### CARDS ON FRAMEWORK

**Affect constitutes Language.**

**Bourassa 2k2** (Alan Bourassa; Assistant English professor at St. Thomas University in

Fredericton, New Brunswick; “A Shock To Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari” Chapter 5 “Literature, Language, And The Non-Human” Pg. 64-65 [EB])

Repetition, sensation, action can all be the basis of affect, and **affect**, as Deleuze has described it, is whatever comes into being when something is affected or affects something else. More than that, it **is the determination** (which must always be actual) **that founds all potentiality**. **Language is filled with affect**s, **and** indeed, **would have no existence without them. But this also means that language is not a homogeneous and empty space in which various affects can be displayed** like paintings on a wall. Language-as-affect (which we will see later is the same thing as language-taken-up-by-affect) is so various that it begins to seem more and more misguided to see language as a genus (or a system, a langue) into which individual events (or speech acts, or parole) are gathered. A love sonnet, a battle cry, a judgement from the bench, a mass, do not seem to be convincingly related by tarring them with a brush called ‘language’. **However, if affect is an affecting or a being-affected, then all that makes language possible, all those forces that link up with it, become part of it.** **Emotion, sensation, possibility, material, force, all have their place in language**. And though we may argue along with Benjamin that it is only in the human that the most perfect language takes place, we must also argue (and not against Benjamin) that **human language has nothing to communicate of the nonhuman world** **without that non-human world communicating itself to him**. **What**, for example, **is less human that light**? Less removed from the fleshy weight of the body, the torpidity of muscle? And yet what is more the basis of human knowledge and understanding, Heidegger’s Dasein standing in the lighted clearing of Being? How much is clarity, uncovering, dispelling of darkness the proudest achievement of the human mind? This is what I mean when I say that **affect is non-human, yet, far from being hostile to the human, gives it the gift of possibility**

**A) Their interpretation gives us a choice – Adopt our authoritative discourse or be skirted out. This captures the subjectivity of minor groups and ensures the death of alterity.**

**Secomb 2K** (Linnell, a lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Sydney, “Fractured Community,” Hypatia – volume 15, Number 2, Spring 2000, pp. 138-9 )

This reformulated **universalist model of community would be founded on** "a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, **the willingness to reason from the others' point of view**, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount" (1992, 8). **Benhabib argues** that this model does not assume that consensus can be reached but **that a** "**reasonable agreement**" **can be achieved**. This formulation of community on the basis of a conversation in which perspectives can be reversed, also implies a new understanding of identity and alterity. Instead of the generalized other, Benhabib argues that ethics, politics, and community must engage with the concrete or particular other. A theory that only engages with the generalized other sees the other as a replica of the self. In order to overcome this reductive assimilation of alterity, Benhabib formulates **a universalist community** which **recognizes the concrete other and** which **allows us to view others as unique** individuals (1992, 10). Benhabib's critique of universalist liberal theory and her formulation of an alternative conversational model of community are useful and illuminating. **However**, I suggest that **her vision** still **assumes the desirability of commonality** and agreement, **which**, I argue, ultimately **destroy difference**. **Her vision of a community of conversing alterities assumes sufficient similarity between alterities** [End Page 138] **so that each can adopt the point of view of the other** and, through this means, reach a "reasonable agreement." She assumes the necessity of a common goal for the community that would be the outcome of the "reasonable agreement." Benhabib's community, then, while attempting to enable difference and diversity, continues to assume a commonality of purpose within community **and implies a subjectivity that would** ultimately **collapse** back **into sameness**. Moreover, Benhabib's formulation of community, while rejecting the fantasy of consensus, nevertheless privileges communication, conversation, and agreement. **This privileging of communication assumes that all can participate in** the **rational conversation irrespective of difference**. **Yet** this assumes rational interlocutors, and **rationality has tended**, both in theory and practice, **to exclude** many groups and individuals, including: women, who are deemed emotional and corporeal rather than rational; **non-liberal** cultures and **individuals who are seen as intolerant** and irrational; **and minoritarian groups who do not adopt** the **authoritative discourses necessary for rational exchange**s. In addition, **this ideal** of communication **fails to acknowledge the indeterminacy and multiplicity of meaning in all speech** and writing. It assumes a singular, coherent, and transparent content. Yet, as Gayatri Spivak writes: "the verbal text is constituted by concealment as much as revelation. . . . [T]he concealment is itself a revelation and visa versa" (Spivak 1976, xlvi). For Spivak, Jacques Derrida, and other deconstructionists, all communication involves contradiction, inconsistency, and heterogeneity. Derrida's concept of différance indicates the inevitable deferral and displacement of any final coherent meaning. The apparently rigorous and irreducible oppositions that structure language, Derrida contends, are a fiction. These mutually exclusive dichotomies turn out to be interrelated and interdependent: their meanings and associations, multiple and ambiguous (Derrida 1973, 1976). While Benhabib's objective is clearly to allow all groups within a community to participate in this rational conversation, her formulation fails to recognize either that language is as much structured by miscommunication as by communication, or that many groups are silenced or speak in different discourses that are unintelligible to the majority. **Minority** groups and **discourses are** frequently ignored or **excluded from political discussion** and decision-making **because they do not adopt** the **dominant modes of authoritative** and rational **conversation that assume homogeneity and transparency**.

