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#### Energy PRODUCTION means the extraction or capture of energy from natural resources – that’s distinct from ENERGIZING debate space and hypotheticals about aliens

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

#### Debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### The opening of infinite frameworks destroys stasis – agreement on the topic as the starting point for debate creates a platform of argumentative stability that is the crucial foundation for deliberation and makes debate meaningful

O’Donnell 4 (Dr. Tim, Director of Debate – Mary Washington U., “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”, Debater’s Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/ DRGArticles/Framework%20article%20for%20the%20DRG%20final2.doc)

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary,* a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question? The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis.[[1]](#endnote-1) Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.[[2]](#endnote-2) How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.[[3]](#endnote-3)

#### A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive teaching of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Limits outweigh – they’re the vital access point for any theory impact – its key to fairness – huge research burdens mean we can’t prepare to compete – and its key to education – big topics cause hyper-generics, lack of clash, and shallow debate – and it destroys participation

Rowland 84 (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

#### Effective decision-making outweighs---

#### Only portable skill---means our framework turns case

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

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#### The problem with this approach is that it falls in lock step with the most essential conventions of neoliberalism. Under neoliberalism, we are told that the locus of action is the individual – and that if individuals experience inequality, they ought to address those conditions as an individual. This system makes coalition building against system inequality impossible.

**Smith '94** (Sharon, "Mistaken Identity", International Socialism Journal, Spring, issue 62, http:llpubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uklisj62lsmith.htm)

