# 1NC

## Framework

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#### A. Interpretation – debate is a game that requires the aff to have a defense of increased energy production for one or more of the following: crude oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear, wind, or solar.

#### Energy PRODUCTION means the extraction or capture of energy from natural resources – that’s distinct from ENERGIZING debate space – not dance

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for **final consumption** by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

#### B. They don’t meet – they claim unique advantages based of the dancing that’s anti-topical and supports a decrease in coal production, not an increase in production.

#### C. Reasons to prefer:

#### Debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### The opening of infinite frameworks destroys stasis – agreement on the topic as the starting point for debate creates a platform of argumentative stability that is the crucial foundation for deliberation and makes debate meaningful

O’Donnell 4 (Dr. Tim, Director of Debate – Mary Washington U., “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”, Debater’s Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/ DRGArticles/Framework%20article%20for%20the%20DRG%20final2.doc)

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary,* a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question? The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis.[[1]](#endnote-1) Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.[[2]](#endnote-2) How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.[[3]](#endnote-3)

#### A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive teaching of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Switch-side is key---Effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)

What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."

Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; **there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies**. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.

It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are **not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments**, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.

Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.

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Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to **engage in mass murder** **because he was able not to think about it,** especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsibility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).

Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,

Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)

Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.

Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).

Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, **theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies**.

Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).

By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:

Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)

There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.**

Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).

Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).

The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). **The paradoxical nature of agonism** (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

Arendt's Polemical Agonism

As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).

Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.

Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:

You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)

Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).

In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.

This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.

Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).

Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).

Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).

Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism.**

Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.

In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Effective decision-making outweighs---

#### Key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

If we assume it to be possible without recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14

I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13

Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained.

Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually.

When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided:

A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision…

The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision…

It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16

John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.

We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### Only portable skill---means our framework turns case

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### 1NC

#### New alternative energy investments will undermine Saudi resolve to cut production and cause them to accept a price crash

**Energy Tech Stocks**, **08**

 ( “Petro-politics Expert Marcel: Saudis Have Oil But Not Enough; OPEC May Flood Market To Hurt New Techs,” 1/27/2008**,** http://energytechstocks.com.previewmysite.com/wp/?cat=15&paged=2.

Saudi Arabia still has a lot of oil; nevertheless, the world doesn’t have enough to meet forecasted demand of roughly 115 million barrels a day by 2030, a more than 30% increase over today’s 87 million barrel daily consumption. Shorter term, should OPEC members feel threatened by new alternative energy technologies, they very well may flood the market, temporarily driving crude prices down in order to make the new technologies appear financially unattractive. That’s the analysis of Valerie Marcel, a Dubai-based petro-politics expert and the author of “Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East.” During a lengthy conversation, Marcel, who is an associate fellow at UK-based Chatham House, one of Europe’s leading foreign policy think-tanks, told EnergyTechStocks.com that she wasn’t optimistic that oil shortages can be avoided, despite growing recognition of the problem in major oil-consuming nations. Marcel further said that the Saudi national oil company – Saudi Aramco – appears worried about fuel cell vehicles and other attempts by the world to wean itself off oil, and that should it and other OPEC members feel threatened, they would “play hardball,” flooding the market in an attempt to derail the new technologies. Marcel said that after 36 separate interviews with oil company officials, she believes Saudi Arabia probably has about 75 years of reserves remaining at current production rates, and that the Kingdom is capable of raising daily production from around nine million barrels a day currently to a sustained 12.5 million per day, which is its plan. At the same time, Marcel said she understands why, given the Kingdom’s self-imposed secrecy surrounding its oil industry, the world keeps asking, “Why should we trust them?

#### Decreases prices

IB Times 11 (The International Business Times is an online global business newspaper, comprising of 17 editions, published in 10 languages across 13 countries. It is among the top ten online business newspapers in the world. The publication, sometimes called IBTimes, offers news, analysis and opinion on geo-politics, global economy, markets, large and small cap companies, science and technology, and business life and culture. May 30, 2011 “Why lower Saudi oil prices kill alternative energy” http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/154524/20110530/saudi-arabia-oil.htm )

The biggest obstacle to alternative energy is money. Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal seems to understand this. In a CNN interview, he admitted Saudi Arabia wants lower oil prices because it doesn’t “want the West to go and find alternatives.” Covers the leading players in the finance industry Sample Alternative energy hasn’t taken off in the US because its development largely depends on the private sector. Currently, it’s simply cheaper to buy oil from countries like Saudi Arabia, so not many private companies bother to develop alternative sources. For example, if Saudi oil average $80 per barrel in the long-term, why bother extracting oil from oil sands and oil shale if doing so cost $85 per barrel? Why turn to electric cars if the whole ordeal – the research, electric cars, and electric grid – cost more than filling up convention cars with imported fossil fuel? On the other hand, if oil skyrockets to $200 per barrel, it would make absolutely sense to develop oil sands, oil shale, and electric cars. Experts generally put the threshold at which alternative energy becomes viable at a long-term sustained price of $80 per barrel. A recent Federal Reserve research, for example, puts the figure for oil sands at $70 per barrel in 2005 terms, which translates to $77.5 in 2010. According to Al-Waleed, Saudi Arabia probably estimates the threshold to be $80 per barrel. The cost of many alternative energy sources is front-loaded. For example, once a solar farm is constructed and the electric grid is built, the cost of harvesting additional electricity becomes extremely cheap. The danger for oil producers like Saudi Arabia is that once a sustained period of high oil prices induces the Western private sector to invest the upfront costs of setting up alternative sources, the price of energy will be lowered permanently. The optimal strategy for Saudi Arabia, therefore, is to avoid a sustained period of high oil prices. For Western countries, the optimal strategy to bite the bullet, pay the upfront cost, and save money in the long-run with cheap alternative energy sources. Western capitalism, however, can be short-sighted and decentralized; if oil prices stay reasonablely low, not enough players in the private sector will have the resolve to eat the enormous upfront costs of developing alternative energy sources.

#### High prices prevent Iran strikes

**Pomeroy 11**

 (Robin, Edmonton Journal, “Higher oil price empowers Iran, blunts sanctions,” 1-22, Lexis)

Juan Cole, a professor of Middle East history at the University of Michigan, said a higher oil price reduced the risk that Washington or its Middle East ally Israel would attack Iran. Both have said they could do that if nothing else halted Iran's nuclear program, which they say is aimed at getting nuclear weapons. Iran says it is entirely peaceful.

"I think the high petroleum prices in the context of a weak U.S. economy make military action less likely. You would not want to risk administering a 'Bush I' to yourself," he told Reuters, referring to the first President George Bush's war on Iraq, which he believes exacerbated a U.S. recession. "Ahmadinejad must enjoy sticking the West with this winter's high prices, as a little revenge for the sanctions." But the sanctions are exacting a long-term cost on Iran's oil sector, already hobbled by years of underinvestment. One day that could mean bigger oil costs for the entire world.

#### Global nuclear war

**Trabanco 9**

(José Miguel Alonso, Independent researcher of geopoltical and military affairs, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at Anytime,” 1-13, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762)

In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases in the regions. Teheran will unquestionably resort to its proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) to carry out attacks against Israel, America and their allies, effectively setting in flames a large portion of the Middle East. The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring intense financial and economic havoc upon the West, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such conflict could rapidly spiral out of control and thus a relatively minor clash could quickly and dangerously escalate by engulfing the whole region and perhaps even beyond. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies and some great powers could become involved in one way or another (America, Russia, Europe, China). Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.

### 1NC

#### All humans are inherently interconnected. This recognition must ground our reaction to domination and oppression. The affirmative’s challenge posits one resolution as opposed to another. This denies the fundamental truth of interconnectedness and re-creates the oppression that the affirmative seeks to challenge. Only a shift in consciousness towards a politics of love rather than contestation can fundamentally transform society.

Butot 4 (Michele Carrie Butot, B.Ed. University of Calgary – 1985, B.S.W. University of Calgary – 1988, & MA Social Work University of Victoria, “Love as Ernancipatory Praxis: An Exploration of Practitioners' Conceptualizations of Love in Critical Social Work Practice,” 2004, Masters Thesis, Proquest Thesis and Dissertation Database.)

