# 1AC

### 1AC – Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce production restrictions on federal lands in the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas

### 1AC – Inherency

#### **Contention One is Inherency –**

#### Obama’s five year plan is insufficient – 85% of OCS is still locked up

Vorberger 13 (Jeff, Vice President of Political Affairs – National Ocean Industries Association, “Harness the Energy: Deliver the Prosperity,” Marine Link, 1-22, http://www.marinelink.com/news/prosperity-deliver350940.aspx)

Now, what else could Congress do? Congress and the Administration should add more offshore areas for oil and natural gas exploration and development. Federal policies limit exploration and development to about 15% of the outer continental shelf (OCS). That means 85% of the OCS is closed to exploration. Are there marketable amounts of oil and natural gas in that 85%? If the Gulf of Mexico is any indication, there certainly is. But we don’t know the true amounts, and won’t know, without looking. The current five year plan does not open up any new areas for oil and natural gas exploration, but Congress could open up more areas through legislation and should do so. There is strong political support for opening up areas off the coasts of Virginia and South Carolina. Those areas would be a good start. Opponents of increased offshore oil and natural gas development often claim that it would take ten years or more before we saw any production from those new areas. In some cases that might be true, but had we started ten years ago, we wouldn’t be having this argument. In addition, energy forecasts indicate that oil and natural gas will continue to be dominant components of our energy supply for generations to come. We will need those presently untapped supplies, not only for our energy reliability and security, but also to fulfill predictions that the U.S. will become a leader in oil and natural gas production around the end of this decade. Opening up new areas, coupled with increased development of nontraditional sources of energy, such as offshore wind, wave and current will contribute greatly to our long term economic stability and well-being.

#### Gas production on federal lands is declining

Bastasch 13 (Michael, Research Associate – Cascade Policy Institute, “Interior Secretary Ken Salazar to leave Obama administration in March,” Daily Caller, 1-16, <http://dailycaller.com/2013/01/16/interior-secretary-ken-salazar-to-leave-obama-administration-in-march/#ixzz2K2gztFOI>)

However, critics of the administration’s federal lands policies argue that oil and gas production on federal lands have suffered while less reliable renewable sources flourish. “President Obama and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar have presided over the most abysmal stewardship of public lands in recent history,” said Dan Kish of the Institute for Energy Research in October. “Oil production on federal lands declined last year,” Kish added. “Natural gas production on federal lands is in a free fall. Western oil shale is under an Obama embargo, and our vast offshore energy resources must now wait another 5 years for development thanks to the president’s most recent 5 year OCS plan.” As recently as November, Salazar’s Interior Department closed off 1.6 million acres originally slated for shale development, at a time when oil and gas production on federal lands are falling.

### 1AC – Arctic

#### Contention Two: Arctic Leadership

#### Offshore drilling is key to effective security investments – solves leadership

Bert 12 (Captain Melissa – USCG, 2011-2012 Military Fellow, U.S.Coast Guard, “A Strategy to Advance the Arctic Economy”, February, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/strategy-advance-arctic-economy/p27258)

The United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. Melting sea ice is generating an emerging Arctic economy. Nations bordering the Arctic are drilling for oil and gas, and mining, shipping, and cruising in the region. Russia, Canada, and Norway are growing their icebreaker fleets and shore-based infrastructure to support these enterprises. For the United States, **the economic potential from the energy and mineral resources is in the trillions of dollars**—based upon estimates that the Alaskan Arctic is the home to 30 billion barrels of oil, more than 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, rare earth minerals, and massive renewable wind, tidal, and geothermal energy. However, the U.S. government is unprepared to harness the potential that the Arctic offers. The United States lacks the capacity to deal with potential regional conflicts and seaborne disasters, and it has been on the sidelines when it comes to developing new governance mechanisms for the Arctic. To advance U.S. economic and security interests and avert potential environmental and human disasters, the United States should ratify the UN Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), take the lead in developing mandatory international standards for operating in Arctic waters, and acquire icebreakers, aircraft, and infrastructure for Arctic operations. Regional Flashpoints Threaten Security Like the United States, the Arctic nations of Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark have geographical claims to the Arctic. Unlike the United States, however, they have each sought to exploit economic and strategic opportunities in the region by developing businesses, infrastructure, and cities in the Arctic. They have also renewed military exercises of years past, and as each nation learns of the others' activities, suspicion and competition increase. When the Russians sailed a submarine in 2007 to plant a titanium flag on the "north pole," they were seen as provocateurs, not explorers. The continental shelf is a particular point of contention. Russia claims that deep underwater ridges on the sea floor, over two hundred miles from the Russian continent, are part of Russia and are legally Russia's to exploit. Denmark and Canada also claim those ridges. Whichever state prevails in that debate will have exclusive extraction rights to the resources, which, based on current continental shelf hydrocarbon lease sales, could be worth billions of dollars. Debates also continue regarding freedom of navigation and sovereignty over waters in the region. Russia claims sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which winds over the top of Russia and Alaska and will be a commercially viable route through the region within the next decade. The United States contends the NSR is an international waterway, free to any nation to transit. The United States also has laid claim to portions of the Beaufort Sea that Canada says are Canadian, and the United States rejects Canada's claim that its Northwest Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific is its internal waters, as opposed to an international strait. Canada and Denmark also have a boundary dispute in Baffin Bay. Norway and Russia disagree about fishing rights in waters around the Spitsbergen/Svalbard Archipelago. U.S. Capacity in the Arctic Is Lacking Traffic and commercial activity are increasing in the region. The NSR was not navigable for years because of heavy ice, but it now consists of water with floating ice during the summer months. As the icebergs decrease in the coming years, it will become a commercially profitable route, because it reduces the maritime journey between East Asia and Western Europe from about thirteen thousand miles through the Suez Canal to eight thousand miles, cutting transit time by ten to fifteen days. Russian and German oil tankers are already beginning to ply those waters in the summer months. Approximately 150,000 tons of oil, 400,000 tons of gas condensate, and 600,000 tons of iron ore were shipped via the NSR in 2011. Oil, gas, and mineral drilling, as well as fisheries and tourism, are becoming more common in the high latitudes and are inherently dangerous, because icebergs and storms can shear apart even large tankers, offshore drilling units, fishing vessels, and cruise ships. As a result, human and environmental disasters are extremely likely. Despite the dangerous conditions, the Arctic has no mandatory requirements for those operating in or passing through the region. There are no designated shipping lanes, requirements for ice-strengthened hulls to withstand the extreme environment, ice navigation training for ships' masters, or even production and carriage of updated navigation and ice charts. Keeping the Arctic safe with the increased activity and lack of regulations presents a daunting task. The U.S. government is further hindered by the lack of ships, aircraft, and infrastructure to enforce sovereignty and criminal laws, and to protect people and the marine environment from catastrophic incidents. In the lower forty-eight states, response time to an oil spill or capsized vessel is measured in hours. In Alaska, it could take days or weeks to get the right people and resources on scene. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, thirteen hundred miles from Point Barrow, and response aircraft are more than one thousand miles south in Kodiak, blocked by a mountain range and hazardous flying conditions. The Arctic shores lack infrastructure to launch any type of disaster response, or to support the growing commercial development in the region. U.S. Leadership in Arctic Governance Is Lacking Governance in the Arctic requires leadership. The United States **is uniquely positioned to provide such leadership**, but it is hampered by its reliance on the eight-nation Arctic Council. However, more than 160 countries view the LSOC as the critical instrument defining conduct at sea and maritime obligations. The convention also addresses resource division, maritime traffic, and pollution regulation, and is relied upon for dispute resolution. The LOSC is particularly important in the Arctic, because it stipulates that the region beyond each country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) be divided between bordering nations that can prove their underwater continental shelves extend directly from their land borders. Nations will have exclusive economic rights to the oil, gas, and mineral resources extracted from those Outer Continental Shelves, making the convention's determinations substantial. According to geologists, **the U.S. portion is projected to be the world's largest underwater extension of land**—over 3.3 million square miles—bigger than the lower forty-eight states combined. **In addition to global credibility** **and protection of Arctic shelf claims**, the convention is important because it sets international pollution standards and requires signatories to protect the marine environment. Critics argue that the LOSC cedes American sovereignty to the United Nations. But the failure to ratify it has the opposite effect: it leaves the United States less able to protect its interests in the Arctic and elsewhere. The diminished influence is particularly evident at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the international body that "operationalizes" the LOSC through its international port and shipping rules. By remaining a nonparty, the United States **lacks the credibility to promote U.S. interests in the Arctic**, such as by transforming U.S. recommendations into binding international laws. A Comprehensive U.S. Strategy for the Arctic The United States needs a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. The current National/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66 / HSPD-25) is only a broad policy statement. An effective Arctic strategy would address both governance and capacity questions. To generate effective governance in the Arctic the United States should ratify LOSC and take the lead in advocating the adoption of Arctic shipping requirements. The IMO recently proposed a voluntary Polar Code, and the United States should work to make it mandatory. The code sets structural classifications and standards for ships operating in the Arctic as well as specific navigation and emergency training for those operating in or around ice-covered waters. The United States should also support Automated Identification System (AIS) carriage for all ships transiting the Arctic. Because the Arctic is a vast region with no ability for those on land to see the ships offshore, electronic identification and tracking is the only way to know what ships are operating in or transiting the region. An AIS transmitter (costing as little as $800) sends a signal that provides vessel identity and location at all times to those in command centers around the world and is currently mandated for ships over sixteen hundred gross tons. The United States and other Arctic nations track AIS ships and are able to respond to emergencies based on its signals. For this reason, mandating AIS for all vessels in the Arctic is needed. The U.S. government also needs to work with Russia to impose a traffic separation scheme in the Bering Strait, where chances for a collision are high. Finally, the United States should push for compulsory tandem sailing for all passenger vessels operating in the Arctic. Tandem sailing for cruise ships and smaller excursion boats will avert another disaster like RMS Titanic. To enhance the Arctic's economic potential, the United States **should** also **develop its capacity to enable commercial entities to operate safely in the region**. The U.S. government should invest in icebreakers**,** aircraft**,** and shore-based infrastructure. A ten-year plan should include the building of at least two heavy icebreakers, at a cost of approximately $1 billion apiece, and an air station in Point Barrow, Alaska, with at least three helicopters. Such an air station would cost less than $20 million, with operating, maintenance, and personnel costs comparable to other northern military facilities. Finally, developing a deepwater port with response presence and infrastructure is critical. A base at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, where ships and fishing vessels resupply and refuel, would only cost a few million dollars per year to operate. Washington could finance the cost of its capacity-building efforts by using offshore lease proceeds and federal taxes on the oil and gas extracted from the Arctic region. In 2008, the United States collected $2.6 billion from offshore lease sales in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (off Alaska's north coast), and the offshore royalty tax rate in the region is 19 percent**, which would cover operation and maintenance of these facilities down the road**. The United States needs an Arctic governance and **acquisition strategy to take full advantage of all the region has to offer** and to protect the people operating in the region and the maritime environment. Neglecting the Arctic reduces the United States' ability to **reap tremendous economic benefits and could harm U.S. national security interests.**

#### The plan spurs military investments – solves escalation of the Arctic war

Talmadge 12 (Eric – AP, Huffington Post, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity’, 4/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-military-activity\_n\_1427565.html)

To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. **They are preparing for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic**, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and a slew of potential conflicts. By Arctic standards, the region is already buzzing with military activity, and experts believe that will increase significantly in the years ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever — Exercise Cold Response — with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, **so will the need for policing, border patrols and** — if push comes to shove — **military muscle to enforce rival claims**. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia, Canada and the United States have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia — one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle — **has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's superpower**. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic countries — Norway, Denmark and Canada — to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in the region. **This is only going to increase as time goes on**." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "We want to maintain our edge up there," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in **the Arctic** has never really waned. It remains very important." **But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions**, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it **lacks ships** able to operate in or near Arctic ice, **support facilities and adequate communications**. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. **The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers**.

#### Diplomacy fails and conflict is likely

Tassinari 9/7 (Fabrizio Tassinari is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and the Head of Foreign Policy and EU Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies, September 7, 2012, “Avoiding a Scramble for the High North”, http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/09/07/avoiding-a-scramble-for-the-high-north/)

The geopolitics of the Arctic are stuck in a paradox: The more regional players restate the importance of international cooperation, the more some pundits and policymakers seem to conclude that the Arctic **risks descending into competition and even conflict.** The world is awakening to the growing strategic importance of the High North. As the Arctic ice melts due to global warming, it opens up new opportunities, from shorter shipping lanes to newly accessible oil and gas reserves; respectively, about 13 percent and 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered resources are in the Arctic, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. These discoveries are usually followed by declarations of the littoral nations to the effect that any potential disagreements over them will be resolved peacefully. However, beneath expressions of goodwill, the Arctic debate is often characterized **by a sense of urgency**, and even forms of alarmism. In recent years, instances of growing securitization of the Arctic have abounded. Back in 2008, a paper by Javier Solana, then the EU’s foreign policy’s chief, and the European Commission warned about “potential conflict over resources in Polar regions” as they become exploitable due to melting ice. In 2010, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, Adm. James Stavridis, argued that “for now, the disputes in the North have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium.” Then there are actions that speak louder than prepared speeches — from the famous August 2007 expedition that planted a Russian flag on the North Pole’s seabed to the annual summer military exercises carried out by Canada to assert its sovereignty in the North. Although the Russian stunt was most likely aimed at nationalist domestic audiences, some observers view these exercises as the expressions of competing national interests. As the scholar Scott Borgerson ominously put it: “The Arctic powers **are fast approaching diplomatic gridlock**, and that could eventually lead to the sort of armed brinkmanship that plagues other territories.” The geopolitical constellation in and around the region provides a ready justification for such an assessment. While no-one really imagines the United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark fighting over the Arctic, some of their politicians have occasionally framed rhetoric in more peppered terms than one might expect. Russia, the fifth Arctic littoral nation, typically treads a fine line between declarations of cooperation and **an innate instinct for great-power competition**. Add to that the EU, which is seeking to carve its own role, and Asia’s giants, above all China, for which the opening of the Northeast passage may reduce sailing distance with Europe by some 40 percent, and it is not hard to conjure up the prospect of an Arctic race building up.

#### Goes nuclear – de-escalation is key

Wallace and Staples 10 (Michael Wallace and Steven Staples. \*Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, **and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic**. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 609 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, **deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states** – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world **– converge on the Arctic and have competing claims**. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, **lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons**.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but **no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly**. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62

#### Extinction – it’s an existential risk

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why **it is useful to distinguish them from other risks**. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a **whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are** mere ripples **on the surface of the great sea of life**. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) A much greater existential risk **emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and** the **USSR**. **An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might** have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy** or thwart **humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### US Arctic leadership via natural gas solves Arctic terrorism

Conley 12 (Heather – Senior Fellow at CSIS and Director, Europe Program, “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic”, January, http://csis.org/files/publication/120117\_Conley\_ArcticSecurity\_Web.pdf)

The Arctic will experience extraordinary economic and environmental change over the next several decades. Commercial, human, and state interaction will rise dramatically. More drilling for oil and gas in the region and growing shipping and ecotourism as new shipping routes come into existence are just a few of the examples of increased human activity in the Arctic. The rapid melting of the Arctic ice cap is now exceeding previous scientific and climatic predictions. A recent study shows that September 2011 marked the lowest levels of sea ice extent ever recorded in the northern polar region.1 The polar ice cap today is 40 percent smaller than it was in 1979,2 and in the summer of 2007 alone, 1 million more square miles of ice beyond the average melted, uncovering an area of open water six times the size of California. While estimates range from 2013 to 2060, the U.S. Navy’s “Arctic Roadmap” projects ice-free conditions for a portion of the Arctic by the summer of 2030.3 **Arctic economics** and an increasingly ice-free and hostile climatic environment **are** on a direct collision course, driving a clear need for a new paradigm to meet pressing security challenges that Arctic nations have thus far been unprepared or ill equipped to address. As the region takes on **greater economic importance, the Arctic requires a comprehensive** regional and global security strategy that includes an increase in regional readiness and border security as well as an enhancement of strategic capabilities. The security challenges are vast, including search and rescue, **environmental remediation, piracy, terrorism, natural and man-made disaster response**, and border protection. Compounding the challenge is the fact that regional players must function in an operational environment of severely limited satellite communication and hydrographic mapping. Arctic coastal states have developed and issued national Arctic security strategies and accompanying documents that, albeit roughly, sketch out their political and security priorities in the region. These documents describe their national security interests and the intentions these states wish to pursue and defend. Each of the five Arctic coastal states—Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States—touts its commitment to cooperative action while simultaneously bolstering its military presence and capabilities in the Arctic. Yet the complexity of competing national security interests is heightened by the lack of a single coherent structure through which these concerns can be addressed. Therefore, a fresh approach is needed for addressing regional Arctic security concerns within a global framework, while recognizing the mutual benefits of maintaining international cooperation, transparency, and stability in the Arctic. Creating a twenty-first century security architecture for the Arctic presents the United States with a conundrum: **U.S. Arctic policy must be given a significant sense of urgency** and focus at the same moment that U.S. defense budgets are being reduced and U.S. military planners consider the Arctic to be “an area of low conflict.” **How does one economically** and militarily square this circle? Unfortunately, while there have been some international debate and discussion on the form and format of Arctic security cooperation, the debate has often focused on what issues related to Arctic security cannot be discussed rather than on those that can and should be addressed. However, these institutional and policy barriers have begun to break down as actors recognize both a collective lack of operational capacity and the increasing number of security actors that will play a role in this rapidly changing region. Arctic stakeholders have yet to discuss seriously, let alone determine, what collective security framework Arctic states should use to address the emerging security challenges in the region, despite signing legally binding agreements on international search and rescue and negotiating international agreements on oil spills and response. It is within this context that the following report will analyze the drivers of change in the region, examine the key Arctic security actors and institutions, and explore the potential for a new security architecture for the Arctic. Oil and Gas As the sea ice retreats, **new commercial opportunities in the Arctic arise**. Natural resources that had once been unreachable are becoming available for extraction. As the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates, the Arctic is projected to contain 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil resources and **30 percent of the gas resources**.1 Because global production of oil and gas will not match global demand and the short-term outlook for the price of oil and gas will increase,2 **the desire to tap these resources in the Arctic will spur commercial exploration**, and multinational companies will invest and become increasingly engaged in the region. At the same time, the need to develop new technologies and approaches for tackling the harsh and unpredictable climate for offshore drilling and transportation in the Arctic is urgent. The greater the potential profit and need to secure supply while maintaining, if not increasing, current production levels, the greater the tendency will be for companies to assume the greater risks inherent in operating in the Arctic. Alaska has contributed significantly to meeting U.S. demand with oil from the oil fields on the North Slope close to the Arctic coast transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. However, due to decreasing North Slope production and a lack of new fields, domestic pressure to explore offshore of Alaska is rising. Royal Dutch Shell has received preliminary approval from the Obama administration for its offshore drilling plans in its acquired leases in the Beaufort Sea. Exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea is expected to commence in 2012.3 Shell is also optimistic that it can begin to develop the reserves in the Chukchi Sea in the near future, but issues with environmental leases, oil spill preparedness and response, and disputes with local communities threaten to delay the process.4 Other Arctic coastal states **are seeking similar economic advantage**. In Norway, leases to the Barents Sea have been allocated, as Norwegian oil and gas production has fallen since its peak of 3.4 million barrels per day in 20015 and is expected to decline further if no significant new fields are discovered. Increased demand from the European market has spurred additional exploratory drilling farther north. Seismic activity by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate6 has already started in the maritime territory obtained after the Norwegian-Russian maritime delimitation treaty entered into effect in July 2011.7 With the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Arctic coast line, Russia **is increasingly interested in developing its potential fields**, especially on the prosperous continental shelf next to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the Kara Sea. Russia is moving to increase gas production in the vast Yamal field, which already produces 90 percent of Russian state gas, following recent discoveries of large gas fields, such as the Bovanenkovo field.8 In addition, Russia has been active in expanding oil production in the Pechora Sea, with plans for drilling in the Prirazlomnoye oil field in early 20129—a significant development as it marks the first instance of offshore drilling in the Russian Arctic.10 Russia also plans to drill in the Dolginskoye oil field in the Pechora Sea, which is projected to be three times as large as the Prirazlomnoye, and aims to have the field developed by 2020.11 Numerous delays—from the large supply of gas available on the global market due to the discovery of unconventional gas in the United States and uncertainty over Russian taxation policies—have to this point prevented the development of the world’s largest gas field, the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, forcing new technological developments and seismic exploration in other parts of the Russian Arctic territory. All of this activity indicates **the keen interest both countries have** in moving rapidly to extract these resources **from their Arctic territories.**

#### Leads to CBW use

Mychajlyszyn 8 (Natalie, International Affairs, Trade and Finance Division, “The Arctic: Canadian Security and Defence”, 24 October 2008, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0813-e.htm#illegalaccess)

Increased illegal access and illegal activities, including terrorism As the Arctic generally becomes more accessible because of the warming climate, some analysts **predict the emergence of new security threats.**(6) One such risk is that of an increase in illegal migration and trafficking in persons to North America through the Arctic. There are also fears of the North being used as a thoroughfare for drug trafficking as well as a destination for illegal narcotics. In the post-September 11 era, fears have been raised concerning the increased vulnerability of the Arctic as a passage for terrorists, whether for illegal entry into North America or for the transport of illegal weapons, including biological and chemical devices. To such a list of activities, generally perpetrated by organized crime groups, can be added the rise of other types of organized crime, such as those involving industries engaged in the extraction of lucrative resources, such as diamonds and copper.

#### Extinction

Sandberg et al 8—Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, Stockholm—AND—Jason G. Matheny—PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh—AND—Milan M. Ćirković—senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction)

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens **are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive**. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

#### Drilling’s inevitable, but it’s a question of safety – plan sends a global signal and solves Arctic environment

Sullivan 12 (Dan – a former state attorney general, commissioner of Alaska's Department of Natural Resources, “It's time to develop our Arctic resources, 7/20, http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/opinion/sullivan-arctic-drilling/index.html)

(CNN) -- The United States **is on the verge of an energy renaissance.** We need to recognize and seize the opportunity. This renaissance involves domestic production of natural resources ranging from clean renewables to hydrocarbons. In particular, domestic hydrocarbon production -- both oil and gas -- is increasing dramatically, with some experts predicting that the United States could become the largest hydrocarbon producer in the word -- outstripping Saudi Arabia and Russia -- by 2020. Increased domestic production of hydrocarbons is driven by two trends. First, new technology is unlocking unconventional resources such as shale-derived oil and gas. And second, investors and policy makers are recognizing that the U.S. still has an enormous resource base of conventional oil and gas, particularly in Alaska. Opinion: Why we should look to the Arctic Federal agencies estimate that Alaska's North Slope and federal waters off Alaska's northern coast contain approximately 40 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil and more than 200 trillion cubic feet of conventional gas. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, this region contains more oil than any comparable region located in the Arctic, including northern Russia. However, the United States **is lagging behind its Arctic neighbors in developing these resources**. This is unfortunate, because we have some of the highest environmental standards in the world **and we should be setting the bar for Arctic development**. Developing our Arctic resources will promote our nation's interests in many ways: securing a politically stable, long-term supply of domestic energy; boosting U.S. economic growth and jobs; reducing the federal trade deficit; **and strengthening our global leadership on energy issues**. Leading academic researchers and economists in Alaska have estimated that oil production from Alaska's outer continental shelf will bring federal revenues of approximately $167 billion over 50 years, and create 55,000 jobs throughout the country. Developing U.S. resources in the Arctic **has the added benefit of enhancing global environmental protection**. One of the arguments used by Arctic drilling opponents is that "we aren't ready," but it is obvious that no matter what preparations are made, they will argue that it isn't enough. Shell, for example, has spent billions to prepare for drilling in the Arctic this summer, incorporating the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, state-of-the-art equipment and extensive scientific research. Recently, the Obama administration has publically expressed its confidence in the company's drilling plans. The U.S. has created some of the highest standards in the world for environmental protection. When we delay or disallow responsible resource development, **the end result is not to protect the environment**, but **to drive hydrocarbon investment and production to countries with** much lower environmental standards and enforcement capacity. Last year, it was reported that between 5 million and 20 million tons of oil leak in Russia per year. This is equivalent to a Deepwater Horizon blowout about every two months. Russia had an estimated 18,000 oil pipeline ruptures in 2010 -- the figure for the U.S. that year was 341. If we do not pursue responsible development in the Arctic, countries such as Russia -- perhaps even China, which is interested in securing access to Arctic hydrocarbon resources -- **will dominate energy production from the Arctic**. Such a scenario **does not bode well for the global environment**. By embracing the opportunities in the Arctic, the United States **will show the world that it can be a strong leader in responsible energy development.**

#### Extinction

**Ford 3** (Violet, Vice President – Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf)

The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to **global processes** and the balance of **life on earth**. Both the unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a resolution effectively recognizes the Arctic as a **“barometer”** or indicator region **of the globe’s environmental health**. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from environmental and other NGO’s.

