# Wake Aff Speeches

## New 1AC

### 1AC - Inherency

#### **Contention One is Inherency –**

#### The Department of Interior’s leasing plan effectively restricts offshore natural gas drilling on federal lands

New 6-30 (Bill, President – New Industires, \*Offers Steel Fabrication Services to Offshore Drilling Projects, “Letters: New Leasing Plan a Step Backward,” The Advocate, 2012, http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion/3484480-123/letters-new-leasing-plan-a)

In late June, the U.S. Department of the Interior released its long-awaited outer continental shelf leasing plan, which effectively blocks offshore oil and natural gas exploration in any new areas for the next five years. Unfortunately, the proposal is a step backward in our effort to achieve energy independence. Under the plan, 85 percent of America’s OCS would be off-limits at a time when exploring every possible energy source is critical to boosting our nation’s economy and creating jobs. Instead of finding out what might be available to us in expansive unexplored areas off our coasts, we will be left to search for oil and natural gas in the same, relatively small portion of the OCS we’ve been exploring for four decades. Not only does this plan run counter to President Barack Obama’s “all of the above” strategy for energy independence, but it shows an outright disregard for the requests of the Gulf Coast states –— including Louisiana — to increase domestic oil production when the Interior Department released a draft of the plan late last year. Interestingly, the Interior Department chose to release this latest version of the OCS plan on the day the Supreme Court announced its health care decision — a thinly veiled attempt to bury it in news coverage of the ruling. But that didn’t keep right-thinking lawmakers from taking notice and working on ways to get America’s economy going using sound energy policies. U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., chairman of the House Natural Resource Committee, has written legislation that sensibly revises the plan. While the Interior Department’s plan is to hold just 12 oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, and three in offshore Alaska from 2012 to 2017, the Hastings plan would schedule 28 lease sales total, dramatically increasing drilling opportunities off the Alaskan coast and including a sale of offshore leases in a potentially rich area off the coast of Virginia. The United States is producing more oil and natural gas than ever thanks to increased production on state-owned or private land. However, production on federal onshore land is down 14 percent in the last two years, and down 17 percent on federal offshore areas. Imagine what could happen if we enact legislation that allows us to open new offshore areas.

#### Current legislation is insufficient – certainty is key

Loris 8-6 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

Senator John Hoeven (R–ND) recently introduced the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (DEJA), which would greatly expand access to energy and simplify burdensome regulations that prevent projects from coming online in a timely manner. While the legislation could be improved by further increasing access and removing the top-down energy planning, DEJA would still spur economic growth and drive energy production. Increasing Access to Energy DEJA would accept the State Department’s environmental review of the Keystone XL pipeline as sufficient and allow the state of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline to meet the state’s environmental concerns. The State Department studied and addressed risks to soil, wetlands, water resources, vegetation, fish, wildlife, and endangered species and concluded that construction of the pipeline would pose minimal environmental risk.[1] The construction of Keystone XL would allow up to 830,000 barrels of oil per day to come from Canada to the Gulf Coast and create thousands of jobs. DEJA also directs the Department of the Interior (DOI) to conduct a lease sale off the coast of Virginia. The 2.9 million acres 50 miles off the coast has an estimated 130 million barrels of oil and 1.14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Opening access off Virginia’s coast is long overdue, and the legislation **only opens up a small portion of America’s territorial waters that are off limits**. The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, also co-sponsored by Senator Hoeven, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska.[2] Both DEJA and OPEN increase the royalties that states would receive from energy production, but both could go further to increase state involvement in offshore drilling decisions. Since onshore states already receive 50 percent of the royalties, Congress should also implement a 50/50 royalty-sharing program between federal and state governments involved in offshore drilling. Efficient Permitting and Leasing for All Energy Projects Another important component of DEJA is that it streamlines the permitting of all energy projects. Receiving a permit for any energy project, not just fossil fuels, takes entirely too long. Duplicative and unnecessary regulations slow the process and drive up costs. Furthermore, environmental activists delay new energy projects by filing endless administrative appeals and lawsuits. DEJA would create a manageable time frame for permitting for all energy sources to increase supply at lower costs and stimulate economic activity. DEJA also calls for an end to the lengthy permit process in the Natural Petroleum Reserve area of Alaska. It would require the DOI to approve drilling permits within 60 days and infrastructure permits within six months. Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the **certainty necessary to pursue energy projects**. Freeze and Study Environmental Regulations DEJA would also create transparency and accountability for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by establishing an interagency committee that would report on the full economic impact of the rules implemented by the EPA that affect fuel prices. This includes any part of the production process that would be affected by greenhouse gas regulations. DEJA delays the implementation of Tier 3 fuel standards (designed to replace the Tier 2 regulations issued in 2000) that would lower the amount of sulfur in gasoline but could add 6–9 cents per gallon to the cost of manufacturing gasoline. The EPA has declared no measurable air quality benefits from these standards. DEJA delays the New Source Performance Standards for refineries, which would drive up the cost of gasoline for no measurable change in the earth’s temperature.[3] It would also delay new national ambient air quality standards for ozone, which are unnecessary because the ozone standard set by the EPA is already more than stringent enough to protect human health. Though the delays contained in DEJA underscore the problems with these regulations, the preferred approach would be to prohibit the implementation of these three standards altogether. DEJA would also prevent the DOI from issuing any rule under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 before 2014 that would adversely affect coal employment, reduce revenue from coal production, reduce coal for domestic consumption or export, designate areas as unsuitable for surface mining and reclamation, or expose the U.S. to liability by taking privately owned coal through regulation. While this temporary fix recognizes the federal overreach in coal production, a better approach would be to create a framework that restricts overregulation, empowers the states, balances economic growth and environmental well-being, and creates a timely permitting process for all aspects of coal production.[4] Energy Central Planning Unneeded DEJA would require the federal government to create production objectives for fossil fuels and renewable energy and allow the relevant agencies to make additional lands available to meet those objectives. The bill would also require the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a critical minerals list and create comprehensive policies to increase critical mineral production. A much simpler and effective solution would be to open all federal lands for energy production of all sources and allow the private sector to determine what sources of energy and what technologies meet America’s electricity and transportation fuel demand. Too often the use of critical minerals has been used as cover for subsidies and extensive government intervention in a major industry. If there are clear military needs for certain critical materials, these should be met by government action. Absent that, streamlining the bureaucracy that has expanded around mining and **opening access is the only necessary federal action surrounding critical minerals**.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce production restrictions on federal lands in the Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas production

### 1AC – Exports

#### Contention 2 : LNG Exports

#### Currently, perception of inadequate supply blocks LNG exports – new, sustainable supply is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).4 According to the Energy Information Adminis- tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over potential exports **hinges on the prospects for its sustained availability and development**. For exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and **compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses**. There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resources—the volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. Based on the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable natural gas resource in the United States. In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production. The productivity of shale gas wells has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

#### Perception is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are **valid** depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for **shale gas reserves are uncertain**, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic.

#### Lifting access restrictions in the OCS is key

Hartley and Medlock 7 (Dr. Peter, Professor of Economics – Rice University, Rice Scholar – Baker Institute for Public Policy, and Dr. Kenneth B., Fellow in Energy Policy – Baker Institute for Public Policy, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Economics – Rice University, “North American Security of Natural Gas Supply in a Global Market,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, November, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/energy-forum/publications/energy-studies/docs/natgas/ng_security-nov07.pdf>)

Higher Lower 48 production as a result of opening access also results in lower imports of LNG. Figure 13 depicts the change in LNG imports when access restrictions are lifted and all other factors remain unchanged. Total LNG imports into the United States in 2015 fall by about 0.85 tcf (or from about 2.4 tcf to 1.55 tcf) and in 2030 by 1.6 tcf (or from 8.8 tcf to 7.3 tcf). This figure includes pipeline imports to the United States from Mexico and Canada that are being reshipped from LNG import terminals from those countries. The decline under this scenario is represents a fall in LNG market share in the United States from just over 31 percent in the Reference Case in 2030 to 22 percent. The LNG receiving terminals that are most directly affected by the opening of access for drilling are those that are closest to these newly opened areas of the Atlantic, Pacific and east Gulf of Mexico OCS. For example, the terminals at Baja, New Brunswick, Pascagoula, Cove Point, and Delaware Bay see the largest volume reductions, in some years accounting for over 80 percent of the difference in overall import flows. This, like the situation with Alaska, represents some cannibalization of market share as companies who might drill in the now restricted OCS would be the same firms whose LNG would be **pushed out of the U.S. market**. One offsetting factor to the loss of market share for LNG and Alaskan supplies is that fact that lower average prices give a slight boost to overall U.S. demand. When access restrictions are lifted, lower prices encourage a modest increase in demand of about 1.3 bcfd by 2030, of which 1.0 bcfd is added natural gas demand in the power generation sector. While the change in average annual prices under this unrestricted scenario is not large, open access also allows existing demand to be served at lower cost. Thus, the net surplus benefits (including added consumer welfare) associated with expanded use of gas at lower prices can be quite large. For example, the benefit to consumers of a $0.42 reduction in price in 2017 (the maximum decrease seen over the modeling period) results in an annual saving of $10.3 billion for natural gas consumers. Of course, the benefits are lower in other years, but cumulative benefits still range into the many billions of dollars. Open access also brings other potential benefits, such as providing a degree of diversification that **mitigates the extent to which a cartel in international natural gas markets can operate effectively to threaten U.S. energy security**. This increased diversification is evident in Figure 14, which depicts the changes in LNG imports by major regions around the world. We see that when access restrictions are removed, the resulting decline in North American LNG imports is accompanied by an increase in LNG imports in other regions around the world. This occurs as global prices are reduced and demand is encouraged. Thus, both energy security benefits as well as welfare benefits accrue to nations outside the United States **as a result of eliminating access restrictions**. 30 In addition, when access restrictions are removed, LNG exports from the more marginal producers, which tend to be OPEC countries (Iran, other Middle East exporters, Venezuela, and to a lesser extent countries in North and West Africa), decline at the margin, falling collectively by 0.27 tcf in 2015, and as much as 0.43 tcf by 2030 (see Figure 15). Even though the volumes are small, the analysis suggests that this **less constrained supply picture** for the global market can contribute to rendering the United States and its allies **less vulnerable to the will** of any one producer, or the collective will of any group of producers, by enhancing the diversification of supply options. The wider swath of alternative supplies for Europe and northeast Asia translates into significantly reduced potential for producers in Russia and the Middle East to exert market power.

#### New onshore terminals are being blocked

Parfomak 9 (Paul W. Parfomak, Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy, and Adam Vann, Legislative Attorney, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety, and Regulation, Congressional Research Service, 12-14-9, <http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Jan/RL32205.pdf>)

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel shipped in large tankers to U.S. ports from overseas. While LNG has historically made up a small part of U.S. natural gas supplies, rising price volatility, and the possibility of domestic shortages have significantly increased LNG demand. To meet this demand, energy companies have proposed new LNG import terminals throughout the coastal United States. Many of these terminals would be built onshore near populated areas. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) grants federal approval for the siting of new onshore LNG facilities under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). This approval process incorporates minimum safety standards for LNG established by the Department of Transportation. Although LNG has had a record of relative safety for the last 45 years, and no LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists, proposals for new LNG terminal facilities have generated considerable public concern. Some community groups and governments officials fear that LNG terminals may expose nearby residents to unacceptable hazards. Ongoing public concern about LNG safety has focused congressional attention on the exclusivity of FERC’s LNG siting authority, proposals for a regional LNG siting process, the lack of “remote” siting requirements in FERC regulations, state permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act, terrorism attractiveness of LNG, the adequacy of Coast Guard security resources, and other issues. LNG terminals directly affect the safety of communities in the states and congressional districts where they are sited, and may influence energy costs nationwide. Faced with an uncertain national need for greater LNG imports and persistent public concerns about LNG hazards, some in Congress have proposed changes to safety provisions in federal LNG siting regulation. Legislation proposed in the 110 th Congress addressed Coast Guard LNG resources, FERC’s exclusive siting authority, state concurrence of federal LNG siting decisions, and agency coordination under the Coastal Zone Management Act, among other proposals. Provisions in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (H.R. 3619), passed by the House on October 23, 2009, would require additional waterway suitability notification requirements in LNG siting reviews by FERC (Sec. 1117). The Maritime Hazardous Cargo Security Act (S. 1385), introduced by Senator Lautenberg and three co-sponsors on June 25, 2009, would require a national study to identify measures to improve the security of maritime transportation of liquefied natural gas (Sec. 6). If Congress concludes that new LNG terminals as currently regulated will pose an unacceptable risk to public safety, Congress may consider additional LNG safety-related legislation, or may exercise its oversight authority in other ways to influence LNG terminal siting approval. Alternatively, Congress may consider other changes in U.S. energy policy legislation to reduce the nation’s demand for natural gas or increase supplies of North American natural gas and, thus, the need for new LNG infrastructure.

#### Offshore terminals are key

Kilisek 12 (Roman, “The Bright Future of Floating LNG Liquefaction, Regasification and Storage Units”, 7/19, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/07/19/the-bright-future-of-floating-lng-liquefaction-regasification-and-storage-units/)

This is a newsworthy event in the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) industry because it is the first time that a floating liquefaction unit is moving from concept to commercial reality. What are the advantages of those floating LNG facilities over conventional liquefaction plants? First off, there is an obvious advantage in tapping offshore resources. In addition to the ability to station the floating vessel directly over distant offshore fields and thereby saving on a costly subsea pipeline to shore, it allows the operator of the facility to move the production facility to a new location once a field is depleted. This would also allow energy companies to exploit smaller fields and now **earn a realistic return on investment**. **Other cost savings are to be expected during the construction phase** for the required marine and loading facilities which often end up costing billions of dollars. Finally, in a world full of risk it can significantly reduce the security and political risk (inter alia, environmental regulation and permits) involved in choosing a land-based site for LNG export facilities in African countries (Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique) and countries in the Middle East as well as South America. The US should contemplate something like this along the East Coast for export to Europe, and along the West Coast for export to South America (Chile) and Asia.

#### Global export contracts are being renegotiated – now is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see Figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates.108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already being felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage.109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract.110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts.111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (Figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020.

#### Scenario 1: Japan

#### LNG exports will go to East Asia – it’s economical and helps meet growing demand

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Owing to growing gas demand, limited domestic supply, and a more rigid and expensive pricing structure, Asia represents a near-to-medium term opportunity for natural gas exports from the United States. The expansion of the Panama Canal by 2014 will allow for LNG tankers to traverse the isthmus, thereby improving the economics of U.S. Gulf Coast LNG shipments to East and South Asian markets. This would make U.S. exports competitive with future Middle Eastern and Australian LNG exports to the region. However, challenges and uncertainties remain on both the demand and supply side. The development of indigenous unconventional gas in China or India may occur at a faster rate than currently forecast, dampening demand for LNG imports to the region. A change in sentiment in Japan may see nuclear power restarted at a greater rate than currently anticipated; alternately, a greater-than-expected penetration of coal in the Japanese electricity sector would suppress gas demand. A change in the cost of Australian LNG production or a reversal of the Qatari moratorium on gas development could disrupt the current supply projections, as could the discovery of new conventional or unconventional resources. For instance, on December 29, 2010, Noble Energy, a U.S. oil and gas exploration company, discovered between 14 and 20 tcf of gas in Israel’s offshore Leviathan gas field. Since then, other nations on the Eastern Mediterranean are exploring for potentially similarly large gas fields. A number of large natural gas discoveries in Mozambique have also prompted early interest in building significant liquefaction capacity in the Southeastern African nation. The high quality (low sulfur and carbon-dioxide content) and liquid-rich nature of Mozambican gas may make this resource a significant competitor in global LNG markets in the medium term. Finally, the expansion of LNG export capacity from Alaska and the development of LNG export capacity in Western Canada may provide a source of strong competition for U.S. Gulf-coast origin LNG. Although Alaska’s Kenai LNG export facility, which has been exporting small quantities of LNG to Northeast Asia for over 40 years, has been idled temporarily, some companies have demonstrated interest in large-scale exports of LNG from Alaska to East Asia. On March 30, 2012, ExxonMobil, along with its project partners BP and ConocoPhillips, settled a dispute with the Government of Alaska to develop its gas re- sources at Prudhoe Bay. The gas from this field is expected to travel from Alaska’s North Slope to Valdez on Alaska’s southern coast, where it will be liquefied and exported.67 According to FERC, there are currently three Canadian export facilities under consideration in British Columbia: a proposed 1.4 bcf/day terminal at Kitimat (initial production would start at 0.7 bcf/day), which received a 20-year export license in October 2011; a proposed 0.25 bcf/day facility at Douglas Island; and a potential 1 bcf/day facility at Prince Rupert Island. Given the lower transportation costs (as a result of the shorter distance), Alaskan and West Canadian exports may prove to be a source of strong competition at the margin for U.S. LNG in the Pacific Basin.

#### That’s key to US-Japan relations

Cronin et al 12 (Dr. Patrick, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program – Center for a New American Security, Paul S. Giarra, President of Global Strategies & Transformation, Zachary M. Hosford, Research Associate – Center for a New American Security, Daniel Katz, Researcher – Center for a New American Security, “The China Challenge: Military, Economic and Energy Choices Facing the US-Japan Alliance,” April, CNAS, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\_TheChinaChallenge\_Cronin\_0.pdf)

Although energy security has long been an issue for the alliance, a new combination of global energy trends and geopolitical realities will raise the issue to unprecedented levels of importance in coming decades. Whereas an abundant supply of cheap energy underpinned tremendous post- World War II economic growth, future energy supplies are unlikely to be as affordable. Acquiring the right mix of energy sources to maintain sufficient economic productivity – while ensuring a gradual transition away from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy – will be one of the most complex challenges for the alliance in this century. Indeed, the means by which the United States and Japan seek to secure their own energy supplies in a complicated geopolitical environment, respond to the enormous and increasing energy demands of a re-emerging China, and address the future of the development and implementation of civilian nuclear power at home and abroad will have huge implications for the alliance. In the midst of U.S. and Japanese efforts to address their own energy security issues, global demand for energy is increasing at a rapid rate. Total world energy use during the 2010 to 2025 time frame is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent, with China and India accounting for 50 percent of that growth.63 Meanwhile, many countries around the globe depend increasingly on Middle Eastern oil, despite its susceptibility to disruption. Further instability in the Middle East would likely pose a “major geo-strategic stability threat” to the United States, with the potential for cascading economic effects.64 Global natural gas production is increasing, however, shifting currency and power flows to new areas. At the same time, demand for nuclear power has bifurcated – growing strongly throughout the developing world, while reaching an inflection point in both the United States and Japan – with as-yet unknown consequences. Both the United States and Japan are undergoing internal debates on energy strategy, and there is no consensus among leaders in either country. To increase economic productivity, Japan will have to craft a new energy policy. Following the March 11, 2011, partial meltdowns of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant and the subsequent release of radiation, the Japanese people and government have indicated that civilian nuclear power might play a reduced role in the country’s future energy mix. However, any increased reliance on fossil fuels that might result from that decision will make Japan more vulnerable to supply disruptions and price spikes. Previous disturbances in the global energy market have prompted many countries – including Japan – to seek some guarantee of energy supplies outside traditional market mechanisms, including investing in upstream oil production overseas, even if financial logic would dictate otherwise. Meanwhile, the Japanese population favors increased investment in renewable energy sources, which are not yet sufficiently affordable to be a viable alternative. Japan: Running Out of Power and Time Japan suffered from its reliance on foreign energy following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. Although these supply disruptions led to massive growth of the domestic nuclear power industry, Japan continues to be the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with 90 percent of its supply originating overseas. In addition, Japan is the world’s second-largest importer of coal – all of which comes from abroad – and the third-largest importer of oil.65 Reliance on energy imports results in extremely low energy self-sufficiency (18 percent) compared with either the United States (75 percent) or China (94 percent).66 Although the nature of the global energy market offers some insulation because of supply-and-demand dynamics, Japanese reliance on imported energy also leaves the country more vulnerable to shocks. In a nation that already relies heavily on imported energy, the Fukushima nuclear disaster complicated the country’s long-term strategy of cultivating domestic energy sources. With much of the population wary of nuclear power following the radiation leaks and inaccurate government statements during the disaster, Japan’s efforts to diversify and secure its energy sources have lost public support. The United States also finds itself in the midst of a heated debate over energy security. The nation consumes large amounts of energy, and Americans are showing frustration with rising gas prices. There continues to be support for a shift to renewable energy sources, but these sources – including solar, wind, biomass and geothermal power– remain costly and have not yet reached the level of economic competitiveness. Meanwhile, technological advances have increased the projected amounts of recoverable oil and natural gas on U.S. land and in its surrounding waters. However, the widely publicized 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and reports of contaminated water sources as a result of the natural gas extraction method known as hydraulic fracturing have mobilized opponents against increases in domestic drilling. Nonetheless, the picture is somewhat rosier for the United States than for Japan. Although the United States, like many industrialized countries, is witnessing a relative plateau in its overall energy demand, its energy consumption from primary fuel is expected to rise from 98.2 quadrillion Btu (British thermal units) in 2010 to 108.0 quadrillion Btu in 2035.67 Largely as a result of advances in recovering shale gas – natural gas trapped in shale formations, only recently made cost-effective to extract – the United States is projected to become a net LNG exporter by 2016, a net pipeline exporter by 2025 and an overall net natural gas exporter by 2021.68 The United States is also poised to increase its crude oil production from 5.5 million barrels per day in 2010 to 6.7 million barrels per day in 2020.69 The apparent move away from nuclear power in Japan following the Fukushima reactor meltdowns, together with the shale gas revolution in the United States, is shifting the energy security environment. Currently, Japan harbors concerns about the reliability of future U.S. energy supplies, which may be influenced by “shifting political winds in American energy policy.”70 Thus, the United States could help reduce the volatility of Japanese fossil fuel imports – which appear set to remain high – by providing a stable source of natural gas. However, if the allies fail to consult on this issue, they could drift apart, thereby missing an opportunity to strengthen the alliance.

#### Alliance solves global nuclear war

**Gates 11** (Robert, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “[U.S.-Japan Alliance a Cornerstone of Asian Security](http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)”, Speech to Keio University, 1-14, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)

Over the course of its history, the U.S.-Japan alliance has succeeded at its original core purpose – to deter military aggression and provide an umbrella of security under which Japan – and the region – can prosper. Today, our alliance is growing deeper and broader as we address a range of security challenges in Asia. Some, like North Korea, piracy or natural disasters, have been around for decades, centuries, or since the beginning of time. Others, such as global terrorist networks, cyber attacks, and nuclear proliferation are of a more recent vintage. What these issues have in common is that they all require multiple nations working together – and they also almost always require leadership and involvement by key regional players such as the U.S. and Japan. In turn, we express our shared values by increasing our alliance’s capacity to provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief, take part in peace-keeping operations, protect the global commons, and promote cooperation and build trust through strengthening regional institutions. Everyone gathered here knows the crippling devastation that can be caused by natural disasters – and the U.S. and Japan, along with our partners in the region, recognize that responding to these crises is a security imperative. In recent years, U.S. and Japanese forces delivered aid to remote earthquake-stricken regions on Indonesia, and U.S. aircraft based in Japan helped deliver assistance to typhoon victims in Burma. We worked together in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, earthquakes in Java, Sumatra, and Haiti, and most recently following the floods in Pakistan. These efforts have demonstrated the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is of real and life-saving value. They also provide new opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese forces to operate together by conducting joint exercises and missions. Furthermore, U.S. and Japanese troops have been working on the global stage to confront the threat of failed or failing states. Japanese peacekeepers have operated around the world, including the Golan Heights and East Timor and assisted with the reconstruction of Iraq. In Afghanistan, Japan represents the second largest financial donor, making substantive contributions to the international effort by funding the salaries of the Afghan National Police and helping the Afghan government integrate former insurgents. Japan and the United States also continue to cooperate closely to ensure the maritime commons are safe and secure for commercial traffic. Our maritime forces work hand-in-glove in the Western Pacific as well as in other sea passages such as the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, where more than a third of the world’s oil and trade shipments pass through every year. Around the Horn of Africa, Japan has deployed surface ships and patrol aircraft that operate alongside those from all over the world drawn by the common goal to counter piracy in vital sea lanes. Participating in these activities thrusts Japan’s military into a relatively new, and at times sensitive role, as an exporter of security. This is a far cry from the situation of even two decades ago when, as I remember well as a senior national security official, Japan was criticized for so-called “checkbook diplomacy” – sending money but not troops – to help the anti-Saddam coalition during the First Gulf War. By showing more willingness to send self-defense forces abroad under international auspices – consistent with your constitution – Japan is taking its rightful place alongside the world’s other great democracies. That is part of the rationale for Japan’s becoming a permanent member of a reformed United Nations Security Council. And since these challenges cannot be tackled through bilateral action alone, we must use the strong U.S.-Japanese partnership as a platform to do more to strengthen multilateral institutions – regional arrangements that must be inclusive, transparent, and focused on results. Just a few months ago, I attended the historic first meeting of the ASEAN Plus Eight Defense Ministers Meeting in Hanoi, and am encouraged by Japan’s decision to co-chair the Military Medicine Working Group. And as a proud Pacific nation, the United States will take over the chairmanship of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum this year, following Japan’s successful tenure. Working through regional and international forums puts our alliance in the best position to confront some of Asia’s toughest security challenges. As we have been reminded once again in recent weeks, none has proved to be more vexing and enduring than North Korea. Despite the hopes and best efforts of the South Korean government, the U.S. and our allies, and the international community, the character and priorities of the North Korean regime sadly have not changed. North Korea’s ability to launch another conventional ground invasion is much degraded from even a decade or so ago, but in other respects it has grown more lethal and destabilizing. Today, it is North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of nuclear know-how and ballistic missile equipment that have focused our attention – developments that threaten not just the peninsula, but the Pacific Rim and international stability as well. In response to a series of provocations – the most recent being the sinking of the Cheonan and North Korea’s lethal shelling of a South Korean island – Japan has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Republic of Korea and the United States. Our three countries continue to deepen our ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks – the kind of multilateral engagement among America’s long-standing allies that the U.S. would like to see strengthened and expanded over time. When and if North Korea’s behavior gives us any reasons to believe that negotiations can be conducted productively and in good faith, we will work with Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China to resume engagement with North Korea through the six party talks. The first step in the process should be a North-South engagement. But, to be clear, the North must also take concrete steps to honor its international obligations and comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Any progress towards diffusing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula must include the active support of the People’s Republic of China – where, as you probably know, I just finished an official visit. China has been another important player whose economic growth has fueled the prosperity of this part of the world, but questions about its intentions and opaque military modernization program have been a source of concern to its neighbors. Questions about China’s growing role in the region manifest themselves in territorial disputes – most recently in the incident in September near the Senkaku Islands, an incident that served as a reminder of the important of America’s and Japan’s treaty obligations to one another. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. Nonetheless, I disagree with those who portray China as an inevitable strategic adversary of the United States. We welcome a China that plays a constructive role on the world stage. In fact, the goal of my visit was to improve our military-to-military relationship and outline areas of common interest. It is precisely because we have questions about China’s military – just as they might have similar questions about the United States – that I believe a healthy dialogue is needed. Last fall, President Obama and President Hu Jin Tao made a commitment to advance sustained and reliable defense ties, not a relationship repeatedly interrupted by and subject to the vagaries of political weather. On a personal note, one of the things I learned from my experience dealing with the Soviet Union during my earlier time in government was the importance of maintaining a strategic dialogue and open lines of communication. Even if specific agreements did not result – on nuclear weapons or anything else – this dialogue helped us understand each other better and lessen the odds of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The Cold War is mercifully long over and the circumstances with China today are vastly different – but the importance of maintaining dialogue is as important today. For the last few minutes I’ve discussed some of the most pressing security challenges – along with the most fruitful areas of regional cooperation – facing the U.S. and Japan in Asia. This environment – in terms of threats and opportunities – is markedly different than the conditions that led to the forging of the U.S-Japan defense partnership in the context of a rivalry between two global superpowers. But on account of the scope, complexity and lethality of these challenges, I would argue that our alliance is more necessary, more relevant, and more important than ever. And maintaining the vitality and credibility of the alliance requires modernizing our force posture and other defense arrangements to better reflect the threats and military requirements of this century. For example, North Korea’s ballistic missiles – along with the proliferation of these weapons to other countries – require a more effective alliance missile defense capability. The U.S.-Japan partnership in missile defense is already one of the most advanced of its kind in the world. It was American and Japanese AEGIS ships that together monitored the North Korean missile launches of 2006 and 2008. This partnership –which relies on mutual support, cutting edge technology, and information sharing – in many ways reflect our alliance at its best. The U.S. and Japan have nearly completed the joint development of a new advanced interceptor, a system that represents a qualitative improvement in our ability to thwart any North Korean missile attack. The co-location of our air- and missile-defense commands at Yokota – and the associated opportunities for information sharing, joint training, and coordination in this area – provide enormous value to both countries. As I alluded to earlier, advances by the Chinese military in cyber and anti-satellite warfare pose a potential challenge to the ability of our forces to operate and communicate in this part of the Pacific. Cyber attacks can also come from any direction and from a variety of sources – state, non-state, or a combination thereof – in ways that could inflict enormous damage to advanced, networked militaries and societies. Fortunately, the U.S. and Japan maintain a qualitative edge in satellite and computer technology – an advantage we are putting to good use in developing ways to counter threats to the cyber and space domains. Just last month, the Government of Japan took another step forward in the evolution of the alliance by releasing its National Defense Program Guidelines – a document that lays out a vision for Japan’s defense posture. These guidelines envision: A more mobile and deployable force structure; Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities; and A shift in focus to Japan’s southwest islands. These new guidelines provide an opportunity for even deeper cooperation between our two countries – and the emphasis on your southwestern islands underscores the importance of our alliance’s force posture. And this is a key point. Because even as the alliance continues to evolve – in strategy, posture, and military capabilities – to deal with this century’s security challenges, a critical component will remain the forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan. Without such a presence: North Korea’s military provocations could be even more outrageous -- or worse; China might behave more assertively towards its neighbors; It would take longer to evacuate civilians affected by conflict or natural disasters in the region; It would be more difficult and costly to conduct robust joint exercises – such as the recent Keen Sword exercise – that hone the U.S. and Japanese militaries ability to operate and, if necessary, fight together; and Without the forward presence of U.S. forces in Japan, there would be less information sharing and coordination, and we would know less about regional threats and the military capabilities of our potential adversaries.

#### Scenario 2: Russia

#### U.S. LNG exports are key to check Russian energy imperialism

Washington Post 9/25 (“ U.S. gas exports could limit Putin’s influence”, 9/25/12, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-natural-gas-exports-could-limit-vladimir-putins-influence/2012/09/25/e949342c-0691-11e2-858a-5311df86ab04_story.html>)

Gazprom finances Russian President Vladimir Putin’s corrupt political system. Under Mr. Putin’s direction, it has also been a notorious international villain, tying delivery of its precious fuel, a matter of life and death during European winters, to the Kremlin’s political agenda. But with the United States no longer demanding massive quantities of liquefied natural gas from Russia or anywhere else — thus freeing up fuel for others — and gas production ramping up elsewhere, the economics that enable Gazprom’s abuse are changing. The company, to be sure, is still a monster. It claimed $44 billion in profit last year — and that’s just what it reported. It provides most or all of the natural gas for many Eastern European nations, and it still has lucrative long-term supply contracts with European customers that link Gazprom’s prices to the price of oil. However, a recent Brookings Institution analysis reported that a looser natural gas market has already empowered German utilities to renegotiate those contracts; some European customers are even ignoring them altogether and buying cheaper liquefied natural gas on spot markets. If the United States begins exporting natural gas, it would only encourage positive long-term structural changes in this international trade — **away from Kremlin domination and toward a larger and more nimble world market.** European countries would not be the only ones to feel this effect. Gazprom intends to enter the gas-hungry Asian market, and **it might find that it has less leverage over its potential customers** than it had expected to wield. If the economic case for allowing U.S. natural-gas exports, which we have made in other editorials, doesn’t persuade those fighting to limit them, the possible geopolitical benefits should. With new supply from America and others sloshing around the world market later this decade, Mr. Putin might have to make a choice — between propping up a dysfunctional and decreasingly profitable monopoly or finally liberalizing the Russian energy sector, to the benefit of customers, shareholders, Russia’s neighbors and, ultimately, Russia, too.

#### Absent that, Russia military influence is inevitable – that causes Senkaku Island conflict, undermines counter-terror operations, and makes conflict inevitable

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former director for China affairs in policy planning at the U.S. Department of Defense., 2/11/09, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=96417>)

After the end of the Cold War and a period of Perestroika, the post 9/11 world ushered in once more a period of Realpolitik in the international security environment. However, Russia’s prime minister and former president Vladimir Putin appeared to have the foresight that Perestroika would not last: his 1997 Ph.D. dissertation at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute viewed the demise of the Soviet Union as the ‘greatest catastrophe of the 20 th century’ and argued for utilising the Russian resource sector to once again reassert Russia’s imperial status. 2 Indeed, under his leadership beginning in 1999 3 , he has systematically established Gazprom and energy as the bedrock of Russian foreign policy and power projection around the globe, and through the bloc of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 4 is asserting its power in the Eurasia region spanning from the EU to Iran in the Middle East, to the Caspian Region/Central Asia and onto South Asia and the Far East. Its foreign policy of weaponisation of energy is demonstrated by invasion of Georgia in 2008 over the BTC pipeline that bypasses Russian control, cutting gas and oil supplies to former Soviet Republics, dividing New Europe and Old Europe via bilateral energy deals with Germany (e.g., Nord Stream), Italy (e.g., South Stream to undermine Nabucco 5 ), at the expense of Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, Belarus, etc. Moreover, Russia has emphasised SCO interests over UNSC interests, and have, along with its SCO partner China, consistently watered down UNSC sanctions against Iran (SCO observer member) and DPRK 6 nuclear issues. Given that China needs Iran’s energy, Russia needs Iran as a foothold into the Middle East, and Iran needs SCO membership to counter international isolation as well as Russia and China’s UNSC votes, these SCO actors seem to act more cohesively within the SCO framework vis-àvis other regional and international organisations. With Iran’s recent calling for a SCO currency and SCO bank 7 to undermine U.S. and western influence, and SCO’s increasingly ambitious military exercises and recent defence agreement with CSTO 8 , this emerging Eurasian economic and security alliance will challenge NATO and western interests and thus bears watching. Russian Energy Imperialism and the SCO Russia appears to have a three-prong approach in re-asserting itself as an imperial power: energy, financial/economic, and military. Energy Weapon As Marshall Goldman portrayed in Putin, power and the New Russia Petrostate 9 , he was privy to visit Gazprom’s dispatching centre headquarter in Moscow, and witnessed the map covering 100-foot wall of a room with a spiderweb-like maze of natural gas pipelines reaching from East Siberia west to the Atlantic Ocean and from the Arctic ocean south to the Caspian and Black Seas. With a flick of a switch these dispatchers could freeze entire countries and have indeed done so in the past with former Soviet Union republics and most recently with Ukraine in January 2009. Russia’s energy strategy is to create energy dependence via monopolistic control of pipelines and acquisition of transit countries’ internal distribution network. 10 For example, Gazprom offered to cancel debt and charge lower prices if Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia would give Gazprom equity stake in their domestic pipeline networks. By owning the networks, Gazprom can maintain monopoly control and economic rent. 11 Due to the high sunk cost and entry barrier of building pipelines, there is rarely a second standing pipeline from another supplier reserved for emergencies. As such, consumers tend to be locked into long-term contracts and therefore dependency on a dominant supplier. Ronald Reagan understood the vulnerability of monopoly tendencies in natural gas pipelines and tried to prevent USSR from building them to W. Europe. In 1984 he asked Thatcher to stop the English firm, John Brown Engineering, from selling Soviets the compressors they needed to move the gas through the pipeline from the Urengoi natural gas field in West Siberia to Germany, but the efforts failed and the pipeline was completed in 1985. 12 Today, Germany imports 40% of its natural gas from Russia, the highest in any W. European country, and is projected to reach 60% in the next decade. 13 Despite EU’s efforts to foment a common energy policy to decrease dependency, Russia has been effective with its “divide and conquer” strategy in dividing Old and New Europe with lucrative bilateral deals with Germany, Italy, France that bypass many transit countries in New Europe. 14 Economic Weapon In tandem with this energy prong of Russian strategy is weaponisation of currency and mercantilist economic policies within the SCO framework. Iran has recently proposed to create an SCO currency and bank to strengthen intra-regional ties. 15 Given that China has $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves 16 --the largest in the world—a move to a common currency (including reserves of 4 observer members) would significantly reduce the influence of U.S. dollar and western currencies in the global capital market. Additionally, Russian President Medvedev in a January 2009 visit to Uzbekistan also called for a stronger SCO and increase economic ties with CIS’ Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) and CSTO. 17 This emerging China-Iran-Russia axis has been noted and dubbed “that other axis” by Asia Times Jephraim P. Gundzik, who wrote in 2005 that “Beijing’s increasingly close ties with Moscow and Tehran will thwart Washington’s foreign policy goal of expanding U.S. security footholds in the Middle East, Central Asia and Asia.” 18 Military Weapon Indeed the creeping militarisation of SCO and 2007 defence ties with CSTO merit further investigation. Although not yet a military alliance, SCO is moving towards that trajectory as measured by: (1) Increased security cooperation: (2) Increased CSTO-SCO ties; (3) Energy Security; and (4) Connection with the West. 19 Firstly, despite denials of the military nature of the SCO, in 2007 for the first time a political summit (Bishtek 2007) was amalgamated with war games (Peace Mission 2007). Hitherto defence ministers were the highest-ranking officials to participate in the military exercises; the heads of states presence at the war game was perhaps signalling SCO’s determination to be in command of regional security. This is further demonstrated by the increasingly ambitious nature of SCO military exercises from bilateral to multilateral to joint all-SCO level. Secondly, the concept of “military assistance” (e.g., attack against one is attack against all) may be included in the SCO policy documents. In October 2007 SCO (a political-economic organisation) signed defence agreements with CSTO (a political-military organisation). Because “military assistance” is a key element of a mature security alliance such as CSTO, and because SCO signed a defence agreement with a purely military organisation, there may be a pull of the SCO towards a more military trajectory. 20 This is tied into the increasing military aspects of energy security. Security organisations tend to be involved in energy security such as guarding security of oil & gas pipelines against terrorist attacks, protecting railway lines and deploying rapid reactions forces. In light of SCO’s new cooperation with CSTO, this may lead to eventual standing of reaction forces in the near future regarding energy security. Finally, SCO is increasing ties with NATO—which has arrangements for cooperation with all SCO states except China. Since the 1990s, NATO has had bilateral cooperation with five Central Asian states within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework, as well as a special relationship with Russia since 2002 called NATO-Russia Council. 21 In November 2005 SCO developed a contact group in Afghanistan and have had operational cooperation with NATO. It is looking to expand its military operations westwards from Central Asia and may joint NATO with contingents in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. The SCO is a formidable organisation that brings together almost half the world’s population (including observers), with several nuclear weapons states (China, Russia, India, Pakistan and perhaps Iran), and includes key energy exporters in Central Asia as well as some of the world’s fastest growing economies. Because recent indicators point SCO towards a trajectory of mature security alliance, it behooves the U.S. and EU to closely monitor this trend and hedge against Russia and Iran from using it for anti-western policies. In Europe, Russia is pursuing an aggressive “divide and conquer” strategy to prevent the EU from fomenting a common energy policy and increase energy diversification. Germany is the top importer while Italy follows behind. As such, Russia has partnered with Germany to build Nord Stream and with Italy to build South Stream pipelines in order to control the flow of Russian and Central European energy supply to W. Europe. Despite some pundits arguing that these two projects are based on purely commercial reasons of supply and demand, in light of recent Russian invasion of Georgia and gas supply cut-off to Ukraine, these two projects must also be examined within the security dimension as they have important strategic implications for the U.S. and EU. Nord Stream: Russian Military Presence & Intelligence Surveillance in the Baltic Region The Nord Stream project in 2005 proposes two natural gas pipelines from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. Legally it is a Swiss company, but economically it is a joint venture between Russia, Germany and Netherlands, driven by Russia geopolitical interests. 22 Although it has invested €8 billion to the project, due to its lack of transparency, some experts project the cost may reach €10-15 billion. 23 Additionally, there are negative implications for this proposed pipeline—increased EU energy dependency on Russia, reduction of ability of small members to act as security providers in region if energy security is undermined, and increased Russian military presence in the Baltic region. Sweden for one fears the risk of Nord Stream as a catalyst for increased Russian military presence and intelligence surveillance. Putin has proclaimed that during construction phase, Russia Baltic Sea Navy would protect Nord Stream pipelines. 24 Additionally, the risers and pipelines are excellent platforms for sensors of various kinds—radars, hydro-acoustic systems and sonars to act as eyes and ears for monitoring the system as well as intelligence surveillance. This would give Russia an intelligence edge in the Baltic Sea concerning all air, surface, and sub-surface activities—especially around Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, and NATO members’ military exercises. This is a realistic risk, given Russia’s past history of installing fiber optic cable along the Yamal pipeline without informing the Polish government in advance. 25 As such Sweden has insisted Nord Stream need approval of all countries whose territories will be traversed by the pipeline. Should the Russians build pipelines without approval of countries in the region, the Swedish military has drawn up plans and are fully prepared to sabotage the pipeline if and when it is built. 26 South Stream: Undermine Nabucco and EU Energy Diversification South Stream is a project between Russian Gazprom and Italian Eni. If constructed, South Stream is projected to be the most expensive pipeline at €12.8 billion and impact EU security relations. 27 The project was announced on 23 June 2007, in reaction to EU’s 2004 decision to focus on Nabucco for energy diversification. When Russia cut off gas to Ukraine in January 2006, the project was elevated and included in European Commission’s Strategic Energy Review, released 10 January 2007, calling for priority of energy supply diversification. Nabucco is non-Russian controlled and a direct Caspian Sea-Middle East-EU southern gas corridor, and South Stream’s route is almost identical to Nabucco. The pipeline has a planned capacity of 31 billion cubic metres to begin in Beregovaya, Russia, and cross the Black Sea to Varna, Bulgaria. Both Nord Stream and Nabucco will bring gas to Austria’s Baumgarten gas storage and distribution hub, a clearinghouse for gas coming to Europe. In January, Austria’s OMV signed a deal giving Gazprom 50% ownership in Baumgarten and its trading floor, and is leading efforts to bring Gazprom into the Nabucco project in order to undermine EU energy diversification from Russia. 28 Russia is also consolidating its control over energy sources elsewhere in Middle East and North Africa (MENA countries). Russia and Iran had called for forming a gas cartel. While Russia, Qatar and Iran hold 56% of the world’s gas reserves, with addition of Venezuela, Algeria and Libya the cartel would have 2/3 of the world’s reserves. Indeed, Russia’s duplicitous stance in the UNSC is highlighted by the 13 July 2008 energy partnership between Gazprom and Iran’s NIOC, at a time when Russia was supposedly working with the U.S. and EU to ensure Iran has no room to manoeuvre in its nuclear weapons ambitions. 29 It also courted Turkey to be a participant in a Russian-Iranian partnership as the third investor to develop Iran’s South Par gas field, which culminated in the November 2008 Turkey-Iran $12 billion deal. 30 Finally, in the Africa region, in March 2008 Italian Eni agreed to share with Gazprom its development quotas for Libyan gas deposits. 31 Eni holds LNG processing facilities in Libya and this gives Gazprom control over another alternative European energy source. 32 In April 2008, Putin cancelled $4.5 billion Libyan debt and oversaw the signing of arms sales and joint ventures agreement between Gazprom and Libyan National Oil Corporation. Gazprom is looking to control Libyan gas and southern Mediterranean transit route that would further threaten Europe energy security, as well as engaging in talks to pipe Nigerian gas to Europe across the Sahara Desert. 33 Russia Energy Imperialism in Middle East Iran as Foothold in the Middle East Russia has longstanding interest in the Middle East, and a key Russia-Iran 1921 treaty stipulates that if a country attacks Russia via Iran, Russia can invade Iran to counter this threat. 34 In the 1980s Ariel Sharon warned Americans the danger of USSR using Iran-Iraq war to enter Iran and taking over its energy resources. 35 Russian military intervention remains a plausible threat should the U.S. and Israel conduct air-strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations, and even more so should Iran become a member of the SCO. Moreover, Russians had planned to meddle in Israel during the June 1967 Six Day War and flew Soviet photo-reconnaissance MiG-25 “Foxbat” aircrafts directly over the Dimona reactor in May 1967. 36 The Soviet Union engineered an operation to provoke Israel into war in order to provide cover for Soviet destruction of Israel’s nuclear programme. Soviet nuclear-missile submarines were poised off Israel’s shores, ready to strike back in case Israel already had a nuclear device. However, the war was over so quickly within six days that the Soviets did not have the chance to carry out its mission. 37 Despite Russia’s support of Iran, it is concurrently making overtures to moderate Arab states in the region to allay their fears of a resurgent and possible nuclear Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been historical rivals for regional hegemony and throughout the Cold War Russo-Saudi relations were chilly, but recently there has been a shift of Saudi Arabia towards Russia as evidenced in the 2007 $4 billion arms deal and increased shuttle diplomacy. 38 In the 1980s, CIA director William Casey worked with the House of Saud to target Russian energy sector by flooding the market with cheap oil, thereby weakening the Russian petro state’s economic power that was over 50% dependent on energy foreign exchange earnings. 39 As such, Russia appears to hedge itself against this risk and is courting many traditional U.S. allies in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the GCC. 40 And, it is reinforcing this hedge with military power by establishing naval ports in the region. Russian Naval Ports in the Middle East In January 2009 Russia announced that it would establish navy bases in Syria, Libya and Yemen. 41 The Syrian port of Tartus could be revived as during the Cold War, the Soviet navy had a permanent presence in the Mediterranean and used Tartus as a supply point. The redeploying of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to the Mediterranean may provide a deterrent to NATO forces, U.S. Sixth Fleet, and may threaten the Suez Canal and Israel. 42 These new ports would allow Russian navy to challenge U.S. CENTCOM, U.S. EUCOM, and NATO. Tensions were high in August 2008 after Russian invasion of Georgia when a build up of NATO and Russian naval forces were underway in the Black Sea, and the expansion of Russian naval power via these new ports would escalate tensions in the future. With Russia’s 1921 defence treaty to Iran and Iran’s 2004 defence treaty with Syria, these three countries are bound to act collectively against aggression to any one of them. Should Iran join the SCO as a member, the U.S., EU and NATO members would need to consider not only countering aggression by either one of these three, but also other members in their collective security alliance. Given Iran’s persistent threat to annihilate Israel and Russian backing with nuclear technology and arm sales to Iran, some pundits have argued for Israel to join NATO as a deterrent against aggression. The case is more compelling given Israel’s recent discovery of massive natural gas reserves offshore near Haifa 43 and potential oil reserves onshore by Haifa 44 , which could entice Russian invasion due to Russia’s own energy depletion 45 and attempts to seek new reserves by staking territorial claims: August 2007 claim in the Arctic region 46 ; 2008 claim to Sergei’s Courtyard (former KGB base) in Jerusalem 47 ; August 2008 invasion of Georgia over BTC pipelines that bypass Russian control 48 ; ongoing territorial disputes with Japan over the Kurile Islands. Given Russia’s pattern of aggressive territorial claims the past years and Iran’s consistent belligerence and support of Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel, Israel has in fact entered into strategic partnership with NATO and held joint military exercises since February 2005. 49 However, there remain obstacles and reservations about Israel joining NATO as a full member, due to their doctrine of self-reliance and freedom of military action, which would be encroached upon in a collective security arrangement. 50 Nonetheless, the notion of free democracies such as Israel, Australia, Japan, South Korea joining NATO to form an arc of freedom to counter emerging threats from totalitarian and rogue regimes continues to be debated and while viewed with reservation by Israel, may be more receptive in Asia. Russian Energy Imperialism in Asia Russian Energy Diplomacy in East Asia Russia is interested in using energy security as an anchor to assert itself as a regional hegemon in the Asia Pacific via oil & gas resources 51 in the Russia Far East (RFE). RFE consists of 40% of Russia landmass but only 10% of its population. Over the years there has been a trend of RFE integration into Northeast Asia and disintegration from the rest of Russia that in 2006 Putin described the situation in RFE as “a threat to national security” and stressed the need “to invest money in the Far East”. 52 Regional unrest is most recently demonstrated by violent protests in Vladivostok on 31 January 2009 53 and officials admitting that RFE is “completely cut off from the rest of Russia” and must “orient itself” to Asian countries rather than to European Russia. RFE imports 90% of goods from Asian countries and there is a trend the area may become a raw material supplier for China and Japan. 54 As such, Russia is attempting to reverse this trend by using energy projects to anchor the RFE and supply energy goods to Asian consumers such as China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. It is hoping to tie East Asia, RFE and the rest of European Russia together via the Iron Silk Road, which would connect the Trans-Siberian Railway to the Trans-Korean Railway to supply European goods as well as energy exports. Moreover, it is also offering incentives such as interest-free loans for Russians to settle in the RFE. However, Russian energy diplomacy in East Asia is still fraught with many obstacles. Oil & gas exploration and production in the greenfield province of East Siberia is expensive due to harsh climatic condition, lack of infrastructure, investment, and western technologies. The East Siberian Pacific Ocean Pipeline (ESPO) that would ensure Russian oil supply to China has faced considerable delays. 55 Even if the pipeline is launched, Russia cannot easily supply Korea and China with gas due to lack of regional grid in East Asia. 56 Given Russia’s end goal of asserting itself in East Asia via energy resources, and the obstacles facing RFE’s near-term energy delivery to East Asian consumers, Russia appears to resort to other means to access and control energy resources for East Asia—e.g., “lock in” long-term bilateral deals with Central Asian energy exporters and asserting control over energy supply; aligning with Iran and courting other Middle East suppliers via ‘arms for energy’ policy; aggressive territorial claims in Arctic Region; forming SCO Energy Club in 2007 and proposing a gas cartel to control supply and coordinate prices. With the increasing **militarisation of Russia’s energy policy** and alignment of totalitarian regimes in the Eurasian SCO bloc, this **has important security implications** for U.S. and its allies in the region. U.S. Alliance Relations and NATO Global Partnership It is no coincidence that in August 2005 SCO kicked off their first joint military exercises in Vladivostok in RFE, underscoring Russia’ concern with RFE secession and China’s angst over Taiwan independence under the then pro-independence President Chen Shui-Bian. 57 In fact China had proposed Zhejiang province across from Taiwan as the site for the military exercise, but when the Russians rejected it as being provocative, they concurred to hold it in Shandong province. 58 The Taiwan contingency is a key flash point for military clashes in East Asia, especially in light of rapid Chinese military modernisation and a recent report by U.S. State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, illuminating the strategic significance of Taiwan in both China and U.S. geopolitical calculus. 59 Given that SCO **is a proxy to advance China and Russian interests** and the 2000 Dushanbe Declaration has specific wording to establish formal support for China regarding “One China Principle,” there is a possibility in a Taiwan scenario for the U.S., under the Taiwan Relations Act, to be drawn into conflict with China and perhaps Russia, Kazakhstan and other SCO members. 60 Indeed Victor Corpus, a retired brigadier general and former chief of the U.S. intelligence service in the Philippines, provides an eerie prediction of war resulting from a Taiwan contingency and how SCO allies could become involved. Corpus writes: “On yet another major front in Central Asia, Russian troops lead the other member countries of the SCO into a major offensive against US military bases in Central Asia. The bases are first subjected to a simultaneous barrage of missiles with fuel-air explosives and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads before they are overrun and occupied by SCO coalition forces.” 61 **The increasing militarisation of the SCO bloc has** strategic **implications for U.S. alliance relations** in East Asia—Japan’s territorial disputes with China over Senkaku Islands and with Russia over Kurile Islands, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, territorial disputes in the South China Sea are flash points that will potentially draw China, Russia and their SCO allies against U.S. and her allies. In face of creeping SCO projection onto Asia Pacific region and an emerging bloc of totalitarian regimes, some scholars have proposed the U.S. and her allies counter this bloc by aligning various bilateral defence alliances into NATO Global Partnership. With the upcoming NATO summit in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009, this would be a good possibility to review criteria of new members. As Eckart von Klaeden, the Foreign Policy Spokesman for Chancellor Merkel’S CDU party posit, it is important to expand NATO relations with partners in Asia who have already contributed troops to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and admit democratic like-minded countries such as Japan, India, Australia etc. to the fold. 62 And, India is a key country for NATO’s mission and reach onto the Indian Ocean. Both NATO and SCO are courting India due to its geo-strategic significance in the Indian Ocean. India is an observer member in the SCO and in the past has been represented by its energy minister to discuss energy deals. At the same time NATO is also cooperating with India with hopes for its entering into a Partnership arrangement. The Indian Ocean is an important region as it is home to U.S. naval base Diego Garcia and naval power projection to secure energy SLOCS from the Middle East to Asia. The U.S. has been encouraging India to forge partnership with NATO and in October 2008 NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Group was deployed to the Indian Ocean to address the problems of piracy. 63 In 2007, after the Malabar Exercise encompassing, U.S. India, Japan, Singapore and Australia, India was invited for the first time to participate in the 2008 U.S.-NATO Red Flag war games. 64 Indeed, without India, NATO’s partnership in the Indian Ocean region would be limited. India has traditionally been a non-aligned nation, but **should Russia use energy to bring India into full SCO membership** at a time when SCO is on a trajectory of increased militarisation (e.g., CSTO-SCO ties, increasingly aggressive military exercises), it could become bound by an eventual SCO ‘mutual assistance’ clause to the detriment of U.S., EU and NATO interests. Two days after NATO deployed its naval forces to the Indian ocean in October 2008, Russia scrambled to project influence onto the region when Moscow stated that a missile frigate from Russia’s Baltic fleet was already heading to the Indian Ocean “to fight piracy off Somalia’s coast,” and shortly afterwards the Upper House of the Russia Parliament announced plans to resume its Soviet-era naval presence in Yemen. 65 It also announced intentions to return to its naval base in Socotra Archipelago, located off the Horn of Africa. 66 The Socotra base was established by the Soviet Union in 1971, and the location is expected to play a role in fighting piracy due to the ability to use small vessels, trawlers and other boats of minor rank as well as providing a reliable logistics system for major ships to allow operations in the Indian Ocean. Given the recent Kyrgyzstan decision, under Russian pressure, to close the Manas airbase 67 , Russian military projection via the Horn of Africa into the Indian Ocean may likewise jeopardise U.S. Counterterrorism efforts. The Horn of Africa is watched through U.S. AFRICOM headquartered in Germany, and Djibouti hosts the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. With Russian inroads into the Horn of Africa via the Socotra base and new defence cooperation with Somalia 68 , its former Cold War ally, this pattern **of recruiting allies whose interests diverge from those of the U.S.** risk bringing Russo-U.S. relations onto a collision course in the region. Over the past years the world has witnessed a disquieting **trend of Russia’s weaponisation of its energy policy to reassert itself as a global superpower**. Admittedly the recent global financial crisis has knocked that off course for the moment, but this is likely to be temporary. After Russian invasion of Georgia, Moscow’s stock market plummeted by more than 50% since its highs in May 2008, and Russia’s strong dependence on energy export revenues and speculative investments render its economy very volatile. 69 Given Putin’s goal of increasing military budget by 28% within the next year and modernising its military 70 , its current economic and budget woes may hinder that ambition. Nonetheless, despite the financial crisis, defence orders remain strong. According to data revealed by deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov, Russia earned more than $8 billion in arms sales in 2008, with $33 billion more in the pipeline. 71 It is to resume arms sales to Lebanon, intensify defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and compete with British, U.S. and French defence contractors for orders from Lebanon, Algeria and elsewhere. It is also looking to increase intra-regional trade of SCO and CSTO members and create a new economic architecture to maintain its economic and military power. 72 Sino-Russian bilateral trade reached $50 billion in 2008 73 , and given that China provides a large energy and trade export market for Russia, in the medium and long-term Russia may be able to ride out the current financial crisis and continue on its military modernisation and strategic ambition. Although SCO is not yet a mature security alliance, under Russian lead it is moving towards that trajectory—aggressive military exercises, agreement with CSTO (a purely military alliance), and possible “military assistance” clause in SCO policy. The U.S and her allies therefore need to monitor the close nexus between energy security and military alliances as manifested through SCO-CSTO ties, and put in place countermeasures to safeguard against Russia-China-Iran axis from using SCO for anti-western policies. To that end, **the U.S. and EU need to work together to reduce Russian energy dependency and seek diversification via non-Russian controlled pipeline**s, renewables, conservation/efficiency measure as well as alternative geographic suppliers from West Africa, Canada, and elsewhere.

[SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization]

#### Russian expansionism results in WMD conflict.

Cohen 96 (Ariel, PhD and Senior Policy Analyst – Heritage, Heritage Foundation Reports, 1-25, Lexis)

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $ 6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East.

#### Senkaku disputes go nuclear

**Emmot**, 6/4/**2008** (Bill – editor of the Economist, Power rises in the east, The Australian, p. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/arts/power-rises-in-the-east/story-e6frg8px-1111116460128)

As well as knitting them, however, this drama is also grinding together Asian powers that had previously kept a strict economic and political separation from one another. China, India and Japan are bumping against each other because their national interests are overlapping and in part competing. **Each is suspicious of the others' motives and intentions** and all three hope to get their own way in Asia and further afield. To have three great powers at the same time may be unprecedented for Asia but it is not for the world. There was a similar situation in Europe during the 19th century, when Britain, France, Russia, Austria and, until German unification, Prussia, existed in an uneasy balance in which none was dominant and none was entirely comfortable, but which nevertheless coincided with a period during which Europe prospered and became firmly established as the world's dominant region. Whether you consider Europe's 19th-century experience with balance-of-power politics as a good or bad omen for Asia depends on how long a sweep of history you consider and on what you think are the most crucial differences between modern times and the world of 150 years ago. If you take a long sweep, then the precedent is bad, since Europe's power balance ended in two devastating world wars. On the other hand, it kept the peace on the continent for about half a century, which would count as an optimistic prospect today. Today the barriers against the use of war as a tool of national policy are far higher: nuclear weapons, public opinion, international law, instant communication and transparency all militate against conflict, though they do not rule it out altogether. The barriers against colonial or quasi-colonial ambitions are higher still. China and India may battle for influence over Burma, but neither is likely to invade it and turn it into a colony. Nevertheless, Asia is piled high with historical bitterness, unresolved territorial disputes, potential flashpoints and strategic competition that could **readily ignite**. There are at least five known flashpoints where it is already clear that any could involve the major powers: the Sino-Indian border and Tibet, North and South Korea, the East China Sea and the Senkaku-Diaoyutai islands, Taiwan and Pakistan.

#### Russian war causes extinction

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why **it is useful to distinguish them from other risks**. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a **whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are** mere ripples **on the surface of the great sea of life**. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) A much greater existential risk **emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and** the **USSR**. **An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might** have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy** or thwart **humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Terrorism results in extinction

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand – Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), July)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,[40](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928" \l "EN0040) and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”[41](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0041) Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”[42](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0042) American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia's use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia's traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

### 1AC – New Advantage

#### Contention 3: Offshore Development

#### Removing OCS natural gas restrictions solves economic collapse and revitalizes the shipbuilding industry

Mason 11 (Joseph – Senior Fellow, The Wharton School, Louisiana State University Endowed Chair of Banking and nationally-renowned economist, “House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Hearing; Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs Legislative Hearing on H.R. 306, H.R. 588, S. 266 and H.R. 285”, 4/6, lexis)

Apart from national energy concerns, however, economic considerations also favor increased development of OCS energy resources. Specifically, the boost provided to local onshore economies by offshore production would be particularly welcome in the present economic climate. Similar to fiscal alternatives presently under consideration, OCS development would provide a long-run economic stimulus to the U.S. economy because the incremental output, employment, and wages provided by OCS development **would be spread over many years**. Unlike those policies, however, this stimulus would not require government expenditures to support that long-term growth. A. The Present State of Offshore U.S. Oil and Gas Production Despite its importance, U.S. oil and natural gas production in offshore areas is currently limited to only a few regions. At the present time, oil and gas is only actively produced off the coast of six U.S. states: Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, California, and Alaska. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas are the only coastal states that provide access to all or almost all of their offshore energy resources. Only two additional states--Alaska and California--are producing any offshore energy supplies. All California OCS Planning Areas and most Alaska OCS Planning Areas, however, were not open to any new facilities until the recent end of the Congressional and Presidential moratoria. The remaining 16 coastal states are not open to new production and are not presently extracting any offshore energy resources. Even without those remaining sixteen states, plus California and Alaska, the OCS is already the most important source of U.S. energy supplies. According to the MMS, "the Federal OCS is a major supplier of oil and **natural gas** for the domestic market, contributing more energy (oil and natural gas) for U.S. consumption than any single U.S. state or country in the world." That is, OCS production presently meets more U.S. energy demand than any other single source, including Saudi Arabia. B. Offshore Oil Production Stimulates Onshore Economies Offshore oil and gas production has **a significant effect** on local onshore economies as well as the national economy. There are broadly three "phases" of development that contribute to state economic growth: (1) the initial exploration and development of offshore facilities; (2) the extraction of oil and gas reserves; and (3) refining crude oil into finished petroleum products. Industries supporting those phases are most evident in the sections of the Gulf of Mexico that are currently open to offshore drilling. For example, the U.S. shipbuilding industry - based largely in the Gulf region - **benefits significantly** from initial offshore oil exploration efforts. Exploration and development also requires specialized exploration and drilling vessels, floating drilling rigs, and miles and miles of steel pipe, as well as highly educated and specialized labor to staff the efforts. The onshore support does not end with production. A recent report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy indicates that the Louisiana economy is "highly dependent on a wide variety of industries that depend on offshore oil and gas production" and that offshore production supports onshore production in the chemicals, platform fabrication, drilling services, transportation, and gas processing. **Fleets of** helicopters and U.S.-built vessels **also supply offshore facilities with a wide range of industrial and consumer goods**, from industrial spare parts to groceries. As explained in Section IV.G, however, the distance between offshore facilities and onshore communities can affect the relative intensity of the local economic effects. The economic effects in the refining phase are even more diffuse than the effects for the two preceding phases. Although significant capacity is located in California, Illinois, New Jersey, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, additional U.S. refining capacity is spread widely around the country. As a result, refinery jobs, wages, and tax revenues are even more likely to "spill over" into other areas of the country, including non-coastal states like Illinois, as those are home to many refining and chemical industries that ride the economic coattails of oil exploration and extraction. II. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS RESERVE ESTIMATES AND THE SOURCES OF THEIR ECONOMIC BENEFITS As described in my 2009 white paper, "The Economic Contribution of Increased Offshore Oil Exploration and Production to Regional and National Economies," available at www.americanenergyalliance.org/images/aea\_offshore\_updated\_final.pdf, significant oil and gas reserves lie under the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the OCS (including Alaskan OCS Planning Areas) contains approximately 86 billion barrels of recoverable oil and **approximately 420 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas**. As noted by the White House, however, the OCS estimates are conservative. Of the total OCS reserves, a significant portion was unavailable to exploration until recently. Specifically, Presidential and Congressional mandates banned production from OCS Planning Areas covering approximately 18 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 77.61 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas. These bans covered approximately 31 percent of the total recoverable OCS oil reserves and 25 percent of the total recoverable OCS natural gas reserves. Economic benefits of utilizing OCS reserves accrue from three primary sources: (1) exploration/platform investments; (2) production; and (3) refining. Sources (1) and (3) produce initial effects--that is, new industry expenditures--today; in contrast, source (2) produce economic effects only once production begins. The analysis therefore considers "initial" economic effects as those that flow from exploration or investments in new refining capacity and long-term economic effects as those that flow from production and ongoing refining. A. Exploration and Offshore Facility Development In contrast to other industries, the high fixed investment costs associated with offshore oil and gas production produce **large initial investments that reverberate throughout the economy**. Once oil or gas reserves are located, billions of additional dollars must be spent before the well produces even $1 of revenue. For example, oil exploration costs can amount to between $200,000 and $759,000 per day per site. Additional production in the U.S. will also require a costly expansion refining capacity as well. Taken together, the fixed expenditures that precede actual offshore oil and gas production can amount to billions of dollars. For example, Chevron's "Tahiti" project in the Gulf of Mexico is representative of the large investments that firms must make before production is achieved. In 2002, Chevron explored the Tahiti lease--which lies 100 miles off the U.S. coast at a depth of 4,000 feet--and found "an estimated 400 million to 500 million barrels of recoverable resources." Chevron estimates that it will take seven years to build the necessary infrastructure required to begin production at Tahiti. The firm estimates that its total development costs will amount to "$4.7 billion--before realizing $1 of return on our investment." As a typical U.S. offshore project, the Tahiti project provides a wealth of information regarding the up-front investment costs, length of investment, and lifespan of future OCS fields. As noted above, the Tahiti field is estimated to hold between 400 million and 500 million barrels of oil and oil equivalents (primarily natural gas) and is expected to require an initial fixed investment of $4.7 billion. Using the mid-point reserve estimate of 450 million barrels of oil equivalent, up-front development costs amount to approximately $10.44 per barrel of oil reserves or $1.86 per 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas reserves. These costs will be spread over 7 years, resulting in average up-front development expenditures equal to $1.49 per barrel of oil and $0.27 per 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas. Chevron also estimates that the Tahiti project will produce for "up to 30 years". Although investment and production times vary widely, the analysis that follows uses the Tahiti project numbers - an average initial investment period of seven years followed by an average production period of 30 years - as indicative of the "typical" offshore project. I will thus assume an average initial investment period of seven years followed by an average production period of 30 years. The speed of OCS development also factors into the analysis. Because most areas of the U.S. OCS have been closed to new exploration and production for almost forty years, it is unclear how quickly firms would move to develop new offshore fields. Given its large potential reserves, however, the OCS is sure to attract significant investment. Without the benefit of government data, a rough estimate suggests that annual total investment in OCS fields would be $9.09 billion per year. Those annual expenditures are expected to last, on average, the full seven years of the development phase. Additional investment in states that already support significant production - Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas - are limited. Some of the greatest benefits accrue to areas that are home to enormous - but unavailable - total reserves: California and Florida. B. Production The likely value of state recoverable oil and gas reserves are estimated using the likely lifetime revenue that could be generated by the project. In that case, average wholesale energy prices provide the information necessary to translate reserves into revenues. Taking the simple average of the EIA's latest inflation-adjusted energy price forecasts through 2030 as provided by its Annual Energy Outlook 2009, the average inflation-adjusted price of oil will be $110.64 per barrel and the average inflation-adjusted price of natural gas will be $6.83 per thousand cubic feet. At these prices, the estimated OCS reserves are worth about $13 trillion. The value of each state's available reserves are calculated as the sum of (1) its share of available OCS Planning Area oil reserves times $110.64 per barrel and (2) its share of available OCS Planning Area natural gas reserves times $6.83 per thousand cubic feet. The same method applies to the valuation of total state OCS reserves. By those estimation methods, states such as California, facing a budget crisis in the current recession, have an estimated $1.65 trillion in resources available in nearby OCS planning areas. Florida, while not facing as dire a fiscal crisis, has about $0.55 trillion in resources available in nearby OCS planning areas. Hence, a **permanent relaxation of all federal OCS production moratoria would unlock more than $3.4 trillion in new production** among all the coastal states. C. Investments in Incremental Refining Capacity Since U.S. refineries are presently operating near maximum capacity increased offshore oil and gas production would also spur investment in new refineries. The U.S. refining industry is presently operating at 97.9 percent of capacity and can no longer depend on excess foreign refining to meet production shortfalls arising from seasonality or repairs. In response, many large refiners are already considering refinery expansions: ConocoPhillips announced that it planned to spend $6.5 billion to $7 billion on capacity expansion at its U.S. facilities; Chevron has also considered a major refinery expansion; and while Shell is completing a $7 billion expansion and its Port Arthur, Texas refinery they are considering further expansion elsewhere. Additional refinery investments are likely to occur in the few U.S. states that already host significant U.S. refineries. This result is largely due to environmental restrictions that severely limit the placement of new refining capacity. Current capacity is primarily concentrated in California, Louisiana, and Texas. The U.S. presently has an operating refining capacity of approximately 6.287 billion barrels of crude oil per year. Conservative estimates of OCS production would add approximately 3.773 billion barrels per year, or about sixty percent of current U.S. operating refinery capacity. Because some OCS refining production would most likely substitute for foreign production, however, the analysis conservatively assumes that only one-quarter of this new OCS production necessitates additional U.S. refinery capacity. That is, I estimate that U.S. refinery demand would increase by 943.25 million barrels per year, or 15 percent of current installed capacity. Even this modest capacity increase would require substantial new investments. In response to existing capacity constraints, Shell is already increasing the capacity of its Port Arthur, Texas refinery. This expansion will take approximately two and one-half years to complete and cost $7 billion. The facility will add 325,000 barrels per day (or 118.6 million barrels per year) in new capacity, at a cost of approximately $59.02 per barrel of new annual capacity. As noted above, since tough environmental regulations effectively limit new refinery capacity to a few states, refinery investments are likely to be limited to only a few states with large existing capacity. These states can be reasonably assumed to be the same states the already have large installed refinery capacity. Hence, incremental refinery capacity will be added predominantly in states already home to large refining capacity--those with a present capacity of more than 200 million barrels per year. There are seven such states: California, Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Expected increases in offshore oil production will induce approximately $22 billion in refining capacity investments each year for two and one half years. California, Texas, and Louisiana will receive the bulk of this investment, but investments of more than $1 billion annually can be expected in Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington. III. INCREASED INVESTMENTS IN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION WILL CAUSE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND TAXES, AND PROFOUND EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES THROUGHOUT THE NATION Onshore state and local economies benefit from the development of OCS reserves by providing goods and services to offshore oil and gas extraction sites. Onshore communities provide all manner of goods and services required by offshore oil and gas extraction. A variety of industries are involved in this effort: shipbuilders **provide exploration vessels, permanent and movable platforms, and resupply vessels**; steelworkers fashion the drilling machinery and specialized pipes required for offshore resource extraction; accountants and bankers provide financial services; and other onshore employees provide groceries, transportation, refining, and other duties. These onshore jobs, in turn, support other jobs and other industries (such as retail and hospitality establishments). The statistical approach known as an "input-output" analysis measures the economic effects associated with a particular project or economic development plan. This approach, which was pioneered by Nobel Prize winner Wassily Leontif, has been refined by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The most recent version of the Commerce Department's analysis is known as the Regional Input-Output Modelling System, or "RIMS II." The RIMS II model provides a variety of multipliers that measure how an economic development project--such as offshore drilling--would "trickle down" through the economy providing new jobs, wages, and government revenues. This analysis can be broken down into two parts: (1) a "direct" analysis measuring the benefits that arise from industries that directly supply offshore oil and gas exploration and (2) the "final" analysis that measures the direct and indirect benefits associated with offshore exploration. The RIMS II model is the standard method governmental authorities use to evaluate the benefits associated with an economic development project. According to the Commerce Department, the RIMS II model has been used to evaluate the economic effects of many projects, including: opening or closing military bases, tourist expenditures, new energy facilities, opening or closing manufacturing plants, shopping malls, sports stadiums, and new airport or port facilities. A. Opening OCS Planning Areas would Unleash More than $11 trillion in Economic Activity The broadest measure of the incremental effect of increased OCS oil and natural gas extraction is the effect on total economic output. Until OCS production begins, onshore communities will realize only the benefits associated with offshore investment. These benefits take two forms: (1) the development of the offshore facilities themselves and (2) the expansion of onshore refining capacity. These two effects, taken together, provide a rough approximation of the additional output that would be created by allowing greater access to offshore reserves. Of course, the investment expenditures and resulting output estimated above is only made to facilitate oil and gas extraction. Once extraction begins, additional economic activity continues for the lifetime of the oil and natural gas reserves. Using the total U.S. multipliers (2.2860 for refining and 2.3938 for extraction), the total increase in U.S. output from initial investment is estimated to be a total of about $0.5 trillion, or approximately $73 billion per year for the first seven years the OCS is open. For comparative purposes, a $73 billion stimulus amounts to approximately 0.5 percent of total U.S. output (GDP) per year. Increased OCS oil and gas extraction would yield approximately $5.75 trillion in new coastal state output over the lifetime of the fields. Approximating the total increase in output associated with increasing offshore resource production throughout the U.S. (including states in the interior), yields approximately $2.45 trillion in additional output. The total increase in output in the United States is estimated to total approximately $8.2 trillion or about $273 billion per year, which amounts to just over two percent of GDP. Because the OCS areas are currently unavailable, the entire amount--$8.2 trillion--is completely new output created by a simple change in policy allowing resource extraction in additional OCS Planning Areas. B. Opening OCS Planning Areas could Create Millions of New Jobs An economic expansion tied to increased OCS resource production would also create millions of new jobs both in the extraction industry and in other sectors **that serve as suppliers** or their employees. The annual increase in coastal state employment from initial investments in previously unavailable OCS planning areas and additional refining capacity is estimated to be 185,320 full-time jobs per year. Again, this number does not consider the spill-over effects of investment in productive capacity and refining to other U.S. states. The total increase in U.S. employment from the investment phase is approximately 271,570 full-time jobs per year. Applying the BEA multipliers to the estimated production value results in approximately 870,000 coastal state jobs in addition to the jobs created during the initial investment phase. Again, the total increase in U.S. employment in all states (including those in the interior) resulting from increased OCS production is 340,000 greater, for a total of approximately 1,190,000 jobs be sustained for the entire OCS production period. Increased investment and production in previously unavailable OCS oil and gas extraction and the ancillary industries that support the offshore industry would produce thousands of new jobs in stable and valuable industries. Among the 271,572 jobs created in the investment phase and sustained during the first seven years of the investment cycle. The majority of new positions (162,541 jobs, or 60 percent) would be created in high-skills fields, such as health care, real estate, professional services, manufacturing, administration, finance, education, the arts, information, and management. Although the largest total increase in employment in the production phase would occur (quite naturally) in the mining industry, significant numbers of jobs would be created in other industries. Again, many of these new jobs **would be created in high-skills fields**, representing approximately 49 percent of all new jobs and approximately 61 percent of all new non-mining jobs. C. Opening OCS Planning Areas can Release Trillions of Dollars of Wages to Workers Hit by Recession Those jobs pay wages. OCS development is estimated to yield approximately $10.7 billion in new wages in coastal states each year. OCS production would yield approximately $1.406 trillion in additional wage income to workers in coastal states over the lifetime of the fields (or $46 billion per year over 30 years). Across the U.S., the investment phase would generate approximately $15.7 billion in additional annual wages per year for the first seven years and $70 billion per year for the next thirty years, or approximately $2.1 trillion in additional wage income. BLS data suggest that all four broad industry classifications related to oil and gas extraction pay higher wages and similar jobs in other industries. Jobs in: (1) Oil and Gas Extraction, (2) Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil, (3) Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing, and (4) Support Activities for Mining, typically pay higher wages than the average American job. Taking this broader measure, the average job created by increased offshore oil and gas production pays approximately 28 percent more than the average U.S. job. D. Opening OCS Planning Areas can Contribute Trillions of Dollars in Taxes and other Public Revenues to Local, State, and Federal Governments Greater output, more jobs, and higher wages translate into higher tax collections and increases in other sources of public revenues. The MMS Report to Congress suggests that public revenues derived from OCS extraction are significant--the U.S. federal government has collected more than $156 billion in lease and levy payments for OCS oil and natural gas production. Note that this amount counts only lease and royalty payments and thus does not include any sales and income taxes paid by firms or workers supported by OCS production. Conservative estimates suggest that seven years of initial annual exploration and refining investments would produce approximately $4.8 billion annually in coastal state and local tax revenue and $11.1 billion in U.S. federal tax income. Over thirty years of production, I estimate that the extraction phase of OCS development would yield approximately $561 billion ($18.7 billion per year) in coastal state and local tax revenue and approximately $1.64 trillion ($54.7 billion per year) in new U.S. federal tax income.

#### Economic decline causes global war

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Commercial shipbuilding’s key to naval power

NLUS 12 (Navy League of the United States, “America’s Maritime Industry The foundation of American seapower”, 2012, <http://www.navyleague.org/files/americas-maritime-industry.pdf>, Date Verification – http://gsship.org/industry-links/)

Defense Industrial Base: Shipbuilding The American Maritime Industry also contributes to our national defense by **sustaining the shipbuilding and repair sector** of our national defense industrial base **upon which our standing as a seapower is based**. History has proven that without a strong maritime infrastructure—**shipyards, suppliers, and seafarers**—no country can hope to **build and support a Navy of sufficient size and capability to protect its interests on a global basis.** Both our commercial and naval fleets rely on U.S. shipyards and their numerous industrial vendors for building and repairs. The U.S. commercial shipbuilding and repair industry also impacts our national economy by adding billions of dollars to U.S. economic output annually. In 2004, there were 89 shipyards in the major shipbuilding and repair base of the United States, defined by the Maritime Administration as including those shipyards capable of building, repairing, or providing topside repairs for ships 122 meters (400 feet) in length and over. This includes six large shipyards that build large ships for the U.S. Navy. Based on U.S. Coast Guard vessel registration data for 2008, in that year U.S. shipyards delivered 13 large deep-draft vessels including naval ships, merchant ships, and drilling rigs; 58 offshore service vessels; 142 tugs and towboats, 51 passenger vessels greater than 50 feet in length; 9 commercial fishing vessels; 240 other self- propelled vessels; 23 mega-yachts; 10 oceangoing barges; and 224 tank barges under 5,000 GT. 11 Since the mid 1990’s, the industry has been experiencing a period of modernization and renewal that is largely market-driven, backed by long-term customer commitments. Over the six-year period from 2000-05, a total of $2.336 billion was invested in the industry, while in 2006, capital investments in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry amounted to $270 million.12 The **state of the industrial base that services this nation’s Sea Services is** of great concern **to the U.S. Navy.** Even a modest increase in oceangoing commercial shipbuilding **would give a substantial boost to our shipyards and marine vendors**. Shipyard facilities at the larger shipyards in the United States are capable of constructing merchant ships as well as warships, but often cannot match the output of shipyards in Europe and Asia. On the other hand, U.S. yards construct and equip the best warships, aircraft carriers and submarines in the world. They are unmatched in capability, but must maintain that lead. 13

#### Naval power solves nuclear war

**Conway et. al** **7** (James – General, US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gary Roughead – Admiral, U.S. navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Thad Allen – Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant of the Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, p. http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf)

The world economy is tightly interconnected. Over the past four decades, total sea borne trade has more than quadrupled: **90% of world trade and two-thirds of its petroleum are transported by sea**. The sea-lanes and supporting shore infrastructure are the lifelines of the modern global economy, visible and vulnerable symbols of the modern distribution system that relies on free transit through increasingly urbanized littoral regions. Expansion of the global system has increased the prosperity of many nations. Yet their continued growth may create increasing competition for resources and capital with other economic powers, transnational corporations and international organizations. Heightened popular expectations and increased competition for resources, coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims of sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural resources—potentially resulting in conflict. Technology is rapidly expanding marine activities such as energy development, resource extraction, and other commercial activity in and under the oceans. Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system. While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are **potential sources of competition and conflict** for access and natural resources. Globalization is also shaping human migration patterns, health, education, culture, and the conduct of conflict. Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways. Weak or corrupt governments, growing dissatisfaction among the disenfranchised, religious extremism, ethnic nationalism, and changing demographics—often spurred on by the uneven and sometimes unwelcome advances of globalization—**exacerbate tensions and are contributors to conflict**. Concurrently, a rising number of transnational actors and rogue states, emboldened and enabled with unprecedented access to the global stage, can cause systemic disruptions in an effort to increase their power and influence. Their actions, often designed to purposely incite conflict between other parties, will complicate attempts to defuse and allay regional conflict. Proliferation of weapons technology and information has increased the capacity of nation-states and transnational actors to challenge maritime access, evade accountability for attacks, and manipulate public perception. Asymmetric use of technology will pose a range of threats to the United States and its partners. Even more worrisome, the appetite for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is growing among nations and non-state antagonists. At the same time, attacks on legal, financial, and cyber systems can be equally, if not more, disruptive than kinetic weapons. The vast majority of the world’s population lives within a few hundred miles of the oceans. Social instability in increasingly crowded cities, many of which exist in already unstable parts of the world, has the potential to create significant disruptions. The effects of climate change may also amplify human suffering through catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands, and coastal flooding, could lead to loss of life, involuntary migration, social instability, and regional crises. Mass communications will highlight the drama of human suffering, and disadvantaged populations will be ever more painfully aware and less tolerant of their conditions. Extremist ideologies will become increasingly attractive to those in despair and bereft of opportunity. Criminal elements will also exploit this social instability. These conditions combine to create an uncertain future and cause us to think anew about how we view seapower. No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain. Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats. Maritime Strategic Concept This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at sea and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the U.S. the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts. The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send **powerful messages to would-be aggressors** that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity. United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance. We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives. Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises. Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic imperatives: Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. Today regional conflict has ramifications far beyond the area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. While this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces, we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict. Where conflict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and combat-ready provide the Nation’s primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for this Nation to respond quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain sight, maritime forces can deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, assure friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global order. Critical to this notion is the maintenance of a powerful fleet—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack. Deter major power war. No other disruption is as potentially **disastrous to global stability as war among major powers**. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be **actively deterred** using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.

#### Now is key – industry collapse causes South China Sea conflict

Crospey 12 (Dr. Seth – Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, Former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy, ““The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plan: Assumptions and Associated Risks to National Security”, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations U.S. House of Representatives, 4/18, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--USNavyShipbuildingPlan--Testimony041812.pdf)

If the Navy’s assumption is mistaken that current political leadership will agree to large future increases in shipbuilding we will be headed toward a kind of naval holiday. The equally optimistic expectation that average ship costs can be maintained at $2 billion dollars per vessel prolongs the holiday. This will not be a pleasant holiday. China’s economy has its problems but it continues to perform. Janes Defence Forecasts says that China will double its defense budget between now and 2015.iii Russia plans a $160 billion dollar naval expansion in the Pacific which is to include 36 new submarines and 40 surface ships.iv If a couple postpones needed repairs on their home for a decade and then decides to fix all that has broken they will be very lucky to finish the job in a year. They will also be fortunate because other more prudent owners will have sustained the home repair industry. Our shipbuilding industry does not have the benefit of other purchasers who can sustain it if Navy budgets prove unequal to the task. For the industrial base that supports U.S. shipbuilding a budget-induced naval holiday would be a disaster that could take decades—if ever—from which to recover. Knowledge of shipbuilding remains part of American manufacturing. But accelerating cost, an ageing workforce, reduced orders for warships, and an **uncertain future risk** the nation’s ability to turn out sufficient numbers of vessels at affordable prices and profitably enough to keep shipbuilding companies alive. The destabilization of the American shipbuilding industrial base **is one reason that the cost of warships is outpacing the rate of inflation**. The Navy’s reduced procurement of ships over the past twenty years has caused the industry to contract, lay off workers, and in general to become less reliable. This has driven up the cost of labor and the cost of construction materials. The fewer ships the Navy buys, the less lucrative the industry is for skilled workers. As the cost of labor rises shipbuilders are increasingly pressed to attract and train qualified personnel. The negative trends reinforce each other. As younger workers are dissuaded from seeking employment or remaining in the industry by the prospects of sporadic employment those who remain—the existing workers—age. The cycle is self-defeating. Paying older workers increases overhead costs and makes it increasingly expensive to invest in the training and education of a younger workforce. The destabilization of the industrial base also causes costs to rise since many of the materials and products that go into building Navy ships are not useful for other purposes. Since the Navy is buying far fewer ships now than it did in the 1980s, many shipyards rely on a single source for necessary materials. With a virtual monopoly on these products, the suppliers have in large part the ability to name their price. The inefficient manner in which the shipyards acquire these materials drives up labor and overhead costs. **The solution lies in stabilizing the American shipbuilding industry**. This means that the Navy must either increase its orders of ships and/or improve its business practices, for example disciplining the changes it requires of shipbuilders once orders have been placed and vessels are under construction. Buying and stockpiling spare parts for ships that are already in service and whose need for regular maintenance and repair is well known would also help provide stability for the American shipbuilding industry. In a study conducted on the subject in 2006, the RAND Corporation concluded that the rising costs of building ships is the result of a combination of unsteady U.S. Government procurement rates and a “monopsony relationship” between the government and the shipbuilders. In a monopsony a single purchaser is faced with a host of sellers. Because there is so little American shipbuilding outside of what the Navy purchases, U.S. firms are at the commercial mercy of the 9 percent of the Navy budget devoted to buying ships. A 2005 Government Accountability Office report attributed cost increases in shipbuilding to instability in the entire industry, the difficulty in recruiting and training qualified personnel, high rates of skilled personnel turnover and the shipbuilders’ dependence on a rapidly shrinking supplier base. Finally there are the consequences **if U.S. seapower continues to decrease** and proves unable to meet even the reduced goals it has set for itself. History is a good guide. Nations in the middle like to side with the winner. During our Civil War British political leadership considered recognizing the Confederacy but was eventually dissuaded by Union military success. In World War II Sweden declared neutrality but grew increasingly amenable to Allied requests as Germany’s military position worsened. Romania initially sided with Germany in the same war but changed sides following U.S. attacks on their oil fields and a coup that deposed the pro-German dictator, Antonescu. Bulgarians followed a similar path from siding with the Nazis to switching their allegiance to the Allies in 1944. Saudi Prince Bandar, acknowledging China’s increasing international prominence and power visited Beijing last year and met with President Hu. American weakness at sea, especially in the Indo-Pacific will change the current military, diplomatic, and commercial character of the region. Whether the U.S. fleet shrinks because of too little funding or because unreformed procurement practices have raised the price of ships or because ships have been called home to save on operational expense, the result is the same. While we were once present in strength, we would be no more. A nation burdened with massive debt whose ability to shape world events has been limited in tandem with its capacity to invest in research and technology will have more and more trouble finding markets. China’s potential hegemony would not only force its neighbors’ to reconsider whether the U.S. is a reliable ally. It would also become an increasingly powerful magnet for trade in the region—at the expense of U.S. commerce. Unlike the U.S. whose seapower has protected global sea lanes that other states have used to their benefit **China has a different set of values**. It views with suspicion a liberal trading system notwithstanding the benefits received from it. **China’s friends include Iran and North Korea**. Beijing is a poor candidate to support the international order that has been the keel of U.S. foreign and security policy for a century. Waning U.S. seapower **is an invitation that China will regard as a complement to its rising military and navy** in particular. It foreshadows **a coercive resolution** of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the likelihood of an increased regional arms race, and the troubling international perception that the U.S. is—or has—**abandoned its role as a great power**. American seapower is the strategic keel of our foreign and security policy. Reducing it would be an exercise of history-making shortsightedness. Restoring it would be an act of statesmanship from which Americans and all who cherish political liberty would benefit for the remainder of this century. Thank you.

#### That’s the most likely scenario for US-China war – navy is key

Glaser 12 (Bonnie S., Senior Fellow – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” CFR, April, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

**The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant**. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities **to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary**. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult

#### Extinction

Lieven 12 (Anatol, Professor in the War Studies Department – King’s College (London), Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Washington), “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, 6-12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html)

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even **a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position**. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

#### Certainty is key – and no link to environment DA

Griles 3 (Lisa, Deputy Secretary – Department of the Interior, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. GRILES. America’s public lands have an abundant opportunity for exploration and development of renewable and nonrenewable energy resources. Energy reserves contained on the Department of the Interior’s onshore and offshore Federal lands are very important to meeting our current and future estimates of what it is going to take to continue to supply America’s energy demand. Estimates suggest that these lands contain approximately 68 percent of the undiscovered U.S. oil resources and 74 percent of the undiscovered natural gas resources. President Bush has developed a national energy policy that laid out a comprehensive, long-term energy strategy for America’s future. That strategy recognizes we need to raise domestic production of energy, both renewable and nonrenewable, to meet our dependence for energy. For oil and gas, the United States uses about 7 billion barrels a year, of which about 4 billion are currently imported and 3 billion are domestically produced. The President proposed to open a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration. Now there is a new and environmentally friendly technology, similar to directional drilling, with mobile platforms, self-containing drilling units. These things will allow producers to access large energy reserves with almost no footprint on the tundra. Each day, even since I have assumed this job, our ability to minimize our effect on the environment continues to improve to where it is almost nonexistent in such areas as even in Alaska. According to the latest oil and gas assessment, ANWR is the largest untapped source of domestic production available to us. The production for ANWR would equal about 60 years of imports from Iraq. The National Energy Policy also encourages development of cleaner, more diverse portfolios of domestic renewable energy sources. The renewable policy in areas cover geothermal, wind, solar, and biomass. And it urges research on hydrogen as an alternate energy source. To advance the National Energy Policy, the Bureau of Land Management and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Lab last week announced the release of a renewable energy report. It identifies and evaluates renewable energy resources on public lands. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this for the record.\* This report, which has just come out, assess the potential for renewable energy on public lands. It is a very good report that we hope will allow for the private sector, after working with the various other agencies, to where can we best use renewable resource, and how do we take this assessment and put it into the land use planning that we are currently going, so that right-of-ways and understanding of what renewable resources can be done in the West can, in fact, have a better opportunity. The Department completed the first of an energy inventory this year. Now the EPCA report, which is laying here, also, Mr. Chairman, is an estimate of the undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Part one of that report covers five oil and gas basins. The second part of the report will be out later this year. Now this report, it is not—there are people who have different opinions of it. But the fact is we believe it will be a good guidance tool, as we look at where the oil and gas potential is and where we need to do land use planning. And as we update these land use plannings and do our EISs, that will help guide further the private sector, the public sector, and all stakeholders on how we can better do land use planning and develop oil and gas in a sound fashion. Also, I have laying here in front of me the two EISs that have been done on the two major coal methane basins in the United States, San Juan Basis and the Powder River Basin. Completing these reports, which are in draft, will increase and offer the opportunity for production of natural gas with coal bed methane. Now these reports are in draft and, once completed, will authorize and allow for additional exploration and development. It has taken 2 years to get these in place. It has taken 2 years to get some of these in place. This planning process that Congress has initiated under FLPMA and other statutes allows for a deliberative, conscious understanding of what the impacts are. We believe that when these are finalized, that is in fact what will occur. One of the areas which we believe that the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management is and is going to engage in is coordination with landowners. Mr. Chairman, the private sector in the oil and gas industry must be good neighbors with the ranchers in the West. The BLM is going to be addressing the issues of bonding requirements that will assure that landowners have their surface rights and their values protected. BLM is working to make the consultation process with the landowners, with the States and local governments and other Federal agencies more efficient and meaningful. But we must assure that the surface owners are protected and the values of their ranches are in fact assured. And by being good neighbors, we can do that. In the BLM land use planning process, we have priorities, ten current resource management planning areas that contain the major oil and gas reserves that are reported out in the EPCA study. Once this process is completed, then we can move forward with consideration of development of the natural gas. We are also working with the Western Governors’ Association and the Western Utilities Group. The purpose is to identify and designate right-of-way corridors on public lands. We would like to do it now as to where right-of-way corridors make sense and put those in our land use planning processes, so that when the need is truly identified, utilities, energy companies, and the public will know where they are Instead of taking two years to amend a land use plan, hopefully this will expedite and have future opportunity so that when the need is there, we can go ahead and make that investment through the private sector. It should speed up the process of right-of-way permits for both pipelines and electric transmission. Now let me switch to the offshore, the Outer Continental Shelf. It is a huge contributor to our Nation’s energy and economic security. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, everything you have talked about so far is onshore. Mr. GRILES. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. You now will speak to offshore. Mr. GRILES. Yes, sir, I will. Now we are keeping on schedule the holding lease sales in the areas that are available for leasing. In the past year, scheduled sales in several areas were either delayed, canceled, or **put under moratoria**, even though they were in the 5-year plan. It undermined certainty. It made investing, particularly in the Gulf, more risky. We have approved a 5-year oil and gas leasing program in July 2002 that calls for 20 new lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico and several other areas of the offshore, specifically in Alaska by 2007. Now our estimates indicate that these areas contain resources up to 22 billion barrels of oil and 61 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. We are also acting to raise energy production from these offshore areas by providing royalty relief on the OCS leases for new deep wells that are drilled in shallow water. These are at depths that heretofore were very and are very costly to produce from and costly to drill to. We need to encourage that exploration. These deep wells, which are greater than 15,000 feet in depth, are expected to access between 5 to 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and can be developed quickly due to existing infrastructure and the shallow water. We have also issued a final rule in July 2002 that allows companies to apply for a lease extension, giving them more time to analyze complex geological data that underlies salt domes. That is, where geologically salt overlays the geologically clay. And you try to do seismic, and the seismic just gets distorted. So we have extended the lease terms, so that hopefully those companies can figure out where and where to best drill. Vast resources of oil and natural gas lie, we hope, beneath these sheets of salt in the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico. But it is very difficult to get clear seismic images. We are also working to create a process of reviewing and permitting alternative energy sources on the OCS lands. We have sent legislation to Congress that would give the Minerals Management Service of the Department of the Interior clear authority to lease parts of the OCS for renewable energy. The renewables could be wind, wave, or solar energy, and related projects that are auxiliary to oil and gas development, such as offshore staging facilities and emergency medical facilities. We need this authority in order to be able to **truly give the private sector what are the rules to play from and buy**, so they can have certainty about where to go.