Non-judging and non-interference in the Buddhist view do not imply non-engagement. In Chodron's discussion with hooks about Buddhism and working to end racism and sexism - hooks , a critical feminist and race analyst, struggles to know how to begin where she is and how the world is, and still have a vision of how it might be different. Chodron suggests it is less a situation of hoping for change (where there is too much hope, she contends, one often begins to have a "strong sense of enemy" or 'other'), but of aspiring to an end to suffering for all beings. She says: "I give up both the hope that something is going to change and the fear that it isn't. We may long to end suffering but somehow it paralyses us if we're too goal-oriented. Do you see the balance there?" (Chodron & hook, 1999, pp. 1-2). This is similar to the paradox we’d hear participants discuss in the interpretive chapter on critical practice, about hoping for change and spealung one's own truth without being attached to how the change ought to unfold, and without trying to change the other. Other critical-feminist Buddhist authors also take up the concept of aspiration towards change, along with non-interference and its implicit notion of engaged non-attachment. Klein (1996), for example, argues that: ... self-awareness and simple self-acceptance is the foundation of all practice. Buddhists call it mindfulness, and it involves among other things the ability to just see what is, without rushing in to criticize, enhance, or change. Just see. Just be. (p. 40) The ability to just be is basic and healing ... we have to start from where we are. And to do th we must accept the person we are at this very moment, in all its unglory, is the perfect place for us to start from. (p. 41) She also contends that it is crucial to be able to make effort toward something without at the same time belittling ourselves because that has not yet been accomplished (p. 42). Thich Nhat Hanh is a Vietnamese Buddhist monk, teacher, writer and peace activist who embodies the principles he teaches. He suggests the need for "mindfulness, insight, and altruistic love as the only sustainable bases for political action" (Thich Nhat Ha&, 1993, p. 155). He was mentioned by two of the participants during our dialogues as someone who understood, stood for, and lived the principles about which we were speaking. Coincidentally, although I am not a Buddhist, and had not mentioned him to participants, his writings, which I had not reviewed for several years, were fundamental in my own early understandings of love in practice; and bell hooks, whom I have cited extensively, considers him one of her key teachers. In his work on non-violent resistance to war, Thich Nhat Hanh (1993) discusses ahimsa, Sanskrit for 'non- harming', a concept also key in yoga philosophy. In parallel with Hart (l999), and participants who we will hear speak of the need for ongoing self-work before and alongside work with others, he states that ahimsa must first be practiced in relation to oneself, not as an achievable goal, but as a guide of the direction in which to proceed. His argument that "Among the three individual, society, and nature - it is the individual who begins to effect change" (p. 123) echoes the words of Chodron above. Thich Nhat Hanh (1993) adds another critical notion to this discussion, complicating the notion of intersubjectivity. In congruence with participants and other theorists who spoke of interconnection, he speaks of "interbeing" (1993, pp. 67-8; see also 1998, p. 134) as a holistic approach to activism. Through the practice of non-harming, he says, we can come to an understanding and experience of "interbeing", recognizing the roots of violence and oppression in all of us, not just those termed the 'oppressor' or the 'enemy' (p. 67). In concert with hooks, he suggests that if we are able to recognize this intrinsic interconnection, we will naturally stop creating an 'other' to blame, argue with, harm, kill (p. 68). In the concept of interbeing, we hear echoes of Ermine and Hart's (1999) 'interconnection' and 'enmeshment', and a connection point with Leonard's (2001) notion of a constant dialectical tension between interdependence and diversity. This notion of interbeing is absolutely key to my inquiry because it speaks eloquently to the apparent contradiction between the universal and the particular: "All phenomena are interdependent ... but if we truly realm the interdependent nature of the dust, the flower, and the human being, we see that unity cannot exist without diversity. Unity and diversity interpenetrate each other freely. Unity is diversity, and diversity is unity. This is the principle of interbeing" Thich Nhat Hanh, 1993, p. 129). While he consciously connects Buddhist beliefs to different faith traditions, each of which he perceives as containing the 'elements' of each other (p. 136), and while he asserts that some concepts, such as the notion of 'no-enemy' is "enshrined in all the great spiritual, humanist, and religious traditions of the world" (pp. 143-4), he also sides with Baskin (2002) in her critique of the absence of spirituality in structwahst social work, saying: "We know there is no place for spiritdty in Marxism" (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1993, p. 57). In keeping with the Aboriginal belief, cited earlier in this conceptual chapter, and by participants in the next, of the intrinsic value of all beings, he states: "Each person is important. Each being is important. Each moment is important" (p. 99). As we will hear participants in later chapters discuss love as a guiding force, and non-judging and truth-telling as coexistent, Thich Nhat Hanh, speaking of the juxtaposition of a strongly nonviolent stance and working actively for peace and other justice issues, names compassion as a guide in knowing how to be and do (or not do) in each moment. "[In] confronting the situation and having compassion in our hearts, ways of acting c[o]me by themselves ... If you are alert and creative, you will know what to do and what not to don (p. 45). "In many circumstances, non-action can help a lot ... sometimes it is best not to say anything ... [but when we see social injustice, if we practice nonaction, we may cause harm" (p. 69). Like Chodron, Thich Nhat Hanh (1993) suggests the possibility of movements for social justice that do not dehumanize or demonize our oppressors and enemies. The keys to social action he suggests are embodied deep listening, non-harming, loving kindness and discernment (pp. 68-71; see also 1998, p. 1 16). The recognition of interbeing, he asserts, is a way towards sustainability of the work for social and ecological justice (1993, p. 138). In her work on 'contemplation and transformation' hooks (1996) takes up contemplative engagement practices as congruent with a critical conceptualization of love and with the notion of interbeing. She conceptualizes love as beyond dualism, and makes a strong link between deep engagement and activism. Her work is so eloquent, and feels so critical to the discussion that I cite some of the text here in detail as a ground from which to move into the rest of the inquiry: Love as an active practice - whether Buddhist, Christian, or Islamic mysticism - requires that one embraces being a lover, being in love with the universe ... To commit to love is fundamentally to commit to a life beyond dualism. That's why, in a culture of domination, love is so sacred. It erodes dualisms - the binary oppositions of black and white, male and female, right and wrong. Love transforms. (hooks, 1996, p. 287) She goes on to describe a loving stance as a way of dissolving dualities. In a loving stance, she argues, we recognize the complexity of life, and must come to our critical and political engagements both actively and from contemplative stillness: If we are concerned with dissolving these apparent dualities we have to identify anchors to hold onto in the midst of fragmentation, in the midst of loss of grounding. My anchor is love. It is life-sustaining to understand that things are always more complex than they seem. This is what it means to see clearly. Such understanding is more useful and more difficult than the idea that there is a right and a wrong, or a good or bad, and you only have to decide what side you're on. In real love, real union or communion, there are no simple rules. (p. 289) Not only does she argue that love is life-sustaining, as we will hear participants agree later, hooks also suggests that it has the potential to lead us to deeper engagement and clarity in our work towards social justice. Participants will be heard to speak to this as well, suggesting that a loving stance demands that we engage deeply, and that such a loving stance requires the self-care and selfwork that hooks contends contemplation can provide. Love as a foundation also takes us more deeply into practice as action in the world ... love leads to a greater commitment and involvement with the world, not a turning away from the world. The wisdom I seek is that which enables us to know what is needed at a given moment in time. When do I need to reside in that location of stillness and contemplation, and when do I need to rise and do whatever is needed to be done in terms of physical work, or engagement with others, or confrontation with others? (p. 289) It is not useful to rank one type of action over the other. (hooks, 1996, p. 290) What is required, she concludes, and what love might provide to our work for social justice, is a "fundamental shift in consciousness": A fundamental shift in consciousness is the only way to transform a culture of domination and oppression into one of love. Contemplation is the key to this shift. There is no change without contemplation ... here [she is referring to the Buddha under the Bodhi tree] is an action taking place that may not q w r t o be a meaningful action. Yet it transforms. (p. 292, italics in original) Whether this shdt in consciousness is defined as spiritual is, I think a matter of preference for the practitioner, but the transformative relationship between love, critical practice and interconnection that hooks refers to is key it brings me back to the notions of intersubjectivity explored earlier.

