# USC AFF

### 1AC’s

Same as Wake – Offshore Development, Exports with Russia and Japan Scenarios

## Round 2 v. UNLV 2AC

### Pipeline CP 2AC

#### Gulf drilling k2 econ and shipbuilding

Mason 11 (Joseph – Senior Fellow, The Wharton School, Louisiana State University Endowed Chair of Banking and nationally-renowned economist, “House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Hearing; Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs Legislative Hearing on H.R. 306, H.R. 588, S. 266 and H.R. 285”, 4/6, lexis)

Apart from national energy concerns, however, economic considerations also favor increased development of OCS energy resources. Specifically, the boost provided to local onshore economies by offshore production would be particularly welcome in the present economic climate. Similar to fiscal alternatives presently under consideration, OCS development would provide a long-run economic stimulus to the U.S. economy because the incremental output, employment, and wages provided by OCS development **would be spread over many years**. Unlike those policies, however, this stimulus would not require government expenditures to support that long-term growth. A. The Present State of Offshore U.S. Oil and Gas Production Despite its importance, U.S. oil and natural gas production in offshore areas is currently limited to only a few regions. At the present time, oil and gas is only actively produced off the coast of six U.S. states: Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, California, and Alaska. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas are the only coastal states that provide access to all or almost all of their offshore energy resources. Only two additional states--Alaska and California--are producing any offshore energy supplies. All California OCS Planning Areas and most Alaska OCS Planning Areas, however, were not open to any new facilities until the recent end of the Congressional and Presidential moratoria. The remaining 16 coastal states are not open to new production and are not presently extracting any offshore energy resources. Even without those remaining sixteen states, plus California and Alaska, the OCS is already the most important source of U.S. energy supplies. According to the MMS, "the Federal OCS is a major supplier of oil and **natural gas** for the domestic market, contributing more energy (oil and natural gas) for U.S. consumption than any single U.S. state or country in the world." That is, OCS production presently meets more U.S. energy demand than any other single source, including Saudi Arabia. B. Offshore Oil Production Stimulates Onshore Economies Offshore oil and gas production has **a significant effect** on local onshore economies as well as the national economy. There are broadly three "phases" of development that contribute to state economic growth: (1) the initial exploration and development of offshore facilities; (2) the extraction of oil and gas reserves; and (3) refining crude oil into finished petroleum products. Industries supporting those phases are most evident in the sections of the Gulf of Mexico that are currently open to offshore drilling. For example, the U.S. shipbuilding industry - based largely in the Gulf region - **benefits significantly** from initial offshore oil exploration efforts. Exploration and development also requires specialized exploration and drilling vessels, floating drilling rigs, and miles and miles of steel pipe, as well as highly educated and specialized labor to staff the efforts. The onshore support does not end with production. A recent report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy indicates that the Louisiana economy is "highly dependent on a wide variety of industries that depend on offshore oil and gas production" and that offshore production supports onshore production in the chemicals, platform fabrication, drilling services, transportation, and gas processing. **Fleets of** helicopters and U.S.-built vessels **also supply offshore facilities with a wide range of industrial and consumer goods**, from industrial spare parts to groceries. As explained in Section IV.G, however, the distance between offshore facilities and onshore communities can affect the relative intensity of the local economic effects. The economic effects in the refining phase are even more diffuse than the effects for the two preceding phases. Although significant capacity is located in California, Illinois, New Jersey, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, additional U.S. refining capacity is spread widely around the country. As a result, refinery jobs, wages, and tax revenues are even more likely to "spill over" into other areas of the country, including non-coastal states like Illinois, as those are home to many refining and chemical industries that ride the economic coattails of oil exploration and extraction.

### US-Cuba Relations – 2AC

#### Offshore drilling leads to cooperation with Cuba – that solves relations

EDF 12 (Environmental Defense Fund, “The U.S., Cuba and oil diplomacy”, 2012, http://www.edf.org/oceans/us-cuba-and-oil-diplomacy)

With the arrival of a huge drilling rig in January 2012, Cuba has moved forward on exploring for oil just 60 miles from Key West, in partnership with the Spanish oil company Repsol. Significant untapped reserves of oil and gas lie off Cuba’s north shore — enough, experts say, to make Cuba self-sufficient and even an exporter of oil. Within 18 months, there could be six exploratory deepwater wells operating in the pristine waters where Ernest Hemingway once fished. A major oil spill in Cuban waters could devastate both coastal Cuba and the United States. The 2010 BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico was a reminder of how damaging an oil blowout can be, especially in deep water. Florida’s $60 billion tourism and fishing industries — as well as the Dry Tortugas marine sanctuary and deepwater corals in the Southeast Atlantic — are at stake. Finding common ground That’s why EDF has started a conversation between Cuban and U.S. officials with the aim of ensuring that drilling is done safely. The dialogue builds on more than a decade of work with Cuban fishermen, scientists and environmental officials to promote marine conservation, sustainable fishing and coastal zone management. In September 2011, EDF, operating under a special license from the U.S. government, led an unprecedented delegation to Cuba, including former EPA administrator Bill Reilly, co-chairman of the BP oil spill commission. The goal was to assess Cuba’s offshore oil and gas plans and to share lessons learned about the risks of offshore drilling with Cuban officials. “The trip put the spotlight on the lack of dialogue between the United States and Cuba on how to prepare and respond to an oil spill in Cuban waters,” says Lee Hunt, head of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, who helped organize the trip. “EDF has proved itself as an influential voice and broker for environmental diplomacy.”

Relations are key to prevent cyber and bioterrorism

Westerman 6 (Toby, Publisher for International News Analysis Today, "Cyber Attack Aimed at US?" International Affairs, July,<http://www.traditioninaction.org/HotTopics/i46htWesterman_Cyberattack.html>)
A dying Cuban dictator Fidel Castro could launch a devastating cyber-terror attack as a last and final blow against his decades-old enemy -the U.S. - according to a Cuban-born computer engineer in an exclusive interview with International News Analysis. Cuba and its terror allies are intent on destroying the United States, and Castro's precarious physical state may be a key factor in timing a terror attack against the United States, according to Manuel Cereijo, a Cuban-born expert in computer engineering, and head of a consulting group to industry and government. The very technology that has insured U.S. world leadership in commercial and military endeavors could also make American society vulnerable to a sophisticated cyber attack, Cereijo stated. An initial bio-terror attack would be used to set the stage for social chaos in the U.S., Cereijo warned. As deadly pathogens begin to take their toll in human lives, a follow-up cyber attack could paralyze America's capacity to respond. Phone and other forms of communications would begin to break down. The effect of the biological attack would be multiplied many times by the fear imposed upon the population by the inability to communicate with others. Police, emergency personnel, and hospitals would all be operating without coordination or knowledge of the actions of one another. Panic could ensue among the targeted population as the sense of isolation increased. America's response to such an attack "would be tremendous," Cereijo said, but worth the price to Castro and his terrorist allies, if it meant serious damage to America. Castro will be 80-years-old this August, and has been in power since 1959. He is rumored to have Parkinson's disease, and may be suffering from the beginning effects of Alzheimer's. Castro's implacable hatred against the U.S. political and economic system has not changed over his nearly 50-year reign, and he has even advocated Nuremberg-type war crimes trials for capitalists. During the 1962 missile crisis, Castro urged the Soviet Union to launch an atomic strike against the U.S., despite the destruction it would mean for Cuba. Today, Castro remains a potentially reckless figure capable of risking catastrophic consequences for his island nation, Cereijo told International News Analysis. The Communist Cuban regime is committed to terror. Havana has close ties with virtually every important terror group and terror-supporting nation in the world, including the missile-ready regime of North Korea and the nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian and Cuban governments have already vowed to bring the United States "to its knees." The Castro regime has cultivated cyber warfare techniques for years, and it has made the island an electronic spy station first for Russia and then China. China is known to be developing cyber warfare techniques to facilitate an invasion of the island of Taiwan. Beijing claims sovereignty over the democratically controlled island, and has stated that it has the right to take the island by force, if necessary. Cyber warfare techniques would be used in the early hours of an invasion to paralyze Taiwan's computer and telecommunications systems before the major attack from the mainland. China's "Integrated Network Electronic Warfare" program is designed to disable enemy computers and communications equipment at the beginning of offensive military operations. Information warfare units are already training with regular Peoples Liberation Army forces, indicating a firm commitment to cyber warfare, and causing concern among some U.S. government computer professionals. Chinese and Cuban technical-military ties have grown increasingly close in the past several years. China has assisted Cuba in computer telecommunications techniques, and the Cuban government operates university-level training courses in cyber warfare. Cereijo does not believe that China would directly assist a Cuban-launched cyber attack on the U.S., but Beijing's technical and material aid to Havana provides the Cuban regime with the necessary know-how to carry out this kind of strike. Cuba's carefully acquired skill in cyber warfare, its close ties with terrorist groups and terror supporting nations, and first rate spy services which are operating within the United States, all combine to make Cuba a serious candidate for coordinating a cyber-terror attack. Cuba has already interfered with U.S. pro-democracy satellite transmissions to Iran. For six weeks Cuba prevented U.S. broadcasts from reaching Iran, Cereijo said. Although Al Qaeda and other terror groups have attempted to hack into U.S. computers, only the Cuban regime has the knowledge and resources to combine with terror groups to initiate an effective cyber-terror campaign, Cereijo told International News Analysis. Even if a dying Castro does not attempt to attack the U.S. as a last strike, Cuban skill in cyber warfare remains a threat to the U.S., especially when combined with existing terror networks dedicated to the destruction of the United States. American vigilance and countermeasures have thus far prevented any harmful attack, but the U.S. must remain alert and be prepared for a possibly desperate assault from a dying dictator and his terrorist friends, Cereijo urged.

#### Biological terrorism causes extinction

Ochs 2 (Richard, Member – Chemical Weapons Working Group, “Biological Weapons Must be Abolished Immediately, 6-9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? **HUMAN EXTINCTION** IS NOW POSSIBLE.

#### Cyber-terrorism causes accidental nuclear war

Cimbala 99 (Stephen, Professor of Political Science – Pennsylvania State University Delaware County Campus, Summer, Armed Forces & Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal)

The nuclear shadow over the information age remains significant. The essence of information warfare is in subtlety and deception: the manipulation of uncertainty. The essence of nuclear deterrence lies in the credible and certain threat of retaliation backed by an information environment accepted and trusted by both sides in a partly competitive, partly conflictual relationship. Nuclear assets may themselves become the targets of cyberwarriors. Triumphalism about the RMA in high technology conventional weapons overlooks asymmetrical strategies that might appeal to U.S. opponents. Among these might be the reciprocal use of information warfare to deny U.S. access in time of need to a timely nuclear response or to a credible nuclear threat. But even more problematic is the potential collision course between intentional information warfare and unintended side effects when cyberwar is waged against a nuclear armed state, especially one with a non-Western culture. Neither the status of nuclear forces in the new world order, nor all of the military implications of the information revolution, are apparent now. There are reasons to suppose that the strategies and technologies of information warfare will develop along one track, whereas efforts to control nuclear weapons spread and to establish the safety and security of existing nuclear arsenals will involve a different community of specialists and attentive publics. Nevertheless, there are sufficient grounds to be concerned that a too successful menu of information strategies may contribute to a failure of nuclear deterrence in the form of accidental/inadvertent war or escalation. Unplanned interactions between infowarriors and deterrers could have unfortunate byproducts.

### Economy – 2AC

#### OCS drilling is key to the economy

Mason 9 (Joseph R. – Louisiana State University Endowed Chair of Banking and nationally-renowned economist , “The Economic Contribution of Increased Offshore Oil Exploration and Production to Regional and National Economies”, February, <http://www.americanenergyalliance.org/images/aea_offshore_updated_final.pdf>)

As above, the analysis estimates both the immediate and the total economic effects associated with increased OCS oil and gas production. Using the investment multipliers (denominated in job-years per $1 million change in final demand) in Table A3 and total investment costs in Table 3, the expected coastal state changes in employment are represented in Table 9.51 The annual increase in coastal state employment from initial investments in previously unavailable OCS planning areas and additional refining capacity is estimated to be 185,320 fulltime jobs per year. Again, this number does not consider the secondary effects of investment in productive capacity and refining to other U.S. states. To estimate the total increase in employment tied to production in previously unavailable OCS Planning Areas, the BEA’s final-demand employment multiplier is applied to the estimated total resource value estimates in Table 4. The total increase in U.S. employment from the investment phase is approximately 271,570 full-time jobs per year. Applying the BEA multipliers to the estimated production value results in the employment estimates in Table 10.52 According to Table 10, approximately 870,000 coastal state jobs would be created in addition to the jobs created during the initial investment phase. Again, the state BEA multipliers do not account for increases in employment outside of the target state. As a result, secondary jobs created in one state based on OCS production in another state are omitted from the totals in Table 10. The total increase in U.S. employment in all states that results from increased OCS production is estimated by applying the overall U.S. employment multiplier (10.4152 job-years per $1 million) to the total value of the additional OCS resources ($3,427,667,487,135), suggesting that approximately 35,700,000 total job-years would be created over the course of production in newly opened OCS Planning Areas. If we again assume a 30 year production horizon, approximately 1,190,000 jobs would be sustained for the entire production period, approximately 340,000 of which are secondary jobs outside the coastal regions.

#### Nuclear war

**Auslin 9** (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### Artic Lead – 2AC

#### Global natural gas extraction is inevitable – the US needs to take the lead to ensure the best practices are used to limit emissions

Schneider 12 (Michael, Advocacy Director – Clean Air Task Force, “Curb Methane Emissions,” National Journal, 7-25, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments)

For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development. Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

#### Extinction

**Ford 3** (Violet, Vice President – Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf)

The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to **global processes** and the balance of **life on earth**. Both the unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a resolution effectively recognizes the Arctic as a **“barometer”** or indicator region **of the globe’s environmental health**. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from environmental and other NGO’s.

### QER CP – 2AC

#### -- No solvency –

#### First is delay

Moniz 12 Ernest Moniz, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Former Clinton Administration Under Secretary of the Department of Energy and as Associate Director for Science in the Office of Science and Technology Policy ; serves on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 11/15/11, Quadrennial Energy and Technology Reviews, web.mit.edu/mitei/views/testimony/111115-quadrennial-energy-and-technology-reviews.html

S.1703 would legislate the QER as a required submission to the Congress, providing "an integrated view of national energy objectives and Federal energy policy, including alignment of research programs, incentives, regulations, and partnerships." Clearly this is in accord with the intentions put forward in the PCAST report. An interagency working group would be established at the beginning of each Administration, with the QER due one year later. This date is displaced by one year from that recommended by PCAST. In steady state, this shift by one year is quite reasonable. My concern is whether the first QER can be put together well by early 2014, given that the entire process needs to be invented. This can be ameliorated to some extent if the buildup of analytical capabilities and process development are funded and pursued aggressively in 2012.

#### Even the perception of delay takes out the case

Bayless 3 (Robert, President – Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. BAYLESS. Senator, if I could follow up, not only is it an issue of whether those lands are available, but as you pointed out, the timing, if there is a long delay, it impedes industry. You are not worried about the industry; you are worried about gas supply. There are signals that come out of the market, price signals, that say we need more gas. We need greater—the price has gone up. Where is the supply? With these long delays, it creates uncertainty for companies to be able to drill those additional wells, to budget for drilling those additional wells. It really puts a bad filter on those price signals.

#### Second is no implementation – QER won’t go into effect

Barlas 12

Stephen, Columnist @ Financial Executive, 1/1, Lexis

But it is highly unlikely that Obama's blueprint will lead to a firmer footing for U.S. energy security than past so-called blueprints from other presidents, or perhaps more importantly, whether a print is even necessary. Obama's policy is a loosely knit set of policies that focus on producing more oil at home and reducing dependence on foreign oil by developing cleaner alternative fuels and greater efficiency. The Obama plan is not the result of any particular deep thinking or strategy. The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) called for the development of such a strategy in its November 2010 Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies. Through an Integrated Federal Energy Policy. PCAST called for a Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR) as the first step in preparing a Quadrennial Energy Review. DOE completed the QTR in November 2011, six months after Obama published his blueprint. Steven E. Koonin, former undersecretary of Energy for Science, says QTR is limited in scope and all DOE felt it could get done given budget and time. "Technology development absent an understanding and shaping of policy and market context in which it gets deployed is not a productive exercise," he says. At this point there is no indication that DOE will even undertake the much more important QER, much less complete it any time soon. The larger reality is that any energy independence plan proposed by any U.S, president--whether based on a QER or not--has as much a chance of coming to fruition as Washington's football Redskins have of getting into the Super Bowl. But regardless of the rhetoric of president after president, maybe the U.S. doesn't even need an energy independence or energy security policy. Natural Gas Making Inroads The biggest energy input for industrial and commercial business users is natural gas. Natural gas prices are incredibly important, both because the fuel is used directly to run industrial processes, heat facilities and commercial buildings and make products such as fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, plastics and other advanced materials. Thanks to the shale revolution, EIA forecasts natural gas prices will stay low for the foreseeable future, rising to $4.66 m/BTU in 2015 and $5.05 m/BTU in 2020. That is good news for the owners of 15,000 to 17,000 industrial boilers in this country, most of which use natural gas (and many of those who still use coal are switching to natural gas). In addition, companies such as Dow Chemical Co. are restarting operations at facilities idled during the recession, Bayer AG is in talks with companies interested in building new ethane crackers at its two industrial parks in West Virginia and Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. and LyondellBasell Co., are considering expanding operations in the United States. Fracking has also had a much less remarked-upon effect on petroleum prices, which are important to businesses with transportation fleets. New oil sources are spurting from the Bakken (stretching from Canada to North Dakota and Montana) and Eagles Ford (South Texas) shale plays. U.S. oil prices have fallen from $133.88 a barrel of Texas intermediate crude in June 2008 to around $86.07. EIA predicts oil prices will rise to $94.58/bbl in 2015 and $108.10/bbl in 2020. Beyond the flood of natural gas washing over them, U.S. companies are also benefitting from three decades of investments--most of which were made without federal subsidies, or support--into facility energy efficiency. Ralph Cavanagh, co-director of the Energy Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council and a member of the Electricity Advisory Board at DOE, says the most important single solution for U.S. businesses worried about energy prices and access is aggressive energy efficiency. "Energy independence is the wrong issue," Cavanagh says. "It is reducing the cost of energy services and improving energy security. "U.S. business has done a tremendous job in energy efficiency over the past three decades," he adds. "It takes less than one-half of a unit of energy to create $1 of economic value than it did in 1973. Industry has done that by upgrading the efficiency of process equipment and upgrading lighting." Others may well argue that the U.S. needs, and has always needed, an energy policy, but one narrowly targeted. Kenneth B Medlock III, deputy director, Energy Forum at the James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, notes that DOE and the Gas Research Institute helped develop, with federal funding, the horizontal drilling (i.e. fracking) technology that Mitchell Energy and Development Corp. (now a part of Devon Energy Corp.) pioneered. "Government ought to be focused on research and development," Med-lock notes. He also is a supporter of loan guarantees to promote investment activity in frontier technologies, and argues that as long as there are more good bets than bad bets in that kind of portfolio, the funds committed in total are a good investment. But spectacular failures of energy companies such as Solyndra Corp., the Chapter 11 filing of Beacon Power Corp. and other less publicized busts reduce, if not kill, the prospect of any additional congressional funding for energy loan guarantees of any kind. That is true even when legislation has bipartisan support, which is the case for the Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2011 (S. 1000), which would, among other things, provide grants for a revolving loan program designed to develop energy-saving technologies for industrial and commercial use. The bill passed the Senate Energy Committee by a vote of 18-3 in July. However, the Congressional Budget Office has pegged the cost of the bill's provisions at $1.2 billion over five years. That is a serious barrier to passage. And in any case, even if it did pass, the bill would simply authorize funding. Congressional appropriations committees would have to approve the money as part of DOE's budget, which would be highly unlikely, Solyndra aside, since similar programs authorized by the 2005 and 2007 energy bills are still begging for appropriations. Besides impact on the federal deficit, politics, too, often impede progress on otherwise sensible policies. Politics apparently have clogged up the proposed Keystone XL oil pipeline extension from Canada. Environmentalists, a Democratic constituency, oppose the project, arguing it would create more greenhouse gas emissions than necessary and pose a potential drinking water danger for Nebraska residents because it passed over the Ogallala Aquifer. That view is shared by Nebraska's Republican Gov. Dave Heineman, whose views are opposite those of all the can presidential candidates, each of whom supported U.S. approval of Keystone XL. Labor unions, another key Democratic constituency, support the project that TransCanada, the project sponsor, says will bring more than 11 8,000 person-years of employment to workers in the states of Montana, South Dakota and Nebraska. If the Keystone debate features Democrats versus Democrats and Republicans versus Republicans, efforts to substitute domestic natural gas for foreign petroleum features business versus business.

#### Third is congressional strike down

Tollefson 11 (Jeff Tollefson, DOE releases first Quadrennial Technology Review, September 27, 2011, http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/09/doe\_releases\_first\_quadrennial\_1.html)

The US Department of Energy (DOE) [released](http://energy.gov/articles/department-energy-releases-inaugural-quadrennial-technology-review-report) its inaugural Quadrennial Technology Review on Tuesday, laying out a longer-term strategic agenda to help integrate energy research and development programmes. Modelled on the [Defense Quadrennial Review](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/), an influential analysis that sets the tone and direction of US defence policy, the document explores the energy department’s role in driving basic energy research and helping shift more mature technologies into the commercial sector. The review sets priorities in six areas (pictured, top right) in order to create a multi-year framework that can be incorporated into planning and budget discussions. Under each of the six umbrellas can be found a range of potential technological solutions — from better batteries to biofuels and carbon sequestration — that will need to be deployed in concert in order to meet demand for energy, increase domestic supplies and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. The agency is aiming for technologies that can create jobs and have a substantial impact — on the order of 1% of US consumption — over the course of two decades. “The timescale of energy is decades,” Energy Secretary Steven Chu said during the public release in Washington. “We need to take a long view.” In truth, the administration doesn’t have a lot of choice but to take the long view. The bulk of its energy and environmental agenda (remember the global warming legislation?) has fallen prey to partisan politics and an epic financial crisis. Moving forward, the administration will have to fight for even the most basic investments in clean energy R&D, a sad reality only made worse by the [scandal over the failed solar manufacturer Solyndra](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/184055-waxman-to-issa-get-your-facts-straight-on-solyndra). And although nobody would argue with efforts to craft a strategic plan to guide energy investments (which can rise and fall according to political whim on an annual basis), the first quadrennial review largely hews to the current course without making any radical recommendations for change. “Frankly it seems almost self evident to us,” said Steve Koonin, undersecretary for science. — Unlike the military, which can in a sense create its own market for new technologies, DOE necessarily plays a transitional role in technology development. All of its R&D is geared toward commercial deployment, and there’s only so much government can do to create private markets, which depend not just on science and technology but also public sentiment and risk perception, not to mention the full suite of macro- and micro-economic forces. For that reason, the document recommends setting up a permanent group within the DOE that can focus on energy markets, business, policy analysis and, most intriguingly, social sciences. Both for perspective and as a reminder, we will end with a spectacularly ambitious list of goals set by the administration of Barack Obama. To say that achieving these goals will be difficult is an understatement; clearly the rate of progress will need to increase substantially in the out years, which of course highlights the danger of long-term thinking that is not backed by legislation.

#### Should doesn’t mean certainty

Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word “would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does

####  “Resolved” means law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### QER links to elections/politics – requires transparency and presidential involvement

PCAST 10

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), Executive Office of the President, Co-Chaired by John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Eric Lander, President, Broad Institute of Harvard and MIT, Nov 2010, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ACCELERATING THE PACE OF CHANGE IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH AN INTEGRATED FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-energy-tech-report.pdf

A QER process would, in some sense, formulate an integrated energy policy for the twenty­first century. It will span mission and vision definition, strategy, and tactics. The QER and the process leading to it would provide an effective tool for Administration­wide coherence on energy and for effective dialog with Congress on a coordinated legislative agenda. **Presidential interest and engagement will be a necessary ingredient for success.**

**While the QER will be a product of the Administration, substantial input from the Congress**, the energy industry, academia, state and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, **and consumers will be essential throughout the process. Transparency in the process of gathering input for the QER will be key to the development of a sound product that can gain wide support.**

### Immigration Reform 2AC

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

#### Gun control and budget battles sidelines immigration reform.

**Bennett**, **12/30**/2012 (Brian, Immigration reform could get overshadowed in Congress, Los Angeles Times, p. <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/30/nation/la-na-immigration-20121230>)

The window to pass immigration laws next year is narrowing as the effort competes with a renewed debate over gun laws and the lingering fight over taxes and the budget, according to congressional staffers and outside advocates. Key congressional committees are preparing for a package of gun control laws to be negotiated and possibly introduced in Congress during the first few months of next year. The shift would push the debate in Congress over immigration reform into the spring. But as budget negotiations continue to stir tensions between Republicans and Democrats, and as lobbyists take to their corners over gun laws, some are concerned that the heated atmosphere could spoil the early signs of bipartisan cooperation on immigration that emerged after the election.

#### Fiscal cliff kills immigration reform.

Wall Street Journal, **1/1**/2013 (Lack of Grand Bargain Complicates Obama’s Priorities, p. ht**t**p://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323635504578216253683816078.html)

Historically, second-term presidents have had a limited window to roll out major policy proposals before lame-duck status sets in and passing significant legislation becomes a steeper challenge. With that in mind, Mr. Obama has said he would roll out proposals aimed at reducing gun violence and overhauling immigration laws early this year. The White House view is that Mr. Obama would have been ill-positioned to pass policy priorities if the country was still preoccupied with the effects of having gone over the fiscal cliff. But now, because lawmakers postponed for two months the spending cuts that were set to take effect Wednesday, fiscal issues will continue to consume much of the political oxygen in the near future. So will talks about whether to raise the nation's statutory borrowing limit. Even in the best of times, issues such as immigration and gun control are flash points for the political parties, said William Galston, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former policy adviser to President Bill Clinton. The past couple of months suggest that these aren't the best of times in Washington, he said. "Whatever hope [Mr. Obama] may have had of changing the tone in Washington must have disappeared by now," he said. "It's an unpleasant discovery that the election appears to have changed much less and settled much less than he at least hoped."

#### The GOP won’t support CIR --- momentum hasn’t changed.

San Francisco **Chronicle**, **12/31**/2012 (Congress Dysfunction as Deadline Arrives Poses 2013 Risks, p. http://www.sfgate.com/business/bloomberg/article/Congress-Dysfunction-as-Deadline-Arrives-Poses-4157560.php#page-3)

 “Boehner and his Republican conference will have leverage over the Democrats on raising the debt ceiling,” Bonjean said. “You will see the first quarter of the year being dominated by spending cuts and entitlement reform as a permission slip for the Democrats to raise the debt ceiling.” That suggests more roadblocks for Obama’s agenda even after his decisive re-election in November. “Immigration is going to be a very tough issue for Republicans to tackle,” Bonjean said. “Coming off a very bruising fiscal cliff fight, pivoting to immigration is going to be more troublesome for Republicans to coalesce around the plan.” Obama’s re-election “doesn’t mean he should get everything he wants” yet “it certainly means that everything he reasonably proposes should get a fair hearing,” said Representative Rob Andrews, a New Jersey Democrat.

#### Obama won’t push CIR --- other priorities.

**Daily Caller**, **12/31**/2012 (Obama promises new immigration plan but keeps endgame close to his vest, p. <http://dailycaller.com/2012/12/31/obama-promises-new-immigration-plan-but-keeps-endgame-close-to-his-vest/>)

However, Obama’s language suggested that increased Latino immigration is a lower priority for him than other measures, and that he’s concerned any revamp would fail because of public opposition. Many previous immigration reform bills have died when leading supporters quietly backed away amid furious public opposition to what was perceived as an attempt at a general amnesty. In 2007, then-Sen. Obama voted against a temporary-worker provision in a pending immigration bill, helping kill the overall legislation. During his first term as president, Obama declined to push a comprehensive immigration bill, despite promising such a revamp while on the 2008 campaign trail. In his NBC interview, Obama showed more enthusiasm about other priorities. “We’ve got a huge opportunity around energy,” he said, “The most immediate thing I’ve got to do … is make sure that taxes are not going up on middle class families,” he claimed. Another priority, he added, is “rebuilding our infrastructure, which is broken.”

#### Weak labor market deters effective immigration reform.

**Grant**, **12/28**/2012 (David, Immigration reform: Is 'amnesty' a possibility now?, Christian Science Monitor, p. <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/1228/Immigration-reform-Is-amnesty-a-possibility-now>)

Moreover, increasing legal immigration above the current level of 1 million annually could be seen as a blow to those born in America. Hurting "the American worker with bad immigration policy is not going to get [Republicans] more Hispanic votes," says Roy Beck, executive director of Numbers USA, a group that advocates lower immigration levels. "They've got to do something else." In that respect, increasing legal immigration might be a difficult sell in 2013. "I do not see Congress acting in this area in a robust way until the labor market is stronger," says Andrew Schoenholtz, deputy director for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. "Just how strong is hard to tell."

#### No link – doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Plan gets spun as jobs- shields blame

Izadi 12

[Elahe is a writer for the National Journal. “Former Sen. Trent Lott, Ex-Rep. Jim Davis Bemoan Partisanship on Energy Issues,” 8/29/12, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/2012-election/former-members-bemoan-partisanship-on-energy-issues-20120829>]

In a climate where everything from transportation issues to the farm bill have gotten caught in political gridlock, it will take serious willingness to compromise to get formerly bipartisan energy issues moving from the current partisan standstill. “If we get the right political leadership and the willingness to put everything on the table, I don’t think this has to be a partisan issue,” former Rep. Jim Davis, D-Fla., said during a Republican National Convention event on Wednesday in Tampa hosted by National Journal and the American Petroleum Institute. Former Senate Republican Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi said that “Republicans who want to produce more of everything have to also be willing to give a little on the conservation side.” The event focused on the future of energy issues and how they are playing out in the presidential and congressional races. Four years ago, the major presidential candidates both agreed that climate change needed to be addressed. However, since then, the science behind global warming has come into question by more and more Republicans. But casting energy as a defense or jobs issue, in the current political climate, will allow debates between lawmakers to gain some steam, Lott and Davis agreed. The export of coal and natural gas, hydraulic fracturing, and how tax reform will affect the energy industries are all issues that will have to be dealt with by the next president and Congress. “The job of the next president is critical on energy and many of these issues, and the job is very simple: adult supervision of the Congress,” Davis said.

#### Ending the moratorium popular

Russell 12

[Barry Russell is President of the Independent Petroleum Association of America, August 15, 2012, “Energy Must Transcend Politics”, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php#2238176]

There have been glimpses of great leadership, examples when legislators have reached across the aisle to construct and support common-sense legislation that encourages American energy production. Recent legislation from Congress which would replace the Obama administration’s five-year offshore leasing plan and instead increase access America’s abundant offshore oil and natural gas is one example of such bipartisanship. The House passed legislation with support from 25 key Democrats. The support from Republicans and Democrats is obviously not equal, but this bipartisan legislative victory demonstrates a commitment by the House of Representatives to support the jobs, economic growth and national security over stubborn allegiance to political party. The same is happening on the Senate side. Democratic Senators Jim Webb (VA), Mark Warner (VA), and Mary Landrieu (LA) cosponsored the Senate’s legislation to expand offshore oil and natural gas production with Republican Senators Lisa Murkowski (AK), John Hoeven (ND), and Jim Inhofe (OK). Senator Manchin (WV) is another Democratic leader who consistently votes to promote responsible energy development.

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital does not affect the agenda

**Dickinson 9** (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

#### Boehner won’t negotiate --- thumps the DA.

**Berman**, **1/2**/2013 (Russell, Boehner tells GOP he’s through with one-on-one Obama talks, The Hill, p. <http://thehill.com/homenews/house/275295-boehner-tells-gop-hes-done-with-one-on-one-obama-talks>)

Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) is signaling that at least one thing will change about his leadership during the 113th Congress: he’s telling Republicans he is done with private, one-on-one negotiations with President Obama. During both 2011 and 2012, the Speaker spent weeks shuttling between the Capitol and the White House for meetings with the president in the hopes of striking a grand bargain on the deficit. Those efforts ended in failure, leaving Boehner feeling burned by Obama and, at times, isolated within his conference. In closed-door meetings since leaving the “fiscal cliff” talks two weeks ago, lawmakers and aides say the Speaker has indicated he is abandoning that approach for good and will return fully to the normal legislative process in 2013 — seeking to pass bills through the House that can then be adopted, amended or reconciled by the Senate. "He is recommitting himself and the House to what we've done, which is working through regular order and letting the House work its will,” an aide to the Speaker told The Hill. The shift could have immediate ramifications as Congress heads into its next showdown over raising the debt ceiling and replacing steep automatic cuts to defense and domestic spending that are now set to take effect in March. It will also impact other presidential priorities like immigration reform and gun control.

#### Fight alone collapses the U.S. credit rating.

**Politico**, **1/1**/2013 (Enjoy the fiscal cliff debate? Just wait for the debt ceiling, p. <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=A4ED7193-AC63-44BA-A01C-31E5D9FC084B>)

Even if Congress steers clear of default, another round of debt-ceiling brinkmanship could do further damage to the U.S. credit rating, analysts said. “It's hard to predict when the global investing community might lose confidence in the United States but courting that possibility doesn't make sense,” said Rob Nichols, president of the Financial Services Forum, a group that represents the CEOs of large banks and other financial services companies. Deficit hawks have long claimed that the nation’s deep debt, accompanied with negative reviews from credit agencies, could cause investors to demand higher interest rates from federal borrowers and driving the country further into the red. Thus far, those fears have not panned out — U.S. borrowing costs have plunged since the S&P downgrade — but market watchers worry that another blow to the credit rating could tip the balance. “If a second rating agency downgraded the U.S., there would be a real and dramatic effect,” said Brian Kessler, an economist at Moody’s Analytics. “Even if they kick the can down the road again and come up with a three-month raise for the ceiling, it’s still pushing the debate forward, and it shows the credit rating firms that there is an unwillingness to address this issue.”

## Round 2 1AR

### Demand

#### Still demand for offshore nat gas

PR Newswire 12 (“Offshore Drilling Industry to 2016 - Rapidly Rising Demand for Hydrocarbons Expected to Boost Offshore Drilling in Ultra-Deepwater and Harsh-weather Environments”, 2012, http://www.bizjournals.com/prnewswire/press\_releases/2012/02/23/SP58486)

The production from offshore regions accounts for an increasing share of the total world oil and gas production. Offshore crude oil production accounts for around 30% or more of the total global crude oil production. Also, offshore natural gas production accounts for about a quarter of the total world natural gas production. In the recent decade, the offshore crude oil industry has witnessed consistent growth in production. The global crude oil production from offshore resources is expected to increase in the near future, mainly due to an increase in offshore production from major offshore regions worldwide, such as deepwater US Gulf of Mexico, offshore Brazil, offshore Africa. offshore India, China and Australia, and also offshore regions in the European regions. In the past decade, offshore drilling activity has picked up pace worldwide, as an increased effort to meet energy needs. The growth of the offshore drilling market is being driven by high demand and rising prices of crude oil and natural gas. However, the global offshore drilling market experienced a temporary slowdown in 2009 as a result of relatively fewer investments by offshore exploration companies in that year, due to the global financial crisis and the subsequent fall in demand. However, the period 2012-2016 for offshore drilling worldwide is expected to be encouraging considering aggressive offshore E&P activity expected in regions worldwide. This is a result of ambitious plans by international oil companies, national oil companies and governments worldwide to boost the search for fresh discoveries of hydrocarbons; with the predicted recovery of the industry from the financial slowdown meaning that drilling expenditure is expected to steadily rise until 2016.

#### Demand for offshore rigs is up – NEWEST EVIDENCE

Pickerell 12/31/12 (Emily, “Demand for offshore rigs up, while onshore count keeps falling”, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/12/31/demand-for-offshore-rigs-up-while-onshore-count-keeps-falling/)

While demand for onshore rigs declined as the result of less natural gas drilling, demand for offshore rigs continues to flourish, driven by Gulf of Mexico demand, industry analysts said Monday. The Gulf of Mexico rig count has increased slightly in the last three months, with 33 floating rigs and 29 jackups for the fourth quarter, up from 27 floating rigs and 27 jackups for the third quarter, according to a Tudor Pickering analyst’s note. Likewise, demand for offshore rigs grew from 73 in January 2012 to 80 by the end of November, as improved technology, such as water flooding, has provided new opportunities to extract oil from maturing wells. The relatively strong price of oil, which closed on Friday on the New York Mercantile Exchange at $90.80 for West Texas Intermediate Crude, compared with natural gas, which closed on Friday at $3.46 per million cubic feet, has been an additional driver. Oil and gas services companies are working hard to meet the offshore demand: Ensco, for example, has three ultra-deepwater rigs that will be available in 2013. Demand has dipped in onshore drilling, as the big operators have shifted away from chasing natural gas exploration, resulting in a 61 percent decline for onshore rigs in 2012, down from 2,082 in January to 1,841 at the end of November 2011. The downturn comes after 13 quarters of increased drilling activity, Tudor Pickering said in its report. The Permian and the Eagle Ford basins have been the hardest hit by the decline, according to Tudor Pickering, while East Texas and North Louisiana have held up the best. Companies are also trending **towards the newer and more efficient alternating-current technology for drilling rigs.** Alternating-current engines allow for greater mobility and control over the drilling process, and are considered to be safer and more environmentally friendly. The older mechanical rigs have made up 72 percent of the rig decline, according to Tudor Pickering, who noted that “as activity trended lower during the quarter, we noticed operators clearly holding onto and/or high-grading their fleets.” Chesapeake continues to have the highest U.S. natural gas rig count, with 37 rigs, while Exxon and Devon have 31 and 30, respectively. Likewise, Chesapeake also has by far the biggest number of onshore oil rigs, 73, while Anadarko has 47 and Devon has 42.

### Prices Uniqueness: 2NC

#### Natural gas prices rising – Demand is increasing, fracking doesn’t solve

Lackey 12 (Mark, energy analyst with CHF Investor Relations, “This Is Your Energy Entry Point: Mark Lackey,” 8-30-12, <http://www.theenergyreport.com/pub/na/14243>)

Natural gas has been somewhat weaker, but it bounced off the $2/thousand cubic feet (Mcf) price a few months ago up to the $2.85–3/Mcf range in North America. With more industrial demand coming back, particularly in the auto sector, and stronger demand from electric utilities, gas should move back up closer to $3.25–3.30/Mcf in the next year. By way of comparison, prices in Europe can be anywhere from $4–8/Mcf, and in China they're as high as $15/Mcf.

### No Econ !

#### No escalation

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### AND - even if wars occur, they won’t escalate.

Bennett & Nordstrom 2k [Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61]

When engaging in diversionary actions in response to economic problems, leaders will be most interested in a cheap, quick victory that gives them the benefit of a rally effect without suffering the long-term costs (in both economic and popularity terms) of an extended confrontation or war. This makes weak states particularly inviting targets for diversionary action since they may be less likely to respond than strong states and because any response they make will be less costly to the initiator. Following Blainey (1973), a state facing poor economic conditions may in fact be the target of an attack rather than the initiator. This may be even more likely in the context of a rivalry because rival states are likely to be looking for any advantage over their rivals. Leaders may hope to catch an economically challenged rival looking inward in response to a slowing economy. Following the strategic application of diversionary conflict theory and states’ desire to engage in only cheap conflicts for diversionary purposes, states should avoid conflict initiation against target states experiencing economic problems.

#### 93 examples are on our side

Miller 2k [Morris Miller, Winter 2K. economist and adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration and former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 25.4]

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Their chain of causation is backwards

Ferguson 6 (Niall, prof. of history, Foreign Affairs, “The Next War of the World”, lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

### Won’t Pass – 1AR

#### Budget battles block immigration reform --- it won’t pass.

**Spaeth**, **1/3**/2013 (Ryu, Will Congress’ budget battles kill immigration reform and gun control?, The Week, p. <http://theweek.com/article/index/238367/will-congress-budget-battles-kill-immigration-reform-and-gun-control>)

Congress' budget battles are only expected to get gorier over the next couple of months, as Republicans and Democrats try to reach a deal that would prevent $1.2 trillion in crippling spending cuts, a U.S. debt default, and a government shutdown. However, the White House insists that President Obama "is planning to move full steam ahead with the rest of his domestic policy agenda," say Elise Foley and Sam Stein at The Huffington Post. Immigration reform and gun control are at the top of the list, but the chances of their quick passage seem slim given the heated atmosphere in Congress. "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," an unidentified Senate Democratic aide told HuffPo. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking — with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill." The key to congressional action is to strike when the iron is hot. In the case of immigration reform, the GOP has to feel the sting of Mitt Romney's defeat as if it were yesterday. Supporters of gun control, an issue that had been all but abandoned before the school shooting in Connecticut, say Obama must act while public opinion is on their side. As time passes, it's only logical to assume that a sense of urgency will give way to the gravitational pull of preserving the status quo. And, of course, there is the boulder-sized obstacle known as the GOP-controlled House, which has proven time and again that it has no interest in compromising with Democrats on pretty much anything. In addition to keeping immigration and gun control in the spotlight, the Obama administration may have to adopt the same strategy it used (or stumbled upon) in the deal to extend the Bush tax cuts for all but the wealthiest Americans, which involved securing strong Republican support in the Senate. On immigration, at least, GOP party leaders are reportedly eager to reach a deal in order to give Republicans a better shot at wooing Latino voters. As Karen Tumulty and Peter Wallsten write at The Washington Post: White House aides are debating whether they should take the unusual step of drafting an immigration bill or instead lay out principles that could serve as a rallying point. Pro-immigration Republicans will be recruited to help, among them evangelical pastors and small-business owners.

#### No clear immigration bill.

**Foley and Stein**, **1/2**/2013 (Elise and Sam, Obama’s Immigration Reform To Begin This Month, The Huffington Post, p. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform\_n\_2398507.html)

It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push.

## Round 3 v. Mo State

### China Relations – 2AC

#### Sustainable US LNG exports spurs cooperative LNG trading with China – that’s key to overall relations

Livingston and Tu 12 (David, Junior Fellow in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Kevin Jianjun, Senior Associate in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Feeding China’s Energy Appetite, Naturally,” Energy Tribune, 7-17, http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/11206/Feeding-Chinas-Energy-Appetite-Naturally)

Ever since CNOOC, one of China’s “big three” national oil companies, made an ill-fated bid to take over Unocal Corporation in 2005, Sino-U.S. energy relations have been marred with mistrust. Foreign acquisitions by China’s national oil companies thereafter have largely avoided the United States. Many were thus caught off guard by recent reports that Sinopec has emerged as a leading suitor for some of the $7 billion in natural gas assets that Chesapeake Energy must shed to avoid a breach of its debt covenants. Yet upon closer inspection, the move is deft and bears the imprint of lessons well-learned. Chinese national oil companies know from prior experience that in the United States they must wear kid gloves to avoid getting burned. With U.S. natural gas prices projected to remain at $2-4/Mmbtu and far higher returns on investment elsewhere around the globe, why would Sinopec pour capital into American shale gas production when so many U.S. companies are shutting down rigs? There are a number of macro- and micro-dynamics at play here. China’s demand for gas is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. Natural gas currently accounts for only 4 percent of the country’s energy mix, but the International Energy Agency projects this rising to 13 percent by 2035. The same organization predicts that China will account for roughly a quarter of global gas demand growth over the same period. There is also a high level of uncertainty over how reliant the country will be on foreign gas. Much of this will depend on China’s ability to exploit its vast domestic shale gas resources. If unconventional development is well-orchestrated, Chinese gas imports as a share of total demand could be as low as 20 percent in 2035. Alternatively, slow progress in unconventional gas development could lead to a dependency rate north of 50 percent, according to the IEA. In either scenario, a stake in Chesapeake’s gas assets could potentially pay dividends for China. Chesapeake was one of the first to commit wholeheartedly to the potential of shale gas in the United States. It has snatched up vast swaths of shale acreage, and possesses the technology and know-how to efficiently extract unconventional gas from these basins. Sinopec would love nothing more than to gain firsthand experience with hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques that could eventually be applied to China’s massive shale resources. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, technically recoverable shale gas reserves in China are at least 50 percent greater than the sizeable shale endowment in the United States. Sinopec drilled its first shale gas well in Chongqing on June 9, but until it develops the capacity to unlock domestic resources en masse at low cost, acquisitions are the quickest way to bolster its gas reserves. The company might be seeking to secure a dedicated stream of U.S. natural gas production for shipping to China as liquefied natural gas in the future. **This is a complicated proposition, especially considering that the scale of U.S. LNG exports is highly uncertain**. The prospect of rising domestic gas prices as a consequence of satiating Chinese demand would become a thorny political issue, whether merited or not. At the corporate level, Sinopec’s own characteristics reveal an internal logic to the prospective Chesapeake deal. The move is driven by its international market-oriented new boss, Fu Chengyu. Fu served at the helm of CNOOC until 2010 and his failure to secure the Unocal deal in 2005 will undoubtedly inform his current attempt. Evidence of this can already be seen in Sinopec’s preference for partial assets over outright ownership. Of course, Sinopec precluding itself from an operational role also potentially distances it from the technologies and methodologies that it covets. Nevertheless, Fu has remains tempted by U.S. shale gas assets with attractive valuations. Sinopec has been slower getting into America than its rival CNOOC, which recently entered into two billion-dollar joint ventures with Chesapeake in the Niobrara and Eagle Ford shale. Moreover, Sinopec suffers from an unbalanced portfolio, with too many loss-making refineries and too few premiere upstream assets. Oil and gas projects in Iran that have been abandoned by Western companies would normally be an attractive target, but Beijing has increasingly pressured national oil companies to curtail involvement in the pariah state. Unsurprisingly, Sinopec has recently returned its gaze to the United States. Although U.S. natural gas won’t offer lucrative returns until prices rise, Chesapeake’s acreage is likely to sell at a discount and would allow Sinopec to hedge its holdings in more geopolitically tenuous markets. After his $2.5 billion deal with Devon Energy in January for stakes in five different liquids-rich shale plays, a tie-up with Chesapeake would solidify Fu’s reputation as a shrewd CEO. For China, the deal offers another geopolitical hedge—the opportunity to turn dollar-denominated treasury bills into real energy assets. The Chinese government would likely play a key role in financing any large deals pursued by its national oil companies. This is an aspect of the deal worth watching. CNOOC’s critics back in 2005 objected to the assortment of low-interest and interest-free loans backed by Chinese government coffers. Were Sinopec to rely on a similar arrangement of state support, it might be met with resistance in the United States. But the U.S. congress is in a much weaker position than it was in 2005. Partial asset ownership is not the wholesale surrender of a strategic corporation, and the American natural gas industry would welcome with open arms the capital inflow. This points to the **most constructive way forward** for both Washington and Beijing. China is still trying to grow a domestic shale gas industry without opening the market to international players. During the second round of shale gas bids in China, a small window was opened for other domestic companies, but none of them have more sophisticated technology than CNPC, Sinopec, or CNOOC. Sooner or later, China will realize that there are no shortcuts if shale gas is to be developed safely, efficiently, and responsibly. It should follow its own offshore oil exploration model, offering up its domestic market in return for cutting-edge technology. The Chesapeake deal may pay dividends to both the United States and China, but the synergy will go even further if Beijing eventually returns the favor at home.

#### Nuclear war

Conable and Lampton 93 (Barber B., President Emeritus – World Bank and David, President – National Committee, China: The Coming Power, Foreign Affairs, December / January, Lexis)

Regionally American interests are both numerous and important. The two most protracted, economically distracting and politically explosive American military commitments in the post-World War II era were Korea and Vietnam. In both cases China figured prominently. The lesson is that regional stability requires workable U.S.-China relations. Competition between Beijing and Washington takes the form of exploiting indigenous regional conflicts by both powers, resulting in local problems that expand to suck both countries into a self-defeating vortex. The most serious threats to American security and economic interests in Asia include armed conflict with nuclear potential between the two Koreas and between India and Pakistan; a deterioration of relations between Beijing and Taipei that could lead to economic or military conflict; a re-ignition of the Cambodian conflict; and a botched transition to Beijing's sovereignty in Hong Kong in 1997. None of these problems can be handled effectively without substantial Sino-American cooperation. Constructive relations with Beijing will not assure P.R.C. cooperation in all cases; needlessly bad relations will nearly ensure conflict. The Republic of Korea's formal diplomatic recognition of Beijing last August, at the expense of Taipei, is just one indication of the increasing importance the region attaches to building positive ties to the P.R.C.

### Case

#### US LNG exports undermine Russian and Iranian gas influence and coercion- checks Iran prolif

Medlock et al 11 (Kenneth, Report from an energy study sponsored by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy and supported by the US Department of energy, Medlock is a fellow in energy and resource economics at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, PhD in economics “Shale Gas and U.S. National Security,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, July 2011, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-DOEShaleGas-07192011.pdf)

The study finds that full development of commercial shale gas resources in the United States will have multiple beneficial effects for U.S. energy security and national interests. The full and timely development of U.S. shale gas resources will limit the need for expensive imports of LNG, reducing the energy-related swelling of the U.S. trade deficit and thereby helping to strengthen the U.S. economy. Shale gas will also lower the cost to average Americans of reducing greenhouse gases as the country switches to cleaner fuels. Moreover, as greater shale gas production creates greater competition among suppliers in global markets, U.S. and international prices for natural gas are kept from rising substantially**.** Increased competition among world natural gas suppliers due to shale gas developments also reduces the threat that a Gas-OPEC can be formed, and it will trim the petro-power of energy producing countries such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela to assert themselves using an “energy” weapon or “energy diplomacy” to counter U.S. interests abroad. In particular, shale gas’ role in global markets will greatly reduce Russia’s leverage over Europe, eventually limiting Moscow’s share of the nonFSU European market to less than 13 percent, down from its recent peak of 26 percent in 2007. The dramatic lessening of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas will likely reduce Russia’s ability to unduly influence political outcomes. European buyers will have ample alternatives to Russian supplies, thereby reducing Moscow’s leverage in the balance of power between Russia and the EU. Europe’s high dependence on Russian pipeline natural gas supplies has in recent years made it difficult for certain European leaders to engage in diplomacy to forcefully object to Russian interference on the European continent, including Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. A more diverse energy supply for Europe enhances U.S. interests by buttressing Europe’s abilities to resist Russian interference in European affairs and help border states in the Balkans and Eastern Europe assert greater foreign policy independence from Moscow. In general, a more energy independent Europe will be better positioned to join with the United States in global matters that might not have the full support of Russia. Rising U.S. shale gas supplies will also assist the United States in its policies toward Iran. Given global market economics under a full development of shale scenario, the commercial window for Iran to export large amounts of natural gas is likely to be closed for an additional 20 years, making it easier for the United States to achieve buy-in for continued economic sanctions against Iran. Shale gas development lowers the chances that Iran can use its energy resources to drive a wedge in the international coalition against it. By delaying the need for Iranian gas, the United States buys time to find a better solution to the Iranian nuclear problem and leaves open the possibility that political change will take place in Iran before its influence as a major global natural gas supplier grows. In addition, the long delay in the commerciality of Iranian gas means that Tehran will have trouble moving forward with the development of pipelines to India or Pakistan until at least the mid-2020s, thus reducing a potential source of tension between the United States and India. Finally, the rise of shale gas will lower the global requirements for natural gas from volatile Middle East and North Africa over the next few years, giving the region time to sort out its current political and social turmoil before its importance as an energy supplier grows from already high current levels. Natural gas stands to play a positive role in the global energy mix, making it easier to shift away from more polluting, higher carbon-intensity fuels and increasing the near-term options to improve energy security and handle the challenge of climate change. The ample geologic endowment of shale gas in North America and potentially elsewhere around the globe means that natural gas prices will likely remain affordable and that the high level of supply insecurity currently facing world oil supplies could be eased by a shift to greater use of natural gas without fear of increasing the power of large natural gas resource holders such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela.

#### Iran prolif causes nuclear war – escalates and draws in major powers

Rubin 9 (Barry Rubin, 2009 - director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center in Israel and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book is The Truth about Syria, 3/9. <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/us_world/2009/03/09/2009-03-09_what_if_iran_gets_a_working_nuclear_weap.html>)

If and when Iran gets nuclear weapons it would set off a global nightmare.  Most obviously, Iran could use nuclear arms to attack Israel. It’s easy to say that Iran’s leaders would be cautious, but what if ideology, error, or an extremist faction decides to wipe the Jewish state off the map? Even a 10-percent chance of nuclear holocaust is terrifying.  And if Israel decides its existence is at risk, it would launch a preemptive attack that would also produce a big crisis.  That’s just for starters.  Once Iran has nuclear weapons, every Arab state, with the exception of Iran’s ally Syria, would also be imperiled. Those countries would beg for U.S. protection. But could they depend on America, under the Barack Obama administration, to go to war – especially a nuclear one – to shield them?  Uncertain of U.S. reliability, these governments would rush to appease Iran.  To survive, the Arab states will do whatever Iran wants – which would come at high cost for America: alliances would weaken and military bases would close down. No Arab state would dare support peace with Israel, either.  But Arab states wouldn’t feel safe with just appeasement. An arms’ race would escalate in which several other countries would try to buy or build nukes of their own. Tension, and chance for nuclear war, whether through accident or miscalculation, would soar. The United States would eventually have to get dragged in.  European allies would also be scared. As reluctant as they are to help America in the Middle East, that paralysis would get worse. As willing as they are to appease Tehran, they’d go far beyond that.  Meanwhile, an emboldened Iran would push to limit oil and gas production and increase prices. Other oil producers would feel compelled to move away from their former, more responsible practices. Consumers’ fears would push up the prices further.  Yet there’s worse. Flush with a feel of victory, Iran and its allies — Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iraqi insurgents — would recruit more members to its cause. These terrorist groups would interpret the retreat of more moderate Arab countries and the West as signs of weakness and use it to fuel more aggression.  Such a terrible scenario is likely even if Iran never actual uses a nuclear weapon on another country.  This new era in the Middle East would bring risks and the probability of war for America that would dwarf all the region’s current troubles and the crises faced by the United States in the whole world.  And that’s why it’s so important to avoid Iran getting nuclear weapons in the first place.

### Cap K – 2AC

#### Solves better – using capitalism to fight itself is more effective

Rothkrug 90 (Paul, Founder – Environmental Rescue Fund, Monthly Review, March, 41(10), p. 38)

No institution is or ever has been a seamless monolith. Although the inherent mechanism of American capitalism is as you describe it, oriented solely to profit without regard to social consequences, this does not preclude significant portions of that very system from joining forces with the worldwide effort for the salvation of civilization, perhaps even to the extent of furnishing the margin of success for that very effort.

#### Capitalism is resilient – it’ll bounce back

Foster 9 (JD, Norman B. Ture Senior Fellow in the Economics of fiscal policy – Heritage Foundation, "Is Capitalism Dead? Maybe," 3-11, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101694302)

Capitalism is down. It may even be out. But it's **far from dead**. Capitalism is **extremely resilient**. Why? Because here, as in every democratic-industrial country around the world, it has always had to struggle to survive against encroachments — both benign and malevolent — of the state. At the moment, capitalism is losing ground most everywhere. But when the economic crisis passes, capitalism and the freedoms it engenders will **recover again**, if only because freedom beats its lack. It is said that the trouble with socialism is socialism; the trouble with capitalism is capitalists. The socialist economic system, inherently contrary to individual liberties, tends to minimize prosperity because it inevitably allocates national resources inefficiently. On the other hand, a truly capitalist system engaged in an unfettered pursuit of prosperity is prone to occasional and often painful excesses, bubbles and downturns like the one we are now experiencing globally. When capitalism slips, governments step in with regulations and buffers to try to moderate the excesses and minimize the broader consequences of individual errors. Sometimes these policies are enduringly helpful. Severe economic downturns inflict collateral damage on families and businesses otherwise innocent of material foolishness. Not only are the sufferings of these innocents harmful to society, but they are also downright expensive. A little wise government buffering can go a long way. The trick, of course, is the wisdom part. A good example of a wise government buffer is deposit insurance at commercial banks. Without it, depositors would have withdrawn their funds en masse, leading to a rapid collapse of the banking system. It happened in years gone by. But today, deposits have flowed into the banking system in search of safety, helping banks staunch their many severe wounds. Yet for every example of helpful government intervention, there are many more that do more harm than good. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac leap to mind. These congressional creatures helped create, then inflate the subprime market. When that balloon popped, it triggered a global economic meltdown. The current financial crisis clearly has capitalism on its back foot. Government ownership of the largest insurance company, the major banks, and Fan and Fred are awesome incursions into private markets. But, as President Obama has underscored, these incursions are only temporary. In time, these institutions — even Fan and Fred — will be broken up and sold in parts. It will leave government agents with stories to tell their grandkids, and taxpayers stuck with the losses. But the power of the state will again recede, and **another new age of** freedom and **capitalism will arrive and thrive**… until we repeat the cycle again sometime down the road.

#### Rejection won’t dislodge capitalism – no critical mass exists

Grossberg 92 (Lawrence, Professor of Communication Studies – UNC-Chapel Hill and Chair of the Executive Committee of the University Program in Cultural Studies, We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture, p. 388-389)

If it is capitalism that is at stake, our moral opposition to it has to be **tempered by** the **realities** of the world and the possibilities of political change. Taking a simple negative relation to it, as if the moral condemnation of the evil of capitalism were sufficient (granting that it does establish grotesque systems of inequality and oppression), is not likely to establish a viable political agenda. First, it is not at all clear what it would mean to overthrow capitalism in the current situation. Unfortunately, despite our desires, "the masses" are not waiting to be led into revolution, and it is not simply a case of their failure to recognize their own best interests, as if we did. Are we to decide-rather undemocratically, I might add-to overthrow capitalism in spite of their legitimate desires? Second, as much as capitalism is the cause of many of the major threats facing the world, at the moment it may also be one of the few forces of stability, unity and even, within limits, a certain "civility" in the world. The world system is, unfortunately, simply too precarious and the alternative options not all that promising. Finally, the appeal of an as yet unarticulated and even unimagined future, while perhaps powerful as a moral imperative, is **simply too weak** in the current context to effectively organize people, and **too vague** to provide any direction.

#### Alternatives to capitalism will inevitably collapse

Taylor 94 (Jerry, Director of Natural Resource Studies – Cato Institute, “The Challenge of Sustainable Development”, Regulation, http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg17n1-taylor.html)

The free, competitive marketplace creates not only human capital but natural capital as well. That is because capitalism is the most productive engine of intellectual and technological advance, and it is that stock of human knowledge and technology that turns the earth's material into useful commodities. "Humans are the active agent, having ideas that they use to transform the environment for human purposes, observes economist Thomas De Gregori. "Resources are not fixed and finite because they are not natural. They are a product of human ingenuity resulting from the creation of technology and science." David Osterfeld adds that "since resources are a function of human knowledge, and since our stock of knowledge has increased over time, it should come as no surprise that the stock of physical resources has also been expanding." Closed societies and economies under the heavy hand of state planning are doomed to live within the **confines of dwindling resource bases** and **eventually experience the** very collapse feared by the proponents of sustainable development.

**Vague alts are a voter – rejecting the aff can be anything – kills 2AC strat, makes it impossible to generate offense – justifies perm do the alt, we’ll defend it.**

#### Alt causes transition wars

Harris 3 (Lee, Analyst – Hoover Institution and Author of The Suicide of Reason, “The Intellectual Origins of America-Bashing”, Policy Review, January, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3458371.html)

This is the immiserization thesis of Marx. And it is central to revolutionary Marxism, since if capitalism produces no widespread misery, then it also produces no fatal internal contradiction: If everyone is getting better off through capitalism, who will dream of struggling to overthrow it? Only genuine misery on the part of the workers would be sufficient to overturn the whole apparatus of the capitalist state, simply because, as Marx insisted, the capitalist class could not be realistically expected to relinquish control of the state apparatus and, with it, the monopoly of force. In this, Marx was absolutely correct. No capitalist society has ever willingly liquidated itself, and it is utopian to think that any ever will. Therefore, in order to achieve the goal of socialism, nothing short of a complete revolution would do; and this means, in point of fact, **a full-fledged** civil **war** not just within one society, but **across the globe**. Without this **catastrophic upheaval**, capitalism would remain completely in control of the social order and all socialist schemes would be reduced to pipe dreams.

**Extinction**

Kothari 82 (Rajni, Professor of Political Science – University of Delhi, Toward a Just Social Order, p. 571)

Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major centres of power -- and hence to a further tightening of the structures of domination and domestic repression – producing in their wake an intensification of the old arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting the stage for **eventual global holocaust**.

#### Retreat solidifies capitalism – the void allows corporate power to go unchallenged

Boggs 97 (Carl, Professor of Political Science – National University, Theory & Society 26, December, p. 750-751)

Both mall culture and mass media symbolize the prevailing mood of anti-politics: they reproduce to a deeply-atomized, commodified social life-world which corresponds to the mode of consciousness described by Richard Sennett in The Fall of Public Man, where citizen involvement in a res publica is effaced ``by the belief that social meanings are generated by the feelings of individual human beings,'' so that the common terrain of power relations and social space is obliterated.15 Sheldon Wolin refers to this development as a ``crisis of citizenship,'' reflected in the carving up of the public sphere by local, privatized interests.16 The point has been reached where most Americans can no longer imagine a system truly open to citizen participation, where the ordinary person might have influence. Viewed in this way, modernity is two-sided: it coincides with the spread of technology, knowledge, and expertise but also reinforces widespread feelings of alienation and powerlessness. Individuals feel engulfed by forces beyond their control – bureaucracy, government, huge corporations, the global economy. Under these conditions psychological retreat from the public sphere may seem normal enough. The problem, however, is that such firmly entrenched bastions of power will not vanish simply because they are denigrated or ignored; on the contrary, their hegemony will simply go unchallenged.

