### FW

#### The roll of the ballot is to vote for the best act of knowledge production, the judge is a critic of argument---this is best,

#### a.) debate realism: the plan won’t happen if you vote aff, all you are doing is endorsing a particular educational model, the only portable skill we get from debate is advocacy skills, voting aff means they are doing the better advocating for change, voting neg means they are doing a bad job.

#### If we win any of our link arguments it means they are not doing the better debating because they train us to be good energy forecasters for shell oil which is bad, they assume energy is a homogenous entity where any combination of interchange can occur, that causes energy shortages, resource wars and serial policy failure.

#### b.) the political Our links also turn their policy making good offense, they will result in bad policies and collapse the political by having a solely supply based solution to the energy problem, assuming the only thing that need be changed out of our consumption, infrastructure and mindset problems is our supply brackets off key political discussions and deemphasizes genuine contestation.

#### c.) A focus on policy relevance precludes the structural change necessary to establish energy security for more than just the privileged few.

Levy 2012

Gabriel, Deconstructing “energy security”: some questions, People and Nature, http://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/deconstructing-energy-security-some-questions/

– On the other hand, the report repeatedly refers to “policymakers” – which to my mind is a generalisation almost as woolly and meaningless as “energy security”. Usually, this word conjours up a picture of besuited smart-alecs in parliamentary offices: the politicians, the assistants who work for them, the academics who construct arguments for them and the lobbyists who lobby them. The idea that such people will effect social change is ridiculous. More insidious, though, is the danger that social movements will get channelled into narrow “political” campaigns, inspired by illusions that “policymakers” can at least be our levers … whereas the big issues posed by the report – e.g. the achievement of energy security as the use of energy by all – can only be addressed by much more sweeping social transformations.

#### ---Framing determines policy effectiveness --- 90% of policy errors emerge from the flawed and deterministic lens of security.

Lowth 2011

Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies

A frame is ‘a perspective from which a problematic situation can be made sense of’.4 Framing sets a particular context. It shapes perceptions, and influences thinking and behaviour (Haider-Markel et al, 2006; Bradley, 2011).5 The re-framing of issues (ie. ‘reinterpreting their meaning and re-perceiving the situation’ (ibid)) is also potentially transformative.6 Much mistaken thinking and associated flawed behaviour is attributed, with authority, to mis-perception: ‘Around 90% of errors in thinking ... arise from errors of perception (Carr, 2010:5).7 Indeed some afford perceptions not just a primary but an exclusive explanatory role: ‘Perception is all there is’ (Peters and Austin, 1994:71). The ways in which problems are articulated and interpreted, in terms of their essential ‘form or origin’, fundamentally affects the strategies developed to resolve them (Goffman, 1986:10). The process of framing influences strategic thinking because it shapes a priori understanding, organisation and explanation: ‘Problems arise as much from the meaning that people involved give them as from the facts of the situation’ (Martin, 2002:28). Framed thinking is inherently convergent, focused and directed as if by a lens, but the process is neither objective nor universal; it varies between individuals and communities, and alters over time. Framing involves (re)definition. Words are critical and their impact, albeit invariably subconscious, can be profound: ‘There is nothing outside the text’ (Derrida, 1976:158). The cognitive linguist George Lakoff challenged his students not to think of an elephant – but none could avoid doing so. The word alone created an irresistible frame: Every word, like elephant, evokes a frame, which can be an image or other kinds of knowledge ... the word is defined relative to that frame (Lakoff, 2004:3). Framing is more than just associative, however; it also tends to be partial: When the word tax is added to relief, the result is a metaphor: Taxation is an affliction, the person who takes it away is a hero, and anyone who tries to stop him is a bad guy. This is a frame ... made up of ideas, like affliction and hero (ibid). Moreover, framing – as a form of linguistic construction – can be purposefully partial: Framing is about language that fits your worldview, [but] it is not just language. Ideas are primary — and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas (ibid). The language of security is similarly evocative, partial and inherently political. The theory of securitization within international relations – the use of the term ‘security’ to elevate an issue above and beyond normal politics – is remarkably similar to that of framing: The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure ... the staging of existential issues as of supreme priority. The process ... a speech-act ... causes the actor to operate in a different mode than he would have otherwise (Buzan et al, 1998:26,30). Both the generic process of framing and the specific example of securitization: ‘construct discourses through which the world comes to be perceived’ (Henry, 2002:68). They are both potentially powerful forms of sense-making. And yet, curiously, the two are seldom connected explicitly.8 Debates about securitisation are conducted within the milieu of security studies; they tend to focus on how issues become characterised as threats, rather than on the ramifications. Those concerned about framing, on the other hand, operating principally within psychology and its fields of application (behavioural sciences, sociology, media studies etc) tend to address much more keenly the cognitive implications, especially the creation of alternative world views, the colouring of perceptions, and associated influences on decision-making. This paper draws upon both fields of research to explore the framing effect of securitization on strategic thinking.9 Starting from the premise that: ‘By saying the word [security], something is done’ (Wæver, 1995:55), it is argued that: − (A part of) what securitization – as a form of discourse – ‘does’, is frame − In the context of strategy, this matters (so strategists should be aware). thinking. − A conscious process of de-securitization can re-frame thinking (with potentially beneficial results). The increasing breadth of affairs portrayed as ‘security issues’ – food, water, the environment, as well as energy – makes it imperative, in an ‘era of security obsessionism’ (Charrett, 2009:11), for policy makers and strategists to appreciate the cognitive influence of securitization. However, while both framing and securitization are periodically characterised as negative, this dissertation makes no such judgment – either in general, or in relation to European energy supply. The intention here is to demonstrate instead that securitization does frame strategic thinking, and that this matters: ‘Designating an issue as a matter of security is not just a theoretical question but caries ‘real-world’ significance’ (Hough, 2004:14).

