# 1NC Round 6

## Topicality

1. **Interpretation – the affirmative must present in the 1AC and defend throughout the debate the desirability of a stable plan text that is a topical exemplar of the resolution.**

**United States Federal Government is composed of 3 branches**

Britannica Online Encyclopedia, 2006, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., http://www.britannica.com/search?query=Federal+Government&ct= The government of the United States, established by the Constitution, is a federal republic of 50 states, a few territories and some protectorates. The national government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The head of the executive branch is the President of the United States. The legislative branch consists of the United States Congress, while the Supreme Court of the United States is the head of the judicial branch. The federal legal system is based on statutory law, while most state and territorial law is based on English common law, with the exception of Louisiana and Puerto Rico. The United States accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations of the federal republic.

**Energy Production means AMOUNT OF SUPPLY**

5th Circuit Court of Appeals 6 IN THE MATTER OF: MIRANT CORPORATION, Debtor, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, Appellant, VERSUS MIRANT CORPORATION, Appellee. No. 04-11264 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 440 F.3d 238; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3438; Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P80,453; 55 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1050; 46 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 13 February 13, 2006, Filed BPA is a federal power marketing agency within the United States Department of Energy. BPA was created in 1937 by Congress to market low-cost hydroelectric power generated by a series of federal dams along the Columbia River in the Pacific Northwest. See generally Bonneville Project Act of 1937, [16 U.S.C. § 832](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305759034&homeCsi=6396&A=0.3905894189281863&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=16%20U.S.C.%20832&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent). Originally, BPA marketed the energy produced for the benefit of the public, particularly domestic and rural customers, giving preference and priority to public bodies and cooperatives. See [§ 832c(a)](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305759034&homeCsi=6396&A=0.3905894189281863&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=16%20U.S.C.%20832C&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent). For some time, surplus in energy production meant BPA could market freely to all who desired to purchase in the area. In 1980, increasing demands upon the supply triggered, in part, Congress's enactment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, [16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305759034&homeCsi=6396&A=0.3905894189281863&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=16%20U.S.C.%20839&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent), which required BPA to offer new contracts to its customers. See [Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 382, 104 S. Ct. 2472, 81 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1984)](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305759034&homeCsi=6396&A=0.3905894189281863&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=467%20U.S.%20380,%20382&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent). Thereafter, BPA was authorized to acquire additional resources in order to increase the supply of federal power. See [16 U.S.C. § 839d(a)(2)](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305759034&homeCsi=6396&A=0.3905894189281863&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=16%20U.S.C.%20839D&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent). [\*\*5] Accordingly, BPA entered certain contracts related to the marketing of federal power. See [§ 832a(f)](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305759034&homeCsi=6396&A=0.3905894189281863&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=16%20U.S.C.%20832A&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent).

1. **Violation – the affirmative does not defend the desirability of a topical plan text that has the United States federal government increase financial incentives for or reduce restrictions on energy production in the United States.**
2. **Standards –**
	* 1. **Defensible Ground – the aff justifies 1ACs that only claim racism or sexism bad leaving the negative with no acceptable ground. The aff crowds out clash meaning we can’t learn anything truly substantive.**
		2. **Predictable Ground – the 1AC attempts to engage us on ground we could not have been prepared for. The aff allows for an infinite number of cases establishing an impossible research burden. Only our interpretation establishes a clear division of ground on which to base strategies against topical affirmatives improving clash, critical thinking skills, and research ability.**
		3. **Debatability – a concrete text is necessary for negative debatability. Without a stable text, it’s impossible for the neg to establish a comprehensive and coherent strategy because it’s too easy for the aff to make minor modifications to their advocacy. Sticking the aff with a concrete text that exemplifies the resolution results in the most developed and educational debate.**
3. **Topicality is a reason to vote negative –**

**1. Fairness dictates that the Affirmative should be required to operate within a predictable boundary – without that limit, ground is skewed unfairly to the Affirmative, resulting in Aff wins every round due to their unpredictable nature.**

**2. Education – without that fair boundary we can’t be prepared to debate which means there is no clash, and thus no learning. Debate teaches a method we can use to make decisions. If we have nothing to say and too much to research, then it’s impossible to learn that method in order to arrive at the best possible decisions.**

**3. Competitive Equity – In a competition, there must be fair rules under which to compete. If we don’t hold the Aff to basic rules, then the negative would always lose destroying the entire point of competition.**

**4. Don’t mistake our argument for something it’s not – we won’t defend the entirety “traditional” debate, we don’t deny that there can be discursive value to advocacy statements, and we’re not confining them to some rigid boundary – we’re only searching for fair agreement over what the debate is about. And this must precede all other arguments – agreement over the topic is a prerequisite to effective resistance and debate itself.**

**Shively**, assistant professor of political science at Texas A & M University, **2k**

[Ruth Lessl, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-2]

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes:We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. **Resisters**, demonstrators, **and debaters** must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

E. Being untopical has three disadvantages:

#### First, MORAL disagreement: Effective moral deliberation requires that all parties be willing to submit to a RECIPROCAL process of agonistic disagreement. Without an effective PROCESS of switch-side debate, there is no method of dealing with the practical constraints that surround any persuasive context. EVEN IF the affirmative wins there is merit to considering their case, their abandonment of the forum of switch-side debate leaves us less able to speak to problems of power, violence, and inequality because they give up on a process that is inherently valuable.