#### Extinction results

Boggs 97 (Carl, Professor of Political Science – National University, Theory & Society 26, December, p. 773-774)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here ^ localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology – intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved – perhaps even unrecognized – only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites – an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise – or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75

### Reg Neg CP – 2AC

#### Coal producers block – they are powerful

Lipton 12 (Eric – NYT, “Even in Coal Country, the Fight for an Industry”, 5/29, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/business/energy-environment/even-in-kentucky-coal-industry-is-under-siege.html?pagewanted=all)

 LOUISA, Ky. — For generations, coal has been king in this Appalachian town. It provided heat, light and jobs for the hundreds of people who worked in the nearby coal mines and the smoke-coughing Big Sandy power plant that burned their black bounty. But now, coal is in a corner. Across the United States, the industry is under siege, threatened by new regulations from Washington, environmentalists fortified by money from Michael R. Bloomberg, the billionaire mayor of New York City, and natural gas companies intent on capturing much of the nation’s energy market. So when the operator of the Big Sandy plant announced last year that it would be switching from coal to cleaner, cheaper natural gas, people here took it as the worst betrayal imaginable. “Have you lost your mind?” State Representative Rocky Adkins, a Democrat and one of Kentucky’s most powerful politicians, thundered at Michael G. Morris, the chairman of the plant’s operator, American Electric Power, during an encounter last summer. “You cannot wave the white flag and let the environmentalists and regulators declare victory here in the heart of coal country.” Coal and electric utilities, long allied, are beginning to split. More than 100 of the 500 or so coal-burning power plants in the United States are expected to be shut down in the next few years. While coal still provides about a third of the nation’s power, just four years ago it was providing nearly half. The decline is largely because new pollution rules have made coal plants more costly, while a surge in production of natural gas through the process of hydraulic fracturing, known as fracking, has sent gas prices plummeting. Together, the economics of coal have been transformed after a century of dominance in Washington, state capitals and the board rooms of electric utilities. “The math screams at you to do gas,” said Mr. Morris, whose company is the nation’s largest consumer of coal. Environmental groups, after years of targeting coal plants as leading sources of air pollution, have moved in for the kill. “We never thought we would get to a place where coal plants are falling so fast,” said Bruce Nilles, the director of the Sierra Club’s Beyond Coal initiative. It has been aided by $50 million from Mr. Bloomberg, who views the campaign as part of a public health effort, and $26 million from an odd bedfellow: the top official of a natural gas company. The environmentalists figure that if they can shut down a third of the nation’s coal burning plants by 2020, emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States could be cut at least as much as they would have under a landmark 2009 climate bill that died in Congress. But the coal industry is mustering all the weapons it can: lobbying, legislation, litigation and a multimillion-dollar advertising campaign trumpeting the benefits of “clean coal.**”** The fight has even become an issue in the presidential campaign, with the industry blaming President Obama and the Environmental Protection Agency for the onslaught, and Mitt Romney, the presumptive Republican nominee, hinting that he would roll back some of the rules.

#### Single veto is sufficient

Rivkin 93 (Administrative Law Journal, Summer, Lexis)

MR. RIVKIN: That is really getting into the minutiae of the Clean Air Act. It was a subcommittee of the Acid Rain Advisory Committee (ARAC) that dealt with NOX issues. [98](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=3c5c2953e65d7c4819d797ee487b9938&docnum=15&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAl&_md5=cf84bac9afc1bf6c4dcddf8075207f61&focBudTerms=reg%21%20neg%21&focBudSel=all#n98#n98) There was a decision made not to pursue NOX issues to their final resolution. That is ancient history and has nothing to do with the Council on Competitiveness. I think that there was a certain tension within ARAC itself when the decision was made. It is not that it was equally split, but this case substantiates the point that both Tom and Cass made. The pitfall of reg-neg is that in any decision taken by consensus, a small band of dissenters can unravel  [\*342]  the entire process. I think there were a few people in ARAC who did not like the way the NOX strawman was emerging and, in the interest of time, the EPA and the people involved decided not to pursue the matter.

#### -- Doesn’t solve --- watered-down

Coglianese 1 (Cary, Assistant Prof Public Policy – Harvard, Environmental Law Journal, Lexis)

Negotiated rulemaking's emphasis on unanimity also makes it more likely that the final outcome will succumb to the lowest-common-denominator problem. The outcome that is minimally acceptable to all the members of a negotiated rulemaking committee will not necessarily be optimal or effective in terms of achieving social goals. A recent study of negotiated rulemaking conducted by Charles Caldart and Nicholas Ashford shows that in industries that are not likely to innovate in the absence of strong governmental regulation, the lowest-common-denominator problem keeps negotiated rules from promoting the technological innovation needed to improve environmental and safety performance. [276](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=41fdcf56cb8c8ce0afc3937b5b6a330b&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAl&_md5=e6a939da1291edc95cd9728cf795aa8c#n276#n276) They conclude that because industry representatives in these types of industries will be reluctant to agree to regulations that would compel firms to make dramatic investments in new technologies, "negotiated rulemaking's focus on consensus can effectively remove the potential to spur innovation." [277](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=41fdcf56cb8c8ce0afc3937b5b6a330b&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAl&_md5=e6a939da1291edc95cd9728cf795aa8c#n277#n277)

#### CP delays and jacks certainty

Ackerman 94 (Susan Rose, Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale University, Duke Law Journal, April, Lexis)

According to Improving Regulatory Systems, the aims of regulatory negotiation are to reduce the time it takes to put a rule into effect and to obtain high levels of compliance. Because affected parties have signed on to the negotiated regulation, they may be both less likely to challenge the rule in court and more likely to comply with it. However, as the authors of the report recognize, regulatory negotiation under current law introduces an extra step that is time-consuming and difficult. One observer advised participants to expect a “roller coaster experience.” Even though regulatory negotiation may shorten the regulatory process in terms of calendar time, the actual hours of participant time [\*12 121 may be greater than under other regulatory procedures. Although a number of regulatory negotiations have been successful, 22 the claims of widespread benefits are mostly speculative. And when it comes to enforcing the regulation, reg neg may not help significantly: even for rules promulgated by standard methods, compliance seems high.

#### -- Courts strike it down

Ackerman 94 (Susan Rose, Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale University, Duke Law Journal, April, Lexis)

How should policymakers decide which approach to regulation is best given our commitment both to public participation and to technical competence and efficiency? The initial consideration is a constitutional one. Because both regulatory negotiation and incentive systems involve private individuals, they raise concerns about the extent to which the government can delegate public tasks to the private sector. American democracy traditionally is wary of delegating policymaking tasks to private groups. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, [36](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=762dde15a6417f9ffe2b8d3c74e25bc3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAz&_md5=718b4f4bd1b457efd3d5b55b0e4a2e5e#n36#n36) the U.S. Supreme Court objected to Congress's reliance on industry self-regulation. The Government urges that the codes will "consist of rules of competition deemed fair for each industry by representative members of that industry -- by the persons most vitally concerned and most familiar with its problems." . . . But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? . . . The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.

#### -- CP trades-off with labor mediation

Hodges 96 (Ann C., Prof Law, U Richmond, Administrative Law Journal, Winter, Lexis)

The agencies might use mediators from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), an experienced mediation agency. [384](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n384#n384) FMCS mediators are stationed around the country, avoiding the geographical problems of using employees located in Washington. There is some debate among mediation scholars, however, as to whether the approach to mediation used successfully in labor disputes is appropriate in civil rights disputes. [385](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n385#n385) In labor disputes, the mediated settlement (as well as the non-mediated settlement) reflects the power of the parties. A labor contract negotiation is, in essence, a power contest. By way of contrast, mediation of a civil rights dispute involves the external standards of the statute. On that basis some might argue that FMCS mediators are inappropriate for the task of rights-based mediation, at least without some assurance that the mediators could make the transition in mediation approach. [386](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n386#n386) FMCS mediators do have some experience in mediation of cases involving statutory civil rights under the Age Discrimination Act. [387](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n387#n387) A study of the mediation program found it difficult to evaluate, however, because of the unavailability of data. [388](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n388#n388) FMCS mediators would require ADA training. A second concern about use of FMCS mediators is their availability. Currently, the first priority of the FMCS is mediation of labor disputes. Absent contrary congressional direction, these disputes are likely to continue as first priority because of the number of people impacted by such disputes, their immediacy, [389](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n389#n389) and the inclinations of the mediators who [\*1079]  presumably joined the agency with a goal of mediating such disputes and are experienced at doing so. Accordingly, without a significant infusion of additional mediators, mediation of ADA cases in a timely manner might be difficult, if not impossible**.**

#### Key to the economy

Toner 3 (John J., Chief of Staff – FMCS, FY 2001 Annual Report, www.fmcs.gov/assets/files/annual%20reports/FY2003\_Annual\_Report\_with\_correction.doc)

As the nation’s economy tightened, but appeared slowly headed toward recovery, the war in Iraq created new economic concerns. Those concerns, coupled with the lingering impacts of 9-11, continued dramatic increased health insurance costs, pension cost pressures caused by dramatic declines in financial markets and an aging workforce, technological changes impacting the nature of the work and where the work is performed, as well as increased global competition, impacted collective bargaining negotiations over the last year. Fiscal year 2003 was a critical bargaining year, with major contracts expiring in the following industries: aerospace, defense, transportation, shipping, telecommunications, food manufacturing, construction, health care, as well as federal, state and local governments. While the West Coast ports and Verizon disputes remained in the public eye, mediators were actively involved in 6640 collective bargaining contract negotiations in every major industry and service throughout the United States during the fiscal year. With our assistance, 4988 contracts were reached. As a result, 75% of our dispute cases resulted in negotiated settlements. With respect to work stoppages, there were 289 work stoppages during this fiscal year. The West Coast ports dispute involved a work stoppage of approximately 10 days, with a significant impact on the nation’s economy. We have been actively involved in settling severe work stoppages around the nation, including a 14 day strike involving 4000 Lockheed Martin machinists who manufacture F-16 fighter jets, a series of one-day rolling strikes by 6000 service and maintenance employees working in 14 Minneapolis/St. Paul hospitals and clinics, and a 55-day strike among 500 employees employed by Waukesha Engine. We have been equally successful at averting strikes. We averted a work stoppage at Verzion, where a strike would have involved close to 80,000 employees and phone service in 13 states. Strikes were also prevented in a defense-related dispute involving 10,000 Northrop Grumman Ship Systems employees, and 2000 employees of the Denver Colorado Regional Transportation District, which provides mass transit to 250,000 riders. D. GPRA Achievements: The Government Performance and Results Act requires all federal agencies to identify performance goals. For every service provided, we identified specific goals for fiscal year 2003 and the chart below identifies our performance during this fiscal year: In addition to the above chart, it should be noted that the Agency continues its success rate in dispute cases. In this fiscal year, we settled 75% of our collective bargaining mediation cases. Although we were unable to secure collective bargaining agreements in 25% of our cases, this does not mean that we were not otherwise successful. In this regard, the mediator could have assisted the parties in reducing the number of open or unresolved issues. Another important measurement of success includes the number of times the labor-management community consented to a mediator’s intervention. As noted above, not every case is assigned to a mediator. Once a case is assigned, the mediator contacts the parties to offer his/her assistance. Even where cases are assigned to mediators and the mediator offers assistance, the parties must consent to the mediator’s intervention. Mediation is a voluntary process and even a skilled mediator cannot intervene in the absence of consent. Bearing this in mind, in fiscal year 2003, we assigned 19,516 cases to mediators. It is presumed that, in each case, the assigned mediator contacted the parties and offered his/her services to resolve the dispute. Of those assigned cases, the parties accepted mediation 6640, roughly 34% of the time, consistent with last year’s rate of 35%. Over the next fiscal year, we will work to improve our penetration rate by continuously educating the public about the mediation process and its advantages in order to increase the number of situations where our services can be utilized and work stoppages avoided. E. New Initiatives: 1. Strategic Plan: The Agency’s five-year strategic plan was recently approved by the Office of Management and Budget. To chart the Agency’s future course, we looked at certain trends that have a significant impact on the workplace including (1) the cost and complexity of health care; (2) the effects of globalization on the workplace; (3) the application and importance of technology in the workplace; and (4) workplace litigation and conflict focusing on individual employees outside the scope of collective bargaining and focusing on individual employees. With these factors in mind, we crafted our strategic goals, which focus on: Minimizing the number and severity of work stoppages influencing interstate commerce, national security, and/or the U.S. health care industry; Increasing the number of collective bargaining partners with an ongoing commitment to improving their relationship; Facilitating a commitment to, and development of, systems for handling workplace disputes arising outside of the collective bargaining context, by labor and management at a significant number of organizations; Assisting labor and management to effectively deal with major issues that drive conflict in the evolving workplace, including health care, technology, effects of globalization, and diversity; and Sharing knowledge gained from the Agency’s experience in workplace conflict resolution with those outside of the workplace context such as schools, courts, and international organizations. The Agency’s plan details the strategies we will employ to achieve these goals and our annual performance plans will address specific performance measurements we will use to determine our success in each area. 2. Web site In fiscal year 2003, the Agency launched its new Web site. The Web site was designed with the President’s Management Agenda E-government Initiative in mind: it affords the public easy access to the Agency and its programs. The Web site provides a wealth of information about each Agency department and the services available to the labor-management community. The Web site has the following capabilities: On-line filing of statutorily-required contract expiration notices (F-7 forms) through the website; On-line filing of arbitration panel requests; On-line filing of grant applications; On-line quarterly submission of grantee progress reports; On-line registration for Institute courses; Publication of FMCS-related Federal Register announcements; Repository of all Agency reports to Congress, including Annual Reports, Performance Plans and Strategic Plans; Regular updates on cases of national significance (i.e., West Coast Ports dispute and current Verizon dispute) with links to newspaper articles of interest; Video messages from the Director, speeches delivered by staff members, and articles published by employees; Links to TAGS e-conferences; Cases of interest and best practices are regularly posted; and Communication for the public, via e-mail, to Agency personnel. 3. Access to Neutrals Program In FY 2003 we proposed a registry of neutrals program. The purpose of the initiative is to develop a register of individuals, approved by the Agency, to whom we can refer employment-related disputes (i.e., EEO cases) where the Agency might be unable to assign a mediator to attend to that dispute. A description of the program was published in the Federal Register in May 2003. We have reviewed all of the public comments and, during fiscal year 2004, we will meet with interested parties to address questions and issues related to implementation of the program. F. Summary All FMCS activity is aimed at promoting and improving conflict resolution and collective bargaining processes in the United States. **This helps American businesses become** and remain **more competitive in the international marketplace and increases the quality of working life of American workers**. Through collective bargaining mediation, FMCS averts or minimizes the impact of work stoppages on the U.S. economy, either in initial bargaining relationships, or in mature bargaining relationships. Relationship development and training programs offer labor and management the skills to improve long-term workplace relationships. Arbitration provides the internal jurisprudence that helps the parties administer their collective bargaining agreements. The grants program promotes innovative, joint approaches to building effective labor-management relationships. Through federal employment mediation, FMCS helps government agencies reduce the likelihood of litigation, speeds up federal processes, and improves the delivery of regulated government services. Our international training and exchange program offers training to foreign governments in these same techniques, promoting the establishment of sound labor-management relations and conflict resolution systems in strategic areas of the world.

#### Those wars go nuclear

**Auslin 9** (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### Renewables DA – 2AC

#### Warming irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction – past temperature fluctuations prove

**Stampf 7** (Olaf, staff writer for Spiegel Online, 5/5. “Not the End of the World as we Know it,” [http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,481684,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0%2C1518%2C481684%2C00.html))

But even this moderate warming would likely have far fewer apocalyptic consequences than many a prophet of doom would have us believe. For one thing, the more paleontologists and geologists study the history of the earth's climate, the more clearly do they recognize just how much temperatures have fluctuated in both directions in the past. Even major fluctuations appear to be completely natural phenomena. Additionally, some environmentalists doubt that the large-scale extinction of animals and plants some have predicted will in fact come about. "A warmer climate helps promote species diversity," says Munich zoologist Josef Reichholf. Also, more detailed simulations have allowed climate researchers to paint a considerably less dire picture than in the past -- gone is the talk of giant storms, the melting of the Antarctic ice shield and flooding of major cities. Improved regionalized models also show that climate change can bring not only drawbacks, but also significant benefits, especially in northern regions of the world where it has been too cold and uncomfortable for human activity to flourish in the past. However it is still a taboo to express this idea in public. For example, countries like Canada and Russia can look forward to better harvests and a blossoming tourism industry, and the only distress the Scandinavians will face is the guilty conscience that could come with benefiting from global warming.

#### No tradeoff – natural gas investment doesn’t tradeoff with renewables

Lacey 12 (Stephen, “Top Three Reasons Cheap Natural Gas Won’t Kill Renewable Energy”, 2/21, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/02/21/421319/top-three-reasons-cheap-natural-gas-wont-kill-renewable-energy/?mobile=nc)

Over the years, the conversation around gas has changed dramatically in renewable energy circles. For example, up until 2008 when gas prices were at their peak and wind development was soaring, the industry’s message was simple: We’re a far more cost-effective, reliable investment than gas. But the tide turned in 2009, when gas prices started their precipitous drop. I remember the American Wind Energy Association’s annual conference in 2010, when shale gas dominated the CEO roundtable discussion. “Our single biggest challenge is improving technologies to compete with these low prices,” said one executive. The industry clearly took the challenge seriously. Today, due to bigger turbines, more reliable equipment and better materials, the cost of wind has dropped to record lows. In fact, some developers are even signing long-term power purchase agreements in the 3 cents a kilowatt-hour range. And last fall, Bloomberg New Energy Finance projected that wind would be “fully competitive with energy produced from combined-cycle gas turbines by 2016″ under fair wind conditions. The same technological improvements and maturation in project development in wind are driving down the cost of solar PV as well. For example, in California, solar developers have signed contracts for power below the projected price of natural gas from a 500-MW combined cycle power plant. (That projection does include a carbon price). These trends are driving record levels of interest from investors. In 2011, for the first time ever, global investments in renewable energy surpassed investments in fossil fuels. The bottom line: the price of renewable energy continues to come down while the projected price of natural gas is only expected to rise. We do have to be realistic about the situation: assuming gas prices stay near record low levels for a long period of time — which they likely won’t — renewables deployment won’t grow at the rate we need it to. But if you look at the where large-scale renewables stack up with the cost of energy from peaking gas plants and combined cycle plants (chart above), you can see that the industry is still nipping at the heels of gas — even with a “revolution” underway in accessing shale resources. That’s something that can’t be ignored.

#### Natural gas acts as a bridge fuel—spurring broad renewable development

Ju 12 (Anne Ju – senior science writer for the Cornell Chronicle) July 17, 2012 “Study Proves Natural Gas Can Bridge the Gap to a Clean Energy Economy” http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Study-Proves-Natural-Gas-Can-Bridge-the-Gap-to-a-Clean-Energy-Economy.html)

Natural gas is a good transition step on the road to greener energy sources like wind, solar, and nuclear power, says a new study. Lawrence M. Cathles, Cornell University professor of earth and atmospheric sciences, says natural gas is a smart move in the battle against global climate change. Published in the most recent edition of the journal Geochemistry, Geophysics and Geosystems, Cathles’ study reviews the most recent government and industry data on natural gas “leakage rates” during extraction, as well as recently developed climate models. He concludes that regardless of the time frame considered, substituting natural gas energy for all coal and some oil production provides about 40 percent of the global warming benefit that a complete switch to low-carbon sources would deliver. “From a greenhouse point of view, it would be better to replace coal electrical facilities with nuclear plants, wind farms, and solar panels, but replacing them with natural gas stations will be faster, cheaper, and achieve 40 percent of the low-carbon-fast benefit,” Cathles writes in the study. “Gas is a natural transition fuel that could represent the biggest stabilization wedge available to us.” Cathles’ study includes additional findings about expanding the use of natural gas as an energy source, as well as the climate impact of “unconventional” gas drilling methods, including hydraulic fracturing in shale formations. They include the following: • Although a more rapid transition to natural gas from coal and some oil produces a greater overall benefit for climate change, the 40 percent of low-carbon energy benefit remains no matter how quickly the transition is made, and no matter the effect of ocean modulation or other climate regulating forces. • Although some critics of natural gas as a transition fuel have cited leakage rates as high as 8 percent or more of total production during drilling—particularly hydraulic fracturing extraction—more recent industry data and a critical examination of Environmental Protection Agency data supports leakage rates closer to 1.5 percent for both conventional and hydrofractured wells. • Even at higher leakage rates, using natural gas as a transition to low-carbon energy sources is still a better policy than “business as usual” with coal and oil, due to the different rates of decay (and hence long-term global warming effect) of carbon dioxide released in greater amounts by burning coal and oil and any methane released during natural gas extraction. • Using natural gas as a transition fuel supports the push to low-carbon sources by providing the “surge capacity” when needed, or a buffer when solar and wind production wanes**.** “The most important message of the calculations reported here is that substituting natural gas for coal and oil is a significant way to reduce greenhouse forcing, regardless of how long the substitution takes,” Cathles writes. “A faster transition to low-carbon energy sources would decrease greenhouse warming further, but the substitution of natural gas for other fossil fuels is equally beneficial in percentage terms no matter how fast the transition.”

#### Turn – conventional gas reduces emissions

Howarth et al 11 (Robert W. Professor of Ecology & Environmental Biology – Cornell, Renee Santoro, Research Aide for Howarth – Cornell, Anthony Ingraffea, Professor of Engineering – Cornell, “Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations,” Climatic Change, 106(4), p.679-690, Springer Link, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e384226wr4160653/?MUD=MP>)

We evaluate the greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas obtained by highvolume hydraulic fracturing from shale formations, focusing on methane emissions. Natural gas is composed largely of methane, and 3.6% to 7.9% of the methane from shale-gas production escapes to the atmosphere in venting and leaks over the lifetime of a well. These methane emissions are at least 30% more than and perhaps more than twice as great as those from conventional gas. The higher emissions from shale gas occur at the time wells are hydraulically fractured—as methane escapes from flow-back return fluids—and during drill out following the fracturing. Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential that is far greater than that of carbon dioxide, particularly over the time horizon of the first few decades following emission. Methane contributes substantially to the greenhouse gas footprint of shale gas on shorter time scales, dominating it on a 20-year time horizon. The footprint for shale gas is greater than that for conventional gas or oil when viewed on any time horizon, but particularly so over 20 years. Compared to coal, the footprint of shale gas is at least 20% greater and perhaps more than twice as great on the 20-year horizon and is comparable when compared over 100 years.

### Debt Ceiling – 2AC

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

#### Uniqueness overwhelms – GOP will cave and PC’s not key

**Sargent**, **1/3**/2013 (Greg, The Morning Plum: Media shouldn’t get rolled by GOP debt ceiling spin, The Washington Post, p. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/01/03/the-morning-plum-media-shouldnt-get-rolled-by-gop-debt-ceiling-spin/)

The papers are filled with articles reporting in a matter-of-fact way that Republicans plan to use the debt ceiling fight to extract major spending cuts from the White House and Democrats. Mitch McConnell is out there this morning calling for a quick resolution to the standoff — one that exchanges a debt limit hike for deep cuts. The early returns, based on the coverage of this looming battle so far, suggest Republicans are successfully defining the terms of this debate — they are defining it as a standard Washington standoff, in which each side will demand concessions from the other. Indeed, you can read through reams of the coverage without learning three basic facts about this fight: 1) Republican leaders will ultimately agree to raise the debt ceiling, and they know it, because they themselves have previously admitted that not doing so will badly damage the economy. 2) Because of the above, a hike in the debt ceiling is not something that Democratic leaders want and that Republican leaders don’t. In other words, it is not a typical bargaining chip in negotiations, in the way spending cuts (which Republicans want and Dems don’t) or tax hikes (which Dems want and Republicans don’t) are.

#### Hagel nomination kills capital --- trades off with budget battles.

**Ratnam**, **12/30**/2012 (Gopal, Obama’s political, policy and Pentagon dilemma, The Bulletin, p. <http://www.bendbulletin.com/article/20121230/NEWS0107/212300381/>)

Having dropped U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice and named Massachusetts Democratic Sen. John Kerry to replace Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, Obama runs the risk of appearing weak if he bows to political opposition again and chooses someone other than former Nebraska Republican senator Chuck Hagel to lead the Pentagon. Picking another candidate would show for a second time “that the president’s important choices for personnel can be vetoed by two or three senators," said Sean Kay, a professor of politics and government at Ohio Wesleyan University in Delaware, Ohio, who specializes in U.S. foreign and defense policy. “The White House will come out of this significantly weakened." If Obama sticks with Hagel in the face of opposition from an ad hoc coalition of Republican advocates of muscular defense policies, Democratic supporters of Israel and gay rights activists, though, Obama might be forced to spend political capital he needs for the bigger battle over the federal budget and deficit reduction.

#### Capital fails --- the divide is too big.

**Bouie**, 12/24/**2012** (Jamelle, Why hopes for a Senate ‘fiscal cliff’ deal are misplaced, The Plum Line, The Washington Post, p. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2012/12/24/why-hopes-for-a-senate-fiscal-cliffdeal-are-misplaced/>)

For those who hope to see a deal before January, it’s worth appreciating the large expanse that separates the two parties. It isn’t just that they disagree on tax hikes — they have a fundamentally different view of what ails the economy. Democrats — as evidenced by their continued support for unemployment insurance, infrastructure spending and broader stimulus — believe that the economy has been held back by insufficient demand. In which case, the best thing government can do is continue to spend and put resources into circulation — it’s why President Obama’s original request on the fiscal cliff included $425 billion in stimulus through job measures and tax extenders. This is the mainstream view of the problem (and solution). Republicans, and conservatives in particular, disagree. Lawmakers such as Boehner and Barrasso insist that high spending and deficits are holding back the economy and that tax hikes are unnecessary — lower spending, especially on entitlements, is enough to fix our finances and get the economy back in order. The big, obvious problem is that none of those things are true. The country’s high deficits have far more to do with economic slowdown — and measures meant to reduce joblessness — than it does with excessive spending. A full economic recovery would create hundreds of billions in new revenue and kick a large dent in the current deficit. There is a long-run budget problem, but that’s — by and large — driven by the rising cost of health care. Cuts to Social Security — floated in the most recent White House proposal — would do little to address the problem. And then there’s the fact that other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have tried to cut their way out of the recession, with predictably disastrous results; the country is just now coming out of its austerity-induced double-dip recession. In any case, you can’t bridge this fundamental difference of perception with hard-nosed deal-making. If there’s anything that will force Republicans to budge, it’s an external shock to the system. And in this instance, that might mean just going over the fiscal cliff.

#### Obama won’t spend capital on the debt ceiling.

New York Times, **1/2**/2013 (Lawmakers Gird for Next Fiscal Clash, on the Debt Ceiling, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/us/politics/for-obama-no-clear-path-to-avoid-a-debt-ceiling-fight.html?pagewanted=all)

With the resolution of the year-end fiscal crisis just hours old, the next political confrontation is already taking shape as this city braces for a fight in February over raising the nation’s borrowing limit. But it is a debate President Obama says he will have nothing more to do with. Even as Republicans vow to leverage a needed increase in the federal debt limit to make headway on their demands for deep spending cuts, Mr. Obama — who reluctantly negotiated a deal like that 18 months ago — says he has no intention of ever getting pulled into another round of charged talks on the issue with Republicans on Capitol Hill. “I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they’ve already racked up through the laws that they passed,” the president said Tuesday night after he successfully pushed Republicans to allow tax increases on wealthy Americans.

#### Case outweighs –

#### No link – doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Olive branch –

#### A) GOP loves the plan

**Washington Independent 11** (“Offshore drilling vote sees bipartisan support in U.S. House, but not for Florida delegation”, 5/12, http://washingtonindependent.com/109468/offshore-drilling-vote-sees-bipartisan-support-in-u-s-house-but-not-for-florida-delegation)

The U.S. House of Representatives passed the second of its three-part package of bills **aimed at encouraging offshore drilling** on Wednesday. # **More than two dozen Democrats joined Republicans in supporting the measure**, but the Florida delegation voted strictly along party lines, with Republicans in support and Democrats in opposition. # Democratic Rep. Ted Deutch of Boca Raton made some noise about a provision that would steer drilling-related court cases – even those affecting Florida – to the Fifth Judicial Circuit, which has a reputation for being oil-friendly. Deutch offered an amendment to strike that provision, which failed. # The third piece of the pro-drilling package, which sets production targets for domestic oil and **gas production**, **could pass as early as today**. The bills face long odds in the Senate, where oil executives are getting grilled on industry tax breaks.

#### B) That’s key to a debt ceiling

NYT 1/2 (New York Times, “Lawmakers Gird for Next Fiscal Clash, on the Debt Ceiling”, 2013, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?board=119.0)

 Even as Republicans vow to leverage a needed increase in the federal debt limit to make headway on their demands for deep spending cuts, Mr. Obama — who reluctantly negotiated a deal like that 18 months ago — says he has no intention of ever getting pulled into another round of charged talks on the issue with Republicans on Capitol Hill. “I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they’ve already racked up through the laws that they passed,” the president said Tuesday night after he successfully pushed Republicans to allow tax increases on wealthy Americans. The president’s position is sure to appeal to his liberal allies, who fear another round of compromises by Mr. Obama. But it once again sets the stage for a nail-biting standoff that economists warn could lead to a damaging financial default and doubt from investors about the ability of the country to pay its obligations.

#### Revenue –

#### A) Plan creates a new source of revenue

Murphy 12 (Robert – Institute for Energy Research, “CBO grossly understates Potential Revenues from Offshore Drilling”, 9/11, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/09/11/cbo-underestimates-potential/)

A recent analysis [.pdf] from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) made it appear as if there would be little benefit from the federal government allowing entrepreneurs to develop more of America’s oil and gas resources. Yet as we’ll see, CBO’s presentation was misleading, and it ignored the major benefits of the government changing policies to allow more access to find and develop the United States’ enormous energy potential. The CBO’s Numbers The CBO report first lays out the context of its analysis: The federal government offers private businesses the opportunity to bid on leases for the development of on- and offshore oil and natural gas resources on federal lands—although not all federally controlled lands are open to leasing now….CBO has analyzed a proposal to immediately open most federal lands to oil and gas leasing, which would affect the amounts the federal government collects in various fees and royalties both in the near term and over a longer period. Implementing such a proposal would open two categories of property now closed to development: Lands where leasing is now statutorily prohibited, notably, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and Onshore and offshore areas that are unavailable for leasing under current administrative policies, including sections of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)— generally, the submerged lands between 3 miles and 200 miles from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Florida coastlines—and certain onshore areas in which oil and gas leasing is either restricted or temporarily prohibited. The CBO report then concludes that “opening ANWR to development would yield about $5 billion in additional receipts over the next 10 years, primarily in the form of bonus payments made by private firms for the opportunity to explore for and develop resources in particular areas.” After this ten-year period, the CBO relies on EIA projections to estimate “gross royalties from leasing in ANWR would probably total between $25 billion and $50 billion (in 2010 dollars) during the 2023–2035 period, or roughly $2 billion to $4 billion a year.” Outside of ANWR, the CBO report estimates “that additional gross proceeds from federal oil and gas leases on public lands—principally in certain sections of the OCS…would total about $2 billion over the 2013–2022 period.” Unlike ANWR, the CBO refuses to say what the increase in government revenue would be beyond the initial ten-year period, because “[m]uch of the near-term development enabled by the proposal (beyond that in ANWR) would occur under current law, albeit at a later time.” In summary, someone taking the CBO report at face value would conclude (a) the federal and state governments at most would get about $7 billion total in the first ten years (primarily from bonus payments) if they removed all federal obstacles to ANWR and OCS development, and (b) even in the longer term from 2023-2035, we can only say with confidence that the proposal would bring in an additional $2 to $4 billion per year, relative to current policies. Billions of dollars is nothing to sneeze at, of course, but the implication is that the proponents of “drill baby, drill” are exaggerating their case. To drive home the point, the CBO report then presents this chart: Visually, the above chart certainly makes it seem as if complaints about federal constraints are overblown; it looks like the government is hardly restricting access to American oil and gas resources. A Different Picture To respond to the CBO report, a very easy step is to consolidate the data presented in their figure. The visual trick in the CBO image involves spreading out the inaccessible resources across six different categories. Suppose instead that we consolidate everything—using their own numbers—into two categories, namely those resources on federal lands that are currently accessible, versus those that aren’t. The revised chart looks like this: Thus, the CBO’s own numbers show that some 51 billion barrels of oil and gas resources on federal lands are currently inaccessible. That works out to 29 percent of the total, again using CBO’s own numbers. At a time when motorists are struggling with prices at the pump, and the Obama Administration is releasing oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, it is significant that the CBO admits the federal government itself keeps almost 30 percent of expected US resources off-limits to development. To put these numbers in perspective, consider: In 2011, the U.S. imported a total of 1.7 billion barrels of crude oil and products from OPEC nations. Thus, the 51 billion barrels of oil and gas that the CBO admits are rendered inaccessible under current policies, works out to thirty times as much as the U.S. imported from OPEC last year. (Even if we consider just the oil resources that CBO admits are off-limit—33 billion barrels—then the figure falls to “only” nineteen times the amount imported from OPEC last year.) These calculations are not to suggest that if the federal government removed all restrictions, then imports from OPEC would fall to zero. Standard economic analysis shows that it makes a country’s people richer to import items from abroad if, on the margin, doing so is cheaper than producing everything domestically. Even so, the important point is that people warning of America’s “dependence on foreign oil” often have no idea just how blessed the country is with rich deposits. It only seems that the U.S. is starved for oil, because the federal government takes so much off the table. The Crucial Choice of Baseline Beyond the visually misleading chart, another aspect of the CBO report is the choice of policy baseline. Recall that the report estimated opening up ANWR would lead to $5 billion in additional government receipts over the first 10 years (i.e. through 2022), and then some $25 to $50 billion in additional receipts from 2023 – 2035. Thus the real revenue windfall came in the second decade, as the newly leased lands began cranking out product (and thus generating royalty revenue for the government). Yet when it came to estimating the budgetary impact of opening up the OCS, the CBO would only discuss the gains in the first decade; it put them at $2 billion. CBO refused to speculate on what would happen in 2023 – 2035, because in this case, the OCS lands were technically not inaccessible at such future dates. In other words, with current policy, certain lands in ANWR cannot be developed, either now or in the future. But with much of the OCS, there is nothing in the “baseline” preventing them from being developed down the road. Hence, CBO will not say that opening up such lands in the present, will lead to higher receipts for the government beyond the year 2022. Although such accounting may be appropriate in a technical sense, it is misleading to the average reader of the CBO report. If we use the same scaling factor as CBO applied to ANWR, we would conclude that in addition to the $2 billion in extra receipts from expanded OCS development in the years 2013 – 2022, the government (states and federal) could expect additional receipts of $10 to $20 billion from 2023 – 2035. Another way of putting it is that this potential $10 to $20 billion in government receipts during 2023 – 2035 will not materialize if the federal government maintains its current restrictions on OCS development. Lowball Estimates Thus far, we have taken the CBO’s numbers at face value, and just pointed out two tricks with the presentation style. However, in this final section we’ll challenge the estimates themselves. For starters, the CBO is probably grossly understating the potential for bonus bids in ANWR, when it puts them at less than $5 billion for the entire decade of 2013 – 2022. Yet in FY 2008 alone, total bonus payments were more than $10 billion. Now to be fair, this isn’t an apples to apples comparison, since the expanded ANWR development would only represent a fraction of total bonus payments. Nonetheless, the figure shows that CBO’s ANWR analysis is quite conservative. More generally, other analysts have projected much larger receipts for federal and state governments, from expanded development. For example, in a February 2009 study, Joseph Mason estimated that in the long-run, expanded OCS development (not including ANWR) would yield an average of $14.3 billion in extra royalty revenue per year. He also estimated an additional $54.7 billion in federal tax revenue annually, and $18.7 billion in additional state and local tax revenue (though these figures count the tax receipts from expanded economic activity). To show that these aren’t pedantic quibbles, we can point to a real-world example of what we mean. In a June 26, 2006 memo[RM1] to Richard Pombo , CBO projected federal OCS revenues in 2008 (net of sharing with states) to be about $10.5 billion. Yet actual OCS revenues in 2008 were $18 billion. This is a rather large underestimate, for a projection that was made only two years earlier. (Also, the bulk of the discrepancy was in the form of bonus payments, which are not particularly susceptible to a temporarily high spot price of oil.)

#### B) Increased revenue source is key to a deal on the debt ceiling.

Munro 1/2 (Neil, The Daily Caller, 1/2/13, <http://dailycaller.com/2013/01/02/obama-schedules-debt-ceiling-fiscal-cliff-ii-for-february/2/>)

Federal officials say they’ll use a series of financial maneuvers to postpone any problems until February. But sometime after that, Obama’s administration won’t be able to borrow more money, and will have to use day-to-day tax revenues to fund the government’s myriad popular and unpopular programs. Without any negotiations, Washington will be gripped by another fiscal crisis sometime in February, while the GOP and Obama battle for public support and international lenders consider further downgrades to the nation’s credit ratings. Obama used his brief appearance Jan. 1 to claim that any limits on the government’s ability to borrow funds would be extremely dangerous. “If Congress refuses to give the United States government the ability to pay [its] bills on time, the consequences for the entire global economy would be catastrophic,” he claimed. Obama’s refusal to negotiate is partly caused by the GOP’s advantage in any debate over the debt ceiling. In the 2011 debt-ceiling dispute, the GOP eventually pressured him to accept spending curbs in exchange for an increase to the debt limit up to $16.4 trillion. Obama has repeatedly complained about that defeat. On Jan. 1, he complained that “the last time this course of action was threatened, our entire recovery was put at risk. Consumer confidence plunged. Business investment plunged. Growth dropped. We can’t go down that path again.” The debt is expected to reach almost $20 trillion by 2016 — equivalent to $80,000 for each working-age American — and then climb to almost $23 trillion by 2022. Current tax revenues are enough to pay roughly 70 percent of federal bills, which include the interest payments on the existing debt. Obama wants to borrow even more money — roughly $850 billion per year — to expand government and operate many additional programs. These programs include large green-tech subsidies, massive government-run healthcare programs and expensive welfare programs for healthy, working-age people. GOP legislators say they won’t allow him to borrow more money unless he agrees to reform long-term government spending.

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital does not affect the agenda

**Dickinson 9** (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

#### Eurozone crisis thumps the global economy – existing reforms haven’t addressed structural problems

Europolitics 1/3/13 ("Echoes of the crisis," http://www.europolitics.info/economy-monetary-affairs/echoes-of-the-crisis-art346706-29.html)

Europe “biggest risk for global economy” in 2013, according to Stiglitz: "In the outlook for 2013, the biggest risks for the global economy are in the US and in Europe," Nobel Prize-winning US economist Joseph Stiglitz wrote in a column for the business daily Handelsblatt, published on 2 January. But "the real risk for the global economy lies in Europe," he warned, making specific reference to economic difficulties in Spain and Greece. "Spain and Greece are in an economic depression with no hope for a recovery,” he noted. The eurozone's 'fiscal pact' is no solution, and the European Central Bank's bond purchase is a temporary palliative at best," Stiglitz wrote. The European Central Bank (ECB) must not impose further conditions for financial aid to countries, he continued. "Otherwise, the medicine will lead to a deterioration in the patient's condition," Stiglitz argued. European policy makers have not until now been able to put in place a real growth pact for peripheral eurozone nations, he wrote. Stiglitz did not rule out further turbulence in the eurozone in 2013.

## Round 3 1AR

### Demand

#### Demand for offshore rigs is up – NEWEST EVIDENCE – their ev is about onshore demand

Pickerell 12/31/12 (Emily, “Demand for offshore rigs up, while onshore count keeps falling”, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/12/31/demand-for-offshore-rigs-up-while-onshore-count-keeps-falling/)

While demand for onshore rigs declined as the result of less natural gas drilling, demand for offshore rigs continues to flourish, driven by Gulf of Mexico demand, industry analysts said Monday. The Gulf of Mexico rig count has increased slightly in the last three months, with 33 floating rigs and 29 jackups for the fourth quarter, up from 27 floating rigs and 27 jackups for the third quarter, according to a Tudor Pickering analyst’s note. Likewise, demand for offshore rigs grew from 73 in January 2012 to 80 by the end of November, as improved technology, such as water flooding, has provided new opportunities to extract oil from maturing wells. The relatively strong price of oil, which closed on Friday on the New York Mercantile Exchange at $90.80 for West Texas Intermediate Crude, compared with natural gas, which closed on Friday at $3.46 per million cubic feet, has been an additional driver. Oil and gas services companies are working hard to meet the offshore demand: Ensco, for example, has three ultra-deepwater rigs that will be available in 2013. Demand has dipped in onshore drilling, as the big operators have shifted away from chasing natural gas exploration, resulting in a 61 percent decline for onshore rigs in 2012, down from 2,082 in January to 1,841 at the end of November 2011. The downturn comes after 13 quarters of increased drilling activity, Tudor Pickering said in its report. The Permian and the Eagle Ford basins have been the hardest hit by the decline, according to Tudor Pickering, while East Texas and North Louisiana have held up the best. Companies are also trending towards the newer and more efficient alternating-current technology for drilling rig**s.** Alternating-current engines allow for greater mobility and control over the drilling process, and are considered to be safer and more environmentally friendly. The older mechanical rigs have made up 72 percent of the rig decline, according to Tudor Pickering, who noted that “as activity trended lower during the quarter, we noticed operators clearly holding onto and/or high-grading their fleets.” Chesapeake continues to have the highest U.S. natural gas rig count, with 37 rigs, while Exxon and Devon have 31 and 30, respectively. Likewise, Chesapeake also has by far the biggest number of onshore oil rigs, 73, while Anadarko has 47 and Devon has 42.

### Pricing

#### Natural gas prices rising – Demand is increasing, fracking doesn’t solve

Lackey 12 (Mark, energy analyst with CHF Investor Relations, “This Is Your Energy Entry Point: Mark Lackey,” 8-30-12, <http://www.theenergyreport.com/pub/na/14243>)

Natural gas has been somewhat weaker, but it bounced off the $2/thousand cubic feet (Mcf) price a few months ago up to the $2.85–3/Mcf range in North America. With more industrial demand coming back, particularly in the auto sector, and stronger demand from electric utilities, gas should move back up closer to $3.25–3.30/Mcf in the next year. By way of comparison, prices in Europe can be anywhere from $4–8/Mcf, and in China they're as high as $15/Mcf.

#### Steady rise in prices coming now – developmental costs

Conti 12 (John J., Assistant Administrator of Energy Analysis, United States Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2012,” June 2012, [http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf)](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282012%29.pdf%29)

U.S. natural gas prices are determined largely by supply and demand conditions in North American markets. At current (2012) price levels, natural gas prices are below average replacement cost. However, over time natural gas prices rise with the cost of developing incremental production capacity (Figure 103). After 2017, natural gas prices rise in the AEO2012 Reference case more rapidly than crude oil prices, but oil prices remain at least three times higher than natural gas prices through the end of the projection (Figure 104). As of January 1, 2010, total proved and unproved natural gas resources are estimated at 2,203 trillion cubic feet. Development costs for natural gas wells are expected to grow slowly. Henry Hub spot prices for natural gas rise by 2.1 percent per year from 2010 through 2035 in the Reference case, to an annual average of $7.37 per million Btu (2010 dollars) in 2035.

### Reg Neg – Ext – Coal Blocks

#### Coal producing companies

Behr 9 (Peter – ClimateWire, “Power Industry Infighting Heats Up Over Climate Legislation “, 7/16, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/07/16/16climatewire-power-industry-infighting-heats-up-over-clim-38477.html?pagewanted=all)

Merchant power hits back Representatives of the merchant power sector said those companies must build cleaner generation technologies in the years ahead to remain in business and are doing more today on the climate front than the co-ops, public power companies or regulated utilities. It's not bad when power companies make money, Shelk said. "That's a good thing. We know we have to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in new, clean technologies." "We already have the cleanest fleet in the country; the lowest emissions; more gas, more nuclear and less coal" than the rest of the industry, he said. "The idea that APPA and NRECA -- which are largely exempt [from the House bill] -- would be lecturing to the rest of us on benefits is pretty hard to take. They are a heck of a lot dirtier." Shelk added, "It is really unfortunate that NARUC would put its name on such a report. It is supposed to represent all of us, and it didn't give [us] a chance to be heard." The controversy has helped launch a new industry advocacy group in an already crowded field -- Generators for Affordable Power -- which represents the coal merchant generators, and includes Allegheny, Ameren, Constellation, Dominion, First Energy and Edison International. Matt Most, managing director of environmental policy for Edison Mission, criticized the Synapse study on behalf of the coal generators group, saying Synapse assumed that the current generation breakdown among coal, natural gas, renewable and nuclear power would remain unchanged if cap and trade and a renewable energy standard became law. "Clearly, the cost of carbon will make fundamental changes in how electricity is produced," said Most. Wind is going to continue to grow, and natural gas will displace coal, he said. "That is the very assumption this paper [Synapse's study] is avoiding." Some industry experts said that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission could, in theory, intervene if merchant generators were taking unfair advantage of the allotment program. But such an effort could run into the complex ownership arrangements that the merchant companies have for their various coal, nuclear and renewable generation sources, they added.

### Reg Neg – Ext – Litigation

#### Reg neg’s are prone to litigation

Choinski 2 (Alexander – J.D. Candidate, 2003, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S. magna cum laude, Vanderbilt University , “SYMPOSIUM ISSUE ON WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT COMPLIANCE: Anatomy of a Controversy: The Balance of Political Forces Behind Implementation of the WTO's Gasoline Decision”, 2002, SUMMER 2002 33 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 569, lexis)

n8 Although the reg neg was touted as "litigation proof," Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1290 (1997), participants in the negotiation commenced several lawsuits on various grounds. See id. Moreover, industry executives, while affirming the value of the negotiated rule, continued to express deep concerns over the political fallout for the oil industry resulting from costs imposed by the rule. See Reformulated Gasoline Oxygenate Additive Fight Goes Down to Wire, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 19, 1994, LEXIS, Bloomberg News File [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Fight].

### Reg Neg CP – A2: Litigation NB

#### Reg neg on energy and environmental issues increases - not decreases – litigation

Coglianese 1 (Cary, Assoc Prof of Pub Policy @ Harvard, "Assessing The Advocacy Of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response To Philip Harter," http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-cbg/research/c.coglianese\_new.york\_assessing.advocacy.pdf)

¶ ¶ ¶ My research follows appropriate standards for empirical research and overcomes major limitations of ¶ the two prior efforts to make comparative assessments of negotiated rulemaking. Unlike Kerwin and ¶ Furlong (who, in fairness, never really set out to evaluate negotiated rulemaking), I include in my ¶ assessment all the negotiated rulemakings completed by EPA during the study period. Unlike the ¶ NPR report, I rely on primary source data on the filings of suits challenging EPA rules and thus ¶ provide an accurate account of litigation filed against both negotiated and conventional rules. By ¶ carefully applying empirical research methods, I find that on average it has taken EPA about three ¶ years to develop a rule, regardless of whether the agency used negotiated rulemaking or conventional ¶ rulemaking procedures.¶ 47¶ The median duration is also about the same for negotiated and ¶ conventional rules.¶ 48¶ Negotiated rulemaking does seem to make a difference when it comes to ¶ litigation—however, the difference is in the direction opposite to what has been expected. ¶ Negotiated rules are challenged 50 percent of the time, while other comparable, significant EPA ¶ rules are challenged only 35 percent of the time.¶ 49¶ These results indicate all too clearly that ¶ negotiated rulemaking has failed to accomplish its goals of preventing litigation and saving time. ¶ Negotiation simply does not “cure” regulatory malaise.

#### Reg neg over environmental issues increases litigation - empirical data proves

Coglianese 1 (Cary, Assoc Prof of Pub Policy @ Harvard, "Assessing The Advocacy Of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response To Philip Harter," http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-cbg/research/c.coglianese\_new.york\_assessing.advocacy.pdf)

Over the years, advocates of negotiated rulemaking consistently claimed that the procedure ¶ would eliminate subsequent litigation filed challenging administrative rules.¶ 140¶ Yet until I undertook ¶ my research, no one had sought to assess these claims by collecting comprehensive data on court ¶ filings for negotiated and conventional rules. Having collected this data for the EPA, I find that six ¶ out of the twelve completed EPA negotiated rules in my study have resulted in legal challenges, a ¶ litigation rate higher than that for all significant rules under EPA’s major statutes and almost twice ¶ as high as that for EPA rules generally.¶ 141¶ Harter does not dispute that these challenges to negotiated ¶ rules were filed.¶ 142¶ Rather, he claims that negotiated rulemaking was never really meant to reduce ¶ litigation.¶ 143¶ He also claims that I fail to account for differences in litigation and that when these ¶ differences are considered, negotiated rulemaking results in less protracted litigation.¶ 144¶ In this Part, ¶ I demonstrate that Harter is wrong on both counts: negotiated rulemaking has long aimed to reduce legal challenges to agency rules and it has failed to reduce both the number and intensity of these ¶ challenges.

#### Reg neg doesn’t reduce litigation – empirical studies prove

Coglianese 1 (Cary, Assoc Prof of Pub Policy @ Harvard, "Assessing The Advocacy Of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response To Philip Harter," http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-cbg/research/c.coglianese\_new.york\_assessing.advocacy.pdf)

¶ For many years, advocates of negotiated rulemaking have made enthusiastic claims about how ¶ negotiated rulemaking would “break impasses,” “cure malaise,” and “bypass lawyers” in the ¶ administrative process.¶ 1¶ Strikingly, such advocates have expressed little interest over the years in ¶ systematically testing their claims by assessing the effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking against ¶ existing rulemaking processes. My research, in contrast, aims to do just that. Beginning several ¶ years ago, I set forth to test the widely stated claims about the superiority of negotiated rulemaking ¶ for preventing litigation and saving time in the regulatory process.¶ 2¶ Following exacting and ¶ transparent standards of empirical evaluation, my research demonstrates all too clearly that ¶ negotiated rulemaking has failed to meet these two prominent goals. It neither saves time nor ¶ reduces litigation.¶ 3

### Pcp

#### “Resolved” means law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Doesn’t mean certainty

Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word “would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does

## Round 5 v. Emory

### A2: LNG Exports Bad – Russian Economy – 2AC (Russia Scenario)

#### Russian economy is collapsing now

MarketWatch 10/8 (“World Bank says Russian economy to slow”, 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/world-bank-says-russian-economy-to-slow-2012-10-08)

 MOSCOW--Russia's economy will slow over the next year, the World Bank said Monday, while urging the country to stick with prudent spending plans and focus monetary policy on low inflation. Growth in Russian gross **domestic product will slow** from 4.3% in 2011 to 3.5% this year and 3.6% in 2013 due to unfavorable base effects, drought in the agricultural sector, rising inflation and weak global sentiment, the World Bank said in a report. The bank revised down its 2012 estimate by 0.3 percentage point and its 2013 forecast by 0.6 percentage point since its June report, citing a poor grain harvest and a weaker-than-expected global environment. "Just at a time when Russia's output levels have exceeded the pre-crisis peak, the economy is settling onto a lower trajectory, even though oil prices have stayed high," the bank said.

#### Russia’s economy is resilient – oil, metals, and financial reserves

**Garrels 8** (Annie – a foreign correspondent for National Public Radio in the United States, “RUSSIAN ECONOMY STRONG DESPITE COMMODITY FALLOUT”, 9/20/08, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94647099>)

For the past six years**, Russia's economy has boomed in large part because of soaring prices for oil and metals.** Russia is strong in these areas ó too strong, though, for a balanced economy. Russian shares have bled almost 50 percent of their value since May, but many analysts say Russia still remains a resilient economy. And after the Georgia invasion and weeks of harsh, anti-western rhetoric, both Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have tried to reassure foreign investors. When those commodities prices dropped, Russia's stock market was hit hard. "The question is if they fall significantly further," says James Fenkner with Red Star Assets in Moscow. Fenkner is one of the more cautious voices in Moscow, and other analysts like Roland Nash of Renaissance Capital look at other indicators, like direct foreign investment. "The level of foreign investment is twice the per capita of Brazil, **four times that of China**, and six times that of India this year," Nash says. "The market arguments for Russia are still very good and there is still a lot of money coming in." Too Dependent On Commodities The Russia government recognizes it is too dependent on commodities, and while their prices were high, it amassed **huge reserves as a cushion**. The country now has a balanced budget and financial analysts predict its economy will continue to grow at about six percent. Vladmir Tikhomirov, senior economist at Uralsib Financial Corporation, says this is enough to avoid a crisis, but it is not what the Kremlin hoped for. "It's not enough to make fundamental changes to the economic structures," Tikhomirov says. "Russia must have to be a more competitive and efficient economy." Moscow may now be the most expensive, glamorous city in the world, but the rest of the country lags behind. Tikhomirov says the Russia needs to improve basic infrastructure like roads as well as small and mid-size businesses. For this, Russia needs a stable global financial system

#### Econ decline won’t change Russia’s foreign policy or cause domestic unrest – empirically denied

Blackwill 9 (Robert Blackwill 2009; former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning; RAND, "The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution", http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf)

Now on to Russia. Again, fi ve years from today. Did the global recession and Russia’s present serious economic problems substantially modify Russian foreign policy? No. (President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as this paper goes to press; nothing fundamental will result from that visit). Did it produce a serious weakening of Vladimir Putin’s power and authority in Russia? No, as recent polls in Russia make clear. Did it reduce Russian worries and capacities to oppose NATO enlargement and defense measures eastward? No. Did it aff ect Russia’s willingness to accept much tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends to make a nuclear weapon.25 In sum, Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized as follows: to resurrect Russia’s standing as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary infl uence over the space of the former Soviet Union; to resist Western efforts to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russia’s military might and power projection; to extend the reach of Russian diplomacy in Europe, Asia, and beyond; and to oppose American global primacy. For Moscow, these foreign policy first principles are here to stay, as they have existed in Russia for centuries. 26 None of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to be changed in any serious way by the economic crisis.

### ASPEC

#### **Saying “Federal Government” doesn’t mean “all three branches” – any one body acts as it**

Chicago 7 (University of Chicago Manual of Style, “Capitalization, Titles”, http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS\_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles30.html)

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be U.S. Federal Government or U.S. federal government? A. The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

### Byrne and Toly K (Emory PS) – 2AC

**Alt cedes the political – energy specific**

**Kuzemko 12** [Caroline Kuzemko, CSGR University of Warwick, Security, the State and Political Agency: Putting ‘Politics’ back into UK Energy, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/381_61.pdf>]

Both Hay (2007) and Flinders and Buller (2006) suggest that there are other forms that depoliticisation can take, or in the terminology of Flinders and Buller ‘tactics’ which politicians can pursue in order to move a policy field to a more indirect governing relationship (Flinders and Buller 2006: 296). For the purposes of understanding the depoliticisation of UK energy policy, however, two of Colin Hay’s forms of depoliticisation are most useful: the ‘… offloading of areas of formal political responsibility to the market…’ and the passing of policymaking responsibility to quasipublic, or independent, authorities (Hay 2007: 82-3). 1 What each of these forms of depoliticisation has in common is the degree to which they can serve, over time, to reduce political capacity by removing processes of deliberation and contestation, thereby reducing the ability for informed agency and choice. In that politics can be understood as being inclusive of processes of deliberation, contestation, informed agency and collective choice the lack of deliberation and capacity for informed agency would result in sub-optimal politics (Hay 2007: 67; cf. Gamble 2000; Wood 2011; Jenkins 2011). There seems little doubt that, with regard to energy as a policy area, the principal of establishing a more indirect governing system had become accepted by UK political elites. One of the very few close observers of UK energy policy from the 1980s to early 2000s claims that both Conservative and New Labour politicians had actively sought to remove energy from politics, making it an ‘economic’ subject: From the early 1980s, British energy policy, and its associated regulatory regime, was designed to transform a state-owned and directed sector into a normal commodity market. Competition and 1 "These"forms"are"referred"to"elsewhere"by"the"author"as"‘marketised’"and"‘technocratic’"depoliticisation"(Kuzemko" 2012b:").liberalization would, its architects hoped, take energy out of the political arena… Labour shared this vision and hoped that energy would drop off the political agenda…. (Helm 2003: 386) 2 As already suggested this paper considers the intention to depoliticise energy to have been reasonably successful. By the early 2000s the Energy Ministry had been disbanded, there was little or no formal Parliamentary debate, energy was not represented at Cabinet level, responsibility for the supply of energy had been passed to the markets, it was regulated by an independent body, and the (cf. Kuzemko 2012b). Furthermore, the newly formed Energy Directorate within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which now had responsibility for energy policy, had no specific energy mandates but instead mandates regarding encouraging the right conditions for business with an emphasis on competition (Helm et al 1989: 55; cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 107). As feared by various analysts who write about depoliticisation as a sub-optimal form of politics, these processes of depoliticisation had arguably resulted in a lack of deliberation about energy and its governance outside of narrow technocratic elite circles. Within these circles energy systems were modelled, language was specific and often unintelligible to others, including generalist politicians or wider publics, and this did, indeed, further encourage a high degree of disengagement with the subject (cf. Kern 2010; Kuzemko 2012b; Stern 1987). Technical language and hiring practices that emphasised certain forms of economic education further isolated elite technocratic circles from political contestation and other forms of knowledge about energy. Arguably, by placing those actors who have been elected to represent the national collective interest at one remove from processes of energy governance the result was a lack of formal political capacity in this policy field. It is worth, briefly, at this point reiterating the paradoxical nature of depoliticisation. Whilst decisions to depoliticise are deeply political, political capacity to deliberate, contest and act in an issue area can be reduced through these processes. Depoliticisation has been an ongoing form of governing throughout the 20 th century it may (Burnham 2001: 464), however, be particularly powerful and more difficult to reverse when underpinned by increasingly dominant ideas about how best to govern. For example Hay, in looking for the domestic sources of depoliticisation in the 1980s and 1990s, suggests that these processes were firmly underpinned by neoliberal and public choice ideas not only about the role of the state but also about the ability for political actors to make sound decisions relating, in particular, to economic governance (Hay 2007: 95-99). Given the degree to which such ideas were held increasingly to be legitimate over this time period depoliticisation was, arguably, genuinely understood by many as a process that would result in better governance (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 15 cf. Hay 2007: 94; Kern 2010). This to a certain extent makes decisions to depoliticise appear both less instrumental but also harder to reverse given the degree to which such ideas become further entrenched via processes of depoliticisation (cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 61-66; Wood 2011: 7).

**Turns the k**

**McClean ‘1**

[David. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope” [www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/2001%2520Conference/Discussion%2520papers/david\_mcclean.htm+foucault+habermas+slapped+cud&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1](http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/2001%2520Conference/Discussion%2520papers/david_mcclean.htm%2Bfoucault%2Bhabermas%2Bslapped%2Bcud%26hl%3Den%26gl%3Dus%26ct%3Dclnk%26cd%3D1) 2001]

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems **of its country.** Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).[(1)](file:///E%3A%5C%5CWINDOWS%5C%5CTemporary%20Internet%20Files%5C%5CContent.IE5%5C%5COTKXU3YH%5C%5Cthe%20city.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22N_1_) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from **being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about** but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Tech thought is inevitable

Kateb 97 George, Professor of politics at Princeton, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_/ai\_19952031

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity--and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives--would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence. As for our generation and the indefinite future, many of us are prepared to say that there are many things we wish that modern science did not know or is likely to find out and many things we wish that modern technology did not know how to do. When referring in 1955 to the new sciences of life, Heidegger says We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us (1966, p. 52). The implication is that it is less bad for the human status or stature and for the human relation to reality that there be nuclear destruction than that (what we today call) genetic engineering should go from success to success. To such lengths can a mind push itself when it marvels first at the passions, drives, and motives that are implicated in modern technology, and then marvels at the feats of technological prowess. The sense of wonder is entangled with a feeling of horror. We are past even the sublime, as conceptualized under the influence of Milton's imagination of Satan and Hell. It is plain that so much of the spirit of the West is invested in modern technology. We have referred to anger, alienation, resentment. But that cannot be the whole story. Other considerations we can mention include the following: a taste for virtuosity, skill for its own sake, an enlarged fascination with technique in itself, and, along with these, an aesthetic craving to make matter or nature beautiful or more beautiful; and then, too, sheer exhilaration, a questing, adventurous spirit that is reckless, heedless of danger, finding in obstacles opportunities for self-overcoming, for daring, for the very sort of daring that Heidegger praises so eloquently when in 1935 he discusses the Greek world in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1961, esp. pp. 123-39). All these considerations move away from anger, anxiety, resentment, and so on. The truth of the matter, I think, is that the project of modern technology, just like that of modern science, must attract a turbulence of response. The very passions and drives and motives that look almost villainous or hypermasculine simultaneously look like marks of the highest human aspiration, or, at the least, are not to be cut loose from the highest human aspiration.

