# 1AC

### 1AC – Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce production restrictions on federal lands in the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas

### 1AC – Inherency

#### **Contention One is Inherency –**

#### The Department of Interior’s leasing plan effectively restricts offshore natural gas drilling on federal lands

New 6-30 (Bill, President – New Industires, \*Offers Steel Fabrication Services to Offshore Drilling Projects, “Letters: New Leasing Plan a Step Backward,” The Advocate, 2012, http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion/3484480-123/letters-new-leasing-plan-a)

In late June, the U.S. Department of the Interior released its long-awaited outer continental shelf leasing plan, which effectively blocks offshore oil and natural gas exploration in any new areas for the next five years. Unfortunately, the proposal is a step backward in our effort to achieve energy independence. Under the plan, 85 percent of America’s OCS would be off-limits at a time when exploring every possible energy source is critical to boosting our nation’s economy and creating jobs. Instead of finding out what might be available to us in expansive unexplored areas off our coasts, we will be left to search for oil and natural gas in the same, relatively small portion of the OCS we’ve been exploring for four decades. Not only does this plan run counter to President Barack Obama’s “all of the above” strategy for energy independence, but it shows an outright disregard for the requests of the Gulf Coast states –— including Louisiana — to increase domestic oil production when the Interior Department released a draft of the plan late last year. Interestingly, the Interior Department chose to release this latest version of the OCS plan on the day the Supreme Court announced its health care decision — a thinly veiled attempt to bury it in news coverage of the ruling. But that didn’t keep right-thinking lawmakers from taking notice and working on ways to get America’s economy going using sound energy policies. U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., chairman of the House Natural Resource Committee, has written legislation that sensibly revises the plan. While the Interior Department’s plan is to hold just 12 oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, and three in offshore Alaska from 2012 to 2017, the Hastings plan would schedule 28 lease sales total, dramatically increasing drilling opportunities off the Alaskan coast and including a sale of offshore leases in a potentially rich area off the coast of Virginia. The United States is producing more oil and natural gas than ever thanks to increased production on state-owned or private land. However, production on federal onshore land is down 14 percent in the last two years, and down 17 percent on federal offshore areas. Imagine what could happen if we enact legislation that allows us to open new offshore areas.

#### Current legislation is insufficient – certainty is key

Loris 8-6 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

Senator John Hoeven (R–ND) recently introduced the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (DEJA), which would greatly expand access to energy and simplify burdensome regulations that prevent projects from coming online in a timely manner. While the legislation could be improved by further increasing access and removing the top-down energy planning, DEJA would still spur economic growth and drive energy production. Increasing Access to Energy DEJA would accept the State Department’s environmental review of the Keystone XL pipeline as sufficient and allow the state of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline to meet the state’s environmental concerns. The State Department studied and addressed risks to soil, wetlands, water resources, vegetation, fish, wildlife, and endangered species and concluded that construction of the pipeline would pose minimal environmental risk.[1] The construction of Keystone XL would allow up to 830,000 barrels of oil per day to come from Canada to the Gulf Coast and create thousands of jobs. DEJA also directs the Department of the Interior (DOI) to conduct a lease sale off the coast of Virginia. The 2.9 million acres 50 miles off the coast has an estimated 130 million barrels of oil and 1.14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Opening access off Virginia’s coast is long overdue, and the legislation **only opens up a small portion of America’s territorial waters that are off limits**. The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, also co-sponsored by Senator Hoeven, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska.[2] Both DEJA and OPEN increase the royalties that states would receive from energy production, but both could go further to increase state involvement in offshore drilling decisions. Since onshore states already receive 50 percent of the royalties, Congress should also implement a 50/50 royalty-sharing program between federal and state governments involved in offshore drilling. Efficient Permitting and Leasing for All Energy Projects Another important component of DEJA is that it streamlines the permitting of all energy projects. Receiving a permit for any energy project, not just fossil fuels, takes entirely too long. Duplicative and unnecessary regulations slow the process and drive up costs. Furthermore, environmental activists delay new energy projects by filing endless administrative appeals and lawsuits. DEJA would create a manageable time frame for permitting for all energy sources to increase supply at lower costs and stimulate economic activity. DEJA also calls for an end to the lengthy permit process in the Natural Petroleum Reserve area of Alaska. It would require the DOI to approve drilling permits within 60 days and infrastructure permits within six months. Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the **certainty necessary to pursue energy projects**. Freeze and Study Environmental Regulations DEJA would also create transparency and accountability for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by establishing an interagency committee that would report on the full economic impact of the rules implemented by the EPA that affect fuel prices. This includes any part of the production process that would be affected by greenhouse gas regulations. DEJA delays the implementation of Tier 3 fuel standards (designed to replace the Tier 2 regulations issued in 2000) that would lower the amount of sulfur in gasoline but could add 6–9 cents per gallon to the cost of manufacturing gasoline. The EPA has declared no measurable air quality benefits from these standards. DEJA delays the New Source Performance Standards for refineries, which would drive up the cost of gasoline for no measurable change in the earth’s temperature.[3] It would also delay new national ambient air quality standards for ozone, which are unnecessary because the ozone standard set by the EPA is already more than stringent enough to protect human health. Though the delays contained in DEJA underscore the problems with these regulations, the preferred approach would be to prohibit the implementation of these three standards altogether. DEJA would also prevent the DOI from issuing any rule under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 before 2014 that would adversely affect coal employment, reduce revenue from coal production, reduce coal for domestic consumption or export, designate areas as unsuitable for surface mining and reclamation, or expose the U.S. to liability by taking privately owned coal through regulation. While this temporary fix recognizes the federal overreach in coal production, a better approach would be to create a framework that restricts overregulation, empowers the states, balances economic growth and environmental well-being, and creates a timely permitting process for all aspects of coal production.[4] Energy Central Planning Unneeded DEJA would require the federal government to create production objectives for fossil fuels and renewable energy and allow the relevant agencies to make additional lands available to meet those objectives. The bill would also require the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a critical minerals list and create comprehensive policies to increase critical mineral production. A much simpler and effective solution would be to open all federal lands for energy production of all sources and allow the private sector to determine what sources of energy and what technologies meet America’s electricity and transportation fuel demand. Too often the use of critical minerals has been used as cover for subsidies and extensive government intervention in a major industry. If there are clear military needs for certain critical materials, these should be met by government action. Absent that, streamlining the bureaucracy that has expanded around mining and **opening access is the only necessary federal action surrounding critical minerals**.

### 1AC – Arctic

#### Contention 1 : Arctic Leadership

#### Offshore drilling is key to US Arctic leadership – it facilitates effective security investments

Bert 12 (Captain Melissa – USCG, 2011-2012 Military Fellow, U.S.Coast Guard, “A Strategy to Advance the Arctic Economy”, February, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/strategy-advance-arctic-economy/p27258)

The United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. Melting sea ice is generating an emerging Arctic economy. Nations bordering the Arctic are drilling for oil and gas, and mining, shipping, and cruising in the region. Russia, Canada, and Norway are growing their icebreaker fleets and shore-based infrastructure to support these enterprises. For the United States, **the economic potential from the energy and mineral resources is in the trillions of dollars**—based upon estimates that the Alaskan Arctic is the home to 30 billion barrels of oil, more than 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, rare earth minerals, and massive renewable wind, tidal, and geothermal energy. However, the U.S. government is unprepared to harness the potential that the Arctic offers. The United States lacks the capacity to deal with potential regional conflicts and seaborne disasters, and it has been on the sidelines when it comes to developing new governance mechanisms for the Arctic. To advance U.S. economic and security interests and avert potential environmental and human disasters, the United States should ratify the UN Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), take the lead in developing mandatory international standards for operating in Arctic waters, and acquire icebreakers, aircraft, and infrastructure for Arctic operations. Regional Flashpoints Threaten Security Like the United States, the Arctic nations of Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark have geographical claims to the Arctic. Unlike the United States, however, they have each sought to exploit economic and strategic opportunities in the region by developing businesses, infrastructure, and cities in the Arctic. They have also renewed military exercises of years past, and as each nation learns of the others' activities, suspicion and competition increase. When the Russians sailed a submarine in 2007 to plant a titanium flag on the "north pole," they were seen as provocateurs, not explorers. The continental shelf is a particular point of contention. Russia claims that deep underwater ridges on the sea floor, over two hundred miles from the Russian continent, are part of Russia and are legally Russia's to exploit. Denmark and Canada also claim those ridges. Whichever state prevails in that debate will have exclusive extraction rights to the resources, which, based on current continental shelf hydrocarbon lease sales, could be worth billions of dollars. Debates also continue regarding freedom of navigation and sovereignty over waters in the region. Russia claims sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which winds over the top of Russia and Alaska and will be a commercially viable route through the region within the next decade. The United States contends the NSR is an international waterway, free to any nation to transit. The United States also has laid claim to portions of the Beaufort Sea that Canada says are Canadian, and the United States rejects Canada's claim that its Northwest Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific is its internal waters, as opposed to an international strait. Canada and Denmark also have a boundary dispute in Baffin Bay. Norway and Russia disagree about fishing rights in waters around the Spitsbergen/Svalbard Archipelago. U.S. Capacity in the Arctic Is Lacking Traffic and commercial activity are increasing in the region. The NSR was not navigable for years because of heavy ice, but it now consists of water with floating ice during the summer months. As the icebergs decrease in the coming years, it will become a commercially profitable route, because it reduces the maritime journey between East Asia and Western Europe from about thirteen thousand miles through the Suez Canal to eight thousand miles, cutting transit time by ten to fifteen days. Russian and German oil tankers are already beginning to ply those waters in the summer months. Approximately 150,000 tons of oil, 400,000 tons of gas condensate, and 600,000 tons of iron ore were shipped via the NSR in 2011. Oil, gas, and mineral drilling, as well as fisheries and tourism, are becoming more common in the high latitudes and are inherently dangerous, because icebergs and storms can shear apart even large tankers, offshore drilling units, fishing vessels, and cruise ships. As a result, human and environmental disasters are extremely likely. Despite the dangerous conditions, the Arctic has no mandatory requirements for those operating in or passing through the region. There are no designated shipping lanes, requirements for ice-strengthened hulls to withstand the extreme environment, ice navigation training for ships' masters, or even production and carriage of updated navigation and ice charts. Keeping the Arctic safe with the increased activity and lack of regulations presents a daunting task. The U.S. government is further hindered by the lack of ships, aircraft, and infrastructure to enforce sovereignty and criminal laws, and to protect people and the marine environment from catastrophic incidents. In the lower forty-eight states, response time to an oil spill or capsized vessel is measured in hours. In Alaska, it could take days or weeks to get the right people and resources on scene. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, thirteen hundred miles from Point Barrow, and response aircraft are more than one thousand miles south in Kodiak, blocked by a mountain range and hazardous flying conditions. The Arctic shores lack infrastructure to launch any type of disaster response, or to support the growing commercial development in the region. U.S. Leadership in Arctic Governance Is Lacking Governance in the Arctic requires leadership. The United States **is uniquely positioned to provide such leadership**, but it is hampered by its reliance on the eight-nation Arctic Council. However, more than 160 countries view the LSOC as the critical instrument defining conduct at sea and maritime obligations. The convention also addresses resource division, maritime traffic, and pollution regulation, and is relied upon for dispute resolution. The LOSC is particularly important in the Arctic, because it stipulates that the region beyond each country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) be divided between bordering nations that can prove their underwater continental shelves extend directly from their land borders. Nations will have exclusive economic rights to the oil, gas, and mineral resources extracted from those outer continental shelves, making the convention's determinations substantial. According to geologists, **the U.S. portion is projected to be the world's largest underwater extension of land**—over 3.3 million square miles—bigger than the lower forty-eight states combined. **In addition to global credibility** **and protection of Arctic shelf claims**, the convention is important because it sets international pollution standards and requires signatories to protect the marine environment. Critics argue that the LOSC cedes American sovereignty to the United Nations. But the failure to ratify it has the opposite effect: it leaves the United States less able to protect its interests in the Arctic and elsewhere. The diminished influence is particularly evident at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the international body that "operationalizes" the LOSC through its international port and shipping rules. By remaining a nonparty, the United States **lacks the credibility to promote U.S. interests in the Arctic**, such as by transforming U.S. recommendations into binding international laws. A Comprehensive U.S. Strategy for the Arctic The United States needs a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. The current National/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66 / HSPD-25) is only a broad policy statement. An effective Arctic strategy would address both governance and capacity questions. To generate effective governance in the Arctic the United States should ratify LOSC and take the lead in advocating the adoption of Arctic shipping requirements. The IMO recently proposed a voluntary Polar Code, and the United States should work to make it mandatory. The code sets structural classifications and standards for ships operating in the Arctic as well as specific navigation and emergency training for those operating in or around ice-covered waters. The United States should also support Automated Identification System (AIS) carriage for all ships transiting the Arctic. Because the Arctic is a vast region with no ability for those on land to see the ships offshore, electronic identification and tracking is the only way to know what ships are operating in or transiting the region. An AIS transmitter (costing as little as $800) sends a signal that provides vessel identity and location at all times to those in command centers around the world and is currently mandated for ships over sixteen hundred gross tons. The United States and other Arctic nations track AIS ships and are able to respond to emergencies based on its signals. For this reason, mandating AIS for all vessels in the Arctic is needed. The U.S. government also needs to work with Russia to impose a traffic separation scheme in the Bering Strait, where chances for a collision are high. Finally, the United States should push for compulsory tandem sailing for all passenger vessels operating in the Arctic. Tandem sailing for cruise ships and smaller excursion boats will avert another disaster like RMS Titanic. To enhance the Arctic's economic potential, the United States **should** also **develop its capacity to enable commercial entities to operate safely in the region**. The U.S. government should invest in icebreakers**,** aircraft**,** and shore-based infrastructure. A ten-year plan should include the building of at least two heavy icebreakers, at a cost of approximately $1 billion apiece, and an air station in Point Barrow, Alaska, with at least three helicopters. Such an air station would cost less than $20 million, with operating, maintenance, and personnel costs comparable to other northern military facilities. Finally, developing a deepwater port with response presence and infrastructure is critical. A base at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, where ships and fishing vessels resupply and refuel, would only cost a few million dollars per year to operate. Washington could finance the cost of its capacity-building efforts by using offshore lease proceeds and federal taxes on the oil and gas extracted from the Arctic region. In 2008, the United States collected $2.6 billion from offshore lease sales in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (off Alaska's north coast), and the offshore royalty tax rate in the region is 19 percent**, which would cover operation and maintenance of these facilities down the road**. The United States needs an Arctic governance and **acquisition strategy to take full advantage of all the region has to offer** and to protect the people operating in the region and the maritime environment. Neglecting the Arctic reduces the United States' ability to **reap tremendous economic benefits and could harm U.S. national security interests.**

#### The Arctic will be the next area of great power conflict – gas production spurs military investments that prevent escalation

Talmadge 12 (Eric – AP, Huffington Post, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity’, 4/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-military-activity\_n\_1427565.html)

To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. **They are preparing for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic**, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and a slew of potential conflicts. By Arctic standards, the region is already buzzing with military activity, and experts believe that will increase significantly in the years ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever — Exercise Cold Response — with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, **so will the need for policing, border patrols and** — if push comes to shove — **military muscle to enforce rival claims**. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia, Canada and the United States have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia — one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle — **has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's superpower**. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic countries — Norway, Denmark and Canada — to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in the region. **This is only going to increase as time goes on**." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "We want to maintain our edge up there," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in **the Arctic** has never really waned. It remains very important." **But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions**, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it **lacks ships** able to operate in or near Arctic ice, **support facilities and adequate communications**. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. **The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers**.

#### Arctic on the brink of great-power conflict – diplomacy is no longer an option

Tassinari 9/7 (Fabrizio Tassinari is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and the Head of Foreign Policy and EU Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies, September 7, 2012, “Avoiding a Scramble for the High North”, http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/09/07/avoiding-a-scramble-for-the-high-north/)

The geopolitics of the Arctic are stuck in a paradox: The more regional players restate the importance of international cooperation, the more some pundits and policymakers seem to conclude that the Arctic **risks descending into competition and even conflict.** The world is awakening to the growing strategic importance of the High North. As the Arctic ice melts due to global warming, it opens up new opportunities, from shorter shipping lanes to newly accessible oil and gas reserves; respectively, about 13 percent and 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered resources are in the Arctic, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. These discoveries are usually followed by declarations of the littoral nations to the effect that any potential disagreements over them will be resolved peacefully. However, beneath expressions of goodwill, the Arctic debate is often characterized **by a sense of urgency**, and even forms of alarmism. In recent years, instances of growing securitization of the Arctic have abounded. Back in 2008, a paper by Javier Solana, then the EU’s foreign policy’s chief, and the European Commission warned about “potential conflict over resources in Polar regions” as they become exploitable due to melting ice. In 2010, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, Adm. James Stavridis, argued that “for now, the disputes in the North have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium.” Then there are actions that speak louder than prepared speeches — from the famous August 2007 expedition that planted a Russian flag on the North Pole’s seabed to the annual summer military exercises carried out by Canada to assert its sovereignty in the North. Although the Russian stunt was most likely aimed at nationalist domestic audiences, some observers view these exercises as the expressions of competing national interests. As the scholar Scott Borgerson ominously put it: “The Arctic powers **are fast approaching diplomatic gridlock**, and that could eventually lead to the sort of armed brinkmanship that plagues other territories.” The geopolitical constellation in and around the region provides a ready justification for such an assessment. While no-one really imagines the United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark fighting over the Arctic, some of their politicians have occasionally framed rhetoric in more peppered terms than one might expect. Russia, the fifth Arctic littoral nation, typically treads a fine line between declarations of cooperation and **an innate instinct for great-power competition**. Add to that the EU, which is seeking to carve its own role, and Asia’s giants, above all China, for which the opening of the Northeast passage may reduce sailing distance with Europe by some 40 percent, and it is not hard to conjure up the prospect of an Arctic race building up.

