### 1AC – Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce production restrictions on federal lands in the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas

### 1AC – Inherency

#### **Contention One is Inherency –**

#### The Department of Interior’s leasing plan effectively restricts offshore natural gas drilling on federal lands

New 6-30 (Bill, President – New Industires, \*Offers Steel Fabrication Services to Offshore Drilling Projects, “Letters: New Leasing Plan a Step Backward,” The Advocate, 2012, http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion/3484480-123/letters-new-leasing-plan-a)

In late June, the U.S. Department of the Interior released its long-awaited outer continental shelf leasing plan, which effectively blocks offshore oil and natural gas exploration in any new areas for the next five years. Unfortunately, the proposal is a step backward in our effort to achieve energy independence. Under the plan, 85 percent of America’s OCS would be off-limits at a time when exploring every possible energy source is critical to boosting our nation’s economy and creating jobs. Instead of finding out what might be available to us in expansive unexplored areas off our coasts, we will be left to search for oil and natural gas in the same, relatively small portion of the OCS we’ve been exploring for four decades. Not only does this plan run counter to President Barack Obama’s “all of the above” strategy for energy independence, but it shows an outright disregard for the requests of the Gulf Coast states –— including Louisiana — to increase domestic oil production when the Interior Department released a draft of the plan late last year. Interestingly, the Interior Department chose to release this latest version of the OCS plan on the day the Supreme Court announced its health care decision — a thinly veiled attempt to bury it in news coverage of the ruling. But that didn’t keep right-thinking lawmakers from taking notice and working on ways to get America’s economy going using sound energy policies. U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., chairman of the House Natural Resource Committee, has written legislation that sensibly revises the plan. While the Interior Department’s plan is to hold just 12 oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, and three in offshore Alaska from 2012 to 2017, the Hastings plan would schedule 28 lease sales total, dramatically increasing drilling opportunities off the Alaskan coast and including a sale of offshore leases in a potentially rich area off the coast of Virginia. The United States is producing more oil and natural gas than ever thanks to increased production on state-owned or private land. However, production on federal onshore land is down 14 percent in the last two years, and down 17 percent on federal offshore areas. Imagine what could happen if we enact legislation that allows us to open new offshore areas.

#### Current legislation is insufficient – certainty is key

Loris 8-6 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

Senator John Hoeven (R–ND) recently introduced the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (DEJA), which would greatly expand access to energy and simplify burdensome regulations that prevent projects from coming online in a timely manner. While the legislation could be improved by further increasing access and removing the top-down energy planning, DEJA would still spur economic growth and drive energy production. Increasing Access to Energy DEJA would accept the State Department’s environmental review of the Keystone XL pipeline as sufficient and allow the state of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline to meet the state’s environmental concerns. The State Department studied and addressed risks to soil, wetlands, water resources, vegetation, fish, wildlife, and endangered species and concluded that construction of the pipeline would pose minimal environmental risk.[1] The construction of Keystone XL would allow up to 830,000 barrels of oil per day to come from Canada to the Gulf Coast and create thousands of jobs. DEJA also directs the Department of the Interior (DOI) to conduct a lease sale off the coast of Virginia. The 2.9 million acres 50 miles off the coast has an estimated 130 million barrels of oil and 1.14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Opening access off Virginia’s coast is long overdue, and the legislation **only opens up a small portion of America’s territorial waters that are off limits**. The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, also co-sponsored by Senator Hoeven, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska.[2] Both DEJA and OPEN increase the royalties that states would receive from energy production, but both could go further to increase state involvement in offshore drilling decisions. Since onshore states already receive 50 percent of the royalties, Congress should also implement a 50/50 royalty-sharing program between federal and state governments involved in offshore drilling. Efficient Permitting and Leasing for All Energy Projects Another important component of DEJA is that it streamlines the permitting of all energy projects. Receiving a permit for any energy project, not just fossil fuels, takes entirely too long. Duplicative and unnecessary regulations slow the process and drive up costs. Furthermore, environmental activists delay new energy projects by filing endless administrative appeals and lawsuits. DEJA would create a manageable time frame for permitting for all energy sources to increase supply at lower costs and stimulate economic activity. DEJA also calls for an end to the lengthy permit process in the Natural Petroleum Reserve area of Alaska. It would require the DOI to approve drilling permits within 60 days and infrastructure permits within six months. Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the **certainty necessary to pursue energy projects**. Freeze and Study Environmental Regulations DEJA would also create transparency and accountability for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by establishing an interagency committee that would report on the full economic impact of the rules implemented by the EPA that affect fuel prices. This includes any part of the production process that would be affected by greenhouse gas regulations. DEJA delays the implementation of Tier 3 fuel standards (designed to replace the Tier 2 regulations issued in 2000) that would lower the amount of sulfur in gasoline but could add 6–9 cents per gallon to the cost of manufacturing gasoline. The EPA has declared no measurable air quality benefits from these standards. DEJA delays the New Source Performance Standards for refineries, which would drive up the cost of gasoline for no measurable change in the earth’s temperature.[3] It would also delay new national ambient air quality standards for ozone, which are unnecessary because the ozone standard set by the EPA is already more than stringent enough to protect human health. Though the delays contained in DEJA underscore the problems with these regulations, the preferred approach would be to prohibit the implementation of these three standards altogether. DEJA would also prevent the DOI from issuing any rule under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 before 2014 that would adversely affect coal employment, reduce revenue from coal production, reduce coal for domestic consumption or export, designate areas as unsuitable for surface mining and reclamation, or expose the U.S. to liability by taking privately owned coal through regulation. While this temporary fix recognizes the federal overreach in coal production, a better approach would be to create a framework that restricts overregulation, empowers the states, balances economic growth and environmental well-being, and creates a timely permitting process for all aspects of coal production.[4] Energy Central Planning Unneeded DEJA would require the federal government to create production objectives for fossil fuels and renewable energy and allow the relevant agencies to make additional lands available to meet those objectives. The bill would also require the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a critical minerals list and create comprehensive policies to increase critical mineral production. A much simpler and effective solution would be to open all federal lands for energy production of all sources and allow the private sector to determine what sources of energy and what technologies meet America’s electricity and transportation fuel demand. Too often the use of critical minerals has been used as cover for subsidies and extensive government intervention in a major industry. If there are clear military needs for certain critical materials, these should be met by government action. Absent that, streamlining the bureaucracy that has expanded around mining and **opening access is the only necessary federal action surrounding critical minerals**.

### 1AC – Arctic

#### Contention 1 : Arctic Leadership

#### Offshore drilling is key to US Arctic leadership – it facilitates effective security investments

Bert 12 (Captain Melissa – USCG, 2011-2012 Military Fellow, U.S.Coast Guard, “A Strategy to Advance the Arctic Economy”, February, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/strategy-advance-arctic-economy/p27258)

The United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. Melting sea ice is generating an emerging Arctic economy. Nations bordering the Arctic are drilling for oil and gas, and mining, shipping, and cruising in the region. Russia, Canada, and Norway are growing their icebreaker fleets and shore-based infrastructure to support these enterprises. For the United States, **the economic potential from the energy and mineral resources is in the trillions of dollars**—based upon estimates that the Alaskan Arctic is the home to 30 billion barrels of oil, more than 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, rare earth minerals, and massive renewable wind, tidal, and geothermal energy. However, the U.S. government is unprepared to harness the potential that the Arctic offers. The United States lacks the capacity to deal with potential regional conflicts and seaborne disasters, and it has been on the sidelines when it comes to developing new governance mechanisms for the Arctic. To advance U.S. economic and security interests and avert potential environmental and human disasters, the United States should ratify the UN Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), take the lead in developing mandatory international standards for operating in Arctic waters, and acquire icebreakers, aircraft, and infrastructure for Arctic operations. Regional Flashpoints Threaten Security Like the United States, the Arctic nations of Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark have geographical claims to the Arctic. Unlike the United States, however, they have each sought to exploit economic and strategic opportunities in the region by developing businesses, infrastructure, and cities in the Arctic. They have also renewed military exercises of years past, and as each nation learns of the others' activities, suspicion and competition increase. When the Russians sailed a submarine in 2007 to plant a titanium flag on the "north pole," they were seen as provocateurs, not explorers. The continental shelf is a particular point of contention. Russia claims that deep underwater ridges on the sea floor, over two hundred miles from the Russian continent, are part of Russia and are legally Russia's to exploit. Denmark and Canada also claim those ridges. Whichever state prevails in that debate will have exclusive extraction rights to the resources, which, based on current continental shelf hydrocarbon lease sales, could be worth billions of dollars. Debates also continue regarding freedom of navigation and sovereignty over waters in the region. Russia claims sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which winds over the top of Russia and Alaska and will be a commercially viable route through the region within the next decade. The United States contends the NSR is an international waterway, free to any nation to transit. The United States also has laid claim to portions of the Beaufort Sea that Canada says are Canadian, and the United States rejects Canada's claim that its Northwest Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific is its internal waters, as opposed to an international strait. Canada and Denmark also have a boundary dispute in Baffin Bay. Norway and Russia disagree about fishing rights in waters around the Spitsbergen/Svalbard Archipelago. U.S. Capacity in the Arctic Is Lacking Traffic and commercial activity are increasing in the region. The NSR was not navigable for years because of heavy ice, but it now consists of water with floating ice during the summer months. As the icebergs decrease in the coming years, it will become a commercially profitable route, because it reduces the maritime journey between East Asia and Western Europe from about thirteen thousand miles through the Suez Canal to eight thousand miles, cutting transit time by ten to fifteen days. Russian and German oil tankers are already beginning to ply those waters in the summer months. Approximately 150,000 tons of oil, 400,000 tons of gas condensate, and 600,000 tons of iron ore were shipped via the NSR in 2011. Oil, gas, and mineral drilling, as well as fisheries and tourism, are becoming more common in the high latitudes and are inherently dangerous, because icebergs and storms can shear apart even large tankers, offshore drilling units, fishing vessels, and cruise ships. As a result, human and environmental disasters are extremely likely. Despite the dangerous conditions, the Arctic has no mandatory requirements for those operating in or passing through the region. There are no designated shipping lanes, requirements for ice-strengthened hulls to withstand the extreme environment, ice navigation training for ships' masters, or even production and carriage of updated navigation and ice charts. Keeping the Arctic safe with the increased activity and lack of regulations presents a daunting task. The U.S. government is further hindered by the lack of ships, aircraft, and infrastructure to enforce sovereignty and criminal laws, and to protect people and the marine environment from catastrophic incidents. In the lower forty-eight states, response time to an oil spill or capsized vessel is measured in hours. In Alaska, it could take days or weeks to get the right people and resources on scene. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, thirteen hundred miles from Point Barrow, and response aircraft are more than one thousand miles south in Kodiak, blocked by a mountain range and hazardous flying conditions. The Arctic shores lack infrastructure to launch any type of disaster response, or to support the growing commercial development in the region. U.S. Leadership in Arctic Governance Is Lacking Governance in the Arctic requires leadership. The United States **is uniquely positioned to provide such leadership**, but it is hampered by its reliance on the eight-nation Arctic Council. However, more than 160 countries view the LSOC as the critical instrument defining conduct at sea and maritime obligations. The convention also addresses resource division, maritime traffic, and pollution regulation, and is relied upon for dispute resolution. The LOSC is particularly important in the Arctic, because it stipulates that the region beyond each country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) be divided between bordering nations that can prove their underwater continental shelves extend directly from their land borders. Nations will have exclusive economic rights to the oil, gas, and mineral resources extracted from those outer continental shelves, making the convention's determinations substantial. According to geologists, **the U.S. portion is projected to be the world's largest underwater extension of land**—over 3.3 million square miles—bigger than the lower forty-eight states combined. **In addition to global credibility** **and protection of Arctic shelf claims**, the convention is important because it sets international pollution standards and requires signatories to protect the marine environment. Critics argue that the LOSC cedes American sovereignty to the United Nations. But the failure to ratify it has the opposite effect: it leaves the United States less able to protect its interests in the Arctic and elsewhere. The diminished influence is particularly evident at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the international body that "operationalizes" the LOSC through its international port and shipping rules. By remaining a nonparty, the United States **lacks the credibility to promote U.S. interests in the Arctic**, such as by transforming U.S. recommendations into binding international laws. A Comprehensive U.S. Strategy for the Arctic The United States needs a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. The current National/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66 / HSPD-25) is only a broad policy statement. An effective Arctic strategy would address both governance and capacity questions. To generate effective governance in the Arctic the United States should ratify LOSC and take the lead in advocating the adoption of Arctic shipping requirements. The IMO recently proposed a voluntary Polar Code, and the United States should work to make it mandatory. The code sets structural classifications and standards for ships operating in the Arctic as well as specific navigation and emergency training for those operating in or around ice-covered waters. The United States should also support Automated Identification System (AIS) carriage for all ships transiting the Arctic. Because the Arctic is a vast region with no ability for those on land to see the ships offshore, electronic identification and tracking is the only way to know what ships are operating in or transiting the region. An AIS transmitter (costing as little as $800) sends a signal that provides vessel identity and location at all times to those in command centers around the world and is currently mandated for ships over sixteen hundred gross tons. The United States and other Arctic nations track AIS ships and are able to respond to emergencies based on its signals. For this reason, mandating AIS for all vessels in the Arctic is needed. The U.S. government also needs to work with Russia to impose a traffic separation scheme in the Bering Strait, where chances for a collision are high. Finally, the United States should push for compulsory tandem sailing for all passenger vessels operating in the Arctic. Tandem sailing for cruise ships and smaller excursion boats will avert another disaster like RMS Titanic. To enhance the Arctic's economic potential, the United States **should** also **develop its capacity to enable commercial entities to operate safely in the region**. The U.S. government should invest in icebreakers**,** aircraft**,** and shore-based infrastructure. A ten-year plan should include the building of at least two heavy icebreakers, at a cost of approximately $1 billion apiece, and an air station in Point Barrow, Alaska, with at least three helicopters. Such an air station would cost less than $20 million, with operating, maintenance, and personnel costs comparable to other northern military facilities. Finally, developing a deepwater port with response presence and infrastructure is critical. A base at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, where ships and fishing vessels resupply and refuel, would only cost a few million dollars per year to operate. Washington could finance the cost of its capacity-building efforts by using offshore lease proceeds and federal taxes on the oil and gas extracted from the Arctic region. In 2008, the United States collected $2.6 billion from offshore lease sales in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (off Alaska's north coast), and the offshore royalty tax rate in the region is 19 percent**, which would cover operation and maintenance of these facilities down the road**. The United States needs an Arctic governance and **acquisition strategy to take full advantage of all the region has to offer** and to protect the people operating in the region and the maritime environment. Neglecting the Arctic reduces the United States' ability to **reap tremendous economic benefits and could harm U.S. national security interests.**