### 1AC – No Disads

#### Contention 4: No Disads

#### 20 years of shale gas now – that takes out your DA

Berman 12 (Art, Former Editor – Oil and Gas Journal, Geological Consultant – American Association of Petroleum Geologists, “After the Gold Rush: A Perspective on Future U.S. Natural Gas Supply and Price,” Oil Drum, 2-8-12, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8914)

The Potential Gas Committee (PGC) is the standard for resource assessments because of the objectivity and credentials of its members, and its long and reliable history. In its biennial report released in April 2011, three categories of technically recoverable resources are identified: probable, possible and speculative. The President and many others have taken the PGC total of all three categories (2,170 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas) and divided by 2010 annual consumption of 24 Tcf. This results in 90 and not 100 years of gas. Much of this total resource is in accumulations too small to be produced at any price, is inaccessible to drilling, or is too deep to recover economically. More relevant is the Committee’s probable mean resources value of 550 (Tcf) of gas (Exhibit 4). If half of this supply becomes a reserve (225 Tcf), the U.S. has approximately 11.5 years of potential future gas supply at present consumption rates. When proved reserves of 273 Tcf are included, there is an additional 11.5 years of supply for a total of almost 23 years. It is worth noting that proved reserves include proved undeveloped reserves which may or may not be produced depending on economics, so even 23 years of supply is tenuous. If consumption increases, this supply will be exhausted in less than 23 years. Revisions to this estimate will be made and there probably is more than 23 years but based on current information, 100 years of gas is not justified.

#### New shale developments are happening

Hulbert 12 (Matthew, Senior Researcher at the Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP) in The Hague, The Netherlands, B.A. in history and politics from Durham University and an Mphil in international relations from Cambridge University, Forbes Contributor, “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World,” 8-5-12,

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world/>)

Unfortunately for producers, they missed two new international headlines into 2010. The first was that global gas demand took a battering from the economic crisis that is still yet to fully recover. Demand was cut by 3% in 2009, with the EU seeing a 7% slide in 2010-11, that’s since plummeted to 9.9% into 2011-2012. Bad stuff for sure, but the far more devastating development was a swathe of new gas all coming on stream at exactly the wrong time for producers – be it pipelines, LNG or more critically the breakthrough in unconventional gas production. Everyone making final investment decisions in the early to mid-2000s simply underestimated the scale of American shale developments. As with most ‘revolutions’ this was not achieved by accident, but by years of development spanning back to the 1970s, with fracking technologies tying into deep and liquid US markets and lots of capital (ironically primed by high oil prices). The result was the massive Marcellus, Haynesville, Barnett and Utica plays, helping the US to catapult its production to 651bcm in 2011. That makes America the largest single producer in the world, accounting for 20% of global share (and a third of all US consumption). Shale developments and technological advances have been so successful that they’ve driven gas prices to under $2MMBtu on Henry Hub, as the quintessential example of ‘gas on gas’ competition. What’s more, despite recent downgrades, the EIA still claims the US has 482tcf of unconventional recoverable reserves to play with.

#### Obama trying to get dirty energy support now- takes out the link

Bastasch 10/17

[Michael, The Daily Caller, <http://dailycaller.com/2012/10/17/candidates-launch-attacks-over-oil-and-gas-production-war-on-coal/>]

The second presidential debate opened up with a heated exchange over energy issues, as both candidates sought to paint the other as hostile to responsible energy production. “We have increased oil production to the highest levels in 16 years,” President Barack Obama said in the debate on Tuesday. “Natural gas production is the highest it’s been in decades. We have seen increases in coal production and coal employment. That’s why we doubled clean — clean energy production like wind and solar and biofuels.” “Now, Governor Romney will say he’s got an all-of-the-above plan, but basically his plan is to let the oil companies write the energy policies,” Obama said. “So he’s got the oil and gas part, but he doesn’t have the clean energy part.” Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney countered, arguing that President Obama’s record on gas and oil production was overstated. “And the president’s right in terms of the additional oil production, but none of it came on federal land,” Romney said. “As a matter of fact, oil production is down 14 percent this year on federal land, and gas production was down 9 percent.” “Why? Because the president cut in half the number of licenses and permits for drilling on federal lands, and in federal waters,” said Romney. However, Obama shot back, arguing that his administration had taken steps to foster increased oil and gas production. “[V]ery little of what Governor Romney just said is true. We’ve opened up public lands. We’re actually drilling more on public lands than in the previous administration and my — the previous president was an oil man,” Obama said. “And **natural gas isn’t just appearing magically. We’re encouraging it** and working with the industry.”

## 2AC v. MSU GT Round 2

### T – Restrictions (Leasing) – 2AC

#### **Natural gas leasing r**estrictions directly prevent energy production – you can’t drill without getting a lease

NaturalGas.org, no date (NaturalGas.org, “Natural Gas Supply,” http://www.naturalgas.org/business/analysis.asp)  
The production of natural gas in the United States is based on competitive market forces: inadequate supply at any one time leads to price increases, which signal to production companies the need to increase the supply of natural gas to the market. Supplying natural gas in the United States in order to meet this demand, however, is dependent on a number of factors. These factors may be broken down into two segments: general barriers to increasing supply, and those factors that affect the short term supply scenario. Short Term Supply Barriers In a perfect world, price signals would be recognized and acted upon immediately, and there would be little lag time between increased demand for natural gas, and an increase in supplies reaching the market. However, in reality, this lag time does exist. There are several barriers to immediate supply increases which affect the short term availability of natural gas supply. They include: Availability of Skilled Workers - The need to train and hire skilled workers results in lag times between times of increased demand and an increase in production. For example, from 1991 to 1999, a prolonged period of relatively low prices indicated adequate supplies of natural gas existed, and the exploration and production industry contracted in response. During this period, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded a 26 percent average decrease in employment in the oil and gas extraction industry. Some of these workers left the industry altogether rather than remain unemployed. When production companies began to react to higher prices in late 1999, the need to find and train skilled workers contributed to a slower increase in activity than would have been the case if skilled workers were plentiful. To counter this problem, many production companies offer increasingly high wages, as well as scholarships and educational contributions to attract professionals to the industry. Availability of Equipment - Drilling rigs are very expensive pieces of equipment. Price volatility in the industry makes it very difficult for producers, as well as production equipment suppliers, to plan the construction and placement of drilling rigs far in advance. Prolonged periods of low prices results in reduction of the number of available rigs. When prices respond to increase demand, and drilling activity increases, time is required to build and place an adequate number of drilling rigs. For this reason, drilling rig counts are a good indication of the status of the oil and natural gas production industry. As can be seen in the graph, an increase in operational rigs lags behind period of high prices. For more information on rig counts, click here. Permitting and Well Development - Before a natural gas well actually begins producing, there are several time consuming procedures and development activities that must take place. In order to begin drilling, exploration activities must take place to pinpoint the location of natural gas reserves. Once a suitable field has been located, production companies must receive the required approval from the landowner (which in many cases is the government) to install drilling equipment and begin to drill the well. The Bureau of Land Management is responsible for issuing permits for onshore development, and the Minerals Management Service is responsible for offshore development areas. Once drilling is completed, extraction and field processing equipment must be set up, as well as gathering systems. In all, the between the location of natural gas deposits and the beginning of production can range from as little as a few months to as much as ten years. Weather and Delivery Disruptions - Although unrelated to natural gas prices or demand increases and decreases, weather patterns and anomalies can have a significant impact on natural gas production. For example, hurricanes can have an impact on the offshore production of natural gas, as safety measures require the temporary shut down of offshore drilling and production platforms. In addition, while the safety record of the natural gas industry is extremely good, malfunctions and accidents may occur from time to time that disrupt the delivery of natural gas. For example, a compressor malfunction in a large pipeline serving a major hub could temporarily disrupt the flow of natural gas through that important market center. While the effects of weather and delivery disruptions are most often of short duration, they can still have an effect on the expeditious production of natural gas. General Barriers to Increasing Supply In addition to the short term impediments to increasing natural gas supply, there exist other more general barriers to the increased supply of natural gas in the United States. These include: Land Access - The U.S. government owns more than 29 percent of all the land in the country, and an estimated 40 percent of undiscovered natural gas exists on this land. In several areas, the government has restricted access to federal lands. 59 percent of undiscovered gas resources are on federal lands and offshore waters. Outside of the western Gulf of Mexico, production companies are prohibited access to virtually all federal lands offshore the Lower 48 states. About 9 percent of resource-bearing land in the Rockies is also off limits, and access to another 32 percent is significantly restricted. The National Petroleum Council in 1999 estimated that 213 Tcf of natural gas exists in areas under federal access restrictions. This restriction is the result of presidential and congressional leasing moratoria, and affects the amount of natural gas resources that may be extracted to increase supply. Pipeline Infrastructure - The ability to transport natural gas from producing regions to consumption regions also affects the availability of supplies to the marketplace. The interstate and intrastate pipeline infrastructure can only transport so much natural gas at any one time, and in essence provides a 'ceiling' for the amount of natural gas that can reach the market. Although the current pipeline infrastructure is significant, with the EIA estimating daily delivery capacity of the pipeline grid to be 119 Bcf. However, natural gas pipeline companies must continue to continually expand the pipeline infrastructure in order to meet growing demand. To learn more about the natural gas pipeline infrastructure in the United States, click here. The Financial Environment - Exploring for and producing natural gas is a very capital intensive endeavor. In fact, the National Petroleum Council estimated in 1999 that production companies will have to invest $1.44 trillion in capital between 1999 and 2015 in order to keep pace with demand growth. This puts significant pressures on production companies, particularly small, privately owned firms, to raise the capital necessary to increase production. While efficient and transparent financial markets in the U.S. do offer options for raising capital effectively, the rate at which production companies may do so can serve as a limiting factor in the increasing availability of supplies reaching the market.

#### **Natural gas production includes the the process of exploration**

Schuck 84 (Peter H., Professor of Law – Yale Law School, “Article: When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy through an Exceptions Process,” Duke Law Journal, April, 1984 Duke L.J. 163, Lexis)

**The Petroleum Industry and Federal Regulation**. n97 Since the first oil wells were drilled at Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859, the American oil industry has become the most complex in the world, an extraordinarily intricate network of companies and activities linking crude oil sources and consumer markets, both foreign and domestic. Industry activities fall into four general categories: production (exploration for and removal of crude oil from natural formations); refining (the manufacture of crude into gasoline, motor oil, heating oil, petrochemicals, and other intermediate and end-use products); distribution (physical transportation, storage, handling, and delivery of petroleum [\*201] products); and marketing (sales of approximately 500 refined products to wholesale and retail customers). n98 Different segments of the industry combine the four basic activities in **various ways**. Approximately fifteen to twenty large, usually multinational companies integrate all four operations. This group (Exxon, Gulf, Texaco, and others -- "the majors" in industry parlance) dominates the industry. In September 1981, for example, the fifteen largest integrated refiners processed nearly 70 percent of all motor gasoline and approximately 55 percent of middle distillates -- a decline in both categories from 1972 but still accounting for the majority of refinery production. Independent refiners, which produce little or none of the crude they refine, processed the remainder. Independent refiners range from small firms, with capacities as low as 10,000 barrels per day (BPD), to large independents, like Ashland Oil, with a capacity as high as 400,000 BPD, rivaling the integrated companies' capacities. Geographically, refiners tend to cluster near port facilities, major markets, or large domestic oil fields. n99 In less densely populated regions, such as the Midwest and Rocky Mountain states, small and independent refiners often process a relatively large proportion of total product.

### Apocalyptic Rhetoric K – 2AC

#### Case outweigh –

#### Perm – do the plan and non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

Political engagement good

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in developing the skills, attitudes, and values that will enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring about change, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest.¶ FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION¶ Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the knowledge that is likely to promote sociopolitical action and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the desirability of those outcomes. Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. It is essential that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and political system(s) that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and national government and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, intervention is not possible. Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which sociopolitical action depends is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy.**

#### No link – no environment impact or trade liberalization arg – that’s inevitable

#### Images of catastrophe cause an empathic shift to common humanity---creates the condition for empathetic relationships that eschew the politically anesthetizing form of politics their evidence criticizes---and, this is especially crucial in the context of policy debates and advocacy simulations

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Perhaps, then, what distant consumers express when they sit glued to the television watching a disaster replayed over and over, when they buy t-shirts or snow globes, when they mail teddy bears to a memorial, or when they tour a disaster site, is a deep, maybe subconscious, longing for those age-old forms of community and real human compassion that emerge in a place when disaster has struck. It is a longing in some ways so alien to the world we currently live in that it requires catastrophe to call it forth, even in our imaginations. Nevertheless, the actions of unadulterated goodwill that become commonplace in harrowing conditions represent the truly authentic form of humanity that all of us, to one degree or another, chase after in contemporary consumer culture every day. And while it is certainly a bit foolhardy to seek authentic humanity through disaster-related media and culture, the sheer strength of that desire has been evident in the public’s response to all the disasters, crises and catastrophes to hit the United States in the past decade. The millions of television viewers who cried on September 11, or during Hurricane Katrina and the Virginia Tech shootings, and the thousands upon thousands who volunteered their time, labor, money, and even their blood, as well as the countless others who created art, contributed to memorials, or adorned their cars or bodies with disaster-related paraphernalia— despite the fact that many knew no one who had been personally affected by any of these disasters—all attest to a desire for real human community and compassion that is woefully unfulfilled by American life under normal conditions today.

In the end, the consumption of disaster doesn’t make us unable or unwilling to engage with disasters on a communal level, or towards progressive political ends—it makes us feel as if we already have, simply by consuming. It is ultimately less a form of political anesthesia than a simulation of politics, a Potemkin village of communal sentiment, that fills our longing for a more just and humane world with disparate acts of cathartic consumption. Still, the positive political potential underlying such consumption—the desire for real forms of connection and community—remains the most redeeming feature of disaster consumerism. Though that desire is frequently warped when various media lenses refract it, diffuse it, or reframe it to fit a political agenda, its overwhelming strength should nonetheless serve notice that people want a different world than the one in which we currently live, with a different way of understanding and responding to disasters. They want a world where risk is not leveraged for profit or political gain, but sensibly planned for with the needs of all socio-economic groups in mind. They want a world where preemptive strategies are used to anticipate the real threats posed by global climate change and global inequality, rather than to invent fears of ethnic others and justify unnecessary wars. They want a world where people can come together not simply as a market, but as a public, to exert real agency over the policies made in the name of their safety and security. And, when disaster does strike, they want a world where the goodwill and compassion shown by their neighbors, by strangers in their communities, and even by distant spectators and consumers, will be matched by their own government. Though this vision of the world is utopian, it is not unreasonable, and if contemporary American culture is ever to give us more than just an illusion of safety, or empathy, or authenticity, then it is this vision that we must advocate on a daily basis, not only when disaster strikes.

#### K doesn’t come first

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Anxiety is vital to avert extinction---the perm solves negative effects and simulation solves despair

Mark **Shepard 7** (Anxiety - the ultimate survival tool!, Neuro Linguistic Programming Expert, http://www.scribd.com/doc/2050501/Anxiety-The-Ultimate-Survival-Skill)

Anxiety, The Ultimate Survival Skill ¶ As much pain and suffering that highly sensitive people go through because of our worry and anxiety habits, these are traits that have **ensured humanity's survival** since time immemorial. What do I mean? First of all you have to understand that anxiety is a thought process. It is not a mental disease. When you are anxious, what are you thinking about? What's great? What's wonderful? How everything is going to turn out better than you can possibly imagine? No! You are imagining the worst case scenario. Anxiety is thinking about what you do not want to have happen. Think about it! Let's float back in time for a moment to One Gazillion B.C. You are hanging out with your hunter gatherer buddies and it's summer time...There's plenty to eat and it's warm. All of a sudden you have an anxious thought. You think of something unpleasant about the future. You suddenly think of the coming... winter! You imagine digging through snow drifts scavenging for whatever scraps of food you can find. You imagine starving. You imagine your children, hungry, cold, sick. That's anxiety. Thinking about what you do not want to have happen. What it's supposed to do is trigger a resourceful response. In this case, you come up with a brilliant idea. In order to avoid starvation in the coming winter you start drying food and storing it in underground containers. Thinking about the cold, you come up with the idea that you can make warm clothing. Come Fall you gladly trade that little summer loin cloth in for a nice woolly mammoth coat. Thus the first root cellar is born and the fur coat is invented, because of anxiety.¶ Your ability to think ahead and visualize bad things happening enables you to plan ahead and take decisive action to create a different outcome. This planning for the winter results in your family and tribe surviving! Your children and their children pass along this anxiety gene. The "lug-heads" who don't have this ability perish. Survival is good, isn't it?¶ So those who were able to foresee the future and imagine the worst were able to better plan and as a result create a better future. Now. Fast forward to today. I would be willing to bet that you've been using this wonderful imagination of yours to imagine the worst. The added factor here is that your unconscious mind does not know the difference between what is real and what is imagined, so when you imagine the worst, your body reacts as if that bad thing is really happening. That releases all sorts of stress hormones and chemicals in your body. The point is to stop beating yourself up for having anxiety. Anxiety is merely an excellent survival tool that's been pushed beyond its original purpose. You can reclaim it's usefulness by doing what ancient people did. Become aware of a possible negative outcome in the future and then take positive, decisive action to make sure something better happens. If it's something beyond your control, practice imagining it working out positively and see how that feels in your body. For example: if you are worried about your kids driving home from college in a snow storm imagine them arriving safely and sitting in front of the fire sipping hot cocoa.

#### Fear of extinction is a legitimate and productive response to the modern condition---working through it by validating our representations is the only way to create an authentic relationship to the world and death

Macy 2K – Joanna Macy, adjunct professor at the California Institute of Integral Studies, 2000, Environmental Discourse and Practice: A Reader, p. 243

The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function of the dangers that are threatening to overwhelm us. We are confronted by social breakdown, wars, nuclear proliferation, and the progressive destruction of our biosphere. Polls show that people today are aware that the world, as they know it, may come to an end. This loss of certainty that there will be a future is the pivotal psychological reality of our time.

Over the past twelve years my colleagues and I have worked with tens of thousands of people in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, helping them confront and explore what they know and feel about what is happening to their world. The purpose of this work, which was first known as “Despair and Empowerment Work,” is to overcome the numbing and powerlessness that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. As their grief and fear for the world is allowed to be expressed without apology or argument and validated as a wholesome, life-preserving response, people break through their avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of futility and isolation. Generally what they break through into is a larger sense of identity. It is as if the pressure of their acknowledged awareness of the suffering of our world stretches or collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self.

It becomes clear, for example, that the grief and fear experienced for our world and our common future are categorically different from similar sentiments relating to one’s personal welfare. This pain cannot be equated with dread of one’s own individual demise. Its source lies less in concerns for personal survival than in apprehensions of collective suffering – of what looms for human life and other species and unborn generations to come. Its nature is akin to the original meaning of compassion – “suffering with.” It is the distress we feel on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it serves as a trigger or getaway to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life in which we are as intricately connected as cells in a larger body.

This shift in consciousness is an appropriate, adaptive response. For the crisis that threatens our planet, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self. It is a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is the delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, that it is so aloof that we can – as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings.

#### No single cause of violence

Muro-Ruiz 2 (Diego, London School of Economics, “The Logic of Violence”, Politics, 22(2), p. 116)

Violence is, most of the time, a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organisation. Individuals present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements. However, the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In the absence of such a general theory, researchers should bear in mind that violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations. Future research on violence will have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic of violence.

#### -- Some threats are real – “security politics” does not motivate all violence

**Kydd 97** (Professor of Political Science – California, Riverside, Security Studies, Autumn, p. 154)

As for the Second World War, few structural realists will make a sustained case the Hitler was genuinely motivated by a rational pursuit of security for Germany and the other German statesmen would have responded in the same way to Germany’s international situation. Even Germen generals opposed Hitler’s military adventurism until 1939; it is difficult to imagine a less forceful civilian leader overruling them and leading Germany in an oath of conquest. In the case of the cold war, it is again difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist before Gorbachev and not solely motivated by security concerns. The increased emphasis within international relations scholarship on explaining the nature and origins of aggressive expansionists states reflects a growing consensus that aggressive states are at the root of conflict, not security concerns.

#### -- Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur

Macy 95 (Joanna, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, Ecopsychology)

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.

#### Alt causes right to fill in – turns the K

Olav. F. **Knudsen**, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, **‘1** [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use **are in no need of** such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to **go back to the literature**. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly in- fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European **security as it is** currently developing**.** That inevitably requires a more **consistent** interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘**traditional’ sector of security** policymaking, **unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.**

#### Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

**Neoliberalism is inevitable – markets control our thought**

**Hudson 99** [Mark, Progressive Librarian, Fall, “Understanding Information Media in the Age of Neoliberalism: The Contributions of Herbert Schiller”]

Neoliberal ideas are as old as capitalism itself, but in recent decades they have seen a tremendous resurgence and have displaced the state-interventionist economic theories of the interwar and post-World War II periods to become the reigning ideology of our time. Neoliberalism emerged full force in the 1980s with the right-wing Reagan and Thatcher regimes, but its **influence has** since **spread** across the political spectrum to encompass not only centrist political parties but even much of the traditional social-democratic left. In the 1990s, neoliberal hegemony over our politics and culture has become so overwhelming that it is becoming difficult to even rationally discuss what neoliberalism is; indeed, as Robert McChesney notes, the term "neoliberalism" is hardly known to the U.S. public outside of academia and the business community (McChesney). The corporate stranglehold on our information and communications media gives neoliberal ideologues a virtually **unchallenged platform** from which to blast their pro-market messages into every corner of our common culture. At the same time, neoliberalism provides the ideological cover for deregulatory legislation (most recently the 1996 Telecommunications Act) that enables corporations to extend their monopoly over these media even more. For the past three decades, one of the fiercest and most coherent critics of corporate control over the information/communications sphere has been the social scientist Herbert Schiller. Although Schiller began his career before neoliberalism's ascendance, and he does not even today use the term in his writings, his work provides essential insights into the roots of neoliberal/corporate hegemony over our information media and the adverse consequences of that hegemony for our politics, economy and culture.

#### Turn – Collapsing neoliberalism results in increased corporate power

Legrain 00 (Phillipe Legrain, special adviser to the WTO director general Mike Moore, 2000, The WTO: Boon or Bane for the Developing World, p. http://www.focusweb.org/publications/2000/The%20WTOThe%20WTO-Boon%20or%20Bane%20for%20the%20Developing%20World.htm)

A convincing case for the WTO’s abolition must show two things. First, that the world would be **better off** without the WTO. Second, that the WTO's abolition is preferable to **any politically feasible reform**. You fail to show either. Abolishing the WTO would not **destroy globalisation, capitalism, or US corporate power**. But it would **wipe out** a forum for governments to negotiate multilateral trade rules and a mechanism for holding them to those rules. That would make **every country worse off**, but **the biggest losers would be the poor and the weak**. One benefit of rules is that they apply to big, rich countries as well as small, poor ones. When America blocked imports of Costa Rican underwear, Costa Rica appealed to the WTO. It won, and America lifted its restrictions. Do you honestly think Costa Rica would have such clout in Washington **without the WTO?** Granted, the dispute-settlement mechanism is not perfect: America has a battery of lawyers to fight its corner, whereas small countries scrimp. It should be improved. But it is already much better than the alternative: the law of the jungle, where might makes right. Another merit of WTO rules is that they tie governments’ hands. Once countries open their markets to foreign trade and investment, they cannot close them again at whim. Without this stability, companies would be reluctant to invest abroad, particularly in developing countries with a protectionist or politically unstable record. Abolishing the WTO would further **marginalise developing countries**. If there were no prospect of further multilateral liberalisation and no body to enforce existing rules, trade barriers would creep up as protectionists gain the upper hand. The world might split into hostile regional blocks, with rich-country exporters **seeking captive markets in developing countries**. Developing countries, which need access to rich-country markets more than rich countries need access to theirs, would have to join on **unfavourable terms** or be left out in the cold. In any case, there would be less trade. And less trade means slower economic growth, stagnating living standards and more people trapped in poverty – like in the Great Depression. Over the past 50 years, the 15-fold rise in world trade has driven a seven-fold rise in world output. Thanks to trade, Japan and South Korea are no longer developing countries. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of Harvard University found that developing countries with open economies grew by 4.5 per cent a year in the 1970s and 1980s, while those with closed economies grew by 0.7 per cent a year. At that rate, open economies double in size every 16 years, while closed ones must wait a hundred. Of course, in the short term, some people lose from trade liberalisation. But in the long run, everyone gains: even the poorest South Koreans today are much richer than their counterparts 30 years ago.

### QER CP – 2AC

#### -- No solvency –

#### First is delay

Moniz 12 Ernest Moniz, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Former Clinton Administration Under Secretary of the Department of Energy and as Associate Director for Science in the Office of Science and Technology Policy ; serves on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 11/15/11, Quadrennial Energy and Technology Reviews, web.mit.edu/mitei/views/testimony/111115-quadrennial-energy-and-technology-reviews.html

S.1703 would legislate the QER as a required submission to the Congress, providing "an integrated view of national energy objectives and Federal energy policy, including alignment of research programs, incentives, regulations, and partnerships." Clearly this is in accord with the intentions put forward in the PCAST report. An interagency working group would be established at the beginning of each Administration, with the QER due one year later. This date is displaced by one year from that recommended by PCAST. In steady state, this shift by one year is quite reasonable. My concern is whether the first QER can be put together well by early 2014, given that the entire process needs to be invented. This can be ameliorated to some extent if the buildup of analytical capabilities and process development are funded and pursued aggressively in 2012.

#### Even the perception of delay takes out the case

Bayless 3 (Robert, President – Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. BAYLESS. Senator, if I could follow up, not only is it an issue of whether those lands are available, but as you pointed out, the timing, if there is a long delay, it impedes industry. You are not worried about the industry; you are worried about gas supply. There are signals that come out of the market, price signals, that say we need more gas. We need greater—the price has gone up. Where is the supply? With these long delays, it creates uncertainty for companies to be able to drill those additional wells, to budget for drilling those additional wells. It really puts a bad filter on those price signals.

#### Second is no implementation – QER won’t go into effect

Barlas 12

Stephen, Columnist @ Financial Executive, 1/1, Lexis

But it is highly unlikely that Obama's blueprint will lead to a firmer footing for U.S. energy security than past so-called blueprints from other presidents, or perhaps more importantly, whether a print is even necessary. Obama's policy is a loosely knit set of policies that focus on producing more oil at home and reducing dependence on foreign oil by developing cleaner alternative fuels and greater efficiency. The Obama plan is not the result of any particular deep thinking or strategy. The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) called for the development of such a strategy in its November 2010 Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies. Through an Integrated Federal Energy Policy. PCAST called for a Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR) as the first step in preparing a Quadrennial Energy Review. DOE completed the QTR in November 2011, six months after Obama published his blueprint. Steven E. Koonin, former undersecretary of Energy for Science, says QTR is limited in scope and all DOE felt it could get done given budget and time. "Technology development absent an understanding and shaping of policy and market context in which it gets deployed is not a productive exercise," he says. At this point there is no indication that DOE will even undertake the much more important QER, much less complete it any time soon. The larger reality is that any energy independence plan proposed by any U.S, president--whether based on a QER or not--has as much a chance of coming to fruition as Washington's football Redskins have of getting into the Super Bowl. But regardless of the rhetoric of president after president, maybe the U.S. doesn't even need an energy independence or energy security policy. Natural Gas Making Inroads The biggest energy input for industrial and commercial business users is natural gas. Natural gas prices are incredibly important, both because the fuel is used directly to run industrial processes, heat facilities and commercial buildings and make products such as fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, plastics and other advanced materials. Thanks to the shale revolution, EIA forecasts natural gas prices will stay low for the foreseeable future, rising to $4.66 m/BTU in 2015 and $5.05 m/BTU in 2020. That is good news for the owners of 15,000 to 17,000 industrial boilers in this country, most of which use natural gas (and many of those who still use coal are switching to natural gas). In addition, companies such as Dow Chemical Co. are restarting operations at facilities idled during the recession, Bayer AG is in talks with companies interested in building new ethane crackers at its two industrial parks in West Virginia and Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. and LyondellBasell Co., are considering expanding operations in the United States. Fracking has also had a much less remarked-upon effect on petroleum prices, which are important to businesses with transportation fleets. New oil sources are spurting from the Bakken (stretching from Canada to North Dakota and Montana) and Eagles Ford (South Texas) shale plays. U.S. oil prices have fallen from $133.88 a barrel of Texas intermediate crude in June 2008 to around $86.07. EIA predicts oil prices will rise to $94.58/bbl in 2015 and $108.10/bbl in 2020. Beyond the flood of natural gas washing over them, U.S. companies are also benefitting from three decades of investments--most of which were made without federal subsidies, or support--into facility energy efficiency. Ralph Cavanagh, co-director of the Energy Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council and a member of the Electricity Advisory Board at DOE, says the most important single solution for U.S. businesses worried about energy prices and access is aggressive energy efficiency. "Energy independence is the wrong issue," Cavanagh says. "It is reducing the cost of energy services and improving energy security. "U.S. business has done a tremendous job in energy efficiency over the past three decades," he adds. "It takes less than one-half of a unit of energy to create $1 of economic value than it did in 1973. Industry has done that by upgrading the efficiency of process equipment and upgrading lighting." Others may well argue that the U.S. needs, and has always needed, an energy policy, but one narrowly targeted. Kenneth B Medlock III, deputy director, Energy Forum at the James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, notes that DOE and the Gas Research Institute helped develop, with federal funding, the horizontal drilling (i.e. fracking) technology that Mitchell Energy and Development Corp. (now a part of Devon Energy Corp.) pioneered. "Government ought to be focused on research and development," Med-lock notes. He also is a supporter of loan guarantees to promote investment activity in frontier technologies, and argues that as long as there are more good bets than bad bets in that kind of portfolio, the funds committed in total are a good investment. But spectacular failures of energy companies such as Solyndra Corp., the Chapter 11 filing of Beacon Power Corp. and other less publicized busts reduce, if not kill, the prospect of any additional congressional funding for energy loan guarantees of any kind. That is true even when legislation has bipartisan support, which is the case for the Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2011 (S. 1000), which would, among other things, provide grants for a revolving loan program designed to develop energy-saving technologies for industrial and commercial use. The bill passed the Senate Energy Committee by a vote of 18-3 in July. However, the Congressional Budget Office has pegged the cost of the bill's provisions at $1.2 billion over five years. That is a serious barrier to passage. And in any case, even if it did pass, the bill would simply authorize funding. Congressional appropriations committees would have to approve the money as part of DOE's budget, which would be highly unlikely, Solyndra aside, since similar programs authorized by the 2005 and 2007 energy bills are still begging for appropriations. Besides impact on the federal deficit, politics, too, often impede progress on otherwise sensible policies. Politics apparently have clogged up the proposed Keystone XL oil pipeline extension from Canada. Environmentalists, a Democratic constituency, oppose the project, arguing it would create more greenhouse gas emissions than necessary and pose a potential drinking water danger for Nebraska residents because it passed over the Ogallala Aquifer. That view is shared by Nebraska's Republican Gov. Dave Heineman, whose views are opposite those of all the can presidential candidates, each of whom supported U.S. approval of Keystone XL. Labor unions, another key Democratic constituency, support the project that TransCanada, the project sponsor, says will bring more than 11 8,000 person-years of employment to workers in the states of Montana, South Dakota and Nebraska. If the Keystone debate features Democrats versus Democrats and Republicans versus Republicans, efforts to substitute domestic natural gas for foreign petroleum features business versus business.

#### Third is congressional strike down

Tollefson 11 (Jeff Tollefson, DOE releases first Quadrennial Technology Review, September 27, 2011, http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/09/doe\_releases\_first\_quadrennial\_1.html)

The US Department of Energy (DOE) [released](http://energy.gov/articles/department-energy-releases-inaugural-quadrennial-technology-review-report) its inaugural Quadrennial Technology Review on Tuesday, laying out a longer-term strategic agenda to help integrate energy research and development programmes. Modelled on the [Defense Quadrennial Review](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/), an influential analysis that sets the tone and direction of US defence policy, the document explores the energy department’s role in driving basic energy research and helping shift more mature technologies into the commercial sector. The review sets priorities in six areas (pictured, top right) in order to create a multi-year framework that can be incorporated into planning and budget discussions. Under each of the six umbrellas can be found a range of potential technological solutions — from better batteries to biofuels and carbon sequestration — that will need to be deployed in concert in order to meet demand for energy, increase domestic supplies and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. The agency is aiming for technologies that can create jobs and have a substantial impact — on the order of 1% of US consumption — over the course of two decades. “The timescale of energy is decades,” Energy Secretary Steven Chu said during the public release in Washington. “We need to take a long view.” In truth, the administration doesn’t have a lot of choice but to take the long view. The bulk of its energy and environmental agenda (remember the global warming legislation?) has fallen prey to partisan politics and an epic financial crisis. Moving forward, the administration will have to fight for even the most basic investments in clean energy R&D, a sad reality only made worse by the [scandal over the failed solar manufacturer Solyndra](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/184055-waxman-to-issa-get-your-facts-straight-on-solyndra). And although nobody would argue with efforts to craft a strategic plan to guide energy investments (which can rise and fall according to political whim on an annual basis), the first quadrennial review largely hews to the current course without making any radical recommendations for change. “Frankly it seems almost self evident to us,” said Steve Koonin, undersecretary for science. — Unlike the military, which can in a sense create its own market for new technologies, DOE necessarily plays a transitional role in technology development. All of its R&D is geared toward commercial deployment, and there’s only so much government can do to create private markets, which depend not just on science and technology but also public sentiment and risk perception, not to mention the full suite of macro- and micro-economic forces. For that reason, the document recommends setting up a permanent group within the DOE that can focus on energy markets, business, policy analysis and, most intriguingly, social sciences. Both for perspective and as a reminder, we will end with a spectacularly ambitious list of goals set by the administration of Barack Obama. To say that achieving these goals will be difficult is an understatement; clearly the rate of progress will need to increase substantially in the out years, which of course highlights the danger of long-term thinking that is not backed by legislation.

#### Should doesn’t mean certainty

Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word “would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does

#### “Resolved” means law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### QER links to elections/politics – requires transparency and presidential involvement

PCAST 10

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), Executive Office of the President, Co-Chaired by John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Eric Lander, President, Broad Institute of Harvard and MIT, Nov 2010, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ACCELERATING THE PACE OF CHANGE IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH AN INTEGRATED FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-energy-tech-report.pdf

A QER process would, in some sense, formulate an integrated energy policy for the twenty­first century. It will span mission and vision definition, strategy, and tactics. The QER and the process leading to it would provide an effective tool for Administration­wide coherence on energy and for effective dialog with Congress on a coordinated legislative agenda. **Presidential interest and engagement will be a necessary ingredient for success.**

**While the QER will be a product of the Administration, substantial input from the Congress**, the energy industry, academia, state and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, **and consumers will be essential throughout the process. Transparency in the process of gathering input for the QER will be key to the development of a sound product that can gain wide support.**

### Fiscal Cliff 2AC

#### No compromise --- it will only be a band-aid solution.

Lister 11/8/12 (Tim, CNN, "No shortage of pressing issues for Obama's next term," http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/analysis-obama-second-term-issues/index.html)

(CNN) -- Even before he takes the oath of office for a second time, President Barack Obama has a crisis on his hands.¶ On January 2, 2013, America will begin a long fall off the "fiscal cliff" -- unless the White House and Congress can agree on a deal to avert the plunge.¶ And that's not going to be easy.¶ "It's going to be tough to govern" with Congress still split and the Republican majority in the House intact, noted CNN political contributor David Gergen, who urged the president to heed the words of Winston Churchill: "In victory, magnanimity."¶ Beyond the domestic agenda, the global economic slowdown threatens an anemic U.S. recovery -- while Iran's nuclear program and Syria's implosion will also demand urgent attention after the rigors of the campaign trail.¶ The in-tray may not seem as daunting as the one that greeted Obama on his first day in office in 2009, but he'll have little time to savor his latest victory.¶ In fewer than 60 days, arbitrary spending cuts and tax increases will begin to kick in unless the president and Congress -- half of which is still controlled by the Republicans -- can find a better way to manage debt reduction.¶ The challenge for Obama and the divided Congress is to come up with a credible consensus that tackles the deficit and doesn't smother the fragile roots of recovery.¶ The Tax Policy Center estimates that allowing the Bush-era tax cuts to expire means an average tax increase of almost $2,000 for middle-class Americans. Sucking that much money out of circulation could push unemployment above 9%, according to the Congressional Budget Office.¶ Obama has declared that the estimated $109 billion worth of automatic budget cuts to defense spending, social services, education and other discretionary federal spending won't happen. And White House officials -- but not the president himself -- say he will preserve the Bush-era tax cuts for the middle class but veto any bill that extends the cuts for households with incomes over $250,000.¶ The expiration of those tax cuts would raise some $500 billion in revenues, according to the latest CBO data.¶ If the United States doesn't address the impending fiscal cliff, ratings agency Moody's has warned of a further downgrading of U.S. sovereign debt.¶ What is the fiscal cliff?¶ Foreign governments are watching the situation with trepidation. Sustaining the U.S. recovery is vital to the health of the global economy -- with most of Europe mired in recession, Japan facing its own version of the fiscal cliff -- its public debt is twice the size of its $5 trillion economy -- and growth in China slackening, though most countries would love to have its 7% expansion rate.¶ Now that the hyper-partisan presidential campaign is out of the way, there may be a window for compromise. But with Congress due to be in session for only 16 more days in 2012, that may extend only as far as a deal to kick the can down the road once more -- resulting in a Band-Aid rather than a grand bargain.¶ House Speaker John Boehner told CNN last weekend that was the most likely path.¶ "I think the best you can hope for is some kind of bridge," he said. Boehner and other Republicans have demanded spending cuts and other measures that would exceed any increase in the federal borrowing ceiling.¶ Deferring the day of judgment is unlikely to impress the markets. Nor will another bout of protracted wrangling over raising the debt ceiling, something that will likely become necessary early in the new year.

#### No compromise --- not enough time.

**Yellin**, **11/9**/2012 (Jessica – CNN Chief White House Correspondent, Analysis: Obama has limits on debt deal, CNN Politics, p. http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/politics/obama-debt-limit/index.html)

In his address at the White House Friday afternoon, the president stressed the importance of congressional action and compromise, including a bill to protect 98% of Americans who will experience a significant tax hike at the end of the year if a deal is not reached. "I've got the pen ready to sign the bill right away," Obama said in the White House East Room, referring to the plan to extend tax cuts for those making under $250,000 a year. "I'm ready to do it; I'm ready to do it." The president said the election proved Americans are on his side in regard to taxes and entitlement reform. "Our job is to get the majority in Congress to reflect the will of the people," he said, before adding he was encouraged by Boehner's openness to tax revenue. Obama held firm on the ideas he espoused on the campaign trail that were also included in a detailed plan the White House sent to Capitol Hill in fall 2011. But there is not much time to negotiate before the new year, a time frame further limited by the Thanksgiving holiday and a just-announced trip by the president to Asia. Republicans sources argued it is unlikely the parties can resolve the sticking points in a lame-duck session of Congress, adding they need to agree on a framework deal that can be resolved in 2013. But don't expect any eye-popping new positions. Sources said the president believes he's been exceedingly clear about how he would like to avoid the painful cuts that would kick in. Throughout his campaign he reiterated his positions while also making clear he would not sign a bill that retained the current low tax rates for the richest Americans.

#### No link – doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Boehner –

#### A) He supports the plan.

**Geman 12** (Ben, “House GOP ready to move on Boehner’s plan to link drilling and infrastructure”, 1/27, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/207043-house-gop-begins-moving-on-boehners-drilling-and-infrastructure-plan)

A House panel will likely approve bills next week **that form the drilling portion of Speaker John Boehner’s** (R-Ohio) plan to fund infrastructure projects with cash raised through expanded oil-and-gas development. The bills will provide Republicans a hook for continuing political attacks against White House energy policies, but are highly unlikely to advance in the Senate or win Obama administration support. The House GOP plan would open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to drilling — a nonstarter for the White House and most Democrats — and require a vastly greater expansion of offshore oil-and-gas leasing than the administration supports. The House Natural Resources Committee will meet Wednesday to mark up three bills. They would open ANWR; **require** oil-and-**gas leasing** off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and remove restrictions in the eastern Gulf of Mexico; and require commercial leasing for oil shale projects in Western states. “Expanding access to **America’s abundant offshore** and onshore **energy resources** will create millions of new American jobs, lower energy prices and generate new revenue to help pay for infrastructure improvements. When new energy resources are developed, we’ll need updated infrastructure to bring it to market. This creates a link that will allow for both American energy jobs and American infrastructure jobs to be created simultaneously,” said House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings (R-Wash.) in a statement. President Obama in recent days has parried election-season GOP attacks against his oil-and-gas record by touting plans for lease sales in the western and central Gulf of Mexico, and vowing support for expanded onshore natural-gas production and incentives for natural-gas-powered vehicles. But **Republicans allege White House policy leaves far too many areas off-limits to drilling rigs**.

#### B) Boehner support is key to avoid the fiscal cliff.

**Weiner 12** (Robert – former senior spokesman in the Clinton White House, the beginning of the Bush Administration, and for Congressmen John Conyers, Charles Rangel, Claude Pepper, and Ed Koch. Sadiq Ahmed is senior policy analyst at Robert Weiner Associates and Solutions for Change, “Boehner, Hero? If He Deals on the Sequester and the Fiscal Cliff”, 10/23, http://www.opednews.com/articles/Boehner-Hero-If-He-Deals-by-Robert-Weiner-121022-761.html)

The country **has reached this critical stage due to the deal with Speaker of the House** John **Boehner** on the Budget Control Act of 2011. The law calls for sequestration (automatic cuts) of social and military spending--but because revenue remains too low, the debt ceiling goes up, up, up regardless. With no additional taxes or program cuts, the sequester shreds 10% of programs for the military, as well as education, housing, health, and food support for the poor, and scientific research. John **Boehner can now become a hero** in American history, a winner of the Kennedy Profiles in Courage--and a hero to Republicans at the same time who see real danger to their control of the House if there is no deal to run the nation. Here's how: If he can round up some support - **it does not have to be a majority of Republicans** - for a tax reform-program cuts combination to avoid the Sequester and the fiscal cliff, at a time of bipartisan vituperation and obstruction, John **Boehner will be considered a Statesman** for the Ages. **Democrats could fill in** the large part of the majority needed. Bill Clinton passed NAFTA in November of 1993 with a majority of the 234 yes votes coming from Republicans (132), and he got enough Democrats (102) to seal the deal. Likewise, Lyndon Johnson passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with a higher percent of House Republicans than Democrats voting for it: Democrats: 152--96 (61--39%); Republicans 138--34 (80--20%). These numbers are an uncomfortable fact for Democrats today.