#### The Aff’s a prerequisite to the Alt – we make tech better

Feenberg 7 (Andrew, Canada Research Chair in the Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Volume 42, “Between Reason and Experience,” p. 24-27, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Between\_Reason\_and\_Experience\_DYP42.pdf)

As I reformulate this social version of the technical revealing, it has political consequences. Political protests arise as feedback from disastrous technical projects and designs reaches those excluded from the original networks of control. These protests are often based on scientific knowledge of the devastation caused by technology designed in indifference to human needs. This is the point at which objective facts enter experience as motives for distrust and fear of technology and technical authority. The subjects become aware of the contingency of the technically structured world on choices and decisions that do not proceed from a supposedly pure rationality. The lifeworld reacts back on technology through the objective contents of knowledge of its side effects. There have been many attempts to articulate the implications of this new situation. My approach is closest to that of Ulrich Beck. Like him I argue that we are entering a new phase of technological development in which the externalities associated with the prevailing technologies threaten the survival of the industrial system (Beck, 1992). This threat has begun to force redesign of many technologies and changes in the disciplines and training underlying the technical professions. Beck explains the transition from a capitalism based on distinct spheres with little interaction, to a “reflexive modernity” in which interaction between spheres becomes the norm. Multiple approaches and cross disciplinary conceptions increasingly shape the design process in response. He develops the social consequences of the resultant changes while I have focused primarily on the technological dimension of the new phase. In this phase, what Gilbert Simondon calls “concretizing” innovations emerge designed to accommodate a wider range of social influences and contextual factors.12 As design is pulled in different directions by actors attempting to impose their differing functional requirements on devices, the winning design strategies are often those that reconcile multiple functions in simple and elegant structures capable of serving them all. Examples abound: hybrid engines in automobiles, refrigerants and propellants that do not damage the ozone layer, substitutes for lead in consumer products, and so on. In the process of developing these technologies environmental, medical and other concerns are brought to bear on design by new actors excluded from the original technological regime. Of course, no small refinements such as these can resolve the environmental crisis, but the fact that they are possible at all removes the threat of technological regression as a major alibi for doing nothing. The emergence of a radically new technical politics requires us to rethink the basic concept of rationality that has supplied the existing industrial society with its highest philosophical sanction. Heidegger and Marcuse help us to understand the limitations of the prevailing concept. They remind us that the hypostatization of a reason fragmented into specializations and differentiated from a broader cultural and normative context is not inevitable but belongs to a specific historical era, an era that may well be approaching its end. A new understanding of rationality is possible based not on a return to a teleological worldview in which we can no longer believe but on recognition of the complexity of experiences that have been cast in artificially narrow instrumental schemas. Concrete experience is thus the touchstone of this ontology because it is only there that the world reveals itself in its multifarious and unpredictable connections and potentialities. From this new standpoint specialization and differentiation will not disappear, but they will be treated as methodologically useful rather than as ontologically fundamental. The resultant breaching of the boundaries between disciplines and between the technical realm and the lifeworld responds to the crisis of industrial society. We may learn to bound the cosmos in modern forms by attending to the limits that emerge from the unintended interactions of domains touched by powerful modern technologies. This is the form in which the lived world we have discovered in the thought of Heidegger and Marcuse becomes active in the structure of a rationality that still has for its mission the explanation of objective nature. The discovery of a limit reveals the significance of that which is threatened beyond it. This dialectic of limitation is most obvious in the case of threats to human health or species survival. On the one side, the experienced world gains a ground in respect for an object, in this case the human body or a threatened species. On the other side, a concrete technical response is solicited employing the means at hand in new combinations or inventing new ones. From this standpoint no return to a qualitative science is possible or necessary. Modern science objectifies and reifies by its very nature but it could operate within limits standing in for the lost essences of antiquity and like them referring us to an irreducible truth of experience. As we encounter this truth we are reminded of the necessity of restraint. This must be a productive restraint leading to a process of transformation, not a passive refusal of a reified system. The forward looking Janus face is fundamental and grants hope not by rejecting scientific-technical achievements but by revealing their essential nature as processes in which human action can intervene.13 Innovative responses to the new limits can serve in the reconstruction of both technical disciplines and technology. To be sure, the process character and full complexity of reality cannot be reflected immediately in the scientific-technical disciplines, but the disciplines can be deployed in fluid combinations that reflect the complexity of reality as it enters experience through humanly provoked disasters of all sorts and through the consciousness of new threats of which we ourselves are the ultimate source. The goal is not merely to survive but to reconstruct modern technology around a new model of wealth that is environmentally compatible and that draws on human capacities suppressed or ignored in the present dispensation. Marcuse interpreted this in terms of the surrealist “hazard objectif,” the rather fantastic notion of an aesthetically formed world in which “human faculties and desires ... appear as part of the objective determinism of nature – coincidence of causality through nature and causality through freedom” (Marcuse, 1969: 31).

**Alt doesn’t solve macro—any practical implementation wouldn’t make a dent in individual or macro-level consumption patterns**

**Røpke 05** [Inge Røpke, Department for Manufacturing Engineering and Management Technical University of Denmark, Consumption in ecological economics, International Society for Ecological Economics, April 2005, <http://www.ecoeco.org/pdf/consumption_in_ee.pdf>]

Compared to the other research questions, the question about how to change consumption patterns in a more sustainable direction is relatively under-researched in ecological economics. In relation to the fields of consumer behaviour, economic psychology and environmental psychology, research on 'sustainable consumption' developed, and energy studies provided new knowledge about energy saving behaviour – research that is sometimes reflected in ecological economics (an extensive review of literature on consumer behaviour and behavioural change in relation to sustainable consumption can be found in (Jackson 2005)). The main focus of this research is consumer choice and individual consumer behaviour, and sustainable consumption is about choosing more environmentally friendly products and services (e.g. organic food) and about recycling behaviour, water saving, room temperature etc. The question is how to encourage consumers to make the environmentally correct choices, and measures such as labelling and information campaigns are studied. This research has also tried to distinguish between different social groups or lifestyles to consider whether the political measures should be tailored to different target groups (Empacher and Götz 2004). A successful contribution from this field has been the NOA-model that describes consumer behaviour as the result of the consumer's Needs, Opportunities and Abilities (Ölander and Thøgersen 1995; Gatersleben and Vlek 1998). For instance, the model is used as an organizing device in the OECD publication Towards Sustainable Household Consumption 11(OECD 2002). The model opens up for public initiatives that can improve the opportunities for more sustainable household behaviour, but neither the social construction of needs, nor the macro aspects of the model akre well developed. However, the idea works well together with strategies for increased technological efficiency: more efficient products and services are provided, and the consumers are encouraged to buy them. Whereas the behavioural research usually focuses on individual consumers or households and how they can be motivated to change behaviour, others have taken an interest in bottom-up initiatives where consumers or citizens organize collectively to change their lifestyle and consumption patterns – initiatives varying from mutual help to be 'green consumers' to the establishment of eco-communities (Georg 1999; Michaelis 2004). Unfortunately, such initiatives still seem to have marginal importance. In general, organizational measures are increasingly studied, both bottom-up initiatives and commercial enterprises – for instance, car-sharing has been arranged in both ways (Prettenthaler and Steininger 1999). A widely promoted idea is to reduce resource use by selling services instead of products, the so-called product-service system concept (Mont 2000; Mont 2004). In this way the final services can be provided with fewer resources, as the provider will have an incentive to reduce costs also in the use phase, and as hardware can sometimes be shared by several consumers. Most of the practical steps to change consumption patterns and most of the related research concern relatively marginal changes that **are like a snowball in hell** compared to the challenge we face, if consumption patterns should deserve to be called sustainable – consistent with a level of consumption that could be generalized to all humans without jeopardizing the basic environmental life support systems. Very little is done to face the 'quantity problem'. At the level of research it is difficult to translate the complexity of driving forces behind the ever-increasing consumption into suggestions for workable solutions, and at the level of politics it is hard to imagine how to achieve support for such solutions. As the driving forces are as strong as ever, all **the small steps towards 'sustainable consumption' co-exist with a general worsening of the situation – although many of these steps can be fine, they are far from sufficient.**

**Individual focus fails—consumers are always embedded in social normality.**

**Bartiaux 09** [Francoise Bartiaux, Institute of Demography at the Universite catholique de Louvain (UCL), Changing energy-related practices and behaviours in the residential sector: Sociological approaches, 2009]

Consumers are definitely members of societies and not individual consumers, rational or not, obeying to price signals and applying energy advice. They are living in socio-technical systems and their practices of energy use and savings are embedded in social definitions of comfort, convenience, cleanliness and connectedness (Shove, 2003; Gram-Hansen, 2008). Although there is a growing convergence between societies, these definitions are time and location specific. So “environmentalists should argue for social and cultural diversity. They should do all that can be done to engender multiple meanings of comfort, diverse conventions of cleanliness and forms of social order less reliant on individual modes of co-ordination” concludes Shove (2003, p. 199). Escalating energy consumption has been explained by the interplay between technological developments and the co-evolution of practices and norms. Will declining consumption and energy savings be brought about by similar but reverse co-evolution patterns? It a micro-analytical scale now, these co-evolutions may be transposed into combinations of several “factors” or “domain”, which are not only numerous and complex, but also in competition and even paradoxical: the same ‘factor’ has a double valence, being possibly a lever or a brake to changes in a more energy-saving behaviour. This is summarised in the table below, presenting the major levers and barriers to changes in energy-related practices. Most domains are made of social factors (e.g. technological developments) and aggregate charac-teristics (e.g. proportion of owners). Three points are important to underline. Firstly, the same factor can be experienced as a brake or as a lever; there is thus no straightforward solution. Secondly, the weight that is given to the different lever factors also depends on the action to be undertaken or on the practice to be changed. This process of priorities-setting is often non conscious, except of course in situations where explicit advices are given, for example by an energy expert. Thirdly, there is always a combination of several lever factors: none will thus be sufficient by itself. However, **one brake factor will be sufficient**. (Bartiaux et al., 2006). If energy consumption is to be divided by ‘a factour four’ (von Weiszäcker, Lovins 8 and Lovins, 1997), or more, all the dimensions mentioned above **indicate potential policy implications** in various forms, either for energy policies as such or more broadly in terms of urban planning, employment and training policies and so on. On the whole, this synthesis calls for visible policies of sustainable energy consumption, as these policies would provide discursive consciousness, social legitimacy and relief from making individual “choice” that would be conflicting with social normality, as contextually defined.

**Tech optimism based on empirical research is good**

Krier 85 (James E., Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, “The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 3; December 1985, pp. 405-429)

A technological optimist is **not** simply **a person with unqualified enthusiasm about technological promise**. Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was an enthusiast, but he was not a technological optimist as the term is currently used. Saint-Simon, rather, was a utopian who happened to attach his vision to technocratic expertise.4 He was the forefather of Technocracy, an active utopian movement in the 1930s and one not entirely dead even today.5 Technological optimists are not utopians, but something less - let us say quasi-utopians, after a recent usage (applied to himself) of Robert Dahl's.6 Unlike any self-respecting pure utopian, quasi-utopians (and technological optimists) seek not perfection but **tolerable imperfection**, tolerable because it is better than anything else they consider attainable though not nearly as good as lots of alternatives that can be imagined. But technological optimists are also something more than mere be- lievers, or faddists, or techniks.7 Their views are rigorously formulated, grounded in an apparent reality, based on knowledge and experience, and artfully defended. There are no crazies among the best of the optimists; they are **conservative, respected experts who command enormous authority**. They have a very specific position namely, "that exponential technological growth will allow us to expand resources ahead of exponentially increasing demands."8

#### Consumption focus fails-~--political action key

Bryant 12—prof of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, Black Ecology: A Pessimistic Moment, larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/03/19/black-ecology-a-pessimistic-moment/)

So why is this an issue? It’s an issue because while environmentalists prescribe all sorts of action we need to take to avert the climate catastrophe, it seems to me that in failing to engage in an ecology of social and political institutions they are whistling past the graveyard by failing to address the question of the conditions under which action is possible. Here’s the part where everyone gets angry with me. Given the way in which government and corporations are today intertwined, I don’t think there’s much we can do to avert the coming catastrophe. As Morton says, referring to logical time, “the catastrophe has already happened”. So what would it mean, I wonder, to take Morton’s thesis seriously? Here I know Tim will disagree with me. When I look at environmental discussions in popular media and from many around me, I see the discussion revolving almost entirely around consumers. We’re told that we have to consume differently to solve this problem. I agree that we need to consume differently, but **I don’t see any feasible way in which** driving fuel efficient cars, **using less** heat and AC, eating less meat, etc **will solve these problems**. This is because the lion’s share of our climate change problems arise from the production and distribution end of the equation, rather than the consumption end. They are problems arising from agricultural practices, factories, and how we ship goods throughout countries and the world. The problem is that given the way in which governments and corporations are intertwined with one another, and given the way in which third world countries are dependent on fossil fuels for their development, and given the fact that only governmental solutions can address problems of production and distribution, **we’re left with no recourse for action**. We can only watch helplessly while our bought and sold politicians continue to fiddle as the world burns.

**Shifting consumption cannot solve**

**Alcott ‘8** (Blake ALCOTT Ecological Economist Masters from Cambridge in Land Economy ‘8 The sufficiency strategy: Would rich-world frugality lower environmental impact? Ecological Economics 64 (4) p. Science Direct

The environmental sufficiency strategy of greater consumer frugality has become popular in ecological economics, its attractiveness increasing along with awareness that not much can be done to stem population growth and that energy-efficiency measures are either not enough or, due to backfire, part of the problem. Concerning the strategy's feasibility, effectiveness, and common rationale, several conclusions can be drawn. • The consequences of the strategy's frugality demand shift – price reduction and the ensuing consumption rebound – are not yet part of mainstream discussion. • Contrary to what is implied by the strategy's advocates, the frugality **shift cannot achieve a one-to-one reduction** in world aggregate consumption or impact: **Poorer marginal consumers increase their consumption**. • The size of the sufficiency rebound is an open question. • The concepts of ‘North’ and ‘South’ are not relevant to the consumption discussion. • **Even if the voluntary material consumption cuts** by the rich would effect some lowering of total world consumption, changing human behaviour through argument and exhortation is **exceedingly** **difficult**. • While our moral concern for present others is stronger than that for future others, this intragenerational equity is in no way incompatible with non-sustainable impact. • Since savings effected by any one country or individual can be (more than) compensated by other countries and individuals, the relevant scale of any strategy is the world. • No single strategy to change any given right-side factor in I = f(P,A,T) guarantees any effect on impact whatsoever. • Right-side strategies in combination are conceptually complicated and perhaps more costly than explicitly political left-side strategies directly lowering impact. • Research emphasis should be shifted towards measures to **directly lower impact** both in terms **of** depletion and **emissions**. Lower consumption may have advantages on the individual, community, or regional level. There is for instance some truth in the view of Diogenes that happiness and quantity of consumption do not necessarily rise proportionally. Living lightly can offer not only less stress and more free time but also the personal boon of a better sense of integrity, fulfilling the Kantian criterion that one’s acts should be possible universally (worldwide). Locally it could mean cleaner air, less acid rain, less noise, less garbage, and more free space. And in the form of explicit, guaranteed shifts of purchasing power to poorer people it would enable others to eat better or to buy goods such as petrol and cars. However, given global markets and marginal consumers, one person’s doing without enables another to ‘do with’: In the near run the former consumption of a newly sufficient person can get fully replaced. And **given the extent of poverty and the temptations of luxury** and prestige consumption, **this near run is likely to be longer** **than the time horizon required for a relevant strategy to stem climate change and the loss of vital species and natural resources.**

### Exclude Alaska CP – 2AC

####  “In” means within --- not throughout

Encarta 7 – Encarta World English Dictionary, 7 (“In (1)”, 2007, <http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861620513>)

in [ [in](http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/Pronounce.aspx?search=in) ] CORE MEANING: a grammatical word indicating that something or somebody is within or inside something.

1. preposition indicates place: indicates that something happens or is situated somewhere

He spent a whole year in Russia.

2. preposition indicates state: indicates a state or condition that something or somebody is experiencing

The banking industry is in a state of flux.

3. preposition after: after a period of time that will pass before something happens

She should be well enough to leave in a week or two.

4. preposition during: indicates that something happens during a period of time

He crossed the desert in 39 days.

5. preposition indicates how something is expressed: indicates the means of communication used to express something

I managed to write the whole speech in French.

6. preposition indicates subject area: indicates a subject or field of activity

She graduated with a degree in biology.

7. preposition as consequence of: while doing something or as a consequence of something

In reaching for a glass he knocked over the ashtray.

8. preposition covered by: indicates that something is wrapped or covered by something

The floor was covered in balloons and toys.

9. preposition indicates how somebody is dressed: indicates that somebody is dressed in a particular way

She was dressed in a beautiful suit.

10. preposition pregnant with: pregnant with offspring

The cows were in calf.

11. adjective fashionable: fashionable or popular

always knew which clubs were in

12. adjective holding power or office: indicates that a party or group has achieved or will achieve power or authority

voted in overwhelmingly

#### Doesn’t solve –

#### Alaska is key – biggest artic reserves – US can take the lead

Beilinson 11 (Jerry – Popular Mechanics, “Oil Drilling in the Arctic Ocean: Is it Safe?”, 6/24, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/oil-drilling-in-the-arctic-ocean-is-it-safe)

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has just released a 292-page report that is supposed to clarify the murky debate over drilling for oil and gas in the Arctic Ocean north of Alaska. But it’s conclusion seems to be that there’s still a great amount we just don’t know. More than a year ago, after the federal government announced it favored expanded drilling in the outer continental shelf, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar ordered this study a year ago to identify the gaps in scientific or technical knowledge about how drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas north of Alaska would affect the region. The report, which was made public on June 23, details several areas where those gaps exist, including oil-spill cleanup technologies, basic mapping of currents and the effects of underwater noise on sea mammals. (The last issue is of particular concern to the Inupiaq communities of the North Slope, which depend heavily on the ocean for subsistence hunting.) The USGS study says that more research, and better methods for pulling together and interpreting existing data, is needed before policymakers make major decisions about Arctic drilling. But politicians may not agree. On June 22, the day before the study was made public, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that would impose a six-month timeline on the Environmental Protection Agency to approve or deny offshore drilling proposals, and exempt these permits from oversight by the EPA’s review panel, the Environmental Appeals Board. Royal Dutch Shell was forced to cancel plans to drill in the Beaufort this summer after that board chose to revisit an air-quality permit the company had already secured. Shell has been conducting negotiations with federal, state and local government officials for several years, and hopes to drill in multiple locations next summer. It was the USGS’s own estimates that put the agency in position to have to do this thankless task. The agency helped spur the race for Arctic resources in 2008 when it estimated that the globe’s northern regions could have undiscovered but technically recoverable reserves numbering 90 billion barrels of oil, 1669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. The biggest deposits of oil in the Arctic are thought to lie on the outer continental shelf north of Alaska, while vast gas deposits reside in Russia’s outer continental shelf. Despite the USGS’s warning, interest in navigation, oil and gas drilling and hard-rock mining is rising throughout the entire Arctic Ocean basin. This summer, the Edinburgh-based company Cairn Energy is drilling for oil (and fending off Greenpeace activists) in Greenland waters. The world’s biggest island also has large deposits of rare-earth metals, zinc and other resources that could become easier to get as glaciers melt. Arctic nations have even been maneuvering publicly over bragging rights to ownership of the North Pole, though geologists say there’s little chance of finding oil or gas so far north.

#### Global natural gas extraction is inevitable – the US needs to take the lead to ensure the best practices are used to limit emissions

Schneider 12 (Michael, Advocacy Director – Clean Air Task Force, “Curb Methane Emissions,” National Journal, 7-25, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments)

For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development. Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

#### Extinction

**Ford 3** (Violet, Vice President – Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf)

The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to **global processes** and the balance of **life on earth**. Both the unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a resolution effectively recognizes the Arctic as a **“barometer”** or indicator region **of the globe’s environmental health**. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from environmental and other NGO’s.

#### Alaska is key – natural gas production

API 11 (Energy American Petroleum Institute, “API calls on Obama administration to open up Alaska’s OCS, cites new study”, 2/24, http://www.api.org/News-and-Media/News/NewsItems/2011/feb-2011/api-calls-on-Obama-administration-to-open-up-alaskas-ocs-cites-new-study.aspx)

A new study, showing important advantages to the U.S. economy and energy security, highlights the tremendous domestic energy resources waiting to be developed in Alaska’s outer continental shelf (OCS). These resources are a vital link to America’s future, according to the oil and natural gas industry. “America will need all forms of energy to get our economy back on track, and that includes oil – we can either produce it here and create more American jobs or import it and create jobs elsewhere,” said Richard Ranger, a senior policy advisor at API. “The administration and Congress need to adopt an ‘all of the above’ energy approach that leverages our offshore resources in Alaska to create an energy plan for America that boosts, rather than inhibits, our economy.” The development of oil and gas resources in Alaska’s OCS could produce almost 10 billion barrels of oil and 15 trillion cubic feet of natural gas – creating an annual average of almost 55,000 new jobs and $145 billion in new payroll nationally, as well as a total of $193 billion in government revenue through the year 2057 – according to a new study by Northern Economics and the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Alaska. The study found that the Alaska OCS holds the potential to make Alaska the eighth largest oil resource province in the world, ahead of Nigeria, Libya, Russia and Norway. About 77 percent of world oil reserves are owned or controlled by national governments and the U.S. currently imports over 60 percent of its crude oil. Northern Economics estimates that Arctic offshore development could cut this by about 9 percent over 35 years. “Given the current political turmoil in the Middle East and increased demand from a slowly growing economy, it is more essential now than ever before that we develop Alaska’s OCS to increase domestic production,” Ranger said. “Increased OCS production in Alaska would also extend the operating life of the 800-mile Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), a critical lifeline of domestic energy for America,” he added. API represents more than 450 oil and natural gas companies, leaders of a technology-driven industry that supplies most of America’s energy, supports more than 9.2 million U.S. jobs and 7.5 percent of the U.S. economy, and, since 2000, has invested nearly $2 trillion in U.S. capital projects to advance all forms of energy, including alternatives.

#### Offshore drilling is key to US Arctic leadership – it facilitates effective security investments

Bert 12 (Captain Melissa – USCG, 2011-2012 Military Fellow, U.S.Coast Guard, “A Strategy to Advance the Arctic Economy”, February, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/strategy-advance-arctic-economy/p27258)

The United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. Melting sea ice is generating an emerging Arctic economy. Nations bordering the Arctic are drilling for oil and gas, and mining, shipping, and cruising in the region. Russia, Canada, and Norway are growing their icebreaker fleets and shore-based infrastructure to support these enterprises. For the United States, **the economic potential from the energy and mineral resources is in the trillions of dollars**—based upon estimates that the Alaskan Arctic is the home to 30 billion barrels of oil, more than 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, rare earth minerals, and massive renewable wind, tidal, and geothermal energy. However, the U.S. government is unprepared to harness the potential that the Arctic offers. The United States lacks the capacity to deal with potential regional conflicts and seaborne disasters, and it has been on the sidelines when it comes to developing new governance mechanisms for the Arctic. To advance U.S. economic and security interests and avert potential environmental and human disasters, the United States should ratify the UN Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), take the lead in developing mandatory international standards for operating in Arctic waters, and acquire icebreakers, aircraft, and infrastructure for Arctic operations. Regional Flashpoints Threaten Security Like the United States, the Arctic nations of Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark have geographical claims to the Arctic. Unlike the United States, however, they have each sought to exploit economic and strategic opportunities in the region by developing businesses, infrastructure, and cities in the Arctic. They have also renewed military exercises of years past, and as each nation learns of the others' activities, suspicion and competition increase. When the Russians sailed a submarine in 2007 to plant a titanium flag on the "north pole," they were seen as provocateurs, not explorers. The continental shelf is a particular point of contention. Russia claims that deep underwater ridges on the sea floor, over two hundred miles from the Russian continent, are part of Russia and are legally Russia's to exploit. Denmark and Canada also claim those ridges. Whichever state prevails in that debate will have exclusive extraction rights to the resources, which, based on current continental shelf hydrocarbon lease sales, could be worth billions of dollars. Debates also continue regarding freedom of navigation and sovereignty over waters in the region. Russia claims sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which winds over the top of Russia and Alaska and will be a commercially viable route through the region within the next decade. The United States contends the NSR is an international waterway, free to any nation to transit. The United States also has laid claim to portions of the Beaufort Sea that Canada says are Canadian, and the United States rejects Canada's claim that its Northwest Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific is its internal waters, as opposed to an international strait. Canada and Denmark also have a boundary dispute in Baffin Bay. Norway and Russia disagree about fishing rights in waters around the Spitsbergen/Svalbard Archipelago. U.S. Capacity in the Arctic Is Lacking Traffic and commercial activity are increasing in the region. The NSR was not navigable for years because of heavy ice, but it now consists of water with floating ice during the summer months. As the icebergs decrease in the coming years, it will become a commercially profitable route, because it reduces the maritime journey between East Asia and Western Europe from about thirteen thousand miles through the Suez Canal to eight thousand miles, cutting transit time by ten to fifteen days. Russian and German oil tankers are already beginning to ply those waters in the summer months. Approximately 150,000 tons of oil, 400,000 tons of gas condensate, and 600,000 tons of iron ore were shipped via the NSR in 2011. Oil, gas, and mineral drilling, as well as fisheries and tourism, are becoming more common in the high latitudes and are inherently dangerous, because icebergs and storms can shear apart even large tankers, offshore drilling units, fishing vessels, and cruise ships. As a result, human and environmental disasters are extremely likely. Despite the dangerous conditions, the Arctic has no mandatory requirements for those operating in or passing through the region. There are no designated shipping lanes, requirements for ice-strengthened hulls to withstand the extreme environment, ice navigation training for ships' masters, or even production and carriage of updated navigation and ice charts. Keeping the Arctic safe with the increased activity and lack of regulations presents a daunting task. The U.S. government is further hindered by the lack of ships, aircraft, and infrastructure to enforce sovereignty and criminal laws, and to protect people and the marine environment from catastrophic incidents. In the lower forty-eight states, response time to an oil spill or capsized vessel is measured in hours. In Alaska, it could take days or weeks to get the right people and resources on scene. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, thirteen hundred miles from Point Barrow, and response aircraft are more than one thousand miles south in Kodiak, blocked by a mountain range and hazardous flying conditions. The Arctic shores lack infrastructure to launch any type of disaster response, or to support the growing commercial development in the region. U.S. Leadership in Arctic Governance Is Lacking Governance in the Arctic requires leadership. The United States **is uniquely positioned to provide such leadership**, but it is hampered by its reliance on the eight-nation Arctic Council. However, more than 160 countries view the LSOC as the critical instrument defining conduct at sea and maritime obligations. The convention also addresses resource division, maritime traffic, and pollution regulation, and is relied upon for dispute resolution. The LOSC is particularly important in the Arctic, because it stipulates that the region beyond each country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) be divided between bordering nations that can prove their underwater continental shelves extend directly from their land borders. Nations will have exclusive economic rights to the oil, gas, and mineral resources extracted from those outer continental shelves, making the convention's determinations substantial. According to geologists, **the U.S. portion is projected to be the world's largest underwater extension of land**—over 3.3 million square miles—bigger than the lower forty-eight states combined. **In addition to global credibility** **and protection of Arctic shelf claims**, the convention is important because it sets international pollution standards and requires signatories to protect the marine environment. Critics argue that the LOSC cedes American sovereignty to the United Nations. But the failure to ratify it has the opposite effect: it leaves the United States less able to protect its interests in the Arctic and elsewhere. The diminished influence is particularly evident at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the international body that "operationalizes" the LOSC through its international port and shipping rules. By remaining a nonparty, the United States **lacks the credibility to promote U.S. interests in the Arctic**, such as by transforming U.S. recommendations into binding international laws. A Comprehensive U.S. Strategy for the Arctic The United States needs a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. The current National/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66 / HSPD-25) is only a broad policy statement. An effective Arctic strategy would address both governance and capacity questions. To generate effective governance in the Arctic the United States should ratify LOSC and take the lead in advocating the adoption of Arctic shipping requirements. The IMO recently proposed a voluntary Polar Code, and the United States should work to make it mandatory. The code sets structural classifications and standards for ships operating in the Arctic as well as specific navigation and emergency training for those operating in or around ice-covered waters. The United States should also support Automated Identification System (AIS) carriage for all ships transiting the Arctic. Because the Arctic is a vast region with no ability for those on land to see the ships offshore, electronic identification and tracking is the only way to know what ships are operating in or transiting the region. An AIS transmitter (costing as little as $800) sends a signal that provides vessel identity and location at all times to those in command centers around the world and is currently mandated for ships over sixteen hundred gross tons. The United States and other Arctic nations track AIS ships and are able to respond to emergencies based on its signals. For this reason, mandating AIS for all vessels in the Arctic is needed. The U.S. government also needs to work with Russia to impose a traffic separation scheme in the Bering Strait, where chances for a collision are high. Finally, the United States should push for compulsory tandem sailing for all passenger vessels operating in the Arctic. Tandem sailing for cruise ships and smaller excursion boats will avert another disaster like RMS Titanic. To enhance the Arctic's economic potential, the United States **should** also **develop its capacity to enable commercial entities to operate safely in the region**. The U.S. government should invest in icebreakers**,** aircraft**,** and shore-based infrastructure. A ten-year plan should include the building of at least two heavy icebreakers, at a cost of approximately $1 billion apiece, and an air station in Point Barrow, Alaska, with at least three helicopters. Such an air station would cost less than $20 million, with operating, maintenance, and personnel costs comparable to other northern military facilities. Finally, developing a deepwater port with response presence and infrastructure is critical. A base at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, where ships and fishing vessels resupply and refuel, would only cost a few million dollars per year to operate. Washington could finance the cost of its capacity-building efforts by using offshore lease proceeds and federal taxes on the oil and gas extracted from the Arctic region. In 2008, the United States collected $2.6 billion from offshore lease sales in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (off Alaska's north coast), and the offshore royalty tax rate in the region is 19 percent**, which would cover operation and maintenance of these facilities down the road**. The United States needs an Arctic governance and **acquisition strategy to take full advantage of all the region has to offer** and to protect the people operating in the region and the maritime environment. Neglecting the Arctic reduces the United States' ability to **reap tremendous economic benefits and could harm U.S. national security interests.**

#### The Arctic will be the next area of great power conflict – gas production spurs military investments that prevent escalation

Talmadge 12 (Eric – AP, Huffington Post, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity’, 4/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-military-activity\_n\_1427565.html)

To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. **They are preparing for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic**, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and a slew of potential conflicts. By Arctic standards, the region is already buzzing with military activity, and experts believe that will increase significantly in the years ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever — Exercise Cold Response — with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, **so will the need for policing, border patrols and** — if push comes to shove — **military muscle to enforce rival claims**. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia, Canada and the United States have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia — one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle — **has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's superpower**. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic countries — Norway, Denmark and Canada — to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in the region. **This is only going to increase as time goes on**." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "We want to maintain our edge up there," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in **the Arctic** has never really waned. It remains very important." **But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions**, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it **lacks ships** able to operate in or near Arctic ice, **support facilities and adequate communications**. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. **The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers**.

#### De-escalation is key to prevent Arctic conflicts from going nuclear – draws in major powers

Wallace and Staples 10 (Michael Wallace and Steven Staples. \*Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, **and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic**. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 609 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, **deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states** – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world **– converge on the Arctic and have competing claims**. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, **lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons**.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but **no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly**. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62

### Methane Hydrates Bad DA – No Link – 2AC (Conventional)

#### Conventional gas is a term that refers to a form of natural gas production

Conoco Phillips No Date (Connoco Phillips, “Conventional Natural Gas”, Accessed 9/12/2012, http://www.conocophillips.com/EN/about/energy/energyissues/pages/conventional.aspx)

Like oil, natural gas is an energy resource that lies hidden beneath the ground, trapped in porous rock formations. In fact, the two resources are often found together. Deposits of natural gas lie throughout the United States, but the most prolific production areas are in the Gulf of Mexico and the western and southwestern states. In the future, large quantities of natural gas are expected to become available from the North Slope of Alaska and from deepwater regions in the Gulf. But these are complex and costly undertakings that will take many years to accomplish. The bulk of the nation’s gas production comes from what are termed “conventional” gas reservoirs, which typically are underground formations composed of sandstone. Increasingly, however, more gas is being discovered and produced from “unconventional” resources, most often coal beds and oil sands, where different production methods are required. The country’s proved reserves of natural gas rank sixth in the world behind Russia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Russia’s reserves are approximately 12 times larger than those of the U.S

#### That excludes shale and methane hydrates

Energy Insider 7 (Energy Insider, “The Rise of Unconventional Gas”, 2007, http://www.enerdynamics.com/documents/Insider91807\_000.pdf)

What is Unconventional Gas? Natural gas is formed over thousands of years by the combination of pressure and heat on organic material trapped in rock. After natural gas is formed, the earth’s pressure often pushes the gas upward through small holes and cracks in rock until it reaches a layer of impermeable rock where the gas becomes trapped. It sits there in a “pool” until it is released from the ground by a drill bit providing a path to the surface. This is what we call conventional gas, the resource upon which our gas industry was built. But not all gas is found in these formations. In fact, there are a number of forms of unconventional gas that were created in formations without the permeability necessary to allow migration. These include: • Tight Sands Gas – formed in sandstone or carbonate (called tight gas sands) with low permeability which prevents the gas from flowing naturally. • Coalbed Methane (CBM) – formed in coal deposits and adsorbed4 by coal particles. • Shale Gas – formed in fine-grained shale rock (called gas shales) with low permeability in which gas has been adsorbed by clay particles or is held within minute pores and microfractures. • Methane Hydrates – a crystalline combination of natural gas and water, formed at low temperature and high pressure in places such as under the oceans and permafrost.

### Methane Hydrates Bad DA – 2AC

#### Gas industry tech solves

Sassoon 10 (David – Writer for SolveClimate, “Did Deepwater methane hydrates cause the BP Gulf explosion?”, 5/10, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/20/deepwater-methane-hydrates-bp-gulf)

She explained that the oil and gas industry has a lot of experience with methane hydrates, because they have to be kept from forming in pipes or they will clog the lines, stop the flow of oil, and pose a danger. Drillers use inhibitors such as methanol to keep the hydrates from crystallizing inside drill rigs operating at great depth, where conditions for methane hydrate formation are ideal. This film clip of an experiment conducted on the ocean floor near the Deepwater Horizon drilling site demonstrates how quickly and easily methane hydrates can form. It was conducted by the Gulf of Mexico Hydrates Research Consortium aboard the Seward Johnson in September 2006. The voices of the scientists conducting the experiment are clearly audible. The clip shows with remarkable clarity a robotic arm maneuvering a clear tube over a stream of hydrate bubbles emanating from a crater on the sea floor. Within minutes, gas trapped in the tube begins to form a visible solid — a white ice matrix — thanks to the extreme cold and pressure of the ocean depth. When the tube is inverted, the hydrate, less dense than seawater, floats out of the tube, dissociating into its components, gas and water.

#### Methane hydrates don’t reach the atmosphere – no impact

Kvenolden 99 (Keith A. – USGS, “Potential Effects of Gas Hydrate on Human Welfare”, 1999, JSTOR)

For almost 30 years. serious interest has been directed toward natural gas hydrate, a crystalline solid composed of water and methane, as a potential (i) energy resource, (ii) factor in global climate change, and (Wi) submarine geohazard. Although each of these issues can affect human welfare, only (iii) is considered to be of immediate importance. Assessments of gas hydrate as an energy resource have often been overly optimistic, based in part on its very high methane content and on its worldwide occurrence in continental margins. Although these attributes are attractive, geologic settings, reservoir properties, and phase-equilibria considerations diminish the energy resource potential of natural gas hydrate. The possible role of gas hydrate in global climate change has been often overstated. Although methane is a "greenhouse" gas in the atmosphere, much methane from dissociated gas hydrate may never reach the atmosphere, but rather may be converted to carbon dioxide and sequestered by the hydrosphere/biosphere before reaching the atmosphere. Thus, methane from gas hydrate may have little opportunity to affect global climate change. However, submarine geohazards (such as sediment instabilities and slope failures on local and regional scales, leading to debris flows, slumps, slides, and possible tsunamis) caused by gas-hydrate dissociation are of immediate and increasing importance as humankind moves to exploit seabed resources in ever-deepening waters of coastal oceans. The vulnerability of gas hydrate to temperature and sea level changes enhances the instability of deep-water oceanic sediments, and thus human activities and installations in this setting can be affected.

#### Inevitable – other countries are attempting to drill for R&D purposes

Fitzpatrick 10 (Michael – The Guardian, “Japan to drill for frozen methane”, 9/27, lexis)

In a bid to shore up its precarious energy security Japan is to start commercial test drilling for controversial frozen methane gas along its coast next year. The gas is methane hydrate, a sherbet-like substance consisting of methane trapped in water ice - sometimes called fire ice or MH - that is locked deep underwater or under permafrost by the cold and under pressure 23 times that of normal atmosphere. A consortium led by the Japanese government and the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (Jogmec) will be sinking several wells off the south-eastern coast of Japan to assess the commercial viability of extracting gas from frozen methane deep beneath local waters. Surveys suggest Japan has enough methane hydrate for 100 years at the current rate of usage. Lying hundreds of metres below the sea and deeper still below sediments, fire ice is exceedingly difficult to mine. Japan is claiming successful tests using a method that gently depressurises the frozen gas. Tokyo plans to start commercial output of methane hydrates by 2018. At present Japan imports nearly all its gas and is heavily dependent on oil imports. In a desperate attempt to secure more oil, for example, Japan recently did a deal with the United Arab Emirates. In exchange for using Japan as a base for Asian oil trading Japan now has priority to purchase rights to up to 4 million barrels of immediately accessible crude. Methane hydrates could make Japan energy independent. "Japan put a lot of R&D into this project because of course the less energy it imports the better. Whether they can commercialise methane hydrates remains to be seen," said Lucia van Geuns, an energy analyst at the international energy programme of the Clingendael Institute. "If it does succeed, and that's very much a long shot, it will have a huge impact - equivalent to the use of gas shales in the US." Japan's ministry of trade, which is behind the scheme, has requested a budget of ¥8.9bn (£667m) for the drilling to start next spring. The huge budget reflects the difficulties of drilling deep offshore. In Japan, hydrates in the Sea of Kumano are found about 30km offshore in about 100 metres of water and at a depth below the seabed of 200 metres , making it difficult to mine the unstable hydrates. Concerns had been raised that digging for frozen methane would destabilise the methane beds which contain enough gas worldwide to snuff out most complex life on earth. Methane itself is a greenhouse gas with 21 times the potency of carbon dioxide and any leakage from wells could be an environmental problem . Professor Gerald Dickens, of Rice University in Texas, thinks accidental releases can be avoided."The only potential issue in regards to drilling would be if there is greatly over-pressured gas immediately beneath the gas hydrate. However, there is growing belief and rationale to suggest that this cannot occur in nature. So, as far as drilling there should be no issue." Environmentalists , however, are concernedabout the burning of more earth-locked hydrocarbons. Methane may be cleaner-burning fossil fuel than coal or oil but will still release many tons of CO2. Jogmec acknowledges the problems, admitting mining of methane ice could lead to landslides and the devastation of marine life in the mining areas. "There are many other technological problems to overcome," says the Jogmec website. "Not least that when you drill you create heat which turns the frozen methane into gas, which could then leak uncontrollably through the sea to our atmosphere." The US, China, Canada and South Korea are among other countries seeking to develop commercially viable extraction technology and each is now exploring the mining of methane hydrates from their own sea beds. "Some commercial production of methane from methane hydrate could be achieved in the United States before 2025," says a US government report on the subject.

### 1NC Environmental Degradation

#### -- No extinction

Easterbrook 3 (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

#### -- Long time-frame

Kay 1 (Jane, “Study Takes Historical Peek at Plight of Ocean Ecosystems”, San Francisco Chronicle, 7-26, Lexis)

The collapse of ecosystems often occur over a long period. In one example, when Aleut hunters killed the Alaskan sea otter about 2,500 years ago, the population of their natural prey, the sea urchin, grew larger than its normal size. In turn, the urchins grazed down the kelp forests, important habitat for a whole host of ocean life. Then, when fur traders in the 1800s hunted the otters and sea cows almost to extinction, the kelp forests disappeared and didn't start to regenerate until the federal government protected the sea otters in the 20th century. In California, the diversity of spiny lobsters, sheephead fish and abalone kept down the urchin numbers. At present in Alaska, the kelp beds are declining again in areas where killer whales are preying on sea otters. Biologists think the killer whales switched to otters for food because there are fewer seals and sea lions to eat.

### 2NC Environment – Resilient

#### No brink to environmental collapse

Lomborg 12 -- director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and author of Smart Solutions to Climate Change (Bjorn, July/August, "Environmental Alarmism, Then and Now," http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137681/bjorn-lomborg/environmental-alarmism-then-and-now?page=show)

As for its pollution predictions, The Limits to Growth was simultaneously scary and vague. Pollution's increase was supposed to trigger a global collapse if the decrease of food or resources didn't do so first, but how exactly pollution was defined was left unclear. Individual pollutants, such as DDT, lead, mercury, and pesticides, were mentioned, but how those could kill any significant number of people was unspecified, making it a bit tricky to test the prediction. Air pollution might be considered a good proxy for overall pollution, since it was the biggest environmental killer in the twentieth century and since the Environmental Protection Agency estimates that its regulation produces 86-96 percent of all the social benefits from environmental regulation more generally. In the developing world, outdoor air pollution is indeed rising and killing more people, currently perhaps over 650,000 per year. Indoor air pollution (from using dirty fuels for cooking and heating) kills even more, almost two million per year (although that number has been decreasing slightly).

#### -- Environment is resilient

Easterbrook 95 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow – Fullbright Foundation, A Moment on Earth, p. 25)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

## Round 5 1AR

### Arctic Leadership – Environment Impact

#### Turns the environment – Russia has worse practices

Sullivan 12 (Dan – a former state attorney general, commissioner of Alaska's Department of Natural Resources, “It's time to develop our Arctic resources, 7/20, http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/opinion/sullivan-arctic-drilling/index.html)

(CNN) -- The United States is on the verge of an energy renaissance. We need to recognize and seize the opportunity. This renaissance involves domestic production of natural resources ranging from clean renewables to hydrocarbons. In particular, domestic hydrocarbon production -- both oil and gas -- is increasing dramatically, with some experts predicting that the United States could become the largest hydrocarbon producer in the word -- outstripping Saudi Arabia and Russia -- by 2020. Increased domestic production of hydrocarbons is driven by two trends. First, new technology is unlocking unconventional resources such as shale-derived oil and gas. And second, investors and policy makers are recognizing that the U.S. still has an enormous resource base of conventional oil and gas, particularly in Alaska. Opinion: Why we should look to the Arctic Federal agencies estimate that Alaska's North Slope and federal waters off Alaska's northern coast contain approximately 40 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil and more than 200 trillion cubic feet of conventional gas. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, this region contains more oil than any comparable region located in the Arctic, including northern Russia. However, the United States is lagging behind its Arctic neighbors in developing these resources. This is unfortunate, because we have some of the highest environmental standards in the world and we should be setting the bar for Arctic development. Developing our Arctic resources will promote our nation's interests in many ways: securing a politically stable, long-term supply of domestic energy; boosting U.S. economic growth and jobs; reducing the federal trade deficit; and strengthening our global leadership on energy issues. Leading academic researchers and economists in Alaska have estimated that oil production from Alaska's outer continental shelf will bring federal revenues of approximately $167 billion over 50 years, and create 55,000 jobs throughout the country. Developing U.S. resources in the Arctic has the added benefit of enhancing global environmental protection. One of the arguments used by Arctic drilling opponents is that "we aren't ready," but it is obvious that no matter what preparations are made, they will argue that it isn't enough. Shell, for example, has spent billions to prepare for drilling in the Arctic this summer, incorporating the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, state-of-the-art equipment and extensive scientific research. Recently, the Obama administration has publically expressed its confidence in the company's drilling plans. The U.S. has created some of the highest standards in the world for environmental protection. When we delay or disallow responsible resource development, the end result is not to protect the environment, but to drive hydrocarbon investment and production to countries with much lower environmental standards and enforcement capacity. Last year, it was reported that between 5 million and 20 million tons of oil leak in Russia per year. This is equivalent to a Deepwater Horizon blowout about every two months. Russia had an estimated 18,000 oil pipeline ruptures in 2010 -- the figure for the U.S. that year was 341. If we do not pursue responsible development in the Arctic, countries such as Russia -- perhaps even China, which is interested in securing access to Arctic hydrocarbon resources -- will dominate energy production from the Arctic. Such a scenario does not bode well for the global environment. By embracing the opportunities in the Arctic, the United States will show the world that it can be a strong leader in responsible energy development.

### Case Turns

#### NW turns

Sasman 9 [Biodiversity Hotspots Threatened by Wars - by Catherine Sasman, 03 March 2009
http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=2754]

WINDHOEK – War and conflict do not just uproot and destroy people’s lives. A new study found that most of the biologically diverse and threatened areas of the world are in conflict-ridden areas, placing plant and animal life under great danger. More than 80 percent of the world’s armed conflicts from 1950 to 2000 took place in regions identified as biodiversity hotspots of the globe, found a study published by the scientific journal ‘Conservation Biology’. The study, ‘Warfare in Biodiversity Hotspots’, shows that the areas – chosen from the 34 biodiversity hotspots identified by Conservation International, an organisation working towards the sustainability of the earth’s natural heritage with all stakeholders, including governments and private sector players – are considered top conservation priorities because they contain the entire populations of more than half of all plant species and at least 42 percent of all vertebrates. The 34 hotspots, said Conservation International, contain more than three-quarters of all amphibians, birds and mammals listed as the Critically Endangered or Endangered. The study showed that as many as 23 biodiversity hotspots have experienced violent conflict in which more than 1 000 people died, and many suffered repeated episodes of violence. Many of these areas are found in Africa, home to eight hotspots with fauna and flora not found anywhere else in the world. These are the Cape Floristic region, the fire-dependent shrublands of the Western Cape; the coastal forests of Eastern Africa that stretch from Saudi Arabia to Zimbabwe; the Guinea lowland forests of Western Africa that are home to more than 20 species of primates; the Horn of Africa renowned for its biological sources; Madagascar and the Indian Ocean islands that have eight plant families, four bird families and five primate families found nowhere else on the planet; Maputuland-Pondoland-Albany along the east coast of southern Africa; and the Succulent Karoo of Namibia and South Africa, which has the richest succulent flora in the world. The other areas include Asia-Pacific (13 hotspots, which include a number of islands along the Pacific Ocean). Four areas are found in Europe and Central Asia; North and Central America contain thousands of acres of important habitats; and South America has some of the most richest and diverse life on Earth. “This is an astounding conclusion – that the richest storehouses of life on Earth are also the regions of the most human conflict – tells us that these areas are essential for both biodiversity conservation and human well-being,” said Russel Mittermeier, president of Conservation International and an author of the study. “Millions of the poorest people live in hotspots and depend on healthy ecosystems for their survival, so there is a moral obligation – as well as political and social responsibility – to protect these places and all the resources and services they provide.” The biodiversity hotspots are said to be home to the majority of the poor in the world: a 1.2 billion of the poorest rely on resources and services provided by these natural ecosystems for their survival. Biodiversity loss, continued Mittermeier, leaves the poor more vulnerable, and he proposed a thorough investigation into the underlying causes of such wars, and highlighted the importance of such areas for global security. Extinction, said the organisation, is the biggest aspect of the biodiversity crisis. While extinction is a natural phenomenon, the human impact, compounded by war and other destructive activities, elevates the rate at which this takes place. The study points out examples where large-scale damage has been done to ecosystems – or ecocide, as it has become known – is the Vietnam War in the late 1960s, where poisonous Agent Orange was dumped from low flying planes, destroying 14 percent of Vietnam’s forest cover and 50 percent of its coastal mangroves. Indirect and far-reaching effects of the conflicts were enumerated in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) felt today as a result of extensive timber harvesting and the cultivation of illicit drugs to bankroll violent conflicts in Afghanistan, South-east Asia and Latin America. The study suggested the collateral damage of these protracted wars and conflicts claimed human, plant and animal life alike. But, said lead author Thor Hanson, the consequences extend far beyond incidents of actual fighting. “War preparations and lingering post-conflict activities also have important implications for biodiversity hotspots and the people who live there.” One other indirect effect of conflict are the hundreds and thousands of refugees on the run, encamped and vulnerable, that live off the land and are more often than not in no position to consider the environmental consequences of their desperate situations, who indiscriminately hunt, gather firewood and build camps to survive, putting even more pressure on local resources.

### General Environment DA – Ext – Drilling Is Safe

#### Offshore drilling is very safe

BOEM 11 (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, “Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing Program 2012-2017”, November, http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/Proposed\_OCS\_Oil\_Gas\_Lease\_Program\_2012-2017.pdf)

Second, this Proposed Program is grounded in the lessons learned from last year’s Deepwater Horizon tragedy, which caused the deaths of 11 workers and resulted in the release of nearly five million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). The Department of the Interior (DOI) has made significant progress in accelerating reforms that have improved the safety and environmental protection of the OCS since the Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill in improving both the safety of offshore drilling to reduce the risk of another loss of well control in our oceans, and our collective ability to respond to a blowout and spill. While offshore oil and gas exploration and development will never be risk free, these activities can be conducted safely and responsibly, with appropriate measures to protect human safety and the environment.

### Methanes

#### Alt cause to methane release – warm water and earthquakes

Gaskill 6 (Alvia, “DOE Meeting Summary”, http://www.global-warming-geo-engineering.org/DOE-Meeting/Catastrophic-Methane-Hydrate-Release/ag13.html)

What causes release of methane hydrates is still poorly understood. Warm waters may destabilize the hydrate zone. Hydrates on the surface of the ocean floor on a ridge may then degass. The sediment may then become unstable and slide down the ridge, exposing other layers of methane hydrate, accelerating the release. As an example, the Storegga slump off the coast of Norway 8000 years ago could have released between 1 and 4 GtC as methane. Alternatively, an undersea earthquake today, say off the Blake Ridge or the coast of Japan or California might loosen and cause some of the sediment to slide down the ridge or slump, exposing the hydrate layer to the warmer water. That in turn could cause a chain reaction of events, leading to the release of massive quantities of methane. Another possibility is drilling and other activities related to exploration and recovery of methane hydrates as an energy resource. The hydrates tend to occur in the pores of sediment and help to bind it together. Attempting to remove the hydrates may cause the sediment to collapse and release the hydrates. So, it may not take thousands of years to warm the ocean and the sediments enough to cause massive releases, only lots of drilling rigs.

#### -- No impact to methane release

Dorrite 7 (Dan, “Killer in Our Midst”, http://www.killerinourmidst.com/methane%20catastrophe.html)

First, methane itself is, like carbon dioxide, an asphyxiating gas, depriving aerobic organisms of needed oxygen. When released in the ocean, it would have impaired the metabolism of aerobic marine organisms, and, in sufficient concentrations, would have caused death. Although, upon reaching the atmosphere, methane could have had similar effects on non-marine organisms, its concentrations would have been unlikely to do much harm, because methane is lighter than air and would have been easily dispersed by winds.

### AT Ocean Bio-d

#### 1. Natural marine fluctuations are inevitable ---- ocean species are highly resilient

Dulvy et al in ‘3

(Nicholas, (School of Marine Science and Tech. @ U. Newcastle), Yvonne Sadovy, (Dept. Ecology and Biodiversity @ U. Hong Kong), and John D. Reynolds, (Centre for Ecology, Evolution and Conservation @ School of Bio. Sci. @ U. East Anglia), Fish and Fisheries, “Extinction vulnerability in marine populations”, 4:1, Blackwell-Synergy)

Marine fish populations are more variable and resilient than terrestrial populations Great natural variability in population size is sometimes invoked to argue that IUCN Red List criteria, as one example, are too conservative for marine fishes (Hudson and Mace 1996; Matsuda et al. 1997; Musick 1999; Powles et al. 2000; Hutchings 2001a). For the (1996) IUCN list, a decline of 20% within 10 years or three generations (whichever is longer) triggered a classification of 'vulnerable', while declines of 50 and 80% led to classifications of 'endangered' and 'critically endangered', respectively. These criteria were designed to be applied to all animal and plant taxa, but many marine resource biologists feel that for marine fishes 'one size does not fit all' (see Hutchings 2001a). They argue that percent decline criteria are too conservative compared to the high natural variability of fish populations. Powles et al. (2000) cite the six-fold variation of the Pacific sardine population (Sardinops sagax, Clupeidae) and a nine-fold variation in northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax, Clupeidae) over the past two millennia to suggest that rapid declines and increases of up to 10-fold are relatively common in exploited fish stocks. It should, however, be borne in mind that the variation of exploited populations must be higher than unexploited populations because recruitment fluctuations increasingly drive population fluctuations when there are few adults (Pauly et al. 2002).

# FULLERTON AFF

#### Need to get 1AR docs from Austin. Once I do that, I will upload a new file with those in it.

## New 1AC

### 1AC – Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce production restrictions on federal lands in the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas

### 1AC – Inherency

#### Contention One is Inherency –

#### The Department of Interior’s leasing plan effectively restricts offshore natural gas drilling on federal lands

New 6-30 (Bill, President – New Industires, \*Offers Steel Fabrication Services to Offshore Drilling Projects, “Letters: New Leasing Plan a Step Backward,” The Advocate, 2012, http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion/3484480-123/letters-new-leasing-plan-a)

In late June, the U.S. Department of the Interior released its long-awaited outer continental shelf leasing plan, which effectively blocks offshore oil and natural gas exploration in any new areas for the next five years. Unfortunately, the proposal is a step backward in our effort to achieve energy independence. Under the plan, 85 percent of America’s OCS would be off-limits at a time when exploring every possible energy source is critical to boosting our nation’s economy and creating jobs. Instead of finding out what might be available to us in expansive unexplored areas off our coasts, we will be left to search for oil and natural gas in the same, relatively small portion of the OCS we’ve been exploring for four decades. Not only does this plan run counter to President Barack Obama’s “all of the above” strategy for energy independence, but it shows an outright disregard for the requests of the Gulf Coast states –— including Louisiana — to increase domestic oil production when the Interior Department released a draft of the plan late last year. Interestingly, the Interior Department chose to release this latest version of the OCS plan on the day the Supreme Court announced its health care decision — a thinly veiled attempt to bury it in news coverage of the ruling. But that didn’t keep right-thinking lawmakers from taking notice and working on ways to get America’s economy going using sound energy policies. U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., chairman of the House Natural Resource Committee, has written legislation that sensibly revises the plan. While the Interior Department’s plan is to hold just 12 oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, and three in offshore Alaska from 2012 to 2017, the Hastings plan would schedule 28 lease sales total, dramatically increasing drilling opportunities off the Alaskan coast and including a sale of offshore leases in a potentially rich area off the coast of Virginia. The United States is producing more oil and natural gas than ever thanks to increased production on state-owned or private land. However, production on federal onshore land is down 14 percent in the last two years, and down 17 percent on federal offshore areas. Imagine what could happen if we enact legislation that allows us to open new offshore areas.

#### Current legislation is insufficient – certainty is key

Loris 8-6 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

Senator John Hoeven (R–ND) recently introduced the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (DEJA), which would greatly expand access to energy and simplify burdensome regulations that prevent projects from coming online in a timely manner. While the legislation could be improved by further increasing access and removing the top-down energy planning, DEJA would still spur economic growth and drive energy production. Increasing Access to Energy DEJA would accept the State Department’s environmental review of the Keystone XL pipeline as sufficient and allow the state of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline to meet the state’s environmental concerns. The State Department studied and addressed risks to soil, wetlands, water resources, vegetation, fish, wildlife, and endangered species and concluded that construction of the pipeline would pose minimal environmental risk.[1] The construction of Keystone XL would allow up to 830,000 barrels of oil per day to come from Canada to the Gulf Coast and create thousands of jobs. DEJA also directs the Department of the Interior (DOI) to conduct a lease sale off the coast of Virginia. The 2.9 million acres 50 miles off the coast has an estimated 130 million barrels of oil and 1.14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Opening access off Virginia’s coast is long overdue, and the legislation **only opens up a small portion of America’s territorial waters that are off limits**. The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, also co-sponsored by Senator Hoeven, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska.[2] Both DEJA and OPEN increase the royalties that states would receive from energy production, but both could go further to increase state involvement in offshore drilling decisions. Since onshore states already receive 50 percent of the royalties, Congress should also implement a 50/50 royalty-sharing program between federal and state governments involved in offshore drilling. Efficient Permitting and Leasing for All Energy Projects Another important component of DEJA is that it streamlines the permitting of all energy projects. Receiving a permit for any energy project, not just fossil fuels, takes entirely too long. Duplicative and unnecessary regulations slow the process and drive up costs. Furthermore, environmental activists delay new energy projects by filing endless administrative appeals and lawsuits. DEJA would create a manageable time frame for permitting for all energy sources to increase supply at lower costs and stimulate economic activity. DEJA also calls for an end to the lengthy permit process in the Natural Petroleum Reserve area of Alaska. It would require the DOI to approve drilling permits within 60 days and infrastructure permits within six months. Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the **certainty necessary to pursue energy projects**. Freeze and Study Environmental Regulations DEJA would also create transparency and accountability for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by establishing an interagency committee that would report on the full economic impact of the rules implemented by the EPA that affect fuel prices. This includes any part of the production process that would be affected by greenhouse gas regulations. DEJA delays the implementation of Tier 3 fuel standards (designed to replace the Tier 2 regulations issued in 2000) that would lower the amount of sulfur in gasoline but could add 6–9 cents per gallon to the cost of manufacturing gasoline. The EPA has declared no measurable air quality benefits from these standards. DEJA delays the New Source Performance Standards for refineries, which would drive up the cost of gasoline for no measurable change in the earth’s temperature.[3] It would also delay new national ambient air quality standards for ozone, which are unnecessary because the ozone standard set by the EPA is already more than stringent enough to protect human health. Though the delays contained in DEJA underscore the problems with these regulations, the preferred approach would be to prohibit the implementation of these three standards altogether. DEJA would also prevent the DOI from issuing any rule under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 before 2014 that would adversely affect coal employment, reduce revenue from coal production, reduce coal for domestic consumption or export, designate areas as unsuitable for surface mining and reclamation, or expose the U.S. to liability by taking privately owned coal through regulation. While this temporary fix recognizes the federal overreach in coal production, a better approach would be to create a framework that restricts overregulation, empowers the states, balances economic growth and environmental well-being, and creates a timely permitting process for all aspects of coal production.[4] Energy Central Planning Unneeded DEJA would require the federal government to create production objectives for fossil fuels and renewable energy and allow the relevant agencies to make additional lands available to meet those objectives. The bill would also require the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a critical minerals list and create comprehensive policies to increase critical mineral production. A much simpler and effective solution would be to open all federal lands for energy production of all sources and allow the private sector to determine what sources of energy and what technologies meet America’s electricity and transportation fuel demand. Too often the use of critical minerals has been used as cover for subsidies and extensive government intervention in a major industry. If there are clear military needs for certain critical materials, these should be met by government action. Absent that, streamlining the bureaucracy that has expanded around mining and **opening access is the only necessary federal action surrounding critical minerals**.