#### The Arctic will be the next area of great power conflict – gas production spurs military investments that prevent escalation

Talmadge 12 (Eric – AP, Huffington Post, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity’, 4/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-military-activity\_n\_1427565.html)

To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. **They are preparing for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic**, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and a slew of potential conflicts. By Arctic standards, the region is already buzzing with military activity, and experts believe that will increase significantly in the years ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever — Exercise Cold Response — with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, **so will the need for policing, border patrols and** — if push comes to shove — **military muscle to enforce rival claims**. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia, Canada and the United States have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia — one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle — **has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's superpower**. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic countries — Norway, Denmark and Canada — to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in the region. **This is only going to increase as time goes on**." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "We want to maintain our edge up there," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in **the Arctic** has never really waned. It remains very important." **But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions**, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it **lacks ships** able to operate in or near Arctic ice, **support facilities and adequate communications**. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. **The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers**.

#### Arctic on the brink of great-power conflict – diplomacy is no longer an option

Tassinari 9/7 (Fabrizio Tassinari is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and the Head of Foreign Policy and EU Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies, September 7, 2012, “Avoiding a Scramble for the High North”, http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/09/07/avoiding-a-scramble-for-the-high-north/)

The geopolitics of the Arctic are stuck in a paradox: The more regional players restate the importance of international cooperation, the more some pundits and policymakers seem to conclude that the Arctic **risks descending into competition and even conflict.** The world is awakening to the growing strategic importance of the High North. As the Arctic ice melts due to global warming, it opens up new opportunities, from shorter shipping lanes to newly accessible oil and gas reserves; respectively, about 13 percent and 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered resources are in the Arctic, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. These discoveries are usually followed by declarations of the littoral nations to the effect that any potential disagreements over them will be resolved peacefully. However, beneath expressions of goodwill, the Arctic debate is often characterized **by a sense of urgency**, and even forms of alarmism. In recent years, instances of growing securitization of the Arctic have abounded. Back in 2008, a paper by Javier Solana, then the EU’s foreign policy’s chief, and the European Commission warned about “potential conflict over resources in Polar regions” as they become exploitable due to melting ice. In 2010, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, Adm. James Stavridis, argued that “for now, the disputes in the North have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium.” Then there are actions that speak louder than prepared speeches — from the famous August 2007 expedition that planted a Russian flag on the North Pole’s seabed to the annual summer military exercises carried out by Canada to assert its sovereignty in the North. Although the Russian stunt was most likely aimed at nationalist domestic audiences, some observers view these exercises as the expressions of competing national interests. As the scholar Scott Borgerson ominously put it: “The Arctic powers **are fast approaching diplomatic gridlock**, and that could eventually lead to the sort of armed brinkmanship that plagues other territories.” The geopolitical constellation in and around the region provides a ready justification for such an assessment. While no-one really imagines the United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark fighting over the Arctic, some of their politicians have occasionally framed rhetoric in more peppered terms than one might expect. Russia, the fifth Arctic littoral nation, typically treads a fine line between declarations of cooperation and **an innate instinct for great-power competition**. Add to that the EU, which is seeking to carve its own role, and Asia’s giants, above all China, for which the opening of the Northeast passage may reduce sailing distance with Europe by some 40 percent, and it is not hard to conjure up the prospect of an Arctic race building up.

#### De-escalation is key to prevent Arctic conflicts from going nuclear – draws in major powers

Wallace and Staples 10 (Michael Wallace and Steven Staples. \*Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, **and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic**. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 609 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, **deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states** – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world **– converge on the Arctic and have competing claims**. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, **lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons**.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but **no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly**. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62

#### Extinction – it’s categorically different from all other impacts

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why **it is useful to distinguish them from other risks**. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a **whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are** mere ripples **on the surface of the great sea of life**. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) A much greater existential risk **emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and** the **USSR**. **An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might** have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy** or thwart **humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### US Arctic leadership solves multiple threats – offshore natural gas solidifies US leadership

Conley 12 (Heather – Senior Fellow at CSIS and Director, Europe Program, “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic”, January, http://csis.org/files/publication/120117\_Conley\_ArcticSecurity\_Web.pdf)

The Arctic will experience extraordinary economic and environmental change over the next several decades. Commercial, human, and state interaction will rise dramatically. More drilling for oil and gas in the region and growing shipping and ecotourism as new shipping routes come into existence are just a few of the examples of increased human activity in the Arctic. The rapid melting of the Arctic ice cap is now exceeding previous scientific and climatic predictions. A recent study shows that September 2011 marked the lowest levels of sea ice extent ever recorded in the northern polar region.1 The polar ice cap today is 40 percent smaller than it was in 1979,2 and in the summer of 2007 alone, 1 million more square miles of ice beyond the average melted, uncovering an area of open water six times the size of California. While estimates range from 2013 to 2060, the U.S. Navy’s “Arctic Roadmap” projects ice-free conditions for a portion of the Arctic by the summer of 2030.3 **Arctic economics** and an increasingly ice-free and hostile climatic environment **are** on a direct collision course, driving a clear need for a new paradigm to meet pressing security challenges that Arctic nations have thus far been unprepared or ill equipped to address. As the region takes on **greater economic importance, the Arctic requires a comprehensive** regional and global security strategy that includes an increase in regional readiness and border security as well as an enhancement of strategic capabilities. The security challenges are vast, including search and rescue, **environmental remediation, piracy, terrorism, natural and man-made disaster response**, and border protection. Compounding the challenge is the fact that regional players must function in an operational environment of severely limited satellite communication and hydrographic mapping. Arctic coastal states have developed and issued national Arctic security strategies and accompanying documents that, albeit roughly, sketch out their political and security priorities in the region. These documents describe their national security interests and the intentions these states wish to pursue and defend. Each of the five Arctic coastal states—Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States—touts its commitment to cooperative action while simultaneously bolstering its military presence and capabilities in the Arctic. Yet the complexity of competing national security interests is heightened by the lack of a single coherent structure through which these concerns can be addressed. Therefore, a fresh approach is needed for addressing regional Arctic security concerns within a global framework, while recognizing the mutual benefits of maintaining international cooperation, transparency, and stability in the Arctic. Creating a twenty-first century security architecture for the Arctic presents the United States with a conundrum: **U.S. Arctic policy must be given a significant sense of urgency** and focus at the same moment that U.S. defense budgets are being reduced and U.S. military planners consider the Arctic to be “an area of low conflict.” **How does one economically** and militarily square this circle? Unfortunately, while there have been some international debate and discussion on the form and format of Arctic security cooperation, the debate has often focused on what issues related to Arctic security cannot be discussed rather than on those that can and should be addressed. However, these institutional and policy barriers have begun to break down as actors recognize both a collective lack of operational capacity and the increasing number of security actors that will play a role in this rapidly changing region. Arctic stakeholders have yet to discuss seriously, let alone determine, what collective security framework Arctic states should use to address the emerging security challenges in the region, despite signing legally binding agreements on international search and rescue and negotiating international agreements on oil spills and response. It is within this context that the following report will analyze the drivers of change in the region, examine the key Arctic security actors and institutions, and explore the potential for a new security architecture for the Arctic. Oil and Gas As the sea ice retreats, **new commercial opportunities in the Arctic arise**. Natural resources that had once been unreachable are becoming available for extraction. As the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates, the Arctic is projected to contain 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil resources and **30 percent of the gas resources**.1 Because global production of oil and gas will not match global demand and the short-term outlook for the price of oil and gas will increase,2 **the desire to tap these resources in the Arctic will spur commercial exploration**, and multinational companies will invest and become increasingly engaged in the region. At the same time, the need to develop new technologies and approaches for tackling the harsh and unpredictable climate for offshore drilling and transportation in the Arctic is urgent. The greater the potential profit and need to secure supply while maintaining, if not increasing, current production levels, the greater the tendency will be for companies to assume the greater risks inherent in operating in the Arctic. Alaska has contributed significantly to meeting U.S. demand with oil from the oil fields on the North Slope close to the Arctic coast transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. However, due to decreasing North Slope production and a lack of new fields, domestic pressure to explore offshore of Alaska is rising. Royal Dutch Shell has received preliminary approval from the Obama administration for its offshore drilling plans in its acquired leases in the Beaufort Sea. Exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea is expected to commence in 2012.3 Shell is also optimistic that it can begin to develop the reserves in the Chukchi Sea in the near future, but issues with environmental leases, oil spill preparedness and response, and disputes with local communities threaten to delay the process.4 Other Arctic coastal states **are seeking similar economic advantage**. In Norway, leases to the Barents Sea have been allocated, as Norwegian oil and gas production has fallen since its peak of 3.4 million barrels per day in 20015 and is expected to decline further if no significant new fields are discovered. Increased demand from the European market has spurred additional exploratory drilling farther north. Seismic activity by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate6 has already started in the maritime territory obtained after the Norwegian-Russian maritime delimitation treaty entered into effect in July 2011.7 With the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Arctic coast line, Russia **is increasingly interested in developing its potential fields**, especially on the prosperous continental shelf next to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the Kara Sea. Russia is moving to increase gas production in the vast Yamal field, which already produces 90 percent of Russian state gas, following recent discoveries of large gas fields, such as the Bovanenkovo field.8 In addition, Russia has been active in expanding oil production in the Pechora Sea, with plans for drilling in the Prirazlomnoye oil field in early 20129—a significant development as it marks the first instance of offshore drilling in the Russian Arctic.10 Russia also plans to drill in the Dolginskoye oil field in the Pechora Sea, which is projected to be three times as large as the Prirazlomnoye, and aims to have the field developed by 2020.11 Numerous delays—from the large supply of gas available on the global market due to the discovery of unconventional gas in the United States and uncertainty over Russian taxation policies—have to this point prevented the development of the world’s largest gas field, the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, forcing new technological developments and seismic exploration in other parts of the Russian Arctic territory. All of this activity indicates **the keen interest both countries have** in moving rapidly to extract these resources **from their Arctic territories.**

#### Arctic terrorism leads to CBW use

Mychajlyszyn 8 (Natalie, International Affairs, Trade and Finance Division, “The Arctic: Canadian Security and Defence”, 24 October 2008, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0813-e.htm#illegalaccess)

Increased illegal access and illegal activities, including terrorism As the Arctic generally becomes more accessible because of the warming climate, some analysts **predict the emergence of new security threats.**(6) One such risk is that of an increase in illegal migration and trafficking in persons to North America through the Arctic. There are also fears of the North being used as a thoroughfare for drug trafficking as well as a destination for illegal narcotics. In the post-September 11 era, fears have been raised concerning the increased vulnerability of the Arctic as a passage for terrorists, whether for illegal entry into North America or for the transport of illegal weapons, including biological and chemical devices. To such a list of activities, generally perpetrated by organized crime groups, can be added the rise of other types of organized crime, such as those involving industries engaged in the extraction of lucrative resources, such as diamonds and copper.

