, is to recover the notion of the political and of the political polis from the debris of contemporary obsessions with governing, management, urban polic(y)ing and its associated technologies (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997). Second, I shall argue that the particular staging of the environmental problem and its modes of management signals and helps to consolidate a postpolitical condition, one that evacuates the properly political from the plane of immanence that underpins any political intervention. The consolidation of an urban postpolitical arrangement runs, so I argue, parallel to the rise of a neoliberal governmentality that has replaced debate, disagreement and dissensus with a series of technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement, accountancy metrics and technocratic environmental management. In the third part, I maintain that this postpolitical consensual police order revolves decidedly around embracing a populist gesture, one that annuls democracy and must, of necessity, lead to an ultra-politics of violent disavowal, radical closure and, ultimately, to the tyrannies of violence and of foreclosure of any real spaces of engagement. However, the disappearance of the political in a postpolitical arrangement leaves all manner of traces that allow for the resurfacing of the properly political. Indeed, the incoherencies of the contemporary urban ordering, the excesses and the gaps that are left in the interstices of the postpolitical urban order permit thinking through if not materially widening and occupying genuine political urban spaces. This will be the theme of the final section. I shall conclude that re-centring the political is a necessary condition for tackling questions of urban environmental justice and for creating different, but egalibertarian, socio-ecological urban assemblages. In Disagreement, Jacques Rancière revisits the Aristotelian foundations of political theory and considers whether the political can still be thought of in an environment in which a postpolitical consensual policy arrangement has increasingly reduced the ‘political’ to ‘policing’, to ‘policymaking’, to managerial consensual governing. This reduction of the political to the ‘mode of governing’ is particularly prevalent in environmental practices. From the environmental justice movement that urges the elites to rectify environmental ‘wrongs’ on the basis of a Rawlsian equal distribution of goods and bads (see also Beck, 1992), to ecological modernization perspectives that insist on the possibility of a technological-managerial conduct that can marry ecological sustainability with economic ‘progress’ (Harvey, 1996) and the scientific consensus that urges the adoption of a particular set of management and accounting rules to mitigate imminent catastrophic environmental disaster, general agreement exists, shared by a broad range of often unlikely allies, about the need to develop a more sustainable, and just, socio-ecological practice, one that operates fully within the contours of the existing social order (Swyngedouw, 2007a). Rancière's political philosophical mission, in contrast, is to re-centre the ‘political’ as distinct from ‘policy’ (what he calls ‘the police’) and to ask whether the properly political can be thought of and, if so, what constitutes a proper political gesture. Rancière distinguishes between ‘the police’ (le police), ‘the political’ (le politique) and ‘politics’ (la politique). For him, the political ‘turns on equality as its principle’ and is about enunciating dissent and rupture, literally voicing speech that claims a place in the order of things, demanding ‘the part for those who have no-part’ (Rancière, 2001: 6); politics disrupts the police order, ‘a refusal to observe the “place” allocated to people and things (or at least, to particular people and things)’ (Robson, 2005: 5). Indeed, as Dikeç maintains, the central premise of Rancière's politics is ‘the contingency of any established order of governance with its distributions of functions, people, and places’ (Dikeç, 2007: Chapter 2: 3). Politics, then, is the arena where the principle of equality is tested in the face of a wrong experienced by ‘those who have no part’. Equality is thereby axiomatically given and presupposed rather than an idealized-normative condition to move towards (Badiou, 1992; 2005a; Lévy et al., 2007): ‘Everyone can occupy the space of politics, if they decide to so' (Badiou, cited in Hallward, 2003a: 225). In democracy, the place of power is indeed structurally empty (Lefort, 1994) and equality is presupposed. In other words, equality is the very premise upon which a democratic politics is constituted; it opens up the space of the political through the testing of a wrong that subverts equality. Equality is, therefore, not a sociologically verifiable concept or procedure that permits opening a policy arena which will remedy the observed inequalities, but the ontologically given condition of democracy. Justice, from this perspective, disappears from the terrain of the moral and enters the space of the political under the name of equality. For Etienne Balibar (Balibar, 1993), for example, the unconditional premise for justice and emancipation resides in the fusion of equality and liberty (what he names as ‘égaliberté’), the former defined as the absence of discrimination and the latter as absence of repression (Dikeç, 2001). Egaliberté stands, thus, for the universal and collective process of emancipation on which the very promise of political democracy is founded. What is central to Balibar's and Rancière's vision is that neither freedom nor equality are offered, granted or distributed, they can only be conquered. The political, therefore, is not about expressing demands to the elites to rectify injustices, inequalities or unfreedoms, but about the enunciation of the right to égaliberté; the political is thus premised on the unconditionality of equality in a police arrangement that has always already ‘wronged’ the very condition of equality and liberty. Put simply, politics (or a properly political sequence) arises when, in the name of equality, those who are not equally included in the existing socio-political order, demand their ‘right to equality’, a demand that both calls the political into being, renders visible and exposes the ‘wrongs’ of the police order: this is the place and time of politics when the staging and articulation of an egalitarian demand exposes the lack, the superfluous, inscribed in the order of the given situation (Arsenjuk, 2005). This existing order of things or the police order is, in Rancière's words, ‘a partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2001: 8). The police refers to ‘all the activities which create order by distributing places, names, functions’ (Rancière, 1994: 173). It suggests ‘an established order of governance with everyone in their “proper” place in the seemingly natural order of things’ (Dikeç, 2005: 174). The partition of the sensible, the police order, ‘renders visible who can be part of the common in function of what he does, of the times and the space in which this activity is exercised . . . This defines the fact of being visible or not in a common space . . . It is a partitioning of times and spaces, of the visible and the invisible, of voice and noise that defines both the place (location) and the arena of the political as a form of experience’ (Rancière, 2000a: 13–14). The police is ‘not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social’ (Rancière, 2001: 8) and refers to both the activities of the state as well as to the ordering of social relations: The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise (Rancière, 1998: 29). It is important to recognize that ‘the police’ includes a multitude of activities and processes, is full of conflict and tension, never totally closed and embraces not only the traditional notion of the state and state functions and activities, but also the ‘assumed spontaneity of social relations’ (Dikeç, 2007: 18). In sum: The police, therefore, is both a principle of distribution and an apparatus of administration, which relies on a symbolically constituted organization of social space, an organization that becomes the basis of and for governance. Thus, the essence of policing is not repression but distribution — distribution of places, peoples, names, functions, authorities, activities and so on — and the normalization of this distribution (ibid.: 19). It is a rule governing the appearance of bodies, ‘a configuration of occupations and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed’ (Rancière, 1998: 29). As such, the ‘police’ is rather close to Foucault's notion of governmentality, the conduct of conduct, the mode of assigning location, relations and distributions, or what Alain Badiou refers to as ‘the state of the situation’ (Badiou, 2005a). The police order is predicated upon saturation, upon suturing social space: ‘The essence of the police is the principle of saturation; it is a mode of the partition of the sensible that recognizes neither lack nor supplement. As conceived by “the police”, society is a totality compromised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces’ (Rancière, 2000b: 124). Of course, saturation is never realized; a sutured society is impossible as there will always be a constituted lack or surplus (Dikeç, 2005). It is exactly this lack or excess that constitutes the possibility of and that calls the political into being. If the supervision of places and functions is defined as the ‘police’, ‘a proper political sequence begins, then, when this supervision is interrupted so as to allow a properly anarchic disruption of function and place, a sweeping de-classification of speech. The democratic voice is the voice of those who reject the prevailing social distribution of roles, who refuse the way a society shares out power and authority’ (Hallward, 2003b: 192). The proper political act, Rancière maintains, is the voice of ‘floating subjects that deregulate all representations of places and portions’ (Rancière, 1998: 99–100): In the end everything in politics turns on the distribution of spaces. What are these places? How do they function? Why are they there? Who can occupy them? For me, political action always acts upon the social as the litigious distribution of places and roles. It is always a matter of knowing who is qualified to say what a particular place is and what is done to it (Rancière, 2003a: 201). Politics proper arises then when the police order is dislocated, transgressed, ‘when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part’ (Rancière, 1998: 11). ‘Politics in general . . . is about the visibilities of places and abilities of the body in these places, about the partition of public and private spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it. All this is what I call the partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2003b: 3). The political arises when the given order of things is questioned; when those whose voice is only recognized as noise by the police order claim the right to speak, acquire speech. As such, it disrupts the order of being, exposes the constituent antagonisms and voids that constitute the police order and tests the principle of equality. The proper democratic political sequence, therefore, is not one that seeks justice and equality through governmental procedures on the basis of sociologically defined injustice, but rather starts from the paradigmatic condition of equality or égaliberté, one that is ‘wronged’ by the police order. Such procedure brings into being a new symbolic ordering, one that transgresses the limitations of police symbolization. Therefore, a proper environmental politics is one that asserts the principle of equality and justice as its original principle, not as a normative goal; it demands equality in the right to produce proper and properly democratic socio-physical environments. Democratic politics is, therefore, always disruptive and transformative: Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place's destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise (Rancière, 1998: 30). Politics acts on the police (ibid.: 33) . . . revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time (Rancière, 2006: 13). The space of the political is to ‘disturb this arrangement [the police] by supplementing it with a part of the no-part identified with the community as a whole’ (Rancière, 2001). And, of course, politics is about the production of spaces, the making of environments and the recognition of the principle of dissensus as the proper base for politics. As Rancière attests: The principle function of politics is the configuration of its proper space. It is to disclose the world of its subjects and its operations. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in one’ (ibid.: Thesis 8). It occurs when there is a place and a way for the meeting of the police process with the process of equality (Rancière, 1998: 30). Politics has, therefore, no specific place: ‘Politics “takes place” in the space of the police, by rephrasing and restaging social issues, police problems and so on’ (Rancière, 2003c: 7); it is the disruption of the police order. It can arise anywhere and everywhere. [S]pace becomes political in that it . . . becomes an integral element of the interruption of the ‘natural’ (or, better yet, naturalized) order of domination through the constitution of a place of encounter by those that have no part in that order. The political, in this account, is signaled by this encounter as a moment of interruption, and not by the mere presence of power relations and competing interests (Dikeç, 2005: 172).

### 2

A. Resolved means to make a firm decision

[Allwords.com](http://Allwords.com/) 2003

http://www.allwords.com/query.php?SearchType=3&Keyword=Resolved&goquery=Find+it%21&Language=ENG

1. To decide firmly or to determine to do it.

Form: resolve on something (usually)

Form: resolve to do something

#### that’s allwords.com 3

#### B. They are not a firm decision, they don’t specify which branch or branches of the federal government enact the plan. Cross examination or 2AC clarification is Inadequate. The plan text is the only clear statement, it’s crucial to pre-round preparation and negative strategizing.

#### C. Voting Issue

1. Ground & Clash: They destroy our ability to run solvency arguments and disads to actions by particular branches. Lack of specification means they can permute away agent counterplans.

2. Debatability: The desirability of a specific course of action depends on who is enacting it. A policy which might be desirable if undertaken by the President might be undesirable if undertaken by Congress.

3. Allows Affirmative Conditionality: Allowing the aff multiple potential agents is in effect allowing them multiple plans.

### 3

#### Obama pushing immigration reform first even with fiscal issues and it will pass – GOP electoral incentives

Stien and Foley 1/2/13 (\*Sam, Political Reporter at the Huffington Post, based in Washington, D.C. Previously he has worked for Newsweek magazine, the New York Daily News and the investigative journalism group Center for Public Integrity. He has a masters from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and is a graduate of Dartmouth College, \*Elise, reporter for the Huffington Post in Washington,

D.C. She previously worked at The Washington Independent., “Obama's Immigration Reform Push To Begin This Month” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform_n_2398507.html>)

WASHINGTON -- Despite a bruising fiscal cliff battle that managed to set the stage for an even more heated showdown that will likely take place in a matter of months, President Barack Obama is planning to move full steam ahead with the rest of his domestic policy agenda. An Obama administration official said the president plans to push for immigration reform this January. The official, who spoke about legislative plans only on condition of anonymity, said that coming standoffs over deficit reduction are unlikely to drain momentum from other priorities. The White House plans to push forward quickly, not just on immigration reform but gun control laws as well. The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit. With those bitter battles ahead, the possibility of passing other complicated legislation would seem diminished. "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," said a Senate Democratic aide, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking -- with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill." It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push. Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said. Advocates have vowed to keep pushing for reform. As part of their efforts, they plan to remind Republican members of Congress about their presidential nominee's defeat among Latino and Asian voters, a majority of whom support a fix to the immigration system. "They can procrastinate as long as they want, but they're going to have a serious day of reckoning next election cycle," said Angela Kelley, vice president for immigration policy and advocacy at the Center for American Progress. "We're going to have a lot of near-death experiences with this issue, but I'm pretty confident it's never going to go completely to a flatline." Good news for immigration advocates may have come Tuesday night, when Boehner broke the so-called "Hastert Rule" and allowed the fiscal cliff bill to come for a vote without support from a majority of his Republican conference. Given opposition to immigration reform by many Tea Party Republicans, the proof that Boehner is willing to bypass them on major legislation is a good sign, the Democratic aide said. "If something is of such importance that the GOP establishment [is] telling Boehner, 'You must do this. You need to get this off the table soon,'" the Democratic aide said, the speaker could break the Hastert Rule again. "He already did it with this fiscal issue, so I would not be surprised if when it came down to it he puts up a bill that he just allows to go through with a combination of Democratic and Republican votes, without worrying about a majority of the majority," the aide continued. Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-immigration reform group America's Voice, also said he thinks the House could pass an immigration bill in the same way it did last night, relying on support from both parties. He's hopeful that the fiscal cliff fight could even make them happy to work out legislation in a more standard way. "I never thought I'd say this, but after bruising battles over the future of the American and world economy, the chance to legislate through regular order on immigration reform might have leaders in both parties working together and singing 'Kumbaya,'" Sharry said.

#### Plan drains capital

Morgan Stanley 11/7/12 (“Post-2012 Election Look At Lame-Duck Session and 2013” http://www.morganstanleyfa.com/public/projectfiles/697ac6e3-64d3-4f8e-a026-2c81e2149e95.pdf)

With an “all of the above” strategy for achieving energy independence, Congress and the administration could move forward on policy that seeks expanded domestic energy production focused on all energy related resources, from conventional sources such as oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear power, to renewable sources focused on wind, solar, geothermal, and other renewable energy projects. At the same time, achieving consensus will remain difficult. Wide ideological differences still exist, especially regarding the efficacy of focusing resources on the development of renewable versus traditional energy sources. Moreover, related issues such as the exportation of domestic energy sources, clean energy standards for utilities, and overall environmental protection will remain as obstacles to the success of any energy-related legislative effort.

#### Obama’s political capital is key to reform passage

Dade 12/7/12 (Corey, staffwriter for NPR, “Black, Latino Groups: It's Our Turn, Mr. President” <http://www.npr.org/2012/12/05/166573082/black-latino-groups-its-our-turn-mr-president>)

Spending 'Political Capital' For Latinos, the November election has sparked momentum for their top issue, immigration. Congressional Republicans have since embraced immigration reform as a priority. Bipartisan talks are under way in the House on legislation that could be introduced early next year. Obama has said Congress should "seize the moment," yet Latino leaders insist that voters have given the president a mandate to lead the effort. Some Latino leaders believe Obama should have fought more aggressively to push the DREAM Act through Congress in 2010. (The bill would have established a path to citizenship for young people brought to the United States as children who attend college or serve in the military.) Latinos also criticized the Obama administration, before it changed its policy, for deporting a record 1.1 million people in three years. "Not only the president but others have said in the past, 'How much political capital do we need to spend on this issue?' Everybody understands now that you need to spend all of it," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill. "With the same vigor and energy that Latino people voted for this president, he should do this."

#### Immigration reform key to solve clean tech U.S.-China co-operation – fosters business relationships

Herman, “why immigrants can drive the green economy” 2010

Raymond Spencer, an Australian-born entrepreneur based in Chicago, has a window on the future--and a gusto for investing after founding a high-technology consulting company that sold for more than $1 billion in 2006. "I have investments in maybe 10 start-ups, all of which fall within a broad umbrella of a 'green' theme," he said. "And it's interesting, the vast majority are either led by immigrants or have key technical people who are immigrants." It should come as no surprise that immigrants will help drive the green revolution. America's young scientists and engineers, especially the ones drawn to emerging industries like alternative energy, tend to speak with an accent. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Nearly 70 percent of the men and women who entered the fields of science and engineering from 1995 to 2006 were immigrants. Yet, the connection between immigration and the development and commercialization of alternative energy technology is rarely discussed. Policymakers envision millions of new jobs as the nation pursues renewable energy sources, like wind and solar power, and builds a smart grid to tap it. But Dan Arvizu, the leading expert on solar power and the director of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy in Golden, Colorado, warns that much of the clean-technology talent lies overseas, in nations that began pursuing alternative energy sources decades ago. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Expanding our own clean-tech industry will require working closely with foreign nations and foreign-born scientists, he said. Immigration restrictions are making collaboration difficult. His lab's efforts to work with a Chinese energy lab, for example, were stalled due to U.S. immigration barriers. "We can't get researchers over here," Arvizu, the son of a once-undocumented immigrant from Mexico, said in an interview in March 2009, his voice tinged with dismay. "It makes no sense to me. We need a much more enlightened approach." Dr. Zhao Gang, the Vice Director of the Renewable Energy and New Energy International Cooperation Planning Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology in China, says that America needs that enlightenment fast. "The Chinese government continues to impress upon the Obama administration that immigration restrictions are creating major impediments to U.S.-China collaboration on clean energy development," he said during a recent speech in Cleveland. So what's the problem? Some of it can be attributed to national security restrictions that impede international collaboration on clean energy. But Arvizu places greater weight on immigration barriers, suggesting that national secrecy is less important in the fast-paced world of green-tech development. "We are innovating so fast here, what we do today is often outdated tomorrow. Finding solutions to alternative energy is a complex, global problem that requires global teamwork," he said.