#### Inner anger makes violence and nuclear war inevitable

Ikeda 7 (Daisaku Ikeda, 2007. Buddhist philosopher and president of Soka Gokkai International. “Restoring the Human Connection: The First Step to Global Peace,”http://www.sgi-uk.org/resources/PeaceProposal2007.pdf.)

The challenge of preventing any further proliferation of nuclear weapons is 8 just such a trial in the quest for world peace, one that cannot be achieved if we are defeated by a sense of helplessness. The crucial element is to ensure that any struggle against evil is rooted firmly in a consciousness of the unity of the human family, something only gained through the mastery of our own inner contradictions. It is this kind of reconfiguration of our thinking that will make possible a skilled and restrained approach to the options of dialogue and pressure. The stronger our sense of connection as members of the human family, the more effectively we can reduce to an absolute minimum any application of the hard power of pressure, while making the greatest possible use of the soft power of dialogue. Tragically, the weighting in the case of Iraq has been exactly the reverse. The need for such a shift has been confirmed by many of the concerned thinkers I have met. Norman Cousins (1915–90), the writer known as the “conscience of America” with whom I published a dialogue, stated with dismay in his work Human Options: “The great failure of education—not just in the United States but throughout most of the world—is that it has made people tribe-conscious rather than species-conscious.”8 Similarly, when I met with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in November of last year, he declared powerfully: “… we continue to emphasize our differences instead of what we have in common. We continue to talk about ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ Only when we can start to talk about ‘us’ as including all of humanity will we truly be at peace….” In our correspondence, Joseph Rotblat posed the question, “Can we master the necessary arts of global security and loyalty to the human race?”9 Three months after writing these words to me, Dr. Rotblat passed away. I believe his choice to leave this most crucial matter in the form of an open question 9 was an expression of his optimism and his faith in humanity. When our thinking is reconfigured around loyalty to the human race—our sense of human solidarity—even the most implacable difficulties will not cause us to lapse into despair or condone the panicked use of force. It will be possible to escape the snares of such shortsighted thinking. We will be empowered to engage in the kind of persistent exertion that Max Weber viewed as the ideal of political action, and the door will be open to the formation of consensus and persuasion through dialogue. The function of anger When my mentor Josei Toda used the words “a devil incarnate, a fiend, a monster,” he was referring to a destructiveness inherent in human life. It is a function of this destructiveness to shred our sense of human solidarity, sowing the seeds of mistrust and suspicion, conflict and hatred. Those who would use nuclear weapons capable of instantaneously killing tens of millions of people exhibit the most desperate symptoms of this pathology. They have lost all sense of the dignity of life, having fallen prey to their own inner demons. Buddhism classifies the underlying destructive impulses that give rise to such behavior as “the three poisons” (Jpn: san-doku) of greed, anger and ignorance. “The world of anger” can be thought of as the state of life of those in whom these forces have been directed outward toward others. Buddhism analyzes the inner state of human life in terms of the following ten categories, or “worlds”: Hell, Hunger, Animality, Anger, Humanity, Rapture, Learning, Realization, Bodhisattva and Buddhahood. Together these worlds constitute an interpenetrating functional whole, referred to as the inherent ten worlds. It is the wisdom and compassion of the world of Buddhahood that bring out the most positive aspect of each of the other 10 worlds. In the Buddhist scriptures we find the statement “anger can function for both good and evil,”10 indicating that just and righteous anger, the kind essential for countering evil, is the form of the world of anger that creates positive value. The anger that we must be on guard against is that which is undirected and unrestrained relative to the other nine worlds. In this case, anger is a rogue and renegade force, disrupting and destroying all in its path. In this form, the world of anger is a condition of “always seeking to surpass, unable to countenance inferiority, disparaging others and overvaluing oneself.”11 When in the world of anger, we are always engaged in invidious comparisons with others, always seeking to excel over them. The resulting distortions prevent us from perceiving the world accurately; we fall easily into conflict, locking horns with others at the slightest provocation. Under the sway of such anger, people can commit unimaginable acts of violence and bloodshed. Another Buddhist text portrays one in the world of anger as “84,000 yojanas tall, the waters of the four oceans coming only up to his knees.”12 A yojana was a measure of distance used in ancient India; there are various explanations as to what the specific distance may be, but “84,000 yojanas” represents an immeasurable enormity. This metaphor indicates how the self-perception of people in the life-state of anger expands and swells until the ocean deeps would only lap their knees. The inner distortions twisting the heart of someone in this state prevent them from seeing things in their true aspect or making correct judgments. Everything appears as a means or a tool to the fulfillment of egotistical desires and impulses. In inverse proportion to the scale of this inflated arrogance, the existence of others—people, cultures, nature—appears 11 infinitely small and insignificant. It becomes a matter of no concern to harm or even kill others trivialized in this way. It is this state of mind that would countenance the use of nuclear weapons; it can equally be seen in the psychology of those who would advocate the use of such hideously cruel weapons as napalm, or, more recently, depleted uranium and cluster bombs. People in such a state of life are blinded, not only to the horrific suffering their actions wreak but also to the value of human life itself. For the sake of human dignity, we must never succumb to the numbing dehumanization of the rampant world of anger. When the atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, not only military personnel but also many scientists were thrilled by the “success” of this new weapon. However, the consciences of genuinely great scientists were filled with anguish. Einstein greeted this news with an agonized cry of woe, while Rotblat told me he was completely overcome with hopelessness. Their feelings were no doubt intensely resonant with the sentiments that motivated Josei Toda to denounce nuclear weapons. When Toda spoke of “declawing” the demonic nature of nuclear weapons, he had in mind the struggle to prevent the inner forces of anger from disrupting the ten worlds and going on an unrestrained rampage. He was calling for the steady and painstaking work of correctly repositioning and reconfiguring the function of anger in an inner world where wisdom and harmony prevail. This is the true meaning of “declawing.” For SGI members in particular it is thus vital we remember that not only our specific activities for peace and culture but the movement for “human revolution” based on the daily endeavor to transform our lives from within is a consistent and essential aspect of the historic challenge of nuclear disarmament and abolition. 12 **Unless we focus on this inner, personal dimension, we will find ourselves overwhelmed by the structural momentum of a technological civilization, which in a certain sense makes inevitable the birth of such demonic progeny as nuclear weapons**.

#### The alternative is to shed the ego --- this creates a realization of our unity with all living things.

Snauwaert 9 (Dale Snauwaert, Fall 2009. Associate Professor of Educational Theory and Social Foundations of Education; Chair of the Department of Foundations of Education, University of Toledo. “The Ethics and Ontology of Cosmopolitanism: Education for a Shared Humanity,” Current Issues in Comparative Education 12.1, <http://www.tc.edu/cice/Issues/12.01/PDFs/12_01_Complete_Issue.pdf>.)

Cosmopolitans assert the existence of a duty of moral consideration to all human beings on the basis of a shared humanity. What is universal in, and definitive of, cosmopolitanism is the presupposition of the shared inherent dignity of humanity. As Martha Nussbaum states: [Human good can] be objective in the sense that it is justifiable by reference to reasons that do not derive merely from local traditions and practices, but rather from features of humanness that lie beneath all local traditions and are there to be seen whether or not they are in fact recognized in local traditions. (Perry, 1998, p. 68) If a shared humanity is presupposed, and if humanity is understood to possess an equal inherent value and dignity, then a shared humanity possesses a fundamental moral value. If the fundamental moral value of humanity is acknowledged, then a universal duty of moral consideration follows, for to deny moral consideration to any human being is to ignore (not recognize) their intrinsic value, and thereby, to violate their dignity. The duty of moral consideration in turn morally requires nations and peoples to conduct their relations in accordance with ethical principles that properly instantiate the intrinsic value and dignity of a shared humanity. If valid, **the fundamental aims of the education of citizens should be based upon this imperative**. In order to further explicate this cosmopolitanism perspective, the philosophy of one of history’s greatest cosmopolitans, Mohandas K. Gandhi, is explored below. Reflections on Gandhi’s Cosmopolitan Philosophy While most commentators focus on Gandhi’s conception and advocacy of nonviolence, it is generally recognized that his core philosophical beliefs regarding the essential unity of humanity and the universal applicability of nonviolence as a moral and political ideal places Gandhi in the cosmopolitan tradition as broadly understood (Iyer, [1973] 1983; Kumar Giri, 2006). At the core of Gandhi’s philosophy are the interdependent values of Satya (Truth) and Ahimsa (nonviolence). Gandhi’s approach to nonviolent social transformation, Satyagraha, is the actualization in action of these two values (Bondurant, 1965; Iyer, [1973] 1983; Naess, 1974). Gandhi’s Satya is multifaceted. Its most fundamental meaning pertains to Truth as self-realization. Satya is derived from sat, Being. Truth is Being; realizing in full awareness one’s authentic Being. Truth, in this sense, is the primary goal of life. Gandhi writes:

What I want to achieve . . . is self-realization . . . I live and move and have my being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field are directed to this same end. (Naess 1974, p. 35) Self-realization, for Gandhi, requires “shedding the ego,” ”reducing one self to zero” (cited in Naess 1974, p. 37). The ego per se is not the real self; it is a fabrication. This egoic self must be transcended. As the egoic self loosens and one becomes increasingly self-aware, **one deepens the realization of one’s authentic being, and that being is experienced as unified with humanity and all living things**. Scholars normally understand human identity in terms of personality, which is a socially constructed self-concept constituted by a complex network of identifications and object relations. This construction is what we normally refer to as the ego or self-identity. Our egoic self-identity is literally a construction, based upon psychological identifications (Almaas, 1986a, 1986b; Batchelor, 1983). From this perspective, **the ego is a socially constructed entity**, ultimately a fabrication of the discursive formations of culture; from this point of view, the self is exclusively egoic. This perspective has its origins in the claim that consciousness is solely intentional: the claim that consciousness is always consciousness of some object. From this presupposition, the socially constructed, discursive nature of the self is inferred. If consciousness is solely intentional, then the self is a construction, and, if the self is a construction, then it is always discursive – a prediscursive self cannot exist. It can be argued, however, that intentionality itself presupposes pre-intentional awareness. A distinction can be made between intentional consciousness and awareness. Intentional consciousness presupposes awareness that is always implicit in intentional consciousness. If intentional consciousness does not presuppose a pre-intentional awareness, if there is only consciousness of, then there is always a knower-known duality, and that duality leads to an infinite regress. To be conscious of an object X, one has to be conscious of one’s consciousness of X, and one would have to be conscious of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of X, and one would have to be conscious of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of X . . . ad infinitum¾reductio ad absurdum. Therefore, there must be implicit in intentional consciousness a level of awareness that is pre-intentional, pre-discursive, and non-positional (Forman, 1999). To be conscious of anything presupposes pre-intentional self-awareness, and being pre-intentional, awareness must be in turn pre-discursive and non-positional (Almaas, 1986a, 1986b; Aurobindo, 1989, 2001; Batchelor, 1983; Buber, 1970; Forman, 1999; Fromm, 1976). When the ego is shed, a pre-discursive, nonpositional self-awareness is revealed. One can be reflexively aware of one’s consciousness. Gandhi held that pre-discursive self-awareness, the core of our being, is unified and interdependent with all living things. He writes: “I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, of all that lives (Naess 1974, p. 43).” In an ontological sense, Gandhi maintains that Satya, Truth, is selfrealization, a realization of one’s self-awareness as essentially unified with and thereby existing in solidarity with all human beings and with all living things. Pre-discursive self-awareness is experienced as non-positional, and, being non-positional, it is unbounded; it exists as a field of awareness that is interconnected with all sentient beings. This state is an experience and is only known experientially. Therefore, the assertion of a shared humanity is based upon a common level of being. Human intentional consciousness is expressed in a vast plurality of cultural expressions; implicit within this plurality, existing as its ground, is a shared level of awareness of being that unites us. From the perspective of ontological Truth, nonviolence follows from the unity and interdependence of humanity and life; violence damages all forms of life, including one’s self. Nonviolence uplifts all. Gandhi writes:

I do not believe . . . that an individual may gain spiritually and those who surround him suffer. I believe in advaita (non-duality), I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, of all that lives. Therefore, I believe that if one man gains spiritually, the whole world gains with him and, if one man falls, the whole world falls to that extent. (Naess 1974, p. 43)

In this experience, one becomes aware of the interrelated and interdependent nature of being. On an existential level, there exists a fundamental interconnection between one’s self and other beings. As Buber suggests, “we live in the currents of universal reciprocity (Buber, 1970, p. 67).” From the perspective of this experience—and this is a direct experience—to harm the other is to harm one’s self. From the perspective of existential interconnection, nonviolence, the essence of morality, rests upon an awareness of our fundamental interconnection.

## Case

#### Innovative responses to tech-induced environmental destruction enable reconceptualization of technology as more than an instrument. The Alt’s passive refusal leaves prevailing worldviews intact.

Feenberg 7 (Andrew, Canada Research Chair in the Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Volume 42, “Between Reason and Experience,” p. 24-27, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Between\_Reason\_and\_Experience\_DYP42.pdf)

As I reformulate this social version of the technical revealing, it has political consequences. Political protests arise as feedback from disastrous technical projects and designs reaches those excluded from the original networks of control. These protests are often based on scientific knowledge of the devastation caused by technology designed in indifference to human needs. This is the point at which objective facts enter experience as motives for distrust and fear of technology and technical authority. The subjects become aware of the contingency of the technically structured world on choices and decisions that do not proceed from a supposedly pure rationality. The lifeworld reacts back on technology through the objective contents of knowledge of its side effects. There have been many attempts to articulate the implications of this new situation. My approach is closest to that of Ulrich Beck. Like him I argue that we are entering a new phase of technological development in which the externalities associated with the prevailing technologies threaten the survival of the industrial system (Beck, 1992). This threat has begun to force redesign of many technologies and changes in the disciplines and training underlying the technical professions. Beck explains the transition from a capitalism based on distinct spheres with little interaction, to a “reflexive modernity” in which interaction between spheres becomes the norm. Multiple approaches and cross disciplinary conceptions increasingly shape the design process in response. He develops the social consequences of the resultant changes while I have focused primarily on the technological dimension of the new phase. In this phase, what Gilbert Simondon calls “concretizing” innovations emerge designed to accommodate a wider range of social influences and contextual factors.12 As design is pulled in different directions by actors attempting to impose their differing functional requirements on devices, the winning design strategies are often those that reconcile multiple functions in simple and elegant structures capable of serving them all. Examples abound: hybrid engines in automobiles, refrigerants and propellants that do not damage the ozone layer, substitutes for lead in consumer products, and so on. In the process of developing these technologies environmental, medical and other concerns are brought to bear on design by new actors excluded from the original technological regime. Of course, no small refinements such as these can resolve the environmental crisis, but the fact that they are possible at all removes the threat of technological regression as a major alibi for doing nothing. The emergence of a radically new technical politics requires us to rethink the basic concept of rationality that has supplied the existing industrial society with its highest philosophical sanction. Heidegger and Marcuse help us to understand the limitations of the prevailing concept. They remind us that the hypostatization of a reason fragmented into specializations and differentiated from a broader cultural and normative context is not inevitable but belongs to a specific historical era, an era that may well be approaching its end. A new understanding of rationality is possible based not on a return to a teleological worldview in which we can no longer believe but on recognition of the complexity of experiences that have been cast in artificially narrow instrumental schemas. Concrete experience is thus the touchstone of this ontology because it is only there that the world reveals itself in its multifarious and unpredictable connections and potentialities. From this new standpoint specialization and differentiation will not disappear, but they will be treated as methodologically useful rather than as ontologically fundamental. The resultant breaching of the boundaries between disciplines and between the technical realm and the lifeworld responds to the crisis of industrial society. We may learn to bound the cosmos in modern forms by attending to the limits that emerge from the unintended interactions of domains touched by powerful modern technologies. This is the form in which the lived world we have discovered in the thought of Heidegger and Marcuse becomes active in the structure of a rationality that still has for its mission the explanation of objective nature. The discovery of a limit reveals the significance of that which is threatened beyond it. This dialectic of limitation is most obvious in the case of threats to human health or species survival. On the one side, the experienced world gains a ground in respect for an object, in this case the human body or a threatened species. On the other side, a concrete technical response is solicited employing the means at hand in new combinations or inventing new ones. From this standpoint no return to a qualitative science is possible or necessary. Modern science objectifies and reifies by its very nature but it could operate within limits standing in for the lost essences of antiquity and like them referring us to an irreducible truth of experience. As we encounter this truth we are reminded of the necessity of restraint. This must be a productive restraint leading to a process of transformation, not a passive refusal of a reified system. The forward looking Janus face is fundamental and grants hope not by rejecting scientific-technical achievements but by revealing their essential nature as processes in which human action can intervene.13 Innovative responses to the new limits can serve in the reconstruction of both technical disciplines and technology. To be sure, the process character and full complexity of reality cannot be reflected immediately in the scientific-technical disciplines, but the disciplines can be deployed in fluid combinations that reflect the complexity of reality as it enters experience through humanly provoked disasters of all sorts and through the consciousness of new threats of which we ourselves are the ultimate source. The goal is not merely to survive but to reconstruct modern technology around a new model of wealth that is environmentally compatible and that draws on human capacities suppressed or ignored in the present dispensation. Marcuse interpreted this in terms of the surrealist “hazard objectif,” the rather fantastic notion of an aesthetically formed world in which “human faculties and desires ... appear as part of the objective determinism of nature – coincidence of causality through nature and causality through freedom” (Marcuse, 1969: 31).