#### Capital fails --- budget specific.

**Gerson**, 10/29/**2012** (Michael – Policy Fellow with the ONE Campaign, visiting fellow with the Center for Public Justice, former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Obama’s discrediting victory limits chances for another term, The Seattle Times, p. http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2019555918\_obamasdiscreditingvictoryxml.html)

Obama tends to overestimate his own negotiating skills with Congress, which are poor — also displayed in his failed attempt to achieve a grand budget compromise in 2011. When the ideological stakes are highest, Obama jettisons bipartisanship with little thought or regret. He was perfectly willing to reorganize one-sixth of the economy on a party-line vote. He has employed tactics that ensure future partisan bitterness. His persuasive powers on the issue of health care turned out to be limited. The more he spoke, the less public support he found. But he proved incapable of creative ideological readjustment. Obama’s largest achievement turned out to be a self-indictment. He has not shown the leadership skills or the inclination to create consensus around large issues. The problem is that large issues — avoiding the fiscal cliff, reforming the tax code, making entitlement commitments more sustainable — are coming. Either Obama will have to become an entirely different type of leader — or America needs a new one.

#### Public –

#### A) Massive support for the plan.

**Dixon**, 3/19/**2012** (Darius – energy reporter at Politico, Poll: Support rises for offshore drilling, Politico, p. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74185.html)

Interest in alternative energy sources like wind and solar over has waned among Americans the last year, while support for offshore oil and gas drilling has climbed back up to pre-BP oil spill levels, according to a poll released Monday. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed by the Pew Research Center support alternative energy, down 11 percent compared with March 2011. However, interest in developing oil, coal and natural gas resources rose by 10 percent, while the remainder to those who said they supported both or didn’t know. Support for offshore oil and gas drilling in U.S. waters has also recovered to its levels prior to the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. **Nearly two-thirds** of those surveyed now favor allowing increased offshore drilling, up from 57 percent a year ago and 44 percent in June 2010, during the spill. The partisan divide on renewable energy versus oil, coal and natural gas development has also become more pronounced over the last year. Eighty-nine percent of Republicans favor allowing more offshore oil and gas drilling while only half of Democrats agree, according the survey. However, a 64 percent of independents support increased drilling off the U.S. coast

#### B) Public support gives Obama leverage on the fiscal cliff.

**The Globe and Mail**, 11/7/**2012** (Lead the way in budget negotiations, GOP tells Obama, p. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/us-election/lead-the-way-in-budget-negotiations-gop-tells-obama/article5082253/)

Fresh off his victory – but facing a renewed Republican majority in the House and anxious investors on Wall Street – Mr. Obama has a precarious choice to make about the second-term path he charts. Will he anger elements of his own party in order to reach a budget deal with Republicans, or risk gridlock in the name of Democratic principles? How Mr. Obama interprets the mandate he received from American voters will determine whether he presses forward with an ambitious progressive agenda – at the risk of seeing it flop in Congress – or seeks broad compromises with Republicans that are unpopular with the coalition of voters that ensured his win. With his narrow popular-vote victory over Mitt Romney, Mr. Obama will likely need to build public support for his positions in order to increase his leverage with Republicans, and even his own party. The Democratic base is dead set against entitlement cuts. The President’s first order of business remains reaching a long-term budget deal that averts massive spending cuts and tax hikes set to take effect in 2013. That imperative was underscored by the stock market’s postelection doubts about the likelihood of a deal, as major U.S. indexes fell more than 2 per cent Wednesday.

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital does not affect the agenda

**Dickinson 9** (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

#### Fiscal cliff doesn't pose a short-term threat to the economy - tax and spending measures aren't immediate

Schoen 11/8/12 (John, NBC News, "Obama victory clouded by looming fiscal battle with Congress," http://www.nbcnews.com/business/economywatch/obama-victory-clouded-looming-fiscal-battle-congress-1C6892841)

The impact could take time to unfold. While clearly dire in the long run, the economic damage from combined tax increases and spending cuts would be felt gradually in the early months of 2013, according to Jared Bernstein, a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and former economic adviser to the Obama administration.¶ “The way to think about the fiscal cliff is more of a slope,” he said. “Just going over the fiscal cliff and reversing yourself pretty quickly - the fiscal bungee jump - I don't think it's a good thing, but that's not recessionary.”

#### -- Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Miller 00 (Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that  
exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore **no relationship** to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

## **1AR v. MSU GT Round 2**

### K

#### Their impact is a theoretical fabrication

Jarvis 00 (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128)

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recommends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley’s torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, modernism, or realism emanate a “violence” that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self-professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, published, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theoretical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imaged violence, global transformation (perhaps even revolutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as “Down with positivism and rationality”? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such **innocuous** and largely unknown **nonrealities** like positivism and realism? These are **imagined and fictitious enemies**, **theoretical fabrications** that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations.

#### Democratic structures check the impact

Dickinson 4 (Edward Ross, University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About ‘Modernity’”, Central European History, 37(1), p. 18-19)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they **did not proceed** **to** the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and **murder** of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

**Neoliberalism isn’t the root cause of war**

**Roberts and Sparke 3** (Susan, Professor of Geography – University of Kentucky, and Matthew, Professor of Geography – University of Washington, “Neoliberal Geopolitics,” Antipode, 35(5), p. 886-897)

Barnett’s work is our main example in this paper of a more widespread form of neoliberal geopolitics implicated in the war-making. This geopolitical world vision, we argue, is closely connected to neoliberal idealism about the virtues of free markets, openness, and global economic integration. Yet, linked as it was to an extreme form of American unilateralism, we further want to highlight how the neoliberal geopolitics of the war planners illustrated the contradictory dependency of multilateral neoliberal deregulation on enforced re-regulation and, in particular, on the deadly and far from multilateral re-regulation represented by the “regime change” that has now been enforced on Iraq. Such re-regulation underlines the intellectual importance of studying how neoliberal marketization dynamics are hybridized and supplemented by various extra-economic forces.2 Rather than making neoliberalism into a **totalizing economic master narrative**, we therefore suggest that it is vital to examine its inter-articulation with certain dangerous supplements, including, not least of all, the violence of American military force. We are not arguing that the war is completely explainable in terms of neoliberalism, nor that neoliberalism is reducible to American imperialism. Instead, the point is to explore how a certain globalist and economistic view of the world, one associated with neoliberalism, did service in legitimating the war while simultaneously finessing America’s all too obvious departure from the “end of the nation-state” storyline.

[Continues]

As we said at the start, we do not want to claim too much for neoliberalism. It cannot explain everything, least of all the diverse brutalities of what happened in Iraq. Moreover, in connecting neoliberal norms to the vagaries of geopolitics, we risk **corrupting the analytical purchase of neoliberalism** on more clearly socioeconomic developments. By the same token, we also risk obscuring the emergence of certain nonmilitarist geoeconomic visions of global and local space that have gone hand in hand with neoliberal globalization (see Sparke 1998, 2002; Sparke and Lawson 2003). But insofar as the specific vision of neoliberal geopolitics brought many neoliberals to support the war (including, perhaps, Britain’s Tony Blair as well as Americans such as Friedman), insofar as it helped thereby also to facilitate the planning and overarching coordination of the violence, and insofar as the war showed how the extension of neoliberal practices on a global scale has come to depend on violent interventions by the US, it seems vital to reflect on the inter-articulations.

**Neoliberalism is inevitable and sustainable – markets control our thought**

**Hudson 99** [Mark, Progressive Librarian, Fall, “Understanding Information Media in the Age of Neoliberalism: The Contributions of Herbert Schiller”]

Neoliberal ideas are as old as capitalism itself, but in recent decades they have seen a tremendous resurgence and have displaced the state-interventionist economic theories of the interwar and post-World War II periods to become the reigning ideology of our time. Neoliberalism emerged full force in the 1980s with the right-wing Reagan and Thatcher regimes, but its **influence has** since **spread** across the political spectrum to encompass not only centrist political parties but even much of the traditional social-democratic left. In the 1990s, neoliberal hegemony over our politics and culture has become so overwhelming that it is becoming difficult to even rationally discuss what neoliberalism is; indeed, as Robert McChesney notes, the term "neoliberalism" is hardly known to the U.S. public outside of academia and the business community (McChesney). The corporate stranglehold on our information and communications media gives neoliberal ideologues a virtually **unchallenged platform** from which to blast their pro-market messages into every corner of our common culture. At the same time, neoliberalism provides the ideological cover for deregulatory legislation (most recently the 1996 Telecommunications Act) that enables corporations to extend their monopoly over these media even more. For the past three decades, one of the fiercest and most coherent critics of corporate control over the information/communications sphere has been the social scientist Herbert Schiller. Although Schiller began his career before neoliberalism's ascendance, and he does not even today use the term in his writings, his work provides essential insights into the roots of neoliberal/corporate hegemony over our information media and the adverse consequences of that hegemony for our politics, economy and culture.

#### Privileging representations locks in violence – policy analysis is the best challenge to power

Taft-Kaufman 95 (Jill, Professor of Speech – CMU, Southern Communication Journal, 60(3), Spring)

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

### Politics

#### Cuts don’t hurt heg

**Friedman 11/2** (Benjamin, Research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, “How Cutting Pentagon Spending Will Fix U.S. Defense Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, 2011 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136637/benjamin-friedman/how-cutting-pentagon-spending-will-fix-us-defense-strategy?page=show>. )

Washington's defense hawks are circling the wagons to defend the Pentagon's budget. The Obama administration has instructed the military to reduce planned spending over the next decade by about $400 billion, or eight percent over time. The Budget Control Act, the culmination of the debt-ceiling standoff this summer, could double those cuts. In response, senior defense officials, congressional committee chairs, and think tanks funded by military contractors have warned that excessive reductions will result in a fighting force that lacks the resources for its missions. The Pentagon's boosters are right that big cuts will limit military capabilities. But that would actually be a good thing for the United States. Shrinking the U.S. military would not only save a fortune but also encourage policymakers to employ the armed services less promiscuously, keeping American troops -- and the country at large -- out of needless trouble. Especially for the last two decades, the United States' considerable wealth and fortunate geography have made global adventurism seem largely costless. The 2011 U.S. military budget of nearly $700 billion is higher in real terms than at any point during the Cold War. But for the American public (except the members of the military and their families, that is), the only real impact of such spending has been marginally higher taxes, which have lately been subsidized by deficits. As a result, leaders confuse needs and ambitions. Going beyond the demands of the White House and the Budget Control Act and cutting the non-war military budget by at least 20 percent would be a first step toward addressing this problem. Austerity is an efficient auditor. It forces Washington to scrutinize expenses and to prioritize. Recall that the George W. Bush administration, with little controversy, cut taxes, fought two wars, expanded non-war defense spending, and added an expensive prescription drug benefit to Medicare -- all at roughly the same time. Deficit concerns have now made such fiscal imprudence impossible. Politicians eager to avoid tax increases and entitlement cuts have finally begun questioning Pentagon largesse, and for the first time since the late 1990s, military reductions are on the table. They are not yet guaranteed, however. The White House says the Budget Control Act locks in lower defense spending. But the bill caps spending for just two years and allows the other "security" agencies -- the State Department, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Nuclear Security Administration -- to bear the required cuts. And those cuts are small: only about $4 billion in 2012 compared to 2011, amounting to less than one percent. Because the caps do not apply to war spending, moreover, Congress can evade reductions by re-labeling base spending as war costs. Senate appropriators already protected $10 billion using this gimmick in their proposed 2012 budget. The act requires another $500 billion in military spending cuts over ten years if the Joint Congressional Committee fails to identify $1.2 trillion in government-wide savings that Congress then passes. But these additional cuts, known as sequestration, are unlikely, too. Neither the White House nor a congressional majority supports sequestering Pentagon funds. In fact, they have all of 2012 to change the law to avoid it, should the joint committee fail. Lawmakers in both parties, including Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), have already suggested such an option. Far bigger savings are possible if the Pentagon is recast as a true defense agency rather than one aimed at something far more ambitious. And cuts would force U.S. officials to prioritize. For starters, they would have to recognize that the U.S. military is currently structured to exercise power abroad, not provide self-defense. The U.S. Navy patrols the globe in the name of protecting global commerce, even though markets easily adapt to supply disruptions and other states have good reason to protect their own shipments. Washington maintains enormous ground forces in order to conduct nation-building missions abroad -- despite the fact that such missions generally fail at great cost. Garrisons in Germany and South Korea have become subsidies that allow Cold War-era allies to avoid self-reliance. Not only are these missions unnecessary, they are counterproductive. They turn economically capable allies into dependents, provoke animosity in far-flung corners of the globe, and encourage states to balance U.S. military power, often with nuclear weapons. A strategy based on restraint would allow Washington to save at least about $1.2 trillion over a decade, three times what the Obama administration is now asking for. Here is a breakdown of those estimated savings over the next ten years: ¶ Fewer missions would require fewer forces and lower procurement and operational costs. A U.S. Navy that surges to fight rare wars could operate three fewer carrier battle groups and air wings, leaving eight and seven, respectively; retain half as many expeditionary strike groups, leaving five; and cut the number of planned ships from 313 to 241. It could buy one attack submarine annually, rather than two, reducing the total to 40 by 2020, rather than 2028, as now planned. The littoral combat ships and the Marines' F-35B, the short-takeoff and vertical-landing version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter -- both currently under development -- would be cancelled. Savings: $127 billion. ¶ The Air Force can do without a third of its roughly 2,000 fighter and attack aircraft (including those in the National Guard and Reserves). Precision munitions have vastly increased each aircraft's striking power. Moreover, the Navy provides several strike alternatives to land-based fighters and bombers. Savings: $89 billion. ¶ If Washington avoids protracted occupations of restive states and defends fewer allies, the Pentagon could lose a quarter of a million troops from the Marines and Army via retirement alone. Savings: $287 billion. ¶ With a reduced force structure, each service would need less housing and administrative support and the Pentagon could employ fewer officers, civilians, and contractors. Combatant commands could be consolidated or eliminated. Additionally, intelligence, research, and development budgets can be cut by 10-15 percent. Savings: $420 billion. ¶ The Pentagon spends a growing portion of its budget on pay and benefits. Experience indicates that it could slow increases in military pay and raise health-care charges without much damage to recruiting. Additional savings can come from reducing commissary discounts. Such steps will grow less controversial as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end. Savings: $130 billion. ¶ U.S. nuclear superiority is so overwhelming that halving the nuclear arsenal and eliminating nuclear-armed bombers would not jeopardize the ability to retaliate sufficiently against a nuclear first strike. Missile defense should cease to be a program intended to protect the U.S. population, an impossible objective against a well-armed foe, and run by a special agency. The military services should instead manage their own programs aimed at protecting their forces from missiles. Savings: $120 billion. Washington's defense establishment is incapable of making the kind of strategic shift these cuts would suggest, as politicians remains wedded to existing American military commitments. The White House, moreover, considers strategy a question for the military, and the Pentagon is never going to slash its own budget by explaining the uselessness of its own missions. Those looking to trim the Pentagon budget significantly should follow the Nike approach: Just do it. Telling the services what their new budget is, but not how to reach it, will force a new kind of efficiency on the Pentagon. Military leaders will prioritize when they have to. With less money, they will sacrifice less important tasks and administrative bloat while salvaging their favored missions. Meanwhile, civilian leaders should jettison the so-called golden ratio, by which each service receives a fixed share of the Pentagon budget. If the services are forced to compete for the same funds, as they did in the 1950s, they will expose flaws in others' arguments and improve their own. The danger in shedding military capability is that policymakers will try to do more with less, overburdening the force and endangering missions. But given the cost of the status quo, that is a risk worth taking.

#### Farm bill Won’t pass

Abbott 11-7-12 (Charles, Crop insurance a post-election target, farm bill elusive, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-election-agriculture-idUSBRE8A62H520121107)

Federally subsidized crop insurance will be a big target for lawmakers looking to cut the budget deficit in the lame-duck session of Congress opening next week, agricultural policy experts agreed the morning after a status-quo general election.¶ But lawmakers will probably be unable to break their deadlock over enacting a five-year, $500 billion farm bill covering a wide range of agricultural policy from food stamps to crop subsidies and soil conservation.

#### -- No shortages – food is abundant

Poole 6 (Holly Kavana, Institute for Food and Development Policy,“12 Myths About Hunger”, Backgrounder, 12(2), Summer, 4-9, http://www.foodfirst.org/12myths)

Myth 1: Not Enough Food to Go Around Reality: Abundance, not scarcity, best describes the world's food supply. Enough wheat, rice and other grains are produced to provide every human being with 3,200 calories a day. That doesn't even count many other commonly eaten foods - ­vegetables, beans, nuts, root crops, fruits, grass-fed meats, and fish. Enough food is available to provide at least 4.3 pounds of food per person a day worldwide: two and half pounds of grain, beans and nuts, about a pound of fruits and vegetables, and nearly another pound of meat, milk and eggs - ­enough to make most people fat! The problem is that many people are too poor to buy readily available food. Even most "hungry countries" have enough food for all their people right now. Many are net exporters of food and other agricultural products.

#### Nothing has changed --- there’s no compromise.

**Cook**, **11/8**/2012 (Nancy – Budget and Tax correspondent at the National Journal, To Avert a Fiscal-Cliff Catastrophe, Someone Has to Blink, National Journal, p. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/to-avert-a-fiscal-cliff-catastrophe-someone-has-to-blink-20121108>)

Both parties pledge that they don’t want to plunge from the fiscal cliff—the more than $500 billion in automatic tax hikes and spending cuts scheduled to kick in with the new year. The tax changes alone would affect roughly 90 percent of Americans, according to the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center. But to avert catastrophe, someone needs to blink. Since Tuesday, the two parties have been acting conciliatory (even if Obama’s victory gives him a great deal of leverage over Republicans who really don’t want the tax cuts to expire). House Speaker John Boehner and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid talked on Wednesday about the need to cut a deal. “It’s better to dance than to fight,” as Reid put it. But besides the happy talk, it’s not clear what, if anything, the election has changed. “We have the same cast of characters. We have the same problems. Are we going to get a different result?” asks Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the former director of the Congressional Budget Office and now president of the conservative American Action Forum. A different result means a large-scale compromise, and that’s one possibility for the lame duck. It is exceedingly remote. Observers think a smaller-scale compromise, however, might be within reach. The administration and Congress could come up with the framework for a deal—with specific targets—that temporarily avoids the sequester, extends the majority of the Bush-era tax cuts, and promises to tackle a grand bargain, as well as tax reform, in 2013. “The key resides in both parties understanding the difference between surrender and principled compromise,” Holtz-Eakin says. So far, the parties have not acquired that understanding. That’s why another scenario may be more likely: a swan dive off the fiscal cliff after weeks of negotiations and tense wrangling. This would rattle the financial markets and vex a business community already horrified by political brinkmanship. But it would also give the two parties a new starting point for negotiations. Democrats could agree to some Medicare changes in return for additional revenue and higher rates on either individual or investment income; Republicans could negotiate upward the definition of “upper earner” and realize a historic entitlement reduction. That way, they could each say they had gotten what they wanted.

#### Boehner controls the deal – new, non-tax revenue is key

Fox 12 (Fox News, “Boehner wants 'bridge' to avoid 'fiscal cliff,' with eyes on 'major' deal in 2013,”

<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/08/gop-house-leaders-begin-outlining-parameters-to-avoid-fiscal-cliff-day-after/?intcmp=trending>)

House Speaker John Boehner, on the heels of an election that left the balance of power in Washington unchanged, made the first move in crafting the framework for a deal to potentially avert the so-called "fiscal cliff." The speaker, on a phone call with Republicans, said he'd like a "bridge" measure to get negotiators past the looming year-end deadline that would, if left un-addressed, trigger automatic spending cuts and tax hikes, people familiar with the call told Fox News. Separately, Boehner told reporters he wants to then see "major solutions" in 2013 "that begin to solve the problem." He said Republicans are willing to accept "new revenue," while indicating that doesn't mean higher tax rates. Rather, Boehner said his party is willing to bring in more revenue by closing loopholes and ending certain deductions through comprehensive tax reform -- but only if Democrats are willing to deal, by making serious spending cuts and putting entitlements on the table. "In order to garner Republican support for new revenues, the president must be willing to reduce spending and shore up the entitlement programs that are the primary drivers of our debt." The push to craft a short-term bill, though, could end up creating yet another future deadline that lawmakers wait until the eleventh hour to address. Short-term measures have become a go-to solution for a gridlocked Congress -- with the body repeatedly passing budget bills known as "continuing resolutions" in lieu of a full-scale budget. The need for renewed fiscal talks grew in urgency after Tuesday's elections did little to change the dynamic in Washington, with Democrats holding on to the White House and Senate and Republicans keeping control of the House. A deal has so far been held up by a central sticking point -- whether to extend all the Bush-era tax rates, or let them lapse for those making $250,000 and up. Both sides have pledged in the aftermath of the election to work together, but for the past two years bipartisan cooperation has been virtually non-existent. Boehner, in the Republican House leaders' call with members, expressed concern about getting major legislation passed in a lame-duck session, making a short-term measure more reasonable until the new Congress is sworn in. However, he also spoke to the Republicans' broader agenda in comments to reporters Wednesday afternoon, saying new revenue is on the table as long as it comes through tax loophole reform, not rate hikes. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor also spoke out Wednesday on Republicans' goals for the new session, saying in a letter to House Republicans that though the party and the president don't agree on many issues, it was their duty to come together and work for the American people. "Our task is to legislate based on our principles and forge the compromise that will be necessary to get our nation back on track," the letter said. However, he also said that the GOP would stick to their principles when dealing with the "fiscal cliff," and would push for a fundamental reform of the tax code rather than increasing taxes. In the Senate, Majority Leader Harry Reid said Wednesday that "we need to start working together, a lot. Gridlock is not the solution." Even so, he disputed Boehner's contention that the public doesn't support a tax increase, saying the election was a "mandate ... that the richest of the rich have to help a little bit." "I'm going to do everything within my power to be as conciliatory as possible. I want to work together, but I want everyone to also understand, you can't push us around," Reid said, adding: "I think we should just roll up our sleeves and get it done." The Bush-era tax rates are just one of a handful of problems facing President Obama and the lame-duck Congress. Obama and the Democrats want to let the lower rates expire for top income earners, while Republicans want to preserve the existing rates for everyone. If they can't compromise, all tax rates will increase. Separately, steep automatic cuts to defense and social spending are set to kick in automatically in January, something both sides say they don't want even though they agreed to the cuts in 2011 as an incentive to get negotiators to strike a long-term deficit-reduction deal. That deal never came, leaving the country at risk of federal cuts that some fear could bring the country back into a recession.

## 2AC v. Michigan DH Round 3

### T – Restrictions (Regulation) – 2AC

#### **Natural gas r**estrictions prevent energy production

NaturalGas.org, no date (NaturalGas.org, “Natural Gas Supply,” http://www.naturalgas.org/business/analysis.asp)  
The production of natural gas in the United States is based on competitive market forces: inadequate supply at any one time leads to price increases, which signal to production companies the need to increase the supply of natural gas to the market. Supplying natural gas in the United States in order to meet this demand, however, is dependent on a number of factors. These factors may be broken down into two segments: general barriers to increasing supply, and those factors that affect the short term supply scenario. Short Term Supply Barriers In a perfect world, price signals would be recognized and acted upon immediately, and there would be little lag time between increased demand for natural gas, and an increase in supplies reaching the market. However, in reality, this lag time does exist. There are several barriers to immediate supply increases which affect the short term availability of natural gas supply. They include: Availability of Skilled Workers - The need to train and hire skilled workers results in lag times between times of increased demand and an increase in production. For example, from 1991 to 1999, a prolonged period of relatively low prices indicated adequate supplies of natural gas existed, and the exploration and production industry contracted in response. During this period, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded a 26 percent average decrease in employment in the oil and gas extraction industry. Some of these workers left the industry altogether rather than remain unemployed. When production companies began to react to higher prices in late 1999, the need to find and train skilled workers contributed to a slower increase in activity than would have been the case if skilled workers were plentiful. To counter this problem, many production companies offer increasingly high wages, as well as scholarships and educational contributions to attract professionals to the industry. Availability of Equipment - Drilling rigs are very expensive pieces of equipment. Price volatility in the industry makes it very difficult for producers, as well as production equipment suppliers, to plan the construction and placement of drilling rigs far in advance. Prolonged periods of low prices results in reduction of the number of available rigs. When prices respond to increase demand, and drilling activity increases, time is required to build and place an adequate number of drilling rigs. For this reason, drilling rig counts are a good indication of the status of the oil and natural gas production industry. As can be seen in the graph, an increase in operational rigs lags behind period of high prices. For more information on rig counts, click here. Permitting and Well Development - Before a natural gas well actually begins producing, there are several time consuming procedures and development activities that must take place. In order to begin drilling, exploration activities must take place to pinpoint the location of natural gas reserves. Once a suitable field has been located, production companies must receive the required approval from the landowner (which in many cases is the government) to install drilling equipment and begin to drill the well. The Bureau of Land Management is responsible for issuing permits for onshore development, and the Minerals Management Service is responsible for offshore development areas. Once drilling is completed, extraction and field processing equipment must be set up, as well as gathering systems. In all, the between the location of natural gas deposits and the beginning of production can range from as little as a few months to as much as ten years. Weather and Delivery Disruptions - Although unrelated to natural gas prices or demand increases and decreases, weather patterns and anomalies can have a significant impact on natural gas production. For example, hurricanes can have an impact on the offshore production of natural gas, as safety measures require the temporary shut down of offshore drilling and production platforms. In addition, while the safety record of the natural gas industry is extremely good, malfunctions and accidents may occur from time to time that disrupt the delivery of natural gas. For example, a compressor malfunction in a large pipeline serving a major hub could temporarily disrupt the flow of natural gas through that important market center. While the effects of weather and delivery disruptions are most often of short duration, they can still have an effect on the expeditious production of natural gas. General Barriers to Increasing Supply In addition to the short term impediments to increasing natural gas supply, there exist other more general barriers to the increased supply of natural gas in the United States. These include: Land Access - The U.S. government owns more than 29 percent of all the land in the country, and an estimated 40 percent of undiscovered natural gas exists on this land. In several areas, the government has restricted access to federal lands. 59 percent of undiscovered gas resources are on federal lands and offshore waters. Outside of the western Gulf of Mexico, production companies are prohibited access to virtually all federal lands offshore the Lower 48 states. About 9 percent of resource-bearing land in the Rockies is also off limits, and access to another 32 percent is significantly restricted. The National Petroleum Council in 1999 estimated that 213 Tcf of natural gas exists in areas under federal access restrictions. This restriction is the result of presidential and congressional leasing moratoria, and affects the amount of natural gas resources that may be extracted to increase supply. Pipeline Infrastructure - The ability to transport natural gas from producing regions to consumption regions also affects the availability of supplies to the marketplace. The interstate and intrastate pipeline infrastructure can only transport so much natural gas at any one time, and in essence provides a 'ceiling' for the amount of natural gas that can reach the market. Although the current pipeline infrastructure is significant, with the EIA estimating daily delivery capacity of the pipeline grid to be 119 Bcf. However, natural gas pipeline companies must continue to continually expand the pipeline infrastructure in order to meet growing demand. To learn more about the natural gas pipeline infrastructure in the United States, click here. The Financial Environment - Exploring for and producing natural gas is a very capital intensive endeavor. In fact, the National Petroleum Council estimated in 1999 that production companies will have to invest $1.44 trillion in capital between 1999 and 2015 in order to keep pace with demand growth. This puts significant pressures on production companies, particularly small, privately owned firms, to raise the capital necessary to increase production. While efficient and transparent financial markets in the U.S. do offer options for raising capital effectively, the rate at which production companies may do so can serve as a limiting factor in the increasing availability of supplies reaching the market.

#### OCS moratorium are restrictions

Hagerty 10

[Curry, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, “ Outer Continental Shelf Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development” CRS 2010]

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) moratoria provisions, enacted as part of the Department of the Interior appropriations over the last 26 years, prohibited federal spending on oil and gas development in certain locations and for certain activities. Annual **congressional moratoria restrictions** expired on September 30, 2008. While the expiration of this restriction does not make leasing and drilling permissible in all offshore areas, it is a significant development in conjunction with other changes in offshore leasing activity. Change in moratoria policy signals a shift in policy that may affect other OCS policies as well.

#### **this evidence is energy specific**

Davies 30 (Major George, “CLAUSE 1.—(Scheme regulating production, supply and sale of coal.),” February, vol 235 cc2453-558, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1930/feb/27/clause-1-scheme-regulating-production)

Major GEORGE DAVIES The hon. Member says he has heard no reason advanced for this Amendment. I am willing to give him one, and I will tell him that the reason why the benches are not full, as they were a short time ago, is that man cannot live by bread alone and, as there is a rule against the introduction of newspapers and foodstuffs, it is necessary for some of us to refresh ourselves after a late Division. I am not going to transgress the ruling of the Chair, as we have been given very great latitude, but I want to confine myself to the point at issue, which is the regulation of sale. I have had experience in the past of efforts to regulate the sale of sugar. Like the coal industry to-day, there has been in the past an over-production of many of the fundamental articles of the life of a nation. I will not dwell on the case of rubber, but the sugar situation was entirely on all fours with this situation, as it was a question of the regulation of sale. Facing a situation very similar in kind and not dissimilar in degree to the problem now before us, those connected with that particular industry in certain countries thought it an advantage to control and regulate the sale. As soon as you use the word "regulation" in this connection it is idle to suggest that it does not mean restriction. Obviously, that is the point—to restrict—and, while 2541 it is true the word "restrict" is not in this particular Clause, and cannot be argued in connection with this Amendment, yet behind the word "regulate" is the word "restrict," in other words, controlling what has been uncontrolled, production thrown on markets not able to receive it.

### Case

#### Counter-interpretation – Energy production is the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

Energy consumption

‘Energy consumption’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Consumption of energy, in relation to a facility, means the use or disposal of energy from the operation of the

facility including own-use and losses in extraction, production and transmission.

### LNG Exports Good – Trade – 2AC

#### Exports key to trade leadership

**Slutz 12**

(James, “The Shale Gas Revolution¶ Implications for U.S. and Canadian Energy Policy ¶ and Asian Energy Security,” 9-4-12, <http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/ETA/Slutz_interview_09042012.pdf>, accessed)

Fundamentally, governments need to decide under what trade principles they wish to operate. In reality, petroleum exports are no different than other commodities. In the United States, history has shown that restrictions on the natural gas market have inhibited production and supply, resulting in higher prices. A key example of this was the Fuel Use Act of 1978. Opening up the natural gas market and marketbased pricing in the 1980s resulted in new technologies and resources, such as coalbed methane (coal seam gas), tight and deep gas, and now shale gas. The United States has been a strong advocate of free trade, and restricting natural gas trade would weaken its stance as a leader of global free trade.

#### Solves war

**Panitchpakdi 4** (DG Supachai, Former Director-General – World Trade Organization, “American Leadership and the World Trade Organization: What is the Alternative?”, National Press Club, 2-26, http://www.wto.org/french/ news\_f/spsp\_f/spsp22\_f.htm)

I can sum up my message today in three sentences: The United States, more than any single country, created the world trading system. The US has never had more riding on the strength of that system. And US leadership — especially in the current Doha trade talks — is indispensable to the system's success. It is true that as the WTO's importance to the world economy increases, so too does the challenge of making it work: there are more countries, more issues, trade is in the spot light as never before. But the fiction that there is an alternative to the WTO — or to US leadership — is both naïve and dangerous. Naïve because it fails to recognize that multilateralism has become more — not less — important to advancing US interests. Dangerous because it risks undermining the very objectives the US seeks — freer trade, stronger rules, a more open and secure world economy. The Doha Round is a crucial test. The core issues — services, agriculture, and industrial tariffs — are obviously directly relevant to the US. America is highly competitive in services — the fastest growing sector of the world economy, and where the scope for liberalization is greatest. In agriculture too the US is competitive across many commodities — but sky-high global barriers and subsidies impede and distort agricultural trade. Industrial tariffs also offer scope for further liberalization — especially in certain markets and sectors. But what is at stake in these talks is more than the economic benefits that would flow from a successful deal. The real issue is the relevance of the multilateral trading system. Its expanded rules, broader membership, and binding dispute mechanism means that the new WTO — created less than ten years ago — is pivotal to international economic relations. But this means that the costs of failure are also higher — with ramifications that can be felt more widely. Advancing the Doha agenda would confirm the WTO as the focal point for global trade negotiations, and as the key forum for international economic cooperation. The credibility of the institution would be greatly enhanced. But if the Doha negotiations stumble, doubts may grow, not just about the WTO's effectiveness, but about the future of multilateralism in trade. This should be a major concern to the US for two reasons: First, the US is now integrated with the world economy as never before. A quarter of US GDP is tied to international trade, up from 10 per cent in 1970 — the largest such increase of any developed economy over this period. A third of US growth since 1990 has been generated by trade. And America's trade is increasingly global in scope — 37 per cent with Canada and Mexico, 23 per cent with Europe, 27 per cent with Asia. Last year alone, exports to China rose by almost 30 per cent. The US has also grown more reliant on the rules of the multilateral system to keep world markets open. Not only has it initiated more WTO dispute proceedings than any other country — some 75 since 1995 — according to USTR it has also won or successfully settled most of the cases it has brought. The point is this: even the US cannot achieve prosperity on its own; it is increasingly dependent on international trade, and the rules-based economic order that underpins it. As the biggest economy, largest trader and one of the most open markets in the world, it is axiomatic that the US has the greatest interest in widening and deepening the multilateral system. Furthermore, expanding international trade through the WTO generates increased global prosperity, in turn creating yet more opportunities for the US economy. The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has as the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with — everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic growth tied to exports; the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it’s worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn’t fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector trade — combined with the high skills of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way. They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO? Some argue that the world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute. There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict. America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world trade”. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable. Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO — would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules. All of these were America’s objectives. The US needs to be both clearer about the magnitude of what it has achieved, and more realistic about what it is trying to — and can — accomplish. Multilateralism can be slow, messy, and tortuous. But it is also indispensable to managing an increasingly integrated global economy. Multilateralism is based on the belief that all countries — even powerful countries like the United States — are made stronger and more secure through international co-operation and rules, and by working to strengthen one another from within a system, not outside of it. Multilateralism's greatest ideal is the ideal of negotiation, compromise, consensus, not coercion. As Churchill said of democracy, it is the worst possible system except for all the others. I do not believe America's long-term economic interests have changed. Nor do I believe that America's vision for a just international order has become blurred. If anything, the American vision has been sharpened since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington; sharpened by the realization that there is now a new struggle globally between the forces of openness and modernity, and the forces of separatism and reaction. More than ever, America's interests lie in an open world economy resting on the foundation of a strong, rules-based multilateral system. More and more, America's growth and security are tied to the growth and security of the world economy as a whole. American leadership today is more — not less — important to our increasingly interconnected planet. A recent successful, and much needed, example is the multilateral agreement on intellectual property rights and access to medicines for poor countries, in which the US played a pivotal role. It would be a tragic mistake if the Doha Round, which offers the world a once-in-a-generation opportunity to eliminate trade distortions, to strengthen trade rules, and open markets across the world, were allowed to founder. We need courage and the collective political will to ensure a balanced and equitable outcome. What is the alternative? It is a fragmented world, with greater conflict and uncertainty. A world of the past, not the future — one that America turned away from after 1945, and that we should reject just as decisively today. America must lead. The multilateral trading system is too important to fail. The world depends on it. So does America.

### LNG Exports Good – Impact – Russia-Ukraine War – 2AC

#### US LNG exports solve Russia-Ukraine war

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

A large increase in U.S. LNG exports would have the potential to increase U.S. foreign policy interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific basins. Unlike oil, natural gas has traditionally been an infrastructure-constrained business, giving geographical proximity and political relations between producers and consumers a high level of importance. Issues of “pipeline politics” have been most directly visible in Europe, which relies on Russia for around a third of its gas. Previous disputes between Moscow and Ukraine over pricing have led to major gas shortages in several E.U. countries in the winters (when demand is highest) of both 2006 and 2009. Further disagreements between Moscow and Kiev over the terms of the existing bilateral gas deal have the potential to escalate again, with negative consequences for E.U. consumers. The risk of high reliance on Russian gas has been a principal driver of European energy policy in recent decades. Among central and eastern European states, particularly those formerly aligned with the Soviet Union such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the issue of reliance on imports of Russian gas is a primary energy security concern and has inspired energy policies aimed at diversification of fuel sources for power generation. From the U.S. perspective such Russian influence in the affairs of these democratic nations is an impediment to efforts at political and economic reform. The market power of Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, is evident in these countries. Although they are closer to Russia than other consumers of Russian gas in Western Europe, many countries in Eastern and Central Europe pay higher contract prices for their imports, as they are more reliant on Russian gas as a proportion of their energy mixes. In the larger economies of Western Europe, which consume most of Russia’s exports, there are efforts to diversify their supply of natural gas. The E.U. has formally acknowledged the need to put in place mechanisms to increase supply diversity. These include market liberalization approaches such as rules mandating third-party access to pipeline infrastructure (from which Gazprom is demanding exemption), and commitments to complete a single market for electricity and gas by 2014, and to ensure that no member country is isolated from electricity and gas grids by 2015.112 Despite these formal efforts, there are several factors retarding the E.U.’s push for a unified effort to reduce dependence on Russian gas. National interest has been given a higher priority than collective, coordinated E.U. energy policy: the gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 probably contributed to the acceptance of the Nord Stream project, which carries gas from Russia into Germany. Germany’s decision to phase out its fleet of nuclear reactors by 2022 will result in far higher reliance on natural gas for the E.U.’s biggest economy. The environmental imperative to reduce carbon emissions— codified in the E.U.’s goal of essentially decarbonizing its power sector by the middle of century—mean that natural gas is being viewed by many as the short-to medium fuel of choice in power generation. Finally, the prospects for European countries to replicate the unconventional gas “revolution” that has resulted in a glut of natural gas in the United States look uncertain. Several countries, including France and the U.K., have encountered stiff public opposition to the techniques used in unconventional gas production, while those countries, such as Poland and Hungary, that have moved ahead with unconventional- gas exploration have generally seen disappointing early results. Collectively, these factors suggest that the prospects for reduced European reliance on Russian gas appear dim. The one factor that has been working to the advantage of advocates of greater European gas diversity has been the increased liquidity of the global LNG market, discussed above. Russia’s dominant position in the European gas market is being eroded by the increased availability of LNG. Qatar’s massive expansion in LNG production in 2008, coupled with the rise in unconventional gas production in the United States as well as a drop in global energy demand due to the global recession, produced a global LNG glut that saw many cargoes intended for the U.S. market diverted into Europe. As mentioned previously, with an abundant source of alternative supply, some European consumers, mainly Gazprom’s closest partners, were able to renegotiate their oil-linked, takeor- pay contracts with Gazprom. As Figure 10 illustrates, however, in the wake of the Fukushima natural disaster and nuclear accident in Japan and a return to growth in most industrialized economies, the LNG market is projected to tighten considerably in the short-term, potentially returning market power to Russia. However, there is a second, structural change to the global gas market that may have more lasting effects to Russia’s market power in the European gas market. LNG is one of the fastest growing segments of the energy sector. The growth of the LNG market, both through long-term contract and spot-market sales, is likely to put increasing pressure on incumbent pipeline gas suppliers. A significant addition of U.S. LNG exports will **accelerate this trend**. In addition to adding to the size of the market, U.S. LNG contracts are likely to be determined on a “floating” basis, with sales terms tied to the price of a U.S. benchmark such as Henry Hub, **eroding the power of providers of long-term oil linked contract suppliers such as Russia**. While U.S. LNG will not be a direct tool of U.S. foreign policy—the destination of U.S. LNG will be determined according to the terms of individual contracts, the spot-price-determined demand, and the LNG traders that purchase such contracts—the addition of a large, market-based producer will **indirectly** serve to increase gas supply diversity in Europe, thereby providing European consumers with increased flexibility and market power.

#### Russia-Ukraine war goes nuclear – draws in the US

**Kingston 9** (Brian, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs – CIFP, “Ukraine: A Risk Assessment Report”, February, http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1214.pdf)

Russia: Russia seeks to influence the weakened Ukraine, inflaming ethnic-Russian separatism; Crimea declares independence; Ukraine resists, perhaps seeing an external war as a distraction from internal strife; Russia comes to the aid of Crimea/ethnic-Russians resulting in open warfare between Russia and Ukraine. The West: The West also suffers from the global recession, but (perhaps following a period of inward looking protectionism) realizes that it cannot allow Russian success in Ukraine; open hostilities erupt between Russian and NATO forces **triggering World War III** and the strong possibility of **nuclear war**, or at least the drawing in of many other countries.

### QER CP – 2AC

#### First is delay

Moniz 12 Ernest Moniz, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Former Clinton Administration Under Secretary of the Department of Energy and as Associate Director for Science in the Office of Science and Technology Policy ; serves on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 11/15/11, Quadrennial Energy and Technology Reviews, web.mit.edu/mitei/views/testimony/111115-quadrennial-energy-and-technology-reviews.html

S.1703 would legislate the QER as a required submission to the Congress, providing "an integrated view of national energy objectives and Federal energy policy, including alignment of research programs, incentives, regulations, and partnerships." Clearly this is in accord with the intentions put forward in the PCAST report. An interagency working group would be established at the beginning of each Administration, with the QER due one year later. This date is displaced by one year from that recommended by PCAST. In steady state, this shift by one year is quite reasonable. My concern is whether the first QER can be put together well by early 2014, given that the entire process needs to be invented. This can be ameliorated to some extent if the buildup of analytical capabilities and process development are funded and pursued aggressively in 2012.

#### Even the perception of delay takes out the case

Bayless 3 (Robert, President – Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. BAYLESS. Senator, if I could follow up, not only is it an issue of whether those lands are available, but as you pointed out, the timing, if there is a long delay, it impedes industry. You are not worried about the industry; you are worried about gas supply. There are signals that come out of the market, price signals, that say we need more gas. We need greater—the price has gone up. Where is the supply? With these long delays, it creates uncertainty for companies to be able to drill those additional wells, to budget for drilling those additional wells. It really puts a bad filter on those price signals.