#### Key to solve reactionary Chinese oil policy – destabilizes Asia.

Herberg 2010

Mikkal E, Senior Research Fellow for International Energy Pacific Council on International Policy, China’s “Energy Rise”, the U.S., and the New Geopolitics of Energy http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=159

Beijing’s sense of weakness and vulnerability has fueled this “go-out” policy and has been very much about ownership and physical control of barrels rather than just access. Mistrust of global energy markets remains deeply ingrained amid a concern that the market alone cannot be counted on to provide reliable oil supplies at reasonable prices. This is reinforced by the belief that these markets are dominated by the U.S., which is out to exploit China’s energy weakness in its efforts to ‘contain’ China. U.S. strategic power in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy’s control over critical energy transport sea lanes, and what is perceived to be the power of the U.S. in the global oil industry and institutions, foster a perception in Beijing that the U.S. exerts a dominating influence on global oil prices and flows. Strident rhetoric in the U.S. during the 2005 CNOOC-Unocal episode reinforced the perception that the U.S. seeks to undermine China’s access to secure supplies and that it sees energy as an arena of strategic competition. All these factors have combined to give a strongly mercantilist impulse to China’s energy security drive and rhetoric and a decidedly strategic approach that has fueled a sharpening image of China Energy Inc. among other major oil importing countries and the oil industry. Regional or multilateral approaches to energy security based on collaboration to ensure open access to oil supplies, boosting investment in new oil supplies, and regional or multilateral cooperation on sharing emergency oil stocks, for example, have been low on Beijing’s agenda. All these attributes have contributed to a more politicized, competitive, and zerosum environment towards control over energy supplies, particularly in Asia where the atmosphere of competition over control of oil supplies is reinforcing strategic rivalries among China, Japan, India, and South Korea. In fairness, other Asian oil importers, as well as the U.S., have strongly fueled and fed this atmosphere of energy nationalism. The U.S. has contributed to this atmosphere with the constant drumbeat of nationalistic rhetoric coming from Congress, the Pentagon, and conservative think tanks about China’s energy strategy. Japan, India, and South Korea have all stepped up their energy diplomacy, rhetoric, and support for the national oil companies and have sharply raised their targets for acquiring “equity” oil.

#### Most likely scenario for nuclear escalation

Nye et al., Professor @ Harvard, 2K

[Joseph S. Nye, Professor Emeritus @ The John F. Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard University, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard L. Armitage, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Michael J. Green, Advisor & Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Associate Professor @ The Walsh School of Foreign Service, Kurt M. Campbell, Fellow @ The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Frank Jannuzi, Minority Staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Edward J. Lincoln, Fellow @ The Brookings Institution, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” The Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 11th 2000, http://homepage2.nifty.com/moru/lib/nichibei-anpo/pdf/INSS%20Special%20Report.pdf]

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy.

### 4

#### Text

#### The United States Federal Government should increase restrictions on natural gas production by increasing the minimum bond amount to $60,000 per lease. The United States federal government should allow increased production on Outer Continental Shelf for producers that meet the bond requirement.

Increased bonding requirements for natural gas production essential to reducing risk of environmental catastrophe

Davis-Professor of Economic Analysis, Berkeley-6/12

Modernizing Bonding Requirements for Natural Gas Producers

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20bonds%20davis/06\_bonds\_davis

Hydraulic fracturing and other recent technological advances have dramatically increased the availability of natural gas. After peaking in 2008, U.S. natural gas prices have fallen dramatically and industry analysts are forecasting that prices will remain low for the next several decades. This increase in the supply of natural gas has broad implications for energy markets in the United States and abroad. Energy is a key input in virtually all sectors of the economy, and inexpensive natural gas is good for growth. Natural gas is also less carbon-intensive than other fossil fuels, leading some to describe the fuel as the “blue bridge to a green future.” At the same time, these new forms of natural gas production raise a number of potential environmental concerns. Hydraulic fracturing requires injecting large quantities of water, sand, and chemicals at high pressure into horizontally drilled wells. Environmental groups are concerned, in particular, about potential contamination of groundwater and about the increased scope for large-volume surface spills. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other organizations are working to better understand the potential risks to human health and the environment, but it will be years before comprehensive analyses are available. Although the scope for environmental damages is still poorly understood, it is not too early to examine the incentives produced by current policies. Currently, misaligned incentives lead natural gas producers to underinvest in environmental protection. Revenues from drilling are realized immediately. Environmental damages, however, may not become evident immediately. And by the time damages are well understood, producers may no longer exist or may no longer have the resources to finance necessary cleanups or to compensate those who have been affected. The tort system is designed to recover damages in these cases. However, bankruptcy laws limit producers’ liability significantly. This is particularly true with natural gas producers because the industry is composed primarily of small and medium-sized companies. In the United States there are hundreds of natural gas producers, none with more than a small share of the total market. Consequently, the tort system does not work as well as a deterrent as it does in many other industries. Policymakers have long been aware of this misalignment of incentives. Since the 1920s, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has required that natural gas producers operating on public lands post a bond prior to drilling. Many states have bonding requirements that exceed the minimum federal requirements. These funds are used to clean up sites when accidents occur, and to guarantee that the producer adequately reclaims the drilling site after production is completed. This approach makes sense, but current requirements are unreasonably low to counter these risks. The current minimum bond amount—$10,000 per lease—was set in 1960 and has never been updated for inflation. This amount is not enough to pay even for routine site reclamation expenses. One of the aims of this proposal is to increase the minimum bond amount to $60,000 per lease to adjust for inflation. This minimum bond amount would be indexed permanently to inflation, preventing the real value of bonds from eroding over time. States would, of course, continue to be able to impose bonding requirements that exceed the federal minimum. Additional evidence supports further increasing minimum bond amounts above that implied by the inflation adjustment. Advanced drilling techniques involve larger and riskier drilling operations than the shallow vertical wells for which the legislation was originally designed. And the large quantity of chemically treated water used in hydraulic fracturing introduces new risks that are simply not present in traditional drilling. Determining the correct minimum bond amount is a challenging problem. Presently, the empirical evidence on potential environmental damages is extremely limited, and as better information becomes available, it will be important to revisit these minimum bond amounts with a view toward further increases. This proposal would also eliminate provisions that allow companies to meet their bonding requirements by posting a single “blanket” bond. These provisions decrease significantly the average bond amount per well, and have often led to situations in which the available bond was insufficient to pay for necessary cleanups at multiple sites. This is particularly problematic for old wells. Natural gas production declines quickly after a well is first constructed, but most wells continue to produce at least a small amount for many years or even decades. It is important to ensure that funds are available to reclaim these sites even if the original drilling companies have long since disappeared. Bonding requirements effectively complement traditional regulation by ensuring that standards are followed, even when it is impossible to assign regulators on the ground at all drilling sites. Bonding is particularly well-suited for addressing low probability, high-cost environmental risks such as surface spills and blowouts. For other types of environmental concerns such as local pollutants from road traffic and methane emissions, policymakers should continue to focus on traditional regulation as the primary policy tool. Strengthening bonding requirements would help motivate producers to work hard to avoid environmental damages. A producer that makes choices that minimize risks to the environment gets this bond back with interest. A producer that makes choices that lead to environmental damages does not. This is a market-based solution for a market failure—a balanced approach that supports the continued growth of this valuable energy resource, while also forcing producers to become responsible for their choices and how they impact the environment.

#### Extinction

Diner 94[Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps of US Army, David N., Military Law Review, Winter, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161]

No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death -- extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a single-minded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [\*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [\*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### 5

#### The United States federal government should not export any natural gas.

#### Counter plan is exclusive with the aff and resolves all of their inevitability arguments- net benefits are on case.

### Solvency

Offshore drilling fails – only 3 percent increase

Plumer 12 (Brad Plumer “Romney would open federal lands to drilling. How much oil and gas is there?” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/08/25/romney-would-open-federal-lands-to-drilling-how-much-oil-and-gas-is-there/)

The three columns on the left show all of the undiscovered oil and gas that’s estimated to exist on federal lands and waters that are currently available for drilling. The middle four columns show oil and gas resources on lands that a Romney administration could open up fairly easily. And the two columns on the right show oil and gas resources that would have to be opened up by Congress. The basic takeaway here is that the vast majority of oil and gas on federal lands is already available for leasing, particularly in the waters off Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico. There’s certainly room to open up further federal lands, but the additional resources appear to be fairly modest in comparison. For instance, opening up the rest of the Outer Continental Shelf to drilling would boost offshore oil and gas production in federal waters by just 3 percent in 2035. Now, CBO does list some caveats here. For one, these are just estimates of how much oil actually exists. “It is important to note,” the CBO adds, “that any projection that involves geologic resources is inherently uncertain.” Some of these areas may turn out to be too expensive or geologically difficult to produce. (Many of the Gulf of Mexico resources are in ultra-deep waters that remain technologically daunting.) Other areas may turn out to have larger resources than expected. But there are also political uncertainties. Even if a Romney administration opened up the Outer Continental Shelf, states such as California might not allow leasing regardless. What’s more, the CBO only looked at revenue for the next decade. But if, say, Congress opened up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge for leasing next year (and that’s not likely), oil production wouldn’t ramp up for at least a decade. Between 2023-2035, drilling in ANWR might provide the federal government with an additional $2 billion to $4 billion per year in revenue, depending on how the royalties were split with Alaska. But this would still be less than one-sixth of the oil and gas revenue the government was getting from other federal lands. Now, as always, there are all sorts of other issues involved in opening up these lands and waters. Many politicians in Florida are opposed to opening up the Eastern Gulf of Mexico for drilling because of the risk that oil spills that could tarnish their valuable beaches. And environmentalists are against opening up ANWR because drilling could threaten the fragile ecosystem there. The CBO report doesn’t get into any of that. Mostly it just tries to offer a sense of how much oil and gas is actually in the areas being discussed.

#### States will block it

EIA 01

(U.S. Natural Gas Markets: Mid-Term Prospects for Natural Gas Supply, Dec,

http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/natgas/chapter2.html)

Even if the Federal moratoria were lifted and offshore leasing activity resumed in Federal waters, States and nongovernmental entities in opposition to offshore oil and gas development could use other legal means to preclude or at least limit the extent of Federal offshore oil and gas exploration and production. Although the States and local governments can not directly prohibit the physical development of offshore oil and gas resources in Federal waters, it would be possible to make their development considerably more expensive. A primary method for accomplishing this would be to preclude or limit the development of oil and gas infrastructure within the jurisdiction of the State and local governments by use of restrictive zoning. The oil and gas infrastructure necessary to develop Federal offshore energy resources include many elements, such as harbor facilities, onshore separation and treatment plants, oil refineries, and pipelines for transporting the crude oil and natural gas onshore. For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that local infrastructure issues and other potential non-Federal impediments would be overcome if Federal access restrictions were lifted, and that oil and gas development would proceed at rates similar to those seen in the early development of currently accessible areas.

### Warming

#### Icecore extractions prove warming is fake

Idso 11 (Craig D. Idso, Ph.D. (cidso@co2science.org), is lead author of Climate Change Reconsidered, published by the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). An earlier version of this article appeared on the NIPCC Web site. Subscriptions to the NIPCC email distribution list are free of charge and can be ordered at <http://www.nipccreport.org/about/emailsignupform.html>. “ Arctic Study Finds No Recent Warming” <http://www.heartland.org/full/29549/Arctic_Study_Finds_No_Recent_Warming.html>)

Climate alarmists contend the earth's near-surface air temperatures of the past decade were unprecedentedly high relative to the warmth of the entire past millennium, due primarily to human carbon dioxide emissions. They also claim this warming has been most strongly expressed throughout the Arctic, which they often describe as the planet's "canary in a coal mine," for the planet as a whole. Working with an ice core that retrieved from the Akademii Nauk (AN) ice cap (~80°31'N, 94°49'E) of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago (which is located in the central Russian Arctic between the Kara and Laptev Seas), scientists used oxygen isotopes to reconstruct temperatures covering the period 1883-1998. After confirming “good correlations and similarities” between their oxygen isotope data and 15 temperature stations distributed throughout the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic, the scientists reported the oxygen isotope data “show pronounced 20th-century temperature changes, with a strong rise about 1920 and the absolute temperature maximum in the 1930s," the scientists reported. Accordingly, **the data show there was no net warming of the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic over the entire last 80 years of the 20th century**. The findings, published in the peer-reviewed *Journal of Glaciology*, cast doubt on alarmist assertions of alarming recent global temperature rise given the Arctic is expected to be the first place on the planet to exhibit anthropogenic-induced global warming, and is expected to exhibit that warming more strongly than other regions of the globe.

#### they can keep up current production and prices, their evidence is industry drama, well productivity and less bottlenecks prove

Zeits, citing the EIA, 9/3 (Richard Zeits is an Energy industry consultant and investment analyst. His background includes fourteen years as investment banker, portfolio manager and senior investment analyst with bulge bracket firms in New York. Zeits Energy Analytics provide custom industry research, market intelligence, investment analyses and transaction advisory services to investment professionals and industry practitioners. “Latest EIA Data Shows Resilient U.S. Natural Gas Production” http://seekingalpha.com/article/842541-latest-eia-data-shows-resilient-u-s-natural-gas-production)

On Friday, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) released natural gas production statistics for the month of June and revised statistics for May. The report will again disappoint those analysts and industry insiders who have predicted an imminent drop off in US natural gas supply in response to the dramatic decline in gas prices during the first half of the year. In defiance of the sub-$2 NYMEX natural gas lows registered in April and continued steep decline in gas-directed rig count, the Lower 48 States' natural gas production remained essentially unchanged in May and June. The Lower 48 production declined in June from May by an almost negligible 0.18 Bcf/d or 0.2%. The production shut-ins in the Gulf of Mexico due to Tropical Storm Debby largely accounted for the decline. The revised May data shows a slight increase in production from April. The Lower 48 natural gas production remained essentially flat from November last year through June (the latest data available). I argued in my earlier note that the natural gas industry is producing at levels exceeding demand, which is manifest in the strong build-up of storage levels and very high backlog of drilled wells waiting on completion or pipeline connection. The flat production figures indicate that the supply/demand balance was still not achieved in June, despite the highly unattractive economics of the dry gas drilling. The report highlights the continued trend of the Marcellus shale production gradually displacing volumes from less economic regions. The Other States gross withdrawals (the key growth behind which is the Marcellus shale) increased by a remarkable 1.9 Bcf/d during the seven-month period from November last year to June this year. The June numbers indicate that the growth trend continued unabated (Other States gross withdrawals increased by 120 MMcf/d in June and 400 MMcf/d in May).What may come as a surprise is the distinct decline trend in the Wyoming production (which includes the prolific Pinedale and Jonah fields). The Pinedale has been broadly perceived in the industry and among investors as one of the lowest cost fields in the United States. Recent decisions by Ultra Petroleum Corp. (UPL), one of the larger operators in the Pinedale, to significantly reduce its completions activity in the Pinedale may cast doubt on the cost of supply economics from the field relative to other regions. A month ago, I argued in several of my notes that the strong drop off in the natural gas rig count does not readily translate in the decline in the natural gas production. Several factors are contributing: A significant backlog of curtailed or shut in production from earlier in the year that will need to find its way to the market once the injection season is over. Two companies alone, Chesapeake Energy Corporation (CHK) and Encana Corporation (ECA), had estimated combined gross operated production of 1.3-1.4 Bcf/d shut in or curtailed during the first half of the year. Chesapeake has guided that it intends to reverse its production curtailments during the next two quarters, which should lead to its natural gas production peaking before the end of the year at a level that is 12% higher than the company's average production during Q2. A significant inventory of wells waiting on completions or pipeline connections. Some of the backlog is explained by the infrastructure constraints in the growing producing areas such as the Marcellus and the Eagle Ford. As the bottlenecks are being resolved, the backlog wells will gradually come online. Most notably, the excess well inventory also reflects deliberate decisions by operators to defer well completions and tie-ins until the expected price recovery in the second half of the year, effectively creating "rig-independent" supply. Improving well performance and rig productivity. As operators focus on drilling only the very best dry gas wells due to the depressed price environment, production per rig is increasing. Productivity gains from the high-graded rig fleet and pad drilling are another important contributing factor. Rapid growth of liquids-rich and associated gas volumes. The rate of growth from this important source of natural gas supply appears to be underestimated by many Wall Street analysts and industry insiders, same way the volume growth from the Haynesville shale and the Marcellus shale was grossly underestimated just two or three years ago. Looking forward, all these factors will contribute to a delayed and shallower decline in the US natural gas production than may appear. As a result, natural gas prices will likely remain vulnerable to corrections until the massive production backlog from various sources is absorbed. These fundamentals have implications for natural gas producer stocks that as a group appear to price in a meaningful recovery in natural gas prices. While in the longer run a return to more economic natural gas price levels is inevitable, the recovery may not be as imminent as often predicted. This fundamental dynamic is most relevant to stocks with natural gas focus and high financial leverage.

#### They have to replace virtually every coal plant in the globe- and this card is from 2009

Kirsch ‘9 (Steve Kirsch, Entrepreneur and philanthropist, “Climate Bill Ignores Our Biggest Clean Energy Source”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-kirsch/climate-bill-ignores-our_b_221796.html>, June 27, 2009)

Do you think our country's energy policy is in good hands now that the American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) climate bill has passed the House? I'm very worried and I think you should be too. Experts fret about balancing energy, environment, and the economy. But there is a way to have all three at the same time if we are willing to take a fresh look at an old technology. And that great solution is nowhere to be found in the ACES bill. First, let's start by assuming science of global warming is correct. We'll see later that we'd want to do exactly the same thing even if we didn't believe in global warming at all. To stop global warming, we must virtually eliminate the use of coal worldwide Dr. James Hansen, one of our nation's leading experts on global warming, is very clear about the necessary attributes of any solution: we must stop building new coal plants immediately and start retiring existing coal plants worldwide. If we cannot virtually eliminate coal worldwide within a couple of decades, then the sum total of all of our other efforts to reduce our carbon footprint will be about as effective as rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

No extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### No impact – recent data proves CO2 escapes

Taylor 11 (James, is a senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News. “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/>)

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict.