### 1AC – Arctic

#### Contention 1 : Arctic Leadership

#### Offshore drilling is key to US Arctic leadership – it facilitates effective security investments

Bert 12 (Captain Melissa – USCG, 2011-2012 Military Fellow, U.S.Coast Guard, “A Strategy to Advance the Arctic Economy”, February, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/strategy-advance-arctic-economy/p27258)

The United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. Melting sea ice is generating an emerging Arctic economy. Nations bordering the Arctic are drilling for oil and gas, and mining, shipping, and cruising in the region. Russia, Canada, and Norway are growing their icebreaker fleets and shore-based infrastructure to support these enterprises. For the United States, the economic potential from the energy and mineral resources is in the trillions of dollars—based upon estimates that the Alaskan Arctic is the home to 30 billion barrels of oil, more than 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, rare earth minerals, and massive renewable wind, tidal, and geothermal energy. However, the U.S. government is unprepared to harness the potential that the Arctic offers. The United States lacks the capacity to deal with potential regional conflicts and seaborne disasters, and it has been on the sidelines when it comes to developing new governance mechanisms for the Arctic. To advance U.S. economic and security interests and avert potential environmental and human disasters, the United States should ratify the UN Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), take the lead in developing mandatory international standards for operating in Arctic waters, and acquire icebreakers, aircraft, and infrastructure for Arctic operations. Regional Flashpoints Threaten Security Like the United States, the Arctic nations of Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark have geographical claims to the Arctic. Unlike the United States, however, they have each sought to exploit economic and strategic opportunities in the region by developing businesses, infrastructure, and cities in the Arctic. They have also renewed military exercises of years past, and as each nation learns of the others' activities, suspicion and competition increase. When the Russians sailed a submarine in 2007 to plant a titanium flag on the "north pole," they were seen as provocateurs, not explorers. The continental shelf is a particular point of contention. Russia claims that deep underwater ridges on the sea floor, over two hundred miles from the Russian continent, are part of Russia and are legally Russia's to exploit. Denmark and Canada also claim those ridges. Whichever state prevails in that debate will have exclusive extraction rights to the resources, which, based on current continental shelf hydrocarbon lease sales, could be worth billions of dollars. Debates also continue regarding freedom of navigation and sovereignty over waters in the region. Russia claims sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which winds over the top of Russia and Alaska and will be a commercially viable route through the region within the next decade. The United States contends the NSR is an international waterway, free to any nation to transit. The United States also has laid claim to portions of the Beaufort Sea that Canada says are Canadian, and the United States rejects Canada's claim that its Northwest Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific is its internal waters, as opposed to an international strait. Canada and Denmark also have a boundary dispute in Baffin Bay. Norway and Russia disagree about fishing rights in waters around the Spitsbergen/Svalbard Archipelago. U.S. Capacity in the Arctic Is Lacking Traffic and commercial activity are increasing in the region. The NSR was not navigable for years because of heavy ice, but it now consists of water with floating ice during the summer months. As the icebergs decrease in the coming years, it will become a commercially profitable route, because it reduces the maritime journey between East Asia and Western Europe from about thirteen thousand miles through the Suez Canal to eight thousand miles, cutting transit time by ten to fifteen days. Russian and German oil tankers are already beginning to ply those waters in the summer months. Approximately 150,000 tons of oil, 400,000 tons of gas condensate, and 600,000 tons of iron ore were shipped via the NSR in 2011. Oil, gas, and mineral drilling, as well as fisheries and tourism, are becoming more common in the high latitudes and are inherently dangerous, because icebergs and storms can shear apart even large tankers, offshore drilling units, fishing vessels, and cruise ships. As a result, human and environmental disasters are extremely likely. Despite the dangerous conditions, the Arctic has no mandatory requirements for those operating in or passing through the region. There are no designated shipping lanes, requirements for ice-strengthened hulls to withstand the extreme environment, ice navigation training for ships' masters, or even production and carriage of updated navigation and ice charts. Keeping the Arctic safe with the increased activity and lack of regulations presents a daunting task. The U.S. government is further hindered by the lack of ships, aircraft, and infrastructure to enforce sovereignty and criminal laws, and to protect people and the marine environment from catastrophic incidents. In the lower forty-eight states, response time to an oil spill or capsized vessel is measured in hours. In Alaska, it could take days or weeks to get the right people and resources on scene. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, thirteen hundred miles from Point Barrow, and response aircraft are more than one thousand miles south in Kodiak, blocked by a mountain range and hazardous flying conditions. The Arctic shores lack infrastructure to launch any type of disaster response, or to support the growing commercial development in the region. U.S. Leadership in Arctic Governance Is Lacking Governance in the Arctic requires leadership. The United States is uniquely positioned to provide such leadership, but it is hampered by its reliance on the eight-nation Arctic Council. However, more than 160 countries view the LSOC as the critical instrument defining conduct at sea and maritime obligations. The convention also addresses resource division, maritime traffic, and pollution regulation, and is relied upon for dispute resolution. The LOSC is particularly important in the Arctic, because it stipulates that the region beyond each country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) be divided between bordering nations that can prove their underwater continental shelves extend directly from their land borders. Nations will have exclusive economic rights to the oil, gas, and mineral resources extracted from those outer continental shelves, making the convention's determinations substantial. According to geologists, the U.S. portion is projected to be the world's largest underwater extension of land—over 3.3 million square miles—bigger than the lower forty-eight states combined. In addition to global credibility and protection of Arctic shelf claims, the convention is important because it sets international pollution standards and requires signatories to protect the marine environment. Critics argue that the LOSC cedes American sovereignty to the United Nations. But the failure to ratify it has the opposite effect: it leaves the United States less able to protect its interests in the Arctic and elsewhere. The diminished influence is particularly evident at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the international body that "operationalizes" the LOSC through its international port and shipping rules. By remaining a nonparty, the United States lacks the credibility to promote U.S. interests in the Arctic, such as by transforming U.S. recommendations into binding international laws. A Comprehensive U.S. Strategy for the Arctic The United States needs a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. The current National/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66 / HSPD-25) is only a broad policy statement. An effective Arctic strategy would address both governance and capacity questions. To generate effective governance in the Arctic the United States should ratify LOSC and take the lead in advocating the adoption of Arctic shipping requirements. The IMO recently proposed a voluntary Polar Code, and the United States should work to make it mandatory. The code sets structural classifications and standards for ships operating in the Arctic as well as specific navigation and emergency training for those operating in or around ice-covered waters. The United States should also support Automated Identification System (AIS) carriage for all ships transiting the Arctic. Because the Arctic is a vast region with no ability for those on land to see the ships offshore, electronic identification and tracking is the only way to know what ships are operating in or transiting the region. An AIS transmitter (costing as little as $800) sends a signal that provides vessel identity and location at all times to those in command centers around the world and is currently mandated for ships over sixteen hundred gross tons. The United States and other Arctic nations track AIS ships and are able to respond to emergencies based on its signals. For this reason, mandating AIS for all vessels in the Arctic is needed. The U.S. government also needs to work with Russia to impose a traffic separation scheme in the Bering Strait, where chances for a collision are high. Finally, the United States should push for compulsory tandem sailing for all passenger vessels operating in the Arctic. Tandem sailing for cruise ships and smaller excursion boats will avert another disaster like RMS Titanic. To enhance the Arctic's economic potential, the United States should also develop its capacity to enable commercial entities to operate safely in the region. The U.S. government should invest in icebreakers**,** aircraft**,** and shore-based infrastructure. A ten-year plan should include the building of at least two heavy icebreakers, at a cost of approximately $1 billion apiece, and an air station in Point Barrow, Alaska, with at least three helicopters. Such an air station would cost less than $20 million, with operating, maintenance, and personnel costs comparable to other northern military facilities. Finally, developing a deepwater port with response presence and infrastructure is critical. A base at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, where ships and fishing vessels resupply and refuel, would only cost a few million dollars per year to operate. Washington could finance the cost of its capacity-building efforts by using offshore lease proceeds and federal taxes on the oil and gas extracted from the Arctic region. In 2008, the United States collected $2.6 billion from offshore lease sales in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (off Alaska's north coast), and the offshore royalty tax rate in the region is 19 percent, which would cover operation and maintenance of these facilities down the road. The United States needs an Arctic governance and acquisition strategy to take full advantage of all the region has to offer and to protect the people operating in the region and the maritime environment. Neglecting the Arctic reduces the United States' ability to reap tremendous economic benefits and could harm U.S. national security interests**.**

#### The Arctic will be the next area of great power conflict – gas production spurs military investments that prevent escalation

Talmadge 12 (Eric – AP, Huffington Post, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity’, 4/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-military-activity\_n\_1427565.html)

To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. They are preparing for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and a slew of potential conflicts. By Arctic standards, the region is already buzzing with military activity, and experts believe that will increase significantly in the years ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever — Exercise Cold Response — with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, so will the need for policing, border patrols and — if push comes to shove — military muscle to enforce rival claims. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia, Canada and the United States have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia — one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle — has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's superpower. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic countries — Norway, Denmark and Canada — to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in the region. This is only going to increase as time goes on." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "We want to maintain our edge up there," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in the Arctic has never really waned. It remains very important." But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it lacks ships able to operate in or near Arctic ice, support facilities and adequate communications. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers.

#### Arctic on the brink of great-power conflict – diplomacy is no longer an option

Tassinari 9/7 (Fabrizio Tassinari is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and the Head of Foreign Policy and EU Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies, September 7, 2012, “Avoiding a Scramble for the High North”, http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/09/07/avoiding-a-scramble-for-the-high-north/)

The geopolitics of the Arctic are stuck in a paradox: The more regional players restate the importance of international cooperation, the more some pundits and policymakers seem to conclude that the Arctic risks descending into competition and even conflict**.** The world is awakening to the growing strategic importance of the High North. As the Arctic ice melts due to global warming, it opens up new opportunities, from shorter shipping lanes to newly accessible oil and gas reserves; respectively, about 13 percent and 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered resources are in the Arctic, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. These discoveries are usually followed by declarations of the littoral nations to the effect that any potential disagreements over them will be resolved peacefully. However, beneath expressions of goodwill, the Arctic debate is often characterized by a sense of urgency, and even forms of alarmism. In recent years, instances of growing securitization of the Arctic have abounded. Back in 2008, a paper by Javier Solana, then the EU’s foreign policy’s chief, and the European Commission warned about “potential conflict over resources in Polar regions” as they become exploitable due to melting ice. In 2010, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, Adm. James Stavridis, argued that “for now, the disputes in the North have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium.” Then there are actions that speak louder than prepared speeches — from the famous August 2007 expedition that planted a Russian flag on the North Pole’s seabed to the annual summer military exercises carried out by Canada to assert its sovereignty in the North. Although the Russian stunt was most likely aimed at nationalist domestic audiences, some observers view these exercises as the expressions of competing national interests. As the scholar Scott Borgerson ominously put it: “The Arctic powers are fast approaching diplomatic gridlock, and that could eventually lead to the sort of armed brinkmanship that plagues other territories.” The geopolitical constellation in and around the region provides a ready justification for such an assessment. While no-one really imagines the United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark fighting over the Arctic, some of their politicians have occasionally framed rhetoric in more peppered terms than one might expect. Russia, the fifth Arctic littoral nation, typically treads a fine line between declarations of cooperation and an innate instinct for great-power competition. Add to that the EU, which is seeking to carve its own role, and Asia’s giants, above all China, for which the opening of the Northeast passage may reduce sailing distance with Europe by some 40 percent, and it is not hard to conjure up the prospect of an Arctic race building up.

#### De-escalation is key to prevent Arctic conflicts from going nuclear – draws in major powers

Wallace and Staples 10 (Michael Wallace and Steven Staples. \*Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 609 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on theArctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62

#### Extinction – it’s categorically different from all other impacts

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the **USSR**. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy** or thwart **humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### US Arctic leadership solves multiple threats – offshore natural gas solidifies US leadership

Conley 12 (Heather – Senior Fellow at CSIS and Director, Europe Program, “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic”, January, http://csis.org/files/publication/120117\_Conley\_ArcticSecurity\_Web.pdf)

The Arctic will experience extraordinary economic and environmental change over the next several decades. Commercial, human, and state interaction will rise dramatically. More drilling for oil and gas in the region and growing shipping and ecotourism as new shipping routes come into existence are just a few of the examples of increased human activity in the Arctic. The rapid melting of the Arctic ice cap is now exceeding previous scientific and climatic predictions. A recent study shows that September 2011 marked the lowest levels of sea ice extent ever recorded in the northern polar region.1 The polar ice cap today is 40 percent smaller than it was in 1979,2 and in the summer of 2007 alone, 1 million more square miles of ice beyond the average melted, uncovering an area of open water six times the size of California. While estimates range from 2013 to 2060, the U.S. Navy’s “Arctic Roadmap” projects ice-free conditions for a portion of the Arctic by the summer of 2030.3 Arctic economics and an increasingly ice-free and hostile climatic environment are on a direct collision course, driving a clear need for a new paradigm to meet pressing security challenges that Arctic nations have thus far been unprepared or ill equipped to address. As the region takes on greater economic importance, the Arctic requires a comprehensive regional and global security strategy that includes an increase in regional readiness and border security as well as an enhancement of strategic capabilities. The security challenges are vast, including search and rescue, environmental remediation**,** piracy**,** terrorism**,** natural and man-made disaster response, and border protection. Compounding the challenge is the fact that regional players must function in an operational environment of severely limited satellite communication and hydrographic mapping. Arctic coastal states have developed and issued national Arctic security strategies and accompanying documents that, albeit roughly, sketch out their political and security priorities in the region. These documents describe their national security interests and the intentions these states wish to pursue and defend. Each of the five Arctic coastal states—Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States—touts its commitment to cooperative action while simultaneously bolstering its military presence and capabilities in the Arctic. Yet the complexity of competing national security interests is heightened by the lack of a single coherent structure through which these concerns can be addressed. Therefore, a fresh approach is needed for addressing regional Arctic security concerns within a global framework, while recognizing the mutual benefits of maintaining international cooperation, transparency, and stability in the Arctic. Creating a twenty-first century security architecture for the Arctic presents the United States with a conundrum: U.S. Arctic policy must be given a significant sense of urgency and focus at the same moment that U.S. defense budgets are being reduced and U.S. military planners consider the Arctic to be “an area of low conflict.” How does one economically and militarily square this circle? Unfortunately, while there have been some international debate and discussion on the form and format of Arctic security cooperation, the debate has often focused on what issues related to Arctic security cannot be discussed rather than on those that can and should be addressed. However, these institutional and policy barriers have begun to break down as actors recognize both a collective lack of operational capacity and the increasing number of security actors that will play a role in this rapidly changing region. Arctic stakeholders have yet to discuss seriously, let alone determine, what collective security framework Arctic states should use to address the emerging security challenges in the region, despite signing legally binding agreements on international search and rescue and negotiating international agreements on oil spills and response. It is within this context that the following report will analyze the drivers of change in the region, examine the key Arctic security actors and institutions, and explore the potential for a new security architecture for the Arctic. Oil and Gas As the sea ice retreats, new commercial opportunities in the Arctic arise. Natural resources that had once been unreachable are becoming available for extraction. As the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates, the Arctic is projected to contain 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil resources and 30 percent of the gas resources.1 Because global production of oil and gas will not match global demand and the short-term outlook for the price of oil and gas will increase,2 the desire to tap these resources in the Arctic will spur commercial exploration, and multinational companies will invest and become increasingly engaged in the region. At the same time, the need to develop new technologies and approaches for tackling the harsh and unpredictable climate for offshore drilling and transportation in the Arctic is urgent. The greater the potential profit and need to secure supply while maintaining, if not increasing, current production levels, the greater the tendency will be for companies to assume the greater risks inherent in operating in the Arctic. Alaska has contributed significantly to meeting U.S. demand with oil from the oil fields on the North Slope close to the Arctic coast transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. However, due to decreasing North Slope production and a lack of new fields, domestic pressure to explore offshore of Alaska is rising. Royal Dutch Shell has received preliminary approval from the Obama administration for its offshore drilling plans in its acquired leases in the Beaufort Sea. Exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea is expected to commence in 2012.3 Shell is also optimistic that it can begin to develop the reserves in the Chukchi Sea in the near future, but issues with environmental leases, oil spill preparedness and response, and disputes with local communities threaten to delay the process.4 Other Arctic coastal states are seeking similar economic advantage. In Norway, leases to the Barents Sea have been allocated, as Norwegian oil and gas production has fallen since its peak of 3.4 million barrels per day in 20015 and is expected to decline further if no significant new fields are discovered. Increased demand from the European market has spurred additional exploratory drilling farther north. Seismic activity by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate6 has already started in the maritime territory obtained after the Norwegian-Russian maritime delimitation treaty entered into effect in July 2011.7 With the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Arctic coast line, Russia is increasingly interested in developing its potential fields, especially on the prosperous continental shelf next to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the Kara Sea. Russia is moving to increase gas production in the vast Yamal field, which already produces 90 percent of Russian state gas, following recent discoveries of large gas fields, such as the Bovanenkovo field.8 In addition, Russia has been active in expanding oil production in the Pechora Sea, with plans for drilling in the Prirazlomnoye oil field in early 20129—a significant development as it marks the first instance of offshore drilling in the Russian Arctic.10 Russia also plans to drill in the Dolginskoye oil field in the Pechora Sea, which is projected to be three times as large as the Prirazlomnoye, and aims to have the field developed by 2020.11 Numerous delays—from the large supply of gas available on the global market due to the discovery of unconventional gas in the United States and uncertainty over Russian taxation policies—have to this point prevented the development of the world’s largest gas field, the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, forcing new technological developments and seismic exploration in other parts of the Russian Arctic territory. All of this activity indicates the keen interest both countries have in moving rapidly to extract these resources from their Arctic territories.

#### Arctic terrorism leads to CBW use

Mychajlyszyn 8 (Natalie, International Affairs, Trade and Finance Division, “The Arctic: Canadian Security and Defence”, 24 October 2008, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0813-e.htm#illegalaccess)

Increased illegal access and illegal activities, including terrorism As the Arctic generally becomes more accessible because of the warming climate, some analysts predict the emergence of new security threats**.**(6) One such risk is that of an increase in illegal migration and trafficking in persons to North America through the Arctic. There are also fears of the North being used as a thoroughfare for drug trafficking as well as a destination for illegal narcotics. In the post-September 11 era, fears have been raised concerning the increased vulnerability of the Arctic as a passage for terrorists, whether for illegal entry into North America or for the transport of illegal weapons, including biological and chemical devices. To such a list of activities, generally perpetrated by organized crime groups, can be added the rise of other types of organized crime, such as those involving industries engaged in the extraction of lucrative resources, such as diamonds and copper.

#### Extinction

Sandberg et al 8—Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, Stockholm—AND—Jason G. Matheny—PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh—AND—Milan M. Ćirković—senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction)

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens **are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive**. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

#### Independently, Arctic natural gas production leads to economic growth and solidifies environmental leadership - that prevents global environmental destruction

Sullivan 12 (Dan – a former state attorney general, commissioner of Alaska's Department of Natural Resources, “It's time to develop our Arctic resources, 7/20, http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/opinion/sullivan-arctic-drilling/index.html)

(CNN) -- The United States is on the verge of an energy renaissance. We need to recognize and seize the opportunity. This renaissance involves domestic production of natural resources ranging from clean renewables to hydrocarbons. In particular, domestic hydrocarbon production -- both oil and gas -- is increasing dramatically, with some experts predicting that the United States could become the largest hydrocarbon producer in the word -- outstripping Saudi Arabia and Russia -- by 2020. Increased domestic production of hydrocarbons is driven by two trends. First, new technology is unlocking unconventional resources such as shale-derived oil and gas. And second, investors and policy makers are recognizing that the U.S. still has an enormous resource base of conventional oil and gas, particularly in Alaska. Opinion: Why we should look to the Arctic Federal agencies estimate that Alaska's North Slope and federal waters off Alaska's northern coast contain approximately 40 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil and more than 200 trillion cubic feet of conventional gas. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, this region contains more oil than any comparable region located in the Arctic, including northern Russia. However, the United States is lagging behind its Arctic neighbors in developing these resources. This is unfortunate, because we have some of the highest environmental standards in the world and we should be setting the bar for Arctic development. Developing our Arctic resources will promote our nation's interests in many ways: securing a politically stable, long-term supply of domestic energy; boosting U.S. economic growth and jobs; reducing the federal trade deficit; and strengthening our global leadership on energy issues. Leading academic researchers and economists in Alaska have estimated that oil production from Alaska's outer continental shelf will bring federal revenues of approximately $167 billion over 50 years, and create 55,000 jobs throughout the country. Developing U.S. resources in the Arctic has the added benefit of enhancing global environmental protection. One of the arguments used by Arctic drilling opponents is that "we aren't ready," but it is obvious that no matter what preparations are made, they will argue that it isn't enough. Shell, for example, has spent billions to prepare for drilling in the Arctic this summer, incorporating the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, state-of-the-art equipment and extensive scientific research. Recently, the Obama administration has publically expressed its confidence in the company's drilling plans. The U.S. has created some of the highest standards in the world for environmental protection. When we delay or disallow responsible resource development, the end result is not to protect the environment, but to drive hydrocarbon investment and production to countries with much lower environmental standards and enforcement capacity. Last year, it was reported that between 5 million and 20 million tons of oil leak in Russia per year. This is equivalent to a Deepwater Horizon blowout about every two months. Russia had an estimated 18,000 oil pipeline ruptures in 2010 -- the figure for the U.S. that year was 341. If we do not pursue responsible development in the Arctic, countries such as Russia -- perhaps even China, which is interested in securing access to Arctic hydrocarbon resources -- will dominate energy production from the Arctic. Such a scenario does not bode well for the global environment. By embracing the opportunities in the Arctic, the United States will show the world that it can be a strong leader in responsible energy development.

#### Extinction

**Ford 3** (Violet, Vice President – Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf)

The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to **global processes** and the balance of **life on earth**. Both the unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a resolution effectively recognizes the Arctic as a **“barometer”** or indicator region **of the globe’s environmental health**. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from environmental and other NGO’s.

#### Global natural gas extraction is inevitable – the US needs to take the lead ensure the best practices are used

Schneider 12 (Michael, Advocacy Director – Clean Air Task Force, “Curb Methane Emissions,” National Journal, 7-25, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments)

For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development. Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

### 1AC – Exports

#### Contention 2 : LNG Exports

#### Currently, perception of inadequate supply blocks LNG exports – new, sustainable supply is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).4 According to the Energy Information Adminis- tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over potential exports **hinges on the prospects for its sustained availability and development**. For exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and **compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses**. There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resources—the volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. Based on the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable natural gas resource in the United States. In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production. The productivity of shale gas wells has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

#### Perception is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are **valid** depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for **shale gas reserves are uncertain**, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic.

#### Removing Alaskan OCS moratoria results in massive LNG exports

Schmitt and Mazza 12 (Gary J. – Resident Scholar at AEI, and Michael – Research Fellow at AEI, “Turn gas into geostrategy “, 6/11, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/turn-gas-into-geostrategy/)

But one corner of the world that has hardly made a dent in this new market is Alaska. America's northernmost state has the gas reserves to meet a substantial part of Japan's demand. Estimates suggest that the North Slope fields and reserves on the outer continental shelf hold as much as 236 trillion cubic feet of gas—enough to serve the Japanese utilities' needs for over 90 years at current rates of consumption. Buying LNG from Alaska would be a good deal for Japan. Tokyo, which buys LNG on the Asian spot market at a price tied to oil, is currently paying about $16-$17 per million British thermal units. According to a recent Brookings Institution study, delivery of LNG from Alaska to Japan in 2020 will cost $11 or less, allowing for substantially lower import prices—and ensuring continued high Asian demand and a boon to the Alaskan economy. However, liberals and environmentalists in Washington are working to stop gas exports altogether. Ed Markey, a Democratic representative from Massachusetts, has proposed legislation which would prohibit any exports until 2025, believing that such a ban would keep supplies in the U.S. high and, in turn, prices for heating and power low. For the Sierra Club and others, stopping exports of LNG is important for lowering demand for new production. The goal is to reduce the need for hydraulic fracturing, so-called fracking, to release natural gas reserves found in shale and other deep deposits. Now, in an apparent Obama administration kowtow to liberals and environmentalists in the run-up to November's election, the Energy Department is now slow-rolling the release of a report expected to positively assess the domestic economic impact of exporting natural gas. But there is little evidence that hydraulic fracturing is the environmental hazard it's been made out to be or that the export of LNG from the United States would have more than a modicum of impact on domestic prices. And in this case, Alaskan natural gas does not even require hydraulic fracturing to recover. Moreover, it is unlikely Alaska's gas will be tapped for U.S. consumption if there is no Asian market. Given the extraordinary amount of reserves in the lower 48 states, Canada and in the Gulf of Mexico, the cost of extracting and shipping gas from Alaska's North Slope would make it uncompetitive with gas from those other sources. And the political problems don't end with Washington. In Juneau, Alaska's capital, state legislators are fussing over the royalty payments companies will be expected to pay to the state for extracting natural gas from its fields. With elections coming, they are worried that their constituents will judge them as having failed in getting as much from the companies as is possible—a charge that's been leveled at their predecessors when it comes to the state's oil. The problem is that the oil companies need a firm commitment from the state about the level of royalties to be paid now and in the future before those companies will invest the billions necessary in wells, pipelines and plants to extract and export Alaska's gas. And delays in doing so could be costly, as Japanese utilities appear willing to sign long-term agreements with other suppliers even at higher prices if they think it will address their pressing energy requirements. The question of whether to export Alaskan natural gas ought to be a no-brainer. Japan is eager to buy a resource that the United States has in abundance. Meanwhile, Alaskans pay no state sales or income taxes and receive a check in the mail every year; natural gas sales would extend those benefits. And for the U.S more broadly, the economic benefits would be a reduction in the trade deficit and the creation of new jobs. There is also an important strategic payoff. A Japan that is less reliant for its energy on unstable Middle East regimes or Russia is more likely to be a dependable ally in confronting common security challenges. Over the past decade, Russian attempts to monopolize gas supplies to Europe have made dealing with Moscow's revanchist policies a bigger headache for Washington. The same goes for Iranian supplies of oil to Japan, India and Europe with regard to Tehran's nuclear program. With other Asian nations also hungry for natural gas, American reserves should be used to U.S. geopolitical advantage. In just a few short years, the United States has gone from being an importer of LNG to being potentially "the Saudi Arabia of natural gas." It would be a shame to let politics get in the way of making the most of this fortuitous development.

#### New onshore terminals are being blocked

Parfomak 9 (Paul W. Parfomak, Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy, and Adam Vann, Legislative Attorney, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety, and Regulation, Congressional Research Service, 12-14-9, <http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Jan/RL32205.pdf>)

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel shipped in large tankers to U.S. ports from overseas. While LNG has historically made up a small part of U.S. natural gas supplies, rising price volatility, and the possibility of domestic shortages have significantly increased LNG demand. To meet this demand, energy companies have proposed new LNG import terminals throughout the coastal United States. Many of these terminals would be built onshore near populated areas. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) grants federal approval for the siting of new onshore LNG facilities under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). This approval process incorporates minimum safety standards for LNG established by the Department of Transportation. Although LNG has had a record of relative safety for the last 45 years, and no LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists, proposals for new LNG terminal facilities have generated considerable public concern. Some community groups and governments officials fear that LNG terminals may expose nearby residents to unacceptable hazards. Ongoing public concern about LNG safety has focused congressional attention on the exclusivity of FERC’s LNG siting authority, proposals for a regional LNG siting process, the lack of “remote” siting requirements in FERC regulations, state permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act, terrorism attractiveness of LNG, the adequacy of Coast Guard security resources, and other issues. LNG terminals directly affect the safety of communities in the states and congressional districts where they are sited, and may influence energy costs nationwide. Faced with an uncertain national need for greater LNG imports and persistent public concerns about LNG hazards, some in Congress have proposed changes to safety provisions in federal LNG siting regulation. Legislation proposed in the 110 th Congress addressed Coast Guard LNG resources, FERC’s exclusive siting authority, state concurrence of federal LNG siting decisions, and agency coordination under the Coastal Zone Management Act, among other proposals. Provisions in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (H.R. 3619), passed by the House on October 23, 2009, would require additional waterway suitability notification requirements in LNG siting reviews by FERC (Sec. 1117). The Maritime Hazardous Cargo Security Act (S. 1385), introduced by Senator Lautenberg and three co-sponsors on June 25, 2009, would require a national study to identify measures to improve the security of maritime transportation of liquefied natural gas (Sec. 6). If Congress concludes that new LNG terminals as currently regulated will pose an unacceptable risk to public safety, Congress may consider additional LNG safety-related legislation, or may exercise its oversight authority in other ways to influence LNG terminal siting approval. Alternatively, Congress may consider other changes in U.S. energy policy legislation to reduce the nation’s demand for natural gas or increase supplies of North American natural gas and, thus, the need for new LNG infrastructure.

#### Offshore terminals are key

Kilisek 12 (Roman, “The Bright Future of Floating LNG Liquefaction, Regasification and Storage Units”, 7/19, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/07/19/the-bright-future-of-floating-lng-liquefaction-regasification-and-storage-units/)

This is a newsworthy event in the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) industry because it is the first time that a floating liquefaction unit is moving from concept to commercial reality. What are the advantages of those floating LNG facilities over conventional liquefaction plants? First off, there is an obvious advantage in tapping offshore resources. In addition to the ability to station the floating vessel directly over distant offshore fields and thereby saving on a costly subsea pipeline to shore, it allows the operator of the facility to move the production facility to a new location once a field is depleted. This would also allow energy companies to exploit smaller fields and now earn a realistic return on investment. Other cost savings are to be expected during the construction phase for the required marine and loading facilities which often end up costing billions of dollars. Finally, in a world full of risk it can significantly reduce the security and political risk (inter alia, environmental regulation and permits) involved in choosing a land-based site for LNG export facilities in African countries (Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique) and countries in the Middle East as well as South America. The US should contemplate something like this along the East Coast for export to Europe, and along the West Coast for export to South America (Chile) and Asia.

#### Global export contracts are being renegotiated – now is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see Figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates.108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already being felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage.109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract.110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts.111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (Figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020.

#### Scenario 2: Russia

#### U.S. LNG exports are key to check Russian energy imperialism

Washington Post 9/25 (“ U.S. gas exports could limit Putin’s influence”, 9/25/12, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-natural-gas-exports-could-limit-vladimir-putins-influence/2012/09/25/e949342c-0691-11e2-858a-5311df86ab04_story.html>)

Gazprom finances Russian President Vladimir Putin’s corrupt political system. Under Mr. Putin’s direction, it has also been a notorious international villain, tying delivery of its precious fuel, a matter of life and death during European winters, to the Kremlin’s political agenda. But with the United States no longer demanding massive quantities of liquefied natural gas from Russia or anywhere else — thus freeing up fuel for others — and gas production ramping up elsewhere, the economics that enable Gazprom’s abuse are changing. The company, to be sure, is still a monster. It claimed $44 billion in profit last year — and that’s just what it reported. It provides most or all of the natural gas for many Eastern European nations, and it still has lucrative long-term supply contracts with European customers that link Gazprom’s prices to the price of oil. However, a recent Brookings Institution analysis reported that a looser natural gas market has already empowered German utilities to renegotiate those contracts; some European customers are even ignoring them altogether and buying cheaper liquefied natural gas on spot markets. If the United States begins exporting natural gas, it would only encourage positive long-term structural changes in this international trade — **away from Kremlin domination and toward a larger and more nimble world market.** European countries would not be the only ones to feel this effect. Gazprom intends to enter the gas-hungry Asian market, and **it might find that it has less leverage over its potential customers** than it had expected to wield. If the economic case for allowing U.S. natural-gas exports, which we have made in other editorials, doesn’t persuade those fighting to limit them, the possible geopolitical benefits should. With new supply from America and others sloshing around the world market later this decade, Mr. Putin might have to make a choice — between propping up a dysfunctional and decreasingly profitable monopoly or finally liberalizing the Russian energy sector, to the benefit of customers, shareholders, Russia’s neighbors and, ultimately, Russia, too.

#### Absent that, Russia military influence is inevitable – that causes Senkaku Island conflict, undermines counter-terror operations, and makes conflict inevitable

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former director for China affairs in policy planning at the U.S. Department of Defense., 2/11/09, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=96417>)

After the end of the Cold War and a period of Perestroika, the post 9/11 world ushered in once more a period of Realpolitik in the international security environment. However, Russia’s prime minister and former president Vladimir Putin appeared to have the foresight that Perestroika would not last: his 1997 Ph.D. dissertation at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute viewed the demise of the Soviet Union as the ‘greatest catastrophe of the 20 th century’ and argued for utilising the Russian resource sector to once again reassert Russia’s imperial status. 2 Indeed, under his leadership beginning in 1999 3 , he has systematically established Gazprom and energy as the bedrock of Russian foreign policy and power projection around the globe, and through the bloc of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 4 is asserting its power in the Eurasia region spanning from the EU to Iran in the Middle East, to the Caspian Region/Central Asia and onto South Asia and the Far East. Its foreign policy of weaponisation of energy is demonstrated by invasion of Georgia in 2008 over the BTC pipeline that bypasses Russian control, cutting gas and oil supplies to former Soviet Republics, dividing New Europe and Old Europe via bilateral energy deals with Germany (e.g., Nord Stream), Italy (e.g., South Stream to undermine Nabucco 5 ), at the expense of Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, Belarus, etc. Moreover, Russia has emphasised SCO interests over UNSC interests, and have, along with its SCO partner China, consistently watered down UNSC sanctions against Iran (SCO observer member) and DPRK 6 nuclear issues. Given that China needs Iran’s energy, Russia needs Iran as a foothold into the Middle East, and Iran needs SCO membership to counter international isolation as well as Russia and China’s UNSC votes, these SCO actors seem to act more cohesively within the SCO framework vis-àvis other regional and international organisations. With Iran’s recent calling for a SCO currency and SCO bank 7 to undermine U.S. and western influence, and SCO’s increasingly ambitious military exercises and recent defence agreement with CSTO 8 , this emerging Eurasian economic and security alliance will challenge NATO and western interests and thus bears watching. Russian Energy Imperialism and the SCO Russia appears to have a three-prong approach in re-asserting itself as an imperial power: energy, financial/economic, and military. Energy Weapon As Marshall Goldman portrayed in Putin, power and the New Russia Petrostate 9 , he was privy to visit Gazprom’s dispatching centre headquarter in Moscow, and witnessed the map covering 100-foot wall of a room with a spiderweb-like maze of natural gas pipelines reaching from East Siberia west to the Atlantic Ocean and from the Arctic ocean south to the Caspian and Black Seas. With a flick of a switch these dispatchers could freeze entire countries and have indeed done so in the past with former Soviet Union republics and most recently with Ukraine in January 2009. Russia’s energy strategy is to create energy dependence via monopolistic control of pipelines and acquisition of transit countries’ internal distribution network. 10 For example, Gazprom offered to cancel debt and charge lower prices if Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia would give Gazprom equity stake in their domestic pipeline networks. By owning the networks, Gazprom can maintain monopoly control and economic rent. 11 Due to the high sunk cost and entry barrier of building pipelines, there is rarely a second standing pipeline from another supplier reserved for emergencies. As such, consumers tend to be locked into long-term contracts and therefore dependency on a dominant supplier. Ronald Reagan understood the vulnerability of monopoly tendencies in natural gas pipelines and tried to prevent USSR from building them to W. Europe. In 1984 he asked Thatcher to stop the English firm, John Brown Engineering, from selling Soviets the compressors they needed to move the gas through the pipeline from the Urengoi natural gas field in West Siberia to Germany, but the efforts failed and the pipeline was completed in 1985. 12 Today, Germany imports 40% of its natural gas from Russia, the highest in any W. European country, and is projected to reach 60% in the next decade. 13 Despite EU’s efforts to foment a common energy policy to decrease dependency, Russia has been effective with its “divide and conquer” strategy in dividing Old and New Europe with lucrative bilateral deals with Germany, Italy, France that bypass many transit countries in New Europe. 14 Economic Weapon In tandem with this energy prong of Russian strategy is weaponisation of currency and mercantilist economic policies within the SCO framework. Iran has recently proposed to create an SCO currency and bank to strengthen intra-regional ties. 15 Given that China has $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves 16 --the largest in the world—a move to a common currency (including reserves of 4 observer members) would significantly reduce the influence of U.S. dollar and western currencies in the global capital market. Additionally, Russian President Medvedev in a January 2009 visit to Uzbekistan also called for a stronger SCO and increase economic ties with CIS’ Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) and CSTO. 17 This emerging China-Iran-Russia axis has been noted and dubbed “that other axis” by Asia Times Jephraim P. Gundzik, who wrote in 2005 that “Beijing’s increasingly close ties with Moscow and Tehran will thwart Washington’s foreign policy goal of expanding U.S. security footholds in the Middle East, Central Asia and Asia.” 18 Military Weapon Indeed the creeping militarisation of SCO and 2007 defence ties with CSTO merit further investigation. Although not yet a military alliance, SCO is moving towards that trajectory as measured by: (1) Increased security cooperation: (2) Increased CSTO-SCO ties; (3) Energy Security; and (4) Connection with the West. 19 Firstly, despite denials of the military nature of the SCO, in 2007 for the first time a political summit (Bishtek 2007) was amalgamated with war games (Peace Mission 2007). Hitherto defence ministers were the highest-ranking officials to participate in the military exercises; the heads of states presence at the war game was perhaps signalling SCO’s determination to be in command of regional security. This is further demonstrated by the increasingly ambitious nature of SCO military exercises from bilateral to multilateral to joint all-SCO level. Secondly, the concept of “military assistance” (e.g., attack against one is attack against all) may be included in the SCO policy documents. In October 2007 SCO (a political-economic organisation) signed defence agreements with CSTO (a political-military organisation). Because “military assistance” is a key element of a mature security alliance such as CSTO, and because SCO signed a defence agreement with a purely military organisation, there may be a pull of the SCO towards a more military trajectory. 20 This is tied into the increasing military aspects of energy security. Security organisations tend to be involved in energy security such as guarding security of oil & gas pipelines against terrorist attacks, protecting railway lines and deploying rapid reactions forces. In light of SCO’s new cooperation with CSTO, this may lead to eventual standing of reaction forces in the near future regarding energy security. Finally, SCO is increasing ties with NATO—which has arrangements for cooperation with all SCO states except China. Since the 1990s, NATO has had bilateral cooperation with five Central Asian states within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework, as well as a special relationship with Russia since 2002 called NATO-Russia Council. 21 In November 2005 SCO developed a contact group in Afghanistan and have had operational cooperation with NATO. It is looking to expand its military operations westwards from Central Asia and may joint NATO with contingents in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. The SCO is a formidable organisation that brings together almost half the world’s population (including observers), with several nuclear weapons states (China, Russia, India, Pakistan and perhaps Iran), and includes key energy exporters in Central Asia as well as some of the world’s fastest growing economies. Because recent indicators point SCO towards a trajectory of mature security alliance, it behooves the U.S. and EU to closely monitor this trend and hedge against Russia and Iran from using it for anti-western policies. In Europe, Russia is pursuing an aggressive “divide and conquer” strategy to prevent the EU from fomenting a common energy policy and increase energy diversification. Germany is the top importer while Italy follows behind. As such, Russia has partnered with Germany to build Nord Stream and with Italy to build South Stream pipelines in order to control the flow of Russian and Central European energy supply to W. Europe. Despite some pundits arguing that these two projects are based on purely commercial reasons of supply and demand, in light of recent Russian invasion of Georgia and gas supply cut-off to Ukraine, these two projects must also be examined within the security dimension as they have important strategic implications for the U.S. and EU. Nord Stream: Russian Military Presence & Intelligence Surveillance in the Baltic Region The Nord Stream project in 2005 proposes two natural gas pipelines from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. Legally it is a Swiss company, but economically it is a joint venture between Russia, Germany and Netherlands, driven by Russia geopolitical interests. 22 Although it has invested €8 billion to the project, due to its lack of transparency, some experts project the cost may reach €10-15 billion. 23 Additionally, there are negative implications for this proposed pipeline—increased EU energy dependency on Russia, reduction of ability of small members to act as security providers in region if energy security is undermined, and increased Russian military presence in the Baltic region. Sweden for one fears the risk of Nord Stream as a catalyst for increased Russian military presence and intelligence surveillance. Putin has proclaimed that during construction phase, Russia Baltic Sea Navy would protect Nord Stream pipelines. 24 Additionally, the risers and pipelines are excellent platforms for sensors of various kinds—radars, hydro-acoustic systems and sonars to act as eyes and ears for monitoring the system as well as intelligence surveillance. This would give Russia an intelligence edge in the Baltic Sea concerning all air, surface, and sub-surface activities—especially around Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, and NATO members’ military exercises. This is a realistic risk, given Russia’s past history of installing fiber optic cable along the Yamal pipeline without informing the Polish government in advance. 25 As such Sweden has insisted Nord Stream need approval of all countries whose territories will be traversed by the pipeline. Should the Russians build pipelines without approval of countries in the region, the Swedish military has drawn up plans and are fully prepared to sabotage the pipeline if and when it is built. 26 South Stream: Undermine Nabucco and EU Energy Diversification South Stream is a project between Russian Gazprom and Italian Eni. If constructed, South Stream is projected to be the most expensive pipeline at €12.8 billion and impact EU security relations. 27 The project was announced on 23 June 2007, in reaction to EU’s 2004 decision to focus on Nabucco for energy diversification. When Russia cut off gas to Ukraine in January 2006, the project was elevated and included in European Commission’s Strategic Energy Review, released 10 January 2007, calling for priority of energy supply diversification. Nabucco is non-Russian controlled and a direct Caspian Sea-Middle East-EU southern gas corridor, and South Stream’s route is almost identical to Nabucco. The pipeline has a planned capacity of 31 billion cubic metres to begin in Beregovaya, Russia, and cross the Black Sea to Varna, Bulgaria. Both Nord Stream and Nabucco will bring gas to Austria’s Baumgarten gas storage and distribution hub, a clearinghouse for gas coming to Europe. In January, Austria’s OMV signed a deal giving Gazprom 50% ownership in Baumgarten and its trading floor, and is leading efforts to bring Gazprom into the Nabucco project in order to undermine EU energy diversification from Russia. 28 Russia is also consolidating its control over energy sources elsewhere in Middle East and North Africa (MENA countries). Russia and Iran had called for forming a gas cartel. While Russia, Qatar and Iran hold 56% of the world’s gas reserves, with addition of Venezuela, Algeria and Libya the cartel would have 2/3 of the world’s reserves. Indeed, Russia’s duplicitous stance in the UNSC is highlighted by the 13 July 2008 energy partnership between Gazprom and Iran’s NIOC, at a time when Russia was supposedly working with the U.S. and EU to ensure Iran has no room to manoeuvre in its nuclear weapons ambitions. 29 It also courted Turkey to be a participant in a Russian-Iranian partnership as the third investor to develop Iran’s South Par gas field, which culminated in the November 2008 Turkey-Iran $12 billion deal. 30 Finally, in the Africa region, in March 2008 Italian Eni agreed to share with Gazprom its development quotas for Libyan gas deposits. 31 Eni holds LNG processing facilities in Libya and this gives Gazprom control over another alternative European energy source. 32 In April 2008, Putin cancelled $4.5 billion Libyan debt and oversaw the signing of arms sales and joint ventures agreement between Gazprom and Libyan National Oil Corporation. Gazprom is looking to control Libyan gas and southern Mediterranean transit route that would further threaten Europe energy security, as well as engaging in talks to pipe Nigerian gas to Europe across the Sahara Desert. 33 Russia Energy Imperialism in Middle East Iran as Foothold in the Middle East Russia has longstanding interest in the Middle East, and a key Russia-Iran 1921 treaty stipulates that if a country attacks Russia via Iran, Russia can invade Iran to counter this threat. 34 In the 1980s Ariel Sharon warned Americans the danger of USSR using Iran-Iraq war to enter Iran and taking over its energy resources. 35 Russian military intervention remains a plausible threat should the U.S. and Israel conduct air-strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations, and even more so should Iran become a member of the SCO. Moreover, Russians had planned to meddle in Israel during the June 1967 Six Day War and flew Soviet photo-reconnaissance MiG-25 “Foxbat” aircrafts directly over the Dimona reactor in May 1967. 36 The Soviet Union engineered an operation to provoke Israel into war in order to provide cover for Soviet destruction of Israel’s nuclear programme. Soviet nuclear-missile submarines were poised off Israel’s shores, ready to strike back in case Israel already had a nuclear device. However, the war was over so quickly within six days that the Soviets did not have the chance to carry out its mission. 37 Despite Russia’s support of Iran, it is concurrently making overtures to moderate Arab states in the region to allay their fears of a resurgent and possible nuclear Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been historical rivals for regional hegemony and throughout the Cold War Russo-Saudi relations were chilly, but recently there has been a shift of Saudi Arabia towards Russia as evidenced in the 2007 $4 billion arms deal and increased shuttle diplomacy. 38 In the 1980s, CIA director William Casey worked with the House of Saud to target Russian energy sector by flooding the market with cheap oil, thereby weakening the Russian petro state’s economic power that was over 50% dependent on energy foreign exchange earnings. 39 As such, Russia appears to hedge itself against this risk and is courting many traditional U.S. allies in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the GCC. 40 And, it is reinforcing this hedge with military power by establishing naval ports in the region. Russian Naval Ports in the Middle East In January 2009 Russia announced that it would establish navy bases in Syria, Libya and Yemen. 41 The Syrian port of Tartus could be revived as during the Cold War, the Soviet navy had a permanent presence in the Mediterranean and used Tartus as a supply point. The redeploying of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to the Mediterranean may provide a deterrent to NATO forces, U.S. Sixth Fleet, and may threaten the Suez Canal and Israel. 42 These new ports would allow Russian navy to challenge U.S. CENTCOM, U.S. EUCOM, and NATO. Tensions were high in August 2008 after Russian invasion of Georgia when a build up of NATO and Russian naval forces were underway in the Black Sea, and the expansion of Russian naval power via these new ports would escalate tensions in the future. With Russia’s 1921 defence treaty to Iran and Iran’s 2004 defence treaty with Syria, these three countries are bound to act collectively against aggression to any one of them. Should Iran join the SCO as a member, the U.S., EU and NATO members would need to consider not only countering aggression by either one of these three, but also other members in their collective security alliance. Given Iran’s persistent threat to annihilate Israel and Russian backing with nuclear technology and arm sales to Iran, some pundits have argued for Israel to join NATO as a deterrent against aggression. The case is more compelling given Israel’s recent discovery of massive natural gas reserves offshore near Haifa 43 and potential oil reserves onshore by Haifa 44 , which could entice Russian invasion due to Russia’s own energy depletion 45 and attempts to seek new reserves by staking territorial claims: August 2007 claim in the Arctic region 46 ; 2008 claim to Sergei’s Courtyard (former KGB base) in Jerusalem 47 ; August 2008 invasion of Georgia over BTC pipelines that bypass Russian control 48 ; ongoing territorial disputes with Japan over the Kurile Islands. Given Russia’s pattern of aggressive territorial claims the past years and Iran’s consistent belligerence and support of Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel, Israel has in fact entered into strategic partnership with NATO and held joint military exercises since February 2005. 49 However, there remain obstacles and reservations about Israel joining NATO as a full member, due to their doctrine of self-reliance and freedom of military action, which would be encroached upon in a collective security arrangement. 50 Nonetheless, the notion of free democracies such as Israel, Australia, Japan, South Korea joining NATO to form an arc of freedom to counter emerging threats from totalitarian and rogue regimes continues to be debated and while viewed with reservation by Israel, may be more receptive in Asia. Russian Energy Imperialism in Asia Russian Energy Diplomacy in East Asia Russia is interested in using energy security as an anchor to assert itself as a regional hegemon in the Asia Pacific via oil & gas resources 51 in the Russia Far East (RFE). RFE consists of 40% of Russia landmass but only 10% of its population. Over the years there has been a trend of RFE integration into Northeast Asia and disintegration from the rest of Russia that in 2006 Putin described the situation in RFE as “a threat to national security” and stressed the need “to invest money in the Far East”. 52 Regional unrest is most recently demonstrated by violent protests in Vladivostok on 31 January 2009 53 and officials admitting that RFE is “completely cut off from the rest of Russia” and must “orient itself” to Asian countries rather than to European Russia. RFE imports 90% of goods from Asian countries and there is a trend the area may become a raw material supplier for China and Japan. 54 As such, Russia is attempting to reverse this trend by using energy projects to anchor the RFE and supply energy goods to Asian consumers such as China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. It is hoping to tie East Asia, RFE and the rest of European Russia together via the Iron Silk Road, which would connect the Trans-Siberian Railway to the Trans-Korean Railway to supply European goods as well as energy exports. Moreover, it is also offering incentives such as interest-free loans for Russians to settle in the RFE. However, Russian energy diplomacy in East Asia is still fraught with many obstacles. Oil & gas exploration and production in the greenfield province of East Siberia is expensive due to harsh climatic condition, lack of infrastructure, investment, and western technologies. The East Siberian Pacific Ocean Pipeline (ESPO) that would ensure Russian oil supply to China has faced considerable delays. 55 Even if the pipeline is launched, Russia cannot easily supply Korea and China with gas due to lack of regional grid in East Asia. 56 Given Russia’s end goal of asserting itself in East Asia via energy resources, and the obstacles facing RFE’s near-term energy delivery to East Asian consumers, Russia appears to resort to other means to access and control energy resources for East Asia—e.g., “lock in” long-term bilateral deals with Central Asian energy exporters and asserting control over energy supply; aligning with Iran and courting other Middle East suppliers via ‘arms for energy’ policy; aggressive territorial claims in Arctic Region; forming SCO Energy Club in 2007 and proposing a gas cartel to control supply and coordinate prices. With the increasing **militarisation of Russia’s energy policy** and alignment of totalitarian regimes in the Eurasian SCO bloc, this **has important security implications** for U.S. and its allies in the region. U.S. Alliance Relations and NATO Global Partnership It is no coincidence that in August 2005 SCO kicked off their first joint military exercises in Vladivostok in RFE, underscoring Russia’ concern with RFE secession and China’s angst over Taiwan independence under the then pro-independence President Chen Shui-Bian. 57 In fact China had proposed Zhejiang province across from Taiwan as the site for the military exercise, but when the Russians rejected it as being provocative, they concurred to hold it in Shandong province. 58 The Taiwan contingency is a key flash point for military clashes in East Asia, especially in light of rapid Chinese military modernisation and a recent report by U.S. State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, illuminating the strategic significance of Taiwan in both China and U.S. geopolitical calculus. 59 Given that SCO **is a proxy to advance China and Russian interests** and the 2000 Dushanbe Declaration has specific wording to establish formal support for China regarding “One China Principle,” there is a possibility in a Taiwan scenario for the U.S., under the Taiwan Relations Act, to be drawn into conflict with China and perhaps Russia, Kazakhstan and other SCO members. 60 Indeed Victor Corpus, a retired brigadier general and former chief of the U.S. intelligence service in the Philippines, provides an eerie prediction of war resulting from a Taiwan contingency and how SCO allies could become involved. Corpus writes: “On yet another major front in Central Asia, Russian troops lead the other member countries of the SCO into a major offensive against US military bases in Central Asia. The bases are first subjected to a simultaneous barrage of missiles with fuel-air explosives and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads before they are overrun and occupied by SCO coalition forces.” 61 **The increasing militarisation of the SCO bloc has** strategic **implications for U.S. alliance relations** in East Asia—Japan’s territorial disputes with China over Senkaku Islands and with Russia over Kurile Islands, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, territorial disputes in the South China Sea are flash points that will potentially draw China, Russia and their SCO allies against U.S. and her allies. In face of creeping SCO projection onto Asia Pacific region and an emerging bloc of totalitarian regimes, some scholars have proposed the U.S. and her allies counter this bloc by aligning various bilateral defence alliances into NATO Global Partnership. With the upcoming NATO summit in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009, this would be a good possibility to review criteria of new members. As Eckart von Klaeden, the Foreign Policy Spokesman for Chancellor Merkel’S CDU party posit, it is important to expand NATO relations with partners in Asia who have already contributed troops to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and admit democratic like-minded countries such as Japan, India, Australia etc. to the fold. 62 And, India is a key country for NATO’s mission and reach onto the Indian Ocean. Both NATO and SCO are courting India due to its geo-strategic significance in the Indian Ocean. India is an observer member in the SCO and in the past has been represented by its energy minister to discuss energy deals. At the same time NATO is also cooperating with India with hopes for its entering into a Partnership arrangement. The Indian Ocean is an important region as it is home to U.S. naval base Diego Garcia and naval power projection to secure energy SLOCS from the Middle East to Asia. The U.S. has been encouraging India to forge partnership with NATO and in October 2008 NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Group was deployed to the Indian Ocean to address the problems of piracy. 63 In 2007, after the Malabar Exercise encompassing, U.S. India, Japan, Singapore and Australia, India was invited for the first time to participate in the 2008 U.S.-NATO Red Flag war games. 64 Indeed, without India, NATO’s partnership in the Indian Ocean region would be limited. India has traditionally been a non-aligned nation, but **should Russia use energy to bring India into full SCO membership** at a time when SCO is on a trajectory of increased militarisation (e.g., CSTO-SCO ties, increasingly aggressive military exercises), it could become bound by an eventual SCO ‘mutual assistance’ clause to the detriment of U.S., EU and NATO interests. Two days after NATO deployed its naval forces to the Indian ocean in October 2008, Russia scrambled to project influence onto the region when Moscow stated that a missile frigate from Russia’s Baltic fleet was already heading to the Indian Ocean “to fight piracy off Somalia’s coast,” and shortly afterwards the Upper House of the Russia Parliament announced plans to resume its Soviet-era naval presence in Yemen. 65 It also announced intentions to return to its naval base in Socotra Archipelago, located off the Horn of Africa. 66 The Socotra base was established by the Soviet Union in 1971, and the location is expected to play a role in fighting piracy due to the ability to use small vessels, trawlers and other boats of minor rank as well as providing a reliable logistics system for major ships to allow operations in the Indian Ocean. Given the recent Kyrgyzstan decision, under Russian pressure, to close the Manas airbase 67 , Russian military projection via the Horn of Africa into the Indian Ocean may likewise jeopardise U.S. Counterterrorism efforts. The Horn of Africa is watched through U.S. AFRICOM headquartered in Germany, and Djibouti hosts the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. With Russian inroads into the Horn of Africa via the Socotra base and new defence cooperation with Somalia 68 , its former Cold War ally, this pattern **of recruiting allies whose interests diverge from those of the U.S.** risk bringing Russo-U.S. relations onto a collision course in the region. Over the past years the world has witnessed a disquieting **trend of Russia’s weaponisation of its energy policy to reassert itself as a global superpower**. Admittedly the recent global financial crisis has knocked that off course for the moment, but this is likely to be temporary. After Russian invasion of Georgia, Moscow’s stock market plummeted by more than 50% since its highs in May 2008, and Russia’s strong dependence on energy export revenues and speculative investments render its economy very volatile. 69 Given Putin’s goal of increasing military budget by 28% within the next year and modernising its military 70 , its current economic and budget woes may hinder that ambition. Nonetheless, despite the financial crisis, defence orders remain strong. According to data revealed by deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov, Russia earned more than $8 billion in arms sales in 2008, with $33 billion more in the pipeline. 71 It is to resume arms sales to Lebanon, intensify defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and compete with British, U.S. and French defence contractors for orders from Lebanon, Algeria and elsewhere. It is also looking to increase intra-regional trade of SCO and CSTO members and create a new economic architecture to maintain its economic and military power. 72 Sino-Russian bilateral trade reached $50 billion in 2008 73 , and given that China provides a large energy and trade export market for Russia, in the medium and long-term Russia may be able to ride out the current financial crisis and continue on its military modernisation and strategic ambition. Although SCO is not yet a mature security alliance, under Russian lead it is moving towards that trajectory—aggressive military exercises, agreement with CSTO (a purely military alliance), and possible “military assistance” clause in SCO policy. The U.S and her allies therefore need to monitor the close nexus between energy security and military alliances as manifested through SCO-CSTO ties, and put in place countermeasures to safeguard against Russia-China-Iran axis from using SCO for anti-western policies. To that end, **the U.S. and EU need to work together to reduce Russian energy dependency and seek diversification via non-Russian controlled pipeline**s, renewables, conservation/efficiency measure as well as alternative geographic suppliers from West Africa, Canada, and elsewhere.

[SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization]

#### Russian military aggression is high now – conflicts will occur in the future

Weitz 11/21 (Richard – Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute, “The Focus of Russian Military Means”, 2012, http://www.sldinfo.com/the-focus-of-russian-military-means/)

Despite the reformers’ goal of redirecting Russian strategic thought away from fighting the West to winning localized conflicts, Russia’s military doctrine and recent military exercises still identify resisting NATO aggression as a major task of the Russian armed forces. The 2010 Military Doctrine describes NATO’s growing military infrastructure near Russia’s border as well as the alliance’s alleged efforts to acquire “global functions in contravention of international law” as potentially threatening Russia’s military security. An important consideration affecting how Russians approach military reform is their expectations of the nature of future wars—especially the questions of the main sources of military threats and how they might manifest themselves. The most basic consideration is that Russian leaders still see themselves as threatened from hostile forces that must be dealt with through military means. Although individuals differ on what they see as the main threats, there is a pervasive sense that, under certain conditions, Russia could come into conflict with certain foreign countries if it fails to have an effective military. Mostly these possible adversaries are seen as Western states, but some Russian strategists, thinking ahead, consider China and possibly Iran as emerging threats.

#### Senkaku disputes go nuclear

**Emmot**, 6/4/**2008** (Bill – editor of the Economist, Power rises in the east, The Australian, p. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/arts/power-rises-in-the-east/story-e6frg8px-1111116460128)

As well as knitting them, however, this drama is also grinding together Asian powers that had previously kept a strict economic and political separation from one another. China, India and Japan are bumping against each other because their national interests are overlapping and in part competing. **Each is suspicious of the others' motives and intentions** and all three hope to get their own way in Asia and further afield. To have three great powers at the same time may be unprecedented for Asia but it is not for the world. There was a similar situation in Europe during the 19th century, when Britain, France, Russia, Austria and, until German unification, Prussia, existed in an uneasy balance in which none was dominant and none was entirely comfortable, but which nevertheless coincided with a period during which Europe prospered and became firmly established as the world's dominant region. Whether you consider Europe's 19th-century experience with balance-of-power politics as a good or bad omen for Asia depends on how long a sweep of history you consider and on what you think are the most crucial differences between modern times and the world of 150 years ago. If you take a long sweep, then the precedent is bad, since Europe's power balance ended in two devastating world wars. On the other hand, it kept the peace on the continent for about half a century, which would count as an optimistic prospect today. Today the barriers against the use of war as a tool of national policy are far higher: nuclear weapons, public opinion, international law, instant communication and transparency all militate against conflict, though they do not rule it out altogether. The barriers against colonial or quasi-colonial ambitions are higher still. China and India may battle for influence over Burma, but neither is likely to invade it and turn it into a colony. Nevertheless, Asia is piled high with historical bitterness, unresolved territorial disputes, potential flashpoints and strategic competition that could **readily ignite**. There are at least five known flashpoints where it is already clear that any could involve the major powers: the Sino-Indian border and Tibet, North and South Korea, the East China Sea and the Senkaku-Diaoyutai islands, Taiwan and Pakistan.

#### Russian war causes extinction

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the **USSR**. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy** or thwart **humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Terrorism results in extinction

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand – Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), July)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,[40](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928" \l "EN0040) and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”[41](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0041) Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”[42](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0042) American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia's use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia's traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

#### Scenario 1: US-China Relations

#### Sustainable US LNG exports spurs cooperative LNG trading with China – that’s key to overall relations

Livingston and Tu 12 (David, Junior Fellow in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Kevin Jianjun, Senior Associate in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Feeding China’s Energy Appetite, Naturally,” Energy Tribune, 7-17, http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/11206/Feeding-Chinas-Energy-Appetite-Naturally)

Ever since CNOOC, one of China’s “big three” national oil companies, made an ill-fated bid to take over Unocal Corporation in 2005, Sino-U.S. energy relations have been marred with mistrust. Foreign acquisitions by China’s national oil companies thereafter have largely avoided the United States. Many were thus caught off guard by recent reports that Sinopec has emerged as a leading suitor for some of the $7 billion in natural gas assets that Chesapeake Energy must shed to avoid a breach of its debt covenants. Yet upon closer inspection, the move is deft and bears the imprint of lessons well-learned. Chinese national oil companies know from prior experience that in the United States they must wear kid gloves to avoid getting burned. With U.S. natural gas prices projected to remain at $2-4/Mmbtu and far higher returns on investment elsewhere around the globe, why would Sinopec pour capital into American shale gas production when so many U.S. companies are shutting down rigs? There are a number of macro- and micro-dynamics at play here. China’s demand for gas is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. Natural gas currently accounts for only 4 percent of the country’s energy mix, but the International Energy Agency projects this rising to 13 percent by 2035. The same organization predicts that China will account for roughly a quarter of global gas demand growth over the same period. There is also a high level of uncertainty over how reliant the country will be on foreign gas. Much of this will depend on China’s ability to exploit its vast domestic shale gas resources. If unconventional development is well-orchestrated, Chinese gas imports as a share of total demand could be as low as 20 percent in 2035. Alternatively, slow progress in unconventional gas development could lead to a dependency rate north of 50 percent, according to the IEA. In either scenario, a stake in Chesapeake’s gas assets could potentially pay dividends for China. Chesapeake was one of the first to commit wholeheartedly to the potential of shale gas in the United States. It has snatched up vast swaths of shale acreage, and possesses the technology and know-how to efficiently extract unconventional gas from these basins. Sinopec would love nothing more than to gain firsthand experience with hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques that could eventually be applied to China’s massive shale resources. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, technically recoverable shale gas reserves in China are at least 50 percent greater than the sizeable shale endowment in the United States. Sinopec drilled its first shale gas well in Chongqing on June 9, but until it develops the capacity to unlock domestic resources en masse at low cost, acquisitions are the quickest way to bolster its gas reserves. The company might be seeking to secure a dedicated stream of U.S. natural gas production for shipping to China as liquefied natural gas in the future. **This is a complicated proposition, especially considering that the scale of U.S. LNG exports is highly uncertain**. The prospect of rising domestic gas prices as a consequence of satiating Chinese demand would become a thorny political issue, whether merited or not. At the corporate level, Sinopec’s own characteristics reveal an internal logic to the prospective Chesapeake deal. The move is driven by its international market-oriented new boss, Fu Chengyu. Fu served at the helm of CNOOC until 2010 and his failure to secure the Unocal deal in 2005 will undoubtedly inform his current attempt. Evidence of this can already be seen in Sinopec’s preference for partial assets over outright ownership. Of course, Sinopec precluding itself from an operational role also potentially distances it from the technologies and methodologies that it covets. Nevertheless, Fu has remains tempted by U.S. shale gas assets with attractive valuations. Sinopec has been slower getting into America than its rival CNOOC, which recently entered into two billion-dollar joint ventures with Chesapeake in the Niobrara and Eagle Ford shale. Moreover, Sinopec suffers from an unbalanced portfolio, with too many loss-making refineries and too few premiere upstream assets. Oil and gas projects in Iran that have been abandoned by Western companies would normally be an attractive target, but Beijing has increasingly pressured national oil companies to curtail involvement in the pariah state. Unsurprisingly, Sinopec has recently returned its gaze to the United States. Although U.S. natural gas won’t offer lucrative returns until prices rise, Chesapeake’s acreage is likely to sell at a discount and would allow Sinopec to hedge its holdings in more geopolitically tenuous markets. After his $2.5 billion deal with Devon Energy in January for stakes in five different liquids-rich shale plays, a tie-up with Chesapeake would solidify Fu’s reputation as a shrewd CEO. For China, the deal offers another geopolitical hedge—the opportunity to turn dollar-denominated treasury bills into real energy assets. The Chinese government would likely play a key role in financing any large deals pursued by its national oil companies. This is an aspect of the deal worth watching. CNOOC’s critics back in 2005 objected to the assortment of low-interest and interest-free loans backed by Chinese government coffers. Were Sinopec to rely on a similar arrangement of state support, it might be met with resistance in the United States. But the U.S. congress is in a much weaker position than it was in 2005. Partial asset ownership is not the wholesale surrender of a strategic corporation, and the American natural gas industry would welcome with open arms the capital inflow. This points to the **most constructive way forward** for both Washington and Beijing. China is still trying to grow a domestic shale gas industry without opening the market to international players. During the second round of shale gas bids in China, a small window was opened for other domestic companies, but none of them have more sophisticated technology than CNPC, Sinopec, or CNOOC. Sooner or later, China will realize that there are no shortcuts if shale gas is to be developed safely, efficiently, and responsibly. It should follow its own offshore oil exploration model, offering up its domestic market in return for cutting-edge technology. The Chesapeake deal may pay dividends to both the United States and China, but the synergy will go even further if Beijing eventually returns the favor at home.