#### Second is no implementation – QER won’t go into effect

Barlas 12

Stephen, Columnist @ Financial Executive, 1/1, Lexis

But it is highly unlikely that Obama's blueprint will lead to a firmer footing for U.S. energy security than past so-called blueprints from other presidents, or perhaps more importantly, whether a print is even necessary. Obama's policy is a loosely knit set of policies that focus on producing more oil at home and reducing dependence on foreign oil by developing cleaner alternative fuels and greater efficiency. The Obama plan is not the result of any particular deep thinking or strategy. The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) called for the development of such a strategy in its November 2010 Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies. Through an Integrated Federal Energy Policy. PCAST called for a Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR) as the first step in preparing a Quadrennial Energy Review. DOE completed the QTR in November 2011, six months after Obama published his blueprint. Steven E. Koonin, former undersecretary of Energy for Science, says QTR is limited in scope and all DOE felt it could get done given budget and time. "Technology development absent an understanding and shaping of policy and market context in which it gets deployed is not a productive exercise," he says. At this point there is no indication that DOE will even undertake the much more important QER, much less complete it any time soon. The larger reality is that any energy independence plan proposed by any U.S, president--whether based on a QER or not--has as much a chance of coming to fruition as Washington's football Redskins have of getting into the Super Bowl. But regardless of the rhetoric of president after president, maybe the U.S. doesn't even need an energy independence or energy security policy. Natural Gas Making Inroads The biggest energy input for industrial and commercial business users is natural gas. Natural gas prices are incredibly important, both because the fuel is used directly to run industrial processes, heat facilities and commercial buildings and make products such as fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, plastics and other advanced materials. Thanks to the shale revolution, EIA forecasts natural gas prices will stay low for the foreseeable future, rising to $4.66 m/BTU in 2015 and $5.05 m/BTU in 2020. That is good news for the owners of 15,000 to 17,000 industrial boilers in this country, most of which use natural gas (and many of those who still use coal are switching to natural gas). In addition, companies such as Dow Chemical Co. are restarting operations at facilities idled during the recession, Bayer AG is in talks with companies interested in building new ethane crackers at its two industrial parks in West Virginia and Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. and LyondellBasell Co., are considering expanding operations in the United States. Fracking has also had a much less remarked-upon effect on petroleum prices, which are important to businesses with transportation fleets. New oil sources are spurting from the Bakken (stretching from Canada to North Dakota and Montana) and Eagles Ford (South Texas) shale plays. U.S. oil prices have fallen from $133.88 a barrel of Texas intermediate crude in June 2008 to around $86.07. EIA predicts oil prices will rise to $94.58/bbl in 2015 and $108.10/bbl in 2020. Beyond the flood of natural gas washing over them, U.S. companies are also benefitting from three decades of investments--most of which were made without federal subsidies, or support--into facility energy efficiency. Ralph Cavanagh, co-director of the Energy Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council and a member of the Electricity Advisory Board at DOE, says the most important single solution for U.S. businesses worried about energy prices and access is aggressive energy efficiency. "Energy independence is the wrong issue," Cavanagh says. "It is reducing the cost of energy services and improving energy security. "U.S. business has done a tremendous job in energy efficiency over the past three decades," he adds. "It takes less than one-half of a unit of energy to create $1 of economic value than it did in 1973. Industry has done that by upgrading the efficiency of process equipment and upgrading lighting." Others may well argue that the U.S. needs, and has always needed, an energy policy, but one narrowly targeted. Kenneth B Medlock III, deputy director, Energy Forum at the James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, notes that DOE and the Gas Research Institute helped develop, with federal funding, the horizontal drilling (i.e. fracking) technology that Mitchell Energy and Development Corp. (now a part of Devon Energy Corp.) pioneered. "Government ought to be focused on research and development," Med-lock notes. He also is a supporter of loan guarantees to promote investment activity in frontier technologies, and argues that as long as there are more good bets than bad bets in that kind of portfolio, the funds committed in total are a good investment. But spectacular failures of energy companies such as Solyndra Corp., the Chapter 11 filing of Beacon Power Corp. and other less publicized busts reduce, if not kill, the prospect of any additional congressional funding for energy loan guarantees of any kind. That is true even when legislation has bipartisan support, which is the case for the Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2011 (S. 1000), which would, among other things, provide grants for a revolving loan program designed to develop energy-saving technologies for industrial and commercial use. The bill passed the Senate Energy Committee by a vote of 18-3 in July. However, the Congressional Budget Office has pegged the cost of the bill's provisions at $1.2 billion over five years. That is a serious barrier to passage. And in any case, even if it did pass, the bill would simply authorize funding. Congressional appropriations committees would have to approve the money as part of DOE's budget, which would be highly unlikely, Solyndra aside, since similar programs authorized by the 2005 and 2007 energy bills are still begging for appropriations. Besides impact on the federal deficit, politics, too, often impede progress on otherwise sensible policies. Politics apparently have clogged up the proposed Keystone XL oil pipeline extension from Canada. Environmentalists, a Democratic constituency, oppose the project, arguing it would create more greenhouse gas emissions than necessary and pose a potential drinking water danger for Nebraska residents because it passed over the Ogallala Aquifer. That view is shared by Nebraska's Republican Gov. Dave Heineman, whose views are opposite those of all the can presidential candidates, each of whom supported U.S. approval of Keystone XL. Labor unions, another key Democratic constituency, support the project that TransCanada, the project sponsor, says will bring more than 11 8,000 person-years of employment to workers in the states of Montana, South Dakota and Nebraska. If the Keystone debate features Democrats versus Democrats and Republicans versus Republicans, efforts to substitute domestic natural gas for foreign petroleum features business versus business.

#### Third is congressional strike down

Tollefson 11 (Jeff Tollefson, DOE releases first Quadrennial Technology Review, September 27, 2011, http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/09/doe\_releases\_first\_quadrennial\_1.html)

The US Department of Energy (DOE) [released](http://energy.gov/articles/department-energy-releases-inaugural-quadrennial-technology-review-report) its inaugural Quadrennial Technology Review on Tuesday, laying out a longer-term strategic agenda to help integrate energy research and development programmes. Modelled on the [Defense Quadrennial Review](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/), an influential analysis that sets the tone and direction of US defence policy, the document explores the energy department’s role in driving basic energy research and helping shift more mature technologies into the commercial sector. The review sets priorities in six areas (pictured, top right) in order to create a multi-year framework that can be incorporated into planning and budget discussions. Under each of the six umbrellas can be found a range of potential technological solutions — from better batteries to biofuels and carbon sequestration — that will need to be deployed in concert in order to meet demand for energy, increase domestic supplies and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. The agency is aiming for technologies that can create jobs and have a substantial impact — on the order of 1% of US consumption — over the course of two decades. “The timescale of energy is decades,” Energy Secretary Steven Chu said during the public release in Washington. “We need to take a long view.” In truth, the administration doesn’t have a lot of choice but to take the long view. The bulk of its energy and environmental agenda (remember the global warming legislation?) has fallen prey to partisan politics and an epic financial crisis. Moving forward, the administration will have to fight for even the most basic investments in clean energy R&D, a sad reality only made worse by the [scandal over the failed solar manufacturer Solyndra](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/184055-waxman-to-issa-get-your-facts-straight-on-solyndra). And although nobody would argue with efforts to craft a strategic plan to guide energy investments (which can rise and fall according to political whim on an annual basis), the first quadrennial review largely hews to the current course without making any radical recommendations for change. “Frankly it seems almost self evident to us,” said Steve Koonin, undersecretary for science. — Unlike the military, which can in a sense create its own market for new technologies, DOE necessarily plays a transitional role in technology development. All of its R&D is geared toward commercial deployment, and there’s only so much government can do to create private markets, which depend not just on science and technology but also public sentiment and risk perception, not to mention the full suite of macro- and micro-economic forces. For that reason, the document recommends setting up a permanent group within the DOE that can focus on energy markets, business, policy analysis and, most intriguingly, social sciences. Both for perspective and as a reminder, we will end with a spectacularly ambitious list of goals set by the administration of Barack Obama. To say that achieving these goals will be difficult is an understatement; clearly the rate of progress will need to increase substantially in the out years, which of course highlights the danger of long-term thinking that is not backed by legislation.

#### Should doesn’t mean certainty

Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word “would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does

#### “Resolved” means law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### QER links to elections/politics – requires transparency and presidential involvement

PCAST 10

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), Executive Office of the President, Co-Chaired by John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Eric Lander, President, Broad Institute of Harvard and MIT, Nov 2010, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ACCELERATING THE PACE OF CHANGE IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH AN INTEGRATED FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-energy-tech-report.pdf

A QER process would, in some sense, formulate an integrated energy policy for the twenty­first century. It will span mission and vision definition, strategy, and tactics. The QER and the process leading to it would provide an effective tool for Administration­wide coherence on energy and for effective dialog with Congress on a coordinated legislative agenda. **Presidential interest and engagement will be a necessary ingredient for success.**

**While the QER will be a product of the Administration, substantial input from the Congress**, the energy industry, academia, state and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, **and consumers will be essential throughout the process. Transparency in the process of gathering input for the QER will be key to the development of a sound product that can gain wide support.**

### Courts CP – 2AC

#### Perm – do both

Perine 8 (Katherine, Staff – CQ Politics, “Congress Unlikely to Try to Counter Supreme Court Detainee Ruling”, 6-12, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002896528&cpage=2)

Thursday’s decision, from a Supreme Court dominated by Republican appointees, gives Democrats further cover against GOP sniping. “This is something that the court has decided, and very often the court gives political cover to Congress,” said Ross K. Baker, a Rutgers Universitiy political science professor. “You can simply point to a Supreme Court decision and say, ‘The devil made me do it.’ ”

#### **Saying “Federal Government” doesn’t mean “all three branches” – any one body acts as it**

Chicago 7 (University of Chicago Manual of Style, “Capitalization, Titles”, http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS\_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles30.html)

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be U.S. Federal Government or U.S. federal government? A. The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

#### Reduce means to diminish the strength of

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Reduce,” Volume 13, p. 433)

21. e. to diminish the strength of (spirit).

#### Unconstitutional laws are eliminated

Treanor and Sperling 93 (William, Associate Professor of Law – Fordham University, and Gene, Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, “Prospective Overruling And The Revival Of "Unconstitutional" Statutes”, Columbia Law Review, December, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1902 , Lexis)

An unconstitutional act is **not a law for any purpose**, cannot confer any right, cannot be relied upon as a manifestation of legislative intent, and, "is, in legal contemplation, **as inoperative as though it had never been passed**." [Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886);](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=da9d7379cbfcf0c93db5d1432c4d149a&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b93%20Colum.%20L.%20Rev.%201902%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=63&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b118%20U.S.%20425%2cat%20442%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=2&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=6e05c2517504e7f8821fc4f5a63f477b) [Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566-67, 33 S.Ct. 581, 57 L.Ed. 966 (1913).](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=da9d7379cbfcf0c93db5d1432c4d149a&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b93%20Colum.%20L.%20Rev.%201902%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=64&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b228%20U.S.%20559%2cat%20566%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=2&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=d0c00f0cb7331c7a562787591dd27dff) Because of this principle, legislative bodies often fail to repeal unconstitutional statutes, deeming them **obsolete matter** which can be later deleted in the course of a general revision or recodification of the laws on the particular subject. [61](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=69d72af7f6c2f11adca9366cc91715a9&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=545bbccdfb5337dc4b23e7bd320ab13f&focBudTerms=nonrevival&focBudSel=all#n61)

#### -- Their card concludes Aff

Treanor and Sperling 93 (William, Associate Professor of Law – Fordham University, and Gene, Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, “Prospective Overruling And The Revival Of "Unconstitutional" Statutes”, Columbia Law Review, December, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1902 , Lexis)

[Their Card]

Commentators have generally agreed with the overwhelming majority of courts that an overruling decision has the effect of automatically reviving statutes. For example, Erica Frohman Plave observed that revival was a necessary function of the limited scope of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality: "Such laws laws found unconstitutional are merely unenforceable until such time as they are found valid." [**54**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=69d72af7f6c2f11adca9366cc91715a9&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=545bbccdfb5337dc4b23e7bd320ab13f&focBudTerms=nonrevival&focBudSel=all#n54) Professor Gerald Gunther has pronounced Attorney General Cummings's conclusion that Adkins "simply "suspended' enforcement" [**55**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=69d72af7f6c2f11adca9366cc91715a9&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=545bbccdfb5337dc4b23e7bd320ab13f&focBudTerms=nonrevival&focBudSel=all#n55) of the District of Columbia minimum wage statute "persuasive," [**56**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=69d72af7f6c2f11adca9366cc91715a9&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=545bbccdfb5337dc4b23e7bd320ab13f&focBudTerms=nonrevival&focBudSel=all#n56) and Professor Melville Nimmer similarly declared that "it seems clear that Attorney General Homer Cummings' opinion was correct." [**57**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=69d72af7f6c2f11adca9366cc91715a9&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=545bbccdfb5337dc4b23e7bd320ab13f&focBudTerms=nonrevival&focBudSel=all#n57) Finally, Professor Oliver Field noted that a statute that has been found unconstitutional becomes enforceable when the case in which it was held unconstitutional is reversed because "a declaration of unconstitutionality does not operate as a repeal of a statute." [**58**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=69d72af7f6c2f11adca9366cc91715a9&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=545bbccdfb5337dc4b23e7bd320ab13f&focBudTerms=nonrevival&focBudSel=all#n58)  [\*1916]   
[Card Ends]  
**All of these analyses rest on a problematic premise**. Implicit in the scholarly articles - and in the state judicial decisions and in the Supreme Court case law previously discussed - is the idea that revival  [\*1917]  reflects appropriate judicial deference to majoritarian decision-making. The majority speaks when it passes the statute. For a time, the courts may have blocked the majority's will. But, having determined that the majority was in fact empowered to pass the statute originally, the court should simply remove the bar on enforcement and, by allowing enforcement, permit the majority's will again to govern. What this analysis misses is that the initial judicial opinion can have a transformative effect on majoritarian decision-making. The fact that "just about everybody was fooled" [**59**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=69d72af7f6c2f11adca9366cc91715a9&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=545bbccdfb5337dc4b23e7bd320ab13f&focBudTerms=nonrevival&focBudSel=all#n59) is consequential. People generally assume that a judicial decision is final or unlikely to be reversed and act accordingly. That a statute remains on the books after it has been found unconstitutional may say very little about what the majority of the population currently thinks about that statute. Such a statute may not be repealed even though it no longer has majoritarian support. Part II develops this insight and its significance. Moreover, there may be circumstances in which - given a statute that is sufficiently constitutionally problematic to have been at one time inconsistent with governing judicial interpretations of constitutional law - it is appropriate to force the legislature to reconsider its position on the statute itself. This is the topic of Part III of this Article.

#### Doesn’t solve –

#### Court natural gas decisions are unpredictable - they are made on a case by case basis and leave many questions unanswered

Neese 5 (Angela – Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Colorado School of Law, 2005; B.S.B.A., University of Denver, “THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE COLORADO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A CALL FOR A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH”, 2005, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 561, lexis)

These two leading Colorado Supreme Court decisions, Bowen/Edwards and Voss, were decided over a decade ago, and yet these cases "leave many questions unanswered." n185 For example, the court did not adequately define "operational conflict," n186 and "it left to speculation the type of local regulation which will offend the principles articulated in those cases." n187 What these Colorado Supreme Court decisions did, in effect, was create a regime in which each occurrence of stringent local regulation of the oil and gas industry must be examined by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Because the court held that state preemption of local regulation is not total, "each provision of a local oil and gas regulation must be examined to determine whether it presents a conflict." n188 For the past decade, the Colorado Supreme Court has declined to hear any further cases on the issue of state preemption of local government oil and gas regulation, thereby foreclosing any possibility of providing more direct guidelines for the COGCC and local governments. As a result, this case-by-case system of preemption analysis has led to more than a decade worth of costly litigation, with no end in sight. The case-by-case regime leads to a high degree of unpredictability and puts natural gas developers and local governments constantly at odds. n189 The litigation that often results, when the industry and the local governments are forced to look to the courts to determine which regulations are controlling, is costly to the industry (and thus to natural gas consumers) and to local governments (and thus to the taxpayers). n190 The lack of predictability, the high costs of litigation, and the resulting delays in production are proof that the Colorado Supreme Court has done the state a disservice by not providing a workable framework on the issue of state preemption of oil and gas regulation. n191 Bowen/Edwards is considered the determinative case as to preemption, yet both sides cite this case in their briefs and point to the same language as suggestive that they will prevail. n192 The lack of clear guidelines under the current Colorado [\*585] case law results in a number of unanswered questions that will likely lead to future legal battles.

#### CP undermines legitimacy – takes out solvency.

**Bentley**, **2007** (Curt, Constrained by the liberal tradition, Brigham Young University Law Review, p. lexis)

This institutional limitation theory focuses primarily on the constraints imposed on the Court because of its relationship with the other branches of government. The Supreme Court is not wholly dependent upon other branches of government; the unique legitimacy given its interpretations of the Constitution by the American people provides it with real influence of its own. n116 However, the institutional limitation theory posits that since the Court possesses neither the purse nor the sword, n117 it relies upon its  [\*1745]  legitimacy in the eyes of the American people in order to pressure the legislative and executive branches to **enforce its decrees**: The Supreme Court ... possesses some bases of power of its own, the most important of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution. This legitimacy the Court jeopardizes if it **flagrantly opposes the major policies** of the dominant alliance; such a course of action, as we have seen, is one in which the Court will not normally be tempted to engage. n118 **Without legitimacy** in the eyes of the public, both Congress and the President might feel justified in **resisting the ruling of the Court** either through jurisdiction-stripping n119 or by simply refusing to enforce its decrees. n120 **There is precedent for both in American history**. n121 The Court risks becoming substantially weakened, or even irrelevant, when the political branches ignore judicial decrees and where it nonetheless doggedly pursues the counter-majoritarian course. n122

#### -- No solvency: delay

Klein 84 (Mitchell S. G., MA and Ph.D in Political Science – Northwestern University, Law, Courts, and Policy, p. 117-118)

The aphorism “Justice delayed is justice denied” finds support from nay court analysts. Court delay is a significant administrative problem in the judiciary. As H. Ted Rubin observes: “Far too many courts operate essentially in the same fashion as fifty years ago … Too many judges have failed to effectively administer control of their own court calendar.” (1976, p. 185) A number of problems associated with court delay have been noted by Hans Zeisel and associates (1959, pp. xxii-xxiii). For example, delay in the courtroom jeopardizes justice because evidence may deteriorate over time. It also causes severe hardship to some parties, even depriving some of a basic public service. Finally, court delay also produces an unhealthy emphasis on the desirability of settling out of court.

#### CP Tanks Biz Con

Woellert 5 (Lorraine, Legal Correspondent – Business Week, “Forget Roe and the Framers. Let’s Talk Business”, Washington Post, 10-16, Lexis)

Friends and peers trying to describe Miers and Roberts like to use the P-word -- pragmatic. That's sweet music to business ears: Corporations worship pragmatism and don't give a whit about judicial philosophy. But it's rank heresy to many on the right, who have had it up to here with jurists who weigh social and cultural mores when crafting opinions. Religious and other social conservatives want justices who will apply a very narrow "strict constructionist" interpretation to the Constitution and not read new rights -- such as the right to privacy found in Roe v. Wade -- into the framers' text. Roberts already has disappointed them. "Judges take a more practical and pragmatic approach when deciding the rule of law," rather than sticking to a strict philosophy, he told the Senate Judiciary Committee. "The Framers were aware they were drafting for the future." Roberts also tipped his hat to the importance of legal precedent and the need to avoid enacting rapid and radical changes in law: "It is a jolt to the legal system to override precedent." Translation: Roe might be here to stay, but business can take comfort. What corporate America wants from the judicial branch more than anything else is consistency and predictability -- tools for planning in the short term. That's one reason CEOs mourned the resignation of Sandra Day O'Connor. Legal scholars have scoffed at her philosophical inconsistency, but business execs lauded her practicality and her frequent acknowledgments of real-world situations in opinions that often made their 9-to-5 workday a little easier.

#### Recession results

Braithwaite 4 (John, Australian Research Council Federation fellow, Australian National University, and chair of the Regulatory Institutions Network, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592 Annals 79, March, Lexis)

The challenge of designing institutions that simultaneously engender emancipation and hope is addressed within the assumption of economic institutions that are fundamentally capitalist. This contemporary global context gives more force to the hope nexus because we know capitalism thrives on hope. When business confidence collapses, capitalist economies head for recession. This dependence on hope is of quite general import; business leaders must have hope for the future before they will build new factories; consumers need confidence before they will buy what the factories make; investors need confidence before they will buy shares in the company that builds the factory; bankers need confidence to lend money to build the factory; scientists need confidence to innovate with new technologies in the hope that a capitalist will come along and market their invention. Keynes's ([1936]1981) General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money lamented the theoretical neglect of "animal spirits" of hope ("spontaneous optimism rather than . . . mathematical expectation" (p. 161) in the discipline of economics, a neglect that continues to this day (see also Barbalet 1993).

#### -- International law doesn’t deter conflict

Wippman 96 (David, Associate Professor – Cornell Law School, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 27 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 435, Spring, Lexis)

What international law has long attempted to prohibit, or at least to regulate, is foreign involvement in internal conflict. [**4**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1eaeca8a103666c056688c6d2438e77d&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAb&_md5=60fd9e16efde2ff1d58f663fbab664a0&focBudTerms=What%20international%20law%20has%20long%20and%20particular%20conflict&focBudSel=all#n4) Foreign  [\*436]  participation in an internal conflict heightens the risk that the conflict will spread to other states and transform an internal struggle into an interstate war. In addition, foreign involvement may deny the people of the affected state the right to determine their own political future. As a result, foreign involvement in internal conflicts often undermines two of the principal goals of the international legal order: the containment of conflict and the preservation of the internal autonomy of each state. **[5](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1eaeca8a103666c056688c6d2438e77d&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAb&_md5=60fd9e16efde2ff1d58f663fbab664a0&focBudTerms=What%20international%20law%20has%20long%20and%20particular%20conflict&focBudSel=all" \l "n5" \t "_self)** Accordingly, contemporary international law is formally non-interventionist: no state is supposed to interfere in civil strife in another state. **[6](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1eaeca8a103666c056688c6d2438e77d&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAb&_md5=60fd9e16efde2ff1d58f663fbab664a0&focBudTerms=What%20international%20law%20has%20long%20and%20particular%20conflict&focBudSel=all" \l "n6" \t "_self)** Nonetheless, foreign intervention in internal conflicts is more the rule than the exception. **[7](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1eaeca8a103666c056688c6d2438e77d&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAb&_md5=60fd9e16efde2ff1d58f663fbab664a0&focBudTerms=What%20international%20law%20has%20long%20and%20particular%20conflict&focBudSel=all" \l "n7" \t "_self)** In the past, foreign intervention consisted almost exclusively of unilateral acts by individual states. During the Cold War, political polarization between East and West made it virtually impossible to achieve the consensus necessary to support collective interventions. With the end of the Cold War, however, collective interventions have become more common. When individual states intervene unilaterally in internal conflicts, they typically seek to justify their involvement under legal principles deemed consistent with, or in some cases, deemed more important than, the principle of non-intervention. In some cases, states rely on consent of the affected state, on the theory that the principle of non-intervention only bars conduct that amounts to "dictatorial interference" in a state's internal affairs. [8](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1eaeca8a103666c056688c6d2438e77d&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAb&_md5=60fd9e16efde2ff1d58f663fbab664a0&focBudTerms=What%20international%20law%20has%20long%20and%20particular%20conflict&focBudSel=all" \l "n8" \t "_self) States also frequently justify intervention as necessary to insulate a state from the effects of another state's prior, illegal intervention, or as necessary to defend a state from an illegal external attack. [9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1eaeca8a103666c056688c6d2438e77d&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAb&_md5=60fd9e16efde2ff1d58f663fbab664a0&focBudTerms=What%20international%20law%20has%20long%20and%20particular%20conflict&focBudSel=all" \l "n9" \t "_self) On occasion, states rely on international human rights norms or democratic principles to justify their support for one faction or another in a particular conflict.

### Fiscal Cliff 2AC

#### No compromise --- it will only be a band-aid solution.

Lister 11/8/12 (Tim, CNN, "No shortage of pressing issues for Obama's next term," http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/analysis-obama-second-term-issues/index.html)

(CNN) -- Even before he takes the oath of office for a second time, President Barack Obama has a crisis on his hands.¶ On January 2, 2013, America will begin a long fall off the "fiscal cliff" -- unless the White House and Congress can agree on a deal to avert the plunge.¶ And that's not going to be easy.¶ "It's going to be tough to govern" with Congress still split and the Republican majority in the House intact, noted CNN political contributor David Gergen, who urged the president to heed the words of Winston Churchill: "In victory, magnanimity."¶ Beyond the domestic agenda, the global economic slowdown threatens an anemic U.S. recovery -- while Iran's nuclear program and Syria's implosion will also demand urgent attention after the rigors of the campaign trail.¶ The in-tray may not seem as daunting as the one that greeted Obama on his first day in office in 2009, but he'll have little time to savor his latest victory.¶ In fewer than 60 days, arbitrary spending cuts and tax increases will begin to kick in unless the president and Congress -- half of which is still controlled by the Republicans -- can find a better way to manage debt reduction.¶ The challenge for Obama and the divided Congress is to come up with a credible consensus that tackles the deficit and doesn't smother the fragile roots of recovery.¶ The Tax Policy Center estimates that allowing the Bush-era tax cuts to expire means an average tax increase of almost $2,000 for middle-class Americans. Sucking that much money out of circulation could push unemployment above 9%, according to the Congressional Budget Office.¶ Obama has declared that the estimated $109 billion worth of automatic budget cuts to defense spending, social services, education and other discretionary federal spending won't happen. And White House officials -- but not the president himself -- say he will preserve the Bush-era tax cuts for the middle class but veto any bill that extends the cuts for households with incomes over $250,000.¶ The expiration of those tax cuts would raise some $500 billion in revenues, according to the latest CBO data.¶ If the United States doesn't address the impending fiscal cliff, ratings agency Moody's has warned of a further downgrading of U.S. sovereign debt.¶ What is the fiscal cliff?¶ Foreign governments are watching the situation with trepidation. Sustaining the U.S. recovery is vital to the health of the global economy -- with most of Europe mired in recession, Japan facing its own version of the fiscal cliff -- its public debt is twice the size of its $5 trillion economy -- and growth in China slackening, though most countries would love to have its 7% expansion rate.¶ Now that the hyper-partisan presidential campaign is out of the way, there may be a window for compromise. But with Congress due to be in session for only 16 more days in 2012, that may extend only as far as a deal to kick the can down the road once more -- resulting in a Band-Aid rather than a grand bargain.¶ House Speaker John Boehner told CNN last weekend that was the most likely path.¶ "I think the best you can hope for is some kind of bridge," he said. Boehner and other Republicans have demanded spending cuts and other measures that would exceed any increase in the federal borrowing ceiling.¶ Deferring the day of judgment is unlikely to impress the markets. Nor will another bout of protracted wrangling over raising the debt ceiling, something that will likely become necessary early in the new year.

#### No compromise --- not enough time.

**Yellin**, **11/9**/2012 (Jessica – CNN Chief White House Correspondent, Analysis: Obama has limits on debt deal, CNN Politics, p. http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/politics/obama-debt-limit/index.html)

In his address at the White House Friday afternoon, the president stressed the importance of congressional action and compromise, including a bill to protect 98% of Americans who will experience a significant tax hike at the end of the year if a deal is not reached. "I've got the pen ready to sign the bill right away," Obama said in the White House East Room, referring to the plan to extend tax cuts for those making under $250,000 a year. "I'm ready to do it; I'm ready to do it." The president said the election proved Americans are on his side in regard to taxes and entitlement reform. "Our job is to get the majority in Congress to reflect the will of the people," he said, before adding he was encouraged by Boehner's openness to tax revenue. Obama held firm on the ideas he espoused on the campaign trail that were also included in a detailed plan the White House sent to Capitol Hill in fall 2011. But there is not much time to negotiate before the new year, a time frame further limited by the Thanksgiving holiday and a just-announced trip by the president to Asia. Republicans sources argued it is unlikely the parties can resolve the sticking points in a lame-duck session of Congress, adding they need to agree on a framework deal that can be resolved in 2013. But don't expect any eye-popping new positions. Sources said the president believes he's been exceedingly clear about how he would like to avoid the painful cuts that would kick in. Throughout his campaign he reiterated his positions while also making clear he would not sign a bill that retained the current low tax rates for the richest Americans.

#### No link – doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Revenue –

#### A) Plan creates a new source of revenue

Murphy 12 (Robert – Institute for Energy Research, “CBO grossly understates Potential Revenues from Offshore Drilling”, 9/11, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/09/11/cbo-underestimates-potential/)

A recent analysis [.pdf] from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) made it appear as if there would be little benefit from the federal government allowing entrepreneurs to develop more of America’s oil and gas resources. Yet as we’ll see, **CBO’s presentation was misleading**, and it ignored the major benefits of the government changing policies to allow more access to find and develop the United States’ enormous energy potential. The CBO’s Numbers The CBO report first lays out the context of its analysis: The federal government offers private businesses the opportunity to bid on leases for the development of on- and offshore oil and natural gas resources on federal lands—although not all federally controlled lands are open to leasing now….CBO has analyzed a proposal to immediately open most federal lands to oil and gas leasing, which would affect the amounts the federal government collects in various fees and royalties both in the near term and over a longer period. Implementing such a proposal would open two categories of property now closed to development: Lands where leasing is now statutorily prohibited, notably, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and Onshore and offshore areas that are unavailable for leasing under current administrative policies, including sections of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)— generally, the submerged lands between 3 miles and 200 miles from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Florida coastlines—and certain onshore areas in which oil and gas leasing is either restricted or temporarily prohibited. The CBO report then concludes that “opening ANWR to development would yield about $5 billion in additional receipts over the next 10 years, primarily in the form of bonus payments made by private firms for the opportunity to explore for and develop resources in particular areas.” After this ten-year period, the CBO relies on EIA projections to estimate “gross royalties from leasing in ANWR would probably total between $25 billion and $50 billion (in 2010 dollars) during the 2023–2035 period, or roughly $2 billion to $4 billion a year.” Outside of ANWR, the CBO report estimates “that additional gross proceeds from federal oil and gas leases on public lands—principally in certain sections of the OCS…would total about $2 billion over the 2013–2022 period.” Unlike ANWR, the CBO refuses to say what the increase in government revenue would be beyond the initial ten-year period, because “[m]uch of the near-term development enabled by the proposal (beyond that in ANWR) would occur under current law, albeit at a later time.” In summary, someone taking the CBO report at face value would conclude (a) the federal and state governments at most would get about $7 billion total in the first ten years (primarily from bonus payments) if they removed all federal obstacles to ANWR and OCS development, and (b) even in the longer term from 2023-2035, we can only say with confidence that the proposal would bring in an additional $2 to $4 billion per year, relative to current policies. Billions of dollars is nothing to sneeze at, of course, but the implication is that the proponents of “drill baby, drill” are exaggerating their case. To drive home the point, the CBO report then presents this chart: Visually, the above chart certainly makes it seem as if complaints about federal constraints are overblown; it looks like the government is hardly restricting access to American oil and gas resources. A Different Picture To respond to the CBO report, a very easy step is to consolidate the data presented in their figure. The visual trick in the CBO image involves spreading out the inaccessible resources across six different categories. Suppose instead that we consolidate everything—using their own numbers—into two categories, namely those resources on federal lands that are currently accessible, versus those that aren’t. The revised chart looks like this: Thus, the CBO’s own numbers show that some 51 billion barrels of oil and gas resources on federal lands are currently inaccessible. That works out to 29 percent of the total, again using CBO’s own numbers. At a time when motorists are struggling with prices at the pump, and the Obama Administration is releasing oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, it is significant that the CBO admits the federal government itself keeps almost 30 percent of expected US resources off-limits to development. To put these numbers in perspective, consider: In 2011, the U.S. imported a total of 1.7 billion barrels of crude oil and products from OPEC nations. Thus, the 51 billion barrels of oil and gas that the CBO admits are rendered inaccessible under current policies, works out to thirty times as much as the U.S. imported from OPEC last year. (Even if we consider just the oil resources that CBO admits are off-limit—33 billion barrels—then the figure falls to “only” nineteen times the amount imported from OPEC last year.) These calculations are not to suggest that if the federal government removed all restrictions, then imports from OPEC would fall to zero. Standard economic analysis shows that it makes a country’s people richer to import items from abroad if, on the margin, doing so is cheaper than producing everything domestically. Even so, the important point is that people warning of America’s “dependence on foreign oil” often have no idea just how blessed the country is with rich deposits. It only seems that the U.S. is starved for oil, because the federal government takes so much off the table. The Crucial Choice of Baseline Beyond the visually misleading chart, another aspect of the CBO report is the choice of policy baseline. Recall that the report estimated opening up ANWR would lead to $5 billion in additional government receipts over the first 10 years (i.e. through 2022), and then some $25 to $50 billion in additional receipts from 2023 – 2035. Thus the real revenue windfall came in the second decade, as the newly leased lands began cranking out product (and thus generating royalty revenue for the government). Yet when it came to estimating the budgetary impact of opening up the OCS, **the CBO would only discuss the gains in the first decade**; it put them at $2 billion. CBO refused to speculate on what would happen in 2023 – 2035, because in this case, the OCS lands were technically not inaccessible at such future dates. In other words, with current policy, certain lands in ANWR cannot be developed, either now or in the future. But with much of the OCS, there is nothing in the “baseline” preventing them from being developed down the road. Hence, CBO will not say that opening up such lands in the present, will lead to higher receipts for the government beyond the year 2022. Although such accounting may be appropriate in a technical sense, it is misleading to the average reader of the CBO report. If we use the same scaling factor as CBO applied to ANWR, we would conclude that in addition to the $2 billion in extra receipts from expanded OCS development in the years 2013 – 2022, the government (states and federal) could expect additional receipts of $10 to $20 billion from 2023 – 2035. Another way of putting it is that this potential $10 to $20 billion in government receipts during 2023 – 2035 **will not materialize if the federal government maintains its current restrictions on OCS development.** Lowball Estimates Thus far, we have taken the CBO’s numbers at face value, and just pointed out two tricks with the presentation style. However, in this final section we’ll challenge the estimates themselves. For starters, the CBO is probably grossly understating the potential for bonus bids in ANWR, when it puts them at less than $5 billion for the entire decade of 2013 – 2022. Yet in FY 2008 alone, total bonus payments were more than $10 billion. Now to be fair, this isn’t an apples to apples comparison, since the expanded ANWR development would only represent a fraction of total bonus payments. Nonetheless, the figure shows that CBO’s ANWR analysis is quite conservative. More generally, other analysts have projected much larger receipts for federal and state governments, from expanded development. For example, in a February 2009 study, Joseph Mason estimated that in the long-run, expanded OCS development (not including ANWR) would yield an average of $14.3 billion in extra royalty revenue per year. He also estimated **an additional** $54.7 billion **in federal tax revenue annually**, and $18.7 billion in additional state and local tax revenue (though these figures count the tax receipts from expanded economic activity). To show that these aren’t pedantic quibbles, we can point to a real-world example of what we mean. In a June 26, 2006 memo[RM1] to Richard Pombo , CBO projected federal OCS revenues in 2008 (net of sharing with states) to be about $10.5 billion. Yet actual OCS revenues in 2008 were $18 billion. This is a rather large underestimate, for a projection that was made only two years earlier. (Also, the bulk of the discrepancy was in the form of bonus payments, which are not particularly susceptible to a temporarily high spot price of oil.)

#### B) Increased revenue source breaks the deadlock --- gets a deal done.

**Politico**, **11/8**/2012 (How will GOP solve fiscal cliff riddle, p. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83610.html)

Republicans know they’re going to have to budge on revenues in the looming debt and spending debate. The question is when to blink. The problem: Revenue increases, which could solve the fiscal cliff riddle this fall, are also their best bargaining chip for an even bigger fight to overhaul the Tax Code expected next year. GOP lawmakers — especially those on the tax-writing Ways and Means Committee — say tax increases should happen only as part of a fundamental Tax Code rewrite that also lowers marginal tax rates, a policy dream that won’t be realized until next year at the earliest. So with 53 days left until the U.S. plunges off the fiscal cliff, House Speaker John Boehner will have to decide whether to sacrifice revenue earlier than he and other Republicans had hoped — and right now, he’s not saying. “The whole question is how you get the revenue,” Illinois Rep. Peter Roskam told POLITICO. Fresh off reelection victories, the Obama administration and Senate Democrats are insisting that Congress agree to revenue as part of a year-end package that saves the Bush-era tax cuts for the middle class and averts $109 billion in scheduled spending cuts. Boehner jump-started the so-called fiscal cliff talks earlier this week with a speech that acknowledged revenue as a political necessity. And while he pushed the type of fundamental tax reform that was last achieved in 1986, the speaker didn’t say whether he’d put taxes on the table before that. “For purposes of forging a bipartisan agreement that begins to solve the problem, we’re will to accept new revenue, under the right conditions,” Boehner said Wednesday. “What matters is where the increased revenue comes from and what type of reform comes with it.”

#### Boehner –

#### A) He supports the plan.

**Geman 12** (Ben, “House GOP ready to move on Boehner’s plan to link drilling and infrastructure”, 1/27, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/207043-house-gop-begins-moving-on-boehners-drilling-and-infrastructure-plan)

A House panel will likely approve bills next week **that form the drilling portion of Speaker John Boehner’s** (R-Ohio) plan to fund infrastructure projects with cash raised through expanded oil-and-gas development. The bills will provide Republicans a hook for continuing political attacks against White House energy policies, but are highly unlikely to advance in the Senate or win Obama administration support. The House GOP plan would open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to drilling — a nonstarter for the White House and most Democrats — and require a vastly greater expansion of offshore oil-and-gas leasing than the administration supports. The House Natural Resources Committee will meet Wednesday to mark up three bills. They would open ANWR; **require** oil-and-**gas leasing** off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and remove restrictions in the eastern Gulf of Mexico; and require commercial leasing for oil shale projects in Western states. “Expanding access to **America’s abundant offshore** and onshore **energy resources** will create millions of new American jobs, lower energy prices and generate new revenue to help pay for infrastructure improvements. When new energy resources are developed, we’ll need updated infrastructure to bring it to market. This creates a link that will allow for both American energy jobs and American infrastructure jobs to be created simultaneously,” said House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings (R-Wash.) in a statement. President Obama in recent days has parried election-season GOP attacks against his oil-and-gas record by touting plans for lease sales in the western and central Gulf of Mexico, and vowing support for expanded onshore natural-gas production and incentives for natural-gas-powered vehicles. But **Republicans allege White House policy leaves far too many areas off-limits to drilling rigs**.

#### B) Boehner support is key to avoid the fiscal cliff.

**Weiner 12** (Robert – former senior spokesman in the Clinton White House, the beginning of the Bush Administration, and for Congressmen John Conyers, Charles Rangel, Claude Pepper, and Ed Koch. Sadiq Ahmed is senior policy analyst at Robert Weiner Associates and Solutions for Change, “Boehner, Hero? If He Deals on the Sequester and the Fiscal Cliff”, 10/23, http://www.opednews.com/articles/Boehner-Hero-If-He-Deals-by-Robert-Weiner-121022-761.html)

The country **has reached this critical stage due to the deal with Speaker of the House** John **Boehner** on the Budget Control Act of 2011. The law calls for sequestration (automatic cuts) of social and military spending--but because revenue remains too low, the debt ceiling goes up, up, up regardless. With no additional taxes or program cuts, the sequester shreds 10% of programs for the military, as well as education, housing, health, and food support for the poor, and scientific research. John **Boehner can now become a hero** in American history, a winner of the Kennedy Profiles in Courage--and a hero to Republicans at the same time who see real danger to their control of the House if there is no deal to run the nation. Here's how: If he can round up some support - **it does not have to be a majority of Republicans** - for a tax reform-program cuts combination to avoid the Sequester and the fiscal cliff, at a time of bipartisan vituperation and obstruction, John **Boehner will be considered a Statesman** for the Ages. **Democrats could fill in** the large part of the majority needed. Bill Clinton passed NAFTA in November of 1993 with a majority of the 234 yes votes coming from Republicans (132), and he got enough Democrats (102) to seal the deal. Likewise, Lyndon Johnson passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with a higher percent of House Republicans than Democrats voting for it: Democrats: 152--96 (61--39%); Republicans 138--34 (80--20%). These numbers are an uncomfortable fact for Democrats today.

#### Capital fails --- budget specific.

**Gerson**, 10/29/**2012** (Michael – Policy Fellow with the ONE Campaign, visiting fellow with the Center for Public Justice, former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Obama’s discrediting victory limits chances for another term, The Seattle Times, p. http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2019555918\_obamasdiscreditingvictoryxml.html)

Obama tends to overestimate his own negotiating skills with Congress, which are poor — also displayed in his failed attempt to achieve a grand budget compromise in 2011. When the ideological stakes are highest, Obama jettisons bipartisanship with little thought or regret. He was perfectly willing to reorganize one-sixth of the economy on a party-line vote. He has employed tactics that ensure future partisan bitterness. His persuasive powers on the issue of health care turned out to be limited. The more he spoke, the less public support he found. But he proved incapable of creative ideological readjustment. Obama’s largest achievement turned out to be a self-indictment. He has not shown the leadership skills or the inclination to create consensus around large issues. The problem is that large issues — avoiding the fiscal cliff, reforming the tax code, making entitlement commitments more sustainable — are coming. Either Obama will have to become an entirely different type of leader — or America needs a new one.

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital does not affect the agenda

**Dickinson 9** (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

### Econ Impact D

#### Band-aid solution is counterproductive – it hurts growth worse than falling off the cliff.

US News & World Report 11/9 (Rob Silverblatt, 2012, http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/mutual-funds/articles/2012/11/09/just-how-high-is-the-fiscal-cliff)

The CBO is quick to warn, however, that mere Band-Aid measures aimed to temporarily forestall the cliff would be harmful in the long term. "Although reducing the fiscal tightening scheduled to occur next year would boost output and employment in the short run, doing so without imposing a comparable amount of additional tightening in future years would reduce the nation's output and income in the longer run relative to what would occur if the scheduled tightening remained in place," the report noted. By comparison, if the economy falls over the cliff (so to speak) next year, the situation could begin to stabilize as early as 2014. "After next year, by the agency's estimates, economic growth will pick up, and the labor market will strengthen, returning output to its potential level (reflecting a high rate of use of labor and capital) and shrinking the unemployment rate to 5.5 percent by 2018," the report noted.

#### Mini-deal fails.

**Eaglen**, **11/2**/2012 (Mackenzie – member of the AOL Defense Board of Contributors, defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, It’s Not Just Defense Cuts: Sequester Would Cripple Our Economy, AOL Defense, p. <http://defense.aol.com/2012/11/02/its-not-just-defense-cuts-sequester-would-cripple-our-economy/>)

Despite this momentum, a mini-deal is still only a mini-deal. And Congress may yet elect to punt entirely. If both chambers do not tackle the larger problems relating to the fiscal cliff before January, it is unclear how small cuts or a few more months will change much in the big picture. Putting off a larger deficit reduction package only leaves a future Congress to deal with the same set of issues-and the looming economic consequences.

#### Middle East war doesn’t escalate

Maloney 7 (Suzanne, Senior Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Steve Cook, Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Fellow – Council for Foreign Relations, “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune, 6-28, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm)

Long before the Bush administration began selling "the surge" in Iraq as a way to avert a general war in the Middle East, observers both inside and outside the government were growing concerned about the potential for armed conflict among the regional powers. Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

## 1AR v. Michigan DH Round 3

### Econ

#### Grand bargain fails – doesn’t stimulate the economy – only the plan solves

**Fieldhouse**, 11/5/**2012** (Andrew – Federal Budget Policy Analyst at the Economic Policy Institute and the Century Foundation, Enacting a ‘Grand Bargain’ Doesn’t Equate to Navigating the Fiscal Obstacle Course, The Huffington Post, p. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-fieldhouse/enacting-a-grand-bargain-doesnt-equate-to-navigating-the-fiscal-obstacle-course_b_2059207.html>)

Writing in The Washington Post recently, former Sens. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) and Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) argued that enacting a bipartisan deficit reduction "grand bargain" could be instrumental in addressing the so-called "fiscal cliff" of legislated spending reductions and expiring tax cuts scheduled for the beginning of 2013. A grand bargain could theoretically mitigate the sizable pending fiscal headwinds, but a deal could also close deficits too quickly, pushing the economy into an austerity-induced recession. Nothing in their op-ed or the two grand bargains it references demonstrates how such a compromise could successfully clear the "fiscal cliff." At its core the "fiscal cliff" represents the macroeconomic reality that budget deficits closing too quickly -- and public debt accumulating too slowly -- will push the U.S. economy back into recession. The scheduled spending cuts and tax increases comprising the legislated fiscal tightening are separable policies, all with varying budgetary costs and a wide range of economic impacts; we decomposed these à la carte in our recent paper, "A fiscal obstacle course, not a cliff." "Cliff" is a terrible metaphor, as it implies a binary choice, whereas each policy should be weighed on its economic impacts and budgetary costs. Government spending cuts are more economically damaging than tax increases, particularly for upper-income households and businesses, but tax increases will drag on growth to varying degrees. Collectively, the legislated fiscal tightening would shave 3.7 percentage points from real GDP growth, and the U.S. would experience a 2.9-percent contraction in the first half of 2013, pushing unemployment back above 9 percent, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) -- if the legislated path is unexpectedly followed. The two grand bargains Domenici and Nunn point to are the "Moment of Truth" report by National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform co-chairs Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles and the "Restoring America's Future" report by the Bipartisan Policy Center's Debt Reduction Task Force, co-chaired by Domenici and former Office of Management and Budget and CBO director Alice Rivlin. But how would either of these plans or a similar congressional grand bargain help sustain recovery? The only way a deficit reduction grand bargain could successfully navigate the fiscal obstacle course is if it substantially moderates the pace of deficit reduction while the economy remains depressed. But these two plans -- implied to be model remedies -- prematurely proposed austerity measures for a depressed economy, and the economy remains about as depressed today, relatively speaking. Fiscal contraction --particularly government spending cuts -- is highly damaging in a depressed economy, and U.S. economic output is currently depressed about $973 billion (5.8 percent of potential GDP) below potential economic output (the level of activity associated with full but non-inflationary levels of resource utilization; e.g., labor, industrial capacity, financial capital). When the Bowles-Simpson and Domenici-Rivlin reports were released in the fourth quarter of 2010, this "output gap" stood at 6 percent of potential GDP, roughly where it stands today. And as demonstrated across Europe, particularly by the United Kingdom, austerity cuts in a depressed economy are very much capable of counterproductively inducing a return to recession and deeper depression. The Simpson-Bowles report in particular failed to acknowledge the prevailing economic context or budget for sustained economic recovery. One of the guiding principles of the co-chairs' plan reads: "Don't Disrupt a Fragile Economic Recovery." Their main recommendation in this section, however, was to delay spending cuts from December 2010 (when the report came out) until October 2011, at which point the unemployment rate was 8.9 percent -- far from the robust recovery that could accommodate deep fiscal retrenchment. Not only did their plan propose premature spending cuts, but it would not have accommodated the deficit-financed payroll tax cuts, emergency unemployment benefits and expansion of refundable tax credits that Congress enacted for 2011 and 2012. Earlier this year we calculated that this fiscal retrenchment would reduce economic output by 1.3 percent in fiscal year 2012 and 2 percent in fiscal year 2013, reducing nonfarm payroll employment by 1.6 million jobs in fiscal year 2012 and 2.4 million jobs in fiscal year 2013 (relative to the path Congress took and current budget policies). The Domenici-Rivlin report earns higher marks for acknowledging the need for fiscal stimulus, but their policy prescription also fails to adequately moderate the pace of deficit reduction. They proposed completely waiving the Social Security payroll tax -- both the employer and employee sides -- for 2011, setting up an earlier "fiscal cliff" by pumping $641 billion of disposable income into the economy in 2011 and then immediately withdrawing it as spending cuts ramped up. Relative to their then-current policy baseline, spending cuts would be ratcheting up from $43 billion in the fiscal year just ended to $112 billion in fiscal year 2013, and tax increases -- less harmful per dollar, but contractionary nonetheless -- would have total non-interest deficit reduction ramping up to $324 billion for the fiscal year that just started (considerably more for calendar year 2013, the present focus of the fiscal obstacle course). And like Simpson-Bowles, emergency unemployment benefits -- among the highest "bang-per-buck" job creation measures and a crucial policy response to the persisting long-term unemployment crisis -- would have ended after December 2010, when the unemployment rate stood at 9.4 percent. Domenici and Nunn are certainly correct that the U.S. faces a serious long-term fiscal sustainability challenge, one driven by rising health care costs, the aging of the baby boomers and inadequate revenue. But reading their op-ed, one would naturally and wrongly conclude that reducing deficits is the foremost challenge posed by the "fiscal cliff," whereas the challenge is reducing the pace of deficit reduction currently scheduled in order to sustain the recovery. A grand bargain could successfully navigate the fiscal obstacle course, but only if it injects hundreds of billions of dollars of stimulative spending (e.g., unemployment benefits, infrastructure spending, aid to state governments and targeted tax cuts) into the economy for years to come and delays government spending cuts until the economy emerges from depression. However, that would require a substantial overhaul of either the Bowles-Simpson or Domenici-Rivlin reports. Contrary to what Domenici and Nunn imply, these are not shelf-ready templates for navigating the fiscal obstacle course; they fail the test of adequately moderating the pace of deficit reduction, even if their implementation were delayed to next year.