#### The US needs to take the lead to ensure best practices

Schneider 12 (Michael, Advocacy Director – Clean Air Task Force, “Curb Methane Emissions,” National Journal, 7-25, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments)

For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development. Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, **the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic**.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

### 1AC – Helium

#### Contention Two is Helium

#### Gas is key to overall helium supply – it’s the linchpin to numerous industries

Kammerzell 11 (Jaime – Energy Writer, “Helium to Move from Byproduct to Primary Drilling Target“, 11/18, <http://rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=112735>)

Helium is likely to move from a derived product of natural gas production in the United States to a primary drilling target in the next five years. Historically produced as a byproduct of natural gas, the U.S. helium supply is declining, which has caused alarm throughout the industry. Why is helium so important? Most people associate helium with party balloons and squeaky cartoon voices; however, there is a very serious side of the helium industry that few people comprehend. Without helium, MRI machines don't function, NASA rockets aren't launchedand semiconductor manufacturing grinds to a halt. Helium is simply indispensible to these and various other critical applications, and its increasing scarcity has many people nervous. According to Bo Sears, president of Inter-American Corporation, U.S. helium extraction from natural gas has been declining since 2000. The fast depleting Hugoton gas field, which covers parts of Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas, is yielding lower and lower volumes natural gas and helium. "Throughout the 20th Century, the Hugoton field was the source of most of the world's helium production. Hugoton gas contains concentrations of helium ranging from 0.3 percent to 1.9 percent and it represents about 75 percent of all domestic helium production," Bo Sears explained. ExxonMobil's LaBarge field in western Wyoming started producing helium in 1986 and represents the other 25 percent. As per the U.S. Helium Act of 1960, the government built a crude helium pipeline through the Texas and Oklahoma Panhandles and Kansas to collect enriched helium volumes from the Hugoton field that were being vented from nitrogen treating facilities. Multiple nitrogen rejection facilities filled the Federal Helium Reserve at the Cliffside field near Amarillo, TX with enriched off-gas, the gas that is removed from the natural gas. The Hugoton hit peak production in the late 1970s. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), a division of the US Department of the Interior, manages the Cliffside reserve and related helium infrastructure. Cliffside is the only significant storage facility for crude helium in the world. As per the Helium Privatization Act of 1996, the BLM is now tasked with selling the helium reserve to pay down debt incurred since the enactment of the Helium Act of 1960. By virtually all accounts, the disposition price for crude helium sold, as stipulated by the 1996 Act, is substantially below the actual market price for helium. This dynamic is leading to shortages of helium to end users and an opportunity cost to the U.S. Treasury. Industrial gas companies with strap-on plants (attached to the BLM helium pipeline running from Cliffside to Bushton, KS) purchase crude helium from the Cliffside reserve via stipulated annual allocations. The composition of this crude helium is roughly 80% helium and 20% nitrogen. At these plants, engineers refine, liquefy, transport and sell the crude helium to any number of domestic and international customers. For most of the 1900s, conventional gas **treating operations captured helium as a byproduct**. For natural gas to meet rigid sales specifications, engineers must purify it to "something close to 1,000 Btu," Scott Sears, CEO of IACX Energy, explained. "Most pipeline interconnections have specifications that limit the quantity of inert gases being pushed into the line. A typical sales line specification is no more than 4% total inerts. And, where large nitrogen rejection facilities were placed in high-helium bearing reservoirs such as Hugoton, the nitrogen waste gas was found to contain high percentages of helium. This helium byproduct was and is further refined and sold. IACX Energy builds small scale helium purification and nitrogen rejection facilities that can be used in tandem to realize multiple profit centers for a gas treating project". "Helium sales can really augment a project's economics, an especially appealing proposition given today's low prices for natural gas," Scott Sears said. "When used in tandem, small scale helium and nitrogen rejection facilities can reap considerable value, even at lower pressures and volumes. When we started this venture late in 2006, we had no treating units in operation. Now, we have 17 units treating gas streams in seven different states." "If a producer is curious about whether or not he has helium in his gas," Scott said, "he can start by looking for high nitrogen levels – there appears to be a correlation between high helium and high nitrogen. Moreover, if any high nitrogen gas is observed from reservoirs at or near any deep-seated Precambrian uplifting events, the chances of having economic levels of helium gas is relatively good. Lastly, just because a gas analysis shows 0 percent doesn't make it so. Most gas chromatographs use helium as a carrier gas and the device cannot measure for the carrier gas. You must specifically ask the testing company for measure for helium, though not all companies are set up to do so," Scott advised. The government "formula price" for the crude helium sold from the Cliffside field (set by the Helium Privatization Act of 1996) is equal to "the total cost of the government helium program, plus accrued interest, divided by the estimated recoverable helium in the reserve," Bo Sears explained. Currently, the formula price sits at $75.75 per thousand cubic feet. What is Helium? Although helium is the second most abundant element in the universe, behind hydrogen, it is quite rare on Earth, Bo Sears explained. "It comes from two different sources, which is cause for the discrepancy. The helium that makes up nearly a quarter of the known universe is of primordial origin, meaning it has been here since the Big Bang. The helium on Earth, however, is solely the result of millions upon millions of years of radioactive decay of three isotopes (Uranium-238, Uranium-235, and Thorium-232)," Bo Sears said. The helium found on Earth is very mobile and accumulates in natural gas reservoirs. "Virtually all of the commercially extractable helium in the U.S. is found in the mid-continent," Bo Sears said. The Hugoton field has been the primary source for global helium since U.S. helium production began. "Most natural gas in the U.S., and elsewhere for that matter, does not contain economic concentrations of helium," Bo Sears said. Incidences of high helium in natural gas are almost always associated with high percentages of nitrogen as well. "As helium concentrations rise, so too does the nitrogen component," Bo Sears said. "However, the opposite is not always true. If you have nitrogen in a gas stream, it does not necessarily imply a high helium concentration." For substantial helium gas to develop, three important geological events must be present, Bo Sears explained. "First, there must be adequate concentrations of helium-generating isotopes in the basement rock. Second, there must be adequate fractures and fissures so that helium can escape the tight granite lattices of crustal rock. And lastly, there must be a caprock tight enough to hold any helium in appreciable quantities." The helium atom is so small that an average caprock holding hydrocarbons likely would not hold helium. "If any one of these three events is missing, there will be no accumulation of helium," Bo Sears said. History of U.S. Helium The U.S. became interested in helium during World War I as a substitute for highly flammable hydrogen for use in military dirigibles and blimps. The first commercial plant, however, did not come onstream until 1921 -- three years after the war ended. In October 1918, the Linde Company signed a contract to build the first commercial helium plant in Fort Worth to process gas from the Petrolia field near Wichita Falls, TX. After Petrolia's depletion, a larger production plant was constructed in 1929 for the Cliffside field near Amarillo, TX. Since then, Amarillo has been the epicenter of the global helium industry. Until the early 1950s, helium's primary purpose was for military dirigibles and blimps but it was also playing an increasingly significant role in magnesium welding applications. Helium played a very important role in World War II as the non-flammable lifting gas for these vessels that escorted naval ships and identified enemy submarines. Demand increased dramatically through the 1950s after engineers developed more applications for helium, such as arc welding and breathing mixtures. Demand grew so much, in fact, that Congress passed the Helium Act of 1960, which it designed primarily for the U.S. to buy (with borrowed money) and store crude helium for future use in the Cliffside field. The Helium Act offered incentives for private natural gas producers to strip helium from natural gas and sell it to the government. The principal purpose was to prevent wastage of valuable helium that would otherwise be vented by private producers. From 1929 to 1960 the federal government was virtually the only domestic producer of helium. However, in 1971, Congress terminated the storage contracts created by the 1960 Act because private producers were processing helium with greater efficiencies. Thus, the U.S. incurred an enormous helium debt. In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Helium Privatization Act, which would ultimately remove the U.S. from the helium industry and place it into private hands. Congress designed this Act to sell most of the remaining stored helium reserves out of Cliffside by the year 2015, while paying off the Helium Debt incurred by the 1960 Act. Future of Helium The U.S. is not only the largest supplier of helium but also the largest consumer. The U.S. consumes about 39 percent or 2.45 Bcf/yr of the worldwide helium demand, compared to Asia, which represents about 27 percent 1.65 Bcf/yr, according to Maura D. Garvey's article in the October 2011 CyroGas International newsletter. Europe represents about 21 percent (1.3 Bcf/yr) of the worldwide demand, while the rest of the world (Canada, Latin American, and Middle East) represent about 13 percent. A new helium plant is due to come online near Big Piney, Wyo., soon. The Air Products and Matheson Tri-Gas helium purifier and liquefaction plant will process 0.6 percent (0.006) helium content out of a constituent gas stream of roughly 20 percent methane, 65 percent CO2, 5 percent H2S and 7 percent nitrogen from the Riley Ridge field. The plant is designed to produce 200 MMcf of helium per year at start up with possible expansion capacity to 400 MMcf per year. Nevertheless, international helium plants are more likely future sources. There are currently seven international helium plants and more are planned. Most recently, the Darwin, Australia, plant came online in March 2010 and more are planned in Algeria, Qatar, and Russia during the next three years. "Production from these sources should be sufficient to meet worldwide demand for the next five years," Garvey wrote. "Substantial worldwide helium reserves in North America, the Middle East, Africa, and Russia could sustain the helium industry for hundreds of years," Garvey wrote, "but those reserves are typically more difficult and costly to develop, which is why they have remained undeveloped to date." The future of the U.S. Helium Reserve is uncertain, Bo Sears said. The reserve has a short life span and new reserves need to be found so that the U.S. is not importing the gas from Qatar and Algeria in the near future. "Besides Cliffside and Riley Ridge, there are no other domestic helium projects currently online. All of the industrial gas company helium assets (ie, large cryogenic facilities) are on the Hugoton field … and there they will sit until there is no more gas to run through them. There has been no push by any industrial gas company to locate and secure new sources." "If we are going to secure our domestic helium supply, we need to find new sources and these will have to come from smaller fields. Those new sources are going to have to come from areas where helium is the primary target as opposed to secondary or tertiary. Our company is focused on exploiting these new sources." "If the U.S. ultimately becomes an importer of helium, I cannot even fathom what helium would cost. You certainly wouldn't see any more toy balloons at birthday parties. They would simply cost too much. Besides, helium is far more important for science, industry and academia."

#### **Shale gas doesn’t solve – conventional gas is key**

Clarke 12 (Richard H – cryogenics and helium specialist at the Culham Centre for Fusion Energy, “Should we ban helium balloons?”, 12/11, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/discussion/user-comments/richardhclarke>)

Most shale gas contains no helium - **helium diffuses through the shale** - and **to the extent that shale displaces 'conventional' gas** that is probably not good news for helium supply. On the other hand, if the US starts to export LNG (made from a mixture of shale and conventional gas) that could help the helium market if the liquefaction ‘purge gas’ is captured and refined into liquid helium. As L1ma says, helium is continuously produced by radioactive decay in the Earth's crust. Unfortunately most of the gas diffuses out of the crust and into the atmosphere where, on average, each molecule spends about a million years in the atmosphere before being ejected into space by the solar wind. At present there is a massive 3.8 billion tonnes of helium in the atmosphere but the concentration is so small (5.2 ppm) that it would be hugely expensive and energy consuming to recover industrial quantities from the air. In those natural gas fields where helium is trapped by the cap rock it has been estimated that only HALF the helium molecules 'unearthed' during natural gas production are refined into pure helium gas or liquid helium. Helium balloons comprise about 8% of the global helium market. About 30% is used in cryogenics including medical imaging or MRI equipment, while the remainder is used in science, welding, chip or optic fibre manufacturing, and aerospace.

#### Supply’s on the brink now---no excess global capacity

Nelson 12 (Walter Nelson – Director, Helium Sourcing and Supply Chain Air Products and Chemicals, Inc, 7/20/12, Helium: Supply Shortages Impacting our Economy, National Defense and Manufacturing, Congressional Documents & Publications, lexis )

There have been planned and unplanned maintenance outages at natural gas processing plants, as well as continuing pipeline allocations on the BLM system during well maintenance that have restricted the supply of crude helium to the U.S. refiners. In Algeria and Qatar, production of helium has decreased due to the fragile worldwide economy, as well as maintenance work at gas palnts. In addition, new helium refining projects have been slow to develop. The delayed start-up of one particular plant in Wyoming has postponed access to major new supplies of helium. Combined, these issues have reduced the global helium supply by as much as 5% to 10%. On top of this, the industry will experience an unprecedented helium shortage this summer. Beyond the developments cited above, there are currently three US plant outages or curtailments that are severely limiting the short-term supply of helium today. First, one company reduced its helium production in Wyoming by approximately 20% beginning early June while performing critical maintenance activities. Full production is not expected to resume until sometime later this summer. The impact of this curtailment is almost five percent of global supply capacity. Second, the crude helium enrichment plant that supplies the BLM pipeline system was shut down July 15th for a planned 10 day safety critical outage. During this outage helium deliveries are limited to pipeline inventory reducing global supply capacity by an additional 25%. Third, a nautral gas plant in Kansas experienced an unplanned helium equipment outage at the end of June and that outage continued through this week. The impact of this outage was another five percent reduction in global supply capacity. In helium circles this has been "the perfect storm." The combination of these issues has resulted in a significant short-term reduction in global helium supply capacity over the summer months. Global inventories would have normally served as a buffer during short-term outage events, minimizing the supply impacts. Unfortunately that's not the case this time. Air Products has had to allocate our customers and I suspect that all helium suppliers have had to do the same. We are caught in a cruch not of our making. We expect some relief soon. Most of the maintenance outages will be completed within weeks, in the U.S. and abroad.That said, it will most probably take months for the global helium supply chains to recover from these summer outages. Helium supplies will continue to remain tight through 2012 and into 2013, when new helium production is expected in Wyoming and Qatar. The Wyoming project is expected to add four percent helium capacity and the Qatar II project may add up to 18% capacity. Only after these two new plants are operational in 2013 and existing plants are running back at full output will the global supply begin to fully stabilize.

#### That destroys U.S. science leadership

Ong 12 (Phuan Ong – the Eugene Higgins Professor of Physics Director, Princeton Center for Complex Materials Department of Physics Princeton University, 7/20/12, Helium: Supply Shortages Impacting our Economy, National Defense and Manufacturing, Congressional Documents & Publications, lexis )

The 2 main reasons why liquid helium is vital for research are: 1) Helium is the only fluid available for cooling samples to temperatures close to absolute zero. All objects follow the universal laws of quantum mechanics. However, at room temperature, large thermal agitations of molecules and atoms largely obscure or destroy the manifestations of quantum physics. Hence quantum behavior seems bizarre and unfamiliar to all of us. Cooling a sample suppresses the thermal agitations, allowing the quantum phenomena to become apparent. Put more directly, liquid helium is the "royal road" to discovery. 2) Helium is used to cool the superconducting wires in superconducting magnets. At present, superconducting magnets using niobium-tin (and tentatively high-Tc cuprates) provide the only known means for producing intense magnetic fields over human-sized volumes. They have to be cooled to 4 Kelvin above absolute zero to remain superconducting. With increasing demands worldwide (in research, MRI machines and in future transport), the demand for liquid helium is expected to rise sharply. To mix metaphors, we may say that liquid helium is the vital "oxygen" that nourishes the large, dynamic U.S. research community. Disrupting this vital flow will deliver a crippling body blow to a large segment of the community, and jeopardize the leadership role of the U.S. in the coming decades. Increasingly, the pre-eminence of the U.S. in this field of physics has come under stiff challenges from groups in Germany, Japan, Netherlands, China and S. Korea. These countries have steeply increased their investments in these areas and "grown" a new generation of physicists, mostly trained in the U.S. The investment stems from the universal consensus that, in contrast to many other fundamental scientific areas, the results here underpin important future technologies. In an increasingly flat world, it is prudent for the U.S. to safeguard the availability of this valuable national resource. From the RandD viewpoint, strong fluctuations in the price of helium or in the supplywould be very harmful to the U.S. national interest.

#### That’s key to the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony---it blunts resentment of the power gap and solves conflict

Coletta 9 (Damon Coletta – Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy, September 2009, “Science, Technology, and the Quest for International Influence,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536133&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

Less appreciated is how scientific progress facilitates diplomatic strategy in the long run, how it contributes to Joseph Nye‘s soft power, which translates to staying power in the international arena. One possible escape from the geopolitical forces depicted in Thucydides‘ history for all time is for the current hegemon to maintain its lead in science, conceived as a national program and as an enterprise belonging to all mankind. Beyond the new technologies for projecting military or economic power, the scientific ethos conditions the hegemon‘s approach to social-political problems. It effects how the leader organizes itself and other states to address well-springs of discontent—material inequity, religious or ethnic oppression, and environmental degradation. The scientific mantle attracts others‘ admiration, which softens or at least complicates other societies‘ resentment of power disparity. Finally, for certain global problems—nuclear proliferation, climate change, and financial crisis—the scientific lead ensures robust representation in transnational epistemic communities that can shepherd intergovernmental negotiations onto a conservative, or secular, path in terms of preserving international order. In today‘s order, U.S. hegemony is yet in doubt even though military and economic indicators confirm its status as the world‘s lone superpower. America possesses the material wherewithal to maintain its lead in the sciences, but it also desires to bear the standard for freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, patronage of basic science does not automatically flourish with liberal democracy. The free market and the mass public impose demands on science that tend to move research out of the basic and into applied realms. Absent the lead in basic discovery, no country can hope to pioneer humanity‘s quest to know Nature. There is a real danger U.S. state and society could permanently confuse sponsorship of technology with patronage of science, thereby delivering a self-inflicted blow to U.S. leadership among nations.

#### Legitimacy’s key to global stability---prevents great power war

Fujimoto 12 (Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11>)

The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to our national security. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and non-hegemonic, its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict that argument. With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the United States should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future **when** we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately **leads to a paradigm shift** in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.11 Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate. Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine **which** avoids **the precepts of** the previous administration: “preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order. Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to **garner support from noncommitted regional powers** (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18 Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.20 Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy **and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower**.

#### Helium is key to particle accelerator science – specifically the ILC

Cofield 9 (Calla – Science Writer , “Helium’s shrinking bubble”, 7/8, http://www.symmetrymagazine.org/sites/default/files/legacy/pdfs/200907/heliums\_shrinking\_bubble.pdf)

At a couple of degrees above absolute zero, far colder than any living organism can survive, liquid helium stirs to life the largest particle accelerators in the world. It pulses through the veins of the Large Hadron Collider, following thousands of dipole superconducting magnets around a 27-kilometer ring. Flowing through magnets in Fermilab’s Tevatron, it helps jump-start subatomic particles on their way. These and other vital organs at dozens of labs around the world depend on helium to help them thrive. Hot air balloons, blimps, car airbag systems, welding, leak detection, scuba breathing mixtures, and NASA space shuttles all use helium. Cryogenics, which includes cooling for particle accelerators and detectors, consumes 28 percent of helium in the United States, with half of that chilling tens of thousands of Magnetic Resonance Imaging, or MRI, machines. And the market is growing. At the turn of the 20th century, natural gas miners found helium coming from underground, produced by the radioactive decay of uranium and thorium. It appears in pockets of natural gas in small portions, with three percent helium considered a good ratio. Although helium is relatively easy to extract, it falls on the natural gas companies to capture the gas or let it go. Lighter than air, helium released from the Earth escapes the atmosphere into space. As the secondsmallest atom in the universe, the cunning gas finds its freedom through almost any opening, joint or crack, eventually leaking out of party balloons and even passing through some types of glass. Like oil, coal, and natural gas, Earth’s supply of helium will inevitably run out. While the physics community is aware of this impending problem, says Fermilab cryogenic engineer Tom Peterson, “we’re just not sure what to do.” The coldest liquid “ Helium,” says Serge Claudet, “is a very nice gas.” Claudet is head of the Large Hadron Collider’s cryogenics operation team, and he has a very specific set of qualifications for a “nice gas.” Placid helium is non-flammable, a big bonus for facilities storing large quantities of it. A noble gas, it is also easy to keep clean since it doesn’t tend to bond to other elements. Helium is the only element that is liquid at nearly absolute zero, and even at that frigid temperature solidifies only under pressure. Helium’s ultra-cool nature makes it the perfect option—the only option—for many superconducting applications. At super-cold temperatures, certain materials— such as copper, aluminum, and niobium titanium—lose all resistance to electricity. This allows electrons to flow uninhibited, delivering current with 100 percent efficiency. Wrapped into coils, superconducting wires become electromagnets that substantially outperform conventional magnets in the strength of their magnetic fields. With this strength, scientists can steer particle beams around circular tracks, as the particles move at nearly the speed of light. 27 symmetry | volume 06 | issue 03 | july 09 To maintain these cold temperatures, superconducting magnets require a liquid coolant that will flow over them, pick up excess heat, and carry it away. The helium refrigeration system at Fermilab rumbles with the get-up of 10,000 horsepower, cooling 10,000 liters of liquid helium—a little more than enough to fill two double-decker buses. Helium exits the refrigeration unit through pipes of stainless steel, one of the few materials that won’t become brittle and crack at 1.8 kelvin, or minus 456 degrees Fahrenheit. Peterson and the cryogenics team surround that pipe in a vacuum, seal it in a second pipe, box the pipes in a copper thermal shield, wrap that in another layer of shielding, and weld the whole package inside a vacuum-tight steel container. It’s the ultimate thermos, dedicated to reducing heat loss to zero. “ Liquid helium is a utility in the production of the particle beam, like power or water,” Peterson says. “ When the cooling is available, experimenters don’t think much about it. It is when it goes away that you notice it.” A knack for getting loose In theory, a system carrying helium through a facility like Fermilab should never need to replenish its supply. It should carry cold helium to its target, bring warmed helium back to the refrigeration unit, and so forth. But joints in miles of piping and hair-line cracks unseen by engineers leave helium just enough room to escape. Materials commonly used to seal up joints become brittle at 1.8 kelvin and cryogenics teams can dedicate only so much time to searching for leaks. Brookhaven National Laboratory holds 50,000 liters of liquid helium and loses 20 percent to leaks per year; after the LHC’s yearly shut-down, cooling-down, and starting up, the helium loss is about 25-30 percent. This leaked helium is rarely recovered. In addition, power outages cause helium to heat up and expand beyond what facilities can hold, forcing them to release it into the atmosphere. In 1925, the US government recognized helium’s limited availability and began storing it in the Federal Helium Reserve in Amarillo, Texas. In the 1990s, in an effort to keep helium costs down, the government began selling off the reserve. Debate over this decision still rages between those who would like helium costs capped, and those who worry what will happen when the supplies run out. Even so, prices have nearly doubled in the United States in the past three years. In 2007, several US helium refineries failed to come online as scheduled, due to a series of coincidental delays. Helium users felt the pinch. Roberto Than, a cryogenics specialist at Brookhaven, says the lab’s supplier warned of possible delays in delivery. It turned out to be a close call. “We were still able to get it on time,” Than says, allowing the lab’s Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider to start up on schedule. Making recycling pay Although experts know helium isn’t as rare as xenon nor as abundant as nitrogen, they have difficulty assessing just how much helium is left underground, and they can’t tell how much of that will be captured by natural-gas miners. It is possible that in as little as 30 years, world helium production could peak. While there is no direct concern for tomorrow, Claudet says the particle physics community does have a focus on helium conservation, and notes that over the past 30 years helium recovery efforts have improved significantly. Large facilities like CERN, Fermilab, and DESY have always liquefied their own helium and have increased efforts to recapture it. At SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, workers built a custom recycling unit to purify contaminated helium from the PEP-II accelerator when it was running. “ At CERN we’re working on diminishing losses,” Claudet says. “We’re trying to increase storage and become less dependent” on the helium market. Many small particle physics facilities don’t use enough helium to make recovery cost-effective. Refrigeration machines need frequent maintenance and eat up a significant amount of power. So used helium is often released into the atmosphere. But a new technology may change that. The Soudan Mine in Minnesota hosts the Cryogenic Dark Matter Search, CDMS, in a laboratory a half mile underground. There, protected from cosmic rays, physicists hope to identify the passage of dark matter particles. To reduce thermal noise, they cool their germanium and silicon detectors with liquid helium. In May 2009, Soudan scientists carefully lugged a new type of helium refrigerator, called a “cryocooler,” down a 12-foot-wide, 2341-foot-deep mine shaft that provides the only entrance to the laboratory. These small helium liquefiers, about the size of a household refrigerator, cost less than one-fifth the price of a traditional liquefier. Bauer, who manages the CDMS project, explains that the lab’s 60-literper- day helium usage wouldn’t justify the cost of a traditional liquefier, especially since the older units usually need maintenance every few weeks. But the cryocoolers are a perfect fit for Soudan, and need maintenance only every year or two. Bauer says he learned about the cryocoolers less than two years ago and made a move to obtain them right away. With helium prices climbing the way they are, the coolers should pay for themselves in less than two years. Pressing ahead Peterson is now working on designs for the International Linear Collider, which would rely on liquid helium as well. But by the time it is built and running, physicists may already need to be on the lookout for alternatives. High-temperature superconductors present one possibility. Scientists are working doggedly to understand the mechanics of superconductivity, and hope to achieve it at temperatures where elements such as nitrogen are still liquid and can be used as coolants. Nitrogen is cheaper than helium, represents about 80 percent of the air we breathe, and isn’t flammable or explosive like hydrogen. However, at this time there are no hightemperature superconductors that could fill the needs of particle accelerators. While the particle physics community must do its part to preserve the world’s helium supplies, in some ways its hands are tied. Although facilities like Fermilab and CERN use helium on a larger scale than most, they represent only a very small percentage of overall helium consumption. For that reason, their conservation efforts alone won’t stop a helium shortage. But that hasn’t stopped them from trying. Conservation efforts at large facilities continue to improve and grow, while physicists and engineers press ahead to create new technologies that could cut helium usage across the board. Slowly but surely, high-energy physics is preparing for a possible helium shortage. Only time will tell if it is acting fast enough.