Exporting LNG increases emissions and causes catastrophic warming and extinction

Romm 12 (Joe Romm – PhD from MIT, Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, previously assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy. “Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Is Bad For The Climate,” Jun 18, 2012 <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/06/18/500954/exporting-liquefied-natural-gas-lng-is-bad-for-the-climate/>)

The surge in U.S. production of shale gas is creating a surge in permit requests to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. That’s because the glut of U.S. gas has dropped domestic prices sharply below global price levels. But if avoiding catastrophic climate change is your goal, then spending huge sums on even conventional natural gas infrastructure is not the answer, as a recent International Energy Agency report made clear: The speciﬁc emissions from a gas-ﬁred power plant will be higher than average global CO2 intensity in electricity generation by 2025, raising questions around the long-term viability of some gas infrastructure investment if climate change objectives are to be met. And liquefying natural gas is an energy intensive and leaky process. When you factor in shipping overseas, you get an energy penalty of 20% or more. The extra greenhouse gas emissions can equal 30% or more of combustion emissions, according to a 2009 Reference Report by the Joint Research Centreof the European Commission, Liquefied Natural Gas for Europe – Some Important Issues for Consideration. Such extra emissions all but eliminate whatever small, short-term benefit there might be of building billion-dollar export terminals and other LNG infrastructure, which in any case will last many decades, long after the electric grid will not benefit from replacing coal with gas. Furthermore, the U.S. Energy Information Administration concluded in a 2012 report on natural gas exports done for DOE’s Office of Fossil Energy that such exports would also increase domestic greenhouse gas emissions: [W]hen also accounting for emissions related to natural gas used in the liquefaction process, additional exports increase CO2 levels under all cases and export scenarios, particularly in the earlier years of the projection period. Asserting any net benefit for the importer requires assuming the new gas replaces only coal — and isn’t used for, say, natural gas vehicles, which are worse for the climate or that it doesn’t replace new renewables. If even a modest fraction of the imported LNG displaces renewables, it renders the entire expenditure for LNG counterproductive from day one. Remember, a major new 2012 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences study on “technology warming potentials” (TWPs) found that a big switch from coal to gas would only reduce TWP by about 25% over the first three decades (see “Natural Gas Is A Bridge To Nowhere Absent A Carbon Price AND Strong Standards To Reduce Methane Leakage“). And that is based on “EPA’s latest estimate of the amount of CH4 released because of leaks and venting in the natural gas network between production wells and the local distribution network” of 2.4%. Many experts believe the leakage rate is higher than 2.4%, particularly for shale gas. Also, recent air sampling by NOAA over Colorado found 4% methane leakage, more than double industry claims. A different 2012 study by climatologist Ken Caldeira and tech guru Nathan Myhrvold finds basically no benefit in the switch whatsoever — see You Can’t Slow Projected Warming With Gas, You Need ‘Rapid and Massive Deployment’ of Zero-Carbon Power. So spending vast sums of money to export natural gas from this country is a bad idea for the climate. A new paper published last week by Brooking’s Hamilton Project, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” asserts a different conclusion, primarily because it ignores all of the issues discussed above. Indeed, the paper rather amazingly asserts “Natural gas, though, has the same climate consequences whether it is burned in the United States, Europe, or Asia,” which would be true for exported U.S. gas only if we could use magic to take the U.S. shale gas and put it into European or Asian gas-fired power plants. In the real world, it takes a massive amount of energy and greenhouse gas emissions to get gas from here to those markets, as is well known in the climate policy arena. BOTTOM LINE: Investing billions of dollars in new shale gas infrastructure for domestic use is, at best, of limited value for a short period of time if we put in place both a CO2 price and regulations to minimize methane leakage. Exporting gas vitiates even that limited value and so investing billions in LNG infrastructure is, at best, a waste of resources better utilized for deploying truly low-carbon energy. At worst, it helps accelerates the world past the 2°C warming threshold into Terra incognita — a planet of amplifying feedbacks and multiple simultaneous catastrophic impacts.

**Takes a decade to scale up exports**

**Romm, 12** – Climate Progress editor, Ph.D. in physics from MIT

(Joe, American Progress fellow, former acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy, "Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Is Still Bad For The Climate — And A Very Poor Long-Term Investment," Think Progress, 8-16-12, thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/16/699601/exporting-liquefied-natural-gas-lng-bad-for-climate-poor-long-term-investment/?mobile=nc, accessed 8-16-12, mss)

The NY Times piece actually makes this odd argument on behalf of LNG exports: “It will take **years** before any export terminals are up and running — in the meantime, producers and regulators should strengthen safeguards so that gas is extracted safely.” But this is yet another reason why LNG exports make no sense. Why would we want to start massive exports of natural gas around the **end of this decade**, with costly new infrastructure that until mid-century?

#### The aff can’t solve exports because of trade barriers

Dlouhy 7/16/12 (Jennifer A., staffwriter, “Natural gas glut a dilemma for Obama” http://www.chron.com/business/article/Natural-gas-glut-a-dilemma-for-Obama-3706576.php)

WASHINGTON - The drilling boom that has led to a glut of natural gas and sent prices to 10-year lows is causing a quandary for the Obama administration, which is struggling to decide whether - and how much - the U.S. should share the bounty with foreign countries. Although the Energy Department recently approved Houston-based Cheniere Energy's plans to begin exporting liquefied natural gas from its Sabine Pass terminal in southwest Louisiana, the government has put off verdicts on similar applications from at least seven other companies. Administration officials say they'll make those decisions after they get the results of a study commissioned by the Energy Department on how allowing companies to sell U.S.-produced natural gas overseas would affect prices for American consumers. The study is due out this summer. "We want analysis to drive decisions," White House energy adviser Heather Zichal said at a recent forum. The administration supports domestic natural gas and isn't opposed to exports, she said, but also is committed to "protecting American consumers and making sure we're sending the right signal to industry and the manufacturing sector." The dilemma is politically treacherous in an election year and struggling economy. Although the United States already exports some natural gas - mostly by pipelines to Mexico and Canada - the flurry of proposals to liquefy natural gas for tanker shipment and sell it to foreign consumers would mean a big jump in exports. Applications filed with the Energy Department could put the United States on track to export about 16 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas each day - nearly a quarter of U.S. daily production in 2011. But few expect all of those proposals to win federal approval, and it could be years before construction is finished on even those projects that win the green light. Experts at IHS CERA say the realistic potential market for exports from the U.S. and Canada is 4 billion to 5 billion cubic feet per day by 2020. An Energy Information Administration report released in January concluded that exporting natural gas would cause prices to climb in the U.S. According to the agency, consumers' electricity bills would increase by 1 percent to 3 percent from 2015 to 2035 and industrial prices would climb 9 percent to 28 percent. Unlike crude, which is a globally traded commodity, natural gas is traded on non-integrated markets, resulting in huge price variations in different places. The prospect of selling natural gas in Asian and European markets at five times its price in the U.S. is enough to make most domestic producers giddy. Energy companies and analysts have argued that current U.S. natural gas prices are unsustainable. It closed Friday at $2.874 per million British thermal units in trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The opposing argument is that exports could cause prices to spike, sending electricity bills upward and jeopardizing a resurgence in domestic manufacturing tied to abundant, cheap natural gas. Manufacturers that use natural gas to fuel their plants and as a building block to make other products were hit hard over the past two decades by volatile swings in prices, which last peaked over $15 in 2005. Because any position risks alienating important constituencies - energy producers and manufacturers as well as voters - few elected officials are pushing the issue.

### Exports

#### US exports undercut Israel – lock in.

Wurmser and Baron 2012

David Wurmser, Ph.D. was a senior advisor on the Middle East to Cheney, Jonathan M. Baron held senior staff positions with members of the congressional leadership and is the founder and president of Baron Public Affairs, Israel's Strategic Energy Opportunity Calls For Exports, September 27 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/09/27/israels-strategic-energy-opportunity-calls-for-exports/

Third, Israel’s offshore natural gas represents a strategically vital resource that must be exploited with great care. Aspects of the Levant Basin in the equivalent of Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone present challenging geology in deep water. Limiting exports risks restricting interested parties to less proven operators, as more experienced international companies prioritize competing opportunities in Asia, Africa, and other regions offering superior terms. The unintended result could be a higher rate of production accidents, with devastating consequences for both near-term development and the public confidence required for a stable and constructive tax and regulatory framework. Fourth, an informed debate should recognize the possibility that a decision now to restrict exports could be difficult to reverse. Natural gas supply agreements often are measured in decades, and the world may be entering an extended period of increased natural gas production. Several trends – U.S. exports of unconventional natural gas, the application of the same unconventional natural gas production techniques to China, and the major offshore discoveries referenced above – mean that a delay in bringing exports to market could find Israel in a world where the supply requirements of energy importers have been met. This fate would undermine the rational for additional private-sector investment, resulting in fewer discoveries and smaller total proven reserves. To be certain, Israel’s natural gas export policy must provide a supply buffer that accounts for the country’s demanding energy security requirements. One approach would peg the reserve volume to the time required in an emergency to transition the economy from natural gas to a substitute fuel. Under this policy, a strategic reserve equivalent to approximately 10-to-12 years of demand would be adequate in the unlikely event Israel were forced to make such a shift. As Israel’s natural gas consumption grows, the total volume that accounts for the 10-to-12 years of demand would increase accordingly. Rather than basing the volume of reserves on an arbitrary time horizon, this concept would mitigate risk without driving away the investment Israel needs to leverage the enormous promise of abundant offshore energy. The government of Israel bears a heavy responsibility in designing a natural resource strategy that safeguards the nation’s energy security in the coming decades. Natural gas export levels that allow producers to achieve attractive returns would increase the abundance and reliability of supply, as well as help unlock considerable macroeconomic and geopolitical advantages.

#### Exports are key to Israeli energy security and Greek EEZ. Solves Cyprus war.

Beranek 2011

Martin, FrontPageMag columnist and former engineer, Israel’s Energy Future, December 20 2011 http://frontpagemag.com/2011/martin-beranek/israels-energy-future/2/

Energy has always been the weak link in Israel’s thriving economy. Decades of digging and drilling yielded practically no hydrocarbons at all. Israel was forced to spend 5% of its GDP buying fuel from suppliers that did not have its interests at heart, and were often unreliable. At one point for instance, Israel purchased 40% of its natural gas from Egypt. But the pipeline across the Sinai has been bombed so many times there was often not enough time between explosions to get the gas flowing again. Post-Mubarak Egypt desperately needs the money to replace lost tourism revenue, but hatred of Israel trumps all. The first brightening of this bleak picture came in 1998, when offshore drilling in Israel’s Mediterranean waters got under way. In 2000, a consortium led by Noble Energy of Houston struck commercial quantities of natural gas off the southern coast, west of Ashdod. By 2004, the Mari B field was in full production, with reserves of nearly 1 trillion cubic feet of gas. This remains the only currently producing offshore well in Israel. But Noble Energy was convinced there must be bigger reserves waiting in deeper waters, and in 2009, diligent exploration paid off in a big way. The Tamar field, with 9 trillion cubic feet of gas, was the biggest offshore gas field found anywhere in the world that year. And the next year, Noble Energy struck it even richer with the 16 trillion cubic foot Leviathan field, further west of Haifa. That was the biggest offshore find of the decade. Together, these discoveries opened up entirely new possibilities. The Tamar field, with enough gas to supply all of Israel’s needs for decades, offered energy security, and the Leviathan field offered energy for export and billions of dollars a year in potential revenues. Gas is scheduled to start flowing from Tamar in 2013 and from Leviathan in 2016. With the same consortium operating Mari B and Tamar and Leviathan, the Israeli government was very concerned about giving one group of companies a monopoly over its offshore gas. This monopoly has now been broken by other companies who’ve found rich pickings in the sea off central Israel. A three-dimensional seismographic survey of the Myra and Sarah fields northwest of Netanya and southeast of Leviathan has revealed 6.5 trillion cubic feet of gas waiting to be developed by a consortium led by the Israel Land Development Company. Modiin Energy has a controlling interest in the Gabriella field in shallow water not far west of Tel Aviv, with an estimated 3.56 trillion cubic feet of gas, and the Yam Hadera field west of Hadera, with an estimated 1.4 trillion cubic feet. Adira Energy, a Canadian company, is developing the Yitzhak field southwest of Netanya, with an estimated 989 billion cubic feet. And ATP Oil & Gas of Houston has partnered with Isramco Negev to develop the Shimshon field, with a best estimate of 2.3 trillion cubic feet. Of course, Nobel Energy hasn’t rested on its laurels after Leviathan. It has identified 12 more prospects with 20 trillion cubic feet of potential gas in the territory covered by its licenses. And all of the fields mentioned have substantial quantities of oil waiting to be developed as well. The best estimate for the Gabriella field alone is 277 million barrels of oil. Getting the most out of all these discoveries will take not just technical expertise and money, but strategic thinking and sound diplomacy as well. And that is what Israel has been practicing, with Greece and Cyprus in particular. Israel has carefully cultivated its relations with Greece since early in 2010. Progress began with an unlikely but warm personal relationship between Prime Ministers Netanyahu and Papandreou. It intensified after Turkish-Israeli relations fell into a deep-freeze following the Mavi Marmara incident, and after the scope of the Leviathan discovery became clear. Face-to-face meetings between officials in Athens and Jerusalem, business and tourism delegations, sharing of intelligence, and joint exercises between the Israeli and Greek air forces all bore fruit when the Greek Coast Guard brought the 2011 version of the Gaza flotilla to a complete halt, and Israel tirelessly lobbied the EU to extend a helping hand to Greece in the face of its financial crisis. Greece is ideally situated to serve as a hub for distributing Israeli gas to Europe, particularly since Turkey has rejected any notion of letting pipelines from Israel cross its territory. In return for giving Israel access to this market, Greece will earn much-needed revenue. Athens has yet to demarcate its Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean, largely because Turkey has threatened war whenever it tried to do so. There are believed to be big, unexplored reserves of oil and gas east of the mainland and south of Crete. With Israel firmly in its corner keeping Turkey at bay, Greece has a powerful motivation to finally declare its EEZ and fully develop those resources, taking advantage of the Israeli experience in extracting hydrocarbons from the same Mediterranean environment. This mutually beneficial relationship is so compelling that it has survived the fall of the Papandreou government. The first official from the coalition unity government headed by Lucas Papademos to visit Israel was the Energy Minister. Giorgos Papakonstantinou, and he came eager to talk about Israeli gas and Greece. It’s worth noting that not long ago, Athens was the font of some of the most vehement hostility to Israel in all of Europe. Pipelines from Israeli gas fields to Greece will pass through Cyprus, and here too, Israel has been busy polishing relations and facing down Turks. The formation that contains the Leviathan field extends into Cypriot waters, and Noble Energy is busily drilling there now. Ankara has insisted that Turkish-occupied North Cyprus must take a share of any gas from Greek Cypriot waters, and threatened to send its navy to block the drilling. But Israel maintained a strong naval presence nearby, and the US, EU, and Russia, none of whom recognize Turkish Cyprus, all affirmed the right of Greek Cypriots to develop their resources. After getting carried away with bellicose rhetoric, the Erdogan government found itself completely isolated. Drilling south of Cyprus has proceeded since late September without incident. The administration of Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias has discussed a security alliance with Israel, and the Israeli air force has carried out exercises over Cypriot airspace. Cypriots in general are eagerly embracing closer ties with Israel and the prosperity coming their way with the development of gas fields, pipelines, and gas liquefaction plants. The Arab Spring has turned into winter, with Syria a slaughterhouse, tourists in Egypt fleeing chaos and Salafists, and Islamists taking power everywhere, even in Tunisia. Meanwhile, the elements of a Jewish Spring are being quietly put into place – energy security, a new strategic position as an energy exporter, dramatically improved relations with Greece and Cyprus, the prospect of better relations with every country that will buy Israeli gas, and the satisfaction of seeing hostile countries punish themselves in their attempts to punish Israel.

#### Spreads to the Middle East

Gerolymatos, Director of the Research Institute on Southwestern Europe at Simon Fraser University, 1997 (The Aegean Sea after the Cold War, pg. 58)

The speed of modern communications and fast reaction time of advanced weapons systems means that any crisis in the Aegean or Cyprus has a strong probability of degenerating into a full-scale conflict by accident. It is not inconceivable that a Greek-Turkish war could invite a Syrian attack against Turkey and expand the conflict beyond the Aegean or Cyprus. The defeat of Turkey, even on a limited scale, would also cause internal unrest and bring that country close to a muslim fundamentalist social and political regime. Under these conditions, and taking into account the escalating arms race between Greece and Turkey, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean is tenuous at best, and could easily and quickly become a theatre of war that could spread to the Middle East.

#### The plan reduces US gas imports and frees up the global market – allows Europe to lessen its dependence on Russian gas

Jaffe & O’Sullivan 12 – Amy Myers Jaffe is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, and Meghan L. O'Sullivan is the Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University. “The Geopolitics of Natural Gas,” July, http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-HKSGeopoliticsOfNaturalGas-073012.pdf

Knowledge of the shale gas resource is not new. Geologists have known about the existence of¶ shale formations for years but accessing those resources was long held to be an issue of technology and cost. In the past decade, innovations have yielded substantial cost reductions,¶ making shale gas production a commercial reality. In fact, shale gas production in the United¶ States has increased from virtually nothing in 2000 to more than 10 billion cubic feet per day¶ (bcfd) in 2010. Rising North America shale gas supplies have significantly reduced US requirements for imported LNG and contributed to lower US domestic natural gas prices. The natural gas supply picture in North America will have a ripple effect around the globe that will¶ expand over time, not only through displacement of supplies in global trade but also by fostering a growing interest in shale resource potential in other parts of the world.¶ The importance of the commercialization of shale cannot be understated from a geopolitical,¶ environmental, or market development perspective. Given the assumption that known shale gas resources will be developed according to their commercial viability in North America and¶ elsewhere, the reference scenario projects shale gas production could more than quadruple over the next two decades, accounting for over 50 percent of total US natural gas production by the early 2030s. Still, the countries of the former Soviet Union will collectively be the largest¶ supplier of natural gas (conventional and unconventional) by 2040, with North America a close second. The reference case anticipates the strongest supply of shale gas will be in North America, where the recoverable shale resource comprises more than a quarter of the world’s 4,024 trillion cubic feet (Tct) and is rivaled in size only by the shale plays in Asia and Oceania.¶ These supply trends will have a significant impact on gas trade flows. Not only will the United¶ States be able to avoid growth in LNG imports for the next three decades, but the reference case projects that North America will export 720 million cubic feet per day of LNG by 2030. Australia will rival Qatar as the world’s largest LNG exporter by 2030. Qatar and Australia will remain the largest LNG exporters through 2040, collectively accounting for about 40 percent of global LNG exports.¶ LNG supplies whose development was anchored to the belief that the United States would be a¶ premium market will continue to be diverted. In the reference case, the US market remains the lowest priced major market region in the world throughout the model time horizon. Many US terminals once expected to be actively utilized will remain relatively empty. During the period from 2013 to 2015, US terminals see some growth as new volumes from Australian LNG development push African LNG cargoes to the US market—a trend exacerbated by growth in LNG supply from West Africa in the 2014-2015 period.¶ The reference case projects that consumers in Europe will receive a double benefit from the rise in global gas supply. Not only will Europe increasingly find alternatives to Russian pipeline¶ supplies, but these alternative supplies will exert pressure on the status quo of indexing gas sales to a premium marker determined by the price of petroleum products. In fact, Russia has already had to accept lower prices for its natural gas and is now allowing a portion of its sales in Europe to be indexed to spot natural gas markets, or regional market hubs, rather than oil prices. This change in pricing terms signals a major paradigm shift.¶ Yet as Europe moves to gas-on-gas pricing, global marker prices in the reference scenario fail to converge through 2040. Europe’s price premium will hover at more than $1 above Henry Hub prices, even as Europe develops its own shale resource and diversifies sources of supply.¶ Shale gas eventually makes up 20 percent of European market. European shale gas production¶ begins in earnest in 2020s, and approaches 20 percent of the total market by 2040. LNG import growth is the second fastest growing source of European supply. The availability of shale gas under the reference case means that Caspian flows will not make economic sense as a competing supply to Europe. The Nabucco pipeline project, for example, is not constructed until lower-cost Iraqi gas is able to flow into the line.

