### 1NC

#### A. Interpretation – debate is a game that requires the aff to have a defense of increased energy production for one or more of the following: crude oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear, wind, or solar.

#### Energy PRODUCTION means the extraction or capture of energy from natural resources – that’s distinct from ENERGIZING debate space and hypotheticals about aliens

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for **final consumption** by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

#### B. They don’t meet – they claim unique advantages based off challenging whiteness

#### C. Reasons to prefer:

#### Debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### The opening of infinite frameworks destroys stasis – agreement on the topic as the starting point for debate creates a platform of argumentative stability that is the crucial foundation for deliberation and makes debate meaningful

O’Donnell 4 (Dr. Tim, Director of Debate – Mary Washington U., “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”, Debater’s Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/ DRGArticles/Framework%20article%20for%20the%20DRG%20final2.doc)

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary,* a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question? The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis.[[1]](#endnote-1) Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.[[2]](#endnote-2) How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.[[3]](#endnote-3)

#### A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive teaching of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Switch-side is key---Effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)

What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."

Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; **there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies**. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.

It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are **not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments**, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.

Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**.

This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.

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Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to **engage in mass murder** **because he was able not to think about it,** especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsibility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).

Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,

Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)

Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.

Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).

Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, **theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies**.

Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).

By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:

Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)

There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.**

Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).

Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).

The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). **The paradoxical nature of agonism** (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

Arendt's Polemical Agonism

As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).

Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.

Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:

You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)

Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).

In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.

This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.

Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).

Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).

Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).

Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism.**

Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.

In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Limits outweigh – they’re the vital access point for any theory impact – its key to fairness – huge research burdens mean we can’t prepare to compete – and its key to education – big topics cause hyper-generics, lack of clash, and shallow debate – and it destroys participation

Rowland 84 (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

#### Over inclusion in the context of the topic undermines effective advocacy to help minority communities.

**Foreman 1998** (Christopher – nonresident senior fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice, p. 117)

Therefore movement rhetoric argues that no community should be harmed and that all community concerns and grievances deserve redress. Scholar-activist Robert Bullard proposes that “the solution to unequal protection lies in the realm of environmental justice for all Americans. No community, rich or poor, black or white, should be allowed to become a ‘sacrifice zone.’”20 When pressed about the need for environmental risk priorities, and about how to incorporate environmental justice into priority setting, Bullard’s answer is a vague plea for nondiscrimination, along with a barely more specific call for a “federal ‘fair environmental protection act’” that would transform “protection from a privilege to a right.”21 Bullard’s position is fanciful and self-contradictory, but extremely telling. He argues essentially that the way to establish environmental priorities is precisely by guaranteeing that such priorities are impossible to implement. This is symptomatic of a movement for which untrammeled citizen voice and overall social equity are cardinal values. Bullard’s position also epitomizes the desire of movement intellectuals to avoid speaking difficult truths (at least in public) to their allies and constituents. Ironically, in matters of health and risk, environmental justice poses a potentially serious, if generally unrecognized, danger to the minority and low-income communities it aspires to help. By discouraging citizens from thinking in terms of health and risk priorities (that is, by taking the position, in effect, that every chemical or site against which community outrage can be generated is equally hazardous), environmental justice can deflect attention from serious hazards to less serious or perhaps trivial ones.

#### Effective decision-making outweighs---

#### Only portable skill---means our framework turns case

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### 1NC

#### Focus on the unique nature of the Black experience marginalizes other minority groups and reifies the Black/White binary. Their discursive approach shapes scholarship and practice.

**Luna**, Fall **2003** (Eduardo – J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Mexicans/Mexican Americans and Discrimination Against Them Invisible, Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis)

Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, details the manner in which paradigms influence the structure and interpretation of knowledge. n6 While there are limits to what we can know, paradigms are commonly used in the sciences. They influence our understanding of all knowledge and fields of study; interpretations of race and ethnic relations are no exception. n7 Scholars of race/ethnic relations in the United States frequently employ paradigms to structure their arguments. n8 Paradigms determine what information is relevant and establish intellectual boundaries. However, because they limit the field of relevant information, paradigms necessarily render scholarship incomplete. Because the [\*227] Black/White binary paradigm limits analysis concerning race/ethnic relations almost exclusively to Black contributions and experiences, scholarship utilizing the paradigm is also incomplete. Although others exist, today the Black/White paradigm is the most pervasive and influential in shaping our understanding of race/ethnicity in the United States. n9 Scholars of race/ethnic relations, and mainstream Americans in general, have focused almost exclusively on Black experiences in, and contributions to, civil rights struggles. The common thread of the Black/White paradigm is that race/ethnicity consists, either exclusively or primarily, of Whites and Blacks. n10 The Black/White paradigm limits the relevancy of race/ethnic relations to include only the experiences of Blacks; it omits the experiences of other minority communities. n11 This omission is not problematic in and of itself. After all, if Blacks were the only significant contributors to civil rights or public school desegregation, then scholarship utilizing the Black/White paradigm would accurately reflect those contributions. However, this is not the case. Despite common misconceptions, Mexicans/Mexican Americans have contributed significantly to general civil rights struggles and specifically to public school desegregation. n12 B. How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Latinos Invisible As this Article will discuss, Mexicans/Mexican Americans have not only struggled to end segregation for their own community, but have also contributed to similar efforts to promote the civil rights of Blacks. n13 Furthermore, it is worth noting that Mexicans'/Mexican Americans' contributions were neither sporadic nor insignificant. Rather, these contributions have contributed to civil rights efforts generally, and desegregation specifically, for as long as their Black counterparts. n14 This fact is worth noting because it more completely describes the civil rights history of the United States. Lamentably, scholars all too often overlook this chapter in the book of legal history. Furthermore, discussion of Mexican/Mexican American contributions to civil rights is particularly important because some legal scholars, including several of the most eminent, have characterized non-Black minorities' contributions to civil rights as secondary to those of Blacks at best, and at worst, have omitted their contributions altogether. For instance, Cornell West describes non-Black minorities' contributions to civil rights as "slight though significant." n15 [\*228] West's description of Latino, Asian, and Native American contributions is important for a number of reasons. First, despite the context of West's characterization, a brief paragraph where he argues that "a prophetic framework encourages a coalition strategy," n16 his statement exemplifies the misconception that Latino civil rights struggles are minimal. Students of civil rights history read scholarship by renowned authors like West to guide them through their study of the subject. With this in mind, it is no mystery that students' understanding of the subject frequently mirrors the incomplete texts from which they read. If the history of civil rights is inaccurately written, then how can we expect students to understand it any differently? As long as civil rights scholarship is incompletely written, students and their scholarship will reflect the aforementioned flaws and fail to include the continuing civil rights struggles of Mexicans/Mexican Americans and other communities of color. Second, for better or worse, the scholarship of renowned authors limits what is considered relevant in a field of study. n17 Scholarship by well-known authors tends to be regarded as definitive. As a result, laypersons and students alike often fail to discern the scholarships' omissions. Because race/ethnicity scholarship is heavily influenced by the Black/White paradigm, it often fails to include the history of non-Black communities of color. Therefore, whether they like it or not, celebrated civil rights authors cannot afford to omit or marginalize the contributions of Mexicans/Mexican Americans and other non-Black communities of color. Current race/ethnicity scholarship is embarrassingly incomplete and does a disservice to the many people who struggled in the Civil Rights Movement and to those who study it today. Having accepted the adulation and economic benefits that come with academic celebrity, it is appropriate to hold such authors to the highest standards of accuracy and completeness. n18 Despite a rich legal history, race/ethnicity scholarship is virtually void of descriptions of the struggles of Mexicans/Mexican Americans. Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of this omission is that it is deliberate. C. Justifications for the Black/White Paradigm: The Deliberate Omission of Mexican/Mexican American Civil Rights History Among the common justifications scholars offer for deliberately omitting Mexican/Mexican American civil rights history is that Mexicans/Mexican Americans do not suffer from discrimination. If Mexicans/Mexican Americans are not omitted completely, they are often only marginally covered as compared to the treatment afforded to Blacks. For instance, Andrew Hacker in his celebrated book Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal describes Mexicans/Mexican Americans, Asians/Asian Americans and other immigrant groups as less affected by discrimination because, "none of the presumptions of inferiority associated with Africa and slavery are imposed on these other ethnicities." n19 [\*229] Hacker's assertion is flawed. True, immigrant communities do not have the same association with slavery that Blacks do, but a history of slavery exists nonetheless. n20 Mexicans/Mexican Americans and other immigrants do not suffer any less from discrimination than Blacks do. In fact, socioeconomic indicators suggest that racial/ethnic discrimination has currently waged a greater toll on Mexicans/Mexican Americans than Blacks. Latinos are the largest minority group in the United States. n21 Additionally, socioeconomic indicators, such as poverty, median household income, school segregation and access to universities suggest that Mexicans/Mexican Americans currently suffer most from discrimination. n22 While immigrant groups may not be subject to the presumptions of inferiority based on an association with slavery, they suffer from discrimination nonetheless. Their position at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy makes this evident. n23 The omission of Mexicans'/Mexican Americans' civil rights struggles suggests that they have not suffered from discrimination, or even worse, that Mexicans/Mexican Americans never resisted discrimination. Neither is true. Another justification for the Black/White paradigm is "black exceptionalism." Describing this claim, Angela Harris, a professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall), writes, "African Americans play a unique and central role in American social, political, cultural, and economic life, and have done so since the nation's founding." n24 I do not dispute that Black exceptionalism presents a strong justification for the Black/White paradigm. The Black community has uniquely shaped contemporary understandings of race. Additionally, I agree with both Harris's and Hacker's assertions that Blacks' unique association with slavery has influenced subsequent discrimination based on race/ethnicity in the United States like no other community. However, the claim becomes dangerous where it exclusively focuses on the Black experience at the expense of omitting the experiences of others.