#### Specifically, the International Linear Collider is key to antimatter propulsion --- stops nuclear rockets

Genuth 6 (Iddo, Founder and Chief Editor – FoT, “New Antimatter Engine Design”, The Future of Things, 10-29, http://thefutureofthings.com/articles.php?itemId=33/64/)

A team of scientists is currently working with NASA to develop a new form of space propulsion technology based on positrons. This revolutionary antimatter engine will require only a few milligrams of positrons to send a spaceship to Mars. Facing many hurdles along the way, this is the first time some of the real problems of building a real antimatter engine are being confronted. Space travel has always been mankind's dream. The 1969 historic moon landing brought the hope that soon we will be able to visit other planets in our solar system, but almost 40 years later this dream is still just that. Reaching Mars will require huge investments in and development of many new technologies. One of the biggest technological hurdles we shall need to surpass is the development of a cost-effective and practical propulsion system for a Mars-bound spaceship. Use of conventional chemical rockets, like the Saturn V that took the Apollo team to the Moon, is not practical since the new spaceship would have to carry too much fuel, making it expensive and complicated to lift into orbit. For this reason, a nuclear-powered engine has been suggested for the Mars mission. Nuclear propulsion systems for rockets have been studied by NASA since the early 1960's under the Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application (NERVA) program, subsequently cancelled in 1972. In 2003, the nuclear space propulsion idea was revived by the Prometheus Project still under development. Although the nuclear propulsion option looks like a prime candidate for the future Mars mission, its disadvantages (mainly extreme radioactivity) led people like Dr. Gerald A. Smith, founder of [Positronics Research](http://www.pr-llc.com/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) in Santa Fe, New Mexico, to suggest a bold new alternative – antimatter. First predicted by the British physicist Paul Dirac in 1928 (and experimentally confirmed 4 years), antimatter is comprised of antiparticles that annihilate when they come in contact with ordinary particles, producing a burst of energy in the form of energetic photons. NASA's Institute for Advanced Concepts ([NIAC](http://www.niac.usra.edu/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)) recently funded Dr. Smith's research to examine the potential applications of antimatter as a fuel for a manned mission to Mars. Dr. Smith and his team at Positronics Research [suggested](http://www.niac.usra.edu/files/studies/abstracts/1147Smith.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) to NASA three possible propulsion concepts, all based on positrons (or anti-electrons). Interview with Positronics Research [TFOT](http://www.tfot.info" \t "_blank) recently conducted an interview with Dr. Smith to learn more about the potential of positron-based space propulsion systems.  Q: Were you the first to come up with the idea for a positron-based propulsion system? A: The first positron engine was proposed by a German engineer, Eugen Saenger, in 1953. This was the classic photon rocket, but the photons (gamma rays) had to be made to reflect in order to give thrust. Unfortunately, there was no way to deflect the gamma rays, then or now. We are different in that we make the gamma rays interact, producing ablative residue, which generates thrust. Compared to antiprotons, positrons are very advantageous: no residual radioactivity, low energy gamma rays make for a compact engine (energy confinement is much simpler), and costs for making positrons are many orders of magnitude less (due to technology of electron accelerators versus proton accelerators). As for the original idea, I can say with 95% confidence that we were the first to tackle the real issues of positron propulsion. Saenger did the early work on dynamical computations of a true photon rocket, but did not deal with the real issues of how to get thrust out of his photons. Sanger deserves the credit for the "big idea", we for solving the physics and engineering problems.  Q: You mentioned that positrons emit less powerful gamma rays than antiprotons. Is the energy produced by positrons still sufficient for a useful propulsion system? A: The energy of a single positron-electron annihilation is a factor of 1836 less than the energy of a single antiproton-proton annihilation. So, the energy per particle emitted in the annihilation is much less for positron annihilation. Combined with the constraints of conservation of momentum and energy, this leads to the result that positron-electron annihilation gives two gamma rays of equal energy, equal to 511 keV. Conversely, the antiproton-proton annihilation gives on average five particles, called pi-mesons, with an average energy of 367 MeV (1 MeV = 1000 keV). On average, 1.5 of the five mesons are neutral pi mesons, and each decays into two gamma rays. So, the average gamma ray energy is 367/2 or 183 MeV. The low energy of the positron annihilation gamma rays make these very easy to contain and turn into propulsive energy. But, it takes 1836 times more positrons to get the same amount of energy as one antiproton. The antiproton annihilation energy is very hard to contain and turn into propulsive energy. In fact, the only way I know to use antiprotons is to make them create nuclear fission reactions in materials like uranium, which results in one of the nasty sides of nuclear fission, namely the presence of radioactive isotopes created by the engine. Q: Can the positron engine perform liftoff or is it more like an ion engine, which can only be used in space? A: Yes to the first question, and no to the second question. But, for many practical reasons we prefer for the first trials to assemble the spacecraft in LEO (low-earth orbit) and power it with positrons from LEO into space. Q: Is this mainly a safety issue or are there other considerations? A: It is partly a safety issue and partly an economic issue. 10 milligrams (mg) (a Mars mission) of positrons contains the energy of 428 tons of TNT. Or, to put it another way, 10 mg of positrons contains the energy of 23 external fuel tanks on the Space Shuttle. We would want to make sure that we know how to handle the positrons with utter confidence before attempting a liftoff from Earth. This would come with time. (Recall the early attempts to launch rockets from Earth in the 1920-1940's with all the mishaps.) The other reason is economy. It takes a lot of energy to lift the spacecraft into LEO. We know how to do this with chemical fuels. It is much cheaper to put the parts of the spacecraft into LEO with chemical fuels than lift the whole thing into LEO using positrons.    Q: Would you describe in a few words the three positron-based propulsion concepts you have come up with, how they work, and what their main advantages and disadvantages are? A: The three positron-based propulsion systems we suggested to NIAC were: Solid core - Energy is transferred to a propellant in tungsten metal matrix heated by annihilation gamma rays. Advantages - Well understood technology. Disadvantages - Performance limited by melting temperature of tungsten. Gas core - Energy is transferred to liquid/gas propellant directly heated by annihilation gamma rays. Advantages - Improvement over solid core, not limited by melting temperature. Disadvantages - Flowing multi-fluid is unstable at boundaries, may ionize and create plasma.  Solid Ablation - Energy is transferred to a material that ablates off surface of a pusher plate. Advantages - Simplicity in design, no obvious technology limits. Disadvantages - Half of the gamma rays do not strike the pusher plate, maximum efficiency 50%.   Q: How do you intend to deal with the two major problems of antimatter propulsion systems - the creation of antimatter and finding a way to store it for long periods of time? A: We are working on production of positrons in large quantities. We are getting a big boost from work being done for the International Linear Collider (ILC). The production rates required for the ILC are just a factor of 10-100 below those required for propulsion systems. Our company, Positronics Research LLC, has been working on storage for 5 years. We think we have found the pathway to long-term storage of large amounts of positrons. It involves making electrically neutral positronium (neutral atom of an electron and positron) atoms, then stabilizing them in magnetic and electric fields. You cannot hold 10 mg of bare positrons in a magnetic trap. The "space charge" forces are enormous and the "positron plasma" blows itself apart. But, with electrically neutral atoms containing positrons, this is not a problem. Our work with positronium is on-going. My sponsors implore me to not discuss details at this time. Suffice it to say we have had some very encouraging results.

#### Nuclear propulsion causes accidents and extinction

Gutheinz 5 (Joseph, Former Senior Special Agent – NASA Office of Inspector and JD, “NASA’s Plutonium Gamble”, http://www.paranoiamagazine.com/plutogamble.html)

Nukes in Space
The Cassini-Huygens mission is a joint project of NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) to explore Saturn and its moons. Launched in October 1997 and powered by 72.3 pounds of plutonium-238, Cassini circled the entire Earth only 312 miles above our heads. The 1999 Cassini "fly-by" heightened fears of an "inadvertent reentry" that could have dosed Earth's entire population.

Dr. Helen Caldicott, of Physicians for Social Responsibility, explains that less than 1 millionth of a gram of plutonium is a carcinogenic dose. One pound, if uniformly distributed, could induce lung cancer in every person on Earth. These physicians believe NASA's plutonium accidents are responsible for a worldwide increase in cancer rates since that time. (see Grossman)

Dr. Michio Kaku says NASA's environmental impact studies underestimated the possible risks of the Cassini mission. He notes that NASA's studies appeared as though accurate calculations had been made, but in reality "no full-scale test of any realistic accident scenario has ever been carried out." Rates of uncertainty cannot be calculated, he concludes, because NASA's numbers are all "educated guesses." NASA's facts and figures are assumed to be correct and are not to be questioned.

NASA claimed that solar power wouldn't work for Cassini because the probe would be too far from the sun. NASA had also claimed the Galileo mission had no other alternative than nuclear power. Weeks after its launch, a JPL study showed that Galileo could have used solar power without impacting its objectives.

Physicist Carla Signorini stated in 1995, "If given the money to do the work, within five years [ESA] could have solar cells ready to power a space mission to Saturn." Yet, NASA and ESA still use nuclear fuel on deep space missions because the budgets for solar power systems are "a grain of sand from the huge bucket in which nuclear research is funded."

Many now believe that NASA is motivated more by a desire for military funding, and that plutonium fueled space missions will indirectly aid public acceptance of the nuclear weaponization of space. Against the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, NASA's $3 billion Project Prometheus program will place nuclear reactors on the moon from where it will launch atomic-propelled rockets.

#### ILC key to advanced nuclear detection systems

Varadarajan 9 (Dr. U., “The Societal Benefits of the U.S. International Linear Collider Research and Development Program”, www.hep.net/falc/ILC%20wider%20scientific%20benefits.doc)

B.  Detector R&D

Exploring with precision the physics of the Terascale at the ILC poses tremendous challenges to current detector technology. Most ILC detector subsystems will have to perform beyond the current state-of-the-art.  A comparison of the ILC detector requirements with the performance of the detectors recently built for the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) can provide a sense of the challenge.  For example, at the heart of an ILC detector system will be a vertex detector, a compact particle tracking device about the size of a wine bottle which surrounds the interaction region.  The vertex detector is analogous to a 3D digital camera – it consists of concentric cylinders of finely segmented silicon detectors, similar to the arrays of small sensors used to record pixels in digital cameras. However, for the ILC, a billion pixels are needed in this 3D camera to measure the tracks of outgoing particles with micron precision.  In particular, this kind of precision is critical in order to accurately detect and characterize exotic heavy quarks produced by the collisions at the ILC which are critical pointers to new physics.  These heavy quarks live only for a billionth of a second and decay at “vertices” within the detector to familiar forms of matter. In order to achieve this precision, the sensor size for an ILC vertex detector must be reduced by a factor of 30 and the sensors must be thinner by a factor of 20 (to avoid disturbing the particles) as compared to those used at LHC detectors.  Further, as we describe in detail below, the readout speed required for the ILC is also much greater than the present state-of-the-art can provide – that is, we must be able to take consecutive 3D gigapixel pictures of the particle tracks much faster than any digital camera can today.   Meeting these demands is plausible only because the environment at the ILC is benign by LHC standards. The LHC demands detectors that are extremely radiation hard and that can operate at high speeds. The ILC, on the contrary, relaxes the radiation hardness requirement, admitting many additional technologies. It runs at comparatively low rates and consequently poses lighter demands for power dissipation. High precision, thin detectors are needed, which have not been developed for LHC.   Vertex Detector   The vertex detector is challenging because of the need to combine high precision with speed.  The electron and positron beams at the ILC consist of trains of electrons and positrons which cross about five times a second.  Each of these trains, in turn, consist of about 3000 bunches of more than 1010 electrons each, spaced by about 300 ns.  Thus, 1010 electrons and positrons cross within the detector (a bunch crossing) every 300ns for a period of 0.9 microseconds, five times a second.  Now, each of these bunch crossings will result in the deposition of roughly 5 particles per square centimeter in the innermost layer of the vertex detector.  If the signals are read out only once for the entire train of 3000 bunches-crossings, the accumulated backgrounds overwhelm the signal, and render the device useless. Unfortunately, the state-of-the-art in the technology that was the basis of the precise SLD detector used in the linear collider at SLAC, Charge Coupled Devices (CCDs, also familiar as the core technologies in digital cameras and camcorders), permits no more than one readout per train.   A British group has developed a new system based on CCDs, but while it is several orders of magnitude faster than any previous CCD system for science, it is probably still too sluggish, and the devices may not hold up in the radiation environment of the ILC.  Other groups are pursuing a variety of other approaches. Some are attempting to adapt the LHC devices, with their higher readout speeds, to the ILC environment by making them thinner and more finely grained. Others are developing smart devices with streamlined readout, or with the ability to timestamp the signals locally.  One of these strategies will need to work if the detector is to meet ILC needs.   Electromagnetic Calorimeter   The electromagnetic calorimeter (ECAL) is designed to measure the energy of light, high energy particles emerging from the interaction region that interact primarily via electromagnetic interactions, such as electrons or photons.  The ECAL is a “sandwich calorimeter” consisting of finely segmented, alternating layers of an absorber material with high electric charge nuclei (like tungsten or lead) and a sensor and readout material.  A high energy electron entering a tungsten absorber layer of sufficient thickness will likely be deflected by the high electric field near some nucleus strongly enough so that it will emit a virtual photon with enough energy and momentum to decay into an electron positron pair, roughly moving in the same direction as the original electron.  Thus, one high energy particle becomes three, which in turn further interact with other tungsten nuclei, creating a cascade or shower of particles.  This shower will then enter a sensor plane, which may be made of silicon pad diodes, monolithic active pixel sensors (MAPS) or of scintillator strips or tiles.  In this last case, as the shower passes through the scintillators, each particle creates a further shower of photons which can then be readout by novel solid-state, silicon based photo-sensors or silicon photomultipliers.  The energy contained in the initial high energy electron can be computed by measuring the depth and size of the resulting showers of light through the many layers of the ECAL.   The need for exquisite energy resolution for precision tests of the physics of the Terascale will require substantial improvements over current ECAL technology.  The sensor sizes in the electromagnetic calorimeter need to be a factor of 200 smaller than those in the LHC.  Currently, the CALICE collaboration, with 190 physicists and engineers drawn from 32 institutes and 9 countries drawn from Europe, Asia and the Americas, is studying the fine-grained silicon-tungsten device that might make this possible. A group from SLAC, Oregon and Brookhaven and another from Asia are testing devices based on the same principle, but with somewhat different electronics and mechanical design. Further, though silicon-based photo-sensors have been developed by various groups, the signal-to-noise ratio, gain, long-term performance, and pixel density required for the ILC calorimeter has not yet been achieved.  It is expected that the ILC R&D effort will be a significant driver for this new technology.    Hadronic Calorimeter   The Hadronic Calorimeter (HCAL) is responsible for measuring the energy of the heavier hadrons (that is, particles which experience nuclear as well as possibly electromagnetic interactions) that may deposit only some of their energy in the ECAL.  Several technologies of fine-segmented sampling calorimeters (i.e. with separate absorber and sensor layers just like the ECAL above) are under investigation with either analog or digital readout. The analog readout hadronic calorimeters use scintillator tiles as sensors, and steel or lead as absorbers.  These scintillator tiles would be readout by the silicon photo-detectors discussed above.   The digital readout calorimeters make use of gaseous signal amplification, such as GEMs (Gaseous Electron Multipliers), Micromegas (Micro mesh gaseous structures) or RPCs (Resistive Plate Chambers) which are being developed in-house specifically for this applications.  These calorimeters consist of thin and large area gas-filled chambers interspersed between steel absorber plates.  The hadronic showers generated in the steel absorber plates create ionized electrons in the gas-filled chambers as they pass through. These are then accelerated and detected digitally at the chamber anode, which is segmented in small pads of about 1 cm2 size, matching the granularity needed for the particle flow algorithms used to compute jet energies to the precision required.   The Detector Magnet   Fundamental to determining the momentum of charged particles is the fact that their trajectories bend in the presence of a magnetic field.  Thus, a basic component of any ILC detector will be a large superconducting electromagnet providing such a magnetic field.  The precision in momentum needed for an ILC detector requires a very strong magnetic field, nearly 50,000 times the strength of the magnetic field at the Earth’s surface, which is also highly uniform over a large volume.   Data Acquisition, Management, and Analysis   While the overall rate of bunch crossings at the ILC will be on the order of 104 per second or 10 kHz, the pulsed nature of the ILC beam will result in much higher peak rates of several MHz.  Appropriately tailored strategies for the acquisition and management for the large amount of vertex and calorimeter data associated with such a data stream need to be developed and validated.  Further, novel data analysis and sharing tools will be needed on a global scale to extract the relevant physics from the data emerging from the ILC.   Broader Impacts of ILC Detector R&D   ILC detector R&D will have important payoffs for instrumentation and data analysis in many other fields ranging from medicine to astrophysics. [[14]](http://www.hep.net/falc/ILC%20wider%20scientific%20benefits.doc%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn14)  q        A new method for photon detection that is suitable for whole-body PET scans.  The ILC calorimeters may require a huge number of photon detectors.  One candidate device is a silicon photomultiplier, in which a photon triggers an avalanche in silicon. The silicon photomultiplier is small and inexpensive, and thus very suitable as a readout sensor both for the calorimeter and whole-body PET scans, but current test chips are too noisy. ILC physicists are working to improve their quality. q        Medical imaging may also benefit from the development of CMOS devices for the ILC vertex detectors.  q        Future experiments in particle physics, astrophysics and nuclear physics will also benefit from ILC detector R&D. Even those with very different goals are likely to draw upon technological advances driven by ILC detector needs, just as some candidate ILC devices draw upon advances made in connection with LHC detector R&D. In the case of the ILC, R&D on a fast, finely-segmented vertex detector and new calorimetry are likely to benefit other experiments, as are technologies associated with the high resolution tracking devices, the large, high-field, highly uniform magnet, and the detector stabilization, alignment, and monitoring systems. q        Particle detector instrumentation.  The very finely pixelated track detectors developed for ILC experiments will find applications such as security scanning and medical imaging. New large scale detector technologies that will be stimulated by ILC include very thin silicon pixel detectors, GEMs and micromegas.

#### That prevents nuclear terrorism

SD 5 (Science Daily, “Muon Detector could Thwart Nuclear Smugglers”, 3-5, http://www.scienceblog.com/cms/node/7136/print)

Existing radiographic methods are inefficient for detecting shielded nuclear materials and present radiation hazards to inspectors and vehicle passengers. Muon radiography uses the natural scattering of muons - produced by the decay of cosmic rays showering down on Earth - as a radiographic probe. In fact, efforts to shield nuclearmaterials with lead or similar heavy metals make a smuggled object easier to detect with muons. "We believe we've worked through all of the major obstacles to building a prototype system for a range of security scenarios," Morris said. Muon radiography works because muons are energetic enough to penetrate thick rock or heavy metals. Materials with large numbers of protons and tightly packed nuclei, such as plutonium and uranium or metals like lead and tungsten, produce stronger electromagnetic forces and therefore deflect muons more than less dense materials such as steel, aluminum or plastic. A pair of detectors above and another pair beneath a truck, cargo container or other suspect object record each muon's path before and after it passes through the cargo. By analyzing changes in energy and trajectory, computer algorithms build a three-dimensional mathematical map of dense items in the cargo. In the 1960s, Luis Alvarez usedmuon counters to seek hidden chambers inside the Second Pyramid of Giza. Muons strike the Earth from every angle, so the key to a workable detection system is to keep improving the computer algorithms for tomographic reconstruction. "If we measure themuon 's path and energy with two detectors going in and two coming out, we have a straight line on either side that tells us how much the target deflects themuon, and we can locate highly dense objects, as well distinguishing between materials," said Larry Schultz, a member of the Los Alamos team. One advantage of muon radiographs is their ability to discriminate between shielding materials and less dense metals. With an average energy of 3 billion electron volts, most muons can penetrate about six feet of lead. Gamma-ray detectors are far less penetrating, produce only cluttered, two-dimensional views that need additional interpretation and require hazardous materials such as cobalt. One drawback of detection systems such as airport screeners is the need for people to interpret images and data. The automation built into theLos Alamos computer algorithm makes inspectors' jobs easier because it doesn't convert data from nearly a million detector coordinates into images, Chartrand explained. Instead, using machine learning techniques, the algorithm is trained with known examples until it can decide directly whether a bomb, nuclearmaterials or shielding are present. "We've shown we can put the data through a machine-learning algorithm and train the system to spot objects of interest with a rate of false positives and false negatives that is less than 3 percent," Chartrand said. "We think we can continue to improve that."