#### De-escalation is key to prevent Arctic conflicts from going nuclear – draws in major powers

Wallace and Staples 10 (Michael Wallace and Steven Staples. \*Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, **and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic**. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 609 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, **deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states** – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world **– converge on the Arctic and have competing claims**. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, **lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons**.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but **no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly**. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62

#### Extinction – it’s categorically different from all other impacts

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why **it is useful to distinguish them from other risks**. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a **whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are** mere ripples **on the surface of the great sea of life**. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) A much greater existential risk **emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and** the **USSR**. **An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might** have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy** or thwart **humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### US Arctic leadership solves multiple threats – offshore natural gas solidifies US leadership

Conley 12 (Heather – Senior Fellow at CSIS and Director, Europe Program, “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic”, January, http://csis.org/files/publication/120117\_Conley\_ArcticSecurity\_Web.pdf)

The Arctic will experience extraordinary economic and environmental change over the next several decades. Commercial, human, and state interaction will rise dramatically. More drilling for oil and gas in the region and growing shipping and ecotourism as new shipping routes come into existence are just a few of the examples of increased human activity in the Arctic. The rapid melting of the Arctic ice cap is now exceeding previous scientific and climatic predictions. A recent study shows that September 2011 marked the lowest levels of sea ice extent ever recorded in the northern polar region.1 The polar ice cap today is 40 percent smaller than it was in 1979,2 and in the summer of 2007 alone, 1 million more square miles of ice beyond the average melted, uncovering an area of open water six times the size of California. While estimates range from 2013 to 2060, the U.S. Navy’s “Arctic Roadmap” projects ice-free conditions for a portion of the Arctic by the summer of 2030.3 **Arctic economics** and an increasingly ice-free and hostile climatic environment **are** on a direct collision course, driving a clear need for a new paradigm to meet pressing security challenges that Arctic nations have thus far been unprepared or ill equipped to address. As the region takes on **greater economic importance, the Arctic requires a comprehensive** regional and global security strategy that includes an increase in regional readiness and border security as well as an enhancement of strategic capabilities. The security challenges are vast, including search and rescue, **environmental remediation, piracy, terrorism, natural and man-made disaster response**, and border protection. Compounding the challenge is the fact that regional players must function in an operational environment of severely limited satellite communication and hydrographic mapping. Arctic coastal states have developed and issued national Arctic security strategies and accompanying documents that, albeit roughly, sketch out their political and security priorities in the region. These documents describe their national security interests and the intentions these states wish to pursue and defend. Each of the five Arctic coastal states—Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States—touts its commitment to cooperative action while simultaneously bolstering its military presence and capabilities in the Arctic. Yet the complexity of competing national security interests is heightened by the lack of a single coherent structure through which these concerns can be addressed. Therefore, a fresh approach is needed for addressing regional Arctic security concerns within a global framework, while recognizing the mutual benefits of maintaining international cooperation, transparency, and stability in the Arctic. Creating a twenty-first century security architecture for the Arctic presents the United States with a conundrum: **U.S. Arctic policy must be given a significant sense of urgency** and focus at the same moment that U.S. defense budgets are being reduced and U.S. military planners consider the Arctic to be “an area of low conflict.” **How does one economically** and militarily square this circle? Unfortunately, while there have been some international debate and discussion on the form and format of Arctic security cooperation, the debate has often focused on what issues related to Arctic security cannot be discussed rather than on those that can and should be addressed. However, these institutional and policy barriers have begun to break down as actors recognize both a collective lack of operational capacity and the increasing number of security actors that will play a role in this rapidly changing region. Arctic stakeholders have yet to discuss seriously, let alone determine, what collective security framework Arctic states should use to address the emerging security challenges in the region, despite signing legally binding agreements on international search and rescue and negotiating international agreements on oil spills and response. It is within this context that the following report will analyze the drivers of change in the region, examine the key Arctic security actors and institutions, and explore the potential for a new security architecture for the Arctic. Oil and Gas As the sea ice retreats, **new commercial opportunities in the Arctic arise**. Natural resources that had once been unreachable are becoming available for extraction. As the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates, the Arctic is projected to contain 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil resources and **30 percent of the gas resources**.1 Because global production of oil and gas will not match global demand and the short-term outlook for the price of oil and gas will increase,2 **the desire to tap these resources in the Arctic will spur commercial exploration**, and multinational companies will invest and become increasingly engaged in the region. At the same time, the need to develop new technologies and approaches for tackling the harsh and unpredictable climate for offshore drilling and transportation in the Arctic is urgent. The greater the potential profit and need to secure supply while maintaining, if not increasing, current production levels, the greater the tendency will be for companies to assume the greater risks inherent in operating in the Arctic. Alaska has contributed significantly to meeting U.S. demand with oil from the oil fields on the North Slope close to the Arctic coast transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. However, due to decreasing North Slope production and a lack of new fields, domestic pressure to explore offshore of Alaska is rising. Royal Dutch Shell has received preliminary approval from the Obama administration for its offshore drilling plans in its acquired leases in the Beaufort Sea. Exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea is expected to commence in 2012.3 Shell is also optimistic that it can begin to develop the reserves in the Chukchi Sea in the near future, but issues with environmental leases, oil spill preparedness and response, and disputes with local communities threaten to delay the process.4 Other Arctic coastal states **are seeking similar economic advantage**. In Norway, leases to the Barents Sea have been allocated, as Norwegian oil and gas production has fallen since its peak of 3.4 million barrels per day in 20015 and is expected to decline further if no significant new fields are discovered. Increased demand from the European market has spurred additional exploratory drilling farther north. Seismic activity by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate6 has already started in the maritime territory obtained after the Norwegian-Russian maritime delimitation treaty entered into effect in July 2011.7 With the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Arctic coast line, Russia **is increasingly interested in developing its potential fields**, especially on the prosperous continental shelf next to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the Kara Sea. Russia is moving to increase gas production in the vast Yamal field, which already produces 90 percent of Russian state gas, following recent discoveries of large gas fields, such as the Bovanenkovo field.8 In addition, Russia has been active in expanding oil production in the Pechora Sea, with plans for drilling in the Prirazlomnoye oil field in early 20129—a significant development as it marks the first instance of offshore drilling in the Russian Arctic.10 Russia also plans to drill in the Dolginskoye oil field in the Pechora Sea, which is projected to be three times as large as the Prirazlomnoye, and aims to have the field developed by 2020.11 Numerous delays—from the large supply of gas available on the global market due to the discovery of unconventional gas in the United States and uncertainty over Russian taxation policies—have to this point prevented the development of the world’s largest gas field, the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, forcing new technological developments and seismic exploration in other parts of the Russian Arctic territory. All of this activity indicates **the keen interest both countries have** in moving rapidly to extract these resources **from their Arctic territories.**

#### Arctic terrorism leads to CBW use

Mychajlyszyn 8 (Natalie, International Affairs, Trade and Finance Division, “The Arctic: Canadian Security and Defence”, 24 October 2008, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0813-e.htm#illegalaccess)

Increased illegal access and illegal activities, including terrorism As the Arctic generally becomes more accessible because of the warming climate, some analysts **predict the emergence of new security threats.**(6) One such risk is that of an increase in illegal migration and trafficking in persons to North America through the Arctic. There are also fears of the North being used as a thoroughfare for drug trafficking as well as a destination for illegal narcotics. In the post-September 11 era, fears have been raised concerning the increased vulnerability of the Arctic as a passage for terrorists, whether for illegal entry into North America or for the transport of illegal weapons, including biological and chemical devices. To such a list of activities, generally perpetrated by organized crime groups, can be added the rise of other types of organized crime, such as those involving industries engaged in the extraction of lucrative resources, such as diamonds and copper.

#### Extinction

Sandberg et al 8—Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, Stockholm—AND—Jason G. Matheny—PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh—AND—Milan M. Ćirković—senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction)

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens **are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive**. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

#### Independently, Arctic natural gas production leads to economic growth and solidifies environmental leadership - that prevents global environmental destruction

Sullivan 12 (Dan – a former state attorney general, commissioner of Alaska's Department of Natural Resources, “It's time to develop our Arctic resources, 7/20, http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/opinion/sullivan-arctic-drilling/index.html)

(CNN) -- The United States **is on the verge of an energy renaissance.** We need to recognize and seize the opportunity. This renaissance involves domestic production of natural resources ranging from clean renewables to hydrocarbons. In particular, domestic hydrocarbon production -- both oil and gas -- is increasing dramatically, with some experts predicting that the United States could become the largest hydrocarbon producer in the word -- outstripping Saudi Arabia and Russia -- by 2020. Increased domestic production of hydrocarbons is driven by two trends. First, new technology is unlocking unconventional resources such as shale-derived oil and gas. And second, investors and policy makers are recognizing that the U.S. still has an enormous resource base of conventional oil and gas, particularly in Alaska. Opinion: Why we should look to the Arctic Federal agencies estimate that Alaska's North Slope and federal waters off Alaska's northern coast contain approximately 40 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil and more than 200 trillion cubic feet of conventional gas. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, this region contains more oil than any comparable region located in the Arctic, including northern Russia. However, the United States **is lagging behind its Arctic neighbors in developing these resources**. This is unfortunate, because we have some of the highest environmental standards in the world **and we should be setting the bar for Arctic development**. Developing our Arctic resources will promote our nation's interests in many ways: securing a politically stable, long-term supply of domestic energy; boosting U.S. economic growth and jobs; reducing the federal trade deficit; **and strengthening our global leadership on energy issues**. Leading academic researchers and economists in Alaska have estimated that oil production from Alaska's outer continental shelf will bring federal revenues of approximately $167 billion over 50 years, and create 55,000 jobs throughout the country. Developing U.S. resources in the Arctic **has the added benefit of enhancing global environmental protection**. One of the arguments used by Arctic drilling opponents is that "we aren't ready," but it is obvious that no matter what preparations are made, they will argue that it isn't enough. Shell, for example, has spent billions to prepare for drilling in the Arctic this summer, incorporating the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, state-of-the-art equipment and extensive scientific research. Recently, the Obama administration has publically expressed its confidence in the company's drilling plans. The U.S. has created some of the highest standards in the world for environmental protection. When we delay or disallow responsible resource development, **the end result is not to protect the environment**, but **to drive hydrocarbon investment and production to countries with** much lower environmental standards and enforcement capacity. Last year, it was reported that between 5 million and 20 million tons of oil leak in Russia per year. This is equivalent to a Deepwater Horizon blowout about every two months. Russia had an estimated 18,000 oil pipeline ruptures in 2010 -- the figure for the U.S. that year was 341. If we do not pursue responsible development in the Arctic, countries such as Russia -- perhaps even China, which is interested in securing access to Arctic hydrocarbon resources -- **will dominate energy production from the Arctic**. Such a scenario **does not bode well for the global environment**. By embracing the opportunities in the Arctic, the United States **will show the world that it can be a strong leader in responsible energy development.**

#### Extinction

**Ford 3** (Violet, Vice President – Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf)

The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to **global processes** and the balance of **life on earth**. Both the unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a resolution effectively recognizes the Arctic as a **“barometer”** or indicator region **of the globe’s environmental health**. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from environmental and other NGO’s.

#### Global natural gas extraction is inevitable – the US needs to take the lead ensure the best practices are used

Schneider 12 (Michael, Advocacy Director – Clean Air Task Force, “Curb Methane Emissions,” National Journal, 7-25, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments)

For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development. Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, **the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic**.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

### 1AC – Exports

#### Contention 2 : LNG Exports

#### Currently, perception of inadequate supply blocks LNG exports – new, sustainable supply is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).4 According to the Energy Information Adminis- tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over potential exports **hinges on the prospects for its sustained availability and development**. For exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and **compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses**. There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resources—the volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. Based on the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable natural gas resource in the United States. In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production. The productivity of shale gas wells has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

#### Perception is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are **valid** depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for **shale gas reserves are uncertain**, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic.

#### Removing Alaskan OCS moratoria results in massive LNG exports

Schmitt and Mazza 12 (Gary J. – Resident Scholar at AEI, and Michael – Research Fellow at AEI, “Turn gas into geostrategy “, 6/11, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/turn-gas-into-geostrategy/)

But one corner of the world that has hardly made a dent in this new market is Alaska. America's northernmost state has the gas reserves to meet a substantial part of Japan's demand. Estimates suggest that the North Slope fields and **reserves on the outer continental shelf hold as** much as 236 trillion cubic feet of gas—enough to serve the Japanese utilities' needs for over 90 years at current rates of consumption. Buying LNG from Alaska would be a good deal for Japan. Tokyo, which buys LNG on the Asian spot market at a price tied to oil, is currently paying about $16-$17 per million British thermal units. According to a recent Brookings Institution study, delivery of LNG from Alaska to Japan in 2020 will cost $11 or less, allowing for substantially lower import prices—and ensuring continued high Asian demand and a boon to the Alaskan economy. However, liberals and environmentalists in Washington are working to stop gas exports altogether. Ed Markey, a Democratic representative from Massachusetts, has proposed legislation which would prohibit any exports until 2025, believing that such a ban would keep supplies in the U.S. high and, in turn, prices for heating and power low. For the Sierra Club and others, stopping exports of LNG is important for lowering demand for new production. The goal is to reduce the need for hydraulic fracturing, so-called fracking, to release natural gas reserves found in shale and other deep deposits. Now, in an apparent Obama administration kowtow to liberals and environmentalists in the run-up to November's election, the Energy Department is now slow-rolling the release of a report expected to positively assess the domestic economic impact of exporting natural gas. But there is little evidence that hydraulic fracturing is the environmental hazard it's been made out to be or that the export of LNG from the United States would have more than a modicum of impact on domestic prices. And in this case, Alaskan natural gas does not even require hydraulic fracturing to recover. Moreover, it is unlikely Alaska's gas will be tapped for U.S. consumption if there is no Asian market. Given the extraordinary amount of reserves in the lower 48 states, Canada and in the Gulf of Mexico, the cost of extracting and shipping gas from Alaska's North Slope would make it uncompetitive with gas from those other sources. And the political problems don't end with Washington. In Juneau, Alaska's capital, state legislators are fussing over the royalty payments companies will be expected to pay to the state for extracting natural gas from its fields. With elections coming, they are worried that their constituents will judge them as having failed in getting as much from the companies as is possible—a charge that's been leveled at their predecessors when it comes to the state's oil. The problem is that the oil companies need a firm commitment from the state about the level of royalties to be paid now and in the future before those companies will invest the billions necessary in wells, pipelines and plants to extract and export Alaska's gas. And delays in doing so could be costly, as Japanese utilities appear willing to sign long-term agreements with other suppliers even at higher prices if they think it will address their pressing energy requirements. The question of whether to export Alaskan natural gas ought to be a no-brainer. Japan is eager to buy a resource that the United States has in abundance. Meanwhile, Alaskans pay no state sales or income taxes and receive a check in the mail every year; natural gas sales would extend those benefits. And for the U.S more broadly, the economic benefits would be a reduction in the trade deficit and the creation of new jobs. There is also an important strategic payoff. A Japan that is less reliant for its energy on unstable Middle East regimes or Russia is more likely to be a dependable ally in confronting common security challenges. Over the past decade, Russian attempts to monopolize gas supplies to Europe have made dealing with Moscow's revanchist policies a bigger headache for Washington. The same goes for Iranian supplies of oil to Japan, India and Europe with regard to Tehran's nuclear program. With other Asian nations also hungry for natural gas, American reserves should be used to U.S. geopolitical advantage. In just a few short years, the United States has gone from being an importer of LNG to being potentially "the Saudi Arabia of natural gas." It would be a shame to let politics get in the way of making the most of this fortuitous development.

#### New onshore terminals are being blocked

Parfomak 9 (Paul W. Parfomak, Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy, and Adam Vann, Legislative Attorney, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety, and Regulation, Congressional Research Service, 12-14-9, <http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Jan/RL32205.pdf>)

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel shipped in large tankers to U.S. ports from overseas. While LNG has historically made up a small part of U.S. natural gas supplies, rising price volatility, and the possibility of domestic shortages have significantly increased LNG demand. To meet this demand, energy companies have proposed new LNG import terminals throughout the coastal United States. Many of these terminals would be built onshore near populated areas. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) grants federal approval for the siting of new onshore LNG facilities under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). This approval process incorporates minimum safety standards for LNG established by the Department of Transportation. Although LNG has had a record of relative safety for the last 45 years, and no LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists, proposals for new LNG terminal facilities have generated considerable public concern. Some community groups and governments officials fear that LNG terminals may expose nearby residents to unacceptable hazards. Ongoing public concern about LNG safety has focused congressional attention on the exclusivity of FERC’s LNG siting authority, proposals for a regional LNG siting process, the lack of “remote” siting requirements in FERC regulations, state permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act, terrorism attractiveness of LNG, the adequacy of Coast Guard security resources, and other issues. LNG terminals directly affect the safety of communities in the states and congressional districts where they are sited, and may influence energy costs nationwide. Faced with an uncertain national need for greater LNG imports and persistent public concerns about LNG hazards, some in Congress have proposed changes to safety provisions in federal LNG siting regulation. Legislation proposed in the 110 th Congress addressed Coast Guard LNG resources, FERC’s exclusive siting authority, state concurrence of federal LNG siting decisions, and agency coordination under the Coastal Zone Management Act, among other proposals. Provisions in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (H.R. 3619), passed by the House on October 23, 2009, would require additional waterway suitability notification requirements in LNG siting reviews by FERC (Sec. 1117). The Maritime Hazardous Cargo Security Act (S. 1385), introduced by Senator Lautenberg and three co-sponsors on June 25, 2009, would require a national study to identify measures to improve the security of maritime transportation of liquefied natural gas (Sec. 6). If Congress concludes that new LNG terminals as currently regulated will pose an unacceptable risk to public safety, Congress may consider additional LNG safety-related legislation, or may exercise its oversight authority in other ways to influence LNG terminal siting approval. Alternatively, Congress may consider other changes in U.S. energy policy legislation to reduce the nation’s demand for natural gas or increase supplies of North American natural gas and, thus, the need for new LNG infrastructure.

