# \*\*\*2AC\*\*\*

# at: exports

**We’re reforming the export process**

Domenici and Miller 12 (Senator Pete and Dr. Warren, Former US Senator and BPC Fellow, Former Department of Energy Assistant and Secretary for Nuclear Energy, "Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets," Bipartisan Policy Center, September, bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Nuclear%20Report.PDF)

In an attempt to ameliorate current competitive ¶ disadvantages, the Obama administration recently created ¶ a new position within the National Security Council ¶ to coordinate civilian nuclear policy. We support the ¶ creation of this new position to improve coordination of ¶ executive branch policy for nuclear energy policy and ¶ international affairs. We believe continued efforts to ¶ improve coordination between government and industry ¶ stakeholders and to more efficiently apply federal export ¶ regulations will allow U.S. companies to compete more ¶ effectively in the global nuclear marketplace.

**IFR possesses such advantages that people will want to buy it**

**Kirsh 11** (Steven T. Kirsh, Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science in electrical engineering and computer science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Why Obama should meet Till,” 9/28/11) <http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/09/28/why-obama-should-meet-till/>

The MIT report ignores what other countries are doing. Obama wants the US to be a leader in clean energy technology. You do that

by building the most advanced nuclear designs and refining them. That’s the way you learn and improve. MIT would have us stuck on old LWR technology for a few decades. Does anyone seriously think that is the way to be the world leader? There is virtually no room for improvement in LWR technology. IFR technology is nearly 100 times more efficient, and it emits no long term nuclear waste. If you are a buyer of nuclear power in China, which nuclear reactor are you going to pick? The one that is 100 times more efficient and generates no waste? Or the one that is 100 times less efficient and generates waste that you better store for a million years? Wow. Now that’s a real tough question, isn’t it. Gotta ponder that one. I’m sure Apple Computer isn’t taking advice from Moniz. If they were, they’d still be building the Apple I. Ernie should get a clue. The reason Apple is a market leader is because they bring the latest technology to market before anyone else, not because they keep producing old stuff and spend decades doing R&D to see if they can come up with something better. Other countries are not hampered by MIT’s report. France and Japan recently entered into an agreement with the US DOE whereby we’re giving them the IFR technology for them to exploit. Even though we are stupid, they aren’t stupid. The Chinese are ordering inferior oxide fueled fast reactors from Russia. If the US were building metal-fueled fast reactors with pyroprocessing, it’s a good bet the Chinese would be buying from us instead of the Russians. But if we take Moniz’s advice to not build the world’s best advanced nuclear technology we already have, then there is no chance of that happening. By the time we get to market with a fast reactor, it will be all over. We’ll arrive to the market decades late. Another great American invention that we blew it on.

# heg war top level

**Social science proves—multipolarity supports the natural incentive to seek status by fighting**

**Wohlforth, 09** – professor of government at Dartmouth (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Affairs, January, project muse)

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research

shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29] Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

**No impact uniqueness – world getting better now heg is peaceful**

**Busby, 12** [Get Real Chicago IR guys out in force, Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>]

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity **compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other [reports](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) based on Uppsala data is right**,** war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

**No one has an incentive for major war**

**Cohen 11** (CSIS Group Report, Craig S. Cohen, Jon B. Alterman, Ernest Z. Bower, Victor D. Cha, Heather A. Conley, Stephen J. Flanagan, Bonnie S. Glaser, Michael J. Green, Andrew C. Kuchins, Haim Malka, Teresita C. Schaffer, “Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of US Power,”

<http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_Cohen_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

We are now entering the third decade of a new international system—let me call it the post– Cold War era. This international system is unique in that it comprises a single global superpower—the United States—but with a number of regional powers, several of which operate beyond the boundaries of their regions. Brazil is South America’s indisputable power. India dominates South Asia. In Europe we see for the first time the emergence of the supranational state of the European Union—an economic superpower to be sure, but not yet a diplomatic or military superpower. But this will emerge. Europe also has the phenomenon of Russia—a remaining military superpower (largely because of nuclear weapons), but not an economic superpower. In West Asia there is an uneasy balance among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and a rising Turkey. In East Asia we have two superpowers—China and Japan. Both are now economic superpowers, and China is certainly a military superpower. Japan’s military alliance with the United States rounds out its economic power base although it is still recovering from the terrible recent events following the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear spillage. For this third international epoch, I pose the same questions we asked of the earlier epochs. Is this a stable international system—that is, will it be prone to resolve differences among the power centers through peaceful means or violent means—and is it a durable system? First, on the question of stability, I believe that a careful analysis will reveal it is an inherently stable system. The global superpower has no incentive to enter conflict with a regional superpower because, although it might win that military exchange, it would sap all its energies doing so and permit other regional superpowers to fill the vacuum. No regional superpower would conceivably find it advantageous to go to war with the global superpower.

**No interventions forthcoming – Iraq era over**

**Heroux 3/19** (Paul Heroux, senior analyst at the Institute for Defense and Disarment Studies, Master's in International Relations from the London School of Economics and a Master's from the Harvard School of Government, “The Aftermath of Iraq: A Cautious West in Iran, Syria and Afghanistan,” 3/19/12) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-heroux/the-aftermath-of-iraq-a-c_b_1363368.html>

The aftermath of the war in Iraq has resulted in a more cautious approach to U.S. military engagements overseas. No longer do Americans think that the U.S. can or should become involved in military operations overseas unless our national security is directly at risk. Even then, there is ample room for debate on what is our national security interest. In the wake of the war in Iraq, the U.S. is reluctant to become involved in the humanitarian crisis going on in Syria and anxious to get out of Afghanistan for fear of getting bogged down. But with Iran, the lesson from Iraq seems to be that there is a new standard of what constitutes 'evidence' of a nuclear weapons program. Iran The West does not trust Iran on its word that it is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program. However, there is no hard evidence of such a program. At present, the concern is not if Iran is constructing a nuclear weapon, but over the concern that Iran is building a nuclear weapon capability. Israel recognizes this important distinction. There are many steps that Iran would have to take to signal to the world that it is pursuing a nuclear 'weapons' program. So long as the IAEA has the ability to monitor their program, we will know if Iran is going to construct a nuclear weapon. In the aftermath of Iraq, the West is far more hesitant about preemptive attacks on another nation suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Israel is working on a much shorter timeline for a strike on Iran than the U.S. Such a premature and perhaps needless attack could have serious consequences for the U.S. and the world. From the U.S. point of view, if diplomacy, sanctions and covert action fails in Iran, the prospect of military intervention becomes almost inevitable. On the one hand, the argument can be made that the U.S. won't get a WMD program wrong a second time. On the other hand, there is a heightened level of skepticism of what the U.S. knows and what it should or should not get involved with. The aftermath of Iraq has made the U.S. wary of preemptive attacks against other nations, and rightly so. Syria With over a year of violence between the Syrian government and its people, talk of ethnic cleansing has entered the fray. Ethnic cleansing is a crime against humanity per the International Criminal Court. The question is: Do hostilities against the Sunni Muslims at the hands of Alawite Muslims constitute ethnic cleansing? If so, should the U.S. intervene, and if so, how -- boots on the ground, sanctions, diplomacy, a combination of all of the above? We can use successful examples of humanitarian intervention as a guide but we do so with limitations. We intervened in 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Accords, but this is not 1995, it is not the Balkans, and this is not yet at the point where anyone is talking about genocide. Russia and China have been obstructing efforts to bring hostilities to an end, and the Arab League has not exhausted all of its own options. Finally, with some reason to believe that terrorist groups may be opposing the al Asad regime, how does the U.S. not support the rebels but not support the terrorist groups? If there were an easy answer, it would not be in the news and we would not be talking about it. The aftermath of Iraq has made us wary to intervene in a humanitarian crisis at the hands of a dictator. Afghanistan With the recent killing of 16 Afghan civilians allegedly at the hands of a U.S. soldier, this incident has brought our attention to the issue of what are we still doing in Afghanistan. The U.S. entered Afghanistan for the right reasons. Now that the Taliban has been removed from power, Osama bin Laden is dead, and with Afghanistan's president essentially saying that the U.S. has overstayed their welcome, the debate is in full gear about our role in that country. Should we leave earlier than planned, or should we stay the course and finish what is called our mission? The aftermath of Iraq has made us wary to remain in any country for a prolonged period of time. Looking Forward In the wake of Iraq, we may be left with a heightened sense of cautiousness about getting involved overseas. This may be a good thing, but taken too far, it may cripple our ability to get involved when it may be necessary.

# at: debt

**Debt won’t kill hegemony – privilege of reserve currency**

**Kelly 12** (Robert Kelly, assistant professor in the Political Science and Diplomacy Department of Pusan National University in Busan, Korea “More on US Allies: America’s ‘Exorbitant Privilege’ means it can borrow to Sustain Hegemony Longer than Anyone Ever Expected,” 6/8/12) <http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2012/06/08/more-on-us-allies-americas-exorbitant-privilege-means-it-can-borrow-to-sustain-hegemony-longer-than-anyone-ever-expected/>

Two of my posts this week (one, two) on hypothetical retrenchment under Ron Paul got a lot of traffic and comments. Hat-tips go to Andrew Sullivan and Stephen Walt for citing me; if you don’t read Walt and Sullivan already, you should. Given the large numbers of comments, both here and elsewhere, I thought I would try to capture some of the concerns generally. This post focuses on the surprisingly low likelihood of retrenchment; a second, in a few days, will look at specific countries mentioned by commenters. The OP was intended as an emergency exercise if the US were to face a truly significant crisis that forced retrenchment. The purpose was to ask who are the most important US allies and commitments if we were forced to choose. Right now, the US is not choosing. We are all over the place; if anything, we are taking on more commitments (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the Asian pivot). As I tried to say in the second post, I don’t think we are about to pull out of Japan or Egypt, but if we get to the point where we really can’t afford globe-spanning hegemony anymore, it would be help to try to prioritize what is genuinely strategically necessary, from what are ‘extras.’ One doesn’t hear this much, except for Ron Paul, whose debate performances motivated the post. On this point, I should say that the bifurcation of the OP into two parts was not to indicate the those in part 2 should get the axe; it was just a matter of convenience. The point of the OP was to try to force a ranking – who is more important to the US than who? This is why I tried to limit the listees to a conventional ‘top 10.’ To go beyond that tight focus, would get us back into the global alliance sprawl the US is in now. The above point raises the next, obvious question about whether we are therefore getting to a point of forced US retrenchment. There is a whole declinist literature that emphasizes long-term US problems, like atrocious public finances, too many wars, bad public schools, political gridlock, rising anti-Americanism in the world, etc. Zakaria’s ‘post-American world’ captures are lot of this, and apparently the Chinese believe the US is in decline too. Probably the best I can think of at the moment is Gideon Rachman’s take. I go back and forth on this myself. The economist in me finds it hard to imagine how the US can borrow $1-1.5T a year and stay on top. We’re borrowing around 9% (!) of GDP per annum, and the IMF calculates America’s debt-to-GDP ratio is 100% already (if you include state debts; it’s 75% now at just the federal level.) I wonder how we can fight so many wars without national exhaustion and diversion of investment from domestic priorities like infrastructure or health care. Signal markers in the decline and fall of empires are heavy borrowing and lots of wars which sounds a lot like us, no? That said, I am constantly amazed (and intellectually perplexed) that foreigners seem to have an unquenchable thirst for dollars. This is the big reason why all those claims that the US would collapse under its debt burden have never materialized. Longstanding lefty critics of US foreign policy, like Noam Chomsky, Johann Galtung, or Walter LaFeber, have been saying this stuff since Vietnam, and it doesn’t happen. (Continental Europeans particularly seem to relish predicting US decline.) I am genuinely amazed the catastrophic one-two punch of the Great Recession and the flown-badly-off-the-rails GWoT in less than a decade did not dramatically set-back US power. Remember when S&P downgraded the US last summer, and yet the very next day, US interest rates went down as everyone fled to the greenback safe-haven? America’s ‘exorbitant privilege’ of printing the reserve currency is even more exorbitant than anyone ever expected. I remember last decade, when people said the Bush administration’s $400B annual borrowing was unsustainable. Yet for the last 5 years, we borrowed triple that, with another decade projected at that level – but with the lowest interest rates in US history! If your head feels like it is about to explode for sheer perplexity, yes – me too. America’s ability to borrow, and thereby forestall retrenchment, is simply astonishing. The rate on the US 10-year T-bill is at an all-time low of 1.44%. If you factor in inflation across the ten-year maturity life-span, the borrower actually loses money! So If you want to know one big reason why the US fights so many wars, here you go: because we can, because foreigners make it so easy by practically begging us to take their money. It’s surreal how cheap we can borrow. Krugman makes this really good point in his latest op-ed: “none of the disasters Republicans predicted have come to pass. Remember all those assertions that budget deficits would lead to soaring interest rates? Well, U.S. borrowing costs have just hit a record low. And remember those dire warnings about inflation and the “debasement” of the dollar? Well, inflation remains low, and the dollar has been stronger than it was in the Bush years.” My own deficit-hawk instincts say conservatives are right about the debt build-up, but in fact, Krugman has been borne out. So why not fight more wars (at least by economic criteria) when they are so cheap? Foreigners seem endlessly willing to fund our wars, which I find so bizarre and inexplicable that I wouldn’t believe it unless it were the reality around us right now. Worse, for the declinist, retrenchment-will-be-forced-on-the-US position is, that the euro-crisis continues to make the US dollar a preferred safe-haven (so lowering US borrowing costs), that China must continue to lend to the US in order to hold-up the value of its current $3T+ reserves (again pushing down US borrowing costs, no matter how many commitments we take on), and finally that a growing body of evidence suggests that China cannot continue its astonishing growth levels without serious reform. Wen Jiabao himself said that China risks turmoil on the scale of the Cultural Revolution (!) without major changes. I tried to argue this also in the second half of the OP. If China slows, that automatically buys US hegemony a breather, because position in international politics is relative: if China slows, then the US recovers. And it is increasingly obvious that there are lots of ways China could derail in the next 2 decades: whether through tightening environmental and demographic caps on growth, from political or democratic transition turmoil, by scaring its neighbors so much that they line-up to contain it. In short, US hegemony and alliance sprawl is turning out to be a lot more durable during this period when the US is seemingly on the ropes, than I thought. In fact, I think a lot of people are amazed at the staggering ability of the US to borrow and keep our global hegemony rolling along. The US is exploiting its ‘exorbitant privilege’ worse than at any other time in its history – and the inflation-adjusted cost is zero!!! I just can’t figure that out, or what that means…