But the dominance of identity politics is a guarantee against building a lasting movement. The tendency among groups organised around identity politics has been to grow--sometimes substantially--for a short period of time, and then fairly rapidly to shrink to a much smaller 'core' membership. For example, the New York chapter of the Women's Action Coalition (WAC), a women only organisation, claimed a membership of 1,500 within a few months of its founding in early 1992. Within a year it was reduced to a small fraction of that size. Queer Nation's short history has followed a similar pattern. All of the problems which led to the fragmentation of the women's and gay liberation movements in the 1970s are magnified in Queer Nation: an emphasis on autonomy, rather than unity with other struggles; an atmosphere of self righteous moralism; and an overwhelming emphasis on personal, lifestyle issues. Instead of growing in size, Queer Nation chapters tend to grow smaller and disappear with the passage of time. Queer Nation was formed in March 1990 by a group of New York lesbian and gay anti-AIDS activists interested in applying 'direct action' tactics to the gay rights movement. They vowed that Queer Nation chapters would be organised in a 'non-hierarchical and non-patriarchal' structure, to ensure democracy and prevent any person or persons from dominating or intimidating the rest of the group. In an interview later that year two founding members of Queer Nation were asked why they chose to call themselves 'queer', a term of anti-gay abuse. One replied, 'It's the idea of reappropriating the words of our oppressors and actually re-contextualising the term "queer" and using it in a positive way to empower ourselves... Now we can really rally around the word, and that confuses our oppressors. It makes us feel stronger.' The other added, 'We have disempowered them by using this term.'40 This reflects the belief that using certain 'politically correct' language can affect the actual conditions facing the mass of gays and lesbians in society. It does not. Whether or not Queer Nation activists feel personally 'empowered' by using the term 'queer', the vast majority of people will continue to regard it as a term of abuse. Indeed, many people will undoubtedly--and with some validity--regard their use of the term 'queer' as an acceptance of oppression, rather than an attempt to challenge it in any purposeful way. Whatever Queer Nation activists claim, words cannot be meaningfully 'reappropriated' without massive struggle. In the 1960s black power activists demanded--and won--the widespread usage of the term 'black', replacing the term 'coloured'. Women's rights activists demanded that the term 'women' replace the term 'girls' to describe adult females. And the slogan of the Gay Liberation Front was 'gay pride', expressing the optimism of a movement which hoped to achieve dignity and respect for gays within society as a whole. In each of these social movements activists fought for social equality--and this was reflected in their demands. If anything, today's usage of the derogatory term 'queer' shows just how much political distance stands between today's gay activists and those who formed the Gay Liberation Front after the Stonewall rebellion. The equivalent would be using the term 'bitch' among women's rights activists, or the word 'nigger' by blacks. Few would argue that this would represent a step forward, even among those who have adopted the term 'queer'. Formulations such as those of Queer Nation's founders, noted above, represent defeat and demoralisation, and an expectation that the gay movement will remain a small group of the 'enlightened few', marginal to the rest of society. But 'queer identity' quickly proved itself to be about more than simply redefining the language of oppression. The Queer Nation founding manifesto was headlined, 'I Hate Straights'. It said, 'Go tell [straights] to go away until they have spent a month walking hand in hand in public with someone the same sex. After they survive that, then you'll hear what they have to say about queer anger. Otherwise, tell them to shut up and listen.' So from the very beginning Queer Nation ruled out the possibility of building the kind of movement which could act in solidarity with heterosexuals who supported gay rights. Black lesbian feminist Barbara Smith, a veteran of the 1970s movement, argued why such an approach is a recipe for disaster: Queer activists focus on 'queer' issues, and racism, sexual oppression and economic exploitation do not qualify, despite the fact that the majority of 'queers' are people of colour, female, or working class... Building unified, ongoing coalitions that challenge the system and ultimately prepare a way for revolutionary change simply isn't what 'queer' activists have in mind... In 1990 I read Queer Nation's Manifesto, 'I Hate Straights,' in Outweek and wrote a letter to the editor suggesting that if queers of colour followed its political lead we would soon be issuing a statement titled, 'I Hate Whitey', including white queers of European origin.41 Furthermore, the call for 'direct action' has not usually meant building large, angry demonstrations. Most Queer Nation activity has been limited to fairly small groups of activists staging events often designed to do nothing more than startle passers by or create publicity. For example, one early activity called the 'Queer Shopping Network' brought groups of activists to area shopping malls, where men wearing tutus and women dressed in macho leather jackets staged kiss-ins. The GLF's 1971 demand that gay activists behave like 'rotten queers' in the most 'offensive' manner possible has been carried out by Queer Nation in the 1990s. The controversial tactic of 'outing' perhaps best reflects the emphasis on moral witness which grew hand in hand with the development of identity politics. It first began in 1989, when the New York based magazine Outweek began exposing the homosexuality of gay celebrities on the grounds that they were remaining silent while thousands of gay men were dying of AIDS. In February 1990 the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force media spokesman Robert Bray threatened to expose the identities of all the gays serving in Congress: We have a list of many of the over 50 gays in the US Congress. Many are very gay and vote pro-gay. Two of them are out of the closet. The others... hurt us yet they benefit from progress made for gays, like going to our bars and buying gay literature, and they benefit from the protection we have for protecting our privacy. We know who they are...42 There is a serious problem with this reasoning. Lesbians and gays should never be forced to come out of the closet, no matter who they are or what job they hold. The idea that those who remain in the closet 'benefit' from the actions of those who come out is dangerous, particularly when applied to ordinary working class gays. Moreover, instead of understanding that the nature of the system makes it impossible for vast numbers of gays to be open about their sexuality, this approach assumes the opposite: that coming out is the way to change the prevailing ideas in society. The underlying assumption of identity politics is that only those who actually experience a form of oppression may define it or voice [express] an opinion about how to fight against it. Rather than leading to collaboration, this assumption has often led to bitter divisions among lesbians and gays, frequently within the same organisations. For example, some lesbians and gays have argued that bisexuals are not really oppressed, because they enjoy 'heterosexual privilege'. Meanwhile, some bisexuals have argued that they are oppressed by 'both gay and straight communities'. This sort of atmosphere damaged the internal life of Queer Nation chapters from early on. The commitment to 'non-hierarchical' structures meant that groups generally operated by 'consensus'. This meant that a single dissenting opinion could embroil the group in hours of argument. Not infrequently meetings degenerated into shouting matches, and eventually into organisational splits. The short history of San Francisco's embattled Queer Nation chapter is not atypical. Attendance at weekly meetings peaked at 350 when Queer Nation first formed in the summer of 1990. The group set up autonomous 'focus' groups for lesbians and bisexuals, as well as those who were racially oppressed. At every meeting two members acted as 'vibes watchers' to make sure that no one felt intimidated. At first the atmosphere was very positive and co-operative. Members dressed in drag and converged on suburban malls. They staged kiss-ins in the middle of Fisherman's Wharf, San Francisco's biggest tourist spot. When Basic Instinct--which depicts a bisexual character as a murderer--began filming, they disrupted production. But by December 1991 Queer Nation San Francisco had shattered--after a fierce argument over the wording for guidelines prohibiting racist, sexist, anti-Semitic and homophobic comments within the group. After the meeting, which one member described as an 'incredible free for all', the handful of remaining members of Queer Nation San Francisco decided to disband. After the split one member concluded, 'Twelve people can reach a decision more easily than 500 can. If these 12 need help, they work with another group of 12. I don't know if we'll ever have a cohesive national gay organisation.'43 The April 1993 gay rights march in Washington, DC, attracted a million demonstrators. Again this showed the tremendous potential which exists for building a broad movement among lesbians and gays. After the demonstration, however, an anonymous group calling itself 'QUASH (Queers United Against Straight-Acting Homosexuals)' issued a newsletter called, 'Why I hated the march on Washington.' The newsletter argued against the 'assimilation' of gays into the rest of society. It stated that 'the racism, sexism, classism and internalised homophobia within our own communities devastates us more than the vicious attacks from the likes of [right wingers such as] Anita Bryant, Jesse Helms, George Bush and Sam Nunn.' Thus it concluded, 'Were there a million people? Maybe. But who gives a shit!' This sort of raving is not left wing. As Barbara Smith put it, 'When the word "radical" is used at all, it means confrontational, "in your face" tactics, not strategic organising aimed at the roots of oppression.'44 Rather, these sorts of politics can be summed up as 'middle class radicalism'--which, as Smith points out, isn't particularly radical at all. Identity politics and black nationalism This discussion of identity politics has focused primarily on the political developments within the women's and gay movements since the late 1960s--with little mention of corresponding changes within the black movement or among other racially oppressed groups. This warrants some explanation. Most importantly, even the most separatist forms of black nationalism do not share all the features of identity politics. For while it holds many of the same assumptions, identity politics cannot be reduced to separatism. It is distinguished by a strong element of middle-class individualism, in some ways akin to anarchism. Most forms of black nationalism today do not contain this component. There is no black equivalent to Queer Nation. To be sure, various forms of black nationalism continue to exist--although the politics are barely recognisable compared with those of the revolutionary black nationalist organisations like the Black Panther Party or the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) which dominated the black power movement in the late 1960s. Though nationalist, both of these movements were consciously part of the left. The Black Panthers argued, for example: The Black Panther Party... will not fight capitalism with black capitalism, we will not fight imperialism with black imperialism, we will not fight racism with black racism. Rather, we will take our stand against these evils with a solidarity derived from a proletarian internationalism born of socialist ideology.45 Although both the Panthers and DRUM were black nationalist, the Black Panthers made important links with white allies on the left, while DRUM, which organised in the auto plants of Detroit, led strikes supported by a layer of white as well as black workers. During the 1960s cultural nationalism was quite marginal to the black movement. Large numbers of blacks took African name, and wore Afros or dashikis, but only a small number argued that this should be the centrepiece of political activity. Black Panther leader Huey P Newton strongly criticised cultural nationalists: Cultural nationalism, or pork chop nationalism, as I sometimes call it, is basically the problem of having the wrong political perspective. It seems to be a reaction instead of responding to political repression. The cultural nationalists are concerned with returning to the old African culture and thereby regaining their identity and freedom. In other words, they feel that the African culture will automatically bring political freedom. Many times cultural nationalists fall into line as reactionary nationalists.46 Black nationalism today bears little resemblance to that which existed in the 1960s. Then, there was a strong working class component to the main black nationalist movements, and there was no room for doubting that the enemy was the state. These factors led to much greater political clarity among black activists. That kind of clarity is all but absent today. Mainstream black leaders--even black politicians--are able to use the language of black nationalism to justify doing nothing, or worse yet, to advance anti-working class policies. In its most backward forms nationalism has played a destructive role, rationalising deep divisions even between blacks and other oppressed groups in society. This was played out most dramatically during the Los Angeles rebellion in 1992, when among a significant layer of those who rebelled anger was deflected toward Koreans, who own a large number of small shops in South Central Los Angeles. In another recent instance, when Latinos claimed they were under-represented in Congress due to discriminatory voting policies, a group of black politicians argued that some groups of Latinos, such as Cuban-Americans, are not genuinely oppressed. For the most part, black nationalists today place little or no importance on building a movement, or on strategies for far reaching social change. If anything, the rising influence of 'Afrocentrism' among a section of black intellectuals has represented a step further away from challenging the status quo. Afrocentrism involves the complete and permanent separation between African history, philosophy and culture from all other civilisations. Afrocentric theorist Molefi Asante has argued for 'every topic, economics, law communication, science, religion, history, literature, and sociology to be reviewed through Afrocentric eyes'.47 But, as Manning Marable argued about Afrocentrism: Vulgar Afrocentrists deliberately ignored or obscured the historical reality of social class stratification within the African diaspora. They essentially argued that the interests of all black people--from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell to conservative Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, to the black unemployed, homeless and hungry of America's decaying urban ghettoes--were philosophically, culturally and racially the same. Even the scholarly Afrocentric approach...[did not] speak to historical materialism, except to attack it. As such, vulgar Afrocentrism was the perfect social theory for the upwardly mobile black petty bourgeoisie.48 As Marable argues, the audience for Afrocentrist theory and other forms of cultural nationalism is to be found mainly among the black middle class in the US, which has grown significantly since the end of the movements of the 1960s. In 1990 more than 15 percent of black households earned above $50,000, while thousands of upper middle class black families earn over $100,000 annually. For this section of blacks, the economic aspects of oppression--poverty, unemployment and police brutality--which daily plague the majority of the black population can be viewed as consequences of racism, rather than the other way round. Thus, while no black organisations have been built specifically on the basis of identity politics, many of the same assumptions have filtered through and gained acceptance among anti-racists, white and black. As Ambalavaner Sivanandan wrote in an argument against those in the Labour left influenced by Marxism Today's attack on class politics in Britain: By personalising power, 'the personal is the political' personalises the enemy: the enemy of the black is the white as the enemy of the woman is the man. And all whites are racist like all men are sexist. Thus racism is the combination of power plus prejudice... Hence the fight against racism became reduced to a fight against prejudice, the fight against institutions and practices to a fight against individuals and attitudes.49 Sivanandan goes on to list a series of cases which demonstrate this point. In one case, people participating in Racial Awareness Training (RAT) classes were so worried about being insensitive that some were afraid to ask for black coffee.50 And as Sivanandan argues brilliantly, the tendency of this sort of approach has been to shift the terrain of the struggle against racism away from movements and towards individual lifestyle. This pattern, of course, closely resembles that of identity politics: Carried to its logical conclusion, just to be black, for instance, was politics enough: because it was in one's blackness that one was aggressed, just to be black was to make a statement against such aggression. If, in addition, you 'came out' black, by wearing dreadlocks say, then you could be making several statements... Equally, you could make a statement by just being ethnic, against Englishness, for instance; by being gay, against heterosexism; by being a woman, against male domination. Only the white straight male, it would appear, had to go find his own politics of resistance somewhere out there in the world (as a consumer perhaps?) Everyone else could say: I am, therefore I resist.51 At times Marable also argues forcefully against the concepts of identity politics. In a recent issue of the journal Race and Class, for example, he called for 'dismantling the narrow politics of racial identity and selective self interest'. And he argued that this requires that 'the black leadership reaches out to other oppressed sectors of society, creating a common programme for economic and social justice.'52 Yet at other times both these writers accept some of the fundamental assumptions of identity politics, demonstrating the extent to which such ideas have gained acceptance within the left. As Alex Callinicos argued about Sivanandan: although he is very critical of the political conclusions drawn by Marxism Today, Sivanandan accepts its analysis of the emergence of a new 'post-Fordist' economy based on the destruction of the mass production industries and the working class these rested on. He merely argues that the effect of these changes is to shift the locus of resistance to the new 'underclass' which now bears the brunt of exploitation... This is... a remarkably pessimistic analysis.53 Marable's drift into the terrain of identity politics has been more dramatic. In his article, 'A New American Socialism', which appeared recently in The Progressive, Marable attacks white socialists in the US for not having had more success in recruiting blacks to socialist organisations. He wrote: The left must ask itself why most socialist organisations... have consistently failed to attract black, Latino, and Asian-American supporters... The left should be challenged to explain why the majority of the most militant and progressive students of colour in the hip-hop contemporary culture of the 1990s have few connections with erstwhile white radicals, and usually perceive Marxism as just another discredited 'white ideology'.54 Marable answers this question by arguing that, 'No American socialist organisation has ever been able to attract substantial numbers of African-Americans and other people of colour, unless, from the very beginning, they were well represented inside the leadership and planning of that body' [his emphasis].55 Here Marable is rewriting history. Some of the most important struggles against racism in this century were built by the Communist Party (CP) in the 1930s--which began as a predominantly white organisation. There was nothing extraordinary about the CP in this respect. Socialists of all races have traditionally been at the forefront in fighting racism. When nine young black men, known as the Scottsboro Boys, were sentenced to death on a trumped up rape charge in Alabama in 1931, the mainstream black organisations shunned their case. A leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) even argued that his group did not want to be identified with a 'gang of mass rapists'. Yet the mainly white Communist Party built an international campaign to free the Scottsboro Boys, and during the course of the 1930s united thousands of black and white workers around various anti-racism campaigns. Because the CP took fighting racism seriously, black membership in the party climbed to 5,000 by 1939.56 The contradictions in Marable's analysis demonstrate why it is not enough to break halfway with identity politics. While in one breath he attacks identity politics using class arguments, in the next he attacks socialists using identity politics arguments. Without a sharp break from identity politics, it is all too easy to lose sight of the source of oppression--capitalism--and to forget that all those who are oppressed and exploited by the system have a common interest in ending it. Post-Marxism: politics in a void The post-Marxist academic fashion which grew in the 1980s has provided a theoretical underpinning for the practice of identity politics. Two gurus of 'post-Marxism', Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, produced a book entitled Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics57 in 1985, which contains many of the themes which dominate discussion of the politics of identity. Laclau and Mouffe clearly share the postmodernist conviction that obscurity, abstraction and self importance amount to political sophistication, or at least create the illusion thereof. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is therefore filled with run on sentences laden with jargon incomprehensible to those not already schooled in the language of postmodernism.58 The ideas of post-Marxism fitted well with the mood of pessimism which dominated the left in the 1980s, and led whole sections to look for alternatives to the class struggle to change society. It is no coincidence that such ideas gained influence within the left in the 1980s, particularly among North American and European intellectuals, at a time when the political climate had moved rightward and working class movements were in retreat. Laclau and Mouffe argue that the failure of revolutions from Eastern Europe to Kampuchea calls into question the entire basis for socialist thought; that the rise of the new social movements based on identity politics signals the end of the era of 'universal discourses' and lays the basis for building a new left based on a different theory. They share the postmodernist view that theories explaining 'totality', or 'universal reality', must be abandoned in favour of 'partial discourses' about social relationships. Both built their theory upon two key themes they inherited from the philosopher Louis Althusser: firstly, he rejected the idea of a 'totality' within society, rather seeing society as made up of many different structures--including political, economic, and ideological structures. Ultimately, economics plays a determining role, but for the most part the different structures develop independently from the rest--in 'conjunctural' rather than necessary relationships to each other. Secondly, Althusser saw history as a 'process without a subject'. He saw Marxism as a science which is developed outside the workers' movement by scientists--an obviously elitist notion--in which only those who devote their lives to the pursuit of 'knowledge' can rise above 'ideology'.59 As Norman Geras points out in his critique of Laclau and Mouffe, these themes are 'much more advanced than with Althusser--in the way that a malady, and not a theory, advances.'60 Althusser had emphasised 'autonomisation', or structural independence, but did not entirely break with the idea of the working class as an agent of social change. Laclau and Mouffe have constructed an entire theory around the concept of autonomisation. Social relations consist not as part of a unitary economic and political system, but 'in a field criss-crossed with antagonisms', which require the 'autonomisation of the spheres of struggle'. In this scheme, the working class plays no central role, and the class struggle is but one of many articulations of 'antagonism'.61 Again, building on Althusser, Laclau and Mouffe also carve out a special role for intellectuals, through their emphasis on ideology and 'discourse'. As Ellen Meiksins Wood argues, this theory ...necessarily ascribes to intellectuals a predominant role in the socialist project, insofar as it relies on them to carry out no less a task than the construction of 'social agents' by means of ideology or discourse. In that case, the inchoate mass that constitutes the bulk of 'the people' still remains without a collective identity, except what it receives from its intellectual leaders, the bearers of discourse.62 Stanley Aronowitz went so far as to argue 'provisionally' (of course) that 'in these societies in which the knowledge mode of production prevails and culture is an ineluctable feature of social rule, intellectuals may become the only genuine political class.'63 The post-Marxist argument exists at the height of abstraction. As such, it only stands as a negation of Marxist theory. If class is not the key division within society, then historical materialism is wrong. If autonomous movements form the basis for struggle, then the working class cannot be the 'privileged agent' for social change. If there is no connection between the spheres of economics and ideology, then the Marxist theory of base and superstructure is wrong. While Laclau and Mouffe describe themselves as post-Marxists, in reality they are anti-Marxists. In order to develop their arguments at each stage in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, it is necessary to strike down these central tenets of Marxist theory. This is therefore the main preoccupation of Laclau and Mouffe. They begin with a frontal assault on the very concept of historical materialism, arguing that Marxist theory sees the outcome of social development as 'predetermined from the beginning': For Marxism, the development of the productive forces plays the key role in the historical evolution towards socialism, given that the 'past development of the productive forces makes socialism possible, and their future development makes socialism necessary'... According to this view, if history has a sense and a rational substratum, it is due to the general law of development of the productive forces. Hence the economy may be understood as a mechanism of society acting ... independently of human action.64 What is being described here is not historical materialism, but a caricature of Marx's and Engels' ideas. Nevertheless, this is the theoretical basis on which Laclau and Mouffe conclude that there is no connection whatsoever between the political and economic realms of society in modern capitalism. This leads them to insist repeatedly that the state itself is autonomous (and even within the state, the different branches can be autonomous from each other). This too is the basis on which they discard the revolutionary potential of the working class. Rather than the relations of production--based upon exploitation--determining the central antagonism in society, they argue that there are no 'historic interests' derived from 'class positions,' and no 'objective' relationship between relationship to the means of production and the 'mentality of the producers': Here, the alternative is clear: either one has a theory of history according to which... an absolutely united working class will become transparent to itself at the moment of the proletarian chiliasm--in which case its 'objective interests' can be determined from the very beginning; or else, one abandons that theory and, with it, any basis for privileging certain subject positions over others in the determination of the 'objective' interests of the agent as a whole--in which case this latter notion becomes meaningless.65 This leads Laclau and Mouffe to argue that the central problem with Marxism is its insistence that 'the working class represents the privileged agent in which the fundamental impulse of social change resides'.66 For them, the working class is not just one of many agents for social change, but it may actually be less inclined towards revolutionary consciousness than others. They describe a working class which is deeply divided by sexism, racism, and fragmented due to the segmentation of the labour market. Moreover, elsewhere Mouffe argues that workers have no 'fundamental interest' in socialism: 'The history of social revolutions which have occurred until now strikingly proves this point, because none of them has been led by the proletariat.'67 Where does that leave Marxism? As Mouffe stated in a 1982 interview, 'Without a drastic recasting, Marxism not only is not going to be in the struggle for a socialist transformation of society today, it might even become a fetter.'68 Having dispensed with a materialist explanation for history, Laclau and Mouffe explain history as a series of accidents or contingencies, and society as riddled with free floating, cross firing--and always shifting--antagonisms. According to this picture of society, not only are antagonisms autonomous from each other, but there is no objective way to locate a primary source of oppression. Thus they argue, 'the ensemble of social practices, of institutions and discourses which produce woman as a category, are not completely isolated but mutually reinforce and act upon one another. This does not mean that there is a single cause of feminine subordination.'69 In place of systematic analysis we are given impressionism. By this method, oppression is something which is self articulated and self defined, having no objective basis in larger society. This approach can and does result in trivialising genuine human suffering--by lumping it together with all in society who define themselves as 'oppressed'--such as middle class consumers and anti-authoritarian or counter-cultural middle class youth, whose complaints may be valid, but who hardly constitute specially oppressed groups in society. Relations of 'subordination' are defined ambiguously as being subject to the decisions of someone else. By this definition, a phone caller may be in a 'subordinate' relationship to a telephone operator, as may be a passenger in a car to the person at the steering wheel. Moreover, relationships of subordination do not automatically become relationships of 'oppression'. Only when that subordination is consciously articulated through 'discourse' does it constitute oppression. And only then can it become a site of antagonism, or struggle. Besides being unnecessarily complicated, this transforms the concept of oppression into an arbitrary, subjective abstraction. This is why they can write: 'Serf,' 'slave,' and so on, do not designate in themselves antagonistic positions; it is only in the terms of a different discursive formation, such as 'the rights inherent to every human being,' that the differential positivity of these categories can be subverted and the subordination constructed as oppression.70 Carrying this approach a step further leads Stanley Aronowitz to argue in The Politics of Identity that Italian-Americans constitute a 'white national minority' in the US. He makes this argument on the grounds that Italian-Americans experience higher unemployment rates and earn lower wages than most other whites. He also notes that, through films such as Mean Streets, Raging Bull and Goodfellas, Hollywood has traditionally stereotyped Italian-Americans as hoodlums prone to senseless violence. Finally, he argues that for more than a century Italian-Americans have suffered 'discrimination' from 'working class hierarchies', which has led to a relatively low level of class mobility.71 He writes: Six decades of Hollywood stereotypes articulated with more than a century of discrimination within working class hierarchies, especially the fairly limited Italian-American mobility compared to Northern Europeans. This record invites comparison with others who have suffered the stigma of stereotypical cultural representations that correspond to their marginal position within the economic and social hierarchies, notably African-Americans.72 This assertion is nothing short of ridiculous. Many decades have passed since newly arrived Italian immigrants, never mind Americans of Italian descent, suffered from systematic discrimination and bigotry in the US. And although Aronowitz makes the disclaimer that he is not drawing an 'exact parallel' between Italian-Americans and blacks, such a comparison can only serve to trivialise the genuine discrimination suffered by blacks. Moreover, according to Laclau and Mouffe, oppression is not only completely subjective, but it also can result from any relationship in which one group of people are subject to the authority of another or others. This method borrows heavily from the blind anti-authoritarianism of anarchism--which opposes any form of authority, regardless of who is wielding it and for what purposes. But there is a difference between the authority of those who are democratically elected and of those whose authority is imposed from above. Similarly, the authority of a picket captain in a strike is of an entirely different nature from the authority of a police officer, based upon each one's objective interests--based upon class position. But taken out of the context of class society, all forms of authority are equal and should be equally opposed. Similarly, if objective working class interests are non-existent, then a party which sets out to represent those interests is at best pointless and at worse harmful. This predictably leads Laclau and Mouffe to oppose the concept of a Leninist party. According to Laclau and Mouffe, 'the relations between "vanguard" and "masses" cannot but have a predominantly external and manipulative character', on the grounds that 'political authoritarianism emerges at the moment when... a distinction is established between leaders and led within mass movements.' Carrying this logic to an extreme leads another post-Marxist, Alberto Melucci, to conclude that even the 'concept of a social movement' makes him 'uncomfortable', because of its 'grandiose political programs which have in practice resulted in tyranny and totalitarianism.'73 The forms of struggle which flow from post-Marxist theory consist of separate, autonomous struggles against specific relations of 'subordination'. In other words, they cannot be generalised. This is again explained as a negation of socialist 'totality': The classic conception of socialism supposed that the disappearance of private ownership of the means of production would set up a chain of effects which, over a whole historical epoch, would lead to the extinction of all forms of subordination. Today we know that this is not so. There are not, for example, necessary links between anti-sexism and anti-capitalism, and a unity between the two can only be the result of a hegemonic articulation. It follows that it is only possible to construct this articulation on the basis of separate struggles... This requires the autonomisation of the spheres of struggle...74 Laclau and Mouffe have promised that the emergence of these sorts of social movements will unleash a new, more powerful kind of radicalism, which will result in a 'democratic revolution': 'What we are witnessing is a politicisation far more radical than any we have known in the past.'75 Thus, in the opinion of its theoretical pioneers, identity politics represents a step forward from the Marxist tradition. Stanley Aronowitz again echoes this viewpoint: the new social movements of ecology, feminism, racial freedom, and gay and lesbian freedom are valid efforts to combat aspects of capitalist rule which oppress these sections of the new petty bourgeoisie of professionals, artists, and other intermediate layers of society who comprise the cadre for the movements... Implicit in this reply is a new conception of historical agent(s) that reduces agency neither to its class nor to other fixed determinations.76 This opinion, expressed in different ways, has gained widespread acceptance within sections of the socialist left. For example, reform socialist Manning Marable wrote in a recent article entitled 'The New American Socialism': The Leninist vanguard-party model of social change... has finally been thoroughly discredited. The idea of seizing power by violence in a computerised, technologically advanced society is simply a recipe for disaster. ...But the central questions confronting the left aren't located within the left itself but in the broader, deeper currents of social protest and struggle among non-socialist, democratic constituencies--in the activities of trade unionists, gays and lesbians, feminists, environmentalists, people of colour, and the poor... This means advancing a politics of radical, multicultural democracy, not socialism [emphasis added].77 In its striking simplicity, Marable's logic shows that the politics of identity are not compatible with socialism--they cannot be incorporated with a wider socialist view. Moreover, identity politics, rather than representing an advance, represents a major step backward in the fight against oppression. Despite Laclau and Mouffe's declarations to the contrary, there is nothing particularly radical about post-Marxism. In fact, the emphasis on autonomy--both the autonomy of the state and the autonomy of social movements--leads directly down the path to mainstream liberalism. Their descriptions of the role of the state read like standard textbook definitions: terms such as 'liberty', equality' and 'pluralism' abound. They take great pains to refute the Marxist assumption that the state consistently acts on behalf of any one social class--arguing that sometimes, as in the case of 'feminist struggle, the state is an important means for effecting an advance, frequently against civil society, in legislation which combats sexism'. Not surprisingly, they conclude, 'It is not liberalism as such which should be called into question, for as an ethical principle which defends the liberty of the individual to fulfil his or her human capacities, it is more valid today than ever.'78 The concept of autonomous movements does not contradict a liberal framework at all. First, the goals of each autonomous movement or democratic struggle are limited to ending only a particular form of subordination within a particular social domain. In other words, Laclau and Mouffe are describing glorified pressure groups. Such a struggle may take the form of making demands on the state. Then again, it may not. In fact, it does not even have to involve more than one person: The fact that these 'new antagonisms' are the expression of forms of resistance to the commodification, bureaucratisation and increasing homogenisation of social life itself explains why they should frequently manifest themselves through... a demand for autonomy itself... Insofar as the two great themes of the democratic imaginary--liberty and equality--it was that of equality which was traditionally predominant, the demands for autonomy bestow an increasingly central role upon liberty. For this reason, many of these forms of resistance are made manifest not in the form of collective struggles, but through an increasingly armed individualism.79 Here, Laclau and Mouffe lead their analysis to its final resting point. The pluralistic ideal so central to the form of 'radical democracy' they envisage amounts to nothing more than an acceptance that each and every subject of struggle, each individual antagonism, possesses a set of separate and distinct interests which prevent the possibility of unity. 