Gutmann & Thompson 96

[Amy & Dennis, President of Penn State and Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 1//wyo-tjc]

OF THE CHALLENGES that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy. The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex. Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of delib-eration that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation—the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics. We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy. Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribu¬tion to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall pos¬sible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy pre-scribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies dis-cussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not Utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and nondeliberative disa-greement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken. (The abortion example—to which we often return in the book—is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, about a policy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practical politics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection, or between the application of each in the non-ideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where the logical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect always to prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in dem-ocratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already part of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies and process that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

#### Second, ENERGY POLICY:

#### Policymaking is critical now- we must act in the realm of policy before all questions of science are settled because the risk that we’re right produces catastrophic impacts

2011

[Donald A. Brown, Associate Professor of Environmental Ethics, Science, and Law, April 18, 2011, New York Times Krugman Claims That US Congressional Hearings Are A Moral Failure: The US Congress and The Ethics of Willful Ignorance., <http://rockblogs.psu.edu/climate/2011/04/new-york-times-krugman-claims-that-us-congressional-hearings-are-a-moral-failure-the-us-congress-and.html>, uwyo//amp]

Introduction In an April 4, 2011 New York Times op-ed entitled "The Truth, Still Inconvenient," Paul Krugman charged that Republican led climate change hearings that had just concluded were a deep moral failure. (Krugman, 2011) Krugman described the GOP US House of Representatives hearings at which of five invited witnesses on climate change, one was a lawyer, another an economist, and a third a professor of marketing---witnesses without any expertise in climate change science. One of the witnesses that was actually a scientist was expected to support the skeptical position but surprised everyone by supporting the mainstream scientific view on the amount of warming that the world has already experienced. Yet he was immediately attacked by climate skeptics. The point of the Krugman article is that it is obvious from the witnesses who were asked to testify that the GOP led hearings were never meant to be a serious attempt to understand climate change science. In this regard, Krugman says: . But it's worth stepping back for a moment and thinking not just about the science here, but about the morality. For years now, large numbers of prominent scientists have been warning, with increasing urgency, that if we continue with business as usual, the results will be very bad, perhaps catastrophic. They could be wrong. But if you're going to assert that they are in fact wrong, you have a moral responsibility to approach the topic with high seriousness and an open mind. After all, if the scientists are right, you'll be doing a great deal of damage. But what we had, instead of high seriousness, was a farce: a supposedly crucial hearing stacked with people who had no business being there and instant ostracism for a climate skeptic who was actually willing to change his mind in the face of evidence. As I said, no surprise: as Upton Sinclair pointed out long ago, it's difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it. But it's terrifying to realize that this kind of cynical careerism -- for that's what it is -- has probably ensured that we won't do anything about climate change until catastrophe is already upon us. So on second thought, I was wrong when I said that the joke was on the G.O.P.; actually, the joke is on the human race.  (Krugman 20110) This post examines Krugman's moral claims about the hearings. . II. Ethics and The US Congressional Hearings. The central ethical problem with the US Congressional climate change hearings on climate change is entailed by the universally recognized duty of people and nations to prevent avoidable harm to others. As we have seen in ClimateEthics, all major ethical theories recognize duties, obligations, and responsibilities of people to prevent serious harm to all people without regard to where they live around the world. See, Ethical Problems With Cost Arguments Against Climate Change Policies: The Failure To Recognize Duties To Non-citizens. Also, as ClimateEthics has previously explained, this duty to prevent harm is triggered once anyone is on notice that harms to others could be created by their actions particularly when those harms could be grave. A corollary of this responsibility is that once someone is put on notice that their behavior could be creating great harm one can know cannot avoid the duty to prevent harm to others by ignoring evidence that their behavior is causing harm. The behavior of the US Congress in the recent climate change hearings is deeply ethically problematic because there was no serious attempt to understand the potential harms the United States was causing others through US emissions of greenhouse gases. In fact, the witnesses that were selected by Congress could not be seriously understood as a sincere effort to determine the nature of the threat entailed by climate change. One must assume the Congressional hearings were designed to avoid what credible scientists or credible scientific institutions such as the US Academy of Sciences know about climate change. This kind of behavior is often referred to in ethics as "willful ignorance." In the 13th Century, Thomas Aquinas explained why "willful ignorance" is ethically problematic. It is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. ...This may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is \*bound and able to know." (Aquinas, 1225) Without doubt, gathering information for the purpose of ignoring obligations that would flow from the relevant evidence is deeply ethically troublesome. Because the impacts of climate change are so potentially devastatingly catastrophic to millions of poor people around the world, willful ignorance of climate change causation must be understood to be deeply ethically reprehensible. This is particularly true because, as ClimateEthics has on numerous times before explained, the duty to act on climate change is triggered long before all scientific uncertainties are resolved. . See for instance: Have We Been Asking the Wrong Questions About Climate Change Science? Why Strong Climate Change Ethical Duties Exist Before Scientific Uncertainties are Resolved. Also see: Twenty Ethical Questions that the US Press Should Ask Opponents of Climate Change Policies., and the Ethical Duty to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, From the standpoint of ethics, those who engage in risky behavior are not exonerated because they did not know that their behavior would actually cause damage. Under law that implements this ethical norm, for instance, to be convicted of reckless driving or reckless endangerment, a prosecutor simply has to prove that the defendant acted in a way that he or she should have known to be risky. Many types of risky behavior are criminal because societies believe dangerous behavior is irresponsible and should not be condoned. As a matter of ethics, a relevant question in the face of scientific uncertainty about harmful consequences of human behavior is whether there is a reasonable basis for concluding that serious harm to others could result from the behavior. Yet, as we have seen, in the case of climate change, humans have understood the potential threat from climate change for over one hundred years and the scientific support for this concern has been building with increasing speed over the last thirty years. In fact, for more than 20 years, the IPCC, a scientific body created with the strong support of governments around the world to advise them about the conclusions of peer review climate change science, has been telling the world that the great harm from climate change is not only possible but likely with increasing levels of confidence. Moreover, since the late 1970s, the United States Academy of Sciences has been advising the US government that human induced climate change is a serious threat to human health and life and the natural systems on which life depends. By the end of the 1980s there was widespread understanding among climate change scientists around the world that there was a great threat posed by rising concentrations of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases event though there were considerable uncertainties about timing and magnitude of climate change impacts. The climate science that has been accumulating in the last 20 years has been increasing the confidence about timing and magnitude of climate change impacts according to IPCC as wells as reasons for concluding that recent warming is largely human caused not withstanding considerable natural variability in the climate system. The United States Congress has clearly been on notice for several decades that climate change is a significant threat. III. Conclusion Thus far we have seen that it's ethically unacceptable to willfully avoid evidence that would establish potential harm to others and that this duty stems from the clear ethical responsibility recognized by almost all ethical theories to prevent serious harm to others. We have also seen that even in the face of uncertainty about the harm, ethics requires action. Given what is at stake with climate change, the conduct of the recent US hearings on climate change is deeply ethically bankrupt. Krugman's condemnation of the recently concluded US Congressional hearings on climate change is strongly supported by almost all ethical theories. Given what is at stake in climate change, U.S. Congress has a strong duty to examine the science of climate change carefully using the most reliable scientific analyses and expertise. The United States created the United Academy of Sciences for the express goal of giving scientific advice to government. In a report in May 2010, the US Academy concluded that: A strong, credible body of scientific evidence shows that climate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses significant risks for a broad range of human and natural systems.(US Academy, 2010) Given that the National Academy of Sciences was created for the express purpose of giving advice to the government about scientific issues and that Congress is now expressly ignoring the advice of the very institution created to summarize significant complex scientific issues, the recent hearings of Congress are even more ethically troubling then the moral failure in conducting the hearings.