#### Offshore terminals are key

Kilisek 12 (Roman, “The Bright Future of Floating LNG Liquefaction, Regasification and Storage Units”, 7/19, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/07/19/the-bright-future-of-floating-lng-liquefaction-regasification-and-storage-units/)

This is a newsworthy event in the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) industry because it is the first time that a floating liquefaction unit is moving from concept to commercial reality. What are the advantages of those floating LNG facilities over conventional liquefaction plants? First off, there is an obvious advantage in tapping offshore resources. In addition to the ability to station the floating vessel directly over distant offshore fields and thereby saving on a costly subsea pipeline to shore, it allows the operator of the facility to move the production facility to a new location once a field is depleted. This would also allow energy companies to exploit smaller fields and now **earn a realistic return on investment**. **Other cost savings are to be expected during the construction phase** for the required marine and loading facilities which often end up costing billions of dollars. Finally, in a world full of risk it can significantly reduce the security and political risk (inter alia, environmental regulation and permits) involved in choosing a land-based site for LNG export facilities in African countries (Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique) and countries in the Middle East as well as South America. The US should contemplate something like this along the East Coast for export to Europe, and along the West Coast for export to South America (Chile) and Asia.

#### Global export contracts are being renegotiated – now is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see Figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates.108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already being felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage.109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract.110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts.111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (Figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020.

#### Scenario 1: Japan

#### LNG exports will go to East Asia – it’s economical and helps meet growing demand

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Owing to growing gas demand, limited domestic supply, and a more rigid and expensive pricing structure, Asia represents a near-to-medium term opportunity for natural gas exports from the United States. The expansion of the Panama Canal by 2014 will allow for LNG tankers to traverse the isthmus, thereby improving the economics of U.S. Gulf Coast LNG shipments to East and South Asian markets. This would make U.S. exports competitive with future Middle Eastern and Australian LNG exports to the region. However, challenges and uncertainties remain on both the demand and supply side. The development of indigenous unconventional gas in China or India may occur at a faster rate than currently forecast, dampening demand for LNG imports to the region. A change in sentiment in Japan may see nuclear power restarted at a greater rate than currently anticipated; alternately, a greater-than-expected penetration of coal in the Japanese electricity sector would suppress gas demand. A change in the cost of Australian LNG production or a reversal of the Qatari moratorium on gas development could disrupt the current supply projections, as could the discovery of new conventional or unconventional resources. For instance, on December 29, 2010, Noble Energy, a U.S. oil and gas exploration company, discovered between 14 and 20 tcf of gas in Israel’s offshore Leviathan gas field. Since then, other nations on the Eastern Mediterranean are exploring for potentially similarly large gas fields. A number of large natural gas discoveries in Mozambique have also prompted early interest in building significant liquefaction capacity in the Southeastern African nation. The high quality (low sulfur and carbon-dioxide content) and liquid-rich nature of Mozambican gas may make this resource a significant competitor in global LNG markets in the medium term. Finally, the expansion of LNG export capacity from Alaska and the development of LNG export capacity in Western Canada may provide a source of strong competition for U.S. Gulf-coast origin LNG. Although Alaska’s Kenai LNG export facility, which has been exporting small quantities of LNG to Northeast Asia for over 40 years, has been idled temporarily, some companies have demonstrated interest in large-scale exports of LNG from Alaska to East Asia. On March 30, 2012, ExxonMobil, along with its project partners BP and ConocoPhillips, settled a dispute with the Government of Alaska to develop its gas re- sources at Prudhoe Bay. The gas from this field is expected to travel from Alaska’s North Slope to Valdez on Alaska’s southern coast, where it will be liquefied and exported.67 According to FERC, there are currently three Canadian export facilities under consideration in British Columbia: a proposed 1.4 bcf/day terminal at Kitimat (initial production would start at 0.7 bcf/day), which received a 20-year export license in October 2011; a proposed 0.25 bcf/day facility at Douglas Island; and a potential 1 bcf/day facility at Prince Rupert Island. Given the lower transportation costs (as a result of the shorter distance), Alaskan and West Canadian exports may prove to be a source of strong competition at the margin for U.S. LNG in the Pacific Basin.

#### LNG exports solidify America’s reliability as a partner on energy issues – that’s key to US-Japan relations

Cronin et al 12 (Dr. Patrick, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program – Center for a New American Security, Paul S. Giarra, President of Global Strategies & Transformation, Zachary M. Hosford, Research Associate – Center for a New American Security, Daniel Katz, Researcher – Center for a New American Security, “The China Challenge: Military, Economic and Energy Choices Facing the US-Japan Alliance,” April, CNAS, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\_TheChinaChallenge\_Cronin\_0.pdf)

Although energy security has long been an issue for the alliance, a new combination of global energy trends and geopolitical realities will raise the issue to unprecedented levels of importance in coming decades. Whereas an abundant supply of cheap energy underpinned tremendous post- World War II economic growth, future energy supplies are unlikely to be as affordable. Acquiring the right mix of energy sources to maintain sufficient economic productivity – while ensuring a gradual transition away from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy – will be one of the most complex challenges for the alliance in this century. Indeed, the means by which the United States and Japan seek to secure their own energy supplies in a complicated geopolitical environment, respond to the enormous and increasing energy demands of a re-emerging China, and address the future of the development and implementation of civilian nuclear power at home and abroad will have huge implications for the alliance. In the midst of U.S. and Japanese efforts to address their own energy security issues, global demand for energy is increasing at a rapid rate. Total world energy use during the 2010 to 2025 time frame is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent, with China and India accounting for 50 percent of that growth.63 Meanwhile, many countries around the globe depend increasingly on Middle Eastern oil, despite its susceptibility to disruption. Further instability in the Middle East would likely pose a “major geo-strategic stability threat” to the United States, with the potential for cascading economic effects.64 Global natural gas production is increasing, however, shifting currency and power flows to new areas. At the same time, demand for nuclear power has bifurcated – growing strongly throughout the developing world, while reaching an inflection point in both the United States and Japan – with as-yet unknown consequences. Both the United States and Japan are undergoing internal debates on energy strategy, and there is no consensus among leaders in either country. To increase economic productivity, Japan will have to craft a new energy policy. Following the March 11, 2011, partial meltdowns of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant and the subsequent release of radiation, the Japanese people and government have indicated that civilian nuclear power might play a reduced role in the country’s future energy mix. However, any increased reliance on fossil fuels that might result from that decision will make Japan more vulnerable to supply disruptions and price spikes. Previous disturbances in the global energy market have prompted many countries – including Japan – to seek some guarantee of energy supplies outside traditional market mechanisms, including investing in upstream oil production overseas, even if financial logic would dictate otherwise. Meanwhile, the Japanese population favors increased investment in renewable energy sources, which are not yet sufficiently affordable to be a viable alternative. Japan: Running Out of Power and Time Japan suffered from its reliance on foreign energy following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. Although these supply disruptions led to massive growth of the domestic nuclear power industry, Japan continues to be the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with 90 percent of its supply originating overseas. In addition, Japan is the world’s second-largest importer of coal – all of which comes from abroad – and the third-largest importer of oil.65 Reliance on energy imports results in extremely low energy self-sufficiency (18 percent) compared with either the United States (75 percent) or China (94 percent).66 Although the nature of the global energy market offers some insulation because of supply-and-demand dynamics, Japanese reliance on imported energy also leaves the country more vulnerable to shocks. In a nation that already relies heavily on imported energy, the Fukushima nuclear disaster complicated the country’s long-term strategy of cultivating domestic energy sources. With much of the population wary of nuclear power following the radiation leaks and inaccurate government statements during the disaster, Japan’s efforts to diversify and secure its energy sources have lost public support. The United States also finds itself in the midst of a heated debate over energy security. The nation consumes large amounts of energy, and Americans are showing frustration with rising gas prices. There continues to be support for a shift to renewable energy sources, but these sources – including solar, wind, biomass and geothermal power– remain costly and have not yet reached the level of economic competitiveness. Meanwhile, technological advances have increased the projected amounts of recoverable oil and natural gas on U.S. land and in its surrounding waters. However, the widely publicized 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and reports of contaminated water sources as a result of the natural gas extraction method known as hydraulic fracturing have mobilized opponents against increases in domestic drilling. Nonetheless, the picture is somewhat rosier for the United States than for Japan. Although the United States, like many industrialized countries, is witnessing a relative plateau in its overall energy demand, its energy consumption from primary fuel is expected to rise from 98.2 quadrillion Btu (British thermal units) in 2010 to 108.0 quadrillion Btu in 2035.67 Largely as a result of advances in recovering shale gas – natural gas trapped in shale formations, only recently made cost-effective to extract – the United States is projected to become a net LNG exporter by 2016, a net pipeline exporter by 2025 and an overall net natural gas exporter by 2021.68 The United States is also poised to increase its crude oil production from 5.5 million barrels per day in 2010 to 6.7 million barrels per day in 2020.69 The apparent move away from nuclear power in Japan following the Fukushima reactor meltdowns, together with the shale gas revolution in the United States, is shifting the energy security environment. Currently, Japan harbors concerns about the reliability of future U.S. energy supplies, which may be influenced by “shifting political winds in American energy policy.”70 Thus, the United States could help reduce the volatility of Japanese fossil fuel imports – which appear set to remain high – by providing a stable source of natural gas. However, if the allies fail to consult on this issue, they could drift apart, thereby missing an opportunity to strengthen the alliance.

#### Alliance solves multiple threats --- escalates to global nuclear war.

**Gates 11** (Robert, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “[U.S.-Japan Alliance a Cornerstone of Asian Security](http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)”, Speech to Keio University, 1-14, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)

Over the course of its history, the U.S.-Japan alliance has succeeded at its original core purpose – to deter military aggression and provide an umbrella of security under which Japan – and the region – can prosper. Today, our alliance is growing deeper and broader as we address a range of security challenges in Asia. Some, like North Korea, piracy or natural disasters, have been around for decades, centuries, or since the beginning of time. Others, such as global terrorist networks, cyber attacks, and nuclear proliferation are of a more recent vintage. What these issues have in common is that they all require multiple nations working together – and they also almost always require leadership and involvement by key regional players such as the U.S. and Japan. In turn, we express our shared values by increasing our alliance’s capacity to provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief, take part in peace-keeping operations, protect the global commons, and promote cooperation and build trust through strengthening regional institutions. Everyone gathered here knows the crippling devastation that can be caused by natural disasters – and the U.S. and Japan, along with our partners in the region, recognize that responding to these crises is a security imperative. In recent years, U.S. and Japanese forces delivered aid to remote earthquake-stricken regions on Indonesia, and U.S. aircraft based in Japan helped deliver assistance to typhoon victims in Burma. We worked together in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, earthquakes in Java, Sumatra, and Haiti, and most recently following the floods in Pakistan. These efforts have demonstrated the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is of real and life-saving value. They also provide new opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese forces to operate together by conducting joint exercises and missions. Furthermore, U.S. and Japanese troops have been working on the global stage to confront the threat of failed or failing states. Japanese peacekeepers have operated around the world, including the Golan Heights and East Timor and assisted with the reconstruction of Iraq. In Afghanistan, Japan represents the second largest financial donor, making substantive contributions to the international effort by funding the salaries of the Afghan National Police and helping the Afghan government integrate former insurgents. Japan and the United States also continue to cooperate closely to ensure the maritime commons are safe and secure for commercial traffic. Our maritime forces work hand-in-glove in the Western Pacific as well as in other sea passages such as the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, where more than a third of the world’s oil and trade shipments pass through every year. Around the Horn of Africa, Japan has deployed surface ships and patrol aircraft that operate alongside those from all over the world drawn by the common goal to counter piracy in vital sea lanes. Participating in these activities thrusts Japan’s military into a relatively new, and at times sensitive role, as an exporter of security. This is a far cry from the situation of even two decades ago when, as I remember well as a senior national security official, Japan was criticized for so-called “checkbook diplomacy” – sending money but not troops – to help the anti-Saddam coalition during the First Gulf War. By showing more willingness to send self-defense forces abroad under international auspices – consistent with your constitution – Japan is taking its rightful place alongside the world’s other great democracies. That is part of the rationale for Japan’s becoming a permanent member of a reformed United Nations Security Council. And since these challenges cannot be tackled through bilateral action alone, we must use the strong U.S.-Japanese partnership as a platform to do more to strengthen multilateral institutions – regional arrangements that must be inclusive, transparent, and focused on results. Just a few months ago, I attended the historic first meeting of the ASEAN Plus Eight Defense Ministers Meeting in Hanoi, and am encouraged by Japan’s decision to co-chair the Military Medicine Working Group. And as a proud Pacific nation, the United States will take over the chairmanship of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum this year, following Japan’s successful tenure. Working through regional and international forums puts our alliance in the best position to confront some of Asia’s toughest security challenges. As we have been reminded once again in recent weeks, none has proved to be more vexing and enduring than North Korea. Despite the hopes and best efforts of the South Korean government, the U.S. and our allies, and the international community, the character and priorities of the North Korean regime sadly have not changed. North Korea’s ability to launch another conventional ground invasion is much degraded from even a decade or so ago, but in other respects it has grown more lethal and destabilizing. Today, it is North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of nuclear know-how and ballistic missile equipment that have focused our attention – developments that threaten not just the peninsula, but the Pacific Rim and international stability as well. In response to a series of provocations – the most recent being the sinking of the Cheonan and North Korea’s lethal shelling of a South Korean island – Japan has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Republic of Korea and the United States. Our three countries continue to deepen our ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks – the kind of multilateral engagement among America’s long-standing allies that the U.S. would like to see strengthened and expanded over time. When and if North Korea’s behavior gives us any reasons to believe that negotiations can be conducted productively and in good faith, we will work with Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China to resume engagement with North Korea through the six party talks. The first step in the process should be a North-South engagement. But, to be clear, the North must also take concrete steps to honor its international obligations and comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Any progress towards diffusing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula must include the active support of the People’s Republic of China – where, as you probably know, I just finished an official visit. China has been another important player whose economic growth has fueled the prosperity of this part of the world, but questions about its intentions and opaque military modernization program have been a source of concern to its neighbors. Questions about China’s growing role in the region manifest themselves in territorial disputes – most recently in the incident in September near the Senkaku Islands, an incident that served as a reminder of the important of America’s and Japan’s treaty obligations to one another. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. Nonetheless, I disagree with those who portray China as an inevitable strategic adversary of the United States. We welcome a China that plays a constructive role on the world stage. In fact, the goal of my visit was to improve our military-to-military relationship and outline areas of common interest. It is precisely because we have questions about China’s military – just as they might have similar questions about the United States – that I believe a healthy dialogue is needed. Last fall, President Obama and President Hu Jin Tao made a commitment to advance sustained and reliable defense ties, not a relationship repeatedly interrupted by and subject to the vagaries of political weather. On a personal note, one of the things I learned from my experience dealing with the Soviet Union during my earlier time in government was the importance of maintaining a strategic dialogue and open lines of communication. Even if specific agreements did not result – on nuclear weapons or anything else – this dialogue helped us understand each other better and lessen the odds of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The Cold War is mercifully long over and the circumstances with China today are vastly different – but the importance of maintaining dialogue is as important today. For the last few minutes I’ve discussed some of the most pressing security challenges – along with the most fruitful areas of regional cooperation – facing the U.S. and Japan in Asia. This environment – in terms of threats and opportunities – is markedly different than the conditions that led to the forging of the U.S-Japan defense partnership in the context of a rivalry between two global superpowers. But on account of the scope, complexity and lethality of these challenges, I would argue that our alliance is more necessary, more relevant, and more important than ever. And maintaining the vitality and credibility of the alliance requires modernizing our force posture and other defense arrangements to better reflect the threats and military requirements of this century. For example, North Korea’s ballistic missiles – along with the proliferation of these weapons to other countries – require a more effective alliance missile defense capability. The U.S.-Japan partnership in missile defense is already one of the most advanced of its kind in the world. It was American and Japanese AEGIS ships that together monitored the North Korean missile launches of 2006 and 2008. This partnership –which relies on mutual support, cutting edge technology, and information sharing – in many ways reflect our alliance at its best. The U.S. and Japan have nearly completed the joint development of a new advanced interceptor, a system that represents a qualitative improvement in our ability to thwart any North Korean missile attack. The co-location of our air- and missile-defense commands at Yokota – and the associated opportunities for information sharing, joint training, and coordination in this area – provide enormous value to both countries. As I alluded to earlier, advances by the Chinese military in cyber and anti-satellite warfare pose a potential challenge to the ability of our forces to operate and communicate in this part of the Pacific. Cyber attacks can also come from any direction and from a variety of sources – state, non-state, or a combination thereof – in ways that could inflict enormous damage to advanced, networked militaries and societies. Fortunately, the U.S. and Japan maintain a qualitative edge in satellite and computer technology – an advantage we are putting to good use in developing ways to counter threats to the cyber and space domains. Just last month, the Government of Japan took another step forward in the evolution of the alliance by releasing its National Defense Program Guidelines – a document that lays out a vision for Japan’s defense posture. These guidelines envision: A more mobile and deployable force structure; Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities; and A shift in focus to Japan’s southwest islands. These new guidelines provide an opportunity for even deeper cooperation between our two countries – and the emphasis on your southwestern islands underscores the importance of our alliance’s force posture. And this is a key point. Because even as the alliance continues to evolve – in strategy, posture, and military capabilities – to deal with this century’s security challenges, a critical component will remain the forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan. Without such a presence: North Korea’s military provocations could be even more outrageous -- or worse; China might behave more assertively towards its neighbors; It would take longer to evacuate civilians affected by conflict or natural disasters in the region; It would be more difficult and costly to conduct robust joint exercises – such as the recent Keen Sword exercise – that hone the U.S. and Japanese militaries ability to operate and, if necessary, fight together; and Without the forward presence of U.S. forces in Japan, there would be less information sharing and coordination, and we would know less about regional threats and the military capabilities of our potential adversaries.