#### natural gas dependency is key to Russia-EU cooperation and Russian growth.

Closson 2008

Stacy, Visiting Professor at the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Russia’s key customer: Europe. http://www.rect.muni.cz/summerschool/International\_Security/Module%203/Closson\_89\_108.pdf

Media reporting and Western security discourse lend to portray Russia as the aggressor in its energy relations, increasingly able to convert its hydrocarbon supply lo Europe into economic and political capital. Likewise, many Western scholarly works and analytical reports suggest that Europe is dangerously dependent on Russia.1 Some NATO members have even urged the creation of an "energy NATO" or suggested that the alliance define a shutoff of energy by Russia as an attack justifying the invocation of Article V on collective defense.1 Part of this perception has to do with the way Russia is pursuing business interests in Europe, a policy once described by Russian President Vladimir Putin as "energy supremacy."1 Russia's tactics regarding the pricing of gas to its Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) customers and related shutoffs of gas and oil transiting Belarus and Ukraine to Europe, as well as its subsequent championing of transit options that bolster its near monopoly of gas supplies to Europe, concern many end users Moreover, Russia's continued recalcitrance toward ratifying the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and its recent effort to limit foreign investment in upstream ventures, such as Kovykta and Sakhalin, are viewed by some as unwarranted, given its demands for access to markets in Europe.\* However, as alarming as these recent developments have been for Europe and the US, the warnings emphasizing an encroaching Russian energy giant do not consider the strong interdependency between Russia and Europe that benefit both parties. This interdependency will remain well into the future, creating conditions that favor cooperation over confrontation. While it is recognized that in the near-term, Russia will remain Europe's single most important source of hydrocarbons, particularly for natural gas, Russia's share of the European market will decline over time, increasing Russia's dependency on Europe. Already, the quality of the relationship makes Europe indispensable to Russia in terms of overall trade volumes The European Union <EU) in 2005 accounted for some 56 percent of Russia's exports and around 45 percent of its imports, with Russia's exports to the EU generally being confined to oil and natural gas. Around two-thirds of Russian gas and oil exports currently go to EU member states, the rest to other European countries and the CIS states. These exports have been critical to Russia's welfare, as one-third of all Russian GDP growth over the recent period has come from the natural resources sector, with taxation of oil and gas providing almost 50 percent of federal government fiscal revenue.5 Moreover, Russia's dependence on hydrocarbon exports is likely to grow, as Russia has failed to invest its energy profits in sectors that would ensure long-term, sustainable economic development. This lack of investment could especially hurt the development of Russia's hydrocarbon sector, as the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts require energy investment at around €800 billion by 2030. In order to meet this requirement, Russia would have to supplement domestic funds by encouraging more foreign investment through a revised legal framework that provides secure property rights for the assets of foreign companies operating in Russia.6 Meanwhile, as European states are making moves to diversify their hydrocarbon resources, Russia appears to be less active in securing alternative markets beyond the West. Europe is strengthening relations with African producers, developing liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets, and moving toward greater use of renewable resources. Russia, on the other hand, continues to make business arrangements to construct more pipelines linking its oil and gas fields westwards, obtain rights for the use of gas storage sites in Europe, and sign long-term purchase guarantees with European customers. These plans are taking priority over the construction of pipelines to Asia, investment in upstream gas sector projects, and construction of the infrastructure required for exporting LNG globally. Given these developments, Russia will remain a major player in the European market in the foreseeable future, accounting for roughly a quarter of EU hydrocarbon consumption or 40 percent of imports. Nevertheless, even with the Russian energy sector concentrated on the European market, it will not be able to meet European demand for gas, which is forecast to grow 70 percent by 2030,' The disjuncture between, on the one hand, the actual interdependency between Russia and Europe and, on the other hand, the portrayal of Russia as the aggressor and Europe as the dependent actor, may be more the result of semantics than of facts. Since the early 2000s, the Russian government has tended to understand the context of its energy business in Europe better than Europeans understand Russia. Russia has done a good job of playing a weak hand by engaging with individual European states and their mostly nationally-owned companies to create a series of business arrangements that suit the interests of both sides. Today, Russian and European energy companies are creating joint stock companies, constructing oil and gas pipelines within the EU, investing in hubs and storage facilities, refineries, and terminals, and swapping Russian sales to customers on Europe's market for European exploration and technology in upstream projects in the Russian Far East. This has created a visible map of Russian state-owned assets dotted across Europe and North Africa.1 It is this visual that concerns many in Europe and America and contributes to calls for less dependency on Russia.

#### Russian economic decline causes nuclear war, lose weapons accidents

Filger, 9 [Sheldon, correspondent for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356]

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the **Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.**

#### Relations are key to stabilize Belarus.

Trenin 2011

Dmitri, Deputy Director Carnegie Moscow Center, Russia, the EU and the common neighbourhood, Centre for European Reform Essays, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay\_russia\_trenin\_sept05-2151.pdf

Of all the countries in the common neighbourhood, Belarus harbours the most risks for the EU-Russia relationship. The EU seeks to boycott the regime of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, which it considers illegitimate. The EU has thus imposed a visa ban on Belarusian top officials and excluded the country from the E N P. As Belarus has become more authoritarian, the EU has looked to Russia to exert some positive influence on its smaller neighbour. But the Kremlin has been reluctant to move against Lukashenka, who has styled himself as the only truly pro-Russian leader in the region. In the last two years, the situation has grown increasingly tense. Exploiting widespread insecurity after the September 2004 Beslan hostage crisis, Lukashenka managed to win a re f e rendum on whether he should be allowed to run for a third term as president – in dire c t violation of the laws he had himself promulgated. Since then, Belarus has been a constant irritant in Russia’s relations with the EU – as well as with the US. President George Bush has called Belarus the “last dictatorship in Europe”; and Secre t a ry of State Condoleezza Rice has met with exiled leaders of the Belarusian opposition. Tensions are likely to rise further ahead of the presidential poll scheduled for September 2006. Putin has been lukewarm at best about plans for a Russian-Belarusian union that were devised by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Putin is said to detest Lukashenka personally, and he realises that the Minsk leader is not only a liability for Russia-US relations but also, and more importantly, a key obstacle to furthering Russian economic interests in Belarus. Nevertheless, Lukashenka remains a close, if difficult ally. The Kremlin’s half-hearted attempts to make him dance to Russia’s tune have failed. As long as the Kremlin remains indecisive about what to do, Lukashenka can continue to make mischief at Moscow’s expense. For example, he defies the attempts of Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, to make Belarus pay for gas deliveries at world prices. He effectively bars private Russian investment in Belarus. He drags his feet on accepting the Russian rouble as the currency for the long-planned Russo-Belarusian union. He censors or bans the Russian media in his country. And he can still wangle support and subsidies from Moscow. The Kremlin is afraid that turning against Lukashenka will result in ‘losing Belarus’ to the West. As Moscow insiders say: “Lukashenka is a bastard, but at least he’s our bastard.” The Kremlin’s call Both Moscow and the EU would be well advised not to underestimate Lukashenka’s political skills and his instincts for survival. Despite his dictatorial practices, Lukashenka remains popular with around one-third of the electorate, and he retains strongholds in rural areas. The political opposition may have western sympathies, but it remains weak, divided and marginalised. Lukashenka periodically shakes up the country’s elites, to keep potential opponents or challengers at bay and to prevent opposition forces from consolidating. The regime has destroyed the country’s big businesses and bullied smaller ones into passivity or submission. In such an environment, anti-Lukashenka and pro-democracy rallies would hardly threaten the regime. Rather, they would give Lukashenka an opportunity to condemn them as the work of western agitators. If opposition demonstrators (or the police agents provocateurs among them) engaged in acts of violence, Lukashenka would have a pretext to use force against them. Any bloodshed in the streets of Minsk would present Putin with a tricky choice: should he condemn Russia’s only ‘true ally’ in the Commonwealth of Independent States and risk seeing it become another ‘Ukraine’ (pro-Western, anti-Russian)? Or should he politically support Lukashenka, as he supported Uzbekistan’s president, Islam Karimov, during recent disturbances there? There are, of course, big geopolitical differences between Belarus and Uzbekistan, so the consequences of Putin’s actions would be very different. The EU cares little about Uzbekistan, but disagreements over Belarus could chill, even freeze, EU-Russia relations. Such disagreements could shape the attitudes of Europe’s publics and elites towards Russia. And they could influence the Russian authorities’ domestic policies and their general attitude to ‘western influence’ in Russia.

#### ---Belarusian instability draws in the U.S., Russia, and goes nuclear.

Carpenter 1997

Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense Policy @ Cato Institute, “NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 1: The Border between Poland and Belarus”, Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 44, 9-16, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb044.pdf

The Powder Keg on the Polish-Belarusian Border Admitting Poland to NATO involves two related dangers. One is that Poland's highly unstable neighbor may suffer the fate of other states with repressive political systems and moribund economies: a violent convulsion. We havewitnessed that development in such places as Somalia, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Georgia, and Zaire. It shouldbe noted that, in every case, the chaos created serious problems for neighboring states. If fighting erupted in Belarus--and the ingredients are all in place for a conflagration--it is highly unlikely that Poland would remain unaffected. Yet there would be multiple risks to NATO if it took action to stabilize its new member's eastern border. In addition to the prospect of being sucked into a Bosnia-style morass, there would be the danger of a confrontation with Russia. Belarus is a weakened Russia's last strategic ally in Europe. Russian leaders would undoubtedly be alarmed by any NATO military initiatives involving Belarus, whether those actions were for the purpose of containment or the more ambitious objective of nation building. Moscow's reluctant acquiescence in the first round of NATO enlargement was conditioned on what Russian officials considered solemn promises in the Founding Act. One crucial provision states that NATO "reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Moscow might well view the deployment of NATO troops in eastern Poland to deal with instability in Belarus as a violation of that pledge. Yet if the alliance failed to act, Poland (and the other new members) would have reason to question the credibility of the security commitments they had been given. Even the possibility of the United States' becoming entangled in a political and military quagmire on the frontier between Poland and Belarus should be ample reason for the Senate to reject the administration's plan to enlarge NATO. The danger that such a development could result in a confrontation with a nuclear-armed Russia reinforces that point. If expansion is approved, the United States risks being blindsided by a conflict that advocates of NATO enlargement never anticipated and that would have no relevance to the security interests of the American people.

## 2NC

### Russia Turn

#### Won’t be used as a weapon – Russian interests and review processes.

Closson 2008

Stacy, Visiting Professor at the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Russia’s key customer: Europe. http://www.rect.muni.cz/summerschool/International\_Security/Module%203/Closson\_89\_108.pdf

Proponents of partnership argue that Russian investments in the European market will require Russian businesses to act in a more transparent, accountable, and responsible manner. As Russian companies integrate their up-, mid-, and downstream business, they are more likely to be responsible suppliers to European customers, given that disruptions would directly hurt their interests. Among those espousing partnership arc European bureaucrats working on the EU Russia Energy Dialogue and European energy company directors cooperating with Russia in joint projects, such as E.ON Ruhrgas, EN1, Total, and Statoil.40 Other advocates of this approach are Russian energy analysts who document the objectives of Russian state-owned energy companies investing in Europe, such as Gazprom." It is a fact that as Russian companies invest in European assets, Ihcy are increasingly bound by European law and regulations. Furthermore, the European Commission's Directorate-General for Energy and Transport has announced that projects such as Nord Stream will be subject to review. These measures, it is argued, should ensure that Russia's investments in the EU's common economic space advance Europe's energy security objectives, while also strengthening the interdependent relationship based on a mutually acceptable legal framework.

#### No risk of their turns – weak Russia is more aggressive and interdependence gives the EU leverage.

Closson 2008

Stacy, Visiting Professor at the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Russia’s key customer: Europe. http://www.rect.muni.cz/summerschool/International\_Security/Module%203/Closson\_89\_108.pdf

The second possibility for Russia's future in the European energy market is the prospect, of confrontation. Russia could operate in a non-transparent and sometimes challenging manner, deterring investments in its internal markets, monopolizing investments in the CIS, and using various points of leverage to assert itself more forcefully in Europe's energy sector. Those who believe that this trend will dominate future relations warn that Russia will gain a firm foothold in domestic EU politics as a result of many of the European states' dependency on Russian gas supplies." Some believe that Russia is planning to take over internal generation facilities and distribution networks in Europe, linking them to the larger supply networks, thus dominating a chain that would eventually put Russia in a politically advantageous position. There is much speculation as to the potential for Russia to. for example, gain an unofficial, yet significant veto on issues by threatening to halt oil and gas supplies to European states.51 Contentious issues at the moment include the installation of a missile defense system in Central Europe (Poland and the Czech Republic), the support of many European states for the independence of Kosovo, and NATO expansion into the former Soviet space (Georgia and Ukraine). On the other hand, confrontation could result from a weakened Russia. Should the EU remain Russia's primary market, it could be in a stronger position in the future to apply more effective sanctions against Russia in the case of a major disagreement.\*4 Conversely, some analysts predict that Russia's energy sector will be unable to sustain current levels of development, state enterprises will stagnate, and new fields will not be brought on-stream in time to meet both growing domestic and European demand." The growth rate of added value in the extractive industries sector for hydrocarbons slowed from 7.9 percent in 2(HM to 1.9 percent in 2005.56 In 2005, Gazprom registered only a 0.5 percent increase in the volume of extracted gas as compared to the previous year, despite its absorption of minor independent gas producers." The same trends held steady through 2007. Should Gazprom be unable to meet supply commitments to Europe, then European gas companies could eliminate the take-or-pay conditions in their contracts with Russia, meaning that they would no longer agree to pay for a fixed amount of gas even when a lesser amount is actually used. This, in turn, would threaten Gazprom's ability to borrow for future development projects.51

### Link

#### NOT A CONSUMPTION K VAST MAJORITY OF THE 2AC WAS NOT RESPONSIVE. QUESTION OF DEPOLITICIZED NATURE OF ENERGY

And, natural gas risks global resource conflicts and catastrophic accidents---turns exports advantage

Byrne & Toly 2006

John, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (CEEP) and Distinguished Professor of Public Policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, research associate and Ph.D. candidate in the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Delaware, Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse, *Transforming Power: Energy, Environment and Society in Conflict*, pg

Among the most prominent techno-fixes for modern energy are those seeking to “green” the fossil fuels (see e.g., Jaccand, 2005). The substitution of natural gas for other hydrocarbons, the emergence of “clean coal,” the “ecologically sustainable” mining of what are supposed to be vast, untapped oil reserves in heretofore unfriendly terrains, 9 and the geological sequestration of climate-destabilizing CO2 emissions are among the most favored in this category. Each represents an effort to legitimate the conventional energy regime without displacing fossil fuel’s powerful role in rationalizing centralized energy production and distribution. Natural gas is said to provide efficiencies equal to, or exceeding, the other fossil fuels while generating far fewer environmentally harmful consequences; as a replacement for oil and coal, it would result in decreased acid rain, smog, and mercury pollution. Natural gas emits fewer pollutants—among them greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. In this regard, it is advocated as an effective means by which to mitigate global warming. Low emissions of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter are also benefits of natural gas. Furthermore, the extraction, processing, and consumption of the fuel is said to produce very little solid waste and to have minimal impacts on water quality, unlike coal and oil (Cassedy and Grossman, 1998: 111 – 114). But while its environmental effects may merit consideration of natural gas as a transitional fuel, the social hazards of bringing this energy source to market are very real. Michael Klare has written of potential armed conflicts to control natural gas reserves and the attendant transportation infrastructure (Klare, 2002b). Bringing natural gas to market will inevitably involve expensive liquefaction of the gas—by cooling it to -259 degrees Fahrenheit (-162 degrees Celsius)—and transportation on potentially vulnerable supertanker ships. And concerns have risen regarding the safety of natural gas receiving terminals in an age of global terrorism (Testa, 2004). A recent study by researchers at Sandia National Laboratories examined the catastrophic potential of explosions, fires, and fireballs caused by ramming, triggered explosion, hijacking, or external terrorist actions such as attack by missile or plane (Hightower et al., 2004). Damage risked by potential explosion, either at a terminal or on a ship, is immense. There are currently five natural gas receiving terminals in the continental United States—one in the highly populated Boston metropolitan area. Forty more are proposed for North American coasts, with nineteen having already received regulatory approval despite the risks of terrorist attack (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (U.S.), 2005).

### A/T Method Not First

#### Not a question of methodology but rather politicization. Discussion of technocratic energy policy forecloses questioning the regime itself, means EVEN IF their method is good you cannot properly evaluate it absent the alternative.

#### ---Politics comes first --- Contestation must have unconditional primacy in the assessment of knowledge construction.