**B) This requires the extermination of the other for debate to continue which ensures unconditional violence.**

**Hoffmann 7** (Kasper, International Development Studies at Roskilde University, May, Militarised Bodies and Spirits of Resistance, <http://diggy.ruc.dk:8080/handle/1800/2766> )

In modern forms of government, concepts of the norm and normal have played a kind mediating role in the formulation and execution of normative projects (Canguilhem 2005 [1966]; Ewald 1990). It is **through the systematic accumulation of knowledge about** certain social problems and **deviations** that **we come to know the normal** and the norm that stabilise and indicate it in social contexts (Ewald 1990: 140). By aligning delinquent or abnormal subjectivities (through, **for instance**, **techniques of pedagogy**, health, economic development, human development, spirituality etc.) to the norm, the normal order, can be restored allowing normative goals to be considered “for the good”: “[T]he good is figured in terms of adequacy – the good product is adequate to the purpose it was meant to serve. Within the normative system, values are not defined a priori, but instead through an endless process of comparison and normalization” (Ewald 1990: 152). Rose has made the point that the “very notion of normality has emerged out of a concern with types of conduct, thought, expression deemed troublesome or dangerous” (Rose 1996: 26), so that normality can only be understood in relation to the abnormal. Therefore, **even if the norm has allowed** modern **biopower to transform negative restraints of power into** more **positive controls** or normalisation, **it is** still **producing dangerous subjectivities**. **Within liberal** forms of **government**, at least, **there is a long history of people who**, for one reason or another, **are deemed not to** possess or to **display the attributes** (e.g. autonomy, responsibility) **required of the** juridical and political **subjects of rights** and who are therefore subjected to all sorts of disciplinary, bio-political and even sovereign interventions. (Dean 1999: 134) The list of those so subjected would include at various times those furnished with the status of the indigent, the degenerate, the feeble-minded, the native, the savage, the homosexual, the delinquent, the dangerous etc. Modern so-called “liberal” practices of government therefore also entail ‘illiberal’ aspects (see Hindess 2001; Dean 1999 Chapter 7). **Liberalism** always **contains the possibility of non-liberal interventions in the lives of those who do not possess the attributes required to be a** “**citizen**”. However, bio-politics is not confined to liberal forms of rule: liberalism just makes the articulation in a specific way. Other types of rule, such as authoritarian or **totalitarian forms**, also **depend on** the elements of **a bio-politics** that is **concerned with the detailed administration of life**. Rather than denying that non-liberal practices are indeed an integral part of all forms of liberal democratic government, we could see the will to establish the authority of liberal democracy – this will to power – as an element of sovereignty in the heart of the “democracy”. **In modern** processes of **government**, **the focus is on the** fostering and **promotion of life**, **though in certain circumstances this** fundamental “**security**” of the population **is experienced as threatened**. In such circumstances the community calls upon its fundamental right to exist as such **and** thus **evokes its right to deny the** right to **life of those who are seen as a threat to the** life of that same **population**. This allows us to consider what might be thought of as the dark side of bio-politics (Dean 1999: 139). In Foucault’s account, **bio-politics**, as concrete political method of security, **does not put an end to** the practice of **war**; **it provides it with renewed scope**. **This** new scope **allows the** actualneutralization, or even **elimination of life at the level of entire populations**, or micro populations. **It** intensifies the killing, whether by “ethnic cleansing” that **visits holocausts upon whole groups or** by the mass slaughter of **classes** and groups **in the name of the utopia to be achieved**. Governance is now exercised at the level of life and of the population, and wars will be waged at that level on behalf of the “security” of each and all. This brings us to the heart of Foucault’s challenging thesis about bio-politics, namely that there is an intimate connection between the exercise of a life-administering power and the commission of genocide: “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers […] it is because power is located at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” (Foucault 1976: 180, my translation). Thus, there seems to be a kind of inescapable connection between the power to foster life and the power to disqualify life which is characteristic of bio-power. The emergence of a bio-political racism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be approached as a trajectory in which the demand for a homogenous social space articulated by the norm appears to turn into a life necessity. Through the establishment of the norm, abnormality is inscribed upon individual “other” bodies, casting certain deviations as both internal dangers to the body politic and as inheritable legacies that threatens the well-being of race: On behalf of the existence of everyone entire populations are mobilised for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of the life necessity: **massacres have become vital**. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed…**at stake is the biological existence of a population**. (Foucault 1976: 180, my translation, emphasis) Bio-politics presides over the processes of birth, death, production and illness. It acts on the human species. Within this bio-political practice the sovereign right to kill appears in a new form; as an “excess” of biopower that does away with life in the name of securing it, and in its most radical form it is a means of introducing a fundamental distinction between those who must live and those who must die. It fragments the biological field and establishes a break within the biological continuum of human beings by defining a hierarchy of races, a set of subdivisions in which certain races are classified as “good”, fit and superior (Stoler 1995: 84). It therefore establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life. It posits that, the more you kill and let die, the more you will live. Thus, in modern **biopolitical** practice, war does more than reinforce one’s own kind by eliminating a racial adversary: it “regenerates” one’s own race (Stoler 1995: 56). It is essential to note that racism as a bio-political practice does not draw on a particular theory of race – it does not need to. Instead racism designates a much more general practice which introduces a rift in the biological continuum that is the human species between those who are worthy of citizenship and those who are not. Internal threats to the health and wellbeing of a social body come from those who were deemed to lack an ethics of “how to live” and thus the ability to govern themselves. It is worth remembering that the Nazi concentration camps housed not only Jews, but also Gypsies, homosexuals, Bolsheviks and other inassimilable elements. To sum up, Foucault understands racism as a sort of permanent feature of biopower and not as the paroxysmal convulsion of a decaying moral order (Stoler, 1995: 64). Foucault’s argument is that **racism is** not only confined within those obviously racist forms of authoritarian government such as the German Nationalist Socialist state, but that it is **intrinsic to** the nature of **all modern**, **normalising governmental rationalities and** their bio-political **technologies**. By showing how racism possesses a polyvalent mobility, he shows that racism is not merely an ideological discourse of exceptionally cruel regimes, but a fundamental feature of modern processes of government.