#### This paradigm actively places non-black minorities as aliens within society – that results in racial exclusion and socially constructs multiple threats

Lugay 5 (Arvin – J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law, “Book Review: "In Defense of Internment": Why Some Americans Are More "Equal" than Others”, 2005, 12 Asian L.J. 209, lexis)

**This black/white paradigm** is further complicated **by other racial groups**; the paradigm deals with those who are neither black nor white by construing them as aliens. One of the critical features of the legal status and racial identity of non-black racial minorities is **the notion of "**foreignness." n119 This previously underexamined dimension of the relationship between race and law sheds light not only on the Japanese American internment, but on contemporary debate as well. n120 "Most important in this development has been the persistence of the view **that even American-born non-Whites** were somehow "foreign.'" n121 Natsu Tailor Saito explains that, The Japanese American internment cases could not be explained merely by race or, alternately, by alienage. Acts that could not be justified in the name of race **were done in the name of alienage** and vice versa. There was overlap and slippage, a legalistic sleight of hand. The racialized identification of Japanese Americans as foreign - regardless of their citizenship - allowed for otherwise **unlawful actions to be taken** against United States citizens. n122 Michelle Malkin relies heavily on the racialization of Japanese Americans (in the context of the internment) and Arab Americans (in the context of the "War on Terror") as disloyal foreigners to justify her dismissal of civil liberties. Malkin and American legal history share a larger racial ideology that defines American national identity through the exclusion of people who do not fit a certain white racial paradigm. Critical race theory teaches that the law not only reflects social institutions such as race, **but also actively constructs them**. n123 The law has helped define the boundaries of racial groups. n124 Far from being a matter of skin color or biology, critical race theory defines race as a social construct. Professor Ian F. Haney Lopez lists four important facets to the social construction of race: First, humans rather than abstract social forces produce races. Second, as human constructs, races constitute an integral part of a whole social fabric that includes gender and class relations. Third, the meaning-systems [\*223] surrounding race change quickly rather than slowly. Finally, races are constructed relationally, against one another, rather than in isolation. n125 In the American legal context, racial differences are societal creations that justify the retention of power by one group - whites - over other groups, **those who are not white**. n126 Courts have struggled to define race and have not successfully done so because they have ignored the historical significance of the social creation of racial difference as a hegemonic device. n127 Historically, our government and legal system have often officially approved of the presumption that non-white immigrants are disloyal. n128 This has helped to inscribe disloyalty as a racial characteristic. n129 This presumption of disloyalty is an underlying rationale for the creation of laws that **ensured the exclusion of non-white immigrant** out-groups. These laws kept such groups from becoming legally and socially integrated into the predominantly white American social fabric. Such laws include the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (which barred entry of Chinese laborers into the United States), n130 citizenship laws that prevented many non-white immigrants from gaining U.S. citizenship, n131 and the Alien Land Laws (which prevented people incapable of proving loyalty through citizenship from owning land). n132 In the case of the Japanese internment, federal law denied Japanese naturalization and prevented their immigration; state law prevented property ownership and intermarriage with Whites; and economic discrimination limited professional and employment opportunities. n133 Courts used these exclusionary laws to justify further oppression. For example, the Supreme Court in Hirabayashi reasoned that Japanese Americans posed an even greater security threat precisely because they had been historically excluded and oppressed by the United States. n134 As Jerry [\*224] Kang described, "the Court said: because America has treated you badly, you have reason to be disloyal; therefore, America now has reason to treat you still more badly, by restricting your civil rights." n135 Kang labels this phenomenon the "vicious cycle" in which "tomorrow's burdens will be justified by the resentment caused by today's burdens." n136 The boundaries of the nation continue to be constructed through excluding certain groups. n137 Discourses of democracy used to support the U.S. war effort against terrorism rests on an image of anti-democracy, in the form of those who seek to destroy the "American way of life." n138 The "imagined community" of the American nation, constituted by loyal citizens, relies on separating itself from the "Middle Eastern terrorist" or the "Yellow Peril" to fuse its identity at moments of crisis. n139 Yet this policy of **continued exclusion merely generates a** "vicious cycle" that **fails to increase security** by breeding additional resentment among communities of non-white immigrants and naturalized citizens. A more effective way to increase national security would be to decrease resentment among immigrants and naturalized citizens of color by breaking the "vicious cycle" of exclusion and unequal burden sharing of the cost of national security. If traditionally excluded groups are allowed to share the benefits of American citizenship that are granted to white citizens, they would have the same incentive as white citizens to protect national security. Arguments for the continued exclusion of outgroups must rest on an assumption of deep, inherent difference. This assumption ignores that people of color have as much to lose from poor national security as do White Americans. Such assumptions rely on a white supremacist paradigm that subordinates and denies the inherent dignity of people of color. The only way to break the "vicious cycle" is to eliminate the underlying paradigm of white supremacy. One way this dominant white racial paradigm subordinates people of color is by racializing them as perpetual foreigners who are presumptively disloyal to America. This subordination creates white citizen "insiders," as opposed to colored immigrant "foreigners/outsiders**." The paradigm can be challenged** by acknowledging its existence in American laws and social norms while **simultaneously asserting the dignity of people of color**. Once this has been achieved, we can begin to effectively bring exclusionary laws into compliance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

#### The inevitable result is extermination – the process of otherization necessitates global destruction

Stein 7 (Howard, PhD and Full Professor in the Department of Family and Preventive Medicine – University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, Journal of Organizational Psychodynamics, Spring, (1)1)

Despite the fact that the federal government had been abundantly warned about the precarious condition of the levees, federal officials insisted on their innocence, ignorance, and goodness, while vilifying the New Orleans government and the Louisiana government for a delayed and incompetent response to the disaster. “Mother” Nature, too, became labeled as the unpredictable enemy. In this national scenario, as in organizational life, leaders often resort to psychological splitting between us/them, good/bad, and count on frightened loyalty from followers. Allcorn writes of the critical role of corporate ideology in establishing this either/or process: Ideology aimed at destroying all opposing views to maintain the certainty of its [that is, the reified organization’s] righteousness and correctness, is a sign of simplicity triumphing over complexity and the regressive withdrawal into a primitive state of oneness and homogeneity. (2006) Through ideology, leaders psychologically “bind” workers to the organization, whereby all opposing views are rejected and doubt is eliminated. For psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas, in the fascist state of mind, “The mind ceases to be complex, achieving a simplicity held together initially by bindings around the signs of ideology” (1992, p. 201). Followers are recruited and subsequently “bound” to the ideology by the promise of alleviating intense anxiety and radically splitting the perceptual world into “good” people (us, insiders) and “bad” people (them, others). Organizational leaders’ appeal to grave danger and their offer of a magical solution, is illustrated by the following story from Seth Allcorn: I recall hearing of a meeting in a large teaching hospital that was called to formally announce that downsizing was about to ensue with the help of a notorious downsizing consulting group. The hospital CEO was speaking to all of upper and middle management, approximately 150 people. He explained the downsizing process this way. “You are standing on a train station platform. You have three choices. You can get on the train that is going where I want to go. You can wait just a little bit before deciding what you want to do. Or, you can get on the second train that is leaving the hospital.” Since I studied downsizing in depth as a researcher…I can bear witness to the fact that the metaphorical trains both lead to a man-made hell on earth. (1998, p. xii) 10 As I have described elsewhere (Stein, 1998; 2001), Nazi Holocaust-era trains are a widespread metaphor used by leaders, victims, and survivors to describe the harrowing experience of downsizing, reductions in force, rightsizing, and other forms of “managed social change.” The CEO offers Captain Ahab’s choice: follow me and you live; don’t follow me and you’re dead. The irony, of course, is that to follow Ahab is to doom oneself to death. Firm belief in the totalitarian ideology and the cause that it champions becomes more vital than life itself. Before continuing, let me say a few words about the psychodynamics of what is “total” in the ideology and practice of totalitarianism. The work of a number of psychoanalytic writers converges to help us understand the psychodynamics of organizational and political totalitarianism, and hence the appeal of its ideology and its ability to mobilize people in its service. In his pioneering work on the adolescent quality of the either/or, inside/outside thinking that characterizes totalitarian ideologies, Erik Erikson distinguished between exclusivistic “totalistic” thinking and inclusivistic “wholism” in identity formation (1968, pp. 74–90). In “totalistic” thinking, an ideology is created and embraced that radically simplifies the world, repudiates if not destroys all opposing views, and is intolerant of all doubt. Erikson described the universal process of dividing the world into what he called “pseudospecies” (pp. 41–42), by which all peoples to some degree describe themselves as THE human beings, and others as lesser and lower life forms. That is, there is a split in affect such that affiliative “good” feelings are associated with one’s own group, and disaffiliative “bad” feelings are associated with Others. “Inside” is idealized and “outside” is demonized. The Others “were at least useful as a screen of projection for the negative identities which were the necessary, if most uncomfortable, counterpart of the positive ones” (p. 41). Erikson continues: “The pseudospecies…is one of the more sinister aspects of all group identity” (p. 42). This process becomes exaggerated and ossified in times of crisis, anxiety, and massive large group regression, as Vamik Volkan (1997; 2002) and Howard Stein (2004) have described. Under such circumstances, people come to rely on emergency psychological measures to protect themselves. What George Devereux (1955) called “catastrophic” thinking tends to seize the group, and the reduction of (psychotic) anxiety becomes the central obsession of the group and its leaders. Great effort is mobilized to revitalize the loss- and death-obsessed group (see La Barre, 1972). Under these simultaneously inner and outer circumstances, people come to re-experience annihilation anxiety, against which they defend themselves by the use of some of the earliest developmental defense mechanisms such as splitting, massive projective identification, and externalization. Identity rigidity replaces continuous identity development. “Total immersion in a synthetic identity” goes hand in glove with “a totally stereotyped enemy of the new identity” (Erikson, 1968, p. 89). Erikson continues: The fear of loss of identity which fosters such indoctrination contributes significantly to that mixture of righteousness and criminality which, under totalitarian conditions, becomes available for organized terror and for the establishment of major industries of extermination. (ibid.)

#### Reject their description of race in terms of the Black/White binary paradigm – scrutinizing critical scholarship on race is key to contest the broader and more multi-faceted operations of diverse forms of racial oppression.

Perea 97 (Juan F., Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law, California Law Review, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1213, “The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race,” October, Lexis)

The point of critical theory generally is to demonstrate shortcomings in our current understandings of legal and social structures and perhaps to suggest alternatives that improve upon these shortcomings. One implication of this Article is that, to the extent that critical theory has focused on questions of race, it is still tightly bound by the Black/White binary paradigm. Although this is much less true of critical race theory in particular, as some writers have focused on the points of view and histories of many racialized American groups, a true paradigm shift away from the Black/White paradigm will only occur when such scholarship is more widely promulgated and accepted than is currently the case. My review of important literature on race establishes the existence of the Black/White binary paradigm and its structuring of writing on race. The "normal science" of race scholarship specifies inquiry into the relationship between Blacks and Whites as the exclusive aspect of race relations that needs to be explored and elaborated. As a result, much relevant legal history and information concerning Latinos/as and other racialized groups is simply omitted from books on race and constitutional law. The omission of this history is extraordinarily damaging to Mexican Americans and other Latinos/as. By omitting this history, students get no understanding that Mexican Americans have long struggled for equality. The absence of Latinos/as from histories of racism and the struggle against it enables people to maintain existing stereotypes of Mexican Americans. These stereotypes are perpetuated even by America's leading thinkers on race. Ignorance of Mexican-American history allows Andrew Hacker to proclaim that Hispanics are passive "spectators" in social struggle, n212 and allows Cornel West to imply that Latino/a struggles against racism have been "slight though significant." n213 To the extent that the legitimacy of claims for civil rights depends on a public perception of having engaged in struggle for them, the omission of this legal history also undermines the legitimacy of Latino/a claims for civil rights. This may explain why courts treat Latino/a claims of discrimination with such indifference. Paradigmatic descriptions and study of White racism against Blacks, with only cursory mention of "other people of color," marginalizes all people of color by grouping them, without particularity, as somehow [\*1258] analogous to Blacks. "Other people of color" are deemed to exist only as unexplained analogies to Blacks. Thus, scholars encourage uncritical readers to continue to assume the paradigmatic importance of the Black/White relationship and to ignore the experiences of other Americans who also are subject to racism in profound ways. Critical readers are left with many important questions: Beyond the most superficial understanding of aversion to non-White skin color, in what ways is White racism against Blacks explanatory of or analogous to White racism against Latinos/as, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and others? Given the unique historical legacy of slavery, what does a deep understanding of White-Black racism contribute to understanding racisms against other "Others?" Why are "other people of color" consistently relegated to parenthetical status and near-nonexistence in treatises purporting to cover their fields comprehensively? It is time to ask hard questions of our leading writers on race. It is also time to demand better answers to these questions about inclusion, exclusion, and racial presence, than perfunctory references to "other people of color." In the midst of profound demographic changes, it is time to question whether the Black/White binary paradigm of race fits our highly variegated current and future population. Our "normal science" of writing on race, at odds with both history and demographic reality, needs reworking.