Swyngedouw 2011

Erik, Geography, School of Environment and Development University of Manchester, Depoliticized Environments: The End of Nature, Climate Change and the Post-Political Condition, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement (2011), 69 : pp 253-274

A genuine politics, in contrast, emerges in ‘the moment in which a particular demand is not simply part of the negotiation of interests but aims at something more, and starts to function as the metaphoric condensation of the global restructuring of the entire social space’ (Žižek, 1999b: 208). It is about the recognition of conflict as constitutive of the social condition, and the naming of the socio-ecological spaces that can become without this process being grounded in the universalizing notions of the social (in the sense of community, unity or cohesion) and of a singular notion of nature/ecology. The political becomes, for Žižek and Rancière, the space of litigation (Žižek, 1998), the space for those who are not ‘All’, who are uncounted and unnamed, not part of the ‘police’ (symbolic or state) order. A true political space is always a space of contestation for those who have no name or no place. As Diken and Laustsen (2004: 9) put it: ‘Politics in this sense is the ability to debate, question and renew the fundament on which political struggle unfolds, the ability to radically criticize a given order and to fight for a new and better one. In a nutshell, then, politics necessitates accepting conflict’. A radical-progressive position ‘should insist on the unconditional primacy of the inherent antagonism as constitutive of the political’ (Žižek, 1999a: 29). The beginning of politics proper emerged with the demos as an active agent in the Greek polis, with, as Žižek (2006b: 69–70) puts it: the emergence of a group which, although it [is] without a fixed place in the social edifice (or, at best, occupying a subordinate place), demanded to be included in the public sphere, to be heard on an equal footing with ruling oligarchy or aristrocracy, i.e. recognized as a partner in political dialogue and the exercise of power . . . Political struggle proper is therefore not a rational debate between multiple interests, but, simultaneously, the struggle for one's voice to be recognized as the voice of a legitimate partner . . . Furthermore, in protesting the wrong (le tort) they suffered, they also presented themselves as the immediate embodiment of society as such, as the stand-in for the Whole of Society in its universality . . . Politics proper thus always involves a kind of short-circuit between the Universal and the Particular: the paradox of a singular which appears as a stand-in for the Universal, destabilizing the ‘natural’ functional order of relations in the social body. The elementary gesture of proper politicization is ‘[t]his identification of the non-part with the Whole, of the part of society with no properly defined place within it (or resisting the allocated place within it) with the Universal, . . . discernible in all great democratic events’ (Žižek, 2006b: 70). Such new symbolizations through which, what is considered to be noise by the police, is turned into speech, is where a proper politicization of the urban should start from, where the re-politicization of public civic space in the polis resides. Reclaiming proper democracy and proper democratic public spaces (as spaces for the enunciation of agonistic dispute) become a foundation for and condition of possibility for sustainability, one that is predicated upon the symbolization of a positively embodied egalibertarian socio-ecological future that is immediately realizable. These symbolizations should start from the premise that equality is being ‘wronged’ by the given socio-environmental police order and are about claiming a metaphorical and material space for those who are unaccounted for, unnamed and whose fictions are only registered as noise.

### Util

#### ---Specifically, failing to challenge the political structure of global energy production and consumption causes global war.

Byrne & Toly 2006

John, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (CEEP) and Distinguished Professor of Public Policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, research associate and Ph.D. candidate in the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Delaware, Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse, *Transforming Power: Energy, Environment and Society in Conflict*, pg

 Remaining modern, however, also demands an increasing commitment to override what lags behind from a modernist point of view. The bottomless wells to which Huber and Mills refer are increasingly found among the most vulnerable ecologies and communities, and their sacrifice to deliver more energy also involves the geological scale refinement of physical formations, biological scale modification of evolution, and historical scale alteration of social relations. A recent advertisement by Occidental Petroleum blends modernist ideology with the hubris of modern management as “Oxy brings energy to energy solutions” (Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 2005): Oxy is on the cutting edge in using advanced techniques to maximize the recovery of oil and natural gas worldwide. Energy is the lifeblood of the sustainable development process that is critical to overcoming poverty and raising living standards. And we’re working hard to meet the world’s ever growing demand for reliable energy supplies. While the company imagines energy as the lifeblood of progress, the U’wa people in Colombia, on whose lands the oil envied by Occidental Petroleum resides, describe it as the lifeblood of “Mother Earth.” Oil extraction would represent the slow death of both ecology and culture for the U’wa (J. T. Roberts and Thanos, 2003; Lee, forthcoming). In addition to a disregard for cultural continuity in traditional and indigenous communities, extending the capacity to exploit fossil fuels through modernization of the conventional energy regime carries an additional requirement. As Michael Klare (2004, 2006) indicates, continued dependence upon oil, coupled with diminishing supplies and increasing demand, is likely to mean increased global conflict. The same can be said of natural gas (Klare, 2002b: 81 - 108). An industrialized world moored to the conventional energy regime will, in all likelihood, force further needs to militarize its operations.

#### ---This violence comparatively outweighs the aff in terms of both magnitude and probability --- Collapse of the political makes enmity invisible and genocidal.

Reinhard 2004

Kenneth, UCLA, Towards a Political-Theology of the Neighbor (Draft), Google Cache

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stablility, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous – forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

#### ---Makes solvency impossible --- Failure to politicize energy security naturalizes inequality sparking localistic, nationalist and religious backlash. Instead of promoting “energy security” we need to ask “energy security for who?”

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

One of the ironies of upper-case Energy Security is that it is unavoidably insecure. Because its logic dictates a certain indifference to lowercase “securities”, its reign will always be conditioned by opposition: from those dispossessed by oil extraction to those impoverished by dam construction, made ill by power plant pollution or enslaved on agrofuel plantations. And the more extended and invasive a militarised energy system becomes, the more flavours of resistance and refusal it will provoke from communities obeying different logics: localistic, nationalistic, religious. Thus even the conversion of a “temporary” US military base in Saudi Arabia to a permanent one on the grounds that the kingdom was a target for Saddam Hussein formed part of the indictment Osama bin Laden issued in his call to arms against the West.77 By the same token, the more that an energy system is subjected to centralised control – that is, the more Securely it is placed in the hands of a few corporations or ministries – the more openings there are for accidents, storms78 or the activities of energy traders or saboteurs to wreak havoc on giant generation plants, interconnected transmission lines, pipelines and waterways. “Risk spreading” through increased interconnection and “tight coupling” among elements of the system paradoxically opens yet more vulnerabilities.79 As geographer Mazen Labban explains: “the vulnerability of the network derives not only from its vastness . . . of the (physical) concentration of the infrastructure, but also from its connectivity: disruption of supply in one place might create shocks at the regional, or even global scale.”80 One insecurity recently talked up involves the potentially “catastrophic consequences” of a cyber-attack on power plants and the electricity grid. The effects, it is said, would be equivalent to “the cumulative toll of 50 major hurricanes ripping into the nation simultaneously”.81 Proposed European Union “smart grids” with “intelligent metering and monitoring systems”82 making possible instant feedback between consumers’ energy use rates and the actions of generators magnify such “cyber-security” and data protection challenges. The growing commodification of Security only adds to these contradictions. As Security evolves into a marketed product, it becomes increasingly opposed to Security itself. The reason is simple. As a commodity, Security tends to become whatever the Security market produces. But what a system of commodified Security produces above all is numbers, because Security products tend to be assessed for their quantitative efficiency: for example, so many kills per unit of money, energy or labour expended. Diminishing returns then set in. The increased production and accumulation of Security becomes of less and less use in dealing with the political and other human realities that must also be faced by any attempt to maintain Security. (It also, of course, tends to be at odds with any systematic defence of lower-case “securities”.) Thus even the overwhelming “shock and awe” piled on to the initial US attack on Iraq was unable to prevent the war from eventually costing 50 times more than predicted84 and dragging on for years, just as the Viet Nam War “kill ratio” of 19 dead Vietnamese to one dead US soldier was powerless to forestall an eventual US defeat. Most people need only to be asked the question to realise that few of the hundreds of billions of dollars being spent today on Security are in the end making anyone safer. If security is “scarce”, accumulation of more Security is only making it more so.

### At sustainable

#### ---“Energy” is not inevitable --- The modern conception of energy is a social construction that emerged in the late 1800s and is not a historical predetermined.

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

Outside the fossil-fuelled world, energy has always also been tied to a multitude of disparate but particular activities that have no omnibus category or abstract quantity linking them all. There was seldom any reason, for example, to treat heat and mechanical energy as equivalent or exchangeable, physically or economically. As economic historian Joel Mokyr notes: “the equivalence of the two forms was not suspected by people in the eighteenth century; the notion that a horse pulling a treadmill and a coal fire heating a lime kiln were in some sense doing the same thing would have appeared absurd to them.”s22 Agriculture was driven by sunlight and muscles, long-range trade by wind and water currents. Cooking and heating depended on wood and sometimes coal, which, together with charcoal and falling water, helped power industry. People did not think of themselves as “energy constrained” in the contemporary sense: an energy unbounded by seasons and the land still lay in the future. Capital “E” Energy as we know it today was in fact nowhere to be found. What we now recognise as Energy was also embedded in particular places in a fairly non-flexible geographical pattern. In European countries, grain-milling was scattered across the countryside, depending on where rivers could provide sufficient mechanical energy. As late as 1838, water still powered one-quarter of Britain’s cotton factories (and even the coal-powered upstarts were nevertheless called “mills” in a mark of their watery heritage). The size of towns depended on how much firewood was available within range of horse-powered transport. Global trade relied on understanding geographically specific wind patterns that had to be worked with, not against. Energy was not mobile, liquid, transferable in large quantities over long distances. The age of Btus, kilojoules and oil-equivalents lay in an unimagined future.23 As a result, there was no politics of energy of the kind that has become familiar in the fossil-fuel era. Controlling muscles meant controlling people and animals. Amassing power over production meant, above all, amassing human bodies – through slavery, for example. Exploitation of firewood and charcoal depended on access to land. How energy was used was subject to different kinds of monitoring: for example, the practices of millers scattered along rivers were vulnerable, to a certain extent, to surveillance by the local peasants whose business they sought. One person could control only limited quantities of energy, both in absolute terms and relative to others.

### Framework

#### ---Framing determines policy effectiveness --- 90% of policy errors emerge from the flawed and deterministic lens of security.

Lowth 2011

Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies

A frame is ‘a perspective from which a problematic situation can be made sense of’.4 Framing sets a particular context. It shapes perceptions, and influences thinking and behaviour (Haider-Markel et al, 2006; Bradley, 2011).5 The re-framing of issues (ie. ‘reinterpreting their meaning and re-perceiving the situation’ (ibid)) is also potentially transformative.6 Much mistaken thinking and associated flawed behaviour is attributed, with authority, to mis-perception: ‘Around 90% of errors in thinking ... arise from errors of perception (Carr, 2010:5).7 Indeed some afford perceptions not just a primary but an exclusive explanatory role: ‘Perception is all there is’ (Peters and Austin, 1994:71). The ways in which problems are articulated and interpreted, in terms of their essential ‘form or origin’, fundamentally affects the strategies developed to resolve them (Goffman, 1986:10). The process of framing influences strategic thinking because it shapes a priori understanding, organisation and explanation: ‘Problems arise as much from the meaning that people involved give them as from the facts of the situation’ (Martin, 2002:28). Framed thinking is inherently convergent, focused and directed as if by a lens, but the process is neither objective nor universal; it varies between individuals and communities, and alters over time. Framing involves (re)definition. Words are critical and their impact, albeit invariably subconscious, can be profound: ‘There is nothing outside the text’ (Derrida, 1976:158). The cognitive linguist George Lakoff challenged his students not to think of an elephant – but none could avoid doing so. The word alone created an irresistible frame: Every word, like elephant, evokes a frame, which can be an image or other kinds of knowledge ... the word is defined relative to that frame (Lakoff, 2004:3). Framing is more than just associative, however; it also tends to be partial: When the word tax is added to relief, the result is a metaphor: Taxation is an affliction, the person who takes it away is a hero, and anyone who tries to stop him is a bad guy. This is a frame ... made up of ideas, like affliction and hero (ibid). Moreover, framing – as a form of linguistic construction – can be purposefully partial: Framing is about language that fits your worldview, [but] it is not just language. Ideas are primary — and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas (ibid). The language of security is similarly evocative, partial and inherently political. The theory of securitization within international relations – the use of the term ‘security’ to elevate an issue above and beyond normal politics – is remarkably similar to that of framing: The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure ... the staging of existential issues as of supreme priority. The process ... a speech-act ... causes the actor to operate in a different mode than he would have otherwise (Buzan et al, 1998:26,30). Both the generic process of framing and the specific example of securitization: ‘construct discourses through which the world comes to be perceived’ (Henry, 2002:68). They are both potentially powerful forms of sense-making. And yet, curiously, the two are seldom connected explicitly.8 Debates about securitisation are conducted within the milieu of security studies; they tend to focus on how issues become characterised as threats, rather than on the ramifications. Those concerned about framing, on the other hand, operating principally within psychology and its fields of application (behavioural sciences, sociology, media studies etc) tend to address much more keenly the cognitive implications, especially the creation of alternative world views, the colouring of perceptions, and associated influences on decision-making. This paper draws upon both fields of research to explore the framing effect of securitization on strategic thinking.9 Starting from the premise that: ‘By saying the word [security], something is done’ (Wæver, 1995:55), it is argued that: − (A part of) what securitization – as a form of discourse – ‘does’, is frame − In the context of strategy, this matters (so strategists should be aware). thinking. − A conscious process of de-securitization can re-frame thinking (with potentially beneficial results). The increasing breadth of affairs portrayed as ‘security issues’ – food, water, the environment, as well as energy – makes it imperative, in an ‘era of security obsessionism’ (Charrett, 2009:11), for policy makers and strategists to appreciate the cognitive influence of securitization. However, while both framing and securitization are periodically characterised as negative, this dissertation makes no such judgment – either in general, or in relation to European energy supply. The intention here is to demonstrate instead that securitization does frame strategic thinking, and that this matters: ‘Designating an issue as a matter of security is not just a theoretical question but caries ‘real-world’ significance’ (Hough, 2004:14).

####  (B.) Our link turns their “policymaking good” offense --- Depoliticization clouds policy choices and precludes effective policy response. That’s the 1nc Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton evidence.

#### ---Energy policy scenario planning disconnects us from the realities of status quo consumption and distracts from material change.

Sumrell & Varnelis 2009

Robert, production designer, educator, writer & teaches at the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Kazys, Director of the Network Architecture Lab at the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Personal Lubricants: Shell Oil and Scenario Planning, New Geographies 2: Landscapes of Energy, pg 131-132

Scenario planning does not focus on the future but rather on the present. Peak oil, global warming, and the fragility of speculative bubbles are imminent threats. But the massive capital already invested by companies like Shell in existing infrastructure makes it impossible for them to abandon standard industry practices, even if they know that the consequences of business as usual will be dire once things hit a tipping point. Like fairy tales, scenarios present carefully crafted stories that indirectly illustrate the dangers of the world to an audience that isn't ready for them. They allow us to prepare for the future, even if we feel powerless against the forces of the world around us, by providing a context for speaking about the unspeakable. The lessons of fairy tales are gentle and distant, they may only make sense later, when the codified dangers from the stories appear in reality. This helps preserve a childlike naiveté and enables the continued drive toward pleasure in the face of fear and doubt. As Bruno Bettelheim wrote: "The figures and events of fairy tales also personify and illustrate inner conflicts, but they suggest ever so subtly how these conflicts may be solved, and what the next steps in the development toward a higher humanity might be. The fairy tale is presented in a simple, homely way; no demands are made on the listener. This prevents even the smallest child from feeling compelled to act in specific ways, and he is never made to feel inferior. Far from making demands, the fairy tale reassures, gives hope for the future, and holds out the promise of a happy ending." By providing a forum where fear and anxiety can both be discussed, fairy tales provide listeners with a sense of importance, even if they do not yet have agency.46 ln Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Sigmund Freud hypothesized that since organisms come into being from a plenum of inanimate matter, they carry with them the death drive or "pleasure principle” a desire to return to this undifferentiated state. lf, however, the organism responds with an "influx of fresh amounts of stimulus" through a traumatic event, it can awake again and go on living or, if the stimulus is strong enough, reproduce.4T In this light, scenario planning functions more as a rhetorical device and therapy than as a method of planning or accurate forecast. The shock of the actual event is necessary to allow change to occur. But scenario planning allows participants to continue playing even though they know better. Like psychoanalysis, there is no end or goal to the process of gaming; its value is the sensation that comes from playing the game.

#### ---A focus on policy relevance precludes the structural change necessary to establish energy security for more than just the privileged few.

Levy 2012

Gabriel, Deconstructing “energy security”: some questions, People and Nature, http://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/deconstructing-energy-security-some-questions/

– On the other hand, the report repeatedly refers to “policymakers” – which to my mind is a generalisation almost as woolly and meaningless as “energy security”. Usually, this word conjours up a picture of besuited smart-alecs in parliamentary offices: the politicians, the assistants who work for them, the academics who construct arguments for them and the lobbyists who lobby them. The idea that such people will effect social change is ridiculous. More insidious, though, is the danger that social movements will get channelled into narrow “political” campaigns, inspired by illusions that “policymakers” can at least be our levers … whereas the big issues posed by the report – e.g. the achievement of energy security as the use of energy by all – can only be addressed by much more sweeping social transformations.