**Their preparedness arguments are based off a drive to uphold a homogenous community norm which attempts to encapsulate the reactive forces of currere in a state controlled module of education, closing off difference and forcing the territorialization of education itself.**

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**The** stable and **closed image of currere finds** expression in the early theoretical works of Bobbitt (1924) and Tyler (1949). In their Fordian image, **the student becomes the product of a vast mechanical apparatus designed to instill the normative conditions of State thought in every mind**. **The** explicit **pedagogical questions introduced** throughout their canon **illustrate a preoccupation with the organization of educational experience and the conformity of student behaviors to preestablished norms** (Tyler, 1949). The canon of the rationalists would similarly answer the problematics of what to teach with the installation of ateleology. In other words, **the content of currere’s course is conceived in terms of its alignment to a predestined image of Being**. **The student’s preparedness** to enter the **workforce is thus signified by their selfsimilarity to a priori ideals of development.** Is this not also the case for the pervasive use of standardized testing in schools by which **students are relentlessly tracked along normative criteria and arranged hierarchically against an a priori image**? **Such tracking is today intimate to the hysterical rhetoric of accountability and efficiency through which students are only ever distributed by degrees of variation from the norm.** That is, the demands of standardization suggest the homogenous treatment of the pedagogical course, which in turn becomes distinguishable according to varying degrees and less radically in terms of *kinds* of currere. **The primacy of** student *tracking* and **standardization has today created a vile habitus in pedagogical thought**. **It has constituted the** most macabre **territorialization** **of the “pedagogical course” that fulfills itself by most closely resembling the image of learning proffered by the State**. “It is through [such] boundaries . . . that school is experienced in a certain way” (Roy, 2003, p. 12). In other words, by **habitually ascribing to a recognizable image of competency** and intelligence, **the reactive image of currere appears as a foundational reality rather than an illusion mobilized by a variety of disciplinary constellations**. Institutional recognizability becomes tethered to the homogenizing powers of the Same.