#### Third, SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE: The net-benefits are both epistemic and ontological: epistemic because prepared, competitive discourse and required listening to both sides of an argument is a prerequisite for critical reasoning, ontological because it affirms a method of living that is the only antidote to the violence of the affirmative’s universalist dogma, which is the root of violence and genocide

Roberts-Miller 3

[Patricia, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at UT Austin, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in both rhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

#### And, BOUNDED CREATIVITY outweighs: You should embrace a model of debate that strikes a balance between predictability and creativity—it is a PRACTICAL REALITY that preparing to debate within a common framework enhances education because it maximizes elaboration and testing of ideas. That’s also a reason to SEVERLY DISCOUNT their impact claims because those claims have not been submitted to rigorous testing but are only shallow gut-shot reactions.

Goodin 03

[Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, uwyo//amp]

Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue.

#### And, It is OK to divorce debate from the ‘real-world’- a laboratory separate from conviction is necessary to teach methods of argumentative reasoning AND advocacy skills—You should privilege these skills even if you have to sacrifice purity of inquiry because these are the skills MOST UNIQUE to the debate forum—they can’t be garnered anywhere else

Muir 93

[Star A., Professor of Communication Studies at George Mason, Philosophy and Rhetoric, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

The emphasis on method---focusing on the technique of debate as an educational end---is characteristic of the defense of debating both sides of a resolution. Interscholastic debate, many scholars reason, is different from “real world” disputation; it lacks the purposes or functions of a senate speech, a public demonstration, or a legal plea. Debate is designed to train students to construct arguments, to locate weaknesses in reasoning, to organize ideas, and to present and defend ideas effectively, not to convert the judge to a particular belief. As such, it is intended to teach debaters to see both sides of an issue and to become proficient in the exposition of argument independent of moral or ethical convictions. The debaters are to present the best case possible given the issues they have to work with. The definition of debate thus shapes a conception of its role in the development of the individual. Windes reaffirms the value of such a procedural training in his view of the activity: Academic debating is a generic term for oral contests in argumentation, held according to established rules, the purpose being to present both sides of a controversy so effectively that a decision may be reached---not on which side was right or wrong but on which side did the better job of arguing. Academic debating is gamesmanship applied to argumentation, not the trivial and amusing gamesmanship often thought of, but sober, realistic, important gamesmanship.

## K

#### Their imagination of a better world is a continuation of the ascetic ideal. This association of all that is good at not of this world expresses a hatred for the only one we’ve got—turns case. Fantasizing about a world without suffering produces creative impotence only our relationship to life can escape this paradox of resentment

Turlani in 2003

(Aydan, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Letters and Sciences
Istanbul Technical University, “Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 26 (2003), 55-63)

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (*WP* III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. **[End Page 61]** Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants *to escape from torture*" (*GM* III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of *this* world'" (*GM* III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (*WP* III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (*WP* III 586). The way out of the circle created by the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (*PI* §309).