### conditionality

### impact calc

#### Arms control fails – meant to maintain existing arsenals

Mutimer 11 (DAVID MUTIMER Associate Professor, Political Science, Arts Director, Centre for International and Security Studies Editor, Critical Studies on Security Coordinator, Graduate Diploma in International and Security Studies @ York University “From Arms Control to Denuclearization: Governmentality and the Abolitionist Desire,” http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-32-1%20Mutimer.pdf)

Taken together, the Joint Understanding and the New START agreement which followed from it encode exactly the same assumptions as in the practices of nuclear arms control throughout the Cold War. These assumptions, however, produce a practice that was not only content to see nuclear weapons remain, but which actively requires them. This requirement is found at the intersection of strategic stability (zero is unstable) and mutual deterrence, an intersection reproduced in the texts of the present through the combined references to stability and to the place of defences. The arms control practice, including its recent renewal, frames nuclear devices as weapons, to be used in a strategy of deterrence through assured destruction for the purposes of achieving security in a world with nuclear arms. The problem for the future is quite clear: the US commitment to ‘seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’ is fundamentally incompatible with the arms control practice it is using to reach that goal, and furthermore, that practice is in itself an expression of the governmentality that is constitutive of modern politics itself.

The argument to this point suggests that there is a fundamental contradiction between the goal set by the Obama Administration to achieve the security of a world without nuclear weapons and the means chosen to reach that goal. The steps that have been taken in conjunction with the Russian Federation reproduce a Cold War practice that is constituted precisely to achieve security in a world with nuclear weapons. What is worse, the central features of that practice are deeply rooted in the governmentality of the modern state, marking arms control not as a sui generisresponse to the speciﬁcities of the nuclear age, but rather as a technology of modern government. In order to advance along the path Obama pointed to in Prague, it will be necessary therefore to break fundamentally with arms control. In this section, I suggest where the seeds of such a break may be located, even within the texts reproductive of arms control governmentality.

To begin, I will return to the text of Obama’s Prague speech. To this point I have concentrated on the last line I quoted at the outset of this article: ‘To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year.’ Before that line, however, Obama suggested another requirement which points in a rather different direction than that of arms control: ‘To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.’ The idea of reducing the salience of nuclear weapons points to a rather different approach to the weapons and their control than the Cold War arms control practice provides.37

What I have shown to this point is that arms control is a practice designed to produce security in a world with nuclear weapons; more precisely, it is a practice which seeks to create the conditions for the effective functioning of deterrence through assured destruction as the basis for nuclear security strategy. That framing of the weapons as weapons, even weapons whose only use is the threat of their use, together with deterrence strategies and arms control, makes denuclearization virtually impossible. On the other hand, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security strategy opens the prospect for reframing the devices as something other than weapons for use in a strategy of deterrence supported by START-like arms control, and thus also raises the prospect of reaching zero. Such an approach to denuclearization does not require bilateral, or multilateral agreements with other nuclear powers – as Obama suggested, the US can begin adjusting its own security strategy. There may be negotiations and agreements, but they do not need to take the form of Cold War arms control, complete with the assumptions that make denuclearization so difﬁcult to achieve.