**US is managing its debt now – deleveraging**

**Drezner 12** (Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “ Predictions about the death of American hegemony may have been greatly exaggerated,” 1/22/12) http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/22/predictions\_about\_the\_death\_of\_american\_hegemony\_may\_have\_been\_greatly\_exaggerated

What about the future?  One could point to the last few months of modestly encouraging economic data, but that's ephemeral.  Rather, there are three macrotrends that are worth observing now before (I suspect) they come up in the State of the Union:

1)  **The United States is successfully deleveraging**.  As [**the McKinsey Global Institute notes**](http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Financial_Markets/Uneven_progress_on_the_path_to_growth), the United States is actually doing a relatively good job of slimming down total debt -- i.e., consumer, investor and public debt combined.  Sure, public debt has exploded, but as MGI points out, that really is the proper way of doing things after a financial bubble:

The deleveraging processes in Sweden and Finland in the 1990s offer relevant lessons today. Both endured credit bubbles and collapses, followed by recession, debt reduction, and eventually a return to robust economic growth. Their experiences and other historical examples show two distinct phases of deleveraging. In the first phase, lasting several years, households, corporations, and financial institutions reduce debt significantly. While this happens, economic growth is negative or minimal and government debt rises. In the second phase of deleveraging, GDP growth rebounds and then government debt is gradually reduced over many years....

As of January 2012, the United States is most closely following the Nordic path towards deleveraging. Debt in the financial sector has fallen back to levels last seen in 2000, before the credit bubble, and the ratio of corporate debt relative to GDP has also fallen. US households have made more progress in debt reduction than other countries, and may have roughly two more years before returning to sustainable levels of debt.

Indeed, the deleveraging is impressive enough for even [**Paul Krugman to start sounding optimistic**](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/opinion/krugman-is-our-economy-healing.html?_r=1):

the economy is depressed, in large part, because of the housing bust, which immediately suggests the possibility of a virtuous circle: an improving economy leads to a surge in home purchases, which leads to more construction, which strengthens the economy further, and so on. And if you squint hard at recent data, it looks as if something like that may be starting: home sales are up, unemployment claims are down, and builders’ confidence is rising.

Furthermore, the chances for a virtuous circle have been rising, because we’ve made significant progress on the debt front.

# at: terror

**Terrorist groups will never get a workable nuclear weapon – insurmountable barriers**

**Brooks 10** (Barry Brooks, Professor of Climate Change University of Adelaide, guest post by a Canadian chemist and materials scientist, “Analysis of the 2010 Nuclear Summit and the obsession with highly enriched uranium,” 5/15/10) <http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/04/15/dv82xl/>

First let’s make one thing very clear: a subnational group (terrorists) cannot and never will be able to manufacture a nuclear weapon. This is true even if they were handed weapons-grade fissile material up front. Whatever the reasons for this drive to strip every last gram of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from every country in the world that is not one of the existing nuclear weapon states (NWS) ‘terrorists’ stealing this material to fabricate a weapon, is not one of them. HEU is treated by all countries that own it as if it were more valuable than gold, a critical mass worth of HEU represents a huge investment to a country who acquired it for a purpose, and as part of a program, the fact remains that this stuff is controlled and accounted for very closely, which is why it has never showed up on the black market.

Let’s examine the first contention. While it is true a gun-assembled HEU uranium bomb is conceptually simple, building one that will work, is not and requires more resources than an extranational group can muster. A careful review of the facts suggests that there are technical obstacles to such an attack that are insuperable, and there is no evidence that any terrorist group currently possesses the expertise necessary for a nuclear effort. Claims that this is possible glosses over the difficulty of finding the kinds of highly qualified experts such a project would need and omits real consideration of at least a dozen points in the process where something could, and very likely would, go wrong that would bring the whole project to an end.

But let’s take it one step further. Any terrorist group that decided it wanted a nuclear weapon would first reason that the easiest way would be to steal or buy a device from a nuclear weapons state. They are quickly disabused of this idea because it is impossible for them to do so. Why do we know this? Because it hasn’t happened. If it was that easy there would be no running planes into buildings; there would already be a radioactive crater in Manhattan.

So they are left with building one. Now they have three issues: HEU which is no easer to obtain than a complete device, finding people that know what to do with it, (and are willing to cooperate) and setting up some place on Earth where the host government won’t have instant diarrhoea at the thought of a group they had no control of holding a nuclear device inside their borders.

Looking at it like this, the terrorists can see that it would require a very unlikely series of events and a great deal of effort, and pressed for information, any high school physics teacher will tell them there are no guarantees the damned thing will work. Result, scrap Plan A and go to Plan B: Hijack four widebody aircraft…

Fretting about “loose nukes” has been a popular topic of discussion in anti-proliferation circles, but a solid decade of this hand-wringing about terrorists’ hypothetical nuclear weapons has revealed no new evidence that any such group is any nearer to realizing this ambition,

# at: disease

**Extinction genetically impossible and ahistorical**

**Posner 2005** (Richard A., Judge U.S. Court of Appeals 7th Circuit, Professor Chicago School of Law, January 1, 2005, Skeptic, Altadena, CA, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html#abstract)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time. That the human race has not yet been destroyed by germs created or made more lethal by modern science, as distinct from completely natural disease agents such as the flu and AIDS viruses, is even less reassuring. We haven't had these products long enough to be able to infer survivability from our experience with them. A recent study suggests that as immunity to smallpox declines because people am no longer being vaccinated against it, monkeypox may evolve into "a successful human pathogen," (9) yet one that vaccination against smallpox would provide at least some protection against; and even before the discovery of the smallpox vaccine, smallpox did not wipe out the human race. What is new is the possibility that science, bypassing evolution, will enable monkeypox to be "juiced up" through gene splicing into a far more lethal pathogen than smallpox ever was.

# 2ac – renewables tradeoff

1. **Renewables are nowhere close to making a dent in market share**

**Hansen 11** (James Hansen, directs the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, adjunct professor in the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Columbia University, Reto Ruedy, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Makiko Sato, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, “Hansen warns not to drink sustainable energy Kool-Aid,” 8/5/11) <http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/08/05/hansen-energy-kool-aid/>