#### Specifically – that removes Chinese fears of US encirclement – solves US-China conflict and spills over to clean tech cooperation

Stone 11 (Matt, Energy Consultant, US Foreign Policy Analyst, and Junior Associate – McKinsey & Company, “Natural Gas,” The Diplomat, 2-15, http://thediplomat.com/whats-next-china/natural-gas/)

In the space of just a couple of years, natural gas has become the 'next big thing' in energy circles. The recent expansion of unconventional gas production in North America has transformed the United States into the world’s top producer of the fuel. Cleaner-burning than coal, gas is expected to benefit in a carbon-constrained world as it displaces coal in the electricity-generation sector. Moreover a burgeoning interconnected global gas market, spurred by the expansion of the sea-borne liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, is helping to increase market flexibility so that disruptions like those caused by Russia-Ukrainian disputes have less pernicious effects on downstream countries. Hoping to take advantage of these developments, China has crafted a strategy for natural gas that aims to increase domestic production and secure access to gas resources in neighbouring countries. For Beijing, gas offers an opportunity to power its growing economy in a less polluting way than burning coal (although coal is expected to remain vital to China’s rapid economic ascent). Natural gas may also have a role to play in the transportation sector, where Beijing is experimenting in dramatic fashion with compressed natural gas (CNG) in automobiles. Historically, oil’s prominent and essential role in the transportation sector has driven its centrality in international affairs. A transportation sector that could rely jointly on oil and natural gas would allow China to be marginally more indifferent to Middle Eastern geopolitics—in stark contrast with the US experience of the past half-century. The BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 estimates that China produced approximately 85 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas in 2009, while consuming 89 bcm, an import gap that’s expected to expand rapidly in the coming years as gas demand outpaces domestic supply. Indeed, the International Energy Agency (IEA) sees China’s gas demand increasing by 6 percent annually through 2035. The reality is, though, that the country’s own conventional natural gas resources are nowhere near enough to meet this growing demand, forcing Beijing to ramp up its efforts to access gas supplies abroad—particularly in Central Asia, Russia and Burma. It’s here that the frequent portrayal of Beijing as a cash-flush power willing to throw money around to lock up resources is misplaced. China has in fact been carefully expanding its influence in Central Asia and Russia in particular, biding its time until the right deal has come along. Negotiations with Russia over gas supplies, for example, have been ongoing for years (much to Moscow’s consternation). The proposal on the table now would mean two pipelines entering China—one in Xinjiang from the Russian region of Altai and another in Manchuria from the Russian Far East. The former line would have a capacity of 30 bcm per year, the latter 38 bcm per year. But lack of agreement on the price Russian state gas company Gazprom will charge has stalled things. Of course, there’s more to this than pricing. Although Moscow enjoys a privileged position in the export of Russian oil and gas for both economic and political reasons, its manipulation of energy flows to Europe has tarnished the country’s reputation as a reliable supplier of hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, investments in the gas fields that would supply China have been slow to materialize. Both points will likely have made Beijing think carefully about the implications of an inconsistent supply of Russian gas. This reticence over gas is in contrast with a deal struck over crude oil, with China having issued a $25 billion loan to Russia in February 2009 to secure a 20-year supply of crude oil. At the same time, Beijing has postponed a decision on a loan for natural gas—a conspicuous vote of no confidence in Russia’s short-term attractiveness as a gas supplier. If the story of the Russia-China gas trade relationship is one of chess-like negotiations and Beijing’s reticence, China’s experience in Central Asia has been more straightforward. China signed an agreement to build a gas pipeline out of Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2006. Backstopped with a $4 billion loan to Ashgabat and upstream contracts for China’s state-owned CNPC in Turkmenistan, the pipeline came online in December 2009—impressively swift. However, now that it’s operational, Beijing has leveraged its position to extract concessions from the countries along the pipeline. Turkmenistan in particular is under pressure. Russia has cut its purchases of Turkmen gas by three-quarters since 2008, prompting Ashgabat to push China to buy more gas. But Beijing, keenly aware of its negotiating advantage, has held out, purchasing only 4 bcm this year. In the case of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, China has spurred competition for access to the pipeline, with the two engaging in development of gas fields and infrastructure in order to access the pipeline before the other. That said, China may decide it’s in its own interests to selectively manage access to the pipeline in order to win concessions on price and upstream contracts in each country, which would provide it potent political leverage with countries that would prefer to develop robust alternatives to exporting hydrocarbons to Russia. But can Beijing afford to play the long game with neighbouring gas suppliers given its fast-growing demand? A look at China’s alternative sources of supply, particularly domestic production and increasing volumes of LNG in the country’s gas supply mix, offer a glimpse of a possible answer. Beijing has prioritized the development of domestic gas supply, partnering with a number of Western oil firms to develop the country’s unconventional gas resources, which are thought to be large. Washington has promoted this cooperation through the US-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative, a mechanism announced in November 2009 to share expertise and technology for unconventional gas production. In addition, LNG spot prices are currently depressed, prompting Chinese energy firms to purchase spot cargoes through the country’s three LNG import terminals. Sixteen more LNG import terminals are under consideration. Such trends point to a relative decline in the importance of Russian and Central Asian gas to China’s energy security future—a narrative that Beijing’s diplomats are sure to promote in Moscow, Ashgabat, Tashkent and Astana. Chinese national oil companies operate with the explicit backing of the Chinese state–including the state budget.In a region where governments treat their oil and gas resources as strategic commodities to be traded for political perquisites, Chinese companies therefore possess an in-built advantage. But more importantly, China’s unity of effort—political and commercial—allows Beijing to act strategically, with long time horizons, in order to secure the best deal. While China couldn’t have predicted the revolution in unconventional gas production or the global recession, its patience has strengthened its bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia and the Central Asian states. Beijing’s engagement also has the tacit consent of Washington. Western policy in the post-Soviet period has been designed to reinforce Central Asian sovereignty by developing export corridors for oil and gas that avoid Russian (and Iranian) territory. While the United States and Europe have had some success on the western edge of the Caspian Sea by constructing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, large-volume trans-Caspian projects for Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas have been delayed for commercial and geopolitical reasons. In this regard, China has developed a non-Russian, non-Iranian export corridor for Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh gas where the West couldn’t (there’s also a Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline in operation). In a sense, this should provide greater stability in an important and strategic part of the world. And China, meanwhile, appears to have not yet attempted to translate its newfound economic heft into political influence to the West’s detriment: Beijing has **so far** avoided pushing for the **curtailment of the Western military presence in Central Asia** despite ongoing worries about ‘encirclement.’ China’s energy trade relationships with Russia and Central Asia should also make the Middle Kingdom feel more assured about its energy security future. Much of China’s naval build-up and assertive behaviour, especially in the South China Sea, in recent years is motivated by concerns about the security of China’s sea-borne energy imports from the Middle East, both oil and LNG. In the post-World War II period, the US Navy has played the role of guarantor of open trade on the high seas, but Beijing appears to believe this commitment won't continue in the event of conflict with Washington over Taiwan or North Korea. The United States’ efforts to help China expand domestic gas production and its lack of opposition to China-bound pipelines out of Central Asia and Russia should be interpreted by Beijing as indicative of the US commitment to help China grow comfortable about its place in the American-led world order. Natural gas is clearly an important component of Beijing’s energy strategy over the next century. Thus far, China’s approach to accessing foreign and domestic sources of supply has proven collaborative, rather than confrontational, in nature. US assistance on Chinese unconventional gas production presages greater cooperation on energy matters, including in clean-tech where Beijing and Washington can best address climate-altering carbon emissions. In Russia and Central Asia, meanwhile, China has husbanded its resources and influence to achieve advantageous deals.

#### That’s the most likely for escalated US-China conflict

Glaser 12 (Bonnie S., Senior Fellow – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” CFR, April, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

**The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant**. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult. A second contingency involves conflict between China and the Philippines over **natural gas deposits**, especially in the disputed area of Reed Bank, located eighty nautical miles from Palawan. Oil survey ships operating in Reed Bank under contract have increasingly been harassed by Chinese vessels. Reportedly, the United Kingdom-based Forum Energy plans to start drilling for gas in Reed Bank this year, which could provoke an aggressive Chinese response. Forum Energy is only one of fifteen exploration contracts that Manila intends to offer over the next few years for offshore exploration near Palawan Island. Reed Bank is a red line for the Philippines, so this contingency could quickly escalate to violence if China intervened to halt the drilling. The United States could be drawn into a China-Philippines conflict because of its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. The treaty states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes." American officials insist that Washington does not take sides in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and refuse to comment on how the United States might respond to Chinese aggression in contested waters. Nevertheless, an apparent gap exists between American views of U.S. obligations and Manila's expectations. In mid-June 2011, a Filipino presidential spokesperson stated that in the event of armed conflict with China, Manila expected the United States would come to its aid. Statements by senior U.S. officials may have inadvertently led Manila to conclude that the United States would provide military assistance if China attacked Filipino forces in the disputed Spratly Islands. With improving political and military ties between Manila and Washington, including a pending agreement to expand U.S. access to Filipino ports and airfields to refuel and service its warships and planes, the United States would have a great deal at stake in a China-Philippines contingency. Failure to respond would not only set back U.S. relations with the Philippines but would also potentially undermine U.S. credibility in the region with its allies and partners more broadly. A U.S. decision to dispatch naval ships to the area, however, would risk a U.S.-China naval confrontation. Disputes between China and Vietnam over seismic surveys or drilling for oil and gas could also trigger an armed clash for a third contingency. China has harassed PetroVietnam oil survey ships in the past that were searching for oil and gas deposits in Vietnam's EEZ. In 2011, Hanoi accused China of deliberately severing the cables of an oil and gas survey vessel in two separate instances. Although the Vietnamese did not respond with force, they did not back down and Hanoi pledged to continue its efforts to exploit new fields despite warnings from Beijing. Budding U.S.-Vietnam relations could embolden Hanoi to be more confrontational with China on the South China Sea issue. The United States could be drawn into a conflict between China and Vietnam, though that is less likely than a clash between China and the Philippines. In a scenario of Chinese provocation, the United States might opt to dispatch naval vessels to the area to signal its interest in regional peace and stability. Vietnam, and possibly other nations, could also request U.S. assistance in such circumstances. Should the United States become involved, subsequent actions by China or a miscalculation among the forces present could result in exchange of fire. In another possible scenario, an attack by China on vessels or rigs operated by an American company exploring or drilling for hydrocarbons could quickly involve the United States, especially if American lives were endangered or lost. ExxonMobil has plans to conduct exploratory drilling off Vietnam, making this an existential danger. In the short term, however, the likelihood of this third contingency occurring is relatively low given the recent thaw in Sino-Vietnamese relations. In October 2011, China and Vietnam signed an agreement outlining principles for resolving maritime issues. The effectiveness of this agreement remains to be seen, but for now tensions appear to be defused. Warning Indicators Strategic warning signals that indicate heightened risk of conflict include political decisions and statements by senior officials, official and unofficial media reports, and logistical changes and equipment modifications. In the contingencies described above, strategic warning indicators could include heightened rhetoric from all or some disputants regarding their territorial and strategic interests. For example, China may explicitly refer to the South China Sea as a core interest; in 2010 Beijing hinted this was the case but subsequently backed away from the assertion. Beijing might also warn that it cannot "stand idly by" as countries nibble away at Chinese territory, a formulation that in the past has often signaled willingness to use force. Commentaries and editorials in authoritative media outlets expressing China's bottom line and issuing ultimatums could also be a warning indicator. Tough language could also be used by senior People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers in meetings with their American counterparts. An increase in nationalistic rhetoric in nonauthoritative media and in Chinese blogs, even if not representing official Chinese policy, would nevertheless signal pressure on the Chinese leadership to defend Chinese interests. Similar warning indicators should be tracked in Vietnam and the Philippines that might signal a hardening of those countries' positions. Tactical warning signals that indicate heightened risk of a potential clash in a specific time and place include commercial notices and preparations, diplomatic and/or military statements warning another claimant to cease provocative activities or suffer the consequences, military exercises designed to intimidate another claimant, and ship movements to disputed areas. As for an impending incident regarding U.S. surveillance activities, statements and unusual preparations by the PLA might suggest a greater willingness to employ more aggressive means to intercept U.S. ships and aircraft. Implications for U.S. Interests The United States has significant political, security, and economic interests at stake if one of the contingencies should occur. Global rules and norms. The United States has important interests in the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes according to international law. With the exception of China, all the claimants of the South China Sea have attempted to justify their claims based on their coastlines and the provisions of UNCLOS. China, however, relies on a mix of historic rights and legal claims, while remaining deliberately ambiguous about the meaning of the "nine-dashed line" around the sea that is drawn on Chinese maps. Failure to uphold international law and norms could harm U.S. interests elsewhere in the region and beyond. Ensuring freedom of navigation is another critical interest of the United States and other regional states. Although China claims that it supports freedom of navigation, its insistence that foreign militaries seek advance permission to sail in its two-hundred-mile EEZ casts doubt on its stance. China's development of capabilities to deny American naval access to those waters in a conflict provides evidence of possible Chinese intentions to block freedom of navigation in specific contingencies. Alliance security and regional stability. U.S. allies and friends around the South China Sea look to the United States to maintain free trade, safe and secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and overall peace and stability in the region. Claimants and nonclaimants to land features and maritime waters in the South China Sea view the U.S. military presence as necessary to allow decision-making free of intimidation. If nations in the South China Sea lose confidence in the United States to serve as the principal regional security guarantor, they could embark on costly and potentially destabilizing arms buildups to compensate or, alternatively, become more accommodating to the demands of a powerful China. Neither would be in the U.S. interest. Failure to reassure allies of U.S. commitments in the region could also undermine U.S. security guarantees in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the United States must avoid getting drawn into the territorial dispute—and possibly into a conflict—by regional nations who seek U.S. backing to legitimize their claims. Economic interests. Each year, $5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea; U.S. trade accounts for $1.2 trillion of this total. Should a crisis occur, the diversion of cargo ships to other routes would harm regional economies as a result of an increase in insurance rates and longer transits. Conflict of any scale in the South China Sea would hamper the claimants from benefiting from the South China's Sea's proven and potential riches. Cooperative relationship with China. The stakes and implications of any U.S.-China incident are far greater than in other scenarios. The United States has an abiding interest in preserving stability in the U.S.-China relationship so that it can continue to secure Beijing's cooperation on an expanding list of regional and global issues and more tightly integrate China into the prevailing international system. Preventive Options Efforts should continue to resolve the disputes over territorial sovereignty of the South China Sea's land features, rightful jurisdiction over the waters and seabed, and the legality of conducting military operations within a country's EEZ, but the likelihood of a breakthrough in any of these areas is slim in the near term. In the meantime, the United States should focus on lowering the risk of potential armed clashes arising from either miscalculation or unintended escalation of a dispute. There are several preventive options available to policymakers—in the United States and other nations—to avert a crisis and conflict in the South China Sea. These options are not mutually exclusive. Support U.S.-China Risk-reduction Measures Operational safety measures and expanded naval cooperation between the United States and China can help to reduce the risk of an accident between ships and aircraft. The creation of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 1988 was intended to establish "rules of the road" at sea similar to the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), but it has not been successful. Communication mechanisms can provide a means to defuse tensions in a crisis and prevent escalation. Political and military hotlines have been set up, though U.S. officials have low confidence that they would be utilized by their Chinese counterparts during a crisis. An additional hotline to manage maritime emergencies should be established at an operational level, along with a signed political agreement committing both sides to answer the phone in a crisis. Joint naval exercises to enhance the ability of the two sides to cooperate in counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations could increase cooperation and help prevent a U.S.-China conflict. Bolster Capabilities of Regional Actors Steps could be taken to further enhance the capability of the Philippines military to defend its territorial and maritime claims and improve its indigenous domain awareness, which might deter China from taking aggressive action. Similarly, the United States could boost the maritime surveillance capabilities of Vietnam, enabling its military to more effectively pursue an anti-access and area-denial strategy. Such measures run the risk of emboldening the Philippines and Vietnam to more assertively challenge China and could raise those countries' expectations of U.S. assistance in a crisis. Encourage Settlement of the Sovereignty Dispute The United States could push for submission of territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for settlement, or encourage an outside organization or mediator to be called upon to resolve the dispute. However, the prospect for success in these cases is slim given China's likely opposition to such options. Other options exist to resolve the sovereignty dispute that would be difficult, but not impossible, to negotiate. One such proposal, originally made by Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke, and Noel Ludwig in Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, would establish "regional sovereignty" over the islands in the South China Sea among the six claimants, allowing them to collectively manage the islands, territorial seas, and airspace. Another option put forward by Peter Dutton of the Naval War College would emulate the resolution of the dispute over Svalbard, an island located between Norway and Greenland. The Treaty of Spitsbergen, signed in 1920, awarded primary sovereignty over Svarlbard to Norway but assigned resource-related rights to all signatories. This solution avoided conflict over resources and enabled advancement of scientific research. Applying this model to the South China Sea would likely entail giving sovereignty to China while permitting other countries to benefit from the resources. In the near term, at least, such a solution is unlikely to be accepted by the other claimants. Promote Regional Risk-reduction Measures The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China agreed upon multilateral risk-reduction and confidence-building measures in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), but have neither adhered to its provisions (for example, to resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes without resorting to the threat or use of force) nor implemented its proposals to undertake cooperative trust-building activities. The resumption of negotiations between China and ASEAN after a hiatus of a decade holds out promise for reinvigorating cooperative activities under the DOC. Multilaterally, existing mechanisms and procedures already exist to promote operational safety among regional navies; a new arrangement is unnecessary. The United States, China, and all ASEAN members with the exception of Laos and Burma are members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Founded in 1988, WPNS brings regional naval leaders together biennially to discuss maritime security. In 2000, it produced the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES), which includes safety measures and procedures and means to facilitate communication when ships and aircraft make contact. There are also other mechanisms available such as the International Maritime Organization's Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and the International Civil Aviation Organization's rules of the air. In addition, regional navies could cooperate in sea environment protection, scientific research at sea, search and rescue activities, and mitigation of damage caused by natural calamities. The creation of new dialogue mechanisms may also be worth consideration. A South China Sea Coast Guard Forum, modeled after the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which cooperates on a multitude of maritime security and legal issues, could enhance cooperation through information sharing and knowledge of best practices. The creation of a South China Sea information-sharing center would also provide a platform to improve awareness and communication between relevant parties. The information-sharing center could also serve as an accountability mechanism if states are required to document any incidents and present them to the center. Advocate Joint Development/Multilateral Economic Cooperation Resource cooperation is another preventive option that is underutilized by claimants in the South China Sea. Joint development of petroleum resources, for example, could reduce tensions between China and Vietnam, and between China and the Philippines, on issues related to energy security and access to hydrocarbon resources. Such development could be modeled on one of the many joint development arrangements that exist in the South and East China seas. Parties could also cooperate on increasing the use of alternative energy sources in order to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. Shared concerns about declining fish stocks in the South China Sea suggest the utility of cooperation to promote conservation and sustainable development. Establishing a joint fisheries committee among claimants could prove useful. Fishing agreements between China and its neighbors are already in place that could be expanded into disputed areas to encourage greater cooperation. Clearly Convey U.S. Commitments The United States should avoid inadvertently encouraging the claimants to engage in confrontational behavior. For example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's reference in November 2011 to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea could have unintended consequences such as emboldening Manila to antagonize China rather than it seeking to peacefully settle their differences.

#### Extinction

Lieven 12 (Anatol, Professor in the War Studies Department – King’s College (London), Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Washington), “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, 6-12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html)

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

#### Independently – US-China clean tech cooperation solves warming

Lieberthal and Sandalow 9 (Kenneth, Visiting Fellow – Brookings Institution, Professor – University of Michigan, and David, Senior Fellow – The Brookings Institution, January, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/1/climate%20change%20lieberthal%20sandalow/01_climate_change_lieberthal_sandalow>)

Climate change is an epic threat. Concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are higher than at any time in human history and rising sharply. Predicted consequences include sea-level rise, more severe storms, more intense droughts and floods, forest loss and the spread of tropical disease. Each of these phenomena is **already** occurring. Every year of delay in reducing greenhouse gas emissions puts the planet at greater risk. The United States and China play central roles in global warming. During the past century, the United States emitted more greenhouse gases than any other country—a fact often noted, since carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas, remains in the atmosphere for roughly 100 years. However, in 2007, China may have surpassed the United States as the world’s top annual emitter of carbon dioxide. 1 Together, the two countries are responsible for over 40% of the greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere each year. For the world to meet the challenge of global warming, the United States and China must each make the transition to a low-carbon economy. Far-reaching changes will be needed. To date, however, each nation has used the other as one reason not do to more. Enormous benefits would be possible if this dynamic were replaced with mutual understanding and joint efforts on a large scale. Yet cooperation will not be easy. The U.S. and China are separated by different histories, different cultures, and different perspectives. Opportunities for collaboration in fighting climate change and promoting clean energy are plentiful, but moving forward at the scale needed will require high-level political support in two very different societies and systems that have considerable suspicion of the other. This report identifies major barriers to cooperation and recommends ways to overcome them. The time for large-scale U.S.-China cooperation on climate change and clean energy is now. Unless both countries change course soon, ongoing investments in 20th century technologies will commit the world as a whole to dangerous levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in the decades ahead. Recent political and technological developments make the benefits of such cooperation especially compelling. Furthermore, thirty years after normalization and with the start of a new administration in the United States, the U.S. China relationship is ready to move to a new stage. This new stage will initiate full bilateral consultation and cooperation where possible on the most critical global issues of the era. Climate change and clean energy are at the top of the list. This “new stage” does not envision a U.S.-China condominium or alliance. Any U.S.-China agreements must be supplements to—not substitutes for—other relationships and obligations. If handled properly, such agreements will increase bilateral and global capacities to manage critical world challenges. The major failing in U.S.-China relations to date is that, despite much progress over the past 30 years, mutual distrust over each other’s long-term intentions remains deep—and perhaps has even grown in recent years. By making active cooperation on critical global issues a centerpiece of the relationship, both countries’ governments can increase trust over long-term intentions and thereby reduce the chances of slipping into mutual antagonism over the coming 10-20 years. In particular, U.S.-China cooperation can make each side less inclined to point to the other as a reason to do less at home to fight global warming. It can also contribute to the success of multilateral climate change negotiations. Having the U.S. and China successfully manage issues that have divided industrialized and developing countries in the global climate change negotiations can help shape acceptable multilateral climate change agreements for the post-Kyoto period. Finally, U.S.-China cooperation on climate change and clean energy can also help each country enhance its energy security and pursue a sustainable economic path that will create jobs and promote economic recovery.

#### Extinction

Mazo 10 (Jeffrey Mazo – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122)

The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be **catastrophic for the stability and security of countries** in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects **on security of widespread state failure** and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.

### 1AC – No Disads

#### Contention 4: No Disads

#### 20 years of shale gas now – that takes out your DA

Berman 12 (Art, Former Editor – Oil and Gas Journal, Geological Consultant – American Association of Petroleum Geologists, “After the Gold Rush: A Perspective on Future U.S. Natural Gas Supply and Price,” Oil Drum, 2-8-12, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8914)

The Potential Gas Committee (PGC) is the standard for resource assessments because of the objectivity and credentials of its members, and its long and reliable history. In its biennial report released in April 2011, three categories of technically recoverable resources are identified: probable, possible and speculative. The President and many others have taken the PGC total of all three categories (2,170 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas) and divided by 2010 annual consumption of 24 Tcf. This results in 90 and not 100 years of gas. Much of this total resource is in accumulations too small to be produced at any price, is inaccessible to drilling, or is too deep to recover economically. More relevant is the Committee’s probable mean resources value of 550 (Tcf) of gas (Exhibit 4). If half of this supply becomes a reserve (225 Tcf), the U.S. has approximately 11.5 years of potential future gas supply at present consumption rates. When proved reserves of 273 Tcf are included, there is an additional 11.5 years of supply for a total of almost 23 years. It is worth noting that proved reserves include proved undeveloped reserves which may or may not be produced depending on economics, so even 23 years of supply is tenuous. If consumption increases, this supply will be exhausted in less than 23 years. Revisions to this estimate will be made and there probably is more than 23 years but based on current information, 100 years of gas is not justified.

## Round 1 2AC

### Demand

#### Demand for offshore rigs is up – NEWEST EVIDENCE

Pickerell 12/31/12 (Emily, “Demand for offshore rigs up, while onshore count keeps falling”, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/12/31/demand-for-offshore-rigs-up-while-onshore-count-keeps-falling/)

While demand for onshore rigs declined as the result of less natural gas drilling, demand for offshore rigs continues to flourish, driven by Gulf of Mexico demand, industry analysts said Monday. The Gulf of Mexico rig count has increased slightly in the last three months, with 33 floating rigs and 29 jackups for the fourth quarter, up from 27 floating rigs and 27 jackups for the third quarter, according to a Tudor Pickering analyst’s note. Likewise, demand for offshore rigs grew from 73 in January 2012 to 80 by the end of November, as improved technology, such as water flooding, has provided new opportunities to extract oil from maturing wells. The relatively strong price of oil, which closed on Friday on the New York Mercantile Exchange at $90.80 for West Texas Intermediate Crude, compared with natural gas, which closed on Friday at $3.46 per million cubic feet, has been an additional driver. Oil and gas services companies are working hard to meet the offshore demand: Ensco, for example, has three ultra-deepwater rigs that will be available in 2013. Demand has dipped in onshore drilling, as the big operators have shifted away from chasing natural gas exploration, resulting in a 61 percent decline for onshore rigs in 2012, down from 2,082 in January to 1,841 at the end of November 2011. The downturn comes after 13 quarters of increased drilling activity, Tudor Pickering said in its report. The Permian and the Eagle Ford basins have been the hardest hit by the decline, according to Tudor Pickering, while East Texas and North Louisiana have held up the best. Companies are also trending towards the newer and more efficient alternating-current technology for drilling rig**s.** Alternating-current engines allow for greater mobility and control over the drilling process, and are considered to be safer and more environmentally friendly. The older mechanical rigs have made up 72 percent of the rig decline, according to Tudor Pickering, who noted that “as activity trended lower during the quarter, we noticed operators clearly holding onto and/or high-grading their fleets.” Chesapeake continues to have the highest U.S. natural gas rig count, with 37 rigs, while Exxon and Devon have 31 and 30, respectively. Likewise, Chesapeake also has by far the biggest number of onshore oil rigs, 73, while Anadarko has 47 and Devon has 42.

### Prices Uniqueness: 2NC

#### Natural gas prices rising – Demand is increasing, fracking doesn’t solve

Lackey 12 (Mark, energy analyst with CHF Investor Relations, “This Is Your Energy Entry Point: Mark Lackey,” 8-30-12, <http://www.theenergyreport.com/pub/na/14243>)

Natural gas has been somewhat weaker, but it bounced off the $2/thousand cubic feet (Mcf) price a few months ago up to the $2.85–3/Mcf range in North America. With more industrial demand coming back, particularly in the auto sector, and stronger demand from electric utilities, gas should move back up closer to $3.25–3.30/Mcf in the next year. By way of comparison, prices in Europe can be anywhere from $4–8/Mcf, and in China they're as high as $15/Mcf.

### Solvency – A2: No Infrastructure for Exports

#### We can use import tech for exports

Levi 12 (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project – Brookings Institute, June, Discussion Paper 2012-04, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20exports%20levi/06\_exports\_levi)

Additional gains would be realized because natural gas exports would exploit existing LNG infrastructure (i.e. some parts of existing import terminals) that would otherwise go unused and thus be worthless. These gains should approximately equal the value of the utilized LNG terminals (not including the value of their regasification facilities, which are not useful for exports), which are typically on the order of $1 billion for each billion cubic feet a day of capacity. Spread over a notional fifteen-year use period, this would add approximately $70 million a year for each billion cubic feet a day of exports. This brings the total estimated surplus from six billion cubic feet a day of exports to $3.1 billion to $3.7 billion.

### A2: LNG Exports Bad – Russian Economy – 2AC (Russia Scenario)

#### 1AC Lin evidence indicates Russian aggression is inevitably regardless of their economy and that their economy is too volatile to be sustainable

#### Russian economy is collapsing now

MarketWatch 10/8 (“World Bank says Russian economy to slow”, 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/world-bank-says-russian-economy-to-slow-2012-10-08)

 MOSCOW--Russia's economy will slow over the next year, the World Bank said Monday, while urging the country to stick with prudent spending plans and focus monetary policy on low inflation. Growth in Russian gross domestic product will slow from 4.3% in 2011 to 3.5% this year and 3.6% in 2013 due to unfavorable base effects, drought in the agricultural sector, rising inflation and weak global sentiment, the World Bank said in a report. The bank revised down its 2012 estimate by 0.3 percentage point and its 2013 forecast by 0.6 percentage point since its June report, citing a poor grain harvest and a weaker-than-expected global environment. "Just at a time when Russia's output levels have exceeded the pre-crisis peak, the economy is settling onto a lower trajectory, even though oil prices have stayed high," the bank said.

#### Russia’s economy is resilient – oil, metals, and financial reserves

**Garrels 8** (Annie – a foreign correspondent for National Public Radio in the United States, “RUSSIAN ECONOMY STRONG DESPITE COMMODITY FALLOUT”, 9/20/08, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94647099>)

For the past six years**, Russia's economy has boomed in large part because of soaring prices for oil and metals.** Russia is strong in these areas ó too strong, though, for a balanced economy. Russian shares have bled almost 50 percent of their value since May, but many analysts say Russia still remains a resilient economy. And after the Georgia invasion and weeks of harsh, anti-western rhetoric, both Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have tried to reassure foreign investors. When those commodities prices dropped, Russia's stock market was hit hard. "The question is if they fall significantly further," says James Fenkner with Red Star Assets in Moscow. Fenkner is one of the more cautious voices in Moscow, and other analysts like Roland Nash of Renaissance Capital look at other indicators, like direct foreign investment. "The level of foreign investment is twice the per capita of Brazil, **four times that of China**, and six times that of India this year," Nash says. "The market arguments for Russia are still very good and there is still a lot of money coming in." Too Dependent On Commodities The Russia government recognizes it is too dependent on commodities, and while their prices were high, it amassed **huge reserves as a cushion**. The country now has a balanced budget and financial analysts predict its economy will continue to grow at about six percent. Vladmir Tikhomirov, senior economist at Uralsib Financial Corporation, says this is enough to avoid a crisis, but it is not what the Kremlin hoped for. "It's not enough to make fundamental changes to the economic structures," Tikhomirov says. "Russia must have to be a more competitive and efficient economy." Moscow may now be the most expensive, glamorous city in the world, but the rest of the country lags behind. Tikhomirov says the Russia needs to improve basic infrastructure like roads as well as small and mid-size businesses. For this, Russia needs a stable global financial system

#### Econ decline won’t change Russia’s foreign policy or cause domestic unrest – empirically denied

Blackwill 9 (Robert Blackwill 2009; former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning; RAND, "The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution", http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf)

Now on to Russia. Again, fi ve years from today. Did the global recession and Russia’s present serious economic problems substantially modify Russian foreign policy? No. (President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as this paper goes to press; nothing fundamental will result from that visit). Did it produce a serious weakening of Vladimir Putin’s power and authority in Russia? No, as recent polls in Russia make clear. Did it reduce Russian worries and capacities to oppose NATO enlargement and defense measures eastward? No. Did it aff ect Russia’s willingness to accept much tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends to make a nuclear weapon.25 In sum, Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized as follows: to resurrect Russia’s standing as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary infl uence over the space of the former Soviet Union; to resist Western efforts to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russia’s military might and power projection; to extend the reach of Russian diplomacy in Europe, Asia, and beyond; and to oppose American global primacy. For Moscow, these foreign policy first principles are here to stay, as they have existed in Russia for centuries. 26 None of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to be changed in any serious way by the economic crisis.

### 1NC Russia/China War

#### No risk of border war—growing ties prevent conflict, land handover proves

Moscow News10/16/08(“China, Russia end lengthy border dispute.” http://mnweekly.ru/national/20081016/55351138.html)

Russia ended a decades-old border dispute with China on Tuesday by giving it a stretch of river island territory in a ceremony symbolising the Cold War rivals' warming ties. Chinese and Russian flags were raised and new border markers erected as part of the handover at China's far northeastern tip near the Russian city of Khabarovsk, Interfax news agency reported. A Russian border guard unit withdrew from what is now Chinese territory, leaving behind an empty headquarters and barracks buildings, Interfax said. Under an agreement signed by the two countries' foreign ministers in July, Russia agreed to give up Tarabarov Island, known as Yinlong in Chinese, and half of Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island, called Heixiazi in Chinese. "This event completes the delineation and the legal establishment of all parts of the Russian-Chinese border, which is over 4,300 kilometres (2,700 miles) long," Russia's foreign ministry said in a statement. "The border issue, a historical legacy that had been left to Russia and China, has received its **complete and final resolution**." Interfax said about 170 square kilometres (66 square miles) of land were handed over in the islands along the Amur River border between Russia and China, which saw skirmishes during the Cold War. After a bitter rift between the one-time communist allies in the 1960s, both nations deployed enormous tank armies along the border, raising the spectre of a vast land battle in the event of full-scale war. Recently, however, Russia and China have drawn closer together, motivated by factors including a joint desire to promote economic growth and form a regional counterweight to the power of the United States.

#### Subsidies for the shipindustry fail – the government fails at picking winners and there is lack of demand

CATO No Date (“CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS”, Sometime around 108th Congress (2002), http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-33.pdf)

A Sampler of Corporate Welfare Programs to Cut The following are some corporate welfare programs that are long overdue for cutting. Spending totals given are budget authority for FY02. Direct Subsidies ● Agriculture Department—Market Access Program ($90 million). This program gives taxpayer dollars to exporters of agricultural products to pay for their overseas advertising campaigns. ● Commerce Department—Advanced Technology Program ($187 million). This program gives research grants to high-tech companies. Handouts to successful firms make no sense because they could have relied on private venture capital instead. Handouts to unsuccessful firms with poor ideas also make no sense because taxpayers end up paying for economic waste. 339 CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS ● ForeignMilitary Financing ($3.7 billion). U.S. taxpayers fund weapons purchases by foreign governments through this program. That seems contrary to weapons nonproliferation policy, and the program runs the risk that weapons recipients may not be U.S. allies in the future. ● Amtrak ($621 million). The federal passenger rail company should be fully privatized to allow it to compete fairly with other modes of transportation. Subsidized Loans and Insurance ● Export-Import Bank ($1.2 billion). This program uses taxpayer dollars to subsidize the financing of foreign purchases of U.S. goods. It makes loans to foreigners at below-market interest rates, guarantees the loans of private institutions, and provides export credit insurance. ● Overseas Private Investment Corporation ($188 million). OPIC provides direct loans, guaranteed loans, and risk insurance to U.S. firms that invest in developing countries. Enron, a top beneficiary of both OPIC and Ex-Im programs in the late 1990s, provides a glaring example of corporate welfare waste. ● Maritime Administration—guaranteed loan program ($250 million). Provides loan guarantees for purchases of ships from U.S. shipyards. The United States has vast and liquid financial markets making credit available to all businesses that have reasonable risks. It makes no sense to use taxpayer funds to duplicate functions of private financial markets. Indirect Subsidies to Businesses ● Agriculture Department—research and marketing services ($2 billion). Agricultural research and marketing programs aim to improve product quality, find new uses for products, generate market data, and support promotions for a variety of agriculture products. In most industries, such commercial activities are carried out by private businesses. ● Energy Department—energy supply research ($670 million). This program aims to develop new energy technologies and improve existing ones. The energy industry itself and private research institutes should fund such work. ● The Small Business Administration ($1.6 billion). The SBA provides subsidized loans and loan guarantees to small businesses and has a poor record of selecting businesses to support since its loans have a very high delinquency rate. 340 Corporate Welfare What Is Wrong with Corporate Welfare? As some of the above examples illustrate, there are many problems with corporate welfare programs. Here are seven: 1. Corporate welfare is a big drain on the taxpayer. In FY02, $93 billion of taxpayer money was spent on programs that subsidize businesses. By eliminating these programs, Congress could provide every household in the country with an $860 per year tax cut. 2. Corporate welfare creates an uneven playing field. By giving selected businesses and industries special advantages, corporate subsidies put businesses that are less politically connected at an unfair disadvantage. 3. Corporate welfare programs are anti-consumer. By helping particular businesses, the government often damages consumers. For example, the protectionist federal sugar program costs consumers several billion dollars per year in higher product prices. 4. The government does a poor job of picking winners. Federal loan programs, such as those operated by the SBA, have high delinquency rates, indicating that the difficult job of analyzing business risks should be left to the private sector. With regard to technology subsidies, the federal government has a long history of wasting money on failed ideas. It is the role of private entrepreneurs and investors to take technology risks through institutions such as ‘‘angel’’ financing, venture capital, and stock markets. Government should not use taxpayer money on risky schemes. 5. Corporate welfare fosters corruption. Corporate welfare generates an unhealthy—sometimes corrupt—relationship between business and the government. For example, a Maritime Administration program aided shipbuilders by guaranteeing a $1.1 billion loan to build cruise ships in Sen. Trent Lott’s hometown. Before the ships were completed, the company went bankrupt and left taxpayers with a $200 million tab. Steering taxpayer funds into risky private schemes in important politicians’ districts should be stopped. 6. Corporate welfare depletes private-sector strength. While ‘‘market entrepreneurs’’ work hard to create new businesses, corporate welfare helps create ‘‘political entrepreneurs’’ who spend their energies seeking government handouts. Corporate welfare draws talented people and firms into wasteful subsidy-seeking activities and away from more productive pursuits. Besides, companies receiving subsidies usually become weaker and less efficient, not stronger.

### Warming – 2AC

#### Displaces CO2 – solves warming

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

By contrast, some advocates of U.S. exports of LNG maintain that they **have the potential to bring global environmental benefits** if they are used to displace more carbon-intensive fuels. According to the IEA, **natural gas in general has the potential to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 740 million tonnes** in 2035, **nearly half of which could be achieved** by the displacement of coal in China’s power-generation portfolio. Natural gas—in the form of LNG—also **has the potential to displace more carbon-intensive fuels in other major energy users, including across the EU and in Japan**, which is being forced to burn more coal and oil-based fuels to make up for the nuclear generation capacity lost in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. In addition to its relatively lower carbon-dioxide footprint, natural gas produces lower emissions of pollutants such as sulfur dioxide nitrogen oxide and other particulates than coal and oil.

#### Extinction

Tickell 8 (Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Guardian, “On a Planet 4C Hotter, All We Can Prepare for is Extinction”, 8-11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

### Artic Lead – 2AC

#### Global natural gas extraction is inevitable – the US needs to take the lead to ensure the best practices are used to limit emissions

Schneider 12 (Michael, Advocacy Director – Clean Air Task Force, “Curb Methane Emissions,” National Journal, 7-25, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments)

For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development. Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

#### Extinction

**Ford 3** (Violet, Vice President – Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf)

The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to **global processes** and the balance of **life on earth**. Both the unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a resolution effectively recognizes the Arctic as a **“barometer”** or indicator region **of the globe’s environmental health**. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from environmental and other NGO’s.

### US-Cuba Relations – 2AC

#### Offshore drilling leads to cooperation with Cuba – that solves relations

EDF 12 (Environmental Defense Fund, “The U.S., Cuba and oil diplomacy”, 2012, http://www.edf.org/oceans/us-cuba-and-oil-diplomacy)

With the arrival of a huge drilling rig in January 2012, Cuba has moved forward on exploring for oil just 60 miles from Key West, in partnership with the Spanish oil company Repsol. Significant untapped reserves of oil and gas lie off Cuba’s north shore — enough, experts say, to make Cuba self-sufficient and even an exporter of oil. Within 18 months, there could be six exploratory deepwater wells operating in the pristine waters where Ernest Hemingway once fished. A major oil spill in Cuban waters could devastate both coastal Cuba and the United States. The 2010 BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico was a reminder of how damaging an oil blowout can be, especially in deep water. Florida’s $60 billion tourism and fishing industries — as well as the Dry Tortugas marine sanctuary and deepwater corals in the Southeast Atlantic — are at stake. Finding common ground That’s why EDF has started a conversation between Cuban and U.S. officials with the aim of ensuring that drilling is done safely. The dialogue builds on more than a decade of work with Cuban fishermen, scientists and environmental officials to promote marine conservation, sustainable fishing and coastal zone management. In September 2011, EDF, operating under a special license from the U.S. government, led an unprecedented delegation to Cuba, including former EPA administrator Bill Reilly, co-chairman of the BP oil spill commission. The goal was to assess Cuba’s offshore oil and gas plans and to share lessons learned about the risks of offshore drilling with Cuban officials. “The trip put the spotlight on the lack of dialogue between the United States and Cuba on how to prepare and respond to an oil spill in Cuban waters,” says Lee Hunt, head of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, who helped organize the trip. “EDF has proved itself as an influential voice and broker for environmental diplomacy.”

Relations are key to prevent cyber and bioterrorism

Westerman 6 (Toby, Publisher for International News Analysis Today, "Cyber Attack Aimed at US?" International Affairs, July,<http://www.traditioninaction.org/HotTopics/i46htWesterman_Cyberattack.html>)
A dying Cuban dictator Fidel Castro could launch a devastating cyber-terror attack as a last and final blow against his decades-old enemy -the U.S. - according to a Cuban-born computer engineer in an exclusive interview with International News Analysis. Cuba and its terror allies are intent on destroying the United States, and Castro's precarious physical state may be a key factor in timing a terror attack against the United States, according to Manuel Cereijo, a Cuban-born expert in computer engineering, and head of a consulting group to industry and government. The very technology that has insured U.S. world leadership in commercial and military endeavors could also make American society vulnerable to a sophisticated cyber attack, Cereijo stated. An initial bio-terror attack would be used to set the stage for social chaos in the U.S., Cereijo warned. As deadly pathogens begin to take their toll in human lives, a follow-up cyber attack could paralyze America's capacity to respond. Phone and other forms of communications would begin to break down. The effect of the biological attack would be multiplied many times by the fear imposed upon the population by the inability to communicate with others. Police, emergency personnel, and hospitals would all be operating without coordination or knowledge of the actions of one another. Panic could ensue among the targeted population as the sense of isolation increased. America's response to such an attack "would be tremendous," Cereijo said, but worth the price to Castro and his terrorist allies, if it meant serious damage to America. Castro will be 80-years-old this August, and has been in power since 1959. He is rumored to have Parkinson's disease, and may be suffering from the beginning effects of Alzheimer's. Castro's implacable hatred against the U.S. political and economic system has not changed over his nearly 50-year reign, and he has even advocated Nuremberg-type war crimes trials for capitalists. During the 1962 missile crisis, Castro urged the Soviet Union to launch an atomic strike against the U.S., despite the destruction it would mean for Cuba. Today, Castro remains a potentially reckless figure capable of risking catastrophic consequences for his island nation, Cereijo told International News Analysis. The Communist Cuban regime is committed to terror. Havana has close ties with virtually every important terror group and terror-supporting nation in the world, including the missile-ready regime of North Korea and the nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian and Cuban governments have already vowed to bring the United States "to its knees." The Castro regime has cultivated cyber warfare techniques for years, and it has made the island an electronic spy station first for Russia and then China. China is known to be developing cyber warfare techniques to facilitate an invasion of the island of Taiwan. Beijing claims sovereignty over the democratically controlled island, and has stated that it has the right to take the island by force, if necessary. Cyber warfare techniques would be used in the early hours of an invasion to paralyze Taiwan's computer and telecommunications systems before the major attack from the mainland. China's "Integrated Network Electronic Warfare" program is designed to disable enemy computers and communications equipment at the beginning of offensive military operations. Information warfare units are already training with regular Peoples Liberation Army forces, indicating a firm commitment to cyber warfare, and causing concern among some U.S. government computer professionals. Chinese and Cuban technical-military ties have grown increasingly close in the past several years. China has assisted Cuba in computer telecommunications techniques, and the Cuban government operates university-level training courses in cyber warfare. Cereijo does not believe that China would directly assist a Cuban-launched cyber attack on the U.S., but Beijing's technical and material aid to Havana provides the Cuban regime with the necessary know-how to carry out this kind of strike. Cuba's carefully acquired skill in cyber warfare, its close ties with terrorist groups and terror supporting nations, and first rate spy services which are operating within the United States, all combine to make Cuba a serious candidate for coordinating a cyber-terror attack. Cuba has already interfered with U.S. pro-democracy satellite transmissions to Iran. For six weeks Cuba prevented U.S. broadcasts from reaching Iran, Cereijo said. Although Al Qaeda and other terror groups have attempted to hack into U.S. computers, only the Cuban regime has the knowledge and resources to combine with terror groups to initiate an effective cyber-terror campaign, Cereijo told International News Analysis. Even if a dying Castro does not attempt to attack the U.S. as a last strike, Cuban skill in cyber warfare remains a threat to the U.S., especially when combined with existing terror networks dedicated to the destruction of the United States. American vigilance and countermeasures have thus far prevented any harmful attack, but the U.S. must remain alert and be prepared for a possibly desperate assault from a dying dictator and his terrorist friends, Cereijo urged.

#### Biological terrorism causes extinction

Ochs 2 (Richard, Member – Chemical Weapons Working Group, “Biological Weapons Must be Abolished Immediately, 6-9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? **HUMAN EXTINCTION** IS NOW POSSIBLE.

#### Cyber-terrorism causes accidental nuclear war

Cimbala 99 (Stephen, Professor of Political Science – Pennsylvania State University Delaware County Campus, Summer, Armed Forces & Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal)

The nuclear shadow over the information age remains significant. The essence of information warfare is in subtlety and deception: the manipulation of uncertainty. The essence of nuclear deterrence lies in the credible and certain threat of retaliation backed by an information environment accepted and trusted by both sides in a partly competitive, partly conflictual relationship. Nuclear assets may themselves become the targets of cyberwarriors. Triumphalism about the RMA in high technology conventional weapons overlooks asymmetrical strategies that might appeal to U.S. opponents. Among these might be the reciprocal use of information warfare to deny U.S. access in time of need to a timely nuclear response or to a credible nuclear threat. But even more problematic is the potential collision course between intentional information warfare and unintended side effects when cyberwar is waged against a nuclear armed state, especially one with a non-Western culture. Neither the status of nuclear forces in the new world order, nor all of the military implications of the information revolution, are apparent now. There are reasons to suppose that the strategies and technologies of information warfare will develop along one track, whereas efforts to control nuclear weapons spread and to establish the safety and security of existing nuclear arsenals will involve a different community of specialists and attentive publics. Nevertheless, there are sufficient grounds to be concerned that a too successful menu of information strategies may contribute to a failure of nuclear deterrence in the form of accidental/inadvertent war or escalation. Unplanned interactions between infowarriors and deterrers could have unfortunate byproducts.

### Heidegger K – 2AC

#### Case turns the K – global natural gas extraction is inevitable – other countries view nature as a standing reserve – the sends a global signal to other countries to use environment-friendly tech – that’s Schneider.

#### The Aff’s a prerequisite to the Alt – only innovative responses to tech-induced environmental destruction enable reconceptualization of technology as more than an instrument and of nature as more than standing reserve. The Alt’s passive refusal leaves prevailing worldviews intact.

Feenberg 7 (Andrew, Canada Research Chair in the Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Volume 42, “Between Reason and Experience,” p. 24-27, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Between\_Reason\_and\_Experience\_DYP42.pdf)

As I reformulate this social version of the technical revealing, it has political consequences. Political protests arise as feedback from disastrous technical projects and designs reaches those excluded from the original networks of control. These protests are often based on scientific knowledge of the devastation caused by technology designed in indifference to human needs. This is the point at which objective facts enter experience as motives for distrust and fear of technology and technical authority. The subjects become aware of the contingency of the technically structured world on choices and decisions that do not proceed from a supposedly pure rationality. The lifeworld reacts back on technology through the objective contents of knowledge of its side effects. There have been many attempts to articulate the implications of this new situation. My approach is closest to that of Ulrich Beck. Like him I argue that we are entering a new phase of technological development in which the externalities associated with the prevailing technologies threaten the survival of the industrial system (Beck, 1992). This threat has begun to force redesign of many technologies and changes in the disciplines and training underlying the technical professions. Beck explains the transition from a capitalism based on distinct spheres with little interaction, to a “reflexive modernity” in which interaction between spheres becomes the norm. Multiple approaches and cross disciplinary conceptions increasingly shape the design process in response. He develops the social consequences of the resultant changes while I have focused primarily on the technological dimension of the new phase. In this phase, what Gilbert Simondon calls “concretizing” innovations emerge designed to accommodate a wider range of social influences and contextual factors.12 As design is pulled in different directions by actors attempting to impose their differing functional requirements on devices, the winning design strategies are often those that reconcile multiple functions in simple and elegant structures capable of serving them all. Examples abound: hybrid engines in automobiles, refrigerants and propellants that do not damage the ozone layer, substitutes for lead in consumer products, and so on. In the process of developing these technologies environmental, medical and other concerns are brought to bear on design by new actors excluded from the original technological regime. Of course, no small refinements such as these can resolve the environmental crisis, but the fact that they are possible at all removes the threat of technological regression as a major alibi for doing nothing. The emergence of a radically new technical politics requires us to rethink the basic concept of rationality that has supplied the existing industrial society with its highest philosophical sanction. Heidegger and Marcuse help us to understand the limitations of the prevailing concept. They remind us that the hypostatization of a reason fragmented into specializations and differentiated from a broader cultural and normative context is not inevitable but belongs to a specific historical era, an era that may well be approaching its end. A new understanding of rationality is possible based not on a return to a teleological worldview in which we can no longer believe but on recognition of the complexity of experiences that have been cast in artificially narrow instrumental schemas. Concrete experience is thus the touchstone of this ontology because it is only there that the world reveals itself in its multifarious and unpredictable connections and potentialities. From this new standpoint specialization and differentiation will not disappear, but they will be treated as methodologically useful rather than as ontologically fundamental. The resultant breaching of the boundaries between disciplines and between the technical realm and the lifeworld responds to the crisis of industrial society. We may learn to bound the cosmos in modern forms by attending to the limits that emerge from the unintended interactions of domains touched by powerful modern technologies. This is the form in which the lived world we have discovered in the thought of Heidegger and Marcuse becomes active in the structure of a rationality that still has for its mission the explanation of objective nature. The discovery of a limit reveals the significance of that which is threatened beyond it. This dialectic of limitation is most obvious in the case of threats to human health or species survival. On the one side, the experienced world gains a ground in respect for an object, in this case the human body or a threatened species. On the other side, a concrete technical response is solicited employing the means at hand in new combinations or inventing new ones. From this standpoint no return to a qualitative science is possible or necessary. Modern science objectifies and reifies by its very nature but it could operate within limits standing in for the lost essences of antiquity and like them referring us to an irreducible truth of experience. As we encounter this truth we are reminded of the necessity of restraint. This must be a productive restraint leading to a process of transformation, not a passive refusal of a reified system. The forward looking Janus face is fundamental and grants hope not by rejecting scientific-technical achievements but by revealing their essential nature as processes in which human action can intervene.13 Innovative responses to the new limits can serve in the reconstruction of both technical disciplines and technology. To be sure, the process character and full complexity of reality cannot be reflected immediately in the scientific-technical disciplines, but the disciplines can be deployed in fluid combinations that reflect the complexity of reality as it enters experience through humanly provoked disasters of all sorts and through the consciousness of new threats of which we ourselves are the ultimate source. The goal is not merely to survive but to reconstruct modern technology around a new model of wealth that is environmentally compatible and that draws on human capacities suppressed or ignored in the present dispensation. Marcuse interpreted this in terms of the surrealist “hazard objectif,” the rather fantastic notion of an aesthetically formed world in which “human faculties and desires ... appear as part of the objective determinism of nature – coincidence of causality through nature and causality through freedom” (Marcuse, 1969: 31).

#### Perm – do the plan and non-competitive parts of the alternative. It solves best.

**McWhorter 92** (Ladelle, Assistant Professor of Philosophy – Northeast Missouri State University, Heidegger and the Earth, p. 3)

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

#### -- No extinction – tech and calculation have existed forever – and the world is getting better

#### Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

#### Treating nature like energy is good—allows us to move beyond unsustainable environmental management

**Huber and Mills ‘5** – senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a Ph.D in Mechanical Engineering

(Peter Huber, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute writing on the issues of drug development, energy, technology, and the law and Ph.D in Mechanical Engineering from MIT, Mills earned several patents while working as an engineer in chips and fiber optics, The Bottomless Well: The Twilight of Fuel, the Virtue of Waste, and Why We Will Never Run Out Of Energy, Perseus Books, 2005)

SO HIGH-GRADE ENERGY buys us order, which we crave insatiably. But in the grand scheme of things, the pursuit of order is a loser's game; the first law of thermodynamics says you can't win in the energy racket, the second decrees that when playing for order you can't even break even. For every unit of new order you rake in on the green felt, you lose a unit and then some from a bank account a hundred miles away. Most of the time we don't much care about those distant losses, and we shouldn't. Most of the new disorder created when we burn coal or gasoline is just plain heat, which we cheerfully dump into the air and forget about. Thermal pollution can be a real issue when, for example, it disrupts the ecology of a river. But most of the time it simply isn't-the amount of heat we release is minuscule compared with the amount that cascades down from sun to Earth by day, and then radiates back into the depths of the cosmos by night. More bothersome are the nitrogen-oxygen (NOx) compounds created in every air-based process of high-temperature combustion, and the sulfur dioxide (acid rain) and particulates that all lower-grade fuels release when they burn-wood being by far the worst, per unit of useful energy delivered, though the poorest grades of coal aren't much better. As noted in the previous chapter, however, these problems are quite readily addressable with today's technology and **more-energy solutions**. New cerium catalytic filters can all but eliminate particulate emissions from diesel engines. Tailpipe emissions from Honda's new ultra-clean internal combustion engine are cleaner than the ambient air on the Santa Monica freeway. Burn even more fuel, dump even more waste heat, and it's reasonably easy to scrub conventional pollutants from the flue gases of power plants and the tailpipes of cars. Carbon dioxide is another matter. Weaning ourselves from hydrocarbons themselves is something that we will undoubtedly do someday, but no time soon. Scrubbing out the carbon dioxide at the smokestack (though not the tailpipe) is technically feasible, but given the gargantuan amounts of carbon at issue, this would require huge additional capital investment and concomitantly large increases in the consumption of fuel. Would it be worth it? That depends entirely on how seriously we take the claim that human carbon emissions are changing the global climate. For the foreseeable future, **the best (and only practical) policy for limiting the buildup of carbon dioxide in the air is to burn more hydrocarbons-not fewer. And then, more uranium.** Because it now figures so centrally in the policy debates, let's use carbon itself as our quantum metric of "disorder." This is not thermodynamically rigorous-far from it-but it will do as a surrogate for discussion, particularly if the global warming models are right. Highly imperfect though the carbon metric is, it does give us one systematic way to line up benefits and costs. One hour of the order that we call 100-watt (W) light costs us, on average, 0.05 pounds of atmospheric-carbon chaos. One bucket of ice from the refrigerator, 0.3 pounds. One average hour in a car, 5 pounds. The pounds certainly do add up. In the units commonly used in the scientific literature, fossil fuel combustion releases about 1.8 billion metric tons of carbon per year into the North American air. Worldwide, humans emit roughly 6.5 by burning fossil fuels, and another 2 through deforestation.2 These are big numbers-but even so, **they must be viewed in perspective**. Plants-the green kind, not electric power plants-exhale about 59 billion metric tons of carbon (in the form of carbon dioxide) a year, and absorb roughly 120 billion in photosynthesis.3 Soil organisms, digesting the dead plants on which they live, emit 59 billion. A net of about 26 billion physically diffuse into the atmosphere out of the oceans, and about 28 billion diffuse back in. In short, green plants and "carbon weathering," both powered by the sun, continuously establish new carbonaceous order. Pretty much all the rest of life promotes carbon chaos. The guess-timated bottom line: chaos is currently gaining ground, at a rate of 3 billion metric tons of carbon per year. Without human combustion of fossil fuels, the order might be gaining at about 4 per year. On these carbon-based order/chaos books of account we are dealing with small differences between large and uncertain numbers. We do know that concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide rose about 20 percent in the past century-but we also know that concentrations have varied substantially in the past, long before fossil fuels entered the picture. **Carbon dioxide levels were only half as high some 50,000 years ago, but they were almost as high as today 150,000 years ago**. Eight hundred million years ago the Earth's air was mostly carbon dioxide. Green plants evolved and flourished in profusion and sucked up most of it. Some of the plants sank into swamps, and then sank deeper. Hence the fossil fuels that we now burn in such quantities. The fear is that if we dig up and burn all the fossilized plants of the Carboniferous period, we can expect to re-create the atmosphere of that period too-a carbon-rich hothouse. Climate models assume carbon dioxide triggers a first little bit of warming. On its own, the effects are still inconsequential-carbon dioxide alone, in the quantities we add, does not act as a very effective atmospheric blanket to block the shedding of heat (and with it, disorder) from the surface of the Earth at night. But water vapor might amplify the impact significantly. Warmer air holds more vapor, which blankets the planet a bit more, which warms the air still more, which holds more vapor, and now the Earth becomes a runaway greenhouse. Or so a good number of the climate models suggest. There is much uncertainty to these models-far more than is acknowledged in most accounts. But the mere possibility that we might be changing our global environment is indeed worrisome. How, then, can anyone responsibly favor the burning of more hydrocarbons? **The short answer is that for most people, the only practical alternative today is to burn carbohydrates**, and that's much worse. Round the clock and around the year, the sun delivers to the United States an average energy flux of roughly 180 watts per square meter. And humanity has certainly found ways to capture some of that energy, albeit not yet very much of it. Worldwide, wild plants currently convert about 0.35 watts per square meter (W/m2) of that into stored energy, a dreadful 1:500 energy conversion efficiency. But with the help of a horse, mule, buffalo, or ox, it isn't too difficult to transform the solar energy thus captured into horsepower. That's how most of the world still gets almost all of its energy-from carbohydrates. We Americans once survived on a high-carb energy diet ourselves. In 1840, it required 6,000 cords of wood to produce 1,000 tons of iron; an iron producer harvested 1,000 acres of timber a year to fire a single furnace.4 As late as 1910, as noted in chapter 1, some 27 percent of all U.S. farmland was devoted to feeding horses used for transportation. Feeding the organic transportation system of 1910 thus required enormous amounts of land-far, far more than we have since seized for oil pipelines, refineries, and wells.\* When Europeans first arrived on the continent the contiguous forty-eight states had about 1,045 million acres of forest. That area shrank steadily to a low of about 750 million acres in 1920.5 We have been restoring forest ever since. Exactly how fast is hard to pin down: the continent is large, most of the land is privately owned, and the definitional debates rage about when regrowth reaches the point of establishing new "forest." But all analyses show more, not less, forest-America's forest cover today is somewhere between 20 million and 80 million acres higher than it was in 1920.6 About 9 million acres have been reforested since 1987 alone.7 Trees have been replanted, in recent years, at a rate of some 3 million acres per year.' We're adding new lumber-quality trees 30 percent faster than we're harvesting them.' For the first time in history, a Western nation has halted, and then reversed, the decline of its woodlands. Within a generation, if current trends continue, America could return to levels of forestation last seen by the Pilgrims. These numbers, though wrenchingly at odds with common notions of what just must be true, are perhaps easier to grasp and accept when stated in terms of how the average family has used the land, yesterday and today. A century and a half ago, a pioneering American family lived off 40 acres and a mule. The family lived entirely off the land, and to do so, cut down trees for crops, pasture, and fuel-just as families still do today in the Amazon basin and much of the rest of the world. Since 1920, however, the North American family has returned at least one and perhaps 2 acres of the homestead to forest. It doesn't need them anymore. Now, it's digging up its energy, in much more concentrated form, from below the surface. Per acre of land used, agricultural productivity at least tripled in the twentieth century, in large part because so much less land is now required to power the plow. The pioneer farmer got his horsepower from his horse, which required 2 acres of pasture to feed. Better crop strains have played a key role too, along with agricultural chemicals, synthesized with copious amounts of oil. Better railways and highways, and the fossil fuels that power them, have allowed us to trade inferior farmland in New England for better land on the prairies. Highly mechanized, energy-intensive agriculture has done the rest. Overall, roughly 40 million more acres of cropland were harvested seventy years ago than are harvested today.10 How has this fundamental change altered our carbon books of account? At today's level of population, an American family of four can lay claim to only 30 acres of the continent, if we imagine the entire land mass evenly divided up on a per capita basis. Roughly one acre of the allotment goes for home, office, factory, road, and highway. Six acres are farmland; 8 are range for livestock; 15 are grassland, forest, mountain, and desert. Instead of harvesting carbohydrates from cleared land, the modern family digs up 24 metric tons of carbon a year, as coal, oil, and gas, and releases it into the air as carbon dioxide. Twenty-four tons seems like a lot. But spread over 30 acres that's about 6 ounces of carbon per square yard, or a film averaging about two-thousandths of an inch thick over the entire estate. And in North America, at least, various processes do indeed seem to be depositing that much back again, and even a bit more. **Today, North America as a whole is, apparently, a carbon sink**. As noted earlier, fossil fuels burned on the continent release about 1.6 billion metric tons of carbon per year into the air. Prevailing winds blow from west to east. This means carbon dioxide concentrations should be 300 parts per billion higher in the North Atlantic than in the North Pacific. But in fact they're about 300 parts per billion lower. As best these things can be measured directly, America's terrestrial uptake of carbon-the amount moving down into the surface rather than up into the air-runs about 1.7 billion metric tons per year, just ahead of the amount emitted by the combustion of fossil fuels. The numbers were set out in a stunning if little publicized article published in an October 1998 issue of Science.\* Carbon-sink skeptics say they don't see enough new trees to account for the drop. But then, global warming skeptics say they don't see enough human carbon emissions to account for rising temperatures. The weight of the evidence indicates both a warming planet and a huge North American carbon sink. The carbon-sink numbers are, if anything, the more reliable, because they require only direct measurement today, not estimates of conditions a century ago. And if we can't precisely explain where all the carbon is sinking, it's because it's hard to track deposits that average two-thousandths of an inch over a vast continent. Many forest inventories count only "lumber quality" trunks, ignoring younger trees and grassland. New forests mean new layers of carbon-rich soil, which are almost impossible to inventory accurately. New soil means more silt in rivers, which dump carbon into the ocean. The total forest ecosystem in the United States holds an estimated 52 billion metric tons of carbon.11 A net growth rate of 3 percent a year is enough to consume all carbon emissions of the U.S. economy.'2 Either in forests themselves or on surrounding grasslands and farms, that is about the net growth rate we seem to have. The carbon chaos we create in burning fossil fuels appears to be offset, and then some, by the carbon order we create by giving back land to trees.