In April of 2010, just as the US was ﬁnalizing its New START agreement with Russia, it also released a Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR), which began to deliver on the second promise of Prague to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in US security strategy. A central section of the report was titled: Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons, which began with the following assertion and commitment: ‘The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and U.S. military strategy has been reduced signiﬁcantly in recent decades, but further steps can and should be taken at this time.’38 In passing judgement on the steps that are outlined in the Report, the Director of the US Arms Control Association, Daryl Kimball, wrote: ‘[the NPR] does not change U.S. policy as much as it should or could have, but the 72-page document represents an important shift in U.S. nuclear thinking and practice’.39 The problem to which Kimball refers is easily seen, as the paragraph following the one I just quoted reads: ‘The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.’40 Within the NPR, nuclear devices are still framed as weapons within a context of deterrence, and so they can be reduced only so far ‘as long as nuclear weapons exist’. In other words, the shift in thinking necessary for denuclearization has not yet happened.

#### Even if your project of ending nukes succeeds—you do nothing to change the mindset that has made it prevalent in the first place—recreates their impacts in more unpredictable forms

Ni Aolain 9 (Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Dorsey & Whitney Chair in Law, University of Minnesota Law School & Professor of Law Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster. “Women, Security, and the Patriarchy of Internationalized Transitional Justice” November 2009 project muse//Donnie

From a gender perspective a number of issues arise. First, what constitutes disarmament sufficient to satisfy a ceasefire requirement in the political/military sense may not in fact entail the removal of all such weapons from the public, and more importantly the private sphere. Second, a perhaps trite but true observation is that the **disarmament of weapons is not the disarmament of mind**s. W**orking this premise through we find that the underlying social psychological dimensions that, in a conflicted society, have supported the resort to violence and the elevation of particular forms of masculinity that accompany it, are not in any sense undermined or addressed by a formal disarmament process.** Thus, **a key issue to be addressed concerning violence in conflicted societies is what exactly is meant by the term “ending violence.**” In the parlance of ending public violence or internal conflict this conversation revolves around decommissioning weapons and getting armed paramilitaries/insurgents to swap violent confrontation for peaceful debate about contested issues. However, **this kind of discussion rarely engages with the fundamental requirement of changing deep-seated social attitudes toward the use of violence**.[36](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v031/31.4.aolain.html#f36) **Attitudinal change is critical and under-valued.** For women, **it means that while guns may physically no longer be present in public spaces, this does not change a social psychology that makes the use of violence acceptable (whether in the private or public sphere**).

#### Their identification of “legitimate threats to America” are just monsters made to be destroyed---in pursuit of quashing these fictional conflicts the aff creates real ones which ultimately collapse US power projection capabilities

Chernus 06, Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Colorado-Boulder, (*Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin*, Published by Paradigm Publishers, ISBN 1594512752, p. 53-54)

The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it won’t stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons’ efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has “unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended.” Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: “For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.”39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that don’t. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. It’s no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a “secret plan” for world conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer “a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution.” They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: “We should not try to convince people that things are getting better.” Michael Ledeen: “The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.”40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons’ fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the “manly virtues” of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The neocons’ story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy. Just as neocons need monsters abroad, they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget). The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it, and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a “window of vulnerability.” The quest for strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

### Perm

#### ---Security destroys value to life.

Der Derian 1998

James, professor of political science at Brown University, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” *On Security*, 1998, pgs. 7

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?"37¶ The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols :¶ The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations.38

#### ---Security ensures extinction --- Being is reduced to a global currency of power than reifies self-fulfilling system of global crisis management.

Dillon 1996

Michael, lecturer in politics and international relations Michael @ University of Lancaster, Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought, pg 14-15