### watr

#### Prioritize local opposition to grand narratives of fracking – the aff forces best cost benefit analysis

Finewood and Stroup 2012

Michael H. and Laura J., Assistant Professor of Sustainability at Chatham University’s School of Sustainability and the Environment and Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies at St. Michael’s College, Fracking and the Neoliberalization of the Hydro-Social Cycle in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale, UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL ON WATER RESOURCES JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATION ISSUE 147, PAGES 72-79, MARCH 2012

The complex energy-water nexus (whereby energy and water are understood to be inextricably linked and vital to human welfare (Sehlke 2009)) is made explicit by the process of fracking for natural gas. The natural gas economy is surging rapidly (Kusnetz 2011) and is often touted as a solution for current and future energy demand. Simultaneously, each fracking well pad requires billions of gallons of water - laced with toxic chemicals - to extract shale gas. as well as creating a need to dispose of the resulting "flowback" wastewater (Urbina 2011). As research on fracking develops, however, there is mounting evidence that communities above targeted shale gas plays are vulnerable to environmental health risks inherent to this industrial extraction process (Colboni et al. forthcoming; Adams 2011; Osborn et al. 2011). Nonetheless, proponents suggest that current and future U.S. energy consumption necessitates the use of this controversial technique and related water usage (USEIA 2011). Many boosters situate a defense of fracking in a multi-scalar argument about national energy needs, energy security, and possibilities for rural economic growth. Conversely, as communities are recognizing the strong connection between fracking and contaminated water resources, growing contingents of stakeholders are beginning to raise objections to gas development in their watershed. This is bearing out in Pennsylvania's Northeastern Tier of the Marcellus Shale gas play where sharp tensions are emerging between proponents and opponents of regional fracking (Maykuth 2010). It is in this context - similar to places in Colorado, Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas - where stakeholders must wade through a diverse range of narratives regarding the costs and benefits of fracking, in order to determine whether or not to allow drilling on their land and within their communities. Perceptions of the hydro-social cycle (Ileynen et al. 2005; Swyngedouw 2006; Bakker 2010) are critical to understanding this decision-making process. The hydro-social cycle is Swyngedouw's (2009) conceptualization of the inextricably linked relationship between water and society, and likewise, "how hydro-social transformations arc imbedded in and infused by class, gender, ethnic, or other power struggles" (57). In this interlinked socio-ecological hydraulic process, opponents and proponents seek to define water resources in differing terms (Hope 2009). On the one hand, fracking proponents use neoliberal benefit-cost analysis to construct water as just one input in a fully economized hydro-social cycle. In this view, stakeholders must weigh the potential risks to water against their personal economic welfare, their communities' environmental health, as well as the economic welfare of the nation as a whole. In contrast, opponents of fracking often frame a more complex narrative about water. In this view, not only are local places and associated resources experiencing social, economic, and ecological costs that far outweigh the benefits of natural gas production, stakeholders arc (re) framing the protection of water resources in noneconomic terms, such as a life-giving resource critical to community values and as a human/nonhuman right (e.g., Hope 2009; Charman 2010). In the remainder of this paper we consider the way proponents of fracking discursively frame water through a neoliberal environments framework (Heynen et al. 2007), and how this framing factors into stakeholders' decision-making process. We argue that multi-scalar, pro-fracking narratives serve to obfuscate the drilling process and normalize impacts on the hydro-social cycle. This largely occurs through a discursive framing of natural gas as a green fossil fuel, a solution for national resource independence and domestic energy needs, and a generator of local economic growth. Local social and ecological resources (i.e. community, sense of place, water as a recreational source) are situated within this scenario as mere factors in a broader marketplace of cosls and benefits. In other words, the risks to water are perhaps a cost, but can be outweighed by the benefits created by the industrial extraction process. Thus, following this logic, the values of water quantity and quality, and by exiension stakeholder concerns for water, are shifted to a fully economized benefitcost analysis. This is also a shift away from a resource that embodies ecological, cultural, and other non-economic values (Fletcher 2010, 176), and whereby locals must sacrifice local resources for the greater good (Scott 2010)."

#### Extinction

Charman 2010

Karen, Trashing the Planet for Natural Gas: Shale Gas Development Threatens Freshwater Sources, Likely Escalates Climate Destabilization, Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol 21, Issue 4, http://www.karencharman.com/resources/TrashingThePlanet.pdf

As the large, easy reservoirs of fossil fuels are exhausted, the capitalist machine is now scouring the earth in a frenzy to exploit sources that are much more difficult, risky, ecologically damaging, and expensive to extract. Natural gas from coalbed methane, shale, and tight gas sands; oil from tarsands or increasingly deep wells far below the ocean floor; and thin coal seams that are only “economic” for companies to exploit by blowing up whole mountaintops define the new era of fossil fuel extraction. All of these activities are destroying ever-larger swathes of land, ecosystems, and the communities that depend on them, greatly escalating the global ecological crisis that, if it continues unabated, will make the earth uninhabitable for life as we know it. Evidence and public awareness of the ecological threats—particularly the use of fossil fuels—have been mounting for some time. But so far, global fossil fuel consumption has only increased, and several forecasts expect substantial rises in energy consumption in the coming decades. 1 Although the explosion in the availability of environmentally friendly products over the last several years indicates that strong support for non-polluting, renewable energy sources does exist, private energy corporations use every means at their disposal to prevent the widespread adoption of alternatives that would threaten their enormous profits. 2 Energy corporations and their proponents manipulate the public sphere by engaging in sophisticated propaganda campaigns to both strengthen the perceived need for fossil fuels and confuse public debate by distorting facts about the environmental harm of extracting and burning them. 3 Energy corporations have also been supremely successful at manipulating the political process, which supports them with massive public subsidies and laws that ensure their profitability while limiting liability for the direct and indirect harm they cause. 4

### A2 Permutation Do Both --- 2nc Energy Alt (1:10)

#### ---The permutation’s pragmatic combination fails because it still allows the debate to be framed by “energy production” which taints the affirmative’s ability to define problems and create solutions outside of existing structures of global inequality.

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

For time-pressed, slogan-bound, “must-be-ready-with-a-response” policy analysts and politicians, the invitation to reconsider such a seemingly settled concept as “energy” may look like an irksome invitation to navel-gaze. What does it matter if many societies – perhaps even the bulk of humanity – do not view a charcoal fire and a bullock drawing a plough through a field as twin instances of “energy consumption”? Far more important is the plight of the 2.7 billion people who rely on traditional biomass for cooking at the expense of forests and health; the 1.3 billion people who do not have access to electricity and thus the means to be “productive citizens”;2 the increasing competition for energy resources as the middle classes in China, India and Brazil weigh into the global mêlée for consumer goods; the need to assuage worried (Northern) consumers that the lights will not go out; and, above all, the threat that resource scarcities pose to continued economic growth. Who cares how or why fossil-fuelled capitalism is tied up with the evolution of a novel conception of energy? What matters is whether this gas pipeline should be built, that nuclear plant commissioned, or that LNG terminal financed. The pressing task is how to make the distasteful tradeoffs dictated by the realpolitik of securing energy for the future – human rights versus access to gas, maintaining jobs versus permitting pollution, leaving future generations with irresolvable problems of nuclear waste versus cutting carbon dioxide emissions. Such apparent pragmatism is understandable – but, in the end, unpragmatic. In today’s world, “energy” is about far more than pipelines and power stations, transmission lines and oil contracts: it is a system of economic and political relationships that weaves and reweaves the connections between corporations, governments, investors, human rights activists, environmentalists, the military, scientists, the media, trade unions and consumers alike into constantly shifting networks of power that serve to reproduce “the world that Energy begat”. No decision related to upper-case or abstract Energy (see pp.12ff) can escape the influences that such networks of power exert: Energy with a capital “E” not only frames the decision; it structures the solution, trapping the critical and the uncritical alike. To respond only to the daily froth of upper-case Energy talk – which power station? where? fuelled by gas or coal? – is to remain hostage to a dynamic that simply reinforces and reproduces the problems that Energy represents. Such “pragmatism” has helped shape an “energy security” agenda that mischaracterises the many energy scarcities – and insecurities – experienced by poorer people; promotes a response that has little to do with ensuring that everyone has the energy to meet their basic needs and everything to do with creating new sources of accumulation; and that disrespects the limits posed by climate change and resource depletion to endless economic growth. The result is a wave of new enclosures that, in addition to creating new scarcities (not only of energy but also of food, water, land and other necessities of life) are making a transition away from fossil fuels far harder to achieve.

#### ---Permutations themselves are a link --- The knee jerk reaction to combine fundamentally opposed positions into one happy consensus and replaces the antagonisms constitutive of political space with the vacuous notion of a “best policy option.” Permutations can only steamroll true politics because in its rush to include everything, it leaves no space for opposition or dissensus.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, Geography @ School of Environment and Development Manchester University, Climate Change as Post-Political and Post-Democratic Populism, Paper presented at DVPW conference, Kiel, Germany, 22-25 September

Consensually established concerns, like climate change, structured around ecologies of fear -- threats that may ultimately undermine the co-ordinates of daily life – and sustained by a universalising populist discourse express and sustain the deepening of a post-political condition. The latter is, in turn, institutionalised through forms of post-democratic governing. Post-politics is marked by the predominance of a managerial logic in all aspects of life, the reduction of the political to administration where decision-making is increasingly considered to be a question of expert knowledge and not of political position. It is accompanied by the diffusion of governance into a host of non-state or quasi-state institutional forms and actors, and fosters consensual understandings of political action and the particularization of political demands. Post-politics refers to a politics in which ideological or dissensual contestation and struggles are replaced by techno-managerial planning, expert management and administration, “whereby the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives is the primary goal” (Žižek, 1999). Whereas the proper democratic political recognizes the constitutive split of the people, the inherent antagonisms and heterogeneities that cut through the social, while presuming the quality of each and everyone qua speaking beings, the post-political disavows these antagonisms by displacing conflict and disagreement on to the terrain of consensually manageable problems, expert knowledge, and interest intermediation (Swyngedouw, 2009a). ‘Doing politics’ is reduced to a form of institutionalized social management and to the mobilization of governmental technologies where difficulties and problems are dealt with by administrative and techno-organizational means (Nancy, cited in (Marchart, 2007: 68). In other words, politics as policy-makings (la politique) have sutured the space of the political as expressions of disagreement/dissensus (le politique) (Dikeç, 2005). Such post-political arrangement signals a depoliticised (in the sense of the disappearance of the democratic agonistic struggle over the content and direction of socio-ecological life) public space whereby adminsistrative governance defines the zero-level of politics (see (Marquand, 2004) (Swyngedouw, 2009d)). Proper political choice as the agonistic confrontation of competing visions of different socio-ecological order is foreclosed as the spaces of the political or sutured by totalising threats that permit only one choice or direction, one that can be ‘managed’ through dialogical consensual practices (Mouffe, 2005). Post-politics reject ideological divisions and the explicit universalisation of particular political demands (Žižek, 1999: 198). Post-politics is thus about the administration (policing) of social, economic, ecological or other issues, and they remain of course fully within the realm of the possible, of existing social relations, they are ‘the partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2001). “The ultimate sign of post-politics in all Western countries”, (Žižek, 2002: 303) argues, “is the growth of a managerial approach to government: government is reconceived as a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension”. “In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists …) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological visions behind and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into account” (Žižek, 1999: 198). “The political (the space of litigation in which the excluded can protest the wrong/injustice done to them), [is] foreclosed … It is crucial to perceive … the post-political suspension of the political in the reduction of the state to a mere police agent servicing the (consensually established) needs of the market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism” (Žižek, 2006b: 72). Post-politics refuses politicization in the classical Greek sense, that is, as the metaphorical universalization of particular demands, which aims at “more” than negotiation of interests. Politics becomes something one can do without making decisions that divide and separate (Thomson, 2003). Difficulties and problems, which are generally staged and accepted as problematic, have to be dealt with by means of compromise and the production of consensus. The key feature of consensus is “the annulment of dissensus ….. the ‘end of politics’” (Rancière, 2001: §32). Of course, this post-political world eludes choice and freedom (other than those tolerated by the consensus) and effaces the proper political from the spaces of public encounter. For Rancière, this disavowal of the political and the staging of politics as a form of consensual management of the givens of the situation as one of the tactics through which spaces of conflict and antagonism are smoothened and displaced (Rancière, 1998). This ‘re-treat of the political’ (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 1997) and its replacement by consensual policing arrangements is organised through post-democratic institutions of governance, like the Kyoto protocol and other public-private bodies, that increasingly replace the political institutions of government (see (Crouch, 2004)). Post-democratic institutional arrangements are the performative expression of a post-political condition. For Rancière (Rancière, 1998: 102), “Postdemocracy is … a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, the miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests.” Urbaniti defines these post-democratic institutions of ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ (see (Swyngedouw, 2005)) as follows: “Governance entails an explicit reference to ‘mechanisms’ or ‘organized’ and ‘coordinated activities’ appropriate to the solution of some specific problems. Unlike government, governance refers to ‘policies’ rather than ‘politics’ … . Its recipients are not ‘the people’ as collective political subject, but ‘the population’ that can be affected by global issues such as the environment, migration, or the use of natural resources” ((Urbinati, 2003: 80), cited in (Mouffe, 2005)). This post-democratic constitution reconfigures the act of governing to a stakeholder based arrangement of multi-scalar governance in which the traditional state forms partake together with experts, NGOs, and other ‘responsible’ partners (while ‘irresponsible’ partners are excluded). They operate with a generally accepted consensus of a global and largely (neo-)liberal capitalism, the right of individual choice, an ecological awareness and the necessity to continue this, to sustain the state of the situation (that is allegedly in serious danger). Discussion and dispute are tolerated, even encouraged, in so far the general frame is not contested. Not only are radical dissent, critique, and fundamental conflict evacuated from the political arena (and relegated to the terrain of ‘extra-political’ and unauthorised violence), but the parameters of democratic governing itself are being shifted, announcing new forms of governmentality, in which traditional disciplinary society is transfigured into a society of control through democratically disembedded networks (like ‘the Kyoto Protocol’; ‘the Dublin Statement’, the ‘Rio Summit’, etc….). Conclusion: re-thinking the political environment “Against thoughts of the end and catastrophe, I believe it is possible and necessary to oppose a thought of political precariousness” (Rancière, 2004: 8). We have argued that the particular framing of climate change and its associated populist politics as outlined above foreclose (or at least attempt to do so) politicization and evacuates dissent through the formation of a particular regimes of environmental governance that revolves around consensus, agreement, participatory negotiation of different interests, and technocratic expert management in the context of a non-disputed management of market-based socio-economic organization. Even a cursory analysis of ‘green politics’, whether from the perspective of environmental movements (like Greenpeace) or environmental parties (the German Greens are a classic case), over the past few decades would signal their rapid transformation from engaging in a politics of contestation, organized acting, radical disagreement, and developing visionary alternatives to their integration into stakeholder based negotiation arrangements aimed at delivering a negotiated policy. A consensual post-politics emerges here, one that either eliminates fundamental conflict or elevates it to antithetical ultra-politics. The consensual times we are currently living in have thus eliminated a genuine political space of disagreement. These post-political climate change policies rest on the following foundations. First, the social and ecological problems caused by modernity/capitalism are external side-effects; they are not an inherent and integral part of the relations of liberal politics and capitalist economies. Second, a strictly populist politics emerges here; one that elevates the interest of an imaginary ‘the People’, Nature, or ‘the environment’ to the level of the universal rather than opening spaces that permit to universalize the claims of particular socio-natures, environments, or social groups or classes. Third, these side-effects are constituted as global, universal, and threatening. Fourth, the ‘enemy’ or the target of concern is continuously externalized and becomes socially disembodied, is always vague, ambiguous, unnamed and uncounted, and ultimately empty. Fifth, the target of concern can be managed through a consensual dialogical politics whereby demands become depoliticized and politics naturalized within a given socio-ecological order for which there is ostensibly no real alternative (Swyngedouw, 2007). The post-political environmental consensus, therefore, is one that is radically reactionary, one that forestalls the articulation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajectories of future socio-environmental possibilities and of human-human and human-nature articulations and assemblages. It holds on to a harmonious view of nature that can be recaptured while re-producing if not solidifying a liberal-capitalist order for which there seems to be no alternative. Much of the sustainability argument has evacuated the politics of the possible, the radical contestation of alternative future socio-environmental possibilities and socio-natural arrangements, and silences the antagonisms and conflicts that are constitutive of our socio-natural orders by externalising conflict. It is inherently reactionary. As Badiou (Badiou, 2005) argues, ‘proper’ politics must revolve around the construction of great new fictions that create real possibilities for constructing different socio-environmental futures. To the extent that the current post-political condition that combines apocalyptic environmental visions with a hegemonic neoliberal view of social ordering constitutes one particular fiction (one that in fact forecloses dissent, conflict, and the possibility of a different future), there is an urgent need for different stories and fictions that can be mobilised for realisation. This requires foregrounding and naming different socio-environmental futures and recognizing conflict, difference, and struggle over the naming and trajectories of these futures. Socio-environmental conflict, therefore, should not be subsumed under the homogenizing mantle of a populist environmentalist-sustainability discourse, but should be legitimised as constitutive of a democratic order. This, of course, turns the climate question into a question of democracy and its meaning. It asserts the horizon of a recuperated democracy as the terrain (space) for expressing conflict, for nurturing agonistic debate and disagreement, and, most importantly, for the naming different possible socio-environmental futures.

### At intellectuals fail

#### ---Popular movements define global energy security --- The ability to mobilize their efforts behind effective politics enables a successful transition away from the fossil-fuel-based capitalist economy.

Levy 2012

Gabriel, Deconstructing “energy security”: some questions, People and Nature, http://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/deconstructing-energy-security-some-questions/

Given the scope and length of the report, it lacks any clear sense of who the authors believe will address the problems it raises. Where are the motive forces of change? Given the authors’ arguments that “energy security” expresses exploitative and unequal social relationships, who will overcome these relationships? The authors argue for “commons regimes” that are “neither private nor public” and that “vest in their members the power to determine access to almost anything: land, forests, water, fish, radio wavelengths, seeds, streets” (p.13). They counterpose “commons life” to the social relationship of capitalism, and counterpose “numerous communities, user groups, cooperatives and other forms of social organisation whose lives are governed not by the principles of neo-classical economics but by the rules of the commons” to the economic system that “naturalises unlimited wants” (p.30). They quote from the significant body of literature that has developed ideas about “the commons” in recent years. I agree that communities such as those mentioned have a crucial role in confronting oil companies, state hierarchies and the rest over “energy enclosures”. But such communities do not comprise a majority. A much larger number of people, many hundreds of millions in rich and poor countries alike, are caught in the social relations of capitalism, complete with its rules of energy production and consumption: not only the working class, both urban and rural, but also giant sections of the population forced into precarious existences on the edge of labour exploitation, or in between that exploitation and subsistence farming. What about these people? The idea of working-class or popular movements for change hardly figures in the report. But in my view, it is these movements that will ultimately shape a future transition away from the fossil-fuel-based capitalist economy. Such movements may take the form of asserting “the commons” against modern-day enclosures – but one only has to read the news, be it from north Africa, China or anywhere else, to see that they take other forms too.

## 1NR

### A2: Conditionality Illegitimate

CONDITION CPS NO WORSE- they are key to testing the certainty

ci no solve

---Real World-Policy makers do consider multiple options at once. Their argument guts one of the core elements of policy discussion.

---Best policy justifies-Multiple options make it more likeley that the best policy will be found. The role of the judge is to endorse the best policy at the end of the round. If a conditional counterplan has been proven to be the best policy, it’s perverse not to allow it to be endorsed.

---Education-Argument breadth has benefits. If depth were the only value, teams wouldn’t be allowed to debate more than one advantage or disadvanatge per round. Exploring the range of issues on a subject is also intellectualy important.

#### ---Time limits aren’t an answer

A. Time is finite in debate. Running one argument inherently trades off with another.

B. Other arguments make this non-unique. Multipe topicality arguments, two card disads, or kritiks equally distort time.

C. Creating time pressure and making time based decisions is an inherent part of debate strategy. It’s an acceptable part of all other debate arguments.