#### And, the 1ac’s vision of a perfect world causes us to hate the one we have, leads to denial of life of this life for a more perfect one

Nietzsche, 1872 (Friedrich, philosopher, “The Birth of Tragedy” Online, MB)

Already in the preface addressed to Richard Wagner, art, and *not* morality, is presented as the truly *metaphysical* activity of man. In the book itself the suggestive sentence is repeated several times, that the existence of the world is *justified* only as an aesthetic phenomenon. Indeed, the whole book knows only an artistic meaning and crypto-meaning behind all events—a "god," if you please, but certainly only an entirely reckless and amoral artist-god who wants to experience, whether he is building or destroying, in the good and in the bad, his own joy and glory—one who, creating worlds, frees himself from the *distress* of fullness and *overfullness* and from the *affliction* of the contradictions compressed in his soul. The world—at every moment the *attained* salvation of God, as the eternally changing, eternally new vision of the most deeply afflicted, discordant, and contradictory being who can find salvation only in *appearance*: you can call this whole artists' metaphysics arbitrary, idle, fantastic; what matters is that it betrays a spirit who will one day fight at any risk whatever the *moral* interpretation and significance of existence. Here, perhaps for the first time, a pessimism "beyond good and evil" is suggested. Here that "perversity of mind" gains speech and formulation against which Schopenhauer never wearied of hurling in advance his most irate curses and thunderbolts [*Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851), II.5, 69]: a philosophy that dares to move, to demote, morality into the realm of appearance—and not merely among "appearances" or phenomena (in the sense of the idealistic **terminus technicus** [technical term]), but among "deceptions," as semblance, delusion, error, interpretation, contrivance, art. Perhaps the depth of this *antimoral* propensity is best inferred from the careful and hostile silence with which Christianity is treated throughout the whole book—Christianity as the most prodigal elaboration of the moral theme to which humanity has ever been subjected. In truth, nothing could be more opposed to the purely aesthetic interpretation and justification of the world which are taught in this book than the Christian teaching, which is, and wants to be, *only* moral and which relegates art, every art, to the realm of lies; with its absolute standards, beginning with the truthfulness of God, it negates, judges, and damns art. Behind this mode of thought and valuation, which must be hostile to art if it is at all genuine, I never failed to sense a hostility to life—a furious, vengeful antipathy to life itself: for all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view [Optik], and the necessity of perspectives and error. Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life's nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed up as, faith in "another: or "better" life. Hatred of "the world," condemnations of the passions [Affekte], fear of beauty and sensuality, a beyond invented the better to slander this life, at bottom a craving for the nothing, for the end, for respite, for "the sabbath of sabbaths"—all this always struck me, no less than the unconditional will of Christianity to recognize *only* moral values, as the most dangerous and uncanny form of all possible forms of a "will to decline"—at the very least a sign of abysmal sickness, weariness, discouragement, exhaustion, and the impoverishment of life. For, confronted with morality (especially Christian, or unconditional, morality), life must continually and inevitably be in the wrong, because life is something essentially amoral—and eventually, crushed by the weight of contempt and the eternal No, life must then be felt to be unworthy of desire and altogether worthless. Morality itself—how now? might not morality be "a will to negate life," a secret instinct of annihilation, a principle of decay, diminution, and slander—the beginning of the end? Hence, the danger of dangers? ... It was *against* morality that my instinct turned with this questionable book, long ago; it was an instinct that aligned itself with life and that discovered for itself a fundamentally opposite doctrine and valuation of life—purely artistic and *anti-Christian*. What to call it? As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, not without taking some liberty—for who could claim to know the rightful name of the Antichrist?—in the name of a Greek god: I called it *Dionysian*. —

#### Thus the alternative:

#### We should forget the 1ac in order to affirm life

Zupancic, 2003 (Alenka, Philosopher, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzche’s philosophy of the two” Online, MB)