-- Bataille’s affirmation of transgression without return means nothing changes.

Wolin 96 (Richard, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History and Humanities at Rice University, Constellations, Volume 2, No 3, “Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology,” p. 406-407)

However, as a result of the ethos of transgression that is propagated in Bataille’s work - a quasi-aestheticist valorization of transgression for transgression’s sake - one encounters serious normative lacunae. One might even go so far as to say, echoing Tony Judt, that aspects of Bataille’s thought are redolent of a more general and long-standing “vacuum at the heart of public ethics in France,” “the marked absence of a concern with public ethics or political morality.”38 I have already spoken of his work as an unsurpassable normative point of reference for much of post-structuralism. Here, “anti-normativism” itself becomes “normative,” insofar as rejection of the “norm” becomes itself a source of normativity. In recent years, as poststructuralists have begun meditating on the problem of how one would go about constituting a non-totalitarian political community - a communautk inavouable (Blanchot) or dksoeuvrke (J-L. Nancy), as it has been called - it is, unsurprisingly, to Bataille’s work that they have immediately turned.39 Yet, as Bernard-Henri LCvy has cautioned in relation to this avowedly illiberal, new “organicism” or “communitarianism”: Organicism. Naturalism. Refusal of universal values. Denial of values purely and simply. ...It is on these bases, on this mute foundation, that one deploys a cover of horror that is more somber and infinitely more clamorous. . . . I will have attained my objective when I have succeeded in convincing that fascism is not in the first instance barbarism; that is it not essentially and to begin with the apocalypse; that it does not always and of necessity mean storms of iron and blood. Instead, it is in the first instance a type of society, a model of community, a manner of thinking and of organizing the social bond.40 It is precisely Bataille’s ecstatic model of community, his manner of “thinking and of organizing the social bond,” that I wish to call into question. It is a model that, fundamentally and undeniably, seeks to establish the normative basis of social action on an aesthetic foundation. As such its guiding ethos would be an aesthetics of transgression. Bataille’s ecstatic community would also be an aesthetic community: it would be a community in which the type of social action that would be valued above all would be action that yielded “no return,” action that - in the manner of art for art’s sake - had no end beyond itself. In the last analysis, the celebration of transgression for transgression’s sake remains **unnuanced, unqualified, and uncritical**. In lieu of a conceptual articulation of how one would begin to differentiate between, shall we say, salutary and retrograde instances of transgression, we are left with an ethos of shock, rupture, and disruption, purely and simply. In essence, Bataille - and those who have followed in his footsteps - seeks to ground an ethics of postmodernity in an avant-garde cultural practice that draws heavily on precapitalist forms of social life, precisely those forms that have been scorned and tabooed by the process of modernization. Indeed, the very desideratum of an adequate “conceptual articulation” of Bataillesque concepts such as “sovereignty,” “heterogeneity,” “expenditure,” and so forth would amount to a contrudictio inadjecto. In Bataille’s sense, the very call for principled legitimation would stand convicted a priori of indebtedness to the logic of “productive consumption,” to the values of a society predicated on instrumental reason and equivalent exchange.

#### Life has intrinsic value that is unattached to instrumental capacity

Penner 5 (Melinda, Director of Operations – STR, “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223)

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but **even if it loses its instrumental value**, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience.

#### -- No extinction

Easterbrook 3 (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

#### -- Long time-frame

Kay 1 (Jane, “Study Takes Historical Peek at Plight of Ocean Ecosystems”, San Francisco Chronicle, 7-26, Lexis)

The collapse of ecosystems often occur over a long period. In one example, when Aleut hunters killed the Alaskan sea otter about 2,500 years ago, the population of their natural prey, the sea urchin, grew larger than its normal size. In turn, the urchins grazed down the kelp forests, important habitat for a whole host of ocean life. Then, when fur traders in the 1800s hunted the otters and sea cows almost to extinction, the kelp forests disappeared and didn't start to regenerate until the federal government protected the sea otters in the 20th century. In California, the diversity of spiny lobsters, sheephead fish and abalone kept down the urchin numbers. At present in Alaska, the kelp beds are declining again in areas where killer whales are preying on sea otters. Biologists think the killer whales switched to otters for food because there are fewer seals and sea lions to eat.

#### Democratic structures check the impact

Dickinson 4 (Edward Ross, University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About ‘Modernity’”, Central European History, 37(1), p. 18-19)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they **did not proceed** **to** the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and **murder** of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

#### -- The alt rejects humanism – dooming the planet to extinction

**Davies 97** (Tony, Professor of English – Birmingham University, Humanism, p. 130-132)

So there will not after all be, nor indeed could there be, any tidy definitions. The several humanisms – the civic humanism of the quattrocento Italian city-states, the Protestant humanism of sixteenth century northern Europe, the rationalistic humanism that attended at the revolutions of enlightened modernity, and the romantic and positivistic humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemony over it, the revolutionary humanism that shook the world and the liberal humanism that sought to tame it, the humanism of the Nazis and the humanism of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser – are not reducible to one, or even to a single line or pattern. Each has its distinctive historical curve, its particular discursive poetics, its own problematic scansion of the human. Each seeks, as all discourses must, to impose its own answer to the question of ‘which is to be master’. Meanwhile, the problem of humanism remains, for the present, an inescapable horizon within which all attempts to think about the ways in which human being have, do, might live together in and on the world are contained. Not that the actual humanisms described here necessarily provide a model, or even a useful history, least of all for those very numerous people, and peoples, for whom they have been alien and oppressive. Some, at least, offer a grim warning. Certainly it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like ‘the destiny of man’ or ‘the triumph of human reason’ without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them. All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore. The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. At the same time, though it is clear that the master narrative of transcendental Man has outlasted its usefulness, **it would be unwise** simply **to abandon the ground occupied by** the historical **humanisms**. For one thing, some variety of humanism remains, on many occasions, the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organize and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these, and the prospect of a world in which they will be secured, can only be articulated in humanist terms. It is true that the Baconian ‘Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things’, harnessed to an overweening rationality and an unbridled technological will to power, has enlarged the bounds of human empire to the point of **endangering the survival of the** violated **planet** on which we live. But how, if not by mobilizing collective resources of human understanding and responsibility of ‘enlightened self-interest’ even, can that danger be turned aside?