### 1NC

#### Identity politics fractures warming movements---reformism is necessary

George Monbiot, English Writer and Environmental and Political Activist, 9-4-2008, “Identity Politics in Climate Change Hell,” http://www.celsias.com/article/identity-politics-climate-change-hell/

If you want a glimpse of how the movement against climate change could crumble faster than a summer snowflake, read Ewa Jasiewicz’s article , published on the Guardian’s Comment is Free site. It is a fine example of the identity politics that plagued direct action movements during the 1990s, and from which the new generation of activists has so far been mercifully free. Ewa rightly celebrates the leaderless, autonomous model of organising that has made this movement so effective. The two climate camps I have attended – this year and last – were among the most inspiring events I’ve ever witnessed. I am awed by the people who organised them, who managed to create, under extraordinary pressure, safe, functioning, delightful spaces in which we could debate the issues and plan the actions which thrust Heathrow and Kingsnorth into the public eye. Climate camp is a tribute to the anarchist politics that Jasiewicz supports. But in seeking to extrapolate from this experience to a wider social plan, she makes two grave errors. The first is to confuse ends and means. She claims to want to stop global warming, but she makes that task 100 times harder by rejecting all state and corporate solutions. It seems to me that what she really wants to do is to create an anarchist utopia, and use climate change as an excuse to engineer it. Stopping runaway climate change must take precedence over every other aim. Everyone in this movement knows that there is very little time: the window of opportunity in which we can prevent two degrees of warming is closing fast. We have to use all the resources we can lay hands on, and these must include both governments and corporations. Or perhaps she intends to build the installations required to turn the energy economy around - wind farms, wave machines, solar thermal plants in the Sahara, new grid connections and public transport systems - herself? Her article is a terryifying example of the ability some people have to put politics first and facts second when confronting the greatest challenge humanity now faces. The facts are as follows. Runaway climate change is bearing down on us fast. We require a massive political and economic response to prevent it. Governments and corporations, whether we like it or not, currently control both money and power. Unless we manage to mobilise them, we stand a snowball’s chance in climate hell of stopping the collapse of the biosphere. Jasiewicz would ignore all these inconvenient truths because they conflict with her politics. “Changing our sources of energy without changing our sources of economic and political power”, she asserts, “will not make a difference. Neither coal nor nuclear are the “solution”, we need a revolution.” So before we are allowed to begin cutting greenhouse gas emissions, we must first overthrow all political structures and replace them with autonomous communities of happy campers. All this must take place within a couple of months, as there is so little time in which we could prevent two degrees of warming. This is magical thinking of the most desperate kind. If I were an executive of E.On or Exxon, I would be delighted by this political posturing, as it provides a marvellous distraction from our real aims. To support her argument, Jasiewicz misrepresents what I said at climate camp. She claims that I “confessed not knowing where to turn next to solve the issues of how to generate the changes necessary to shift our sources of energy, production and consumption”. I confessed nothing of the kind. In my book Heat I spell out what is required to bring about a 90% cut in emissions by 2030. Instead I confessed that I don’t know how to solve the problem of capitalism without resorting to totalitarianism. The issue is that capitalism involves lending money at interest. If you lend at 5%, then one of two things must happen. Either the money supply must increase by 5% or the velocity of circulation must increase by 5%. In either case, if this growth is not met by a concomitant increase in the supply of goods and services, it becomes inflationary and the system collapses. But a perpetual increase in the supply of goods and services will eventually destroy the biosphere. So how do we stall this process? Even when usurers were put to death and condemned to perpetual damnation, the practice couldn’t be stamped out. Only the communist states managed it, through the extreme use of the state control Ewa professes to hate. I don’t yet have an answer to this conundrum. Does she? Yes, let us fight both corporate power and the undemocratic tendencies of the state. Yes, let us try to crack the problem of capitalism and then fight for a different system. But let us not confuse this task with the immediate need to stop two degrees of warming, or allow it to interfere with the carbon cuts that have to begin now. Ewa’s second grave error is to imagine that society could be turned into a giant climate camp. Anarchism is a great means of organising a self-elected community of like-minded people. It is a disastrous means of organising a planet. Most anarchists envisage their system as the means by which the oppressed can free themselves from persecution. But if everyone is to be free from the coercive power of the state, this must apply to the oppressors as well as the oppressed. The richest and most powerful communities on earth - be they geographical communities or communities of interest - will be as unrestrained by external forces as the poorest and weakest. As a friend of mine put it, “when the anarchist utopia arrives, the first thing that will happen is that every Daily Mail reader in the country will pick up a gun and go and kill the nearest hippy.” This is why, though both sides furiously deny it, the outcome of both market fundamentalism and anarchism, if applied universally, is identical. The anarchists associate with the oppressed, the market fundamentalists with the oppressors. But by eliminating the state, both remove such restraints as prevent the strong from crushing the weak. Ours is not a choice between government and no government. It is a choice between government and the mafia. Over the past year I have been working with groups of climate protesters who have changed my view of what could be achieved. Most of them are under 30, and they bring to this issue a clear-headedness and pragmatism that I have never encountered in direct action movements before. They are prepared to take extraordinary risks to try to defend the biosphere from the corporations, governments and social trends which threaten to make it uninhabitable. They do so for one reason only: that they love the world and fear for its future. It would be a tragedy if, through the efforts of people like Ewa, they were to be diverted from this urgent task into the identity politics that have wrecked so many movements.

#### Extinction

Mazo 10 (Jeffrey Mazo – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122)

The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be **catastrophic for the stability and security of countries** in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects **on security of widespread state failure** and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.

#### Warming locks in environmental racism --- preventing climate change is a pre-requisite to progressive politics.

**Glantz 6** (Michael H., Senior Scientist – National Center for Atmospheric Research, “Africans, African-Americans and Climate Impacts: Top-down vs. Bottom-up Approach to Capacity Building”, Fragile Ecologies, 7-7, http://www.fragilecologies.com/jul07\_06.html)

Numerous studies document that the poor and people of color in the United States and around the world have borne greater health and environmental risks than the society at large when it comes to workplace hazards, pollution from chemical plants, municipal landfills, incinerators, abandoned toxic waste dumps, lead smelters, and emissions from clogged freeways. The environmental and economic justice movement was born in response to these injustices and disparities. The movement's diverse allies have much to offer policymakers in resolving many of the problems that have resulted from industrial pollution and human settlement patterns. Finding solutions to global climate change is one of the areas that desperately need the input from those populations most likely to be negatively affected, poor people in the developing countries of the South and people of color and the poor in the North. Global climate change looms as a major environmental justice issue of the 21st century. Another recent expression of interest in climate's impacts on the minorities focused specifically on the United States . The US Congressional Black Caucus, a group that includes all African-American members of the US Congress, commissioned a report that focused on the potential impacts of global warming on African Americans. The report (entitled “Black Americans and Global Warming: An Unequal Burden”) was released to the public in July 2004. The report supported Bullard's (among others') contention that minorities (in America , African Americans specifically) are most likely to suffer disproportionately as a result of the foreseeable impacts of climate change (for example, flooding, heat waves and high energy prices). Most likely, they already are suffering disproportionately from the impacts of today's climate variability and extreme events, such as Hurricane Katrina's impacts in New Orleans in 2005 and Hurricane Floyd's impacts in North Carolina in 1999. To be sure, all poor people along with people in other socio-economic strata in these areas, regardless of race, were adversely affected by these events. However, the African-American communities have been the worst affected with regard to adverse impacts (deaths) and in the economic recovery process as well, when compared with other nearby communities and socioeconomic groups. The report of the Caucus seemed to dwell primarily on energy-related issues, especially the impacts of the rising costs to Black consumers of energy (heat, light, gasoline, for example). However, there are many more obvious and subtle climate-related impacts that can adversely affect Black Americans. Some of those adverse impacts were exposed on TV and in newspapers worldwide as Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the US Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005. Poor people, many of whom were African-Americans, were the primary victims of Katrina. They were living in areas known to be most vulnerable to flooding, as much of New Orleans had been built below sea level and protected by levees from invasion of waters from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Ponchetrain. Making a risky situation even riskier, poorer people in New Orleans were also the least likely to have life or property insurance coverage on their lives and property, transportation or cash in hand for a rapid escape from the potential threats from Hurricane Katrina. A brief comparison of two parts of the city, one predominantly Black and the other White, underscores the demographic differences and disadvantages between these communities: the Lower Ninth Ward (African American) and the Lake District (Caucasian). While reflecting on the discriminatory impacts of Katrina and how it exposed the vulnerabilities of African-American minority residents, I was reminded about the devastating impacts of Hurricane Floyd (September 1999) which, today, few remember. It damaged greatly a predominantly African American town called Princeville, as well as nearby communities. In the first year or two after having been hit by Hurricane Floyd, Princeville still struggled to get support to rebuild itself, whereas other adversely affected communities seemed to have been on the mend at a much faster pace. In 2004 (a year before Katrina), I sought to encourage the development of a “Climate Affairs” program for undergraduates at the Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). This was (and still is) an attempt to develop awareness of and interest among African-Americans (i.e., to build capacity) in climate-related science, impacts and equity issues. This can empower the African-American community to better cope with the obvious and not so obvious ways that climate variability, change and extremes can influence human activities in general and their communities in particular. Keeping Bullard's earlier statement in mind, Finding solutions to global climate change is one of the areas that desperately need the input from those populations most likely to be negatively affected, poor people in the developing countries of the South and people of color and the poor in the North. there are not many African-Americans focused on climate-related impacts. At least, I have not encountered many over the years at various climate-related meetings I have attended. There are some African-American scientists researching the science of climate change, and there are many Africans who have come to the USA to teach science at the university level. The main point of a comparison of Africans and African Americans focused on climate impact assessments is to underscore what I believe is an urgent need to sharply and quickly increase the involvement in climate-related impact assessments of African-Americans, the minority most likely to be adversely affected by global warming. Only by getting involved directly in climate impact studies related to climate change --- whether public health, disaster preparedness, political and legal aspects, risk assessments, and so on --- will African Americans be prepared to do their own bidding in political circles, for the greater protection of the African-American community, not only from global warming but from other climate and weather extremes as well, such as hurricanes, floods, vector-borne diseases (e.g., mosquitoes), and other climate-related problems.