'For this very reason, the possibility of a unified discourse of the left is also erased. If the various subject positions and the diverse antagonisms and points of rupture constitute a diversity and not a diversification, it is clear they cannot be led back to a point from which they could all be embraced and explained by a single discourse' [their emphasis].80 So identity politics is both a celebration of, and a resignation to, the inevitability of 'difference'--the polar opposite of 'totality', or a unifying movement. Movementism meets post-Marxism Movementism, with its stress on autonomy and anti-authoritarianism, has much in common with the ideas of anarchism. Post-Marxism manages to combine these same anarchist elements with an insistence on the neutrality of the state. Moreover, struggles against oppression may take place entirely outside the realm of 'politics', ie without making demands on the state. As Laclau and Mouffe argue, since society is a field 'criss crossed with antagonisms', none more important than any other, each struggle against oppression is an entirely separate entity--which may interact with others, but remains nevertheless autonomous. In the world of abstraction such a formulation can seem plausible. But the minute this theory is confronted with reality, it is wrought with contradictions. The evolution of US feminist Catharine MacKinnon provides a perfect illustration of the kind of contradictions engendered by identity politics when applied to real world situations. MacKinnon, a well known law professor, is also a self avowed post-Marxist whose analysis shares fundamental agreement with that of Laclau and Mouffe. She too insists upon the neutrality of the state. A neutral state can be ignored, or it can be pressured by different interest groups (men and women) to play either a positive or negative role regarding women's rights. Today, in MacKinnon's view, the state acts in the interests of men, but she believes that laws can be redefined on a 'sex equality' basis. This may, however, require abandoning the right to free speech. In her newest book, Only Words, she argues, 'Equality is a "compelling state interest" that can already outweigh First Amendment [free speech] rights in certain settings.'81 Like Laclau and Mouffe, she too regards the source of women's oppression as unrelated to class society: 'male power over women is a distinctive form of power that inter-relates with the class structure but is neither derivative from nor a side effect of it. In this view, men oppress women to the extent that they can because it is in their interest and to their advantage to do so.' The class struggle, therefore, is something which is simply 'the struggle of men against men'. For women, she argues, the Marxist method of dialectical materialism must be replaced with the feminist method of consciousness-raising.82 A longtime separatist, MacKinnon and her sidekick Andrea Dworkin initiated a campaign in the 1980s aimed at criminalising the production and sale of pornography on the grounds that it 'violates the rights of women'. Their campaign, called 'Women Against Pornography', succeeded in winning an ordinance criminalising pornography in the cities of Minneapolis and Indianapolis in 1983-4, but both laws were eventually overturned by a Supreme Court decision on the grounds that they were unconstitutional. Far from challenging the powers that be, MacKinnon and Dworkin enlisted them in their campaign. In Indianapolis, for example, Women Against Pornography drew the enthusiastic support of a city councillor active in the Stop ERA (Equal Rights Amendment) crusade, and from the city's mayor and police, as well as from the Christian Right. It was pushed through the city council with the overwhelming support of Republicans. They, too, wanted to criminalise pornography, for reasons that had absolutely nothing to do with women's liberation. The excuse of criminalising pornography, rather, fitted in nicely with their interest in finding any way to legitimise the routine police practices of raiding gay and lesbian bars, harassing prostitutes and committing acts of police brutality. Yet MacKinnon and Dworkin were only too happy to have the right wingers on board. As Dworkin explained in a New York Times interview in 1985, 'When Jerry Falwell [leader of the Moral Majority] starts saying there's harm in pornography, that is valuable to me.'83 More recently Dworkin's and MacKinnon's anti-pornography campaign has been put into practice north of the US border, in Canada. In 1992 the Canadian Supreme Court adopted the substance of a legal brief submitted by MacKinnon in its Regina v Butler decision. The Court declared that the right to freedom of expression can be superseded when sexually explicit material promotes 'harm', or is 'degrading' or 'dehumanising', particularly to women. The ruling vastly increased the jurisdiction of Canadian customs officials, who, predictably, have chosen to use their new found censorship powers primarily against feminist and gay publications. Since the ruling border guards have seized a plethora of literature, much of it feminist. One quarter of all feminist bookstores in Canada have had material withheld by customs. The books withheld have included such titles as Black Looks: Race and Representation, by black feminist scholar bell hooks--not to mention two titles by Andrea Dworkin herself! A satirical feminist cartoon book, Hot-Head Paisan, was banned for being 'degrading to men'. Gay publications have also been singled out, since Canadian customs' obscenity guidelines consider only anal penetration--as opposed to other forms--to be 'degrading'. A publication called Weenie Toons was banned for 'degradation of the male penis'. Even a September issue of the liberal US magazine The Nation was detained by zealous border guards. And the books of literary figures, such as Oscar Wilde, who were persecuted in bygone days, have been banned once again.84 None of this should be any surprise. The state is not neutral, but will use each and every opportunity to uphold the interests of the class in power. In the case of capitalism, whatever excuse is used, 'cracking down' will always be directed against those already oppressed by the system. MacKinnon's views on the nature of the state, in other words, have led her directly over to the side of reaction. But it doesn't end there. In MacKinnon's latest book, Only Words, she crosses the line into absurdity, describing a world in which there is no difference between that which is imagined and that which is really experienced. She claims that pornography should not be protected by the First Amendment because reading about or watching a film about abusive sex is the same as rape: 'protecting pornography means protecting sexual abuse as speech' [her emphasis]. She explains further, 'Unwelcome sex talk is an unwelcome sex act,' and, 'to say it is to do it, to do it is to say it.' In the book MacKinnon presents an overview of women's 'thousand years of silence', which reads like a psychotic rant: You grow up with your father holding you down and covering your mouth so another man can make a horrible searing pain between your legs. When you are older, your husband ties you to the bed and drips hot wax on your nipples and brings in other men to watch and makes you smile through it. Your doctor will not give you drugs he has addicted you to unless you suck his penis.85 There is yet a further complication in applying post-Marxist concepts to the real world: separate struggles do not neatly correspond to 'separate oppressions'. Oppressions overlap, so that many people face more than one different form of oppression: many people are both female and black, and so on. Only in the world of abstraction can autonomous struggles against 'criss crossing antagonisms' be fought separately. This means that choices must be made. This can only lead to a dynamic of growing division and fragmentation even within autonomous movements, in much the same way that the women's and gay liberation movements disintegrated in the early 1970s. Moreover, if oppression exists not as an objective relationship, but is something which is self defined, the complications become even greater. Let's take one last look at the politics of Catharine MacKinnon. Surprising as it may seem given her separatist analysis noted above, her version of sisterhood does not extend to all women. She has joined the chorus clamouring for greater intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina on behalf of Bosnian Muslims. From her viewpoint this places Serbs--all Serbs--in the enemy camp. She put forward this viewpoint in a speech at a recent human rights conference in Vienna, angering two Serbian feminists in the audience. They happened to be involved in a telephone hotline in Serbia set up to help women and children victims of physical abuse, and resented the fact that MacKinnon didn't acknowledge the existence of a Serbian opposition. MacKinnon's reply? 'If you were an effective opposition you wouldn't be here. You'd be dead.'86 The Marxist case The caricature of Marxism which the post-Marxists strike down leaves out the essence of Marx's view of historical materialism. To listen to Laclau and Mouffe is to be told that Marxism is a view of history without actors, in which the accumulation of the forces of production causes society to 'evolve' towards socialism. Far more than resembling the Marxist view, this formulation is similar to the fatalist view put forward in the Second International or later by Stalinists--the view that changes in the forces of production automatically result in corresponding changes in society. For some of the theorists of the Second International, like Karl Kautsky, such a view meant that the role of socialist organisation was not to intervene, but to simply wait for the inevitable transition from capitalism to socialism. Stalinists, meanwhile, used a similar mechanical framework to equate the development of industry in Russia with its procession to socialism. It is worth noting that Althusser gradually developed a critique which broke with the Stalinist version of economic determinism. But in doing so Althusser abandoned the essence of Marx's notion of the relationship between the economic base and the superstructure. Most importantly, Althusser developed a theory which downplayed the idea that economic factors have a significant causal role in relation to the spheres of politics and ideology, or that human beings play a determinant role in making history. But Marx's notion of historical materialism has nothing in common with the mechanical formulations of either the Second Intemational or Stalinism. Marx did say that the 'relations of production ...correspond to a definite stage of development of the material productive forces', and he did argue that the development of the productive forces is cumulative, in that technological advances make it possible for societies to move forward, by increasing human beings' control over nature.87 But Marx did not argue that this advance proceeds automatically. The second part of Marx's equation involves the human, or social, factor: the relations of production. Marx described these as 'the social relations based on class antagonism. These relations are not relations between individual and individual, but between worker and capitalist, between farmer and landlord, etc.88 And the theory of base and superstructure does not simply describe the one way influence of the economic base. The relationship between base and superstructure is one of reciprocal, though not equal, influence. As Chris Harman argued: So great is the reciprocal impact of the 'superstructure' on the base, that many of the categories we commonly think of as 'economic' are in fact constituted by both. So, for instance, 'property rights' are judicial (part of the superstructure) but regulate the way exploitation takes place (part of the base)... Far from ignoring the impact of the 'superstructure' on the 'base,' as many ignorant critics have claimed for more than a century, Marx builds his whole account of human history around it.89 Engels made a similar point in a letter to Franz Mehring in 1893. He criticised 'the fatuous notion of the ideologists that because we deny an independent historical development to the various ideological spheres which play a part in history we also deny them any effect upon history. The basis of this is the common undialectical conception of cause and effect as rigidly opposite poles, the total disregarding of interaction'90 [his emphasis]. So the relationship between base and superstructure is genuinely dialectical. Far from being lifeless mirrors of existing relations of production, the various parts of the superstructure can be arenas of massive political and ideological struggle--between the old ruling class, which acts to impede the development of new relations of production which challenge its rule, and an emerging class, which seeks to revolutionise the relations of production. The outcome of such struggles is far from 'predetermined'. Rather, it depends on the human element--the relative strength and organisation of class forces on either side. Within capitalism, as Engels argued in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, 'The contradiction between socialised production and capitalistic appropriation manifested itself as the antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie.'91 Thus in the context of capitalism the working class is the revolutionary class in society--the class which has the potential to transform the relations of production. Or, as Marx wrote in a letter to his friend Joseph Weydemeyer, 'no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society or the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes.'92 Put differently by historian Hal Draper, the meaning is still clear: To engage in class struggle it is not necessary to 'believe in' the class struggle any more than it is necessary to believe in Newton in order to fall from an airplane... The working class moves toward class struggle insofar as capitalism fails to satisfy its economic and social needs and aspirations, not insofar as it is told about struggle by Marxists. There is no evidence that workers like to struggle any more than anyone else; the evidence is that capitalism compels and accustoms them to do so.93 The Marxist definition of the working class has little in common with those of sociologists. Neither income level nor self definition are what determine social class. Although income levels obviously bear some relationship to class, some workers earn the same or higher salaries than some people who fall into the category of middle class. And many people who consider themselves 'middle class' are in fact workers. Nor is class defined by categories such as white and blue collar. For Marx the working class is defined by its relationship to the means of production. Broadly speaking, those who do not control the means of production and who are forced to sell their labour power to capitalists are workers. The very conditions of work under capitalism lead workers to identify their interests as part of the working class and to organise collectively to defend those interests. Capitalism is based upon mass production, which draws workers together in large numbers under a single roof, and reduces the role of each worker in the labour process to that of a cog in a wheel. As Marx wrote in Capital: All means for the development of production transform themselves into means of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work and turn it into a hated toil...94 So workers' objective relationship to the productive process leads them to struggle, and to struggle collectively, as the only way to win. While workers may engage in struggle spontaneously, without prior organisation or class consciousness, class struggle helps to re-educate workers--sometimes very rapidly--challenging bourgeois notions which keep workers divided. When workers go on strike, confronting capital and its agents of repression, the police and national guard, the class nature of society becomes suddenly clarified. Racist, sexist or anti-gay ideas cultivated over a lifetime can disappear within a matter of days in a mass strike wave. The sight of hundreds of police lined up to protect the boss's property or to usher in a bunch of scabs speaks volumes about the class nature of the state within capitalism. The process of struggle also exposes another truth hidden beneath layers of ruling class ideology: as the producers of the goods and services which keep capitalism running, workers have the ability to shut down the system through a mass strike. And workers not only have the power to shut down the system, but to replace it with a socialist society, based upon collective ownership of the means of production. Although other groups in society suffer oppression, only the working class possesses this objective power. Sections of the middle layer in society, the petty bourgeoisie or middle class, suffer oppression--in some cases worse than that experienced by workers. Peasants, or even sections of the lower middle class during periods of economic crisis, may suffer severe deprivation. But while sections of the petty bourgeoisie may join a revolutionary movement, their conditions of existence prevent them from leading such a movement. Most importantly, the peasant or small shop owner looks primarily to individual, rather than collective, solutions to conflicts with the ruling class. In contrast, the working class holds the potential to lead a struggle in the interests of all those who suffer injustice and oppression. That is because both exploitation and oppression are rooted in capitalism. Exploitation is the method by which the ruling class robs workers of surplus value; the various forms of oppression play a primary role in maintaining the rule of a tiny minority over the vast majority. In each case, the enemy is one and the same. These are the basic reasons why Marx argued that capitalism created its own gravedigger in the shape of a working class. But when Marx defined the working class as the agent for revolutionary change, he was describing its historical potential, rather than a foregone conclusion. While capitalism propels workers toward collective forms of struggle, it also forces them into competition. The unremitting pressure from a layer of unemployed workers, which exists in most economies even in times of 'full employment', is a deterrent to struggle--a constant reminder that workers compete for limited jobs which afford a decent standard of living. Without the counterweight of the class struggle this competition can act as an obstacle to the development of class consciousness, and encourage the growth of what Marx called 'false consciousness'--part of which is ideas which scapegoat other sections of society. The growth of such ideas divides workers, and impedes their ability to focus on the real enemy. For example, racism against immigrants can grow in times of high unemployment, undermining workers' ability to build a fightback against unemployment. But the dynamic is such that workers' objective circumstances are always in conflict with bourgeois ideology. Marx and Engels argued in The Communist Manifesto, 'This organisation of proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier.'95 Marx distinguished between a working class 'in itself', which holds objective revolutionary potential, and a working class 'for itself', which acts in its own class interests. The difference is between the objective potential and the subjective organisation needed to realise that potential. Draper described Marx's view of the working class as 'an objective agency of social revolution in the process of becoming'. An essential part of this process is the development of political consciousness among workers. The role played by revolutionaries is crucial in the development of political consciousness among workers. The whole Leninist conception of the vanguard party rests on the understanding that a battle of ideas must be fought inside the working class movement. A section of workers, won to a socialist alternative and organised into a revolutionary party, can win other workers away from false consciousness and provide an alternative world view. For Lenin, the notion of political consciousness entailed workers' willingness to champion the interests of all the oppressed in society, as a part of the struggle for socialism: 'Working class consciousness cannot be genuine political consciousness unless the workers are trained to respond to all cases of tyranny, oppression, violence, and abuse, no matter what class is affected--unless they are trained, moreover, to respond from a Social-Democratic point of view and no other.'97 Oppression and class society The prevailing view within identity politics circles is that issues of exploitation and oppression are entirely separate. In fact, this view argues that white, male, and heterosexual workers all 'benefit' from at least some forms of oppression. The Marxist view is quite different. The working class has no interest in maintaining a system which thrives upon inequality and oppression. In fact, the working class as a whole is oppressed, as well as exploited. And the special oppression faced by women, gays, blacks and other racially oppressed minorities serves both to lower the living standards of the entire working class and to weaken workers' ability to fight back. So even in the short term the working class has nothing to gain from oppression. In Marx's and Engels' time there was little doubt that the working class suffered from oppression. Engels' book, The Condition of the Working Class in England, published in 1845, described the complete immiseration of the British working class brought about by the industrial revolution. Living standards have improved dramatically in advanced industrial societies in this century. Nevertheless, even in the richest societies in the world, including the United States, the working class still experiences oppression. Oppression takes many forms: regressive taxation policies; inferior schools; substandard or inaccessible medical care; the prevailing ideologies, which teach workers that they are less intelligent or less capable than the better-educated middle and upper classes; even the siting of toxic waste dumps, never installed anywhere but in working class areas--the list goes on and on. Oppression is necessary to (and a product of) a system based upon the rule of a tiny minority at the expense of the vast majority. In other words, oppression is endemic to capitalism. The special forms of oppression experienced by women, gays, blacks, and other racial minorities in society are also endemic to the system. Women's oppression rose hand in hand with the family, along with the development of class society. Racism and anti-gay ideology grew up more recently with capitalism. Today these various forms of oppression serve to uphold the capitalist system in particular ways. But they also serve a more general function for capital: pitting worker against worker by creating divisions within the working class. The ruling class deliberately fosters antagonisms between different sections of workers by promoting inequality and discriminating against certain parts of the population. Using whatever means are at its disposal, including the legal system, the media, the educational system, and again the prevailing ideologies, the ruling class creates scapegoats to blame for society's ills, or to be relegated to second class citizenship. Harmful stereotypes are made to seem like 'common sense'. When the ruling class is most successful those groups which suffer the most discrimination are also the most despised people in society. It is they, not the system, who are blamed for society's problems. Marx applied a similar analysis to the role of racism and slavery in the US. He said, 'In fact the veiled slavery of the wage labourers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the New World as its pedestal...' The black abolitionist Frederick Douglass summed up the purpose of racism in this simple phrase, 'They divided both to conquer each.'98 The period after the introduction of the Jim Crow segregation laws in the Southern US at the turn of the century illustrates this dynamic perfectly. Far from benefiting from the extreme level of racism brought about by Jim Crow, Southern white workers suffered wages lower than those of black workers in the North.99 Whenever capitalists can threaten to replace one group of workers with another, poorly paid, group of workers, neither group benefits. The only beneficiaries of this inequality are within the ruling class, who pay lower wages overall. The same relationship holds between the wages of men and those of women workers, which tend to be lower. In the US women's wages tend to hover at between 60 and 70 percent of men's. But this has the net effect of depressing men's wages, for they are made constantly aware that, if their own wage demands aim too high, they can be replaced with cheaper women workers. For example, the formerly male occupation of clerical work is now dominated by lower paid women workers. The effect of special oppression is to increase the level of oppression for the working class overall. Besides this aspect, however, the oppression of women and gays involves another key feature of the capitalist system: the role of the nuclear family. The nuclear family first grew up hand in hand with the development of class society. During the early flourishing of industrial capitalism low wages forced entire working class families to work in factories in order to survive. This severely undermined the working class family to the point of threatening its existence. Indeed, Marx and Engels (mistakenly) believed that the working class family was disappearing under capitalism. But from the mid-19th century onwards, the trend was toward consolidation of the family: wages rose enough so that more working class women would remain within the home and make childrearing a priority. The modern working class family developed as part of the superstructure, first and foremost to provide the system with a plentiful supply of labour. The working class family developed as a cheap way to reproduce labour power for capitalism, both in terms of replenishing the daily strength of the current labour force and also as a way of raising future generations of workers through adulthood. Capitalists have come to rely upon 'privatised reproduction', as Marx called it. It is doubtful at this point that capitalism could do without the family. Engels argued that the role of the 'proletarian wife' meant 'the wife became the head servant... if she carries out her duties in the private service of her family, she remains excluded from public production and unable to earn; and if she wants to take part in public production and earn independently, she cannot carry out her family duties.'100 In order to prop up the family, ruling class ideology compels both women and men to adhere to rigidly demarcated sex roles--the ideal of homemaker for women, subordinate to the family's male breadwinner--regardless of how little these ideals actually reflect the real lives of working class people. An essential component of bourgeois ideology around the family is the portrayal of human sexuality as 'naturally' heterosexual and monogamous. This aspect of the ideology of the family is so essential, in fact, that the very existence of lesbians and gays who choose to live outside the traditional nuclear family poses a threat to it. Therefore, laws governing sexual behaviour and explicitly defining homosexuality as 'deviant' began to appear in the late 19th century. Unless one understands the family's role in privatised reproduction for capitalism, it can seem as if the personal relationships themselves which exist inside the family produce oppression, particularly of women. Inequality between women and men does exist within the family, in that women take much more responsibility for housework and childcare than men. But the unpaid labour women perform inside the family is labour which benefits only the ruling class. Working class men have no objective interest in maintaining the role of the nuclear family as it exists under capitalism, for it places the entire burden of reproduction onto the shoulders of workers. Working class men also have an interest in a system in which housework is socialised and quality childcare is available whenever it is needed. Some feminists in particular reject the Marxist view that the family is part of the superstructure, claiming that this downplays the importance of the personal aspects of women's oppression. But the Marxist view simply locates the source of all aspects of women's oppression as flowing from the needs of class society. This does not mean that Marxists disregard the personal aspects of women's oppression or of any other form of oppression. Since Marx and Engels, Marxists have understood that privatised reproduction through the nuclear family must be ended in order to end sexual oppression and to create the material conditions in which women and men can truly be equals in their personal lives. Engels himself said, in a passage from The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State: What we can now conjecture about the way in which sexual relations will be ordered after the impending overthrow of capitalist production is mainly of a negative character, limited for the most part to what will disappear. But what will there be new? That will be answered when a new generation has grown up: a generation of men who never in their lives have known what it is to buy a woman's surrender with money or any other social instrument of power; a generation of women who have never known what it is to give themselves to a man from any other considerations than real love or to refuse to give themselves to their lover from fear of the economic consequences. When these people are in the world, they will care precious little what anybody today thinks they ought to do; they will make their own practice and their corresponding public opinion about the practice of each individual--and that will be the end of it.101 Nor have Marxists underestimated the degree of inequality which exists between women and men in the family. Leon Trotsky once wrote, 'In order to change the conditions of life, we must learn to see them through the eyes of women.' Furthermore, Trotsky argued that, in order to achieve the actual equality of man and woman within the family is an... arduous problem. All our domestic habits must be revolutionised before that can happen. And yet it is quite obvious that unless there is actual equality of husband and wife in the family, in a normal sense as well as in the conditions of life, we cannot speak seriously of their equality in social work or even in politics.102 Rather than downplaying oppression, then, the emphasis by Marxists on the class nature of oppression leads to an understanding that capitalism must be overthrown in order to end it. Moreover, locating the root of oppression in class society explains why the working class has an interest in ending oppression in all its forms. Socialism and the fight against oppression In the context of oppression the demand for 'autonomy' entails a deep sense of pessimism about the possibility of the working class movement fighting for the interests of all workers, and for all who suffer oppression in society. In the framework of identity politics, it involves a pessimism about the possibility for building solidarity even amongst the oppressed. Yet, as experience has shown, elevating the notion of autonomy to a principle, as identity politics does, makes it virtually impossible to build the kind of movement which can end oppression. Class provides the only unifying basis for fighting against oppression. Only a movement organised on the basis of genuine solidarity between all who are exploited and oppressed by capitalism, under the leadership of the working class, holds the potential to wipe out oppression in all its forms. The Marxist view is that the working class cannot hope to win a socialist society unless the working class movement is united on the basis of ending all forms of oppression and exploitation. Thus it is in workers' objective interests to fight oppression in all its forms. The Leninist conception of the revolutionary party is one which represents the objective interests of the working class, and on this basis argues within the working class movement that the socialist movement must, in Lenin's words, be the 'tribune of the people'.103 But for a revolutionary party to act as the 'tribune of the people' it must unite the oppressed within its ranks, not give way to the pressure to fracture organisationally along lines of race or gender. Lenin made this point forcefully in reply to members of the Jewish Bund who wanted a separate revolutionary organisation for Jewish workers. Lenin argued that, 'we must not set up organisations that would march separately, each along its own track.' This would not only weaken the working class movement as a whole, but it would weaken the struggle of Jewish workers fighting against anti-Semitism. He argued that the Bund had 'stepped onto the inclined plane of nationalism' which could only lead it into isolation and hamper its ability to fight back. He argued that, carried to its organisational conclusion, the result would be the complete compartmentalisation of struggle: one who has adopted the standpoint of nationalism naturally arrives at the desire to erect a Chinese Wall around his nationality, his national working-class movement; he is unembarrassed by the fact that it would mean building separate walls in each city, in each little town and village, unembarrassed even by the fact that by his tactics of division and dismemberment he is reducing to nil the great call for the rallying and unity of the proletarians of all nations, all races, and all languages[his emphasis].104 Lenin's words do not represent the principles of a movement which ignores oppression, but one which seeks to bring together the greatest possible force to combat it: the working class. And the Bolshevik Revolution proved in practice that Lenin was right. In 1917 the same Russian workers who the Bund had argued in 1903 were too backward to champion the rights of Jewish workers elected Trotsky, a Jew, as chairman of the Petrograd soviet, Kamenev, a Jew, as chairman of the Moscow soviet, and Sverdlov, a Jew, as chairman of the Soviet Republic. Lenin argued, the socialist movement must be the tribune of all those, regardless of class, who suffer oppression under capitalism. But the Bolsheviks also clearly understood that the class nature of oppression precluded the possibility for cross-class alliances among the oppressed. And class is nevertheless the key division within society. This means that class interests divide those who are oppressed. The Bolsheviks clarified this position in regard to women's oppression. As Alexandra Kollontai argued in The Social Basis of the Woman Question: The women's world is divided, just as is the world of men, into two camps: the interests and aspirations of one group brings it close to the bourgeois class, while the other group has close connections to the proletariat, and its claims for liberation encompass a full solution to the woman question. Thus, although both camps follow the general slogan of the 'liberation of women', their aims and interests are different.105 But arguing against cross-class interests among women wasn't the end of the matter. The Bolsheviks also argued with men workers why it was in their class interests to fight for demands such as equal pay for women workers. At the First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in 1917, Alexandra Kollontai argued in her address, 'The class conscious worker must understand that the value of male labour is dependent on the value of female labour and that, by threatening to replace male labour with cheaper female workers, the capitalist can put pressure on men's wages. Only a lack of understanding could lead one to see this question as purely a "woman's issue".'106 The Bolsheviks had made the right choice of allies. When the October Revolution took place, ruling class women fought on the other side, against the interests of working class women and men.107 But the working class movement embraced a full programme for women's liberation. The October Revolution was indeed a 'festival of the oppressed', as Trotsky described. All those groups who had been oppressed under the rule of Tsarism were liberated by the workers' government. In a period of months after the October Revolution women were granted full social and political equality--including the right to vote and run for public office, at a time when no other society had yet granted women full suffrage rights. Legislation was passed granting women workers equal pay for equal work. Abortion was made free and legal. Divorce was granted by request, while age of consent laws were revoked. And despite the tremendous hardships of the civil war which followed the revolution, the Bolsheviks set up a women's bureau, Zhenotdel, which took the first steps toward relieving women of the burdens imposed by the family--by setting up communal kitchens and child care centres, and public laundries. All laws criminalising homosexuality were repealed, in an attempt to rid society of the distinction between heterosexuality and homosexuality. The Bolshevik Grigorii Btakis described the impact of the October Revolution on sexuality in 1923: [Soviet legislation] declares the absolute non-interference of the state and society into sexual matters, so long as nobody is injured, and no one's interests are encroached upon--concerning homosexuality, sodomy and various other forms of sexual gratification, which are set down in European legislation as offences against morality--Soviet legislation treats these exactly as so-called 'natural' intercourse.108 But all the progress towards ending oppression that had been made during the early years of the revolution came to an abrupt halt with Stalin's consolidation of power in 1928. The rise of Stalinism marked the beginning of a new period of massive industrialisation in Russia and the brutal consolidation of a bureaucratic, state capitalist regime. Millions of people were killed in this process--peasants, workers, and many Bolsheviks who had participated in the October Revolution. Stalinism, in other words, annihilated the workers' government and everything the Bolsheviks stood for. It is important to understand this, because many people make their case against Marxism on the grounds that various forms of oppression continued under Stalin's rule, and in other societies calling themselves socialist, such those in Eastern Europe, and Cuba or China.109 But Stalinism marked the defeat of the Russian Revolution of 1917, and buried the real Marxist tradition for six decades. Conclusion The politics of identity do not offer a way forward for those genuinely interested in transforming society. At its worst, the logic of identity politics can be used to bolster the ruling class's primary means of repression, the capitalist state--as is the case with Catharine MacKinnon's version. But even when organisations built around identity politics ignore the state, their strategies leave class society completely intact. **The veneer is radical, but the substance is not**. Class is the **main antagonism** in society. This is as true today as it was in Marx's time. For working class people, the notion of individual 'empowerment' will remain an impossibility as long as capitalism exists. The emphasis on lifestyle so central to identity politics is the guarantee that such movements will remain middle class. Moreover, workers' objective role within the productive process places them in an objectively antagonistic relationship to capital. The lessons of the class struggle train workers to act in solidarity with all those who are oppressed and exploited by capitalism. The battle for class consciousness is a battle over ideas, but it is one which will be fought out in the context of the class struggle, not the musings of ex-Marxist academics.