It is true that there is also a rather different notion present in Christianity, a notion much closer to Nietzsche’s own position—namely, the notion of mercy as situated “beyond law” (Jenseits des Rechts). Nietzsche links to this notion nothing less than the possibility of an escape from the vicious circle of punishment and guilt. But his notion of mercy is not simply that of an act of forgiveness; it can spring only from a surplus of “power” and “richness.” Illustrating this with the example of actual wealth, Nietzsche writes that the creditor becomes more human to the extent that he has grown richer: so that, finally, how much injury he can endure without suffering from it becomes the actual measure of his wealth.24 Such a creditor can now allow himself the noblest luxury possible: letting those who harm him go unpunished. In this way, the justice which began with “everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged” ends by winking, and letting those who are incapable of discharging their debt go free. This “self-overcoming of justice” is called mercy, and remains the privilege of the most “powerful.”25 We should be careful here not to believe that the terms “rich” and “powerful” refer simply to those who have a lot of money, and hold this or that position of power.As Nietzsche points out, it is the capacity not to be injured, and not to suffer because of an injustice, that constitutes the measure of one’s richness and power—not the capacity to endure suffering and injury, to bear pain, but the capacity not to let this suffering as suffering enter the constitution of one’s subjectivity (which also means the capacity not to let oneself be subjectivized in the figure of the “subject of injury,” the figure of the victim). Those who can manage this are “rich” and “powerful” because they can manage it, not the other way around. There is also an important difference between forgiving and (what Nietzsche calls) forgetting. Forgiveness has a perverse way of involving us even further in debt. To forgive somehow always implies to pay for the other, and thus to use the very occurrence of injury and its forgiveness as a new “engagement ring.” Nietzsche makes this very point in relation to Christianity: the way God has forgiven our sins has been to pay for them, to pay for them with His own “flesh.” This is the fundamental perversity of Christianity: while forgiving, it simultaneously brandishes at us the cross, the instrument of torture, the memory of the one who suffered and died so that we could be forgiven, the memory of the one who paid for us. Christianity forgives, but does not forget. One could say that, with the eyes of the sinner fixed on the cross, forgiving creates a new debt in the very process of this act. It forgives what was done, but it does not forgive the act of forgiving itself. On the contrary, the latter establishes a new bond and a new debt. It is now infinite mercy (as the capacity of forgiving) that sustains the infinite debt, the debt as infinite. The debt is no longer brought about by our actions; it is brought about by the act of forgiving us these actions.We are indebted for forgiveness. The infinite capacity to forgive might well become the infernal flame in which we “temper” our debt and guilt. This is why Nietzsche counters the concept of forgiving with the concept of forgetting (“a good example of this in modern times is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done to him and was unable to forgive simply because he—forgot”).26 This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean “forgetting” is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of “great health”? Nietzsche claims that memory entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes as the principle used in human “mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory.”27 Thus, if memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche claims the opposite of what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects of repression; yet pain is not the same thing as trauma, just as “forgetting” is not the same thing as repressing), then forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of our actions and choiceXs. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but, rather, the “mental pain” that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and appropriates some traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure. In other words, in relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event, but already its memory (the “memory of the body”). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of the traumatic encounter as a preservation of its external character, of its foreignness, of its otherness. In Unfashionable Observations, Second Piece (“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life”), Nietzsche links the question of forgetting (which he employs as a synonym for the ahistorical) to the question of the act. Forgetting, oblivion, is the very condition of possibility for an act in the strong sense of the word. Memory (the “historical”) is eternal sleeplessness and alert insomnia, a state in which no great thing can happen, and which could even be said to serve this very purpose. Considering the common conception according to which memory is something monumental that “fixes” certain events, and closes us within their horizon, Nietzsche proposes a significantly different notion. It is precisely as an eternal openness, an unceasing stream, that memory can immobilize us, mortify us, make us incapable of action. Nietzsche invites us to imagine the extreme example of a human being who does not possess the power to forget. Such a human being would be condemned to see becoming everywhere: he would no longer believe in his own being, would see everything flow apart in turbulent particles, and would lose himself in this stream of becoming. He would be like the true student of Heraclitus. A human being who wanted to experience things in a thoroughly historical manner would be like someone forced to go without sleep.28 Memory holds us in eternal motion—it keeps opening numerous horizons, and this is precisely how it immobilizes us, forcing us into frenetic activity. Hence, Nietzsche advances a thesis that is as out of tune with our time as it was with his own: “every living thing can become healthy, strong and fruitful only within a defined horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and too selfish, in turn, to enclose its own perspective within an alien horizon, then it will feebly waste away or hasten to its timely end.”29 Of course, Nietzsche’s aim here is not to preach narrow-mindedness and pettiness, nor is it simply to affirm the ahistorical against history and memory. On the contrary, he clearly states that it is only by thinking, reflecting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing (i.e. only by means of the power to utilize the past for life, and to reshape past events into history) that the human being becomes properly human.Yet, in the excess of history, the human being ceases to be human once again, no longer able to create or invent. This is why Nietzsche insists that “every great historical event” is born in the “ahistorical atmosphere,” that is to say, in conditions of oblivion and closure: Imagine a man seized and carried away by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea; how his world changes! Looking backward he feels he is blind, listening around he hears what is unfamiliar as a dull, insignificant sound; and those things that he perceives at all he never before perceived in this way; so palpable and near, colorful, resonant, illuminated, as though he were apprehending it with all his senses at once. All his valuations are changed and devalued; . . . It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings; a tiny whirlpool of life in a dead sea of night and oblivion; and yet this condition—ahistorical, antihistorical through and through— is not only womb of the unjust deed, but of every just deed as well; and no artist will create a picture, no general win a victory, and no people gain its freedom without their having previously desired and striven to accomplish these deeds in just such an ahistorical condition. . . . Thus, everyone who acts loves his action infinitely more than it deserves to be loved, and the best deeds occur in such an exuberance of love that, no matter what, they must be unworthy of this love, even if their worth were otherwise incalculably great.30 If we read this passage carefully,we note that the point is not simply that the capacity to forget, or the “ahistorical condition,” is the condition of “great deeds” or “events.” On the contrary: it is the pure surplus of passion or love (for something) that brings about this closure of memory, this “ahistorical condition.” In other words, it is not that we have first to close ourselves within a defined horizon in order then to be able to accomplish something. The closure takes place with the very (“passionate”) opening toward something (“a woman or a great idea”). Nietzsche’s point is that if this surplus passion engages us “in the midst of life,” instead of mortifying us, it does so via its inducement of forgetting. Indeed, I could mention a quite common experience here: whenever something important happens to us and incites our passion,we tend to forget and dismiss the grudges and resentments we might have been nurturing before. Instead of “forgiving” those who might have injured us in the past, we forget and dismiss these injuries. If we do not, if we “work on our memory” and strive to keep these grudges alive, they will most probably affect and mortify our (new) passion.