### 1NC Case

#### The use of performance is banal and overused – and doesn’t merit affirmation

Ahmed 4 (Sara Ahmed, Reader in Race and Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths College, University of London, Borderlands E-Journal, Volume 3, Number 2, “Declarations of Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism,” http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol3no2\_2004/ahmed\_declarations.htm)

50. This might sound like an argument about the performativity of race. I am sympathetic with the idea that race is performative in Judith Butler’s (1993) sense of the term: race as a category is brought into existence by being repeated over time (race is an effect of racialisation). I have even argued for the performativity of race myself (Ahmed 2002). But throughout this paper I have insisted on the non-performativity of anti-racism. It might, seem now, a rather odd tactic. If race is performative, and is itself an effect of racism, then why isn’t anti-racism performative as well? Is anti-racism a form of ‘race trouble’ that is performative as it ‘exposes’ the performativity of race, and which by citing the terms of racism (such as ‘white’) allows those terms to acquire new meanings? I would suggest the potential ‘exposure’ of the performativity of race does not make ‘anti-racism’ performative as a speech act. As I stated in my introduction, I am using performativity in Austin’s sense as referring to a particular class of speech, where the issuing of the utterance ‘is the performing of an action’ (1975, 6). In such speech the saying is the doing; it is not that saying something leads to something, but that it does something at the moment of saying. It is important to note here that, for Austin, performativity is not a quality of a sign or an utterance; it does not reside within the sign, as if the sign was magical. For an utterance to be performative, certain conditions have to be met. When these conditions are met, then the performative is happy. This model introduces a class of ‘unhappy performatives’: utterances that would ‘do something’ if the right conditions had been met, but which do not do that thing, as the conditions have not been met. 51. I would hasten to add that in my view performativity has become rather banal and over-used within academic writing; it seems as if almost everything is performative, where performative is used as a way of indicating that something is ‘brought into existence’ through speech, representation, writing, law, practice, or discourse. Partly, I am critiquing this ‘banalisation’ of the performative, as well as how performativity as a concept can be used in a way that ‘forgets’ how performativity depends upon the repetition of conventions and prior acts of authorization (see Butler 1997). I am also suggesting that the logic that speech ‘brings things into existence’ (as a form for positive action) only goes so far, and indeed the claim that saying is doing can bypass that ways in which saying is not sufficient for an action, and can even be a substitute for action. 52. My concern with the non-performativity of anti-racism has hence been to examine how sayings are not always doings, or to put it more strongly, to show how the investment in saying as if saying was doing can actually extend rather than challenge racism. Implicitly, I am critiquing a claim that I have not properly attributed: that is, the claim that anti-racism is performative. I would argue that the six declarations of whiteness I have analysed function as implicit claims to the performativity of anti-racism. The claim to the performativity of anti-racism would be to presume that ‘being anti’ is transcendent, and that to declare oneself as being something shows that one is not the thing that one declares oneself to be. It might be assumed that the speech act of declaring oneself (to be white, or learned, or racist) ‘works’ as it brings into existence the non- or anti-racist subject or institution. None of these claims I have investigated operate as simple claims. None of them say ‘I/we are not racists’ or ‘I/we are anti-racists’, as if that was an action. They are more complex utterances, for sure. They have a very specific form: they define racism in a particular way, and then they imply ‘I am not’ or ‘we are not’ that. 53. So it is not that such speech acts say ‘we are anti-racists’ (and saying makes us so); rather they say ‘we are this’, whilst racism is ‘that’, so in being ‘this’ we are not ‘that’, where ‘that’ would be racist. So in saying we are raced as whites, then we are not racists, as racism operates through the unmarked nature of whiteness; or in saying we are racists, then we are not racists, as racists don’t know they are racists; or in expressing shame about racism, then we are not racists, as racists are shameless; or in saying we are positive about our racial identity, as an identity that is positive insofar as it involves a commitment to anti-racism, then we are not racists, as racists are unhappy, or in being self-critical about racism, then we are not racists, as racists are ignorant; or in saying we exist alongside others, then we are not racists, as racists see themselves as above others, and so on. 54. These statements function as claims to performativity rather than as performatives, whereby the declaration of whiteness is assumed to put in place the conditions in which racism can be transcended, or at the very least reduced in its power. Any presumption that such statements are forms of political action would be an overestimation of the power of saying, and even a performance of the very privilege that such statements claim they undo. The declarative mode, as a way of doing something, involves a fantasy of transcendence in which ‘what’ is transcended is the very thing ‘admitted to’ in the declaration: so, to put it simply, if we admit to being bad, then we show that we are good (see also paper by Hill and Riggs in this issue). So it is in this specific sense that I have argued that anti-racism is not performative. Or we could even say that anti-racist speech in a racist world is an ‘unhappy performative’: the conditions are not in place that would allow such ‘saying’ to ‘do’ what it ‘says’. 55. Our task is not to repeat anti-racist speech in the hope that it will acquire performativity. Nor should we be satisfied with the ‘terms’ of racism, or hope they will acquire new meanings, or even look for new terms. Instead, anti-racism requires much harder work, as it requires working with racism as an ongoing reality in the present. Anti-racism requires interventions in the political economy of race, and how racism distributes resources and capacities unequally amongst others. Those unequal distributions also affect the ‘business’ of speech, and who gets to say what, about whom, and where. We need to consider the intimacy between privilege and the work we do, even in the work we do on privilege. 56. You might not be surprised to hear that a white response to this paper has asked the question, ‘but what are white people to do’. That question is not necessarily misguided, although it does re-center on white agency, as a hope premised on lack rather than presence. It is a question asked persistently in response to hearing about racism and colonialism: I always remember being in an audience to a paper on the stolen generation and the first question asked was: ‘but what can we do’. The impulse towards action is understandable and complicated; it can be both a defense against the ‘shock’ of hearing about racism (and the shock of the complicity revealed by the very ‘shock’ that ‘this’ was a ‘shock’); it can be an impulse to reconciliation as a ‘re-covering’ of the past (the desire to feel better); it can be about making public one’s judgment (‘what happened was wrong’); or it can be an expression of solidarity (‘I am with you’); or it can simply an orientation towards the openness of the future (rephrased as: ‘what can be done?’). But the question, in all of these modes of utterance, can work to block hearing; in moving on from the present towards the future, it can also move away from the object of critique, or place the white subject ‘outside’ that critique in the present of the hearing. In other words, the desire to act, to move, or even to move on, can stop the message ‘getting through’. 57. To hear the work of exposure requires that white subjects inhabit the critique, with its lengthy duration, and to recognise the world that is re-described by the critique as one in which they live. The desire to act in a non-racist or anti-racist way when one hears about racism, in my view, can function as a defense against hearing how that racism implicates which subjects, in the sense that it shapes the spaces inhabited by white subjects in the unfinished present. Such a question can even allow the white subject to re-emerge as an agent in the face of the exposure of racism, by saying ‘I am not that’ (the racists of whom you speak), as an expression of ‘good faith’. The desire for action, or even the desire to be seen as the good white anti-racist subject, is not always a form of bad faith, that is, it does not necessarily involve the concealment of racism. But such a question rushes too quickly past the exposure of racism and hence ‘risks’ such concealment in the very ‘return’ of its address. 58. I am of course risking being seen as producing a ‘useless’ critique by not prescribing what an anti-racist whiteness studies would be, or by not offering some suggestions about ‘what white people can do’. I am happy to take that risk. At the same time, I think it is quite clear that my critique of ‘anti-racist whiteness’ is prescriptive. After all, I am arguing that whiteness studies, even in its critical form, should not be about re-describing the white subject as anti-racist, or constitute itself as a form of anti-racism, or even as providing the conditions for anti-racism. Whiteness studies should instead be about attending to forms of white racism and white privilege that are not undone, and may even be repeated and intensified, through declarations of whiteness, or through the recognition of privilege as privilege.

#### Framing issue – evaluate racial progress using regression – qualitative gains have been solidified – future progression is determine by effectiveness of deliberation.

**Clark 1995** (Leroy – Professor of Law at Catholic University Law School, A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23, p. Lexis)

I must now address the thesis that there has been no evolutionary progress for blacks in America. Professor Bell concludes that blacks improperly read history if we believe, as Americans in general believe, that progress--racial, in the case of blacks--is "linear and evolutionary." n49 According to Professor Bell, the "American dogma of automatic progress" has never applied to blacks. n50 Blacks will never gain full equality, and "even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance." n51 Progress toward reducing racial discrimination and subordination has never been "automatic," if that refers to some natural and inexorable process without struggle. Nor has progress ever been strictly "linear" in terms of unvarying year by year improvement, because the combatants on either side of the equality struggle have varied over time in their energies, resources, capacities, and the quality of their plans. Moreover, neither side could predict or control all of the variables which accompany progress or non-progress; some factors, like World War II, occurred in the international arena, and were not exclusively under American control. With these qualifications, and a long view of history, blacks and their white allies achieved two profound and qualitatively different leaps forward toward the goal of equality: the end of slavery, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Moreover, despite open and, lately, covert resistance, black progress has never been shoved back, in a qualitative sense, to the powerlessness and abuse of periods preceding these leaps forward. n52

# Block

### Effective Deliberation Outweighs – 2NC

#### 3) Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems – being relevantly informed is key

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, **debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making**, and **better public judgment**. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a **puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change**, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed** about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of **problem-solving skills** demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology **for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities**. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a **crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement** and **new articulations of democratic life.**

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to **produce revisions of democratic life** that are **necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive**. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for **rapid climate change**; emerging **threats to international stability** in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing **challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an **informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### Topical Version

#### That proves there is a topical version of their performance – incentivize energy on different cites, or decentralized renewables which allow for community control

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in **decision making** diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of **grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states.** In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the **legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions** which produced those projects.

Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany.

In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The **technicality** **of the issue** **was not a barrier** to their participation. On the contrary, grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems. Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens through which the **goals of energy policy could be recast** and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots energy protest in West Germany is twofold.

First, it produced major substantive changes in public policy. Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest **undermined** the **legitimacy** of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

### Exclusion

#### Establishing constraints on the topics for discussion in debate does not cause internal exclusion and breaking down those constraints doesn’t solve it because the absence of clash and the refusal of the burden of rejoinder only flips external exclusion---the way to resolve internal exclusion is to broaden the scope of what counts as a persuasive argument within a given topic---for example, our model of debate would welcome the use of narrative and personal experience on behalf of a topical argument---this middle ground most effectively resolves their exclusion arguments

Gert Biesta et al 9, professor of Education and Director of Research at the School of Education, University of Stirling, Susan Verducci , Assistant Professor at the Humanities Department at San José State University, and Michael S. Katz, professor of philosophy and education at San Jose State, Education, Democracy and the Moral Life, 2009, p. 105-107

This example not only shows why the issue of inclusion is so prominent in the deliberative model. It also explains why the deliberative turn has generated a whole new set of issues around inclusion. The reason for this is that deliberation is not simply a form of political decision-making but first and foremost a form of political communication. The inclusion question in deliberative democracy is therefore not so much a question about who should be included - although this question should be asked always as well. It is first and foremost a question about who is able to participate effectively in deliberation. As Dryzek aptly summarises, the suspicion about deliberative democracy is "that its focus on a particular kind of reasonable political interaction is not in fact neutral, but systematically excludes a variety of voices from effective participation in democratic politics" (Dryzek, 2000, p.58). In this regard Young makes a helpful distinction between two forms of exclusion: external exclusion, which is about "how people arc [actually] kept outside the process of discussion and decision-making", and internal exclusion where people are formally included in decision-making processes but where they may find, for example, "that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect" (Young, 2000, p.55). Internal exclusion, in other words, refers to those situations in which people "lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-making" (ibid.) which can particularly be the outcome of the emphasis of some proponents of deliberative democracy on "dispassionate, unsituatcd, neutral reason" (ibid. p.63).