#### Economy will decline – 3 reasons

Mohr 11/8 (Angie Mohr Chartered Accountant and Certified Management Accountant , freelancer “3 Alarming Trends With America's Economy” November 8, 2012 http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/1112/3-alarming-trends-with-americas-economy.aspx#ixzz2Bg4HgsR0)

After Barack Obama's successful re-election bid on November 6, the democrats will again be facing some of the most difficult economic realities and trends in the history of the United States. Although not in technical recession currently, economic growth is sluggish by many measures. Following are three trends that have the potential to lead the country back into an economic morass. Rising Debt Ceiling The government has two ways that it can cover a budget deficit. It can either increase revenues through taxes or it can borrow the money from domestic or foreign sources. The United States Congress sets a "credit" limit past which the government cannot further borrow. In order to increase the debt ceiling, Congress must pass legislation and it must be signed into law by the president. In 2011, federal borrowing once again brushed up against the debt ceiling and, after a contentious set of negotiations between the democrats and republicans, the debt ceiling was raised again, this time by $900 billion, in exchange for a reduction of spending over 10 years of $917 billion. The deal also allows for further increases if certain budgetary and spending guidelines are met. The largest danger of increasing the debt ceiling is that it also increases the amount of interest that must be carved from each year's spending. Interest is not a discretionary spending item and it further ties the federal government's hands when it comes to trying to balance the budget. Rise of Mandatory Spending While interest forms a part of the mandatory spending portion of the federal budget (i.e., money that Congress or the administration cannot change in the short term), the largest mandatory pieces of the budget are the so-called entitlement plans, such as social security, Medicare and Medicaid. With the American population aging, expected increases in the elderly drawing on these programs will further tax the budget. The 2012 fiscal budget includes revenues of $2.47 billion and mandatory spending (including interest) of $2.48 billion. This does not include any discretionary spending on the military, education and other social programs. Without an increase in revenues, presenting a balanced budget is practically impossible in the short term. Distribution of Wealth The old saying, "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer" has manifested in the United States over the past quarter century. Corporate profits are increasingly concentrated into the hands of the wealthy who control the means of production. Workers' wages are declining in real dollars and include fewer health care benefits. A report by the American Sociological Review found that wage inequality in the U.S. rose by more than 40% in the private sector between 1973 and 2007. Part of the reason for depressed wages is the decline in union membership over that time period, but is reinforced by technological advances replacing the need for skilled labor and foreign trade. The increasing disparity between the rich and poor guts the middle class, which can have a serious impact on consumer demand, saving and investing.

### Japan

#### North Korean conflict causes extinction

Africa News 99 (10-25, Lexis)

Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with North Korea.

### P-CP

#### Reducing restrictions can mean not enforcing them

Berger 1 Justice Opinion, INDUSTRIAL RENTALS, INC., ISAAC BUDOVITCH and FLORENCE BUDOVITCH, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and NEW CASTLE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAND USE, Appellees Below, Appellees. No. 233, 2000SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE776 A.2d 528; 2001 Del. LEXIS 300April 10, 2001, Submitted July 17, 2001, Decided lexis

We disagree. Statutes must be read as a whole and all the words must be given effect. 3 The word "restriction" means "a limitation (esp. in a deed) placed on the use or enjoyment of property." 4 If a deed restriction has been satisfied, and no longer limits the use or enjoyment of the property, then it no longer is a deed restriction -- even though the paper on which it was written remains. [\*\*6] Thus, the phrase "projects containing deed restrictions requiring phasing…," in Section 11.130(A)(7) means presently existing deed restrictions. As of June 1988, the Acierno/Marta Declaration contained no remaining deed restrictions requiring phasing to coincide with improvements to the transportation system. As a result, the Acierno/Marta projects should not have been included in the scope of the Budovitches' TIS.

#### Courts can remove restrictiosn

Michigan Bar 4 (“DEPARTMENTS: SECTION BRIEFS”, October, 2004 83, MI Bar Jnl. 52, lexis)

Business Law Section A covenant not to compete was held unenforceable in a recent court of appeals case. Instead of applying the "blue pencil" to reduce the restriction, the court held that it had the authority to delete the restriction in its entirety. Remember that when you ask for too much! . . . A new judgment lien statute enacted in Michigan became effective September 1, 2004 . . . . If adopted, look forward to a seminar on Eastern District bankruptcy rules scheduled for November 5.

### Courts CP – A2: Politics – 2AC

#### Court rulings on energy policy link to elections

**Sunstein**, Fall **2006** (Cass – Distinguished Service Professor in the Law School and Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Timing Controversial Decisions, Hofstra Law Review, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, p. Lexis)

In any election, voters have a large menu of items on which to focus. They might be concerned about national security, unemployment, climate change, abortion, energy independence, the stock market, the price of gasoline, or some combination of these. If there is a highly salient event immediately before the election, it might have a large role, simply because of its immediacy. Such an "external shock" might well affect numerous votes. 1 Suppose, for example, that the nation faces a terrorist attack a month before a presidential election; that a natural disaster, two months before the election, devastates a city; that gasoline prices fall dramatically in the previous three months; or that the unemployment rate, in that time, suddenly spikes up. The idea of the "October Surprise" signals the possibility that events of this kind might be expected to influence electoral outcomes. We know enough about human cognition to know that a salient incident can have a significant effect on people's judgments. A great deal remains to be learned about this subject. Let us simply stipulate that in imaginable circumstances, such an effect is likely. But perhaps there is nothing wrong with that effect. Perhaps voters are simply updating on the basis of new information. If a terrorist strike occurs, voters learn that the nation is more vulnerable than they had [\*3] thought. If unemployment jumps, the economy is apparently weaker than had appeared. If voters are rationally incorporating new information, then any external shock provides a legitimate and perhaps an invaluable input into voter decisions. We might make some distinctions here. If the relevant event is not self-consciously timed by anyone, then there is no effort to manipulate the system - and if voters will rationally incorporate the relevant information, nothing is amiss. But suppose that some person or institution has deliberately triggered a salient event, and done so at the appropriate time for maximum effect. The problem here is that voters might be deceived, in a way that will affect their judgments. If voters are unaware of the manipulation, they might believe that, for example, gas prices or unemployment rates are falling, even though these effects are temporary ones, made visible by self-interested politicians who are unable or unwilling to maintain them for the long run. If a terrorist has been caught two weeks before the election, and if the timing of this event has been orchestrated to convince voters that an incumbent administration is winning the war on terror, then voters might be manipulated to believe that a victory is occurring when in reality it is not. Consider in this regard the controversial 2006 decision, by the Internal Revenue Service, to delay in the collection of back taxes until after the election, in part to avoid negative publicity. 2 Perhaps the political market can expose any real efforts at manipulation. Perhaps the market functions well enough to ensure that such efforts will be revealed as such. But suppose that political markets cannot be expected to work this well. Even if so, the conclusion does not speak to my question here: No one is arguing that courts should deliberatively time their announcements in order to influence the outcome of elections. Everyone agrees that any such effort would be illicit. The question is whether courts should deliberately time their announcements so as not to influence the outcome of elections. The discussion of the effect of manipulation of events shows why an affirmative answer is not implausible. The risk is that a recent judicial decision may distort voter behavior, simply because its timing gives undue salience to a particular issue. No one doubts that recent events can have large effects on public judgments. Consider the fact that public concern about risks usually tracks changes in the actual fluctuations in those risks. But public concern outruns actual fluctuations in the [\*4] important case of "panics," bred by vivid illustrations that do not reflect changes in levels of danger. 3 A "particularly vivid case or new finding that receives considerable media attention" played a major role in those leaps in public concern. 4 Legislation itself is often fueled by identifiable events, putting issues on the agenda that would otherwise be ignored. "Availability cascades" occur when an available event spreads through the public, spurring attention to an issue that had formerly been neglected. 5 To take just one example, legislation calling for disclosure of toxic releases was spurred by a chemical accident at Bhopal, India, which focused media attention on the safety issues and led members of Congress to introduce right-to-know legislation. 6 The relevant legislation could not possibly have been enacted without the highly publicized Bhopal disaster. These points should be enough to suggest the possibility that in a genuinely close election, a salient judicial decision will have a large impact, perhaps even altering its outcome. Even if it is agreed that a highly visible event can have a large effect on political processes, we might insist that the effect can be salutary and sensible, as voters and representatives respond to a problem that had received too little concern. Undoubtedly sensible responses often occur. Unfortunately, the optimistic view seems unwarranted, for at least some of the time, the recent event produces a distorted judgment and undesirable law. 7 Let me therefore sketch a highly tentative principle: To the extent that salient judicial decisions can significantly affect voters' judgments, such decisions should not be issued in the period immediately before an election. Of course this position would be vulnerable if a great deal were to be lost by the delay. But in ordinary circumstances, any delay will produce no harm at all; it is not important for a judicial decision to be announced in October rather than December. If the delay is costless, and if it avoids a potential distortion, why should courts refuse to delay?

### 1AR Too Little Time

#### Time is too limited.

The Daytona Beach **News-Journal**, **11/9**/2012 (As fiscal cliff looms, leaders must compromise, p. <http://www.news-journalonline.com/article/20121109/OPINION/311089958/1027?Title=As-fiscal-cliff-looms-leaders-must-compromise>)

Obama and House Speaker John Boehner, the leader of Republicans on Capitol Hill, don’t have much time to agree on a much-talked-about “grand bargain” on raising revenue and cutting spending. Reportedly, they were close to such a bargain in 2011, but partisan gridlock returned at the 11th hour, and a resolution was delayed until after the election. With a lame-duck Congress and limited time, it’s unlikely Obama and Boehner will be able to work out a sweeping agreement that puts the nation on a sustainable long-term fiscal course. The most realistic option may be a short-term measure that helps advance the long and difficult process of ending deficit spending.

### 1AR No Compromise

#### Nothing has changed --- there’s no compromise.

**Cook**, **11/8**/2012 (Nancy – Budget and Tax correspondent at the National Journal, To Avert a Fiscal-Cliff Catastrophe, Someone Has to Blink, National Journal, p. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/to-avert-a-fiscal-cliff-catastrophe-someone-has-to-blink-20121108>)

Both parties pledge that they don’t want to plunge from the fiscal cliff—the more than $500 billion in automatic tax hikes and spending cuts scheduled to kick in with the new year. The tax changes alone would affect roughly 90 percent of Americans, according to the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center. But to avert catastrophe, someone needs to blink. Since Tuesday, the two parties have been acting conciliatory (even if Obama’s victory gives him a great deal of leverage over Republicans who really don’t want the tax cuts to expire). House Speaker John Boehner and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid talked on Wednesday about the need to cut a deal. “It’s better to dance than to fight,” as Reid put it. But besides the happy talk, it’s not clear what, if anything, the election has changed. “We have the same cast of characters. We have the same problems. Are we going to get a different result?” asks Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the former director of the Congressional Budget Office and now president of the conservative American Action Forum. A different result means a large-scale compromise, and that’s one possibility for the lame duck. It is exceedingly remote. Observers think a smaller-scale compromise, however, might be within reach. The administration and Congress could come up with the framework for a deal—with specific targets—that temporarily avoids the sequester, extends the majority of the Bush-era tax cuts, and promises to tackle a grand bargain, as well as tax reform, in 2013. “The key resides in both parties understanding the difference between surrender and principled compromise,” Holtz-Eakin says. So far, the parties have not acquired that understanding. That’s why another scenario may be more likely: a swan dive off the fiscal cliff after weeks of negotiations and tense wrangling. This would rattle the financial markets and vex a business community already horrified by political brinkmanship. But it would also give the two parties a new starting point for negotiations. Democrats could agree to some Medicare changes in return for additional revenue and higher rates on either individual or investment income; Republicans could negotiate upward the definition of “upper earner” and realize a historic entitlement reduction. That way, they could each say they had gotten what they wanted.

### Thumps the DA – Economy

#### Kicking-the-can kills the econ.

**Eaglen**, **11/2**/2012 (Mackenzie – member of the AOL Defense Board of Contributors, defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, It’s Not Just Defense Cuts: Sequester Would Cripple Our Economy, AOL Defense, p. <http://defense.aol.com/2012/11/02/its-not-just-defense-cuts-sequester-would-cripple-our-economy/>)

The second option available to Congress is to simply cancel sequestration without a long-term framework for debt reduction. However, this ignores our growing debt challenge and increases the likelihood of another sovereign debt downgrade, which could bring additional economic and market complications. Under CBO's alternative fiscal scenario -- which reverses most of the fiscal cliff policies -- real GDP growth would be roughly 1.7 percent in 2013, and the unemployment rate would be a full percentage point lower than under the fiscal cliff scenario. However, this short-term growth would come with a cost. Debt held by the public would rise to 90 percent of GDP by 2022. This kick-the-can "solution" could wind up being as detrimental as careening off the fiscal cliff.

#### Even a short-term fix triggers collapse.

**Reuters**, **11/8**/2012 (IMF Urges Permanent Fix to US ‘Fiscal Cliff’, p. http://www.cnbc.com/id/49753647)

Many analysts believe Washington will come up with a deal that would temporarily stave off what has become known as the fiscal cliff, although doubts persist as to whether Congress can agree on a timely compromise. In a report prepared for the Group of 20 finance ministers' meeting in Mexico on Nov. 4-5 and published on Thursday, the IMF warned that the euro zone crisis and the threat of a political impasse in Washington over the looming fiscal cliff posed the biggest risks to the world economy. The Fund said, however, there were signs that financial stress and global economic conditions "may be stabilizing" due to recent steps by major central banks to cut interest rates to spur growth, although economic activity remains sluggish. The combined U.S. government spending cuts and tax rises to be implemented under existing law at the start of 2013 are seen by many as threatening to tip the economy back into recession. The IMF has estimated that the tax increases and spending cuts amount to $700 billion in 2013. Unless avoided, this could contract U.S. gross domestic product by around 4.5 percent. "A last-minute deal that relies on suboptimal fixes or largely 'kicks the can down the road' may ultimately prove harmful," the IMF said in the report. It also said a temporary U.S. fiscal cliff was a "medium-term probability event," and said that even if the cuts were quickly unwound, damage to the economy would be "substantial" because businesses and consumers would be unsure about tax and spending policies.

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425), Ofir]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

### 1AR Revenue Key

#### New forms of revenue are key to get a deal.

**CBS News**, **11/7**/2012 (Top Democrat wants quick deal on ‘fiscal cliff’, p. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505245\_162-57546552/top-democrat-wants-quick-deal-on-fiscal-cliff/)

But a rejuvenated Obama still confronts a re-elected House GOP majority that stands in powerful opposition to his promise to raise tax rates on upper-bracket earners, although House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, has left the door open for other forms of new revenue as part of a deal to tackle the spiraling national debt.

## 2AC v. Wayne State LM Round 5

#### Life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures---its preservation should be an a priori goal

Amien Kacou 8 WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation.

Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.

However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### **Belief in** life after death causes complacency and paralysis – makes extinction inevitable

David Ray Griffin, Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Theology at Claremont, 1989

God and religion in the postmodern world: essays in postmodern theology

The most contemporary form of the moral objection to belief in life after death is the fifth claim—that belief in life after death creates complacency about the fate of the earth, a complacency we can ill afford in this age of environmental pollution and nuclear arsenals. If human souls can live without bodies, at least biological bodies, runs this objection, then they can live without the planet. The destruction of the planet's capacity to support life would therefore be no ultimate tragedy. The complacency produced by this belief is increased by those apocalyptic visions according to which our everlasting life will be preceded by the foreordained destruction of the earth (through nuclear war, many Christians believe), followed by the creation of a new earth. But even without this extreme doctrine, it is felt, belief in life after death prevents that intense passion to save the earth which is now needed. If we are to be motivated to engage in the almost superhuman (ask of ridding the planet of nuclear weapons, Jonathan Schell seems to believe," we must be convinced that the destruction of the planet's life would be the ultimate tragedy—the very death of meaning— and this it cannot be if billions of human souls live on in some other realm. This objection, unlike the former ones, does not apply only to a super-naturalistic understanding of life after death. Of course, the apocalyptic vision of the destruction and instantaneous re-creation of the world is su-pernaturalistic to the extreme degree. But the more general charge applies to all views of life after death, insofar as they lead us to think that the planet's death, however tragic, would not be the very death of meaning.

#### Nuke war threat is real and o/w racism and invisible violence---their expansion of structural violence to an all-pervasive omnipresence makes preventing war impossible – also answers their value to life claim

Ken Boulding 78 is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most danger- ous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, ad- vancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peacex

#### This is true at a fundamental and ontological level

Paterson 3 Craig, Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81

In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Choice is key --- they are serial killers

Paterson 3 Craig, Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>

In determining whether a life is worth living or not, attention should be focused upon an array of ‘interests’ of the person, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the patient’s underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients, a broad-ranging assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive. For Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. If a person values his or her own life, then that life is valuable**,** precisely to the extent that he or she values it. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, ‘. . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives’. It follows that the primary injustice done to a person is to deprive the person of a life he or she may think valuable. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of ‘critical interests’; interests worthy of pursuing — friendships, family, life goals, etc. — which are subjected to de facto self-assessment for the further determination of meaningful value. Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, can therefore be justified, on the grounds that once the competent nature of the person making the decision has been established, the thoroughgoing commensuration between different values, in the form of interests or preferences, is essentially left up to the individual to determine for himself or herself.

#### Life is a pre-requisite to death’s symbolic value---fearing death doesn’t preclude recognizing life’s finitude and its inevitability---we can still create provisional value in life---individuals should have the option to live

Cara Kalnow 9 A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews “WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE” https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF

(PA) also provided us with good reason to reject the Epicurean claim that the finitude of life cannot be bad for us. With (PA), we saw that our lives could accumulate value through the satisfaction of our desires beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But Chapter Four determined that the finitude of life is a necessary condition for the value of life as such and that many of our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life. I therefore argued that an indefinite life cannot present a desirable alternative to our finite life, because life as such would not be recognized as valuable. In this chapter, I have argued that the finitude of life is instrumentally good as it provides the recognition that life itself is valuable. Although I ultimately agree with the Epicureans that the finitude of life cannot be an evil, this conclusion was not reached from the Epicurean arguments against the badness of death, and I maintain that (HA) and (EA) are insufficient to justify changing our attitudes towards our future deaths and the finitude of life. Nonetheless, the instrumental good of the finitude of life that we arrived at through the consideration of immortality should make us realize that the finitude of life cannot be an evil; it is a necessary condition for the recognition that life as such is valuable. Although my arguments pertaining to the nature of death and its moral implications have yielded several of the Epicurean conclusions, my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams, as (PA) accounts for the intuition that it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided. I have therefore reached three of the Epicurean conclusions pertaining to the moral worth of the nature of death: (1) that the state of being dead is nothing to us, (2) death simpliciter is nothing to us, and (3) the finitude of life is a matter for contentment. But against the Epicureans, I have argued that we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided. Finally, I also claimed against the Epicureans, that the prospect of death can rationally be regarded as morally good for one if one no longer desires to continue living. 5.3 Conclusion I began this thesis with the suggestion that in part, the Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us. I went on to defend the Epicurean position against the objections raised by the deprivation theorists and Williams. I argued that the state of being dead, and death simpliciter, cannot be an evil of deprivation or prevention for the person who dies because (once dead), the person—and the grounds for any misfortune—cease to exist. I accounted for the anti-Epicurean intuition 115 that it is rational to fear death and to regard death as an evil to be avoided, not because deathsimpliciter is bad, but rather because the prospect of our deaths may be presented to us as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable. In this chapter, I concluded that even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, we can attach two distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect of our own individual deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. How to decide on the balance of those values is a matter for psychological judgment.

#### Extinction actually is the end of all human consciousness---this arg is dumb

Stenger 92 – Victor J. Stenger, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado, 1992, “The Myth of Quantum Consciousness,” online: http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Quantum/QuantumConsciousness.pdf

Quantum mechanics is called on further to argue that the cosmic field, like Newton’s aether, couples to the human mind itself. In Robert Lanza’s view, that field is the universal mind of all humanity - living, dead, and unborn. Ironically, this seemingly profound association between quantum and mind is an artifact, the consequence of unfortunate language used by Bohr, Heisenberg and the others who originally formulated quantum mechanics. In describing the necessary interaction between the observer and what is being observed, and how the state of a system is determined by the act of its measurement, they inadvertently left the impression that human consciousness enters the picture to cause that state come into being. This led many who did not understand the physics, but liked the sound of the words used to describe it, to infer a fundamental human role in what was previously a universe that seemed to have need for neither gods nor humanity.

If Bohr and Heisenberg had spoken of measurements made by inanimate instruments rather than “observers,” perhaps this strained relationship between quantum and mind would not have been drawn. For, nothing in quantum mechanics requires human involvement.

Quantum mechanics does not violate the Copernican principle that the universe cares not a whit about the human race. Long after humanity has disappeared from the scene, matter will still undergo the transitions that we call quantum events. The atoms in stars will radiate photons, and these photons will be absorbed by materials that react to them. Perhaps, after we are gone, some of our machines will remain to analyze these photons. If so, they will do so under the same rules of quantum mechanics that operate today.

#### Reject Lanza’s model of consciousness---it’s non-falsifiable and shouldn’t even be considered science

Wadhawan & Kamal 9 – Vinod K., Fellow at the Babha Atomic Research Center in Mumbai, & Aijta, December 14, 2009, “Biocentrism Demystified: A Response to Deepak Chopra and Robert Lanza’s Notion of a Conscious Universe,” online: http://nirmukta.com/2009/12/14/biocentrism-demystified-a-response-to-deepak-chopra-and-robert-lanzas-notion-of-a-conscious-universe/

In the first case Lanza seems to state that motion is logically impossible (which is a pre-relativistic view of the paradox) and in the next case he mentions that uncertainty is present in the system (a post-relativistic model of motion). In both cases, however, Lanza’s conclusion is the same - biocentrism is true for time. No matter what the facts about the nature of time, Lanza concludes that time is not real. His model is unfalsifiable and therefore cannot be a part of science. What Lanza doesn’t let on is that Einstein’s special-relativity theory removes the possibility of absolute time, not of time itself. Zeno’s Arrow paradox is resolved by replacing the idea of absolute time with Einstein’s relativistic coupling of space and time. Space-time has an uncertainty in quantum mechanics, but it is not nonexistent. The idea of time as a series of sequential events that we perceive and put together in our heads is an experiential version of time. This is the way we have evolved to perceive time. This experiential version of time seems absolute, because we evolved to perceive it that way. However, in reality time is relative. This is a fundamental fact of modern physics. Time does exist outside of the observer, but allows us only a narrow perception of its true nature.

#### Fear of extinction is a legitimate and productive response to the modern condition---working through it by validating our representations is the only way to create an authentic relationship to the world and death

Macy 2K – Joanna Macy, adjunct professor at the California Institute of Integral Studies, 2000, Environmental Discourse and Practice: A Reader, p. 243

The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function of the dangers that are threatening to overwhelm us. We are confronted by social breakdown, wars, nuclear proliferation, and the progressive destruction of our biosphere. Polls show that people today are aware that the world, as they know it, may come to an end. This loss of certainty that there will be a future is the pivotal psychological reality of our time.

Over the past twelve years my colleagues and I have worked with tens of thousands of people in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, helping them confront and explore what they know and feel about what is happening to their world. The purpose of this work, which was first known as “Despair and Empowerment Work,” is to overcome the numbing and powerlessness that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. As their grief and fear for the world is allowed to be expressed without apology or argument and validated as a wholesome, life-preserving response, people break through their avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of futility and isolation. Generally what they break through into is a larger sense of identity. It is as if the pressure of their acknowledged awareness of the suffering of our world stretches or collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self.

It becomes clear, for example, that the grief and fear experienced for our world and our common future are categorically different from similar sentiments relating to one’s personal welfare. This pain cannot be equated with dread of one’s own individual demise. Its source lies less in concerns for personal survival than in apprehensions of collective suffering – of what looms for human life and other species and unborn generations to come. Its nature is akin to the original meaning of compassion – “suffering with.” It is the distress we feel on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it serves as a trigger or getaway to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life in which we are as intricately connected as cells in a larger body.

This shift in consciousness is an appropriate, adaptive response. For the crisis that threatens our planet, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self. It is a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is the delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, that it is so aloof that we can – as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings.

#### Linearity might not be true but complexity isn’t 100% true either

Dr. Sebastian L. V. Gorka et al 12, Director of the Homeland Defense Fellows Program at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, teaches Irregular Warfare and US National Security at NDU and Georgetown, et al., Spring 2012, “The Complexity Trap,” Parameters, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher_Geltzer_Gorka.pdf>

These competing views of America’s national security concerns indicate an important and distinctive characteristic of today’s global landscape: prioritization is simultaneously very difficult and very important for the United States. Each of these threats and potential threats—al Qaeda, China, nuclear proliferation, climate change, global disease, and so on—can conjure up a worstcase scenario that is immensely intimidating. Given the difficulty of combining estimates of probabilities with the levels of risk associated with these threats, it is challenging to establish priorities. Such choices and trade-offs are difficult, but not impossible. 30 In fact, they are the stock-in-trade of the strategist and planner. If the United States is going to respond proactively and effectively to today’s international environment, prioritization is the key first step—and precisely the opposite reaction to the complacency and undifferentiated fear that the notion of unprecedented complexity encourages. Complexity suggests a maximization of flexibility and minimization of commitment; but prioritization demands wise allotment of resources and attention in a way that commits American power and effort most effectively and efficiently. Phrased differently, complexity induces deciding not to decide; prioritization encourages deciding which decisions matter most. Today’s world of diverse threats characterized by uncertain probabilities and unclear risks will overwhelm us if the specter of complexity seduces us into either paralysis or paranoia. Some priorities need to be set if the United States is to find the resources to confront what threatens it most. 31 As Michael Doran recently argued in reference to the Arab Spring, “the United States must train itself to see a large dune as something more formidable than just endless grains of sand.”32¶ This is not to deny the possibility of nonlinear phenomena, butterfly effects, self-organizing systems that exhibit patterns in the absence of centralized authority, or emergent properties. 33 If anything, these hallmarks of complexity theory remind strategists of the importance of revisiting key assumptions in light of new data and allowing for tactical flexibility in case of unintended consequences. Sound strategy requires hard choices and commitments, but it need not be inflexible. We can prioritize without being procrustean. But a model in which everything is potentially relevant is a model in which nothing is.

#### Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

#### Life good---Schopenhaeur wrong

Amien Kacou 8 WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

IV. Is life “better than” death a priori? a. The value of survival We are now in a position to state an answer to our main question. As we have shown, we are animated (at the very least) by an infinite desire for pleasure and it is impossible to desire that our present generally consistent desires be extinguished before they are satisfied. Therefore, it is impossible to desire the end of what makes pleasure possible (namely, experience, “life”) unless perhaps pain is a constant of that condition—that is, unless life presents a constant problem. Indeed, We have seen that pain has the form of a problem—it signals non-definitive (thus temporary!) dissatisfaction with consciousness, or hardship. In other terms: [simple pain] = [(consciousness\*desire) + obstacle]. On the other hand: [consciousness\*desire] = [desire for satisfaction including pleasure]. Therefore: [Simple pain] = [desire for satisfaction including pleasure + obstacle]. Since, as shown above, consciousness is always an expression of desire, then [consciousness\*desire] can be simplified to [consciousness]. In this way, pain can be seen to address an additional circumstance (the obstacle it signals) seemingly outside of the essence of consciousness. Nonetheless, perhaps we could imagine that such circumstance always subsists with consciousness, or even “precedes” it in some way (in which case, we might be more inclined to relax our restriction to a priori matters). What if, for instance, we were to theorize that the birth of consciousness is explained by the circumstantial advantage it confers—say, toward organic survival, as aforesaid? (For instance, it provides a sense of orientation.) Perhaps this could be expressed by saying that, at its foundation, consciousness (“life” in the relevant sense) is an expression of a will to such power as would allow organisms to survive. It would return us to the view that consciousness is, at its essence, valuable as a security device or capacity instrumental to something else whose value could also be questioned. The issue would be whether that circumstantial advantage addresses an “obstacle” explaining the need for the advantage. If so, then the nature of the desire for pleasure could more accurately be described, not as “infinite,” but rather as “indefinite”—pleasure would have value only so long as the advantage is needed. However, such an image would also be the result of what we characterized earlier as a confusion of modalities. The fact is that the advantage, the power, which consciousness is supposed to confer, fails as a whole to correspond to any problem or obstacle. Were the fundamental value of consciousness considered to be that it furthers our security interests in general simply by ameliorating our capacity for orientation away from undesirable circumstances (relative to some desire other than that for pleasure), then the general “circumstance” that the advantage of having consciousness addresses could simply be described as follows: it is the fact that undesirable circumstances can exist. In other words, consciousness could be seen as an advantage vis-à-vis the simple fact that things can go wrong—which, as we have seen, is a condition of the existence of value itself. Thus the advantage would not be aimed at a problem or obstacle. Rather, it would be aimed at the possibility of problems and obstacles, perfectly reflecting the form of desire itself. Accordingly, desiring the end of the condition for which the advantage is needed a priori would be the same as desiring the end of the possibility of problems, which, in turn, would be the same as desiring the end of desire—the disappearance of value.[31] In sum: no problem for consciousness precedes or is inherent to consciousness, which indeed involves an infinite desire for pleasure. Therefore, it is false to say as Schopenhauer said that “essentially all life is suffering.” Whereas the end of pain can only be desired, it is impossible to desire the end of the essence of life, because it would have to involve a satisfaction with the end of an unproblematic infinite desire. In other words, we cannot help but desire the continuation of life-as-such: our survival is good a priori. Life at its essence is not suffering—pain is an a posteriori (i.e., circumstantial) phenomenon of consciousness. Furthermore, since, as we have seen, life is an expression of desire (and no state of desire can be one of indifference), then life “at its essence” cannot be indifference. The value of our situated (i.e., a posteriori) experiences can be assumed to be entirely variable. For instance, anyone of us could imaginably be born with a health condition that causes chronic headaches, or instead with a tendency for joyful reverie, or something else. However, the initial value of experience (to the extent we can distinguish experience from its objects—to the extent we commit to assign a value to all life in general) is the same for all. It follows that life at its essence is pleasure. Life inherently, initially, “produces” pleasure. It “begins” as pleasure, so to speak, only to be countered, frustrated, a posteriori, by pain. (We can think of pain as thwarted pleasure—but not of pleasure as thwarted pain.)[32] And the desire for pleasure appears more precisely as a quest, not really to find or discover pleasure,[33] but rather to sustain (continue), and then augment (intensify) or expand (diversify) pleasure. In conclusion, since the infinite desire for pleasure finds its greatest satisfaction a priori in its own perpetuation, then life finds its greatest satisfaction a priori in its own perpetuation. The fact that the circumstances of life (limited life expectancy, torture, etc…) do not allow, or frustrate, such perpetuation, however, forces us to reevaluate our death. But this issue belongs to another type of inquiry—on the subjective or circumstantial or a posteriori value of life. b. The value of birth The above “demonstration” that our survival-as-such is good may also suggest that the mere fact that experience exists can be said to be a good thing. If experience (which we have shown to be an expression of desire) inherently produces pleasure (which is satisfaction with experience), then there is a point at which, or a degree to which, we can treat desire and satisfaction interchangeably. Indeed, pleasure is produced not simply after it is desired, but while it is desired. Thus, it is perhaps possible, on this account, to suggest of the birth of the desire for pleasure that it is good. In any event, we cannot rationally prefer a priori not to have been born in the first place. Conclusions: The value of life, ethical foundationalism and post-theism The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference.[34] a. Nihilistic theism: In conclusion, we have shown that the desire for the good of life is a priori superior to the desire for the good of death—and that the good of life finds its highest form in its own perpetuation. We have also noted that circumstantial entanglements could conceivably make us think we want what we do not want. In other words, irrational behavior becomes possible: it becomes possible to find discrete pleasure in things that should not give us pleasure—say, because they compromise access to greater pleasure. This explains why it becomes possible to even deny the value of life-as-such. We can also reason that it is the circumstance that the perpetuation of life and pleasure seems practically (i.e., a posteriori) impossible—because we believe we are mortal and expect to die—that forces us to, not only reevaluate our death but also, focus more on the other dimensions of pleasure (intensity and diversity). And, what is even more interesting: it is the denial of the truth of this apparent circumstance, this imperfection of pleasure, which forms the central concern of theological worldviews (which devalue pleasure in its finite form—at least, to the extent that it does not seem conditioned by them). This concern finds expression in two assertions: that experience belongs to an immortal soul; and that perfect pleasure is guaranteed in “heaven.” “Heaven” is defined as a place where nothing bad can occur—a place where problems and dissatisfaction are not possible. (A place of absolute, necessary security.) As we have seen, however, any desire for such a place would seem to entail a desire for a place where value is no longer possible—because value always entails a preference over alternatives (one of which is bad). In other words, desiring to go to heaven would be the same as desiring the end of desire, the disappearance of value. We need not investigate in detail the circumstances that make it possible to say that such a place ought to exist. (Perhaps it relates to a fear of Murphy’s Law—“what can go wrong will go wrong.”)[35] But we can “see” how tempting it is to say so, and thus unwittingly sacrifice the possibility of the good to the desire for its necessity. Those who commit to such a place, we call “greedy nihilists.” Hamlet, for instance, even though he does not actually mention a place we would call “heaven,” shows that he is a greedy nihilist when he laments “outrageous fortune” to the point of finding value in the idea of the end of experience—he wishes that things in general were incapable of going wrong. (This is precisely the contrary of amor fati.) It is as if one needed to be able to believe in the possibility of a perfect, everlasting, totalitarian state of goodness in order to be able to find anything good at all. Heaven can be defined as “God’s realm.” That “God” may be defined as an inescapable (perhaps even all-inclusive, somehow), eternally consistent, committed and supreme preference and power. Through these attributes, It makes heaven possible. Therefore, it is Its authority that conditions the possibility of the good itself (which for greedy nihilists, as we have shown, is conditioned on the idea of its necessity). Thus, that “God” becomes the source or foundation of ethics and value. Accordingly, when the idea that such a “God” does not exist becomes contemplated, the idea that the good itself does not exist also becomes contemplated. With the idea of the disappearance of the duty imposed by that “God” also comes the idea of the disappearance of the good itself. Thus, it is as if the greedy nihilistic theist needed to feel compelled to love anything at all by such “God,” without which she would be terminally overcome with a sense of all-encompassing futility. In other words, she would become a passive nihilist—in the Nietzschean sense. In sum, there would be two sides to this paradoxical coin we can now call the Nietzschean God. On one side, it is something that guarantees the preservation of one’s “willingness to care,” so to speak, more or less like an anti-depressant. Because of immortality and heaven, it becomes impossible to “lose” the world. On the other side, it is something that forces one to care. Because of immortality and hell, it becomes impossible to “escape” the world—and costly to try to do so. The Nietzschean God could perhaps be distinguished from the run of the mill “God,” perhaps more primitive, which is sought, not to provide a source or ground for the very possibility of value, but simply to provide marginal gain or good fortune—or perhaps a special kind of inspiration in the face of dismal odds. We could define this “God” broadly as, “that which can help us in our darkest hours,” and, for contrast, baptize it “the Pascalian God”—solely as an evocation of the opportunism suggested by Blaise Pascal’s wager, and not necessarily as a claim regarding the wisdom of that wager as stated or of Pascal’s beliefs. To the opportunist, it is good if the Pascalian God exists, but it is not necessary that the Pascalian God exist for things to be good. It is perhaps the temptation to further define the Pascalian God, in order to make It more predictable, that eventually leads us to conceive of the totalitarian Nietzschean God—inflating, in the process, the problem of fortune (chance), from a discrete, marginal, “quantized” phenomenon, so to speak, to a massive one. b. Post-theism and axiological realism Post-theism needs not involve any negation of the existence of a particular “God.”[36] It needs only involve a realization that we must find answers without reference to any such “God.” The “cause” for the existence of value, like the ”cause” for the existence of consciousness, is a matter open to speculation or theorizing. For instance, it may be that organic beings have a tendency to value things (to have preferences) simply by virtue of their contingent material constitution. In other words, Dawkins (in the epigraph above) could be right. Or, it may be that our world (if modal realism makes sense) contains in its modal particularity a definitive “bias” which, somehow, immortal souls within it reflect in their innate sense of value. Whatever! For our purposes, the only difference would be that in one case the “force” of value would seem to come from the contingent forces that hold us together, whereas in the other it would appear to come from the fact that the finding of value is incidentally inescapable (i.e., because we just happen to live in that world with the relevant modal particularity). What must be understood is that neither “theory” should change anything to the “value of value.” An ethical foundation is “something for the sake of which everything else can be valued.”[37] Greedy nihilists believe that an absence of external obligation (external force) at the foundation (or as the source) of value (desire) would eliminate value. However, we have seen that their worldview was founded on a desire for something that would make value impossible. Perhaps, then, something like “gratuity” (freedom) would best serve as “foundation.” But such a “foundation” would seem to correspond to no foundation at all, except for the simple fact that we value things. It would not be conditioned upon any additional claims about other entities. And yet this would seem to make sense, since any such conditioning (of the possibility of asserting value) would itself have to express (albeit indirectly) an assertion of value already preexisting that conditioning. What, then, when it presupposes that value exists, could such conditioning add to the possibility of that existence? (Or, perhaps more importantly, what might it subtract?) In other words, while we see that the constitution of all morality is twofold—including (1) value (i.e., the fact that we value anything), and (2) the fact that the service of what we value may be conditioned[38]—we now also see that, however, we cannot meaningfully, by ourselves, place conditions for our valuing things in general, for valuing things in the first place. In yet other words, we have seen that, in terms of general phenomena, care (value) “precedes” belief. Therefore, how could any belief—except the senseless (uninformative) belief that value exists—rationally condition value? More specifically, how could belief in a particular explanation for the existence of value condition value? (These are rhetorical questions.) Value cannot be self-defeating—desire cannot desire its own dissatisfaction. Moreover, every moment in life expresses or pursues value. Accordingly, conscious behavior must always be limited to value-supporting actions—at least so long as external forces do not interfere. Therefore, even if it is imaginable that there exists outside of life a state of affairs wherein there is no concern with things, and that such a state should in principle be accessible (if death is the end of experience), we nonetheless find ourselves incapable of truly desiring it as an end in itself. Hamlet’s lament (if sincere) was nothing more than the product of a special kind of confusion (or stupidity). In this sense, we are “trapped” in value—our “escape” could only come (directly at least, if at all) from the exterior. Perhaps then it follows that it is in those who depend on external references, or transcendental “truths,” to provide their axiological source or foundation that we truly begin to find the collapse of what makes value (and therefore morality) possible. c. Temptation of “meaning” To ask for the meaning of life can be thought ultimately to ask what should be done with one’s time thought of as a whole (a single project). We have said more specifically that what we seek when we search for “the meaning of life” in the most basic or general sense can be one or both of two things: either it is an explanation for the fact that “life” as we know it exists, or it is a justification for our most basic (or “default”) desire to survive. We have also defined the word “meaningful” (as pertaining to life), for purposes of our inquiry, as being basically synonymous with the word “useful”—a relation between objects and moments, on the one hand, and how what we value can be served, on the other hand. On the one hand, one who seeks an explanation for the fact that life exists may well seek no more than an inspiration to, as it were, shape her life. On the other hand, one who seeks a justification for our most basic desire to survive seems to seek an inspiration to want a life. What we have attempted to show can be stated as follows: that wanting to live is an a priori aspect of life—in other words, life has value a priori, irrespective of any explanation regarding its existence. As we have shown that life-as-such (the general condition of experience) has, at the very least, the unproblematic value of pleasure (the liking of experience, or the experience of liking things), then the service of pleasure could be seen as that object or moment in life that is sufficiently “meaningful” in serving what we value. Furthermore, since value-as-such could not be conditioned by any explanation, then the very existence of unproblematic value in life could not rationally be conditioned on one explanation or another for the existence of life. It is not simply that we have some subjective desire for life, but that living things cannot help but desire life a priori. Accordingly, we should be able to see life as an end in itself. Although one explanation, as opposed to another, for the existence of life could depict a better overall situation for life (e.g., one that would involve immortality), we must fight the temptation to believe that any explanation could condition our finding life good.

#### Even if life isn’t good – unconditional mass death isn’t the answer – the permutation allows for an individualized approach to death – solves viviocentrism

Derbyshire 10 (John, Contributing Editor – National Review, “September Diary,” National Review, 10-6, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/248613/september-diary-john-derbyshire#)

And like all but the very best intellects, Heisman’s is trapped in the received cant notions of his time, most particularly in late-20th-century Western hysterias about “prejudice” and “discrimination.” He actually coins a word in this context: “viviocentrism,” the absurd and irrational prejudice that favors being alive over being dead. No kidding: The attempt to go beyond ethnocentrism and anthropomorphism leads towards overcoming the prejudices of what I call viviocentrism, or, life-centeredness. Just as overcoming ethnocentrism requires recognition of the provincialism of ethnic values, overcoming viviocentrism emerges from the recognition of the provincialism of life values. . . . Overcoming the prejudice against death, then, is only an extension and continuation of the Western project of eliminating bias, especially biologically based biases (i.e. race or sex based biases). The liberation of death is only the next step in the political logic that has hitherto sought to overcome prejudices based on old assumptions of a fixed biological human nature . . . (p. 24) Heisman believed he had identified the ultimate victim group — the dead! Warn’t nothin’ Politically Incorrect about ol’ Mitch. Perhaps I shouldn’t be making fun of Mitchell Heisman while his family members are still grieving their loss. I can’t feel much guilt about it, though. Suicide is always a supremely selfish business, and Heisman inflicted far more pain on those who loved him than anything my mild mockery might add. And for all the shallowness and muddle of his suicide note, Heisman was at least tackling a real and deep problem to the best of his ability. How exactly do you demonstrate that being alive is better than being dead? Most of life is pretty boring, and parts of it are perfectly awful. Why bother? If you can persuade yourself that your thoughts will survive your dying, you have solved the problem. However you conceive of the Afterlife, it gives you a reason to live. It may be a grim place, entry into which should be put off for as long as possible. This was the view of the Ancients, expressed in the Homeric epics, the Odes of Horace, and the ghost-worlds of Chinese folk religion. Or there may be an alternative Afterlife, a fun place — a “metaphysical Disneyland,” philosopher Thomas Metzinger calls it — but for admission to which you have to have lived correctly, according to rules relayed by the gods through their human intermediaries. That’s the view taken by the Abrahamic religions. In either case you have a reason to prefer life over death — or as Heisman would see it, a justification for your viviocentric bigotry. If you don’t have those powers of self-persuasion, you are stuck with either irresolvable doubt or blank nihilism. The former was the position of most modern thinkers before the 20th century: Hamlet’s soliloquy, Pascal’s wager, Dr. Johnson, Darwin. The latter came to the fore with Nietzsche, and has been the majority opinion among intellectuals ever since. In this biological age, so impatient of introspection, our thoughts drift not so much towards the contents of these various notions as towards their consequences for our species. In that regard, Mitchell Heisman’s suicide at least serves a useful purpose, reminding us that whatever the truth value of nihilism, it is a biological dead end. Heisman, like Nietzsche, left no descendants. Listen to Granny My own life philosophy is one I call Blithe Nihilism. I believe there is no point to life, but I try not to let the belief bother me. Blithe Nihilism has its roots in the grand English anti-intellectual tradition — in the conviction that life is to be got on with and not thought about too much. Once in a while — after some string of personal disasters, or in a random melancholy mood, or when reading some bloke’s 1,905-page suicide note — once in a while the defenses crack and you find yourself looking down into the pit. When that happens, you need to have some habitual remedy close at hand. As with hiccups or the common cold, each of us has his own preferred remedy, which might not work for another person. My own treatment is to summon up the voice of my grandmother, Esther Knowles. When someone in her presence was moaning about his misfortunes, Granny would say: “There’s many a poor soul in the churchyard would be glad to change places with you.” That settles it for me; though as I said, it might not work for another person. Granny lived to nearly 86 and bore 13 children. I call that a test of aliquidism (Latin aliquid = “something,” as opposed to Latin nihil = “nothing”), and a pretty successful one. Measuring consciousness Having gotten into a metaphysical mood, I may as well comment on this news item about measuring consciousness. Dr. Giulio Tononi and some colleagues at the University of Wisconsin want to take your consciousness pressure: To do so, they are adapting information theory, a branch of science originally applied to computers and telecommunications. If Dr. Tononi is right, he and his colleagues may be able to build a “consciousness meter” that doctors can use to measure consciousness as easily as they measure blood pressure and body temperature. Well, the unit of measurement has already been named. In his 2007 book I Am a Strange Loop, Doug Hofstadter quotes the American music critic James Huneker, writing about Chopin’s piano étude Op. 25, No. 11: “Small-souled men, no matter how agile their fingers, should not attempt it.” Taking his inspiration from that, Hofstadter suggests the huneker as a unit of ensoulment. You could calibrate your hunekometer so that an ordinary wide-awake human being has 100 hunekers of soul, while a mosquito has, according to Hofstadter, only about one ten-billionth of a huneker to work with. There are some technicalities to be worked through, “soul” and “consciousness” not referring to exactly the same things in common usage (most people would say that when unconscious, you still have a soul). It’s a start, though.