#### Existence is a prerequisite to the alternative

Wapner ‘3

(Paul, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, “Leftist Criticism of ‘Nature’,” Winter, Dissent)

I would like to present a third response to contemporary eco-criticism, accepting the intellectual insights of postmodern critics and, at the same time, providing some guidelines for protecting the nonhuman world. My argument will focus less on the fundamental character of reality—an endless debate—and more on the ethics of environmentalism. The two responses that I’ve just described ask whether a postmodern sensibility has the right epistemological or ontological “take” on reality— with the first denying and the second defending the rightness. I will ask instead how we want to live in the world and what kind of people we want to be. But I will try to build my answers on (or out of) the ontological debris created by postmodern criticism. Eco-critics are not intellectual hacks. Neither are most cultural critics nihilistic or amoral. Many of them offer useful insights about human experience. In fact, much postmodern thought acknowledges purposeful elements in human life and attempts to make judgments about the different purposes. Many critics see themselves involved in a moral enterprise. The position I want to defend joins the intellectual and moral dimensions of postmodern cultural criticism by working through what is often called an “ethic of otherness.” One of the hallmarks of postmodernism is the understanding that whenever we reflect upon, talk about, or act in the world, we represent it to ourselves and others. And when we do that, we are not rendering an objective view of reality so much as constructing a certain understanding of the world. We are subscribing to a particular discourse or set of discourses about the “way things are,” and this “way” shapes our experience. This is not to say, of course, that physical objects are figments of our imagination or that there is no substratum to reality, but simply that we endow the objects of our experience with particular meanings that determine how we think and act in the world. The ethical dimension of this insight comes into view when we recognize the danger of forgetting the constructed quality of human experience. We construct our experience, fail to hold onto the idea that we’ve done just that, and then assume that our constructions are somehow “real.” This becomes an ethical failing insofar as it silences the views of others. The claim to know how the world really is expresses a hegemonic ambition; it asserts authority in a way that delegitimizes others’ perspectives on human experience and the world in general. This is an ambition—a kind of “violence”— that many postmodernists find unacceptable. The ethical alternative is respect for the “other.” This involves turning down the volume of our own pronouncements about the world and listening to others—or providing them with the opportunity to express themselves so that we can listen. Hence the many efforts by postmodernists to “give voice to the other”: from academic campaigns to expand the literary canon to popular efforts to embrace and celebrate multiculturalism. The aim is to promote the expression of the marginalized and disadvantaged. While postmodern cultural critics are comfortable giving voice to other people, they stop short at the nonhuman world—the paradigmatic “other.” When it comes to nature, postmodernists are happy to do all the talking. They seem to see no need to heed the voice of the nonhuman, no reason even to assume that, in the vast world of rivers, chimpanzees, rainstorms, and whales, anything is being said. Postmodern cultural critics look at the nonhuman world and think that they are looking in the mirror. There is nothing out there with its own authentic voice because, as soon as we imagine it expressing itself, we recognize that we are speaking, and therefore making up, its words. As Christopher Manes puts it, “It is as if we had compressed the entire buzzing, howling, gurgling biosphere into the narrow vocabulary of epistemology, to the point that someone like Georg Lukacs could say, ‘nature is a societal category’—and actually be understood.” The third response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn’t mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn’t postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of “nature” *does* deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn’t speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature’s behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions—except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can’t ascribe meaning to that which doesn’t appear. What doesn’t exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature’s expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature’s behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world—in all its diverse embodiments—must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

### Renewables DA – 2AC

#### Warming irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction – past temperature fluctuations prove

**Stampf 7** (Olaf, staff writer for Spiegel Online, 5/5. “Not the End of the World as we Know it,” [http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,481684,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0%2C1518%2C481684%2C00.html))

But even this moderate warming would likely have far fewer apocalyptic consequences than many a prophet of doom would have us believe. For one thing, the more paleontologists and geologists study the history of the earth's climate, the more clearly do they recognize just how much temperatures have fluctuated in both directions in the past. Even major fluctuations appear to be completely natural phenomena. Additionally, some environmentalists doubt that the large-scale extinction of animals and plants some have predicted will in fact come about. "A warmer climate helps promote species diversity," says Munich zoologist Josef Reichholf. Also, more detailed simulations have allowed climate researchers to paint a considerably less dire picture than in the past -- gone is the talk of giant storms, the melting of the Antarctic ice shield and flooding of major cities. Improved regionalized models also show that climate change can bring not only drawbacks, but also significant benefits, especially in northern regions of the world where it has been too cold and uncomfortable for human activity to flourish in the past. However it is still a taboo to express this idea in public. For example, countries like Canada and Russia can look forward to better harvests and a blossoming tourism industry, and the only distress the Scandinavians will face is the guilty conscience that could come with benefiting from global warming.

#### Turn – conventional gas reduces emissions

Howarth et al 11 (Robert W. Professor of Ecology & Environmental Biology – Cornell, Renee Santoro, Research Aide for Howarth – Cornell, Anthony Ingraffea, Professor of Engineering – Cornell, “Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations,” Climatic Change, 106(4), p.679-690, Springer Link, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e384226wr4160653/?MUD=MP>)

We evaluate the greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas obtained by highvolume hydraulic fracturing from shale formations, focusing on methane emissions. Natural gas is composed largely of methane, and 3.6% to 7.9% of the methane from shale-gas production escapes to the atmosphere in venting and leaks over the lifetime of a well. These methane emissions are at least 30% more than and perhaps more than twice as great as those from conventional gas. The higher emissions from shale gas occur at the time wells are hydraulically fractured—as methane escapes from flow-back return fluids—and during drill out following the fracturing. Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential that is far greater than that of carbon dioxide, particularly over the time horizon of the first few decades following emission. Methane contributes substantially to the greenhouse gas footprint of shale gas on shorter time scales, dominating it on a 20-year time horizon. The footprint for shale gas is greater than that for conventional gas or oil when viewed on any time horizon, but particularly so over 20 years. Compared to coal, the footprint of shale gas is at least 20% greater and perhaps more than twice as great on the 20-year horizon and is comparable when compared over 100 years.

### AT Food / Famine Wars

#### Famine doesn’t cause war ---- it makes people too hungry to fight

Barnett in ’00 (Jon, Australian Research Council fellow and Senior Lecturer in Development Studies @ Melbourne U. School of Social and Environmental Enquiry, Review of International Studies, “Destabilizing the environment-conflict Thesis”, 26:271-288, Cambridge Journals Online)

Considerable attention has been paid to the links between population, the environment and conflict. The standard argument is that population growth will overextend the natural resources of the immediate environs, leading to deprivation which, it is assumed, will lead to conflict and instability either directly through competition for scarce resources, or indirectly through the generation of ‘environmental refugees’. For example, according to Myers: ‘so great are the stresses generated by too many people making too many demands on their natural-resource stocks and their institutional support systems, that the pressures often create first-rate breeding grounds for conflict’.37 The ways in which population growth leads to environmental degradation are reasonably well known. However, the particular ways in which this leads to conflict are difficult to prove. In the absence of proof there is a negative style of argumentation, and there are blanket assertions and abrogations; for example: ‘the relationship is rarely causative in a direct fashion’, but ‘we may surmise that conflict would not arise so readily, nor would it prove so acute, if the associated factor of population growth were occurring at a more manageable rate’.38 It is possible though, that rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war. Indeed, it is less the case that famines in Africa in recent decades have produced ‘first rate breeding grounds for conflict’; the more important, pressing, and avoidable product is widespread malnutrition and large loss of life.

### Immigration 2AC

#### Immigration reform won’t pass --- fiscal issues and gun control sidelines it.

**The Republic**, **1/4**/2013 (‘Cliff’ fight, gun control pushing immigration reform out of spotlight, p. http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20130103immigration-reform-at-crossroads.html)

But the already-difficult challenge of passing comprehensive immigration reform this year, as Obama hopes, has been exacerbated by the drawn-out battle over the “fiscal cliff” and emergence of gun control as a major issue following the December shooting of 20 first-graders and six adults at an elementary school in Newtown, Conn. In an interview Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” Obama reiterated that “fixing our broken immigration system is a top priority.” “We’ve talked about it long enough,” he said. The overwhelming support Obama received from Latino voters in November also prompted many Republicans to call for immigration reform in a bid to rehabilitate their party’s negative image with Latinos. But immigration reform has a long history of being sidetracked by other issues. Health-care reform and fixing the economy knocked immigration reform off the table in 2009 and 2010. Now, spending cuts and gun control are threatening to derail immigration reform again. That’s because the window to pass immigration legislation is short, analysts and immigration-reform advocates say. If nothing happens this year, immigration reform may become too politically radioactive to tackle leading up to the 2014 congressional midterm election and then the 2016 presidential election. Obama has said numerous times since the election that he wants to begin tackling immigration reform this month. In his first term, he failed to deliver on his pledge to pass a sweeping bill that would have included a legalization program for the more than 11 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S., including about 350,000 in Arizona. To win back support from Latino voters leading up to the election, Obama directed Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano to implement broad administrative changes aimed at helping some undocumented immigrants remain in the United States. One of those changes allows undocumented immigrants to remain in the country while they attempt to legalize their status through a spouse who is a U.S. citizen or other immediate relative. The rule change was finalized this week, a year after it was proposed by the Obama administration, and takes effect on March 4. In the past, illegal immigrants had to first leave the country to apply for a waiver to avoid having to wait outside the country for 10 years as punishment for entering illegally. After the change, illegal immigrants will still have to leave the country to apply for a green card, but they will be able to apply for the waiver inside the U.S., greatly reducing the amount of time they will have to spend separated from relatives who are U.S. citizens. A second change, announced on June 15, allows young undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as minors to apply to live and work temporarily in the country without the threat of deportation. So far, more than 367,000 young undocumented immigrants, often referred to as “dreamers,” have applied for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. Meanwhile, the clock is ticking on immigration reform. Although Obama says he wants to jump right into immigration reform, he and Congress will have to focus their attention for months on several unresolved issues left over from the New Year’s Day deal to avert the “fiscal cliff,” including a March1 deadline to avoid billions of dollars in across-the-board spending cuts and a late February/early March deadline to raise the debt ceiling. “That is problem Number 1 for immigration reform. That will dominate the agenda for the time being,” said Louis DeSipio, a political-science professor at the University of California-Irvine. Immigration reform also will have to compete with gun-control legislation. After the shooting in Newtown, Obama appointed Vice President Joe Biden to head an anti-violence commission to come up with new gun-control measures by the end of this month. “That is going to put more pressure on Congress,” DeSipio said. Gun control, plus the divisive atmosphere demonstrated by the Republican-controlled House and the Democrat-run Senate during the fiscal-cliff debate, “makes it more and more unlikely that Congress will actually be able to debate a comprehensive immigration-reform bill,” he said.

#### Strong ideological divides prevent passage.

**CNN**, **1/3**/2013 (Low bar for new Congress, p. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/03/politics/new-congress/index.html>)

Immigration reform, another White House priority, will also stoke ideological differences and test the demographic shifts in Congress. All in all, the sharp divisions on Capitol Hill are still evident and expectations for meaningful progress on substantive issues are not high. "My sense is that things are not going to be that different because the fundamental divisions that existed in the previous Congress are still there," said Alan Abramowitz, a political science professor at Emory University. "We still have a Democratic Senate and Republican House. We still have a divided Congress. The ideological divisions between the parties are as great as they were in the last Congress," he said. The divide is widened by a continued attrition of moderates, who lost or retired from seats on both sides of the aisle in both chambers.

#### Capital is insufficient to pass immigration reform --- ideology outweighs.

**Soto**, **1/4**/2013 (Victoria – Senior Analyst for Latino Decisions and Fellow at the Center for Politics and Governance at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, at Austin, Opinion: Immigration reform will not be easy, but it’s not impossible, NBC Latino, p. <http://nbclatino.com/2013/01/04/opinion-immigration-reform-will-not-be-easy-but-its-not-impossible/>)

Unlike in his first administration, the president seems to be on board and ready for rolling up his sleeves and getting into immigration reform, but that won’t cut it. The problem for immigration reform in 2013 is rooted in Capital Hill. The president’s support is a necessary condition for any major policy overhaul, but it is not a sufficient condition. Let’s just assume the president can arm-wrestle the Senate Democrats and a few Senate Republicans into supporting his immigration reform. Two out of three won’t cut it. The Republican-controlled House is what stands in the way of immigration reform. More specifically, the GOP’s split mindset regarding Latinos and immigration is what will likely prevent the president from crossing off immigration reform from his 2013 to-do list.

#### The GOP won’t support CIR --- momentum hasn’t changed.

San Francisco **Chronicle**, **12/31**/2012 (Congress Dysfunction as Deadline Arrives Poses 2013 Risks, p. http://www.sfgate.com/business/bloomberg/article/Congress-Dysfunction-as-Deadline-Arrives-Poses-4157560.php#page-3)

 “Boehner and his Republican conference will have leverage over the Democrats on raising the debt ceiling,” Bonjean said. “You will see the first quarter of the year being dominated by spending cuts and entitlement reform as a permission slip for the Democrats to raise the debt ceiling.” That suggests more roadblocks for Obama’s agenda even after his decisive re-election in November. “Immigration is going to be a very tough issue for Republicans to tackle,” Bonjean said. “Coming off a very bruising fiscal cliff fight, pivoting to immigration is going to be more troublesome for Republicans to coalesce around the plan.” Obama’s re-election “doesn’t mean he should get everything he wants” yet “it certainly means that everything he reasonably proposes should get a fair hearing,” said Representative Rob Andrews, a New Jersey Democrat.

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital does not affect the agenda

**Dickinson 9** (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

## Round 3 2AC v. Mo State

### T – Energy Production

#### We meet – natural gas drilling is energy production

CMP No Date (Conservation Measures Partnership, “3 Energy Production & Mining,” *Threats & Actions Taxonomies*, http://www.conservationmeasures.org/initiatives/threats-actions-taxonomies/threats-taxonomy/3-energy-production-mining)

3 Energy Production & Mining

Definition: Threats from production of non-biological resources

Exposition: Various forms of water use (for example, dams for hydro power) could also be put in this class, but these threats seemed more related to other threats that involve alterations to hydrologic regimes. As a result, they should go in 7.2 Dams & Water Management/Use.

3.1 Oil & Gas Drilling

Definition: Exploring for, developing, and producing petroleum and other liquid hydrocarbons

Exposition: Oil and gas pipelines go into 4.2 Utility & Service Lines. Oil spills that occur at the drill site should be placed here; those that come from oil tankers or pipelines should go in 4. Transportation & Service Corridors or in 9.2 Industrial & Military Effluents, depending on your perspective.

Examples:

 oil wells

 deep sea natural gas drilling

3.2 Mining & Quarrying

Definition: Exploring for, developing, and producing minerals and rocks

Exposition: It is a judgment call whether deforestation caused by strip mining should be in this category or in 5.3 Logging & Wood Harvesting – it depends on whether the primary motivation for the deforestation is access to the trees or to the minerals. Sediment or toxic chemical runoff from mining should be placed in 9.2 Industrial & Military Effluents if it is the major threat from a mining operation.

Examples:

 coal strip mines

 alluvial gold panning

 gold mines

 rock quarries

 sand/salt mines

 coral mining

 deep sea nodules

 guano harvesting

 dredging outside of shipping lanes

3.3 Renewable Energy

Definition: Exploring, developing, and producing renewable energy

Exposition: Hydropower should be put in 7.2 Dams & Water Management/Use.

Examples:

 geothermal power production

 solar farms

 wind farms (including birds flying into windmills)

 tidal farms

#### Counter-interpretation – Energy production is the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

Energy consumption

‘Energy consumption’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Consumption of energy, in relation to a facility, means the use or disposal of energy from the operation of the

facility including own-use and losses in extraction, production and transmission.

#### Lease restrictions are on natural gas production

NaturalGas.org, no date (NaturalGas.org, “Natural Gas Supply,” http://www.naturalgas.org/business/analysis.asp)
The production of natural gas in the United States is based on competitive market forces: inadequate supply at any one time leads to price increases, which signal to production companies the need to increase the supply of natural gas to the market. Supplying natural gas in the United States in order to meet this demand, however, is dependent on a number of factors. These factors may be broken down into two segments: general barriers to increasing supply, and those factors that affect the short term supply scenario. Short Term Supply Barriers In a perfect world, price signals would be recognized and acted upon immediately, and there would be little lag time between increased demand for natural gas, and an increase in supplies reaching the market. However, in reality, this lag time does exist. There are several barriers to immediate supply increases which affect the short term availability of natural gas supply. They include: Availability of Skilled Workers - The need to train and hire skilled workers results in lag times between times of increased demand and an increase in production. For example, from 1991 to 1999, a prolonged period of relatively low prices indicated adequate supplies of natural gas existed, and the exploration and production industry contracted in response. During this period, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded a 26 percent average decrease in employment in the oil and gas extraction industry. Some of these workers left the industry altogether rather than remain unemployed. When production companies began to react to higher prices in late 1999, the need to find and train skilled workers contributed to a slower increase in activity than would have been the case if skilled workers were plentiful. To counter this problem, many production companies offer increasingly high wages, as well as scholarships and educational contributions to attract professionals to the industry. Availability of Equipment - Drilling rigs are very expensive pieces of equipment. Price volatility in the industry makes it very difficult for producers, as well as production equipment suppliers, to plan the construction and placement of drilling rigs far in advance. Prolonged periods of low prices results in reduction of the number of available rigs. When prices respond to increase demand, and drilling activity increases, time is required to build and place an adequate number of drilling rigs. For this reason, drilling rig counts are a good indication of the status of the oil and natural gas production industry. As can be seen in the graph, an increase in operational rigs lags behind period of high prices. For more information on rig counts, click here. Permitting and Well Development - Before a natural gas well actually begins producing, there are several time consuming procedures and development activities that must take place. In order to begin drilling, exploration activities must take place to pinpoint the location of natural gas reserves. Once a suitable field has been located, production companies must receive the required approval from the landowner (which in many cases is the government) to install drilling equipment and begin to drill the well. The Bureau of Land Management is responsible for issuing permits for onshore development, and the Minerals Management Service is responsible for offshore development areas. Once drilling is completed, extraction and field processing equipment must be set up, as well as gathering systems. In all, the between the location of natural gas deposits and the beginning of production can range from as little as a few months to as much as ten years. Weather and Delivery Disruptions - Although unrelated to natural gas prices or demand increases and decreases, weather patterns and anomalies can have a significant impact on natural gas production. For example, hurricanes can have an impact on the offshore production of natural gas, as safety measures require the temporary shut down of offshore drilling and production platforms. In addition, while the safety record of the natural gas industry is extremely good, malfunctions and accidents may occur from time to time that disrupt the delivery of natural gas. For example, a compressor malfunction in a large pipeline serving a major hub could temporarily disrupt the flow of natural gas through that important market center. While the effects of weather and delivery disruptions are most often of short duration, they can still have an effect on the expeditious production of natural gas. General Barriers to Increasing Supply In addition to the short term impediments to increasing natural gas supply, there exist other more general barriers to the increased supply of natural gas in the United States. These include: Land Access - The U.S. government owns more than 29 percent of all the land in the country, and an estimated 40 percent of undiscovered natural gas exists on this land. In several areas, the government has restricted access to federal lands. 59 percent of undiscovered gas resources are on federal lands and offshore waters. Outside of the western Gulf of Mexico, production companies are prohibited access to virtually all federal lands offshore the Lower 48 states. About 9 percent of resource-bearing land in the Rockies is also off limits, and access to another 32 percent is significantly restricted. The National Petroleum Council in 1999 estimated that 213 Tcf of natural gas exists in areas under federal access restrictions. This restriction is the result of presidential and congressional leasing moratoria, and affects the amount of natural gas resources that may be extracted to increase supply. Pipeline Infrastructure - The ability to transport natural gas from producing regions to consumption regions also affects the availability of supplies to the marketplace. The interstate and intrastate pipeline infrastructure can only transport so much natural gas at any one time, and in essence provides a 'ceiling' for the amount of natural gas that can reach the market. Although the current pipeline infrastructure is significant, with the EIA estimating daily delivery capacity of the pipeline grid to be 119 Bcf. However, natural gas pipeline companies must continue to continually expand the pipeline infrastructure in order to meet growing demand. To learn more about the natural gas pipeline infrastructure in the United States, click here. The Financial Environment - Exploring for and producing natural gas is a very capital intensive endeavor. In fact, the National Petroleum Council estimated in 1999 that production companies will have to invest $1.44 trillion in capital between 1999 and 2015 in order to keep pace with demand growth. This puts significant pressures on production companies, particularly small, privately owned firms, to raise the capital necessary to increase production. While efficient and transparent financial markets in the U.S. do offer options for raising capital effectively, the rate at which production companies may do so can serve as a limiting factor in the increasing availability of supplies reaching the market.

#### Prefer it –

#### Over-limits – There are terrible natural gas, oil, or coal affs under their interpretation. The aff can only reduce restrictions on the development of existing natural resources that have already been tapped – lease restrictions prevent companies from drilling in new places. If that’s not T, then no aff is because every single restriction prevents companies from extracting resources.

#### No ground loss – the aff links to all their topic generics and we still claim to increase energy production

#### Competing interpretations are bad – causes a race to the bottom – they will always find a way to exclude the aff. Default to reasonability – we don’t make the topic unmanageable

### A2: EU Turn

#### No U – Russian military aggression is high now – conflicts will occur in the future

Weitz 11/21 (Richard – Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute, “The Focus of Russian Military Means”, 2012, http://www.sldinfo.com/the-focus-of-russian-military-means/)

Despite the reformers’ goal of redirecting Russian strategic thought away from fighting the West to winning localized conflicts, Russia’s military doctrine and recent military exercises still identify resisting NATO aggression as a major task of the Russian armed forces. The 2010 Military Doctrine describes NATO’s growing military infrastructure near Russia’s border as well as the alliance’s alleged efforts to acquire “global functions in contravention of international law” as potentially threatening Russia’s military security. An important consideration affecting how Russians approach military reform is their expectations of the nature of future wars—especially the questions of the main sources of military threats and how they might manifest themselves. The most basic consideration is that Russian leaders still see themselves as threatened from hostile forces that must be dealt with through military means. Although individuals differ on what they see as the main threats, there is a pervasive sense that, under certain conditions, Russia could come into conflict with certain foreign countries if it fails to have an effective military. Mostly these possible adversaries are seen as Western states, but some Russian strategists, thinking ahead, consider China and possibly Iran as emerging threats.

#### No chance of EU collapse

Brooks 10 (Kathleen, Research Director – Forex.com, “Will the Euro Survive Europe’s Latest Sovereign Debt Crisis?”, Reuters, 11-19, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate-uk/2010/11/19/will-the-euro-survive-europe%E2%80 %99s-latest-sovereign-debt-crisis/)

While the fund may be able to cope with the claims of Ireland and Greece, it could not cope with those of Spain, another debt-laden southern European economy that is at risk from bond vigilantes once the focus shifts from Ireland’s woes. If Spain was to require financing in the coming months then it would come down to Germany, as the largest economic force in the Euro zone, to cough up more cash. Angela Merkel certainly doesn’t seem to have the political will to “donate” any more money to bail out its Eurozone peers, and if the funds are not there then a situation where Spain is “too big to bail” could break the Eurozone and cause the demise of the Euro. But we believe this is an extremely unlikely scenario. So what is a more realistic conclusion to the current crisis in Europe? At the moment, it appears that Ireland will receive some form of financial assistance, which will reduce the near-term risks of an Irish default and should calm the markets. But on a more fundamental level, the Irish crisis has shown the political will in Europe to keep the Union afloat. Ireland has been pushed to accept financial assistance from all corners of Europe in an attempt to calm the markets and stop contagion in other fiscally challenged members like Portugal and Spain.

This suggests that although the way that Europe has coped with its first major challenge has been inconsistent and laden with confusion, there is an overwhelming desire to keep the monetary union intact. Thus, investors who believe that this is the death knell for the Eurozone will have to battle the political will of Brussels.

Secondly, Spain is a large economy and although it has suffered the bursting of its real estate bubble, it has other industries to try and pull it out of its economic malaise. As well as this, its financial position is clear, whereas Ireland’s financial liabilities are still technically unknown as more bad mortgages turn sour on Irish banks’ balance sheets. This should help Spain avoid a similar fate to Greece and Ireland in the capital markets.

Lastly, although the euro has come under some selling pressure during this most recent debt crisis, it hasn’t suffered a capitulation. The forex market is not pricing in the chance of a collapse in the euro any time soon. While there are major structural issues – including implementing strict fiscal rules and setting up an automatic default mechanism for member states – this is to be expected with a political union that is essentially only 10-years old.

Essentially the peripheral nations need to be more like Germany, and Germany needs to consume a little more. If Europe can get succeed in its own balancing act, then it could emerge from this crisis as the strongest of the major economies.

### K – 2AC

#### The alt creates a political void filled by elites – locking in oppression

Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor – Georgetown Law, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, **creates a political** and spiritual **void** into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and **steps on** the disempowered and dispossessed.  [\*762]  To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the **void will be filled** by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

#### The impact is extinction

Rorty 98 (Richard, Professor of Comparative Literature – Stanford University, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, p. 89-94)

At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were **wildly overoptimistic**. One thing that is very likely to happen is that **the gains made in the past forty years** by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, **will be wiped out**. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. **All the sadism** which the academic Left has tried to make unaccept­able to its students will come flooding back. All the resent­ment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international super­rich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to **pro­voke military adventures which will** generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twenti­eth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he ex­presses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus commu­nitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situa­tions are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the tradition­ally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the mean­ing of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a right­ist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellec­tual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the estab­lished order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of lan­guage, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist ver­sion of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential sub­jectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's im­possible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by prob­lematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossi­ble to clamber back down from their books to a level of ab­straction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a re­cent scandal-they offer the most abstract and barren expla­nations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into polit­ical relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left re­treats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice pro­duces **theoretical hallucinations**. These result in an intellec­tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund­son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

#### Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

#### Existence is a pre-requisite to examining ontology

Wapner 3 (Paul, Associate Professor and Director of the Global Environmental Policy Program – American University, “Leftist Criticism of”, Dissent, Winter, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539)

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that **a prerequisite of expression is existence**. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment. NOW, WHAT does this mean for politics and policy, and the future of the environmental movement? Society is constantly being asked to address questions of environmental quality for which there are no easy answers. As we wrestle with challenges of global climate change, ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, and so forth, we need to consider the economic, political, cultural, and aesthetic values at stake. These considerations have traditionally marked the politics of environmental protection. A sensitivity to eco-criticism requires that we go further and include an ethic of otherness in our deliberations. That is, we need to be moved by our concern to make room for the "other" and hence fold a commitment to the nonhuman world into our policy discussions. I don't mean that this argument should drive all our actions or that respect for the "other" should always carry the day. But it must be a central part of our reflections and calculations. For example, as we estimate the number of people that a certain area can sustain, consider what to do about climate change, debate restrictions on ocean fishing, or otherwise assess the effects of a particular course of action, we must think about the lives of other creatures on the earth-and also the continued existence of the nonliving physical world. We must do so not because we wish to maintain what is "natural" but because we wish to act in a morally respectable manner.

#### Shoring up energy primacy is the only way to sustain leadership and prevent extinction

Hagel 12 [Chuck Hagel, Professor at Georgetown University, “The Challenge of Change”, 5/15/12, <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/challenge-change>]

A new world order is being built today by seven billion global citizens. America’s responsibilities in this new world and to future generations are as enormous as they are humbling. The challenges and choices before us demand leadership that reaches into the future without stumbling over today. They also require challenging every past frame of reference. Sensing the realities and subtleties of historic change are not always sudden or obvious. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recounted, “Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the 19th century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.” Staying a step ahead of the forces of change requires an ability to foresee and appreciate the consequences of our actions, a willingness to learn the hard lessons of history and from our own experiences, and a clear realization of the limitations of great power. Acheson and the Wise Men of that time got it right. America led the shaping of the post-Second World War world order through strong inspired leadership, a judicious (most of the time) use of its power, and working with allies through alliances and institutions. This has helped prevent a Third World War and a nuclear holocaust. The world we face in 2012 is of a different character than even a few years ago. Many developing nations are fragile states and are under enormous pressure from terrorism, endemic poverty, environmental challenges, debt, corruption, civil unrest, and regional, tribal, and religious conflicts. The result is a climate of despair, and potential breeding grounds for radical politics and extremism. A successful American foreign policy must include thinking through actions and policies, and how uncontrollable and unpredictable global forces may affect outcomes. Eleven years of invasions and occupations have put the U.S. in a deep hole and mired us down in terribly costly commitments in blood, treasure, and prestige. Our diplomatic and security flexibility has been seriously eroded by many of the decisions of the last eleven years. Too often we tend to confuse tactical action for strategic thinking. A matter of mutual understanding American foreign policy has always required a principled realism that is true to our values as we face the world as it really is in all of its complexities. We need to accept the reality that there is not a short-term solution to every problem in the world. What we must do is manage these realities and complex problems, moving them into positions of solution possibilities and resolution. American foreign policy has always dared to project a vision of a world where all things are possible. If we are to succeed, we must understand how the world sees us. Turn on our receivers more often and shut off our transmitters. This is a vital priority for a successful 21st century foreign policy. We must also avoid the traps of hubris, ideology and insularity, and know that there is little margin for error with the stakes so high in the world today. America must strengthen its global alliances. Common-interest alliances will be required in a volatile world of historic diffusions of power. The great challenges facing the world today are the responsibility of all peoples of the world. They include cyber warfare, terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, prosperity and stability, and global poverty, disease and environmental degradation. Our allies throughout the world share these same challenges and threats and will also be just as affected by the outcomes. These will be either our common successes or our common failures. America cannot be successful with any of these challenges, without sustained partnerships and deep cooperation in the economic, intelligence, diplomatic, humanitarian, military and law enforcement fields. The centrality of alliances and multi-lateral institutions to a successful foreign policy is fundamental. Alliances and multi-lateral institutions must be understood as expansions of our influence, not as constraints on our power. Alliances are imperfect, as are all institutions. But like “process,” they help absorb shocks. Beyond military solutions Alliances must be built on solid foundations to handle both routine and sudden unforeseen challenges. Crisis-driven “coalitions of the willing” by themselves are not the building blocks for a stable world. We need to think more broadly, deeply and strategically. American military power and force structure cannot sustain its commitments without a shift to a more comprehensive strategic approach to global threats and a more flexible and agile military. Cyber warfare is a paramount example of these new threats. The perception of American power around the world must not rest solely on a military orientation or optic. There must be an underlying commitment to engagement and humanity. Engagement is not appeasement, nor is it negotiation. It is not a guarantee of anything, but rather a smart diplomatic bridge to better understanding and possible conflict resolution. American foreign policy must reflect the realities and demands of the global economy. The global economy cannot be shut out of foreign policy. There can be no higher priority for America than to remain economically competitive in a world undergoing a historic diffusion of economic power. A nation’s strength is anchored to and underpinned by its economic strength. The connections between America’s trade, economic, and energy policies must also be synthesized into a strategic vision for American foreign policy that not only meets the challenges of our time, but frames the completeness of long-term policies for strategic future outcomes. Trade is a major catalyst for economic strength and growth at home and abroad, as well as a critical stabilizer for world peace and prosperity. America must remain the global champion of free, fair and open trade. As the world’s strongest, largest and most dynamic economy, America must continue to lead world trade. Economic strength must be as high a priority as any other foreign policy priority. America’s security and growth are connected to both the American and global economies. A centerpiece of this security is energy security. Energy security and energy interdependence are interconnected parts of a broad and deep foreign policy paradigm that frames the complexity of the challenges that face America and the world. A diverse portfolio of energy that is accessible and affordable is the core of America’s energy security. Much of the world’s energy is produced in countries and regions that are consumed by civil unrest, lack of human rights, corruption, underdevelopment, and conflict. The price of oil is driven by supply and demand and the global market. We must ensure diversification of sources of supply and distribution networks to prevent undue dependence on any one country or region. Instability and violence disrupt supply and distribution and increase prices.

### Courts CP – 2AC

#### Perm – do both

Perine 8 (Katherine, Staff – CQ Politics, “Congress Unlikely to Try to Counter Supreme Court Detainee Ruling”, 6-12, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002896528&cpage=2)

Thursday’s decision, from a Supreme Court dominated by Republican appointees, gives Democrats further cover against GOP sniping. “This is something that the court has decided, and very often the court gives political cover to Congress,” said Ross K. Baker, a Rutgers Universitiy political science professor. “You can simply point to a Supreme Court decision and say, ‘The devil made me do it.’ ”

#### Saying “Federal Government” doesn’t mean “all three branches” – any one body acts as it

Chicago 7 (University of Chicago Manual of Style, “Capitalization, Titles”, http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS\_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles30.html)

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be U.S. Federal Government or U.S. federal government? A. The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

#### Reduce means to diminish the strength of

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Reduce,” Volume 13, p. 433)

21. e. to diminish the strength of (spirit).

#### Reducing restrictions can mean not enforcing them

Berger 1 Justice Opinion, INDUSTRIAL RENTALS, INC., ISAAC BUDOVITCH and FLORENCE BUDOVITCH, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and NEW CASTLE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAND USE, Appellees Below, Appellees. No. 233, 2000SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE776 A.2d 528; 2001 Del. LEXIS 300April 10, 2001, Submitted July 17, 2001, Decided lexis

We disagree. Statutes must be read as a whole and all the words must be given effect. 3 The word "restriction" means "a limitation (esp. in a deed) placed on the use or enjoyment of property." 4 If a deed restriction has been satisfied, and no longer limits the use or enjoyment of the property, then it no longer is a deed restriction -- even though the paper on which it was written remains. [\*\*6] Thus, the phrase "projects containing deed restrictions requiring phasing…," in Section 11.130(A)(7) means presently existing deed restrictions. As of June 1988, the Acierno/Marta Declaration contained no remaining deed restrictions requiring phasing to coincide with improvements to the transportation system. As a result, the Acierno/Marta projects should not have been included in the scope of the Budovitches' TIS.

#### Court natural gas decisions are unpredictable - they are made on a case by case basis and leave many questions unanswered

Neese 5 (Angela – Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Colorado School of Law, 2005; B.S.B.A., University of Denver, “THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE COLORADO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A CALL FOR A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH”, 2005, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 561, lexis)

These two leading Colorado Supreme Court decisions, Bowen/Edwards and Voss, were decided over a decade ago, and yet these cases "leave many questions unanswered." n185 For example, the court did not adequately define "operational conflict," n186 and "it left to speculation the type of local regulation which will offend the principles articulated in those cases." n187 What these Colorado Supreme Court decisions did, in effect, was create a regime in which each occurrence of stringent local regulation of the oil and gas industry must be examined by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Because the court held that state preemption of local regulation is not total, "each provision of a local oil and gas regulation must be examined to determine whether it presents a conflict." n188 For the past decade, the Colorado Supreme Court has declined to hear any further cases on the issue of state preemption of local government oil and gas regulation, thereby foreclosing any possibility of providing more direct guidelines for the COGCC and local governments. As a result, this case-by-case system of preemption analysis has led to more than a decade worth of costly litigation, with no end in sight. The case-by-case regime leads to a high degree of unpredictability and puts natural gas developers and local governments constantly at odds. n189 The litigation that often results, when the industry and the local governments are forced to look to the courts to determine which regulations are controlling, is costly to the industry (and thus to natural gas consumers) and to local governments (and thus to the taxpayers). n190 The lack of predictability, the high costs of litigation, and the resulting delays in production are proof that the Colorado Supreme Court has done the state a disservice by not providing a workable framework on the issue of state preemption of oil and gas regulation. n191 Bowen/Edwards is considered the determinative case as to preemption, yet both sides cite this case in their briefs and point to the same language as suggestive that they will prevail. n192 The lack of clear guidelines under the current Colorado [\*585] case law results in a number of unanswered questions that will likely lead to future legal battles.

#### CP undermines legitimacy – takes out solvency.

**Bentley**, **2007** (Curt, Constrained by the liberal tradition, Brigham Young University Law Review, p. lexis)

This institutional limitation theory focuses primarily on the constraints imposed on the Court because of its relationship with the other branches of government. The Supreme Court is not wholly dependent upon other branches of government; the unique legitimacy given its interpretations of the Constitution by the American people provides it with real influence of its own. n116 However, the institutional limitation theory posits that since the Court possesses neither the purse nor the sword, n117 it relies upon its  [\*1745]  legitimacy in the eyes of the American people in order to pressure the legislative and executive branches to **enforce its decrees**: The Supreme Court ... possesses some bases of power of its own, the most important of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution. This legitimacy the Court jeopardizes if it **flagrantly opposes the major policies** of the dominant alliance; such a course of action, as we have seen, is one in which the Court will not normally be tempted to engage. n118 **Without legitimacy** in the eyes of the public, both Congress and the President might feel justified in **resisting the ruling of the Court** either through jurisdiction-stripping n119 or by simply refusing to enforce its decrees. n120 **There is precedent for both in American history**. n121 The Court risks becoming substantially weakened, or even irrelevant, when the political branches ignore judicial decrees and where it nonetheless doggedly pursues the counter-majoritarian course. n122

#### -- No solvency: delay

Klein 84 (Mitchell S. G., MA and Ph.D in Political Science – Northwestern University, Law, Courts, and Policy, p. 117-118)

The aphorism “Justice delayed is justice denied” finds support from nay court analysts. Court delay is a significant administrative problem in the judiciary. As H. Ted Rubin observes: “Far too many courts operate essentially in the same fashion as fifty years ago … Too many judges have failed to effectively administer control of their own court calendar.” (1976, p. 185) A number of problems associated with court delay have been noted by Hans Zeisel and associates (1959, pp. xxii-xxiii). For example, delay in the courtroom jeopardizes justice because evidence may deteriorate over time. It also causes severe hardship to some parties, even depriving some of a basic public service. Finally, court delay also produces an unhealthy emphasis on the desirability of settling out of court.

### Debt Ceiling – 2AC

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

#### Won’t pass

**Business Insider**, **1/2**/2013 (Goldman: Why This Debt Ceiling Fight Could Be Even More Of A Nightmare Than The Last One, p. http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-why-this-debt-ceiling-fight-could-be-even-more-of-a-nightmare-than-the-last-one-2013-1)

Goldman's Alec Phillips warns that the upcoming fight over lifting the debt ceiling could be harder than the 2012 fight, which was brutal and confidence crushing. Phillips writes: Unfortunately, the upcoming increase may be more difficult to enact than the increase in 2011. Few spending cuts had been enacted before the previous increase, which left lawmakers with several areas of the budget from which to pull potential savings. Congress eventually settled on $2.1 trillion in spending cuts, essentially all coming from a reduction in spending appropriated by Congress (about $900bn from caps on "discretionary" spending, and $1.2 trillion from "sequestration"). While hardly non-controversial, these cuts did not affect specific programs but instead capped overall spending, thus reducing political opposition. The fiscal agreement Congress just passed increases revenues by about $600bn over 10 years (compared with a full extension of expiring income tax cuts), and while this second round of savings was much more controversial than the first, a majority of the public supported the tax increase, which was targeted on high incomes. More specifically. Suppose the Congress wants to raise the debt ceiling by $1 trillion, then that means an addition $1 trillion in cuts must be found. But this is not easy. For one thing, no party has identified where they would find another $1 trillion in cuts to discretionary spending. Furthermore, if the cuts are going to come from entitlements, then Obama would demand that there also be new taxes, which the GOP won't accept. And beyond that, Obama has already said he won't negotiate cuts for a debt ceiling hike this time. Says Phillips: These factors imply that the next debt limit increase will be at least as difficult to enact as the last one was, and that there is a clear possibility of breaching the limit and causing more significant disruptions to government financing. Phillips is not alone in worrying.

#### Uniqueness overwhelms – GOP will cave and PC’s not key

**Sargent**, **1/3**/2013 (Greg, The Morning Plum: Media shouldn’t get rolled by GOP debt ceiling spin, The Washington Post, p. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/01/03/the-morning-plum-media-shouldnt-get-rolled-by-gop-debt-ceiling-spin/)

The papers are filled with articles reporting in a matter-of-fact way that Republicans plan to use the debt ceiling fight to extract major spending cuts from the White House and Democrats. Mitch McConnell is out there this morning calling for a quick resolution to the standoff — one that exchanges a debt limit hike for deep cuts. The early returns, based on the coverage of this looming battle so far, suggest Republicans are successfully defining the terms of this debate — they are defining it as a standard Washington standoff, in which each side will demand concessions from the other. Indeed, you can read through reams of the coverage without learning three basic facts about this fight: 1) Republican leaders will ultimately agree to raise the debt ceiling, and they know it, because they themselves have previously admitted that not doing so will badly damage the economy. 2) Because of the above, a hike in the debt ceiling is not something that Democratic leaders want and that Republican leaders don’t. In other words, it is not a typical bargaining chip in negotiations, in the way spending cuts (which Republicans want and Dems don’t) or tax hikes (which Dems want and Republicans don’t) are.

#### Hagel nomination kills capital --- trades off with budget battles.

**Ratnam**, **12/30**/2012 (Gopal, Obama’s political, policy and Pentagon dilemma, The Bulletin, p. <http://www.bendbulletin.com/article/20121230/NEWS0107/212300381/>)

Having dropped U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice and named Massachusetts Democratic Sen. John Kerry to replace Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, Obama runs the risk of appearing weak if he bows to political opposition again and chooses someone other than former Nebraska Republican senator Chuck Hagel to lead the Pentagon. Picking another candidate would show for a second time “that the president’s important choices for personnel can be vetoed by two or three senators," said Sean Kay, a professor of politics and government at Ohio Wesleyan University in Delaware, Ohio, who specializes in U.S. foreign and defense policy. “The White House will come out of this significantly weakened." If Obama sticks with Hagel in the face of opposition from an ad hoc coalition of Republican advocates of muscular defense policies, Democratic supporters of Israel and gay rights activists, though, Obama might be forced to spend political capital he needs for the bigger battle over the federal budget and deficit reduction.

#### Capital fails --- the divide is too big.

**Bouie**, 12/24/**2012** (Jamelle, Why hopes for a Senate ‘fiscal cliff’ deal are misplaced, The Plum Line, The Washington Post, p. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2012/12/24/why-hopes-for-a-senate-fiscal-cliffdeal-are-misplaced/>)

For those who hope to see a deal before January, it’s worth appreciating the large expanse that separates the two parties. It isn’t just that they disagree on tax hikes — they have a fundamentally different view of what ails the economy. Democrats — as evidenced by their continued support for unemployment insurance, infrastructure spending and broader stimulus — believe that the economy has been held back by insufficient demand. In which case, the best thing government can do is continue to spend and put resources into circulation — it’s why President Obama’s original request on the fiscal cliff included $425 billion in stimulus through job measures and tax extenders. This is the mainstream view of the problem (and solution). Republicans, and conservatives in particular, disagree. Lawmakers such as Boehner and Barrasso insist that high spending and deficits are holding back the economy and that tax hikes are unnecessary — lower spending, especially on entitlements, is enough to fix our finances and get the economy back in order. The big, obvious problem is that none of those things are true. The country’s high deficits have far more to do with economic slowdown — and measures meant to reduce joblessness — than it does with excessive spending. A full economic recovery would create hundreds of billions in new revenue and kick a large dent in the current deficit. There is a long-run budget problem, but that’s — by and large — driven by the rising cost of health care. Cuts to Social Security — floated in the most recent White House proposal — would do little to address the problem. And then there’s the fact that other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have tried to cut their way out of the recession, with predictably disastrous results; the country is just now coming out of its austerity-induced double-dip recession. In any case, you can’t bridge this fundamental difference of perception with hard-nosed deal-making. If there’s anything that will force Republicans to budge, it’s an external shock to the system. And in this instance, that might mean just going over the fiscal cliff.

#### Obama won’t spend capital on the debt ceiling.

New York Times, **1/2**/2013 (Lawmakers Gird for Next Fiscal Clash, on the Debt Ceiling, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/us/politics/for-obama-no-clear-path-to-avoid-a-debt-ceiling-fight.html?pagewanted=all)

With the resolution of the year-end fiscal crisis just hours old, the next political confrontation is already taking shape as this city braces for a fight in February over raising the nation’s borrowing limit. But it is a debate President Obama says he will have nothing more to do with. Even as Republicans vow to leverage a needed increase in the federal debt limit to make headway on their demands for deep spending cuts, Mr. Obama — who reluctantly negotiated a deal like that 18 months ago — says he has no intention of ever getting pulled into another round of charged talks on the issue with Republicans on Capitol Hill. “I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they’ve already racked up through the laws that they passed,” the president said Tuesday night after he successfully pushed Republicans to allow tax increases on wealthy Americans.

#### No link – doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Olive branch –

#### A) GOP loves the plan

**Washington Independent 11** (“Offshore drilling vote sees bipartisan support in U.S. House, but not for Florida delegation”, 5/12, http://washingtonindependent.com/109468/offshore-drilling-vote-sees-bipartisan-support-in-u-s-house-but-not-for-florida-delegation)

The U.S. House of Representatives passed the second of its three-part package of bills **aimed at encouraging offshore drilling** on Wednesday. # **More than two dozen Democrats joined Republicans in supporting the measure**, but the Florida delegation voted strictly along party lines, with Republicans in support and Democrats in opposition. # Democratic Rep. Ted Deutch of Boca Raton made some noise about a provision that would steer drilling-related court cases – even those affecting Florida – to the Fifth Judicial Circuit, which has a reputation for being oil-friendly. Deutch offered an amendment to strike that provision, which failed. # The third piece of the pro-drilling package, which sets production targets for domestic oil and **gas production**, **could pass as early as today**. The bills face long odds in the Senate, where oil executives are getting grilled on industry tax breaks.

#### B) That’s key to a debt ceiling

NYT 1/2 (New York Times, “Lawmakers Gird for Next Fiscal Clash, on the Debt Ceiling”, 2013, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?board=119.0)

 Even as Republicans vow to leverage a needed increase in the federal debt limit to make headway on their demands for deep spending cuts, Mr. Obama — who reluctantly negotiated a deal like that 18 months ago — says he has no intention of ever getting pulled into another round of charged talks on the issue with Republicans on Capitol Hill. “I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they’ve already racked up through the laws that they passed,” the president said Tuesday night after he successfully pushed Republicans to allow tax increases on wealthy Americans. The president’s position is sure to appeal to his liberal allies, who fear another round of compromises by Mr. Obama. But it once again sets the stage for a nail-biting standoff that economists warn could lead to a damaging financial default and doubt from investors about the ability of the country to pay its obligations.

#### Revenue –

#### A) Plan creates a new source of revenue

Murphy 12 (Robert – Institute for Energy Research, “CBO grossly understates Potential Revenues from Offshore Drilling”, 9/11, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/09/11/cbo-underestimates-potential/)

A recent analysis [.pdf] from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) made it appear as if there would be little benefit from the federal government allowing entrepreneurs to develop more of America’s oil and gas resources. Yet as we’ll see, CBO’s presentation was misleading, and it ignored the major benefits of the government changing policies to allow more access to find and develop the United States’ enormous energy potential. The CBO’s Numbers The CBO report first lays out the context of its analysis: The federal government offers private businesses the opportunity to bid on leases for the development of on- and offshore oil and natural gas resources on federal lands—although not all federally controlled lands are open to leasing now….CBO has analyzed a proposal to immediately open most federal lands to oil and gas leasing, which would affect the amounts the federal government collects in various fees and royalties both in the near term and over a longer period. Implementing such a proposal would open two categories of property now closed to development: Lands where leasing is now statutorily prohibited, notably, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and Onshore and offshore areas that are unavailable for leasing under current administrative policies, including sections of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)— generally, the submerged lands between 3 miles and 200 miles from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Florida coastlines—and certain onshore areas in which oil and gas leasing is either restricted or temporarily prohibited. The CBO report then concludes that “opening ANWR to development would yield about $5 billion in additional receipts over the next 10 years, primarily in the form of bonus payments made by private firms for the opportunity to explore for and develop resources in particular areas.” After this ten-year period, the CBO relies on EIA projections to estimate “gross royalties from leasing in ANWR would probably total between $25 billion and $50 billion (in 2010 dollars) during the 2023–2035 period, or roughly $2 billion to $4 billion a year.” Outside of ANWR, the CBO report estimates “that additional gross proceeds from federal oil and gas leases on public lands—principally in certain sections of the OCS…would total about $2 billion over the 2013–2022 period.” Unlike ANWR, the CBO refuses to say what the increase in government revenue would be beyond the initial ten-year period, because “[m]uch of the near-term development enabled by the proposal (beyond that in ANWR) would occur under current law, albeit at a later time.” In summary, someone taking the CBO report at face value would conclude (a) the federal and state governments at most would get about $7 billion total in the first ten years (primarily from bonus payments) if they removed all federal obstacles to ANWR and OCS development, and (b) even in the longer term from 2023-2035, we can only say with confidence that the proposal would bring in an additional $2 to $4 billion per year, relative to current policies. Billions of dollars is nothing to sneeze at, of course, but the implication is that the proponents of “drill baby, drill” are exaggerating their case. To drive home the point, the CBO report then presents this chart: Visually, the above chart certainly makes it seem as if complaints about federal constraints are overblown; it looks like the government is hardly restricting access to American oil and gas resources. A Different Picture To respond to the CBO report, a very easy step is to consolidate the data presented in their figure. The visual trick in the CBO image involves spreading out the inaccessible resources across six different categories. Suppose instead that we consolidate everything—using their own numbers—into two categories, namely those resources on federal lands that are currently accessible, versus those that aren’t. The revised chart looks like this: Thus, the CBO’s own numbers show that some 51 billion barrels of oil and gas resources on federal lands are currently inaccessible. That works out to 29 percent of the total, again using CBO’s own numbers. At a time when motorists are struggling with prices at the pump, and the Obama Administration is releasing oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, it is significant that the CBO admits the federal government itself keeps almost 30 percent of expected US resources off-limits to development. To put these numbers in perspective, consider: In 2011, the U.S. imported a total of 1.7 billion barrels of crude oil and products from OPEC nations. Thus, the 51 billion barrels of oil and gas that the CBO admits are rendered inaccessible under current policies, works out to thirty times as much as the U.S. imported from OPEC last year. (Even if we consider just the oil resources that CBO admits are off-limit—33 billion barrels—then the figure falls to “only” nineteen times the amount imported from OPEC last year.) These calculations are not to suggest that if the federal government removed all restrictions, then imports from OPEC would fall to zero. Standard economic analysis shows that it makes a country’s people richer to import items from abroad if, on the margin, doing so is cheaper than producing everything domestically. Even so, the important point is that people warning of America’s “dependence on foreign oil” often have no idea just how blessed the country is with rich deposits. It only seems that the U.S. is starved for oil, because the federal government takes so much off the table. The Crucial Choice of Baseline Beyond the visually misleading chart, another aspect of the CBO report is the choice of policy baseline. Recall that the report estimated opening up ANWR would lead to $5 billion in additional government receipts over the first 10 years (i.e. through 2022), and then some $25 to $50 billion in additional receipts from 2023 – 2035. Thus the real revenue windfall came in the second decade, as the newly leased lands began cranking out product (and thus generating royalty revenue for the government). Yet when it came to estimating the budgetary impact of opening up the OCS, the CBO would only discuss the gains in the first decade; it put them at $2 billion. CBO refused to speculate on what would happen in 2023 – 2035, because in this case, the OCS lands were technically not inaccessible at such future dates. In other words, with current policy, certain lands in ANWR cannot be developed, either now or in the future. But with much of the OCS, there is nothing in the “baseline” preventing them from being developed down the road. Hence, CBO will not say that opening up such lands in the present, will lead to higher receipts for the government beyond the year 2022. Although such accounting may be appropriate in a technical sense, it is misleading to the average reader of the CBO report. If we use the same scaling factor as CBO applied to ANWR, we would conclude that in addition to the $2 billion in extra receipts from expanded OCS development in the years 2013 – 2022, the government (states and federal) could expect additional receipts of $10 to $20 billion from 2023 – 2035. Another way of putting it is that this potential $10 to $20 billion in government receipts during 2023 – 2035 will not materialize if the federal government maintains its current restrictions on OCS development. Lowball Estimates Thus far, we have taken the CBO’s numbers at face value, and just pointed out two tricks with the presentation style. However, in this final section we’ll challenge the estimates themselves. For starters, the CBO is probably grossly understating the potential for bonus bids in ANWR, when it puts them at less than $5 billion for the entire decade of 2013 – 2022. Yet in FY 2008 alone, total bonus payments were more than $10 billion. Now to be fair, this isn’t an apples to apples comparison, since the expanded ANWR development would only represent a fraction of total bonus payments. Nonetheless, the figure shows that CBO’s ANWR analysis is quite conservative. More generally, other analysts have projected much larger receipts for federal and state governments, from expanded development. For example, in a February 2009 study, Joseph Mason estimated that in the long-run, expanded OCS development (not including ANWR) would yield an average of $14.3 billion in extra royalty revenue per year. He also estimated an additional $54.7 billion in federal tax revenue annually, and $18.7 billion in additional state and local tax revenue (though these figures count the tax receipts from expanded economic activity). To show that these aren’t pedantic quibbles, we can point to a real-world example of what we mean. In a June 26, 2006 memo[RM1] to Richard Pombo , CBO projected federal OCS revenues in 2008 (net of sharing with states) to be about $10.5 billion. Yet actual OCS revenues in 2008 were $18 billion. This is a rather large underestimate, for a projection that was made only two years earlier. (Also, the bulk of the discrepancy was in the form of bonus payments, which are not particularly susceptible to a temporarily high spot price of oil.)

#### B) Increased revenue source is key to a deal on the debt ceiling.

Munro 1/2 (Neil, The Daily Caller, 1/2/13, <http://dailycaller.com/2013/01/02/obama-schedules-debt-ceiling-fiscal-cliff-ii-for-february/2/>)

Federal officials say they’ll use a series of financial maneuvers to postpone any problems until February. But sometime after that, Obama’s administration won’t be able to borrow more money, and will have to use day-to-day tax revenues to fund the government’s myriad popular and unpopular programs. Without any negotiations, Washington will be gripped by another fiscal crisis sometime in February, while the GOP and Obama battle for public support and international lenders consider further downgrades to the nation’s credit ratings. Obama used his brief appearance Jan. 1 to claim that any limits on the government’s ability to borrow funds would be extremely dangerous. “If Congress refuses to give the United States government the ability to pay [its] bills on time, the consequences for the entire global economy would be catastrophic,” he claimed. Obama’s refusal to negotiate is partly caused by the GOP’s advantage in any debate over the debt ceiling. In the 2011 debt-ceiling dispute, the GOP eventually pressured him to accept spending curbs in exchange for an increase to the debt limit up to $16.4 trillion. Obama has repeatedly complained about that defeat. On Jan. 1, he complained that “the last time this course of action was threatened, our entire recovery was put at risk. Consumer confidence plunged. Business investment plunged. Growth dropped. We can’t go down that path again.” The debt is expected to reach almost $20 trillion by 2016 — equivalent to $80,000 for each working-age American — and then climb to almost $23 trillion by 2022. Current tax revenues are enough to pay roughly 70 percent of federal bills, which include the interest payments on the existing debt. Obama wants to borrow even more money — roughly $850 billion per year — to expand government and operate many additional programs. These programs include large green-tech subsidies, massive government-run healthcare programs and expensive welfare programs for healthy, working-age people. GOP legislators say they won’t allow him to borrow more money unless he agrees to reform long-term government spending.

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital does not affect the agenda

**Dickinson 9** (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

## Round 5 2AC v. MSU

### T – Restrictions (Leasing) – 2AC

#### Natural gas leasing restrictions prevent energy production – you can’t drill without getting a lease

NaturalGas.org, no date (NaturalGas.org, “Natural Gas Supply,” http://www.naturalgas.org/business/analysis.asp)
The production of natural gas in the United States is based on competitive market forces: inadequate supply at any one time leads to price increases, which signal to production companies the need to increase the supply of natural gas to the market. Supplying natural gas in the United States in order to meet this demand, however, is dependent on a number of factors. These factors may be broken down into two segments: general barriers to increasing supply, and those factors that affect the short term supply scenario. Short Term Supply Barriers In a perfect world, price signals would be recognized and acted upon immediately, and there would be little lag time between increased demand for natural gas, and an increase in supplies reaching the market. However, in reality, this lag time does exist. There are several barriers to immediate supply increases which affect the short term availability of natural gas supply. They include: Availability of Skilled Workers - The need to train and hire skilled workers results in lag times between times of increased demand and an increase in production. For example, from 1991 to 1999, a prolonged period of relatively low prices indicated adequate supplies of natural gas existed, and the exploration and production industry contracted in response. During this period, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded a 26 percent average decrease in employment in the oil and gas extraction industry. Some of these workers left the industry altogether rather than remain unemployed. When production companies began to react to higher prices in late 1999, the need to find and train skilled workers contributed to a slower increase in activity than would have been the case if skilled workers were plentiful. To counter this problem, many production companies offer increasingly high wages, as well as scholarships and educational contributions to attract professionals to the industry. Availability of Equipment - Drilling rigs are very expensive pieces of equipment. Price volatility in the industry makes it very difficult for producers, as well as production equipment suppliers, to plan the construction and placement of drilling rigs far in advance. Prolonged periods of low prices results in reduction of the number of available rigs. When prices respond to increase demand, and drilling activity increases, time is required to build and place an adequate number of drilling rigs. For this reason, drilling rig counts are a good indication of the status of the oil and natural gas production industry. As can be seen in the graph, an increase in operational rigs lags behind period of high prices. For more information on rig counts, click here. Permitting and Well Development - Before a natural gas well actually begins producing, there are several time consuming procedures and development activities that must take place. In order to begin drilling, exploration activities must take place to pinpoint the location of natural gas reserves. Once a suitable field has been located, production companies must receive the required approval from the landowner (which in many cases is the government) to install drilling equipment and begin to drill the well. The Bureau of Land Management is responsible for issuing permits for onshore development, and the Minerals Management Service is responsible for offshore development areas. Once drilling is completed, extraction and field processing equipment must be set up, as well as gathering systems. In all, the between the location of natural gas deposits and the beginning of production can range from as little as a few months to as much as ten years. Weather and Delivery Disruptions - Although unrelated to natural gas prices or demand increases and decreases, weather patterns and anomalies can have a significant impact on natural gas production. For example, hurricanes can have an impact on the offshore production of natural gas, as safety measures require the temporary shut down of offshore drilling and production platforms. In addition, while the safety record of the natural gas industry is extremely good, malfunctions and accidents may occur from time to time that disrupt the delivery of natural gas. For example, a compressor malfunction in a large pipeline serving a major hub could temporarily disrupt the flow of natural gas through that important market center. While the effects of weather and delivery disruptions are most often of short duration, they can still have an effect on the expeditious production of natural gas. General Barriers to Increasing Supply In addition to the short term impediments to increasing natural gas supply, there exist other more general barriers to the increased supply of natural gas in the United States. These include: Land Access - The U.S. government owns more than 29 percent of all the land in the country, and an estimated 40 percent of undiscovered natural gas exists on this land. In several areas, the government has restricted access to federal lands. 59 percent of undiscovered gas resources are on federal lands and offshore waters. Outside of the western Gulf of Mexico, production companies are prohibited access to virtually all federal lands offshore the Lower 48 states. About 9 percent of resource-bearing land in the Rockies is also off limits, and access to another 32 percent is significantly restricted. The National Petroleum Council in 1999 estimated that 213 Tcf of natural gas exists in areas under federal access restrictions. This restriction is the result of presidential and congressional leasing moratoria, and affects the amount of natural gas resources that may be extracted to increase supply. Pipeline Infrastructure - The ability to transport natural gas from producing regions to consumption regions also affects the availability of supplies to the marketplace. The interstate and intrastate pipeline infrastructure can only transport so much natural gas at any one time, and in essence provides a 'ceiling' for the amount of natural gas that can reach the market. Although the current pipeline infrastructure is significant, with the EIA estimating daily delivery capacity of the pipeline grid to be 119 Bcf. However, natural gas pipeline companies must continue to continually expand the pipeline infrastructure in order to meet growing demand. To learn more about the natural gas pipeline infrastructure in the United States, click here. The Financial Environment - Exploring for and producing natural gas is a very capital intensive endeavor. In fact, the National Petroleum Council estimated in 1999 that production companies will have to invest $1.44 trillion in capital between 1999 and 2015 in order to keep pace with demand growth. This puts significant pressures on production companies, particularly small, privately owned firms, to raise the capital necessary to increase production. While efficient and transparent financial markets in the U.S. do offer options for raising capital effectively, the rate at which production companies may do so can serve as a limiting factor in the increasing availability of supplies reaching the market.

#### Natural gas production includes the the process of exploration

Schuck 84 (Peter H., Professor of Law – Yale Law School, “Article: When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy through an Exceptions Process,” Duke Law Journal, April, 1984 Duke L.J. 163, Lexis)

A. **The Petroleum Industry and Federal Regulation**. n97 Since the first oil wells were drilled at Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859, the American oil industry has become the most complex in the world, an extraordinarily intricate network of companies and activities linking crude oil sources and consumer markets, both foreign and domestic. Industry activities fall into four general categories: production (exploration for and removal of crude oil from natural formations); refining (the manufacture of crude into gasoline, motor oil, heating oil, petrochemicals, and other intermediate and end-use products); distribution (physical transportation, storage, handling, and delivery of petroleum [\*201] products); and marketing (sales of approximately 500 refined products to wholesale and retail customers). n98 Different segments of the industry combine the four basic activities in **various ways**. Approximately fifteen to twenty large, usually multinational companies integrate all four operations. This group (Exxon, Gulf, Texaco, and others -- "the majors" in industry parlance) dominates the industry. In September 1981, for example, the fifteen largest integrated refiners processed nearly 70 percent of all motor gasoline and approximately 55 percent of middle distillates -- a decline in both categories from 1972 but still accounting for the majority of refinery production. Independent refiners, which produce little or none of the crude they refine, processed the remainder. Independent refiners range from small firms, with capacities as low as 10,000 barrels per day (BPD), to large independents, like Ashland Oil, with a capacity as high as 400,000 BPD, rivaling the integrated companies' capacities. Geographically, refiners tend to cluster near port facilities, major markets, or large domestic oil fields. n99 In less densely populated regions, such as the Midwest and Rocky Mountain states, small and independent refiners often process a relatively large proportion of total product.