#### Nuclear terrorism causes retaliation that sparks global nuclear war and extinction

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand – Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), July)

*A Catalytic Response: Dragging in the Major Nuclear Powers*

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,[40](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0040) and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”[41](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0041) Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”[42](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0042) American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

### 1AC – Solvency

#### Certainty is key – and no link to environment DA

Griles 3 (Lisa, Deputy Secretary – Department of the Interior, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. GRILES. America’s public lands have an abundant opportunity for exploration and development of renewable and nonrenewable energy resources. Energy reserves contained on the Department of the Interior’s onshore and offshore Federal lands are very important to meeting our current and future estimates of what it is going to take to continue to supply America’s energy demand. Estimates suggest that these lands contain approximately 68 percent of the undiscovered U.S. oil resources and 74 percent of the undiscovered natural gas resources. President Bush has developed a national energy policy that laid out a comprehensive, long-term energy strategy for America’s future. That strategy recognizes we need to raise domestic production of energy, both renewable and nonrenewable, to meet our dependence for energy. For oil and gas, the United States uses about 7 billion barrels a year, of which about 4 billion are currently imported and 3 billion are domestically produced. The President proposed to open a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration. Now there is a new and environmentally friendly technology, similar to directional drilling, with mobile platforms, self-containing drilling units. These things will allow producers to access large energy reserves with almost no footprint on the tundra. Each day, even since I have assumed this job, our ability to minimize our effect on the environment continues to improve to where it is almost nonexistent in such areas as even in Alaska. According to the latest oil and gas assessment, ANWR is the largest untapped source of domestic production available to us. The production for ANWR would equal about 60 years of imports from Iraq. The National Energy Policy also encourages development of cleaner, more diverse portfolios of domestic renewable energy sources. The renewable policy in areas cover geothermal, wind, solar, and biomass. And it urges research on hydrogen as an alternate energy source. To advance the National Energy Policy, the Bureau of Land Management and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Lab last week announced the release of a renewable energy report. It identifies and evaluates renewable energy resources on public lands. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this for the record.\* This report, which has just come out, assess the potential for renewable energy on public lands. It is a very good report that we hope will allow for the private sector, after working with the various other agencies, to where can we best use renewable resource, and how do we take this assessment and put it into the land use planning that we are currently going, so that right-of-ways and understanding of what renewable resources can be done in the West can, in fact, have a better opportunity. The Department completed the first of an energy inventory this year. Now the EPCA report, which is laying here, also, Mr. Chairman, is an estimate of the undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Part one of that report covers five oil and gas basins. The second part of the report will be out later this year. Now this report, it is not—there are people who have different opinions of it. But the fact is we believe it will be a good guidance tool, as we look at where the oil and gas potential is and where we need to do land use planning. And as we update these land use plannings and do our EISs, that will help guide further the private sector, the public sector, and all stakeholders on how we can better do land use planning and develop oil and gas in a sound fashion. Also, I have laying here in front of me the two EISs that have been done on the two major coal methane basins in the United States, San Juan Basis and the Powder River Basin. Completing these reports, which are in draft, will increase and offer the opportunity for production of natural gas with coal bed methane. Now these reports are in draft and, once completed, will authorize and allow for additional exploration and development. It has taken 2 years to get these in place. It has taken 2 years to get some of these in place. This planning process that Congress has initiated under FLPMA and other statutes allows for a deliberative, conscious understanding of what the impacts are. We believe that when these are finalized, that is in fact what will occur. One of the areas which we believe that the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management is and is going to engage in is coordination with landowners. Mr. Chairman, the private sector in the oil and gas industry must be good neighbors with the ranchers in the West. The BLM is going to be addressing the issues of bonding requirements that will assure that landowners have their surface rights and their values protected. BLM is working to make the consultation process with the landowners, with the States and local governments and other Federal agencies more efficient and meaningful. But we must assure that the surface owners are protected and the values of their ranches are in fact assured. And by being good neighbors, we can do that. In the BLM land use planning process, we have priorities, ten current resource management planning areas that contain the major oil and gas reserves that are reported out in the EPCA study. Once this process is completed, then we can move forward with consideration of development of the natural gas. We are also working with the Western Governors’ Association and the Western Utilities Group. The purpose is to identify and designate right-of-way corridors on public lands. We would like to do it now as to where right-of-way corridors make sense and put those in our land use planning processes, so that when the need is truly identified, utilities, energy companies, and the public will know where they are Instead of taking two years to amend a land use plan, hopefully this will expedite and have future opportunity so that when the need is there, we can go ahead and make that investment through the private sector. It should speed up the process of right-of-way permits for both pipelines and electric transmission. Now let me switch to the offshore, the Outer Continental Shelf. It is a huge contributor to our Nation’s energy and economic security. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, everything you have talked about so far is onshore. Mr. GRILES. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. You now will speak to offshore. Mr. GRILES. Yes, sir, I will. Now we are keeping on schedule the holding lease sales in the areas that are available for leasing. In the past year, scheduled sales in several areas were either delayed, canceled, or **put under moratoria**, even though they were in the 5-year plan. It undermined certainty. It made investing, particularly in the Gulf, more risky. We have approved a 5-year oil and gas leasing program in July 2002 that calls for 20 new lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico and several other areas of the offshore, specifically in Alaska by 2007. Now our estimates indicate that these areas contain resources up to 22 billion barrels of oil and 61 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. We are also acting to raise energy production from these offshore areas by providing royalty relief on the OCS leases for new deep wells that are drilled in shallow water. These are at depths that heretofore were very and are very costly to produce from and costly to drill to. We need to encourage that exploration. These deep wells, which are greater than 15,000 feet in depth, are expected to access between 5 to 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and can be developed quickly due to existing infrastructure and the shallow water. We have also issued a final rule in July 2002 that allows companies to apply for a lease extension, giving them more time to analyze complex geological data that underlies salt domes. That is, where geologically salt overlays the geologically clay. And you try to do seismic, and the seismic just gets distorted. So we have extended the lease terms, so that hopefully those companies can figure out where and where to best drill. Vast resources of oil and natural gas lie, we hope, beneath these sheets of salt in the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico. But it is very difficult to get clear seismic images. We are also working to create a process of reviewing and permitting alternative energy sources on the OCS lands. We have sent legislation to Congress that would give the Minerals Management Service of the Department of the Interior clear authority to lease parts of the OCS for renewable energy. The renewables could be wind, wave, or solar energy, and related projects that are auxiliary to oil and gas development, such as offshore staging facilities and emergency medical facilities. We need this authority in order to be able to **truly give the private sector what are the rules to play from and buy**, so they can have certainty about where to go.

#### Demand for offshore rigs is up – NEWEST EVIDENCE

Pickerell 12/31/12 (Emily, “Demand for offshore rigs up, while onshore count keeps falling”, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/12/31/demand-for-offshore-rigs-up-while-onshore-count-keeps-falling/)

While demand for onshore rigs declined as the result of less natural gas drilling, demand for offshore rigs continues to flourish, driven by Gulf of Mexico demand, industry analysts said Monday. The Gulf of Mexico rig count has increased slightly in the last three months, with 33 floating rigs and 29 jackups for the fourth quarter, up from 27 floating rigs and 27 jackups for the third quarter, according to a Tudor Pickering analyst’s note. Likewise, demand for offshore rigs grew from 73 in January 2012 to 80 by the end of November, as improved technology, such as water flooding, has provided new opportunities to extract oil from maturing wells. The relatively strong price of oil, which closed on Friday on the New York Mercantile Exchange at $90.80 for West Texas Intermediate Crude, compared with natural gas, which closed on Friday at $3.46 per million cubic feet, has been an additional driver. Oil and gas services companies are working hard to meet the offshore demand: Ensco, for example, has three ultra-deepwater rigs that will be available in 2013. Demand has dipped in onshore drilling, as the big operators have shifted away from chasing natural gas exploration, resulting in a 61 percent decline for onshore rigs in 2012, down from 2,082 in January to 1,841 at the end of November 2011. The downturn comes after 13 quarters of increased drilling activity, Tudor Pickering said in its report. The Permian and the Eagle Ford basins have been the hardest hit by the decline, according to Tudor Pickering, while East Texas and North Louisiana have held up the best. Companies are also trending **towards the newer and more efficient alternating-current technology for drilling rigs.** Alternating-current engines allow for greater mobility and control over the drilling process, and are considered to be safer and more environmentally friendly. The older mechanical rigs have made up 72 percent of the rig decline, according to Tudor Pickering, who noted that “as activity trended lower during the quarter, we noticed operators clearly holding onto and/or high-grading their fleets.” Chesapeake continues to have the highest U.S. natural gas rig count, with 37 rigs, while Exxon and Devon have 31 and 30, respectively. Likewise, Chesapeake also has by far the biggest number of onshore oil rigs, 73, while Anadarko has 47 and Devon has 42.

#### Nothing passes – budget thumps, Obama has no PC, and he doesn’t use it

Delamaide 3-27 (Darrell, “Obama gains no traction on fiscal, economic fronts,” Market Watch, 2013, <http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-03-27/commentary/38051670_1_obama-gains-climate-change-second-term>)

President Barack Obama’s second term is only two months old, but it may not be too early to write his political obituary as a mediocre president who meant well. The president stands by — or worse, goes off to play golf with Tiger Woods — while other people make the decisions that determine our economy and many other things in our lives. Congress continues to squabble over budgets and sequestration, with the White House seeming to have little effect on these deliberations. Obama will have to sign a temporary funding bill this week that preserves most of the spending cuts he objects to just to keep the government from shutting down. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee are keeping the economy afloat with an accommodative monetary policy and no help at all from the administration. Most of the initiatives that Obama announced boldly in his inaugural speech and State of the Union — gun control, immigration and tax reform, action on climate change — seem to be going nowhere fast. His biggest success so far seems to be his ability to play the brackets in March Madness. His recent trip to the Middle East produced little more than an opportunity for Obama to visit the historic Petra site in Jordan. The president who spent most of his first term relying on a lackluster cabinet and abdicating most of the important policy work to a divided Congress, seems intent in his second term on relying on an even more lackluster cabinet and an even more divided Congress. The two biggest accomplishments of Obama’s first term — the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank financial reform — were largely designed by congressional committees and are proving themselves to be unwieldy and difficult to implement. In his new term, after declaring climate change to be a top priority, Obama appointed the chief executive of a sporting goods manufacturer and Mobil Oil veteran to the key post of Interior secretary. After reaffirming his support for alternative energies, he appointed an academic who champions fracking and nuclear energy as his Energy secretary. Faced with persistent concern about banks being too big to fail, especially in the wake of damaging revelations about the breakdown of risk controls at the country’s largest bank, the president keeps on an attorney general who admits to Congress it’s too difficult to bring big banks to justice because the financial system might collapse if he did. He appoints a Treasury secretary who held a lucrative position at Citigroup in between Democratic administrations and got a handsome payoff when he returned to public service. He nominated a new head of the Securities and Exchange Commission whose biggest claim to fame as a defense attorney is squelching an SEC investigation into possible insider trading by the former head of Morgan Stanley. So just two months into this president’s second term, there’s virtually no trace of the hope and change he promised when he swept to victory in his first presidential campaign in 2008. Instead, the electoral machine that successfully got him elected to the second term has now become more about campaigning than governing. It’s hard to discern exactly what Obama is campaigning for, however. He cannot run for a third term. If what he wants is public pressure to get his policies enacted, or ultimately a renewed Democratic majority in both houses of Congress in 2014, jetting to rallies around the country may not be the best way to get it. Instead, with increasing defections among key Democratic senators — South Dakota’s Tim Johnson is set to announce his retirement — it is looking harder than ever to preserve that party’s slim majority in the Senate, which is ineffective in any case given the lack of filibuster reform. In the meantime, we are stuck with what appears to be a federal government limping along from one fiscal Band-Aid to another. Policy is being made by a sequestration law that was designed to be so abhorrent it would never come into effect. Obama may be tenacious enough to get something done. But right now, after an initial flutter of hope from November’s electoral victory, it’s hard to imagine anything like real change from this administration.

#### Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

#### No PC

Sink 3-20 (Justin, Correspondent – The Hill, “Obama Honeymoon May Be Over,” The Hill, 2013, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/289179-obama-honeymoon-may-be-over>)

The second-term honeymoon for President Obama is beginning to look like it is over. Obama, who was riding high after his reelection win in November, has seen his poll numbers take a precipitous fall in recent weeks. A CNN poll released Tuesday showed Obama’s favorability rating underwater, with 47 percent approving and 50 percent disapproving of Obama’s handling of his job. Much of the president’s agenda is stuck, with climate change regulations delayed, immigration reform mired in committee negotiations and prospects for a grand bargain budget deal in limbo at best. On Tuesday, in a decision that underscored Obama’s depleting political capital, the White House watched as Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) announced only a watered-down version of Obama’s gun control proposals would be considered on the Senate floor. Republicans, sensing the sea change, are licking their chops. They point to the lack of movement on Obama’s signature issues, noting the contrast to the ambitious plans outlined in the early weeks of his second term. “The president set very high goals for himself during his State of the Union, but the reality is very little of his agenda is actually moving,” Republican strategist Ron Bonjean said. “He allowed himself to get caught up in the legislative quicksand, [and] the cement is beginning to harden. “ History isn’t on Obama’s side. The last four presidents who won a second term all saw their poll numbers slide by mid-March with the exception of Bill Clinton, whose numbers improved in the four months following his reelection. Clinton may have only been delaying the inevitable. His numbers dropped 5 points in April 1994. Even Ronald Reagan, buoyed by a dominant performance over Walter Mondale in the 1984 election, saw a double-digit erosion by this point in his second term. Obama has yet to complete the first 100 days of his second term. But without a signature achievement since his reelection, he faces a crossroads that could define the remainder of his presidency. White House aides maintain that the 24-hour news cycle makes comparisons to previous presidents difficult. “I think the nature of our politics now is different than Ronald Reagan’s honeymoon,” one senior administration official said. “The ebb and flow of politics doesn’t follow that model anymore.” But observers say a drop in popularity is typical for second-termers. “There may be some typical second-term honeymoon fade happening,” said Martin Sweet, an assistant visiting professor of political science at Northwestern University. “Honeymoon periods for incumbents are a bit more ephemeral.” But like most other presidents, Sweet added, “Obama’s fate is tied to the economy.” “Continuing economic progress would ultimately strengthen the president but if we are hit with a double-dip recession, then Obama’s numbers will crater,” he said. The White House disputes any notion that Obama has lost any political capital in recent weeks. “The president set out an ambitious agenda and he’s doing big things that are not easy, from immigration to gun control,” the senior administration official said. “Those are policies you can’t rack up easily, and no one here is naive about that.” The White House is aware that the clock is ticking to push its hefty agenda, but the official added, “The clock is not ticking because of president’s political capital. The clock is ticking because there’s a timetable in achieving all of this. [Lawmakers] are not going to sign on because the president’s popular.” And administration officials believe they still have the leverage. “There’s a decent amount of momentum behind all of this,” the official said. “It looks like immigration is closer [to passage] than ever before.” Republican strategist Ken Lundberg argued that current budget fights “have cut short the president’s second-term honeymoon.” He said this could also hurt the president’s party, warning “the lower the president’s approval rating, the bigger the consequence for vulnerable Democrats.”

# 2AC

### T – Restrictions (Regulation) – 2AC

#### We meet – we reduce access restrictions on OCS lands – the plan text specifies this

#### OCS moratorium are restrictions

Hagerty 10

[Curry, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, “ Outer Continental Shelf Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development” CRS 2010]

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) moratoria provisions, enacted as part of the Department of the Interior appropriations over the last 26 years, prohibited federal spending on oil and gas development in certain locations and for certain activities. Annual **congressional moratoria restrictions** expired on September 30, 2008. While the expiration of this restriction does not make leasing and drilling permissible in all offshore areas, it is a significant development in conjunction with other changes in offshore leasing activity. Change in moratoria policy signals a shift in policy that may affect other OCS policies as well.

#### We meet – removing the restrictions is a financial incentive for companies to drill for natural gas

#### Counter interpretation – Reduce means to rescind and revoke

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Reduce,” Volume 13, p. 433)

23. Sc. Law. To rescind, revoke, annul.

#### C/I – Restrictions make production more difficult or expensive

LVMI 96 Ludwig Von Mises Institute Original Book by Ludwig Von Mises, Austrian Economist in 1940, Evidence is cut from fourth edition copyright Bettina B. Greaves, “Human Action”[http://mises.org/pdf/humanaction/pdf/ha\_29.pdf](http://mises.org/pdf/humanaction/pdf/ha_29.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)

Restriction of production means that the government either forbids or makes more difficult or more expensive the production, transportation, or distribution of definite articles, or the application of definite modes of production, transportation, or distribution. The authority thus eliminates some of the means available for the satisfaction of human wants. The effect of its interference is that people are prevented from using their knowledge and abilities, their labor and their material means of production in the way in which they would earn the highest returns and satisfy their needs as much as possible. Such interference makes people poorer and less satisfied.

#### Energy production is the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

Energy consumption

‘Energy consumption’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Consumption of energy, in relation to a facility, means the use or disposal of energy from the operation of the

facility including own-use and losses in extraction, production and transmission.

#### Prefer it –

#### Over-limits – There are no natural gas affs under their interpretation. The aff can only reduce restrictions on the development of those natural resources – lease restrictions prevent companies from drilling. There is no topical version of the aff because if you have a lease already, you can drill for natural gas. If that’s not T, then no aff is because the core definition of a restriction on energy production prevents companies from extracting resources.

#### No ground loss – the aff links to all their topic generics and we still claim to increase energy production

#### Competing interpretations are bad – causes a race to the bottom – they will always find a way to exclude the aff. Default to reasonability – we don’t make the topic unmanageable

#### Default to reasonability---prevents race to the bottom to arbitrarily limit out the aff and is preferable in restrictions context

MME 12 Mexican Ministry of Economy, “Other Appellant Submission of Mexico”, UNITED STATES – CERTAIN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELLING REQUIREMENTS, March, http://www.economia.gob.mx/files/comunidad\_negocios/comercio\_exterior/solucion\_controversias/EDO.EDO/ORGANIZACION%20MUNDIAL%20DE%20COMERCIO/Participaci%C3%B3n%20de%20M%C3%A9xico%20como%20reclamante/EU\_COOL/20COMUNICACIONDELOTROAPELANTEDEMEXICO.pdf

52. The ordinary meaning of “restrictive” is “imposing restrictions”63 “[i]mplying, conveying or expressing restriction or limitation” and “[h]aving the nature or effect of a restriction; imposing a restriction.”64 The term “restriction” is defined as “the act or an instance of restricting; the state of being restricted”65 and as “[a] thing which restricts someone or something, a limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation.”66 The term “restrict” is defined as “confine, bound, limit”.67 53. The meaning of “restriction” has been elaborated upon in jurisprudence concerning other WTO provisions. The term “restriction” should not be given a narrow meaning.68 A “disguised restriction” in the context of Article XX of the GATT 1994 has been interpreted to include “disguised discrimination in international trade”.69 In the context of Article XI and other non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994, it has been found that GATT disciplines on the use of restrictions are not meant to protect “trade flows”, but rather the “competitive opportunities of imported products”.70 In Argentina – Hides and Leather, the Panel found that in determining whether a measure makes effective a restriction in the context of Article I, II, III and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 the focus is on the competitive opportunities of imported products, not the trade effects. That panel considered that the complaining party claiming the existence of a restriction need not prove actual trade effects.

### **Case**

#### Heg is completely sustainable- their authors are incorrect

**Beckley 12** [Michael Beckley, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “China’s Century?”, Winter 2012]

Hegemony is indeed expensive and provocative, but these declinist arguments tell only part of the story. The United States is both “system-maker and privilege-taker”—it pays a large share of system-maintenance costs but takes a disproportionate share of the benefiªts.36 The basic claim of the alternative perspective is that these benefiªts outweigh the costs. Most obvious, the United States, as hegemon, possesses an array of tools with which to reward and punish. It can provide, restrict, or deny access to the U.S. market, technology, foreign aid, support for membership in international organizations, bribes, and White House visits. These tit-for-tat bargains with individual states, however, are not as consequential as the United States’ power over aspects of the international system itself. In the alternative perspective, hegemony is not just preponderant power, it is “structural power.”37 It is the power to set agendas, to shape the normative frameworks within which states relate to one another, and to change the range of choices open to others without putting pressure directly on them. It is, at once, less visible and more profound than brute force. Seen in this light, the United States is neither benevolent nor feeble, but coercive and capable, and the goods it produces “are less collective goods than private ones, accruing primarily to the hegemon and thus helping maintain its hegemony.”38 Military superiority, for example, allows the United States to employ “force without war,” pressuring other countries into making concessions by shifting military units around or putting them on alert.39 It also allows the United States to run a protection racket, garnering inºfluence through the provision of security. As Joseph Nye explains, “Even if the direct use of force were banned among a group of countries, military force would still play an important political role. For example, the American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen’s minds.”40 To be sure, the costs of maintaining U.S. military superiority are substantial. By historical standards, however, they are exceptionally small.41 Past hegemons succumbed to imperial overstretch after ªfighting multifront wars against major powers and spending more than 10 percent (and often 100 or 200 percent) of their GDPs on defense.42 The United States, by contrast, spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense and concentrates its enmity on rogue nations and failed states. Past bids for global mastery were strangled before hegemony could be fully consolidated. The United States, on the other hand, has the advantage of being an extant hegemon—it did not overturn an existing international order; rather, the existing order collapsed around it. As a result, its dominant position is entrenched to the point that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”43 The dollar’s global role may handicap American exports, but it also comes with perks including seigniorage,44 reduced exchange rate risks for U.S. ªfirms involved in international commerce, competitive advantages for American banks in dollarized ªfinancial markets, and the ability to delay and deºflect current account adjustments onto other countries.45 More important, foreign governments that hold dollar reserves depend on U.S. prosperity for their continued economic growth and are thus “entrapped,” unable to disentangle their interests from those of the United States.46 Rather than seeking to undermine the American economy, they invest in its continued expansion.47 Finally, given its position at the top of the world trade regime, the United States can distort international markets in its favor.48 Declinists expect the hegemon to use its power magnanimously. According to the alternative perspective, however, American foreign economic policy involves the routine use of diplomatic leverage at the highest levels to create opportunities for U.S. ªfirms.49 U.S. trade offiªcials, “acting as self-appointed enforcers of the free trade regime, asserted the right with their own national law to single out and punish countries they judged to be unfair traders.”50 Globalization, therefore, may not be a neutral process that diffuses wealth evenly throughout the international system, but a political process shaped by the United States in ways that serve its interests.

#### There is an important framing issue when evaluating hegemony – none of their turns can ever be proven to be true – the last 60 years of lasting unipolarity disprove every heg bad argument that they put forth and prove every single one of ours

They don’t assume the transition – that goes nuclear

 Posen and Ross 97 [Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science in the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at MIT, Andrew Ross, Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College, International Security, Winter 1997]

The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation**. There would** like **be more war. W**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction **might be used in** some of **the wars**, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved.

### 2AC – A2: OSB/Retrenchment

Offshore balancing causes aggression, triggers a power vacuum and causes global war

Poffenbarger and Schaefer 9

[John G., Dept Social Sciences @ Wheeling Jesuit U, and Mark E., Dept History, Philosophy, Poli. Sci. and Religion @ Marietta College, "Searching for Acceptance: The United States and South America," for presentation at the 2009 International Studies Assoc. Annual Conference, February 17, AllAcademic | VP]

It is our contention that a strategy of hegemony is preferable to one of offshore balancing for several reasons. First, we believe that the depth and breadth of United States’ interests may not be best served by the use of regional proxies. The utilization of regional partners is certainly a possibility for an actor such as the United States, however off-shore balancing seems to call for an over reliance on such partners that could weaken United States power and interests. Second, the realities of the recent Bush administration’s policies may not allow for such a strategic adjustment to offshore balancing. That is not to say that the United States might not seek to reduce its exposure abroad in some areas, but a move to an off-shore balancing strategy at this time may send the wrong message to allies and potential rivals. Next, a move away from a strategy of hegemony would likely trigger a power vacuum in some areas. The European Union faces problems of unity, cohesion, willingness, and a lack of structure to deal with most of the situations currently faced by the United States. Russia, while seeing a resurgence of power in recent years, does not appear to currently have global ambitions, but more likely wishes to focus on its “near-abroad”. (This “near abroad” also seems to lie within United States’ security and economic purview.) China also appears to currently have limited global interests, as it seeks to finalize its development and gain global energy access, but it also may be searching for ways to alter its relative power in relation to the United States. Finally, it is our belief that such a dramatic change in strategy may actually trigger more balancing; as such a withdrawal may send a signal of vulnerability and a lack of willingness to latent balancers. We contend that the United States would be best served by maintaining its current position in the international system, and by simply taking steps to mitigate the motivations for balancing while seeking to attract bandwagoners.