#### The alt creates a political void filled by elites – locking in oppression

Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor – Georgetown Law, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, **creates a political** and spiritual **void** into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and **steps on** the disempowered and dispossessed.  [\*762]  To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the **void will be filled** by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

#### The impact is extinction

Rorty 98 (Richard, Professor of Comparative Literature – Stanford University, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, p. 89-94)

At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were **wildly overoptimistic**. One thing that is very likely to happen is that **the gains made in the past forty years** by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, **will be wiped out**. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. **All the sadism** which the academic Left has tried to make unaccept­able to its students will come flooding back. All the resent­ment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international super­rich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to **pro­voke military adventures which will** generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twenti­eth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he ex­presses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus commu­nitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situa­tions are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the tradition­ally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the mean­ing of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a right­ist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellec­tual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the estab­lished order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of lan­guage, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist ver­sion of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential sub­jectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's im­possible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by prob­lematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossi­ble to clamber back down from their books to a level of ab­straction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a re­cent scandal-they offer the most abstract and barren expla­nations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into polit­ical relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left re­treats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice pro­duces **theoretical hallucinations**. These result in an intellec­tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund­son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

# 2NC/1NR

## FW

### Interp

#### Interpretation – “financial incentives” mean cash transfer – not sacrifice

Chi and Hoffman 2k (Keon S., Senior Fellow – CSG, and Daniel J., Research Associate, “State Business Incentives: Trends and Options for the Future,” The Council of State Governments, http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/Misc00BusinessIncentives.pdf)

In this report, the term “business incentives” is broadly defined as public subsidies, including, but not limited to, tax abatement and financial assistance programs, designed to create, retain or lure businesses for job creation. The term is used interchangeably as “industrial” or “development incentives.” The term “tax incentives” broadly refers to any credits or abatements of corporate income, personal income, sales-and-use, property or other taxes to create, retain or lure business. **The term “financial incentives” broadly refers to any type of direct loan, loan guarantee grant, infrastructure development, or job training assistance** offered to help create, retain or lure businesses.

### Model of Debate – 2NC

#### That proves there is a topical version of their performance – incentivize energy on different cites, or decentralized renewables which allow for community control

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in **decision making** diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of **grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states.** In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the **legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions** which produced those projects.

Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany.

In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The **technicality** **of the issue** **was not a barrier** to their participation. On the contrary, grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems. Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens through which the **goals of energy policy could be recast** and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots energy protest in West Germany is twofold.

First, it produced major substantive changes in public policy. Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest **undermined** the **legitimacy** of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

### Limits/Rowland

#### Limits outweigh – they’re the vital access point for any theory impact – its key to fairness – huge research burdens mean we can’t prepare to compete – and its key to education – big topics cause hyper-generics, lack of clash, and shallow debate – and it destroys participation

Rowland 84 (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

## Case

### Global Violence Decreasing

#### \*Global violence is decreasing – their impact is empirically denied

Pinker 7 (Steven, Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “A History of Violence”, Edge: The Third Culture, 3-28, http://www.edge.org/3rd\_culture/pinker07/pinker07\_index.html)

In sixteenth-century Paris, a popular form of entertainment was cat-burning, in which a cat was hoisted in a sling on a stage and slowly lowered into a fire. According to historian Norman Davies, "[T]he spectators, including kings and queens, shrieked with laughter as the animals, howling with pain, were singed, roasted, and finally carbonized." Today, such sadism would be unthinkable in most of the world. This change in sensibilities is just one example of perhaps the **most important and** most **underappreciated** **trend** in the human saga: **Violence has been in decline over long stretches of history, and today we are** probably **living in the most peaceful moment of our species' time on earth**. In the decade of Darfur and Iraq, and shortly after the century of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, the claim that violence has been diminishing may seem somewhere between hallucinatory and obscene. Yet recent studies that seek to quantify the historical ebb and flow of violence point to exactly that conclusion. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession, rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution—all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are **rare to nonexistent** in the West, far less common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and widely condemned when they are brought to light. At one time, these facts were widely appreciated. They were the source of notions like progress, civilization, and man's rise from savagery and barbarism. Recently, however, those ideas have come to sound corny, even dangerous. They seem to demonize people in other times and places, license colonial conquest and other foreign adventures, and conceal the crimes of our own societies. The doctrine of the noble savage—the idea that humans are peaceable by nature and corrupted by modern institutions—pops up frequently in the writing of public intellectuals like José Ortega y Gasset ("War is not an instinct but an invention"), Stephen Jay Gould ("Homo sapiens is not an evil or destructive species"), and Ashley Montagu ("Biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood"). But, now that social scientists have started to count bodies in different historical periods, they have discovered that the romantic theory gets it backward: Far from causing us to become more violent, something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler. To be sure, any attempt to document changes in violence must be soaked in uncertainty. In much of the world, the distant past was a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, and, even for events in the historical record, statistics are spotty until recent periods. Long-term trends can be discerned only by smoothing out zigzags and spikes of horrific bloodletting. And the choice to focus on relative rather than absolute numbers brings up the moral imponderable of whether it is worse for 50 percent of a population of 100 to be killed or 1 percent in a population of one billion. Yet, despite these caveats, a picture is taking shape. The decline of violence is a fractal phenomenon, visible at the scale of millennia, centuries, decades, and years. It **applies over several orders** of magnitude of violence, from genocide to war to rioting to homicide to the treatment of children and animals. And it appears to be a **worldwide trend**, though not a homogeneous one. The leading edge has been in Western societies, especially England and Holland, and there seems to have been a **tipping point** at the onset of the Age of Reason in the early seventeenth century. At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, quantitative body-counts—such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men—suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own. It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But, in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher. According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million. Political correctness from the other end of the ideological spectrum has also distorted many people's conception of violence in early civilizations—namely, those featured in the Bible. This supposed source of moral values contains many celebrations of genocide, in which the Hebrews, egged on by God, slaughter every last resident of an invaded city. The Bible also prescribes death by stoning as the penalty for a long list of nonviolent infractions, including idolatry, blasphemy, homosexuality, adultery, disrespecting one's parents, and picking up sticks on the Sabbath. The Hebrews, of course, were no more murderous than other tribes; one also finds frequent boasts of torture and genocide in the early histories of the Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and Chinese. At the century scale, it is hard to find quantitative studies of deaths in warfare spanning medieval and modern times. Several historians have suggested that there has been an increase in the number of recorded wars across the centuries to the present, but, as political scientist James Payne has noted, this may show only that "the Associated Press is a more comprehensive source of information about battles around the world than were sixteenth-century monks." Social histories of the West provide evidence of numerous barbaric practices that became obsolete in the last five centuries, such as slavery, amputation, blinding, branding, flaying, disembowelment, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and so on. Meanwhile, for another kind of violence—homicide—the data are abundant and striking. The criminologist Manuel Eisner has assembled hundreds of homicide estimates from Western European localities that kept records at some point between 1200 and the mid-1990s. In every country he analyzed, murder rates declined steeply—for example, from 24 homicides per 100,000 Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s. On the scale of decades, comprehensive data again paint a **shockingly happy picture**: Global violence has **fallen steadily** since the middle of the twentieth century. According to the Human Security Brief 2006, the number of battle deaths in interstate wars has declined from more than 65,000 per year in the 1950s to less than 2,000 per year in this decade. In Western Europe and the Americas, the second half of the century saw a steep decline in the number of wars, military coups, and deadly ethnic riots. Zooming in by a further power of ten exposes yet another reduction. After the cold war, every part of the world saw a steep drop-off in state-based conflicts, and those that do occur are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than being fought to the bitter end. Meanwhile, according to political scientist Barbara Harff, between 1989 and 2005 the number of campaigns of mass killing of civilians decreased by 90 percent. The decline of killing and cruelty poses several challenges to our ability to make sense of the world. To begin with, how could so many people be so wrong about something so important? Partly, it's because of a **cognitive** **illusion**: We estimate the probability of an event from how easy it is to recall examples. Scenes of carnage are more likely to be relayed to our living rooms and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. Partly, it's an intellectual culture that is loath to admit that there could be anything good about the institutions of civilization and Western society. Partly, it's the incentive structure of the activism and opinion markets: No one ever attracted followers and donations by announcing that things keep getting better. And part of the explanation lies in the phenomenon itself. The decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often the attitudes are in the lead. As deplorable as they are, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the lethal injections of a few murderers in Texas are mild by the standards of atrocities in human history. But, from a contemporary vantage point, we see them as signs of how low our behavior can sink, not of how high our standards have risen. The other major challenge posed by the decline of violence is how to explain it. A force that pushes in the same direction across many epochs, continents, and scales of social organization mocks our standard tools of causal explanation. The usual suspects—guns, drugs, the press, American culture—aren't nearly up to the job. Nor could it possibly be explained by evolution in the biologist's sense: Even if the meek could inherit the earth, natural selection could not favor the genes for meekness quickly enough. In any case, human nature has not changed so much as to have lost its taste for violence. Social psychologists find that at least 80 percent of people have fantasized about killing someone they don't like. And modern humans still take pleasure in viewing violence, if we are to judge by the popularity of murder mysteries, Shakespearean dramas, Mel Gibson movies, video games, and hockey. What has changed, of course, is people's willingness to act on these fantasies. The sociologist Norbert Elias suggested that European modernity accelerated a "civilizing process" marked by increases in self-control, long-term planning, and sensitivity to the thoughts and feelings of others. These are precisely the functions that today's cognitive neuroscientists attribute to the prefrontal cortex. But this only raises the question of why humans have increasingly exercised that part of their brains. No one knows why our behavior has come under the control of the better angels of our nature, but there are four plausible suggestions.