#### Scenario 2: US-China Relations

#### Sustainable US LNG exports spurs cooperative LNG trading with China – that’s key to overall relations

Livingston and Tu 12 (David, Junior Fellow in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Kevin Jianjun, Senior Associate in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Feeding China’s Energy Appetite, Naturally,” Energy Tribune, 7-17, http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/11206/Feeding-Chinas-Energy-Appetite-Naturally)

Ever since CNOOC, one of China’s “big three” national oil companies, made an ill-fated bid to take over Unocal Corporation in 2005, Sino-U.S. energy relations have been marred with mistrust. Foreign acquisitions by China’s national oil companies thereafter have largely avoided the United States. Many were thus caught off guard by recent reports that Sinopec has emerged as a leading suitor for some of the $7 billion in natural gas assets that Chesapeake Energy must shed to avoid a breach of its debt covenants. Yet upon closer inspection, the move is deft and bears the imprint of lessons well-learned. Chinese national oil companies know from prior experience that in the United States they must wear kid gloves to avoid getting burned. With U.S. natural gas prices projected to remain at $2-4/Mmbtu and far higher returns on investment elsewhere around the globe, why would Sinopec pour capital into American shale gas production when so many U.S. companies are shutting down rigs? There are a number of macro- and micro-dynamics at play here. China’s demand for gas is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. Natural gas currently accounts for only 4 percent of the country’s energy mix, but the International Energy Agency projects this rising to 13 percent by 2035. The same organization predicts that China will account for roughly a quarter of global gas demand growth over the same period. There is also a high level of uncertainty over how reliant the country will be on foreign gas. Much of this will depend on China’s ability to exploit its vast domestic shale gas resources. If unconventional development is well-orchestrated, Chinese gas imports as a share of total demand could be as low as 20 percent in 2035. Alternatively, slow progress in unconventional gas development could lead to a dependency rate north of 50 percent, according to the IEA. In either scenario, a stake in Chesapeake’s gas assets could potentially pay dividends for China. Chesapeake was one of the first to commit wholeheartedly to the potential of shale gas in the United States. It has snatched up vast swaths of shale acreage, and possesses the technology and know-how to efficiently extract unconventional gas from these basins. Sinopec would love nothing more than to gain firsthand experience with hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques that could eventually be applied to China’s massive shale resources. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, technically recoverable shale gas reserves in China are at least 50 percent greater than the sizeable shale endowment in the United States. Sinopec drilled its first shale gas well in Chongqing on June 9, but until it develops the capacity to unlock domestic resources en masse at low cost, acquisitions are the quickest way to bolster its gas reserves. The company might be seeking to secure a dedicated stream of U.S. natural gas production for shipping to China as liquefied natural gas in the future. **This is a complicated proposition, especially considering that the scale of U.S. LNG exports is highly uncertain**. The prospect of rising domestic gas prices as a consequence of satiating Chinese demand would become a thorny political issue, whether merited or not. At the corporate level, Sinopec’s own characteristics reveal an internal logic to the prospective Chesapeake deal. The move is driven by its international market-oriented new boss, Fu Chengyu. Fu served at the helm of CNOOC until 2010 and his failure to secure the Unocal deal in 2005 will undoubtedly inform his current attempt. Evidence of this can already be seen in Sinopec’s preference for partial assets over outright ownership. Of course, Sinopec precluding itself from an operational role also potentially distances it from the technologies and methodologies that it covets. Nevertheless, Fu has remains tempted by U.S. shale gas assets with attractive valuations. Sinopec has been slower getting into America than its rival CNOOC, which recently entered into two billion-dollar joint ventures with Chesapeake in the Niobrara and Eagle Ford shale. Moreover, Sinopec suffers from an unbalanced portfolio, with too many loss-making refineries and too few premiere upstream assets. Oil and gas projects in Iran that have been abandoned by Western companies would normally be an attractive target, but Beijing has increasingly pressured national oil companies to curtail involvement in the pariah state. Unsurprisingly, Sinopec has recently returned its gaze to the United States. Although U.S. natural gas won’t offer lucrative returns until prices rise, Chesapeake’s acreage is likely to sell at a discount and would allow Sinopec to hedge its holdings in more geopolitically tenuous markets. After his $2.5 billion deal with Devon Energy in January for stakes in five different liquids-rich shale plays, a tie-up with Chesapeake would solidify Fu’s reputation as a shrewd CEO. For China, the deal offers another geopolitical hedge—the opportunity to turn dollar-denominated treasury bills into real energy assets. The Chinese government would likely play a key role in financing any large deals pursued by its national oil companies. This is an aspect of the deal worth watching. CNOOC’s critics back in 2005 objected to the assortment of low-interest and interest-free loans backed by Chinese government coffers. Were Sinopec to rely on a similar arrangement of state support, it might be met with resistance in the United States. But the U.S. congress is in a much weaker position than it was in 2005. Partial asset ownership is not the wholesale surrender of a strategic corporation, and the American natural gas industry would welcome with open arms the capital inflow. This points to the **most constructive way forward** for both Washington and Beijing. China is still trying to grow a domestic shale gas industry without opening the market to international players. During the second round of shale gas bids in China, a small window was opened for other domestic companies, but none of them have more sophisticated technology than CNPC, Sinopec, or CNOOC. Sooner or later, China will realize that there are no shortcuts if shale gas is to be developed safely, efficiently, and responsibly. It should follow its own offshore oil exploration model, offering up its domestic market in return for cutting-edge technology. The Chesapeake deal may pay dividends to both the United States and China, but the synergy will go even further if Beijing eventually returns the favor at home.

#### Specifically – that removes Chinese fears of US encirclement – solves US-China conflict and spills over to clean tech cooperation

Stone 11 (Matt, Energy Consultant, US Foreign Policy Analyst, and Junior Associate – McKinsey & Company, “Natural Gas,” The Diplomat, 2-15, http://thediplomat.com/whats-next-china/natural-gas/)

In the space of just a couple of years, natural gas has become the 'next big thing' in energy circles. The recent expansion of unconventional gas production in North America has transformed the United States into the world’s top producer of the fuel. Cleaner-burning than coal, gas is expected to benefit in a carbon-constrained world as it displaces coal in the electricity-generation sector. Moreover a burgeoning interconnected global gas market, spurred by the expansion of the sea-borne liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, is helping to increase market flexibility so that disruptions like those caused by Russia-Ukrainian disputes have less pernicious effects on downstream countries. Hoping to take advantage of these developments, China has crafted a strategy for natural gas that aims to increase domestic production and secure access to gas resources in neighbouring countries. For Beijing, gas offers an opportunity to power its growing economy in a less polluting way than burning coal (although coal is expected to remain vital to China’s rapid economic ascent). Natural gas may also have a role to play in the transportation sector, where Beijing is experimenting in dramatic fashion with compressed natural gas (CNG) in automobiles. Historically, oil’s prominent and essential role in the transportation sector has driven its centrality in international affairs. A transportation sector that could rely jointly on oil and natural gas would allow China to be marginally more indifferent to Middle Eastern geopolitics—in stark contrast with the US experience of the past half-century. The BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 estimates that China produced approximately 85 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas in 2009, while consuming 89 bcm, an import gap that’s expected to expand rapidly in the coming years as gas demand outpaces domestic supply. Indeed, the International Energy Agency (IEA) sees China’s gas demand increasing by 6 percent annually through 2035. The reality is, though, that the country’s own conventional natural gas resources are nowhere near enough to meet this growing demand, forcing Beijing to ramp up its efforts to access gas supplies abroad—particularly in Central Asia, Russia and Burma. It’s here that the frequent portrayal of Beijing as a cash-flush power willing to throw money around to lock up resources is misplaced. China has in fact been carefully expanding its influence in Central Asia and Russia in particular, biding its time until the right deal has come along. Negotiations with Russia over gas supplies, for example, have been ongoing for years (much to Moscow’s consternation). The proposal on the table now would mean two pipelines entering China—one in Xinjiang from the Russian region of Altai and another in Manchuria from the Russian Far East. The former line would have a capacity of 30 bcm per year, the latter 38 bcm per year. But lack of agreement on the price Russian state gas company Gazprom will charge has stalled things. Of course, there’s more to this than pricing. Although Moscow enjoys a privileged position in the export of Russian oil and gas for both economic and political reasons, its manipulation of energy flows to Europe has tarnished the country’s reputation as a reliable supplier of hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, investments in the gas fields that would supply China have been slow to materialize. Both points will likely have made Beijing think carefully about the implications of an inconsistent supply of Russian gas. This reticence over gas is in contrast with a deal struck over crude oil, with China having issued a $25 billion loan to Russia in February 2009 to secure a 20-year supply of crude oil. At the same time, Beijing has postponed a decision on a loan for natural gas—a conspicuous vote of no confidence in Russia’s short-term attractiveness as a gas supplier. If the story of the Russia-China gas trade relationship is one of chess-like negotiations and Beijing’s reticence, China’s experience in Central Asia has been more straightforward. China signed an agreement to build a gas pipeline out of Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2006. Backstopped with a $4 billion loan to Ashgabat and upstream contracts for China’s state-owned CNPC in Turkmenistan, the pipeline came online in December 2009—impressively swift. However, now that it’s operational, Beijing has leveraged its position to extract concessions from the countries along the pipeline. Turkmenistan in particular is under pressure. Russia has cut its purchases of Turkmen gas by three-quarters since 2008, prompting Ashgabat to push China to buy more gas. But Beijing, keenly aware of its negotiating advantage, has held out, purchasing only 4 bcm this year. In the case of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, China has spurred competition for access to the pipeline, with the two engaging in development of gas fields and infrastructure in order to access the pipeline before the other. That said, China may decide it’s in its own interests to selectively manage access to the pipeline in order to win concessions on price and upstream contracts in each country, which would provide it potent political leverage with countries that would prefer to develop robust alternatives to exporting hydrocarbons to Russia. But can Beijing afford to play the long game with neighbouring gas suppliers given its fast-growing demand? A look at China’s alternative sources of supply, particularly domestic production and increasing volumes of LNG in the country’s gas supply mix, offer a glimpse of a possible answer. Beijing has prioritized the development of domestic gas supply, partnering with a number of Western oil firms to develop the country’s unconventional gas resources, which are thought to be large. Washington has promoted this cooperation through the US-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative, a mechanism announced in November 2009 to share expertise and technology for unconventional gas production. In addition, LNG spot prices are currently depressed, prompting Chinese energy firms to purchase spot cargoes through the country’s three LNG import terminals. Sixteen more LNG import terminals are under consideration. Such trends point to a relative decline in the importance of Russian and Central Asian gas to China’s energy security future—a narrative that Beijing’s diplomats are sure to promote in Moscow, Ashgabat, Tashkent and Astana. Chinese national oil companies operate with the explicit backing of the Chinese state–including the state budget.In a region where governments treat their oil and gas resources as strategic commodities to be traded for political perquisites, Chinese companies therefore possess an in-built advantage. But more importantly, China’s unity of effort—political and commercial—allows Beijing to act strategically, with long time horizons, in order to secure the best deal. While China couldn’t have predicted the revolution in unconventional gas production or the global recession, its patience has strengthened its bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia and the Central Asian states. Beijing’s engagement also has the tacit consent of Washington. Western policy in the post-Soviet period has been designed to reinforce Central Asian sovereignty by developing export corridors for oil and gas that avoid Russian (and Iranian) territory. While the United States and Europe have had some success on the western edge of the Caspian Sea by constructing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, large-volume trans-Caspian projects for Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas have been delayed for commercial and geopolitical reasons. In this regard, China has developed a non-Russian, non-Iranian export corridor for Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh gas where the West couldn’t (there’s also a Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline in operation). In a sense, this should provide greater stability in an important and strategic part of the world. And China, meanwhile, appears to have not yet attempted to translate its newfound economic heft into political influence to the West’s detriment: Beijing has **so far** avoided pushing for the **curtailment of the Western military presence in Central Asia** despite ongoing worries about ‘encirclement.’ China’s energy trade relationships with Russia and Central Asia should also make the Middle Kingdom feel more assured about its energy security future. Much of China’s naval build-up and assertive behaviour, especially in the South China Sea, in recent years is motivated by concerns about the security of China’s sea-borne energy imports from the Middle East, both oil and LNG. In the post-World War II period, the US Navy has played the role of guarantor of open trade on the high seas, but Beijing appears to believe this commitment won't continue in the event of conflict with Washington over Taiwan or North Korea. The United States’ efforts to help China expand domestic gas production and its lack of opposition to China-bound pipelines out of Central Asia and Russia should be interpreted by Beijing as indicative of the US commitment to help China grow comfortable about its place in the American-led world order. Natural gas is clearly an important component of Beijing’s energy strategy over the next century. Thus far, China’s approach to accessing foreign and domestic sources of supply has proven collaborative, rather than confrontational, in nature. US assistance on Chinese unconventional gas production presages greater cooperation on energy matters, including in clean-tech where Beijing and Washington can best address climate-altering carbon emissions. In Russia and Central Asia, meanwhile, China has husbanded its resources and influence to achieve advantageous deals.

#### That’s the most likely for escalated US-China conflict

Glaser 12 (Bonnie S., Senior Fellow – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” CFR, April, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