#### Extinction

Sandberg et al 8—Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, Stockholm—AND—Jason G. Matheny—PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh—AND—Milan M. Ćirković—senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction)

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens **are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive**. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

#### Independently, Arctic natural gas production leads to economic growth and solidifies environmental leadership - that prevents global environmental destruction

Sullivan 12 (Dan – a former state attorney general, commissioner of Alaska's Department of Natural Resources, “It's time to develop our Arctic resources, 7/20, http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/opinion/sullivan-arctic-drilling/index.html)

(CNN) -- The United States **is on the verge of an energy renaissance.** We need to recognize and seize the opportunity. This renaissance involves domestic production of natural resources ranging from clean renewables to hydrocarbons. In particular, domestic hydrocarbon production -- both oil and gas -- is increasing dramatically, with some experts predicting that the United States could become the largest hydrocarbon producer in the word -- outstripping Saudi Arabia and Russia -- by 2020. Increased domestic production of hydrocarbons is driven by two trends. First, new technology is unlocking unconventional resources such as shale-derived oil and gas. And second, investors and policy makers are recognizing that the U.S. still has an enormous resource base of conventional oil and gas, particularly in Alaska. Opinion: Why we should look to the Arctic Federal agencies estimate that Alaska's North Slope and federal waters off Alaska's northern coast contain approximately 40 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil and more than 200 trillion cubic feet of conventional gas. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, this region contains more oil than any comparable region located in the Arctic, including northern Russia. However, the United States **is lagging behind its Arctic neighbors in developing these resources**. This is unfortunate, because we have some of the highest environmental standards in the world **and we should be setting the bar for Arctic development**. Developing our Arctic resources will promote our nation's interests in many ways: securing a politically stable, long-term supply of domestic energy; boosting U.S. economic growth and jobs; reducing the federal trade deficit; **and strengthening our global leadership on energy issues**. Leading academic researchers and economists in Alaska have estimated that oil production from Alaska's outer continental shelf will bring federal revenues of approximately $167 billion over 50 years, and create 55,000 jobs throughout the country. Developing U.S. resources in the Arctic **has the added benefit of enhancing global environmental protection**. One of the arguments used by Arctic drilling opponents is that "we aren't ready," but it is obvious that no matter what preparations are made, they will argue that it isn't enough. Shell, for example, has spent billions to prepare for drilling in the Arctic this summer, incorporating the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, state-of-the-art equipment and extensive scientific research. Recently, the Obama administration has publically expressed its confidence in the company's drilling plans. The U.S. has created some of the highest standards in the world for environmental protection. When we delay or disallow responsible resource development, **the end result is not to protect the environment**, but **to drive hydrocarbon investment and production to countries with** much lower environmental standards and enforcement capacity. Last year, it was reported that between 5 million and 20 million tons of oil leak in Russia per year. This is equivalent to a Deepwater Horizon blowout about every two months. Russia had an estimated 18,000 oil pipeline ruptures in 2010 -- the figure for the U.S. that year was 341. If we do not pursue responsible development in the Arctic, countries such as Russia -- perhaps even China, which is interested in securing access to Arctic hydrocarbon resources -- **will dominate energy production from the Arctic**. Such a scenario **does not bode well for the global environment**. By embracing the opportunities in the Arctic, the United States **will show the world that it can be a strong leader in responsible energy development.**

#### Extinction

**Ford 3** (Violet, Vice President – Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf)

The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to **global processes** and the balance of **life on earth**. Both the unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a resolution effectively recognizes the Arctic as a **“barometer”** or indicator region **of the globe’s environmental health**. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from environmental and other NGO’s.

#### Global natural gas extraction is inevitable – the US needs to take the lead ensure the best practices are used

Schneider 12 (Michael, Advocacy Director – Clean Air Task Force, “Curb Methane Emissions,” National Journal, 7-25, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments)

For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development. Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, **the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic**.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

### 1AC – Exports

#### Contention 2 : LNG Exports

#### Currently, perception of inadequate supply blocks LNG exports – new, sustainable supply is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).4 According to the Energy Information Adminis- tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over potential exports **hinges on the prospects for its sustained availability and development**. For exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and **compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses**. There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resources—the volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. Based on the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable natural gas resource in the United States. In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production. The productivity of shale gas wells has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

#### Perception is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are **valid** depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for **shale gas reserves are uncertain**, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic.

#### Removing Alaskan OCS moratoria results in massive LNG exports

Schmitt and Mazza 12 (Gary J. – Resident Scholar at AEI, and Michael – Research Fellow at AEI, “Turn gas into geostrategy “, 6/11, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/turn-gas-into-geostrategy/)

But one corner of the world that has hardly made a dent in this new market is Alaska. America's northernmost state has the gas reserves to meet a substantial part of Japan's demand. Estimates suggest that the North Slope fields and **reserves on the outer continental shelf hold as** much as 236 trillion cubic feet of gas—enough to serve the Japanese utilities' needs for over 90 years at current rates of consumption. Buying LNG from Alaska would be a good deal for Japan. Tokyo, which buys LNG on the Asian spot market at a price tied to oil, is currently paying about $16-$17 per million British thermal units. According to a recent Brookings Institution study, delivery of LNG from Alaska to Japan in 2020 will cost $11 or less, allowing for substantially lower import prices—and ensuring continued high Asian demand and a boon to the Alaskan economy. However, liberals and environmentalists in Washington are working to stop gas exports altogether. Ed Markey, a Democratic representative from Massachusetts, has proposed legislation which would prohibit any exports until 2025, believing that such a ban would keep supplies in the U.S. high and, in turn, prices for heating and power low. For the Sierra Club and others, stopping exports of LNG is important for lowering demand for new production. The goal is to reduce the need for hydraulic fracturing, so-called fracking, to release natural gas reserves found in shale and other deep deposits. Now, in an apparent Obama administration kowtow to liberals and environmentalists in the run-up to November's election, the Energy Department is now slow-rolling the release of a report expected to positively assess the domestic economic impact of exporting natural gas. But there is little evidence that hydraulic fracturing is the environmental hazard it's been made out to be or that the export of LNG from the United States would have more than a modicum of impact on domestic prices. And in this case, Alaskan natural gas does not even require hydraulic fracturing to recover. Moreover, it is unlikely Alaska's gas will be tapped for U.S. consumption if there is no Asian market. Given the extraordinary amount of reserves in the lower 48 states, Canada and in the Gulf of Mexico, the cost of extracting and shipping gas from Alaska's North Slope would make it uncompetitive with gas from those other sources. And the political problems don't end with Washington. In Juneau, Alaska's capital, state legislators are fussing over the royalty payments companies will be expected to pay to the state for extracting natural gas from its fields. With elections coming, they are worried that their constituents will judge them as having failed in getting as much from the companies as is possible—a charge that's been leveled at their predecessors when it comes to the state's oil. The problem is that the oil companies need a firm commitment from the state about the level of royalties to be paid now and in the future before those companies will invest the billions necessary in wells, pipelines and plants to extract and export Alaska's gas. And delays in doing so could be costly, as Japanese utilities appear willing to sign long-term agreements with other suppliers even at higher prices if they think it will address their pressing energy requirements. The question of whether to export Alaskan natural gas ought to be a no-brainer. Japan is eager to buy a resource that the United States has in abundance. Meanwhile, Alaskans pay no state sales or income taxes and receive a check in the mail every year; natural gas sales would extend those benefits. And for the U.S more broadly, the economic benefits would be a reduction in the trade deficit and the creation of new jobs. There is also an important strategic payoff. A Japan that is less reliant for its energy on unstable Middle East regimes or Russia is more likely to be a dependable ally in confronting common security challenges. Over the past decade, Russian attempts to monopolize gas supplies to Europe have made dealing with Moscow's revanchist policies a bigger headache for Washington. The same goes for Iranian supplies of oil to Japan, India and Europe with regard to Tehran's nuclear program. With other Asian nations also hungry for natural gas, American reserves should be used to U.S. geopolitical advantage. In just a few short years, the United States has gone from being an importer of LNG to being potentially "the Saudi Arabia of natural gas." It would be a shame to let politics get in the way of making the most of this fortuitous development.

#### New onshore terminals are being blocked

Parfomak 9 (Paul W. Parfomak, Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy, and Adam Vann, Legislative Attorney, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety, and Regulation, Congressional Research Service, 12-14-9, <http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Jan/RL32205.pdf>)

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel shipped in large tankers to U.S. ports from overseas. While LNG has historically made up a small part of U.S. natural gas supplies, rising price volatility, and the possibility of domestic shortages have significantly increased LNG demand. To meet this demand, energy companies have proposed new LNG import terminals throughout the coastal United States. Many of these terminals would be built onshore near populated areas. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) grants federal approval for the siting of new onshore LNG facilities under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). This approval process incorporates minimum safety standards for LNG established by the Department of Transportation. Although LNG has had a record of relative safety for the last 45 years, and no LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists, proposals for new LNG terminal facilities have generated considerable public concern. Some community groups and governments officials fear that LNG terminals may expose nearby residents to unacceptable hazards. Ongoing public concern about LNG safety has focused congressional attention on the exclusivity of FERC’s LNG siting authority, proposals for a regional LNG siting process, the lack of “remote” siting requirements in FERC regulations, state permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act, terrorism attractiveness of LNG, the adequacy of Coast Guard security resources, and other issues. LNG terminals directly affect the safety of communities in the states and congressional districts where they are sited, and may influence energy costs nationwide. Faced with an uncertain national need for greater LNG imports and persistent public concerns about LNG hazards, some in Congress have proposed changes to safety provisions in federal LNG siting regulation. Legislation proposed in the 110 th Congress addressed Coast Guard LNG resources, FERC’s exclusive siting authority, state concurrence of federal LNG siting decisions, and agency coordination under the Coastal Zone Management Act, among other proposals. Provisions in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (H.R. 3619), passed by the House on October 23, 2009, would require additional waterway suitability notification requirements in LNG siting reviews by FERC (Sec. 1117). The Maritime Hazardous Cargo Security Act (S. 1385), introduced by Senator Lautenberg and three co-sponsors on June 25, 2009, would require a national study to identify measures to improve the security of maritime transportation of liquefied natural gas (Sec. 6). If Congress concludes that new LNG terminals as currently regulated will pose an unacceptable risk to public safety, Congress may consider additional LNG safety-related legislation, or may exercise its oversight authority in other ways to influence LNG terminal siting approval. Alternatively, Congress may consider other changes in U.S. energy policy legislation to reduce the nation’s demand for natural gas or increase supplies of North American natural gas and, thus, the need for new LNG infrastructure.

#### Offshore terminals are key

Kilisek 12 (Roman, “The Bright Future of Floating LNG Liquefaction, Regasification and Storage Units”, 7/19, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/07/19/the-bright-future-of-floating-lng-liquefaction-regasification-and-storage-units/)

This is a newsworthy event in the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) industry because it is the first time that a floating liquefaction unit is moving from concept to commercial reality. What are the advantages of those floating LNG facilities over conventional liquefaction plants? First off, there is an obvious advantage in tapping offshore resources. In addition to the ability to station the floating vessel directly over distant offshore fields and thereby saving on a costly subsea pipeline to shore, it allows the operator of the facility to move the production facility to a new location once a field is depleted. This would also allow energy companies to exploit smaller fields and now **earn a realistic return on investment**. **Other cost savings are to be expected during the construction phase** for the required marine and loading facilities which often end up costing billions of dollars. Finally, in a world full of risk it can significantly reduce the security and political risk (inter alia, environmental regulation and permits) involved in choosing a land-based site for LNG export facilities in African countries (Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique) and countries in the Middle East as well as South America. The US should contemplate something like this along the East Coast for export to Europe, and along the West Coast for export to South America (Chile) and Asia.