To counteract the internal exclusion that is the product of a too narrow focus on argument, Young has suggested several other modes of political communication which should be added to the deliberative process not only to remedy "exclusionary tendencies in deliberative practices" but also to promote "respect and trust" and to make possible "understanding across structural and cultural difference" (ibid. p.57). The first of these is greeting or public acknowledgement. This is about "communicative political gestures through which those who have conflicts . .. recognize others as included in the discussion, especially those with whom they differ in opinion, interest, or social location" (ibid., p.61; emphasis in original). Young emphasises that greeting should be thought of as a starting-point for political interaction. It "precedes the giving and evaluating of reasons" (ibid., p.79) and does so through the recognition of the other parties in the deliberation. The second mode of political communication is rhetoric and more specifically the affirmative use of rhetoric (ibid., p.63). Although one could say that rhetoric only concerns the form of political communication and not its content, the point Young makes is that inclusive political communication should pay attention to and be inclusive about the different forms of expression and should not try to purify rational argument from rhetoric. Rhetoric is not only important because it can help to get particular issues on the agenda for deliberation. Rhetoric can also help to articulate claims and arguments "in ways appropriate to a particular public in a particular situation' (ibid., p.67; emphasis in original). Rhetoric always accompanies an argument by situating it "for a particular audience and giving it embodied style and tone" (ibid., p.79). Young's third mode of political communication is narrative or storytelling. The main function of narrative in democratic communication lies in its potential "to foster understanding among members of a polity with very different experience or assumptions about what is important" (ibid., p.71). Young emphasises the role of narrative in the teaching and learning dimension of political communication. "Inclusive democratic communication", so she argues, "assumes that all participants have something to teach the public about the society in which they dwell together" and also assumes "that all participants are ignorant of some aspects of the social or natural world, and that everyone comes to a political conflict with some biases, prejudices, blind spots, or sterco-types" (ibid., p.77).

It is important to emphasise that greeting, rhetoric and narrative are not meant to replace argumentation. Young stresses again and again that deliberative democracy entails "that participants require reasons of one another and critically evaluate them" (ibid., p.79). Other proponents of the deliberative model take a much more narrow approach and see deliberation exclusively as a form of rational argumentation (e.g. Bcnhabib, 1996) where the only legitimate force should be the "forceless force of the better argument" (Habermas). Similarly, Dryzck, after a discussion of Young's ideas,1 concludes that argument always has to be "central to deliberative democracy" (Dryzek, 2000, p.7l). Although he acknowledges that other modes of communication can be present and that there are good reasons to welcome them, their status is different "because they do not have to be present" (ibid., emphasis added). For Dryzek, at the end of the day, all modes of political communication must live up to the standards of rationality. This does not mean that they must be subordinated to rational argument “but their deployment only makes sense in a context where argument about what is to be done remains central” (ibid., p.168).

### Narratives

#### Stasis DA

#### This cards ends the debate – we turn all of their narrative arguments – narratives can only produce legal change though adversary exchange among competing views which can only occur when there is proper stasis. Outside of our framework, narratives are doomed to failure.

Abrams 91 (Kathryn, professor of law at Cornell University's Law School and a nationally recognized scholar on feminist jurisprudence, “Hearing the Call of Stories,” California Law Review, 79 (4), Article 1, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1804&context=californialawreview)

Underlying these concerns about the prescriptive implications of narratives is a rich subtextual debate about the value of narrative as a form of legal persuasion. Although critics most frequently focus on whether the narrative scholar has said anything normative, many are also asking whether prescriptions derived from narrative are entitled to be taken as normative by legal actors. Some readers are reluctant to regard narratives as legitimate sources of legal prescriptions, either because of qualities that inhere in the narratives themselves or because of the effect they produce on debate and discussion. These concerns create the final three families of objections. Critics sometimes express doubts about whether a narrative is "true." By this the reader usually means whether the narrative is a reliable account of something that occurred. When Patricia Williams first described the experience of being barred from a Benetton store on the basis of race, 2 2 some readers challenged her credibility, citing her refusal to give "equal time" to the "other side." 23 As lawyers and liberals, 24 many scholars harbor a belief that "truth" is established through adversary exchange among competing views. 2 In the absence of adversary exchange, the safest path is to entrust a neutral decisionmaker with the task of discovering the "truth." The narrative account is suspect because it provides no "equal time," and it rejects neutrality through its explicit affiliation with a particular viewpoint. Those narratives that provide first-hand accounts of a person's pain are also laden with emotional content. This may be viewed not only as undermining the objectivity of the writer, but as threatening the objectivity of the reader, making him increasingly reluctant to credit the account the narrative provides. Readers may have a similar response to those narratives exploring experiences that are the subject of strong social taboos. The discomfort triggered in some scholars by hearing anyone (but particularly a colleague) discuss her rape, marital abuse-or even her childbirth, in particularly graphic terms-makes them eager to discount, discredit, or otherwise distance themselves from such discussions. 26 Even some readers willing to believe that a narrative scholar has offered a trustworthy account of a particular experience may doubt the "typicality" of the experience recounted. Catharine MacKinnon reports that when she speaks about the sexual coercion she claims is paradigmatic of women's experience, she is regularly challenged by questions about women who are not harassed, are not abused, or who claim to enjoy their sexual experiences. 27 These doubts about typicality arise in part from the fact that the experiences described are unfamiliar to main- stream readers; and those whose perceptions are ratified by dominant social norms may find it difficult to believe that a divergent experience is anything but idiosyncratic. 2 " Readers may also be reluctant to rely on a single set of experiences as a basis for legal change. The expressed concern is that legal changes, which affect scores of people, cannot be based on one person's account(s); yet it is difficult to separate this argument from the deeper epistemological claim that universality and statistical significance are necessary attributes of any claim to know about the world.

### AT: Ableism

No link – didn’t read it – we shouldn’t be tied to institutions

Doesn’t create change – next debate we just take it out – it demotivates change

#### Backlash – Censoring certain words transforms politics into a fight over language rather than the institutions that generate true violence.

**Brown 1** [Wendy Brown, professor at UC-Berkeley, 2001 Politics Out of History, p. 35-36]JFS

 “Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech. Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive *political* response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislative and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationality and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize

#### Thus, permutation – acknowledge oppressiveness of wording but don’t vote for it – Language is reversible – The introduction of injurious language simultaneously introduces the prospect of contestation – Their erasure avoids the prospect of contestation

**Butler 97** (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 2)

One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. In being called an injurious name, one is derogated and demeaned. But the name holds out another possibility as well: by being called a name, one is also, paradaoxically, given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call. Thus the injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may also produce an unexpected and enabling response. If to be addressed is to be interpellated, then the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject in speech who comes to use language to counter the offensive call. When the address is injurious, it works its force upon the one in injures.

#### Giving meaning to language can’t be done in a situation where one person defines words on behalf of others – environments where individuals can concede new ideas about language is key to education – liberation is only possible with a consistent effort, not a strategic discourse

**Freire in ‘70**

(Paulo, Brazilian educator and influential theorist of critical pedagogy*, Pedagogy of the Opressed*, 1970)

If it is in speaking their word that people, by naming the world, transform it dialogue imposes itself as the +way by which they achieve significance as human beings. Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person’s “depositing” ideas in another; nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be “consumed” by the discussants. Nor yet is it a hostile, polemical argument between those who are committed neither to the naming of the world, nor to the search for truth, but rather to the imposition of their own truth. Because dialogue is an encounter among women and men who name the world, it must not be a situation where some name on behalf of others. It is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another. The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is conquest of the world for the liberation of humankind.

Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for people. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love.[[4]](http://www.marxists.org/subject/education/freire/pedagogy/ch03.htm#n4)Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to others. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause — the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical. As an act of bravery, love cannot be sentimental; as an act of freedom, it must not serve as a pretext for manipulation. It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love. Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the lovewhich that situation made impossible. If I do not love the world — if I do not love life — if I do not love people — I cannot enter into dialogue.

On the other hand, dialogue cannot exist without humility. The naming of the world, through which people constantly re-create that world, cannot be an act of arrogance. Dialogue, as the encounter of those addressed to the common task of learning and acting, is broken if the parties (or one of them) lack humility. How can I dialogue if I always project ignorance onto others and never perceive my own? How can I dialogue if I regard myself as a case apart from others — mere “its” in whom I cannot recognize other “I"s? How can I dialogue if I consider myself a member of the in-group of pure men, the owners of truth and knowledge, for whom all non-members are “these people” or “the great unwashed"? How can I dialogue if I start from the premise that naming the world is the task of an elite and that the presence of the people in history is a sign of deterioration, thus to be avoided? How can I dialogue if I am closed to — and even offended by — the contribution of others? How can I dialogue if I am afraid of being displaced, the mere possibility causing me torment and weakness? Self-sufficiency is incompatible with dialogue. Men and women who lack humility (or have lost it) cannot come to the people, cannot be their partners in naming the world**.** Someone who cannot acknowledge himself to be as mortal as everyone else still has a long way to go before he can reach the point of encounter. At the point of encounter there are neither utter ignoramuses nor perfect sages; there are only people who are attempting, together, to learn more than they now know.