**The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant**. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult. A second contingency involves conflict between China and the Philippines over **natural gas deposits**, especially in the disputed area of Reed Bank, located eighty nautical miles from Palawan. Oil survey ships operating in Reed Bank under contract have increasingly been harassed by Chinese vessels. Reportedly, the United Kingdom-based Forum Energy plans to start drilling for gas in Reed Bank this year, which could provoke an aggressive Chinese response. Forum Energy is only one of fifteen exploration contracts that Manila intends to offer over the next few years for offshore exploration near Palawan Island. Reed Bank is a red line for the Philippines, so this contingency could quickly escalate to violence if China intervened to halt the drilling. The United States could be drawn into a China-Philippines conflict because of its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. The treaty states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes." American officials insist that Washington does not take sides in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and refuse to comment on how the United States might respond to Chinese aggression in contested waters. Nevertheless, an apparent gap exists between American views of U.S. obligations and Manila's expectations. In mid-June 2011, a Filipino presidential spokesperson stated that in the event of armed conflict with China, Manila expected the United States would come to its aid. Statements by senior U.S. officials may have inadvertently led Manila to conclude that the United States would provide military assistance if China attacked Filipino forces in the disputed Spratly Islands. With improving political and military ties between Manila and Washington, including a pending agreement to expand U.S. access to Filipino ports and airfields to refuel and service its warships and planes, the United States would have a great deal at stake in a China-Philippines contingency. Failure to respond would not only set back U.S. relations with the Philippines but would also potentially undermine U.S. credibility in the region with its allies and partners more broadly. A U.S. decision to dispatch naval ships to the area, however, would risk a U.S.-China naval confrontation. Disputes between China and Vietnam over seismic surveys or drilling for oil and gas could also trigger an armed clash for a third contingency. China has harassed PetroVietnam oil survey ships in the past that were searching for oil and gas deposits in Vietnam's EEZ. In 2011, Hanoi accused China of deliberately severing the cables of an oil and gas survey vessel in two separate instances. Although the Vietnamese did not respond with force, they did not back down and Hanoi pledged to continue its efforts to exploit new fields despite warnings from Beijing. Budding U.S.-Vietnam relations could embolden Hanoi to be more confrontational with China on the South China Sea issue. The United States could be drawn into a conflict between China and Vietnam, though that is less likely than a clash between China and the Philippines. In a scenario of Chinese provocation, the United States might opt to dispatch naval vessels to the area to signal its interest in regional peace and stability. Vietnam, and possibly other nations, could also request U.S. assistance in such circumstances. Should the United States become involved, subsequent actions by China or a miscalculation among the forces present could result in exchange of fire. In another possible scenario, an attack by China on vessels or rigs operated by an American company exploring or drilling for hydrocarbons could quickly involve the United States, especially if American lives were endangered or lost. ExxonMobil has plans to conduct exploratory drilling off Vietnam, making this an existential danger. In the short term, however, the likelihood of this third contingency occurring is relatively low given the recent thaw in Sino-Vietnamese relations. In October 2011, China and Vietnam signed an agreement outlining principles for resolving maritime issues. The effectiveness of this agreement remains to be seen, but for now tensions appear to be defused. Warning Indicators Strategic warning signals that indicate heightened risk of conflict include political decisions and statements by senior officials, official and unofficial media reports, and logistical changes and equipment modifications. In the contingencies described above, strategic warning indicators could include heightened rhetoric from all or some disputants regarding their territorial and strategic interests. For example, China may explicitly refer to the South China Sea as a core interest; in 2010 Beijing hinted this was the case but subsequently backed away from the assertion. Beijing might also warn that it cannot "stand idly by" as countries nibble away at Chinese territory, a formulation that in the past has often signaled willingness to use force. Commentaries and editorials in authoritative media outlets expressing China's bottom line and issuing ultimatums could also be a warning indicator. Tough language could also be used by senior People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers in meetings with their American counterparts. An increase in nationalistic rhetoric in nonauthoritative media and in Chinese blogs, even if not representing official Chinese policy, would nevertheless signal pressure on the Chinese leadership to defend Chinese interests. Similar warning indicators should be tracked in Vietnam and the Philippines that might signal a hardening of those countries' positions. Tactical warning signals that indicate heightened risk of a potential clash in a specific time and place include commercial notices and preparations, diplomatic and/or military statements warning another claimant to cease provocative activities or suffer the consequences, military exercises designed to intimidate another claimant, and ship movements to disputed areas. As for an impending incident regarding U.S. surveillance activities, statements and unusual preparations by the PLA might suggest a greater willingness to employ more aggressive means to intercept U.S. ships and aircraft. Implications for U.S. Interests The United States has significant political, security, and economic interests at stake if one of the contingencies should occur. Global rules and norms. The United States has important interests in the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes according to international law. With the exception of China, all the claimants of the South China Sea have attempted to justify their claims based on their coastlines and the provisions of UNCLOS. China, however, relies on a mix of historic rights and legal claims, while remaining deliberately ambiguous about the meaning of the "nine-dashed line" around the sea that is drawn on Chinese maps. Failure to uphold international law and norms could harm U.S. interests elsewhere in the region and beyond. Ensuring freedom of navigation is another critical interest of the United States and other regional states. Although China claims that it supports freedom of navigation, its insistence that foreign militaries seek advance permission to sail in its two-hundred-mile EEZ casts doubt on its stance. China's development of capabilities to deny American naval access to those waters in a conflict provides evidence of possible Chinese intentions to block freedom of navigation in specific contingencies. Alliance security and regional stability. U.S. allies and friends around the South China Sea look to the United States to maintain free trade, safe and secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and overall peace and stability in the region. Claimants and nonclaimants to land features and maritime waters in the South China Sea view the U.S. military presence as necessary to allow decision-making free of intimidation. If nations in the South China Sea lose confidence in the United States to serve as the principal regional security guarantor, they could embark on costly and potentially destabilizing arms buildups to compensate or, alternatively, become more accommodating to the demands of a powerful China. Neither would be in the U.S. interest. Failure to reassure allies of U.S. commitments in the region could also undermine U.S. security guarantees in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the United States must avoid getting drawn into the territorial dispute—and possibly into a conflict—by regional nations who seek U.S. backing to legitimize their claims. Economic interests. Each year, $5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea; U.S. trade accounts for $1.2 trillion of this total. Should a crisis occur, the diversion of cargo ships to other routes would harm regional economies as a result of an increase in insurance rates and longer transits. Conflict of any scale in the South China Sea would hamper the claimants from benefiting from the South China's Sea's proven and potential riches. Cooperative relationship with China. The stakes and implications of any U.S.-China incident are far greater than in other scenarios. The United States has an abiding interest in preserving stability in the U.S.-China relationship so that it can continue to secure Beijing's cooperation on an expanding list of regional and global issues and more tightly integrate China into the prevailing international system. Preventive Options Efforts should continue to resolve the disputes over territorial sovereignty of the South China Sea's land features, rightful jurisdiction over the waters and seabed, and the legality of conducting military operations within a country's EEZ, but the likelihood of a breakthrough in any of these areas is slim in the near term. In the meantime, the United States should focus on lowering the risk of potential armed clashes arising from either miscalculation or unintended escalation of a dispute. There are several preventive options available to policymakers—in the United States and other nations—to avert a crisis and conflict in the South China Sea. These options are not mutually exclusive. Support U.S.-China Risk-reduction Measures Operational safety measures and expanded naval cooperation between the United States and China can help to reduce the risk of an accident between ships and aircraft. The creation of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 1988 was intended to establish "rules of the road" at sea similar to the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), but it has not been successful. Communication mechanisms can provide a means to defuse tensions in a crisis and prevent escalation. Political and military hotlines have been set up, though U.S. officials have low confidence that they would be utilized by their Chinese counterparts during a crisis. An additional hotline to manage maritime emergencies should be established at an operational level, along with a signed political agreement committing both sides to answer the phone in a crisis. Joint naval exercises to enhance the ability of the two sides to cooperate in counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations could increase cooperation and help prevent a U.S.-China conflict. Bolster Capabilities of Regional Actors Steps could be taken to further enhance the capability of the Philippines military to defend its territorial and maritime claims and improve its indigenous domain awareness, which might deter China from taking aggressive action. Similarly, the United States could boost the maritime surveillance capabilities of Vietnam, enabling its military to more effectively pursue an anti-access and area-denial strategy. Such measures run the risk of emboldening the Philippines and Vietnam to more assertively challenge China and could raise those countries' expectations of U.S. assistance in a crisis. Encourage Settlement of the Sovereignty Dispute The United States could push for submission of territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for settlement, or encourage an outside organization or mediator to be called upon to resolve the dispute. However, the prospect for success in these cases is slim given China's likely opposition to such options. Other options exist to resolve the sovereignty dispute that would be difficult, but not impossible, to negotiate. One such proposal, originally made by Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke, and Noel Ludwig in Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, would establish "regional sovereignty" over the islands in the South China Sea among the six claimants, allowing them to collectively manage the islands, territorial seas, and airspace. Another option put forward by Peter Dutton of the Naval War College would emulate the resolution of the dispute over Svalbard, an island located between Norway and Greenland. The Treaty of Spitsbergen, signed in 1920, awarded primary sovereignty over Svarlbard to Norway but assigned resource-related rights to all signatories. This solution avoided conflict over resources and enabled advancement of scientific research. Applying this model to the South China Sea would likely entail giving sovereignty to China while permitting other countries to benefit from the resources. In the near term, at least, such a solution is unlikely to be accepted by the other claimants. Promote Regional Risk-reduction Measures The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China agreed upon multilateral risk-reduction and confidence-building measures in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), but have neither adhered to its provisions (for example, to resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes without resorting to the threat or use of force) nor implemented its proposals to undertake cooperative trust-building activities. The resumption of negotiations between China and ASEAN after a hiatus of a decade holds out promise for reinvigorating cooperative activities under the DOC. Multilaterally, existing mechanisms and procedures already exist to promote operational safety among regional navies; a new arrangement is unnecessary. The United States, China, and all ASEAN members with the exception of Laos and Burma are members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Founded in 1988, WPNS brings regional naval leaders together biennially to discuss maritime security. In 2000, it produced the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES), which includes safety measures and procedures and means to facilitate communication when ships and aircraft make contact. There are also other mechanisms available such as the International Maritime Organization's Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and the International Civil Aviation Organization's rules of the air. In addition, regional navies could cooperate in sea environment protection, scientific research at sea, search and rescue activities, and mitigation of damage caused by natural calamities. The creation of new dialogue mechanisms may also be worth consideration. A South China Sea Coast Guard Forum, modeled after the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which cooperates on a multitude of maritime security and legal issues, could enhance cooperation through information sharing and knowledge of best practices. The creation of a South China Sea information-sharing center would also provide a platform to improve awareness and communication between relevant parties. The information-sharing center could also serve as an accountability mechanism if states are required to document any incidents and present them to the center. Advocate Joint Development/Multilateral Economic Cooperation Resource cooperation is another preventive option that is underutilized by claimants in the South China Sea. Joint development of petroleum resources, for example, could reduce tensions between China and Vietnam, and between China and the Philippines, on issues related to energy security and access to hydrocarbon resources. Such development could be modeled on one of the many joint development arrangements that exist in the South and East China seas. Parties could also cooperate on increasing the use of alternative energy sources in order to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. Shared concerns about declining fish stocks in the South China Sea suggest the utility of cooperation to promote conservation and sustainable development. Establishing a joint fisheries committee among claimants could prove useful. Fishing agreements between China and its neighbors are already in place that could be expanded into disputed areas to encourage greater cooperation. Clearly Convey U.S. Commitments The United States should avoid inadvertently encouraging the claimants to engage in confrontational behavior. For example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's reference in November 2011 to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea could have unintended consequences such as emboldening Manila to antagonize China rather than it seeking to peacefully settle their differences.

#### Extinction

Lieven 12 (Anatol, Professor in the War Studies Department – King’s College (London), Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Washington), “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, 6-12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html)

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

# 2AC

### Case

#### Natural gas cements climate leadership

Casten 9 (Sean Casten, president of Recycled Energy Development, December 16, 2009, “Natural gas as a near-term CO2 mitigation strategy,” Grist, http://goo.gl/b8z08)

Discussions of CO2 reduction tend to start from a presumption of near-term economic disruption coupled to long-term investment in green technology. The presumption isn’t right. The U.S. could reduce its total CO2 footprint by 14-20 percent tomorrow with no disruption in our access to energy services, without investing in any new infrastructure. The Waxman-Markey proposal to reduce CO2 emissions by 17 percent over 10 years is constrained only by its ambition. This near-term opportunity would be realized by ramping up our nation’s generation of electricity from gas and ramping down our generation from coal, taking advantage only of existing assets. Its scale and potential for immediate impact deserves consideration; even partial action towards this goal would have dramatic political and environmental consequences, establishing U.S. leadership and credibility in global climate negotiations.

### 1NC Middle East War

#### Middle East war doesn’t escalate

Maloney 7 (Suzanne, Senior Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Steve Cook, Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Fellow – Council for Foreign Relations, “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune, 6-28, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm)

Long before the Bush administration began selling "the surge" in Iraq as a way to avert a general war in the Middle East, observers both inside and outside the government were growing concerned about the potential for armed conflict among the regional powers. Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

### A2: LNG Exports Bad – Russian Economy – 2AC

#### **Qatar takes out the link – already out competing Russia**

Satanovsky 12 (E. , “Small, but very dangerous. Qatar could oust Russia from the global gas market”, 9/4, <http://therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/2012/04/09/small-but-very-dangerous-qatar-could-oust-russia-from-the-global-gas-market/>, originally from http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1333724880)

Ironically, the tiny but ambitious and dynamic, Qatar is the main competitor of Russia in world energy markets.While Moscow, sinking into the international political and technical problems, build pipelines, which were to allow it to solve the problems with transit countries, Doha has created sweeping the entire world network of terminals for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and formed the largest specialized fleet of 54 vessels. About stuck at the stage of negotiations, “South Stream” keep silent, but the Russian gas that goes to Europe on the “Nord Stream”, and in China and other Asian countries on the ESPO under construction, will meet in those markets most serious competition from Qatar. In 2010, the emirate has put 55.7 million tons of LNG to 23 countries. In 2011 – 77 million tons by the end of 2012 plans to sell 120 million tons. 23% of EU gas consumption has Qatari origin. During the eight years of production and export of LNG in Qatar grew by six times, and five-year plan involves the development of its economy to invest more than $ 96 billion in deposits and the expansion of processing facilities, while maintaining a caretaker as a series of major gas fields. Isolated from the land of Saudi Arabia, which at one time cut off from his UAE, Qatar was forced to concentrate on the manufacture and export of LNG and is now independent of the neighbor-rival. And its partners Exxon Mobil and British Petroleum have the most advanced technology liquefaction. Growing market Qatari gas is Europe. In Asia, the number of his clients are India, China, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea and Japan. In North America – USA and Canada. In South America, from 2011 – Argentina and Brazil (Petrobras). Competing in the EU with the Algerian and Egyptian gas, the main pressure on the emirate has a Russian “Gazprom”, pushing it even on the traditional markets such as Italy and Poland, where the LNG will begin in 2013. Active negotiations on the export of Qatari gas to the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus. In Asia Qatari liquefied natural gas – a competitor of Russian LNG produced on Sakhalin and the Far East. Russian politicians have believed in vain that the creation of the so-called ”Gas OPEC” (Forum countries – exporters of natural gas) will be the basis of alliance of gas producers, who will be able to dictate its conditions to consumers the benefit of all market players. For Qatar, the whole point of this organization limited to the location of its headquarters in Doha, and the possibility of imitation in its framework for collective action, which allows competitors to divert attention from its offensive against their interests. At a red herring like and discussion about the emirate’s investment in the project “Yamal LNG.” While the economic cooperation of Qatar and Russia costavlyaet less than $ 20 million per year. And if Russia is open for cooperation, the presence of Russian business in Qatar is extremely complicated. The rapid expansion of Qatar’s terminal network, dumping, and the transition from the spot to supply medium-and long-term contracts do not give a reason for the optimistic estimates of the possibilities for harmonizing Russian and Qatari gas strategy. Geography of Qatar LNG terminals covers the UK, continental Europe, the U.S. (only one Golden Pass terminal on the Gulf Coast has a capacity of 15.6 million tonnes of LNG per year), Latin America, the Middle East. Requirements of European companies that rely on the Qatari dumping, the decline in prices for Russian gas complicate the situation of “Gazprom”, especially since the transition to long-term transactions Qatar neutralized the main traditional advantage of Russia. A precedent was a three-year contract for $ 3.25 billion signed in 2011 between Qatargas and the British company Centrica, to supply the last 2.4 million tons of LNG annually.

#### Russian economy is collapsing now

MarketWatch 10/8 (“World Bank says Russian economy to slow”, 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/world-bank-says-russian-economy-to-slow-2012-10-08)

MOSCOW--Russia's economy will slow over the next year, the World Bank said Monday, while urging the country to stick with prudent spending plans and focus monetary policy on low inflation. Growth in Russian gross **domestic product will slow** from 4.3% in 2011 to 3.5% this year and 3.6% in 2013 due to unfavorable base effects, drought in the agricultural sector, rising inflation and weak global sentiment, the World Bank said in a report. The bank revised down its 2012 estimate by 0.3 percentage point and its 2013 forecast by 0.6 percentage point since its June report, citing a poor grain harvest and a weaker-than-expected global environment. "Just at a time when Russia's output levels have exceeded the pre-crisis peak, the economy is settling onto a lower trajectory, even though oil prices have stayed high," the bank said.

#### Russia’s economy is resilient – oil, metals, and financial reserves

**Garrels 8** (Annie – a foreign correspondent for National Public Radio in the United States, “RUSSIAN ECONOMY STRONG DESPITE COMMODITY FALLOUT”, 9/20/08, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94647099>)

For the past six years**, Russia's economy has boomed in large part because of soaring prices for oil and metals.** Russia is strong in these areas ó too strong, though, for a balanced economy. Russian shares have bled almost 50 percent of their value since May, but many analysts say Russia still remains a resilient economy. And after the Georgia invasion and weeks of harsh, anti-western rhetoric, both Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have tried to reassure foreign investors. When those commodities prices dropped, Russia's stock market was hit hard. "The question is if they fall significantly further," says James Fenkner with Red Star Assets in Moscow. Fenkner is one of the more cautious voices in Moscow, and other analysts like Roland Nash of Renaissance Capital look at other indicators, like direct foreign investment. "The level of foreign investment is twice the per capita of Brazil, **four times that of China**, and six times that of India this year," Nash says. "The market arguments for Russia are still very good and there is still a lot of money coming in." Too Dependent On Commodities The Russia government recognizes it is too dependent on commodities, and while their prices were high, it amassed **huge reserves as a cushion**. The country now has a balanced budget and financial analysts predict its economy will continue to grow at about six percent. Vladmir Tikhomirov, senior economist at Uralsib Financial Corporation, says this is enough to avoid a crisis, but it is not what the Kremlin hoped for. "It's not enough to make fundamental changes to the economic structures," Tikhomirov says. "Russia must have to be a more competitive and efficient economy." Moscow may now be the most expensive, glamorous city in the world, but the rest of the country lags behind. Tikhomirov says the Russia needs to improve basic infrastructure like roads as well as small and mid-size businesses. For this, Russia needs a stable global financial system

#### No link and non-unique – most nat gas is domestically used and Russia’s industry is screwed

Stratfor 12 (“Russia's Natural Gas Dilemma”, 4/9, http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/russias-natural-gas-dilemma)

Russia produced approximately 510 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas in 2011, and approximately 60% of it was sold on the domestic Russian market. Russia has one of the highest domestic consumption rates per capita of natural gas - understandably so, since Russia is one of the world's coldest countries, and heating and electricity use is high. Russian industry also depends heavily on natural gas. Russia uses a four-tier pricing system for natural gas: two tiers for domestic prices, one for the former Soviet states and one for its European customers. Russia has long capped domestic natural gas prices, a practise left over from the Soviet era. Currently, Russia charges between $75 and $97 per thousand cubic metres (tcm) on the domestic market, with households and municipal entities, such as schools and hospitals, paying the lower price and industrial entities paying more. Most of the former Soviet states pay in the mid-$200s and Europe pays $350 to $450 per tcm. Russia's natural gas firms - primarily Gazprom - are suffering financially because of measures that let domestic users pay a fraction of the price Russia's foreign customers pay. In the past decade, the Kremlin has permitted Gazprom to increase its price by 14 to 25% a year. This gradual increase has prevented a massive backlash from natural gas consumers in Russia because it has been accompanied by improving economic standards in the country. However, Gazprom says this increase is insufficient. Gazprom sees four primary problems with Russia's current natural gas prices. First, Gazprom is losing money on its domestic sales. According to current Gazprom data, it costs Gazprom approximately $132 to produce or acquire and then distribute 1 tcm of natural gas, but its revenue from the domestic market is only $80 per tcm, which means Gazprom loses more than $50 per tcm sold domestically. Considering that the domestic market makes up 60% of sales, the loss is monumental. Gazprom has continued to stay afloat and remain strong because of its sales abroad, where its revenue is approximately $279 per tcm (double the cost of production). However, Russia's domestic natural gas consumption has grown more than 15% in the past decade (but declined during the economic crisis of 2008-2009). Gazprom is thus producing more natural gas at a loss than it would if it charged its domestic customers what it charged its foreign customers. Second, Gazprom is concerned that its revenues from sales to Europe will decrease amid negotiations over new natural gas prices with many of its European customers. Coupled with Europe's diversification of natural gas supplies away from Russia, this means Gazprom could soon be unable to continue offsetting its domestic losses with high profit margins from sales on the European market. Third, when winters are particularly cold, Russia curbs what it exports (mainly to Europe) to keep more supplies at home. This happened this past winter and shortages of up to 30% were seen in Austria, Romania, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy, all of which also experienced an extraordinarily cold winter. Although this practice might keep the population at home warm, it meant that Gazprom lost a great deal of money it could have made if more supplies had gone to Europe. Finally, Gazprom is trying to offset a recent 61% increase in mineral extraction taxes, which cost Gazprom $2.2 billion more in 2011 and could cost an estimated $5.2 billion more in 2012. The tax issue is highly controversial and interwoven with the ongoing internal political struggle in the Kremlin. The idea of restructuring the country's energy tax system has drawn both robust opposition and staunch support within the Kremlin. The increased tax came from a faction in the Kremlin that believes the government needs more funds to offset its budget deficit and that the government needed to stop coddling Russia's energy firms with low taxes. Citing these concerns, Gazprom is arguing that it cannot continue funding future projects without more revenue from domestic natural gas consumers. It is not that Gazprom would be unable to continue the de facto subsidisation overall; the company generates a great deal of revenue. Gazprom has some large and expensive projects planned that it does not believe it can fund without making more money. These projects include the Shtokman Arctic project, estimated to cost $15 billion to $20 billion; the South Stream pipeline, with an estimated cost of $24 billion to $31 billion; the Yamal fields project, which will cost tens of billions of dollars; and an expansion of Sakhalin, which will also cost tens of billions of dollars.