A facile explanation would focus on the ‘merchants of doubt’ who have managed to confuse the public about the reality of human-made climate change. The merchants play a role, to be sure, a sordid one, but they are not the main obstacle to solution of human-made climate change. The bigger problem is that people who accept the reality of climate change are not proposing actions that would work. This is important, because as Mother Nature makes climate change more obvious, we need to be moving in directions within a framework that will minimize the impacts and provide young people a fighting chance of stabilizing the situation. Let me try to provide some insight about the problem via personal experience and simple charts for the United States and the world. When I received two large awards last year (the Sophie and Blue Planet Prizes), I decided to divide the proceeds (after taxes and paying off a home equity loan) between education funds for my grandchildren and installation of renewable energy systems. Here is a preliminary report on how the renewable energies are working out. We put solar panels (11.3 KW) on our barn at a cost of $72,312. It was neither the cheapest nor most expensive system, but it received good references when we visited several installations. Pennsylvania provided a $17,500 rebate and the federal government a 30% tax credit. What made it too good to be true was a third subsidy, Alternative Energy Credits – one AEC for each MW-hour of energy generated. AECs are sold to utilities that are required by Pennsylvania to have a certain number. The AEC price when we signed up for our solar system would have given us about $4000 per year, thus paying off the system’s cost within 5-10 years. It was too good to last. Before I could sell a single AEC, the price collapsed more than 75% and seems likely to go lower. Our electric bills did decrease more than half, but there are still charges even though we generate more power than we use. It took months before the utility was satisfied with the paperwork and installed a two-way meter, allowing us credit for power generated. I need a longer baseline and more information to make an overall assessment. It still may eventually pay for itself, because of the large subsidies and the fact that electric rates are going up fast (10% last year, 6.6%/year projected). Utilities blame the increases in part on renewable energy requirements; if that is true, the majority of people without renewable energies are in effect providing another subsidy. I will do a more quantitative accounting in the future. The story is not quite as good for the solar panels on my daughter’s house. Their roof is smaller than our barn’s, so more efficient (and expensive) panels were purchased, yielding almost as much power as for our barn. Cost was about $75,000. By the time the project started the PA rebate had decreased to $12,500 (it is being phased down – it is now $7,500). The disappointment to me (and her) was the collapse of the AEC market. If the ~$4000/year that existed at time of purchase had held up it would have provided her a nice monthly income, but by the time electricity began flowing the AEC return was small. Nevertheless, the meter readings will allow Sophie and Connor to learn something by making appropriate graphs and do experiments to test the effectiveness of different actions aimed at reducing their electric usage. I will do a more quantitative analysis after the record is longer. These specific examples provide one perspective, but the economics varies with location and with many other factors, so we should not over-generalize based on specific examples. There is a consensus that renewable energies need to be part of the solution to the energy security and climate matters. But we must be realistic about their contribution. So now let’s look at the progress of renewable energies after several years of strong government incentives. United States and World Electricity Generation Figure 3 shows United States electricity generation by source in 2009 based on EIA International Energy Statistics. Renewable sources provide 10.7% of the electric energy. But as the pie chart on the right shows, almost two-thirds of this is hydroelectric. Wind has grown to almost 17% of the renewable energy, so it is approaching 1.8% of U.S. electricity. Solar power is only 0.2% of the renewable portion or 0.02% of electricity. Figure 4 shows the global breakdown in 2008. Renewable energies provide 19% of electricity, but most of the renewable energy is hydroelectric. Wind provides 1% of global electricity and solar energy less than 0.1%. Renewables may be small, but they are growing rapidly, exponentially, right? Fig. 5a reveals that growth of electricity in the past two decades in the U.S. has been mainly from fossil fuels. Fig. 5b and 5c expand the scale to show the growth of non-hydro renewable energy, which has been mainly wind. Solar energy remains invisible, even with the greatly stretched vertical scale. What about the world as a whole? The global story (Fig. 6) is similar to that for the U.S., except there has been growth in large hydro. Hydropower has contributed more to global growth than all other renewable energies together. Meanwhile, fossil fuel use has continued to increase. The Easter Bunny and Tooth Fairy The insightful cynic will note: “Now I understand all the fossil fuel ads with windmills and solar panels – fossil fuel moguls know that renewables are no threat to the fossil fuel business.” The tragedy is that many environmentalists line up on the side of the fossil fuel industry, advocating renewables as if they, plus energy efficiency, would solve the global climate change matter. Can renewable energies provide all of society’s energy needs in the foreseeable future? It is conceivable in a few places, such as New Zealand and Norway. But suggesting that renewables will let us phase rapidly off fossil fuels in the United States, China, India, or the world as a whole is almost the equivalent of believing in the Easter Bunny and Tooth Fairy. This Easter Bunny fable is the basis of ‘policy’ thinking of many liberal politicians. Yet when such people are elected to the executive branch and must make real world decisions, they end up approving expanded off-shore drilling and allowing continued mountaintop removal, long-wall coal mining, hydro-fracking, etc. – maybe even a tar sands pipeline. Why the inconsistency? Because they realize that renewable energies are grossly inadequate for our energy needs now and in the foreseeable future and they have no real plan. They pay homage to the Easter Bunny fantasy, because it is the easy thing to do in politics. They are reluctant to explain what is actually needed to phase out our need for fossil fuels. Reluctance to be honest might seem strange, given that what is needed to solve the problem actually makes sense and is not harmful to most people. I will offer a possible explanation for their actions below. But first, let’s look at one of the main sources of the Easter Bunny fable. Fig. 7 updates Figure 2 of “Storms of My Grandchildren”(http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/). It compares actual U.S. energy consumption with projections made by the U.S. Energy Information Administration and by Amory Lovins in the 1970s. Note how EIA keeps adjusting energy projections down as reality disproves their assumptions of rapid growth. Lovins, and many others, are right to assert that energy efficiency is the cheapest and most effective way to satisfy energy requirements. Of course, a principal reason for slow growth of energy use is that much of our manufacturing moved overseas. Note the failure of U.S. energy to follow the ‘soft’ energy path of Lovins. Lovins asserts that we could phase out nuclear power, large hydro, coal, oil and gas. But soft renewables are still nearly invisible after 30 years, providing about one third of the thin renewable slice of total energy. Yet Amory Lovins is the most popular person that I know and has received uncountable awards. He deserves them. But I believe his popularity is in part because he says everything people want to hear. He even says there is no need to have a tax on carbon. Thus even fossil fuel companies love him. Fossil fuel companies are happy to support energy efficiency, which places the onus on the public and guarantees fossil fuel dominance far into the future (see Yankee Ticket Prices). When I saw Amory most recently and queried him, he affirmed that no tax was needed. He said that hundred dollar bills are being left on the ground by companies that ignore energy efficiency. Indeed, there is still great potential in energy efficiency. However, the full potential of energy efficiency to help rapidly phase down fossil fuel CO2 emissions will be achieved only if there is a substantial rising price on carbon emissions. As long as fossil fuel energy is cheap, efficiency encourages more energy use. For example, solid state lighting is much more efficient, but it encourages more extensive lighting. That would be o.k., if the energy source were carbon-free. The Real World Many well-meaning people proceed under the illusion that ‘soft’ renewable energies [3] will replace fossil fuels if the government tries harder and provides more subsidies. Meanwhile, governments speak greenwash while allowing pursuit of fossil fuels with increasingly destructive technologies (hydrofracking, mountaintop removal, longwall mining, drilling in the deepest ocean, the Arctic and other pristine environments) and development of unconventional fossil fuels [4]. It will be a tragedy if environmentalists allow the illusion of ‘soft’ energies to postpone demand for real solution of the energy, climate and national security problems. Solar power is just a small part of the solution. Subsidies yielding even its present tiny contribution may be unsustainable. Victor and Yanosek discuss ineffectual U.S. policies to promote green energies and green jobs in the current issue of Foreign Affairs. They conclude that the policies do not promote technologies that can compete with fossil fuels without subsidies. Victor and Yanosek suggest incentives for innovative technologies, including advanced nuclear power. Bill Gates is so distressed by the irrational pusillanimous U.S. energy policy that he is investing a piece of his personal fortune to help develop a specific 4th generation nuclear technology.

2) Germany proves they’ll never work

**Blees 9** (Tom Blees, president of the Science Council for Global Initiatives and a board member of the UN-affiliated World Energy Forum, “Climbing mount improbable,” 4/11/9) <http://bravenewclimate.com/2009/04/11/climbing-mount-improbable/>

Next time someone tell you how renewables are enough, show them this picture from the IEA.

Look at Germany for a case study in the potential of renewables. For over 25 years, Germany has had massive public subsidization of wind power to the point where 38% of the world’s wind power is produced there, as well as about half of all the world’s solar power. The upshot? Subsidies for this ”green” electricity of up to 7 times USA average rates, and Germany now produces about 6% of their energy from wind and a trivial 0.5% from solar (this from a pro-solar website, no less). Meanwhile people are willing to claim that ten years would be enough to get to 10-15% wind power in places like Australia and the US, despite the fact that 25 years has brought Germany to about 6-7% with massive subsidies.

If Germany can provide such a tiny fraction of their electricity needs now, what happens as they switch to an all-electric future? The idea that Germany and the USA and other developed countries can provide all their energy needs from renewables strains credulity to the breaking point if you look at what Germany’s done, and the fact that they’ve got over two dozen coal-fired power plants on the drawing board now is a damning testimony to the failure of their all-renewable fantasy. But even if, against all odds and at staggering cost, Germany and other developed countries could conceivably pull off an all-renewable energy future, would the entire world follow suit? It wouldn’t matter a bit if Chinese and Indian coal-fired power plants continued to belch forth CO2. We’d all still be cooked (metaphorically if not literally).

Check out the graph again. The 6.5% nuclear portion we’ll want to replace with IFRs (integral fast reactors), some sooner, some later as the current LWR (light water reactor nuclear) plants age and go offline. We also want to replace much — I would say most — of the 10.6% now filled by combustible renewables, since much of that is wood and dung that contributes a lot to air pollution and ill health among the poorest of the poor. And we want to replace all the fossil fuels. I believe, if you ask this directly of anyone in the “all-renewables” crowd, you’d be able to make your point and get them to agree that ultimately these are the goals. So that means we want to build capacity to equal about 97% of the current energy used in the world today.

But wait, that’s not enough. For virtually every projection anticipates a demand at least twice that much by mid-century, even without taking into account the energy we’ll need for massive desalination and pumping projects, which are inevitable. So we’re talking about a minimum of 200% of todays entire energy production by mid-century. Hydro will likely not increase much, so of that demand of 2050 we can probably safely assume that hydro won’t provide more than 2% (that would assume almost double today’s hydroelectric production).

Now let’s look at that last bar graph on the right. Nearly all of it is from geothermal, primarily because of Iceland and a few other easy hot spots in California and elsewhere. Will we make technological leaps in geothermal technology to allow us to use geothermal everywhere and solve our energy problems with one fell swoop? It would be nice to think so, but experts on the subject seems to be shaking their heads and crossing their fingers, recognizing the serious difficulties they face in making that vision a reality. We can’t bank our futures on it.

Lacking such a transformative development, that leaves energy systems that currently provide about 0.1% of the world’s energy with the herculean task of providing at least 200% of current energy production, and all this by 2050. Look again at what Germany’s accomplished after a couple decades of focusing on wind and solar power. Look again at their plans to build dozens of coal-fired power plants.

I’d say “Wake up and smell the roses” but for the fact that the only thing we’ll smell is coal smoke.

3. No link **- abundance and France prove**

**Tindale, 11** [Stephen Tindale is an associate fellow at the CER, June 2011, Center for European Reform, <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/pb_thorium_june11-153.pdf>]

The money to support research and development of molten salt reactors need not be taken from renewables or other low-carbon energy supply options. There is more than enough money available in the existing subsidies for nuclear fusion. And the argument that governments which support any form of nuclear power overlook or downplay renewables is disproved by the example of France. France gets over three-quarters of its electricity from nuclear power stations. Yet the French government has supported onshore wind farms and is now giving subsides to offshore wind. It is also subsidising an expansion of the district heating system in Paris, to distribute heat from power stations burning energy crops and waste wood which would otherwise be wasted.

**Trades off with fossil fuels**

Loudermilk 2011 (Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, May 31, 2011, “Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs,” Journal of Energy Security, <http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375>)

Pursuing a carbon-free world Realistically speaking, a world without nuclear power is not a world full of increased renewable usage, but rather, of fossil fuels instead. The 2007 Japanese Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear outage is an excellent example of this, as is Germany’s post-Fukushima decision to shutter its nuclear plants, which, despite immense development of renewable options, will result in a heavier reliance on coal-based power as its reactors are retired, leading to a 4% increase in annual carbon emissions. On the global level, without nuclear power, carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation would rise nearly 20% from nine to eleven billion tons per year. When examined in conjunction with the fact that an estimated 300,000 people per year die as a result of energy-based pollutants, the appeal of nuclear power expansion grows further. As the world copes simultaneously with burgeoning power demand and the need for clean energy, nuclear power remains the one consistently viable option on the table. With this in mind, it becomes even more imperative to make nuclear energy as safe as possible, as quickly as possible—a capacity which SMRs can fill with their high degree of safety and security. Additionally, due to their modular nature, SMRs can be quickly constructed and deployed widely. While this is not to say that small reactors should supplant large ones, the US would benefit from diversification and expansion of the nation’s nuclear energy portfolio.

# 2ac – t investment incentives

**CI: Financial incentives are the direct monetary incentives incentives**

Beattie & Menz 5 Kristin M. Beattie Interdisciplinary Engineering and Management, Honors Program Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY Mentor: Dr. Fredric Menz Professor, Department of Economics Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY “Renewable Energy in the United States: Policy Effectiveness and Economic Issues” Summer Research Program, 2005, Google (downloaded as word doc)

There are many different incentive programs that exist in different states to promote the use of renewable energy technologies. The three main categories of policies to promote green power are financial incentives, volunteer and outreach programs, and rules and regulations.

The financial incentives include personal income tax exemptions, corporate tax exemptions, sales tax exemptions, property tax exemptions, rebate programs, grant programs, loan programs, industry recruitment programs, leasing/lease purchase programs, and production incentives. There are currently 200 financial incentives in place that promote renewable energy in the United States (DSIRE, 2003).

Volunteer and Outreach Programs include green pricing programs, voluntary installer certification programs, and outreach programs. At present, there are 201 volunteer and outreach programs in place to promote renewable energy in the United States (DSIRE, 2003).

Rules, regulations, and policies include public benefits funds, generation disclosure rules, renewable portfolio standards, net metering rules, line extension analysis requirements, contractor licensing requirements, equipment certifications, solar access laws, construction and design standards, green power purchasing/aggregation, and mandatory utility green power options. There are currently 216 rules, regulations, and policies in place to promote renewable energy in the United States (DSIRE, 2003).