### A2: Deliberation = Racism

#### Studies prove debate enhances the advancement of minority communities and closes the learning gap.

National Association for Urban Debate Leagues **2009** (Urban Debate League Case Statement: Evidence-Based, Field-Tested Approach, p. <http://www.urbandebate.org/casestatement.pdf>)

Rigor, Relevance, and Relationships

Academic debate enjoys wide support from teachers and administrators because it helps urban school systems achieve their goals for secondary instruction by raising expectations overall and closing learning gaps. Urban debate embodies the three R’s of successful schools because it entails rigorous intellectual work, creates relationships that connect students to a network of peers and mentors, and provides relevant learning opportunities. Debate engages students with high standards and rigor, and equips students to meet these standards. UDL participation shifts the locus of control for students to regulate their own learning. Students move beyond predetermined curricula to use creativity to generate and apply new knowledge. Debaters research, write, and develop strategies; practice and compete; and must defend their positions in competition. As the season progresses, students research new strategies to gain an advantage over the competition, who in turn must write new responses. The process of confronting new arguments, much like encountering unexpected texts on exams or in advanced coursework, prepares students to respond to novel intellectual challenges with flexibility and confidence. Urban Debate Leagues create exceptional relationships and school-based communities where students feel recognized and cared for by mentors and fellow engaged students. Debaters must work together and learn to know and adapt to each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Teachers and coaches develop relationships with students that enable them to feel accepted and confident as learners. Debaters also receive mentoring from college students, recruiters, and community member volunteers who provide valuable feedback, perspective, and connections. Relevant, real world learning creates the conditions for in-depth education, by allowing students to explore topics which directly and obviously impact many of their lives and communities (e.g., the 2009/10 resolution concerns poverty). Competitions motivate and recognize hard work where it is due, in an atmosphere of friendly competition, fun, and celebration. Tournaments, unlike standardized tests, orient activity and demand performance in a manner students deem relevant to their lives. Data from six UDLs show that in one year of participation, debaters increased their GPAs an average of 8% to 10%. The Atlanta UDL has documented a 50% reduction in disciplinary referrals among at-risk middle school participants in urban debate. In a survey of urban debaters in Minneapolis/St. Paul, 100% reported they were unlikely to engage in negative risk behaviors such as early pregnancy or drug or alcohol use, and 100% report increased interest in classes. Due to this interest, 80% of debaters reported no attendance problems, compared to only 49% among the comparison group. Most recently, research has shown urban debate participants have average GPAs twenty percent (20%) of a letter grade higher than similarly situated peers (with the effect an even great 50% among the subgroup of African-American males).9 Debate’s high standards and rigor carry over from team to classroom. Students who ask critical questions and bring outside knowledge and concepts to bear in classroom discussions can sometimes encourage teachers to raise their own expectations and provide greater challenges for students. Debate instills the sense in both teachers and students that academic excellence is to be expected from urban students who may not otherwise be engaged by the traditional classrooms. Success at debate can thus seismically shift the entire culture of teaching and learning.

### Impact – 2NC

#### The Black/White paradigm silences and renders invisible the histories and experiences of other racialized groups, re-inscribing racial oppression.

Perea 97 (Juan F., Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law, California Law Review, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1213, “The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race,” October, Lexis)

One could defend the Black/White paradigm on the grounds that it represents the efforts of scholars to study the most virulent form of racism in the United States, White racism against Blacks, and that study of the most virulent form will naturally encompass less virulent forms such as those experienced by Latinos/as. The extent of White racism against Blacks, cruelly manifested in slavery, was unprecedented. Pervasive and continuing racism against Blacks justifies every effort dedicated to its eradication. There are at least three reasons, however, why an exclusive focus on Blacks and Whites is not justified. First, it is important to work to eradicate all racism, not just the racism experienced by Blacks. Second, it is wrong to assume that racism against Latinos/as is simply a less virulent form of the same racism experienced by Blacks. As Blauner described, racism against Latinos/as has a different genesis. It may also be different in kind in ways that are very important. For example, Blacks may or may not ever experience the language and accent discrimination faced by many Latinos/as. Finally, our national demographics are changing significantly. One cannot simply ignore the concerns of an increasingly [\*1254] large and subordinated group of Latinos/as forever. A society is just only if everyone can participate in it on equal terms. Some readers might object that Latinos/as are now, late in the game, attempting to lay claim to civil rights already hard won by Blacks after long struggle. I think the abbreviated slice of Mexican-American legal history presented in this article begins to refute this argument. In fact, Mexican Americans can lay claim to a long struggle for civil rights. Ironically, it is largely because of the Black/White paradigm of race that more people do not learn Mexican-American and other Latino/a history in the United States. So readers and scholars must begin to ask whether Latinos/as are invisible because they have not participated in social struggle or because scholars have been indifferent and have neglected to tell the stories of their presence and participation in social struggle. I suggest that the latter is the more accurate explanation. It is not my intent to fault Black and White writers for writing solely about Blackness and its relation to Whiteness. Indeed, such writing has improved everyone's understanding of White racism against Blacks. On this subject, we need more, not less understanding. An important justification for focusing on Whiteness is that White racism is the source of the problems they explore. n206 Such writing and scholarship is an act of struggle in itself and it need not be made in conjunction with or on behalf of any other group. My objection to the state of most current scholarship on race is simply that most of this scholarship claims universality of treatment while actually describing only part of its subject, the relationship between Blacks and Whites. Race in the United States means more than just Black and White. It also refers to Latino/a, Asian, Native American, and other racialized groups. Accordingly, books titled "Race in America" or "White Racism" that only discuss Blackness and Whiteness claim a universality of scope that they do not deliver. These books offer a paradigmatic rendering of their subject that excludes important portions of civil rights history. Authors of such books need to be aware that they promulgate a binary paradigm of race that operates to silence and render invisible Latinos/as, Asian Americans and Native Americans. Accordingly, they reproduce a serious harm.

### Impact – Alien –

#### Alien discourse project worse forms of racism – turns case

Burns 1 (Christy L., Associate Prof. of Eng at College of William and Mary. “Erasure: Alienation, Paranoia, and the Loss of Memory in the X-Files”. Camera Obscura Vol. 15, No. 3, 2001, Project Muse)

America has always been a land of uncertain boundaries. Even with two oceans abutting either coast, its initial status as a colony—and later internal colonizer of Native Americans, African slaves, Chinese and Mexican slave labor—has marked it as a nation of perforated borders and mixed ethnic identities. How little surprising then that its paranoid tendencies should oscillate between distrust of centralized government power and fear of an “alien” breach of national security.1 US cultural constructs of the alien repeatedly link illegal or unassimilated aliens and their mythological counterparts—aliens who descend from outer space, with, to use Orson Welles’s fictional account, gray snaking bodies and faces so unfamiliar that they inspire sheer horror. I am suggesting here that American anxiety about aliens follows a paranoid structure, manifest in radical reifications of identity that purify **the paranoid subject as** “good” and externalize all internal instabilities (failures, “evil” and maladaptive intent) onto some other. This paranoid scenario involves repeated dissolution of boundaries and disruption of identity consolidation, so that attempts to differentiate self from other are launched with increasing agitation. In the 1990s in the US, gestures of aggression against historically marginalized racial and ethnic groups accelerated. Jasper, Texas, became the media’s exemplar of racial hatred in June 1998, with the murder and mutilation of an African American man receiving national scrutiny amid a culminating rise of white supremacist actions, through which the multiculturation of American society was being stringently resisted.2 Curiously synchronic with the decade’s swell in violence against internally perceived “aliens,” the Fox television network ignited unexpected fervor with The X-Files (which debuted in 1993) and its stories of externally perceived aliens invading from outer space. A film noir, paranoid detective scenario centered on reports of UFO sightings and paranormal events, the program garnered a global following, closing its first season with 5 million households viewing, eventually attracting a full 13.7 million.3 Under Chris Carter’s tutelage, the show unfolded a series of classic American paranoid scenarios, linking cultural anxiety alternately to governmental erasure of evidence of UFOs and to 196 • Camera Obscura fear of those aliens themselves. Interestingly, the series shifts between scapegoating and advocating for aliens, with the show’s two main characters, Fox Mulder (David Duchovny) and Dana Scully (Gillian Anderson) functioning as rebel FBI agents repeatedly accused of operating outside the bureau’s regulations. Mulder and Scully determinedly pursue traces of evidence supposedly erased by the US government and, in consequence, face repeated career- and life-threatening suppressions, while their conspiracy theories appear to oscillate between government- (center) and alien- (other) focused suspicions. In fact, in a paranoid gesture, any radical externalization of alienation suffices to salve momentarily the discomfort with identity instability, and so the alien may be found conspiratorially within (in governmental, supposedly protective structures) and without (in outer space or outside the boundaries of the normative culture). Aliens may tacitly be those frightening beings who drop from outer space, but this cultural phantasm operates as a thinly disguised anxiety about illegal aliens who cross national borders, allegedly abduct jobs, and create “mutant” children through miscegenation. So while paranoia, as François Roustang describes it, need not practice racial othering, in the American consciousness, with its identificatory core defined by a history of flight from persecution, necessary relocation, and ethnic assimilation, cultural paranoia is often focused on ethnic and racial instabilities. This may be caused by the very heterogeneity of US origins, which contradicts normative notions of pure, reified origins and identity. If, in Jacques Lacan’s analysis, all subjects suffer from internal alienation— a fissure between egoistic and superegoistic functions— the paranoiac can be distinguished as one who fails to come to terms with the realization that we are all defined by this internal ambivalence, lacking any fixed, core being.4 Paranoiacs symptomatically insist on their individuality and perceive a conspiratorial world to help them consolidate their imaginary, psychic boundaries, and in US culture the multicultural other as “alien” (illegal or otherwise) serves as the negative double that both threatens and then affirms (as a locus of negative identification) the paranoiac’s identity. The X-Files simultaneously plays on this oscillation Erasure • 197 in American identity while also triggering an implicit cultural-psychological analysis of its more oppressive constructions of racial and cultural “others.” Most remarkably, the show does not merely repeat the simplified othering of aliens; rather, it rescripts and therein opens up a critique of the classic gesture of marginalization in American anxiety about aliens and alienation. In its first five seasons, The X-Files engaged in a subtle dialogue with aggression against marginalized groups, demonstrating how aggression shores up “whiteness” **and a homogenized American image**.5 Yet beyond each season’s shifting depiction of government- and alien-entwined plots, the very construction of American conspiracy theories and postmodern paranoia is explored, as the show makes visible the buried social implications of centrist politics. Viewers become increasingly aware of how conspiracy narratives must constantly rupture and how demonized aliens are in fact no more than stand-ins for marginalized groups. This occurs as Chris Carter and his team of writers engage in a critical revision of the very genres of hard-boiled detective drama and film noir upon which The X-Files draws.6 In American hard-boiled detective fiction, hoodlums are repeatedly cast as foreigners and marginals, those who must be beaten back because they pose **a threat to the white, heterosexual, middle-class values** espoused in Bogart films and novels by Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett.7 Now, in the particularly American appropriation of noir in the 1990s, aliens provide an emotional cathexis point for anxiety about Americans’ history as colonizers (geographically and culturally) and as scientists—colonizers of knowledge, which can be used for germ warfare, genetic manipulation, surveillance, and spectacular weaponry. In The X-Files, the technological grandeur of alien ships is cause for wonder—a kind of futuristic sublime—while the alien’s role as hyperdefamiliarized scientist taps into fears of technology beyond human reach and available for manipulation toward malevolent ends. The paranormal may be aligned with the feared alien race, which is more technologically advanced, or alternately it may reside in marginalized cultures that have been suppressed in the making of the American image.

#### Wilderson conceives of black people and white people as essentially opposed and he conceives of all other racial groups as “junior partners” to black people.