### Courts CP – 2AC

#### Perm – do both

Perine 8 (Katherine, Staff – CQ Politics, “Congress Unlikely to Try to Counter Supreme Court Detainee Ruling”, 6-12, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002896528&cpage=2)

Thursday’s decision, from a Supreme Court dominated by Republican appointees, gives Democrats further cover against GOP sniping. “This is something that the court has decided, and very often the court gives political cover to Congress,” said Ross K. Baker, a Rutgers Universitiy political science professor. “You can simply point to a Supreme Court decision and say, ‘The devil made me do it.’ ”

#### Perm – do the counterplan – we don’t spec an agent. The CP does not disprove the desirability of the plan.

#### **Saying “Federal Government” doesn’t mean “all three branches” – any one body acts as it**

Chicago 7 (University of Chicago Manual of Style, “Capitalization, Titles”, http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS\_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles30.html)

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be U.S. Federal Government or U.S. federal government? A. The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

#### Reduce means to diminish the strength of

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Reduce,” Volume 13, p. 433)

21. e. to diminish the strength of (spirit).

#### Doesn’t solve –

#### Court natural gas decisions are unpredictable - they are made on a case by case basis and leave many questions unanswered

Neese 5 (Angela – Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Colorado School of Law, 2005; B.S.B.A., University of Denver, “THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE COLORADO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A CALL FOR A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH”, 2005, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 561, lexis)

These two leading Colorado Supreme Court decisions, Bowen/Edwards and Voss, were decided over a decade ago, and yet these cases "leave many questions unanswered." n185 For example, the court did not adequately define "operational conflict," n186 and "it left to speculation the type of local regulation which will offend the principles articulated in those cases." n187 What these Colorado Supreme Court decisions did, in effect, was create a regime in which each occurrence of stringent local regulation of the oil and gas industry must be examined by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Because the court held that state preemption of local regulation is not total, "each provision of a local oil and gas regulation must be examined to determine whether it presents a conflict." n188 For the past decade, the Colorado Supreme Court has declined to hear any further cases on the issue of state preemption of local government oil and gas regulation, thereby foreclosing any possibility of providing more direct guidelines for the COGCC and local governments. As a result, this case-by-case system of preemption analysis has led to more than a decade worth of costly litigation, with no end in sight. The case-by-case regime leads to a high degree of unpredictability and puts natural gas developers and local governments constantly at odds. n189 The litigation that often results, when the industry and the local governments are forced to look to the courts to determine which regulations are controlling, is costly to the industry (and thus to natural gas consumers) and to local governments (and thus to the taxpayers). n190 The lack of predictability, the high costs of litigation, and the resulting delays in production are proof that the Colorado Supreme Court has done the state a disservice by not providing a workable framework on the issue of state preemption of oil and gas regulation. n191 Bowen/Edwards is considered the determinative case as to preemption, yet both sides cite this case in their briefs and point to the same language as suggestive that they will prevail. n192 The lack of clear guidelines under the current Colorado [\*585] case law results in a number of unanswered questions that will likely lead to future legal battles.

#### That’s key – a certain and predictable environment is key to generate adequate investment – that’s 1AC Loris and Ebinger

#### Agent CPs are a voting issue – detracts from topic education, steals aff ground, and neg fiat does not extend to topical actions.

#### CP undermines legitimacy – takes out solvency.

**Bentley**, **2007** (Curt, Constrained by the liberal tradition, Brigham Young University Law Review, p. lexis)

This institutional limitation theory focuses primarily on the constraints imposed on the Court because of its relationship with the other branches of government. The Supreme Court is not wholly dependent upon other branches of government; the unique legitimacy given its interpretations of the Constitution by the American people provides it with real influence of its own. n116 However, the institutional limitation theory posits that since the Court possesses neither the purse nor the sword, n117 it relies upon its  [\*1745]  legitimacy in the eyes of the American people in order to pressure the legislative and executive branches to **enforce its decrees**: The Supreme Court ... possesses some bases of power of its own, the most important of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution. This legitimacy the Court jeopardizes if it **flagrantly opposes the major policies** of the dominant alliance; such a course of action, as we have seen, is one in which the Court will not normally be tempted to engage. n118 **Without legitimacy** in the eyes of the public, both Congress and the President might feel justified in **resisting the ruling of the Court** either through jurisdiction-stripping n119 or by simply refusing to enforce its decrees. n120 **There is precedent for both in American history**. n121 The Court risks becoming substantially weakened, or even irrelevant, when the political branches ignore judicial decrees and where it nonetheless doggedly pursues the counter-majoritarian course. n122

#### -- No solvency: delay

Klein 84 (Mitchell S. G., MA and Ph.D in Political Science – Northwestern University, Law, Courts, and Policy, p. 117-118)

The aphorism “Justice delayed is justice denied” finds support from nay court analysts. Court delay is a significant administrative problem in the judiciary. As H. Ted Rubin observes: “Far too many courts operate essentially in the same fashion as fifty years ago … Too many judges have failed to effectively administer control of their own court calendar.” (1976, p. 185) A number of problems associated with court delay have been noted by Hans Zeisel and associates (1959, pp. xxii-xxiii). For example, delay in the courtroom jeopardizes justice because evidence may deteriorate over time. It also causes severe hardship to some parties, even depriving some of a basic public service. Finally, court delay also produces an unhealthy emphasis on the desirability of settling out of court.

#### CP Tanks Biz Con

Woellert 5 (Lorraine, Legal Correspondent – Business Week, “Forget Roe and the Framers. Let’s Talk Business”, Washington Post, 10-16, Lexis)

Friends and peers trying to describe Miers and Roberts like to use the P-word -- pragmatic. That's sweet music to business ears: Corporations worship pragmatism and don't give a whit about judicial philosophy. But it's rank heresy to many on the right, who have had it up to here with jurists who weigh social and cultural mores when crafting opinions. Religious and other social conservatives want justices who will apply a very narrow "strict constructionist" interpretation to the Constitution and not read new rights -- such as the right to privacy found in Roe v. Wade -- into the framers' text. Roberts already has disappointed them. "Judges take a more practical and pragmatic approach when deciding the rule of law," rather than sticking to a strict philosophy, he told the Senate Judiciary Committee. "The Framers were aware they were drafting for the future." Roberts also tipped his hat to the importance of legal precedent and the need to avoid enacting rapid and radical changes in law: "It is a jolt to the legal system to override precedent." Translation: Roe might be here to stay, but business can take comfort. What corporate America wants from the judicial branch more than anything else is consistency and predictability -- tools for planning in the short term. That's one reason CEOs mourned the resignation of Sandra Day O'Connor. Legal scholars have scoffed at her philosophical inconsistency, but business execs lauded her practicality and her frequent acknowledgments of real-world situations in opinions that often made their 9-to-5 workday a little easier.

#### Recession results

Braithwaite 4 (John, Australian Research Council Federation fellow, Australian National University, and chair of the Regulatory Institutions Network, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592 Annals 79, March, Lexis)

The challenge of designing institutions that simultaneously engender emancipation and hope is addressed within the assumption of economic institutions that are fundamentally capitalist. This contemporary global context gives more force to the hope nexus because we know capitalism thrives on hope. When business confidence collapses, capitalist economies head for recession. This dependence on hope is of quite general import; business leaders must have hope for the future before they will build new factories; consumers need confidence before they will buy what the factories make; investors need confidence before they will buy shares in the company that builds the factory; bankers need confidence to lend money to build the factory; scientists need confidence to innovate with new technologies in the hope that a capitalist will come along and market their invention. Keynes's ([1936]1981) General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money lamented the theoretical neglect of "animal spirits" of hope ("spontaneous optimism rather than . . . mathematical expectation" (p. 161) in the discipline of economics, a neglect that continues to this day (see also Barbalet 1993).

### Heidegger K – 2AC

#### Case turns the K – global natural gas extraction is inevitable – other countries view nature as a standing reserve – the sends a global signal to other countries to use environment-friendly tech – that’s Schneider.

#### The Aff’s a prerequisite to the Alt – only innovative responses to tech-induced environmental destruction enable reconceptualization of technology as more than an instrument and of nature as more than standing reserve. The Alt’s passive refusal leaves prevailing worldviews intact.

Feenberg 7 (Andrew, Canada Research Chair in the Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Volume 42, “Between Reason and Experience,” p. 24-27, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Between\_Reason\_and\_Experience\_DYP42.pdf)

As I reformulate this social version of the technical revealing, it has political consequences. Political protests arise as feedback from disastrous technical projects and designs reaches those excluded from the original networks of control. These protests are often based on scientific knowledge of the devastation caused by technology designed in indifference to human needs. This is the point at which objective facts enter experience as motives for distrust and fear of technology and technical authority. The subjects become aware of the contingency of the technically structured world on choices and decisions that do not proceed from a supposedly pure rationality. The lifeworld reacts back on technology through the objective contents of knowledge of its side effects. There have been many attempts to articulate the implications of this new situation. My approach is closest to that of Ulrich Beck. Like him I argue that we are entering a new phase of technological development in which the externalities associated with the prevailing technologies threaten the survival of the industrial system (Beck, 1992). This threat has begun to force redesign of many technologies and changes in the disciplines and training underlying the technical professions. Beck explains the transition from a capitalism based on distinct spheres with little interaction, to a “reflexive modernity” in which interaction between spheres becomes the norm. Multiple approaches and cross disciplinary conceptions increasingly shape the design process in response. He develops the social consequences of the resultant changes while I have focused primarily on the technological dimension of the new phase. In this phase, what Gilbert Simondon calls “concretizing” innovations emerge designed to accommodate a wider range of social influences and contextual factors.12 As design is pulled in different directions by actors attempting to impose their differing functional requirements on devices, the winning design strategies are often those that reconcile multiple functions in simple and elegant structures capable of serving them all. Examples abound: hybrid engines in automobiles, refrigerants and propellants that do not damage the ozone layer, substitutes for lead in consumer products, and so on. In the process of developing these technologies environmental, medical and other concerns are brought to bear on design by new actors excluded from the original technological regime. Of course, no small refinements such as these can resolve the environmental crisis, but the fact that they are possible at all removes the threat of technological regression as a major alibi for doing nothing. The emergence of a radically new technical politics requires us to rethink the basic concept of rationality that has supplied the existing industrial society with its highest philosophical sanction. Heidegger and Marcuse help us to understand the limitations of the prevailing concept. They remind us that the hypostatization of a reason fragmented into specializations and differentiated from a broader cultural and normative context is not inevitable but belongs to a specific historical era, an era that may well be approaching its end. A new understanding of rationality is possible based not on a return to a teleological worldview in which we can no longer believe but on recognition of the complexity of experiences that have been cast in artificially narrow instrumental schemas. Concrete experience is thus the touchstone of this ontology because it is only there that the world reveals itself in its multifarious and unpredictable connections and potentialities. From this new standpoint specialization and differentiation will not disappear, but they will be treated as methodologically useful rather than as ontologically fundamental. The resultant breaching of the boundaries between disciplines and between the technical realm and the lifeworld responds to the crisis of industrial society. We may learn to bound the cosmos in modern forms by attending to the limits that emerge from the unintended interactions of domains touched by powerful modern technologies. This is the form in which the lived world we have discovered in the thought of Heidegger and Marcuse becomes active in the structure of a rationality that still has for its mission the explanation of objective nature. The discovery of a limit reveals the significance of that which is threatened beyond it. This dialectic of limitation is most obvious in the case of threats to human health or species survival. On the one side, the experienced world gains a ground in respect for an object, in this case the human body or a threatened species. On the other side, a concrete technical response is solicited employing the means at hand in new combinations or inventing new ones. From this standpoint no return to a qualitative science is possible or necessary. Modern science objectifies and reifies by its very nature but it could operate within limits standing in for the lost essences of antiquity and like them referring us to an irreducible truth of experience. As we encounter this truth we are reminded of the necessity of restraint. This must be a productive restraint leading to a process of transformation, not a passive refusal of a reified system. The forward looking Janus face is fundamental and grants hope not by rejecting scientific-technical achievements but by revealing their essential nature as processes in which human action can intervene.13 Innovative responses to the new limits can serve in the reconstruction of both technical disciplines and technology. To be sure, the process character and full complexity of reality cannot be reflected immediately in the scientific-technical disciplines, but the disciplines can be deployed in fluid combinations that reflect the complexity of reality as it enters experience through humanly provoked disasters of all sorts and through the consciousness of new threats of which we ourselves are the ultimate source. The goal is not merely to survive but to reconstruct modern technology around a new model of wealth that is environmentally compatible and that draws on human capacities suppressed or ignored in the present dispensation. Marcuse interpreted this in terms of the surrealist “hazard objectif,” the rather fantastic notion of an aesthetically formed world in which “human faculties and desires ... appear as part of the objective determinism of nature – coincidence of causality through nature and causality through freedom” (Marcuse, 1969: 31).

#### Perm – do the plan and non-competitive parts of the alternative. It solves best.

**McWhorter 92** (Ladelle, Assistant Professor of Philosophy – Northeast Missouri State University, Heidegger and the Earth, p. 3)

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

#### -- No extinction – tech and calculation have existed forever – and the world is getting better

#### -- Extinction outweighs – pre-requisite to Being

**Zimmerman 93** (Michael E., Professor of Philosophy – University of Tulane, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, p. 119-120)

Heidegger asserted that human self assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might “bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth.” This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one’s soul by losing ones relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur in an ontological clearing through which life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity’s one dimensional disclosure to entities virtually denies that any “being” at all, the loss of humanity’s openness for being is already occurring. Modernity’s background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material happiness for everyone by reducing nature into pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in a nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity’s slow destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided a nuclear war only to survive as contended clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. **But most** of them **could not agree that the loss of humanity’s relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide**, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never “disclosed” by humanity.

#### Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

#### -- Alt fails – ‘letting be’ and waiting for metaphysical transformation dooms us to extinction

**Santoni 85** (Ronald E., Professor of Philosophy – Denison, Nuclear War, Ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-157)

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to **omnicide**. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we **simultaneously act** to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the arms race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about our disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be **too permissive** in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be **an early accomplice to** the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its **annihilation**.

#### That’s especially true for the environment

**Levy 99** (Neil, Ph.D. in Comparative Literature and Critical Theory – Monash University, and Currently Tutor, Centre for Critical Theory, Monash University, (Discourses of the Environment edited by Eric Darier) p. 214-215)

If our current situation can really be accurately characterized as the extension of bio-power from the realm of population to that of all life, does that entail that the strategies we should be adopting are those of management of the non-human world, as well as that of the human? I believe that **it does**. But I do not believe that this necessitates, or even makes possible, the genetically engineered, artificial world which McKibben and many others who have advocated non-anthropocentric ethics have feared, the replacement of the natural world with `a space station' (McKibben 1989: 170). And not just for the reason that, after the end of nature, the artificial/natural distinction is impossible to maintain. The world McKibben fears, in which forests are replaced by trees designed by us for maximum efficiency at absorbing carbon, and new strains of genetically engineered corn flourish in the new conditions brought about by global warming, seems to me unlikely in the extreme. The systems with which we are dealing, the imbrication of a huge variety of forms of life with chemical processes, with meteorological and geographic processes, are so complex, and occur on such scale, that I can see no way in which they could be replaced by artificial systems which would fulfil the same functions. Every intervention we make in' that direction has consequences which are so far-reaching, and involve so many variables and as yet undetected connections between relatively independent systems, that they are practically unforeseeable. To replace non-human systems with mechanisms of our own devising would involve thousands of such interventions, each of which would then require follow-up interventions in order to reverse or control their unintended consequences. Even when, and if, our knowledge of the environment were to reach a stage at which we were able to predict the consequences of our interventions, it would be likely to be far easier, and, in the long run, cheaper, simply to turn the already functioning, `natural' systems to our advantage. No method of reducing the amount of carbon dioxide in our atmosphere is likely to be more effective than preserving the Amazonian rain forest. For this reason, I believe, environmentalists **have nothing to fear from** such **an apparently instrumental approach.** If the `technological fix' is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are nevertheless **unable simply to leave the environment as it is.** There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have **already set in train** will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to **develop** real, **concrete proposals for action**, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also **preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources** and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, **we risk exacerbating these inequalities**. It is not us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current green-house gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals **for concrete action** must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, **very much the province of Foucault's specific intellectual,** the one who works `within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them' (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as `the strategists of life and death' than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man's `politics places his existence as a living being in question' (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the **fate of our species**, and of those with whom we share this planet, **will be decided**.