#### Global export contracts are being renegotiated – now is key

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see Figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates.108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already being felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage.109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract.110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts.111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (Figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020.

#### Scenario 2: Russia

#### U.S. LNG exports are key to check Russian energy imperialism

Washington Post 9/25 (“ U.S. gas exports could limit Putin’s influence”, 9/25/12, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-natural-gas-exports-could-limit-vladimir-putins-influence/2012/09/25/e949342c-0691-11e2-858a-5311df86ab04_story.html>)

Gazprom finances Russian President Vladimir Putin’s corrupt political system. Under Mr. Putin’s direction, it has also been a notorious international villain, tying delivery of its precious fuel, a matter of life and death during European winters, to the Kremlin’s political agenda. But with the United States no longer demanding massive quantities of liquefied natural gas from Russia or anywhere else — thus freeing up fuel for others — and gas production ramping up elsewhere, the economics that enable Gazprom’s abuse are changing. The company, to be sure, is still a monster. It claimed $44 billion in profit last year — and that’s just what it reported. It provides most or all of the natural gas for many Eastern European nations, and it still has lucrative long-term supply contracts with European customers that link Gazprom’s prices to the price of oil. However, a recent Brookings Institution analysis reported that a looser natural gas market has already empowered German utilities to renegotiate those contracts; some European customers are even ignoring them altogether and buying cheaper liquefied natural gas on spot markets. If the United States begins exporting natural gas, it would only encourage positive long-term structural changes in this international trade — **away from Kremlin domination and toward a larger and more nimble world market.** European countries would not be the only ones to feel this effect. Gazprom intends to enter the gas-hungry Asian market, and **it might find that it has less leverage over its potential customers** than it had expected to wield. If the economic case for allowing U.S. natural-gas exports, which we have made in other editorials, doesn’t persuade those fighting to limit them, the possible geopolitical benefits should. With new supply from America and others sloshing around the world market later this decade, Mr. Putin might have to make a choice — between propping up a dysfunctional and decreasingly profitable monopoly or finally liberalizing the Russian energy sector, to the benefit of customers, shareholders, Russia’s neighbors and, ultimately, Russia, too.

#### Absent that, Russia military influence is inevitable – that causes Senkaku Island conflict, undermines counter-terror operations, and makes conflict inevitable

**Lin 9 (**Dr. Christina Y. Lin is currently a researcher with Jane’s Information Group in Surrey, England and

former director for China affairs in policy planning at the U.S. Department of Defense., 2/11/09, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=96417>)