#### Acknowledging inorganic life does not mean we can’t make distinctions – we should acknowledge our interconnections with vibrant matter to enrich our collective existence.

Bennett 2010 (Jane, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, Vibrant Matter, p. 108-109)

As our ability to detect and translate the more subtle forms of animal behavior and communication has grown, so, too, has our willingness to attribute intelligence to it and to recast it from behavior to action. But to truly take worms seriously, we would not only have to revise our assessment of their activities but also need to question our larger faith in the uniqueness of humans and to reinvent concepts now attached to thatfaith.36 Theories of democracy that assume a world of active subjects and passive objects begin to appear as thin descriptions at a time when the interactions between human, viral, animal, and technological bodies are becoming more and more intense. If human culture is inextricably enmeshed with vibrant, nonhuman agencies,31 and if human intentionality can be agentic only if accompanied by a vast entourage of nonhumans,38 then it seems that the appropriate unit of analysis for democratic theory is neither the individual human nor an exclusively human collective but the ontologically heterogeneous “public” coalescing around a problem. We need not only to invent or reinvoke concepts like conatus, actant, assemblage, small agency, operator, disruption, and the like but also to devise new procedures, technologies, and regimes of perception that enable us to consult nonhumans more closely, or to listen and respond more carefully to their outbreaks, objections, testimonies, and propositions. For these offerings are profoundly important to the health of the political ecologies to which we belong. Of course, to acknowledge nonhuman materialities as participants in a political ecology is not to claim that everything is always a participant, or that all participants are alike. Persons, worms, leaves, bacteria, metals, and hurricanes have different types and degrees of power, just as different persons have different types and degrees of power, different worms have different types and degrees of power, and so on, depending on the time, place, composition, and density of the formation. But surely the scope of democratization can be broadened to acknowledge more nonhumans in more ways, in something like the ways in which we have come to hear the political voices of other humans formerly on the outs: "Are you ready, and at the price of what sacrifice, to live the good life together? That this highest of moral and political questions could have been raised, for so many centuries, by so many bright minds, for human only without the nonhumans that make them up, will soon appear, I have no doubt, as extravagant as when the Founding Fathers denied slaves and women the vote."40

#### Death is not a social phenomenon – it is strictly a biological one that represents the end of all biological functions

Bernat 9 (James – Neurology Department, M.D., Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, “Contemporary controversies in the definition of death”, 2009, Progress in Brain Research Volume 177, 2009, Pages 21–31, ScienceDirect)

The definition and criterion of death To better understand the need to analyze the definition and criterion of death before physicians can design tests to determine death, let us consider the findings in a typical case of a brain-dead patient. A 44-year-old man suffered a spontaneous massive subarachnoid hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. His intracranial pressure exceeded systolic blood pressure for over 12 h. Neurological examination showed a complete absence of all clinical brain functions. He had apnea, absence of all brain stem reflexes, and complete unresponsiveness to any stimuli. He had diabetes insipidus and profound systemic hypotension requiring vasopressor drugs to maintain his blood pressure. Brain MRI showed marked cerebral edema with bilateral uncal herniation. Intracranial blood flow was entirely absent by intravenous radionuclide angiography. While on the ventilator, his heart continued to beat, blood continued to perfuse visceral organs (but not his brain), his kidneys made urine, and his gastrointestinal tract absorbed nutrients provided medically through a nasogastric tube. Was he alive or dead? He had some findings traditionally present in dead patients: he was apneic, motionless, utterly unresponsive, had no pupillary reflexes to light, and had no neuroendocrine homeostatic control mechanisms. But he also had some findings seen in living patients: he had heartbeat and visceral organ circulation and functioning. But a physician's determination of whether he should be considered as alive or dead cannot be made until there is conceptual agreement on what it means to be dead when technology successfully supports some of his vital subsystems. In the pretechnological era, when one system vital to life stopped (heartbeat/circulation, respiration, or brain functions) the others stopped within minutes, so we did not have to address the question of whether a person was dead when only brain functions stopped. Now, technology has created cases in which brain functions can cease irreversibly but circulation and respiration can be mechanically supported. Now, we must analyze the nature of death to resolve the ambiguity of whether the “brain dead” person described in this case is truly dead. In the earliest description of brain-dead patients, Mollaret and Goulon (1959) intuited that they were actually dead, claiming that they were in a state beyond coma (le coma dépassé). In the classic Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee report that publicized the concept and established the term “brain death” (1968), the authors asserted that the patients were dead and therefore represented suitable organ donors. The first rigorous conceptual arguments showing why brain-dead patients should be considered dead were not offered until a decade later (Korein, 1978; Capron and Kass, 1978) and were refined and expanded further over the next several years ( Bernat, Culver, & Gert (1981) and Bernat, Culver, & Gert (1982); President's Commission, 1981). Jurisdictions within the United States began to incorporate brain death determination into death statutes in 1970 (Curran, 1971), even before a firm philosophical foundation justified doing so. The analyses of death that have gained the greatest acceptance by other scholars begin conceptually with the meaning of death and progress to tangible and measurable criteria. Korein (1978) and Capron and Kass (1978) pointed out that agreement on a concept of death must precede the development of tests to determine it. My colleagues, Charles Culver and Bernard Gert, and I further developed their idea of hierarchies of analysis by fashioning a rigorous sequential analysis that incorporated the paradigm, definition, criterion, and tests of death (Bernat, Culver, & Gert (1981) and Bernat, Culver, & Gert (1982)). I refined this analysis in subsequent articles that I summarize here (Bernat (1998), Bernat (2002) and Bernat (2006a)). This analysis is frequently regarded as the standard defense that brain death represents human death, even among those who disagree with it (Shewmon, 2009). The first stage of analysis is to state and defend the preconditions of the argument or “paradigm” of death: that set of assumptions that frame the analysis by clarifying the goal and boundaries of the analysis. Agreement on these conditions is a prerequisite for further discussion. Much of the disagreement by other scholars with this account results from failure to accept one or more of the seven conditions of the paradigm. 1. The word “death” is a nontechnical word that we use correctly in ordinary conversation to refer to the cessation of life of a human being. The goal in an analysis should not be to redefine “death” by contriving a new or different meaning but to make explicit the implicit meaning of death that we all accept in our usage of “death” that has been made ambiguous by advances in life-support technology. 2. Death is a biological phenomenon. We all agree that life is a biological phenomenon; thus its cessation also is fundamentally biological. Death is an immutable and objective biological fact and is not a social contrivance. The focus of analyzing the definition and criterion of death is the ontology of death and not its normative aspects. 3. We restrict the analysis to the death of higher vertebrate species for whom death is univocal. We refer to the same phenomenon of “death” when we say our cousin died as we do when we say our dog died. 4. “Death” should be applied directly and categorically only to organisms. All living organisms must die and only living organisms can die. When we say “a person died,” we refer to the death of the living organism that embodied the person, not that their organism continues to live but has ceased to have the attributes of personhood. 5. A higher organism can reside in only one of two states, alive or dead: no organism can be in both states simultaneously or in neither. 6. Death is most accurately represented as an event and not a process. If there are only two mutually exclusive underlying states of an organism (alive and dead), the transition from one state to the other, at least in theory, must be sudden and discontinuous, because there is no intervening state. However, because of technical limitations, the event of death may be determinable only in retrospect. Death is conceptualized most accurately as the event separating the true biological processes of dying and bodily disintegration. 7. Death is irreversible. If the event of death were reversible it would not be death but rather incipient dying that was interrupted and reversed. A definition of death must reflect the concept that something fundamental and essential about the organism has changed irreversibly. We do not require the cessation of function of every cell, tissue, or organ to intuit death. The life and growth of some of a formerly living person's cells in a cell culture dish does not imply that she remains alive although part of her undoubtedly does. Similarly, the functioning of a single organ outside the body, such as a donated kidney that is being mechanically perfused and oxygenated awaiting transplantation, is not indicative of life of the organism. Respiration and circulation that are supported technologically after the brain has been destroyed allow many organs to continue functioning despite the loss of the life force driving them as well as the cessation of the overall interrelatedness and unity of the body. Such a preparation of mechanically functioning but nonintegrated bodily subsystems constitutes life of part of the organism but does not represent life of the overall organism any more than does the isolated functioning of its individual cells, tissue, or organs. An adequate definition of death is the cessation of the critical functions of the organism as a whole. The biologist Jacques Loeb (1916) explained the concept of the organism as a whole. This concept does not refer to the whole organism (the sum of its parts) but to the integrated functioning and interrelatedness of its parts that create the unity of the organism. Contemporary biophilosophers use the mechanism of emergent functions to explain this concept more precisely (Mahner and Bunge, 1997). An emergent function is a property of a whole that is not possessed by any of its component parts, and that cannot be reduced to one or more of its component parts. A function is called an emergent function because it emerges spontaneously from the sum of its parts given the condition that the necessary parts (subsystems) are in place and functioning normally. The ineffable phenomenon of human consciousness is the most exquisite example of an emergent function. The organism as a whole is the set of critical emergent functions of the organism. The irreversible loss of the organism's critical emergent functions produces loss of the functioning of the organism as a whole and represents the death of the organism. The organism's individual subsystems that remain functioning as a result of mechanical support do not represent life of the organism because their interrelatedness, wholeness, and unity have ceased forever. The cessation of the organism as a whole is the most precise conceptualization of death in our technological era in which physicians are capable of providing visceral organ support, transplantation, and advanced critical care. The criterion of death best satisfying this definition is the irreversible cessation of all clinical brain functions. This criterion is known as the “whole-brain” criterion of death because it requires cessation of all clinically measurable brain functions including those executed by the brain stem, diencephalon, thalamus, and cerebral hemispheres. The functions generated and organized within these structures are necessary and sufficient for the critical emergent functions of the organism and thus are necessary and sufficient for the organism as a whole. Death of the organism requires their irreversible cessation. In past analyses of the unity and interrelatedness of the subsystems of the organism, my colleagues and I stressed that functions of the whole brain provided the integration of the parts that created the whole. Subsequently, critics pointed out that the brain was not the only organ responsible for integration, and that structures such as the spinal cord contributed significantly to the organism's integration of its parts into a whole (Shewmon, 2004). In their recent report, the President's Council on Bioethics (2009) accepted the coherence of the formulation of whole brain death but concluded that Shewmon's integration criticism was justified. As a result, they proposed an alternative explanation of why brain death satisfies the definition of death as the loss of the organism as a whole. They concluded that the cessation of clinical brain functions caused “the inability of the organism to conduct its self-preserving work.” This conceptualization emphasized the cessation of the organism's principal functions that made it an organism. Shewmon recently analyzed the President's Council's alternative justification and found it wanting (Shewmon, 2009). Physicians have devised tests to show that the criterion of death has been fulfilled. Two sets of tests for death reflect the two basic clinical circumstances: resuscitation or no resuscitation. If positive-pressure ventilation is not used or planned, physicians can use the permanent cessation of circulation and respiration to declare death because the brain will be destroyed by ischemic infarction within a sort time once its circulation has ceased. If positive-pressure ventilation is being used, physicians must directly measure brain functions to assess death (“brain death”). Bedside clinical and laboratory tests to determine brain death have been standardized and subjected to evidence-based analysis. Their description is clinically crucial but is beyond the scope of this article. These tests and procedures have been critically reviewed (Wijdicks, 2001; Bernat, 2009). Alternative formulations of death Critics of either the whole-brain criterion of death or of all brain-based concepts of death have offered alternative analyses. The earliest criticism accepted the theory of brain death but argued that criterion of death should not be cessation of all clinical functions of the entire brain but only those of the cerebral hemispheres. This argument holds that the cerebrum imparts the characteristics that distinguish humans from other species and the more primitive brain structures that are shared with other species are not relevant. Robert Veatch claimed that death should be defined uniquely for human beings as “the irreversible loss of that which is considered to be essentially significant to the nature of man.” He rejected the idea that death should be related to an organism's loss of the capacity to integrate bodily function” because “man is, after all, something more than a sophisticated computer” (Veatch (1975) and Veatch (1993)). A reasonable application of the higher brain formulation would define as dead patients who had irreversibly lost consciousness such as those in a vegetative state. Several other scholars concurred with this concept that became known as the higher brain formulation of death (Gervais, 1986). The higher brain formulation is an inadequate construct of death because it violates the first principle of the paradigm by not attempting to make explicit the ordinary concept of death. Instead, it redefines death by declaring as dead brain-damaged patients who are universally regarded as alive. A clear example of a patient satisfying the higher brain formulation would be a patient in an irreversible vegetative state. Despite loss of awareness and many features of personhood, these patients are regarded as alive throughout the world (Bernat, 2006b). Because many people would prefer to die if they were ever in such a state, the proper place of the higher brain formulation is in determining grounds to permit cessation of life-sustaining therapy. Another critique of the criterion of whole-brain death is the British formulation of brain stem death. Under the intellectual leadership of Christopher Pallis, the practice of brain stem death in the United Kingdom requires the cessation of only brain stem functions (Pallis, 1995). In these cases, examiners cannot test cerebral hemispheric function and cannot use confirmatory tests showing cessation of intracranial blood flow (Kosteljanetz et al., 1988). This circumstance creates the possibility of retained awareness despite other evidence of brain stem failure (Ferbert et al., 1988). This serious flaw is uncompensated for by any unique benefit of the brain stem formulation. Yet, because most whole-brain functions can be shown to be absent when all brain stem functions are absent, the whole-brain and brain stem formulations usually yield the same results. The sole exception is the case of a primary brain stem catastrophe in which the patient could be declared dead in the brain stem formulation but not in the higher brain formulation. Several scholars have argued that no single criterion of death can be determined because death is not a discrete event but rather is an ineluctable process within which it is arbitrary to stipulate the moment that death has occurred. Linda Emanuel (1995) made this argument and offered a scenario of a patient gradually dying over many months from progressive multi-organ failure. Although this claim appears plausible in some cases of gradual dying, it errs by confusing the state of an underlying organism with our technical ability to determine that state. Simply because we may not always be able to detect the moment the organism changes from alive to dead, or we may be able to detect the transition only in retrospect — as in a brain death determination — does not necessarily mean that the point of death does not exist or is arbitrary. Death is not a process but is the event separating the process of dying from the process of bodily disintegration. Other scholars argue that alive and dead are not always distinctly separable states and that some organisms (such as brain-dead patients) can reside in an in-between state that is neither alive nor dead but has elements of both. Halevy and Brody (1993) made this argument employing the mathematical theory of fuzzy sets. They claimed that physical or biological phenomena do not always divide themselves neatly into sets and their complements. They asserted that the event of death is such an example and therefore it is impossible to identify a unitary criterion of death. However, this claim confuses our ability to identify an organism's biological state and the nature of that underlying state. The paradigm made clear that life and death are the only two underlying states of an organism and there can be no in-between state because the transition from one state to the other must be sudden and discontinuous. Using the terminology of fuzzy set theory, it is most accurate biologically to view alive and dead as mutually exclusive (nonoverlapping) and jointly exhaustive (no other) sets thereby permitting a unitary criterion of death. Some scholars claim that death is not an immutable biological event but is a social contrivance that varies among societies and cultures (Miles, 1999). The most libertarian among them go so far as to claim that because death is a socially determined event, individuals in a free society should be permitted to stipulate their own criterion of death based on their personal values (Veatch, 1999). These claims err in rejecting the paradigm requirement that death (like life) is fundamentally a biological, not a social, phenomenon. We all agree that customs surrounding death and dying have important and cherished social, legal, religious, and cultural aspects, which vary among societies. But Veatch and Miles err by failing to restrict their philosophical consideration to the ontogeny of death rather than to its normative issues. A few philosophers argue that there are two kinds of death: death of the human organism and death of the person (McMahan, 1995; Lizza, 2005). These scholars claim that they are not using “person” metaphorically and assert that the death of a person is separate from that of the death of the human organism embodying the person. This nonbiological dichotomy and dualism violates the paradigm requirement that death is fundamentally a biological phenomenon that refers to the demise of the human organism that embodied a person.

#### Value to life can’t be calculated

Schwartz 2 (Lisa, M.D., Associate Professor of Medicine – Dartmouth College Medical School, et al., Medical Ethics: A Case Based Approach, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)

The first criterion that springs to mind regarding the value of life is usually the quality of the life or lives in question: The quality of life ethic puts the emphasis on the type of life being lived, not upon the fact of life. Lives are not all of one kind; some lives are of great value to the person himself and to others while others are not. What the life means to someone is what is important. Keeping this in mind it is not inappropriate to say that some lives are of greater value than others, that the condition or meaning of life does have much to do with the justification for terminating that life.1 Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgment, and value judgments are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality.

#### A.I. is coming --- it will improve human existence and outweighs all current suffering.

Ray **Kurzweil**, Pioneer in the fields of [optical character recognition](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optical_character_recognition), [text-to-speech synthesis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speech_synthesis), [speech recognition](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speech_recognition) technology, 1998 Recipient of the Inventor of the Year award from MIT, **2007**. “The Intelligent Universe,” <http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=memelist.html?m=1%23696>

Consider that the [price-performance](javascript:loadBrain('Price-Performance')) of [computation](javascript:loadBrain('Computation')) has grown at a superexponential rate for over a century. The doubling [time](javascript:loadBrain('Time')) (of computes per dollar) was three years in 1900 and two years in the middle of the 20th century; and priceperformance is now doubling each year. This [progress](javascript:loadBrain('Progress'))ion has been remarkably smooth and predictable through five [paradigm](javascript:loadBrain('Paradigm'))s of computing [substrate](javascript:loadBrain('Substrate')): electromechanical [calculator](javascript:loadBrain('Calculator'))s, relay-based [computer](javascript:loadBrain('Computer'))s, [vacuum tube](javascript:loadBrain('Vacuum%20Tube'))s, [transistor](javascript:loadBrain('Transistor'))s, and now several decades of Moore’s Law (which is based on shrinking the size of key features on a flat integrated [circuit](javascript:loadBrain('Circuit'))). The sixth paradigm—three-dimensional molecular computing—is already beginning to work and is waiting in the wings. We see similar smooth exponential progressions in every other aspect of [information technology](javascript:loadBrain('Information%20Technology%20(IT)')), a [phenomenon](javascript:loadBrain('Phenomenon')) I call the [law of accelerating returns](javascript:loadBrain('Law%20of%20Accelerating%20Returns')). Where is all this headed? It is leading inexorably to the intelligent universe that Jim Gardner envisions. Consider the following: As with all of the other manifestations of information technology, we are also making exponential gains in reverse-[engine](javascript:loadBrain('Engine'))ering the [human](javascript:loadBrain('Human')) [brain](javascript:loadBrain('Brain')). The spatial resolution in 3D volume of in-vivo [brain scan](javascript:loadBrain('Brain%20Scan'))ning is doubling each year, and the latest generation of scanners is capable of imaging [individual](javascript:loadBrain('Individual')) interneuronal connections and seeing them interact in real time. For the first time, we can see the brain create our [thought](javascript:loadBrain('Thought'))s, and also see our thoughts create our brain (that is, we create new spines and [synapse](javascript:loadBrain('Synapse'))s as we learn). The amount of [data](javascript:loadBrain('Data')) we are gathering about the brain is doubling each year, and we are showing that we can turn this data into working models and simulations. Already, about 20 regions of the human brain have been modeled and simulated. We can then apply tests to the simulations and compare these results to the performance of the actual human brain regions. These tests have had impressive results, including one of a simulation of the [cerebellum](javascript:loadBrain('Cerebellum')), the region responsible for physical skill, and which comprises about half of the [neuron](javascript:loadBrain('Neuron'))s in the brain. I make the case in my book (The [Singularity](javascript:loadBrain('Singularity')) is Near) that we will have models and simulations of all several hundred regions, including the [cerebral cortex](javascript:loadBrain('Cerebral%20Cortex')), within 20 years. Already, [IBM](javascript:loadBrain('International%20Business%20Machines%20(IBM)')) is building a detailed simulation of a substantial portion of the cerebral cortex. The result of this activity will be greater insight into ourselves, as well as a dramatic expansion of the [AI](javascript:loadBrain('Artificial%20intelligence%20(AI)')) tool kit to incorporate all of the [method](javascript:loadBrain('Method'))s of human [intelligence](javascript:loadBrain('Intelligence')). By 2029, sufficient computation to simulate the entire human brain, which I estimate at about 1016 (10 million billion) calculations per second (cps), will cost about a dollar. By that time, intelligent [machine](javascript:loadBrain('Machine'))s will combine the subtle and supple skills that humans now excel in (essentially our powers of [pattern recognition](javascript:loadBrain('Pattern%20Recognition'))) with ways in which machines are already superior, such as remembering trillions of facts accurately, [search](javascript:loadBrain('Search'))ing quickly through vast [database](javascript:loadBrain('Database'))s, and [download](javascript:loadBrain('Download'))ing skills and [knowledge](javascript:loadBrain('Knowledge')). But this will not be an alien invasion of intelligent machines. It will be an [expression](javascript:loadBrain('Expression')) of our own [civilization](javascript:loadBrain('Civilization')), as we have always used our [technology](javascript:loadBrain('Technology')) to extend our physical and mental reach. We will [merge](javascript:loadBrain('Merge')) with this technology by sending intelligent [nanobot](javascript:loadBrain('Nanobot'))s (blood-[cell](javascript:loadBrain('Cell'))-sized computerized robots) into our brains through the capillaries to intimately interact with our [biological](javascript:loadBrain('Biological')) neurons. If this scenario sounds very [futurist](javascript:loadBrain('Futurist'))ic, I would point out that we already have blood-cell-sized [device](javascript:loadBrain('Device'))s that are performing sophisticated therapeutic functions in [animal](javascript:loadBrain('Animal'))s, such as curing Type I diabetes and identifying and destroying [cancer](javascript:loadBrain('Cancer')) cells. We already have a pea-sized device approved for human use that can be placed in patients’ brains to replace the biological neurons destroyed by Parkinson’s [disease](javascript:loadBrain('Disease')), the latest generation of which allows you to download new [software](javascript:loadBrain('Software')) to your [neural implant](javascript:loadBrain('Neural%20Implant')) from outside the patient. If you consider what machines are already capable of, and apply a billion-fold increase in price-performance and [capacity](javascript:loadBrain('Capacity')) of computational technology over the next quarter century (while at the same time we shrink the key features of both [electronic](javascript:loadBrain('Electronic')) and mechanical technology by a factor of 100,000), you will get some idea of what will be feasible in 25 years. By the mid-2040s, the [nonbiological](javascript:loadBrain('Nonbiological')) portion of the intelligence of our humanmachine civilization will be about a billion times greater than the biological portion (we have about 1026 cps among all human brains today; nonbiological intelligence in 2045 will provide about 1035 cps). Keep in [mind](javascript:loadBrain('Mind')) that, as this happens, our civilization will be become capable of performing more ambitious engineering projects. One of these projects will be to keep this [exponential growth](javascript:loadBrain('Exponential%20Growth')) of computation going. Another will be to continually redesign the [source code](javascript:loadBrain('Source%20Code')) of our own intelligence. We cannot easily redesign human intelligence today, given that our biological intelligence is largely hard-[wired](javascript:loadBrain('Wired')). But our [future](javascript:loadBrain('Future'))—largely nonbiological—intelligence will be able to apply its own intelligence to redesign its own [algorithm](javascript:loadBrain('Algorithm'))s. So what are the limits of computation? I show in my book that the ultimate one-kilogram computer (less than the weight of a typical notebook computer today) could perform about 1042 cps if we want to keep the device cool, and about 1050 cps if we allow it to get hot. By hot, I mean the temperature of a [hydrogen](javascript:loadBrain('Hydrogen')) bomb going off, so we are likely to asymptote to a figure just short of 1050 cps. Consider, however, that by the time we get to 1042 cps per kilogram of [matter](javascript:loadBrain('Matter')), our civilization will possess a vast amount of intelligent engineering capability to figure out how to get to 1043 cps, and then 1044 cps, and so on. So what happens then? Once we saturate the ability of matter and [energy](javascript:loadBrain('Energy')) to support computation, continuing the ongoing expansion of human intelligence and knowledge (which I see as the overall mission of our human-machine civilization), will require converting more and more matter into this ultimate computing substrate, sometimes referred to as “computronium.” What is that limit? The overall [solar system](javascript:loadBrain('Solar%20System')), which is dominated by the sun, has a mass of about 2 × 1030 kilograms. If we apply our 1050 cps per kilogram limit to this figure, we get a crude estimate of 1080 cps for the computational capacity of our solar system. There are some practical considerations here, in that we won’t want to convert the entire solar system into computronium, and some of it is not suitable for this purpose anyway. If we devoted 1/20th of 1 percent (.0005) of the matter of the solar system to computronium, we get capacities of 1069 cps for “cold” computing and 1077 cps for “hot” computing. I show in my book how we will get to these levels using the resources in our solar system within about a century. I’d say that’s pretty rapid progress. Consider that in 1850, a state-of-the-[art](javascript:loadBrain('Art')) method to transmit messages was the Pony Express, and calculations were performed with an ink stylus on paper. Only 250 years later, we will have vastly expanded the intelligence of our civilization. Just taking the 1069 cps figure, if we compare that to the 1026 cps figure, which represents the capacity of all human biological intelligence today, that will represent an expansion by a factor of 1043 (10 million trillion trillion trillion). Now for the intelligent universe. At this point, the ongoing expansion of our intelligence will require moving out into the rest of the universe. Indeed, this process will start before we saturate the resources in our midst. When this happens, we will immediately confront a key issue—the speed of light—which we understand to be the cosmic speed limit. But what is it a speed limit for? We can easily cite examples of phenomena that exceed the speed of [light](javascript:loadBrain('Light')). For example, we know the universe to be expanding, and the speed with which galaxies recede from each other exceeds the speed of light if the distance between the two galaxies is greater than what is called the Hubble distance. But the speed of light, as postulated by Einstein in his special theory of [relativity](javascript:loadBrain('Relativity')), represents a limit on the speed with which we can transmit [information](javascript:loadBrain('Information')). The phenomenon of receding galaxies does not violate Einstein’s theory because it is caused by [space](javascript:loadBrain('Space')) expanding, rather than the galaxies moving through space. As such, it does not help us to transmit information at speeds faster than the speed of light. Another phenomenon that appears to exceed the speed of light is quantum disentanglement of two entangled [particle](javascript:loadBrain('Particle'))s. Two particles created together may be “quantum entangled,” meaning that if we resolve the ambiguity of a undetermined property (such as the phase of its spin) in one of the paired particles (by measuring it), it will also be resolved in the other particle as the same value, and at exactly the same time. There is the appearance of some sort of [communication](javascript:loadBrain('Communication')) link between the two particles, and this phenomenon has been [experiment](javascript:loadBrain('Experiment'))ally measured at many times the speed of light. But again, this does not allow us to transmit information (such as a file), because what is being “communicated” by quantum disentanglement is not information, but quantum randomness. As such, it can be used to generate profoundly random [encryption](javascript:loadBrain('Encryption')) codes (and that application has already been exploited in a new generation of [quantum encryption](javascript:loadBrain('Quantum%20Encryption')) devices), but it does not allow faster-than-light communication. There are suggestions that the speed of light has changed slightly. In 2001, astronomer John Webb presented results that suggested that the speed of light may have changed by 4.5 parts out of 108 over the past 2 billion years. These observations need confirmation. That may not seem like much of a change, but it is the [nature](javascript:loadBrain('Nature')) of engineering to take a subtle effect and amplify it. So perhaps there are ways to engineer a change in the speed of light. The theory that the early universe went through a rapid expansion in an [inflation](javascript:loadBrain('Inflation'))ary period does postulate a speed far greater than the speed of light, so we may be able to find an engineering approach to harnesses the conditions that existed in the early universe. The most compelling idea of circumventing the speed of light is not to change it at all, but simply to find shortcuts to places in the universe that seem to be far away. The theory of general relativity does not rule out the [existence](javascript:loadBrain('Existence')) of wormholes in time-space that could allow us to travel to a far-off location in a short period of time. California Institute of Technology physicists Michael Morris, Kip Thorne, and Uri Yurtsever have described theoretical methods to engineer wormholes to get to faraway locations in a brief period of time. The amount of energy required might make it difficult to [set](javascript:loadBrain('Single%20Electron%20Transfer%20(SET)')) up a passageway for biological humans to pass through, but our exploration and colonization of the universe requires only nanobots. Physicists David Hochberg and Thomas Kephart have shown how [gravity](javascript:loadBrain('Gravity')) was strong enough in the very early universe to have provided the energy required to spontaneously create massive [number](javascript:loadBrain('Number'))s of self-stabilizing wormholes. A significant portion of these wormholes is likely to still be around and may be pervasive, providing a vast [network](javascript:loadBrain('Network')) of corridors that reach far and wide throughout the universe. It might be easier to discover and use these natural wormholes than to create new ones. We have to regard these proposals to exceed or bypass the speed of light as speculative. But while this may be regarded as an interesting intellectual reflection today, it will be the primary issue confronting human civilization a century from now. And keep in mind that we’re talking about a civilization that will be trillions of trillions of times more capable than we are today. So one thing we can be confident of, is that if there is any way to transmit devices and information at speeds exceeding the speed of light (or circumventing it through wormholes), our future civilization will be both motivated and capable of discovering and exploiting that insight. The price-performance of computation went from 10-5 to 108 cps per thousand dollars in the 20th century. We also went from about a million dollars to a trillion dollars in the amount of capital devoted to computation, so overall progress in nonbiological intelligence went from 10-2 to 1017 cps in the 20th century, which is still short of the human biological figure of 1026 cps. We will achieve around 1069 cps by the end of the 21st century. If we can circumvent the speed of light, we only need about another 20 orders of magnitude to convert the entire universe into computronium, and that can be done well within another century. On the other hand, if the speed of light remains unperturbed by the vast intelligence that will seek to overcome it, it will take billions of years. But it will still happen. I make this case more fully in my book, and Jim makes it quite forcefully in this book. It is remarkable to me that almost all of the discussions of [cosmology](javascript:loadBrain('Cosmology')) fail to mention the role of intelligence. In the common cosmological view, intelligence is just a [bit](javascript:loadBrain('Bit')) of froth, something interesting that happens on the sidelines of the great cosmic story. But in the standard view, whether the universe winds up or down, ends up in fire (a great crunch and new Big Bang), or ice (an ever-expanding and ultimately dead universe), or something in-between, depends only on measures of [dark matter](javascript:loadBrain('Dark%20Matter')), dark energy, and other [parameter](javascript:loadBrain('Parameter'))s we have yet to discover. That the story of the universe is a story yet to be written by the intelligence it will spawn is almost never mentioned. This book will help to change the common “unintelligent” view. So what will we do when our intelligence is in the range of a googol (10100) cps? One thing we may do is to engineer new universes. Similarly, our universe may be the creation of some [superintelligence](javascript:loadBrain('Superintelligence'))s in another universe. In this case, there was an intelligent designer of our universe—that designer would be the evolved intelligence of some other universe that created ours. Perhaps our universe is a [science](javascript:loadBrain('Science')) fair experiment of a student in another universe. (Reading the news of the day, you might get the impression that this erstwhile adolescent superintelligence who designed our universe is not going to get a very good grade on his or her project.) But the [evolution](javascript:loadBrain('Evolution')) of intelligence here on [Earth](javascript:loadBrain('Earth')) is actually going very well. All of the vagaries (and tragedies) of human [history](javascript:loadBrain('History')), such as two world wars, the cold war, the great depression, and other notable events, did not make even the slightest dent in the ongoing exponential progressions I previously mentioned.

#### -- The alt rejects humanism – dooming the planet to extinction

**Davies 97** (Tony, Professor of English – Birmingham University, Humanism, p. 130-132)

So there will not after all be, nor indeed could there be, any tidy definitions. The several humanisms – the civic humanism of the quattrocento Italian city-states, the Protestant humanism of sixteenth century northern Europe, the rationalistic humanism that attended at the revolutions of enlightened modernity, and the romantic and positivistic humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemony over it, the revolutionary humanism that shook the world and the liberal humanism that sought to tame it, the humanism of the Nazis and the humanism of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser – are not reducible to one, or even to a single line or pattern. Each has its distinctive historical curve, its particular discursive poetics, its own problematic scansion of the human. Each seeks, as all discourses must, to impose its own answer to the question of ‘which is to be master’. Meanwhile, the problem of humanism remains, for the present, an inescapable horizon within which all attempts to think about the ways in which human being have, do, might live together in and on the world are contained. Not that the actual humanisms described here necessarily provide a model, or even a useful history, least of all for those very numerous people, and peoples, for whom they have been alien and oppressive. Some, at least, offer a grim warning. Certainly it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like ‘the destiny of man’ or ‘the triumph of human reason’ without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them. All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore. The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. At the same time, though it is clear that the master narrative of transcendental Man has outlasted its usefulness, **it would be unwise** simply **to abandon the ground occupied by** the historical **humanisms**. For one thing, some variety of humanism remains, on many occasions, the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organize and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these, and the prospect of a world in which they will be secured, can only be articulated in humanist terms. It is true that the Baconian ‘Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things’, harnessed to an overweening rationality and an unbridled technological will to power, has enlarged the bounds of human empire to the point of **endangering the survival of the** violated **planet** on which we live. But how, if not by mobilizing collective resources of human understanding and responsibility of ‘enlightened self-interest’ even, can that danger be turned aside?

#### -- Some threats are real – “security politics” does not motivate all violence

**Kydd 97** (Professor of Political Science – California, Riverside, Security Studies, Autumn, p. 154)

As for the Second World War, few structural realists will make a sustained case the Hitler was genuinely motivated by a rational pursuit of security for Germany and the other German statesmen would have responded in the same way to Germany’s international situation. Even Germen generals opposed Hitler’s military adventurism until 1939; it is difficult to imagine a less forceful civilian leader overruling them and leading Germany in an oath of conquest. In the case of the cold war, it is again difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist before Gorbachev and not solely motivated by security concerns. The increased emphasis within international relations scholarship on explaining the nature and origins of aggressive expansionists states reflects a growing consensus that aggressive states are at the root of conflict, not security concerns.

#### -- Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur

Macy 95 (Joanna, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, Ecopsychology)

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.

## 1AR v. Wayne State LM Round 5

### Viviocentrism

#### -- Evaluate consequences – allowing violence for the sake of moral purity is evil

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey C., Professor of Political Science – Indiana-Bloomington, Director – Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, Ph.D. – Yale, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the **clean conscience** of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about **unintended consequences** as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### \*Global violence is decreasing – their impact is empirically denied

Pinker 7 (Steven, Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “A History of Violence”, Edge: The Third Culture, 3-28, http://www.edge.org/3rd\_culture/pinker07/pinker07\_index.html)

In sixteenth-century Paris, a popular form of entertainment was cat-burning, in which a cat was hoisted in a sling on a stage and slowly lowered into a fire. According to historian Norman Davies, "[T]he spectators, including kings and queens, shrieked with laughter as the animals, howling with pain, were singed, roasted, and finally carbonized." Today, such sadism would be unthinkable in most of the world. This change in sensibilities is just one example of perhaps the most important and most underappreciated trend in the human saga: Violence has been in decline over long stretches of history, and today we are probably living in the most peaceful moment of our species' time on earth. In the decade of Darfur and Iraq, and shortly after the century of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, the claim that violence has been diminishing may seem somewhere between hallucinatory and obscene. Yet recent studies that seek to quantify the historical ebb and flow of violence point to exactly that conclusion. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession, rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution—all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are rare to nonexistent in the West, far less common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and widely condemned when they are brought to light. At one time, these facts were widely appreciated. They were the source of notions like progress, civilization, and man's rise from savagery and barbarism. Recently, however, those ideas have come to sound corny, even dangerous. They seem to demonize people in other times and places, license colonial conquest and other foreign adventures, and conceal the crimes of our own societies. The doctrine of the noble savage—the idea that humans are peaceable by nature and corrupted by modern institutions—pops up frequently in the writing of public intellectuals like José Ortega y Gasset ("War is not an instinct but an invention"), Stephen Jay Gould ("Homo sapiens is not an evil or destructive species"), and Ashley Montagu ("Biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood"). But, now that social scientists have started to count bodies in different historical periods, they have discovered that the romantic theory gets it backward: Far from causing us to become more violent, something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler. To be sure, any attempt to document changes in violence must be soaked in uncertainty. In much of the world, the distant past was a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, and, even for events in the historical record, statistics are spotty until recent periods. Long-term trends can be discerned only by smoothing out zigzags and spikes of horrific bloodletting. And the choice to focus on relative rather than absolute numbers brings up the moral imponderable of whether it is worse for 50 percent of a population of 100 to be killed or 1 percent in a population of one billion. Yet, despite these caveats, a picture is taking shape. The decline of violence is a fractal phenomenon, visible at the scale of millennia, centuries, decades, and years. It applies over several orders of magnitude of violence, from genocide to war to rioting to homicide to the treatment of children and animals. And it appears to be a worldwide trend, though not a homogeneous one. The leading edge has been in Western societies, especially England and Holland, and there seems to have been a tipping point at the onset of the Age of Reason in the early seventeenth century. At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, quantitative body-counts—such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men—suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own. It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But, in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher. According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million. Political correctness from the other end of the ideological spectrum has also distorted many people's conception of violence in early civilizations—namely, those featured in the Bible. This supposed source of moral values contains many celebrations of genocide, in which the Hebrews, egged on by God, slaughter every last resident of an invaded city. The Bible also prescribes death by stoning as the penalty for a long list of nonviolent infractions, including idolatry, blasphemy, homosexuality, adultery, disrespecting one's parents, and picking up sticks on the Sabbath. The Hebrews, of course, were no more murderous than other tribes; one also finds frequent boasts of torture and genocide in the early histories of the Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and Chinese. At the century scale, it is hard to find quantitative studies of deaths in warfare spanning medieval and modern times. Several historians have suggested that there has been an increase in the number of recorded wars across the centuries to the present, but, as political scientist James Payne has noted, this may show only that "the Associated Press is a more comprehensive source of information about battles around the world than were sixteenth-century monks." Social histories of the West provide evidence of numerous barbaric practices that became obsolete in the last five centuries, such as slavery, amputation, blinding, branding, flaying, disembowelment, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and so on. Meanwhile, for another kind of violence—homicide—the data are abundant and striking. The criminologist Manuel Eisner has assembled hundreds of homicide estimates from Western European localities that kept records at some point between 1200 and the mid-1990s. In every country he analyzed, murder rates declined steeply—for example, from 24 homicides per 100,000 Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s. On the scale of decades, comprehensive data again paint a shockingly happy picture: Global violence has fallen steadily since the middle of the twentieth century. According to the Human Security Brief 2006, the number of battle deaths in interstate wars has declined from more than 65,000 per year in the 1950s to less than 2,000 per year in this decade. In Western Europe and the Americas, the second half of the century saw a steep decline in the number of wars, military coups, and deadly ethnic riots. Zooming in by a further power of ten exposes yet another reduction. After the cold war, every part of the world saw a steep drop-off in state-based conflicts, and those that do occur are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than being fought to the bitter end. Meanwhile, according to political scientist Barbara Harff, between 1989 and 2005 the number of campaigns of mass killing of civilians decreased by 90 percent. The decline of killing and cruelty poses several challenges to our ability to make sense of the world. To begin with, how could so many people be so wrong about something so important? Partly, it's because of a cognitive illusion: We estimate the probability of an event from how easy it is to recall examples. Scenes of carnage are more likely to be relayed to our living rooms and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. Partly, it's an intellectual culture that is loath to admit that there could be anything good about the institutions of civilization and Western society. Partly, it's the incentive structure of the activism and opinion markets: No one ever attracted followers and donations by announcing that things keep getting better. And part of the explanation lies in the phenomenon itself. The decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often the attitudes are in the lead. As deplorable as they are, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the lethal injections of a few murderers in Texas are mild by the standards of atrocities in human history. But, from a contemporary vantage point, we see them as signs of how low our behavior can sink, not of how high our standards have risen. The other major challenge posed by the decline of violence is how to explain it. A force that pushes in the same direction across many epochs, continents, and scales of social organization mocks our standard tools of causal explanation. The usual suspects—guns, drugs, the press, American culture—aren't nearly up to the job. Nor could it possibly be explained by evolution in the biologist's sense: Even if the meek could inherit the earth, natural selection could not favor the genes for meekness quickly enough. In any case, human nature has not changed so much as to have lost its taste for violence. Social psychologists find that at least 80 percent of people have fantasized about killing someone they don't like. And modern humans still take pleasure in viewing violence, if we are to judge by the popularity of murder mysteries, Shakespearean dramas, Mel Gibson movies, video games, and hockey. What has changed, of course, is people's willingness to act on these fantasies. The sociologist Norbert Elias suggested that European modernity accelerated a "civilizing process" marked by increases in self-control, long-term planning, and sensitivity to the thoughts and feelings of others. These are precisely the functions that today's cognitive neuroscientists attribute to the prefrontal cortex. But this only raises the question of why humans have increasingly exercised that part of their brains. No one knows why our behavior has come under the control of the better angels of our nature, but there are four plausible suggestions.

#### ****The act of progressing towards a goal gives some joy to life and pleasure is not the only thing that gives life value.****

**Schroeder 6 (William R.,** Associate Professor of Philosophy – University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Review of Julian Young’s Schopenhauer, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 9-7, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=7583)

Young suggests that Schopenhauer’s pessimism consists of a descriptive claim (that all life is suffering) and an consequent evaluative claim (that life ought not to be) (206). The main support for the descriptive claim is that life oscillates between the suffering that follows from the inability to satisfy incessant desires and the boredom that follows from temporary satisfactions. Though suffering is burdensome, Young believes that Schopenhauer’s major contribution is the analysis of boredom, which typically produces dissociation, indifference, and even cruelty. The desperate inability to will that boredom produces is nothing like the disinterestedness and openness of aesthetic contemplation. Thus, boredom offers no release from the suffering endemic to willing. Everyday life is merely a pendulum that swings between dissatisfaction and boredom, neither of which yield genuine happiness (209-14). To this descriptive claim Young objects that even if striving produces only rare satisfactions, this does not mean it always produces dissatisfaction. There is a **distinctive joy** in progressing toward a goal, even if its achievement remains distant. The experience of challenge **can be stimulating** even if the goal is never fully reached (217-18). The evaluative claim supporting Schopenhauer’s pessimism is also flawed because, oddly, it **presupposes that only pleasure can give life any value**. In fact, many other values that are not reducible to pleasure are equally compelling--vitality, self-development, and spiritual strength (218-19).