The way of sharpening and focusing this thought into a precise question is first provided, however, by referring back to Foucault; for whom Heidegger was the philosopher. Of all recent thinkers, Foucault was amongst the most committed to the task of writing the history of the present in the light of the history of philosophy as metaphysics. That is why, when first thinking about the prominence of security in modern politics, I first found Foucault’s mode of questioning so stimulation. There was it seemed to me, a parallel to be drawn between what he saw the technology of disciplinary power/ knowledge doing to the body and what the principle of security does to politics.What truths about the human condition, he therefore prompted me to ask, are thought to be secreted in security? **What work does securing security do for and upon us? What power-effects issue out of the regimes of truth of security?** If the truth of security compels us to secure security, why, how and where is the grounding compulsion grounded? How was it that seeking security became such an insistent and knowledge through representation-calculative thought, technology and subjectification? **Above all, how are we to account- amongst all the manifest contradictions of our current (inter)national systems of security: which** incarcerate rather than liberate; radically endanger rather than liberate**; radically endanger rather than make safe; and engender fear rather than create assurance** for that terminal paradox of our modern (inter)national politics of security which Foucault captured so well in the quotation that heads this chapter.5 **A terminal paradox which not only subverts its own predicate of security, most spectacularly by rendering the future of terrestrial existence conditional on the strategies and calculations of its hybrid regime of sovereignty and governmentality, but which also seems to furnish a new predicate of global life, a new experience in the context of which the political has to be recovered and to which must then address itself: the globalization of politics of security in the global extension of nihilism and technology, and the advent of the real prospect of human species extinction.**

### SCHULTE CARD

the nuclear umbrellas (extended deterrence) held over … allies, which reduced incentives to acquire nuclear arms

#### proves the exceptionalism argument, framing of the 1ac is what matters.

#### How we define problems shapes how solutions will be implemented---the affirmatives violent imagery highlights the importance of other nations insecurity and irrationality resulting in excessive and destabilizing accumulations elsewhere

Mutimer 95 David Mutimer Centre for International and Strategic Studies York University

 “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation”

The discussion in this paper has examined the way in which international security, and international security- policy, are constituted in the terms of an assembly of metaphors. An image, comprising a scries of metaphors, provides the conceptual frame for a problem, and therefore structures the policy agenda by privileging a particular set of solutions which can be proposed and implemented. In particular, the image highlights certain aspects of a given problem, while downplaying others and hiding still more. The policy solutions which will be advanced will, not surprisingly, focus upon the features highlighted by the image, and ignore those downplayed and hidden. I have shown how in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in the context of the Gulf War, an image of a problem of PROLIFERATION was developed, which comprised three key metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance'. The entailments of these metaphors provide an image of an autonomous, technical, apolitical process, which if left unchecked spreads its technological offspring outwards from its source, resulting in excessive and destabilising accumulations elsewhere. This image is reflected in, and is driving the further development of, the instruments of control—the policy being applied to the problem defined by PROLIFERATION.

### A/T No link we say us bad

#### Quotes from ev

Heisbourg ’12, [Francois Heisbourg, Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, prof at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, July 2012, “How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?”, <http://www.npolicy.org/userfiles/file/oving%20Beyond%20Pretense%20web%20version.pdf#page=182>]

Unsustainable strains are possibly the single most compelling feature of contemporary proliferation. Examples include tight geographical constraints–with, for instance, New Delhi and Islamabad, located within 300 miles of each other; nuclear multi-polarity against the backdrop of multiple, crisscrossing sources of tension

may be argued that these risk factors are known to potential protagonists and that they therefore will be led to avoid the sort of nuclear brinksmanship that characterized U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War in crises such as the Korean War, Berlin, Cuba or the Yom Kippur War. Unfortunately, the multiple nuclear crises between India and Pakistan demonstrate no such prudence, rather the contrary

### policy relevance

#### ---Critique turns their policy claims --- A focus on “Energy crisis” disconnects policy makers from citizens under the guise of emergency and superior expertise that makes practicing democracy cease to exist.

Karakatsanis 2010

Georgios, M.Sc. “Environment & Development”, National Technical University of Athens (NTUA), Quantifying Energy Democracy: A framework for energy citizenship, ISEE 11th Biennial Conference, http://www.isee2010.org/paper/24ps0404%23Quantifying%20Energy%20Democracy%23\_Karakatsanis,Georgios\_.pdf

Energy technology is a core variable for civilization evolution. It might as well be considered the flip side of what is called energy democracy. Its democratization is a key factor for the energy independence of each individual. For example, many wars in history held for the discovery and conquest of new energy sources were actually funded –directly or indirectly- by their populations who were bound to the centralized energy distribution system and ecologically incapable of breaking free from it. If we accept the vital importance that energy has for an individual’s life, then it is easy to understand that in a centralized energy production and distribution system a government has no need of its citizens’ consent for making and implementing unethical decisions. In that sense, citizens become accomplices to these decisions (such as imperialistic wars) whether they want it or not. Needless to say that in such cases the very essence of practicing democracy ceases to exist irrespective of its constitutional foundation.