**This territorialization of education allows for an anthropocentric framing of how we view the potentialities of knowledge production and life as a whole.**

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**The territorialization of the pedagogical** course **is indicative of** another privilege central to its reactive image. That is, **the reactive image of currere is distinctly humanistic**, **reducing life to its human-all-too-human enframement. Potential ways of thinking a life are reduced to the image that the world is “just like us,” and following, that the course to be run finds full representation in the anthropocentric imaginary**. **The capacity for thinking the inhuman potentials of currere are disallowed via the presupposition of life as a distinctly human affair**. Akin to the reactive image of currere, the course of life finds expression in the most human of constructions. As a perfect analogue for the pace and habitus of contemporary schooling, the **racetrack is taken for the image of a life, circumventing rhizomatic**, amoebic, geomorphic, and a **swarm of other ways to think the course to be run.** **Such thinking is** **not simply the creation of a new humanistic image, but a way of attaining a thought without image**; after all, as Daignault avers, the “curriculum does not exist, it happens” (cited in Hwu, 2004, p. 183).

**Anthropocentrism makes human extinction inevitable**

**Destefano 90** (Linda Destefano 1990<http://www.peacecouncil.net/history/PNLs1981-90/PNL570-1990.pdf>.)

It is **the human species** which **has brought the entire ecosystem to the brink of disaster**- whether by **poison- ing the biosphere** with **out deadly chemicals and radioactive garbage** or by **using up all earth's resource s** through overpopulation and extravagant, wasteful lifestyles, **or by nuclear** **holocaust** **because of the ultimate ego-trip** (that is, being **will- ing to destroy everything rather tha** **n give up the childish fascination with human cleverness** as manifested i n the latest "advance" in weapons tech- nology) **Human oppression of other species is a flaw which turns back on us** **because everything in the environ- ment is related**; **the** attitude and **behavior of one species influences th e others,** and eventually the result returns to initiator. For instance, there is the willingness of many per - sons to drive other species to extinc- tion. Example: many plants are endangered. Research is being con - ducted on the potential treatment of cancer by plant extracts. Will we extinguish a plant species which could have treated cancer? Example: whales, dolphins, gorillas an d elephants are among the many endangered animals . If they are decimated, we may lose more than the beauty and wonder of these earth companions. We may lose the pos- sibility to learn from them a wiser way to treat the earth and each other. Dr. John Lilly (a medical doctor and scientist) has worked thought his Human-Dolphin Institute to develop a better means of com- munication between humans and dolphins, who he regards as probabl y more intelligent and ethical than humans.(l) If we drive them to extinction, we will never learn whether Lilly is right or wrong . In many ways, people are very intelligent, adaptable, empathetic an d loving. If we love ourselves an d Mother Earth, let's use those traits to eradicate lethal ways of looking at the world, such as a speciesist view, and acquire an earth nurturing outlook . The survival of all of us depends on it

### A2: ZIZEK

#### Zizek’s alt is disastrous for progressive politics and is little more than therapy – only the perm solves

Tormey 5 – Simon, Senior Lecturer in Politics & Critical Theory, with A. Robinson, Ph.D., U-Nottingham