After the end of the Cold War and a period of Perestroika, the post 9/11 world ushered in once more a period of Realpolitik in the international security environment. However, Russia’s prime minister and former president Vladimir Putin appeared to have the foresight that Perestroika would not last: his 1997 Ph.D. dissertation at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute viewed the demise of the Soviet Union as the ‘greatest catastrophe of the 20 th century’ and argued for utilising the Russian resource sector to once again reassert Russia’s imperial status. 2 Indeed, under his leadership beginning in 1999 3 , he has systematically established Gazprom and energy as the bedrock of Russian foreign policy and power projection around the globe, and through the bloc of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 4 is asserting its power in the Eurasia region spanning from the EU to Iran in the Middle East, to the Caspian Region/Central Asia and onto South Asia and the Far East. Its foreign policy of weaponisation of energy is demonstrated by invasion of Georgia in 2008 over the BTC pipeline that bypasses Russian control, cutting gas and oil supplies to former Soviet Republics, dividing New Europe and Old Europe via bilateral energy deals with Germany (e.g., Nord Stream), Italy (e.g., South Stream to undermine Nabucco 5 ), at the expense of Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, Belarus, etc. Moreover, Russia has emphasised SCO interests over UNSC interests, and have, along with its SCO partner China, consistently watered down UNSC sanctions against Iran (SCO observer member) and DPRK 6 nuclear issues. Given that China needs Iran’s energy, Russia needs Iran as a foothold into the Middle East, and Iran needs SCO membership to counter international isolation as well as Russia and China’s UNSC votes, these SCO actors seem to act more cohesively within the SCO framework vis-àvis other regional and international organisations. With Iran’s recent calling for a SCO currency and SCO bank 7 to undermine U.S. and western influence, and SCO’s increasingly ambitious military exercises and recent defence agreement with CSTO 8 , this emerging Eurasian economic and security alliance will challenge NATO and western interests and thus bears watching. Russian Energy Imperialism and the SCO Russia appears to have a three-prong approach in re-asserting itself as an imperial power: energy, financial/economic, and military. Energy Weapon As Marshall Goldman portrayed in Putin, power and the New Russia Petrostate 9 , he was privy to visit Gazprom’s dispatching centre headquarter in Moscow, and witnessed the map covering 100-foot wall of a room with a spiderweb-like maze of natural gas pipelines reaching from East Siberia west to the Atlantic Ocean and from the Arctic ocean south to the Caspian and Black Seas. With a flick of a switch these dispatchers could freeze entire countries and have indeed done so in the past with former Soviet Union republics and most recently with Ukraine in January 2009. Russia’s energy strategy is to create energy dependence via monopolistic control of pipelines and acquisition of transit countries’ internal distribution network. 10 For example, Gazprom offered to cancel debt and charge lower prices if Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia would give Gazprom equity stake in their domestic pipeline networks. By owning the networks, Gazprom can maintain monopoly control and economic rent. 11 Due to the high sunk cost and entry barrier of building pipelines, there is rarely a second standing pipeline from another supplier reserved for emergencies. As such, consumers tend to be locked into long-term contracts and therefore dependency on a dominant supplier. Ronald Reagan understood the vulnerability of monopoly tendencies in natural gas pipelines and tried to prevent USSR from building them to W. Europe. In 1984 he asked Thatcher to stop the English firm, John Brown Engineering, from selling Soviets the compressors they needed to move the gas through the pipeline from the Urengoi natural gas field in West Siberia to Germany, but the efforts failed and the pipeline was completed in 1985. 12 Today, Germany imports 40% of its natural gas from Russia, the highest in any W. European country, and is projected to reach 60% in the next decade. 13 Despite EU’s efforts to foment a common energy policy to decrease dependency, Russia has been effective with its “divide and conquer” strategy in dividing Old and New Europe with lucrative bilateral deals with Germany, Italy, France that bypass many transit countries in New Europe. 14 Economic Weapon In tandem with this energy prong of Russian strategy is weaponisation of currency and mercantilist economic policies within the SCO framework. Iran has recently proposed to create an SCO currency and bank to strengthen intra-regional ties. 15 Given that China has $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves 16 --the largest in the world—a move to a common currency (including reserves of 4 observer members) would significantly reduce the influence of U.S. dollar and western currencies in the global capital market. Additionally, Russian President Medvedev in a January 2009 visit to Uzbekistan also called for a stronger SCO and increase economic ties with CIS’ Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) and CSTO. 17 This emerging China-Iran-Russia axis has been noted and dubbed “that other axis” by Asia Times Jephraim P. Gundzik, who wrote in 2005 that “Beijing’s increasingly close ties with Moscow and Tehran will thwart Washington’s foreign policy goal of expanding U.S. security footholds in the Middle East, Central Asia and Asia.” 18 Military Weapon Indeed the creeping militarisation of SCO and 2007 defence ties with CSTO merit further investigation. Although not yet a military alliance, SCO is moving towards that trajectory as measured by: (1) Increased security cooperation: (2) Increased CSTO-SCO ties; (3) Energy Security; and (4) Connection with the West. 19 Firstly, despite denials of the military nature of the SCO, in 2007 for the first time a political summit (Bishtek 2007) was amalgamated with war games (Peace Mission 2007). Hitherto defence ministers were the highest-ranking officials to participate in the military exercises; the heads of states presence at the war game was perhaps signalling SCO’s determination to be in command of regional security. This is further demonstrated by the increasingly ambitious nature of SCO military exercises from bilateral to multilateral to joint all-SCO level. Secondly, the concept of “military assistance” (e.g., attack against one is attack against all) may be included in the SCO policy documents. In October 2007 SCO (a political-economic organisation) signed defence agreements with CSTO (a political-military organisation). Because “military assistance” is a key element of a mature security alliance such as CSTO, and because SCO signed a defence agreement with a purely military organisation, there may be a pull of the SCO towards a more military trajectory. 20 This is tied into the increasing military aspects of energy security. Security organisations tend to be involved in energy security such as guarding security of oil & gas pipelines against terrorist attacks, protecting railway lines and deploying rapid reactions forces. In light of SCO’s new cooperation with CSTO, this may lead to eventual standing of reaction forces in the near future regarding energy security. Finally, SCO is increasing ties with NATO—which has arrangements for cooperation with all SCO states except China. Since the 1990s, NATO has had bilateral cooperation with five Central Asian states within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework, as well as a special relationship with Russia since 2002 called NATO-Russia Council. 21 In November 2005 SCO developed a contact group in Afghanistan and have had operational cooperation with NATO. It is looking to expand its military operations westwards from Central Asia and may joint NATO with contingents in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. The SCO is a formidable organisation that brings together almost half the world’s population (including observers), with several nuclear weapons states (China, Russia, India, Pakistan and perhaps Iran), and includes key energy exporters in Central Asia as well as some of the world’s fastest growing economies. Because recent indicators point SCO towards a trajectory of mature security alliance, it behooves the U.S. and EU to closely monitor this trend and hedge against Russia and Iran from using it for anti-western policies. In Europe, Russia is pursuing an aggressive “divide and conquer” strategy to prevent the EU from fomenting a common energy policy and increase energy diversification. Germany is the top importer while Italy follows behind. As such, Russia has partnered with Germany to build Nord Stream and with Italy to build South Stream pipelines in order to control the flow of Russian and Central European energy supply to W. Europe. Despite some pundits arguing that these two projects are based on purely commercial reasons of supply and demand, in light of recent Russian invasion of Georgia and gas supply cut-off to Ukraine, these two projects must also be examined within the security dimension as they have important strategic implications for the U.S. and EU. Nord Stream: Russian Military Presence & Intelligence Surveillance in the Baltic Region The Nord Stream project in 2005 proposes two natural gas pipelines from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. Legally it is a Swiss company, but economically it is a joint venture between Russia, Germany and Netherlands, driven by Russia geopolitical interests. 22 Although it has invested €8 billion to the project, due to its lack of transparency, some experts project the cost may reach €10-15 billion. 23 Additionally, there are negative implications for this proposed pipeline—increased EU energy dependency on Russia, reduction of ability of small members to act as security providers in region if energy security is undermined, and increased Russian military presence in the Baltic region. Sweden for one fears the risk of Nord Stream as a catalyst for increased Russian military presence and intelligence surveillance. Putin has proclaimed that during construction phase, Russia Baltic Sea Navy would protect Nord Stream pipelines. 24 Additionally, the risers and pipelines are excellent platforms for sensors of various kinds—radars, hydro-acoustic systems and sonars to act as eyes and ears for monitoring the system as well as intelligence surveillance. This would give Russia an intelligence edge in the Baltic Sea concerning all air, surface, and sub-surface activities—especially around Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, and NATO members’ military exercises. This is a realistic risk, given Russia’s past history of installing fiber optic cable along the Yamal pipeline without informing the Polish government in advance. 25 As such Sweden has insisted Nord Stream need approval of all countries whose territories will be traversed by the pipeline. Should the Russians build pipelines without approval of countries in the region, the Swedish military has drawn up plans and are fully prepared to sabotage the pipeline if and when it is built. 26 South Stream: Undermine Nabucco and EU Energy Diversification South Stream is a project between Russian Gazprom and Italian Eni. If constructed, South Stream is projected to be the most expensive pipeline at €12.8 billion and impact EU security relations. 27 The project was announced on 23 June 2007, in reaction to EU’s 2004 decision to focus on Nabucco for energy diversification. When Russia cut off gas to Ukraine in January 2006, the project was elevated and included in European Commission’s Strategic Energy Review, released 10 January 2007, calling for priority of energy supply diversification. Nabucco is non-Russian controlled and a direct Caspian Sea-Middle East-EU southern gas corridor, and South Stream’s route is almost identical to Nabucco. The pipeline has a planned capacity of 31 billion cubic metres to begin in Beregovaya, Russia, and cross the Black Sea to Varna, Bulgaria. Both Nord Stream and Nabucco will bring gas to Austria’s Baumgarten gas storage and distribution hub, a clearinghouse for gas coming to Europe. In January, Austria’s OMV signed a deal giving Gazprom 50% ownership in Baumgarten and its trading floor, and is leading efforts to bring Gazprom into the Nabucco project in order to undermine EU energy diversification from Russia. 28 Russia is also consolidating its control over energy sources elsewhere in Middle East and North Africa (MENA countries). Russia and Iran had called for forming a gas cartel. While Russia, Qatar and Iran hold 56% of the world’s gas reserves, with addition of Venezuela, Algeria and Libya the cartel would have 2/3 of the world’s reserves. Indeed, Russia’s duplicitous stance in the UNSC is highlighted by the 13 July 2008 energy partnership between Gazprom and Iran’s NIOC, at a time when Russia was supposedly working with the U.S. and EU to ensure Iran has no room to manoeuvre in its nuclear weapons ambitions. 29 It also courted Turkey to be a participant in a Russian-Iranian partnership as the third investor to develop Iran’s South Par gas field, which culminated in the November 2008 Turkey-Iran $12 billion deal. 30 Finally, in the Africa region, in March 2008 Italian Eni agreed to share with Gazprom its development quotas for Libyan gas deposits. 31 Eni holds LNG processing facilities in Libya and this gives Gazprom control over another alternative European energy source. 32 In April 2008, Putin cancelled $4.5 billion Libyan debt and oversaw the signing of arms sales and joint ventures agreement between Gazprom and Libyan National Oil Corporation. Gazprom is looking to control Libyan gas and southern Mediterranean transit route that would further threaten Europe energy security, as well as engaging in talks to pipe Nigerian gas to Europe across the Sahara Desert. 33 Russia Energy Imperialism in Middle East Iran as Foothold in the Middle East Russia has longstanding interest in the Middle East, and a key Russia-Iran 1921 treaty stipulates that if a country attacks Russia via Iran, Russia can invade Iran to counter this threat. 34 In the 1980s Ariel Sharon warned Americans the danger of USSR using Iran-Iraq war to enter Iran and taking over its energy resources. 35 Russian military intervention remains a plausible threat should the U.S. and Israel conduct air-strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations, and even more so should Iran become a member of the SCO. Moreover, Russians had planned to meddle in Israel during the June 1967 Six Day War and flew Soviet photo-reconnaissance MiG-25 “Foxbat” aircrafts directly over the Dimona reactor in May 1967. 36 The Soviet Union engineered an operation to provoke Israel into war in order to provide cover for Soviet destruction of Israel’s nuclear programme. Soviet nuclear-missile submarines were poised off Israel’s shores, ready to strike back in case Israel already had a nuclear device. However, the war was over so quickly within six days that the Soviets did not have the chance to carry out its mission. 37 Despite Russia’s support of Iran, it is concurrently making overtures to moderate Arab states in the region to allay their fears of a resurgent and possible nuclear Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been historical rivals for regional hegemony and throughout the Cold War Russo-Saudi relations were chilly, but recently there has been a shift of Saudi Arabia towards Russia as evidenced in the 2007 $4 billion arms deal and increased shuttle diplomacy. 38 In the 1980s, CIA director William Casey worked with the House of Saud to target Russian energy sector by flooding the market with cheap oil, thereby weakening the Russian petro state’s economic power that was over 50% dependent on energy foreign exchange earnings. 39 As such, Russia appears to hedge itself against this risk and is courting many traditional U.S. allies in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the GCC. 40 And, it is reinforcing this hedge with military power by establishing naval ports in the region. Russian Naval Ports in the Middle East In January 2009 Russia announced that it would establish navy bases in Syria, Libya and Yemen. 41 The Syrian port of Tartus could be revived as during the Cold War, the Soviet navy had a permanent presence in the Mediterranean and used Tartus as a supply point. The redeploying of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to the Mediterranean may provide a deterrent to NATO forces, U.S. Sixth Fleet, and may threaten the Suez Canal and Israel. 42 These new ports would allow Russian navy to challenge U.S. CENTCOM, U.S. EUCOM, and NATO. Tensions were high in August 2008 after Russian invasion of Georgia when a build up of NATO and Russian naval forces were underway in the Black Sea, and the expansion of Russian naval power via these new ports would escalate tensions in the future. With Russia’s 1921 defence treaty to Iran and Iran’s 2004 defence treaty with Syria, these three countries are bound to act collectively against aggression to any one of them. Should Iran join the SCO as a member, the U.S., EU and NATO members would need to consider not only countering aggression by either one of these three, but also other members in their collective security alliance. Given Iran’s persistent threat to annihilate Israel and Russian backing with nuclear technology and arm sales to Iran, some pundits have argued for Israel to join NATO as a deterrent against aggression. The case is more compelling given Israel’s recent discovery of massive natural gas reserves offshore near Haifa 43 and potential oil reserves onshore by Haifa 44 , which could entice Russian invasion due to Russia’s own energy depletion 45 and attempts to seek new reserves by staking territorial claims: August 2007 claim in the Arctic region 46 ; 2008 claim to Sergei’s Courtyard (former KGB base) in Jerusalem 47 ; August 2008 invasion of Georgia over BTC pipelines that bypass Russian control 48 ; ongoing territorial disputes with Japan over the Kurile Islands. Given Russia’s pattern of aggressive territorial claims the past years and Iran’s consistent belligerence and support of Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel, Israel has in fact entered into strategic partnership with NATO and held joint military exercises since February 2005. 49 However, there remain obstacles and reservations about Israel joining NATO as a full member, due to their doctrine of self-reliance and freedom of military action, which would be encroached upon in a collective security arrangement. 50 Nonetheless, the notion of free democracies such as Israel, Australia, Japan, South Korea joining NATO to form an arc of freedom to counter emerging threats from totalitarian and rogue regimes continues to be debated and while viewed with reservation by Israel, may be more receptive in Asia. Russian Energy Imperialism in Asia Russian Energy Diplomacy in East Asia Russia is interested in using energy security as an anchor to assert itself as a regional hegemon in the Asia Pacific via oil & gas resources 51 in the Russia Far East (RFE). RFE consists of 40% of Russia landmass but only 10% of its population. Over the years there has been a trend of RFE integration into Northeast Asia and disintegration from the rest of Russia that in 2006 Putin described the situation in RFE as “a threat to national security” and stressed the need “to invest money in the Far East”. 52 Regional unrest is most recently demonstrated by violent protests in Vladivostok on 31 January 2009 53 and officials admitting that RFE is “completely cut off from the rest of Russia” and must “orient itself” to Asian countries rather than to European Russia. RFE imports 90% of goods from Asian countries and there is a trend the area may become a raw material supplier for China and Japan. 54 As such, Russia is attempting to reverse this trend by using energy projects to anchor the RFE and supply energy goods to Asian consumers such as China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. It is hoping to tie East Asia, RFE and the rest of European Russia together via the Iron Silk Road, which would connect the Trans-Siberian Railway to the Trans-Korean Railway to supply European goods as well as energy exports. Moreover, it is also offering incentives such as interest-free loans for Russians to settle in the RFE. However, Russian energy diplomacy in East Asia is still fraught with many obstacles. Oil & gas exploration and production in the greenfield province of East Siberia is expensive due to harsh climatic condition, lack of infrastructure, investment, and western technologies. The East Siberian Pacific Ocean Pipeline (ESPO) that would ensure Russian oil supply to China has faced considerable delays. 55 Even if the pipeline is launched, Russia cannot easily supply Korea and China with gas due to lack of regional grid in East Asia. 56 Given Russia’s end goal of asserting itself in East Asia via energy resources, and the obstacles facing RFE’s near-term energy delivery to East Asian consumers, Russia appears to resort to other means to access and control energy resources for East Asia—e.g., “lock in” long-term bilateral deals with Central Asian energy exporters and asserting control over energy supply; aligning with Iran and courting other Middle East suppliers via ‘arms for energy’ policy; aggressive territorial claims in Arctic Region; forming SCO Energy Club in 2007 and proposing a gas cartel to control supply and coordinate prices. With the increasing **militarisation of Russia’s energy policy** and alignment of totalitarian regimes in the Eurasian SCO bloc, this **has important security implications** for U.S. and its allies in the region. U.S. Alliance Relations and NATO Global Partnership It is no coincidence that in August 2005 SCO kicked off their first joint military exercises in Vladivostok in RFE, underscoring Russia’ concern with RFE secession and China’s angst over Taiwan independence under the then pro-independence President Chen Shui-Bian. 57 In fact China had proposed Zhejiang province across from Taiwan as the site for the military exercise, but when the Russians rejected it as being provocative, they concurred to hold it in Shandong province. 58 The Taiwan contingency is a key flash point for military clashes in East Asia, especially in light of rapid Chinese military modernisation and a recent report by U.S. State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, illuminating the strategic significance of Taiwan in both China and U.S. geopolitical calculus. 59 Given that SCO **is a proxy to advance China and Russian interests** and the 2000 Dushanbe Declaration has specific wording to establish formal support for China regarding “One China Principle,” there is a possibility in a Taiwan scenario for the U.S., under the Taiwan Relations Act, to be drawn into conflict with China and perhaps Russia, Kazakhstan and other SCO members. 60 Indeed Victor Corpus, a retired brigadier general and former chief of the U.S. intelligence service in the Philippines, provides an eerie prediction of war resulting from a Taiwan contingency and how SCO allies could become involved. Corpus writes: “On yet another major front in Central Asia, Russian troops lead the other member countries of the SCO into a major offensive against US military bases in Central Asia. The bases are first subjected to a simultaneous barrage of missiles with fuel-air explosives and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads before they are overrun and occupied by SCO coalition forces.” 61 **The increasing militarisation of the SCO bloc has** strategic **implications for U.S. alliance relations** in East Asia—Japan’s territorial disputes with China over Senkaku Islands and with Russia over Kurile Islands, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, territorial disputes in the South China Sea are flash points that will potentially draw China, Russia and their SCO allies against U.S. and her allies. In face of creeping SCO projection onto Asia Pacific region and an emerging bloc of totalitarian regimes, some scholars have proposed the U.S. and her allies counter this bloc by aligning various bilateral defence alliances into NATO Global Partnership. With the upcoming NATO summit in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009, this would be a good possibility to review criteria of new members. As Eckart von Klaeden, the Foreign Policy Spokesman for Chancellor Merkel’S CDU party posit, it is important to expand NATO relations with partners in Asia who have already contributed troops to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and admit democratic like-minded countries such as Japan, India, Australia etc. to the fold. 62 And, India is a key country for NATO’s mission and reach onto the Indian Ocean. Both NATO and SCO are courting India due to its geo-strategic significance in the Indian Ocean. India is an observer member in the SCO and in the past has been represented by its energy minister to discuss energy deals. At the same time NATO is also cooperating with India with hopes for its entering into a Partnership arrangement. The Indian Ocean is an important region as it is home to U.S. naval base Diego Garcia and naval power projection to secure energy SLOCS from the Middle East to Asia. The U.S. has been encouraging India to forge partnership with NATO and in October 2008 NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Group was deployed to the Indian Ocean to address the problems of piracy. 63 In 2007, after the Malabar Exercise encompassing, U.S. India, Japan, Singapore and Australia, India was invited for the first time to participate in the 2008 U.S.-NATO Red Flag war games. 64 Indeed, without India, NATO’s partnership in the Indian Ocean region would be limited. India has traditionally been a non-aligned nation, but **should Russia use energy to bring India into full SCO membership** at a time when SCO is on a trajectory of increased militarisation (e.g., CSTO-SCO ties, increasingly aggressive military exercises), it could become bound by an eventual SCO ‘mutual assistance’ clause to the detriment of U.S., EU and NATO interests. Two days after NATO deployed its naval forces to the Indian ocean in October 2008, Russia scrambled to project influence onto the region when Moscow stated that a missile frigate from Russia’s Baltic fleet was already heading to the Indian Ocean “to fight piracy off Somalia’s coast,” and shortly afterwards the Upper House of the Russia Parliament announced plans to resume its Soviet-era naval presence in Yemen. 65 It also announced intentions to return to its naval base in Socotra Archipelago, located off the Horn of Africa. 66 The Socotra base was established by the Soviet Union in 1971, and the location is expected to play a role in fighting piracy due to the ability to use small vessels, trawlers and other boats of minor rank as well as providing a reliable logistics system for major ships to allow operations in the Indian Ocean. Given the recent Kyrgyzstan decision, under Russian pressure, to close the Manas airbase 67 , Russian military projection via the Horn of Africa into the Indian Ocean may likewise jeopardise U.S. Counterterrorism efforts. The Horn of Africa is watched through U.S. AFRICOM headquartered in Germany, and Djibouti hosts the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. With Russian inroads into the Horn of Africa via the Socotra base and new defence cooperation with Somalia 68 , its former Cold War ally, this pattern **of recruiting allies whose interests diverge from those of the U.S.** risk bringing Russo-U.S. relations onto a collision course in the region. Over the past years the world has witnessed a disquieting **trend of Russia’s weaponisation of its energy policy to reassert itself as a global superpower**. Admittedly the recent global financial crisis has knocked that off course for the moment, but this is likely to be temporary. After Russian invasion of Georgia, Moscow’s stock market plummeted by more than 50% since its highs in May 2008, and Russia’s strong dependence on energy export revenues and speculative investments render its economy very volatile. 69 Given Putin’s goal of increasing military budget by 28% within the next year and modernising its military 70 , its current economic and budget woes may hinder that ambition. Nonetheless, despite the financial crisis, defence orders remain strong. According to data revealed by deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov, Russia earned more than $8 billion in arms sales in 2008, with $33 billion more in the pipeline. 71 It is to resume arms sales to Lebanon, intensify defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and compete with British, U.S. and French defence contractors for orders from Lebanon, Algeria and elsewhere. It is also looking to increase intra-regional trade of SCO and CSTO members and create a new economic architecture to maintain its economic and military power. 72 Sino-Russian bilateral trade reached $50 billion in 2008 73 , and given that China provides a large energy and trade export market for Russia, in the medium and long-term Russia may be able to ride out the current financial crisis and continue on its military modernisation and strategic ambition. Although SCO is not yet a mature security alliance, under Russian lead it is moving towards that trajectory—aggressive military exercises, agreement with CSTO (a purely military alliance), and possible “military assistance” clause in SCO policy. The U.S and her allies therefore need to monitor the close nexus between energy security and military alliances as manifested through SCO-CSTO ties, and put in place countermeasures to safeguard against Russia-China-Iran axis from using SCO for anti-western policies. To that end, **the U.S. and EU need to work together to reduce Russian energy dependency and seek diversification via non-Russian controlled pipeline**s, renewables, conservation/efficiency measure as well as alternative geographic suppliers from West Africa, Canada, and elsewhere.

[SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization]

#### Russian military aggression is high now – conflicts will occur in the future

Weitz 11/21 (Richard – Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute, “The Focus of Russian Military Means”, 2012, http://www.sldinfo.com/the-focus-of-russian-military-means/)

Despite the reformers’ goal of redirecting Russian strategic thought away from fighting the West to winning localized conflicts, Russia’s military doctrine and recent military exercises **still identify** resisting NATO **aggression as** a major task of the Russian armed forces. The 2010 Military Doctrine describes NATO’s growing military infrastructure near Russia’s border as well as the alliance’s alleged efforts to acquire “global functions in contravention of international law” as potentially threatening Russia’s military security. An important consideration affecting how Russians approach military reform is their expectations of the nature of future wars—especially the questions of the main sources of military threats and how they might manifest themselves. The most basic consideration is that Russian leaders still see themselves as threatened from hostile forces that must be dealt with through military means. Although individuals differ on what they see as the main threats, there is a pervasive sense that, under certain conditions, Russia could come into conflict with certain foreign countries if it fails to have an effective military. Mostly these possible adversaries are seen as Western states, but some Russian strategists, thinking ahead, consider China and possibly Iran as emerging threats.

#### Senkaku disputes go nuclear

**Emmot**, 6/4/**2008** (Bill – editor of the Economist, Power rises in the east, The Australian, p. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/arts/power-rises-in-the-east/story-e6frg8px-1111116460128)

As well as knitting them, however, this drama is also grinding together Asian powers that had previously kept a strict economic and political separation from one another. China, India and Japan are bumping against each other because their national interests are overlapping and in part competing. **Each is suspicious of the others' motives and intentions** and all three hope to get their own way in Asia and further afield. To have three great powers at the same time may be unprecedented for Asia but it is not for the world. There was a similar situation in Europe during the 19th century, when Britain, France, Russia, Austria and, until German unification, Prussia, existed in an uneasy balance in which none was dominant and none was entirely comfortable, but which nevertheless coincided with a period during which Europe prospered and became firmly established as the world's dominant region. Whether you consider Europe's 19th-century experience with balance-of-power politics as a good or bad omen for Asia depends on how long a sweep of history you consider and on what you think are the most crucial differences between modern times and the world of 150 years ago. If you take a long sweep, then the precedent is bad, since Europe's power balance ended in two devastating world wars. On the other hand, it kept the peace on the continent for about half a century, which would count as an optimistic prospect today. Today the barriers against the use of war as a tool of national policy are far higher: nuclear weapons, public opinion, international law, instant communication and transparency all militate against conflict, though they do not rule it out altogether. The barriers against colonial or quasi-colonial ambitions are higher still. China and India may battle for influence over Burma, but neither is likely to invade it and turn it into a colony. Nevertheless, Asia is piled high with historical bitterness, unresolved territorial disputes, potential flashpoints and strategic competition that could **readily ignite**. There are at least five known flashpoints where it is already clear that any could involve the major powers: the Sino-Indian border and Tibet, North and South Korea, the East China Sea and the Senkaku-Diaoyutai islands, Taiwan and Pakistan.

#### Terrorism results in extinction

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand – Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), July)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,[40](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928" \l "EN0040) and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”[41](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0041) Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”[42](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0042) American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia's use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia's traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

#### Scenario 1: US-China Relations

#### Sustainable US LNG exports spurs cooperative LNG trading with China – that’s key to overall relations

Livingston and Tu 12 (David, Junior Fellow in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Kevin Jianjun, Senior Associate in the Energy and Climate Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Feeding China’s Energy Appetite, Naturally,” Energy Tribune, 7-17, http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/11206/Feeding-Chinas-Energy-Appetite-Naturally)

Ever since CNOOC, one of China’s “big three” national oil companies, made an ill-fated bid to take over Unocal Corporation in 2005, Sino-U.S. energy relations have been marred with mistrust. Foreign acquisitions by China’s national oil companies thereafter have largely avoided the United States. Many were thus caught off guard by recent reports that Sinopec has emerged as a leading suitor for some of the $7 billion in natural gas assets that Chesapeake Energy must shed to avoid a breach of its debt covenants. Yet upon closer inspection, the move is deft and bears the imprint of lessons well-learned. Chinese national oil companies know from prior experience that in the United States they must wear kid gloves to avoid getting burned. With U.S. natural gas prices projected to remain at $2-4/Mmbtu and far higher returns on investment elsewhere around the globe, why would Sinopec pour capital into American shale gas production when so many U.S. companies are shutting down rigs? There are a number of macro- and micro-dynamics at play here. China’s demand for gas is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. Natural gas currently accounts for only 4 percent of the country’s energy mix, but the International Energy Agency projects this rising to 13 percent by 2035. The same organization predicts that China will account for roughly a quarter of global gas demand growth over the same period. There is also a high level of uncertainty over how reliant the country will be on foreign gas. Much of this will depend on China’s ability to exploit its vast domestic shale gas resources. If unconventional development is well-orchestrated, Chinese gas imports as a share of total demand could be as low as 20 percent in 2035. Alternatively, slow progress in unconventional gas development could lead to a dependency rate north of 50 percent, according to the IEA. In either scenario, a stake in Chesapeake’s gas assets could potentially pay dividends for China. Chesapeake was one of the first to commit wholeheartedly to the potential of shale gas in the United States. It has snatched up vast swaths of shale acreage, and possesses the technology and know-how to efficiently extract unconventional gas from these basins. Sinopec would love nothing more than to gain firsthand experience with hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques that could eventually be applied to China’s massive shale resources. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, technically recoverable shale gas reserves in China are at least 50 percent greater than the sizeable shale endowment in the United States. Sinopec drilled its first shale gas well in Chongqing on June 9, but until it develops the capacity to unlock domestic resources en masse at low cost, acquisitions are the quickest way to bolster its gas reserves. The company might be seeking to secure a dedicated stream of U.S. natural gas production for shipping to China as liquefied natural gas in the future. **This is a complicated proposition, especially considering that the scale of U.S. LNG exports is highly uncertain**. The prospect of rising domestic gas prices as a consequence of satiating Chinese demand would become a thorny political issue, whether merited or not. At the corporate level, Sinopec’s own characteristics reveal an internal logic to the prospective Chesapeake deal. The move is driven by its international market-oriented new boss, Fu Chengyu. Fu served at the helm of CNOOC until 2010 and his failure to secure the Unocal deal in 2005 will undoubtedly inform his current attempt. Evidence of this can already be seen in Sinopec’s preference for partial assets over outright ownership. Of course, Sinopec precluding itself from an operational role also potentially distances it from the technologies and methodologies that it covets. Nevertheless, Fu has remains tempted by U.S. shale gas assets with attractive valuations. Sinopec has been slower getting into America than its rival CNOOC, which recently entered into two billion-dollar joint ventures with Chesapeake in the Niobrara and Eagle Ford shale. Moreover, Sinopec suffers from an unbalanced portfolio, with too many loss-making refineries and too few premiere upstream assets. Oil and gas projects in Iran that have been abandoned by Western companies would normally be an attractive target, but Beijing has increasingly pressured national oil companies to curtail involvement in the pariah state. Unsurprisingly, Sinopec has recently returned its gaze to the United States. Although U.S. natural gas won’t offer lucrative returns until prices rise, Chesapeake’s acreage is likely to sell at a discount and would allow Sinopec to hedge its holdings in more geopolitically tenuous markets. After his $2.5 billion deal with Devon Energy in January for stakes in five different liquids-rich shale plays, a tie-up with Chesapeake would solidify Fu’s reputation as a shrewd CEO. For China, the deal offers another geopolitical hedge—the opportunity to turn dollar-denominated treasury bills into real energy assets. The Chinese government would likely play a key role in financing any large deals pursued by its national oil companies. This is an aspect of the deal worth watching. CNOOC’s critics back in 2005 objected to the assortment of low-interest and interest-free loans backed by Chinese government coffers. Were Sinopec to rely on a similar arrangement of state support, it might be met with resistance in the United States. But the U.S. congress is in a much weaker position than it was in 2005. Partial asset ownership is not the wholesale surrender of a strategic corporation, and the American natural gas industry would welcome with open arms the capital inflow. This points to the **most constructive way forward** for both Washington and Beijing. China is still trying to grow a domestic shale gas industry without opening the market to international players. During the second round of shale gas bids in China, a small window was opened for other domestic companies, but none of them have more sophisticated technology than CNPC, Sinopec, or CNOOC. Sooner or later, China will realize that there are no shortcuts if shale gas is to be developed safely, efficiently, and responsibly. It should follow its own offshore oil exploration model, offering up its domestic market in return for cutting-edge technology. The Chesapeake deal may pay dividends to both the United States and China, but the synergy will go even further if Beijing eventually returns the favor at home.