Prefer

**A)**

**It’s the federal definition**

US Energy Information Administration, 1 (Renewable Energy 2000: Issues and Trends, Report prepared by the US Energy Information Administration, “Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy”, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/renewables/06282000.pdf)

Over the years, incentives and mandates for renewable energy have been used to advance different energy policies, such as ensuring energy security or promoting environmentally benign energy sources. Renewable energy has beneficial attributes, such as low emissions and replenishable energy supply, that are not fully reflected in the market price. Accordingly, governments have used a variety of programs to promote renewable energy resources, technologies, and renewable-based transportation fuels.1 This paper discusses: (1) financial incentives and regulatory mandates used by Federal and State governments and Federal research and develop- ment (R&D),2, 3 and (2) their effectiveness in promoting renewables. A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: • A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; • Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, • Creating **or expanding** a market **for producers. The intended effect of a financial incentive is to increase the production or consumption of the good or service over what it otherwise would have been without the incentive. Examples of financial incentives are: tax credits, production payments, trust funds, and low-cost loans.** Research and development is included **as a support program** because its effect is to decrease cost**, thus enhancing the commercial viability of the good(s) provided.4 Regulatory mandates include both** actions required by legislation and regulatory agencies (Federal or State). Examples of regulatory mandates are: requiring utilities to purchase power from nonutilities and requiring the incorporation of environmental impacts and other social costs in energy planning (full cost pricing). Another example is a requirement for a minimum percentage of generation from renewable energy sources (viz., a “renewable portfolio standard,” or, RPS). Regulatory mandates and financial incentives can produce similar results, but regulatory mandates generally require no expenditures or loss of revenue by the Government.

# 2ac – politics – immigration

#### Won’t pass --- several reasons

-Other Agenda Items Thump -Dems overplay their hand -Graham will bail like he always does

-Obama push will polarize it -Dems stall bc the GOP would get blamed

-No payoff for the rank and file House GOP, Hispanics won’t switch by 2014 and the base is still key

Altman 3-20 (Alex,- Washington correspondent for TIME “Four Hurdles That Could Block Immigration Reform”)

The next few months offer the best chance in a generation for the two parties to solve a problem that has bedeviled Congress like few others. Both sides agree the U.S. immigration system is broken. Both would seem to gain from a deal that clears a pathway out of legal oblivion for the nation’s 11 million illegal immigrants. Support is building for a landmark pact. But while negotiations are progressing in both the House and Senate, **an agreement is a long way off**. As the talks grow more detailed, obstacles to a deal may begin to emerge: Problem #1: The Gang of Eight The first snag lurks in the Senate, where the so-called Gang of Eight has huddled privately since the election in hopes of hammering out a bill. Members have crafted a set of measures that would create a pathway to citizenship for the nation’s estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants within about 13 years while requiring them to register with federal authorities, pay back taxes and fines, learn English and undergo background checks. The deal, both sides agree, would also beef up border security and determine how the future flow of immigrants will be regulated to match the needs of the economy. (MORE: Rand Paul Embraces Immigration Reform) The Gang’s closed conclaves have been marked by Vatican-style secrecy, often a sign of progress in a town where silence is rare. The Gang’s members – Republicans Marco Rubio, Lindsey Graham, John McCain and Jeff Flake, and Democrats Chuck Schumer, Dick Durbin, Bob Menendez and Michael Bennet – have, by all accounts, developed a rapport. “You can tell by the tone of their voices,” says an elected Democrat briefed on the progress of the private talks. But the broad themes are the easy part. The full bill will stretch to hundreds of pages, each peppered with detailed provisions that could spike it. Members bring clashing political imperatives and ideologies to the talks. Rubio, for exam ple, is trying to repair the GOP’s tattered image with Hispanic voters without sparking a backlash among the movement conservatives he’d need in a presidential bid. Graham, who faces a probable primary challenge in 2014, has a habit of basking in the bipartisan spotlight **before bolting when negotiations intensify**. The measure of the Gang of Eight’s success **isn’t** whether they are aligned at the start of their talks. It’s whether they are all aligned at the end. Problem #2: The Lobbyists A few years ago, an impasse between the leaders of the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO helped scupper an immigration-reform bill backed by President George W. Bush. At that time, business and labor could not agree on how many visas to grant low skilled workers who make the construction, agriculture and hotel and restaurant industries hum. The Chamber wanted cheap labor, but didn’t want workers to stay; unions were concerned about protecting citizens’ jobs. Soon after, reform collapsed. This time the two groups have nurtured an unlikely alliance. “There has been a sea change,” says a labor source close to the discussions. Nudged by Graham and Schumer, the two lobbies released a set of shared principles, including one stating that Americans should get “first crack” at available jobs and that businesses should have the flexibility to hire to meet the demands of the market. But history could repeat itself again. The two sides call for a new federal agency charged with setting visa levels, but they have yet to agree on who’s eligible or how the new bureau will work. The issue of future flow has been a stubborn sticking point before. And it is as easy to imagine conservatives balking at efforts to create a new government agency as it is to foresee unions drawing a line at a small number of foreign workers. (MORE: Committee to Save the GOP Says Pass Comprehensive Immigration Reform, Become Inclusive to Gays or Keep Losing) Problem #3: House Republicans Even if Senate negotiators can come up with a package to get 60 votes in the upper chamber, “the question continues to be, how does it get through the House?” says Frank Sharry, an expert on immigration reform. As in the Senate, a bipartisan cluster of eight representatives from across the ideological spectrum have been secretly meeting for months. Congressman Luis Gutierrez, an Illinois Democrat who has long been a leader on immigration reform, is full of praise for the new tack taken by his Republican counterparts. But, he acknowledges, “You still have to put those votes on the board, and that’s going to be a **real, real test in the House** of Representatives.” For their part, Republicans say the party’s old dogma, which held that illegal immigrants should self-deport and then go to the back of the line, is not viable policy. Even many immigration hard-liners say they want to help shape comprehensive reform. “It’s time for us to belly up to the bar,” says Ted Poe, the Texas Republican who chairs the House immigration reform caucus. But for conservatives, amnesty remains a dirty word. “A bill that’s basically amnesty, that says you’re here and you’re going to be a citizen — those two things are not going to come out of this conservative House,” says Poe. Even citizenship is charged enough that Republican Senator Rand Paul, who gave a speech March 19 backing a path to legalization for undocumented immigrants, avoided using the term. Many House Republicans, including several in the Judiciary Committee through which a bill must pass, have a long history of antipathy to amnesty, and **only** a grassroots rebellion to fear as next year’s primaries approach. Then there is the reality that **even if** Republicans were to be widely supportive of amnesty, **very few** of those new citizens are likely to abandon the Democratic Party **anytime soon**. “Republicans face a choice: do they ditch their principles and go all out in a failing attempt to outpander Democrats?” asks Rosemary Jenks, director of government relations at NumbersUSA, which advocates for lower immigration levels. “It’s becoming **very clear** to Republicans in Congress that this is **not going to get them the Hispanic vote**.” (MORE: The Plight of the “Illegal” Nanny) Problem #4: The Democrats Little discussed but also looming is the possibility that Democrats drag their feet on reform. Liberals will balk if the path to citizenship is too long or too onerous, or if enforcement provisions are too rigid. Many conservatives also suspect that Democratic power brokers, despite their daily hammering of Republicans to get moving on immigration reform, would privately prefer to keep the issue as a cudgel than actually pass a law. Barack Obama “wants to make a bill come out of the Senate that is so far out there that it would never pass, so that he can blame us for not being compassionate and use the issue to take back the House in 2014,” says a House Republican. Even some liberals see this as a plausible scenario. “There’s always a lingering doubt in my mind,” admits one House Democrat. Obama knows that putting his fingerprints on the deal is an easy way to kill it; when a draft of his proposal leaked in the press, he called Republican negotiators individually to apologize. But if negotiations in Congress bog down, **he may not be so hands off**. By all accounts, negotiators are making genuine progress toward a landmark deal that builds on a foundation laid during its last fumbled attempts. But lawmakers still have to thread a bill through a **thicket of obstacles** in a bitterly divided Congress. Sources close to the negotiations say they expect both chambers to introduce legislation in early April, giving Congress several months to haggle out a pact before members scatter for their summer recess. It sounds like plenty of time, **but it’s not**. Immigration will **have to jockey for attention** this spring with gun control, budgets and a potential grand bargain on tax and entitlement reform. Meanwhile, the human cost of the political stalemate is high. Each day, 1,400 undocumented immigrants are deported.

#### Not done until after august

Ferrechio 3-24 (Susan,- Chief Congressional Correspondant for the Washington Examiner “Congress 'for first time' is close to crafting immigration plan” http://washingtonexaminer.com/congress-for-first-time-close-to-crafting-immigration-plan/article/2525183)

There are Republicans in both the House and Senate, however, who are far less enthusiastic about the prospects of any compromise that provides a path to citizenship, which they derided as amnesty for lawbreakers. The House is writing its own legislation, which may not be ready until later this year, and some Republicans, including Rep. Raul Labrador of Idaho, are already **lining up in opposition** to a citizenship provision. And opposition could grow depending on what a pair of studies being released next month say about the cost of comprehensive reform and its impact on U.S. wages. One study, by the conservative Heritage Foundation, will show that legalization could open up entitlement benefits and access to health care to millions of people, at tremendous expense to the federal government. A second study, by Harvard University, will show that legalization could reduce the wages of lower-income workers. The cost factor may make it hard for fiscally conservative House Republicans to vote for a bill that includes either legalization or a path to citizenship. "They are not going to be able to figure out a way to keep it from absolutely busting the budget," a person familiar with the Heritage study told The Washington Examiner. Six Republican senators, meanwhile, wrote to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., asking for additional time to "read and analyze" the compromise before it is pushed through the panel. Haley Barbour, the former Mississippi governor heading a Bipartisan Policy Center immigration task force, told reporters last week that immigration reform is "complex and contentious" and could take a long time to complete. "It's a little bit overly optimistic to talk about what we're going to get done this spring or before the August recess," Barbour said.

**No spillover --- prefer empirics to opinions**

Berger 3-4 (Judson,- writer for Fox News “Recurring budget crises could put squeeze on Obama's second-term priorities”)

"The spirit of bipartisan cooperation that is keeping the immigration issue moving forward **has not been poisoned** by the sequester and budget stalemate, so far," he said in a statement. "The two sets of issues seem to exist in parallel universes **where I can disagree** with my Republican colleaguesstrenuously **on budget matters, but** still work with them effectively to eventually reach an immigration **compromise**.  ... I remain extremely optimistic that immigration reform is going to happen this year."  Immigration reform efforts are still marching along despite the budget drama. Obama met last week on the issue with Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who both are part of a bipartisan group crafting legislation.