[Feb, Thesis Eleven, Vol. 80, p. 103-5]cn

As useful as such a reading is, this is not, we would argue, the Zizek who emerges on closer examination. Regarding where radicals should proceed from ‘here and now’, his work offers little to celebrate. The relevance of a politics based on formal structural categories instead of lived historical processes, which measures ‘radicalism’ not by concrete achievements but by how abruptly one rejects the existing symbolic order, is questionable. The concept of the Act is, we think, metaphysical, not political, leading to a rejection of most forms of resistance. For Zizek, objections to official ideologies which stop short of an Act are ‘the very form of ideology’ (Zizek, 1997a: 21), and the gap between ‘complaint’ and Acts is ‘insurmountable’ (Zizek, 1999: 361). So protest politics ‘fits the existing power relations’ and carnivals are ‘a false transgression which stabilizes the power edifice’ (Zizek, 1999: 230; 1997a: 73). This position misreads past revolutionary movements – including the decades-long revolutionary process in Russia – and offers little for the development of left strategies aiming to challenge the existing system. What Zizek establishes, we would argue, is a radical break between his own theory and any effective left politics, much of which – as we have shown – he peremptorially dismisses. The concept of the Act is a recipe for creating a desert around oneself while sitting in judgement on actual political movements which always fall short of one’s ideal criteria. In our view, Zizek is justified in advocating a transformative stance given the structural causes of many of the issues he confronts, but he is wrong to posit such a stance as a radical break constituted ex nihilo. Far from being the disavowed supplement of capitalism, the space for thinking the not-real which is opened by imaginaries and ‘petty resistances’ is, we think, a prerequisite to building a more active resistance and, ultimately, any substantial social transformation. As the cultural anthropologist James Scott shows in a series of case studies, political revolutions tend to emerge through the radicalization of existing demands and resistances – not as pure Acts occurring out of nothing. Even when they are incomprehensible from the standpoint of ‘normal’, conformist bystanders, they are a product of the development of subterranean resistances and counterhegemonies among subaltern groups (see, for example, Scott, 1990: 179–82). This is to say that social change does not come from nothing, but rather requires the pre-existence of a counter-culture involving nonconformist ideas and practices. As Gramsci puts it, before coming into existence a new society must be ‘ideally active’ in the minds of those struggling for change (Gramsci, 1985: 39). The history of resistance thus gives little reason to support Zizek’s politics of the Act. The ability to Act in the manner described by Zizek is largely absent from the subaltern strata. Mary Kay Letourneau (let us recall) did not transform society; rather, her ‘Act’ was repressed and she was jailed. In another case discussed by Zizek (2001b: 74–5), a group of Siberian miners is said to accomplish an Act – by getting massacred. Since Acts are not even on Zizek’s terms socially effective, they cannot help the worst-off, let alone transform society. Zizek’s assumption of the effectiveness of Acts thus rests on a confusion between individual and social levels of analysis and between clinical therapy and political action. Vaneigem eerily foresees Zizek’s ‘Act’ when he argues against ‘active nihilism’. The transition from this ‘wasteland of the suicide and the solitary killer’ to revolutionary politics requires the repetition of negation in a different register, connected to a positive project to change the world and relying on the imaginaries Zizek denounces, the carnival spirit and the ability to dream (Vaneigem, 1967 [1994]: 111). Zizek’s politics are not merely impossible but, as we have shown, potentially despotic, and also – between support for a Master, acceptance of pain and alienation, militarism and the restoration of order – tendentially conservative. Such a politics, if adopted in practice, could only discredit progressive movements and further alienate those they seek to mobilize. We would argue that a transformative politics should be theorized instead as a process of transformation, an a-linear, rhizomatic, multiform plurality of resistances, initiatives and, indeed, acts which are sometimes spectacular and carnivalesque, sometimes prefigurative, sometimes subterranean, sometimes rooted in institutional change and reform and, under certain circumstances, directly transformative. Moreover, we would take issue with Zizek’s model of the pledged group bound together by the One who Acts as a step backwards from the decentred character of current left-radical politics. Nor need this decentring be seen as a weakness, as Zizek insists it should. It can be seen as a strength, protecting radical politics from self-appointed elites, transformism, infiltration, defeat through the ‘neutralization’ of leaders, and betrayal. In contrast with Zizek’s stress on subordination, exclusivity, hierarchy and violence, the current emphasis on the adoption of anti-authoritarian, heterogeneous, inclusive and multiform types of activity offer a better chance of effectively overcoming the homogenizing logic of capitalism and of winning support among wider circles of those dissatisfied with it. Similarly, the stress on the centrality of direct action – which includes ludic, carnivalesque and a variety of non-violent actions – generates the possibility of empowerment through involvement in and support for the myriad causes which make up the anticapitalist resistance. This resistance stands in stark contrast to the desert of ‘heroic’ isolation advocated by Zizek which, as Laclau puts it, is ‘a prescription for political quietism and sterility’ (Butler et al., 2000: 293). Zizek is right that we should aim to overcome the ‘impossibilities’ of capitalism, but this overcoming should involve the active prefiguration and construction in actuality of alternative social forms, not a simple (and actually impossible) break – with everything which exists – of the kind imagined by Zizek. It is important that radicals invoke ‘utopias’, but in an active way, in the forms of organization, ‘disorganization’, and activity adopted – in the spaces created for resistance and in the prefiguration of alternative economic, political and social forms. Utopian imaginaries express what is at stake in left radicalism: that what exists does not exist of necessity, and that the contingency of social institutions and practices makes possible the transcendence of existing institutions and the construction or creation of different practices, social relations and conceptions of the world. The most Zizek allows radicals is the ability to ‘glimpse’ utopia while enacting the reconstruction of oppression. Radicals should go further and bring this imagined ‘other place’ into actual existence. Through enacting utopia, we have the ability to bring the ‘no-where’ into the ‘now-here’.