## Case

#### Capitalism sustainable and inevitable: empirically proven to adapt to any conditions

Farndale 12

(Nigel, The Daily Telegraph, “CAPITALISM: We can rebuild it REPORT First we blamed bankers for the financial collapse, and now the system itself is under attack. But do economists have any better ideas?” January 15, 2012, ProQuest//wyo-mm)

Adam Fergusson's book When Money Dies: the Nightmare of the Weimar Hyperinflation, has become a modern classic. I ask for Fergusson's take. "I don't think there are any serious alternatives to capitalism," he says, "not if we hope for growth and recovery, because capitalism represents the competition and enterprise that produces these things. The events of the past three or four years will have taught those who practise capitalism some big lessons." Does his blood run cold at mention of quantitative easing? "Absolutely. It hasn't worked with us. It hasn't worked in America. The danger is of losing control. If it doesn't work you try harder with more, and it if it does work you increase the amount. It's like drug addiction." And anyway, a shortage of money is not the problem. The problem is that the money is in the wrong place. It's in China where people, for reasons that seem enigmatic to us, like to - say it in a whisper - save. What we are witnessing, then, is the "creative destruction" of the heavily indebted Western economies by the emerging economies of the East. Darwinism at its purest. And a very capitalist idea. What, after all, is capitalism about if not competition and survival of the fittest? Capitalism, like the poor, will always be with us, because trade is how society operates.XX Trade is the human condition. As the philosopher Michel Onfray has said: "Is this the end of capitalism? Absolutely not. Capitalism has been through antiquity, feudalism, the industrial era, it has worn the guise of fascism and now it's wedding itself to the ecology cause. After this latest event, it will take on a new form. It is indestructible and works like the Hydra of Lerne, cut off one head and another grows in its place."

**Aff rejects capital T truths- these are necessary for rejecting atrocities in the real world, otherwise everything is relative**

Their ethical framework is at loggerheads with itself—considerations for any ethical system necessarily presuppose a human benchmark to refer back to. Two impacts: either human-centric value is inevitable and they don’t solve, or their value schema is a backdoor anthropomorphic method of asserting value without warrant, turns the case\*\*

Hayward 97

[PhD, Department of Politics at Edinburgh University, “Anthropocentrism: a Misunderstood Problem”, Environmental Values, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

But if the project of overcoming speciesism can be pursued with some expectation of success, this is not the case with the overcoming of anthropocentrism. What makes anthropocentrism unavoidable is a limitation of a quite different sort, one which cannot be overcome even in principle because it involves a non-contingent limitation on moral thinking as such. While overcoming speciesism involves a commitment to the pursuit of knowledge of relevant similarities and differences between humans and other species, the criteria of relevance will always have an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism about them. Speciesism is the arbitrary refusal to extend moral consideration to relevantly similar cases; the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is marked by the impossibility of giving meaningful moral consideration to cases which bear no similarity to any aspect of human cases. The emphasis is on the ‘meaningful’ here: for in the abstract one could of course declare that some feature of the nonhuman world was morally valuable, despite meeting no determinate criterion of value already recognised by any human, but because the new value is completely unrelated to any existing value it will remain radically indeterminate as a guide to action. If the ultimate point of an ethic is to yield a determinate guide to human action, then, the human reference is ineliminable even when extending moral concern to nonhumansX. So my argument is that one cannot know if any judgement is speciesist if one has no benchmark against which to test arbitrariness; and, more specifically, if we are concerned to avoid speciesism of humans then one must have standards of comparison between them and others. Thus features of humans remain the benchmark. As long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criteria of value will be limited by this fact. It is this fact which precludes the possibility of a radically nonanthropocentric value scheme, if by that is meant the adoption of a set of values which are supposed to be completely unrelated to any existing human values. Any attempt to construct a radically non-anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be arbitrary – because founded on no certain knowledge – but also to be more insidiously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a matter of fact are selected by a human, onto nonhuman beings without certain warrant for doing so. This, of course, is the error of anthropomorphism, and will inevitably, I believe, be committed in any attempt to expunge anthropocentrism altogether.

#### First Personalized debate Has Two Disads- Victimization and Therapy rhetoric

Zompetti 04

[Joseph P. Zompetti (Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University) “PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY” September  2004   Contemporary Argumentation and Debate volume 25, \\wyo-bb]