#### Approaching issues of racial injustice outside of the lens of neoliberalism is theoretically bankrupt – market relations systematically strip us of the vocabulary needed to cultivate a sense of collective responsibility and install a conception of freedom as the absence of external constraints – criticizing neoliberalism is logically prior to addressing their impacts.

Giroux 3 (Henry A., Waterbury Chair Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at Pennsylvania State University, Communication Education, Vol. 52, No. 3/4, July/October, “Spectacles of Race and Pedagogies of Denial: Anti-Black Racist Pedagogy Under the Reign of Neoliberalism,” p. 196-198)

Under the reign of neoliberalism in the United States, society is largely defined through the privileging of market relations, deregulation, privatization, and consumerism. Central to neoliberalism is the assumption that profit making be construed as the essence of democracy, thus providing a rationale for a handful of private interests to control as much of social life as possible to maximize their financial investments. Strictly aligning freedom with a narrow notion of individual interest, neoliberalism works hard to privatize all aspects of the public good and simultaneously narrow the role of the state as both a gatekeeper for capital and a policing force for maintaining social order and racial control. Unrestricted by social legislation or government regulation, market relations as they define the economy are viewed as a paradigm for democracy itself. Central to neoliberal philosophy is the claim that the development of all aspects of society should be left to the wisdom of the market. Similarly, neoliberal warriors argue that democratic values be subordinated to economic considerations, social issues be translated as private dilemmas, part-time labor replace full-time work, trade unions be weakened, and everybody be treated as a customer. Within this market-driven perspective, the exchange of capital takes precedence over social justice, the making of socially responsible citizens, and the building of democratic communities. There is no language here for recognizing antidemocratic forms of power, developing nonmarket values, or fighting against substantive injustices in a society founded on deep inequalities, particularly those based on race and class. Hence, it is not surprising that under neoliberalism, language is often stripped of its critical and social possibilities as it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine a social order in which all problems are not personal, social issues provide the conditions for understanding private considerations, critical reflection becomes the essence of politics, and matters of equity and justice become crucial to developing a democratic society.¶ It is under the reign of neoliberalism that the changing vocabulary about race and racial justice has to be understood and engaged. As freedom is increasingly abstracted from the power of individuals and groups to participate actively in shaping society, it is reduced to the right of the individual to be free from social constraints. In this view, freedom is no longer linked to a collective effort on the part of individuals to create a democratic society. Instead, freedom becomes an exercise in self-development rather than social responsibility, reducing politics to either the celebration of consumerism or a privileging of a market-based notion of agency and choice that appear quite indifferent to how power, equity, and justice offer the enabling conditions for real individual and collective choices to be both made and acted upon. Under such circumstances, neoliberalism undermines those public spaces where noncommercial values and crucial social issues can be discussed, debated, and engaged. As public space is privatized, power is disconnected from social obligations, and it becomes more difficult for isolated individuals living in consumption-oriented spaces to construct an ethically engaged and power-sensitive language capable of accommodating the principles of ethics and racial justice as a common good rather than as a private affair. According to Bauman (1998), the elimination of public space and the subordination of democratic values to commercial interests narrow the discursive possibilities for supporting notions of the public good and create the conditions for “the suspicion against others, the intolerance of difference, the resentment of strangers, and the demands to separate and banish them, as well as the hysterical, paranoiac concern with ‘law and order”’ (p. 47). Positioned within the emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant economic and political philosophy of our times, neoracism can be understood as part of a broader attack against not only difference but also the value of public memory, public goods, and democracy itself.¶ The new racism both represents a shift in how race is defined and is symptomatic of the breakdown of a political culture in which individual freedom and solidarity maintain an uneasy equilibrium in the service of racial, social, and economic justice. Individual freedom is now disconnected from any sense of civic responsibility or justice, focusing instead on investor profits, consumer confidence, the downsizing of governments to police precincts, and a deregulated social order in which the winner takes all. Freedom is no longer about either making the powerful responsible for their actions or providing the essential political, economic, and social conditions for everyday people to intervene in and shape their future. Under the reign of neoliberalism, freedom is less about the act of intervention than it is about the process of withdrawing from the social and enacting one’s sense of agency as an almost exclusively private endeavor. Freedom now cancels out civic courage and social responsibility while it simultaneously translates public issues and collective problems into tales of failed character, bad luck, or simply indifference. As Amy Elizabeth Ansell (1997) points out:¶ The disproportionate failure of people of color to achieve social mobility speaks nothing of the justice of present social arrangements, according to the New Right worldview, but rather reflects the lack of merit or ability of people of color themselves. In this way, attention is deflected away from the reality of institutional racism and towards, for example, the “culture of poverty”, the “drug culture”, or the lack of black self-development. (p. 111)¶ Appeals to freedom, operating under the sway of market forces, offer no signposts theoretically or politically for engaging racism, an ethical and political issue that undermines the very basis of a substantive democracy. Freedom in this discourse collapses into self-interest and as such is more inclined to organize any sense of community around shared fears, insecurities, and an intolerance of those “others” who are marginalized by class and color. But freedom reduced to the ethos of self-preservation and brutal self-interests makes it difficult for individuals to recognize the forms that racism often take when draped in either the language of denial, freedom or individual rights. In what follows, I want to explore two prominent forms of the new racism, color blindness and neoliberal racism and their connection to the New Right, corporate power, and neoliberal ideologies.