#### Multiple recent battles

Continetti 3-15 (Matthew,- editor in chief of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon, he was opinion editor of the Weekly Standard, where he remains a contributing editor “The Obama Quagmire”)

The president is stuck in a congressional quagmire and no amount of “outside pressure” will get him out. Spring is about to begin. The first 100 days of his second term will end in a little more than a month. Before long baseball will resume, and then the NFL season will begin, and Congress will turn its compound eye to 2014. The president will be a lame duck. And what will he have to show for it? Guns, immigration, budgets, climate change, and the minimum wage are all tied up on Capitol Hill. No one knows when, or if, they will emerge. Or what they might end up looking like. Meanwhile, Obama’s approval rating is falling. He has been relegated to visiting the hill, and “reaching out” to select Republican mealtime companions, in an effort to stay relevant. But his activities seem curiously out of place. They demonstrate that the real action at the moment is not in the Oval Office. Even in the drama over the budget, where Obama could play a major role, he seems desultory and content to let Rep. Paul Ryan (R., Wis.) and Sen. Patty Murray (D., Wash.) have the stage. Otherwise his administration wouldn’t be waiting until April to release its proposal. What happened? Last week, I suggested Obama and his team had fallen for the “mandate myth,” or the false idea that winning reelection guarantees policy success. But there may be more to Obama’s current stall. Clearly the Obama team, in the aftermath of the president’s reelection, had a strategy. And the strategy was simple: Press the Republicans on all fronts at once. Use the momentum of the campaign and the fiscal cliff deal to win the controversial nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense, and pass gun controls, immigration reform, and additional tax increases on the wealthy. If the problem was Republican intransigence, then follow Donald Rumsfeld’s (and Dwight Eisenhower’s) advice: “If a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it.” Break the Republicans by revealing their stubbornness baldly and unequivocally and globally. There was no way of knowing whether or not this strategy would succeed. And maybe, in some parallel universe, it did succeed. After all, the Republicans are demoralized. They have their own problems. A swell of presidential and media pressure might have forced them into hasty acquiescence. Such was the president’s bet, anyway. A bet he clearly lost. Looking back, we can identify two things that **seriously eroded** the president’s position. The first was Hagel. In the weeks prior to Hagel’s nomination, few could imagine that 41 Republican senators would end up opposing a former Republican senator for secretary of defense. But the battle over Hagel—the vetting of his positions on the Middle East, Iran, and the U.S. nuclear deterrent; the revelation of anti-Israel remarks he had made in the past; his horrible performance during his confirmation hearing, which revealed him to be completely unqualified—rallied Republicans against the president **at a critical juncture**. It also had the effect, in a body that seems incapable of dealing with more than one controversy at a time, of **slowing down the rest of the president’s agenda**. Robert Reich, the left-wing economist, predicted as much. “There is a puzzle here,” he said during a Jan. 6 discussion of Hagel on ”This Week.” “With all the fights that the president has coming up, why is he doing this? I mean, there are a lot of other people he could be putting up, but why is he expending political capital in this way? I don’t understand.” Credit Reich for prescience and good judgment—if only in this particular case. Actually, also credit him for predicting that Obama’s sequester strategy would fail. “The White House apparently believes the best way to strengthen its hand in the upcoming ‘sequester’ showdown with Republicans is to tell Americans how awful the spending cuts will be, and blame Republicans for them,” Reich wrote on Feb. 25. “It won’t work.” And it didn’t work. The White House’s hyperbolic sequester approach backfired. Many of the claims made by administration officials were exposed as false. And some of the actions those officials took—such as releasing illegal immigrants in detention and closing the White House to tours—were clumsy and harmful. The situation is beginning to resemble the start of the most recent second term. I remember a dinner I had with a columnist friend before the August 2005 recess. My gloomy friend noted that Bush had lost his momentum and probably could not get it back. Don’t worry, I told him. Bush is going to regain the initiative after winning passage of the Central America Free Trade Agreement and the bankruptcy reform bill. Then he’ll stabilize Iraq. All will be well. Shows you what I know. Bush’s second term went horribly. It gave us Speaker Nancy Pelosi and President Obama. His mistake, in retrospect, was in not surging troops to Iraq and adopting a counterinsurgency strategy after winning reelection. He, too, fell for the mandate myth. He fell for a flawed political strategy of deemphasizing the war and turning to Social Security and immigration reform. I no longer predict the future (see above). But it seems to me quite possible that, four years from now, as Obama addresses high-dollar donors to whatever Organizing for Action becomes after he leaves office, the president will look back on the first months of 2013 and say: Mistakes were made.

**Plan’s massively popular in Congress**

Press Action 3/12/12 (“US Nuclear Industry Operates as if Fukushima Never Happened”) <http://www.pressaction.com/news/weblog/full_article/nuclearsubsidies03122012/>

Both Democrats and Republicans have had a long love affair with commercial nuclear power, and the relationship is showing no signs of losing steam. Since the 1950s, members of both parties have enthusiastically lavished electric utility companies with expensive gifts, ranging from subsidies to protection from liability for disasters to loan guarantees, all underwritten by U.S. taxpayers. The political calculus is simple: nuclear power enjoys unanimous support in Washington. Try to name one member of the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives who favors shutting down the nation’s 104 commercial nuclear reactors. Federal agencies, from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Energy to the Nuclear Regulatory, have worked diligently through the years to promote nuclear power. At the state level, support for nuclear power also is extremely strong, although there are some politicians—albeit a tiny number—who have publicly called for the closure of certain nuclear plants. On the one-year anniversary of the start of the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan, one would assume a voice in official Washington would have emerged calling for an end to the nation’s experiment with nuclear power. In Germany, government officials made the decision to phase out nuclear power by 2022 in response to Fukushima. There’s no such sentiment among the ruling elite in the United States. Locating a member of Congress opposed to the continued operation of nuclear power plants is as hard as finding a lawmaker who favors breaking ties with Israel over its mistreatment of Palestinians for the last 60 years. In fact, it’s more than hard, it’s impossible. It’s very rare to find an issue where there is a noteworthy difference between Democrats and Republicans. When there are differences, they tend to be subtle, although party officials and the corporate media will attempt to sensationalize a slight difference to create an impression that the U.S. political system permits honest and real debate.

**No spending links – plan net saves money b/c we can cancel the MOX plant, can be PART of a budget deal**

**Lots of support for IFRs and no one opposes them**

**Kirsch 9** (Steve Kirsch, Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science in electrical engineering and computer science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, American serial entrepreneur who has started six companies: Mouse Systems, Frame Technology, Infoseek, Propel, Abaca, and OneID, “Why We Should Build an Integral Fast Reactor Now,” 11/25/9) <http://skirsch.wordpress.com/2009/11/25/ifr/>

Support

Secretary of Energy Steven Chu[9]

White House Science Advisor John Holdren[10]

James Hansen, Director, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies

Hans Bethe, Nobel laureate, Physics[11]

Charles Till, Former Associate Director Argonne National Laboratory

Yoon Chang, former Associate Laboratory Director, Argonne National Laboratory

John Sackett, former Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory

Ray Hunter, former Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

Leonard Koch, 2004 winner of the Global Energy International Prize (equivalent to the Nobel prize for energy)

California Lt. Governor John Garamendi

Congressman Jerry McNerney

Congresswoman Anna Eshoo

Congresswoman Jackie Speier

Senator Lamar Alexander

Senator Jeff Bingaman[12]

General Electric (who already has a plant design for the IFR ready to build)

The American public, 59% of whom support nuclear power according to a March 2009 Gallup poll, despite zero PR by the nuclear industry.[13]

Dean Warshawsky, Mayor of Los Altos Hills, CA

Opposition

We do not know of any members of Congress who oppose restarting the IFR. Most have never heard of it.

Environmental groups, in general, do not like nuclear power. For example, environmental groups in Germany got Germany to ban nuclear power. The result is that Germany is forced to build more new coal plants…the worst possible outcome for the environment and exactly the opposite of what the green groups wanted. The green case against nuclear is based largely on dogma and myth. See Mark Lynas: the green heretic persecuted for his nuclear conversion which is an eye-opening account of a noted environmentalist who took an objective look at the facts. One of the top people at NRDC (speaking on his own behalf), says his only objection to the IFR is the cost competiveness of nuclear. GE says IFRs can be built in volume for $1,500 per kW which is cheaper than coal (and slightly less than the $2,000 per kW that the Chinese paid to construct Qinshan Phase 3 which was completed 52 days ahead of schedule and under budget in 2003). The NRDC spokesperson is skeptical of GE’s cost numbers for the IFR ($1,500 per kW).

The Sierra Club is in the process of determining their position on the IFR. Most other groups say that while they are sympathetic, they “do not have the expertise or inclination to take this on.”

You won’t have any trouble finding people who will throw darts at the IFR. They will argue it’s too expensive, unreliable, unproven, increases the proliferation risk, etc. These arguments lack credibility; they all fail in the face of the facts, e.g., the EBR-II and the Russian BN-600 experiences (a commercial nuclear reactor that has operated for 30 years without incident and the precursor to Russia’s next generation fast reactors that are now being built). These two reactors are are the “inconvenient truths” for the fast reactor skeptics.

**Obama won’t use political capital effectively on immigration – too disengaged.**

Jay Cost 2/11, The Weekly Standard, Lexis

While this statement would surely make the republicans of the founding generation turn over in their graves, it does encapsulate the job of the modern president, but only in part. Yes, he is to stand, almost godlike, above the political process and tell a story, but the modern presidential deity is not in line with the watchmaker God of the 18th-century rationalists. It is not enough to put the pieces in motion, then stand back. Instead, a president must be more like the God of the Old and New Testaments, above the world and sovereign over it, but also intimately involved in it, guiding, encouraging, cajoling, and threatening people to make the right choices.The ideal modern president, to borrow a phrase from Theodore Roosevelt, is one actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood. President Obama does not much care for the arena, and his successes came despite this distaste, not because of it. In fact, Nancy Pelosi probably deserves most of the credit for the legislative victories of 2009-2010. She functioned as a de facto prime minister, with her eyes always on big, national projects while she dealt with the provincial concerns of this committee chair or that subcommittee member. She, not Obama, was the one in the arena.What this means is that major breakthroughs on legislation in the next four years are likely to depend on political actors outside the White House. Pelosi's power is only a fraction of what it was, but policy success will still depend on congressional entrepreneurs as long as the White House remains disengaged. Thus, a whole host of issues will likely go unaddressed, above all, the looming entitlement crisis. One issue that could see movement is immigration reform, a topic of discussion where there is overlap between the parties and there are potential leaders in Congress, like Marco Rubio, who could help in whipping his party and negotiating a compromise with the other side.But little such progress will be due to President Obama. It is highly unlikely that he will act as the collective bargainer Neustadt envisioned. He will not be the one to help hammer out policy differences between Senate Democrats and House Republicans, such as illegal immigrants' status under Obamacare, or help the appropriators find the money needed for enforcement, or create a political space where both parties can declare victory.Sure enough, last week's campaign-style speech in Las Vegas on immigration reform was classic Obama. Not only did it do nothing to advance the ball on the sensitive negotiations in Congress, but the president demanded immediate amnesty, something to which Republicans will never agree. He also said he would insist that Congress vote on his proposal if it did not act in a timely fashion.That captures Obama's problem in a nutshell. Insisting that Congress do something is a good way to make sure nothing happens. Instead, as Harry Truman once said, the president must spend ~~his~~ time flattering, kissing, and kicking people to get them to do what they are supposed to do anyway. Barack Obama does not do this. He thinks it beneath him. After four years in office, he still fails to grasp the essence of modern presidential power.

**Obama won’t push the plan- empirics prove**

**Pasternak ’10** (Nuclear energy lobby working hard to win support BY JUDY PASTERNAK Sunday, January 24th, 2010 ShareThis This story is being co-published with McClatchy Newspapers .

There’s no telling whether the industry’s expensive effort will succeed. Witness the fate of the full-court press a week after Obama’s inauguration. Sen. Robert Bennett, R-Utah, who received $56,000 in nuclear-interest donations from 1999 to 2008, pitched the addition of $50 billion in loan guarantees for the nuclear power industry to the economic stimulus bill. Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., allowed it; he chairs the energy appropriations subcommittee and has received $190,000 in industry contributions since 1999, nearly half of that in 2007-2008. Although nuclear power plants starting a multi-year licensing process are hardly “shovel-ready,” “You take the vehicles you can get,” Bennett said in an interview. The full Senate included the money, but critics protested and the House insisted on removing guarantees from the final version of the bill. **Obama stayed out of the fight.** “The President **is a very smart guy,”** Clyburn said. “The Energy Department hadn’t given out the (Bush-era loan guarantees of) $18.5 billion. Why tie up $50 billion?” Since then, Chu has announced talks with four finalists for those guarantees. “That 18.5 billion can only cover three or four, but no more,” he told the House energy appropriations subcommittee in June. He’d be back to ask for more, he added.

**Political capital doesn’t exist but winners-win and issues determine outcomes**

Michael **Hirsch, 2-7**, 13, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital,” National Journal, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207> (Michael Hirsh is chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to [2012 Decoded](http://decoded.nationaljournal.com/contributors/michael-hirsh). Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com, “The World from Washington.” Earlier on, he was Newsweek’s foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror. He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994.)

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the **pundits will** do what they always do this time of year: They will **talk about how** unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “**political capital” Obama possesses** to push his program through. **Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago,** just before the November election, **if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term**—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—**this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license**. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. **And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen.** What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” **The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards**, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason**, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history**. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But **the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly**. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some **political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it**. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. **That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital**. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” **Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”**

ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ

**Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s** **aggressive** and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. **Bush failed** utterly, of course. But **the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital.** Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. **The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes**. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” **Obama may also get his** way on the debt ceiling**, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea**,” as the party suffers in the polls.

THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER

Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. **Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging**, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. **If he can get some early wins**—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—**that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.”** Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

**Obama losing immigration still results in high-skill reform**

Matthew Yglesias, Slate, 1/15/13, How the GOP Can Roll Obama on Immigration, www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/01/15/immigration\_reform\_will\_obama\_get\_rolled.html

Of the major policy issues under discussion in Washington, "immigration reform" stands out for having unusually undefined content. For the major immigration-advocacy groups, the goal is clear, a comprehensive bill that includes a path to citizenship for the overwhelming majority of unauthorized migrants already living in the United States. But many other aspects of immigration law are in the mix as part of a proposed deal, and it seems to me that there's a fair chance that a nimble Republican Party could essentially roll the Democratic coalition and pass an "immigration reform" bill that doesn't offer the path Latino advocacy groups are looking for. Elise Foley has the key line from her briefing on the administration's thinking about immigration, namely that a piecemeal approach "could result in passage of the less politically complicated pieces, such as an enforcement mechanism and high-skilled worker visas, while leaving out more contentious items such as a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants." And indeed it could. But how can they stop it? The last House GOP effort to split the high-tech visas question from the path to citizenship question was an absurd partisan ploy. If Republicans want to get serious about it they should be able to make it work. The centerpiece would be something on increased immigration of skilled workers. That's something the tech industry wants very much, it's a great idea on the merits, and few influential people have any real beef with it. High tech visas will easily generate revenue to pay for some stepped-up enforcement. Then instead of adding on a poison pill so Democrats will block the bill, you need to add a sweetener. Not the broad path to citizenship, but something small like the DREAM Act. Now you've got a package that falls massively short of what Latino groups are looking for, but that I think Democrats will have a hard time actually blocking. After all, why would they block it? It packages three things—more skilled immigration, more enforcement, and help for DREAMers—they say they want. Blocking it because it doesn't also do the broad amnesty that liberals want and conservatives hate would require the kind of fanaticism that is the exact opposite of Obama's approach to politics.

# at: remittances il

**This internal link is ridiculous – even if they have cards saying remittances are important to India’s economy they can’t win its important enough to take down the whole economy**

A. India only gets 70 billion a year in remittances

The Economic Times 12 ("India to receive record $70 billion remittances in 2012: Worl dBank," articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-11-21/news/35256192\_1\_remittance-flows-private-capital-flows-world-bank)

WASHINGTON: India will receive record $70 billion remittances in the year 2012, topping the list of developing countries which are expected to receive a total of $406 billion this year, the World Bank has said.

**B. That is less than one percent of their GDP**

Embassy of India 13 ("India's Economy,"www.embassyofindiabelgrade.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=43&Itemid=22)

Indian Economy Overview

GDP 2011-12: US$ 1,859.9 billion

GDP (PPP) 2011 : US$ 4,463.- billion

Per Capita Income 2011-12: US$ 1,549.9

Per Capita Income (PPP) 2011 : US$ 3,700.-

GDP growth rate 6.5 % in 2011-12

**Remittances are resilient and too many alt causes**

Ratha 9 (Dilip, "India is the top recipient of remittances," Worldbank, blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/india-is-the-top-recipient-of-remittances)

The resilience of remittances arises from the fact that while new migration flows have declined, the stock of migrants has been relatively unaffected by the crisis. Sources of risk to this outlook include uncertainty about the depth and duration of the current crisis, unpredictable movements in exchange rates, and the possibility that immigration controls may be tightened further in major destination countries.

# indian econ

India economy is rebounding

**Pasricha 12-28** (Anjana Pasricha, Voice of America, 12-28-12, “India’s Economy Looks to Rebound in 2013,” <http://www.voanews.com/content/indias-economy-looks-to-rebound-in-2013/1573681.html>)

India’s economy has experienced its worst slowdown in nearly a decade this year. But there are signs that the country, which is still among the world’s fastest growing economies, may soon begin to recover from the slump. Month after month in 2012, virtually every sector of the Indian economy - agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services - slowed. At the end of the year, economic growth stood at 5.3 percent. It was a huge disappointment for a country whose economy had been racing ahead at eight percent plus for the last eight years. Like many other countries, India was affected by the global slowdown as exports were hit. But several domestic factors also pulled down the economy. Many economists blamed the government, which faces allegations of graft in many spheres, for policy inaction. Chief economist at ratings agency, CRISIL in Mumbai, D.K. Joshi, says the downturn was sharper than warranted by global factors. “It is widely recognized now, to clear projects it is taking time because of governance issues. And when it takes time to clear projects, the investment pipeline gets choked," says Joshi. "As a result of that investment slowed down quite significantly. Then we also had high inflation regime, and high inflation means the Central bank cannot cut interest rates to perk up the economy.” The government admits that investment is critical to revive the economy. Faced with plummeting growth, it has taken some steps to liberalize the economy and make it easier for foreign businesses to pump money into sectors such as retail, aviation and insurance. The long-awaited reforms were the biggest initiated in nearly ten years. Authorities also promised to speed up clearances for large infrastructure projects. The government also announced spending cuts as it grappled with high deficits. It slashed subsidies on fuel despite political opposition. This is expected to ward off the threat of a credit rating downgrade. Economist N. Bhanumurthy with the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy in New Delhi, says these steps are meant to reassure investors and could help the economy stage a gradual recovery. “Frankly right now the most important issue is confidence among investors, both domestic and foreign. All these measures are expected to provide some kind of confidence-booting measures for revival in the economy." he said. "Our own projections for the next year, 2013-14, is 7.1 percent.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said the government’s first priority is to reverse the slowdown. But he says that a return to eight percent growth is an ambitious goal.

**Economy is rebounding – industry is growing and government actions are positive**

**Gupta 1-1** (Surojit Gupta, Times of India, 1-1-13, “Lower rates could boost economy in 2013,” <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Lower-rates-could-boost-economy-in-2013/articleshow/17838422.cms>)

After going through a gloomy phase in 2012, the Indian economy is poised to return to a healthy growth trajectory in the early part of 2013-14 on the back of some positive factors. While it may not be a smooth ride due to several risk factors going ahead, investors and economists say the worst may be over for the Indian economy.

"We recently met 80-plus institutional investors across asset classes in Europe. While the consensus was that the worst was over, key concerns were (1) execution of reforms to sustain interest, especially if the outlook on other emerging markets (China) improves and (2) economics could be overshadowed by political compulsions by the second quarter of 2013," Rohini Malkani, an economist at Citigroup India, said in a recent research note. In recent weeks, some positive signs have emerged that hold out hope for the future. Industrial growth rebounded in October although it is too early to predict whether it would be sustainable, given the volatility in data. However, other data such as the HSBC Purchasing Managers Index points to an improvement in the manufacturing sector, which should augur well for industrial growth in the months ahead.

Inflation, which has emerged as a major policy challenge for the past nearly three years, is also expected to moderate in the months ahead and there is a consensus that it may settle in the 6-7% range by end-March 2013. Perhaps the most crucial factor that should help jumpstart growth and boost investments as well as sentiment would be easing of interest rates. The Reserve Bank of India has signalled its intent to support growth and expectations are that the central bank may cut policy rates in January.

Economists say that the much anticipated interest rate reduction, along with the impact of the reform measures announced by the government, should help revive growth. Clearances to mega projects are also expected to be streamlined with the Cabinet Committee on Investments set to approve pending projects.

Another major factor that could help the growth momentum would be the 2013-14 Union Budget in February. It could contain some positive measures to bolster the economic recovery, while reiterating the government's commitment to fiscal consolidation. Firm timelines about the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax could strengthen sentiment.

# at: robinson

**Concludes the impact is inevitable**

**Robinson ‘10**

Dr. David Robinson, History lecturer at Edith Cowan University in Perth, Western Australia and published author that holds a PhD in History, and is mid-way through a Master of International Relations degree. “The Regional and Global Implications of India’s Rise as a Great Power.” – June 17th, 2010 – made available at http://lfort.wordpress.com/2010/06/17/indias-rise-as-a-great-power/#\_ftn21

India’s rise to great power status is inevitable and will occur quickly over the coming decades, especially as the United States believes this will assist it in maintaining a global strategic balance. This will lead to a greater exertion of India’s power outside of its borders, and especially into the Indian Ocean region, which it sees as being essentially for its economic and social stability. The two states that India’s ascent will have the greatest strategic impact on will be its neighbours Pakistan and China, however, for contrasting reasons, this impact may not change the fundamental power balance that exists today. Pakistan is already overwhelmed by the military strength of India, and thus its primary defences are the threat of nuclear exchange, or state disintegration – neither of which will definitely be undermined by rising Indian power. In contrast, China and India will have increasingly complex and intertwined relations, but the economic and strategic issues that bind them, and the evenly-matched nature of their conventional and nuclear forces, are likely to maintain relative peace and strategic stability. India sees itself as an emerging great power in a multi-power world, which will maintain a strategy of poly-alignment. With the balance of forces developing as they are, that projection is likely to become a reality.

# \*\*\*1AR\*\*\*

# lifecycle

**Nuclear’s lifetime carbon costs are the same as renewables – and IFRs solve them**

**Blees et al 11** (Tom Blees1, Yoon Chang2, Robert Serafin3, Jerry Peterson4, Joe Shuster1, Charles Archambeau5, Randolph Ware3, 6, Tom Wigley3,7, Barry W. Brook7, 1Science Council for Global Initiatives, 2Argonne National Laboratory, 3National Center for Atmospheric Research, 4University of Colorado, 5Technology Research Associates, 6Cooperative Institute for Research in the Environmental Sciences, 7(climate professor) University of Adelaide, “Advanced nuclear power systems to mitigate climate change (Part III),” 2/24/11) <http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/>

It is sometimes alleged by anti-nuclear campaigners that nuclear power’s life-cycle carbon costs are so high as to render it little better than the use of coal. The IPCC has studied this and put nuclear in about the same category as wind and solar in their Fourth Assessment Report section entitled Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change [xxii]. On page 293 of this report there is a chart that describes both non-biomass renewables and nuclear in terms of their carbon output simply as “small amount.” The text of the report (on page 269) states: “Total life-cycle GHG emissions per unit of electricity produced from nuclear power are below 40 g CO2-eq/kWh (10 g C-eq/kWh), similar to those for renewable energy sources. Nuclear power is therefore an effective GHG mitigation option…” Cynics may point out that they mention a thoroughly debunked report [xxiii] that claims much higher life-cycle emissions, but the IPCC clearly found it unpersuasive. A recent meta-review published in the journal Energy reinforced this result [xxiv].

It’s important to note that the vast majority of CO2 emissions in the nuclear life cycle arise from uranium mining and enrichment. Deployment of integral fast reactors, however, will eliminate the need for both mining and enrichment for nearly a millennium, so the life-cycle carbon cost will be virtually nil, especially if the concrete used in the new plants is of the magnesium silicate variety that actually is carbon negative [xxv]. While it is sometimes hard to envision a world powered by abundant nuclear energy, the fact is that the vehicles that are used in constructing a power plant can all be zero-emission, the smelting of the steel that goes into building the plant will be done with clean nuclear power, and even the cement plants can be powered by nuclear heat.

**French example and modern innovations show we can build nukes fast enough**

**Barton 11** (Charles Barton, “21st Century Nuclear Challenges: 1 Mass Deployment, A. Coal Replacement,” 2/14/11) <http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011/02/21st-century-nuclear-challenges-1-mass.html>

The cost of the first 54 reactors was reported to be 400 billion Francs or about 105 Billion 2009 dollars. Thus the French created a nuclear powered electrical system that provided between 70% and 80% of their electricity within 18 years of deciding to do so. The population of France at the time was under 60,000,000 or no more that 1/5th the current population of the United States. The United States would have to do no more than match the French nuclear effort between 1974 and 1992 in order to replace its coal fired power plants with nuclear power plants within a 20 year time span. Thus even if the replacement of coal fired power plants is accomplished by the use of conventional nuclear power plants, it can easily be accomplished 20 years before 2050.