#### Their strategy of exposure and individual withdrawal only reinforces capitalist ideology

Nicol 1 – Bran, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer in English Literature at the University of Portsmouth, UK

[Jul, Paragraph, v. 24, n. 2, p. 152-3]cn

Perhaps there is a note of anxiety in all the compulsive energy of Zizek’s project: he brilliantly unmasks the workings of ideology as if we can overthrow them, but is only too aware that this is impossible. Alternatively, this might well be the source of a certain critical jouissance we can detect in his continual affirmation of the unassailable quality of the big Other. In this respect Zizek himself shifts between the hysterical and the perverse positions in his theory: exposing the fragile status of the big Other by questioning it, while also investing in its ultimate status as the Law. Zizek’s very method of exposing the ideological mechanism, in other words, reinforces its inevitability. The paradox bears a strong similarity to Baudrillard’s critique of Marxism in The Mirror of Production, that it depends upon precisely the same ideology (the idea of self-production) as the late-capitalist political economy it claims to deconstruct. Zizek’s ubiquitous interpretative mechanism functions as the mirror of the transcendent processes he identifies at the heart of culture. We might even see its status in Zizek’s work as the equivalent of the fundamental fantasy at the core of the individual, supporting his very identity as a theorist. Like Clarice Starling, who thinks she need only rescue one more victim and the lambs will stop crying, it is as if Zizek imagines he need give us just one more example of the traumatic encounter with the real and the dominance of the Big Other will be exposed and overthrown. This, as Hannibal Lecter might say, is no more than a fantasy.

#### Zizek’s Act only seeks to supplement psychoanalytic theory – it doesn’t achieve any fundamental change

Robinson 4 – Andrew, Ph.D., political & critical theorist

[“Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model,” Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogsp...ogress\_15.html]cn

Why does Zizek support the Act? Although he connects the Act to 'radicalism', he does not state anywhere that the Act accomplishes any fundamental change in the deep structure of existence; at best, it can temporarily suspend (for instance) exclusion. This is not an attempt to achieve a better world (still less a perfect one!) but a purely structural attempt to restore something which Zizek thinks is missing. In this sense, even in its 'radicalism', the Act is conservative. Zizek seems to be restoring to psychoanalysis a naive conception of psychological health: via the ex nihilo act, one can escape the logic of the symptom (DSST 178).

### AT: Capitalism K

1. **You got the wrong D&G – The Dolce and Gabanna Store is a few miles away from here. It is impossible for our method to uphold capitalism because it requires the breakdown of transcendental structures such as capitalism in order for the act to be a becoming at all – at best what they are criticizing are imitations to becoming.**

Houle 2k5 (Karen; Prof of Philosophy @ University of Alberta – Edmonton; “Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts – Becoming Woman” Page 102)

Finally, becoming is non-representational: Becoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying with some­thing; neither is it regressing-progressing; neither is it correspond­ing, ... [nor] producing... Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, “appearing,” “being,” “equalling” or “producing”. (ATP: 239) For Deleuze and Guattari, becomings are processes of desire. When they talk about becoming-woman, they are adamant about this non-representational process of movement, proximity and desire: What we term a molar entity is, for example, the woman as defined by her form, endowed with organs and functions and assigned as a subject ... [Becoming-woman is] not imitating or assuming the female form, but emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman, create the molecular woman. (ATP: 275)

1. **Our method is the only one that can truly escape the capitalist system – stripping identity away and becoming-imperceptible is the only way we can create revolutionary desire to break away from the capitalist system.**

Deleuze & Guattari 72(Gilles – Professor and Scholar, Felix – Psychoanalyst and activist; “Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism & Schizophrenia” Plateau pg. 372)