---Counterplans don’t introduce unique complexity into the round. The counterplan may just be a minor alteration of the plan. Disadvantage s also raise multiple issues.

---Permutations justify-Retaining the status quo as an option is reciprocal to the affirmative’s ability to advocate the plan or permutation.

---Conditionality is reciprocal to the affirmative’s ability to select a case. Since the affirmative selects the ground for the debate they enjoy a huge preparation advantage. Allowing hypothetical negative arguments helps to defeat this edge.

---Advocacy concerns aren’t decisive.

A. In the real world, policies are attacked from avariety of perspectives. In debate there is only one negative team, so to encompass the true range of potential counter-affirmative advocacy, multiple positions must be allowed.

B. Most debate practice isn’t consistent with the advocacy paradigm. Strategic concessions by the affirmative and permutations allow the affirmative to advocate multiple positions.

---Not a voting issue. Emphasis on punishment incentivizes a race to bottom discouraging substsantive debates.

### ASIA ADD ON

**China isn’t a threat --- conservatives blow a hypothetical Chinese conflict way out of proportion**

**Guardiano 10** (John Guardiano, – Writer and analyst who focuses on political, military, and public-policy issues “Overstating the China Threat,” FrumForum, May 13th, 2010, <http://www.frumforum.com/overstating-the-china-threat> //AnthonyOgbuli)

Devore, in fact, has it exactly backwards: We have to prepare for the real enemy, and it’s not China. The real and immediate enemy is a network of Islamic radicals determined to destabilize the world and wreck havoc and destruction on America and the West. Yet, China is what preoccupies the Weekly Standard’s Noonan, Goldfarb and indeed, most conservative defense hawks. To be sure, China is a potential military threat. The United States certainly should maintain military superiority over China; and we certainly should guarantee the independence of Taiwan. But the Right’s obsession with a hypothetical and distant Chinese military threat is seriously misplaced and inappropriate — especially given the wartime exigencies of today. American Soldiers and Marines are being targeted and killed, after all, not by China, but by Islamic radicals in Iraq and Afghanistan. And it is this global war against the Islamists — and not a distant, hypothetical war with China — that is the future of warfare. It’s a future involving lots of messy asymmetric fights in which American troops are integral to stability, security, and gradual, long-term democratization. It is not, however, a future that conservatives like or wish to accept. Conservatives don’t like messy asymmetric fights which involve counterinsurgency and nation building: because to many on the Right, that’s not “real war.” That’s not the role and purpose of the U.S. military. The Right dreams or imagines, instead, of a conventional “big war” with China. Dream on, because it ain’t gonna happen, not in our lifetime anyhow. The Chinese are interested in making money, not war. Their increasing military prowess is a natural and inevitable reflection of their growing economic strength and vitality. Indeed, as a country modernizes and develops, so, too, does its military. Again, I’m not suggesting that we let our guard down with China. I’m simply saying that we view the potential Chinese military threat in context and with perspective and that we plan and budget accordingly. Unfortunately, the Right’s misplaced obsession with China has deleterious real-world consequences. It causes conservatives to too often give short shrift to the existential Jihadist threat that now confronts us, and too little attention to the war we are now fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. What’s more, because the Right has yet to come to terms with the nature of 21st irregular asymmetric warfare, it has been AWOL and ineffective in the defense budget battles of recent years. For example, when President Obama and Defense Secretary Robert Gates last year pushed dramatic defense budget cuts in the name of canceling “Cold War weapon systems,” most conservatives were flummoxed and stymied. They rightly sensed that eliminating some of our most advanced weapon systems was a bad idea. However, conservatives also realized that the world and warfare had changed, and that defense budget reform might well be necessary. Conventional set-piece battles, after all, are largely a thing of the past. Except that they’re not, because in the minds of conservative hawks, the Chinese military threat is always looming.  Thus, the Right fell back on old and dated Cold War modes of analysis, lamenting the loss of aircraft like the F-22 — even though the F-22 has not been used in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and even though modern-day conflicts are inherently land-based and ground-force intensive. My point is not that we don’t need any more F-22s, because we might. My point is that conservatives should focus their intellectual and rhetorical firepower on more relevant and urgent military priorities like the need for ground-force modernization, a new Army combat vehicle, and networking our Army and Marine Corps with state-of-the-art communication capabilities. But the sad reality is that most conservative defense hawks — and certainly most conservative politicians and elected officials — haven’t a clue about U.S. military requirements. And they are especially clueless about the needs of our ground-force Soldiers and Marines. That’s why conservatives last year lost the defense budget battle; and that’s why they’re still losing and losing badly: because they have yet to come to terms with new geostrategic and military realities. They’re stuck in a Cold War time warp and are mistakenly focused on China. But the Chinese are eager to sell us commercial goods; they are not eager to destroy our cities and our people. The same cannot be said, however, of the Jihadists who plan and plot for our destruction. You’d think that nine years after the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, and with wars still raging in Iraq and Afghanistan, conservatives would understand this. But alas, you would be wrong. The Right still doesn’t get it. But they should and they must. The fate of American national security, and the survival of our Soldiers and Marines, hangs in the balance. Time to modernize our thinking. Now.

East Asia war will never happen

A. Informal processes

Weissmann 9 (Mikael Weissmann, senior fellow at the Swedish School of Advanced Asia Pacific Studies “Understanding the East Asian Peace: Some Findings on the Role of Informal Processes,” Nordic Asia Research Community, November 2, 2009, http://barha.asiaportal.info/blogs/in-focus/2009/november/understanding-east-asian-peace-some-findings-role-informal-processes-mi)

The findings concerning China’s role in keeping peace in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and on the Korean Peninsula confirm the underlying hypothesis that various informal processes and related mechanisms can help explain the relative peace. Virtually all of the identified processes and related mechanisms have been informal rather than formal. It should be noted that it is not necessarily the same types of processes that have been of importance in each and every case. In different ways these informal processes have demonstrated that the relative lack of formalised security structures and/or mechanisms have not prevented the region from moving towards a stable peace. Informal processes have been sufficient both to prevent tension and disputes from escalating into war and for moving East Asia towards a stable peace.

#### ---‘Security’ is depoliticizing.

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

“Security” is just as problematic. “What kind of “security”? For whom? Which kinds of security are connected with which energy sources? What kinds of strategies are required for each kind of security? How do they conflict or overlap? The word abstracts from all these questions. By concealing differences and conflicts that have to be acknowledged and brought out into the open, it hinders effective, democratic policymaking related to agriculture, electricity, trade, aid, transport, manufacturing, housing, banking, national development and the role of the military in society.

#### ---Their defense of American hegemony relies on epistemologically flawed colonial stereotypes of racial inferiority that whitewashes American imperialism while constructing a universal notion of humanity that enables a self-defeating genocidal politics in the name of stability.

Kaplan 2003

Amy, Professor of English at University of Pennsylvania, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,” American Quarterly 56.1

Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the "reluctant imperialist." 10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an [End Page 4] uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society." 11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image. This is also a narrative about race. The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from earlier colonial discourses about races who are incapable of governing themselves, Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law," or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society," in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "The American Empire," Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Burden" but insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden." 12 Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism. These narratives of the origins of the current empire—that is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionist—have much in common. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberalism, and democracy, the "indispensable nation," in Madeleine Albright's words. In this logic, the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong" for everyone [End Page 5] else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others." 13 Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus deems the entire world a potential site of intervention. Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems. According to this logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather, resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values. Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As part of the "coming-out" narrative, the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. We've always been interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty.' Let's just be ourselves." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign—one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future." 14 Historians of the United States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S. interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms, in relation to other historical changes and movements across the globe. The struggle over history also entails a struggle over language and culture. It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks words [End Page 6] such as freedom, democracy, and liberty. It's imperative that we draw on our knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and transnational sources. Today's reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power," the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. As Ignatieff writes, "America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires." 15 The work of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of global culture is not a one-way street, but a process of transnational exchange, conflict, and transformation, which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by empire. In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, those whose dreams are different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself. As one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote, "when you adopt a way of terror you've excused yourself from the community of human beings." 16 Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act, the accusation of terrorism alone, without due process and proof, is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity. As scholars of American studies, we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical, literary, and visual representations about the way such exclusions from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

### ENERGY ADD ON

#### ---Framing natural gas policy in terms of supply security externalizes our culpability for domestic consumption patterns collapsing the political & creating the conditions for nationalism, war and policy failure.

Lowth 2011

Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies

Gas security has become synonymous with gas supply. Indeed the former has been established, and institutionalised, as the preferred term. Like Lakoff’s elephant, the connection between gas and security is today not only persistent, it is also irresistible. This conflation of security and supply has created, and through common usage perpetuates, a presumption that gas supply is intrinsically insecure, survival is at stake, special measures are necessary, and specific security actors are thereby empowered: When a particular [...] designation is accepted and taken for granted, something akin to a paradigm exists. When one paradigm and its adherents become the ultimate arbiter of “reality” in society, we say a hegemony of definition exists (Conrad and Schneider, 1992:181). Strategic thinking about gas supply has become security thinking. Formerly commercial and economic outcomes have been translated into security outcomes,30 sought in extremis by hard security or military means, often usurping compromises in other areas,31 and contradicting market fundamentals.32 Securitization of the gas market has also disrupted ‘consumer/producer’ or ‘customer/supplier’ relations, privileging instead ‘friend and foe’ (ie. opposition beyond mere competition): ‘while casting an issue as one of ‘security’ may help elevate its position on the political agenda, it also risks placing that issue within the logic of threat and decision, and potentially within the contrast of friend and enemy’ (Williams, 2003:523). One of the unintended consequences of this elevation, and shift in emphasis from the economic to the security spheres, has been to frustrate EU attempts to enhance its status, and collective bargaining power, as a gas consumer (the largest in the world). While, from as early as 2006, member states have supported in principle the notion of a common energy policy, many have been reluctant in practice to cede authority for security of gas supplies to the EU: ‘In [the economic domain] ... securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 115). So, despite their ‘communitarian rhetoric’ (Aliboni, 2008:4), member states – touched by the perceived threat of gas shortages – have chosen to act unilaterally to safeguard their own interests: ‘the broad consensus over the need for a more integrated energy policy ran parallel with EU member states’ reinforced trend to affirm their own national energy policies,’ (Natorski and Surrallés, 2008:72). Germany, for example, has struck bilateral agreements with Russia that include both long-term supply contracts and also the construction of North European Gas Pipeline (Nordstream) that will enhance Germany’s future gas security – but not necessarily serve the collective interests of the EU most effectively. In the south, where the EU is planning to construct its own Nabucco pipeline, Hungary and Italy have struck deals with Gazprom to build a South Stream pipeline in direct competition. Securitization has promoted self-interested or ‘narrow minded’ – and, in a community-sense, somewhat hypocritical – national thinking (Umbach, 2010:1239): ‘In [the economic domain] ... securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 115). In short, securitization has had a paradoxical effect on strategic thinking. While economic logic and EU competence favours collective EU action, the spectre of insecurity – understood and interpreted differently by individual states – has prevented the requisite solidarity and mobilization: ‘What unites the discourse of all member states is the emphasis on their competencies in determining their national strategies for security of supply ... [S]ecurity framing of energy is precisely what justified [member states’] reluctance to ... transfer competencies to the supranational level’ (ibid: 82,83). Externalization Securitization ‘externalizes’ strategic thinking about gas supplies in three interrelated ways: it establishes gas security as an intrinsically external problem; it prejudices cooperative relations with other gas stakeholders; and it introduces the prospect of reciprocal defensive strategies by other states, especially suppliers such as Russia, with unforeseeable consequences. Constructing gas supply as a security issue creates the perception that states are entitled to receive adequate gas, in the same way that they are entitled to enjoy national security (of which gas security is portrayed as an integral part). Any actual or potential shortfall in gas supply is therefore treated as if it were (rather than because it necessarily is) an existential threat. At the same time, in common with other threats to national security, the danger is deemed to exist outside. Self is threatened by other. The overall effect is powerful: the state is entitled to supplies of gas (akin, as well as contributing, to national security) and ‘they’, out there, are endangering those supplies. One of the consequences of conceptualising ‘gas for the EU’ as a security of supply issue, is that insecurity is thereby framed as something that is ‘done to’ the EU – a victim, threatened by aggressive producer/suppliers (Belyi, 2009). This externalization diverts thinking away from domestic aspects of the problem, and displaces potential internal solutions (which appear irrelevant compared with tackling the external threat). One of the principal and relentless critics of the EU’s securitization of gas supply, Pierre Noël, of the Cambridge Energy Policy Research Group, has argued continually in favour of internal EU market solutions to ensure adequate supplies of gas to member states.33 Successful securitization has, however, left little analytical space for his contention that ‘[economic rather than security] risks require that we let the markets work’ (Noel, 2008:1). His proposition forms the basis of a possible re-framing of energy security at the end of this section.

#### ---Scarcity is a political construction not constitutive of earthly existence --- Their economic analysis naturalizes consumption levels and precludes structural adjustments to alleviate resource disparities.

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

When scarcity is “naturalised” – by making it something that is part of the human condition – awkward questions as to how demand for specific sources of energy has been (and still is) deliberately created are conveniently pushed aside. What needs to be explained (scarcity) becomes the explanation (scarcity). Growing demand is simply assumed to be, and understood as, a force that cannot, indeed must not, be tempered, a function both of rising numbers of people and of their innate desires, wants and needs. Yet demand for oil-based “energy” and its products results from policies deliberately aimed at creating demand for oil that have been pursued for over a century, at the expense of non-oil based forms of livelihood or production.7 In the case of agriculture, for instance, farmers North and South were pressed into abandoning organic forms of farming, which rely on rotations and other techniques to maintain fertility, and adopting oil- and gas-based chemical agriculture through subsidies, land amalgamation schemes, taxation, and, in many cases, violence. In South Korea, for instance, officials uprooted varieties of rice that farmers had developed to meet their own needs over centuries and pushed peasants into planting chemical-intensive modern varieties, whilst elsewhere farmers who refused to “modernise” were frequently dispossessed of their land.8 Today, similar efforts are made to create demand for electricity and other market-based forms of energy through policies that curtail people from gathering fuelwood for free, on the spurious grounds that fuelwood collectors are, in the words of the World Health Organisation, “stripping our forests, heating our planet”9 (see Box: “Fuelwood Collectors”, p.24). In the transport sector, demand for cars has been carefully nurtured through suburbanisation, highway construction programmes, advertising (with cars being made an object of desire) and policies that have favoured the car over mass transport systems.10 Infamously, tram systems in a number of US cities were deliberately run down or replaced after they were bought by a consortium of manufacturers including Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Phillips Petroleum Co., Mack Truck and General Motors.11 The consequent manufactured scarcity of public transport means that cars are a necessity, not a luxury, for many US urban dwellers.

### Solves the aff

#### sovles price spike- the alternative politicizes the energy debate- the question isn’t WHERE DO WE GET OUR ENERGY NEXT? it becomes why do we need that energy? energy for who? Politicizing the debate allows for localized energies that resolve shortages best. that’s swendgfdgfiosadhgasodfow. the aff only delays the problem.

#### ---Focusing on developing new alternative energy inputs naturalize current structures of energy consumption removing them from the realm of political contestation.

Robert 2003

Jean, Energy (Manuscript), www.pudel.uni-bremen.de/pdf/energy\_1.pdf

By now this is taken-for-granted. That people have "energy needs" goes unquestioned, partly because "energy" has almost transformed society into a laboratory. Professionals of every stripe now offer competing ways to optimize the relation between "energy resources" and "energy needs." Such "energy policies" are blind to the truth that neither cars nor human motors can act politically. They perpetuate the scientific disregard for sensible differences and thereby deepen man's enslavement to his "energy" slaves. Man is no less enslaved whether the car runs on coal or hydrogen; whether the light bulb shines because of water or wind. Neither the technocrat nor the ecocrat can lessen man's slavishness as long as both cannot see the commonsense distinctions erased by "energy." It would a political act to stop looking at the wonderland that appears through "energy" glasses. To recover such a clear-eyed vision, one cannot do much better than to reread Illich (1973).

#### ---Securitizing the environment is a self-fulfilling prophecy --- It undermines collective solutions and sustainable global cooperation.

Ostrauskaite 2001

Rasa, EU Political Advisor in the Office of the High Representative for BiH, December, Environmental Security as an Ambiguous Symbol[1]: Can We Securitize the Environment? Rubikon, http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/rasa2.htm

Having demonstrated the ambiguities of the environmental security discourse, I shall specify the link between environment and security, arguing against this linkage. According to supporters of the environment-security linkage, environmental degradation is as severe as the military threats and thus deserves to be lifted to the “high politics”; i.e. environmental degradation should be placed under the umbrella of national security. Yet tacking the security label to environmental issues deserves more than a word of caution. First, in the environmental security discourse, whose interests should be secured: those of the state, humanity, the future generations or the nature? As we have seen in the previous sections, these interests can be and usually are in conflict. It could be pointed out, however, that once a link between environmental degradation and violent conflict is established, the answer to the question whose interest should be secured becomes self-evident. It is at these crucial junctures of conflict that the issue of environmental degradation becomes worthy of a “security” label. Nevertheless, the linkage between environmental degradation and violent conflict could not be easily established, and even those who maintain the existence of such linkages, albeit indirect, subtle and not always predictable, admit that environmental degradation is not very likely to cause interstate conflicts[47]. Therefore, it is “analytically misleading to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat, because the traditional focus of national security has little in common with either environmental problems or solutions”[48]. Second, since one state’s unilateral efforts may have little effect, if at all, states may choose to cooperate to prevent or minimize environmental threats for which they share responsibility. To agree upon collective strategies to reduce environmental vulnerabilities would be easier, however, if decision-makers first desecuritized environmental degradation. As rightly pointed out by Waever, while to securitize an issue is to declare it being “off limits”, to desecuritize an issue is to remove it from the realm of the politics of survival and to allow for a more open and fruitful debate on it[49]. Thus, desecuritization renders the issue amenable to more cooperative forms of behavior. And this could be applicable to the logic of international environmental relations among the states. Moreover, the collective approach frequently entails negotiating treaties that commit states to limit certain activities within their jurisdiction, which, if the issue is declared to be “off limits”, might prove to be more difficult to achieve. The only reason to feel tempted to keep environment “off limits”, however, would be the possibility to have more resources allocated from the state budget, which, unless environment is securitized, might prove to be a complicated task. Yet the question remains whether the benefits of increased attention of environmental issues to be gained through association with security are worth the harms caused by negative connotation and effect. It is probably accurate to say that one of the biggest difficulties for securitization of environment is posed by the fact that causes and effects of environmental issues differ in time and space. If one of the motives for speaking of environmental degradation as a threat to national security is rhetorical: to make people respond to environmental threats with a sense of urgency, effects rather than causes tend to be securitized. As Buzan et al. point out, “in terms of politicizing causes, much is happening, but most of the threats are too distant to lead to securitization”[50]. With the exception of already discussed securitization of the threats posed by nuclear plants in Central and Eastern Europe, which are close in both time and space to the European states, slow progress has been made towards addressing the causes rather than effects of environmental threats. Even climate change, which is a global problem that requires a coordinated global response, has recently been defined as “at least a 100-year problem,”[51] signaling that, inter alia, asymmetries in causes and effects might seriously impede securitization moves at the global level. Another motive for securitization of effects rather than causes is a recognition that crises call for resolution during which the patience of society can be mobilized. Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that permanent patterns of environmentally sound behavior could be supported for a long time, especially if requires some personal sacrifice[52]. For this reason, it seems that environmental concerns could be better addressed if they constitute part of ‘normal politics’, rather than if enveloped in the national security, since the focus should be on the causes, rather than effects.