### QER CP – 2AC

#### -- No solvency –

#### First is delay

Moniz 12 Ernest Moniz, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Former Clinton Administration Under Secretary of the Department of Energy and as Associate Director for Science in the Office of Science and Technology Policy ; serves on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 11/15/11, Quadrennial Energy and Technology Reviews, web.mit.edu/mitei/views/testimony/111115-quadrennial-energy-and-technology-reviews.html

S.1703 would legislate the QER as a required submission to the Congress, providing "an integrated view of national energy objectives and Federal energy policy, including alignment of research programs, incentives, regulations, and partnerships." Clearly this is in accord with the intentions put forward in the PCAST report. An interagency working group would be established at the beginning of each Administration, with the QER due one year later. This date is displaced by one year from that recommended by PCAST. In steady state, this shift by one year is quite reasonable. My concern is whether the first QER can be put together well by early 2014, given that the entire process needs to be invented. This can be ameliorated to some extent if the buildup of analytical capabilities and process development are funded and pursued aggressively in 2012.

#### Even the perception of delay takes out the case

Bayless 3 (Robert, President – Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. BAYLESS. Senator, if I could follow up, not only is it an issue of whether those lands are available, but as you pointed out, the timing, if there is a long delay, it impedes industry. You are not worried about the industry; you are worried about gas supply. There are signals that come out of the market, price signals, that say we need more gas. We need greater—the price has gone up. Where is the supply? With these long delays, it creates uncertainty for companies to be able to drill those additional wells, to budget for drilling those additional wells. It really puts a bad filter on those price signals.

#### Second is no implementation – QER won’t go into effect

Barlas 12

Stephen, Columnist @ Financial Executive, 1/1, Lexis

But it is highly unlikely that Obama's blueprint will lead to a firmer footing for U.S. energy security than past so-called blueprints from other presidents, or perhaps more importantly, whether a print is even necessary. Obama's policy is a loosely knit set of policies that focus on producing more oil at home and reducing dependence on foreign oil by developing cleaner alternative fuels and greater efficiency. The Obama plan is not the result of any particular deep thinking or strategy. The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) called for the development of such a strategy in its November 2010 Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies. Through an Integrated Federal Energy Policy. PCAST called for a Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR) as the first step in preparing a Quadrennial Energy Review. DOE completed the QTR in November 2011, six months after Obama published his blueprint. Steven E. Koonin, former undersecretary of Energy for Science, says QTR is limited in scope and all DOE felt it could get done given budget and time. "Technology development absent an understanding and shaping of policy and market context in which it gets deployed is not a productive exercise," he says. At this point there is no indication that DOE will even undertake the much more important QER, much less complete it any time soon. The larger reality is that any energy independence plan proposed by any U.S, president--whether based on a QER or not--has as much a chance of coming to fruition as Washington's football Redskins have of getting into the Super Bowl. But regardless of the rhetoric of president after president, maybe the U.S. doesn't even need an energy independence or energy security policy. Natural Gas Making Inroads The biggest energy input for industrial and commercial business users is natural gas. Natural gas prices are incredibly important, both because the fuel is used directly to run industrial processes, heat facilities and commercial buildings and make products such as fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, plastics and other advanced materials. Thanks to the shale revolution, EIA forecasts natural gas prices will stay low for the foreseeable future, rising to $4.66 m/BTU in 2015 and $5.05 m/BTU in 2020. That is good news for the owners of 15,000 to 17,000 industrial boilers in this country, most of which use natural gas (and many of those who still use coal are switching to natural gas). In addition, companies such as Dow Chemical Co. are restarting operations at facilities idled during the recession, Bayer AG is in talks with companies interested in building new ethane crackers at its two industrial parks in West Virginia and Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. and LyondellBasell Co., are considering expanding operations in the United States. Fracking has also had a much less remarked-upon effect on petroleum prices, which are important to businesses with transportation fleets. New oil sources are spurting from the Bakken (stretching from Canada to North Dakota and Montana) and Eagles Ford (South Texas) shale plays. U.S. oil prices have fallen from $133.88 a barrel of Texas intermediate crude in June 2008 to around $86.07. EIA predicts oil prices will rise to $94.58/bbl in 2015 and $108.10/bbl in 2020. Beyond the flood of natural gas washing over them, U.S. companies are also benefitting from three decades of investments--most of which were made without federal subsidies, or support--into facility energy efficiency. Ralph Cavanagh, co-director of the Energy Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council and a member of the Electricity Advisory Board at DOE, says the most important single solution for U.S. businesses worried about energy prices and access is aggressive energy efficiency. "Energy independence is the wrong issue," Cavanagh says. "It is reducing the cost of energy services and improving energy security. "U.S. business has done a tremendous job in energy efficiency over the past three decades," he adds. "It takes less than one-half of a unit of energy to create $1 of economic value than it did in 1973. Industry has done that by upgrading the efficiency of process equipment and upgrading lighting." Others may well argue that the U.S. needs, and has always needed, an energy policy, but one narrowly targeted. Kenneth B Medlock III, deputy director, Energy Forum at the James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, notes that DOE and the Gas Research Institute helped develop, with federal funding, the horizontal drilling (i.e. fracking) technology that Mitchell Energy and Development Corp. (now a part of Devon Energy Corp.) pioneered. "Government ought to be focused on research and development," Med-lock notes. He also is a supporter of loan guarantees to promote investment activity in frontier technologies, and argues that as long as there are more good bets than bad bets in that kind of portfolio, the funds committed in total are a good investment. But spectacular failures of energy companies such as Solyndra Corp., the Chapter 11 filing of Beacon Power Corp. and other less publicized busts reduce, if not kill, the prospect of any additional congressional funding for energy loan guarantees of any kind. That is true even when legislation has bipartisan support, which is the case for the Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2011 (S. 1000), which would, among other things, provide grants for a revolving loan program designed to develop energy-saving technologies for industrial and commercial use. The bill passed the Senate Energy Committee by a vote of 18-3 in July. However, the Congressional Budget Office has pegged the cost of the bill's provisions at $1.2 billion over five years. That is a serious barrier to passage. And in any case, even if it did pass, the bill would simply authorize funding. Congressional appropriations committees would have to approve the money as part of DOE's budget, which would be highly unlikely, Solyndra aside, since similar programs authorized by the 2005 and 2007 energy bills are still begging for appropriations. Besides impact on the federal deficit, politics, too, often impede progress on otherwise sensible policies. Politics apparently have clogged up the proposed Keystone XL oil pipeline extension from Canada. Environmentalists, a Democratic constituency, oppose the project, arguing it would create more greenhouse gas emissions than necessary and pose a potential drinking water danger for Nebraska residents because it passed over the Ogallala Aquifer. That view is shared by Nebraska's Republican Gov. Dave Heineman, whose views are opposite those of all the can presidential candidates, each of whom supported U.S. approval of Keystone XL. Labor unions, another key Democratic constituency, support the project that TransCanada, the project sponsor, says will bring more than 11 8,000 person-years of employment to workers in the states of Montana, South Dakota and Nebraska. If the Keystone debate features Democrats versus Democrats and Republicans versus Republicans, efforts to substitute domestic natural gas for foreign petroleum features business versus business.

#### Third is congressional strike down

Tollefson 11 (Jeff Tollefson, DOE releases first Quadrennial Technology Review, September 27, 2011, http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/09/doe\_releases\_first\_quadrennial\_1.html)

The US Department of Energy (DOE) [released](http://energy.gov/articles/department-energy-releases-inaugural-quadrennial-technology-review-report) its inaugural Quadrennial Technology Review on Tuesday, laying out a longer-term strategic agenda to help integrate energy research and development programmes. Modelled on the [Defense Quadrennial Review](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/), an influential analysis that sets the tone and direction of US defence policy, the document explores the energy department’s role in driving basic energy research and helping shift more mature technologies into the commercial sector. The review sets priorities in six areas (pictured, top right) in order to create a multi-year framework that can be incorporated into planning and budget discussions. Under each of the six umbrellas can be found a range of potential technological solutions — from better batteries to biofuels and carbon sequestration — that will need to be deployed in concert in order to meet demand for energy, increase domestic supplies and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. The agency is aiming for technologies that can create jobs and have a substantial impact — on the order of 1% of US consumption — over the course of two decades. “The timescale of energy is decades,” Energy Secretary Steven Chu said during the public release in Washington. “We need to take a long view.” In truth, the administration doesn’t have a lot of choice but to take the long view. The bulk of its energy and environmental agenda (remember the global warming legislation?) has fallen prey to partisan politics and an epic financial crisis. Moving forward, the administration will have to fight for even the most basic investments in clean energy R&D, a sad reality only made worse by the [scandal over the failed solar manufacturer Solyndra](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/184055-waxman-to-issa-get-your-facts-straight-on-solyndra). And although nobody would argue with efforts to craft a strategic plan to guide energy investments (which can rise and fall according to political whim on an annual basis), the first quadrennial review largely hews to the current course without making any radical recommendations for change. “Frankly it seems almost self evident to us,” said Steve Koonin, undersecretary for science. — Unlike the military, which can in a sense create its own market for new technologies, DOE necessarily plays a transitional role in technology development. All of its R&D is geared toward commercial deployment, and there’s only so much government can do to create private markets, which depend not just on science and technology but also public sentiment and risk perception, not to mention the full suite of macro- and micro-economic forces. For that reason, the document recommends setting up a permanent group within the DOE that can focus on energy markets, business, policy analysis and, most intriguingly, social sciences. Both for perspective and as a reminder, we will end with a spectacularly ambitious list of goals set by the administration of Barack Obama. To say that achieving these goals will be difficult is an understatement; clearly the rate of progress will need to increase substantially in the out years, which of course highlights the danger of long-term thinking that is not backed by legislation.

#### Should doesn’t mean certainty

Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word “would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does

####  “Resolved” means law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### QER links to elections/politics – requires transparency and presidential involvement

PCAST 10

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), Executive Office of the President, Co-Chaired by John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Eric Lander, President, Broad Institute of Harvard and MIT, Nov 2010, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ACCELERATING THE PACE OF CHANGE IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH AN INTEGRATED FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-energy-tech-report.pdf

A QER process would, in some sense, formulate an integrated energy policy for the twenty­first century. It will span mission and vision definition, strategy, and tactics. The QER and the process leading to it would provide an effective tool for Administration­wide coherence on energy and for effective dialog with Congress on a coordinated legislative agenda. **Presidential interest and engagement will be a necessary ingredient for success.**

**While the QER will be a product of the Administration, substantial input from the Congress**, the energy industry, academia, state and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, **and consumers will be essential throughout the process. Transparency in the process of gathering input for the QER will be key to the development of a sound product that can gain wide support.**

### SEP CP – 2AC

#### Reduce means to diminish the strength of

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Reduce,” Volume 13, p. 433)

21. e. **to diminish the strength of** (spirit).

#### The counterplan is a reduction – restrictions must be enforced – if it’s on paper but not enforced it is NOT a restriction

Berger 1 Justice Opinion, INDUSTRIAL RENTALS, INC., ISAAC BUDOVITCH and FLORENCE BUDOVITCH, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and NEW CASTLE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAND USE, Appellees Below, Appellees. No. 233, 2000SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE776 A.2d 528; 2001 Del. LEXIS 300April 10, 2001, Submitted July 17, 2001, Decided lexis

We disagree. Statutes must be read as a whole and all the words must be given effect. 3 The word "restriction" means "a limitation (esp. in a deed) placed on the use or enjoyment of property." 4 If a deed restriction has been satisfied, and no longer limits the use or enjoyment of the property, then it no longer is a deed restriction -- even though the paper on which it was written remains. [\*\*6] Thus, the phrase "projects containing deed restrictions requiring phasing…," in Section 11.130(A)(7) means presently existing deed restrictions. As of June 1988, the Acierno/Marta Declaration contained no remaining deed restrictions requiring phasing to coincide with improvements to the transportation system. As a result, the Acierno/Marta projects should not have been included in the scope of the Budovitches' TIS.

#### B) Agency rulemaking is unpredictable and uncertain – no understanding of its binding effect

Fraser 10 (Thomas J. – J.D., Boston University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Boston College, 2007., “INTERPRETIVE RULES: CAN THE AMOUNT OF DEFERENCE ACCORDED THEM OFFER INSIGHT INTO THE PROCEDURAL INQUIRY?”, 2010, http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/FRASER.pdf)

Without a simple way to determine the validity of agency rules promulgated without the procedural machinery required for binding pronouncements of agency policy, affected parties may waste resources trying to discern the **precise effect of the rule and whether the agency has overstepped its bounds**. Furthermore, **confusion** over the appropriate level of deference for a particular agency rule can translate into uncertainty regarding the extent to which that rule, while not technically binding, can have binding effect; the harder it is for a regulated entity to challenge a rule in court, the more compliant that entity will be.

#### Destroys solvency – no investment occurs

MarEx 11 (Maritime Executive , “Gas-Only Drilling in Offshore Moratorium Areas Suggested”, 1/19, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2005-10-20gas-only-drilling-in-offshore-moratori)

Oil and gas industry groups are criticizing a provision in House offshore drilling legislation that would allow the government to offer "natural gas-only" leases in areas that are currently off-limits to new production. The criticism is included in wider comments by petroleum producers to the Minerals Management Service (MMS), which has begun collecting public comments as it begins preparing an outer continental shelf leasing plan for 2007-2012. MMS asked for comment on the gas-only concept. Gas-only leasing was included in a bill by House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo (R-CA.) that allows states to "opt-out" of offshore leasing bans. States exercising the option could allow gas-only leasing, or oil and gas leasing. Senate legislation by Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN.) -- and supported by chemical companies and other industries that rely on the costly fuel -- also accepts the idea. However, the American Petroleum Institute (API), in comments this week to MMS, says gas-only and gas-preference leasing **would offer the "false promise" of future supplies.** The group says the concept would **create uncertainties** that could dampen investment, since it is impossible to predict with certainty what types of resources will be in an area. "A company might spend up to $80 million to buy a lease, conduct seismic testing, obtain the necessary permits, and drill a well(s) to determine whether any resources are present in amounts that make the prospect economic," the group says. "A company is unlikely to know if it had met the gas only or gas preference requirement until the capital investment had been made. Companies **will be reluctant to spend tens of millions of dollars to explore for and develop a prospect**, only to be forced to abandon the resource, **stranding substantial investments."**

#### Any risk triggers it

Kabelitz 6 (Dr. Klaus-Robert, Chief Economist – E.on Ruhrgas, one of the leading European players in natural gas, “Strategy, Economy, and Regulation,” International Gas Union, June, http://www.igu.org/html/wgc2006/pdf/com/PGC%20B%20final%20report.pdf)

It goes without saying that abundant gas reserves and favourable pre-tax economics may not deliver investment and production growth if the fiscal terms are so onerous as to make post-tax economics uncompetitive. Investors’ political risk perceptions are critical to gas developments. Political risk includes the risk of social and political disturbances, and the risk of unforeseen changes in legal and regulatory conditions. Political risk is a key component of total project risk for long term, large, capital intensive, complex projects involving installations that may easily be targeted or accidentally damaged in times of war or civil strife. Gas projects typically meet all these criteria. Concerning the regulatory aspect of political risk, an uneven playing field, an unstable fiscal framework and/or suspicions of a lack of commitment across the board to the sanctity of contracts can make otherwise low risk areas high risk from the point of view of investors.

#### SEP Fines are ineffective- prevents compliance

ARB 11

[Air Resources Board, Enforcement Penalties: Backround and Policy, 9/30/11, <http://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/sb1402/policy.pdf>]

Part 2 is the proposed penalty policy itself and related Cal/EPA guidance documents. The policy calls for consideration of “all relevant circumstances,” in 6 determining the penalty amount. By law, penalty levels must be set at levels to ensure compliance and deter violations. They may be based on any relevant evidence, including a violator’s financial condition. Such circumstances, along with the eight factors enumerated in SB 1402 (see Preface), must all be considered in determining penalties for violations of laws under the Board’s jurisdiction. For easy reference, Appendix B of this document presents a matrix of most of the laws and regulations ARB enforces, with the corresponding penalties. The penalty policy explains how ARB works to consistently reach swift and fair resolution of violations. Fairness is at the heart of an effective enforcement program—one that benefits those who invested in pollution controls and maintains consistency in the level of penalties issued for similar violations. To be fair, the Board also takes into account the specific circumstances, causes, results and actors—all of which vary from case to case. As a result, comparisons between individual cases of similar violations may be invalid. Similarly, the policy does not have a mathematical formula for calculating penalties. Such a formulaic approach would not properly weigh individual circumstances and might result in an unjust or ineffective penalty.

#### SEP fails and no spillover

Robertson 09

[Brooke, Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 2009, <http://lawreview.wustl.edu/in-print/expanding-the-use-of-supplemental-environmental-projects/>]

The 80% ceiling the SEP policy places on the mitigation percentage is perhaps the largest contributor to the underutilization of SEPs. 116 If the EPA calculates a $100 settlement penalty for a violation, the defendant is presented with two options. The defendant can agree to perform an SEP that will cost $100 and pay a $20 settlement penalty (since only 80% of the SEP cost can be used to mitigate the settlement penalty). 117 Alternatively, the defendant can simply pay the $100 settlement penalty. 118 Thus, the defendant must pay a total of $120 when the SEP is included in the settlement, but must only pay a total of $100 if the SEP is not included. Assuming most defendants are rational economic actors, they will choose the less expensive option. The SEP policy creates “a built-in economic disincentive to undertake SEPs by making the dollars spent on SEPs less valuable than dollars simply paid as penalties.” 119 Another reason a settlement may not include an SEP is that it may not be feasible. The settlement amount may be too small to develop and carry out an SEP in some cases. 120 The current SEP policy requires the defendant to propose a project that meets all the SEP requirements and to be responsible for implementing the SEP. 121 Some defendants may be unable to identify a project that meets the SEP policy requirements or may not have the expertise and resources necessary to implement an SEP.

**No environmental net benefit-**

**A) Squo solves**

Droughton 95

[Laurie, “ Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Bargainfor the Environment”, 1995, Pace Environmental Review, <http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1447&context=pelr>]

The EPA and the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), in reports submitted to Congress in 1986, concluded that traditional command and control regulatory approaches for pollution prevention programs were neither practicable nor feasible.' 8 Instead they recommended encouraging voluntary efforts through increased dissemination of information to promote awareness and to provide technological information. 19 This approach was incorporated into the PPA and the resultant regulatory actions. The EPA has tried to further "volunteer" efforts in pollution prevention by incorporating Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) into settlements for alleged violations of various federal statutes, including the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),20 the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA),21 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 22 RCRA, 23 CWA24 and the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, also known as the Clean Air Act (CAA).25 26 The EPA uses the SEP program in enforcement settlements through which a company may receive a decreased fine in return for performing specified pollution prevention activities. 27 SEPs offer the advantage of imposing a penalty that will have a long term environmental benefit in addition to the punitive effect of extracting monetary penalties.

#### Famine doesn’t cause war ---- it makes people too hungry to fight

Barnett in ’00 (Jon, Australian Research Council fellow and Senior Lecturer in Development Studies @ Melbourne U. School of Social and Environmental Enquiry, Review of International Studies, “Destabilizing the environment-conflict Thesis”, 26:271-288, Cambridge Journals Online)

Considerable attention has been paid to the links between population, the environment and conflict. The standard argument is that population growth will overextend the natural resources of the immediate environs, leading to deprivation which, it is assumed, will lead to conflict and instability either directly through competition for scarce resources, or indirectly through the generation of ‘environmental refugees’. For example, according to Myers: ‘so great are the stresses generated by too many people making too many demands on their natural-resource stocks and their institutional support systems, that the pressures often create first-rate breeding grounds for conflict’.37 The ways in which population growth leads to environmental degradation are reasonably well known. However, the particular ways in which this leads to conflict are difficult to prove. In the absence of proof there is a negative style of argumentation, and there are blanket assertions and abrogations; for example: ‘the relationship is rarely causative in a direct fashion’, but ‘we may surmise that conflict would not arise so readily, nor would it prove so acute, if the associated factor of population growth were occurring at a more manageable rate’.38 It is possible though, that rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war. Indeed, it is less the case that famines in Africa in recent decades have produced ‘first rate breeding grounds for conflict’; the more important, pressing, and avoidable product is widespread malnutrition and large loss of life.

### Politics

#### Forgot to save my speech doc so I don’t remember what all I included in here. The link turns and thumpers are the same ones I read above for the debt ceiling. If want me to figure out the other cards I read for sequestration, email me at shyam115@gmail.com

## Doubles

### 1AC

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce production restrictions on federal lands in the Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas

#### Contention : The Energy Revolution

#### The energy transition is failing – fracking requires massive amounts of water that drives up costs and makes new natural gas uneconomical – access to new conventional natural gas makes the transition sustainable

Dorsey 12 (Gregory, Managing Editor – Leeb’s Income Performance Letter, “Fractured Logic: The Myth of Abundant Natural Gas,” Leeb’s Market Forecast, 5-9, http://leebsmarketforecast.com/content/fractured-logic-myth-abundant-natural-gas)

A popular meme these days is the idea that natural gas is America’s salvation on the road to energy independence. Production of the clean burning fuel has reached record levels in this country and stockpiles are bursting at the seams. Natural gas prices recently dipped to their lowest level since the late 1990s below $2 before clawing their way back to $2.50. The supply glut has occurred thanks to an extraction technique known as hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” as it’s commonly known. In contrast to the conventional method where companies merely drill into the earth to exploit natural gas and oil deposits below the surface, fracturing entails pumping a highly pressurized mixture of water, sand and chemicals into the well. The highly pressurized cocktail opens up cracks in tight rock formations, facilitating the flow of natural gas and other hydrocarbons from the source rock. Since fracking was approved for energy production through its exemption from the 2005 Safe Drinking Water Act, its popularity has grown immensely. Fracking has allowed producers to exploit resources that were otherwise considered too difficult to access. However, we would **stop short of calling fracking a true energy revolution** for a number of reasons, just one of which we want to address today. What’s typically overlooked is the huge amount of water resources required for hydraulic fracturing. While many believe fresh water to be an abundant resource, it’s actually anything but. As we’ve pointed out in the past, natural resources tend to be inter-correlated through the energy required to extract and process them. As one resource becomes scarcer, it will affect the cost or availability of other resources as well. In the long run, we see natural gas extraction from unconventional sources as no exception. And fresh water is the key connection. The mainstream political opposition to fracking comes from the environmental concern that the chemicals injected into the ground can leak into the groundwater, contaminating an important source of drinking water. We’ll leave the environmental argument to the experts in that field, but what has become increasingly clear in our research is that the amount of fresh water required for large-scale hydraulic fracturing is massive, far surpassing any estimates put forward by the oil and gas industry today. Depending on which numbers you use, unconventional shale fracking uses between six and 50 times the amount of water as conventional gas drilling. And the bulk of that water is required up front, as opposed to being used throughout the extraction process. The higher figures come from actual operational data, while the lower estimates are just that: estimates. As a result, many of the US shale plays that have been lauded as an abundant source of clean energy may produce far less natural gas than current forecasted estimates after all costs and resource inputs are accounted for. If these unconventional shale plays require much more water than conventional wisdom expects, as we suspect they will, there will be much less gas coming on line in the future than expected. And the cost of much of the gas that may eventually be extracted will be much higher than anticipated. Either way, the result is the same, causing the natural gas market to tighten and prices to rise. So if you heat and cool your home with natural gas, enjoy the current bonanza while it lasts. The takeaway for investors, meanwhile, is not simply to pile into the energy stocks most leveraged to natural gas prices, as tempting as that may be from a contrarian perspective. Unconventional gas deposits that will require fracking now make up a large portion of total natural gas assets for many E&P companies. And while higher water requirements will drive natural gas prices northward, it will also drive up costs for unconventional producers. The result for those producers will not be pretty. We would therefore stick with conventional natural gas producers who will benefit from higher gas prices. For safety sake, companies that also have a healthy exposure to crude oil earn the highest honors.

#### Natural gas abundance is a myth – shale gas is declining and studies don’t assume increased production

Berman 12 (Art, Former Editor – Oil and Gas Journal, Geological Consultant – American Association of Petroleum Geologists, “After the Gold Rush: A Perspective on Future U.S. Natural Gas Supply and Price,” Oil Drum, 2-8, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8914)

For several years, we have been asked to believe that less is more, that more oil and gas can be produced from shale than was produced from better reservoirs over the past century. We have been told more recently that the U.S. has enough natural gas to last for 100 years. We have been presented with an improbable business model that has no barriers to entry except access to capital, that provides a source of cheap and abundant gas, and that somehow also allows for great profit. Despite three decades of experience with tight sandstone and coal-bed methane production that yielded low-margin returns and less supply than originally advertised, we are expected to believe that poorer-quality shale reservoirs will somehow provide superior returns and make the U.S. energy independent. Shale gas advocates point to the large volumes of produced gas and the participation of major oil companies in the plays as indications of success. But advocates rarely address details about profitability and they never mention failed wells. Shale gas plays are an important and permanent part of our energy future. We need the gas because there are fewer remaining plays in the U.S. that have the potential to meet demand. A careful review of the facts, however, casts doubt on the extent to which shale plays can meet supply expectations except at much higher prices. One Hundred Years of Natural Gas The U.S. does not have 100 years of natural gas supply. There is a difference between resources and reserves that many outside the energy industry fail to grasp. A resource refers to the gas or oil in-place that can be produced, while a reserve must be commercially producible. The Potential Gas Committee (PGC) is the standard for resource assessments because of the objectivity and credentials of its members, and its long and reliable history. In its biennial report released in April 2011, three categories of technically recoverable resources are identified: probable, possible and speculative. The President and many others have taken the PGC total of all three categories (2,170 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas) and divided by 2010 annual consumption of 24 Tcf. This results in 90 and not 100 years of gas. Much of this total resource is in accumulations too small to be produced at any price, is inaccessible to drilling, or is too deep to recover economically. More relevant is the Committee’s probable mean resources value of 550 (Tcf) of gas (Exhibit 4). If half of this supply becomes a reserve (225 Tcf), the U.S. has approximately 11.5 years of potential future gas supply at present consumption rates. When proved reserves of 273 Tcf are included, there is an additional 11.5 years of supply for a total of almost 23 years. It is worth noting that proved reserves include proved undeveloped reserves which may or may not be produced depending on economics, so even 23 years of supply is tenuous. If consumption increases, this supply will be exhausted in less than 23 years. Revisions to this estimate will be made and there probably is more than 23 years but based on current information, 100 years of gas is not justified. Shale Gas Plays May Not Provide Sustainable Supply Several of the more mature shale gas plays are either in decline or appear to be approaching peak production. Exhibit 5 shows that total Barnett Shale production is approximately 5.7 Bcf per day (Bcf/d) and cumulative gas production is more than 10 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas. It also shows that production may be approaching a peak at current gas prices despite the constant addition of new wells. Exhibit 5. Barnett Shale Total Production. Source: HPDI. The Haynesville Shale surpassed the Barnett during 2011 as the most productive gas play in North America, with present daily rates of almost 7 Bcf/d and cumulative production of 3.5 Tcf (Exhibit 6). This play is most responsible for the current over-supply of gas with the average well producing 3.3 million cubic feet per day (Mcf/d) compared to only 0.4 Mdf/d in the Barnett. It is too early to say for sure, but the Haynesville Shale may also be approaching peak production. The Marcellus Shale is presently producing 2.4 Bcf/d and has produced a total of about 0.8 Tcf (Exhibit 7). In this play, production shows no sign of leveling off, as it does in the Barnett and Haynesville, and production in the Fayetteville Shale may also be approaching a peak (Exhibit 8). The Woodford Shale is already in decline (Exhibit 9). If some existing shale gas plays are approaching peak production after only a few years since the advent of horizontal drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing, what is the basis for long-term projections of abundant gas supply?

#### Claims of abundant natural gas are industry bias and use manipulated data

Hughes 11 (J. David, Fellow in Fossil Fuels – Post Carbon Institute, Geoscientist – Geological Survey of Canada, and Team Leader – Canadian Gas Potential Committee, Abstract by Richard Heinberg, Senior Fellow-in-Residence – Post Carbon Institute, “Will Natural Gas Fuel America in the 21st Century?” Post Carbon Institute, May, http://www.postcarbon.org/reports/PCI-report-nat-gas-future-plain.pdf)

As this report details, all of these assumptions and recommendations need to be re-thought. What emerges from the data is a very different assessment. But if this report is right, then how could mainstream energy analysts have gotten so much so wrong? It is not our purpose to analyze in detail the social, political, and economic process whereby public relations became public policy. Nevertheless it is fairly easy to trace the convergence of interests among major players. First, the shale gas industry was motivated to hype production prospects in order to attract large amounts of needed investment capital; it did this by drilling the best sites first and extrapolating initial robust results to apply to more problematic prospective regions. The energy policy establishment, desperate to identify a new energy source to support future economic growth, accepted the industry’s hype uncritically. This in turn led Wall Street Journal, Time Magazine, 60 Minutes, and many other media outlets to proclaim that shale gas would transform the energy world. Finally, several prominent environmental organizations, looking for a way to lobby for lower carbon emissions without calling for energy cutbacks, embraced shale gas as a necessary “bridge fuel” toward a renewable energy future. Each group saw in shale gas what it wanted and needed. The stuff seemed too good to be true—and indeed it was. The biggest losers in this misguided rush to anoint shale gas as America’s energy savior are members of the public, who need sound energy policy based on realistic expectations for future supply, as well as sound assessments of economic and environmental costs.

#### **New state and federal regulations are coming now – that makes** fracking unsustainable

Plumer 12 (Brad, “How states are regulating fracking (in maps)”, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/16/how-states-are-regulating-fracking-in-maps/)

Armed with new drilling techniques, companies are spreading out across the United States, cracking open shale rock in search of vast new stores of natural gas. It’s not an exaggeration to say that hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” has revolutionized the U.S. energy industry. Cheap natural gas has become America’s top source for electricity, displacing coal and bringing back jobs to once-decaying states like Ohio.But the fracking boom has also led to plenty of environmental concerns. Local communities are worried that the chemicals used to pry open the shale rock can contaminate nearby drinking water supplies. (So far, there’s scant evidence this is happening in places like Pennsylvania, but the science is still in its infancy.) Excess gas is often vented off, producing air pollution. And the disposal of fracking wastewater underground appears to be linked to earthquakes in places like Ohio. Confronted with these worries, states have responded with a patchwork of different regulations. But there’s a lot of variation between different states. And here’s a good way to track what’s going on: A helpful series of new maps, put together by Resources for the Future (RFF), gives an overview of how 31 states with significant shale gas reserves are treating different aspects of fracking. Here, for instance, is a look at which states require companies to disclose the chemicals they use in drilling. (Fracking is exempt from federal disclosure rules under the Safe Water Drinking Act.) Some states, like Pennsylvania — which sits above the gas-rich Marcellus shale formation — now require a full disclosure of chemicals. By contrast, Kansas, which is just beginning to see widespread fracking activity, is further behind: Meanwhile, the map below details how different states treat the “venting” or release of excess gas into the air. Just 22 of the 31 gas states have restrictions on this process, which can release both heat-trapping methane into the atmosphere as well as “volatile organic compounds” such as benzene that can produce smog and trigger health problems. Some states ban this practice entirely; others restrict it to emergencies or require that operators not harm public health: There are many more maps on RFF’s Web site, which is worth poking around on. In an introductory essay, RFF’s Nathan Richardson notes that these maps still provide just a partial picture — the details of laws matter, and more importantly, different states may enforce their rules with different levels of vigor. But it’s an invaluable resource all the same. The regulation of fracking has become a low-level campaign issue, as well. The Obama administration is gradually putting forward federal regulations. The Department of Interior is drafting rules for fracking on publicly-owned lands (where about 38 percent of the country’s gas reserves sit, according to the American Petroleum Institute). The Environmental Protection Agency, meanwhile, is slowly getting in on regulation and has proposed rules that will require all producers to phase out venting by 2015 and capture their waste methane instead. Mitt Romney, by contrast, has criticized the federal approach. In his “Believe in America” economic plan (pdf), he warns that the EPA should not “pursue overly aggressive interventions designed to discourage fracking altogether.” By contrast, Romney praises states for having “carefully and effectively regulated the process for decades.” Indeed, many Republicans believe that fracking regulations should be mainly left to the states, which can issue rules more speedily and can tailor regulations to the specific needs of their communities. Environmentalists, by contrast, worry that this will create a race to the bottom whereby states pare back their rules — or enforce them weakly — in order to compete for business. Both sides agree that addressing the public health and environmental aspects of fracking isn’t costless. The International Energy Agency recently estimated that addressing all of the various concerns could boost the price of natural gas by roughly 7 percent. Yet the IEA also warned that if these rules weren’t adopted, public outcry and protests could stop the shale gas boom altogether. Anti-fracking protests like those in New York state could become the norm. And that, the IEA notes, could prove even more costly to the gas industry

#### A US-led natural gas revolution solidifies international leadership

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities – Bard College and Editor-at-Large – American Interest, “Energy Revolution 2: A Post Post-American Post,” American Interest, 7-15, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/15/energy-revolution-2-a-post-post-american-post/)

Forget peak oil; forget the Middle East. The energy revolution of the 21st century isn’t about solar energy or wind power and **the “scramble for oil” isn’t going to drive global politics**. The energy abundance that helped propel the United States to global leadership in the 19th and 2oth centuries is back; if the energy revolution now taking shape lives up to its full potential, we are headed into a new century in which the location of the world’s energy resources and the structure of the world’s energy trade **support American affluence at home and power abroad**. By some estimates, the United States has more oil than Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran combined, and Canada may have even more than the United States. A GAO report released last May (pdf link can be found here) estimates that up to the equivalent of 3 trillion barrels of shale oil may lie in just one of the major potential US energy production sites. If half of this oil is recoverable, US reserves in this one deposit are roughly equal to the known reserves of the rest of the world combined. Edward Luce, an FT writer usually more given to tracing America’s decline than to promoting its prospects, cites estimates that as early as 2020 the US may be producing more oil than Saudi Arabia. So dramatic are America’s finds, analysts talk of the US turning into the world’s new Saudi Arabia by 2020, with up to 15m barrels a day of liquid energy production (against the desert kingdom’s 11m b/d this year). Most of the credit goes to private sector innovators, who took their cue from the high oil prices in the last decade to devise ways of tapping previously uneconomic underground reserves of “tight oil” and shale gas. And some of it is down to plain luck. Far from reaching its final frontier, America has discovered new ones under the ground. Additionally, our natural gas reserves are so large that the US is likely to become a major exporter, and US domestic supplies for hydrocarbon fuels of all types appear to be safe and secure for the foreseeable future. North America as a whole has the potential to be a major exporter of fossil fuels for decades and even generations to come. Since the 1970s, pessimism about America’s energy future has been one of the cornerstones on which the decline theorists erected their castles of doom; we are now entering a time when energy abundance will be an argument for continued American dynamism. The energy revolution isn’t a magic wand that can make all America’s wishes come true, but it is **a powerful wind in the sails of both America’s domestic economy and of its international goals**. The United States isn’t the only big winner of the energy revolution — Canada, Israel and China among others will also make gains — but the likely consequences of the energy revolution for America’s global agenda are so large, that the chief effect of the revolution is likely to be its role in shoring up the foundations of the American-led world order.

#### And it allows us to determine how the system functions- alters the global balance of power

Gjelten 12 (Tom, Diplomatic Correspondent – NPR, “The Dash for Gas: The Golden Age of an Energy Game-Changer,” World Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/dash-gas-golden-age-energy-game-changer)

For a fresh perspective on geopolitical trends, look at the world through the lens of the natural gas trade. One of the reasons for Israeli unease with the Arab Spring is that the democratic uprising that took down Hosni Mubarak also brought interruptions in Israel’s supply of natural gas, much of which since 2008 has come from Egypt. Wondering about China’s new interest in Australia and Qatar? It’s about their abundant gas supplies and China’s tremendous energy needs. Desperate for signs of cooperation from North Korea? Check out reports that Kim Jong-il may agree to the construction of a natural gas pipeline that would link Russia, Pyongyang, and Seoul. From Asia to the Middle East to North America, a boom in natural gas usage is rearranging international connections, with major repercussions for global politics. Energy consumers see that natural gas is relatively inexpensive, provided it can be transported efficiently, and abundant, especially if it can be harvested from shale rock and other unconventional deposits. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that over the next twenty-five years gas will be the fastest-growing energy source, overtaking coal as soon as 2030. Around the world, natural gas is fast becoming the fuel of choice for electric power generation, especially with nuclear losing its appeal in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Energy experts predict gas could even displace oil in the transportation sector, as car and truck engines are redesigned. The trend has so impressed IEA analysts that the agency in 2011 boldly predicted that the world is entering “a golden age of gas.” The implications are significant. Because gas is somewhat cleaner than other fossil fuels, its rise as a fuel source should have environmental benefits. Because it is cheaper than oil, its increased use would lower energy costs and bring energy to millions of people who lack access to it now. But among the most striking consequences of a dramatic growth in natural gas consumption would be its effect on international relations. The energy trade is an important determinant of the global balance of power, and the shift to natural gas will introduce **a new set of winners and losers**, bringing greater independence to many countries and reducing the energy leverage that oil producers have traditionally enjoyed. After chairing an advisory panel on the subject for the Department of Energy, former CIA director John Deutch concluded that the prospective geopolitical shifts amount to no less than “a natural gas revolution” in global affairs. A big difference between gas and oil is the trading infrastructure. While oil can be shipped in tankers, gas has moved mainly through pipelines, thus confining it largely to regional markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is facilitating the development of a global market in gas, but it is still traded largely on a country-to-country basis, with negotiated prices that are specified in contracts. As gas usage has grown, these gas deals have grown more important. In Bolivia, for instance, a determination to use natural gas wealth for political ends has affected relations with its neighbors for most of the past decade. Privately financed exploration in the late 1990s revealed that the country’s proven gas reserves were six times greater than what was previously believed, but Bolivian leaders could not agree on how to exploit them. A public outcry forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign and leave the country in 2003 after he proposed to export natural gas to Mexico and the United States through a terminal in Chile, where it was to have been liquefied. (Anti-Chilean sentiment has run deep in Bolivia ever since a war with Chile in 1879 cost the country its Pacific access.) Bolivian gas is now sold instead to Brazil and Argentina, but disputes with Brazil over the terms of the gas contract have cast a shadow over that relationship in recent years, and management of the country’s gas exports is probably Bolivia’s top foreign-policy challenge. The Bolivian case shows how the natural gas trade is more likely to be complicated by resource nationalism than the oil business would be. In a pique, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez can say he is prepared to cut off oil sales to the United States, but because oil is a globally traded commodity managed by middlemen, the threat is largely meaningless. For every buyer, there will always be a seller. State-to-state gas deals, by contrast, are more likely to carry geopolitical overtones. In 2005, for example, Egypt took the bold step of agreeing to sell natural gas to Israel. The gas began flowing in 2008 through a pipeline that runs across the Sinai peninsula and continues undersea to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Israel depends on natural gas for much of its power generation, and the deal with Egypt has provided the country with more than forty percent of its gas needs. The notion of exporting gas to Israel has been highly unpopular in Egypt, however, and in the months following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the Sinai pipeline has been repeatedly blown up, forcing Israel to fire up unused coal plants and convert several gas-fueled generating stations to run on fuel oil or diesel instead, at a cost of several million dollars. But the country had a possible solution: In December 2010, a Houston-based energy exploration company announced “a significant natural gas discovery” about eighty miles off Israel’s coast. Preliminary measurements suggested it could be the world’s biggest deepwater gas discovery in ten years and could provide Israel with enough gas to become a net exporter, providing it with more clout in its regional energy relationships. South Korea also relies on imported energy sources and is keen on natural gas, which explains its interest in a Russian proposal to build a pipeline that would carry Russian gas from Siberia across the Korean peninsula. The idea has been floated for years, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently gave the proposal his firm support during a meeting in August 2011 with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak subsequently agreed to work closely with the Russians to make the project a reality. The South Koreans have offered to build a natural gas power generating plant in the north as compensation for Pyongyang’s support for the pipeline. The key to the project’s success would be a design that would reassure Seoul that the North Korean authorities had no incentive to steal the gas or cut off the supply before it reaches the south. The textbook illustration of a link between geopolitics and the natural gas trade is Russia. As of 2010, the country was the world’s top gas producer (after briefly being surpassed by the United States), with one state-controlled company, Gazprom, accounting for about eighty percent of the country’s production. Originally part of the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Gas Industry, Gazprom is in effect a state monopoly, and its power and reach are without comparison in the energy world. The company has its own armed forces, with as many as twenty thousand armed security guards and a private fleet of unmanned drones, used mainly to monitor pipelines and production facilities. The company effectively operates as an arm of the Russian state, and the company’s gas deals in Europe and Asia can legitimately be seen as an extension of Russian foreign policy, exemplifying the growing importance of “gas diplomacy.” Though its relative importance as a gas provider to Europe has diminished over the past ten years, Russia still meets about a quarter of Europe’s needs, more than any other supplier, and European governments have long been uneasy about their dependence on Russian gas. About eighty percent of the Russian gas shipment to Europe goes through Ukraine, and the flow has been cut on two major occasions at least in part because of geopolitical wrangling. In January 2006, after Kiev resisted price increase demands, Gazprom reduced the flow of gas to Ukraine, causing shortages in other European countries that received gas through Ukraine. Politics seems to have played a role in the Russian move. Ukraine at the time was moving closer to the West, and Ukrainian leaders charged that Moscow, with its price increase demands, was trying to “blackmail” Ukraine into changing its political course. The gas flow was cut once again in January 2009, causing a severe midwinter gas shortage across Europe. The two episodes convinced many European leaders that Russia was ready and willing to use Gazprom’s clout in what it considered its “privileged sphere of influence,” with the goal of bringing the former Soviet republics back under Moscow’s control. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, spoke for many European observers when he wrote in 2010, “The primary goal of Russian gas policy isn’t economic but political, namely to further the aim of revising the post-Soviet order in Europe.” The eagerness of European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian gas has prompted ongoing efforts to find alternative supply routes. Iraq and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are promising sources, and for about a decade European authorities have been scheming to develop a gas pipeline that would bypass Russia. The Nabucco pipeline project, launched in 2002, would bring gas from the Caspian basin across Turkey to a hub in Austria. In addition, BP and two Italian companies have been promoting pipeline projects of their own along that southern corridor. The European Commission and the United States have both given strong backing to the Nabucco project, but the pipeline planners have had a difficult time lining up the supply commitments needed to make the project economically worthwhile. Moscow has put pressure on the Central Asian states to send their gas to Russia rather than Europe, and China is pursuing supply deals of its own in the region. Among the major new developments has been the construction of new facilities to liquefy natural gas. Petroleum engineers have long known how to convert gas into liquid form through extreme cooling, but only in recent years has the LNG industry expanded to the point that it has altered gas trading patterns. The construction of dozens of new liquefaction and regasification plants around the world, along with the introduction of LNG tanker ships, has made it possible for island nations like Australia to become major gas exporters, and it has given gas-consuming countries new supply sources. The United States, Japan, China, and European countries were all quick to embrace the industry. (In the US alone, twelve new terminals have been built to receive LNG, with plants to regasify the LNG for shipment through pipelines around the country.) The development has been rapid. The International Energy Agency predicts that between 2008 and 2020 total liquefaction capacity will double. Qatar, which opened its first LNG plant in 1997, by 2006 had become the world’s top LNG producer and was investing in LNG terminals around the world. For European countries with terminals, importing LNG from Qatar or Algeria or Nigeria is another way to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. By 2035, for example, LNG is expected to supply about half of the United Kingdom’s natural gas needs, with imports from Qatar leading the way. British Prime Minister David Cameron’s February 2011 visit to Qatar, culminating in a new gas deal, put Moscow on notice that Europe had alternatives to Russian gas. Qatar and other LNG exporters have an even more inviting market in Asia. The IEA foresees China’s gas consumption growing by nearly six percent annually up to 2035. Japan, having lost much of its nuclear generating capacity as a result of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, is now a huge gas market as well, and LNG imports from Australia, Qatar, and the other gas exporting countries will be essential to its energy mix. Such developments were not foreseen twenty years ago. The LNG industry has diversified the gas trade, introducing new producers into the picture and giving gas importers more supply choices just as their demand for gas is growing. Without a doubt, the most revolutionary recent development in the natural gas world has been an improvement in the ability to extract gas from shale rock and other unconventional sources. Geologists have known for two hundred years that shale contains combustible gas, but the tightness of the shale formation meant that the gas was generally considered unrecoverable. In the last decade, however, energy companies in the United States have found that it is economically possible to harvest shale gas through the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), by which large amounts of water mixed with sand and chemicals are injected at high pressure into the rock formations in order to free the gas trapped inside. In addition, gas producers are now employing horizontal drilling techniques, turning their drill bits in a horizontal direction after reaching a deep shale reservoir and thus reaching more deposits from a single well. These developments have proven so promising that analysts are dramatically increasing their estimates of how much shale gas can be recovered around the world. In the United States, shale accounted for almost no gas production as recently as 2000. It now provides about twenty percent of the total production, and within twenty years it could be half. The US government’s Energy Information Administration has estimated that if recoverable shale gas reserves are included, the United States may have enough natural gas to meet US needs for the next hundred years, at current consumption rates. Such estimates are imprecise and may well be adjusted downward, but the production of shale gas has already dramatically altered the US energy picture. Just a few years ago, it was assumed that the United States would be a net importer of natural gas, with much of it arriving as LNG. But the terminals and regasification facilities that were built to facilitate LNG imports are now going largely unused. The successful production of shale gas could even mean the United States will soon be a net gas exporter. Some of the existing regasification facilities, built for LNG imports, could actually be converted to liquefaction plants, so that excess domestic gas production can be exported as LNG. If the United States became self-sufficient in natural gas, there would be significant geopolitical implications. When Arab states in 1973 imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States as punishment for US support of Israel, American consumers learned how vulnerable their country was to the “oil weapon” when used by potentially hostile states. As the United States moves toward energy independence, **if only in gas**, that vulnerability disappears. There would also be geopolitical effects overseas. With the United States no longer importing LNG, that gas could go to European consumers instead, and Europe’s dependence on Russia for its gas supply would diminish. In 2000, Russia was supplying about forty percent of Europe’s gas; some estimates have the Russian share sliding to ten percent by 2040. Whether the United States can maintain a sharply upward trend in shale gas production **depends on whether the reserves are as promising as they now appear to be**, whether the gas price is sufficient to cover production costs, and especially whether environmental concerns associated with shale drilling are addressed. Hydraulic fracturing requires enormous amounts of water, and recycling or disposal of the waste water can be problematic. There have been cases where shale well casings have proved defective, and contamination of the surrounding soil or water has occurred. Authorities in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland have imposed temporary moratoria on fracking in order to assess the practice and determine whether it imposes any risks to drinking water or human health.

circumstances.

#### Military dominance fails, strengthening the liberal order prevents great power war

Kromah 9 (Lamii Moivi Kromah, Department of International Relations University of the Witwatersrand, February 2009, “The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11”, http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR%2009.pdf)

**I see a multi-polar world as one being filled with instability and higher chances of great power conflict.** The Great Power jostling and British hegemonic decline that led to WWI is an example of how multi polar systems are prone to great power wars. I further posit that U.S. hegemony is significantly different from the past British hegemony because of its reliance on consent and its mutilaterist nature. The most significant would be the UN and its various branches financial, developmental, and conflict resolution. It is common for the international system to go through cataclysmic changes with the fall of a great power. I feel that American **hegemony is so different especially with its reliance on liberal institutionalism and complex interdependence that U.S. hegemonic order and governance will be maintained by others**, if states vary in size, then cooperation between the largest of the former free riders (and including the declining hegemonic power) may suffice to preserve the cooperative outcome. Thus we need to amend the assumption that collective action is impossible and incorporate it into a fuller specification of the circumstances under which international cooperation can be preserved even as a hegemonic power declines. 58 If hegemony means the ability to foster cooperation and commonalty of social purpose among states, **U.S. leadership and its institutional creations will long outlast the decline of its post war position of military and economic dominance**; and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of particular administrations. 59 U.S. hegemony will continue providing the public good that the world is associated with despite the rise of other powers in the system “cooperation may persist after hegemonic decline because of the inertia of existing regimes. Institutional factors and different logics of regime creation and maintenance have been invoked to explain the failure of the current economic regime to disintegrate rapidly in response to the decline of American predominance in world affairs.” 60

#### Increased U.S. Commitment is key – otherwise the system collapses

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[G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Spring 2011, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/20/a-world-of-our-making.php?page=all>]

It is in this sense that **there is a new urgency** for a renewed American commitment to international order building. The Arab world is embroiled in turmoil, but this is only part of a larger global drama of crisis and transformation that includes the world economy’s struggle to find a path to stable growth, conflicts driven by resource scarcity, looming environmental threats, and the rise of developing countries—India, Brazil, and particularly China—into the ranks of the great powers. Even today, amidst these grand shifts in the global system, the United States remains the critical player in the rebuilding of international order, and three broad tasks confront it: It must integrate the rising powers into that order, ensuring continuity; it must make sure that China has the right incentives and opportunities to participate; and it must forge a “milieu-based” grand strategy that structures the general international environment in ways that are congenial to its long-term security. The Future of America Inc. For half a century, the United States held the keys to global order—and in many ways it still does today. No country has ever been as powerful as the United States or has had as many opportunities to put its mark on the organization of world politics. After the world wars, after the Cold War, and again today, the United States has been in a unique position to lead in the creation of rules and institutions that guide the global system. At key turning points, it stepped forward with liberal ideas about world order and struggled to reconcile them with the geopolitical realities of the day. The United States has been a liberal order builder, reflecting both American national interests and a set of calculations about the virtues of an order that would provide a long-term flow of economic and security benefits to itself and the wider world. The pivotal moment in liberal order building occurred in the years after World War II. It was then that America’s desire for a congenial world order—open, stable, friendly—turned into an agenda for the construction of a liberal hegemonic order. But this shift was not entirely deliberate. The United States took charge of the liberal project and then found itself creating and running an international order. America and liberal order became fused. It was a distinctive type of order, organized around American hegemonic authority, **open markets, cooperative security, multilateral institutions, social bargains, and democratic community.** It was also built on core hegemonic bargains. These bargains determined how power and authority would be apportioned. So although the United States ran the liberal order and projected power, it did so within a system of rules and institutions—of commitments and restraints. It underwrote order in various regions of the world. It provided public goods related to stability and openness, and it engaged in bargaining and reciprocity with its allies and partners. The center of gravity of this order was the West—and as it moved outward to Asia, Latin America, and the developing world, the liberal logic gave way to more traditional imperial and great-power domination. Globally, the order was hierarchical—dominated by the United States—but infused with liberal characteristics.

#### US built institutions and the liberal international order prevent global war

Kromah 9 (Lamii Moivi Kromah, Department of International Relations University of the Witwatersrand, February 2009, “The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11”, http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR%2009.pdf)

A final major gain to the United States from the benevolent hegemony has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States. 39 This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "coca-colonization." 40 After WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to facilitate peace. The hegemonic project involves using political and economic advantages gained in world war to restructure the operation of the world market and interstate system in the hegemon's own image. The interests of the leader are projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world. The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project. 41 Since wealth depended on peace the U.S set about creating institutions and regimes that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution. U.S. benevolent hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII. **The upshot is that U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable political order that the world has seen** since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order, Kant’s Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it. 42 This view of the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on U.S. leadership in the traditional sense. U.S. leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving disputes not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems. 43 America as a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is considered legitimate by the other states**. It is not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material capabilities to get other states to go along**. Legitimacy exists when political order is based on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power. 44 So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well, it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas: colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger. 45 It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security and economic strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. We must first discuss the three pillars that U.S .hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony. If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2) Institutional leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more important role. 46 Institutional management is important and can generate results that are internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state interests, and thereby transforms existing relations.Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system asa result of its victory in the last hegemonic war. 47 Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates. It is assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining and rising powers 48 , but I see a different pattern: the U.S. hegemonic stability promoting liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief abnormality from this path, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism. Hegemonic states are the crucial components in military alliances that turn back the major threats to mutual sovereignties and hence political domination of the system. Instead of being territorially aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They aspire to be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality. 49 The nature of the institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the years immediately after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to establish institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to resolve global conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in terms of the theory of collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the United States, in so doing, was providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially) collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with "national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals. Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on non- capitalist principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans. 50 For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. **And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives**. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony; "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs”. 51 I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macro political system-a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony. 52 If the U.S.retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world –and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia**, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age**. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’ –a global vacuum of power**.** 53 Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant leader politically, economically and military. But its leadership has been unique; it has not been tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has forgone absolute gains. **The difference lies in the exercise of power**. The strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of the world economy, the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions. That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such. 54 Leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of politics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end. 55 By validating regimes and norms of international behaviour the U.S. has given incentives for actors, small and large, in the international arena to behave peacefully The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable international system. Woodrow Wilson’s zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a quasi world government;It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and reducing the costs of transactions, institutions can permit cooperation to continue even after a hegemon's influence has eroded. Institutions provide opportunities for commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments. Such opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum situations, as gaming experiments demonstrate. Declining hegemony and stagnant (but not decaying) institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of desired outcomes, although the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to deal with new problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic. Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation. 56 In restructuring the world after WWII it was America that was the prime motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATO’s making Western Europe secure for the unification of Europe. It was through NATO institutionalism that the countries in Europe where able to start the unification process. The U.S. working through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to unite and benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defence policy. Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own well- being depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible without a broad measure of international security. 57

#### Legitimacy of U.S. hegemony’s key to global stability---prevents great power war

Fujimoto 12 (Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11>)

The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to our national security. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and non-hegemonic, its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict that argument. With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the United States should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future **when** we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately **leads to a paradigm shift** in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.11 Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate. Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine **which** avoids **the precepts of** the previous administration: “preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order. Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to **garner support from noncommitted regional powers** (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18 Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.20 Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy **and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower**.

#### Contention 2 : LNG Exports

#### Currently, perception of inadequate supply blocks LNG exports – new, sustainable supply is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).4 According to the Energy Information Adminis- tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over potential exports **hinges on the prospects for its sustained availability and development**. For exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and **compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses**. There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resources—the volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. Based on the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable natural gas resource in the United States. In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production. The productivity of shale gas wells has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

#### Perception is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are **valid** depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for **shale gas reserves are uncertain**, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic.

#### Lifting access restrictions in the OCS is key

Hartley and Medlock 7 (Dr. Peter, Professor of Economics – Rice University, Rice Scholar – Baker Institute for Public Policy, and Dr. Kenneth B., Fellow in Energy Policy – Baker Institute for Public Policy, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Economics – Rice University, “North American Security of Natural Gas Supply in a Global Market,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, November, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/energy-forum/publications/energy-studies/docs/natgas/ng_security-nov07.pdf>)

Higher Lower 48 production as a result of opening access also results in lower imports of LNG. Figure 13 depicts the change in LNG imports when access restrictions are lifted and all other factors remain unchanged. Total LNG imports into the United States in 2015 fall by about 0.85 tcf (or from about 2.4 tcf to 1.55 tcf) and in 2030 by 1.6 tcf (or from 8.8 tcf to 7.3 tcf). This figure includes pipeline imports to the United States from Mexico and Canada that are being reshipped from LNG import terminals from those countries. The decline under this scenario is represents a fall in LNG market share in the United States from just over 31 percent in the Reference Case in 2030 to 22 percent. The LNG receiving terminals that are most directly affected by the opening of access for drilling are those that are closest to these newly opened areas of the Atlantic, Pacific and east Gulf of Mexico OCS. For example, the terminals at Baja, New Brunswick, Pascagoula, Cove Point, and Delaware Bay see the largest volume reductions, in some years accounting for over 80 percent of the difference in overall import flows. This, like the situation with Alaska, represents some cannibalization of market share as companies who might drill in the now restricted OCS would be the same firms whose LNG would be **pushed out of the U.S. market**. One offsetting factor to the loss of market share for LNG and Alaskan supplies is that fact that lower average prices give a slight boost to overall U.S. demand. When access restrictions are lifted, lower prices encourage a modest increase in demand of about 1.3 bcfd by 2030, of which 1.0 bcfd is added natural gas demand in the power generation sector. While the change in average annual prices under this unrestricted scenario is not large, open access also allows existing demand to be served at lower cost. Thus, the net surplus benefits (including added consumer welfare) associated with expanded use of gas at lower prices can be quite large. For example, the benefit to consumers of a $0.42 reduction in price in 2017 (the maximum decrease seen over the modeling period) results in an annual saving of $10.3 billion for natural gas consumers. Of course, the benefits are lower in other years, but cumulative benefits still range into the many billions of dollars. Open access also brings other potential benefits, such as providing a degree of diversification that **mitigates the extent to which a cartel in international natural gas markets can operate effectively to threaten U.S. energy security**. This increased diversification is evident in Figure 14, which depicts the changes in LNG imports by major regions around the world. We see that when access restrictions are removed, the resulting decline in North American LNG imports is accompanied by an increase in LNG imports in other regions around the world. This occurs as global prices are reduced and demand is encouraged. Thus, both energy security benefits as well as welfare benefits accrue to nations outside the United States **as a result of eliminating access restrictions**. 30 In addition, when access restrictions are removed, LNG exports from the more marginal producers, which tend to be OPEC countries (Iran, other Middle East exporters, Venezuela, and to a lesser extent countries in North and West Africa), decline at the margin, falling collectively by 0.27 tcf in 2015, and as much as 0.43 tcf by 2030 (see Figure 15). Even though the volumes are small, the analysis suggests that this **less constrained supply picture** for the global market can contribute to rendering the United States and its allies **less vulnerable to the will** of any one producer, or the collective will of any group of producers, by enhancing the diversification of supply options. The wider swath of alternative supplies for Europe and northeast Asia translates into significantly reduced potential for producers in Russia and the Middle East to exert market power.

#### Global export contracts are being renegotiated – now is key to get the US in the LNG export game

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see Figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates.108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already being felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage.109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract.110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts.111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (Figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020.

#### Scenario 2: US-China Relations

#### Sustainable US LNG exports spurs cooperative LNG trading with China – that’s key to overall relations

Livingston and Tu 12 (David, Junior Fellow in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Kevin Jianjun, Senior Associate in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Feeding China’s Energy Appetite, Naturally,” Energy Tribune, 7-17, http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/11206/Feeding-Chinas-Energy-Appetite-Naturally)

Ever since CNOOC, one of China’s “big three” national oil companies, made an ill-fated bid to take over Unocal Corporation in 2005, Sino-U.S. energy relations have been marred with mistrust. Foreign acquisitions by China’s national oil companies thereafter have largely avoided the United States. Many were thus caught off guard by recent reports that Sinopec has emerged as a leading suitor for some of the $7 billion in natural gas assets that Chesapeake Energy must shed to avoid a breach of its debt covenants. Yet upon closer inspection, the move is deft and bears the imprint of lessons well-learned. Chinese national oil companies know from prior experience that in the United States they must wear kid gloves to avoid getting burned. With U.S. natural gas prices projected to remain at $2-4/Mmbtu and far higher returns on investment elsewhere around the globe, why would Sinopec pour capital into American shale gas production when so many U.S. companies are shutting down rigs? There are a number of macro- and micro-dynamics at play here. China’s demand for gas is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. Natural gas currently accounts for only 4 percent of the country’s energy mix, but the International Energy Agency projects this rising to 13 percent by 2035. The same organization predicts that China will account for roughly a quarter of global gas demand growth over the same period. There is also a high level of uncertainty over how reliant the country will be on foreign gas. Much of this will depend on China’s ability to exploit its vast domestic shale gas resources. If unconventional development is well-orchestrated, Chinese gas imports as a share of total demand could be as low as 20 percent in 2035. Alternatively, slow progress in unconventional gas development could lead to a dependency rate north of 50 percent, according to the IEA. In either scenario, a stake in Chesapeake’s gas assets could potentially pay dividends for China. Chesapeake was one of the first to commit wholeheartedly to the potential of shale gas in the United States. It has snatched up vast swaths of shale acreage, and possesses the technology and know-how to efficiently extract unconventional gas from these basins. Sinopec would love nothing more than to gain firsthand experience with hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques that could eventually be applied to China’s massive shale resources. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, technically recoverable shale gas reserves in China are at least 50 percent greater than the sizeable shale endowment in the United States. Sinopec drilled its first shale gas well in Chongqing on June 9, but until it develops the capacity to unlock domestic resources en masse at low cost, acquisitions are the quickest way to bolster its gas reserves. The company might be seeking to secure a dedicated stream of U.S. natural gas production for shipping to China as liquefied natural gas in the future. **This is a complicated proposition, especially considering that the scale of U.S. LNG exports is highly uncertain**. The prospect of rising domestic gas prices as a consequence of satiating Chinese demand would become a thorny political issue, whether merited or not. At the corporate level, Sinopec’s own characteristics reveal an internal logic to the prospective Chesapeake deal. The move is driven by its international market-oriented new boss, Fu Chengyu. Fu served at the helm of CNOOC until 2010 and his failure to secure the Unocal deal in 2005 will undoubtedly inform his current attempt. Evidence of this can already be seen in Sinopec’s preference for partial assets over outright ownership. Of course, Sinopec precluding itself from an operational role also potentially distances it from the technologies and methodologies that it covets. Nevertheless, Fu has remains tempted by U.S. shale gas assets with attractive valuations. Sinopec has been slower getting into America than its rival CNOOC, which recently entered into two billion-dollar joint ventures with Chesapeake in the Niobrara and Eagle Ford shale. Moreover, Sinopec suffers from an unbalanced portfolio, with too many loss-making refineries and too few premiere upstream assets. Oil and gas projects in Iran that have been abandoned by Western companies would normally be an attractive target, but Beijing has increasingly pressured national oil companies to curtail involvement in the pariah state. Unsurprisingly, Sinopec has recently returned its gaze to the United States. Although U.S. natural gas won’t offer lucrative returns until prices rise, Chesapeake’s acreage is likely to sell at a discount and would allow Sinopec to hedge its holdings in more geopolitically tenuous markets. After his $2.5 billion deal with Devon Energy in January for stakes in five different liquids-rich shale plays, a tie-up with Chesapeake would solidify Fu’s reputation as a shrewd CEO. For China, the deal offers another geopolitical hedge—the opportunity to turn dollar-denominated treasury bills into real energy assets. The Chinese government would likely play a key role in financing any large deals pursued by its national oil companies. This is an aspect of the deal worth watching. CNOOC’s critics back in 2005 objected to the assortment of low-interest and interest-free loans backed by Chinese government coffers. Were Sinopec to rely on a similar arrangement of state support, it might be met with resistance in the United States. But the U.S. congress is in a much weaker position than it was in 2005. Partial asset ownership is not the wholesale surrender of a strategic corporation, and the American natural gas industry would welcome with open arms the capital inflow. This points to the **most constructive way forward** for both Washington and Beijing. China is still trying to grow a domestic shale gas industry without opening the market to international players. During the second round of shale gas bids in China, a small window was opened for other domestic companies, but none of them have more sophisticated technology than CNPC, Sinopec, or CNOOC. Sooner or later, China will realize that there are no shortcuts if shale gas is to be developed safely, efficiently, and responsibly. It should follow its own offshore oil exploration model, offering up its domestic market in return for cutting-edge technology. The Chesapeake deal may pay dividends to both the United States and China, but the synergy will go even further if Beijing eventually returns the favor at home.