(NOTE – Young is Julian Young, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland)

#### **Jeffrey long is a hack and NED’s are distinct from actual death**

Fortin 10 (Jacob, “Confused Dr. Jeffrey Long thinks his book proves there’s an afterlife”, 2010, Confused Dr. Jeffrey Long thinks his book proves there’s an afterlife)

Dr. Jeffrey Long is a doctor who helps terminal cancer patients deal with their illness. He’s been fascinated with Near Death Experiences for a long time, and he’s recently written a book about them called Evidence of the Afterlife: The Science of Near-Death Experiences. He has interviewed thousands of people, and because of the remarkable similarity of their experiences, he’s concluded it must be proof there is an afterlife. I think it just proves he’s a fucking idiot. Dr. Long has obviously decided to abandon his objectivity, and I find his use of the word “Science” in his title extremely misleading. When you do science, you have to explain how even your own theories might be disproved; in his case, all that is necessary is evidence that the reason we experience similar effects during death is because of the way the brain reacts when it dies. The effects of NDEs have been recorded for a long time, and most serious scientists compare them with what we experience during lucid dreaming (this is where people are aware they are dreaming, but still have very realistic experiences). Dr. Long is either unaware of these studies, or has already concluded that the only viable explanation must be there is a supernatural world that people escape to during death. It’s a pretty weak conclusion, and it’s obviously not very scientific. Perhaps he’s never heard of Occam’s Razor; is it more logical to assume people’s brains are freaking out and releasing a potent cocktail of chemicals to calm them down, or that a spiritual world beyond our comprehension exists so our minds can live forever in some fantasy land paradise? I feel fucking stupid just proposing the latter, and so should he. He claims he’s a better physician now that he’s written this book. I would disagree, since he now foolishly believes he has enough proof to tell his patients they don’t need to feel frightened about death since they will live forever in a magical playland created by a loving sky daddy. Maybe not everyone feels it’s very healthy to endorse obvious wishful thinking. Sounds to me like he’s actually gotten worse…

#### Their understanding of tech is static – prefer a fluid understanding of tech – that’s key to value

Feenberg 7 (Andrew, Canada Research Chair in the Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Volume 42, “Between Reason and Experience,” p. 24-27, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Between\_Reason\_and\_Experience\_DYP42.pdf)

As I reformulate this social version of the technical revealing, it has political consequences. Political protests arise as feedback from disastrous technical projects and designs reaches those excluded from the original networks of control. These protests are often based on scientific knowledge of the devastation caused by technology designed in indifference to human needs. This is the point at which objective facts enter experience as motives for distrust and fear of technology and technical authority. The subjects become aware of the contingency of the technically structured world on choices and decisions that do not proceed from a supposedly pure rationality. The lifeworld reacts back on technology through the objective contents of knowledge of its side effects. There have been many attempts to articulate the implications of this new situation. My approach is closest to that of Ulrich Beck. Like him I argue that we are entering a new phase of technological development in which the externalities associated with the prevailing technologies threaten the survival of the industrial system (Beck, 1992). This threat has begun to force redesign of many technologies and changes in the disciplines and training underlying the technical professions. Beck explains the transition from a capitalism based on distinct spheres with little interaction, to a “reflexive modernity” in which interaction between spheres becomes the norm. Multiple approaches and cross disciplinary conceptions increasingly shape the design process in response. He develops the social consequences of the resultant changes while I have focused primarily on the technological dimension of the new phase. In this phase, what Gilbert Simondon calls “concretizing” innovations emerge designed to accommodate a wider range of social influences and contextual factors.12 As design is pulled in different directions by actors attempting to impose their differing functional requirements on devices, the winning design strategies are often those that reconcile multiple functions in simple and elegant structures capable of serving them all. Examples abound: hybrid engines in automobiles, refrigerants and propellants that do not damage the ozone layer, substitutes for lead in consumer products, and so on. In the process of developing these technologies environmental, medical and other concerns are brought to bear on design by new actors excluded from the original technological regime. Of course, no small refinements such as these can resolve the environmental crisis, but the fact that they are possible at all removes the threat of technological regression as a major alibi for doing nothing. The emergence of a radically new technical politics requires us to rethink the basic concept of rationality that has supplied the existing industrial society with its highest philosophical sanction. Heidegger and Marcuse help us to understand the limitations of the prevailing concept. They remind us that the hypostatization of a reason fragmented into specializations and differentiated from a broader cultural and normative context is not inevitable but belongs to a specific historical era, an era that may well be approaching its end. A new understanding of rationality is possible based not on a return to a teleological worldview in which we can no longer believe but on recognition of the complexity of experiences that have been cast in artificially narrow instrumental schemas. Concrete experience is thus the touchstone of this ontology because it is only there that the world reveals itself in its multifarious and unpredictable connections and potentialities. From this new standpoint specialization and differentiation will not disappear, but they will be treated as methodologically useful rather than as ontologically fundamental. The resultant breaching of the boundaries between disciplines and between the technical realm and the lifeworld responds to the crisis of industrial society. We may learn to bound the cosmos in modern forms by attending to the limits that emerge from the unintended interactions of domains touched by powerful modern technologies. This is the form in which the lived world we have discovered in the thought of Heidegger and Marcuse becomes active in the structure of a rationality that still has for its mission the explanation of objective nature. The discovery of a limit reveals the significance of that which is threatened beyond it. This dialectic of limitation is most obvious in the case of threats to human health or species survival. On the one side, the experienced world gains a ground in respect for an object, in this case the human body or a threatened species. On the other side, a concrete technical response is solicited employing the means at hand in new combinations or inventing new ones. From this standpoint no return to a qualitative science is possible or necessary. Modern science objectifies and reifies by its very nature but it could operate within limits standing in for the lost essences of antiquity and like them referring us to an irreducible truth of experience. As we encounter this truth we are reminded of the necessity of restraint. This must be a productive restraint leading to a process of transformation, not a passive refusal of a reified system. The forward looking Janus face is fundamental and grants hope not by rejecting scientific-technical achievements but by revealing their essential nature as processes in which human action can intervene.13 Innovative responses to the new limits can serve in the reconstruction of both technical disciplines and technology (MARKED) To be sure, the process character and full complexity of reality cannot be reflected immediately in the scientific-technical disciplines, but the disciplines can be deployed in fluid combinations that reflect the complexity of reality as it enters experience through humanly provoked disasters of all sorts and through the consciousness of new threats of which we ourselves are the ultimate source. The goal is not merely to survive but to reconstruct modern technology around a new model of wealth that is environmentally compatible and that draws on human capacities suppressed or ignored in the present dispensation. Marcuse interpreted this in terms of the surrealist “hazard objectif,” the rather fantastic notion of an aesthetically formed world in which “human faculties and desires ... appear as part of the objective determinism of nature – coincidence of causality through nature and causality through freedom” (Marcuse, 1969: 31).

## 2AC v. JMU BM Round 7

### T – In the US – 2AC

#### WM – OCS is within federal jurisdiction

Hartley and Medlock 7 (Dr. Peter, Professor of Economics – Rice University, Rice Scholar – Baker Institute for Public Policy, and Dr. Kenneth B., Fellow in Energy Policy – Baker Institute for Public Policy, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Economics – Rice University, “North American Security of Natural Gas Supply in a Global Market,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, November, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/energy-forum/publications/energy-studies/docs/natgas/ng_security-nov07.pdf>)

The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is defined as the offshore areas that stretch between three and 200 nautical miles from the U.S. coastline. In all states except Texas and Florida, areas within the first three nautical miles of the shoreline are managed by the state. In Texas and Florida, state waters extend to approximately nine nautical miles. Beyond 200 nautical miles is generally considered international waters, except where the geological continental margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles, as is the case in areas off Alaska, the Atlantic coast, and in the Gulf of Mexico. In these instances, the federal jurisdiction is extended.

#### Counter-interpretation – US means possessions of the US

US Code 12 (18 USC § 2340 – Definitions, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2340)

(3) “United States” means the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States.

### EIS CP – 2AC

#### -- No solvency –

#### First is delay

WEA 11 (Western Energy Alliance, “Top Ten Ways the Federal Government is Preventing Onshore

Oil and Natural Gas Production,” May 2011, http://westernenergyalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Western-Energy-Alliance-Prevention-of-Federal-Onshore-Production-Detailed1.pdf)

Project Approvals: Whether a small project under fifty wells or a large one with thousands, the Department of the Interior (DOI) is simply not approving oil and natural gas projects. Environmental analysis must occur before companies can even apply for drilling permits. Companies submit project proposals to the government, which then completes the analysis in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), but paid for by companies. • The government is taking more than seven years to complete NEPA analyses. To compound the problem, many projects are currently experiencing indefinite delays with no realistic plan by the government to clear the backlog in NEPA project approvals. • Small Environmental Assessments (EA) often take over four years, and large Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) regularly take over seven years, despite White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidance that EAs should take three months and EISs twelve months. • Between 1994 and 2005, the government took a little over three years on average to complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Since 2005, the average time is just under six years. Even with that poor record – an almost doubling of government inefficiency – it is likely that many major projects across the West will far exceed that timeframe, as many large projects are on indefinite hold for a variety of excuses from the federal government. • Without project NEPA approvals, a company cannot even start to drill and create jobs. Delays are preventing project NEPA approval representing about 21,000 and 17,500 wells in Utah and Wyoming respectively. Each rig running represents about 150 direct and indirect jobs, and each well drilled creates about 26 jobs and generates about $250,000 in annual government revenue. • According to an Interior Department Lease Utilization Report, about 43% of leased acreage is in production or exploration, a much higher percentage than their original messaging. Of the remaining acreage, Western Energy Alliance estimates that about half is undergoing preparatory work, such as NEPA analysis and permitting.

#### Even the perception of delay takes out the case

Bayless 3 (Robert, President – Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. BAYLESS. Senator, if I could follow up, not only is it an issue of whether those lands are available, but as you pointed out, the timing, if there is a long delay, it impedes industry. You are not worried about the industry; you are worried about gas supply. There are signals that come out of the market, price signals, that say we need more gas. We need greater—the price has gone up. Where is the supply? With these long delays, it creates uncertainty for companies to be able to drill those additional wells, to budget for drilling those additional wells. It really puts a bad filter on those price signals.

#### Should doesn’t mean certainty

Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word “would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does

#### “Resolved” means law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### A. Counterproductive – one shot assessments prevent agency evolution, produce bad info

Karkkainen 2 (Bradley C., Associate Professor, Columbia Law School, “Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring And Managing Government's Environmental Performance,” May, 2002, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903)

Yet there is a crucial difference. Under most circumstances, we get feedback from our environment that allows us to identify our errors, adjust course, and move on. The corporate CEO, for example, can constantly reevaluate and revise plans and strategies as conditions change because a well managed firm provides continuously updated information on market conditions and revised predictions of future trends. In contrast, NEPA's one-time-only comprehensive prediction requirement in effect says to agency managers, "Go ahead and make your decision today based on your best informed current prediction; if it turns out that you are wrong, neither you nor anyone else need know, or care." No self respecting corporate CEO would countenance such a management philosophy. Other pathologies are associated with NEPA's insistence on an unattainable level of clairvoyance. The rigors of EIS production, coupled with the risk of judicial reversal, may induce the agency to delay any action until "all the facts are in" - the familiar problem of "paralysis by analysis." n116 Indeed, it appears that this is often the chief purpose and effect [\*930] of NEPA litigation. n117 CEQ regulations attempt to address this problem by explicitly acknowledging that uncertainties pervade the predictive analyses required by NEPA. n118 The regulatory response, however, is to establish a triage system aimed at getting the agency through the one-time NEPA analysis. If it is feasible and not prohibitively costly to obtain the missing information, the agency must do so. If that is not feasible, the agency must state what information is unavailable or incomplete, summarize the relevant scientific evidence, and do its best to estimate the impacts anyway, using methods "generally accepted in the scientific community." n119 In short, the approach of the CEQ regulations is to endorse reliance on low quality predictions or "guesstimates" when higher quality information is unavailable or prohibitively costly. Courts are generally quite deferential to agencies when it comes to accepting uncertainties in an EIS, n120 although some courts would apparently insist on production of an EIS in the case of highly uncertain environmental harms, even if the circumstances suggest that the production of the EIS would yield little additional information. n121 [\*931] Alternatively, the demand for a one-shot predictive assessment may encourage the agency to proceed with false confidence in its own predictive powers when a sounder course, given the uncertainties, might be to develop a range of contingency plans or "adaptive mitigation" measures, to be triggered by the information produced by monitoring actual outcomes. n122 More generally, NEPA's one-shot approach assumes that an agency's responsibility for assessment and evaluation of the environmental impacts of management decisions ends upon completion of the predecision EA or EIS, rather than following the agency continuously throughout its involvement in the project or program. n123 An agency that does not monitor the actual environmental consequences of its activities will have little capacity to develop useful performance benchmarks against which to measure present and proposed activities - for example, by comparing actual results against baseline conditions, performance targets (including those predicted in the EIS), or other projects. n124 Consequently, it will have an underdeveloped capacity to evaluate and learn from its own experience and to improve its performance over time. n125 Similarly, in the absence of ongoing monitoring, interested actors outside the agency, including Congress, the White House, other agencies, and the concerned public, will be unable to evaluate the agency's actual environmental performance, or to assess the quality of the predictive [\*932] judgments contained in its EA/EIS statements. Lack of continuing accountability for "postproject" (i.e., actual) environmental performance may also reinforce the tendency on the part of some agencies to view the NEPA process as simply a pro forma paperwork exercise, rather than an integral part of ongoing management responsibilities. n126 Finally, the NEPA once-and-for-all approach is self-limiting even as a matter of pure predictive judgment, insofar as an agency that fails to verify its predictions against monitored results will be less likely to identify and correct errors in the assumptions and models upon which its predictions are based, or otherwise to improve its own predictive capacity. n127

#### B.) No enforcement – bad policies go forward based on biased information

Davis 6 (Wendy B., Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School, The Fox is Guarding the Henhouse: Enhancing the Role of the EPA in FONSI Determinations Pursuant to NEPA, 2006, 39 Akron L. Rev. 35)

The EPA and other environmental agencies should play an increased role in the preparation of the EIS. NEPA requires the preparation of an EIS when the facts alleged, if true, "show that the proposed project would materially degrade any aspect of environmental quality." n130 The EIS must include a discussion of the environmental impact of the proposed action and any reasonable alternative actions. n131 The lead agency preparing the EIS must consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved ... . Such statement and the comments ... shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality, and to the public... . n132 [\*53] Mandating consultation and comments is not the same as requiring approval. Many projects proceed over the protests of the EPA and other environmental agencies, n133 and many times consultation is never requested because the lead agency determines that no significant environmental impact is likely. n134 Although the EPA has some authority to review the final EIS and refer concerns to the CEQ, n135 other environmental agencies lack such authority. More importantly, this final review authority is limited to the information contained in the EIS, including the data and analysis prepared by the lead agency. Environmental experts may differ on a lead agency's analysis, testing procedures, and data gathering methods; therefore it is important for environmental experts to be involved earlier in the EIS preparation process. The EIS may be drafted by an agency that has neither environmental expertise, nor an incentive to evaluate environmental impact with any greater concern than economic benefits. Even a contractor hired to construct a project has been deemed an appropriate party to draft an EIS. n136 An appraiser of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development was deemed to be an appropriate person to prepare an environmental assessment and make a FONSI determination for a proposed low income apartment project. n137 The Navy prepared an EIS proposing sonar testing, which has been proven to cause whales and marine mammals to die by beaching themselves, without any reasonable alternatives included in the EIS. n138 This bias and lack of environmental expertise is an obvious detriment to a meaningful environmental assessment. In addition to a lack of environmental expertise in the lead agency, another problem with the drafting of the EIS is the use of professional [\*54] authors, where the lead agency hires a consultant for the purpose of paper compliance. The hired expert may be more skilled in paper compliance than in the management and mitigation of harm to the environment. It is not reasonable to expect a hired contractor to undermine the desires of its employer by emphasizing adverse environmental harm or criticizing the proposed project. n139

#### Nuke war outweighs structural violence – prioritizing structural violence makes preventing war impossible

Boulding 78 (Ken, is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354)

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most dangerous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, advancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peacex

#### War turns structural violence not vice versa

**Goldstein 2001** – IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

### Heidegger K – 2AC

#### The Aff’s a prerequisite to the Alt – only innovative responses to tech-induced environmental destruction enable reconceptualization of technology as more than an instrument and of nature as more than standing reserve. The Alt’s passive refusal leaves prevailing worldviews intact.

Feenberg 7 (Andrew, Canada Research Chair in the Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Volume 42, “Between Reason and Experience,” p. 24-27, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Between\_Reason\_and\_Experience\_DYP42.pdf)

As I reformulate this social version of the technical revealing, it has political consequences. Political protests arise as feedback from disastrous technical projects and designs reaches those excluded from the original networks of control. These protests are often based on scientific knowledge of the devastation caused by technology designed in indifference to human needs. This is the point at which objective facts enter experience as motives for distrust and fear of technology and technical authority. The subjects become aware of the contingency of the technically structured world on choices and decisions that do not proceed from a supposedly pure rationality. The lifeworld reacts back on technology through the objective contents of knowledge of its side effects. There have been many attempts to articulate the implications of this new situation. My approach is closest to that of Ulrich Beck. Like him I argue that we are entering a new phase of technological development in which the externalities associated with the prevailing technologies threaten the survival of the industrial system (Beck, 1992). This threat has begun to force redesign of many technologies and changes in the disciplines and training underlying the technical professions. Beck explains the transition from a capitalism based on distinct spheres with little interaction, to a “reflexive modernity” in which interaction between spheres becomes the norm. Multiple approaches and cross disciplinary conceptions increasingly shape the design process in response. He develops the social consequences of the resultant changes while I have focused primarily on the technological dimension of the new phase. In this phase, what Gilbert Simondon calls “concretizing” innovations emerge designed to accommodate a wider range of social influences and contextual factors.12 As design is pulled in different directions by actors attempting to impose their differing functional requirements on devices, the winning design strategies are often those that reconcile multiple functions in simple and elegant structures capable of serving them all. Examples abound: hybrid engines in automobiles, refrigerants and propellants that do not damage the ozone layer, substitutes for lead in consumer products, and so on. In the process of developing these technologies environmental, medical and other concerns are brought to bear on design by new actors excluded from the original technological regime. Of course, no small refinements such as these can resolve the environmental crisis, but the fact that they are possible at all removes the threat of technological regression as a major alibi for doing nothing. The emergence of a radically new technical politics requires us to rethink the basic concept of rationality that has supplied the existing industrial society with its highest philosophical sanction. Heidegger and Marcuse help us to understand the limitations of the prevailing concept. They remind us that the hypostatization of a reason fragmented into specializations and differentiated from a broader cultural and normative context is not inevitable but belongs to a specific historical era, an era that may well be approaching its end. A new understanding of rationality is possible based not on a return to a teleological worldview in which we can no longer believe but on recognition of the complexity of experiences that have been cast in artificially narrow instrumental schemas. Concrete experience is thus the touchstone of this ontology because it is only there that the world reveals itself in its multifarious and unpredictable connections and potentialities. From this new standpoint specialization and differentiation will not disappear, but they will be treated as methodologically useful rather than as ontologically fundamental. The resultant breaching of the boundaries between disciplines and between the technical realm and the lifeworld responds to the crisis of industrial society. We may learn to bound the cosmos in modern forms by attending to the limits that emerge from the unintended interactions of domains touched by powerful modern technologies. This is the form in which the lived world we have discovered in the thought of Heidegger and Marcuse becomes active in the structure of a rationality that still has for its mission the explanation of objective nature. The discovery of a limit reveals the significance of that which is threatened beyond it. This dialectic of limitation is most obvious in the case of threats to human health or species survival. On the one side, the experienced world gains a ground in respect for an object, in this case the human body or a threatened species. On the other side, a concrete technical response is solicited employing the means at hand in new combinations or inventing new ones. From this standpoint no return to a qualitative science is possible or necessary. Modern science objectifies and reifies by its very nature but it could operate within limits standing in for the lost essences of antiquity and like them referring us to an irreducible truth of experience. As we encounter this truth we are reminded of the necessity of restraint. This must be a productive restraint leading to a process of transformation, not a passive refusal of a reified system. The forward looking Janus face is fundamental and grants hope not by rejecting scientific-technical achievements but by revealing their essential nature as processes in which human action can intervene.13 Innovative responses to the new limits can serve in the reconstruction of both technical disciplines and technology. To be sure, the process character and full complexity of reality cannot be reflected immediately in the scientific-technical disciplines, but the disciplines can be deployed in fluid combinations that reflect the complexity of reality as it enters experience through humanly provoked disasters of all sorts and through the consciousness of new threats of which we ourselves are the ultimate source. The goal is not merely to survive but to reconstruct modern technology around a new model of wealth that is environmentally compatible and that draws on human capacities suppressed or ignored in the present dispensation. Marcuse interpreted this in terms of the surrealist “hazard objectif,” the rather fantastic notion of an aesthetically formed world in which “human faculties and desires ... appear as part of the objective determinism of nature – coincidence of causality through nature and causality through freedom” (Marcuse, 1969: 31).

#### Perm – do the plan and non-competitive parts of the alternative. It solves best.

**McWhorter 92** (Ladelle, Assistant Professor of Philosophy – Northeast Missouri State University, Heidegger and the Earth, p. 3)

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

#### -- Extinction outweighs – pre-requisite to Being

**Zimmerman 93** (Michael E., Professor of Philosophy – University of Tulane, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, p. 119-120)

Heidegger asserted that human self assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might “bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth.” This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one’s soul by losing ones relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur in an ontological clearing through which life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity’s one dimensional disclosure to entities virtually denies that any “being” at all, the loss of humanity’s openness for being is already occurring. Modernity’s background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material happiness for everyone by reducing nature into pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in a nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity’s slow destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided a nuclear war only to survive as contended clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. **But most** of them **could not agree that the loss of humanity’s relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide**, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never “disclosed” by humanity.

#### -- Alt fails – ‘letting be’ and waiting for metaphysical transformation dooms us to extinction

**Santoni 85** (Ronald E., Professor of Philosophy – Denison, Nuclear War, Ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-157)

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to **omnicide**. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we **simultaneously act** to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the arms race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about our disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be **too permissive** in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be **an early accomplice to** the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its **annihilation**.

#### -- The alt rejects humanism – dooming the planet to extinction

**Davies 97** (Tony, Professor of English – Birmingham University, Humanism, p. 130-132)

So there will not after all be, nor indeed could there be, any tidy definitions. The several humanisms – the civic humanism of the quattrocento Italian city-states, the Protestant humanism of sixteenth century northern Europe, the rationalistic humanism that attended at the revolutions of enlightened modernity, and the romantic and positivistic humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemony over it, the revolutionary humanism that shook the world and the liberal humanism that sought to tame it, the humanism of the Nazis and the humanism of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser – are not reducible to one, or even to a single line or pattern. Each has its distinctive historical curve, its particular discursive poetics, its own problematic scansion of the human. Each seeks, as all discourses must, to impose its own answer to the question of ‘which is to be master’. Meanwhile, the problem of humanism remains, for the present, an inescapable horizon within which all attempts to think about the ways in which human being have, do, might live together in and on the world are contained. Not that the actual humanisms described here necessarily provide a model, or even a useful history, least of all for those very numerous people, and peoples, for whom they have been alien and oppressive. Some, at least, offer a grim warning. Certainly it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like ‘the destiny of man’ or ‘the triumph of human reason’ without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them. All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore. The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. At the same time, though it is clear that the master narrative of transcendental Man has outlasted its usefulness, **it would be unwise** simply **to abandon the ground occupied by** the historical **humanisms**. For one thing, some variety of humanism remains, on many occasions, the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organize and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these, and the prospect of a world in which they will be secured, can only be articulated in humanist terms. It is true that the Baconian ‘Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things’, harnessed to an overweening rationality and an unbridled technological will to power, has enlarged the bounds of human empire to the point of **endangering the survival of the** violated **planet** on which we live. But how, if not by mobilizing collective resources of human understanding and responsibility of ‘enlightened self-interest’ even, can that danger be turned aside?

#### Existence is a pre-requisite to examining ontology

Wapner 3 (Paul, Associate Professor and Director of the Global Environmental Policy Program – American University, “Leftist Criticism of”, Dissent, Winter, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539)

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that **a prerequisite of expression is existence**. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment. NOW, WHAT does this mean for politics and policy, and the future of the environmental movement? Society is constantly being asked to address questions of environmental quality for which there are no easy answers. As we wrestle with challenges of global climate change, ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, and so forth, we need to consider the economic, political, cultural, and aesthetic values at stake. These considerations have traditionally marked the politics of environmental protection. A sensitivity to eco-criticism requires that we go further and include an ethic of otherness in our deliberations. That is, we need to be moved by our concern to make room for the "other" and hence fold a commitment to the nonhuman world into our policy discussions. I don't mean that this argument should drive all our actions or that respect for the "other" should always carry the day. But it must be a central part of our reflections and calculations. For example, as we estimate the number of people that a certain area can sustain, consider what to do about climate change, debate restrictions on ocean fishing, or otherwise assess the effects of a particular course of action, we must think about the lives of other creatures on the earth-and also the continued existence of the nonliving physical world. We must do so not because we wish to maintain what is "natural" but because we wish to act in a morally respectable manner.

### A2: LNG Exports Bad – Russian Economy – 2AC

#### Russian economy is collapsing now

MarketWatch 10/8 (“World Bank says Russian economy to slow”, 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/world-bank-says-russian-economy-to-slow-2012-10-08)

MOSCOW--Russia's economy will slow over the next year, the World Bank said Monday, while urging the country to stick with prudent spending plans and focus monetary policy on low inflation. Growth in Russian gross domestic product will slow from 4.3% in 2011 to 3.5% this year and 3.6% in 2013 due to unfavorable base effects, drought in the agricultural sector, rising inflation and weak global sentiment, the World Bank said in a report. The bank revised down its 2012 estimate by 0.3 percentage point and its 2013 forecast by 0.6 percentage point since its June report, citing a poor grain harvest and a weaker-than-expected global environment. "Just at a time when Russia's output levels have exceeded the pre-crisis peak, the economy is settling onto a lower trajectory, even though oil prices have stayed high," the bank said.

#### Russia’s economy is resilient – oil, metals, and financial reserves

**Garrels 8** (Annie – a foreign correspondent for National Public Radio in the United States, “RUSSIAN ECONOMY STRONG DESPITE COMMODITY FALLOUT”, 9/20/08, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94647099>)

For the past six years**, Russia's economy has boomed in large part because of soaring prices for oil and metals.** Russia is strong in these areas ó too strong, though, for a balanced economy. Russian shares have bled almost 50 percent of their value since May, but many analysts say Russia still remains a resilient economy. And after the Georgia invasion and weeks of harsh, anti-western rhetoric, both Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have tried to reassure foreign investors. When those commodities prices dropped, Russia's stock market was hit hard. "The question is if they fall significantly further," says James Fenkner with Red Star Assets in Moscow. Fenkner is one of the more cautious voices in Moscow, and other analysts like Roland Nash of Renaissance Capital look at other indicators, like direct foreign investment. "The level of foreign investment is twice the per capita of Brazil, **four times that of China**, and six times that of India this year," Nash says. "The market arguments for Russia are still very good and there is still a lot of money coming in." Too Dependent On Commodities The Russia government recognizes it is too dependent on commodities, and while their prices were high, it amassed **huge reserves as a cushion**. The country now has a balanced budget and financial analysts predict its economy will continue to grow at about six percent. Vladmir Tikhomirov, senior economist at Uralsib Financial Corporation, says this is enough to avoid a crisis, but it is not what the Kremlin hoped for. "It's not enough to make fundamental changes to the economic structures," Tikhomirov says. "Russia must have to be a more competitive and efficient economy." Moscow may now be the most expensive, glamorous city in the world, but the rest of the country lags behind. Tikhomirov says the Russia needs to improve basic infrastructure like roads as well as small and mid-size businesses. For this, Russia needs a stable global financial system

**High oil prices means Russia’s economy’s strong now and will remain strong**

[**Rapoza**](http://blogs.forbes.com/kenrapoza/) **12** (Kenneth, “High Oil Prices Bode Well For Russian Government”, Forbes, 1/28/12, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/01/28/high-oil-prices-bode-well-for-russian-government/>)

High oil prices mean more cash flowing into the Russian government. The country is dependent on energy exports to keep its budget surplus in tact. Oil futures cracked $100 a barrel this week, before settling at $99.56 for the May contract for WTI crude. Still, prices like that bode well for Russia’s public coffers. International Monetary Fund’s Moscow representative, Odd Per Brekk, said in an interview with Russian newswire Ria Novosti that high oil prices actually opened a “window of opportunity” for the country to take measures to strengthen and protect its economy from the ongoing problems facing Europe, it’s biggest oil and gas customer. To take full advantage of this opportunity, Brekk said, the Russian government must undertake a complete economic transformation – keeping inflation at 3%-5%, cutting budget expenses, improving the financial sector and reducing its dependence on commodities materials. One way to do it is to use their oil wealth as a means to justify reform. Current geopolitical events are supporting high oil prices, mainly problems in Libya and Syria, and a new oil embargo against Iran. Ria Novosti also noted in its report that Iraq was contributing to high oil prices as well. As U.S. troops head home, some oil firms are looking at the security risks there and wondering if it is worth maintaining current projects. Russia’s government is expecting that the Iran oil embargo will contribute to a 10%-15% rise in oil prices, including the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, an important oil route in the Middle East.

#### Econ decline won’t change Russia’s foreign policy or cause domestic unrest – empirically denied

Blackwill 9 (Robert Blackwill 2009; former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning; RAND, "The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution", http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf)

Now on to Russia. Again, fi ve years from today. Did the global recession and Russia’s present serious economic problems substantially modify Russian foreign policy? No. (President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as this paper goes to press; nothing fundamental will result from that visit). Did it produce a serious weakening of Vladimir Putin’s power and authority in Russia? No, as recent polls in Russia make clear. Did it reduce Russian worries and capacities to oppose NATO enlargement and defense measures eastward? No. Did it aff ect Russia’s willingness to accept much tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends to make a nuclear weapon.25 In sum, Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized as follows: to resurrect Russia’s standing as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary infl uence over the space of the former Soviet Union; to resist Western efforts to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russia’s military might and power projection; to extend the reach of Russian diplomacy in Europe, Asia, and beyond; and to oppose American global primacy. For Moscow, these foreign policy first principles are here to stay, as they have existed in Russia for centuries. 26 None of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to be changed in any serious way by the economic crisis.

### Russia/Ukraine – 2AC

#### US LNG exports solve Russia-Ukraine war

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

A large increase in U.S. LNG exports would have the potential to increase U.S. foreign policy interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific basins. Unlike oil, natural gas has traditionally been an infrastructure-constrained business, giving geographical proximity and political relations between producers and consumers a high level of importance. Issues of “pipeline politics” have been most directly visible in Europe, which relies on Russia for around a third of its gas. Previous disputes between Moscow and Ukraine over pricing have led to major gas shortages in several E.U. countries in the winters (when demand is highest) of both 2006 and 2009. Further disagreements between Moscow and Kiev over the terms of the existing bilateral gas deal have the potential to escalate again, with negative consequences for E.U. consumers. The risk of high reliance on Russian gas has been a principal driver of European energy policy in recent decades. Among central and eastern European states, particularly those formerly aligned with the Soviet Union such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the issue of reliance on imports of Russian gas is a primary energy security concern and has inspired energy policies aimed at diversification of fuel sources for power generation. From the U.S. perspective such Russian influence in the affairs of these democratic nations is an impediment to efforts at political and economic reform. The market power of Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, is evident in these countries. Although they are closer to Russia than other consumers of Russian gas in Western Europe, many countries in Eastern and Central Europe pay higher contract prices for their imports, as they are more reliant on Russian gas as a proportion of their energy mixes. In the larger economies of Western Europe, which consume most of Russia’s exports, there are efforts to diversify their supply of natural gas. The E.U. has formally acknowledged the need to put in place mechanisms to increase supply diversity. These include market liberalization approaches such as rules mandating third-party access to pipeline infrastructure (from which Gazprom is demanding exemption), and commitments to complete a single market for electricity and gas by 2014, and to ensure that no member country is isolated from electricity and gas grids by 2015.112 Despite these formal efforts, there are several factors retarding the E.U.’s push for a unified effort to reduce dependence on Russian gas. National interest has been given a higher priority than collective, coordinated E.U. energy policy: the gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 probably contributed to the acceptance of the Nord Stream project, which carries gas from Russia into Germany. Germany’s decision to phase out its fleet of nuclear reactors by 2022 will result in far higher reliance on natural gas for the E.U.’s biggest economy. The environmental imperative to reduce carbon emissions— codified in the E.U.’s goal of essentially decarbonizing its power sector by the middle of century—mean that natural gas is being viewed by many as the short-to medium fuel of choice in power generation. Finally, the prospects for European countries to replicate the unconventional gas “revolution” that has resulted in a glut of natural gas in the United States look uncertain. Several countries, including France and the U.K., have encountered stiff public opposition to the techniques used in unconventional gas production, while those countries, such as Poland and Hungary, that have moved ahead with unconventional- gas exploration have generally seen disappointing early results. Collectively, these factors suggest that the prospects for reduced European reliance on Russian gas appear dim. The one factor that has been working to the advantage of advocates of greater European gas diversity has been the increased liquidity of the global LNG market, discussed above. Russia’s dominant position in the European gas market is being eroded by the increased availability of LNG. Qatar’s massive expansion in LNG production in 2008, coupled with the rise in unconventional gas production in the United States as well as a drop in global energy demand due to the global recession, produced a global LNG glut that saw many cargoes intended for the U.S. market diverted into Europe. As mentioned previously, with an abundant source of alternative supply, some European consumers, mainly Gazprom’s closest partners, were able to renegotiate their oil-linked, takeor- pay contracts with Gazprom. As Figure 10 illustrates, however, in the wake of the Fukushima natural disaster and nuclear accident in Japan and a return to growth in most industrialized economies, the LNG market is projected to tighten considerably in the short-term, potentially returning market power to Russia. However, there is a second, structural change to the global gas market that may have more lasting effects to Russia’s market power in the European gas market. LNG is one of the fastest growing segments of the energy sector. The growth of the LNG market, both through long-term contract and spot-market sales, is likely to put increasing pressure on incumbent pipeline gas suppliers. A significant addition of U.S. LNG exports will **accelerate this trend**. In addition to adding to the size of the market, U.S. LNG contracts are likely to be determined on a “floating” basis, with sales terms tied to the price of a U.S. benchmark such as Henry Hub, **eroding the power of providers of long-term oil linked contract suppliers such as Russia**. While U.S. LNG will not be a direct tool of U.S. foreign policy—the destination of U.S. LNG will be determined according to the terms of individual contracts, the spot-price-determined demand, and the LNG traders that purchase such contracts—the addition of a large, market-based producer will **indirectly** serve to increase gas supply diversity in Europe, thereby providing European consumers with increased flexibility and market power.

#### Russia-Ukraine war goes nuclear – draws in the US

**Kingston 9** (Brian, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs – CIFP, “Ukraine: A Risk Assessment Report”, February, http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1214.pdf)

Russia: Russia seeks to influence the weakened Ukraine, inflaming ethnic-Russian separatism; Crimea declares independence; Ukraine resists, perhaps seeing an external war as a distraction from internal strife; Russia comes to the aid of Crimea/ethnic-Russians resulting in open warfare between Russia and Ukraine. The West: The West also suffers from the global recession, but (perhaps following a period of inward looking protectionism) realizes that it cannot allow Russian success in Ukraine; open hostilities erupt between Russian and NATO forces **triggering World War III** and the strong possibility of **nuclear war**, or at least the drawing in of many other countries.

### Boehner DA

#### Case outweighs –

#### Warming irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction – past temperature fluctuations prove

**Stampf 7** (Olaf, staff writer for Spiegel Online, 5/5. “Not the End of the World as we Know it,” <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,481684,00.html>)

But even this moderate warming would likely have far fewer apocalyptic consequences than many a prophet of doom would have us believe. For one thing, the more paleontologists and geologists study the history of the earth's climate, the more clearly do they recognize just how much temperatures have fluctuated in both directions in the past. Even major fluctuations appear to be completely natural phenomena. Additionally, some environmentalists doubt that the large-scale extinction of animals and plants some have predicted will in fact come about. "A warmer climate helps promote species diversity," says Munich zoologist Josef Reichholf. Also, more detailed simulations have allowed climate researchers to paint a considerably less dire picture than in the past -- gone is the talk of giant storms, the melting of the Antarctic ice shield and flooding of major cities. Improved regionalized models also show that climate change can bring not only drawbacks, but also significant benefits, especially in northern regions of the world where it has been too cold and uncomfortable for human activity to flourish in the past. However it is still a taboo to express this idea in public. For example, countries like Canada and Russia can look forward to better harvests and a blossoming tourism industry, and the only distress the Scandinavians will face is the guilty conscience that could come with benefiting from global warming.

#### Magnitsky at the top of the lame-duck agenda – saps Obama’s capital

Berman 11/6/12 (Ilan, Wash Times, "U.S.-Russia ‘reset’ hasn’t changed stance," http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/6/us-russia-reset-hasnt-changed-stance/)

The Magnitsky case has generated considerable public outrage internationally. The White House, however, hasn’t had much to say about it. In fact, it has done a great deal to try to sweep the Magnitsky affair under the political carpet.¶ The reason is obvious. Since 2009, the Obama administration’s obsession with a “reset” of relations with Russia has resulted in an attempt to forge a new political relationship with the Kremlin on everything from arms control to normalized trade relations. To be fair, the “reset” has had some tactical successes — most notably, Russia’s acquiescence to the use of its airspace to resupply troops in Afghanistan, following Pakistan’s closure of overland supply routes into Southwest Asia last year.¶ There is little evidence that larger Russian attitudes toward America have changed. To the contrary, the Kremlin’s adversarial stance on an array of foreign policy issues — from Syria’s civil war to Iran’s nuclear program — suggests strongly that Moscow still sees Washington as the “main enemy.” Worse still, the “reset” has come at a tremendous cost: a laissez faire American attitude toward the capricious, unaccountable and deeply anti-democratic nature of the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin.¶ That blind eye, in turn, has only served to reinforce the Kremlin’s authoritarian attitudes at home. This point has been hammered home by numerous recent instances, from the legal lynching of a punk band to the politically motivated prosecution of socialist opposition leader Sergei Udaltsov. Last month, the lower house of Russia’s legislature rubber-stamped a controversial new bill expanding the legal definition of treason — a step that opponents say paves the way for the Kremlin “to put any civil activist, let alone rights defender, in custody.”¶ Fortunately, other parts of the U.S. government haven’t been so sanguine. The Magnitsky case has become a significant rallying point in Congress, where new legislation — colloquially known as the “Magnitsky Act” — enjoys broad bipartisan support in both the House and Senate. When Congress reconvenes in lame-duck session later this month, passage of the act will rank high on its legislative agenda.

#### It’s top of the docket

House 11-9-12 (Billy House, House to Vote on Russia PNTR Next Week, http://influencealley.nationaljournal.com/2012/11/house-republicans-are-planning.php)

House Republicans are planning to take long-delayed action next week on a bill to normalize trade relations with Russia, which is likely to be the first item taken up by lawmakers in their post-election lame duck session.¶ The Rules Committee has set a hearing for Tuesday on the measure, and the bill is expected to be ready for floor action on Friday.¶ The measure would provide "permanent normal trade relations" by lifting a Cold War trade provision known as the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The move is needed to allow U.S. companies to share in the full market benefits of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization, and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk has been among those urging Congress to approve it.¶ The delays this year have centered on Moscow's record on human rights. But language to iron out those concerns will be among the items discussed at the Tuesday Rules hearing.

#### FISA will costs floor time and is being pushed by Obama.

**Roll Call**, **11/2**/2012 (Ron Wyden Blocks Surveillance Bill That Is Barack Obama Priority, p. http://www.rollcall.com/news/Ron-Wyden-Blocks-Surveillance-Bill-That-Is-Barack-Obama-Priority-218649-1.html?pos=hln)

For the lame-duck session, add another bill to the Senate agenda that is very likely to consume valuable floor time: legislation extending provisions of a 2008 surveillance law that are set to expire at the end of the year. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) has placed the bill (S 3276) on hold, meaning that the measure’s backers will probably have to go through a cumbersome floor process to overcome that hold unless they can persuade him to stop blocking the legislation. But, aides said, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) wants to move the bill. Intelligence officials in the Obama administration have deemed the extension measure their top legislative priority. The expiring provisions allow the federal government to conduct surveillance of foreign targets without individual court orders, even if those targets are communicating with people in the United States

#### Keystone exploitation is inevitable – only U.S. intervention prevents worse damages.

Wall Street Journal, 12/9/**2011** (An Inevitable Keystone Pipeline, p. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204319004577084921578161262.html)

If the Prohibition Era taught us anything about business, it's that demand has a way of finding supply. That was true of whiskey. It will likely also be true of Canada's oil sands and the controversial Keystone XL pipeline. Keystone XL, or a similar pipeline and set of worries, isn't just inevitable. It's something we should accept to prevent worse alternatives from coming to pass. The 1,700-mile pipeline, proposed by TransCanada Corp. and blocked for the moment by the White House, is back in the news. Lawmakers in the U.S. Congress are seeking to override the administration and start construction of the pipeline, which would carry oil from the oil sands of Alberta to refineries in Houston. President Barack Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper discussed the matter on Wednesday. Big corporate names have stakes in the Canadian oil sands: ConocoPhillips, Exxon, Shell, Chevron, Marathon, Statoil, Total, Sinopec and BP among many others. Environmentalists say the pipeline is a bad idea: "It locks the U.S. into a high carbon form of energy," says Nathan Lemphers at the Pembina Institute in Calgary. "Until there's a national energy policy, these sorts of pipelines will become the surrogate battleground for the environmental movement." Susan Casey-Lefkowitz of the National Resources Defense Council says the pipeline would promote a dirty and energy-intensive form of oil extraction, pipe that oil through environmentally sensitive areas and aquifers in the U.S., and ultimately keep the U.S. addicted to the wrong sort of fuel, speeding climate change. Theirs is a compelling argument for abstinence: Until Washington stops dithering and charts a clear road to cleaner energy, remove the temptation to burn more oil by preventing access to supply. Last month, the White House delayed a yes-or-no decision on the pipeline—conveniently until after the 2012 presidential election. Markets, however, won't delay. Global demand for energy, driven by growth in developing countries, is expected to rocket 33% over the next 25 years, says the International Energy Agency. By 2035, China is likely to consume almost 70% more energy than the U.S. Fossil fuels such as oil will still account for 75% of energy consumed in 2035, says the IEA. And these numbers assume positive steps toward conservation and the adoption of renewable and other fuels. Where will the new energy come from? Globally, reliance will grow on a relatively small number of producers, mainly in the Middle East and North Africa, and the oil will be shipped along vulnerable supply routes, says the IEA. By 2035, the agency says, OPEC's share of global production will rise to above 50%. If you wonder why China is currently running sea trials for its first aircraft carrier, these vulnerable supply routes and China's own energy insecurity provide an answer. Frustrated with the U.S., Canada is talking with China about piping its oil west instead of south. Enbridge Inc. has proposed a pipeline to a port at Kitimat, British Columbia, where the oil would be loaded on ships bound for Asia. Native communities in the region are resisting the project. Somehow, though, demand will eventually pull the oil to market. "That oil is going to get produced, it's going to get refined somewhere, and it's going to get consumed," says Larry Nichols, executive chairman of Devon Energy. Devon produces about 30,000 barrels a day in the oil sands now and plans to more than quintuple production by 2020. Until cleaner energy sources are cheap, effective and available enough to supplant oil—until pipelines like Keystone are no longer needed—the options for the U.S. are difficult but clear: On supply: The U.S. can continue to rely on dicey regimes in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Or it can buy more oil from its ally Canada and companies it knows, with the added short-term benefit of generating jobs to build new pipelines to U.S. refineries. On the environment: The U.S. can let oil-sands oil go to Asia with all the carbon emissions that entails: pollution from shipping, possible substandard refining, and use of the product in Chinese industries with weak emissions rules. Scientists have already found that mercury and other effluents from China's power plants and factories drift across the Pacific and contaminate North American waterways. Expect more. Or the U.S. can pipe the oil to Houston where regulators scrutinize refiners over emissions, where ever-greater economies of scale help companies create best practices in refining, and where the U.S. can earn money exporting refined products to the rest of the world. The choices seem inevitable. Why wait?

## 1AR v. JMU BM Round 7

#### K doesn’t come first

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Extinction actually is the end of all human consciousness---this arg is dumb

Stenger 92 – Victor J. Stenger, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado, 1992, “The Myth of Quantum Consciousness,” online: http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Quantum/QuantumConsciousness.pdf

Quantum mechanics is called on further to argue that the cosmic field, like Newton’s aether, couples to the human mind itself. In Robert Lanza’s view, that field is the universal mind of all humanity - living, dead, and unborn. Ironically, this seemingly profound association between quantum and mind is an artifact, the consequence of unfortunate language used by Bohr, Heisenberg and the others who originally formulated quantum mechanics. In describing the necessary interaction between the observer and what is being observed, and how the state of a system is determined by the act of its measurement, they inadvertently left the impression that human consciousness enters the picture to cause that state come into being. This led many who did not understand the physics, but liked the sound of the words used to describe it, to infer a fundamental human role in what was previously a universe that seemed to have need for neither gods nor humanity.

If Bohr and Heisenberg had spoken of measurements made by inanimate instruments rather than “observers,” perhaps this strained relationship between quantum and mind would not have been drawn. For, nothing in quantum mechanics requires human involvement.

Quantum mechanics does not violate the Copernican principle that the universe cares not a whit about the human race. Long after humanity has disappeared from the scene, matter will still undergo the transitions that we call quantum events. The atoms in stars will radiate photons, and these photons will be absorbed by materials that react to them. Perhaps, after we are gone, some of our machines will remain to analyze these photons. If so, they will do so under the same rules of quantum mechanics that operate today.