#### Neoliberalism’s extermination of the public sphere leads to social exclusion and racial apartheid

Giroux 4 (Henry A. – Global Television Network Chair Professor at McMaster University 2004 Henry Neoliberalism and the Demise of Democracy: Resurrecting Hope in Dark Times Dissident Voice http://dissidentvoice.org/Aug04/Giroux0807.htm)

The ideology and power of neoliberalism also cuts across national boundaries. Throughout the globe, the forces of neoliberalism are on the march, dismantling the historically guaranteed social provisions provided by the welfare state, defining profit-making as the essence of democracy, and equating freedom with the unrestricted ability of markets to “govern economic relations free of government regulation.” [5] Transnational in scope, neoliberalism now imposes its economic regime and market values on developing and weaker nations through structural adjustment policies enforced by powerful financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Secure in its dystopian vision that there are no alternatives, as England’s former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once put it, neoliberalism obviates issues of contingency, struggle, and social agency by celebrating the inevitability of economic laws in which the ethical ideal of intervening in the world gives way to the idea that we “have no choice but to adapt both our hopes and our abilities to the new global market.” [6] Coupled with a new culture of fear, market freedoms seem securely grounded in a defense of national security, capital, and property rights. When coupled with a media driven culture of fear and the everyday reality of insecurity, public space becomes increasingly militarized as state governments invest more in prison construction than in education. Prison guards and security personnel in public schools are two of the fastest growing professions. In its capacity to dehistoricize and depoliticize society, as well as in its aggressive attempts to destroy all of the public spheres necessary for the defense of a genuine democracy, neoliberalism reproduces the conditions for unleashing the most brutalizing forces of capitalism. Social Darwinism has been resurrected from the ashes of the 19th century sweatshops and can now be seen in full bloom in most reality TV programs and in the unfettered self-interests that now drives popular culture. As narcissism is replaced by unadulterated materialism, public concerns collapse into utterly private considerations and where public space does exist it is mainly used as a confessional for private woes, a cut throat game of winner take all, or a advertisement for consumerism. Neoliberal policies dominate the discourse of politics and use the breathless rhetoric of the global victory of free-market rationality to cut public expenditures and undermine those non-commodified public spheres that serve as the repository for critical education, language, and public intervention. Spewed forth by the mass media, right-wing intellectuals, religious fanatics, and politicians, neoliberal ideology, with its ongoing emphasis on deregulation and privatization, has found its material expression in an all-out attack on democratic values and on the very notion of the public sphere. Within the discourse of neoliberalism, the notion of the public good is devalued and, where possible, eliminated as part of a wider rationale for a handful of private interests to control as much of social life as possible in order to maximize their personal profit. Public services such as health care, child care, public assistance, education, and transportation are now subject to the rules of the market. Construing the public good as a private good and the needs of the corporate and private sector as the only source of investment, neoliberal ideology produces, legitimates, and exacerbates the existence of persistent poverty, inadequate health care, racial apartheid in the inner cities, and the growing inequalities between the rich and the poor. [7]

#### This effects of this system are felt in the everyday lives of real people – Dean Blanchard, a fisherman in Louisiana, describes the effects of corporate control of energy production in his gulf-coast community…

Kistner 12 (Rocky, “Fossil Fuel Subsidies: the Answer Lies in the Gulf,” 6-22-12.

http://theenergycollective.com/rockykistner/87692/fossil-fuel-subsidies-answer-lies-gulf

You don’t have to go to Brazil to find out why this polluter payoff system has tragic consequences. We’ve got exhibit A right here in the good ole USA, where oil companies spend millions lobbying Congress and get billions in subsidies in return. It’s a fossil fuel free-for-all; Big Oil keeps its tax breaks while it drills its way to record profits. This week, NRDC and other environmental groups sued the Obama Administration to stop the planned sale of new oil leases in the deepwater Gulf, a reckless plan that ignores ongoing safety issues associated with drilling at even more dangerous depths, as NRDC’s David Pettit has blogged. Just talk to the fishermen in the Gulf about their faith in the oil companies these days. Seafood king Dean Blanchard of Grand Isle, LA, was once one of the most successful shrimp buyers on the coast. But that all changed in BP’s fiery explosion two years ago. Now his business is in tatters, ruined he says by the millions of gallons of oil and chemical dispersant that flooded into local waters and straight into Barataria Bay, one of the most productive commercial shrimping grounds in the country. But no longer. This year Blanchard says his once robust shrimp catch is down by about 50 percent, and he doesn’t expect it to get better anytime soon. In fact he bets it will get worse as the oil and dispersant mix works its way up the food chain, potentially wrecking havoc on future generations of seafood—threatening his fishing community's very survival. “Oil’s still coming in everyday out here, people are sick in the community, the fishing is getting worse….there’s deformed shrimp everywhere,” Blanchard says. “The oil companies have bought off all the politicians. I’m praying for a hurricane so it will stir up all the oil off the bottom and dump it on the Governor’s mansion. Then let’s see how he likes it.” Other fishermen confirm catches are down, and many say it's getting increasingly hard to make a living off the sea, while they say BP has done little to compensate them. A veteran Louisiana fisherman says he's caught shrimp recently with what appear to be tumor-like growths, weird deformities he's never seen before. He also says the shrimp are unusually small for this time of year, so small they fall through the nets. With the high price of gas, he given up trawling at a time when he normally is making good money. Like many fishermen in the Gulf, he has no idea what the future will hold. “Everything was going so good before the spill,” he said. “We finally had the shrimp prices up and then wham, the oil hit. We can fix things after a hurricane, but seems like we can’t fix things after an oil spill like this.”

Thus, in contrast with the Aff, we prevent the following advocacy statement: The USFG should INCREASE restrictions on conversations of energy production to account for what occurs in the urban space, just as the debate community should INCREASE restrictions on knowledge production to account for the urban space of this community.

#### Critical reflection opens spaces of resistance by which we can reframe our relationship to systems of power in a manner that enhances human agency and threatens their existence

Giroux 6 (Henry A. – Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University, “Academic Freedom under Fire: The Case for Critical Pedagogy”, Fall 2006, JSTOR)

What makes critical pedagogy so dangerous to Christian evangelicals, neoconservatives, and right-wing nationalists in the United States is that central to its very definition is the task of educating students to become critical agents actively questioning and negotiating the relationship between theory and practice, critical analysis and common sense, and learning and social change. Critical pedagogy opens up a space where students should be able to come to terms with their own power as critical agents; it provides a sphere where the unconditional freedom to question and assert is central to the purpose of the university, if not democracy itself (Derrida 2001, 233). And as a political and moral practice, pedagogy should "make evident the multiplici ty and complexity of history," as a narrative to enter into critical dialogue with rather than accept unquestioningly. Similarly, such a pedagogy should cultivate in students a healthy scepticism about power, a "willingness to temper any reverence for authority with a sense of critical awareness" (Said 2001, 501). As a performative practice, pedagogy should provide the conditions for students to be able to reflectively frame their own relationship to the ongoing project of an unfinished democracy. It is precisely this relationship between democracy and pedagogy that is so threatening to conservatives such as Horowitz. Pedagogy always represents a commitment to the future, and it remains the task of educators to make sure that the future points the way to a more socially just world, a world in which the discourses of critique and possibility in conjunction with the values of reason, freedom, and equal ity function to alter, as part of a broader democratic project, the grounds upon which life is lived. This is hardly a prescription for political indoctrina tion, but it is a project that gives education its most valued purpose and meaning, which in part is "to encourage human agency, not mold it in the manner of Pygmalion" (Aronowitz 1998, 10?11). It is also a position that threatens right-wing private advocacy groups, neoconservative politicians, and conservative extremists because they recognize that such a pedagogical commitment goes to the very heart of what it means to address real inequalities of power at the social level and to conceive of education as a project for democracy and critical citizenship while at the same time foregrounding a series of important and often ignored questions such as: "Why do we [as edu cators] do what we do the way we do it"?W hose interests does higher edu cation serve? How might it be possible to understand and engage the diverse contexts in which education takes place? In spite of the right-wing view that equates indoctrination with any suggestion of politics, critical pedagogy is not concerned simply with offering students new ways to think critically and act with authority as agents in the classroom; it is also concerned to provide students with the skills and knowledge necessary for them to expand their capacities to both question deep-seated assumptions and myths that legitimate the most archaic and disempowering social practices that structure every aspect of society and to take responsibility for intervening in the world they inhabit. Education is not neutral, but that does not mean it is merely a form of indoctrination. On the contrary, as a practice that attempts to expand the capacities necessary for human agency and hence the possibilities for democracy itself, the university must nourish those pedagogical practices that promote "a concern with keeping the forever unexhausted and unfulfilled human potential open, fighting back all attempts to foreclose and pre-empt the further unravelling of human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning itself and preventing that questioning from ever stalling or being declared finished" (Bauman and Tester 2001, 4). In other words, critical pedagogy forges both critique and agency through a language of scepticism and possibility and a culture of openness, debate, and engagement, all elements that are now at risk in the latest and most dangerous attack on higher education.

### Case

#### Reject their affirmation of performance as a strategy for contesting racial oppression – anti-racist performance isn’t revolutionary or transformative but rather functions to re-inscribe and conceal oppression.

Ahmed 4 (Sara Ahmed, Reader in Race and Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths College, University of London, Borderlands E-Journal, Volume 3, Number 2, “Declarations of Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism,” http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol3no2\_2004/ahmed\_declarations.htm)

50. This might sound like an argument about the performativity of race. I am sympathetic with the idea that race is performative in Judith Butler’s (1993) sense of the term: race as a category is brought into existence by being repeated over time (race is an effect of racialisation). I have even argued for the performativity of race myself (Ahmed 2002). But throughout this paper I have insisted on the non-performativity of anti-racism. It might, seem now, a rather odd tactic. If race is performative, and is itself an effect of racism, then why isn’t anti-racism performative as well? Is anti-racism a form of ‘race trouble’ that is performative as it ‘exposes’ the performativity of race, and which by citing the terms of racism (such as ‘white’) allows those terms to acquire new meanings? I would suggest the potential ‘exposure’ of the performativity of race does not make ‘anti-racism’ performative as a speech act. As I stated in my introduction, I am using performativity in Austin’s sense as referring to a particular class of speech, where the issuing of the utterance ‘is the performing of an action’ (1975, 6). In such speech the saying is the doing; it is not that saying something leads to something, but that it does something at the moment of saying. It is important to note here that, for Austin, performativity is not a quality of a sign or an utterance; it does not reside within the sign, as if the sign was magical. For an utterance to be performative, certain conditions have to be met. When these conditions are met, then the performative is happy. This model introduces a class of ‘unhappy performatives’: utterances that would ‘do something’ if the right conditions had been met, but which do not do that thing, as the conditions have not been met. 51. I would hasten to add that in my view performativity has become rather banal and over-used within academic writing; it seems as if almost everything is performative, where performative is used as a way of indicating that something is ‘brought into existence’ through speech, representation, writing, law, practice, or discourse. Partly, I am critiquing this ‘banalisation’ of the performative, as well as how performativity as a concept can be used in a way that ‘forgets’ how performativity depends upon the repetition of conventions and prior acts of authorization (see Butler 1997). I am also suggesting that the logic that speech ‘brings things into existence’ (as a form for positive action) only goes so far, and indeed the claim that saying is doing can bypass that ways in which saying is not sufficient for an action, and can even be a substitute for action. 52. My concern with the non-performativity of anti-racism has hence been to examine how sayings are not always doings, or to put it more strongly, to show how the investment in saying as if saying was doing can actually extend rather than challenge racism. Implicitly, I am critiquing a claim that I have not properly attributed: that is, the claim that anti-racism is performative. I would argue that the six declarations of whiteness I have analysed function as implicit claims to the performativity of anti-racism. The claim to the performativity of anti-racism would be to presume that ‘being anti’ is transcendent, and that to declare oneself as being something shows that one is not the thing that one declares oneself to be. It might be assumed that the speech act of declaring oneself (to be white, or learned, or racist) ‘works’ as it brings into existence the non- or anti-racist subject or institution. None of these claims I have investigated operate as simple claims. None of them say ‘I/we are not racists’ or ‘I/we are anti-racists’, as if that was an action. They are more complex utterances, for sure. They have a very specific form: they define racism in a particular way, and then they imply ‘I am not’ or ‘we are not’ that. 53. So it is not that such speech acts say ‘we are anti-racists’ (and saying makes us so); rather they say ‘we are this’, whilst racism is ‘that’, so in being ‘this’ we are not ‘that’, where ‘that’ would be racist. So in saying we are raced as whites, then we are not racists, as racism operates through the unmarked nature of whiteness; or in saying we are racists, then we are not racists, as racists don’t know they are racists; or in expressing shame about racism, then we are not racists, as racists are shameless; or in saying we are positive about our racial identity, as an identity that is positive insofar as it involves a commitment to anti-racism, then we are not racists, as racists are unhappy, or in being self-critical about racism, then we are not racists, as racists are ignorant; or in saying we exist alongside others, then we are not racists, as racists see themselves as above others, and so on. 54. These statements function as claims to performativity rather than as performatives, whereby the declaration of whiteness is assumed to put in place the conditions in which racism can be transcended, or at the very least reduced in its power. Any presumption that such statements are forms of political action would be an overestimation of the power of saying, and even a performance of the very privilege that such statements claim they undo. The declarative mode, as a way of doing something, involves a fantasy of transcendence in which ‘what’ is transcended is the very thing ‘admitted to’ in the declaration: so, to put it simply, if we admit to being bad, then we show that we are good (see also paper by Hill and Riggs in this issue). So it is in this specific sense that I have argued that anti-racism is not performative. Or we could even say that anti-racist speech in a racist world is an ‘unhappy performative’: the conditions are not in place that would allow such ‘saying’ to ‘do’ what it ‘says’. 55. Our task is not to repeat anti-racist speech in the hope that it will acquire performativity. Nor should we be satisfied with the ‘terms’ of racism, or hope they will acquire new meanings, or even look for new terms. Instead, anti-racism requires much harder work, as it requires working with racism as an ongoing reality in the present. Anti-racism requires interventions in the political economy of race, and how racism distributes resources and capacities unequally amongst others. Those unequal distributions also affect the ‘business’ of speech, and who gets to say what, about whom, and where. We need to consider the intimacy between privilege and the work we do, even in the work we do on privilege. 56. You might not be surprised to hear that a white response to this paper has asked the question, ‘but what are white people to do’. That question is not necessarily misguided, although it does re-center on white agency, as a hope premised on lack rather than presence. It is a question asked persistently in response to hearing about racism and colonialism: I always remember being in an audience to a paper on the stolen generation and the first question asked was: ‘but what can we do’. The impulse towards action is understandable and complicated; it can be both a defense against the ‘shock’ of hearing about racism (and the shock of the complicity revealed by the very ‘shock’ that ‘this’ was a ‘shock’); it can be an impulse to reconciliation as a ‘re-covering’ of the past (the desire to feel better); it can be about making public one’s judgment (‘what happened was wrong’); or it can be an expression of solidarity (‘I am with you’); or it can simply an orientation towards the openness of the future (rephrased as: ‘what can be done?’). But the question, in all of these modes of utterance, can work to block hearing; in moving on from the present towards the future, it can also move away from the object of critique, or place the white subject ‘outside’ that critique in the present of the hearing. In other words, the desire to act, to move, or even to move on, can stop the message ‘getting through’. 57. To hear the work of exposure requires that white subjects inhabit the critique, with its lengthy duration, and to recognise the world that is re-described by the critique as one in which they live. The desire to act in a non-racist or anti-racist way when one hears about racism, in my view, can function as a defense against hearing how that racism implicates which subjects, in the sense that it shapes the spaces inhabited by white subjects in the unfinished present. Such a question can even allow the white subject to re-emerge as an agent in the face of the exposure of racism, by saying ‘I am not that’ (the racists of whom you speak), as an expression of ‘good faith’. The desire for action, or even the desire to be seen as the good white anti-racist subject, is not always a form of bad faith, that is, it does not necessarily involve the concealment of racism. But such a question rushes too quickly past the exposure of racism and hence ‘risks’ such concealment in the very ‘return’ of its address. 58. I am of course risking being seen as producing a ‘useless’ critique by not prescribing what an anti-racist whiteness studies would be, or by not offering some suggestions about ‘what white people can do’. I am happy to take that risk. At the same time, I think it is quite clear that my critique of ‘anti-racist whiteness’ is prescriptive. After all, I am arguing that whiteness studies, even in its critical form, should not be about re-describing the white subject as anti-racist, or constitute itself as a form of anti-racism, or even as providing the conditions for anti-racism. Whiteness studies should instead be about attending to forms of white racism and white privilege that are not undone, and may even be repeated and intensified, through declarations of whiteness, or through the recognition of privilege as privilege.

#### Identity politics fractures warming movements---reformism is necessary

George Monbiot, English Writer and Environmental and Political Activist, 9-4-2008, “Identity Politics in Climate Change Hell,” http://www.celsias.com/article/identity-politics-climate-change-hell/

If you want a glimpse of how the movement against climate change could crumble faster than a summer snowflake, read Ewa Jasiewicz’s article , published on the Guardian’s Comment is Free site. It is a fine example of the identity politics that plagued direct action movements during the 1990s, and from which the new generation of activists has so far been mercifully free. Ewa rightly celebrates the leaderless, autonomous model of organising that has made this movement so effective. The two climate camps I have attended – this year and last – were among the most inspiring events I’ve ever witnessed. I am awed by the people who organised them, who managed to create, under extraordinary pressure, safe, functioning, delightful spaces in which we could debate the issues and plan the actions which thrust Heathrow and Kingsnorth into the public eye. Climate camp is a tribute to the anarchist politics that Jasiewicz supports. But in seeking to extrapolate from this experience to a wider social plan, she makes two grave errors. The first is to confuse ends and means. She claims to want to stop global warming, but she makes that task 100 times harder by rejecting all state and corporate solutions. It seems to me that what she really wants to do is to create an anarchist utopia, and use climate change as an excuse to engineer it. Stopping runaway climate change must take precedence over every other aim. Everyone in this movement knows that there is very little time: the window of opportunity in which we can prevent two degrees of warming is closing fast. We have to use all the resources we can lay hands on, and these must include both governments and corporations. Or perhaps she intends to build the installations required to turn the energy economy around - wind farms, wave machines, solar thermal plants in the Sahara, new grid connections and public transport systems - herself? Her article is a terryifying example of the ability some people have to put politics first and facts second when confronting the greatest challenge humanity now faces. The facts are as follows. Runaway climate change is bearing down on us fast. We require a massive political and economic response to prevent it. Governments and corporations, whether we like it or not, currently control both money and power. Unless we manage to mobilise them, we stand a snowball’s chance in climate hell of stopping the collapse of the biosphere. Jasiewicz would ignore all these inconvenient truths because they conflict with her politics. “Changing our sources of energy without changing our sources of economic and political power”, she asserts, “will not make a difference. Neither coal nor nuclear are the “solution”, we need a revolution.” So before we are allowed to begin cutting greenhouse gas emissions, we must first overthrow all political structures and replace them with autonomous communities of happy campers. All this must take place within a couple of months, as there is so little time in which we could prevent two degrees of warming. This is magical thinking of the most desperate kind. If I were an executive of E.On or Exxon, I would be delighted by this political posturing, as it provides a marvellous distraction from our real aims. To support her argument, Jasiewicz misrepresents what I said at climate camp. She claims that I “confessed not knowing where to turn next to solve the issues of how to generate the changes necessary to shift our sources of energy, production and consumption”. I confessed nothing of the kind. In my book Heat I spell out what is required to bring about a 90% cut in emissions by 2030. Instead I confessed that I don’t know how to solve the problem of capitalism without resorting to totalitarianism. The issue is that capitalism involves lending money at interest. If you lend at 5%, then one of two things must happen. Either the money supply must increase by 5% or the velocity of circulation must increase by 5%. In either case, if this growth is not met by a concomitant increase in the supply of goods and services, it becomes inflationary and the system collapses. But a perpetual increase in the supply of goods and services will eventually destroy the biosphere. So how do we stall this process? Even when usurers were put to death and condemned to perpetual damnation, the practice couldn’t be stamped out. Only the communist states managed it, through the extreme use of the state control Ewa professes to hate. I don’t yet have an answer to this conundrum. Does she? Yes, let us fight both corporate power and the undemocratic tendencies of the state. Yes, let us try to crack the problem of capitalism and then fight for a different system. But let us not confuse this task with the immediate need to stop two degrees of warming, or allow it to interfere with the carbon cuts that have to begin now. Ewa’s second grave error is to imagine that society could be turned into a giant climate camp. Anarchism is a great means of organising a self-elected community of like-minded people. It is a disastrous means of organising a planet. Most anarchists envisage their system as the means by which the oppressed can free themselves from persecution. But if everyone is to be free from the coercive power of the state, this must apply to the oppressors as well as the oppressed. The richest and most powerful communities on earth - be they geographical communities or communities of interest - will be as unrestrained by external forces as the poorest and weakest. As a friend of mine put it, “when the anarchist utopia arrives, the first thing that will happen is that every Daily Mail reader in the country will pick up a gun and go and kill the nearest hippy.” This is why, though both sides furiously deny it, the outcome of both market fundamentalism and anarchism, if applied universally, is identical. The anarchists associate with the oppressed, the market fundamentalists with the oppressors. But by eliminating the state, both remove such restraints as prevent the strong from crushing the weak. Ours is not a choice between government and no government. It is a choice between government and the mafia. Over the past year I have been working with groups of climate protesters who have changed my view of what could be achieved. Most of them are under 30, and they bring to this issue a clear-headedness and pragmatism that I have never encountered in direct action movements before. They are prepared to take extraordinary risks to try to defend the biosphere from the corporations, governments and social trends which threaten to make it uninhabitable. They do so for one reason only: that they love the world and fear for its future. It would be a tragedy if, through the efforts of people like Ewa, they were to be diverted from this urgent task into the identity politics that have wrecked so many movements.