### Environment --- 1nc/2nc Security Link

#### ---Framing global warming as a security issue requiring energy policy reform encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm and trading off with a laundry list of environmental problems that each independently risk extinction. Only the alternative’s act of politicization can address and draw connections between instances of ecosystem destruction.

Crist 2007

Eileen, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, Telos 141 Winter, pg. 29-55

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity,23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### ---Framing environmental destruction within the lens of security is a political choice that militarizes environmental policy and precludes the development of new international environmental ethic.

Waever 1998

Ole, professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html

These observations point back toward a more general question: Is it a good idea to frame as many problems as possible in terms of security? Does not such a strategy present the negative prospect of, in a metaphorical sense, militarizing our thinking and seeing problems in terms of threat-vulnerability-defense, when there are good reasons for not treating them according to this formula? 51 Use of the slogan "environmental security" is tempting, because it is an effective way of dramatizing environmental problems. In the longer run, however, the practices resulting from the slogan might lead to an inappropriate social construction of the environment, as a threat/defense problem. We might find it more constructive, instead, to thematize the problem in terms of an economy-ecology nexus, where decisions are actually interlinked. 52 Use of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a special way. When a problem is "securitized," the act tends to lead to specific ways of addressing it: Threat, defense, and often state-centered solutions. This, of course, leaves the environmental agenda, with its labelling problem, unresolved. One alternative is to view the emerging values of environmentalism as establishing their own moral basis. As his basis for optimism, for example, Buzan suggests that such values are already emerging as new norms of international society. 53 Deudney, more lyrically, talks about ecological awareness being linked to "a powerful set of values and symbols" that "draw upon basic human desires and aspirations," and argues that this, and not regressive security logic, should be the basis for mobilization. 54

#### ---Environmental securitization foreclose a proper political framing; presenting the issue as a global humanitarian cause rather than revolving around competing political trajectories and precludes the mobilization for individual change required to prevent global environmental collapse.

Swyngedouw 2011

Erik, Geography, School of Environment and Development University of Manchester, Depoliticized Environments: The End of Nature, Climate Change and the Post-Political Condition, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement (2011), 69 : pp 253-274

Irrespective of the particular views of Nature held by different individuals and social groups, consensus has emerged over the seriousness of the environmental condition and the precariousness of our socio-ecological predicament.35 The successive IPCC reports and Al Gore’s evangelical An Inconvenient Truth landed both with the Nobel Peace price, surely one of the most telling illustrations of how climate matters are elevated to the status of global humanitarian cause.36 There is a virtually unchallenged consensus over the need to be more ‘environmentally’ sustainable if disaster is to be avoided; a climatic sustainability that centres around reducing and stabilizing the CO2 content in the atmosphere.37 In this consensual setting, environmental problems are generally staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind and sustained by what Mike Davis called ‘ecologies of fear’38 on the one hand and a series of decidedly populist gestures on the other. The discursive matrix through which the contemporary meaning of the environmental condition is woven is one quilted by the invocation of fear and danger, and the spectre of ecological annihilation or at least seriously distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. ‘Fear’ is indeed the crucial trope through which many of the current environmental and other biopolitical narratives are woven.39 This cultivation of ‘ecologies of fear’, in turn, is sustained by a particular set of phantasmagorical, often apocalyptic, imaginations. 40 The apocalyptic imaginary of a world with endemic resource shortages, ravaged by hurricanes whose intensity is amplified by climate change, pictures of scorched land as the geo-pluvial regime and the spatial variability of droughts and floods shifts, icebergs that disintegrate around the poles and cause sea levels to rise, alarming reductions in bio-diversity, the devastations raked by wildfires, tsunamis, spreading diseases like SARS, Avian Flu, or HIV. These imaginaries of a Nature out of synch, destabilised, threatening, and out of control is paralleled by equally disturbing images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2 into the atmosphere, deforesting the earth, etc… We seem to have an unquenchable fascination with such dystopian imaginaries. Our ecological predicament is sutured by a series of performative gestures signalling an overwhelming, mind-boggling danger, one that threatens to undermine the very co-ordinates of our every day lives and routines and may shake up the foundations of all we take for granted. Yet, despite the fact we know very well that the ecological catastrophe is already here (rather than a disavowed promise of disaster to come – the apocalyptic pledge that few really believe in), we fail to take nature really seriously, to think and act really as subjects inscribed in the very dynamics of natural processes. The attractions of such an apocalyptic imaginary are related to a series of characteristics. At the symbolic level, apocalyptic imaginaries are extraordinarily powerful in disavowing or displacing social conflict and antagonisms. As such, apocalyptic imaginations foreclose a proper political framing. Or in other words, the presentation of climate change as a global humanitarian cause produces a thoroughly depoliticized imaginary, one that does not revolve around choosing one trajectory rather than another, one that is not articulated with specific political programs or socio-ecological projects. It is this sort of mobilizations without political issue that led Alain Badiou to state that ‘ecology is the new opium for the masses’, whereby the nurturing of the promise of a more benign retrofitted climate exhausts the horizon of our social and political aspirations and imaginations. We have to make sure that radical techno-managerial and behavioral transformations, organized within the horizons of a liberal-capitalist order that is beyond dispute, are initiated to retrofit the climate. The proposed transformations often take a distinct dystopian turn when the Malthusian specter of overpopulation is fused with concerns with the climate, whereby, perversely, newborns are indentified as the main culprits of galloping climate change and resource depletion, a view supported by luminaries like Sir David Attenborough (OM CH CVO CBE), Dr Jane Goodall (DBE), Dr James Lovelock (CBE), and Sir Crispin Tickell (GCMG KCVO), among others.41 In other words, the techno-managerial eco-consensus maintains, we have to change radically, but within the contours of the existing state of the situation – ‘the partition of the sensible’ in Rancière’s words42 – so that nothing really has to change!

#### ---Framing environmental policy in terms of survival creates a state of emergency that crushes democratic deliberation enabling sovereign and corporate interests to dictate and coopt environmental policy.

Schnurr & Swatuk 2012

Matthew A., Larry A., Introduction: Toward Critical Environmental Security, *Environmental Change, Natural Resources and Social Conflict: Rethinking Environmental Security in Theory and Practice*, http://uwaterloo.academia.edu/LarrySwatuk/Papers/930036/Introduction\_Toward\_Critical\_Environmental\_Security

For our purposes, the most significant insights into the study of environmental securityover the past decade concerns the dangers of securitization, which understands security asa form of ‘social practice’ that transforms the meanings and outcomes associated with it. Labeling the environment as a security issue limits the linguistic possibilities to those revolving around ‘survival, urgency, and emergency. It allows for exceptional measures, the breaking of otherwise binding rules and governance by decrees rather than by democratic decisions’ (Trombetta 2008: 588). Once an issue is securitized the logic of security necessarily follows: environmental issues normally handled in the democratic realm are transformed into emergency politics, which erodes transparency and accountability, instills fear, and curtails political freedoms (Newman 2010). The real‐world consequences of this transformation are significant: the discourse of securitization expands state monopolization of the issue and serves to legitimize the security agenda of the wealthy elite by targeting the poor as threats to both affluence and political stability (Barnett 2000,Dalby 2000). Security, Ken Booth reminds us, is a ‘powerful political concept; it is the sort of word that energizes opinion and moves material power’ (Booth 2005: 23).

#### ---Environmental Securitization destroys environmental politics --- Its nationalist framing gets coopted by military interests and precludes international cooperation necessary to prevent global ecosystem collapse.

Amarilla-Mena 2007

Manuel, Executive Director of the Centre for the International Promotion of Security, The Usefulness of Environmental Security, World Security Network, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article\_id=14554

For him, it is not useful to speak about environmental security. Securitizing the environment undermines rather than enhances the likelihood of finding appropriate political solutions to environmental problems. He emphasises that there is a danger in seeing such threats as national security concerns, and that it may increase international tensions and make international accords more difficult to achieve, while diverting attention from internal clean-up. This can lead to new types of interventions, a new imperialism of the strong against the weak. Deudney asks environmentalists (vogue among progressive intellectuals, particularly in English-speaking and Nordic countries) to call into question the national grouping and its privileged status in world politics. He also perceives that many people want to use environmental problems to stimulate interstate conflict and even promote violence. His last argument is related to the capacity of environmental policies to cause conflict and war. This reason is tied to the sacrifices these policies would require from society in terms of living standards. This decline would be faced with resistance from groups at all levels, producing class war and revolutionary upheavals. If this were to happen then liberal democracy and free-market systems would increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems to maintain a minimum order. He resumes his study with the following: Sentiment for a “war on pollution” is a dangerous and probably self-defeating enterprise, fortunately are not as great as often conjured by environmentalists…adopting environmental security agendas are a symbol of failure of imagination and political awareness. Apart from Deudney’s arguments, other scholars such as Gleick and Levy address another set of criticisms. They are concerned with issues of treating environmental in isolatation, as a contextualizing term. Therefore, environment is subsumed into other sectors, including the military and societal sectors, where security thinking embraces problems of population growth, transnational pollution, widespread poverty, and inequitable social systems. At the same time, they criticise the idea of environmental security as too amorphous, where ‘environment’ can refer to anything in which something takes place or which affects what people do; in other words, almost anything at all. From this stand point, ‘environment’ should be reserved as a term for those issues that involve ecological feedback and equilibrium, or are critical to the sustenance of human life.18 Finally there are several arguments to support the idea that the linking of environment and security has a further disadvantage. This is that the environmental issues might request a new state effort in term of readiness to lose autonomy and sovereignty, which causes a deceleration process when tackling such issues. Therefore, securitizing the environment would be counterproductive when trying to reach a common effort to deal with environmental problems, because they would be seen as part of the national interest, instead of common compromises or further cooperation. Lack of publicity, increasing secretism or manipulation efforts would be the first consequences 19.

#### ---The affirmatives act of depoliticization makes questioning the premise of limitless growth that lies at the root of environmental destruction impossible

Klein 2011

Naomi, award-winning journalist, syndicated columnist, fellow at The Nation Institute and author of the international and New York Times bestseller The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Capitalism vs. the Climate, The Nation, http://www.thenation.com/article/164497/capitalism-vs-climate?page=full

The fact that the earth’s atmosphere cannot safely absorb the amount of carbon we are pumping into it is a symptom of a much larger crisis, one born of the central fiction on which our economic model is based: that nature is limitless, that we will always be able to find more of what we need, and that if something runs out it can be seamlessly replaced by another resource that we can endlessly extract. But it is not just the atmosphere that we have exploited beyond its capacity to recover—we are doing the same to the oceans, to freshwater, to topsoil and to biodiversity. The expansionist, extractive mindset, which has so long governed our relationship to nature, is what the climate crisis calls into question so fundamentally. The abundance of scientific research showing we have pushed nature beyond its limits does not just demand green products and market-based solutions; it demands a new civilizational paradigm, one grounded not in dominance over nature but in respect for natural cycles of renewal—and acutely sensitive to natural limits, including the limits of human intelligence. So in a way, Chris Horner was right when he told his fellow Heartlanders that climate change isn’t “the issue.” In fact, it isn’t an issue at all. Climate change is a message, one that is telling us that many of our culture’s most cherished ideas are no longer viable. These are profoundly challenging revelations for all of us raised on Enlightenment ideals of progress, unaccustomed to having our ambitions confined by natural boundaries. And this is true

#### ---There is nothing innately liberating about renewables --- Absent politicization they will fail & be assimilated into existing structures of domination.

Rahi 2011

George, Energy, Equity, and Social Struggle in the Transition to a Post-­‐Petrol World, Trail Six, Vol. 5, ojs.library.ubc.ca/index.php/trailsix/article/download/2152/2065

With these social relations in mind, a shift to alternative energy has widespread implications for global class struggle. Looking at the history of past energy shifts, it is clear that social movements have been highly influential in affecting energy policies. Bruce Pobobnik argues that labour militancy in coalmines from the 1880s onwards accelerated the transition to emerging oil industries as the security of access to coal was continually disrupted (74). During the 1960s and early 1970s, strikes by oil workers, nationalization of oil reserves abroad, and the geopolitical instability of the 1973 oil embargo led the United States to drastically increase funding for renewables and initiated many command and control regulations (ibid 75). More recently, Harvey argues that the British Government’s success in meeting emission reduction targets set at the 1994 Rio Conference in the run-­‐up to Kyoto was indebted to the “Conservative Party’s determination to crush the power of labor anchored in the Miners’ Union by freeing the British energy industry from its dependency on coal” (Spaces of Hope 217). These interactions between class struggle and energy geographies reveal important dimensions of the emerging “alternative energy” economy. Expansion of the renewables is not without conflict. Mega-dams have a long and continuing history of struggles for social justice (Leslie 2005). Farmers in Oaxaca, Mexico are currently fighting the enclosure of the ‘wind commons’ as private energy companies seek to gain control over strategic sites for renewable energy production (Oceransky 506). In 2006, over a dozen villagers were killed by police during protests in the Guangdong province of China over the lack of compensation for land lost to a wind power plant (Reuters 524). The continued expansion of the industrial agro-­‐fuel economy has been tied to the displacement of indigenous peoples, loss of biodiversity, and human rights abuses in places like Brazil’s sugar cane ethanol industry (Collazos 2010). Under existing politico-­‐economic condition, the emerging boom in alternative energy in these cases can be seen as new round of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. To promote the concept of a ‘just transition’, groups such as the Energy Justice Network and Rising Tide North America have advocated the need for decentralized, non-­‐ commercial, publicly owned, energy systems. Community autonomy is a central component in order to avoid the commodification and monopolization of energy. An industry maintains a radical monopoly, argues Ivan Illich, not only when “it produces scarce products, or by driving competing industries off the market”, but ultimately when it has acquired the ability to “create and shape the need which it alone can satisfy” (14). Such a vision of energy autonomy stands in opposition to many of the accumulation strategies based on private control over the energetic means of production and cheap fossil fuels that serve as its subsidy. That task, as Illich states, is to envision the preservation of the world for all peoples in a just, democratic way, rather than to merely ask, “how reservations necessary for the survival of people can be established on an earth that has been reshaped for the sake of industrial outputs” (15). When considering whether ‘sustainable growth’ and ‘alternative energy’ will offer new possibilities for emancipation from a crisis-prone system, it is crucial to keep in mind the possibility that renewable energy may only perpetuate, perhaps even strengthen, forms of hierarchy and domination in the sunbelts and wind-­‐corridors of the world. There is no a priori reason why renewable energy should be based on progressive social and environmental terms. Thinking beyond the renewable/nonrenewable binary, “all industrial energy systems deploy space, capital, and technology to construct their geographies of power and inscribe their technological order as a mode of organization of social, economic, and political relations” (Ghosn 7). It is important not to overlook the deep structural continuities between conventional and alternative energy in regards to issues of power, control, and unequal access to resources. The attractiveness of ‘renewable energy’ as a panacea for social and environmental ills, independent of a wider social transformation of capitalism, risks foreclosing serious political questions about alternative socio-environmental trajectories.

#### ---RENEWABLES PUT A NEW FACE ON THE OLD GAME

Roberts 2009

Jean, completed his architectural studies at the ETH, Zurich. ln 1972 he met lvan lllich, with whom he conducted a long conversation on industrialism, transportation, and energy. Robert lives in Mexico where he is a long-standing ecological militant and proponent of dry sanitation and waste recycling. He is author of numerous books and articles and coauthor of LaTrahison de l'Opulence (Presses Universitaires de France, 1976) and La Puissance des Pauvres (Actes Sud, 2008), Alternatives and the Technogenic Production of Scarcity, New Geographies 2: Landscapes of Energy, pg. 137

Though scientifically correct inasmuch as it confirms the impossibility of tricking nature, the energy concept is more than a correct scientific statement. It is also a conceptual device that transforms all that it touches into gold for the industrial process. If you don't want gold, but cow-dung for everyone, you have to let cow-dung remain a gift and use the appropriate word for it - among dozens. If you aim at protecting the concrete living matrix of real women and men, “energy” is perhaps not an appropriate word. It is not hairsplitting to insist that, underlying the debate on the appropriateness of technologies, there is the need for another debate on the appropriateness of the alternative technologists' semantics. Energy, as most works of the imagination, is overdetermined, redundant with societal and cultural meanings. Historically, it is the product of a time that considered scarcity, the fundamental axiom of formal economics, to be the law governing the social order, much as the law of gravity governs the Newtonian universe. So is it plausible that the industrial enthusiasm that characterized the time of the "energy mania" will nolens volens taint every social and cultural reality where the concept energy is imported today? In other words, because it is a constitutive theme - or an active connection - of its genesis, will not scarcity be transferred together with the energy concept? Underlying the debate on alternative energy production, beyond or behind the ecological and the social levels, there is the semantic bottom line from which cultural meanings, symbols, and social myths stem. When used in everyday language, energy is a term that, contrary to common words, deprives the speaker of her innate definitory powers while suppressing its more vernacular synonyms. The stenographic token of the first principle of thermodynamics, “energy" has become theTrojan horse for a contamination of common sense by ecologically and socially unsound representations, as well as culturally and symbolically destructive thought habits.