#### Specifically – that removes Chinese fears of US encirclement – solves US-China conflict and spills over to clean tech cooperation

Stone 11 (Matt, Energy Consultant, US Foreign Policy Analyst, and Junior Associate – McKinsey & Company, “Natural Gas,” The Diplomat, 2-15, http://thediplomat.com/whats-next-china/natural-gas/)

In the space of just a couple of years, natural gas has become the 'next big thing' in energy circles. The recent expansion of unconventional gas production in North America has transformed the United States into the world’s top producer of the fuel. Cleaner-burning than coal, gas is expected to benefit in a carbon-constrained world as it displaces coal in the electricity-generation sector. Moreover a burgeoning interconnected global gas market, spurred by the expansion of the sea-borne liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, is helping to increase market flexibility so that disruptions like those caused by Russia-Ukrainian disputes have less pernicious effects on downstream countries. Hoping to take advantage of these developments, China has crafted a strategy for natural gas that aims to increase domestic production and secure access to gas resources in neighbouring countries. For Beijing, gas offers an opportunity to power its growing economy in a less polluting way than burning coal (although coal is expected to remain vital to China’s rapid economic ascent). Natural gas may also have a role to play in the transportation sector, where Beijing is experimenting in dramatic fashion with compressed natural gas (CNG) in automobiles. Historically, oil’s prominent and essential role in the transportation sector has driven its centrality in international affairs. A transportation sector that could rely jointly on oil and natural gas would allow China to be marginally more indifferent to Middle Eastern geopolitics—in stark contrast with the US experience of the past half-century. The BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 estimates that China produced approximately 85 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas in 2009, while consuming 89 bcm, an import gap that’s expected to expand rapidly in the coming years as gas demand outpaces domestic supply. Indeed, the International Energy Agency (IEA) sees China’s gas demand increasing by 6 percent annually through 2035. The reality is, though, that the country’s own conventional natural gas resources are nowhere near enough to meet this growing demand, forcing Beijing to ramp up its efforts to access gas supplies abroad—particularly in Central Asia, Russia and Burma. It’s here that the frequent portrayal of Beijing as a cash-flush power willing to throw money around to lock up resources is misplaced. China has in fact been carefully expanding its influence in Central Asia and Russia in particular, biding its time until the right deal has come along. Negotiations with Russia over gas supplies, for example, have been ongoing for years (much to Moscow’s consternation). The proposal on the table now would mean two pipelines entering China—one in Xinjiang from the Russian region of Altai and another in Manchuria from the Russian Far East. The former line would have a capacity of 30 bcm per year, the latter 38 bcm per year. But lack of agreement on the price Russian state gas company Gazprom will charge has stalled things. Of course, there’s more to this than pricing. Although Moscow enjoys a privileged position in the export of Russian oil and gas for both economic and political reasons, its manipulation of energy flows to Europe has tarnished the country’s reputation as a reliable supplier of hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, investments in the gas fields that would supply China have been slow to materialize. Both points will likely have made Beijing think carefully about the implications of an inconsistent supply of Russian gas. This reticence over gas is in contrast with a deal struck over crude oil, with China having issued a $25 billion loan to Russia in February 2009 to secure a 20-year supply of crude oil. At the same time, Beijing has postponed a decision on a loan for natural gas—a conspicuous vote of no confidence in Russia’s short-term attractiveness as a gas supplier. If the story of the Russia-China gas trade relationship is one of chess-like negotiations and Beijing’s reticence, China’s experience in Central Asia has been more straightforward. China signed an agreement to build a gas pipeline out of Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2006. Backstopped with a $4 billion loan to Ashgabat and upstream contracts for China’s state-owned CNPC in Turkmenistan, the pipeline came online in December 2009—impressively swift. However, now that it’s operational, Beijing has leveraged its position to extract concessions from the countries along the pipeline. Turkmenistan in particular is under pressure. Russia has cut its purchases of Turkmen gas by three-quarters since 2008, prompting Ashgabat to push China to buy more gas. But Beijing, keenly aware of its negotiating advantage, has held out, purchasing only 4 bcm this year. In the case of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, China has spurred competition for access to the pipeline, with the two engaging in development of gas fields and infrastructure in order to access the pipeline before the other. That said, China may decide it’s in its own interests to selectively manage access to the pipeline in order to win concessions on price and upstream contracts in each country, which would provide it potent political leverage with countries that would prefer to develop robust alternatives to exporting hydrocarbons to Russia. But can Beijing afford to play the long game with neighbouring gas suppliers given its fast-growing demand? A look at China’s alternative sources of supply, particularly domestic production and increasing volumes of LNG in the country’s gas supply mix, offer a glimpse of a possible answer. Beijing has prioritized the development of domestic gas supply, partnering with a number of Western oil firms to develop the country’s unconventional gas resources, which are thought to be large. Washington has promoted this cooperation through the US-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative, a mechanism announced in November 2009 to share expertise and technology for unconventional gas production. In addition, LNG spot prices are currently depressed, prompting Chinese energy firms to purchase spot cargoes through the country’s three LNG import terminals. Sixteen more LNG import terminals are under consideration. Such trends point to a relative decline in the importance of Russian and Central Asian gas to China’s energy security future—a narrative that Beijing’s diplomats are sure to promote in Moscow, Ashgabat, Tashkent and Astana. Chinese national oil companies operate with the explicit backing of the Chinese state–including the state budget.In a region where governments treat their oil and gas resources as strategic commodities to be traded for political perquisites, Chinese companies therefore possess an in-built advantage. But more importantly, China’s unity of effort—political and commercial—allows Beijing to act strategically, with long time horizons, in order to secure the best deal. While China couldn’t have predicted the revolution in unconventional gas production or the global recession, its patience has strengthened its bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia and the Central Asian states. Beijing’s engagement also has the tacit consent of Washington. Western policy in the post-Soviet period has been designed to reinforce Central Asian sovereignty by developing export corridors for oil and gas that avoid Russian (and Iranian) territory. While the United States and Europe have had some success on the western edge of the Caspian Sea by constructing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, large-volume trans-Caspian projects for Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas have been delayed for commercial and geopolitical reasons. In this regard, China has developed a non-Russian, non-Iranian export corridor for Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh gas where the West couldn’t (there’s also a Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline in operation). In a sense, this should provide greater stability in an important and strategic part of the world. And China, meanwhile, appears to have not yet attempted to translate its newfound economic heft into political influence to the West’s detriment: Beijing has **so far** avoided pushing for the **curtailment of the Western military presence in Central Asia** despite ongoing worries about ‘encirclement.’ China’s energy trade relationships with Russia and Central Asia should also make the Middle Kingdom feel more assured about its energy security future. Much of China’s naval build-up and assertive behaviour, especially in the South China Sea, in recent years is motivated by concerns about the security of China’s sea-borne energy imports from the Middle East, both oil and LNG. In the post-World War II period, the US Navy has played the role of guarantor of open trade on the high seas, but Beijing appears to believe this commitment won't continue in the event of conflict with Washington over Taiwan or North Korea. The United States’ efforts to help China expand domestic gas production and its lack of opposition to China-bound pipelines out of Central Asia and Russia should be interpreted by Beijing as indicative of the US commitment to help China grow comfortable about its place in the American-led world order. Natural gas is clearly an important component of Beijing’s energy strategy over the next century. Thus far, China’s approach to accessing foreign and domestic sources of supply has proven collaborative, rather than confrontational, in nature. US assistance on Chinese unconventional gas production presages greater cooperation on energy matters, including in clean-tech where Beijing and Washington can best address climate-altering carbon emissions. In Russia and Central Asia, meanwhile, China has husbanded its resources and influence to achieve advantageous deals.

#### That’s the most likely for escalated US-China conflict

Glaser 12 (Bonnie S., Senior Fellow – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” CFR, April, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

**The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant**. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult. A second contingency involves conflict between China and the Philippines over **natural gas deposits**, especially in the disputed area of Reed Bank, located eighty nautical miles from Palawan. Oil survey ships operating in Reed Bank under contract have increasingly been harassed by Chinese vessels. Reportedly, the United Kingdom-based Forum Energy plans to start drilling for gas in Reed Bank this year, which could provoke an aggressive Chinese response. Forum Energy is only one of fifteen exploration contracts that Manila intends to offer over the next few years for offshore exploration near Palawan Island. Reed Bank is a red line for the Philippines, so this contingency could quickly escalate to violence if China intervened to halt the drilling. The United States could be drawn into a China-Philippines conflict because of its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. The treaty states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes." American officials insist that Washington does not take sides in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and refuse to comment on how the United States might respond to Chinese aggression in contested waters. Nevertheless, an apparent gap exists between American views of U.S. obligations and Manila's expectations. In mid-June 2011, a Filipino presidential spokesperson stated that in the event of armed conflict with China, Manila expected the United States would come to its aid. Statements by senior U.S. officials may have inadvertently led Manila to conclude that the United States would provide military assistance if China attacked Filipino forces in the disputed Spratly Islands. With improving political and military ties between Manila and Washington, including a pending agreement to expand U.S. access to Filipino ports and airfields to refuel and service its warships and planes, the United States would have a great deal at stake in a China-Philippines contingency. Failure to respond would not only set back U.S. relations with the Philippines but would also potentially undermine U.S. credibility in the region with its allies and partners more broadly. A U.S. decision to dispatch naval ships to the area, however, would risk a U.S.-China naval confrontation. Disputes between China and Vietnam over seismic surveys or drilling for oil and gas could also trigger an armed clash for a third contingency. China has harassed PetroVietnam oil survey ships in the past that were searching for oil and gas deposits in Vietnam's EEZ. In 2011, Hanoi accused China of deliberately severing the cables of an oil and gas survey vessel in two separate instances. Although the Vietnamese did not respond with force, they did not back down and Hanoi pledged to continue its efforts to exploit new fields despite warnings from Beijing. Budding U.S.-Vietnam relations could embolden Hanoi to be more confrontational with China on the South China Sea issue. The United States could be drawn into a conflict between China and Vietnam, though that is less likely than a clash between China and the Philippines. In a scenario of Chinese provocation, the United States might opt to dispatch naval vessels to the area to signal its interest in regional peace and stability. Vietnam, and possibly other nations, could also request U.S. assistance in such circumstances. Should the United States become involved, subsequent actions by China or a miscalculation among the forces present could result in exchange of fire. In another possible scenario, an attack by China on vessels or rigs operated by an American company exploring or drilling for hydrocarbons could quickly involve the United States, especially if American lives were endangered or lost. ExxonMobil has plans to conduct exploratory drilling off Vietnam, making this an existential danger. In the short term, however, the likelihood of this third contingency occurring is relatively low given the recent thaw in Sino-Vietnamese relations. In October 2011, China and Vietnam signed an agreement outlining principles for resolving maritime issues. The effectiveness of this agreement remains to be seen, but for now tensions appear to be defused. Warning Indicators Strategic warning signals that indicate heightened risk of conflict include political decisions and statements by senior officials, official and unofficial media reports, and logistical changes and equipment modifications. In the contingencies described above, strategic warning indicators could include heightened rhetoric from all or some disputants regarding their territorial and strategic interests. For example, China may explicitly refer to the South China Sea as a core interest; in 2010 Beijing hinted this was the case but subsequently backed away from the assertion. Beijing might also warn that it cannot "stand idly by" as countries nibble away at Chinese territory, a formulation that in the past has often signaled willingness to use force. Commentaries and editorials in authoritative media outlets expressing China's bottom line and issuing ultimatums could also be a warning indicator. Tough language could also be used by senior People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers in meetings with their American counterparts. An increase in nationalistic rhetoric in nonauthoritative media and in Chinese blogs, even if not representing official Chinese policy, would nevertheless signal pressure on the Chinese leadership to defend Chinese interests. Similar warning indicators should be tracked in Vietnam and the Philippines that might signal a hardening of those countries' positions. Tactical warning signals that indicate heightened risk of a potential clash in a specific time and place include commercial notices and preparations, diplomatic and/or military statements warning another claimant to cease provocative activities or suffer the consequences, military exercises designed to intimidate another claimant, and ship movements to disputed areas. As for an impending incident regarding U.S. surveillance activities, statements and unusual preparations by the PLA might suggest a greater willingness to employ more aggressive means to intercept U.S. ships and aircraft. Implications for U.S. Interests The United States has significant political, security, and economic interests at stake if one of the contingencies should occur. Global rules and norms. The United States has important interests in the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes according to international law. With the exception of China, all the claimants of the South China Sea have attempted to justify their claims based on their coastlines and the provisions of UNCLOS. China, however, relies on a mix of historic rights and legal claims, while remaining deliberately ambiguous about the meaning of the "nine-dashed line" around the sea that is drawn on Chinese maps. Failure to uphold international law and norms could harm U.S. interests elsewhere in the region and beyond. Ensuring freedom of navigation is another critical interest of the United States and other regional states. Although China claims that it supports freedom of navigation, its insistence that foreign militaries seek advance permission to sail in its two-hundred-mile EEZ casts doubt on its stance. China's development of capabilities to deny American naval access to those waters in a conflict provides evidence of possible Chinese intentions to block freedom of navigation in specific contingencies. Alliance security and regional stability. U.S. allies and friends around the South China Sea look to the United States to maintain free trade, safe and secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and overall peace and stability in the region. Claimants and nonclaimants to land features and maritime waters in the South China Sea view the U.S. military presence as necessary to allow decision-making free of intimidation. If nations in the South China Sea lose confidence in the United States to serve as the principal regional security guarantor, they could embark on costly and potentially destabilizing arms buildups to compensate or, alternatively, become more accommodating to the demands of a powerful China. Neither would be in the U.S. interest. Failure to reassure allies of U.S. commitments in the region could also undermine U.S. security guarantees in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the United States must avoid getting drawn into the territorial dispute—and possibly into a conflict—by regional nations who seek U.S. backing to legitimize their claims. Economic interests. Each year, $5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea; U.S. trade accounts for $1.2 trillion of this total. Should a crisis occur, the diversion of cargo ships to other routes would harm regional economies as a result of an increase in insurance rates and longer transits. Conflict of any scale in the South China Sea would hamper the claimants from benefiting from the South China's Sea's proven and potential riches. Cooperative relationship with China. The stakes and implications of any U.S.-China incident are far greater than in other scenarios. The United States has an abiding interest in preserving stability in the U.S.-China relationship so that it can continue to secure Beijing's cooperation on an expanding list of regional and global issues and more tightly integrate China into the prevailing international system. Preventive Options Efforts should continue to resolve the disputes over territorial sovereignty of the South China Sea's land features, rightful jurisdiction over the waters and seabed, and the legality of conducting military operations within a country's EEZ, but the likelihood of a breakthrough in any of these areas is slim in the near term. In the meantime, the United States should focus on lowering the risk of potential armed clashes arising from either miscalculation or unintended escalation of a dispute. There are several preventive options available to policymakers—in the United States and other nations—to avert a crisis and conflict in the South China Sea. These options are not mutually exclusive. Support U.S.-China Risk-reduction Measures Operational safety measures and expanded naval cooperation between the United States and China can help to reduce the risk of an accident between ships and aircraft. The creation of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 1988 was intended to establish "rules of the road" at sea similar to the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), but it has not been successful. Communication mechanisms can provide a means to defuse tensions in a crisis and prevent escalation. Political and military hotlines have been set up, though U.S. officials have low confidence that they would be utilized by their Chinese counterparts during a crisis. An additional hotline to manage maritime emergencies should be established at an operational level, along with a signed political agreement committing both sides to answer the phone in a crisis. Joint naval exercises to enhance the ability of the two sides to cooperate in counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations could increase cooperation and help prevent a U.S.-China conflict. Bolster Capabilities of Regional Actors Steps could be taken to further enhance the capability of the Philippines military to defend its territorial and maritime claims and improve its indigenous domain awareness, which might deter China from taking aggressive action. Similarly, the United States could boost the maritime surveillance capabilities of Vietnam, enabling its military to more effectively pursue an anti-access and area-denial strategy. Such measures run the risk of emboldening the Philippines and Vietnam to more assertively challenge China and could raise those countries' expectations of U.S. assistance in a crisis. Encourage Settlement of the Sovereignty Dispute The United States could push for submission of territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for settlement, or encourage an outside organization or mediator to be called upon to resolve the dispute. However, the prospect for success in these cases is slim given China's likely opposition to such options. Other options exist to resolve the sovereignty dispute that would be difficult, but not impossible, to negotiate. One such proposal, originally made by Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke, and Noel Ludwig in Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, would establish "regional sovereignty" over the islands in the South China Sea among the six claimants, allowing them to collectively manage the islands, territorial seas, and airspace. Another option put forward by Peter Dutton of the Naval War College would emulate the resolution of the dispute over Svalbard, an island located between Norway and Greenland. The Treaty of Spitsbergen, signed in 1920, awarded primary sovereignty over Svarlbard to Norway but assigned resource-related rights to all signatories. This solution avoided conflict over resources and enabled advancement of scientific research. Applying this model to the South China Sea would likely entail giving sovereignty to China while permitting other countries to benefit from the resources. In the near term, at least, such a solution is unlikely to be accepted by the other claimants. Promote Regional Risk-reduction Measures The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China agreed upon multilateral risk-reduction and confidence-building measures in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), but have neither adhered to its provisions (for example, to resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes without resorting to the threat or use of force) nor implemented its proposals to undertake cooperative trust-building activities. The resumption of negotiations between China and ASEAN after a hiatus of a decade holds out promise for reinvigorating cooperative activities under the DOC. Multilaterally, existing mechanisms and procedures already exist to promote operational safety among regional navies; a new arrangement is unnecessary. The United States, China, and all ASEAN members with the exception of Laos and Burma are members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Founded in 1988, WPNS brings regional naval leaders together biennially to discuss maritime security. In 2000, it produced the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES), which includes safety measures and procedures and means to facilitate communication when ships and aircraft make contact. There are also other mechanisms available such as the International Maritime Organization's Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and the International Civil Aviation Organization's rules of the air. In addition, regional navies could cooperate in sea environment protection, scientific research at sea, search and rescue activities, and mitigation of damage caused by natural calamities. The creation of new dialogue mechanisms may also be worth consideration. A South China Sea Coast Guard Forum, modeled after the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which cooperates on a multitude of maritime security and legal issues, could enhance cooperation through information sharing and knowledge of best practices. The creation of a South China Sea information-sharing center would also provide a platform to improve awareness and communication between relevant parties. The information-sharing center could also serve as an accountability mechanism if states are required to document any incidents and present them to the center. Advocate Joint Development/Multilateral Economic Cooperation Resource cooperation is another preventive option that is underutilized by claimants in the South China Sea. Joint development of petroleum resources, for example, could reduce tensions between China and Vietnam, and between China and the Philippines, on issues related to energy security and access to hydrocarbon resources. Such development could be modeled on one of the many joint development arrangements that exist in the South and East China seas. Parties could also cooperate on increasing the use of alternative energy sources in order to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. Shared concerns about declining fish stocks in the South China Sea suggest the utility of cooperation to promote conservation and sustainable development. Establishing a joint fisheries committee among claimants could prove useful. Fishing agreements between China and its neighbors are already in place that could be expanded into disputed areas to encourage greater cooperation. Clearly Convey U.S. Commitments The United States should avoid inadvertently encouraging the claimants to engage in confrontational behavior. For example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's reference in November 2011 to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea could have unintended consequences such as emboldening Manila to antagonize China rather than it seeking to peacefully settle their differences.

#### Nuclear war

Lieven 12 (Anatol, Professor in the War Studies Department – King’s College (London), Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Washington), “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, 6-12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html)

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

#### Recognizing conflict as *one possible* outcome for U.S. –China relations doesn’t essentialize Chinese behavior—it helps boost support for policies that alleviate sources of conflict like nuclear posture—avoids self-fulfilling prophecy.

Andrew **LEONARD** Senior Technology Writier @ Salon 8-21-**‘9** “Hu Jintao is no Kaiser Wilhelm” http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2009/08/21/hu\_jintao\_is\_the\_new\_kaiser\_wilhelm/

I don't think Hu Jintao makes a good Kaiser Wilhelm and I think it is foolhardy to predict what will happen with the kind of thunderous certainty that is Ferguson's stock-in-trade. A superpower clash, whether economic or military, between the U.S. and China is in no one's interest. World War I, of course, wasn't ultimately in anyone's interest either, but Europe seems to have learned from its 20th century mistakes, at least so far, so maybe we can too. I'm with James Fallows; just to assert that a disastrous divorce is **inevitable** is positively dangerous because it ignores a **world of other possibilities**, and constricts our freedom to move.

Even historians -- or especially historians -- recognize that world events are shaped in part by deep economic, demographic, and technical trends, but only in part. Real human beings make real decisions that have real effects. (Cf: LBJ in 1964, Bush-Cheney in 2001, JFK-Khrushchev in 1962, etc.) If we recognize that a collision with China is **possible,** but **only one of several possibilities**, then we act so as to reduce that possibility and increase the probability of **better outcomes**. If we think breakup is inevitable, as Ferguson is arguing, then the odds of a collision in fact occurring become higher than they would otherwise be. (Because each side interprets the other's moves in the darkest way and responds in kind.)

#### Pan agrees with our scenario

Pan 4 (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 154-156)

To sum up, in this chapter, I have argued that the (neo)realist ‘China threat’ literature is primarily a discursive construction of Otherness. A construction predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the American self, with a positivist-cum-realist obsession with absolute certainty, security, and power. Within this self/Other framework, it is imperative that China be treated as an absolute threat so that U.S. preponderance in the post-Cold War world in general and in Asia in particular can continue to be legitimated and maintained. Thus, not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of nuanced understanding of China as a dynamic, multifaceted country, but it is also responsible for the creation of the policy of containment which, even in the guise of ‘crisis management,’ can have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy plane incident have vividly attested. Like in the past, the ‘threat/containment’ theory as practice is not only confrontational in itself, but also tends to have a self-fulfilling effect in terms of hardening Chinese worldview and foreign behaviour (a theme I will take up in Chapter 7). For instance, should the U.S. press ahead with a missile defence shield to both contain China and ‘guarantee’ its own invulnerability, it would be almost certain to intensify China’s sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal to maintain the credibility of its limited deterrence. As a result, it is far from unthinkable that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would ultimately make war more likely. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that “A policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China.”  Apparently, neither the U.S. nor the PRC wants open war with the other. Neoconservative writers Robert Kagan and William Kristol maintain that “we do not seek war with China.”  But the point is that the ‘China threat’ theorists, for all their alleged desire for peace and stability, tend to make war preparedness the most ‘realistic’ option for both sides. In this instance, therefore, intention, while important, may not be enough, just as all the ‘good, friendly’ intention on the part of the U.S. had not been able to avoid the ‘loss of China’ half a century ago. On this point, and to conclude this chapter, I want to draw attention to an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist, on the Vietnam War. He says, “Nobody wants it. We don’t want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn’t want it; it’s simply a question of annoying the other side.”  Yet, as we now know, goaded by the fear of a rather illusive Communist threat in Southeast Asia, this ‘unwanted war’ in the end not only materialised, but it also claimed the lives of some 58,000 young Americans, as well as the lives of 2 million Vietnamese men, women, and children, and achieved virtually nothing else. Three decades on, the lesson, it seems, remains to be fully learned by ‘China threat’ theorists. As noted throughout this thesis thus far, the (neo)realist discourse of China as a threat is just one of the two dominant perspectives in the study of Chinese foreign relations. The other perspective, a (neo)liberal discourse, looks at China primarily in terms of ‘opportunity.’ It is this literature that I now want to turn my attention to in the chapter to follow, and explore the questions of both how this knowledge, its more ‘positive’ representation notwithstanding, remains a discursive practice of constructing Otherness, and what its implications are for contemporary Sino-Western relations.

#### Independently – US-China clean tech cooperation solves warming

Lieberthal and Sandalow 9 (Kenneth, Visiting Fellow – Brookings Institution, Professor – University of Michigan, and David, Senior Fellow – The Brookings Institution, January, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/1/climate%20change%20lieberthal%20sandalow/01_climate_change_lieberthal_sandalow>)

Climate change is an epic threat. Concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are higher than at any time in human history and rising sharply. Predicted consequences include sea-level rise, more severe storms, more intense droughts and floods, forest loss and the spread of tropical disease. Each of these phenomena is **already** occurring. Every year of delay in reducing greenhouse gas emissions puts the planet at greater risk. The United States and China play central roles in global warming. During the past century, the United States emitted more greenhouse gases than any other country—a fact often noted, since carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas, remains in the atmosphere for roughly 100 years. However, in 2007, China may have surpassed the United States as the world’s top annual emitter of carbon dioxide. 1 Together, the two countries are responsible for over 40% of the greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere each year. For the world to meet the challenge of global warming, the United States and China must each make the transition to a low-carbon economy. Far-reaching changes will be needed. To date, however, each nation has used the other as one reason not do to more. Enormous benefits would be possible if this dynamic were replaced with mutual understanding and joint efforts on a large scale. Yet cooperation will not be easy. The U.S. and China are separated by different histories, different cultures, and different perspectives. Opportunities for collaboration in fighting climate change and promoting clean energy are plentiful, but moving forward at the scale needed will require high-level political support in two very different societies and systems that have considerable suspicion of the other. This report identifies major barriers to cooperation and recommends ways to overcome them. The time for large-scale U.S.-China cooperation on climate change and clean energy is now. Unless both countries change course soon, ongoing investments in 20th century technologies will commit the world as a whole to dangerous levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in the decades ahead. Recent political and technological developments make the benefits of such cooperation especially compelling. Furthermore, thirty years after normalization and with the start of a new administration in the United States, the U.S. China relationship is ready to move to a new stage. This new stage will initiate full bilateral consultation and cooperation where possible on the most critical global issues of the era. Climate change and clean energy are at the top of the list. This “new stage” does not envision a U.S.-China condominium or alliance. Any U.S.-China agreements must be supplements to—not substitutes for—other relationships and obligations. If handled properly, such agreements will increase bilateral and global capacities to manage critical world challenges. The major failing in U.S.-China relations to date is that, despite much progress over the past 30 years, mutual distrust over each other’s long-term intentions remains deep—and perhaps has even grown in recent years. By making active cooperation on critical global issues a centerpiece of the relationship, both countries’ governments can increase trust over long-term intentions and thereby reduce the chances of slipping into mutual antagonism over the coming 10-20 years. In particular, U.S.-China cooperation can make each side less inclined to point to the other as a reason to do less at home to fight global warming. It can also contribute to the success of multilateral climate change negotiations. Having the U.S. and China successfully manage issues that have divided industrialized and developing countries in the global climate change negotiations can help shape acceptable multilateral climate change agreements for the post-Kyoto period. Finally, U.S.-China cooperation on climate change and clean energy can also help each country enhance its energy security and pursue a sustainable economic path that will create jobs and promote economic recovery.

#### Extinction

Mazo 10 (Jeffrey Mazo – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122)

The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be **catastrophic for the stability and security of countries** in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects **on security of widespread state failure** and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.

#### Intervention has irreparably altered the environment. Abandoning management risks extinction.

Levy 99 (Neil, Ph.D. in Comparative Literature and Critical Theory – Monash University, and Currently Tutor, Centre for Critical Theory – Monash University, Discourses of the Environment edited by Eric Darier, p. 214-215)

If our current situation can really be accurately characterized as the extension of bio-power from the realm of population to that of all life, does that entail that the strategies we should be adopting are those of management of the non-human world, as well as that of the human? I believe that it does. But I do not believe that this necessitates, or even makes possible, the genetically engineered, artificial world which McKibben and many others who have advocated non-anthropocentric ethics have feared, the replacement of the natural world with `a space station' (McKibben 1989: 170). And not just for the reason that, after the end of nature, the artificial/natural distinction is impossible to maintain. The world McKibben fears, in which forests are replaced by trees designed by us for maximum efficiency at absorbing carbon, and new strains of genetically engineered corn flourish in the new conditions brought about by global warming, seems to me unlikely in the extreme. The systems with which we are dealing, the imbrication of a huge variety of forms of life with chemical processes, with meteorological and geographic processes, are so complex, and occur on such scale, that I can see no way in which they could be replaced by artificial systems which would fulfil the same functions. Every intervention we make in' that direction has consequences which are so far-reaching, and involve so many variables and as yet undetected connections between relatively independent systems, that they are practically unforeseeable. To replace non-human systems with mechanisms of our own devising would involve thousands of such interventions, each of which would then require follow-up interventions in order to reverse or control their unintended consequences. Even when, and if, our knowledge of the environment were to reach a stage at which we were able to predict the consequences of our interventions, it would be likely to be far easier, and, in the long run, cheaper, simply to turn the already functioning, `natural' systems to our advantage. No method of reducing the amount of carbon dioxide in our atmosphere is likely to be more effective than preserving the Amazonian rain forest. For this reason, I believe, environmentalists have nothing to fear fromsuchan apparently instrumental approach. If the `technological fix' is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are nevertheless unable simply to leave the environment as it is.There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have **already** set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is not us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current green-house gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province of Foucault's specific intellectual**,** the one who works `within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them' (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as `the strategists of life and death' than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man's `politics places his existence as a living being in question' (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the **fate of our species**, and of those with whom we share this planet, **will be decided**.

#### Their critique will be re-deployed to destroy the environment

Wapner 3 (Paul, Associate Professor and Director of the Global Environmental Policy Program – American University, “Leftist Criticism of”, Dissent, Winter, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539)

Most of us are familiar with rightist attacks on environmentalism. For a long time, many people on the right have faulted environmentalists for wanting to curtail free enterprise, limit private property, and abridge individual freedom in the service of environmental well-being. We are less familiar with leftist criticism. Over the past decade or so, however, some parts of the left have launched their own attacks on environmentalism, and, although these are more philosophical in character, they threaten the movement every bit as much as those coming from the right. Leftist environmental criticism is the work of a group of postmodern intellectuals and professors. Postmodernists expose the constructed quality of those things we take for granted. They unmask the given and show that "what is" is not necessarily "meant to be," but rather is a consequence of particular decisions and socio-historical conditions. Postmodernism is a natural ally of the left in that it deconstructs existing conditions and shows that, although they may appear natural or necessary, they are really contingent; they can be changed. This is a doctrine that has helped people look critically at their society and consider the possibility of other arrangements. Leftist critiques of environmentalism start from this same premise. They point out that our notions of nature-the nonhuman world that environmentalists care so much about-are themselves social constructions and thus subject to various interpretations, none of which can provide absolute guidance for environmental policy. We never experience nature directly but always through the lenses of our own values and assumptions. "Nature" is thus not simply a physical entity that is "out there" or given; it is an idea that takes on different meanings in different cultural contexts, a social construction that directs us to see mountains, rivers, trees, and deserts in particular ways. Raymond Williams expressed this understanding when he wrote, "The idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history." To postmodernists, "nature" is not something the mind discovers but something that it makes. This understanding of "nature" is helpful in guarding against insensitive environmentalist projects. We often assume that everyone concerned with a particular environmental issue shares the same understanding of the problem. But this is far from being the case. When it comes to preserving wilderness areas or protecting biological diversity, one person's wilderness is another person's neighborhood. What one person values as an endangered species is potential income, a threat, or dinner to someone else. Leftist criticism has been important in reminding us that "nature" is not a single realm with a universalized meaning, but a canvas on which we project our sensibilities, our culture, and our ideas about what is socially necessary. The postmodern argument also poses challenges for anyone concerned with environmental protection. Environmentalism is fundamentally about conserving and preserving nature. Whether one worries about climate change, loss of biological diversity, dwindling resources, or overall degradation of the earth's air, water, soil, and species, the nonhuman world is the backdrop of concern. What happens when critics call this backdrop into question? What happens when they claim that one understanding of "nature" is at odds with another and that there is no definitive way to judge which one is better? How can a movement dedicated to protecting nature operate if the very identity of its concern is in doubt? These may seem like academic questions, but they go to the heart of environmentalism and have begun to worry even the most committed environmentalists. After scholars such as William Cronon, Timothy Luke, and J. Baird Callicott introduced "eco-criticism" to the scholarly and popular publics, various environmental activists and thinkers have struggled to articulate a response. Their inability to do so in a decisive and persuasive manner has further damaged the environmentalist position. Even more troubling, now that the critique is out of the bag, it is **being co-opted by** people on **the right**. Anti-environmentalists such as Charles Rubin and Alston Chase, for example, now claim that, if there is no such thing as "real" nature, we need not treat the nonhuman world with unqualified respect. If we think it is in our interest, we can freely choose to pave the rainforest, wipe out the last panda bear, or pump high levels of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. What is critical to notice in both cases is that criticisms of "nature," whether they come from the left or are co-opted by the right, are playing an increasing role in structuring the confrontation between anti- and pro-environmentalists. And they are re-setting the fault lines within the environmental movement itself.

## 2AC

### Case

#### Primacy has resulted in the lowest level of war in history – best stats prove

**Owen 2011** (John – professor of politics at the University of Virginia, Don’t Discount Hegemony, p. www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, **things have been getting better**. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the **downward trend in international war**, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “**democratic peace**” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “**commercial peace**” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all **plausible mechanisms for peace**. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically **American hegemony**. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that **for the global economy to remain open**—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—**one powerful country must take the lead**. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that **American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world**. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a **deeper cause of the proximate causes** outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) **render violence irrational**. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has **prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism** that entails economic openness and produces **sustainable economic growth**. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and **left market capitalism the best model**. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, **eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence** in the Third World.) What we call **globalization** is **caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon**. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the **spread of democracy**. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### Sequestration means no mil leverage

### Solvency – A2: No Infrastructure for Exports

#### We can use import tech for exports

Levi 12 (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project – Brookings Institute, June, Discussion Paper 2012-04, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20exports%20levi/06\_exports\_levi)

Additional gains would be realized because natural gas exports would exploit existing LNG infrastructure (i.e. some parts of existing import terminals) that would otherwise go unused and thus be worthless. These gains should approximately equal the value of the utilized LNG terminals (not including the value of their regasification facilities, which are not useful for exports), which are typically on the order of $1 billion for each billion cubic feet a day of capacity. Spread over a notional fifteen-year use period, this would add approximately $70 million a year for each billion cubic feet a day of exports. This brings the total estimated surplus from six billion cubic feet a day of exports to $3.1 billion to $3.7 billion.

### Renewables

#### No tradeoff – natural gas investment doesn’t tradeoff with renewables

Lacey 12 (Stephen, “Top Three Reasons Cheap Natural Gas Won’t Kill Renewable Energy”, 2/21, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/02/21/421319/top-three-reasons-cheap-natural-gas-wont-kill-renewable-energy/?mobile=nc)

Over the years, the conversation around gas has changed dramatically in renewable energy circles. For example, up until 2008 when gas prices were at their peak and wind development was soaring, the industry’s message was simple: We’re a far more cost-effective, reliable investment than gas. But the tide turned in 2009, when gas prices started their precipitous drop. I remember the American Wind Energy Association’s annual conference in 2010, when shale gas dominated the CEO roundtable discussion. “Our single biggest challenge is improving technologies to compete with these low prices,” said one executive. The industry clearly took the challenge seriously. Today, due to bigger turbines, more reliable equipment and better materials, the cost of wind has dropped to record lows. In fact, some developers are even signing long-term power purchase agreements in the 3 cents a kilowatt-hour range. And last fall, Bloomberg New Energy Finance projected that wind would be “fully competitive with energy produced from combined-cycle gas turbines by 2016″ under fair wind conditions. The same technological improvements and maturation in project development in wind are driving down the cost of solar PV as well. For example, in California, solar developers have signed contracts for power below the projected price of natural gas from a 500-MW combined cycle power plant. (That projection does include a carbon price). These trends are driving record levels of interest from investors. In 2011, for the first time ever, global investments in renewable energy surpassed investments in fossil fuels. The bottom line: the price of renewable energy continues to come down while the projected price of natural gas is only expected to rise. We do have to be realistic about the situation: assuming gas prices stay near record low levels for a long period of time — which they likely won’t — renewables deployment won’t grow at the rate we need it to. But if you look at the where large-scale renewables stack up with the cost of energy from peaking gas plants and combined cycle plants (chart above), you can see that the industry is still nipping at the heels of gas — even with a “revolution” underway in accessing shale resources. That’s something that can’t be ignored.

#### Natural gas acts as a bridge fuel—spurring broad renewable development

Ju 12 (Anne Ju – senior science writer for the Cornell Chronicle) July 17, 2012 “Study Proves Natural Gas Can Bridge the Gap to a Clean Energy Economy” http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Study-Proves-Natural-Gas-Can-Bridge-the-Gap-to-a-Clean-Energy-Economy.html)

Natural gas is a good transition step on the road to greener energy sources like wind, solar, and nuclear power, says a new study. Lawrence M. Cathles, Cornell University professor of earth and atmospheric sciences, says natural gas is a smart move in the battle against global climate change. Published in the most recent edition of the journal Geochemistry, Geophysics and Geosystems, Cathles’ study reviews the most recent government and industry data on natural gas “leakage rates” during extraction, as well as recently developed climate models. He concludes that regardless of the time frame considered, substituting natural gas energy for all coal and some oil production provides about 40 percent of the global warming benefit that a complete switch to low-carbon sources would deliver. “From a greenhouse point of view, it would be better to replace coal electrical facilities with nuclear plants, wind farms, and solar panels, but replacing them with natural gas stations will be faster, cheaper, and achieve 40 percent of the low-carbon-fast benefit,” Cathles writes in the study. “Gas is a natural transition fuel that could represent the biggest stabilization wedge available to us.” Cathles’ study includes additional findings about expanding the use of natural gas as an energy source, as well as the climate impact of “unconventional” gas drilling methods, including hydraulic fracturing in shale formations. They include the following: • Although a more rapid transition to natural gas from coal and some oil produces a greater overall benefit for climate change, the 40 percent of low-carbon energy benefit remains no matter how quickly the transition is made, and no matter the effect of ocean modulation or other climate regulating forces. • Although some critics of natural gas as a transition fuel have cited leakage rates as high as 8 percent or more of total production during drilling—particularly hydraulic fracturing extraction—more recent industry data and a critical examination of Environmental Protection Agency data supports leakage rates closer to 1.5 percent for both conventional and hydrofractured wells. • Even at higher leakage rates, using natural gas as a transition to low-carbon energy sources is still a better policy than “business as usual” with coal and oil, due to the different rates of decay (and hence long-term global warming effect) of carbon dioxide released in greater amounts by burning coal and oil and any methane released during natural gas extraction. • Using natural gas as a transition fuel supports the push to low-carbon sources by providing the “surge capacity” when needed, or a buffer when solar and wind production wanes**.** “The most important message of the calculations reported here is that substituting natural gas for coal and oil is a significant way to reduce greenhouse forcing, regardless of how long the substitution takes,” Cathles writes. “A faster transition to low-carbon energy sources would decrease greenhouse warming further, but the substitution of natural gas for other fossil fuels is equally beneficial in percentage terms no matter how fast the transition.”

### T - Substantial

#### The OCS contains 398 tcf total

Robertson 12 (Jessica – USGS, “World’s Oil and Gas Endowment “, 4/18, http://www.usgs.gov/blogs/features/usgs\_top\_story/worlds-oil-and-gas-endowment/)

The U.S. Geological Survey released in April a new global estimate for conventional oil and gas resources. The USGS estimates that the undiscovered, conventional resources in the world total 565 billion barrels of oil (bbo), 5,606 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, and 167 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. All of these numbers represent technically recoverable resources, which are those quantities of oil and gas producible using currently available technology and industry practices, regardless of economic or accessibility considerations. “In the twelve years since the last assessment, the steady progress in technology now allows additional resources to be regarded as technically recoverable,” said USGS Director Marcia McNutt. “By placing this information in the public domain, government leaders, investors, public and private corporations, and citizens have a common information base for planning and decisions that affect the global environment and market place.” Vertical limestone beds forming cliffs along Three Pagodas-Fault Zone near Hua Hin, Thailand. This area was included in the USGS report, “An Estimate of Undiscovered Conventional Oil and Gas Resources of the World, 2012.” This new assessment is complete reassessment of the world since the last World Petroleum Assessment in 2000 by the USGS. The report includes mean estimates of resources in 171 geologic provinces of the world. These estimates include resources beneath both onshore and offshore areas. Resources in the United States This assessment does not include undiscovered, conventional resources in theUnited States, which the USGS currently estimates holds 27 bbo and 388 tcf of natural gas onshore and in State waters. Additionally, there are an estimated 81 bbo and 398 tcf of natural gas in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), according to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.

#### Substantially means “of ample or considerable amount” – that’s dictionary.com

(http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/substantial)

### **Apocalyptic Rhetoric K**

#### K doesn’t come first

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

Aff kt/ pol engagement good

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in developing the skills, attitudes, and values that will enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring about change, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest.¶ FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION¶ Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the knowledge that is likely to promote sociopolitical action and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) scientific and technological knowledge that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the desirability of those outcomes. Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. It is essential that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and political system(s) that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and national government and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the mechanisms by which decisions are reached, intervention is not possible. Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which sociopolitical action depends is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the establishment of policy.

#### Images of catastrophe cause an empathic shift to common humanity---creates the condition for empathetic relationships that eschew the politically anesthetizing form of politics their evidence criticizes---and, this is especially crucial in the context of policy debates and advocacy simulations

Recuber 11 Timothy Recuber is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the Graduate Center of the City. University of New York. He has taught at Hunter College in Manhattan "CONSUMING CATASTROPHE: AUTHENTICITY AND EMOTION IN MASS-MEDIATED DISASTER" gradworks.umi.com/3477831.pdf

Perhaps, then, what distant consumers express when they sit glued to the television watching a disaster replayed over and over, when they buy t-shirts or snow globes, when they mail teddy bears to a memorial, or when they tour a disaster site, is a deep, maybe subconscious, longing for those age-old forms of community and real human compassion that emerge in a place when disaster has struck. It is a longing in some ways so alien to the world we currently live in that it requires catastrophe to call it forth, even in our imaginations. Nevertheless, the actions of unadulterated goodwill that become commonplace in harrowing conditions represent the truly authentic form of humanity that all of us, to one degree or another, chase after in contemporary consumer culture every day. And while it is certainly a bit foolhardy to seek authentic humanity through disaster-related media and culture, the sheer strength of that desire has been evident in the public’s response to all the disasters, crises and catastrophes to hit the United States in the past decade. The millions of television viewers who cried on September 11, or during Hurricane Katrina and the Virginia Tech shootings, and the thousands upon thousands who volunteered their time, labor, money, and even their blood, as well as the countless others who created art, contributed to memorials, or adorned their cars or bodies with disaster-related paraphernalia— despite the fact that many knew no one who had been personally affected by any of these disasters—all attest to a desire for real human community and compassion that is woefully unfulfilled by American life under normal conditions today.

 In the end, the consumption of disaster doesn’t make us unable or unwilling to engage with disasters on a communal level, or towards progressive political ends—it makes us feel as if we already have, simply by consuming. It is ultimately less a form of political anesthesia than a simulation of politics, a Potemkin village of communal sentiment, that fills our longing for a more just and humane world with disparate acts of cathartic consumption. Still, the positive political potential underlying such consumption—the desire for real forms of connection and community—remains the most redeeming feature of disaster consumerism. Though that desire is frequently warped when various media lenses refract it, diffuse it, or reframe it to fit a political agenda, its overwhelming strength should nonetheless serve notice that people want a different world than the one in which we currently live, with a different way of understanding and responding to disasters. They want a world where risk is not leveraged for profit or political gain, but sensibly planned for with the needs of all socio-economic groups in mind. They want a world where preemptive strategies are used to anticipate the real threats posed by global climate change and global inequality, rather than to invent fears of ethnic others and justify unnecessary wars. They want a world where people can come together not simply as a market, but as a public, to exert real agency over the policies made in the name of their safety and security. And, when disaster does strike, they want a world where the goodwill and compassion shown by their neighbors, by strangers in their communities, and even by distant spectators and consumers, will be matched by their own government. Though this vision of the world is utopian, it is not unreasonable, and if contemporary American culture is ever to give us more than just an illusion of safety, or empathy, or authenticity, then it is this vision that we must advocate on a daily basis, not only when disaster strikes.

#### Their alternative is fake radicalism – does nothing to improve the material conditions of the insecure

Booth 5 (Kenneth, Professor of International Politics – University of Wales-Aberystwyth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 270-271, footnote on 277)

Postmodern/poststructural engagement with the subject of security in international relations has been characterized by some of the general problems of the genre, notably obscurantism, relativism, and **faux radicalism**.26 What has particularly troubled critics of the postmodern sensibility has been the latter's underlying conception of politics.27 Terry Eagleton, for one, has praised the "rich body of work" by postmodern writers in some areas but at the same time has contested the genre's "cultural relativism and moral conventionalism, its scepticism, pragmatism and localism, its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined organization, [and] its lack of any adequate theory of political agency."28 Eagleton made these comments as part of a general critique of the postmodern sensibility, but I would argue that specific writing on security in international relations from postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives has generally done nothing to ease such concerns. Eagleton's fundamental worry was how postmodernism would "shape up" to the test of fascism as a serious political challenge. Other writers, studying particular political contexts, such as postapartheid South Africa, have shown similar worries; they have questioned the **lack of concrete or specific resources** that such theories can add to the repertoire of reconstruction strategies.29 Richard A. Wilson, an anthropologist interested in human rights, has generalized exactly the same concern, namely, that the postmodernist rejection of metanarratives and universal solidarities does not deliver a helpful politics to people in trouble. As he puts it, "Rights without a metanarrative are like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications, the passenger's safety is jeopardised."30 The struggle within South Africa to bring down the institutionalized racism of apartheid benefited greatly from the growing strength of universal human rights values (which delegitimized racism and legitimized equality) and their advocacy by groups in different countries and cultures showing their political solidarity in material and other ways. Anxiety about the politics of postmodernism and poststructuralism is provoked, in part, by the negative conceptualization of security projected by their exponents. The poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security cannot be common or positive-sum but must always be zero-sum, with somebody's security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. At the same time, security itself is questioned as a desirable goal for societies because of the assumption of poststructuralist writers that the search for security is necessarily conservative and will result in negative consequences for somebody. They tend also to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a **middle-class affront to the truly insecure**.31

*Cut to footnote on page 277—*

31. Examples of the approach are **Dillon**, *The Politics of Security*; **and Der Derian**, “The Value of Security,” in Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*.

In the shadow of such views, it is not surprising that the postmodern/poststructuralist genre is sometimes seen as having affinities with realism. Political realists and poststructuralists seem to share a fatalistic view that humans are doomed to insecurity; regard the search for emancipation as both futile and dangerous; believe in a notion of the human condition; and relativize norms. Both leave power where it is in the world: deconstruction and deterrence are equally static theories.

#### Perm do both---it is a contingent recognition of the capacity of catastrophe to forge relations of empathy---disaster reps don’t cause compassion fatigue or anxiety, and the alt alone is epistemic colonialism by circumscribing possible responses

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Conclusion: Contemporary Disaster Consumption and the Aura

Recently the trend among scholars and cultural critics has been to argue that media culture has grown increasingly focused on the tragic and disastrous, often elevating minor events to disproportionately high levels of public concern through incessant multi-media hype. Herbert Gans (1979) found that journalists were worried about inducing panic and disorder, and tried to steer clear of reporting that they thought would encourage such behavior, but the “moral panic” literature in sociology and criminology, beginning with Cohen’s (1972) seminal study of the misguided British panic over violent youth gangs, suggests otherwise. By 1999, Glassner had argued credibly that the media was inducing a “culture of fear” by drumming up anxieties over a host of largely invented crises and threats. Similar arguments have also been made by Furedi (1997) and Stearns (2006), to name just a couple, though these arguments are not very different from turn-of-the-century concerns over journalistic sensationalism. They all take the position that new technologies enable greater manipulation of public emotions, in ways which prevent reasoned or rational consideration of facts, or of more important but less exciting news stories.

Although consumer culture does certainly rely on increasingly high levels of spectacle (see 63 Ritzer, 1999), consumers may also grow accustomed to, and thus less affected by, media technologies and consumption styles over time. Radio broadcasts and color photographs were once accused of the same deleterious, panic-inducing effects as twenty-four-hour cable news channels and Hollywood disaster movies, though the former are now seen as antiquated or unremarkable. This gradual inducement to complacency is the reverse side of contemporary media criticism; instead of frenzy and panic, some critics cite the media’s erosion of affect, its generation of “compassion fatigue” (Moeller, 1999), or “empty empathy” (Kaplan, 2005). The question then becomes how to reconcile these two perspectives; are we too concerned with disasters, or not concerned enough? Is our concern empty or genuine?

In reality, these perspectives are not mutually exclusive. The contemporary state of disaster consumption hints at new conceptions of authenticity and genuineness that encompass, or perhaps circumvent, both views. Understandings of authenticity often begin with the notion that authentic experiences are unmediated, un-reproducible, locked in a particular time and space. In the face of such a position, the only response to the spread of mass media and consumer culture has been to suggest that nothing is authentic any longer, that the world is increasingly artificial or simulated (see Debord, 2006; Baudrillard, 1994). But this is precisely what makes disasters and tragedies such an important part of contemporary consumer culture. They provide the hint of a longed-for connection to reality; they resonate by frightening, mystifying, or titillating, but always with the prospect of real loss, real death. As new media technologies and consumer culture have cast doubt on the authenticity of human experience and emotion, the baseline authenticity of disasters has become that much more valuable. As Slavoj Zizek put it, “the Real itself, in order to be sustained, has to be perceived as a nightmarish unreal spectre” (Zizek, 2006, p. 93). Contemporary popular culture has set in motion a dialectical frenzy where the phenomenon of authenticity that producers, marketers, and politicians hope to capture is the same phenomenon they end up nearly destroying through endless reproduction. But rather than a destruction of the real or the aura, the consumption of catastrophe today reveals an ongoing struggle over the undeniable kernel of reality that stubbornly persists in disasters, often despite their continued reproduction and mediation. In such a context, consumers of catastrophe are neither naïve nor prurient; they are simply drawn to the traces of authenticity that make catastrophes stand out from the rest of a hyper-mediated, seemingly inauthentic culture.

The kernel of authenticity at the heart of a disaster transcends the conditions of its reproduction in media culture, at least for the most powerful disasters. Benjamin found this transcendent aura in early photographs, where “the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the subject” (Benjamin, 1999, p. 510). One sees the same traces of the here and now, the same seared markers of reality, in the Zapruder film, or the footage of the Challenger explosion, and in iconic photographs from Vietnam such as “Accidental Napalm,” in which a young Vietnamese girl runs naked and screaming due to the burns on her back and arms. That same trace of reality, that aura of disaster is also apparent in the incredible array of images from September 11, as well as certain footage of flooded New Orleans streets and stranded rooftop survivors during Hurricane Katrina. In these cases, the disaster as a multi-media event in and of itself may be the seat of the aura: it is not so much one image but the sum total of these shots, their blending or composite in individual recollections and collective memory. But the determining factor here is not the technology with which images of disaster are produced, but the context in which they are apprehended. As Duttlinger (2008) and Hansen (2007) have argued, aura may refer to an imaginary encounter between viewer and image, a haunting and destabilizing interaction with even mechanically reproduced imagery; by this definition, the aura obtains even in contemporary multi-mediated disasters.

As such, the central problem of contemporary disaster consumption is not the inauthenticity of disaster consumption, or of those engaged in it, but the ability of political elites to frame a narrow range of emotional or political responses as the only appropriate ones. The consumption of catastrophe is most threatened, or perhaps most threatening, when dominant interests are able to channel the wide range of emotions surrounding disasters into a few politically useful contexts. The aura of disaster is not only a source of deep emotion for audiences and victims, it is a contested terrain, a site of struggle for control over the fleeting essence of reality itself, but as this dissertation will show, over the past decadee that contest has tended to heavily favor elite interpretations and definitions.

Since the Enlightenment, the importance of genuine emotional responses to the suffering of others has been a subject of public discussion and debate. In the intervening centuries, the contours of that debate have changed alongside new developments in media technology and new styles of consumer culture, but always some belief in the possibility of an authentic public reaction has obtained, even if that possibility seemed a diminishing one. This remains true today, at a time when consumer culture puts a premium on authentic selfhood despite the doubt cast on the entire notion of authenticity by modern and postmodern critics of media culture. Disasters partially resolve this problem by providing, at least in extreme cases, cultural products with an undeniable relation to reality, regardless of their mediation or reproduction. Emotional investment in such cultural products has become accepted and even expected, precisely because of this connection to the real, though the outcome of such investment is liable to encompass a wide range of responses. Disasters, tragedies, and catastrophes are, after all, complex; they tend to elide simple designations of cause and effect or blame and victimhood, and they generate multiple meanings based on the context in which they are experienced, viewed, or consumed. Like classical works of art, or the natural landscapes to which Benjamin compared those works of art, disasters demand contemplation; they cast a shadow over victims and media spectators alike, asking them to confront the lingering ghosts of collective trauma. That is their aura, and as this chapter has shown, it remains in the traces and fragments left behind in a disaster’s wake, not only in the physical landscape, but also in the landscape of media and consumer culture that disasters generate today.

#### Anxiety is vital to avert extinction---the perm solves negative effects and simulation solves despair

Mark **Shepard 7** (Anxiety - the ultimate survival tool!, Neuro Linguistic Programming Expert, http://www.scribd.com/doc/2050501/Anxiety-The-Ultimate-Survival-Skill)

Anxiety, The Ultimate Survival Skill ¶ As much pain and suffering that highly sensitive people go through because of our worry and anxiety habits, these are traits that have **ensured humanity's survival** since time immemorial. What do I mean? First of all you have to understand that anxiety is a thought process. It is not a mental disease. When you are anxious, what are you thinking about? What's great? What's wonderful? How everything is going to turn out better than you can possibly imagine? No! You are imagining the worst case scenario. Anxiety is thinking about what you do not want to have happen. Think about it! Let's float back in time for a moment to One Gazillion B.C. You are hanging out with your hunter gatherer buddies and it's summer time...There's plenty to eat and it's warm. All of a sudden you have an anxious thought. You think of something unpleasant about the future. You suddenly think of the coming... winter! You imagine digging through snow drifts scavenging for whatever scraps of food you can find. You imagine starving. You imagine your children, hungry, cold, sick. That's anxiety. Thinking about what you do not want to have happen. What it's supposed to do is trigger a resourceful response. In this case, you come up with a brilliant idea. In order to avoid starvation in the coming winter you start drying food and storing it in underground containers. Thinking about the cold, you come up with the idea that you can make warm clothing. Come Fall you gladly trade that little summer loin cloth in for a nice woolly mammoth coat. Thus the first root cellar is born and the fur coat is invented, because of anxiety.¶ Your ability to think ahead and visualize bad things happening enables you to plan ahead and take decisive action to create a different outcome. This planning for the winter results in your family and tribe surviving! Your children and their children pass along this anxiety gene. The "lug-heads" who don't have this ability perish. Survival is good, isn't it?¶ So those who were able to foresee the future and imagine the worst were able to better plan and as a result create a better future. Now. Fast forward to today. I would be willing to bet that you've been using this wonderful imagination of yours to imagine the worst. The added factor here is that your unconscious mind does not know the difference between what is real and what is imagined, so when you imagine the worst, your body reacts as if that bad thing is really happening. That releases all sorts of stress hormones and chemicals in your body. The point is to stop beating yourself up for having anxiety. Anxiety is merely an excellent survival tool that's been pushed beyond its original purpose. You can reclaim it's usefulness by doing what ancient people did. Become aware of a possible negative outcome in the future and then take positive, decisive action to make sure something better happens. If it's something beyond your control, practice imagining it working out positively and see how that feels in your body. For example: if you are worried about your kids driving home from college in a snow storm imagine them arriving safely and sitting in front of the fire sipping hot cocoa.

#### Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

### D & G – 2AC

#### Case outweigh –

#### Perm – do the plan and non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

#### Life always has value – even if its reduced, people have some worth – they have families and relationships and hobbies and fun – which should be preserved

Coontz 1 (Phyllis D., School of Public and International Affairs – University of Pittburgh, “Transcending the Suffering of AIDS”, Journal of Community Health Nursing, 18(4), December)

In the 1950s, psychiatrist and theorist Viktor Frankl (1963) described an existentia l theory of purpose and meaning in life. Frankl, a long-time prisoner in a concentration camp, related several instances of transcendent states that he experienced in the midst of that terrible suffering using his own experiences and observations. He believed that these experiences allowed him and others to maintain their sense of dignity and self-worth. Frankl (1969) claimed that transcendence occurs by giving to others, being open to others and the environment, and coming to accept the reality that some situations are unchangeable. He hypothesized that life always has meaning for the individual; a person can always decide how to face adversity. Therefore, self-transcendence provides meaning and enables the discovery of meaning for a person (Frankl, 1963). Expanding Frankl’s work, Reed (1991b) linked self-transcendence with mental health. Through a developmental process individuals gain an increasing understanding of who they are and are able to move out beyond themselves despite the fact that they are experiencing physical and mental pain. This expansion beyond the self occurs through introspection, concern about others and their well-being, and integration of the past and future to strengthen one’s present life (Reed, 1991b).

#### Life has intrinsic value that is unattached to instrumental capacity

Penner 5 (Melinda, Director of Operations – STR, “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223)

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience.

#### Value to life can’t be calculated

Schwartz 2 (Lisa, M.D., Associate Professor of Medicine – Dartmouth College Medical School, et al., Medical Ethics: A Case Based Approach, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)

The first criterion that springs to mind regarding the value of life is usually the quality of the life or lives in question: The quality of life ethic puts the emphasis on the type of life being lived, not upon the fact of life. Lives are not all of one kind; some lives are of great value to the person himself and to others while others are not. What the life means to someone is what is important. Keeping this in mind it is not inappropriate to say that some lives are of greater value than others, that the condition or meaning of life does have much to do with the justification for terminating that life.1 Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgment, and value judgments are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality.

#### Life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures---its preservation should be an a priori goal

Amien Kacou 8 WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation.

Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.

However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### This is true at a fundamental and ontological level

Paterson 3 Craig, Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81

In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Choice is key --- they are serial killers

Paterson 3 Craig, Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>

In determining whether a life is worth living or not, attention should be focused upon an array of ‘interests’ of the person, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the patient’s underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients, a broad-ranging assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive. For Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. If a person values his or her own life, then that life is valuable**,** precisely to the extent that he or she values it. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, ‘. . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives’. It follows that the primary injustice done to a person is to deprive the person of a life he or she may think valuable. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of ‘critical interests’; interests worthy of pursuing — friendships, family, life goals, etc. — which are subjected to de facto self-assessment for the further determination of meaningful value. Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, can therefore be justified, on the grounds that once the competent nature of the person making the decision has been established, the thoroughgoing commensuration between different values, in the form of interests or preferences, is essentially left up to the individual to determine for himself or herself.

#### -- Alt fails – Deleuzian resistance is hopeless – their method is a narcissistic fantasy

Mann 95 (Professor of English at Pomona, Paul, “Stupid Undergrounds,” PostModern Culture 5:3, Project MUSE)

Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work cannot protect itself from the order of fashion. Becoming-fashion, becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin. Such instant, indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of flight pursued by Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted by the very people who would take them most seriously. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical apparatus is liable to be tricked out with smooth spaces, war-machines, n - 1s, planes of consistency, plateaus and deterritorializations, strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The nomad is already succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were always invested in his figure; whatever Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic outlaw, to a position opposite the State, in the sort of dialectical operation Deleuze most despised. And the rhizome is becoming just another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately protect their thought from this dialectical reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's recuperation of him as a proper Catholic), but no vigilance would have sufficed in any case. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is evidence that, in real time, virtual models and maps close off the very exits they indicate. The problem is in part that rhizomes, lines of flight, smooth spaces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices of the highest critical order and **merely fantasmatic, delirious, narcissistic models for writing**, and thus perhaps an instance of the all-too-proper blurring of the distinction between criticism and fantasy. In Deleuze-speak, the stupid underground would be mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-dimensional intersection of rhizomatic plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest reflection on what might be involved in rendering the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid, colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or another techno-metaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the model but the fantastic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the experience of virtual exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always pretend otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this very narcissistic wish to see oneself projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has long since been overdeveloped, entirely reterritorialized in advance. **To pursue** nomadology or **rhizomatics** as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic and **no project is more hopeless**; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns back on itself.