**The actualization of a revolutionary potentiality is explained** less by the preconscious state of causality in which it is nonetheless included, than **by the efficacy of a libidinal break at a precise moment, a schiz whose sole cause is desire-which is to say the rupture with causality that forces a rewriting of history on a level with the real, and produces this strangely polyvocal moment when everything is possible.** **Of course the schiz has been prepared by a subterranean labor of causes, aims, and interests working together; of course this order of causes runs the risk of closing and cementing the breach in the name of the new socius and its interests.** Of course one can always say after the fact that history has never ceased being governed by the same laws of aggregates and large numbers. **The fact remains that the schiz came into existence only by means of a desire without aim or cause that charted it and sided with it. While the schiz is possible without the order of causes, it becomes real only by means of something of another order**: Desire, the desert-desire, **the revolutionary investment of desire. And that is indeed what undermines capitalism: where will the revolution come from, and in what form *within* the exploited masses?** It is like death-where, when? It will be a decoded flow, a deterritorialized flow that runs too far and cuts too sharply, thereby escaping from the axiomatic of capitalism. **Will it come in the person of a Castro**, an Arab, a Black Panther, **or a Chinaman on the horizon? A May '68, a home-grown Maoist planted like an anchorite on a factory smokestack?** Always the addition of an axiom to seal off a breach that has been discovered; fascist colonels start reading Mao, we won't be fooled again; **Castro has become impossible, even in relation to himself; vacuoles are isolated, ghettos created; unions are appealed to for help; the most sinister forms of "dissuasion" are invented; the repression of interest is reinforced-but where will the new irruption of desire come from?**

1. **No Link- We don’t engage in the system of capitalism, rather we criticize it. We solve for it by disallowing the state to commodify our lives and stop it from making us mere dollar bills in the capitalist factory.**

#### Perm: Do Both – Combing Strata solves better than either methodology could alone.

Deleuze & Guattari 80 (Gilles & Felix; Prof of Philosophy & Psychoanalyst and militant; “A Thousand Plateaus” Pg. 63 [EB])

We have to hurry, Challenger said, we're being rushed by the line of time on this third stratum. So we have a new organization of content and expression, each with its own forms and substances: technological content, semiotic or symbolic expression. Content should be understood not sim- ply as the hand and tools but as a technical social machine that preexists them and constitutes states of force or formations of power. Expression should be understood not simply as the face and language, or individual languages, but as a semiotic collective machine that preexists them and constitutes regimes of signs. A formation of power is much more than a tool; a regime of signs is much more than a language. Rather, they act as determining and selective agents, as much in the constitution of languages and tools as in their usages and mutual or respective diffusions and com- munications. The third stratum sees the emergence of Machines that are fully a part of that stratum but at the same time rear up and stretch their pincers out in all directions at all the other strata. Is this not like an interme- diate state between the two states of the abstract Machine"?—the state in which it remains enveloped in a corresponding stratum (ecumenon),and the state in which it develops in its own right on the destratified plane of consistency (planomenon). The abstract machine begins to unfold, to stand to full height, producing an illusion exceeding all strata, even though the machine itself still belongs to a determinate stratum. This is, obviously, the illusion constitutive of man (who does man think he is?). This illusion derives from the overcoding immanent to language itself. But what is not illusory are the new distributions between content and expression: techno- logical content characterized by the hand-tool relation and, at a deeper level, tied to a social Machine and formations of power; symbolic expres- sion characterized by face-language relations and, at a deeper level, tied to a semiotic Machine and regimes of signs. On both sides, the epistrata and parastrata, the superposed degrees and abutting forms, attain more than ever before the status of autonomous strata in their own right. In cases where we can discern two different regimes of signs or two different forma- tions of power, we shall say that they are in fact two different strata in human populations.

#### Affect produces economic effect more swiftly than actual economics does.

Massumi 2k7 (Brian; Deleuzian Scholar and Writer; “Autonomy of Affect”; <http://www.brianmassumi.com/textes/Autonomy%20of%20Affect.PDF> [EB])