#### -- Fracking and technology makes all your impacts inevitable – it will exist in some form of another – makes technological forms inevitable

#### -- The alt rejects humanism – dooming the planet to extinction

**Davies 97** (Tony, Professor of English – Birmingham University, Humanism, p. 130-132)

So there will not after all be, nor indeed could there be, any tidy definitions. The several humanisms – the civic humanism of the quattrocento Italian city-states, the Protestant humanism of sixteenth century northern Europe, the rationalistic humanism that attended at the revolutions of enlightened modernity, and the romantic and positivistic humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemony over it, the revolutionary humanism that shook the world and the liberal humanism that sought to tame it, the humanism of the Nazis and the humanism of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser – are not reducible to one, or even to a single line or pattern. Each has its distinctive historical curve, its particular discursive poetics, its own problematic scansion of the human. Each seeks, as all discourses must, to impose its own answer to the question of ‘which is to be master’. Meanwhile, the problem of humanism remains, for the present, an inescapable horizon within which all attempts to think about the ways in which human being have, do, might live together in and on the world are contained. Not that the actual humanisms described here necessarily provide a model, or even a useful history, least of all for those very numerous people, and peoples, for whom they have been alien and oppressive. Some, at least, offer a grim warning. Certainly it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like ‘the destiny of man’ or ‘the triumph of human reason’ without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them. All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore. The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. At the same time, though it is clear that the master narrative of transcendental Man has outlasted its usefulness, **it would be unwise** simply **to abandon the ground occupied by** the historical **humanisms**. For one thing, some variety of humanism remains, on many occasions, the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organize and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these, and the prospect of a world in which they will be secured, can only be articulated in humanist terms. It is true that the Baconian ‘Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things’, harnessed to an overweening rationality and an unbridled technological will to power, has enlarged the bounds of human empire to the point of **endangering the survival of the** violated **planet** on which we live. But how, if not by mobilizing collective resources of human understanding and responsibility of ‘enlightened self-interest’ even, can that danger be turned aside?

#### Existence is a pre-requisite to examining ontology

Wapner 3 (Paul, Associate Professor and Director of the Global Environmental Policy Program – American University, “Leftist Criticism of”, Dissent, Winter, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539)

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that **a prerequisite of expression is existence**. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment. NOW, WHAT does this mean for politics and policy, and the future of the environmental movement? Society is constantly being asked to address questions of environmental quality for which there are no easy answers. As we wrestle with challenges of global climate change, ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, and so forth, we need to consider the economic, political, cultural, and aesthetic values at stake. These considerations have traditionally marked the politics of environmental protection. A sensitivity to eco-criticism requires that we go further and include an ethic of otherness in our deliberations. That is, we need to be moved by our concern to make room for the "other" and hence fold a commitment to the nonhuman world into our policy discussions. I don't mean that this argument should drive all our actions or that respect for the "other" should always carry the day. But it must be a central part of our reflections and calculations. For example, as we estimate the number of people that a certain area can sustain, consider what to do about climate change, debate restrictions on ocean fishing, or otherwise assess the effects of a particular course of action, we must think about the lives of other creatures on the earth-and also the continued existence of the nonliving physical world. We must do so not because we wish to maintain what is "natural" but because we wish to act in a morally respectable manner.

### Agenda Politics – Obama Good (Arctic) – 2AC

#### Won’t pass- fighting and timeframe

Soto 2/1

[ Victoria DeFrancesco Soto Dr. Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto is an MSNBC and NBCLatino contributor, and a fellow and adjunct professor at the LBJ School of Public Policy at the University of Texas., 2/1/13, <http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/02/01/reality-check-on-immigration-reforms-obstacles/>]

Immigration reform also has an active advocate in President Obama and a Senate chamber that can make the push. That’s the good news. Now for the bad news. There are two big and messy inter-related obstacles-the details and time. Devil is in the details The immigration reform proposals put forward by the Senate and the president are very similar. Both call for more border enforcement, a pathway to citizenship, guest worker permits, and employer enforcement. The one major difference however is in the detail of when undocumented persons can be granted citizenship. Under the Senate plan eligibility of a green card is contingent on, “requiring our proposed enforcement measures be complete.” This is no minor detail. While in theory the Senate plan puts forward a path to citizenship, in practice, it’s a stop gap. This condition would allow anti-immigrant forces to indefinitely postpone a pathway to citizenship by claiming that undocumented immigration hasn’t been sufficiently enforced. The Senate’s conditional clause is what it means for the devil to be in the details. It is over this clause that the bi-partisan chumminess of the Senate will fall apart. Democrats will not want their hands tied, and Republicans will want to look tough. Beyond the Senate, the pathway to citizenship condition will not play well with the president. Obama has staked out immigration as one of his legacy issues and is not going to allow the Senate to move forward with a bill that in practice does not include a pathway to citizenship. The enforcement condition leads to the second main obstacle that could see the 2013 immigration reform never see the light of day, time. A ticking time bomb For immigration reform to become a reality it must be passed by the end of July before Congresses’ summer recess. If it is not passed by then, consider immigration reform as good as dead. The House of Representatives will be the biggest challenge to immigration reform because of its Republican majority. The closer we get to the 2014 primary season, the greater the number of GOP House members who will get skittish about voting for reform. Immigration reform will not be wildly popular with the Republican base, but at least if there is the buffer of time it will give representatives more freedom to support immigration reform. If immigration reform is not passed before members of Congress go home to their districts for summer recess then we could see a replay of the disastrous Health Care Reform town halls of 2009. Anti-immigration reform media outlets and conservative public voices (e.g. Rush Limbaugh, the National Review) have already started stoking public opinion against immigration reform. Come August, town halls could turn amnesty into the new “death panels” and scare the begeezus out of all Republicans. By design Congress **is a slow-moving vehicle**. Incrementalism, not sweeping change, is the name of the game. As such, comprehensive immigration reform faces a built-in institutional speed bump. Add to that the time the inter-party and inter-branch haggling that the conditional clause will take. The president currently has momentum, but it won’t last long; more specifically, it’ll last him till August.

#### Obama’s backing off – thinks PC is a poison-pill

Avlon 1-31 (John, “Immigration Reform Proposal Shows Similar Ideas between Bush and Obama,” Daily Beast, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/31/immigration-reform-proposal-shows-similar-ideas-betweeen-bush-and-obama.html)

Wehner’s comments cut to the heart of the lessons learned. After essentially ignoring immigration reform in its first term, the Obama administration is front-loading the ambitious effort and—for the time, at least—deferring to the Gang of Eight in hopes that it might be less polarizing if the president’s name isn’t on the bill when senators from the opposing party try to sell it to their base. What’s old is new. It’s an irony not lost on Bush administration alumni and family members. The death of the Bush bill came largely at the hands of a right-wing talk-radio revolt that attacked any path to citizenship as “amnesty.” The fact that then–presidential candidate John McCain was sponsoring the bill with none other than Ted Kennedy created an opening for competitors like Mitt Romney to try to get to McCain’s right in a play to the primary’s conservative populist cheap seats. But the other hostile front came from resurgent House Democrats who frankly did not want to give the polarizing lame-duck incumbent named Bush a political win. Fast-forward six years, and the right-wing talk-radio crowd is weakened. The evangelical, law-enforcement, and business communities are now united behind comprehensive immigration reform. Responsible Republicans know they cannot afford to alienate Hispanics any longer. And the presence of Florida Sen. Marco Rubio—a onetime Jeb Bush protégé—is an essential addition to the coalition. “Senator Rubio, a Tea Party choice, is well respected and well liked and trusted,” adds Wehner. “With him as the lead in these negotiations, conservatives are more willing to consider immigration reform than in the past. You’re not seeing the explosion of opposition now that we saw in 2007. That doesn’t mean it won’t happen; but for now, it hasn’t.” Long story short: it’s much easier for Marco Rubio to make the case for the Senate’s bipartisan path to citizenship than to argue on behalf of President Obama’s bill, which would be a nonstarter to much of the base. And so the president wisely held off from offering his specific policy vision in the much-hyped Las Vegas speech earlier this week. It’s not unlike the reason Harry Truman gave for naming the postwar European-aid bill after his secretary of state, George Marshall: “Anything that is sent up to the Senate and House with my name on it will quiver a couple of times and then turn over and die.”

#### Gun control derails immigration

Rauch 1-20. [Jonathan, guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, "Tackle immigration first, Mr. President" NY Daily News -- www.nydailynews.com/opinion/tackle-immigration-mr-president-article-1.1242944?print]

So what does Obama do first? Gun control.¶ If ever there was a political sticky wicket, this is it. “Gun Agenda Faces an Uphill Battle,” headlined the Washington Post the other day. You can say that again. On the merits, in a magic-wand world, it makes sense to tighten some gun regulations, especially by closing the so-called “gun show loophole,” which allows non-dealers to buy firearms without background checks.¶ But let’s not kid ourselves: In a country with perhaps 250 million firearms already in private hands, even the deftest regulatory improvements will bring only marginal reductions in violence. No one likes to hear this, but it is true: the mass murder at Sandy Hook Elementary School was an atrocity of the first magnitude, and even one such atrocity is too many — but mass shootings in schools are very rare, and way, way down the list of causes of violent deaths. Moreover, there is little the federal government can do to prevent them.¶ No doubt, Obama was distraught by those murders. We all were. But this was a case when his more characteristic cold-blooded realism would have served him better.¶ None of what makes immigration so urgent and accomplishable is true of gun control. There is no bipartisan desire to get it done. In fact, not even Democrats are united. Republicans already smell blood: a chance to grind Obama down by stalling and obstructing in the usual way and to re-energize what has been, until now, a demoralized conservative base. The National Rifle Association will provide plenty of assistance with that project, fattening its coffers along the way.¶ Now, Obama is more popular today than Bush was in 2005, and he won a stronger reelection victory; nor is gun regulation as quixotic as was Bush’s effort to reform Social Security with only one party’s support. Obama may yet succeed where Bush failed.¶ Suppose he does succeed, though. What with the upcoming two (or is it three? four?) budgetary crises, the bandwidth for immigration was always narrow. It will be narrowed still further by diverting legislative time and energy toward guns. Gun control gives liberals a new crusade, but in doing so it opens an attention-distracting, resource-depleting two-front war.¶ Meanwhile, the window of opportunity for immigration might stay open for a while, but it might not, especially if Obama is weakened and conservatives regroup.¶ And if he loses on guns? Bush thought he could afford to lose on Social Security and move on to immigration. He was wrong. In fact, he never recovered. His political strength and strategic credibility were shaken, and he spent the rest of his second term playing defense. Also, of course, the immigration-reform window closed. Republican moderates were marginalized by conservatives who had no interest in any reform that Democrats might accept.¶ Unlike President Bill Clinton, Obama has never broken in any important way with his liberal base. Gun control, despite its poor return on investment as a policy matter, is catnip to liberals. They just can’t stay away from it. That might be all right if the opportunity cost weren’t so high — for Democrats and liberals, for the economy, and not least for immigrants.¶ One thing I have learned about Barack Obama: When he and I disagree, he is usually right and I am usually wrong. Maybe he sees something I don’t. Maybe it is true, as liberals seem to believe, that public opinion on guns has undergone a fundamental change (though more likely, based on the available facts, is that the public is undergoing a short-term reaction to a prominent news story).¶ As a supporter of both immigration reform and smarter gun regulation, I hope Obama, unlike Bush at the same point eight years ago, gets away with his off-center lurch. If not, in a few years senior administration officials will be scratching their heads, wondering why the heck they didn’t put immigration first.

#### Spending PC on a ton of issues – Hagel, debt ceilings, and guns

Jones 1-16 (Jonathan, Director of Research – Spectator, “Briefing: Obama and Gun Control,” The Spectator, 2013, http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2013/01/briefing-obama-on-gun-control/?utm\_source=rss&utm\_medium=rss&utm\_campaign=briefing-obama-on-gun-control)

It’s going to be a lot of work for Obama to get Congress to agree to what amounts to the biggest stride forward in gun control since the Gun Control Act was passed in 1968 in the aftermath of the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy. In particular, the assault weapons ban may prove the biggest stumbling block in his negotiations with the GOP. But the Washington Post poll found that Obama has the greater stock of political capital: his approval rating is at 55 per cent, compared to 24 per cent for Congressional Republicans. And 67 per cent think Republican leaders should do more to compromise with Obama, whereas just 48 per cent think Obama should do more to compromise with them. But Obama will be expending that capital on three fronts in the coming weeks: getting Chuck Hagel confirmed as Defense Secretary, raising the debt ceiling and now improving gun control.

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

#### Case outweighs –

#### -- Won’t Pass –

#### No link – doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Arctic is a massive win for Obama – assumes their link arguments

Geman 12 (Ben, energy and environment reporter for The Hill, “Senator: Arctic drilling a political win for Obama,” 6-29-12, <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/235679-senator-arctic-drilling-a-political-win-for-obama>)

The Obama administration’s expected approval of Royal Dutch Shell's plan to drill in Arctic waters off Alaska’s coast this summer is a political plus for President Obama, according to Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska), an advocate of the project. “I think what he is showing is — and [Interior Secretary Ken] Salazar and the whole team and what we have been doing with them — is [saying] ‘look, let’s manage it right, let’s manage it carefully, and at the end of the day let’s also constantly review what we are doing,’ ” Begich said in the Capitol Friday. Interior is on the cusp of providing Shell its drilling permits for the long-planned, long-delayed project to drill exploratory wells in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. The department is [vowing robust safety oversight](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/232665-overnight-energy-interior-lays-groundwork-to-green-light-shells-arctic-drilling-plan-) — it plans to have inspectors on the rigs around-the-clock — and the permits will follow testing of Shell’s spill containment equipment and other inspections of the company’s infrastructure. But environmentalists oppose the project. They say there’s not sufficient capacity to respond to a potential oil spill in the harsh seas, which are home to polar bears, bowhead and beluga whales and other fragile species. Begich, however, said he did not think the decision will erode Obama’s standing with an environmental base that’s focused on many issues, but will allow Obama to show voters that he’s committed to developing domestic oil resources that displace imports from people that “hate us.” “If anything, I think it gives him something to talk about in the sense of ‘look, we are doing it, we are bringing domestic [resources],” Begich said, citing estimates of very large amounts of oil beneath the Arctic seas.

# 1AR

## Inherency

#### Demand for offshore rigs is up – NEWEST EVIDENCE

Pickerell 12/31/12 (Emily, “Demand for offshore rigs up, while onshore count keeps falling”, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/12/31/demand-for-offshore-rigs-up-while-onshore-count-keeps-falling/)

While demand for onshore rigs declined as the result of less natural gas drilling, demand for offshore rigs continues to flourish, driven by Gulf of Mexico demand, industry analysts said Monday. The Gulf of Mexico rig count has increased slightly in the last three months, with 33 floating rigs and 29 jackups for the fourth quarter, up from 27 floating rigs and 27 jackups for the third quarter, according to a Tudor Pickering analyst’s note. Likewise, demand for offshore rigs grew from 73 in January 2012 to 80 by the end of November, as improved technology, such as water flooding, has provided new opportunities to extract oil from maturing wells. The relatively strong price of oil, which closed on Friday on the New York Mercantile Exchange at $90.80 for West Texas Intermediate Crude, compared with natural gas, which closed on Friday at $3.46 per million cubic feet, has been an additional driver. Oil and gas services companies are working hard to meet the offshore demand: Ensco, for example, has three ultra-deepwater rigs that will be available in 2013. Demand has dipped in onshore drilling, as the big operators have shifted away from chasing natural gas exploration, resulting in a 61 percent decline for onshore rigs in 2012, down from 2,082 in January to 1,841 at the end of November 2011. The downturn comes after 13 quarters of increased drilling activity, Tudor Pickering said in its report. The Permian and the Eagle Ford basins have been the hardest hit by the decline, according to Tudor Pickering, while East Texas and North Louisiana have held up the best. Companies are also trending **towards the newer and more efficient alternating-current technology for drilling rigs.** Alternating-current engines allow for greater mobility and control over the drilling process, and are considered to be safer and more environmentally friendly. The older mechanical rigs have made up 72 percent of the rig decline, according to Tudor Pickering, who noted that “as activity trended lower during the quarter, we noticed operators clearly holding onto and/or high-grading their fleets.” Chesapeake continues to have the highest U.S. natural gas rig count, with 37 rigs, while Exxon and Devon have 31 and 30, respectively. Likewise, Chesapeake also has by far the biggest number of onshore oil rigs, 73, while Anadarko has 47 and Devon has 42.

#### Natural gas prices rising – Demand is increasing, fracking doesn’t solve

Lackey 12 (Mark, energy analyst with CHF Investor Relations, “This Is Your Energy Entry Point: Mark Lackey,” 8-30-12, <http://www.theenergyreport.com/pub/na/14243>)

Natural gas has been somewhat weaker, but it bounced off the $2/thousand cubic feet (Mcf) price a few months ago up to the $2.85–3/Mcf range in North America. With more industrial demand coming back, particularly in the auto sector, and stronger demand from electric utilities, gas should move back up closer to $3.25–3.30/Mcf in the next year. By way of comparison, prices in Europe can be anywhere from $4–8/Mcf, and in China they're as high as $15/Mcf.