#### Layne’s wrong- it removes the deterrent effect that’s key to prevent conflict

**Taliaferro 07**

 Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University

[Jeffrey W. “Hegemonic Delusions: Power, Liberal Imperialism, and the Bush Doctrine” The Fletcher Dorum on World Affairs, Volume 31:2 (http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/31-2pdfs/Taliaferro.pdf)]

Second, many of Layne’s arguments about the feasibility of an offshore balancing strategy today seem disconnected from political reality. He devotes only five pages in a 290-page book to a discussion of how the United States ought to go about implementing his preferred strategy. He never grapples with the tremendous sunk costs of U.S. forward deployment in Europe and East Asia, nor does he consider the lack of support for such a radically different grand strategy among officials in Washington or the American people. It is also difficult to imagine Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf, East Asia, and even Western Europe openly advocating the withdrawal of all U.S. forces in the near future, if for no other reason than that the American military presence dampens the security dilemma in those three regions.

**Reducing reliance on forward deployment causes a shift to PGS – results in nuclear miscalculation**

**Woolf 11** [Amy F. Woolf Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues”, 6/21/11, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/167962.pdf>]

Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or “fleeting targets” at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. Many analysts believe that the United States should use long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads for the PGS mission. These weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons in the U.S. war plan but would, instead, provide a “niche” capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets, which might expand the range of U.S. conventional options. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. DOD is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities. The Air Force and Navy have both considered deploying conventional warheads on their longrange ballistic missiles. The Navy sought to deploy conventional warheads on a small number of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In FY2008, Congress rejected the requested funding for this program. The Air Force and DARPA are developing a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle that could deploy on a modified Peacekeeper land-based ballistic missile—a system known as the Conventional Strike Missile (CSM). In FY2008, Congress created a single, combined fund for the conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) mission. This fund is supporting research and development into the Air Force CSM and two possible hypersonic glide vehicles. The Obama Administration has requested $239.9 million for the CPGS program in FY2011. Congress may consider a number of issues when it reviews the budget requests for CPGS weapons. It may question DOD’s rationale for the mission, reviewing whether the United States might face circumstances in conflicts where it would have to attack targets promptly at the start of or during a conflict, and when it could not rely on forward-based land or naval forces. It might also review whether this capability would reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons or whether, as some critics have asserted, it might upset stability and possibly increase the risk of a nuclear response to a U.S. attack. This risk derives, in part, from the possibility that nations detecting the launch of a U.S. PGS weapon would not be able to determine whether the weapon carried a nuclear or conventional warhead. Congress has raised concerns about this possibility in the past.

#### Offshore balancing kills the economy – removes international economic cooperation

Khalilzad 95

 [Zalmay, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, Washington Quarterly, Spring]

It is possible that in a balance of power system the United States would be in a relatively privileged position as compared to the other great powers. Given the relative distance of the United States from other power centers, it might be able to mimic the former British role of an offshore balancer. As in the nineteenth century, the United States and other great powers would compete and cooperate to avoid hegemony and global wars. Each great power would protect its own specific interests and protect common interests cooperatively. If necessary, the United States would intervene militarily to prevent the emergence of a preponderant power. But there are also several serious problems with this approach. First, there is a real question whether the major powers will behave as they should under the logic of a balance of power framework. For example, would the West European powers respond appropriately to a resurgent Russian threat, or would they behave as the European democracies did in the 1930s? The logic of a balance of power system might well require the United States to support a non-democratic state against a democratic one, or to work with one undesirable state against another. For example, to contain the power of an increasingly powerful Iran, the United States would have to strengthen Iraq. The United States may, however, be politically unable to behave in this fashion. For example, after the Iraqi victory against Iran in 1988, balance of power logic indicated that the United States should strengthen Iran. However, because of ongoing animosity in U.S. Iranian relations, the nature of Iran's regime, and moral concerns, the United States could not implement such a strategy. There are many other examples. To expect such action is therefore probably unrealistic. Second, this system implies that the major industrial democracies will no longer see themselves as allies. Instead, political, and possibly even military, struggle among them will become not only thinkable but legitimate. n5 Each will pursue its own economic interest much more vigorously, thereby weakening such **multilateral economic institutions** as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the liberal world trading order in general. **This would increase the likelihood of major economic depressions** and dislocations. Third, the United States is likely to face more competition from other major powers in areas of interest to it. For example, other powers might not be willing to grant the United States a sphere of influence in the Americas, but might seek, as Germany did in World War I, to reach anti-U.S. alliances with Latin American nations. Similarly, as noted above, another great power might decide to support a potential hegemon in the Persian Gulf. Finally, and most important, there is no guarantee that the system will succeed in its own terms. Its operation requires subtle calculations and indications of intentions in order to maintain the balance while avoiding war; nations must know how to signal their depth of commitment on a given issue without taking irrevocable steps toward war. This balancing act proved impossible even for the culturally similar and aristocratically governed states of the nineteenth-century European balance of power systems. It will be infinitely more difficult when the system is global, the participants differ culturally, and the governments of many of the states, influenced by public opinion, are unable to be as flexible (or cynical) as the rules of the system require. Thus, miscalculations might be made about the state of the balance that could lead to wars that the United States might be unable to stay out of. The balance of power system failed in the past, producing World War I and other major conflicts. It might not work any better in the future -- and war among major powers in the nuclear age is likely to be more devastating

#### Nuclear war

Royal 10

 [Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,? in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

### 2ac- China

#### 1. Heg doesn’t cause china war

**Foot 06**

Professor of International Relations and Swire Senior Research Fellow in the International Relations of East Asia at St Antony's College, Oxford

(Rosemary, Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging, International Affairs, Jan 06)

China is neither part of, nor determinedly seeking to build, anti-hegemonic coalitions. Consequently, other emerging states such as Brazil, India or Russia should not expect too much in the way of sustained cooperation from China on this front, assuming they are interested in forming such coalitions. It is unlikely to stick out for negotiating positions that the US would see as seriously detrimental to its interests. This approach seems likely to change only were China to become convinced that it faced sustained US hostility. Beijing’s leaders remain preoccupied with their relationship with the US, Hu Jintao reportedly describing America in 2002 as the ‘central thread in China’s foreign policy strategy’.49 A consequence of this preoccupation is that its strategy is fixed only in the broadest of terms, and largely remains contingent on what is decided in Washington as a reaction to China’s rise. Beijing’s policy, therefore, is not determined simply by inequalities in the distribution of power: it is not US hegemony as such that influences China’s policies, but how that hegemonic position is used, especially with reference to China itself.

#### 2. Hegemony decreases chances of war with China

**Lieber ‘5**

 (Robert J., Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, (p. 158))

Parallels between America's role in East Asia and its involvements in Europe might seem far-fetched. Asia's geography and history are enormously different, there is no regional organization in any way comparable to the European Union, the area is not a zone of peace, conflict among its leading states remains a potential risk, and there is nothing remotely resembling NATO as a formal multilateral alliance binding the United States to the region's security and the regional states to one another. Yet, as in Europe, the United States plays a unique stabilizing role in Asia that no other country or organization is capable of playing. Far from being a source of tension or instability, this presence tends to reduce competition among regional powers and to deter armed conflict. Disengagement, as urged by some critics of American primacy, would probably lead to more dangerous competition or power-balancing among the principal countries of Asia as well as to a more unstable security environment and the spread of nuclear weapons. As a consequence, even China acquiesces in America's regional role despite the fact that it is the one country with the long-term potential to emerge as a true major power competitor

#### No US-China war – economics

Shor 12 (Francis, Professor of History – Wayne State, “Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict?”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 11(1), pp. 157-167)

While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after WWII, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world's largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world's copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of U.S. foreign reserves, e.g. treasury bonds. This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict with the U.S. now, since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, "the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology firms, and other enterprises." [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China's rising economic power, especially as an expression of the U.S. governing elite's ideological commitment to national security.

### 2ac- Terror

#### 1. Heg solves terror- takes away incentives for them to attack- that’s Thayer and barnett

#### 2. Their ev isn’t reverse causal – collapse of heg wont stop terror

**Lieber 05**

 Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University

(Robert J., The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, (p. 29))

Realist views tend to rest on certain general assumptions about the nature of world politics, for example, that states with the capacity to use WMD or who make these weapons available to terrorists can be reliably deterred. And in the case of Iraq, realists believed Saddam Hussein could have been dissuaded from attacking his neighbors and that even if he eventually acquired nuclear weapons, he could have been deterred by the overwhelming power of the United States. Some in this group, in comparing the United States with other dominant powers of the past, invoke the examples of great empires that came to grief through imperial overreach or through causing other powerful states to form coalitions against them. And because of the emphasis on system-level explanations, some realists downplay the traits of especially violent and fanatical individual leaders or groups. However, as Richard Betts notes, although American primacy is one of the causes of the terror war "There is no reason to assume that terrorist enemies would let America off the hook if it retreated.

### CP

#### Perm – do both

#### Takes too long to solve – we need helium now

And you need helium before youc an get to space

NRC 10 (National Research Council as part of the National Academies – Committee on Understanding the Impact of Selling the Helium Reserve, Board on Physics and Astronomy, National Materials Advisory Board, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, CHARLES G. GROAT – Director of the Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy and former director of USGS, University of Texas at Austin, Co-Chair

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON – Senior Vice Provost for Research and winner of Nobel Prize, Cornell University, Co-Chair, “Selling the Nation's Helium Reserve”, 2010, www.sia-online.org/clientuploads/directory/DocumentSIA/national%20academies%20helium%20report.pdf)

The U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is steward of the Federal Helium Reserve (see Box 1.1), the only significant depository of crude helium in the world. Helium is a critical component in many fields of scientific research, is needed in a number of important high-technology manufacturing processes, is indispensable to the U.S. space exploration program, and plays an important role in defense activities on the battle field and elsewhere. For many of these uses, there is no substitute for helium, so when shortages occur, operations must cease. Further, helium is a nonrenewable resource—it is found in only a few locations and many of the deposits in the United States are being depleted. Accordingly, the United States has an important interest in ensuring that critical users have an uninterrupted supply of helium. Indeed, this was the original reason for creating the Helium Reserve, and its proper stewardship is critical for ensuring that supply.

#### Plan requires massive political capital

**Foust 11** (Jeff Foust, editor of the Space Review, “Making the Case, Again, for Space-Based Solar Power,” The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1978/1)

Missing from the rollout of the report was any strategy by the NSS or other organizations to raise awareness of SBSP and to win support for it from NASA, the DOE, or other agencies. It’s a task that, through no fault of their own, has become harder in recent weeks, both because of the prospects of significant automatic cuts in discretionary spending after the failure of the “supercommittee” to develop a deficit reduction plan, and the greater political scrutiny of solar and other DOE alternative energy programs in the wake of the bankruptcy of Solyndra, the terrestrial solar power company that was supported by over $500 million in federal loan guarantees. If it was tough raising support and funding before, it will be even harder in the near future with decreased budgets and increased skepticism. The IAA report makes the case that space-based solar power remains a good idea, at least on paper. If it’s ever to be more than that, though, it will require not just technical and economic breakthroughs, but political ones as well.

### Security K – 2AC

#### Case outweighs – nuclear war causes the worst forms of securitization – causes the right to take over – empirically true – WWII.

#### Perm – do both

#### Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

#### K doesn’t come first

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Securitizing the environment is good – builds public awareness to solve

**Matthew 2**, Richard A, associate professor of international relations and environmental political at the University of California at Irvine, Summer (ECSP Report 8:109-124)

In addition, environmental security's language and findings can benefit conservation and sustainable development."' Much environmental security literature emphasizes the importance of development assistance, sustainable livelihoods, fair and reasonable access to environmental goods, and conservation practices as the vital upstream measures that in the long run will contribute to higher levels of human and state security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are examples of bodies that have been quick to recognize how the language of environmental security can help them. The scarcity/conflict thesis has alerted these groups to prepare for the possibility of working on environmental rescue projects in regions that are likely to exhibit high levels of related violence and conflict. These groups are also aware that an association with security can expand their acceptance and constituencies in some countries in which the military has political control, For the first time in its history; the contemporary environmental movement can regard military and intelligence agencies as potentialallies in the struggle to contain or reverse humangenerated environmental change. (In many situations, of course, the political history of the military--as well as its environmental record-raise serious concerns about the viability of this cooperation.) Similarly, the language of security has provided a basis for some fruitful discussions between environmental groups and representatives of extractive industries. In many parts of the world, mining and petroleum companies have become embroiled in conflict. These companies have been accused of destroying traditional economies, cultures, and environments; of political corruption; and of using private militaries to advance their interests. They have also been targets of violence, Work is now underway through the environmental security arm of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to address these issues with the support of multinational corporations. Third, the general conditions outlined in much environmental security research can help organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, and IUCN identify priority cases--areas in which investments are likely to have the greatest ecological and social returns. For all these reasons, IUCN elected to integrate environmental security into its general plan at the Amman Congress in 2001. Many other environmental groups and development agencies are taking this perspective seriously (e.g. Dabelko, Lonergan& Matthew, 1999). However, for the most part these efforts remain preliminary.' Conclusions Efforts to dismiss environment and security research and policy activities on the grounds that they have been unsuccessful are premature and misguided. This negative criticism has all too often been based on an excessively simplified account of the research findings of Homer-Dixon and a few others. Homer-Dixon’s scarcity-conflict thesis has made important and highly visible contributions to the literature, but it is only a small part of a larger and very compelling theory. This broader theory has roots in antiquity and speaks to the pervasive conflicts and security implications of complex nature-society relationships. The theory places incidents of violence in larger structural and historical contexts while also specifying contemporarily significant clusters of variables. From this more generalized and inclusive perspective, violence and conflict are revealed rarely as a society’s endpoint and far more often as parts of complicated adaptation processes. The contemporary research on this classical problematic has helped to revive elements of security discourse and analysis that were marginalized during the Cold War. It has also made valuable contributions to our understanding of the requirements of human security, the diverse impacts of globalization, and the nature of contemporary transnational security threats. Finall,y environmental security research has been valuable in myriad ways to a range of academics, policymakers, and activists, although the full extent of these contributions remains uncertain, rather than look for reasons to abandon this research and policy agenda, now is the time to recognize and to build on the remarkable achievements of the entire environmental security field.

#### No floating piks – their independently a voter b/c they steal all aff ground – aff is structurally behind – all the reasons their K are good are not reasons it comes before the aff

#### Embracing insecurity is a strategy of the privileged. Their alternatives presumes some degree of personal security necessary for the *freedom* to live life as you choose.

Ken BOOTH IR @ Aberystwyth ‘7 *Theory of World Security* p. 104-105

Perhaps the most hideous image of the congruity of insecurity and the determined life in the Western imagination was that of the inmates of the Nazi death-camps. Years after the war, Primo Levi related how, driven by thirst on his first day in Auschwitz, he reached for an icicle. A guard snatched it away. When Levi asked 'Warum? the guard pushed him away: 'Hier ist kein wanim' ('There is no why here)." Here was survival, for a shorter or longer time, but definitely no security, not even the choice of asking 'Why?' The determined life in extrernis of the death- camp inmate is rare, though not as rare as one would hope. Nonetheless, people can live honourable lives surviving in extreme insecurity. There is some space for human dignity in the death-camp, in the trenches, or grubbing for food on rubbish tips. But there is not much Such a life is not much different from that of non-human animals existing only to feed and protect their young, driven by some biological imperative to survive. Since the earliest times societies have shared the belief that human being/being human should be more than this. 22 The most basic task for emancipatory politics must therefore be to create conditions in which sentient bodies are never driven into sites of insecurity where the freedom to ask Why?' and to live in dignity is never present.

It is important here to distinguish between insecurity that is enforced and life-determining, and danger that is chosen. Insecurityof the sort discussed above and elective danger are not synonymous When people choose risky pastimes or when powerful states choose to take on ambi- tious foreign interventions, they place themselves in some danger, but they are not facing insecurity in the sense discussed above. Elective dan- ger is synonymous with a sort of freedom. The insecure of the earth have neither the time nor the resources to engage in Formula One car racing, nor in organising expeditions to climb the highest peaks. There is all the difference in the world between those who go into the mountains for recreation and challenge - and have the time and money to do so - and those Kurds who went into the mountains to flee from Saddam Hussein's forces in 1991. Security allows choice, and some choices (the result of security rather than insecurity) may be life-threatening. Elective danger is a privilege of the secure; direct and unavoidable danger is the determining condition of the world's insecure. Those whose lives are dominated by the search for scraps of food on a refuse tip on the edges of Sao Paulo have no choice about what to do. There is no money to buy hooks, or the opporhinity to go across the city to attend the theatre. Such opportunities were also denied the family in Glasgow mentioned earlier, and the woman working in the rnaquiladora. If one lives in an autocratic. state, which punishes those who think unacceptable thoughts, it is necessary to self-police those thoughts. Equally, weak states have to defer to mighty and ambitious neighbours. Manipulating insecurity may of course be functional for the powerful (individuals regimes, and states) by helping to keep the weak 'in their place' through deference and self-policing. But such insecurity obstructs the opportunities for the victims to achieve self-realisation in their lives. A determined life is not one in which humans, in whole or in part, can flourish. Those in such a situation are never even given the opportunity to know 'Why?' because they do not have the power to ask the question in the first place. .

#### Perm do plan and affirm difference and embrace disorder

#### Alt causes right to fill in – turns the K

Olav. F. **Knudsen**, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, **‘1** [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use **are in no need of** such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to **go back to the literature**. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly in- fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European **security as it is** currently developing**.** That inevitably requires a more **consistent** interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘**traditional’ sector of security** policymaking, **unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.**

#### Judge choice – can still endorse other representations and reject the faulty ones of the 1AC

#### You essentialize security and ignore its political potential

Nunes 12 -- post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, and has a PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth University, Wales (Joao, 8/15/2012, "Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies," Security Dialogue 43(4), Sage)

This tendency in the literature is problematic for the critique of security in at least three ways. First, it constitutes a blind spot in the effort of politicization. The assumption of an exclusionary, totalizing or violent logic of security can be seen as an essentialization and a moment of closure. To be faithful to itself, the politicization of security would need to recognize that there is nothing natural or necessary about security – and that security as a paradigm of thought or a register of meaning is also a construction that depends upon its reproduction and performance through practice. The exclusionary and violent meanings that have been attached to security are themselves the result of social and historical processes, and can thus be changed. Second, the institution of this apolitical realm runs counter to the purposes of critique by foreclosing an engagement with the different ways in which security may be constructed. As Matt McDonald (2012) has argued, because security means different things for different people, one must always understand it in context. Assuming from the start that security implies the narrowing of choice and the empowerment of an elite forecloses the acknowledgment of security claims that may seek to achieve exactly the opposite: alternative possibilities in an already narrow debate and the contestation of elite power.5 In connection to this, the claims to insecurity put forward by individuals and groups run the risk of being neglected if the desire to be more secure is identified with a compulsion towards totalization, and if aspirations to a life with a degree of predictability are identified with violence. Finally, this tendency blunts critical security studies as a resource for practical politics. By overlooking the possibility of reconsidering security from within – opting instead for its replacement with other ideals – the critical field weakens its capacity to confront head-on the exceptionalist connotations that security has acquired in policymaking circles. Critical scholars run the risk of playing into this agenda when they tie security to exclusionary and violent practices, thereby failing to question security actors as they take those views for granted and act as if they were inevitable. Overall, security is just too important – both as a concept and as a political instrument – to be simply abandoned by critical scholars. As McDonald (2012: 163) has put it, If security is politically powerful, is the foundation of political legitimacy for a range of actors, and involves the articulation of our core values and the means of their protection, we cannot afford to allow dominant discourses of security to be confused with the essence of security itself. In sum, the trajectory that critical security studies has taken in recent years has significant limitations. The politicization of security has made extraordinary progress in problematizing predominant security ideas and practices; however, it has paradoxically resulted in a depoliticization of the meaning of security itself. By foreclosing the possibility of alternative notions of security, this imbalanced politicization weakens the analytical capacity of critical security studies, undermines its ability to function as a political resource and runs the risk of being politically counterproductive. Seeking to address these limitations, the next section revisits emancipatory understandings of security.

#### Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate it into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

#### Their impact essentializes national identity as a source of violence. This is a rigged game more vulnerable to self-fulfilling prophecy than *provisional* and *empirical* uses for security.

Karin **FIERKE** Politics @ Queens Univ. Belfast **‘1** in *Constructing International Relations* eds. Fierke and Jorgensen p. 119-120

There are several poststructuralist assumptions that are problematic from a constructivist perspective. First, poststructuralists, in Campbells argument, focus on the theorization of identity, rather than assuming an a priori agency or pre-given subjects, as many constructivists do. However, the poststructuralist emphasis on theorizing identity often leads to a practice that is not qualitatively different than the "positivist orthodoxy" they criticize, that is. the **reification of a set of assumptions** prior to detailed analysis.' In this case, the theoretical maxim is that identity is constituted in difference, and-this has been modified since the end of the Cold War- this is an antagonistic relationship. As Ole Waever (1996a. 122) notes, there is reason to question this assumption: Many critical and poststructuralist authors enjoy remonstrating against the alleged 'other" that is at present taking place in relation to Russia. North Africa, or Asia. Many authors-including Campbell-balance between, on the one hand, (formally) saying that identity does not demand an Other. does not demand antagonism, only difference(s) that can be non-antagonistic and. on the other, actually assuming that identity is always based on an antagonistic relationship to an other. is always constituted as absolute difference. In the current situation, because of this unfortunate habit, when one notices that there are efforts in identity creation for Europe, one immediately looks wound and asks. "Who can it be directed against?' and then one discerns some more or less well-founded examples of, for example, Russia being castigated as other. 1 am not convinced. The dominant aspiration is rather to constitute Europe as a pole of attraction with graduated membership so that Europe fades out but is not constituted against an external enemy. Some of Europe's mechanisms for stabilizing or disciplining eastern Europe rely exactly on this non-definition of an eastern border. on the image of an open but heterogeneous polity of which some are more members than others, but none are defined as total outsiders or opponents. The context of post Cold War Europe raises questions about the assumption that identity requires an Other. In contrast to the emphasis on theorizing identity. Adler argues that constructivists want to know in detail how identities and interests are constituted in particular cases. If one takes the practices of actors in the world seriously, then a more fruitful analysis would, to cite Wittgenstein (1958. 66-67). 'look and see" how identities are constituted in specific contexts. As Onuf (199Kb. I) emphasizes, constructivism is not a theory: it is a "way of studying social relations."

Second. from Campbell's perspective, constructivists are too easily drawn into the "protocols of 'empirical social science' rule, to the detriment of a politicized account of important practices" (Campbell 1998a, 225) This sounds very similar to Ashley's claim that poststructuralists are 'not especially interested in the meticulous examination of particular cases or sites for purposes of understanding them in their own terms" (Ashley. 1989. 278). In fact, one can argue that the critical endeavor of the poststructuralists suffers precisely because their own, often very **abstract, theoretical assumptions** are not sufficiently related to the analysis of actual practices. While claiming a desire to open up spaces for marginalized voices to speak, there is often a closing down of that possibility precisely because of another assumption, which shares a family resemblance with realist accounts, that is, states do reproduce realist practices. Campbell, and other poststructuralists (Doty, 1993)? ask how state action becomes possible; they emphasize processes of marginalization rather than how alternatives, which had been considered unrealistic, become possible. Subsequently. Campbell (1998, 7- 8) suggests that the practices of states remain largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War, ' By contrast. constructivists such as Koslowski and Kratochwil (1995) and Fierke (1998) have taken dissident practice in the context of the ending Cold War seriously. As a result, there is an increasing awareness of the role of these actors in constituting the possibility of a change (Adler 1997, 342). When a detailed analysis of the practices of these actors is taken seriously, a different and more nuanced reading of both the end of the Cold War and the post Cold War practices of states is in order.