#### Specifically – that removes Chinese fears of US encirclement – solves US-China conflict and spills over to clean tech cooperation

Stone 11 (Matt, Energy Consultant, US Foreign Policy Analyst, and Junior Associate – McKinsey & Company, “Natural Gas,” The Diplomat, 2-15, http://thediplomat.com/whats-next-china/natural-gas/)

In the space of just a couple of years, natural gas has become the 'next big thing' in energy circles. The recent expansion of unconventional gas production in North America has transformed the United States into the world’s top producer of the fuel. Cleaner-burning than coal, gas is expected to benefit in a carbon-constrained world as it displaces coal in the electricity-generation sector. Moreover a burgeoning interconnected global gas market, spurred by the expansion of the sea-borne liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, is helping to increase market flexibility so that disruptions like those caused by Russia-Ukrainian disputes have less pernicious effects on downstream countries. Hoping to take advantage of these developments, China has crafted a strategy for natural gas that aims to increase domestic production and secure access to gas resources in neighbouring countries. For Beijing, gas offers an opportunity to power its growing economy in a less polluting way than burning coal (although coal is expected to remain vital to China’s rapid economic ascent). Natural gas may also have a role to play in the transportation sector, where Beijing is experimenting in dramatic fashion with compressed natural gas (CNG) in automobiles. Historically, oil’s prominent and essential role in the transportation sector has driven its centrality in international affairs. A transportation sector that could rely jointly on oil and natural gas would allow China to be marginally more indifferent to Middle Eastern geopolitics—in stark contrast with the US experience of the past half-century. The BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 estimates that China produced approximately 85 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas in 2009, while consuming 89 bcm, an import gap that’s expected to expand rapidly in the coming years as gas demand outpaces domestic supply. Indeed, the International Energy Agency (IEA) sees China’s gas demand increasing by 6 percent annually through 2035. The reality is, though, that the country’s own conventional natural gas resources are nowhere near enough to meet this growing demand, forcing Beijing to ramp up its efforts to access gas supplies abroad—particularly in Central Asia, Russia and Burma. It’s here that the frequent portrayal of Beijing as a cash-flush power willing to throw money around to lock up resources is misplaced. China has in fact been carefully expanding its influence in Central Asia and Russia in particular, biding its time until the right deal has come along. Negotiations with Russia over gas supplies, for example, have been ongoing for years (much to Moscow’s consternation). The proposal on the table now would mean two pipelines entering China—one in Xinjiang from the Russian region of Altai and another in Manchuria from the Russian Far East. The former line would have a capacity of 30 bcm per year, the latter 38 bcm per year. But lack of agreement on the price Russian state gas company Gazprom will charge has stalled things. Of course, there’s more to this than pricing. Although Moscow enjoys a privileged position in the export of Russian oil and gas for both economic and political reasons, its manipulation of energy flows to Europe has tarnished the country’s reputation as a reliable supplier of hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, investments in the gas fields that would supply China have been slow to materialize. Both points will likely have made Beijing think carefully about the implications of an inconsistent supply of Russian gas. This reticence over gas is in contrast with a deal struck over crude oil, with China having issued a $25 billion loan to Russia in February 2009 to secure a 20-year supply of crude oil. At the same time, Beijing has postponed a decision on a loan for natural gas—a conspicuous vote of no confidence in Russia’s short-term attractiveness as a gas supplier. If the story of the Russia-China gas trade relationship is one of chess-like negotiations and Beijing’s reticence, China’s experience in Central Asia has been more straightforward. China signed an agreement to build a gas pipeline out of Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2006. Backstopped with a $4 billion loan to Ashgabat and upstream contracts for China’s state-owned CNPC in Turkmenistan, the pipeline came online in December 2009—impressively swift. However, now that it’s operational, Beijing has leveraged its position to extract concessions from the countries along the pipeline. Turkmenistan in particular is under pressure. Russia has cut its purchases of Turkmen gas by three-quarters since 2008, prompting Ashgabat to push China to buy more gas. But Beijing, keenly aware of its negotiating advantage, has held out, purchasing only 4 bcm this year. In the case of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, China has spurred competition for access to the pipeline, with the two engaging in development of gas fields and infrastructure in order to access the pipeline before the other. That said, China may decide it’s in its own interests to selectively manage access to the pipeline in order to win concessions on price and upstream contracts in each country, which would provide it potent political leverage with countries that would prefer to develop robust alternatives to exporting hydrocarbons to Russia. But can Beijing afford to play the long game with neighbouring gas suppliers given its fast-growing demand? A look at China’s alternative sources of supply, particularly domestic production and increasing volumes of LNG in the country’s gas supply mix, offer a glimpse of a possible answer. Beijing has prioritized the development of domestic gas supply, partnering with a number of Western oil firms to develop the country’s unconventional gas resources, which are thought to be large. Washington has promoted this cooperation through the US-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative, a mechanism announced in November 2009 to share expertise and technology for unconventional gas production. In addition, LNG spot prices are currently depressed, prompting Chinese energy firms to purchase spot cargoes through the country’s three LNG import terminals. Sixteen more LNG import terminals are under consideration. Such trends point to a relative decline in the importance of Russian and Central Asian gas to China’s energy security future—a narrative that Beijing’s diplomats are sure to promote in Moscow, Ashgabat, Tashkent and Astana. Chinese national oil companies operate with the explicit backing of the Chinese state–including the state budget.In a region where governments treat their oil and gas resources as strategic commodities to be traded for political perquisites, Chinese companies therefore possess an in-built advantage. But more importantly, China’s unity of effort—political and commercial—allows Beijing to act strategically, with long time horizons, in order to secure the best deal. While China couldn’t have predicted the revolution in unconventional gas production or the global recession, its patience has strengthened its bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia and the Central Asian states. Beijing’s engagement also has the tacit consent of Washington. Western policy in the post-Soviet period has been designed to reinforce Central Asian sovereignty by developing export corridors for oil and gas that avoid Russian (and Iranian) territory. While the United States and Europe have had some success on the western edge of the Caspian Sea by constructing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, large-volume trans-Caspian projects for Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas have been delayed for commercial and geopolitical reasons. In this regard, China has developed a non-Russian, non-Iranian export corridor for Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh gas where the West couldn’t (there’s also a Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline in operation). In a sense, this should provide greater stability in an important and strategic part of the world. And China, meanwhile, appears to have not yet attempted to translate its newfound economic heft into political influence to the West’s detriment: Beijing has **so far** avoided pushing for the **curtailment of the Western military presence in Central Asia** despite ongoing worries about ‘encirclement.’ China’s energy trade relationships with Russia and Central Asia should also make the Middle Kingdom feel more assured about its energy security future. Much of China’s naval build-up and assertive behaviour, especially in the South China Sea, in recent years is motivated by concerns about the security of China’s sea-borne energy imports from the Middle East, both oil and LNG. In the post-World War II period, the US Navy has played the role of guarantor of open trade on the high seas, but Beijing appears to believe this commitment won't continue in the event of conflict with Washington over Taiwan or North Korea. The United States’ efforts to help China expand domestic gas production and its lack of opposition to China-bound pipelines out of Central Asia and Russia should be interpreted by Beijing as indicative of the US commitment to help China grow comfortable about its place in the American-led world order. Natural gas is clearly an important component of Beijing’s energy strategy over the next century. Thus far, China’s approach to accessing foreign and domestic sources of supply has proven collaborative, rather than confrontational, in nature. US assistance on Chinese unconventional gas production presages greater cooperation on energy matters, including in clean-tech where Beijing and Washington can best address climate-altering carbon emissions. In Russia and Central Asia, meanwhile, China has husbanded its resources and influence to achieve advantageous deals.

#### That’s the most likely for escalated US-China conflict

Glaser 12 (Bonnie S., Senior Fellow – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” CFR, April, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

**The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant**. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult. A second contingency involves conflict between China and the Philippines over **natural gas deposits**, especially in the disputed area of Reed Bank, located eighty nautical miles from Palawan. Oil survey ships operating in Reed Bank under contract have increasingly been harassed by Chinese vessels. Reportedly, the United Kingdom-based Forum Energy plans to start drilling for gas in Reed Bank this year, which could provoke an aggressive Chinese response. Forum Energy is only one of fifteen exploration contracts that Manila intends to offer over the next few years for offshore exploration near Palawan Island. Reed Bank is a red line for the Philippines, so this contingency could quickly escalate to violence if China intervened to halt the drilling. The United States could be drawn into a China-Philippines conflict because of its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. The treaty states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes." American officials insist that Washington does not take sides in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and refuse to comment on how the United States might respond to Chinese aggression in contested waters. Nevertheless, an apparent gap exists between American views of U.S. obligations and Manila's expectations. In mid-June 2011, a Filipino presidential spokesperson stated that in the event of armed conflict with China, Manila expected the United States would come to its aid. Statements by senior U.S. officials may have inadvertently led Manila to conclude that the United States would provide military assistance if China attacked Filipino forces in the disputed Spratly Islands. With improving political and military ties between Manila and Washington, including a pending agreement to expand U.S. access to Filipino ports and airfields to refuel and service its warships and planes, the United States would have a great deal at stake in a China-Philippines contingency. Failure to respond would not only set back U.S. relations with the Philippines but would also potentially undermine U.S. credibility in the region with its allies and partners more broadly. A U.S. decision to dispatch naval ships to the area, however, would risk a U.S.-China naval confrontation. Disputes between China and Vietnam over seismic surveys or drilling for oil and gas could also trigger an armed clash for a third contingency. China has harassed PetroVietnam oil survey ships in the past that were searching for oil and gas deposits in Vietnam's EEZ. In 2011, Hanoi accused China of deliberately severing the cables of an oil and gas survey vessel in two separate instances. Although the Vietnamese did not respond with force, they did not back down and Hanoi pledged to continue its efforts to exploit new fields despite warnings from Beijing. Budding U.S.-Vietnam relations could embolden Hanoi to be more confrontational with China on the South China Sea issue. The United States could be drawn into a conflict between China and Vietnam, though that is less likely than a clash between China and the Philippines. In a scenario of Chinese provocation, the United States might opt to dispatch naval vessels to the area to signal its interest in regional peace and stability. Vietnam, and possibly other nations, could also request U.S. assistance in such circumstances. Should the United States become involved, subsequent actions by China or a miscalculation among the forces present could result in exchange of fire. In another possible scenario, an attack by China on vessels or rigs operated by an American company exploring or drilling for hydrocarbons could quickly involve the United States, especially if American lives were endangered or lost. ExxonMobil has plans to conduct exploratory drilling off Vietnam, making this an existential danger. In the short term, however, the likelihood of this third contingency occurring is relatively low given the recent thaw in Sino-Vietnamese relations. In October 2011, China and Vietnam signed an agreement outlining principles for resolving maritime issues. The effectiveness of this agreement remains to be seen, but for now tensions appear to be defused. Warning Indicators Strategic warning signals that indicate heightened risk of conflict include political decisions and statements by senior officials, official and unofficial media reports, and logistical changes and equipment modifications. In the contingencies described above, strategic warning indicators could include heightened rhetoric from all or some disputants regarding their territorial and strategic interests. For example, China may explicitly refer to the South China Sea as a core interest; in 2010 Beijing hinted this was the case but subsequently backed away from the assertion. Beijing might also warn that it cannot "stand idly by" as countries nibble away at Chinese territory, a formulation that in the past has often signaled willingness to use force. Commentaries and editorials in authoritative media outlets expressing China's bottom line and issuing ultimatums could also be a warning indicator. Tough language could also be used by senior People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers in meetings with their American counterparts. An increase in nationalistic rhetoric in nonauthoritative media and in Chinese blogs, even if not representing official Chinese policy, would nevertheless signal pressure on the Chinese leadership to defend Chinese interests. Similar warning indicators should be tracked in Vietnam and the Philippines that might signal a hardening of those countries' positions. Tactical warning signals that indicate heightened risk of a potential clash in a specific time and place include commercial notices and preparations, diplomatic and/or military statements warning another claimant to cease provocative activities or suffer the consequences, military exercises designed to intimidate another claimant, and ship movements to disputed areas. As for an impending incident regarding U.S. surveillance activities, statements and unusual preparations by the PLA might suggest a greater willingness to employ more aggressive means to intercept U.S. ships and aircraft. Implications for U.S. Interests The United States has significant political, security, and economic interests at stake if one of the contingencies should occur. Global rules and norms. The United States has important interests in the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes according to international law. With the exception of China, all the claimants of the South China Sea have attempted to justify their claims based on their coastlines and the provisions of UNCLOS. China, however, relies on a mix of historic rights and legal claims, while remaining deliberately ambiguous about the meaning of the "nine-dashed line" around the sea that is drawn on Chinese maps. Failure to uphold international law and norms could harm U.S. interests elsewhere in the region and beyond. Ensuring freedom of navigation is another critical interest of the United States and other regional states. Although China claims that it supports freedom of navigation, its insistence that foreign militaries seek advance permission to sail in its two-hundred-mile EEZ casts doubt on its stance. China's development of capabilities to deny American naval access to those waters in a conflict provides evidence of possible Chinese intentions to block freedom of navigation in specific contingencies. Alliance security and regional stability. U.S. allies and friends around the South China Sea look to the United States to maintain free trade, safe and secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and overall peace and stability in the region. Claimants and nonclaimants to land features and maritime waters in the South China Sea view the U.S. military presence as necessary to allow decision-making free of intimidation. If nations in the South China Sea lose confidence in the United States to serve as the principal regional security guarantor, they could embark on costly and potentially destabilizing arms buildups to compensate or, alternatively, become more accommodating to the demands of a powerful China. Neither would be in the U.S. interest. Failure to reassure allies of U.S. commitments in the region could also undermine U.S. security guarantees in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the United States must avoid getting drawn into the territorial dispute—and possibly into a conflict—by regional nations who seek U.S. backing to legitimize their claims. Economic interests. Each year, $5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea; U.S. trade accounts for $1.2 trillion of this total. Should a crisis occur, the diversion of cargo ships to other routes would harm regional economies as a result of an increase in insurance rates and longer transits. Conflict of any scale in the South China Sea would hamper the claimants from benefiting from the South China's Sea's proven and potential riches. Cooperative relationship with China. The stakes and implications of any U.S.-China incident are far greater than in other scenarios. The United States has an abiding interest in preserving stability in the U.S.-China relationship so that it can continue to secure Beijing's cooperation on an expanding list of regional and global issues and more tightly integrate China into the prevailing international system. Preventive Options Efforts should continue to resolve the disputes over territorial sovereignty of the South China Sea's land features, rightful jurisdiction over the waters and seabed, and the legality of conducting military operations within a country's EEZ, but the likelihood of a breakthrough in any of these areas is slim in the near term. In the meantime, the United States should focus on lowering the risk of potential armed clashes arising from either miscalculation or unintended escalation of a dispute. There are several preventive options available to policymakers—in the United States and other nations—to avert a crisis and conflict in the South China Sea. These options are not mutually exclusive. Support U.S.-China Risk-reduction Measures Operational safety measures and expanded naval cooperation between the United States and China can help to reduce the risk of an accident between ships and aircraft. The creation of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 1988 was intended to establish "rules of the road" at sea similar to the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), but it has not been successful. Communication mechanisms can provide a means to defuse tensions in a crisis and prevent escalation. Political and military hotlines have been set up, though U.S. officials have low confidence that they would be utilized by their Chinese counterparts during a crisis. An additional hotline to manage maritime emergencies should be established at an operational level, along with a signed political agreement committing both sides to answer the phone in a crisis. Joint naval exercises to enhance the ability of the two sides to cooperate in counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations could increase cooperation and help prevent a U.S.-China conflict. Bolster Capabilities of Regional Actors Steps could be taken to further enhance the capability of the Philippines military to defend its territorial and maritime claims and improve its indigenous domain awareness, which might deter China from taking aggressive action. Similarly, the United States could boost the maritime surveillance capabilities of Vietnam, enabling its military to more effectively pursue an anti-access and area-denial strategy. Such measures run the risk of emboldening the Philippines and Vietnam to more assertively challenge China and could raise those countries' expectations of U.S. assistance in a crisis. Encourage Settlement of the Sovereignty Dispute The United States could push for submission of territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for settlement, or encourage an outside organization or mediator to be called upon to resolve the dispute. However, the prospect for success in these cases is slim given China's likely opposition to such options. Other options exist to resolve the sovereignty dispute that would be difficult, but not impossible, to negotiate. One such proposal, originally made by Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke, and Noel Ludwig in Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, would establish "regional sovereignty" over the islands in the South China Sea among the six claimants, allowing them to collectively manage the islands, territorial seas, and airspace. Another option put forward by Peter Dutton of the Naval War College would emulate the resolution of the dispute over Svalbard, an island located between Norway and Greenland. The Treaty of Spitsbergen, signed in 1920, awarded primary sovereignty over Svarlbard to Norway but assigned resource-related rights to all signatories. This solution avoided conflict over resources and enabled advancement of scientific research. Applying this model to the South China Sea would likely entail giving sovereignty to China while permitting other countries to benefit from the resources. In the near term, at least, such a solution is unlikely to be accepted by the other claimants. Promote Regional Risk-reduction Measures The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China agreed upon multilateral risk-reduction and confidence-building measures in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), but have neither adhered to its provisions (for example, to resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes without resorting to the threat or use of force) nor implemented its proposals to undertake cooperative trust-building activities. The resumption of negotiations between China and ASEAN after a hiatus of a decade holds out promise for reinvigorating cooperative activities under the DOC. Multilaterally, existing mechanisms and procedures already exist to promote operational safety among regional navies; a new arrangement is unnecessary. The United States, China, and all ASEAN members with the exception of Laos and Burma are members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Founded in 1988, WPNS brings regional naval leaders together biennially to discuss maritime security. In 2000, it produced the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES), which includes safety measures and procedures and means to facilitate communication when ships and aircraft make contact. There are also other mechanisms available such as the International Maritime Organization's Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and the International Civil Aviation Organization's rules of the air. In addition, regional navies could cooperate in sea environment protection, scientific research at sea, search and rescue activities, and mitigation of damage caused by natural calamities. The creation of new dialogue mechanisms may also be worth consideration. A South China Sea Coast Guard Forum, modeled after the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which cooperates on a multitude of maritime security and legal issues, could enhance cooperation through information sharing and knowledge of best practices. The creation of a South China Sea information-sharing center would also provide a platform to improve awareness and communication between relevant parties. The information-sharing center could also serve as an accountability mechanism if states are required to document any incidents and present them to the center. Advocate Joint Development/Multilateral Economic Cooperation Resource cooperation is another preventive option that is underutilized by claimants in the South China Sea. Joint development of petroleum resources, for example, could reduce tensions between China and Vietnam, and between China and the Philippines, on issues related to energy security and access to hydrocarbon resources. Such development could be modeled on one of the many joint development arrangements that exist in the South and East China seas. Parties could also cooperate on increasing the use of alternative energy sources in order to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. Shared concerns about declining fish stocks in the South China Sea suggest the utility of cooperation to promote conservation and sustainable development. Establishing a joint fisheries committee among claimants could prove useful. Fishing agreements between China and its neighbors are already in place that could be expanded into disputed areas to encourage greater cooperation. Clearly Convey U.S. Commitments The United States should avoid inadvertently encouraging the claimants to engage in confrontational behavior. For example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's reference in November 2011 to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea could have unintended consequences such as emboldening Manila to antagonize China rather than it seeking to peacefully settle their differences.