## Boooo-Dism

### 2NC Impact Overview

#### Mind-world dualism is the root of environmental destruction --- re-education is critical to creating a sustainable relationship.

C. Jotin Khisty, Ph. D., 2007. Professor emeritus in the department of civil, architectural, and environmental Engineering at the Illinois Institute of Technology. He has published extensively in the areas of urban planning, transportation engineering, and systems science. “The Marriage of Buddhism and Deep Ecology,” http://www.theosophical.org/publications/quest-magazine/1670.

In 2005, people all across the world sat up in their seats to watch Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient Truth. They were stunned to see the environmental degradation and destruction that has occurred and the profound threat it poses to all life on the planet. Then, in October 2007, many of us jumped with joy when Gore and the U. N. Panel on Climate Change were jointly awarded the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. This recognition gave us hope of a way to work through our political, economic, and environmental systems in order to reverse the effects of decades of indifference and damage to our planet. One of the paramount reasons for this degradation is not hard to find. The organizing principle of society for at least the last hundred years has been: What will make the economy grow larger and produce greater profit? But with a new consciousness on the horizon and a transformation of the human heart all around the world, it is very likely that for the next hundred years, the organizing principle may be: What will make the planet more sustainable? This has to be the new lens through which we look at the world. After all, the voyage of discovery lies not in seeking new vistas but in having new eyes. This article aims to explore the connections between two important disciplines: spiritual systems, particularly Buddhism, and deep ecology. Spiritual systems are more than a belief in a transcendental deity or a means to an afterlife. They are a way of understanding both the cosmos and our role in its preservation. In this way they are closely connected with ecology, which embraces a cultural awareness of kinship with and dependence on the natural environment for the continuity of all life. Buddhism, one of the world’s great spiritual systems, offers a well-developed philosophy of our connection with nature. Deep ecology is focused on the survival and self-renewal of all living beings. (It is so called in contrast to “shallow” ecology, which is essentially anthropocentric and technocratic.) Celebrating the marriage of spiritual systems and deep ecology fosters a moral and cultural awareness of the kinship of the natural environment and the continuity of life. We hear of ecological disasters occurring around the world almost on a daily basis. Almost all of these crises are a result of human neglect, apathy, and greed. They range from resource depletion, species extinction, pollution growth, climate change, to population explosion and over consumption. As far back as 1992, the Union of Concerned Scientists, consisting of over 100 Nobel laureates and 1600 other distinguished scientists from seventy countries, warned us of the deepening ecological crisis caused by human activities on this planet. They warned that a great change in the stewardship of the earth and the life on it is required if vast misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated (Uhl, 124). Almost all such warnings have been ignored and ridiculed by our politicians. One prominent source of disinformation about global warning, for instance, has been the Bush-Cheney administration. It has silenced scientists working for the government about the extreme danger we are facing, and has appointed “skeptics” recommended by oil companies to government positions as our principal negotiators. The world has been thunderstruck by the arrogance and ignorance of such political leaders and their cronies (Gore, 264). The reasons for this disconnection from nature, especially in the West, are not hard to detect. Spiritually and psychologically we live inside a bubble of the “self,” as though we are “in here” and the rest of the world is “out there.” According to Buddhist thought, this sense of separation manifests itself in the form of the Three Poisons—greed, ill will, and delusion. Examples of these poisons can be seen everywhere in the current ecological crisis. Greed rooted in untrammeled economic growth and consumerism is the secular religion of advanced industrial societies. Similarly, the military-industrial complex promotes ill will, fear, and terror, while propaganda and advertising systems are well known for deluding the public about everything under the sun. A fundamental question of our time is whether we can counter these forces by developing attitudes of respect, responsibility, and care for the natural world and so create a sustainable future. From its origins in India about 500 years before the birth of Christ, Buddhism spread throughout Asia and is now exerting an ever-increasing influence on Western culture. We in the West are awakening to the fact that there is a more ancient science of mind than our own. The well-known philosopher Alan Watts pointed out that historically the Buddha (563-483 BCE) was the first great psychologist and psychotherapist. He not only recognized the meaning of existential anxiety or suffering that we all experience but offered ways of treating it. Many psychologists, psychiatrists, and scientists regard the discovery of Buddhist philosophy in the West today as a kind of second renaissance (Varela, 22). Contrary to popular belief, Buddhism is in essence a philosophy and not a religion. Buddhist philosophy over the centuries has been very carefully thought out and documented by some of the best scholars and practitioners across the world. A starting point is the central tenet concerning the interconnectedness of all life—human beings, animals, plants, birds. Buddhist ethical teaching emphasizes that this interdependence comes with a moral component. For humans, that means maintaining a sense of universal responsibility in whatever we do. The cornerstone of all Buddhist teachings is the Four Noble Truths. The first truth is that of suffering (or existential anxiety), starting with birth and continuing on through aging and then on to the inevitability of death. The second truth is the realization that human craving and greed are at the very root of our suffering. The third truth stresses that it is possible to eliminate craving, greed, and suffering by transforming the mind. The fourth truth is the Eightfold Path, the Buddhist formula of practices for cultivating this transformation, leading to the extinction of both craving and suffering (Rifkin, 101). Buddhists assert that mindful awareness of existential anxiety produces compassionate empathy for all forms of life. Two other concepts form the bedrock of Buddhist thinking: impermanence and interdependence. All phenomena are impermanent, because everything is in transition. Interdependence refers to the fact that everything is a part of everything else. The philosophical roots of the deep ecology movement can be found in the writings of Henry David Thoreau, Theodore Roszak, Lewis Mumford, Rachel Carson, and others, going back to Baruch Spinoza and the Buddhist philosophers. But it was in 1972 that the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess coined the term to distinguish it from “shallow” anthropocentric and technocratic ecology. Since then, Naess has spelled out a comprehensive platform describing the meaning and scope of deep ecology, as outlined in an eight-point summary: 1. The well-being of human and nonhuman life on earth have value in themselves. 2. The interdependence, richness, and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values. 3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. 5. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with substantial decrease of the human population. Moreover, the flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 6. Policies must therefore be changed. The changes in policies will affect basic economic and technological structures. 7. Ideological change is required in order to emphasize quality of life rather than striving for an ever-higher standard of living. 8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation to help implement these changes (Naess, 68). To imagine oneself as a separate ego, separate from everything else, locked up in a bag of skin, is a hallucination. Everything is indeed connected with everything else. Given the profound similarity of Buddhist thought to deep ecology, it is not difficult to realize that the “egocentricity” of an apparently isolated self needs to be replaced by “ecocentricity.” How can we harness this obvious interconnection between Buddhist thought and deep ecology in order to tackle the urgent problems that continue to threaten the sentient beings on this planet? As Vaclav Havel, the former president of the Czech Republic, wrote: “The only option for us is a change in the sphere of the spirit, in the sphere of human conscience. It’s not enough to invent new machines, new regulations, and new institutions. We must develop a new understanding of the true purpose of our existence on earth. Only by making such a fundamental shift will we be able to create new models of behavior and a new set of values for the planet” (Uhl, 307). Like Havel, scores of philosophers, economists, and politicians have recognized that the advancing human crisis is result of the lack of deep spiritual roots, brought on to a great extent by the divorce of spiritual meaning and identity from life. But how can we wake up to face this human crisis? Today there is already evidence of an emerging cultural shift as millions of people and their leaders are stirring, as if from a trance, to deal with these issues. Here are some possible avenues of approach: \* Collective awakening. Spiritual awakening in an individual is sometimes called the “opening of the third eye.” When this awareness occurs collectively, it can be called the “opening of the fourth eye.” Evidence of this collective awakening started in the 1960s and has matured in subsequent years, dealing head-on with problems as diverse as postmodern anomie, free-market globalization, and global terrorism. \* Building sustainable systems. The great challenge of our time is to build and nurture sustainable communities–social, cultural, and physical. This goal is best attained in four steps: (1) introducing “ecoliteracy” in order to understand how ecosystems evolve for sustaining the web of life; (2) moving toward “ecodesign” by promoting organic farming, energy- and resource-efficient industries, nonmotorized transportation, and low-cost housing, and by reducing energy consumption; (3) thinking in terms of relationships, contexts, patterns, and processes for ecodesign; (4) striving for resource efficiency, service-flow economy, and energy conservation in order to reduce ecological degradation (Capra, 230-32). So far the records in these areas of nurturing have been deplorable. \* Transforming the world economy. According to free-market capitalism, all values are monetary values determined by buyers of goods and services in a competitive market. The prime movers of this system are the transnational corporations (TNCs), whose economic powers frequently surpass that of many sovereign states. To grow, these TNCs must make enormous profits and consume the world’s raw materials. TNCs and their advocate, the World Trade Organization (WTO), have been largely able to get what they want because of their influence in manipulating the global market for their own profit. Poor countries and the poorer sectors of the world are the worst victims of the WTO. Today, one-third of all economic activity worldwide is generated by only 200 corporations, which are linked to each other by strategic alliances. While the WTO was initially hailed by nations rich and poor as an organization that would produce huge economic benefits which would trickle down to everybody, it failed to live up to this promise, instead creating fatal consequences such as the breakdown of democracies, the rapid deterioration of the environment, and increasing poverty and alienation. Consumerism is now recognized as the most successful religion of all time, winning more converts more quickly than any previous belief or value system in human history. Philosopher David Loy has pointed out that the strategies of the WTO and the World Bank have been exposed, with the result that there are regular riots whenever their meetings are held. These two organizations are clearly ill-suited for building a just, sustainable, and compassionate society that can nurture sufficiency, partnership, and respect for life and its values. Naturally, a new kind of civil society, organized to counterbalance globalization is gradually emerging, embodied in powerful nongovernmental organizations such as Oxfam and Greenpeace. \* Transforming ethics. Activists devoted to peace and social justice acknowledge that there is a spirit of coerciveness that is present in all cultures, manifesting particularly in violence and crime. This coerciveness can be counteracted by several strategies. Creative nonviolence in the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi and Buddhist ethics is one well-documented possibility. Essentially this means that one does not struggle against the opponent but rather against the situation. Political and social adversaries are seen as potential partners rather than as enemies. Satyagraha, or nonviolent resistance, also pioneered by Gandhi, is one form of such creative nonviolence. The principle of ahimsa (harmlessness)—the refusal to kill any living beings—has also been put to use in stopping armed conflicts. It is said that when people saw the Buddha soon after his enlightenment, they were so struck by the extraordinary peacefulness of his presence that they stopped to ask: “What are you? Are you a god, a magician, or a wizard?” Buddha’s reply was stunning. He simply said: “I am awake.” His answer became his title, for this is what the word buddha means in Sanskrit–one who is awakened. While the rest of the world was deep in “sleep,” dreaming a dream known as the waking state of life, the Buddha shook off the slumber and woke up (Smith and Novak, 3-4). Although the Buddha’s wake-up call was issued a very long time ago and has since been repeated time and time again by almost every known spiritual system, it is unfortunate that a mistaken metaphysics has led us to an alienation between us and the earth and between us and other sentient beings. It is essential that we reestablish and restore an awareness of this interdependence. **Naturally, such a transformation requires profound reeducation** at every stage of our lives. Private foundations, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, academic institutions, and religious organizations have an equal stake in setting priorities in this endeavor. In this context the advice of the Dalai Lama is particularly poignant: The Earth, our Mother, is telling us to behave. . . . If we develop good and considerate qualities within our own minds, our activities will naturally cease to threaten the continued survival of life on Earth. By protecting the natural environment and working to forever halt the degradation of our planet, we will also show respect for Earth’s human descendants—our future generations—as well as for the natural right to life of all of Earth’s living things. If we care for nature, it can be rich, bountiful, and inexhaustibly sustainable. It is important that we forgive the destruction of the past and recognize that it was produced by ignorance. At the same time, we should reexamine, from an ethical perspective, what kind of world we have inherited, what we are responsible for, and what we will pass on to coming generations (Hunt-Badiner, v).