#### The negative’s wholesale rejection of securitization fails – adopting a framework of issue-specific consequentialist evaluation of securitization can solve the neg’s impacts while still solving the case

**Floyd 07** (Rita Floyd, University of Warwick, Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p 327-250)

Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security Considering the two brief overviews of the different schools provided in the first section, it could be argued that Wæver has an overly negative conception of security, whereas Booth and Wyn Jones have an overly positive conception of security. This article will aim to show that what form security takes is entirely issue-dependent, leaving both camps having something important and valid to contribute to the study of security as both camps can potentially be right. Issue-dependent hereby does not mean that, for example, all securitisations in one particular sector are always positive (negative) – indeed this article will show how differently securitisations in the environmental sector can turn out – it rather means that every incidence of securitisation is unique. Since this is the case, however, security in general is neither as good nor as bad as the two camps argue, but rather it is a mixed bag. In the approach proposed here, principles that determine whether a securitisation is positive or negative can only be derived by considering what would have been the alternative solution. Given that for the Copenhagen School, securitisation is nothing but ‘an extreme version of politicisation’,45 the question to consider in evaluating the nature of securitisation must be: did the securitisation in question achieve more, and/or better results than a mere politicisation of the issue would have done? It is important to note here, that ‘more and better’, is not equivalent to the success of the speech act (successful securitisation can still be negative), but rather it refers to whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitisation are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicisation. The idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of a securitisation depends on its consequences corresponds to what in moral philosophy is known as a consequentialist ethics. Consequentialism46 referring to a set of moral philosophies, which hold ‘that the rightness of an action is to be judged solely by consequences, states of affairs brought about by the action’.47 Or, put slightly differently ‘a consequentialist theory [. . .] is an account of what justifies an option over alternatives – the fact that it promotes values.’48 These premises capture well what is meant by positive and negative securitisation in this article, for the adjectives positive and negative do not refer to the relative success of the speech act that is securitisation, but rather to how well any given security policy addresses the insecurity in question. The approach introduced in this article will henceforth be referred to as a consequentialist evaluation of security. In moral philosophy the idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of an action is attributable to its consequences alone is of course contentious (see also fn. 46). The question that arises is thus, why, in the evaluation of security/ securitisation, focus on consequences as opposed to, for example, rights as deontologists would have it, or indeed virtues, as virtue theorists suggest? Much of the answer to this question already lies in the argument of this article. Thus it is not only this author’s opinion that the key to security evaluation lies with its consequences, rather scholars from both the schools discussed above, with their respective positive and negative views of security, themselves already focus on what they take to be the consequences of security. That is to say these scholars themselves are consequentialists. However, and as this article aims to show, the consequentialism proposed by them is neither very balanced nor, in the long run, particularly helpful, as in both cases, consequentialism is constricted by the nature of their respective theoretical frameworks. Frameworks, whereby one promotes security as emancipation, therefore generating a necessarily positive view of security, whilst the other school’s framework for analysis is void of emancipation altogether, therefore partial to a negative view of security. That security is neither always positive nor negative but rather issue dependent is the key hypothesis of this article. If this hypothesis holds true we are – as a discipline – much in need of a more balanced and indeed critical evaluation of security than proposed by either school, a provision of which is the purpose of this article. Given what has been said so far it should have become clear that the herewith proposed consequentialist evaluation of security is also the key to rendering the above-mentioned ‘normative dilemma of speaking and writing security’ less important, as it enables the analyst to critically evaluate his/her speaking and writing security, rather than his/her simply speaking and writing security. This approach thus enables the previously solely analytical securitisation analyst to step into the security equation and on behalf of the actors encourage some securitisations and renounce others, depending on the moral rightness of the respective securitisation’s consequences. It is precisely at this point where the emancipatory nature of the Welsh School’s security studies becomes crucially relevant for a consequentialist evaluation of security, for – under this approach – it is the **task of the analyst** to fight ignorance (or, put differently, false consciousness) on the part of **existing** and/or potential **securitising actors** and inform (or better enlighten) them of the **best possible actions**. But how does the analyst know what the best possible actions are? Or, put differently, with what standards in mind are the consequences to be evaluated? Is it enough to problematise securitisation by elites for elites, and make majority consensus the measuring unit behind the principles for positive/negative securitisation? One should think not. Although it is useful to assume, that the narrower the interest group behind the securitisation, the more likely it is to be negative, this cannot be ascertained as the only general principle. After all, majority consensus does not prevent the effective securitisation of something that is morally/ethically wrong. But how to determine what is morally/ethically right? In security studies, one way of doing so, is by entering the evaluation of positive/negative through the discourses of security prevalent in the different sectors of security. Here, by working out the specific security relations in the competing discourses that make up the individual sector – who or what is the referent object of security, who is the securitising actor and what is the nature of the threat – it should be possible to determine the most and the least advantageous strategies in addressing insecurity; thereby determining which approach to security (in the individual sector) is the best (most positive) all-round – morally, ethically, effective – strategy. A consequentialist evaluation of security thus postulates the maximisation of genuine security as its overarching value. The invocation of values itself is perfectly legitimate, particularly considering that ‘every moral theory invokes values such that it can make sense to recommend in consequentialist fashion that they be promoted or in non-consequentialist fashion that they be honoured,

#### No single cause of violence

Muro-Ruiz 2 (Diego, London School of Economics, “The Logic of Violence”, Politics, 22(2), p. 116)

Violence is, most of the time, a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organisation. Individuals present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements. However, the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In the absence of such a general theory, researchers should bear in mind that violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations. Future research on violence will have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic of violence.

#### -- Some threats are real – “security politics” does not motivate all violence

**Kydd 97** (Professor of Political Science – California, Riverside, Security Studies, Autumn, p. 154)

As for the Second World War, few structural realists will make a sustained case the Hitler was genuinely motivated by a rational pursuit of security for Germany and the other German statesmen would have responded in the same way to Germany’s international situation. Even Germen generals opposed Hitler’s military adventurism until 1939; it is difficult to imagine a less forceful civilian leader overruling them and leading Germany in an oath of conquest. In the case of the cold war, it is again difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist before Gorbachev and not solely motivated by security concerns. The increased emphasis within international relations scholarship on explaining the nature and origins of aggressive expansionists states reflects a growing consensus that aggressive states are at the root of conflict, not security concerns.

#### -- Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur

Macy 95 (Joanna, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, Ecopsychology)

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate

#### Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

Tara **McCormack, ’10**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states **a more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful sta**tes**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Security and realism inevitable

**Guzzini, Senior Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 98** Associate Professor of Political Science, International Relations, and European Studies at the Central European University in Budapest, 1998 (Stefano, Realism in International Relations, p. 212)

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew.

This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

### Oil DA – 2AC

#### Case outweighs –

#### Natural gas doesn’t affect oil prices and US production can’t change oil prices

Krugman 12 (Paul – professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Natural Born Drillers” , 3/15, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/krugman-natural-born-drillers.html)

Given this expansion, it’s hard to claim that excessive regulation has crippled energy production. Indeed, reporting in The Times makes it clear that U.S. policy has been seriously negligent — that the environmental costs of fracking have been underplayed and ignored. But, in a way, that’s the point. The reality is that far from being hobbled by eco-freaks, the energy industry has been given a largely free hand to expand domestic oil and gas production, never mind the environment. Strange to say, however, while natural gas prices have dropped, rising oil production and a sharp fall in import dependence haven’t stopped gasoline prices from rising toward $4 a gallon. Nor has the oil and gas boom given a noticeable boost to an economic recovery that, despite better news lately, has been very disappointing on the jobs front. As I said, this was totally predictable. First up, oil prices. Unlike natural gas, which is expensive to ship across oceans, oil is traded on a world market — and the big developments moving prices in that market usually have little to do with events in the United States. Oil prices are up because of rising demand from China and other emerging economies, and more recently because of war scares in the Middle East; these forces easily outweigh any downward pressure on prices from rising U.S. production. And the same thing would happen if Republicans got their way and oil companies were set free to drill freely in the Gulf of Mexico and punch holes in the tundra: the effect on prices at the pump would be negligible.

#### Oil prices low –

#### Latest reviews prove

Wahito 3/13

[Margaret, All Africa, Kenya: Fuel Prices Likely to Drop – Experts, 3/13/13, http://allafrica.com/stories/201303140004.html]

The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) is likely to review fuel pump prices downwards in its monthly review expected on Thursday. Senior Investments Manager at PineBridge Investments Edward Gitahi predicts that the decline is likely to be attributed to the stable shilling evidenced in the last two months. The exchange rate remained stable, according to Central Bank Kenya (CBK), fluctuating within a narrower range of between Sh85 and Sh87.50 for the US dollar in January and February this year, indicating what CBK termed as return of confidence in the market. "You remember when we started the year, many had fears that the shilling may drop in value like it happened sometimes back, especially due to the heightened political campaigns and the elections that have just ended. But instead we have seen the shilling even gain. This is usually very positive, not only to oil importation, but also to other imported commodities," Gitahi told Capital FM Business. He said the international oil prices have also remained stable hence giving high hopes for a slight drop in March.

#### The link is non-unique – Oil prices are decreasing and US consumption of oil is down

Tverberg 12 (Gail – Editor of Oil Drum, “Why Low Oil Prices Indicate the World is Heading for a Recession”, 7/1, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Why-Low-Oil-Prices-Indicate-the-World-is-Heading-for-a-Recession.html)

Oil Supply is Not Rising Enough The big issue is that oil supply is not rising enough–and hasn’t been for a long time.(1) The most common effect is that prices will go higher. This can be seen in the upward trend in prices in the last eight years. (2) The other effect is that prices can drop quite sharply, as they did in late 2008. This happens when parts of the world are entering recession, and their demand is decreasing. It seems to me that this second effect may be happening this time around, as well. The down-leg we are seeing in the prices may have farther to go, as the recession plays out. One Problem Area: PIIGS Oil Consumption is Declining If we look at three-year average growth rates for the PIIGS, we find that there is a close correlation between oil growth, energy growth, and GDP growth. Furthermore, in recent years, a growth (or drop) in energy use seems to proceed a growth (or drop) in GDP. Not all of this energy is oil, but for the PIIGS countries, even natural gas is a relatively high-priced import. Recently, oil consumption has been declining sharply, which could imply further economic contraction.Furthermore, data from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI) shows that recent PIIGS oil demand is down even more. Comparing oil demand for February-April 2012 with February-April 2011, demand is down by 10% for the five PIIGS countries combined. This would suggest that these countries are sliding more deeply into recession. US Oil Consumption Is Also Shrinking US oil consumption is also shrinking. US oil consumption shrank by 3.2%, comparing the first four months of 2012 with a similar period of 2011. This is concerning, because based on Figure 5, it looks much like a repeat of the pattern that took place in the 2005 to 2009 time period. Oil consumption was stable during the period 2005 through 2007, then dropped in early 2008 by an amount not too different from the decrease in oil consumption from 2011 to 2012. The bigger step-down in oil consumption came in 2009, after oil prices dropped, and the follow-on effects (reduced credit availability, layoffs) had started. Now oil consumption has been relatively stable in 2009 to 2011, but there has been a step down in consumption in 2012, similar to the step-down in early 2008.

#### Fracking disproves this – it’s high and so are oil prices – they’re not connected

#### Middle East instability keeps oil prices high

Zhou 12 (Moming – Bloomberg, “Oil Rises to Two-Month High on Rising Mideast Tension”, 7/19, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-19/oil-rises-to-seven-week-high-on-geopolitical-risk-stimulus-bets.html)

Oil advanced to the highest level in two months on rising concern that instability in the Middle East will disrupt supplies from a region responsible for about one- third of world production. Prices gained for a seventh day after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blamed Lebanon’s Iranian-backed Hezbollah organization for yesterday’s killing of Israeli tourists in Bulgaria and threatened a forceful response. In Damascus, Syrian government forces battled rebels in retaliation for a blast that killed three top anti-insurgency leaders. “People are very concerned about what’s going on in the Middle East and that’s giving oil a boost,” said Jason Schenker, president of Prestige Economics LLC, an Austin, Texas- based energy consultant. “Iran is back in the spotlight and the situation in Syria is deteriorating. It increases geopolitical risk in the region.” Crude for August delivery increased $2.79, or 3.1 percent, to settle at $92.66 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The price has risen 10 percent in seven days of gains, the longest such streak since Feb. 24. Prices are down 6.2 percent this year. Brent oil for September advanced $2.64, or 2.5 percent, to settle at $107.80 a barrel on the London-based ICE Futures Europe exchange. ‘Geopolitical Premium’ Five Israeli tourists, a Bulgarian bus driver and the assailant were killed in the suicide attack yesterday at the airport in Burgas, a popular holiday spot on the Black Sea coast, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry said on its website. Netanyahu said in a statement broadcast from his office that Israel will pursue and punish those who harm its citizens. “You are seeing geopolitical premium with Netanyahu basically blaming Iran for the bombing,” said Tariq Zahir, a New York-based commodity fund manager at Tyche Capital Advisors. “Fear about supply disruption is the main driver out there today.” The incident comes amid heightened tension over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, which Israel says is intended to produce weapons for use against the Jewish state. Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a transit point for about 20 percent of the world’s traded crude, as the European Union imposed sanctions on Iranian oil on July 1. Iran Output Iran’s crude output will fall by 1 million barrels a day by the end of 2012 because of the EU sanctions, the U.S. Energy Department estimated in its July 10 Short-Term Energy Outlook. The country’s production fell to a 20-year low of 3.16 million barrels a day in June, according to Bloomberg estimates. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries will cut shipments this month as the sanctions on Iran take effect, tanker-tracker Oil Movements said in an e-mailed report. “The Middle East is getting pretty ugly so you don’t really want to be bearish on oil,” said Bill O’Grady, chief market strategist at Confluence Investment Management in St. Louis, which oversees $1.4 billion. “Syria is starting to look like it may just fall apart, and if Syria goes, potential for a regional war goes up quite a bit.”

#### Iraq stable

Clapper 3/12 -- US Director of National Intelligence (James R., 2013, "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community," Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, http://intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf)

Since the US departure, the Iraqi Government has remained generally stable, with the major parties pursuing change through the political process rather than violence. However, there are rising tensions between Prime Minister Maliki and Kurdistan Regional Government President Masud Barzani and an increase in anti-regime Sunni protests since the end of 2012. Maliki is pressing for greater authority over disputed territories in northern Iraq, and Barzani is pushing forward to export hydrocarbons independent of Baghdad. AQI conducted more vehicle and suicide bombings in 2012 than in 2011, almost exclusively against Iraqi targets. However, AQI and other insurgent groups almost certainly lack sufficient strength to overwhelm Iraqi Security Forces, which has put pressure on these groups through arrests of key individuals. Iraq is producing and exporting oil at the highest levels in two decades, bolstering finances for a government that derives 90 to 95 percent of its revenue from oil exports. Iraq increased production capacity from about 2.4 million barrels per day in 2010 to roughly 3.3 million barrels per day in 2012. However, it is still wrestling with the challenges of diversifying its economy and providing essential services.

#### Zero risk of escalation- self interest checks

Fettweis ’7(Christopher J. Fettweis, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, 2007 “'On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq”)

**No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable**. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. **Iraq’s neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door**. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If **the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare**. Even a Turkish invasion of the north is hardly inevitable. Withdrawal from Iraq would, after all, hardly rob the United States of all its tools with which to influence events. Washington and the rest of NATO still wield significant influence over Ankara; a cross-border invasion would almost certainly doom Turkey’s prospects of entering the European Union. It is puzzling why anyone would think that no incentive structure could be devised to convince Turkey not to attack its neighbour. Should such an assault prove undeterrable, it is not clear that intervention would be in the strategic interest of the United States. One of the worst suggestions that occasionally surfaces in the withdrawal debate is that the United States should ‘redeploy’ troops to Kurdistan in northern Iraq, in order to ‘deter’ Turkey and reward its Kurdish allies.18 Such a move would allow a continuation of what amounts to state-sponsored terrorism, and risk embroiling the United States in yet another local, intractable conflict. The removal of de facto US protection would presumably encourage the Kurds to act more responsibly toward their more powerful neighbours, and may well prove to be good for stability. Clearly, elements in Kurdistan actively support Kurdistan Workers’ Party terrorists in Turkey, but that would change if they faced the possibility of paying a price for their behaviour. A regional descent into the whirlwind following a US withdrawal cannot be ruled out; using that logic, neither can benevolent transitions to democracy. Just because a scenario is imaginable does not make it likely. In fact, most of the chaotic outcomes pessimists predict require unprecedented breaks with the past. Since the United States has historically overestimated the threats it faces, there is every reason to believe that it is doing so again.

### Politics

#### Won’t pass – guest worker’s too controversial and Obama’s not pushing

Nakamura 3-28 (David, Washington Post, “Guest-worker program dispute may delay immigration bill,” AZ Central, <http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/free/20130328immigration-reform-guest-worker-program-dispute-may-delay-bill.html>)

A bipartisan deal on immigration is at risk of stalling because of a worsening dispute over a new guest-worker program, exposing fault lines between crucial interest groups and threatening to delay the unveiling of a Senate bill early next month. The impasse has prompted a bitter round of name-calling between labor and business groups, both of whom accuse the other of imperiling comprehensive immigration reform. As the standoff has deteriorated, the Obama administration has remained on the sidelines and declined to intervene — a calculated decision that the president’s influence would risk alienating Republican senators crucial to the process. The dispute over a program for foreign workers has emerged as perhaps the most serious obstacle to a final deal from a bipartisan group of eight senators, who are attempting to fashion model legislation for broad immigration reform. The same issue helped derail the last serious attempt at reform in 2007 with help from Obama, then a U.S. senator from Illinois. The current talks center on rules governing the “future flow” of migrants who come to the United States for low-paying, menial jobs. Republicans, citing business interests, want to give temporary work visas to up to 400,000 foreign workers a year, mostly at minimum wages. But unions and many Democrats, fearing the impact on American workers, want fewer workers and higher pay under the program. Senators involved in the immigration talks insist they remain on schedule to complete a bill, including a path to citizenship for 11 million illegal immigrants, in early April. Obama also expressed confidence this week that the guest-workers disagreement could be solved. “I don’t agree that it’s threatening to doom the legislation,” Obama said in an interview Wednesday with Telemundo, the Spanish-language TV network. “Labor and businesses may not always agree exactly on how to do this, but this is a resolvable issue.” But behind the scenes, negotiations over the guest-worker program — and the White House’s refusal to take a position — have soured relations between the AFL-CIO and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which only a month ago joined hands to publicly proclaim agreement on an overall plan. “Unions say they want a guest-worker program, but their behavior is to the contrary,” said Geoff Burr, vice president for federal affairs for the Associated Builders and Contractors. “They are insisting on a program that no employer would consider using.” Union officials believe they have leverage because they have publicly committed to supporting Obama’s push for a path to citizenship, a key issue for Latino voters who overwhelmingly supported the president’s reelection last year. “This is not what Barack Obama campaigned on,” AFL-CIO spokesman Jeff Hauser said. “I don’t understand why people believe business has a seat at the main table after fighting for anti-citizenship candidates in 2012.” As a senator eyeing union support for a White House bid, Obama voted in favor of an amendment to an immigration bill in 2007 that would have eliminated a new guest-worker program after five years. The amendment, which passed by one vote, has since been cited as a key reason that immigration legislation failed to advance that year. Obama made no mention of a guest-worker program in the immigration principles he laid out in a speech in Las Vegas two months ago. The omission was notable considering the bipartisan Senate group had included the idea in its own principles that same week. Instead, the White House has deferred to the Senate group — which includes four Democrats and four Republicans — to work out an agreement between the Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO. “If it’s included in line with the other principles that the president has rolled out in terms of what should be included in comprehensive immigration reform, that’s certainly something that we could support,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest said Wednesday of a guest-worker program. “But we’re going to reserve judgment on what that looks like until it’s actually produced.” Administration officials say privately that the Senate group asked the White House to give the lawmakers “space” to take the lead in finding common ground between labor and business. Obama also is mindful of causing a political firestorm if he is seen trying to big-foot the efforts of the senators, potentially angering the Republican members, officials said.

#### The bills are contentious – won’t pass

Nakamura 3-28 (David, Washington Post, “Guest-worker program dispute may delay immigration bill,” AZ Central, <http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/free/20130328immigration-reform-guest-worker-program-dispute-may-delay-bill.html>)

The guest-worker program is not the only contentious area of the Senate legislation. The bill is likely to include a large increase in visas for high-tech workers and the elimination of some categories of family visas, two areas that have provoked strong push back from advocates who fear it could make it harder for families to be reunited while favoring employment-based migration. The guest-worker dispute broke into view last week when Chamber of Commerce officials went public with their concerns over the process, leading to angry responses from AFL-CIO officials. The chamber has called for 400,000 new visas for guest workers, along with the ability for the workers to switch jobs once they are in the United States. Union officials countered with an offer of 10,000 visas and say the foreign workers should be allowed to pursue citizenship once they have entered the country. The senators have reportedly agreed to cap the program at 200,000 visas per year, starting at a much lower figure and moving up as the economy improves. The biggest sticking point, however, has been wages. The chamber wants to pay the foreigners the equivalent of minimum wages of American workers, and the unions are holding out for a higher pay scale based on median wages of each industry. Business leaders contend that the AFL-CIO — and, by association, the White House — are not negotiating in good faith. “The president is obviously close to unions on this issue. The constituencies they’re trying to keep happy with immigration reform do not care about this piece of it,” said Tamar Jacoby, president of ImmigrationWorks USA, a federation of small-business owners that supports immigration reform. “They want to keep Latino voters happy, keep unions happy — and, dare say it, who cares about the economy?” Jacoby said that based on last year’s election results, the White House is calculating that “Republicans so badly need to get on the right side of history with Latino voters, they will throw business to the wolves and throw future immigrants under the bus.”

#### Gun control thumps

Murray 3-28 (Mark, “First Thoughts: Obama jumps back into the gun debate,” NBC News, <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/28/17501341-first-thoughts-obama-jumps-back-into-the-gun-debate?lite>)

Obama jumps back into the gun debate: With some GOP senators vowing to filibuster the legislation coming to the floor next month and with some analysts saying that reformers have already lost, President Obama today steps back into the gun debate with an event at the White House at 11:40 am ET. Per the White House, Obama will stand with mothers, law-enforcement officials, and Vice President Biden in urging Congress to take action on the upcoming Senate legislation, which includes universal background checks. As we have written before, those checks -- supported overwhelmingly in public opinion polls -- will ultimately define success or failure for gun-control advocates. Democrats, led by Sen. Chuck Schumer, are trying to get Republicans to back some type of compromise on background checks, given that the filibuster threat means 60 votes will be needed to even begin considering the legislation. That’s why Michael Bloomberg’s Mayors Against Illegal Guns is airing TV ads in key states to also apply pressure. Meanwhile, Politico reports that Sen. Chuck Grassley, the top GOP lawmaker on the Senate Judiciary Committee, is drafting his own Republican gun bill (without background checks), which “could further complicate what will already be a difficult lift for Democrats and the White House.” \*\*\* Obama, bipartisan group still optimistic on immigration reform: While Obama uses the bully pulpit today on guns, yesterday he used it on immigration by granting interviews to the top Spanish-language TV news outlets. “If we have a bill introduced at the beginning of next month -- as these senators indicate it will be -- then I'm confident that we can get it done certainly before the end of the summer,” Obama told Telemundo regarding the Senate bipartisan activity on immigration, per NBC’s Carrie Dann. “I'm optimistic,” he added. “I've always said that if I see a breakdown in the process, that I've got my own legislation. I'm prepared to step in. But I don't think that's going to be necessary. I think there's a commitment among this group of Democratic and Republican senators to get this done.” Speaking of that bipartisan group senators, four of them (Schumer, John McCain, Jeff Flake, and Michael Bennet) held a press conference yesterday in Arizona, where they also expressed optimism. “I’d say we are 90 percent there,” Schumer said, according to Roll Call. “We have a few little problems to work on; we’ve been on the phone all day talking to our other four colleagues who aren’t here. McCain chimed in: “Nobody is going to be totally happy with this legislation -- no one will be because we are having to make compromises, and that’s what makes for good legislation. It’s compromise that brings everybody together.”