Many, if not most, of **the complaints heard in debate rounds have merit**. As a community, we must address the issues of exclusivity, tolerance, respect and diversity. **However, when debaters make arguments about these issues in debate rounds, the arguments become personalized, often seen as attacks against specific individuals, namely the "other" team** (in arguments such as "you don't address your privilege," or "you don't do anything or aren't doing enough for diversity"). The so-called "Other" that debaters refer to as being marginalized becomes transferred onto "other" individuals and teams as the competitive structure of a debate necessitates. **The point, then, is not that these complaints and concerns should not be discussed, but that they should not be discussed in actual debate rounds**. I should also add that since diversity is still an on-going concern, we must question the efficacy of personalized debating at generally improving diversity in our community. **Even if other solutions fall short as well, they at least avoid the pitfalls of personalized debating** that I now begin to explore. Interjecting **the personalized into debate rounds has become highly problematic.** As discussions on eDebate demonstrate 1 and my own discussions with folks who have judged teams like Louisville 1 suggest, **these arguments have increased anxiety, frustration, anger and resentment. To be fair, these arguments have also facilitated much soul-searching and self-reflexivity in the community**. However, except for the Urban Debate League (UDL) movement 2 little, **if anything, is being done to correct for inadequacies and inequities in the community, contrary to the appeal of the personalized arguments. In fact, any benefits from the personalization of debate can be accrued from enhancing other strategies: larger community discussions** (as evidenced by some messages on eDebate), 3 discussion fora at national tournaments, 4 special high school debate institutes, 5 clear directives and discussion during the CEDA and NDT business and roundtable meetings, 6 more sensitive topic selection, 7 etc. **The drawbacks to personalizing debate, however, are, in my opinion, enormous. I will elaborate on two significant problems of engaging the personal in actual debate rounds: victimhood and therapy rhetoric.**

#### Second- Victimage Stacks The Deck In Favor of the other Team- Arguments Non-falsifiable

Zompetti 04

[Joseph P. Zompetti (Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University) “PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY” September  2004   Contemporary Argumentation and Debate volume 25, \\wyo-bb]

**The first major problem with this new form of debating is its appeal to victimage. Through victimage and scapegoating, a rhetor uses a purification ritual as a means of identifying and blaming the guilt onto an “appropriate” other**. This commonality helps form identification among people when such blaming is in common (Burke, 1962, p. 22). In other words, **victimage necessarily implies the understanding that one is in a position of marginalization.** In debate, **marginalized groups gain credit for being victims by arguing their plight among the community. There is no shame in that. However, many so-called "victims" deploy these arguments in actual debate rounds.** I have no problem with discussions of exclusivity and underrepresentation in our community, but let me be clear: Such arguments should not be the focus of debate competition. On one level, we clearly have a problem in our community, namely the marginalization of diverse groups. On the other level, **we have arguments about problem "x" occurring in debate rounds where debate teams may not have access to knowledge concerning the problem of the community-at-large or they may not be prepared to debate such issues** (after all, one is reminded of the importance of clash in individual debates). Clearly, **we have a mismatch concerning a topic and its venue. The concomitant positions advanced by a team in favor of changing the community are essentially "debate-proof."** We may initially want to congratulate such debaters for their strategic prowess: For **how can one debate against the claim that one "feels" or "perceives" marginalization? Such claims are unverifiable and dependent on the person who is advancing the argument, not on the one answering it. In essence, then, victimage arguments "stack-the-deck" in favor of those advocating such positions.**

**Self-correction proven by the status quo – low prices caused by the downturn make it attractive to invest – prevents system failure**

**Kiviat 10**

 (Barbara, Time Magazine correspondent, 2-15, lexis)

Few in Davos dissented from that somber view. But David Rubenstein--co-founder and managing director of the Carlyle Group, a leading private-equity shop--pointed out that buyers were returning. "I'd say it's a pretty attractive time to invest," Rubenstein said, "because prices are relatively low. I think **the risk of systemic failure in the United States' financial system or the global financial system is gone.** And as a result I think investors are now willing to put capital to work again and to get reasonably attractive rates of return."

**Self-correcting market sources will create a gradual transition to cheap clean energy**

**Williams ‘3**

(Bob Williams, executive editor, 8-18-2003, Oil & Gas Journal, p. 18, l/n)