#### Extinction

Mazo 10 (Jeffrey Mazo – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122)

The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.

#### Studies prove debate enhances the advancement of minority communities and closes the learning gap.

National Association for Urban Debate Leagues **2009** (Urban Debate League Case Statement: Evidence-Based, Field-Tested Approach, p. <http://www.urbandebate.org/casestatement.pdf>)

Rigor, Relevance, and Relationships

Academic debate enjoys wide support from teachers and administrators because it helps urban school systems achieve their goals for secondary instruction by raising expectations overall and closing learning gaps. Urban debate embodies the three R’s of successful schools because it entails rigorous intellectual work, creates relationships that connect students to a network of peers and mentors, and provides relevant learning opportunities. Debate engages students with high standards and rigor, and equips students to meet these standards. UDL participation shifts the locus of control for students to regulate their own learning. Students move beyond predetermined curricula to use creativity to generate and apply new knowledge. Debaters research, write, and develop strategies; practice and compete; and must defend their positions in competition. As the season progresses, students research new strategies to gain an advantage over the competition, who in turn must write new responses. The process of confronting new arguments, much like encountering unexpected texts on exams or in advanced coursework, prepares students to respond to novel intellectual challenges with flexibility and confidence. Urban Debate Leagues create exceptional relationships and school-based communities where students feel recognized and cared for by mentors and fellow engaged students. Debaters must work together and learn to know and adapt to each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Teachers and coaches develop relationships with students that enable them to feel accepted and confident as learners. Debaters also receive mentoring from college students, recruiters, and community member volunteers who provide valuable feedback, perspective, and connections. Relevant, real world learning creates the conditions for in-depth education, by allowing students to explore topics which directly and obviously impact many of their lives and communities (e.g., the 2009/10 resolution concerns poverty). Competitions motivate and recognize hard work where it is due, in an atmosphere of friendly competition, fun, and celebration. Tournaments, unlike standardized tests, orient activity and demand performance in a manner students deem relevant to their lives. Data from six UDLs show that in one year of participation, debaters increased their GPAs an average of 8% to 10%. The Atlanta UDL has documented a 50% reduction in disciplinary referrals among at-risk middle school participants in urban debate. In a survey of urban debaters in Minneapolis/St. Paul, 100% reported they were unlikely to engage in negative risk behaviors such as early pregnancy or drug or alcohol use, and 100% report increased interest in classes. Due to this interest, 80% of debaters reported no attendance problems, compared to only 49% among the comparison group. Most recently, research has shown urban debate participants have average GPAs twenty percent (20%) of a letter grade higher than similarly situated peers (with the effect an even great 50% among the subgroup of African-American males).9 Debate’s high standards and rigor carry over from team to classroom. Students who ask critical questions and bring outside knowledge and concepts to bear in classroom discussions can sometimes encourage teachers to raise their own expectations and provide greater challenges for students. Debate instills the sense in both teachers and students that academic excellence is to be expected from urban students who may not otherwise be engaged by the traditional classrooms. Success at debate can thus seismically shift the entire culture of teaching and learning.

# 2NC

#### 3) Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems – being relevantly informed is key

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed

 about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### That proves there is a topical version of their performance – incentivize energy on different cites, or decentralized renewables which allow for community control

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in decision making diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states. In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions which produced those projects.

Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany.

In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The technicality of the issue was not a barrier to their participation. On the contrary, grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems. Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens through which the goals of energy policy could be recast and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots energy protest in West Germany is twofold.

First, it produced major substantive changes in public policy. Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest undermined the legitimacy of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

#### Establishing constraints on the topics for discussion in debate does not cause internal exclusion and breaking down those constraints doesn’t solve it because the absence of clash and the refusal of the burden of rejoinder only flips external exclusion---the way to resolve internal exclusion is to broaden the scope of what counts as a persuasive argument within a given topic---for example, our model of debate would welcome the use of narrative and personal experience on behalf of a topical argument---this middle ground most effectively resolves their exclusion arguments

Gert Biesta et al 9, professor of Education and Director of Research at the School of Education, University of Stirling, Susan Verducci , Assistant Professor at the Humanities Department at San José State University, and Michael S. Katz, professor of philosophy and education at San Jose State, Education, Democracy and the Moral Life, 2009, p. 105-107

This example not only shows why the issue of inclusion is so prominent in the deliberative model. It also explains why the deliberative turn has generated a whole new set of issues around inclusion. The reason for this is that deliberation is not simply a form of political decision-making but first and foremost a form of political communication. The inclusion question in deliberative democracy is therefore not so much a question about who should be included - although this question should be asked always as well. It is first and foremost a question about who is able to participate effectively in deliberation. As Dryzek aptly summarises, the suspicion about deliberative democracy is "that its focus on a particular kind of reasonable political interaction is not in fact neutral, but systematically excludes a variety of voices from effective participation in democratic politics" (Dryzek, 2000, p.58). In this regard Young makes a helpful distinction between two forms of exclusion: external exclusion, which is about "how people arc [actually] kept outside the process of discussion and decision-making", and internal exclusion where people are formally included in decision-making processes but where they may find, for example, "that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect" (Young, 2000, p.55). Internal exclusion, in other words, refers to those situations in which people "lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-making" (ibid.) which can particularly be the outcome of the emphasis of some proponents of deliberative democracy on "dispassionate, unsituatcd, neutral reason" (ibid. p.63).

To counteract the internal exclusion that is the product of a too narrow focus on argument, Young has suggested several other modes of political communication which should be added to the deliberative process not only to remedy "exclusionary tendencies in deliberative practices" but also to promote "respect and trust" and to make possible "understanding across structural and cultural difference" (ibid. p.57). The first of these is greeting or public acknowledgement. This is about "communicative political gestures through which those who have conflicts . .. recognize others as included in the discussion, especially those with whom they differ in opinion, interest, or social location" (ibid., p.61; emphasis in original). Young emphasises that greeting should be thought of as a starting-point for political interaction. It "precedes the giving and evaluating of reasons" (ibid., p.79) and does so through the recognition of the other parties in the deliberation. The second mode of political communication is rhetoric and more specifically the affirmative use of rhetoric (ibid., p.63). Although one could say that rhetoric only concerns the form of political communication and not its content, the point Young makes is that inclusive political communication should pay attention to and be inclusive about the different forms of expression and should not try to purify rational argument from rhetoric. Rhetoric is not only important because it can help to get particular issues on the agenda for deliberation. Rhetoric can also help to articulate claims and arguments "in ways appropriate to a particular public in a particular situation' (ibid., p.67; emphasis in original). Rhetoric always accompanies an argument by situating it "for a particular audience and giving it embodied style and tone" (ibid., p.79). Young's third mode of political communication is narrative or storytelling. The main function of narrative in democratic communication lies in its potential "to foster understanding among members of a polity with very different experience or assumptions about what is important" (ibid., p.71). Young emphasises the role of narrative in the teaching and learning dimension of political communication. "Inclusive democratic communication", so she argues, "assumes that all participants have something to teach the public about the society in which they dwell together" and also assumes "that all participants are ignorant of some aspects of the social or natural world, and that everyone comes to a political conflict with some biases, prejudices, blind spots, or sterco-types" (ibid., p.77).

It is important to emphasise that greeting, rhetoric and narrative are not meant to replace argumentation. Young stresses again and again that deliberative democracy entails "that participants require reasons of one another and critically evaluate them" (ibid., p.79). Other proponents of the deliberative model take a much more narrow approach and see deliberation exclusively as a form of rational argumentation (e.g. Bcnhabib, 1996) where the only legitimate force should be the "forceless force of the better argument" (Habermas). Similarly, Dryzck, after a discussion of Young's ideas,1 concludes that argument always has to be "central to deliberative democracy" (Dryzek, 2000, p.7l). Although he acknowledges that other modes of communication can be present and that there are good reasons to welcome them, their status is different "because they do not have to be present" (ibid., emphasis added). For Dryzek, at the end of the day, all modes of political communication must live up to the standards of rationality. This does not mean that they must be subordinated to rational argument “but their deployment only makes sense in a context where argument about what is to be done remains central” (ibid., p.168).

#### The affirmatives “call for an end of society” forecloses changes in democracy and causes worse forms of oppression like Al-Qaeda – we embrace “democracy to come” – it’s not perfect, but we should try to perfect it

Derrida 3 (Jacques, director of studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides,” Philosophy in a Time of Terror, ed Giovanna Borradori, p. 113-114)

DERRIDA: What appears to me unacceptable in the "strategy" (in terms of weapons, practices, ideology, rhetoric, discourse, and so on) of the "bin Laden effect" is not only the cruelty, the disregard for human life, the disrespect for law, for women, the use of what is worst in technocapitalist modernity for the purposes of religious fanaticism. No, it is, above all, the fact that such actions and such discourse open onto no future and, in my view, have no future. If we are to put any faith in the perfectibility of public space and of the world juridico-political scene, of the "world" itself, then there is, it seems to me, nothing good to be hoped for from that quarter. What is being proposed, at least implicitly, is that all capitalist and modern technoscientific forces be put in the service of an interpretation, itself dogmatic, of the Islamic revelation of the One. Nothing of what has been so laboriously secularized in the forms of the "political," of "democracy," of "international law," and even in the nontheological form of sovereignty (assuming, again, that the value of sovereignty can be completely secularized or detheologized, a hypothesis about which I have my doubts), none of this seems to have any place whatsoever in the discourse "bin Laden." That is why, in this unleashing of violence without name, if I had to take one of the two sides and choose in a binary situation, well, I would. Despite my very strong reservations about the American, indeed European, political posture, about the ~'international antiterrorist" coalition, despite all the de facto betrayals, all the failures to live up to democracy, international law, and the very international institutions that the states of this "coalition" themselves founded and supported up to a certain point, I would take the side of the camp that, in principle, by right of law, leaves a perspective open to perfectibility in the name of the "political," democracy, international law, international institutions, and so on. Even if this "in the name of" is still merely an assertion and a purely verbal commitment. Even in its most cynical mode, such an assertion still lets resonate within it an invincible promise. I don't bear any such promise coming from "bin Laden," at least not one for this world.

#### This cards ends the debate – we turn all of their narrative arguments – narratives can only produce legal change though adversary exchange among competing views which can only occur when there is proper stasis. Outside of our framework, narratives are doomed to failure.

Abrams 91 (Kathryn, professor of law at Cornell University's Law School and a nationally recognized scholar on feminist jurisprudence, “Hearing the Call of Stories,” California Law Review, 79 (4), Article 1, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1804&context=californialawreview)

Underlying these concerns about the prescriptive implications of narratives is a rich subtextual debate about the value of narrative as a form of legal persuasion. Although critics most frequently focus on whether the narrative scholar has said anything normative, many are also asking whether prescriptions derived from narrative are entitled to be taken as normative by legal actors. Some readers are reluctant to regard narratives as legitimate sources of legal prescriptions, either because of qualities that inhere in the narratives themselves or because of the effect they produce on debate and discussion. These concerns create the final three families of objections. Critics sometimes express doubts about whether a narrative is "true." By this the reader usually means whether the narrative is a reliable account of something that occurred. When Patricia Williams first described the experience of being barred from a Benetton store on the basis of race, 2 2 some readers challenged her credibility, citing her refusal to give "equal time" to the "other side." 23 As lawyers and liberals, 24 many scholars harbor a belief that "truth" is established through adversary exchange among competing views. 2 In the absence of adversary exchange, the safest path is to entrust a neutral decisionmaker with the task of discovering the "truth." The narrative account is suspect because it provides no "equal time," and it rejects neutrality through its explicit affiliation with a particular viewpoint. Those narratives that provide first-hand accounts of a person's pain are also laden with emotional content. This may be viewed not only as undermining the objectivity of the writer, but as threatening the objectivity of the reader, making him increasingly reluctant to credit the account the narrative provides. Readers may have a similar response to those narratives exploring experiences that are the subject of strong social taboos. The discomfort triggered in some scholars by hearing anyone (but particularly a colleague) discuss her rape, marital abuse-or even her childbirth, in particularly graphic terms-makes them eager to discount, discredit, or otherwise distance themselves from such discussions. 26 Even some readers willing to believe that a narrative scholar has offered a trustworthy account of a particular experience may doubt the "typicality" of the experience recounted. Catharine MacKinnon reports that when she speaks about the sexual coercion she claims is paradigmatic of women's experience, she is regularly challenged by questions about women who are not harassed, are not abused, or who claim to enjoy their sexual experiences. 27 These doubts about typicality arise in part from the fact that the experiences described are unfamiliar to main- stream readers; and those whose perceptions are ratified by dominant social norms may find it difficult to believe that a divergent experience is anything but idiosyncratic. 2 " Readers may also be reluctant to rely on a single set of experiences as a basis for legal change. The expressed concern is that legal changes, which affect scores of people, cannot be based on one person's account(s); yet it is difficult to separate this argument from the deeper epistemological claim that universality and statistical significance are necessary attributes of any claim to know about the world.

# 1NR

#### We control uniqueness – business encroachment on deliberative spheres is happening rapidly, it is incumbent upon us to resist that influence

Edwards 9 (Michael, Oxford, Senior Fellow at Demos, former Regional Director for Oxfam – Southern Africa, director of the Ford Foundations’ Governance and Civil Society Program, Civil Society, p. viii-ix, Polity Press)

The second set of challenges have come from the economic arena, and specifically from the increasing encroachment of business and the market into areas traditionally seen as the preserve of civil society (if indeed one sees these institutions as separate). For many years, there has been tension between radical and neo-liberal interpretations of civil society the former seeing it as the ground from which to challenge the status quo and build new alternatives, and the latter as the service-providing not-for-profit sector necessitated by "market failure." Today, "philanthrocapitalism" the belief that business and the market can solve social problems as well as create an economic surplus - is as "big an idea" as civil society perhaps even bigger. It remains to be seen whether the global financial crisis of 2008 dampens enthusiasm for this new trend but, for now, social enterprise, social entrepreneurs, venture philanthropy, corporate social responsibility and "creative capitalism" occupy a central position in public and political debate. Civil society is part of this debate, of course, both as a source of positive influence on business and as a potential beneficiary of stronger financial management and market-based strategies for financial sustainability but there is also skepticism among philanthrocapitalists about the power of collective action, social movements, democratic decision-making, community organizing and the non-commercial values of solidarity, service and cooperation, "A society that reduces everything to a market inevitably divides those who can buy from those who cannot, undermining any sense of collective responsibility, and with it, democracy." Will philanthrocapitalism and increased government regulation undermine civil society's transformative potential by reducing the ability or willingness of citizens' groups to hold public and private power accountable for its actions, generate alternative ideas and policy positions, push for fundamental changes in the structures of power, and organize collective action on a scale large enough to force through long-term shifts in politics, economics and social relations?