#### Debt ceiling thumps

Parkinson 3-21 (John, “Budget and Funding Done but Debt Limit Battle Brewing,” ABC News, 3-21, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/03/budget-and-funding-done-but-debt-limit-battle-brewing/>)

After the House of Representatives passed a budget and a stop-gap measure to fund the government through the end of the fiscal year today, Congress is now poised to turn its attention to a fresh battle over a looming debt limit increase.

#### Nominations thump

Stirewalt 3-28 (Chris, “Obama Joins Bloomberg’s Squeeze Play on Senate Dems,” Fox News, 2013, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/28/obama-joins-bloombergs-squeeze-play-on-senate-dems/>)

Congress is gagging on the work of passing a full-year budget that includes an increase to the debt limit. Meanwhile, the president said Tuesday that he expects the Senate to concurrently pass a comprehensive package on immigration, which faces opposition on the left and right. The cherry on top will be a pair of highly controversial nominees for key cabinet posts. Obama may claim that Congress can “walk and chew gum at the same time” but surely his bitter experience with both united and divided government has convinced him that his claim is just not true.

#### Rubio loves offshore drilling

Johnson 10 (Luke, “Marco Rubio’s consistency on offshore drilling may cost him at the polls”, 6/23, http://floridaindependent.com/2677/marco-rubios-consistency-on-offshore-drilling-may-cost-him-at-the-polls)

Even as tar balls wash up on Florida Panhandle shores from the April 20 oil spill, Republican U.S. Senate candidate Marco Rubio stands consistently behind offshore drilling. “The bottom line is that there is going to be drilling off the coast of Florida. There is right now. Other countries are going to be drilling, Cuba, Venezuela, China, Brazil and Russia. The issue is not whether there is going to be offshore drilling, it’s whether America will benefit from it,” he said in an interview on MSNBC’s Morning Joe — broadcasting from Pensacola instead of New York — on June 11. “I don’t think any of that is premature conversation,” he added towards the end of the interview. On CNBC the same day, Rubio said to host Larry Kudlow, “In the long term, offshore drilling has to be part of our overall energy strategy.” He added, “Other countries are going to do it, and if they have an accident, that’s going to impact [the U.S.] just the same.”

#### **Rubio is key**

Avlon 1-31 (John, “Immigration Reform Proposal Shows Similar Ideas between Bush and Obama,” Daily Beast, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/31/immigration-reform-proposal-shows-similar-ideas-betweeen-bush-and-obama.html)

Wehner’s comments cut to the heart of the lessons learned. After essentially ignoring immigration reform in its first term, the Obama administration is front-loading the ambitious effort and—for the time, at least—**deferring to the Gang of Eight in hopes that it might be less polarizing if the president’s name isn’t on the bill when senators from the opposing party try to sell it to their base**. What’s old is new. It’s an irony not lost on Bush administration alumni and family members. The death of the Bush bill came largely at the hands of a right-wing talk-radio revolt that attacked any path to citizenship as “amnesty.” The fact that then–presidential candidate John McCain was sponsoring the bill with none other than Ted Kennedy created an opening for competitors like Mitt Romney to try to get to McCain’s right in a play to the primary’s conservative populist cheap seats. But the other hostile front came from resurgent House Democrats who frankly did not want to give the polarizing lame-duck incumbent named Bush a political win. Fast-forward six years, and the right-wing talk-radio crowd is weakened. The evangelical, law-enforcement, and business communities are now united behind comprehensive immigration reform. Responsible Republicans know they cannot afford to alienate Hispanics any longer. And the presence of Florida Sen. Marco Rubio—a onetime Jeb Bush protégé—is an essential addition to the coalition. “Senator Rubio, a Tea Party choice, is well respected and well liked and trusted,” adds Wehner. “With him as the lead in these negotiations, conservatives are more willing to consider immigration reform than in the past. You’re not seeing the explosion of opposition now that we saw in 2007. That doesn’t mean it won’t happen; but for now, it hasn’t.” Long story short: it’s much easier for Marco Rubio to make the case for the Senate’s bipartisan path to citizenship than to argue on behalf of President Obama’s bill, which would be a nonstarter to much of the base. And so the president wisely held off from offering his specific policy vision in the much-hyped Las Vegas speech earlier this week. It’s not unlike the reason Harry Truman gave for naming the postwar European-aid bill after his secretary of state, George Marshall: “Anything that is sent up to the Senate and House with my name on it will quiver a couple of times and then turn over and die.”

#### No link – doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Plan gets spun as jobs- shields blame

Izadi 12

[Elahe is a writer for the National Journal. “Former Sen. Trent Lott, Ex-Rep. Jim Davis Bemoan Partisanship on Energy Issues,” 8/29/12, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/2012-election/former-members-bemoan-partisanship-on-energy-issues-20120829>]

In a climate where everything from transportation issues to the farm bill have gotten caught in political gridlock, it will take serious willingness to compromise to get formerly bipartisan energy issues moving from the current partisan standstill. “If we get the right political leadership and the willingness to put everything on the table, I don’t think this has to be a partisan issue,” former Rep. Jim Davis, D-Fla., said during a Republican National Convention event on Wednesday in Tampa hosted by National Journal and the American Petroleum Institute. Former Senate Republican Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi said that “Republicans who want to produce more of everything have to also be willing to give a little on the conservation side.” The event focused on the future of energy issues and how they are playing out in the presidential and congressional races. Four years ago, the major presidential candidates both agreed that climate change needed to be addressed. However, since then, the science behind global warming has come into question by more and more Republicans. But casting energy as a defense or jobs issue, in the current political climate, will allow debates between lawmakers to gain some steam, Lott and Davis agreed. The export of coal and natural gas, hydraulic fracturing, and how tax reform will affect the energy industries are all issues that will have to be dealt with by the next president and Congress. “The job of the next president is critical on energy and many of these issues, and the job is very simple: adult supervision of the Congress,” Davis said.

#### Arctic is a massive win for Obama – assumes their link arguments

Geman 12 (Ben, energy and environment reporter for The Hill, “Senator: Arctic drilling a political win for Obama,” 6-29-12, <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/235679-senator-arctic-drilling-a-political-win-for-obama>)

The Obama administration’s expected approval of Royal Dutch Shell's plan to drill in Arctic waters off Alaska’s coast this summer is a political plus for President Obama, according to Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska), an advocate of the project. “I think what he is showing is — and [Interior Secretary Ken] Salazar and the whole team and what we have been doing with them — is [saying] ‘look, let’s manage it right, let’s manage it carefully, and at the end of the day let’s also constantly review what we are doing,’ ” Begich said in the Capitol Friday. Interior is on the cusp of providing Shell its drilling permits for the long-planned, long-delayed project to drill exploratory wells in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. The department is [vowing robust safety oversight](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/232665-overnight-energy-interior-lays-groundwork-to-green-light-shells-arctic-drilling-plan-%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) — it plans to have inspectors on the rigs around-the-clock — and the permits will follow testing of Shell’s spill containment equipment and other inspections of the company’s infrastructure. But environmentalists oppose the project. They say there’s not sufficient capacity to respond to a potential oil spill in the harsh seas, which are home to polar bears, bowhead and beluga whales and other fragile species. Begich, however, said he did not think the decision will erode Obama’s standing with an environmental base that’s focused on many issues, but will allow Obama to show voters that he’s committed to developing domestic oil resources that displace imports from people that “hate us.” “If anything, I think it gives him something to talk about in the sense of ‘look, we are doing it, we are bringing domestic [resources],” Begich said, citing estimates of very large amounts of oil beneath the Arctic seas.

#### Winning on controversial issues is the only way to achieve his agenda --- capital will fail.

**Dickinson**, 1/18/**2013** (John – chief political correspondent for Slate, Go for the Throat!, Slate , p. <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/barack_obama_s_second_inaugural_address_the_president_should_declare_war.single.html>)

The challenge for President Obama’s speech is the challenge of his second term: how to be great when the environment stinks. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation can only cement his legacy if he destroys the GOP. If he wants to transform American politics, he must go for the throat. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack Obama of the first administration might have approached the task by finding some Republicans to deal with and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. That's the old way. He has abandoned that. He doesn't think it will work and he doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the Republicans are dead set on opposing him. They cannot be unchained by schmoozing. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation. Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of clarifying fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or cause a rift in the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.

#### Ending the moratorium popular

Russell 12

[Barry Russell is President of the Independent Petroleum Association of America, August 15, 2012, “Energy Must Transcend Politics”, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php#2238176]

There have been glimpses of great leadership, examples when legislators have reached across the aisle to construct and support common-sense legislation that encourages American energy production. Recent legislation from Congress which would replace the Obama administration’s five-year offshore leasing plan and instead increase access America’s abundant offshore oil and natural gas is one example of such bipartisanship. The House passed legislation with support from 25 key Democrats. The support from Republicans and Democrats is obviously not equal, but this bipartisan legislative victory demonstrates a commitment by the House of Representatives to support the jobs, economic growth and national security over stubborn allegiance to political party. The same is happening on the Senate side. Democratic Senators Jim Webb (VA), Mark Warner (VA), and Mary Landrieu (LA) cosponsored the Senate’s legislation to expand offshore oil and natural gas production with Republican Senators Lisa Murkowski (AK), John Hoeven (ND), and Jim Inhofe (OK). Senator Manchin (WV) is another Democratic leader who consistently votes to promote responsible energy development.

#### Natural gas production is popular

Strahan 12 (David, Energy Reporter – New Scientist, “The Great Gas Showdown,” New Scientist, 2-25, 213(2835), Academic Search Complete)

I FIRST heard the idea on a private jet flying from New York to London. The US oil billionaire Robert Hefner III, known as the "father of deep natural gas", had offered me a lift to discuss a book he was planning. The idea was, perhaps unsurprisingly, that natural gas will solve the supply problem of "peak oil" -- when global oil production starts to decline -- and dramatically cut US emissions of greenhouse gases, making it a perfect bridging fuel to a low-carbon future. With gas prices approaching record highs at the time, I was sceptical to say the least. But things have changed. Today the US is awash with cheap gas, thanks in part to the newfound ability to extract large amounts of shale gas. So could it be that Hefner, despite his obvious commercial interest, was right all along? Fellow tycoon T. Boone Pickens has also been pushing the gas agenda and their ideas have found enthusiastic support among the US public and in Congress. Replacing oil imports with domestically produced gas may promise better energy security and economic benefits. Is it the best route for cutting carbon emissions, though? Natural gas, which is mainly methane, may generate less carbon dioxide than oil and coal when burned, but as recent research has found, there's more to greenhouse gas emissions than just combustion.

#### **Turn – Republicans and natural gas industry loves the plan**

Clark 12 (Aaron, “Obama Stance on Fossil Fuel Angers Industry,” Bloomberg, 1-24, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/obama-claiming-credit-for-fossil-fuel-gains-angers-industry.html)

President Barack Obama is taking credit for higher U.S. oil and gas production and lower imports, angering industry groups and Republicans who say he is working against domestic energy production. American energy will be a major theme of Obama’s State of the Union address to Congress tonight, Jay Carney, the White House spokesman, said in a briefing yesterday. In his first campaign ad this year, Obama boasts that U.S. dependence on foreign oil is below 50 percent for the first time in 13 years. Since Obama took office, U.S. natural gas production averaged 1.89 trillion cubic feet a month through October, 13 percent higher than the average during President George W. Bush’s two terms, according to Energy Department data. Crude oil production is 2 percent higher, the department said. “To be sure that is not because the White House meant for that to happen,” said Pavel Molchanov, an analyst at Raymond James & Associates Inc. Republicans say the numbers are misleading. Onshore oil and gas production on federal lands directly under Obama’s control is down 40 percent compared to 10 years ago, according to Spencer Pederson, a spokesman for Representative Doc Hastings, a Washington Republican and chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee. In 2010, the U.S. signed the fewest number of offshore drilling leases since 1984. ‘Drill Baby Drill’ “The president is responding to what America’s gut feeling is, that we should be less dependent on foreign oil, and he’s trying to take credit for it,” Hastings said in an interview. “His policies are exactly the opposite.” Four years ago, Obama campaigned against Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin’s rally to “Drill Baby Drill.” Today he is highlighting fossil fuel gains to blunt charges that his policies are contributing to higher energy costs, according to Tyson Slocum, energy program director for Public Citizen, a Washington-based consumer advocacy group, said in an interview. “The Republican narrative is that Obama is shoveling huge amounts of money to his cronies in the renewable industry, and blocking the real energy that American needs,” Slocum said in an interview. “It’s a false narrative. The administration has been focused on green energy, but they haven’t been against fossil fuels.” Federal Leases In a January report, the American Petroleum Institute in Washington said that in two years the number of new leases to drill on federal lands declined 44 percent to 1,053 in 2010. The report blamed “new rules, policies and administrative actions that are not conducive to oil and natural gas production.” Lower imports are the result of lower demand, and increasing production has come despite Obama’s policies, according to Jack Gerard, American Petroleum Institute President. The U.S. needs a “course correction” on energy policy that includes faster permitting on federal lands in the West and in the Gulf of Mexico, he said. The group, whose members include Exxon Mobil Corp., the largest U.S. oil company, convened a conference call with reporters today to comment on what Obama is expected to say on domestic energy in tonight’s address. “We hope that the actions match the words,” Gerard said on the call. “The truth is that the administration has sometimes paid lip service to more domestic energy development, including more oil and natural gas development.” Offshore Drilling The American Enterprise Institute, a Washington group that supports free markets, called Obama’s Jan. 18 decision to deny a permit for TransCanada Corp. (TRP)’s $7 billion Keystone XL oil pipeline, part of his “crusade against fossil fuels.” “The losses due to the Obama administration’s death-grip on offshore drilling and its unwillingness to open federal lands or issue timely permits for exploration far outweigh any energy gains that the White House may tout this week,” Thomas Pyle, president of the Washington-based Institute for Energy Research, said in a statement. Obama last year called on Congress to eliminate “billions in taxpayer” subsidies for oil companies and to invest instead in renewable sources of power. In 2010, he proposed drilling for oil and natural gas off the U.S. East Coast, weeks before BP Plc (BP/)’s Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico failed, spewing 4.9 million barrels of oil and triggering a temporary administration ban on offshore exploration.

#### Nat gas lobbyists have tremendous influence in congress

Browning and Clifford 11 (James, Regional State Director – Common Cause, and Pat, Stone Senior Fellow – HUC-UC Ethics Center, “Fracking for Support: Natural Gas Industry Pumps Cash Into Congress,” Common Cause, 11-10, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=7831813)

Natural gas interests have spent more than $747 million during a 10-year campaign – stunningly successful so far – to avoid government regulation of hydraulic “fracking,” a fast-growing and environmentally risky process used in Ohio and at least a dozen other states to tap underground gas reserves, according to a new study by Common Cause. A faction of the natural gas industry has directed more than $20 million to the campaigns of current members of Congress – including $600,000 to Ohioans -- and put $726 million into lobbying aimed at shielding itself from oversight, according to the report, the third in a series of “Deep Drilling, Deep Pockets” reports produced by the non-profit government watchdog group. Rep. John Boehner led Ohio’s Congressional delegation with $186,900 raised from fracking interests, followed Sen. Rob Portman with $91,000, Rep. Steve Chabot with $59,050, and Rep. Steve Stivers with $51,250. “Players in this industry have pumped cash into Congress in the same way they pump toxic chemicals into underground rock formations to free trapped gas,” said Common Cause President Bob Edgar. “And as fracking for gas releases toxic chemicals into groundwater and streams, the industry’s political fracking for support is toxic to efforts for a cleaner environment and relief from our dependence on fossil fuels.” The report also tracks $2.8 million in campaign contributions to Ohio’s state elected officials and notes that Ohio’s fracking regulations are among the weakest of any state. Gov. John Kasich was the leading individual recipient with $213,519, followed by former Gov. Ted Strickland with $87,450 and Secretary of State John Husted with $84,750. In Congress, the industry’s political giving heavily favors lawmakers who supported the 2005 Energy Policy Act, which exempted fracking from regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Current members who voted for the bill received an average of $73,433, while those who voted against the bill received an average of $10,894. The report comes as the Environmental Protection Agency is scheduled to publish new, preliminary findings in 2012 about the potential dangers of fracking. That gives the industry a powerful incentive to increase political spending now in an attempt to shape public opinion and the debate over fracking in Congress, as well as affect the outcome of the 2012 congressional elections. “Thanks to the Supreme Court and its Citizens United decision, the natural gas industry will be free to spend whatever it likes next year to elect a Congress that will do its bidding,” Edgar said. “The industry’s political investments already have largely freed it from government oversight. Controlling the flow of that money and other corporate spending on our elections is critical to protecting our environment for this and future generations.”

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### PC theory is wrong- winners win

Hirsh, 2-7 – National Journal chief correspondent, citing various political scientists

[Michael, former Newsweek senior correspondent, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital," National Journal, 2-9-13, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207, accessed 2-8-13, mss]

**There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital**

The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get itwrong. On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of **this** talk **will have no bearing on what actually happens** over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The **political tectonics** have **shift**ed **dramatically in very little time**. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, **political capital** is a concept that **misleads** far more than it enlightens. **It is** **distortionary**. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “**Winning wins.”** In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some **political scientists** **who study** the elusive calculus of **how to pass legislation** and run successful presidencies **say** that **political capital is**, at best, **an empty concept**, and that **almost nothing in** the **academic literature** successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. **Winning** on one issue often **changes the** **calculation** for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where **the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants**, and [they]he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the **other actors**” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may **change positions to get on the winning side**. **It’s a bandwagon effect**.” ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because [they’re]he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)

[Matt note: gender paraphrased]

# 1AR

## Hegemony

### 2ac- Russia

#### Multipolarity exacerbates current tensions with Russia – causing nuke war

**Arbatov 07** corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs.

(*Alexei,* [© "Russia in Global Affairs". № 2, July - September 2007](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), Is a New Cold War Imminent? 08-08)

However, the low probability of a new Cold War and the collapse of American unipolarity (as a political doctrine, if not in reality) cannot be a cause for complacency. Multipolarity, existing objectively at various levels and interdependently, holds many difficulties and threats. For example, if the Russia-NATO confrontation persists, it can do much damage to both parties and international security. Or, alternatively, if Kosovo secedes from Serbia, this may provoke similar processes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, and involve Russia in armed conflicts with Georgia and Moldova, two countries that are supported by NATO. Another flash point involves Ukraine. In the event of Kiev’s sudden admission into the North Atlantic Alliance (recently sanctioned by the U.S. Congress), such a move may divide Ukraine and provoke mass disorders there, thus making it difficult for Russia and the West to refrain from interfering. Meanwhile, U.S. plans to build a missile defense system in Central and Eastern Europe may cause Russia to withdraw from the INF Treaty and resume programs for producing intermediate-range missiles. Washington may respond by deploying similar missiles in Europe, which would dramatically increase the vulnerability of Russia’s strategic forces and their control and warning systems. This could make the stage for nuclear confrontation even tenser.

### 1AR - Sustainability Overview

#### And this isn’t offense for them- we should always try to maximize heg- sustainability is irrelevant

**Thayer 07**

 Associate Professor at Missouri State University

[Bradley “American Empire: A Debate” (pg 105)]

In contrast to Layne's argument, maximizing the power of the United States aids its ability to defend itself from attacks and to advance its interests. This argument is based on its prodigious economic, ideological, and military power. Due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over, to reassure its allies, and to dissuade states from challenging it. From this power also comes respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times. These advantages keep the United States, its interests, and its allies secure, and it must strive to maintain its advantages in international politics as long as possible. Knowing that American hegemony will end someday does not mean that we should welcome or facilitate its demise; rather the reverse. The United States should labor to maintain hegemony as long as possible—just as know¬ing that you will die someday does not keep you from planning your future and living today. You strive to live as long as possible although you realize that it is inevitable that you will die. Like good health, Americans and most of the world should welcome American primacy and work to preserve it as long as possible.

#### And their authors measurements should be discounted- the system is sustainable

**Brooks and Wohlforth 09**

Steven G. Brooks --AND-- William C. Wohlforth, Associate Professors of Government at Dartmouth College, 09

[“Reshaping the World Order,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64652/stephen-g-brooks-and-william-c-wohlforth/reshaping-the-world-order]

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Now, the conventional wisdom is that the world is rapidly approaching the end of the unipolar system with the United States as the sole superpower. A dispassionate look at the facts shows that this view understates U.S. power as much as recent talk of empire exaggerated it. That the United States weighs more on the traditional scales of world power than has any other state in modern history is as true now as it was when the commentator Charles Krauthammer proclaimed the advent of a "unipolar moment" in these pages nearly two decades ago. The United States continues to account for about half the world's defense spending and one-quarter of its economic output. Some of the reasons for bearishness concern public policy problems that can be fixed (expensive health care in the United States, for example), whereas many of the reasons for bullishness are more fundamental (such as the greater demographic challenges faced by the United States' potential rivals). So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States' successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower's performance. From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U.S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the United States as the world's leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better. The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its policies in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today. Another key reason for the multipolar mania is "the rise of the rest." Impressed by the rapid economic growth of China and India, many write as if multipolarity has already returned. But such pronouncements mistake current trajectories for final outcomes -- a common strategic error with deep psychological roots. The greatest concern in the Cold War, for example, came not from the Soviet Union's actually attaining parity with the United States but from the expectation that it would do so in the future. Veterans of that era recall how the launch of Sputnik in 1957 fed the perception that Soviet power was growing rapidly, leading some policymakers and analysts to start acting as if the Soviet Union were already as powerful as the United States. A state that is rising should not be confused with one that has risen, just as a state that is declining should not be written off as having already declined. China is generally seen as the country best positioned to emerge as a superpower challenger to the United States. Yet depending on how one measures GDP, China's economy is between 20 percent and 43 percent the size of the United States'. More dramatic is the difference in GDP per capita, for which all measures show China's as being less than 10 percent of the United States'. Absent a 1930s-style depression that spares potential U.S. rivals, the United States will not be replaced as the sole superpower for a very long time. Real multipolarity -- an international system of three or more evenly matched powers -- is nowhere on the horizon. Relative power between states shifts slowly. This tendency to conflate trends with outcomes is often driven by the examination in isolation of certain components of state power. If the habit during the Cold War was to focus on military power, the recent trend has been to single out economic output. No declinist tract is complete without a passage noting that although the United States may remain a military superpower, economic multipolarity is, or soon will be, the order of the day. Much as highlighting the Soviet Union's military power meant overlooking the country's economic and technological feet of clay, examining only economic output means putting on blinders. In 1991, Japan's economy was two-thirds the size of the United States', which, according to the current popular metric, would mean that with the Soviet Union's demise, the world shifted from bipolarity to, well, bipolarity. Such a partial assessment of power will produce no more accurate an analysis today. Nor will giving in to apprehension about the growing importance of nonstate actors. The National Intelligence Council's report Global Trends 2025 grabbed headlines by forecasting the coming multipolarity, anticipating a power shift as much to nonstate actors as to fast-growing countries. But nonstate actors are nothing new -- compare the scale and scope of today's pirates off the Somali coast with those of their eighteenth-century predecessors or the political power of today's multinational corporations with that of such behemoths as the British East India Company -- and projections of their rise may well be as much hype as reflections of reality. And even if the power of nonstate actors is rising, this should only increase the incentives for interstate cooperation; nonstate threats do not affect just the United States. Most nonstate actors' behavior, moreover, still revolves around influencing the decisions of states. Nongovernmental organizations typically focus on trying to get states to change their policies, and the same is true of most terrorists. When it comes to making, managing, and remaking international institutions, states remain the most important actors -- and the United States is the most important of them. No other country will match the United States' combination of wealth, size, technological capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future. The world is and will long remain a 1 + x world, with one superpower and x number of major powers. A shift from 1 + 3 to 1 + 4 or 5 or 6 would have many important consequences, but it would not change the fact that the United States will long be in a far stronger position to lead the world than any other state.