Bruker 11 (Malia, screenwriter and documentary filmmaker, Journal of Film and Video 63.4, winter, p. 66-68, Ebsco)

Wilderson’s central tenet is the impossibility of analogizing the suffering of black people with that of any other race or group of people since the continued gratuitous violence that characterizes black existence is found nowhere else in history. The structural, noncontingent violence on the black body and psyche has continued from the Middle Passage through slavery and the Jim Crow era and continuing on to today’s ghettos and prison-industrial complex. So although the meaning of suffering for whites (or non-blacks), with few exceptions, is based on issues of exploitation and alienation, the ontology of suffering for blacks is based on issues of “accumulation and fungibility” (14, original quote Saidiya Hartman). In Wilderson’s theory, this condition of being owned and traded is not simply an experience, like, for example, the experience of wage exploitation, but it is the essence and ontology of blackness. For Wilderson, this contrast in white and black essential positioning, and the white creation of and parasitism on the situation, is so polarizing that the relationship between whites and blacks, or “Masters and Slaves” (10), can only be considered an antagonism, as opposed to a negotiable, solvable conflict. Afro-pessimist theory is difficult and taxing for those who would like to imagine the relations between whites, blacks, and Native Americans as better-off, improving, or even fixable. Wilderson is neither simple nor soothing, with dense academic style and an unapologetic disinclination to posit solutions, as his conclusion addresses. “To say we must be free of air, while admitting to knowing no other source of breath, is what I have tried to do here” (338). But Wilderson seems clear in his writing and in interviews that his book is intended as a way of opening up new avenues of dialogue on race in America, and readers will certainly find his work thought-provoking and worth the time it may take to process. Wilderson addresses the inability of most film and political theory to adequately portray the reality of the structures of these relations. He asserts that a new wave of theorists (bell hooks, James Snead, Manthia Diawara) improved Black film theory by taking the discussion beyond the realm of “positive/negative” (60) representations, working more importantly on interrogating film “as an apparatus or institution in relation to the derelict institutional status of Black people” (64). But Wilderson asserts that these theorists fail to address or recognize the utter impossibility of black agency in civil society’s institutions. Wilderson aligns himself with Afro-pessimists such as Hortense Spillers, Ronald Judy, David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Orlando Patterson, and Jared Sexton, whom he references throughout the book. In the lengthy and dense chapter “The Narcissistic Slave,” Wilderson builds heavily on the work of Franz Fanon to argue against the possibility of Lacan and Lacanian film theory to apply to black people. “Whereas Lacan was aware of how language ‘precedes and ex- ceeds us,’ he did not have Fanon’s awareness of how violence also precedes and exceeds Blacks” (76). Wilderson sees Lacan’s process of full speech for whites as contingent on the black Other as a frame of reference, “which remonumentalizes the (White) ego” and “is an accomplice to social stability, despite its claims to the contrary” (75). In more understandable terms, Wilderson examines films created by and involving “Reds, Whites, and Blacks,”1 analyzing narrative strategies and cinematic techniques to explore the structure of relations. Directed by Denzel Washington, Antwone Fisher is a film based on the harrowing experiences and process of self-awareness of the real Antwone Fisher of Los Angeles, California. In a quick and pointed chapter, Wilderson takes exception to Washington’s assessment of the causes of suffering for this particular black man in America. Although Fisher’s childhood was fraught with abandonment, neglect, and abuse, for Wilderson this is the life of a slave in the master’s world, characterized by gratuitous violence and captivity. He highlights the narrative order of Antwone Fisher that would place the blame elsewhere, specifically on “bad” black women, “self-generating catalysts” (104) of their people’s failed familial structures. Wilderson characterizes Haile Gerima’s Bush Mama, made during the Black Liberation Army years of the 1970s, as an astute and direct response to the noncontingent, or gratuitous, violence that characterizes black life in America. Bush Mama follows the energy-drained and desolate Dorothy through her navigations of the welfare system; her fight for her family, torn apart by an unjust prison/policing/military system; and her interactions with the residents of south-central Los Angeles. Wilderson applauds Bush Mama’s unique ability to capture the essence of black female suffering as a symptom of her object positioning in (white) civil society. Wilderson finds it far superior to the white feminism that locates all women’s struggles at the level of wage relations or focuses on “access to and transformation of existing institutions” (135). Gerima seems to blame the dominant society’s institutions as the perpetrators of violence against the black woman’s body and womanhood in a number of scenes that Wilderson analyzes. The abortion clinic that Dorothy’s welfare officer insists she visit, full of poor women of color; the bedroom where Dorothy’s daughter is raped by an on-duty police officer; and the jail cell where Dorothy is beaten to the point of miscarriage of her baby all point to the institutional, gratuitous violence that Wilderson considers the essence of the black position in the United States. Almost a third of this 341-page book focuses on Native American cinema and political theory. Wilderson writes that because reparations or restoration of all that Native Americans have lost would result in the downfall of white society, “Reds” are positioned antagonistically to whites. Native American maintenance of cartographic integrity and natal relations prevents a true analogy to the suffering of blacks, who were stripped of those capacities, but the near genocide of their race positions them antagonistically to whites. However, because most metacommentary on Native American ontology focuses on ideas of sovereignty rather than genocide, this antagonism is often ratcheted down to the level of conflict. Wilderson outlines the work of Native American theorists Vine Deloria Jr., Leslie Silko, and Taiaiake Alfred, assessing how ideas of land restoration, religion, kinship, and governance dominate discussions on the ontology of Native American suffering. He finds solidarity with Ward Churchill, who has kept the modality of genocide as his primary argument, and he suggests that black and Native American theorists must confer and organize along their shared, albeit different, antagonistic positions to white civil society. In this vein, Wilderson acknowledges that Skins, directed by Native American Chris Eyre, contains elements of a suffering that is analogous to that of blacks, specifically through the character of Mogie Yellow Lodge (played by Graham Greene). However, he is ultimately dissatisfied by Eyre’s locating of the essential Native American struggle in the central character Rudy Yellow Lodge, whose suffering is based around spirituality and sovereignty. In Skins’ narrative techniques, Wilderson also interprets a Native American “negrophobia” (221) that prevents a shared antagonistic position with blacks. Although some of Rudy’s rage and angst is directed at the exploitative white-owned liquor store that fuels Native American alcoholism, he is also an active and angry force against the Native American teens who mimic typical black behavior. Investigating the dialogue, mise-en-scène, and director’s commentary, Wilderson perceives in Eyre’s work a fear that Native Americans might enter into the void that is blackness. Although this section on Native American political theory is exhaustive and provides a new and interesting dynamic to the white/black antagonism, it is of note that Wilderson considers all other non-blacks “junior partners” (33) in civil society, staking some claim to the hegemonic power that whites wield. Although it may be true that no other racial group in the United States has the same ontological struggles, for some readers it may seem an oversight to describe groups such as undocumented immigrants as “junior partners” when they are currently facing what most liberatory activists would characterize as slave-like working conditions, mass roundups, inhumane Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facilities, and draconian legislation.

### Link

#### Focusing on Blackness re-entrenches the Black-White paradigm and marginalizes alternative forms of oppression

Westley 99 (Robert – Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School, “INTER-GROUP SOLIDARITY: MAPPING THE INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DYNAMICS OF OPPRESSION: Introduction Lat Crit Theory and the Problematics of Internal/External Oppression: A Comparison of Forms of Oppression and InterGroup/IntraGroup Solidarity”, July 1999, 53 U. Miami L. Rev. 761, lexis)

Sticking to the task at hand meant that it was necessary to defer certain exchanges. But the incitement to critical dialogue represented by these writings, I believe, is a general feature of this collection. In Social and Legal Repercussions of Latinos' Colonized Mentality, Laura M. Padilla argues, for example, that internalized racism and oppression explains the support by some Latinas/os of repressive anti-Latino policies and anti-Black social behavior. Backed up by compelling examples, her argument is nonetheless complicated by the critical race theory of hegemony and its relationship to racial domination. n1 As critical race [\*762] theorist Kimberle Crenshaw explains, the concept of hegemony has been used to account for "the continued legitimacy of American society by revealing how legal consciousness induces people to accept or consent to their own oppression." n2 But in relating the concept of hegemony to the dynamics of racial oppression, Crenshaw finds that coercion rather than consent better explains the way in which people of color are drawn into the ideology of the dominant class. n3 This reworking of the Du Boisian double consciousness thesis emphasizes the historical ways in which people of color resist rather than give in to their own oppression but are faced by a lack of options. Padilla picks up on the psychological dimensions of internalized oppres sion and racism among Latinas/os to examine the political and social consequences of giving in to the master narrative according to which being a white English-speaker is better than being a Latina/o bilingual or Spanish-speaker. In Padilla's psychological exploration, the concept of hegemony implicitly re-emerges at the level of the sociopolitical con sciousness of some Latinas/os who fail to resist dominant ideology, not through lack of options, but through social conditioning and defaulting to majority rhetoric. The re-emergence of neo-Marxian hegemony analysis in its pristine critical legal studies form, n4 as Padilla recognizes, leads to the recon structive paradox: If identification with domination entails self-depricat ing criticism and a discriminatory mentality along the axis of "light" and "dark," then how is it possible to reverse the polarity of racial valuation? Put differently, where being dark-skinned or black is the color of subju gation among those who are raced as Latina/o, how is it possible for the Latina/o community to reclaim and embrace its own African and indige nous elements? Thus, the problem of self-hatred within the Latina/o community presents a dilemma of both intra-group and inter-group transformation. Transformation seems to require identification with subordinated elements within the Latina/o community while at the same time rejecting subordination, whereas identification with domination involves rejection of the subordinated themselves and acceptance of sub ordination. The paradox lies not only in the inability to see oneself among the excluded but also in the belief that such exclusion is legiti [\*763] mate or necessary. The pervasive confirmation of the aims and values of domination implied by hegemony analysis makes it seem impossible to depart the enchanted circle of internalized racism and oppression. n5 There is no easy solution to this paradox, although part of the solu tion would certainly entail analysis and rejection of white racism. The belief that to be light or white is intrinsically and aesthetically better than to be dark or black is a dynamic that reflects white normativity and leads to internalized oppression within communities of color. n6 Adher ence to color hierarchies, as a retrograde acquiescence to the imperatives of Anglo supremacy, inhibits the formation of solidarity among and between Latina/os and other communities of color. Thus, critiquing the construction of whiteness as normative seems integral to the project of reconstituting Latina/os and other communities of color in solidarity. However, the critique of white racism may only be an initial stage in the process of eliminating internalized oppression. For her part, Padilla views the problem of reconstructing antiracist political consciousness as a matter of defining the Latina/o community in terms of self-analysis and solidarity. Starting at the group level, Padilla suggests that sustained development of critical alliances within the Latina/o community is an important first step in overcoming inter nalized oppression. Through solidarity with others who are critical of status quo racism, Padilla believes that an ethic of community accept ance can be nurtured. At the individual level, Padilla suggests that intro spection on the meaning of being Latina/o can bring about revaluation of self and community. The subordinated when they identify with domina tion identify with their own stereotype, foreclosing an encounter with the self as belonging to a community of persons united by a unique experience of oppression. Self-analysis, it is proposed, fosters the insight among individuals that stereotypes of Latinas/os serve to opera tionalize their oppression. To the extent that it raises the problematic of Latina/o self-hatred from an intracommunity standpoint, Padilla's is a privileged critique in reference to which those defined as outside the community may only obtain secondhand access. By contrast, in BlackCrit Theory and The Problem of Essentialism, Dorothy E. Roberts takes on the more open- textured issue of racial particularization implied by Lat Crit, and ques tions whether it would be essentialist to speak of "Black Crit" where the [\*764] focus of analysis is on Black women's experience. Roberts reminds us of the importance of the derivation of the antiessentialism critique and posits that her use of the title "women of color" is intended as an anties sentialist gesture, even though the subject of analysis is in fact Black women. For Roberts, essentialism pertains to the treatment of intra group realities as uniform and universal. Thus, the resort to racial par ticularity is not intrisically essentialist so long as occupation of the center of analysis remains open to the articulation of intergroup com monalities and differences, as well as the occasional decentering of par ticular racial subjects. The matter of decentering the Black subject in particular has gar nered special attention and importance in Lat Crit discourse under the rubric of the Black-White paradigm. n7 The Black-White paradigm refers to the tendency in mainstream discussions of race **to treat race as a binary opposition between Black and White**. This racial lens, of course, leaves those who are non Black and nonwhite out of the picture and on the margins. Lat Crit itself can be seen as in part an attempt to shift the central focus of analysis away from the monotony of Black-White rela tions and onto the Latina/o community. The Black-White paradigm critique challenges the marginalization of non Black/non White racial experience. However, the Black-White paradigm critique is frought with its own dangers of excess and mischaracterization of race relations. For her part, Roberts poses the question troublesome to the Black-White paradigm critique of who should take responsibility for the Black-White paradigm. Critique of the Black-White paradigm should hold Whites account able for the manifold ways in which the problem of racism in dominant discourse is characterized **exclusively as a problem** of anti Black **racism**, **thus marginalizing the racial oppression of non Black, nonwhites**. In other words, the critique of the Black-White paradigm should not be used as an instrument for castigating Blacks who focus their efforts on resistance to antiBlack racism; rather, it should occasion a broader anal ysis of and opposition to the racisms that **affect various communities of color**, including Latina/os. Recognizing that the Black-White paradigm is a shorthand expression for obsessive attentiveness to antiBlack racism does not make attentiveness to antiBlack racism a critical blindspot, nor should it imply that Blacks and Whites are co-equal partners in the nar [\*765] rative exclusion of nonBlack nonWhites from the story of racial oppres sion. Indeed, the paradigm itself must be seen as a measure of the extent to which an antiBlack sociopolitical environment generates the idealiza tion of Blacks as the racial group most necessary for Whites to avoid. Roberts is concerned that avoidance of Blacks in an antiBlack sociopolitical context is dangerous. She argues, for instance, that the Black-White paradigm, rather than benefitting Blacks, instead benefits whites in the market for reproduction assistance and adoption. The para digm, which undoubtedly exists, is thus seen as the locus of negative white obsession with the avoidance of Blacks, an avoidance that may get repeated within minority Black-White paradigm critiques. Echoing Padilla's point about antiBlack social behavior among some Latinas/os, Roberts believes that the Black-White paradigm actually inhibits recog nition and formation of political identities that embrace Blackness as an element of its community self-definition. Therefore, it seems likely that inclusive recognition of multiple and overlapping community identifica tions, such as that which may be embodied by the black Latina/o, may help to alleviate the binarism of dominant racial discourse.