#### Critical reflection opens spaces of resistance by which we can reframe our relationship to systems of power in a manner that enhances human agency and threatens their existence

Giroux 6 (Henry A. – Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University, “Academic Freedom under Fire: The Case for Critical Pedagogy”, Fall 2006, JSTOR)

What makes critical pedagogy so dangerous to Christian evangelicals, neoconservatives, and right-wing nationalists in the United States is that central to its very definition is the task of educating students to become critical agents actively questioning and negotiating the relationship between theory and practice, critical analysis and common sense, and learning and social change. Critical pedagogy opens up a space where students should be able to come to terms with their own power as critical agents; it provides a sphere where the unconditional freedom to question and assert is central to the purpose of the university, if not democracy itself (Derrida 2001, 233). And as a political and moral practice, pedagogy should "make evident the multiplici ty and complexity of history," as a narrative to enter into critical dialogue with rather than accept unquestioningly. Similarly, such a pedagogy should cultivate in students a healthy scepticism about power, a "willingness to temper any reverence for authority with a sense of critical awareness" (Said 2001, 501). As a performative practice, pedagogy should provide the conditions for students to be able to reflectively frame their own relationship to the ongoing project of an unfinished democracy. It is precisely this relationship between democracy and pedagogy that is so threatening to conservatives such as Horowitz. Pedagogy always represents a commitment to the future, and it remains the task of educators to make sure that the future points the way to a more socially just world, a world in which the discourses of critique and possibility in conjunction with the values of reason, freedom, and equal ity function to alter, as part of a broader democratic project, the grounds upon which life is lived. This is hardly a prescription for political indoctrina tion, but it is a project that gives education its most valued purpose and meaning, which in part is "to encourage human agency, not mold it in the manner of Pygmalion" (Aronowitz 1998, 10?11). It is also a position that threatens right-wing private advocacy groups, neoconservative politicians, and conservative extremists because they recognize that such a pedagogical commitment goes to the very heart of what it means to address real inequalities of power at the social level and to conceive of education as a project for democracy and critical citizenship while at the same time foregrounding a series of important and often ignored questions such as: "Why do we [as edu cators] do what we do the way we do it"?W hose interests does higher edu cation serve? How might it be possible to understand and engage the diverse contexts in which education takes place? In spite of the right-wing view that equates indoctrination with any suggestion of politics, critical pedagogy is not concerned simply with offering students new ways to think critically and act with authority as agents in the classroom; it is also concerned to provide students with the skills and knowledge necessary for them to expand their capacities to both question deep-seated assumptions and myths that legitimate the most archaic and disempowering social practices that structure every aspect of society and to take responsibility for intervening in the world they inhabit. Education is not neutral, but that does not mean it is merely a form of indoctrination. On the contrary, as a practice that attempts to expand the capacities necessary for human agency and hence the possibilities for democracy itself, the university must nourish those pedagogical practices that promote "a concern with keeping the forever unexhausted and unfulfilled human potential open, fighting back all attempts to foreclose and pre-empt the further unravelling of human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning itself and preventing that questioning from ever stalling or being declared finished" (Bauman and Tester 2001, 4). In other words, critical pedagogy forges both critique and agency through a language of scepticism and possibility and a culture of openness, debate, and engagement, all elements that are now at risk in the latest and most dangerous attack on higher education.

#### Attributing priority to race in anti-racist discourse reifies race, normalizing inequality and inspiring reactionary conservativism – highlighting neoliberalism is key.

Dirlik 8 (Arif, chair professor of Chinese studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, honorary director of the CUHK-Chiang Ching-kuo Asia Pacific Centre for Chinese Studies, concurrent professor at the Center for the Study of Marxist Social Theory @ Nanjing University, distinguished visiting professor at the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies @ University of British Columbia, PMLA, Vol. 123, No. 5, October, “Race Talk, Race, and Contemporary Racism,” p. 1372-1377, Modern Language Association)

The experience of the United States following the Civil War may help shed light on these developments in Europe, as much in their difference as in their similarity. The abolition of slavery released blacks from their bondage, creating the threat of social mixture, which was resolved by segregation. At the same time, racist exclusion was extended to new immigrants, as a means of controlling who might or might not qualify as an American. In present-day Europe, the new immigration is largely (but not exclusively) tied to the end of colonialism. It may be possible to speak of Mexican immigration to the United States as a case of colonials reclaiming what they had lost. In Europe there is an unmistakable connection between colonialism and the new immigration: the formerly colonized, faced with problems of livelihood in their now free countries, are coming home to the mother country.13 Segregation is no longer an option under contemporary circumstances, except in societies, such as Israel, under the protective wing of the United States. And it is not quite clear that the new immigration is equally undesirable to all, since the creation of a global reserve army is not necessarily a bad thing for a capital that seeks to liberate itself from territorial attachments to become truly global.14 Nevertheless, the uncontrolled mobility of laborers presents the threat of chaos, especially when they are empowered by new ideologies of national and global multiculturalism, about which I will say more below. Racism is one way to keep populations in their places when other means are not available. Macedo and Gounari point in the right direction: [T]he impossibility of “the end of racism” [is evident] in light of the exponential increase of xenophobia throughout the world, which has been caused in large measure by neoliberal policies producing economic dislocation that has impelled millions of the world’s poor to seek economic relief by migrating from rural to urban areas and from poor to rich countries. This massive migration has, more often than not, heightened racism that has manifested itself differently in other contexts. (“Globalization” 7) The racism that Macedo and Gounari describe is surely fundamental to understanding the proliferation of race talk globally, and yet we may wonder if it is the only, or even the most important, source of the racialization of discourses in the contemporary world. Not all race talk is racist. Indeed, a good bit of it is antiracist, in response to the legacies of colonialism, slavery, and racism. On the other hand, even antiracist race talk may contribute to racism by normalizing the category of race in everyday discourses, popular and academic. I have in mind here two further developments of the last three decades that have a bearing on the proliferation of race talk. First are developments in biogenetics that have brought issues of biology to the center of dis- courses on what it means to be human with a force that may have been unequaled since the days of eugenics and social Darwinism, in the late nineteenth century. As Gilroy has argued perceptively, if grasped rationally, biogenetics (and DNA) research should undercut racism in revealing the complexities of the distribution of biological characteristics across human populations (ch. 1). Nevertheless, biogenetics, in demonstrating the importance of natural endowments and the possibilities of human transformation through genetic manipulation, has given biology an unprecedented significance. And what DNA research may reveal may be irrelevant, since biogenetic research itself is subject to social and political direction and may be formulated to confirm the reification of race and ethnicity, contributing further to the naturalization of racism, as the case of one of its “godfathers,” James Watson, shows.15 Race talk has also been encouraged by the hegemony in universities (especially in the United States and the United Kingdom) of postcolonial studies over the last two decades. As Robert Young has argued, a concept such as hybridity, dear to the promoters of postcolonial studies, is burdened by biological associations and, despite some protestations to the contrary, continues to be so burdened as much now, when it is approved of, as it did when it was understood in the negative sense of species degeneration.16 No less important in this regard are concepts that have come to be associated with (and extensively deployed by) postcolonial studies, even though they have independent origins: diaspora and multiculturalism. A term such as diaspora, intended to break down boundaries and to deconstruct homogenizing essentializations of categories such as race and nation, has been endowed with a utopian promise among some proponents, such as Gilroy (123–33). Nevertheless, used uncritically without due attention to differences of place, diaspora lends itself to cultural and racial reification in endowing populations that are products of different historical trajectories with identity on the basis of descent from a common “nation,” itself a recent historical product of complex population interactions. Lynn Pan writes of the tendency of some Chinese “in diaspora” to think of “Chineseness” as a product of genetic endowment, and the insistence on Chineseness on the basis of descent from one “country,” contrary to all the evidence of local cultural differences, ends up biologizing culture as well. Opposing the assumption that diaspora serves to deconstruct the nation, moreover, there is considerable evidence that diasporic populations may also serve as the medium to project national “characteristics,” “styles,” and interests globally, with further reification of the idea of the nation (Dirlik, “Intimate Others”). Most insidious in this regard, however, may be the idea of “multiculturalism,” currently relabeled “diversity,” which has racialized issues of equality and justice. Despite all the good intentions underlying the advocacy of multiculturalism or diversity, this concept forces its constituents into boxes labeled with the names of “cultures,” an action that, reprehensible enough in itself for its cultural reification, more often than not covers up the fact that culture in most of these instances is a stand-in for race, ethnicity, or nationality. Diversity conceived in this fashion suppresses the actual diversities that are internal to all these categories. As the institutional advocates of diversity sometimes let slip out, multiculturalism or diversity, in its appropriation for power, becomes a new tool of management— for the managed incorporation of “nonwhite” ethnicities, races, and cultures into a system that is in the first place a legacy of colonialism, slavery, and racism but seeks to sustain itself through managed acceptance of the formerly excluded (Dominguez, “Taste”). The idea of multiculturalism has a history of its own, usually ignored, in management practices to deal with the labor force of multi- or transnational corporations. It was an issue for corporate management going back to the 1960s, long before it entered academia and other institutions, and bears the imprint of that legacy (Dirlik, “Postmodernization”; San Juan, “Multicultural Problematic”). Multiculturalism is welcome to the extent that it makes possible the recognition of groups institutionally marginalized or erased earlier, which accounts for its enthusiastic embrace by members of those groups. In establishing new boundaries around these groups (often self-defined and arbitrary, varying from one setting to another), multiculturalism becomes an instrument of racialization. The goals of cultural diversity may be realized ultimately only if issues of diversity are liberated from forced identifications of nation or culture. Perhaps the most important contribution of postcolonial criticism has been the fore- grounding of the critique of Eurocentrism in the criticism of the legacies of colonialism, accompanied by the reevaluation of “native” cultural traditions that had been doomed to extinction under the theoretical premises of capitalist and socialist modernization discourses. Here, too, there are unexpected consequences. The dethroning of Eurocentrism has derived additional force from the globalization of capital and the increasing importance within it of non-Euro-American societies that, empowered by their newfound status in a post-colonial world, have reasserted the validity of native cultures and epistemologies even as they partake in the deepening of the cultural practices of capitalist society in production and consumption alike. The combination underlies the reification of native cultures as emblems of identity, even as they lose the ground-level diversity of lived cultures. Increasingly, national and global culture wars take as their referents these reified notions of culture. It is ironic that the globalization of capitalist modernity has been accompanied by the undermining of the faith in universalism that characterized the modernity of an earlier period and that unified the colonizer and the colonized, who now stand divided by a common modernity. No less important are the political consequences. Radical as the critique of Eurocentrism was in intention, the reaffirmation of native cultural traditions more often than not coincides with the wishes of the most conservative elements in those societies, contributing at the extreme to fascist tendencies globally. This is the situation that Wieviorka describes: Only yesterday, the “social question” was predominant, that question being shaped by struggles conducted, directly or in directly, in the name of the labour movement. Only yesterday, the existence of cultural or religious particularisms seemed subordinate to universal values, to a single conception of progress, to states more or less capable of speaking simultaneously the language of modernity and that of the nation, capable also of integrating foreigners and assimilating them in the short or long term. Modernity is so badly shaken today that we hear talk of post-modernity; the idea of class relations has become archaic; states seem increasingly powerless to maintain the old models of integration; and everywhere communal identities, whether defined in religious, ethnic, regional, cultural, historical or, most importantly, national terms, are emerging or being reinforced. (xi)We might add here that this situation, where racialized modes of thinking have taken over from the socialized modes of modernity, is the creation not only of racism but also of efforts to overcome the legacies of colonialism and racism. If colonialism racialized both the colonizer and the colonized, the persistence of these racialized identities is a sign of the persistence of colonial modernity under the rubric of globalization, a persistence also visible, as I suggested above, in the continuation of colonial spaces in human motions. It also brings up the rather uncomfortable notion that racialization in contemporary society is a product not just of ruling groups who benefit from racism but of the ruled as well, who find in racial categories, or racialized cultural categories, sources of identity for self-defense or self-assertion and become complicitous with the very racism they would overcome (Mullings). The ruling classes themselves are no longer monoracial, however we want to view that term, but are transnational in their constitution, creating the kind of paradox with which I started this discussion. It is a situation in which neoliberalism plays a crucial part, but it calls for a more complicated analysis than seems to be assumed by critics such as Macedo and Gounari. As contemporary racism is best grasped as one component in a larger field of conceptual forces, so is neoliberalism as a force in the making of race and racism in contemporary society. Neoliberalism, for all the transformative power it has commanded since the 1980s, has found legitimization in transformations in the structuring of capitalism that are associated with the emergence of new centers of capital in East Asia since the 1970s and the new practices they introduced into its operations, which included cultural practices different from those of Euro-American capitalisms. Neoliberalism is best perceived as the product of a historical conjuncture that includes other elements. Most pertinent, where this discussion is concerned, is that the conjuncture of decolonization (bringing into global circuits the class formations of colonialism), neoliberalism (understood in the broadest sense, deployed by David Harvey, to include the retreat from socialism), and the so-called cultural turn (in its postcolonial accents) provides a context in which to understand the manifestations of racism in the contemporary world (Harvey). These various moments of the conjuncture have their own histories. Decolonization issued first in the national liberation struggles of an earlier period, which were defeated by the late 1970s through a combination of neo-colonial subversion of the new regimes and the regimes’ corruption by legacies of colonialism that they were unable to purge. The result has been a search for salvation in the global capitalist economy, spearheaded by elites who were themselves the “hybridized” products of colonialism. As Karl Polanyi argued half a century ago in his now classic The Great Transformation, the fundamental assumption of neoliberalism—the primacy of the market as the determinant of everything else—is as old as the history of free market capitalism. This assumption was made before the emergence of the idea of the social in response, which would issue in a century of socialist effort to find an alternative to capitalism, as well as state regulation of capital in the name of popular welfare. This originary assumption found renewed persuasiveness in the 1980s in the dynamism of emergent East Asian economies, which, under the aegis of the United States and with the promise of its market, had switched since the 1960s from import substitution to export-oriented development. These developments would also put an end to the faltering socialist economies and help discredit the idea of national economies in general, finding expression ultimately in the ideology of globalization. This change would also dissolve society into the market and redefine the nation-state as a regulatory agency of global capital. The “cultural turn” had its origins in complicated sources ranging from the revolt within Marxism against Stalinist economic determinism, including the Cultural Revolution in China, to the new power assigned to culture in political economy to account for the success of East Asian economies and for the cultural or religious turn revolutionary movements took in the late 1970s, to a renewed preoccupation with cultural heritage globally.17 These developments were products of the contradictions not just of capitalism but also of revolutionary struggles against it that reached their greatest intensity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 1980s put the developments on new trajectories that signaled the final retreat from hopes in revolutionary transformation. How these moments came together in the 1980s, leading to the intellectual sea change Wieviorka identifies, remains to be sorted out. The immediate issue here is that the conjuncture produced its own contradictions, which define colonial modernity globalized, or “global modernity.”18 Racism may be endemic in Euro-American conceptualizations of the world, but it is no longer merely Euro-American, since it has been internalized in the worldviews of populations around the world; we would be hard put to argue now that Chinese or Indians are less racist than white Europeans or Americans or that racism is less prevalent in Africa, Latin America, and Asia than it is in Europe or North America. Race may no longer be identified exclusively with biological characteristics, moreover, since the boundaries between the biological and the social have been blurred in the reification of the categories of nation, ethnicity, civilization, and culture, which often read as stand-ins for race. On the other hand, while racism is globalized and race effects invade these categories, racism itself for the same reason assumes different attributes under different circumstances. Its manifestations are, therefore, concretely situational. Great care needs to be exercised not to reify race and racism even by way of analysis or critique, since such reification contributes to the globalization and universalization of race talk and racism. It is in these contradictions that we may also seek explanations for the contradictory dimensions and meanings that racism has assumed over the last two or three decades Conclusion The paradox I posed at the beginning of this essay, between the increased institutional visibility of members of marginalized and excluded groups and the continued reality of exclusion and marginalization in society at large, points to the necessity of reading the question of race in different registers to accommodate the processes simultaneously of racialization and deracialization. The difference between the two registers, to put it bluntly, is the difference of class. Macedo and Gounari write that “racial and cultural equality cannot be achieved outside the class ideology that guides, shapes, and maintains racial and cultural antagonisms” (“Globalization” 33). Class more than ever cuts across and through racial divides. Members of the colonized and the racially excluded have always been included in the ruling classes, but the transnationalization of class structures with globalization brings forth the issue of class more insistently than ever—ironically, as class has practically disappeared from analysis with the cultural and the postcolonial turn. I am not suggesting here that class be brought back in so that race can once again be pushed to the background. That has never been the case in scholarship in the United States, where race has been privileged all along over class and class has been racialized (Martinot; McLaren and Jaramillo).19 It may not be surprising that postcolonial intellectuals, originating in or being incorporated into dominant transnational classes, should be reluctant to speak about class. There are many differences among these intellectuals. Nevertheless, postcolonial criticism in its dominant trends (whether of postcolonial intellectuals or of liberal academics of colonialist societies born again as postcolonials) has on the whole not been receptive to Marxism or class analysis; indeed, it has insisted on the priority of race over issues of class, as well as of gender.20 The issue, however, concerns not just postcolonial criticism but cultural studies in general, of which postcolonial criticism is a dynamic component. Postcolonial criticism as it appeared in the 1990s was shaped largely by the cultural turn (Jameson). A number of authors have noted that as cultural studies abandoned the transformative goals that had animated it in its origins, there was a retreat from the social into the cultural, now reconceived not in its relation to but in its independence from the social (Grossberg). That this turn coincided historically with the ascendancy of neoliberalism is quite significant. It was also a response to the proliferation of questions of identity that has accompanied the intensified global motions of human beings and commodities over the last three decades. Since these motions presented genuine problems of cultural, national, or civilizational encounter, it may be understandable that cultural studies has increasingly expressed them in reified notions of identity that are at odds with the professed goals of overcoming or erasing boundaries—especially given the pressures of ethnicized politics. If cultural studies is to be rescued from its complicity in the proliferation of race talk, it is imperative once again to bring the perspective of the social to questions of culture and cultural identity. It is important, in the struggle against racism, to be reminded that the conceptualization of race is overdetermined by issues of class and gender, among others, just as racialization enters into the conceptualization of these other categories. The struggle against racism, needless to say, is not just an intellectual struggle. But our discourses are of consequence where ideological and social formations are concerned. Putting race talk in its place is an important step toward this end.