A man writes a health-care reform bill in his White House. It starts to melt in the media glare. He takes it to the Hill, where it continues to melt. He does not say goodbye. Although economic indicators show unmistakeable signs of recovery, the stock market dips. By way of explanation, TV commentators cite a second-hand feeling. The man’s “waffling” on other issues has undermined the public’s confidence in him, and is rebounding on the health-care initiative. The worry is that President Clinton is losing his “presidential” feel. What does that have to do with the health of the economy? The prevailing wisdom among the same commentators is that passage of the health-care would harm the economy. It is hard to see why the market didn’t go up at the news of the”unpresidential” falter of what many “opinion-makers” considered a costly social program inconsistant with basically sound economic policy inherited from the previous administration, credited with starting a recovery. However, the question does not even arise, because the commentators are operating under the assumption that the stock market registers affective fluctuations in adjoining spheres more directly than properly economic indicators. Are they confused? Not according to certain economic theorists who, when called upon to explain to a nonspecialist audience the ultimate foundation of the capitalist monetary system, answer “faith.”xxx And what, in the late-capitalist economy, is the base cause of inflation, according to the same experts? A “mindset,” they say, in which feelings about the future become self-fulfilling prophesies capable of reversing “real” conditions. xxxi The ability of affect to produce an economic effect more swiftly and surely than economics itself means that affect is itself a real condition, an intrinsic variable of the late capitalist system, as infrastructural as a factory. Actually, it is beyond infrastructural, it is everywhere, in effect. Its ability to come second-hand, to switch domains and produce effects across them all, gives it a meta-factorial ubiquity. It is beyond infrastructual. It is transversal. This fact about affect – this matter-of-factness of affect – needs to be taken seriously into account in cultural and political theory. Don’t forget.

#### **Affect Precedes Cap**

Chaput ‘11(Catherine, Associate Professor at University of Nevada Reno, “Affect and Belonging in Late Capitalism: A Speculative Narrative on Reality TV”, International Journal of Communications 5, Pg. 5, [DF])

Even though I do not follow Hardt and Negri along their feted pathway beyond Marx, their theory of affective labor does compel me to inquire further into the mysterious process by which laboring bodies transfer value into commodities. Recall Massumi’s definition of affect as a carrier of life energy across thresholds between situations, people, and things. So defined, affect intersects with the Marxist understanding of value as life energy transferred from a worker to the product of his or her creation. For Marx (1990), the value of things derives from the fact that “human labor is accumulated in them” (p. 128). When we look at a coat, for example, we see value in its ability to provide warmth. This visible use value derives from an invisible value—the labor transferred from workers into the things they produce. Human labor (measuring, cutting, and sewing fabric) congeals within the coat, “although this property never shows through, even when the coat is at its most threadbare” (Marx, 1990, p. 143). The transfer of this value lies at the heart of Marx’s commodity fetish and its ideological symptom.7 Ever since Marx proclaimed that capitalism “transforms every product of labor into a social hieroglyphic” (1990, p. 167), theorists have been obsessed with the need to decipher the always-already present, but not quite visible, sociality of the commodity. Some of these theories explore the labor that goes into commodity production (the political economic approach) and others study its erasure through cultural consumption (the ideological approach). What these theories fail to account for, however, is the process by which workers transfer their labor power or life energy into commodities—a process I believe takes place through the transmission of affect.

#### Capitalism subjugates affect through a laborer’s life energy – this is the root cause of surplus value.

Chaput ‘11(Catherine, Associate Professor at University of Nevada Reno, “Affect and Belonging in Late Capitalism: A Speculative Narrative on Reality TV”, International Journal of Communications 5, Pg. 6, [DF])

Neither a state of being, nor a category of labor, affect names the material energy circulating throughout all life processes. Teresa Brennan (2004), for instance, conjectures that affect hangs in the air and moves between individuals, raising and lowering energy levels. Affect moves from person to person physiologically, circulating into and out of bodies through our oral, aural, visual, taste, and tactile senses. It produces a sense of belonging through a “process that is social in origin but biological and physical in effect” (p. 3). Articulating this theory through Marxist terms, laborers transfer life energy (through mental and physical exertion as well as their unconscious affective emissions) into the commodities they produce. Recipients of these things consume not only their use values, but also their affective values—energies taken in through our sensuous interactions with these products. The transmission of affect respects no division between the physical and biological “nor between them and the human” (Massumi, 2002b, p. 37). From this perspective, the elusive thing that haunts commodities, the surplus value that represents the excess or remainder of exploited labor, may be invisible to our eye’s perception, but it is not metaphorical. On the contrary, affect—or what Patricia Clough and her co-authors (2007) call affect-itself—is a physical energy that unites a variety of human subjects through and with nonhuman objects, helping to constitute social relations separate from and prior to our ability to decipher meaning (p. 65).9