## Case

### 1NC US/EU Relations

#### U.S.-E.U relations resilient – their security interests are aligned and they perceive interdependence

Leonard 05(Mark, executive director of the European Council on Foreign Relations and former director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform, Feb 28th. “Why the U.S. Needs the E.U.” Time International, vol. 165 iss. 9, p. 31. Proquest.)

For the first time in 50 years, it is the U.S. that needs Europe's help, rather than the other way around. Americans realize that, without European diplomacy, money and soft power, freedom's march would be a lot more halting. In Kiev, Sarajevo, Ankara, Ramallah and even Tehran, the E.U. is having a more constructive impact than the U.S. Yet the E.U.'s transformative power is often confused with weakness. The E.U. doesn't change countries by threatening to invade them. Its biggest threat is not intervention but withdrawal of the hand of friendship and especially the prospect of membership. For countries like Bosnia, Turkey and Ukraine, the only thing worse than having to deal with the Brussels bureaucracy is not getting to deal with it at all. E.U. membership is such a powerful lure that countries will revamp their legal, judicial and political systems just to join. The E.U. and U.S. face similar threats--drug trafficking, large flows of migrants, networks of international criminals and terrorists--but their responses could not be more different. The U.S. has sent troops into neighboring countries more than 15 times over the past 50 years, but many of them--from Haiti to Colombia--have barely changed; they limp from crisis to crisis, often sucking U.S. troops back in. Sometimes, military force is the right--and only--solution. In the Balkans, for example, the U.S., with the backing of the U.N. Security Council, led NATO air strikes to protect the Muslim population while Europe fretted. But Europeans have learned the hard way that political and economic engagement can be a more powerful and permanent agent of change. These days in the Balkans, it's the prospect of E.U. membership that's driving political and social transformation. Beyond the 450 million citizens who are already living in the E.U., there are another 1.3 billion people in about 80 countries linked to the E.U. through trade, finance, foreign investment and aid. Nearly a third of the world's population lives in the Eurosphere, the E.U.'s zone of influence. The E.U.'s secret weapon is the law. The U.S. may have changed the regime in Afghanistan, but the E.U. is changing all of Polish society, from its economic policies to its property laws to its treatment of minorities. Each country that joins the E.U. must absorb 80,000 pages of new laws on everything from gay rights to food safety. Once drawn into the Eurosphere, countries are changed forever--and they never want to get out. The U.S. can impose its will almost anywhere in the world, but when its back is turned, its potency wanes. The elections in Iraq and Afghanistan were only possible because of American intervention, but the Administration's suspicion of international law and multilateral institutions mean that the democratic changes could be difficult to entrench. In the aftermath of the war in Iraq, the Administration has realized it can't change the world on its own. Similarly, the Europeans have learned that it sometimes takes good, old-fashioned U.S. might to get the attention of undemocratic regimes and so prepare the ground for reform. There is a lot the U.S. and the E.U. can do together to rein in the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, to further cement Turkey's relationship with the West, to combat the threat of terrorism.

### 2NC Middle East War

#### Stability comparatively outweighs motives to go to war

Fettweis 7 (Christopher J., Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision

Making Department – US Naval War College, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, 49(4), p. 83-98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni–Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intraMuslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq’s neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

#### Err Neg – their authors exaggerate

Luttwak 7 (Edward, Senior Associate – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Middle of Nowhere”, Prospect Magazine, May, http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\_details.php?id=9302)

Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is "five minutes to midnight" catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless… And then came the remedy—usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein's son Abdullah periodically repeating his father's speech almost verbatim. What actually happens at each of these "moments of truth"—and we may be approaching another one—is nothing much; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough. The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000—about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

## Ptx

### 2NC No Econ War

No more wars

#### AND - even if wars occur, they won’t escalate.

Bennett & Nordstrom 2k [Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61]

When engaging in diversionary actions in response to economic problems, leaders will be most interested in a cheap, quick victory that gives them the benefit of a rally effect without suffering the long-term costs (in both economic and popularity terms) of an extended confrontation or war. This makes weak states particularly inviting targets for diversionary action since they may be less likely to respond than strong states and because any response they make will be less costly to the initiator. Following Blainey (1973), a state facing poor economic conditions may in fact be the target of an attack rather than the initiator. This may be even more likely in the context of a rivalry because rival states are likely to be looking for any advantage over their rivals. Leaders may hope to catch an economically challenged rival looking inward in response to a slowing economy. Following the strategic application of diversionary conflict theory and states’ desire to engage in only cheap conflicts for diversionary purposes, states should avoid conflict initiation against target states experiencing economic problems.

#### 93 examples are on our side

Miller 2k [Morris Miller, Winter 2K. economist and adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration and former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 25.4]

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Their chain of causation is backwards

Ferguson 6 (Niall, prof. of history, Foreign Affairs, “The Next War of the World”, lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

### 1NC US Econ Resilient

#### Economy’s resilient – can survive shocks

Bloomberg 12 (“Fed’s Plosser Says U.S. Economy Proving Resilient to Shocks,” 5-9, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-09/fed-s-plosser-says-u-s-economy-proving-resilient-to-shocks.html)

Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Plosser said the U.S. economy has proven “remarkably resilient” to shocks that can damage growth, including surging oil prices and natural disasters. “The economy has now grown for 11 consecutive quarters,” Plosser said today according to remarks prepared for a speech at the Philadelphia Fed. “Growth is not robust. But growth in the past year has continued despite significant risks and external and internal headwinds.” Plosser, who did not discuss his economic outlook or the future for monetary policy, cited shocks to the economy last year, including the tsunami in Japan that disrupted global supply chains, Europe’s credit crisis that has damaged the continent’s banking system and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. “The U.S. economy has a history of being remarkably resilient,” said Plosser, who doesn’t have a vote on policy this year. “These shocks held GDP growth to less than 1 percent in the first half of 2011, and many analysts were concerned that the economy was heading toward a double dip. Yet, the economy proved resilient and growth picked up in the second half of the year.” Plosser spoke at a conference at the Philadelphia Fed titled, “Reinventing Older Communities: Building Resilient Cities.” Urban Resilience His regional bank’s research department is working on a project to measure the resilience of different cities, to learn more about the reasons that some urban areas suffer more than others in downturns, Plosser said. He mentioned one early finding of the study: Industrial diversity increases a city’s resilience. “I do want to caution you that resilient and vibrant communities are not just about government programs or directed industrial planning by community leaders,” Plosser said. “The economic strength of our country is deeply rooted in our market- based economy and the dynamism and resilience of its citizenry.”

### Uniqueness Overwhelms

#### We’ll concede their will pass args

-schumer and mcain on board – that’s their Strauss evidence

#### GOP will cave

Lawrence 1-29 (Jill, Obama to Congress: No Repeat of Obamacare on Immigration, National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/obama-to-congress-no-repeat-of-obamacare-on-immigration-20130129)

Between the lecture on timeliness and a campaign rally atmosphere punctuated by bursts of adoring applause, there was not much in Obama’s appearance for Republicans to love. His deadlines, his tone, even the lofty rhetoric he employed -- all served as a reminder, once again, that he won the White House. But Republicans can’t afford to opt out of this enterprise. They're unlikely to win the White House themselves until immigrants, legal or not, view them as friends rather than foes.

### Thumper – Gun Control 1AR

#### We’ll concede the focus link – gun control thumps it

#### Gun control thumps – top of the agenda and costs PC

Robinson 1-23 (Gordon, Professor of Political Science – University of Vermont, Specialist – Gulf News, “A gun fight looms in the second term,” Gulf News, 2013, http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/a-gun-fight-looms-in-the-second-term-1.1136127)

Conventional wisdom holds that second-term presidential honeymoons are very, very short. That is worth remembering now that Barack Obama’s second four years as US president are officially underway. What no one could have foreseen last November was that the re-elected president’s first major initiative would focus on guns. America’s strange relationship with guns baffles and frightens the rest of the world. Both he and Mitt Romney barely mentioned them during last year’s campaign. Yet, here was the president on inaugural weekend sending his surrogates out to tell every big-time journalist in Washington that reforming America’s gun laws will be the big push of the next few months — the focus of this charmed moment when his political power will be at its peak. This is especially surprising because the gun lobby has long been Washington’s most feared institution, particularly among Democrats. For years I have told incredulous friends in the Middle East that the National Rifle Association (NRA) puts AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) and the Israel lobby to shame. Events in the first three weeks of this month have pretty much proved my point. As the New Year began, Obama was preparing to nominate former senator Chuck Hagel as Defence Secretary despite the obvious displeasure this caused among Israel’s right-wing supporters in the US. Key senators claimed to find his views on the Middle East “troubling” and Elliott Abrams, a prominent official in Republican administrations going back to the 1980s, publicly called Hagel an anti-Semite. In barely two weeks, however, the furore passed. Private meetings between Hagel and key Jewish senators yielded expressions of support and, with that, the controversy mostly vanished. Everyone expects his hearings to be pointed, perhaps even tense, but barring a new controversy of some sort, Hagel’s confirmation is all but certain. Compare this with the still-growing storm over the Obama administration’s gun control (or, as the administration prefers: “gun safety”) agenda. The modest collection of executive actions announced by the administration earlier this month was denounced by Republicans as an executive power-grab that undermined the very basis of constitutional government. Two members of the House of Representatives threatened the president with impeachment. Leave aside, for a moment, the fact that many Republicans denounced these measures before they were even announced. The reaction among gun supporters was wildly out of proportion to Obama’s actual moves: He ordered federal agencies to do a better job of sharing information, pledged to devote more resources to safety education programmes and nominated a head for the government’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which has been leaderless since 2006. The measures that will actually require Congress’ approval will be regarded as minimal common sense pretty much anywhere else: Requiring that all gun sales be preceded by a background check on the buyer, banning high-capacity magazines and reinstating the ban on assault weapons that expired in 2004. Modest though they may be, it is highly debatable whether any of these proposals can actually become law. Why, then, is Obama planning to spend his precious political capital in this way? To some extent, it is to please his base. A month after the Newtown shootings the liberals who remain Obama’s strongest supporters see a rare opportunity to force reluctant Democrats to tackle the gun issue and an even rarer opportunity to shame at least a few Republicans into voting for it. Mass shootings have become sufficiently common in the US that a predictable political script follows each one: Grief is expressed and gun advocates claim that “now is not the time” to discuss new laws. Once it is time to have that discussion, the emotional shock has passed and the gun lobby’s political muscle is sufficient to ensure that nothing actually changes. For the last month, however, there has been a feeling that the Newtown killings are different. Perhaps it was just one mass shooting too many. Perhaps it was the almost unbelievable circumstances of the incident itself: 20 six and seven-year-olds, and six adults, murdered in their schoolrooms just before Christmas. Whatever the reason, the outrage has not faded so easily this time. Perhaps Americans should take Obama at his word when he says he feels a responsibility to use his power to try to achieve something lasting on this most intractable of issues. Obama was clearly moved by the scenes at Newtown and the families he met there. He knows that the next few months are likely to be the last opportunity he will have to do anything big and transformative, at least in domestic terms. He may also sense that the supposedly invincible NRA has overplayed its hand this time by refusing to discuss anything beyond its own plan to put armed guards in every American school. However, from where America stands now to signing actual legislation there remains a long road. Win or lose, it will take political courage to challenge America’s gun lobby and the thousands of supporters its scare tactics can turn out. If, however, you believe that political power matters then you also have to believe this is a battle worth fighting. After all, why be president if you are not at least willing to try accomplishing something big?

#### \*Gun control’s a top priority and saps all of Obama’s PC

Rucker and O’Keefe 1-16 (Philip, and Ed, Washington Post, “Obama's gun controls face tough odds,” 2013, http://www.onlinesentinel.com/politics/obamas-gun-controls-face-tough-odds\_2013-01-17.html)

The gun-control agenda that President Obama unveiled with urgency Wednesday now faces an uncertain fate in a bitterly divided Congress, where Republican opposition hardened and centrist Democrats remained noncommittal after a month of feverish public debate. By pursuing an expansive overhaul of the nation's gun laws, Obama is wagering that public opinion has evolved enough after a string of mass shootings to force passage of politically contentious measures that Congress has long stymied. Yet there was no indication Wednesday that the mood on Capitol Hill has changed much. Within hours of Obama's formal policy rollout at the White House, Republicans condemned his agenda as violating the Second Amendment's right to bear arms. "I'm confident there will be bipartisan opposition to his proposal," Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said in a prepared statement. The Senate plans to begin taking up Obama's proposals next week, with the House waiting to see what the Democrat-controlled Senate passes first, congressional aides said. The Senate is likely to take a piecemeal approach, eventually holding up-or-down votes on the individual elements of Obama's plan rather than trying to muscle through a single comprehensive bill, aides said. Obama, in an emotional White House ceremony, outlined four major legislative proposals aimed at curbing what he called "the epidemic of gun violence in this country" -- universal background checks for all gun buyers, a crackdown on gun trafficking, a ban on military-style assault weapons and a ban on ammunition magazines holding more than 10 bullets. Obama also signed paperwork initiating 23 executive actions that include steps to strengthen the existing background-check system, promote research on gun violence and provide training in "active shooter situations." As important as the executive actions are, Obama said, "they are in no way a substitute" for the legislative proposals he sent to Congress. "We have to examine ourselves in our hearts and ask yourselves: What is important?" Obama said. "If parents and teachers, police officers and pastors, if hunters and sportsmen, if responsible gun owners, if Americans of every background stand up and say, enough, we've suffered too much pain and care too much about our children to allow this to continue, then change will -- change will come." But on Capitol Hill, where two decades of gun-control efforts have landed in the political graveyard, leaders of Obama's own party do not necessarily share his views. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., stopped short of embracing Obama's proposals, calling them "thoughtful recommendations."The four measures that Obama presented -- which, taken together, rank among the most ambitious legislative projects of his presidency -- appear to have varying levels of support in Congress. The White House and Democratic lawmakers have calculated that the assault-weapons ban -- a version of which passed in 1994 but expired a decade later -- has the toughest odds, according to gun-control advocates in regular contact with administration officials. Also in jeopardy, they said, is the proposal to prohibit high-capacity magazines. But a broad consensus seems more likely to build around universal background checks, which senior administration officials said is Obama's top priority. Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., said the idea is "at the sweet spot" of what is politically possible. The gun trafficking proposal, which would impose new penalties on those who buy multiple firearms and hand them off to criminals, also could find majority support. "If you are left in a position of having to oppose universal background checks and a firearms trafficking statute, that's tough for responsible Republicans," said Matt Bennett, a senior vice president at Third Way, a centrist think tank. Rep. Steve Stockman, R-Texas, who has threatened to initiate impeachment proceedings against Obama, condemned what he described as Obama's "anti-gun sneak attack" and promised a legislative battle to protect "the God-given right to keep and bear arms." Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa said Obama's executive actions amounted to a "power grab" to "poke holes in the Second Amendment." Obama acknowledged that getting his proposals through Congress "will be difficult," making a veiled reference to powerful lobbying groups such as the National Rifle Association. "There will be pundits and politicians and special-interest lobbyists publicly warning of a tyrannical, all-out assault on liberty -- not because that's true, but because they want to gin up fear or higher ratings or revenue for themselves," Obama predicted. "And behind the scenes, they'll do everything they can to block any common-sense reform and make sure nothing changes whatsoever." In its official response, the NRA adopted a more muted tone than it has in recent weeks, saying it would work with Congress "on a bipartisan basis" to develop solutions that secure the nation's schools and fix broken mental health systems. The statement did not specifically address Obama's proposals, which include a $150 million school-safety initiative to help communities hire 1,000 new school resource officers. But at a huge annual gun show in Las Vegas, the NRA said its opposition to Obama's plans was "the fight of the century." "I warned you this day was coming, and now it's here," NRA executive vice president Wayne LaPierre wrote in a fundraising letter circulated at the trade show. "It's not about protecting your children. It's not about stopping crime. It's about banning your guns ... PERIOD!" Gun-control advocates say their strategy will be to highlight popular support for most of Obama's proposals and rally voters across the country to press their representatives in Congress to act. "There's an extraordinary disconnect between what the American public wants -- including gun owners and NRA members -- and what our elected officials are doing about it," said Dan Gross, president of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence. "It is going to be up to us, the American public, to close that disconnect." Obama vowed Wednesday to "put everything I've got into this." In a moving event one month and two days after a gunman killed 20 small children and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., Obama was flanked by children who wrote him letters in the days after the massacre, pleading with him to do something to curb gun violence.

#### Their ev goes aff – that’s 1NC CX

There are three major initiatives that Obama is currently pushing: action on global warming, comprehensive immigration reform, and gun control. Obama did mention other issues in his speech, but these are the big three for now. Gay marriage, for instance, is in the hands of the Supreme Court right now, and no matter how they rule it's hard to see any legislative action (good or bad) happening on it immediately afterwards. **Gun control** will likely be the first of these debated in Congress.

#### There answer is that he can do multiple things – proves there is no link to the DA bc Obama can walk and chew gum at the same time. Or Obama will just choose not to spend PC on the plan

Their ev is from Mcconnel – incentive to lie

#### It’s a top priority – and costs capital

Braun 1-17 (Eric, “Buono continues to slap Christie on gun control, grabs endorsement,” Examiner, 2013, http://www.examiner.com/article/buono-continues-to-slap-christie-on-gun-control-grabs-endorsement)

In questioning Christie's leadership Buono stated, “yesterday, while Governor Christie was proudly touting the fact that he was doing his 100 town hall meeting, he was also remaining conspicuously absent in the ongoing fight to curb gun violence. Leaders like President Obama and Governor Cuomo have identified gun control as a top priority and have wasted no time in jumping to the forefront in the fight to keep our streets safe.”