#### Perm crowds-out --- their focus on Black experience will always rise to the top.

**Luna**, Fall **2003** (Eduardo – J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Mexicans/Mexican Americans and Discrimination Against Them Invisible, Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis)

The Black/White paradigm has so thoroughly dominated conventional analysis of race/ethnicity that few in academia, and fewer in the population at large, question its legitimacy, let alone its efficacy for analyzing race/ethnicity. The Black/White paradigm is hegemonic in nature. Its domination of racial/ethnic [\*233] discourse is so widely accepted that scholars fail to consider the use of any other paradigm to analyze racial/ethnic discrimination. Mexicans/Mexican Americans, along with Whites, Blacks, and others, are complicit in the paradigm's hegemonic status. Under the hegemony of the Black/White paradigm, Black experiences receive a virtual monopoly over racial/ethnic discourse. Representations of Black experiences dominate racial/ethnic discourse to such a degree that their position at center stage often goes unnoticed and hence unchallenged. Trina Grillo and Stephanie Wildman have written about a dominant group's sense of entitlement to monopolize discourse in particular forums. n44 Dominant groups assume that their perceptions are the pertinent perceptions, that their problems are the problems that need to be addressed, and that in discourse they should be the speaker rather than the listener. Part of being a member of a privileged group is being the center and the subject of all inquiry in which people of color or other non-privileged groups are the objects. So strong is this expectation of holding center-stage that even when a time and place are specifically designated for members of a non-privileged group to be central, members of the dominant group will often attempt to take back the pivotal focus. They are stealing the center - usually with a complete lack of self-consciousness. n45

#### Perm fails – simply calling attention to other people without genuine focus reasserts the black/white paradigm

Lin 2 (Elbert – J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2003, “BOOK NOTE: Yellow Is Yellow: Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White”, 2002, 20 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 529, lexis)

Setting aside the fact that the asian American race problem is actually unique, it is also - for several reasons - functionally important to the asian American struggle to argue that yellow is yellow. It is not enough to clamor to be seen as yellow (and not as honorary whites or constructive blacks) without advocating yellow as yellow. If we asian Americans are going to claim that the black-white race paradigm is somehow insufficient (as we must), we need to be prepared to follow through. When we do not follow through, we facilitate the very rationalizing we seek to dispel. As Wu recognizes, the ironic legacy of the Civil Rights Movement is that "as a nation, we have become so seemingly triumphant at vilifying racists that we have induced denial about racism." n79 Many white Americans believe that "what should be, already is." n80 As a society, America has made much progress on "racism," when "racism" is defined in terms of black and white. Acknowledging discrimination against asian Americans would be a huge blow to that myth of progress. Instead, non-asian Americans [\*540] deny and rationalize. Arguing that yellow is gray props up this facade. It is a retreat from forcing non-asian Americans to come face to face with anti-asian American discrimination. Asian Americans should challenge the myth of progress by waving a yellow flag and insisting that the discussion about race has not been wholly inclusive. By contrast, the message of "gray" is that yellow is a lesser shade of black and anti-asian American discrimination is really anti-black discrimination. "Gray" couches discrimination against asian Americans in a comfortable way. If yellow is a lesser shade of black, it is a problem that has been or is being solved. Indeed, after convincing non-asian Americans that yellow might be important enough to notice, Yellow trails off and Wu leaves non-asian Americans wondering "so what?" As Scott Shibuya Brown wrote in the Chicago Tribune, "Where Yellow falls short is in articulating a vision beyond its trenchant observations." n81 Similarly, we must argue that yellow is yellow, or we risk encouraging non-asian American denial of discrimination against asian Americans. If yellow is a lesser shade of black, it is, in comparison with the "real thing" (anti-black discrimination), not a problem at all. Consider Wu's appearance on The O'Reilly Factor. In Wu's interview, Fox News analyst Bill O'Reilly appeared to be open to the notion that yellow belongs. Specifically, he asked Wu to point out the "institutional bias [in America] towards Asian Americans." n82 Wu gave him grayness: "[asian Americans discrimination is] one of the themes. But really, it's about how complicated race is. You've got black on white, yellow on brown, you know, you've got all these different hues. Really, the title of the book should be "Gray.'" n83 Then Wu made yellow a lesser shade of black: "Well, [the bias against asian Americans] doesn't compare, I should emphasize, to the bias against African-Americans." n84 O'Reilly appeared to take Wu's backpedaling and qualifications as a cue to lapse right back into rationalizing: "I think Asians get a fair shake in this country. They do very, very well here, as compared to their home countries. They're on a parity with whites as far as salaries are concerned. I'm not seeing it." n85 O'Reilly might have been more responsive if Wu had said that yellow is yellow. He appeared to be ready to listen if Wu could tell him the problem of yellowness - the "institutional bias" against asian Americans. However, as he did in Yellow, Wu argued that yellow is really only gray, and in so doing, facilitated the non-asian American denial of the asian American race problem. [\*541] It is also important to argue that yellow is yellow for the sake of recognition. For instance, some asian American advocates of the black-white paradigm believe that the paradigm has been misunderstood. Janine Kim argues that it is "rife with complexities that reach beyond the races for which the words "black' and "white' stand." n86 I, of course, disagree. I believe that the paradigm cannot **stretch far enough to encompass** the issues most significant to asian Americans - our problems exist on an entirely separate spectrum. Even assuming Kim is right on this point, however, she speaks to only part of the problem. At the end of the day, **no matter how complex or nuanced**, the black-white paradigm **is still cast in terms of** black and white. Professor Juan Perea asserts: The mere recognition that "other people of color" exist, **without careful attention to their voices**, **their histories**, **and their real presence**, is merely a reassertion of the Black/White paradigm. If one conceives of race and racism as primarily of concern only to Blacks and Whites, and understands "other people of color" only through some unclear analogy to the "real" races, this just restates the binary paradigm with a slight concession to demographics. n87 As Wu has noted, "People speak of "American' as if it means "white' and "minority' as if it means "black.'" n88 Thus, the black-white paradigm may address discrimination against asian Americans, but it does not acknowledge the color yellow. Whether our problems are exactly the same as those faced by black Americans or not, the solution is insufficient if it treats all discrimination as anti-black. Non-asian Americans discriminate against asian Americans because we are and look yellow. How can we accept a scheme that so belittles us by making our skin color - that which has caused us so much pain and harm - invisible? Yellowness is a defining characteristic for an asian American's identity: I am male, I am twenty-four, I am five foot nine, and I am yellow. It is important to our very personhood to have our yellow problems addressed, rather than to have our problems addressed as a side effect, or bonus, of addressing black problems. The same logic that undermined "separate but equal" is at work here. In Brown v. Board of Education, n89 the United States Supreme Court determined that separate schools for blacks and whites could seem superficially equal, but lack equality in an intangible sense. "Even though the physical facilities and other "tangible' factors may be equal... . To separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." n90 Similarly, if solving [\*542] anti-black discrimination solved anti-asian American discrimination, black Americans and asian Americans would be superficially equal. However, asian Americans would still lack equality in an intangible sense. Even though black Americans and asian Americans would have equal rights, to fail to recognize yellowness - to only articulate yellow in terms of another "real" color, like black - would generate a feeling of inferiority as to our status in the community that may affect our hearts and minds permanently. Just as there was something inherent to being integrated, there is something inherent to being recognized.

### Alt Solves – Black Body Politics

#### Alternative is a pre-requisite for solving black body politics.

**Jackson 2006** (Ronald – Professor and Head of the African American Studies Department at the University of Illinois, Scripting the Black Masculine Body: Identity, Discourse, and Racial Politics, p. 11)

Blacks can endlessly participate in self-healing exercises in an effort to retrieve custody over the total inscription of their bodies and the debilitating social conditions that attempt redefinition and confinement of their corporeality, but this analysis will reveal that inscriptions of race and racism are not entirely a Black problem; hence, Blacks cannot expunge them alone. All North American cultural groups must participate in deconstructive processes, deciphering the origins and precincts of racist and socially corrupt images, and one way this can be initiated and achieved is by understanding the practice I call “scripting the Black body.” This must be done before racial healing may begin. One way this can be accomplished is via a critical-historical method.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)