### 1ar- China

#### And- Collapse causes china aggression

**Brzezinski 12**

[Zbigniew Brzezinski , National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, Professor of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, “ 8 Geopolitically Endangered Species”, January 2012, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8_geopolitically_endangered_species?page=full>,]

2. TAIWAN Since 1972, the United States has formally accepted the mainland's "one China" formula while maintaining that neither side shall alter the status quo by force. Beijing, however, reserves the right to use force, which allows Washington to justify its continued arms sales to Taiwan. In recent years, Taiwan and China have been improving their relationship. America's decline, however, would increase Taiwan's vulnerability, leaving decision-makers in Taipei more susceptible to direct Chinese pressure and the sheer attraction of an economically successful China. That, at the least, could speed up the timetable for cross-strait reunification, but on unequal terms favoring the mainland. At stake: Risk of a serious collision with China.

**And- Specifically heg deters Taiwan war**

**Brookes 08**

 (Peter, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation and member of the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Heritage, Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might). November 24, 2008

We know that China is undergoing a major military buildup, especially involving its power projec­tion forces--i.e., air force, navy, and ballistic missile forces, all aimed at Taiwan. Indeed, today Beijing has the world's third largest defense budget and the world's fastest growing peacetime defense budget, growing at over 10 percent per year for over a decade. It increased its defense budget nearly 18 percent annually over the past two years. I would daresay that military tensions across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China would be much greater today if not for an implied commitment on the part of the United States to prevent a change in the political status quo via military means. China hasn't renounced the use of force against its neighbor and rival, Taiwan, a vibrant, free-market democracy. It is believed by many analysts that absent American military might, China would quickly unite Taiwan with the main­land under force of arms. In general, the system of military alliances in Asia that the United States maintains provides the basis for stability in the Pacific, since the region has failed to develop an overarching security architecture such as that found in Europe in NATO

### 2NC US/China War – NDT

#### No US-China conflict

Allison & Blackwill 3/5 -- \*director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND \*\*Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/)

Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac's honour committee

Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world. There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the United States. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.

### OSB Bad- Bolton and Hanson

#### The alternative is Backing down – this causes belligerence and kills credibility

#### Bolton 09

John R. Bolton -- Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (The Los Angeles Times, “The danger of Obama's dithering,”, October 18, 2009, pg. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/18/opinion/oe-bolton18)

Weakness in American foreign policy in one region often invites challenges elsewhere, because our adversaries carefully follow diminished American resolve. Similarly, presidential indecisiveness, whether because of uncertainty or internal political struggles, signals that the United States may not respond to international challenges in clear and coherent ways. Taken together, weakness and indecisiveness have proved historically to be a toxic combination for America's global interests. That is exactly the combination we now see under President Obama. If anything, his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize only underlines the problem. All of Obama's campaign and inaugural talk about "extending an open hand" and "engagement," especially the multilateral variety, isn't exactly unfolding according to plan. Entirely predictably, we see more clearly every day that diplomacy is not a policy but only a technique. Absent presidential leadership, which at a minimum means clear policy direction and persistence in the face of criticism and adversity, engagement simply embodies weakness and indecision. Obama is no Harry Truman. At best, he is reprising Jimmy Carter. At worst, the real precedent may be Ethelred the Unready, the turn-of the-first-millennium Anglo-Saxon king whose reputation for indecisiveness and his unsuccessful paying of Danegeld -- literally, "Danish tax" -- to buy off Viking raiders made him history's paradigmatic weak leader. Beyond the disquiet (or outrage for some) prompted by the president's propensity to apologize for his country's pre-Obama history, Americans increasingly sense that his administration is drifting from one foreign policy mistake to another. Worse, the current is growing swifter, and the threats more pronounced, even **as the admin**istration **tries to** turn its **face** away from the world and toward its **domestic priorities.** Foreign observers, friend and foe alike, sense the same aimlessness and drift. French President Nicolas Sarkozy had to remind Obama at a Sept. 24 U.N. Security Council meeting that "we live in the real world, not a virtual one." Examples of weakness abound, and the consequences ae readily foreseeable. Canceling the Polish and Czech missile defense bases is understood in Moscow and Eastern European capitals as backing down in the face of Russian bluster and belligerence. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev threatened the day after our 2008 election to deploy missiles targeting these assets unless they were canceled, a threat duly noted by the Russian media when Obama canceled the sites. Given candidate Obama's reaction to the 2008 Russia-Georgia war -- calling on both sides to exercise restraint -- there is little doubt that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's project to re-extend Russian hegemony over as much of the former Soviet Union as he can will continue apace. Why should he worry about Washington? Obama's Middle East peace process has stalled, most recently because he set a target for an end to Israeli settlement expansion, couldn't meet it and then proceeded as though he hadn't meant what he said originally. By insisting that Israel freeze settlements as a precondition to renewing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Obama drew a clear line. But when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu withstood Obama's pressure, Obama caved, hosting a photo-op with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas that strengthened Netanyahu and weakened Abbas just when Obama wanted to achieve exactly the opposite. However one views the substantive outcome of this vignette, Obama himself looked the weakest of all. It could well be years before his Middle East policy gets back up off the ground. On nuclear nonproliferation, North Korea responded to the "open hand" of engagement by testing its second nuclear device, continuing an aggressive ballistic missile testing program, cooperating with other rogue states and kidnapping and holding hostage two American reporters. Obama's reaction is to press for more negotiations, which simply encourages Pyongyang to up the ante. Iran is revealed to have been long constructing an undeclared, uninspected nuclear facility that makes a mockery of almost seven years of European Union negotiation efforts. Forced to deal publicly with this deeply worrying threat, Obama proposes the equivalent of money-laundering for nuclear threats: Iranian uranium enriched in open, unambiguous defiance of four Security Council resolutions will be enriched to higher levels in Russia, and then returned to be burned in a Tehran reactor -- ostensibly for peaceful purposes. Sarkozy again captured the growing international incredulity in his noteworthy Security Council speech: "I support America's 'extended hand.' But what have these proposals for dialogue produced for the international community? Nothing but more enriched uranium and more centrifuges." Finally, Obama's agonizing, very public reappraisal of his own 7-month-old Afghanistan policy epitomizes indecisiveness. While there is no virtue in sustaining policy merely for continuity's sake, neither is credit due for too-quickly adopting policies without appreciating the risks entailed and then fleeing precipitously when the risks become manifest. The administration's stated reason for its policy re-evaluation was widespread fraud in Afghanistan's Aug. 20 presidential election. But this explanation is simply not credible. Did not the administration's generals and diplomats on the ground, not to mention United Nations observers, see the election mess coming? Was the Hamid Karzai administration's cupidity and corruption overlooked or ignored during Obama's original review and revision of his predecessor's policy? The unmistakable inference is that Obama did not carefully think through his March Afghan policy, or did not have full confidence then or now in Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal or Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, or that it is now politically inconvenient among increasingly antiwar Democrats to follow through on that policy. None of these explanations reflect credit on the president. He is dithering. Whatever decision Obama reaches on Afghanistan, his credibility and leadership have been badly wounded by his continuing public display of indecisiveness. Our international adversaries undoubtedly welcome all of these "resets" in U.S. foreign policy, but Americans should be appalled at how much of our posture in the world has already been given away. If Obama's first nine months indicate the direction of the next 39, we still have a long way to fall.

binet secretary be the face of the oil spill. The buck stops with his office."

## Politics

### Gun Control---1AR---Obama Pushing

#### Prefer predictive ev – he’s pushing

Rucker 3-23 (Philip, Political Correspondent, “Obama to Congress: Finish the job on gun control,” Washington Post, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/03/23/obama-to-congress-join-me-in-finishing-the-job/>)

Three months after an elementary school massacre in Connecticut reignited a debate over the nation’s gun laws, President Obama is urging Congress to “join me in finishing the job” by taking swift action on gun-control legislation. Obama, in his weekly radio address released on Saturday, noted the preliminary steps taken in the Senate to advance such measures as universal background checks for all gun buyers and a federal crack-down on gun trafficking. But he chastised Congress for the slow pace of progress, contrasting their indecision with the widespread popular support across the country for strengthening the background check system and other proposals. “Today there is still genuine disagreement among well-meaning people about what steps we should take to reduce the epidemic of gun violence in this country,” Obama said. “But you – the American people – have spoken. You’ve made it clear that it’s time to do something.” Before departing on his trip to Israel and Jordan, Obama spoke with lawmakers from both parties about the gun measures under consideration, according to a White House official. The president plans to continue pressuring Congress on the issue, including additional travel outside of Washington designed to mobilize public support, said the official, who spoke only on the condition of anonymity. Obama’s remarks come after a difficult week for his gun violence agenda. After a ban on assault weapons — supported by Obama and authored by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) — did not gain enough bipartisan traction on Capitol Hill, Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) decided not to include it as part of a bill encompassing several other gun-control proposals that the Senate is scheduled to begin debating in early April. Reid’s decision severely diminished any prospect of passing a prohibition on hundreds of specific so-called assault weapons, although Feinstein still can introduce the assault weapons ban as an amendment to the full bill. The centerpiece of Obama’s gun-control agenda is universal background checks, which has by far the most support among Americans, and appears to have more momentum in the Senate than the assault weapons ban. In his radio address, Obama urged the Senate and the House to vote on each of the proposals he is championing – from background checks to bans on assault weapons and high-capacity ammunition magazines to school safety measures to the gun trafficking bill. “These ideas shouldn’t be controversial – they’re common sense,” Obama said. “They’re supported by a majority of the American people. And I urge the Senate and the House to give each of them a vote.”

#### Obama’s using PC

Sink 3-25 (Justin, “Obama plans road trip to prod Senate to move on gun-control legislation,” The Hill, 2013, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/290169-obama-to-prod-senators-takes-gun-control-message-on-the-road)

President Obama will hit the road to rally Senate support for new gun controls in coming weeks, seeking to frame upcoming votes on an assault weapons ban and universal background checks as tests of political courage for skittish Democrats. White House spokesman Josh Earnest said Monday that Obama would travel the country in the coming weeks to rally support for the proposals, written in the aftermath of the Newtown, Conn., elementary school shooting that left 20 children and six educators dead. "I do anticipate that you will see the president using the power of the bully pulpit, as you describe it, by traveling across the country a little bit and talking about some of these issues," Earnest said. Earnest said Obama was "pleased" with plans announced by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) last week to hold a vote on gun control legislation when Congress returns from Easter break. Reid's bill includes expanded background checks, funding for school security and new penalties for those straw purchasing guns, but it does not include an assault weapons ban. Instead, Reid has promised to hold a vote on banning certain semiautomatic weapons and high-capacity magazines as an amendment to the overall bill. "What Leader Reid has said is that he would allow it to be offered up as an amendment, which would give everybody in the Senate the opportunity to vote on it and to have it be included as part of the legislation," Earnest told reporters. "The president thinks that is really important. And it will be a question for all 100 members of the Senate to ask themselves about whether or not they think that voting for and supporting an assault weapons ban would actually do something to reduce gun violence in communities all across the country." Reid has cautioned that, although he will allowed the assault weapons ban to be offered as an amendment, it has little chance of being approved. Separately, Organizing for Action — the political group born from the president's reelection campaign — announced Monday it would hold more than 100 events across the country on Thursday to support efforts to reduce gun violence. And New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg (I) on Sunday announced that his political action committee would spend $12 million on television ads over the next month urging swing-state lawmakers to back the firearms legislation. “We've been fighting since 2007 to get a vote. We are going to have a vote for sure on assault weapons and we're going to have a vote on background checks,” Bloomberg said Sunday on "Meet the Press." On Monday, Earnest said he did not know whether the White House had coordinated with Bloomberg on that effort, but he noted that the New York City mayor and Vice President Biden had spoken in recent weeks. "We certainly have been in touch with Mayor Bloomberg, as we have been with a range of individuals," Earnest said. The White House is hoping to frame the coming vote as an opportunity for those in Congress to display political leadership.

#### Obama nominated a District court Justice AND lost – slayed PC

Vadum 3-28 (Matthew, “Obama’s Gun-Grabbing Judge Nominee Implodes,” American Spectator, 2013, <http://spectator.org/blog/2013/03/28/obamas-gun-grabbing-judge-nomi>)

With all the hoopla surrounding same sex marriage in recent days, you may not have heard that President Obama suffered a major political defeat in his attack on Second Amendment rights. The president was forced to withdraw the nomination of radical New York lawyer Caitlin J. Halligan to the critical District of Columbia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals. (Jack Park wrote about the nomination previously.) This is more than a mere political win for Republicans. The withdrawal is an important victory against the Left’s gun control agenda. It prevents a virulently anti-Second Amendment jurist from getting on the D.C. Circuit, which is viewed by some as a stepping-stone to the U.S. Supreme Court. Conservatives viewed the twice-filibustered Halligan as radical largely because of her open hostility to gun rights. On March 6, the Senate fell short of the 60 votes needed to end debate on the nomination, voting 51 to 41 to move to a confirmation vote.

#### Obama nominated a new Secretary of Labor – that’s costing PC

Johnson 3-27 (Carrie, “Obama's Labor Nominee Faces GOP Opposition Over His Role In A Supreme Court Case,” NPR, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/03/27/175513560/obamas-labor-nominee-faces-gop-opposition-over-his-role-in-a-supreme-court-case>)

Thomas Perez, the president's nominee to lead the Department of Labor and a high-profile Latino advocate for civil rights, is scheduled for a Senate confirmation hearing April 18. But behind-the-scenes wrangling over his nomination, and his controversial role in a Supreme Court case, is already well under way. House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Darrell Issa, R-Calif., and the ranking GOP member on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Charles Grassley, are investigating what they call a quid pro quo deal that may have cost the federal Treasury as much as $180 million. The GOP lawmakers are upset by the appearance that the Justice Department used inappropriate reasons to stay out of a whistle-blower lawsuit that claimed the city of St. Paul, Minn., had misused funds it got from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Under the False Claims Act, the Justice Department can intervene in such cases and support whistle-blowers, which often leads to victories or settlements that return millions of dollars to the U.S. Treasury. Under the GOP theory, the Justice Department declined to throw its weight into that whistle-blower case as part of an improper deal with St. Paul, Minn. What's the other end of the alleged quid pro quo? That would be St. Paul agreeing to withdraw its bid for Supreme Court review in a separate case that put at risk a major legal tool the federal government uses in civil rights and housing discrimination cases. In the case, Magner v. Gallagher, St. Paul asked the Supreme Court to consider the government's use of the so-called disparate impact theory, which allows lawsuits to proceed under the Fair Housing Act if people can prove a practice has a statistically significant negative impact on minorities, rather than specific bad acts involving individual landlords. That theory has been a frequent target of political conservatives and some members of Congress, and its supporters fear if the issue gets to the Supreme Court, it could be invalidated there. Republican lawmakers have demanded more answers from Perez, the assistant attorney general for civil rights, and others in the Justice Department who may have played a role in that decision, which they consider a "dubious bargain." Grassley told reporters earlier this month, "It's hard to believe that the president would nominate somebody at the heart of a congressional investigation and so deeply involved in a controversial decision to make a shady deal with the city of St. Paul, Minn." New documents indicate Perez and other top DOJ officials have spent hours talking to members of Congress behind closed doors this month about that arrangement. Perez told investigators in an eight-hour session on March 22 that the St. Paul case heading to the Supreme Court last year "caught my attention and was a source of concern." In the first explanation of his role in the case, Perez said the dispute headed toward the Supreme Court presented some bad facts, and "because bad facts make bad law, this could have resulted in a decision that undermined our ability...to protect victims of housing and lending discrimination." He told lawmakers he reached out to people in Minnesota and found out they were interested in getting the Justice Department to stay out of a separate whistle-blower case that could cost the state money. Perez said he reached out inside the Justice Department for ethics advice and told lawmakers he learned "there would be no concerns so long as I had permission" from counterparts in the civil unit handling the whistle-blower case and that "there was no prohibition on linking matters." He added that he learned former Vice President Walter Mondale, who played a role in sponsoring the Fair Housing Act in Congress, and who had close ties to the mayor of St. Paul, was going to reach out regarding the Supreme Court case and its effects on civil rights enforcement as well. "I believe then, and I believe now, that the result achieved here was in the best interests of the United States," he said. Justice Department officials have turned over 1,500 pages of documents about the controversy, but that's unlikely to satisfy Republicans on Capitol Hill.

#### Every nomination causes a huge fight

Bernstein 3-21 (Jonathan, Special Contributor – Washington Post, “The GOP’s path of most resistance,” The Reporter, http://www.thereporteronline.com/article/20130321/OPINION03/130329884/the-gop-s-path-of-most-resistance)

It now looks as if we’re going to get not one, but two, new GOP filibusters of executive branch nominees. Multiple Republicans are planning to filibuster against the new Secretary of Labor pick Thomas Perez; Chuck Grassley just joined in this effort today. Meanwhile, it has emerged that Roy Blunt is putting a hold on Gina McCarthy, Obama’s choice to head the Environmental Protection Agency. Kevin Drum comments: Let’s take a look at the body count of high-profile Obama nominees so far: Susan Rice, Chuck Hagel, John Brennan, Jack Lew, Caitlin Halligan, Thomas Perez, and now Gina McCarthy. Plus maybe some others that I’ve already forgotten. And now for the list of high-profile nominees who haven’t been blocked or filibustered: John Kerry. One of the consequences of this maximum obstruction plan by Mitch McConnell and the Republicans is that is renders even perfectly reasonable actions by Republican Senators highly suspicious. Blunt’s hold on McCarthy is over a local issue in Missouri, something about levees on the Mississippi. But it’s impossible to know whether that’s something that Blunt is perfectly willing to negotiate with the relevant agencies, or if it’s just a cover for GOP opposition to yet another Obama nomination for the sake of opposition itself. The big picture here is that by setting the bar at 60 for every single nomination — something that was never done until January 2009 — Senate Republicans are in effect filibustering every single nomination.

### 2NC Cyberterror – NDT

No retal

#### No cyber-attack – experts agree

Gjelten 3/15 -- veteran correspondent for NPR News, specializing in national security and international affairs (Tom, 2013, "Is All The Talk About Cyberwarfare Just Hype?" http://www.wgbh.org/News/Articles/2013/3/15/Is\_All\_The\_Talk\_About\_Cyberwarfare\_Just\_Hype.cfm)

U.S. officials and security experts regularly highlight the cyberthreat, but they also note that the prospects of a major cyberattack are remote. Cyberespionage and "nuisance" cyberattacks may be a problem now, but all-out cyberwar is not. U.S. government pronouncements about the danger of a major cyberattack can be confusing. The director of national intelligence, James Clapper, and the head of the U.S. military's Cyber Command, Army Gen. Keith Alexander, delivered mixed messages this week while testifying on Capitol Hill. Clapper told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the prospect of a computer attack on the nation's critical infrastructure is now the top security threat facing the country, surpassing terrorism. "It's hard to overestimate its significance," Clapper said. In a separate appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Alexander issued a similar warning. "All our systems today — our power systems, our water systems, our governments, our industry — depend on computers, depend on computerized switches, depend on these networks," Alexander said. "All are at risk. If an adversary were to get in, they could essentially destroy those components." Asked by Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham whether such an intrusion would cause as much or more damage than the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Alexander answered, "That's correct. I think it would." The Clapper and Alexander testimonies, however, were worded carefully. Clapper, in an assessment representing the views of the entire U.S. intelligence community, characterized the chance of a major cyberattack against U.S. infrastructure in the next two years as "remote." "The level of technical expertise and operational sophistication required for such an attack will be out of reach for most actors during this time frame," the assessment stated. "Advanced cyber actors — such as Russia and China — are unlikely to launch such a devastating attack against the United States outside of a military conflict or crisis that they believe threatens their vital interests."

Alexander was similarly reassuring in his written testimony. "We feel confident that foreign leaders believe that a devastating attack on the critical infrastructure and population of the United States by cyber means would be correctly traced back to its source and elicit a prompt and proportionate response," Alexander said. "We [therefore] have some confidence in our ability to deter major state-on-state attacks in cyberspace." So what about a cyber-9/11, or a "cyber-Pearl Harbor," the scenario envisioned in an October 2012 speech by then-U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta? Is the scare talk just hype? Cyber expert James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies says he put that question recently to what he calls "one of the leading hypers" of the cyberthreat. "I said, 'Oh, come on, you know it's not going to be Pearl Harbor,' " Lewis says. "And he said, 'Yeah.' But he wants people to pay attention. And nobody is doing anything." Cybersecurity experts in both industry and government say the country is unprepared to deal with computer threats. "So there are some folks out there who have believed we needed to hype the threat to get the country to move, on the theory that democracies don't do anything until they've had a disaster," Lewis notes. "He's probably right, but I think it has been overhyped." The immediate security problem is cybercrime and cyberespionage, not cyberwar. President Obama's national security adviser, Tom Donilon, this week accused computer hackers from China of stealing confidential business information and technology. "Increasingly, U.S. businesses are speaking out about their serious concerns about sophisticated, targeted theft through cyber-intrusions emanating from China on a very large scale," Donilon said. Industry and government leaders say the everyday theft of trade secrets is undermining the U.S. economy. Beyond that is the danger that some country, in the future, might be tempted to launch a major cyberattack that could knock out portions of the U.S. power grid or paralyze the financial system. It is unlikely now, but some up-and-coming cyber powers are a cause for concern. Among them is Iran, suspected of carrying out a recent attack against the state oil company in Saudi Arabia. "One thing most of us didn't expect was the Iranians [going] from zero to 60 in about eight months," Lewis notes. "China, Russia, these are responsible countries. They're not going to start a war. How comfortable do you feel saying that about the Iranian Revolutionary Guard?" At this point, even the leaders of Iran may see little reason to spark a major cyber-confrontation with the United States. Their calculation, however, could change at some point, considering the current hostility between the two countries.

# 2AR

#### Trade won't solve

Christopher **Layne**, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, PhD in poli sci. Jan 200**8**. (Current History. “China's Challenge to US Hegemony”. http://www.morris.umn.edu/~joos/us/Readings/2\_US%20in%20NE%20Asia/China%20challenge%20to%20US%20hegemony.pdf)

Engagement is a problematic strategy, however, because it rests on a shaky foundation. The conventional wisdom notwithstanding, there is little support in the historical record for the idea that economic interdependence leads to peace. After all, Europe never was more interdependent (not only economically but also, among the ruling elites, intellectually and culturally) than before World War I. It was famously predicted, on the eve of World War I, that the economic ties among Europe’s great powers had ushered in an era in which war among them was unthinkable. Yet, as we know, the prospect of forgoing the economic gains of trade did not stop Europe’s great powers from fighting a prolonged and devastating war. Beijing’s actual foreign policy furnishes a concrete reason to be skeptical of the argument that interdependence leads to peace. China’s behavior in the 1996 crisis with Taiwan (during which it conducted missile tests in waters surrounding the island in the run-up to Taiwan’s presidential election) suggested it was not constrained by fears that its muscular foreign policy would adversely affect its overseas trade. Of course, during the past decade, China has been mindful of its stake in international trade and investment. But this does not vindicate the us strategy of engagement. China’s current policy reflects the fact that, for now, Beijing recognizes its strategic interest in preserving peace in East Asia. Stability in the region, and in Sino-American relations, allows China to become richer and to catch up to the United States in relative power. For a state in China’s position vis-à-vis the United States, this is the optimal realpolitik strategy: buying time for its economy to grow so that the nation can openly balance against the United States militarily and establish its own regional hegemony in East Asia. Beijing is pursuing a peaceful policy today in order to strengthen itself to confront the United States tomorrow.