The deployment of so many reactors so rapidly, would actually offer a considerable production advantage. Reactor manufacture can be modularized, with factories building parts that can easily be transported to the final construction site, and then assembled with labor savings machinery. The Westinghouse AP-1000 reactor was designed to be built with such a plan. It is designed to be constructed in three years, and thus AP-1000 unit construction will be, if anything, more rapid than French reactor construction between 1974 and 19992.

According to Westinghouse,

The AP1000 was designed to reduce capital costs and to be economically competitive with contemporary fossil-fueled plants. The amount of safety-grade equipment required is greatly reduced by using the passive safety system design. Consequently, less Seismic Category I building volume is required to house the safety equipment (approximately 45 percent less than a typical reactor). Modular construction design further reduces cost and shortens the construction schedule. Using advanced computer modeling capabilities, Westinghouse is able to optimize, choreograph and simulate the construction plan. The result is very high confidence in the construction schedule.

A rapid build and other economies facilitated by large scale serial production would enable to produce AP-1000 reactors in the united States at a cosy that would be similar too or less than coal fired power plants, with NOx, SOx, and fine particulate controls, and certainly less than coal fired power plants with carbon capture and storage. The cost of these plants would also be less than renewable generating capacity that could produce similar amounts of electricity with similar consumer demand response characteristics.

# china

**Hegemony is the best way t stop china war**

**Kagan 2/14** (Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, Financial Times chief foreign affairs commentator, “[The Rise or Fall of the American Empire](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire),” 2/14/12) <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full>

The main point of my book, in fact, is to examine what might happen in the world should the United States prove incapable of continuing as the predominant power and slip into a rough equality with other powers, like China. I'm afraid it is optimistic to believe that China will pose only an economic challenge to the United States under those circumstances. The effects of a new multipolar world will be far-reaching. I sometimes think we have forgotten how countries behave as their power increases. We have been living so long in a world where one power has been so much more powerful than all the others. The existence of the American hegemon has forced all other powers to exercise unusual restraint, curb normal ambitions, and avoid actions that might lead to the formation of a U.S.-led coalition of the kind that defeated Germany twice, Japan once, and the Soviet Union, more peacefully, in the Cold War.

The Chinese, as good historians, are acutely aware of the fate that befell these others and have worked hard to avoid a similar fate, following as best they can Deng Xiaoping's advice to "keep a low profile and never take the lead." As relative power shifts, however, that advice becomes harder and harder to follow. We saw some early signs of what the future might hold in China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The response of the United States, which swung in behind the nervous powers in the region, has possibly convinced the Chinese that their moves were premature. They may have themselves bought in too much to the widespread talk of America in decline. Were that decline to become real in the coming years, however, it is a certainty that Chinese pressures and probes will return. Greater relative power on China's part might also lead Beijing to become less patient with Taiwan's lack of movement toward acquiescing to the mainland's sovereignty. A situation in which U.S. power were declining, China's power were rising, and the Taiwan issue became fractious is practically a textbook instance of how wars start -- even if neither side wants war. That is why some have referred to Taiwan as East Asia's Sarajevo.

**Heg determines whether china is cooperative – war will not happen if we’re strong, but definitely happens if we’re weak**

**Felzenberg and Gray 1/3** (Alvin S. Felzenberg, lexturer at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication and at Yale University, Alexander B. Gray, Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and the war-studies department of King’s College, London. “The New Isolationism,” 12/3/10) <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/256150>

China, while continuing to upgrade its naval capabilities, grows increasingly assertive. In pursuit of its own Monroe Doctrine for East Asia, Beijing has proclaimed its sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, menaced neighbors from India to Vietnam, used its economic muscle to intimidate Japan, and increased its threats against Taiwan. China’s leaders have been studying the writings of the 19th-century American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who demonstrated the connection between sea power and economic strength. At the turn of the last century, Theodore Roosevelt found in Mahan the blueprint for achieving unprecedented American influence in world affairs. His efforts to build both a strong navy and a sound economy ushered in the “American century,” the period in which the United States became a force for good throughout the world and a beacon of hope for those yearning to breathe free.

In pursuing a “blue-water” ocean-going navy capable of supporting their expanding global economic ambitions, the Chinese are acting from a desire to defend their nation’s trade and access to world markets, with a focus on energy supplies. It is critical that the Chinese — who are closely studying both Mahan’s writings and the history of the Monroe Doctrine — and Americans who see Chinese hegemony over Asia as either inevitable or a price they are willing to pay in exchange for slashing defense spending not draw the wrong lessons from history. Both sides should understand that it was not American might that gave the Monroe Doctrine force, but the then all-powerful British navy. For much of the 19th century, Great Britain had reasons of its own for keeping other nations out of the Western Hemisphere and for wanting to see the United States develop internally.

If appropriately funded, the United States Navy has the capacity to play a similar role in China’s rise — perhaps, in the process, influencing how China develops. Should China conclude that the United States intends to remain a visible and active presence in the region, it will respond accordingly. Acting together, the two nations might embark on a series of cooperative ventures designed to help assure a steady flow of trade and an unimpeded exchange of people, goods, and ideas. They can also work together to combat a rise in piracy and terrorism in Asia and elsewhere and to respond to humanitarian crises, like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. For its part, China, should it continue to hold North Korea in check, will achieve some of the status it seeks as a rising world power, with commensurate influence on the world stage.

Should China conclude, on the other hand, that the United States intends to turn inward, it may grow even more ambitious and assertive in its region and beyond, potentially menacing world peace. Its smaller neighbors nervously wait to see how the United States will respond to China’s growing assertiveness. Should they come to believe that the U.S. is in retreat, they will make their own accommodations with Beijing. That result would wreak irreparable damage both to America’s economy and to its security.

Messrs. Frank and Paul and their supporters have taken it into their minds that a reduced American presence in world affairs, particularly where the military is involved, would be a good thing. They had better think again: World politics, like nature, is hardly prone to respect vacuums. Iran and Venezuela remain as bellicose and destabilizing as ever, in spite of two years of Obama “engagement.” Iran squats beside the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the world’s energy supply travels. Iran has also, the original Monroe Doctrine be damned, extended its military cooperation with Hugo Chávez’s authoritarian regime. Evidence is strong that Venezuela is providing sanctuary for Hezbollah terrorists in South America. The alliance of these two anti-American and increasingly menacing states could pose a threat to the United States of a kind that would make us nostalgic for the Cuban Missile Crisis.

# econ shift

**Rise of the rest helps america**

**Kagan 12** (Robert Kagan, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and a columnist for The Washington Post, “Not Fade Away,” 1/11/12) http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm\_source=Editors+and+Bloggers&utm\_campaign=cbaee91d9d-Edit\_and\_Blogs&utm\_medium=email

BUT WHAT ABOUT the “rise of the rest”—the increasing economic clout of nations like China, India, Brazil, and Turkey? Doesn’t that cut into American power and influence? The answer is, it depends. The fact that other nations in the world are enjoying periods of high growth does not mean that America’s position as the predominant power is declining, or even that “the rest” are catching up in terms of overall power and influence. Brazil’s share of global GDP was a little over 2 percent in 1990 and remains a little over 2 percent today. Turkey’s share was under 1 percent in 1990 and is still under 1 percent today. People, and especially businesspeople, are naturally excited about these emerging markets, but just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not mean it is a rising great power. Wealth matters in international politics, but there is no simple correlation between economic growth and international influence. It is not clear that a richer India today wields greater influence on the global stage than a poorer India did in the 1950s under Nehru, when it was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, or that Turkey, for all the independence and flash of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, really wields more influence than it did a decade ago.

As for the effect of these growing economies on the position of the United States, it all depends on who is doing the growing. The problem for the British Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century was not its substantial decline relative to the United States, a generally friendly power whose interests did not fundamentally conflict with Britain’s. Even in the Western hemisphere, British trade increased as it ceded dominance to the United States. The problem was Britain’s decline relative to Germany, which aimed for supremacy on the European continent, and sought to compete with Britain on the high seas, and in both respects posed a threat to Britain’s core security. In the case of the United States, the dramatic and rapid rise of the German and Japanese economies during the Cold War reduced American primacy in the world much more than the more recent “rise of the rest.” America’s share of the world’s GDP, nearly 50 percent after World War II, fell to roughly 25 percent by the early 1970s, where it has remained ever since. But that “rise of the rest” did not weaken the United States. If anything, it strengthened it. Germany and Japan were and are close democratic allies, key pillars of the American world order. The growth of their economies actually shifted the balance irretrievably against the Soviet bloc and helped bring about its demise.

When gauging the impact of the growing economies of other countries today, one has to make the same kinds of calculations. Does the growth of the Brazilian economy, or of the Indian economy, diminish American global power? Both nations are friendly, and India is increasingly a strategic partner of the United States. If America’s future competitor in the world is likely to be China, then a richer and more powerful India will be an asset, not a liability, to the United States. Overall, the fact that Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa are enjoying a period of economic growth—which may or may not last indefinitely—is either irrelevant to America’s strategic position or of benefit to it. At present, only the growth of China’s economy can be said to have implications for American power in the future, and only insofar as the Chinese translate enough of their growing economic strength into military strength.

# always try heg

We’ll always try to be the hegemon – macdonald isn’t an answer

**Kagan, 07 –** senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, 7/19, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end\_of\_dreams\_return\_of\_histor.html)

The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would–be nations is a second defining feature of the new post–Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying –– its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

# india relations

US-Indian relations don’t work but will never collapse

**Padukone 12** (Neil Padukone is the Felow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution, 6/19/2012, "Natural Allies?", pragati.nationalinterest.in/2012/06/natural-allies/)