### Link

#### 3) The act of calling for sacrifice itself is a violation of the mind – body dualism that must be rejected

O’Leary 12 (Joseph S., “Sacrifice and Self-Immolation in Buddhism”, 11/13, http://josephsoleary.typepad.com/my\_weblog/2012/11/sacrifice-and-self-immolation-in-buddhism.html)

Buddhism rejected the institution of sacrifice, not only because of the violence against living beings that it entailed, but also because its magical mechanism was alien to the seamless rationality of the Buddhist path. This rejection was not sudden. From the 9th to the 4th century BCE ‘a certain number of spiritual breakthroughs contributed to put in question, among the brahmans themselves, the sacrificial vision of the world.’[1]The limits of sacrifice had become troubling, for who could assure the permanence of its effect in the world beyond death? A religious crisis was marked by the spread of the idea of karma and the reorientation of soteriology toward moksa, liberation from the round of rebirths. The basic Buddhist virtue of giving, dāna, the first of the six perfections of a bodhisattva, echoes the institutionalized dāna of Vedic sacrificial language, but demythologizes the ideology of sacrifice. A Jātaka from Northern Buddhism of the early Mahāyāna [2] tells of a king (the Buddha in a former life) who agrees, in order to appease his Brahmins, to perform a Vedic sacrifice to end a drought. But he proposes to choose the victim from those his police detect to be living an unworthy life. The police action brings such an improvement in behavior that no victims can be found. The king then proposes that the sacrifice will take the form of giving generously to the poor. The result is a happy and flourishing society, achieved without any shedding of blood. The text is littered with criticisms of sacrificial logic: ‘And should the victim killed in sacrifice really go to heaven, should we not expect the brahmins to offer themselves to be immolated in sacrifice? A similar practice, however, is nowhere seen among them.’[3] In other birth-stories, however, the bodhisattva practices dāna in a more literally sacrificial way, offering his own eyes to a blind beggar,[4] or his own body to feed a hungry tigress: ‘Why should I search after meat from the body of another, whilst the whole of my own body is available?’[5]It is hard to read these stories as mere allegories or parables, given that the translator of the tigress story, Āryaśūra, is said to have imitated it: ‘He first gave the tigers his blood to drink, and, when their bodies had taken a little force, offered himself.’[6] We also hear that ‘the Buddha entered into the Samadhi of fire to achieve his own cremation.’[7]The practice of self-immolation among Vietnamese and Tibetan Buddhists in recent decades has given new life to such notions. Self-immolation by fire is not a recent invention but is found in 4th century China. One of the Vietnamese immolations is shown in Peter Brook’s 1968 film Tell Me Lies: it is a religious ceremony, and the monks gather around and bow respectfully. A monk interviewed in the film says that the first self-immolator (ThichQuangDuc, 11 June 1963) won sympathy in Vietnam but his imitators did not; Buddhism condemns taking life, and the fire that it preaches is the fire that burns up the three poisons. As in Judaism, the dynamics of sacrifice is interiorized and spiritualized in Buddhism, which goes all the way in emptying sacrifice of its physical substance. Thus the perfection of giving, when grounded in the perfection of wisdom, is marked by the disappearance of giver, gift, and receiver. The objectification of any of the three taints the pure freedom of emptiness. The spiritualization of sacrifice is clear in a statement from the Perfection of Wisdom sutras: ‘the passions are burnt in the fire of wisdom’ (T.374.385c16). The entire movement of Buddhist thought, which abandons finite categories and discriminations, or which abandons speech for silence, in order to perceive the nondual and empty thusness of all things, can be seen as a refined sublimation of sacrifice.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)