#### Interrogating economic ideology is key to successful antiracist struggles.

Macedo & Gounari 3 (Donaldo, Distinguished Professor of Education at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and Panayota, Assistant Professor in the Applied Linguistics Graduate Program at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, “Globalization and The Unleashing of New Racism: An Introduction,” in The Globalization of Racism, Eds. Donaldo Macedo and Panayota Gounari, p. 26-28)

An authentic revolution based on "cultural action for freedom" differs radically from a reform based on cultural action for the domestication of the masses. According to Freire, "the former problematizes, and the latter sloganizes."65 Since the civil rights movement in the United States was mostly a reformist movement based on cultural action for domestication (there were many exceptions to the reformist mode, but their expressions were summarily suppressed by assassination and other coercive methods), the dominant ideology would inevitably conceive ways to enlarge the gulf between the civil rights leaders and the sea of miserable humanity they left behind and for whom they were spokespeople. This was abundantly clear when the former head of the NAACP, Julian Bond, declared on television that he had more in common with folks in his middle-class reality than with folks in the community. As a reformist movement, civil rights had no pedagogical space in which an ongoing dialogue between the leadership and the oppressed masses could occur and through which both the leadership and the masses would expose myths and ideologies contrary to the oppressed class interests. For instance, the myth that the United States is a classless society was never exposed or analyzed in a systematic and rigorous manner, and the interplay between class and race never really achieved prominence in the civil rights debate.¶ Regrettably the civil rights movement, as a mere reformist movement, by and large failed to expose and interrogate the dominant capitalist ideology and so failed to show that racism is an inherent feature of a capitalist ideology. No antiracist struggle can succeed without a full understanding of this relation. Many civil rights leaders failed to understand the fundamental role of those committed to cultural action that leads to conscientization, and those who understood the importance of concientization during the early years of the struggle were silenced. Furthermore, many of these leaders failed to understand, paraphrasing Freire, that conscientization should not be reduced to banal phraseology designed to spout liberating ideas but should invite people to think together in order to uncover the truth of their reality. And that truth would require people "to reject decidedly any and every form of discrimination. Preconceptions of race, class, or sex offend the essence of human dignity and constitute a radical negation of democracy. How far from these values we are when we tolerate the impunity of those who kill a street child; those who murder peasants who struggle for a minimum justice; those who discriminate on the basis of color, burning churches where blacks pray because prayer," according to them, should be for whites only.66 By understanding the internal mechanisms of the dominant capitalist ideology, oppressed people would soon come to realize that the oppressive mechanisms that relegated them to "subhumanity" are part of the structure that needs to be transformed. This would necessarily implicate the capitalist structure that also gave rise to white supremacy.¶ The lack of substantial land reform in the Civil Rights Act is a continuation of a history that has always denied blacks total freedom. Even with the abolition of slavery, attempts to give land to the landless freed slaves were rapidly crushed by the invocation of racist principles. President Andrew Jackson, for example, announced that "this is a country for white men, and, by God, so long as I am president, it shall be a government for white men."67 Because Andrew Jackson's white supremacist posture rationalized the denial of land to blacks on the Sea Islands, the white owners easily regained control of the land as well as the means of production, which in turn kept the freed blacks in a state of semislavery. As this historical narrative illustrates, there is in principle a striking similarity between the backlash after the abolition of slavery-in which the small amount of land granted to former slaves was quickly reappropriated-and the present assault on civil rights benefits. For example, black farmers are fast losing their land through open government discrimination in lending practices and subsidies that favor large agribusiness corporations, forcing them to turn to "Congress to get compensation for years of being denied federal loans and access to training provided to white farmers, particularly the agri-business corporate farms."68 Other subordinate groups find themselves assaulted in the media, for example, being characterized as "welfare queens" who lack moral values. David Duke, a former presidential candidate, unapologetically concluded: "It's them! They're what's wrong with America! They're taking your job, soaking up your tax dollars, living off food stamps, drinking cheap wine and making baby at your own expense."69 Although the racist mechanisms for rationalizing the exploitation of blacks are different from those in Andrew Jackson's time, we carmot ignore the fact that racism (albeit in a less violent form) very much informs the ideology unleashed by former president Ronald Reagan's attempt to turn the clock back on what he viewed as the excess largesse of the civil rights legislation and social programs of the 1960s.¶ In order to justify violent discrimination and the economic exploitation of other human beings – through cheap labor and other forms of servitude (such as the almost permanent status of second class citizens) – the dominant white ideology must always portray the oppressed in a negative light. The majority members of the society, who claim to have a conscience, then see the oppressed as unworthy. This is achieved through a process of distinguishing between the oppressor and the oppressed. In fact, the distinction that devalues and dehumanizes is not very different from the "colonial racism [that] is built from three major ideological components: one, the gulf between the culture of the colonialist and the colonized; two, the exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonialist; three, the use of these supposed differences as standards of absolute fact." 70 Like the colonialists, the neocolonialists in democratic societies such as the United States remove "the factor from history, time, and therefore possible evolution. What is actually a sociological point becomes labeled as being biological."71Thus the material conditions that inform the oppressive and racist conditions under which the majority of U.S. blacks live are often devoid of their historicity, making it easy for cultural commissars like Charles Murray and Richard J. Herrnstein to construct arguments in their book The Bell Curve that transform what is actually sociological into a biological referent that portrays blacks in general as genetically inferior to whites. The pseudo-scientific social construction of biological traits to legitimize rejecting the humanity of the oppressed is part of a colonial ideology that has "at the basis of the entire construction, a common motive; the colonizer's economic and basic needs, which he substitutes for logic, and which shape and explain each of the traits he assigns to the colonized."72

#### Our location is the central place for this struggle to take place – we need to use our agency as students to prioritize neoliberalism – this can help challenge the privatization of the debate space and lead to effective state based political reforms to

Giroux 11 (Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 21 November 2011, “Occupy Colleges Now: Students as the New Public Intellectuals”, http://www.truth-out.org/occupy-colleges-now-students-new-public-intellectuals/1321891418)

Finding our way to a more humane future demands a new politics, a new set of values, and a renewed sense of the fragile nature of democracy. In part, this means educating a new generation of intellectuals who not only defend higher education as a democratic public sphere, but also frame their own agency as intellectuals willing to connect their research, teaching, knowledge, and service with broader democratic concerns over equality, justice, and an alternative vision of what the university might be and what society could become. Under the present circumstances, it is time to remind ourselves that academe may be one of the few public spheres available that can provide the educational conditions for students, faculty, administrators, and community members to embrace pedagogy as a space of dialogue and unmitigated questioning, imagine different futures, become border-crossers, and embrace a language of critique and possibility that makes visible the urgency of a politics necessary to address important social issues and contribute to the quality of public life and the common good. To see other articles by Henry A. Giroux visit The Public Intellectual Project. As people move or are pushed by authorities out of their makeshift tent cities in Zuccotti Park and other public spaces in cities across the United States, the harsh registers and interests of the punishing state become more visible. The corporate state cannot fight any longer with ideas because their visions, ideologies and survival of the fittest ethic are bankrupt, fast losing any semblance of legitimacy. Students all over the country are changing the language of politics while reclaiming pedagogy as central to any viable notion of agency, resistance and collective struggle. In short, they have become the new public intellectuals, using their bodies, social media, new digital technologies, and any other viable educational tool to raise new questions, point to new possibilities, and register their criticisms of the various antidemocratic elements of casino capitalism and the emerging punishing state. Increasingly, the Occupy Wall Street protesters are occupying colleges and universities, setting up tents, and using the power of ideas to engage other students, faculty, and anyone else who will listen to them. The call is going out from the University of California at Berkeley, Harvard University, Florida State University, Duke University, Rhode Island College, and over 120 other universities that the time has come to connect knowledge not just to power, but to the very meaning of what it means to be an engaged intellectual responsive to the possibilities of individual and collective resistance and change. This poses a new challenge not only for the brave students mobilizing these protests on college campuses, but also to faculty who often relegate themselves to the secure and comfortable claim that scholarship should be disinterested, objective and removed from politics. There is a great deal these students and young people can learn from this turn away from the so-called professionalism of disinterested knowledge and the disinterested intellectual by reading the works of Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, Jacques Derrida, Howard Zinn, Arundhati Roy, Elaine Scarry, Pierre Bourdieu and others who offer a treasure trove of theoretical and political insights about what it means to assume the role of a public intellectual as both a matter of social responsibility and political urgency. As the world rises up against economic injustice, Truthout brings you the latest news and analysis, free of corporate influence. Help support this work with a tax-deductible donation today. In response to the political indifference and moral coma that embraced many universities and scholars since the 1980s, the late Said argued for intellectuals to move beyond the narrow interests of professionalism and specialization as well as the cheap seductions of celebrity culture being offered to a new breed of publicity and anti-public intellectuals. Said wanted to defend the necessity - indeed, keep open the possibility - of the intellectual who does not consolidate power, but questions it, connects his or her work to the alleviation of human suffering, enters the public sphere in order to deflate the claims of triumphalism and recalls from exile those dangerous memories that are often repressed or ignored. Of course, such a position is at odds with those intellectuals who have retreated into arcane discourses that offer the cloistered protection of the professional recluse. Making few connections with audiences outside of the academy or to the myriad issues that bear down on everyday lives, many academics became increasingly irrelevant, while humanistic inquiry suffers the aftershocks of flagging public support. The Occupy Wall Street protesters have refused this notion of the deracinated, if not increasingly irrelevant, notion of academics and students as disinterested intellectuals. They are not alone. Refusing the rewards of apolitical professionalism or obscure specialization so rampant on university campuses, Roy has pointed out that intellectuals need to ask themselves some very "uncomfortable questions about our values and traditions, our vision for the future, our responsibilities as citizens, the legitimacy of our 'democratic institutions,' the role of the state, the police, the army, the judiciary, and the intellectual community."[1] Similarly, Scarry points to the difficulty of seeing an injury and injustice, the sense of futility of one's own small efforts, and the special difficulty of lifting complex ideas into the public sphere.[2] Derrida has raised important questions about the relationship between critique and the very nature of the university and the humanities, as when he writes: The university without condition does not, in fact, exist, as we know only too well. Nevertheless, in principle and in conformity with its declared vocation, its professed essence, it should remain an ultimate place of critical resistance - and more than critical - to all the power of dogmatic and unjust appropriation.[3] Chomsky and the late Zinn have spoken about and demonstrated for over 40 years what it means to think rigorously and act courageously in the face of human suffering and manufactured hardships. All of these theorists are concerned with what it means for intellectuals both within and outside of higher education to embrace the university as a productive site of dialogue and contestation, to imagine it as a site that offers students the promise of a democracy to come, to help them understand that there is no genuine democracy without genuine opposing critical power and the social movements that can make it happen. But there is more at stake here than arguing for a more engaged public role for academics and students, for demanding the urgent need to reconnect humanistic inquiry to important social issues, or for insisting on the necessity for academics to reclaim a notion of ethical advocacy and connective relationships. There is also the challenge of connecting the university with visions that have some hold on the present, defending education as more than an investment opportunity or job credential, students as more than customers, and faculty as more than technicians or a subaltern army of casualized labor. At a time when higher education is increasingly being dominated by a reductive corporate logic and technocratic rationality unable to differentiate training from a critical education, we need a chorus of new voices to emphasize that the humanities, in particular, and the university, in general, should play a central role in keeping critical thought alive while fighting back all attempts to foreclose and pre-empt the further unraveling of human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning itself and prevent that questioning from ever stalling or being declared finished. Corporations and the warfare state should not dictate the needs of public and higher education, or, for that matter, any other democratic public sphere. As the Occupy student protesters have pointed out over the last few months, one of the great dangers facing the 21st century is not the risk of illusory hopes, but those undemocratic forces that promote and protect state terrorism, massive inequality, render some populations utterly disposable, imagine the future only in terms of immediate financial gains, and promote forms of self-serving historical reinvention in which power is measured by the degree to which it evades any sense of actual truth and moral responsibility. Students, like their youthful counterparts in the 1960s, are once again arguing that higher education, even in its imperfect state, still holds the promise, if not the reality, of being able to offer them the complex knowledge and interdisciplinary related skills that enable existing and future generations to break the continuity of common sense, come to terms with their own power as critical agents, be critical of the authority that speaks to them, translate private considerations into public issues, and assume the responsibility of not only being governed but learning how to govern. Inhabiting the role of public intellectuals, students can take on the difficult but urgent task of reclaiming the ideal and the practice of what it means to reclaim higher education in general and the humanities, more specifically, as a site of possibility that embraces the idea of democracy not merely as a mode of governance but, most importantly- as journalist Bill Moyers points out - as a means of dignifying people so they can become fully free to claim their moral and political agency. Students are starting to recognize that it is crucial to struggle for the university as a democratic public sphere and the need to use that sphere to educate a generation of new students, faculty and others about the history of race, racism, politics, identity, power, the state and the struggle for justice. They are increasingly willing to argue in theoretically insightful and profound ways about what it means to defend the university as a site that opens up and sustains public connections through which people's fragmented, uncertain, incomplete narratives of agency are valued, preserved, and made available for exchange while being related analytically to wider contexts of politics and power. They are moving to reclaim, once again, the humanities as a sphere that is crucial for grounding ethics, justice and morality across existing disciplinary terrains, while raising both a sense of urgency and a set of relevant questions about what kind of education would be suited to the 21st-century university and its global arrangements as part of a larger project of addressing the most urgent issues that face the social and political world. The punishing state can use violence with impunity to eject young people from parks and other public sites, but it is far more difficult to eject them from sites that are designed for their intellectual growth and well-being, make a claim to educate them, and register society's investment and commitment to their future. Students can be forced out of parks and other public spaces, but it is much more difficult to force them out of those sites designed to educate them - places that are identified with young people and register the larger society's obligation to their future and well-being. The police violence that has taken place at the University of California campuses at Berkeley and Davis does more than border on pure thuggery; it also reveals a display of force that is as unnecessary as it is brutal, and it is impossible to justify. These young people are being beaten on their campuses for simply displaying the courage to protest a system that has robbed them of both a quality education and a viable future. But there is more. It is also crucial not to allow casino capitalism to transform higher education into another extension of the corporate and warfare state. If higher education loses its civic purpose and becomes simply an adjunct of corporate and military power, there will be practically no spaces left for dissent, dialogue, civic courage, and a spirit of thoughtfulness and critical engagement. This is all the more reason to occupy colleges and use them as a launching pad to both educate and to expand the very meaning of the public sphere. Knowledge is about more than the truth; it is also a weapon of change. The language of a radical politics needs more than hope and outrage; it needs institutional spaces to produce ideas, values, and social relations capable of fighting off those ideological and material forces of casino capitalism that are intent in sabotaging any viable notion of human interaction, community, solidarity, friendship, and justice. Space is not the ultimate prize here.[4] Politics and ideology are the essence of what this movement should be about. But space becomes invaluable when it its democratic functions and uses are restored. In an age when the media have become a means of mass distraction and entertainment, the university offers a site of informed engagement, a place where theory and action inform each other, and a space that refuses to divorce intellectual activities from matters of politics, social responsibility and social justice. As students and faculty increasingly use the space of the university as a megaphone for a new kind of critical education and politics, it will hopefully reclaim the democratic function of higher education and demonstrate what it means for students, faculty, and others to assume the role of public intellectuals dedicated to creating a formative culture that can provide citizens and others with the knowledge and skills necessary for a radical democracy. Rather than reducing learning to a measurable quantity in the service of a narrow instrumental rationality, learning can take on a new role, becoming central to developing and expanding the capacity for critical modes of agency, new forms of solidarity, and an education in the service of the public good, an expanded imagination, democratic values, and social change. The student intellectual as a public figure merges rigor with civic courage, meaning with the struggle for eliminating injustice wherever it occurs and hope with a realistic notion of social change.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)