In the late 1990s, the United States and India embarked on a partnership based largely on three strategic issues: markets, counter-terrorism, and balancing China. With the opening of India’s economy in 1991, the United States saw India’s billion-strong population as a massive market for its businesses. In the wake of 9/11, Washington came to see India’s travails against Islamist militants in Kashmir and Afghanistan through the lens of its War on Terror and increased counter-terrorism cooperation with New Delhi. And as India’s and China’s strategic spaces began to overlap, managing China’s rise became a common concern for both New Delhi and Washington. With that in mind, the United States and India reversed decades of enmity and, through the 2006 nuclear deal, embarked upon a symbolic commitment to what heads of state of both countries have called a “natural alliance.” Yet with all the fanfare- particularly after U.S. President Barack Obama voiced his support for a permanent Indian seat on the UN Security Council in his 2010 Lok Sabha speech- bilateral ties have recently been marked by considerable drift: India has not fallen in line on the issue of Iran, Washington is only slowly coming around on Pakistani militancy, the countries’ UN voting records do not mesh, and trade disagreements abound. Questions have been raised over why U.S.-India relations have cooled, or whether they were over hyped in the first place. The U.S. Department of Defense’s “strategic pivot” toward Asia is one way to shore up relations and realign the Indo-U.S. partnership. India’s geostrategic location at the centre of the Indian Ocean- along with its naval expansion toward the southern Indian Ocean and its Port Blair naval base at the Andaman Islands- enable New Delhi to manage China’s presence in the region. Indeed, India and America’s navies have been more coordinated than any other bureaucracy since 2000. But the implications of this shared Beijing-centric orientation will only come about in the medium-term. One dimension of these ties, the sale of defence technologies, is another place where India has not yet delivered: the recent Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition failed to award contracts to American companies. And in the middle of a global recession in which all countries are hunkering down, and domestic inflation and unemployment- not to mention concerns over doing business in India, such as retroactive taxation and tax avoidance measures- have grown, economic reforms that would further open India’s markets have slowed. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Kolkata was largely an effort to encourage India to increase the speed of its market liberalisation, particularly in the retail sector. This may be a prospect for the future, but is doubtful today given India’s economic slowdown and the attendant drop in employment. Yet perhaps the main reason for this strategic drift is that America’s key concern in South Asia these days is Afghanistan. President Obama delivered on his campaign promise to refocus efforts on the war in that country, and from 2009, his administration’s “AfPak” strategy took a regional perspective that originally sought to bring India into the equation. The thinking behind this, as Amitai Etzioni writes, is that “for Pakistanis, conflict (with India) poses an ominous existential challenge that drives their behaviour on all things,” including “their approach to the West and the war in Afghanistan… If the India-Pakistan confrontation could be settled, chances for progress on other fronts would be greatly enhanced.” The implication was that Washington ought to hyphenate India and Pakistan, to see the two as part of the same regional tussle, and try to settle the Kashmir dispute in order to make progress in Afghanistan. This was something New Delhi vehemently opposed and in fact, it sought de-hyphenation from Pakistan – engagement with New Delhi and Islamabad on separate and unconnected tracks. So when the office of the late US Special Adviser on Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke sought to include India and Kashmir in its purview, New Delhi successfully lobbied against it. This effort served one of India’s aims, insofar as it keeps Kashmir out of America’s area of direct intervention. Yet it also takes India, its assets, and its clout out of the broader Afghan resolution. Among these assets is the Indian-constructed Chabahar Road that connects Iran’s eastern Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman to western Afghanistan. The road ends Pakistan’s monopoly on seaborne trade to Afghanistan, which has long allowed Islamabad’s pernicious dominance of Kabul’s economic and political life. In light of America’s confrontation with Iran and efforts to sanction the latter’s energy sector, however, Washington opposes India’s use of Chabahar, particularly to import Iranian oil and natural gas. Indeed another goal of Secretary Clinton’s visit was to try to shore up India’s support for sanctions against Iran- to which end India is reducing its dependence on Iranian energy as it awaits an exemption on sanctions from the US State Department. But when New Delhi recently used its Chabahar road to send 100,000 tons of wheat to Kabul, its full potential vis-à-vis Afghanistan became evident. And this food aid was on top of India’s additional commitments to Afghanistan: constructing the Zaranj-Delaram highway in western Afghanistan that connects Chabahar to the Afghan ring road, the development of the Ayni Air base in Tajikistan (originally designed to treat wounded Afghan soldiers), building Afghanistan’s parliament building, exploring the Hajigak iron mine, and even commitments to train the Afghan National Police and Army- all of which amount to pledges of over $1 billion since 2001. Washington has been wary of encouraging India’s presence in Afghanistan citing Islamabad’s fear of encirclement. But, even without American attention, a refutation of Pakistan’s “India Threat” narrative is already underway. In order to remain focused on strategic horizons beyond South Asia, India is reorienting its defence apparatus away from Pakistan and towards China and the southern Indian Ocean; even the Ayni Base and Chabahar Road can be seen as elements of this strategic shift beyond the subcontinent. Together with Pakistan’s focus on the Durand Line and events within its own borders, political breathing space between Islamabad and New Delhi has opened up. India-Pakistan talks have already produced a number of important breakthroughs that portend better bilateral days to come: the granting of Most-Favoured Nation status, enhanced trade measures, as well as discussions on the specific parameters of a Kashmir peace based on economic integration. Specifically regarding the Indo-Pak dynamic in Afghanistan, things are less zero-sum than they appear. Important as the Chabahar route is, the combination of road, sea, and even rail links still comes with massive transport costs for India-Afghanistan trade. As S Verma, chairman of Steel Authority of India and the head of a consortium of Indian industries engaged in Afghanistan’s Hajigak iron mine, put it, “over the longer term,” transporting Afghan minerals over Pakistani territory “will be a productive investment. Not just for us, but others in the region including Pakistan. There are license fees, logistics, and so forth.” Meanwhile, Kaustav Chakrabarti of the Observer Research Foundation has suggested “deploying joint Indo-Pak nation building teams” in Afghanistan that include advisors, military trainers, bureaucrats, developments experts, medical crews and NGOs. These teams would “provide additional resources, bridge political polarities, foster cooperation between India and Pakistan and devise means to verify each other’s role, and ultimately, present a long-term mechanism,” guaranteed by India and Pakistan’s geographic proximity, “to ensure Afghanistan’s neutrality.” He cites as a precedent the collaboration between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in “UN peacekeeping missions in hot spots like Somalia.” Full realisation of any Indo-Pak promise will require more space, and time, between the two countries. The interim period, meanwhile, may indeed take a cooling period between the United States and India, who are unlikely to become allies in the fullest sense due to differing tactical approaches. But the strategic fundamentals of the Indo-American rapport- balancing China, expanding trade, and stabilising South Asia- remain intact.

# uniqueness

#### Predictive and grounded in history --- their ev is just a snapshot

Stanton 3-21 (John,- writer for Buzzfeed “How Washington's Immigration Momentum Could Collapse At Any Moment”)

"Some of the people who are talking about this haven't been through an immigration debate. In fact, a lot of the people lining up behind that leadership haven't been through an immigration debate. Those of us who were here in this congress in 2006 and 7 remember what that was like," said Rep. Steve King. "We remember the tens of thousands of people pouring into the Capital grounds on both sides of the issue, remember the phones being jammed" by constituent calls, the Iowa Republican explained. "So I think there's going to be a constituent backlash against this thing soon, as they see it moving in that direction," King warned, adding, "Whether they can pass something before the American public wakes up, I don't know." Conservatives may be increasingly comfortable with the idea of a pathway to citizenship — or, as Paul calls it, "probation" — but they're still **very skittish** when it comes to the kind of language used to describe it. "It's an inaccurate phrase. It's inaccurate. There's a pathway to a green card, and then you can decide whether to apply for citizenship," said Sen. Marco Rubio, one of the Republican leaders of the Senate bipartisan reform effort. "Everyone misunderstands how this process works. There's no such thing as a pathway to citizenship. You can't go from being an immigrant to a citizen, even today. You have to get a green card," Rubio said. That squeamishness is understandable: as King noted, for movement conservatives "comprehensive immigration reform is amnesty" so **even** mentioning **the word** "pathway" can set off a bitter fight. But even once lawmakers get beyond that linguistic hurdle — which is far from certain — there are still plenty of other traps that could **kill reform**, most notably **how** that pathway will work. Will undocumented workers be forced to pay a fine? If so, how much? Everyone seems to agree that they will need to go to "the back of the line" to apply for green cards and eventually citizenship. But what does that mean, exactly? Will they have to live in the United States legally for some period of time before they can begin those processes, or will they be able to apply immediately? Each of these questions, along with figuring out how to secure the border and reform the legal immigration system are all **landmines** that negotiators are still struggling to map out. Each one could **easily derail the entire process**. "Any one of these things could undo all of this," a senior House GOP leadership aide said. And then there's the problem of passing a bill in the House. While Labrador and a number of other House conservatives are moving toward the pro-reform camp, King is one of the leaders of a hardline group of conservatives that will simply not be swayed. "Is [Rep.] Louie Gohmert going to do something? No. Is Steve King going to do something? No," the leadership aide said. And while activists have speculated that Speaker John Boehner could use parliamentary tricks to pass the bill, aides said it is all but impossible for him to break the so-called "Hastert Rule," which requires a majority of Republicans to vote for a bill. "Boehner can't break the Hastert rule on something as high profile as immigration. It wouldn't even be a question of him loosing his speakership. His entire leadership team would get thrown out," the aide warned.

# delay

#### Negotiations will take too long and drag out the debate --- Altman says even the whole summer isn’t enough.

#### This kills it --- even a two-week delay is enough

Munro 3-12 (Neil,- 3-12 White House Correspondent “Senate Democrats eye immigration blitz after recess”)

The Senate’s Democratic leaders may try to rush a nation-changing, economy-shaping immigration law though the Senate as soon as the Easter recess ends April 8, before the public can even read the bill, say GOP insiders. The GOP’s concerns are fueled by the Senate judiciary committee’s failure to schedule any hearings so that senators, advocates and the public can analyze the draft bill, which is expected to be several hundred pages long. The pending strategy was highlighted by a recent statement from GOP Sen. Lindsey Graham, the leading advocate for the bill, which could grant amnesty to at least 11 million low-skill immigrants, allow them to bring in their relatives, and also allow companies to bring in millions more workers. “You don’t want to leave it hanging out for **two weeks** **to get shot up”** by opponents, Graham told the AP. In 2006 and 2007, Graham’s efforts to pass a major rewrite failed once the public protested. So far, the Democrat-controlled Senate has scheduled no hearings on the bill, even though proponents say it will be released immediately after the recess. The most prominent Republican in the eight-member group writing the bill is Rubio. He’s told AP that he isn’t rushing to complete the bill. “I don’t know about timeframe. … I’d rather do it right than do it fast. …. I think we’re making good progress,” he said. His office did not respond to a request from TheDC about whether he will demand hearings for the bill. In 2006, the huge bill contained numerous complex proposals that provided many new opportunities for immigration lawyers. It also include numerous controversial measures that spurred public opposition. In 2007, for example, Majority Leader Sen. Harry Reid introduced a 790-page bill, S.1639, that included a so-called “Z visa,” allowing nearly all illegal immigrants in the country to get work permits. On page 572, the bill called for requiring government officials to provide temporary work permits — dubbed probationary Z visas — within 24 hours to every applicant who claimed to be in the country when the bill was passed, for up to two years after passage of the law. “No probationary benefits shall be issued to an alien until the alien has passed all appropriate background checks or the end of the next business day, whichever is sooner,” said the bill. Other measures in the bill would provide taxpayer funded legal services and tuition payments to illegal immigrants, and allow gang members to stay if they signed a “renunciation of gang affiliation.” The push for rapid approval of the controversial bill is a major lesson drawn from the failure of the 2006 and 2007 immigration rewrite bills. In 2006, “the time between agreement and getting it to the floor really **allowed a lot of erosion from both the right and left** … [so] **you’ve got to move it it quickly**,” said Michael Cherthoff, who also served as secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Cherthoff led the 2006 push for President George W. Bush. He’s now employed by Covington & Burling, a large legal and lobbying firm.

#### Anything past the August Recess is DOA

Hesson 3-27 (Ted,- Immigration Editor for ABC in Washington D.C. “3 Reasons Why an Immigration Reform Timeline Matters”)

A group of Democrats and Republicans working on an immigration reform bill in the Senate will almost certainly miss a self-imposed March deadline to produce draft legislation. And yesterday, one of the groups foremost members, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), cautioned that a bill might not come in early April, either. Why does the deadline matter? Here are three reasons. 1. Momentum The November presidential election -- where Obama housed Romney among Latinos, taking 71 percent of the vote -- got people in Washington talking about immigration reform as a way for the Republican party to win Latino voters. But that was five months ago, and **political memory can be short**. "Once the sting of the election starts to wear off a little bit, I think there's **less of an impetus to act** on this issue," said Marshall Fitz, immigration policy director at the liberal Center for American Progress. "You've got to act when the issue is fresh and everyone is very cognizant of the political implications...The political implications aren't going to change as we go further into this, but the calculus of the members may start to get **obscured**." 2. Deportations Lots of interests groups would like to see an immigration deal inked sooner than later, but no one group feels the pressure more than immigrants who are living in the country without authorization. Even while President Obama stumps for a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, his administration continues to deport record numbers of people, many of them for immigration-related offenses. A recent report in The New York Times found that on any given day, about 300 people in immigration detention are kept in solitary confinement, treatment that could have lasting psychological effects. "There is a sense that every day of delay is a day in which people continue to be deported who would otherwise be eligible for relief," Fitz said. "It's not like delay is the status quo. The delay is continued active harm on the community and on immigrant families." 3. Primaries If the so-called Senate "Gang of Eight" working on immigration reform is able to produce a bill in April, the Senate and House could feasibly vote and pass legislation before the August recess in Congress. But **any** further significant **delay could jeopardize that** timeline. If Congress continues to negotiate the bill in the fall, some Republican members of the House facing reelection in 2014 may be less likely to give their support, fearing a primary challenger who will use the issue as a political cudgel. "I think the House leadership feels like they've got to get this done and behind them by [the August recess] because **their guys are** **going to be unwilling to take a tough vote after that**," Fitz said.

More ev GOP will backtrack as negotiations move along