If the depletionists are right about global oil production peaking around the turn of the decade, then renewables won't need much in the way of subsidies or Kyoto mandates; skyrocketing costs of oil will help usher in a renewables era sooner than anyone currently predicts. But the resulting high energy costs for everyone will prove a massive economic dislocation for the world, a grim scenario often outlined by the peak-oil theorists. Some have even painted alarming pictures of civilization crumbling as a result of this new oil shock. "No technology breakthrough can come to alter the imminent oil peak; it would take much too long to put new technology in place to hope to dent oil and gas demand," said A.M. Samsam Bakhtiari, National Iranian Oil Co. senior expert. "Even if the two great hopes of solar and cold fusion would materialize, they could not be developed in time, as it takes decades (not years) to put in place the necessary infrastructures." But there is a prevailing view among most energy economists that an approaching peak and subsequent steep decline in global oil production will send early price signals that will crimp demand, spur development of nonconventional oil resources, and thus stave off the peak day. Another prominent peak-oil theorist, who declined to be identified, acknowledged that "prices will rise, but they will send a signal that comes too late, given the long lead times to create new energy infrastructures. This will result in a reduction of demand but, unfortunately, the so-created room of maneuver will be short-lived because non-Middle East oil supply will continue to decline with little chance that new investments will be sufficient to compensate for both this decline and the potential [overall] rise of demand. "To this equation, one should add the negative impact on the GDP, as was the case during the last 30 years each time the price of oil went up. I believe that it won't be the end of the civilization, but it will certainly be a painful transition." Some of the depletionists contend that the only answer is for governments to take steps now to boost energy prices and thereby conserve what oil reserves remain. But the unidentified peak-oil theorist is a contrarian on that score. "The idea that planners, and especially state planners, could be smart enough to rise the prices progressively to avoid a shock is totally unrealistic," he told OGJ. "My preference is to leave things happen and ensure that governments will not intervene. A competitive industry is by far the best means to ensure a rapid and correct adaptation." Rowley too sees increasing pressure on oil supplies within the next decade but offers a less apocalyptic vision. "[Natural] gas will act as a next phase after oil, but what we expect to see over the next decade is a realization that conventional energy costs can only go one way, up," he said. "The global economy has a wonderful way of coping, and transition away from conventional to renewables will occur. "**The real pivotal impact of renewable energy will be within the period of 2010-20**, where players will be making significant choices between a maturing renewable sector and conventional [energy sources]." Noting that recent history is full of instances in which technical progress or volatility of primary energy sources has led to major changes in energy supply or energy consumption, Mogford voices the BP stance that "oil will remain in relatively abundant supply for at least the next 15 years, with gas being plentiful for several decades longer. "More than economics will drive the growth of alternative energy. Security of supply, minimization of environmental impacts, and technical advances will also be factors." But will the transition to renewables be an orderly one? Sullivan expressed her belief in an **orderly transition**: "We have seen occasional price spikes in traditional energy resources over the last 30 years, and I suspect we will continue to see those from time to time, for various reasons." But I also suspect that governments will tailor their policies on emissions, renewable portfolio requirements, and technology funding to ensure that, except for the occasional, unusual price spikes, there is an orderly transition to an era in which renewables and non-conventional fossil fuel technologies are playing a major role in our energy supply picture." Therefore, she reckons that it will be another 20-25 years before alternative energy sources play a dominant role the world's energy mix. But **orderly and rapid are not** necessarily **mutually exclusive** in this outlook, says Namovicz. "If 'orderly' transition means 'gradual' transition, I think that history shows that transitions to a new form of energy can happen relatively quickly, over the course of a decade or so, but are not necessarily disorderly," he said. "If, either through subsidy or natural market forces, one or more renewable technology becomes very economically attractive, there may be a boom period where lots of new capacity is built every year for a few years, just like lots of new gas combined-cycle capacity has been built over the past few years. But just because they're building lots of new combined-cycle units doesn't mean the coal units are suddenly disappearing. It shouldn't be too surprising to see a similar pattern if wind or bio-mass suddenly broke through some economic threshold, with lots of new annual capacity additions all of a sudden, but with the impact greatly dampened because the existing capital stock is so large, and they weren't necessarily being built to replace that [capital stock], but potentially to satisfy new demand." In addition to the existing-capital-stock issue, Namovicz also cautions observers to remember the effect of market feedbacks in citing his expectation that it will be a long time before renewables can become the world's dominant energy source. "If wind becomes economic because natural gas is too expensive, then they will build lots of wind [projects]. But this will take market share from gas and lower the gas price. At the lower gas price, the new economics for wind may dampen its growth." If in fact a permanent oil shock is looming on the near horizon, it would seem that an early effort to impose higher energy prices for that reason or **to support an early transition** to renewables **would have its own severe economic consequences, especially for developing countries.** In effect, **this could accelerate the** price **shock**. The likely deep recession that would ensue could hit not only the developing countries directly but also squelch economic growth in the developed countries, upon which the former depend heavily for export markets and economic aid.

**Traditional free-market capitalism is gone – technological progress will move us toward a sustainable capitalism, and there is no superior alternative**

**Veron ‘9**

(Nicolas, Research Fellow at Bruegel, National Journal Online, “Re-examining Capitalism,” 3-17, http://economy.nationaljournal.com/2009/03/re-examining-capitalism.php?rss=1)

Nothing in what has happened in the past eighteen months or so suggests that the basic tenets of capitalism as we know it have been altered. As things stand, our economic systems will continue to rely on companies generally started by entrepreneurs, whose equity is generally held by private-sector entities, and which generally compete with each other for revenue and profit. Companies will still need to rely on a complex financial system to access the capital they need. Even after the humbling experience of the past months, **there is no superior framework available to channel humankind's economic impulses and activity.** Nor will capitalism become more 'moral', as some would have it. It has never been and will never be. Capitalism can always be the best and wor[st] of things, emancipating upstart entrepreneurs or alienating exploited employees, strengthening or destabilizing social balances, rewarding hard work or enriching lazy rent-holders, enabling philanthropy and human development or crushing communities and spoiling the environment. It is in its nature to be all this at once. On that front, nothing has changed since French novelist Emile Zola pictured in L'Argent (1891) the Janus-like identity of the industrial capitalism of his time, with its inseparable mix of creative entrepreneurship and destructive speculation. **But this does not mean that tomorrow's capitalism will be identical to yesterday's**. In some scenarios, protectionist impulses, which are everywhere to be seen these days, could lead to a reversal of the global cross-border integration of the past three decades and give new relevance to the notion of national companies and financial systems, which had tended to become increasingly hollow. State ownership could expand from the financial sector to other industries and again become an enduring feature, as it has been in many countries during the third quarter of the 20th century. Financial systems could be reshaped by regulation and allocate capital on the basis of political priorities rather than the search for the best risk-adjusted return. But do not bet on it. **Technological breakthroughs**, more than anything else, have powerfully supported and **will** continue to **support the trends towards more complex, unbundled and global supply chains**; the ability of entrepreneurial new firms to challenge established ones; and more choice and empowerment offered to savers on how to invest their money. Each of these trends has its downsides. But their net economic benefits are too great to be reversed by the crisis, **even after the outright defeat of the naïve ideological vision of a self-organizing marketplace.**