#### Extinction

Lieven 12 (Anatol, Professor in the War Studies Department – King’s College (London), Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Washington), “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, 6-12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html)

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

### 1AC – No Disads

#### Contention 4: No Disads

#### 20 years of shale gas now – that takes out your DA

Berman 12 (Art, Former Editor – Oil and Gas Journal, Geological Consultant – American Association of Petroleum Geologists, “After the Gold Rush: A Perspective on Future U.S. Natural Gas Supply and Price,” Oil Drum, 2-8-12, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8914)

The Potential Gas Committee (PGC) is the standard for resource assessments because of the objectivity and credentials of its members, and its long and reliable history. In its biennial report released in April 2011, three categories of technically recoverable resources are identified: probable, possible and speculative. The President and many others have taken the PGC total of all three categories (2,170 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas) and divided by 2010 annual consumption of 24 Tcf. This results in 90 and not 100 years of gas. Much of this total resource is in accumulations too small to be produced at any price, is inaccessible to drilling, or is too deep to recover economically. More relevant is the Committee’s probable mean resources value of 550 (Tcf) of gas (Exhibit 4). If half of this supply becomes a reserve (225 Tcf), the U.S. has approximately 11.5 years of potential future gas supply at present consumption rates. When proved reserves of 273 Tcf are included, there is an additional 11.5 years of supply for a total of almost 23 years. It is worth noting that proved reserves include proved undeveloped reserves which may or may not be produced depending on economics, so even 23 years of supply is tenuous. If consumption increases, this supply will be exhausted in less than 23 years. Revisions to this estimate will be made and there probably is more than 23 years but based on current information, 100 years of gas is not justified.

#### No PC

Financial Times, **1/2**/2013 (Fiscal fights threaten US policy goals, p. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8f8ef804-5501-11e2-a628-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=published\_links%2Frss%2Fworld%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2GrNoEPIS)

The measured peace offering from Mr Obama to Republicans in Congress, however, will run up against a much more rancorous reality on Capitol Hill and promises to make any second-term gains painfully difficult. The confrontation over the fiscal cliff has further undermined relations between Mr Obama and his most important negotiating partner in Congress, John Boehner, the Republican House speaker. “I don’t think either of them regards the other as being able to deliver his own troops,” said William Galston, a former Clinton administration official, now at the Brookings Institution. Within Congress, relations between the Democratic and Republican Senate leaders, Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell, two old warhorses who can usually find ways to do business, also foundered in the fiscal cliff talks. In the short term, fiscal fights will dominate politics for months to come and threaten to crowd out serious consideration of other issues, with a large potential downside for the economy in 2013.

#### Obama’s capital is perceived as weak --- GOP won’t negotiate.

**Mogulescu**, **1/1**/2013 (Miles – entertainment attorney and political activist, Obama’s Bad Deal and Worse Negotiating, The Huffington Post, p. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/miles-mogulescu/obamas-bad-deal-and-worse_b_2393095.html?utm_hp_ref=politics>)

By agreeing to move the tax increases only to those making over $250,000 Obama gave away about $200 billion in revenues that could have helped to pay for social programs. In a political vacuum, an argument can be made that's a viable political compromise, particularly since he got temporary extensions to unemployment benefits and tax breaks for the poor in exchange for permanent tax breaks for the rich. But by easily compromising on his central campaign promise that he claimed was a line in the sand, Obama signaled to Republicans that there's nothing he won't compromise on. He may say now that he won't negotiate cuts in entitlements and social programs for an increase in the debt ceiling, but there's not a single Republican who will believe him. This January 1 fiscal cliff never posed a long-term danger. But when Republicans took it hostage, Obama caved in on taxes with barely a fight. Failing to raise the debt ceiling does pose a long-term danger to the global economy. Republicans learned again that when dealing with President Obama, hostage taking works. It will only embolden them to take the debt ceiling hostage again, knowing full well that Obama will cave on his promises to defend Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and other social programs that protect the middle class and the poor.

#### No compromise on any major agenda items.

**The Cairns Post**, **1/3**/2013 (US steps back from fiscal cliff, p. Lexis-Nexis)

The political feuding which spanned the Christmas and New Year holidays reflected the near impossibility of forging compromise in Washington, where power is divided between a Democratic president and the Republican House. It was also a signal that Mr Obama may find it tough to achieve second-term legislative goals that include immigration reform, clean energy legislation and gun control. The truce in dysfunctional Washington is likely to be brief, given the fight that will ensue over the spending cuts that now loom at the end of February.

#### PC is useless for Obama

Dickenson, 9 (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, “There Is No There, There: Obama and the Polarized Congress”, March 30, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/03/30/there-is-no-there-there-obama-and-the-polarized-congress/)

Neither perspective is correct. Instead, as I have argued since before Obama’s inauguration, there was never much probability that we would see a decline in the partisan polarization that has characterized presidential-congressional relations during both the Clinton and Bush administrations, Obama’s best intentions to the contrary notwithstanding. Change, in this case, means more of the same. And the reason has almost nothing to do with Republican desires to “wreck” Obama’s presidency any more than the polarization during Bush’s presidency can be blamed on Democratic efforts to thwart his leadership. Nor should we accuse Obama – as many critics have – of pulling a bait and switch on American voters; although many Republicans view his calls for a more bipartisan relationship as insincere, I think he was (and continues to be) strongly committed to finding a middle ground on which Democrats and Republicans can come together to address the nation’s problems. The problem, of course, is that there is no such middle ground on most issues, particularly those pertaining to the economy and the budget. Democrats and Republicans are polarized because they do not agree on how best to solve problems related to the economic recession, health care, the energy crisis, or cap and trade emissions policies, to name only a few pressing issues. Faced with this lack of agreement, Obama is essentially powerless to broker a bipartisan compromise on any of these fronts. If he moves Right to attract Republican votes, Democrats rebuke him. If he sides with his party, Republicans accuse him of bargaining in poor faith. Given these two unpalatable options, I have predicted from Day 1 that Obama would, on most polarizing issues, opt for going with his party majority, just as George Bush ultimately opted to govern primarily (albeit not exclusively) through the Republican majority, until he lost that majority in 2006. . But what of the 2008 election results? Didn’t they indicate Americans’ desire for change in the form of a more bipartisan governing stance? Participants at a recent talk I gave on a paper I wrote about the lack of bipartisanship under Obama made essentially this claim in taking my argument to task. Republicans’ obstructionism, they argue, runs contrary to prevailing public opinion. Americans voted for change, and Republicans are out of line for not recognizing this. This line of reasoning fundamentally misreads how our political system works and what the 2008 election results signify. Ours is not a parliamentary system whose members are selected from party “lists”. Nor is it a “presidential” system in which the president’s election dictates what voters believe Congress will (or should) do. Rather, we are governed by a congressional system, in which Senators and Representatives represent geographically distinct locales. And for most Republicans (and not a few Democrats) the most recent elections did not signal a commitment to bipartisanship if that meant abandoning party principles. Consider the following graph. It shows the relative influence of “local” versus “national” forces on midterm congressional elections during the period 1954-2006. Most notably, even in 2006, which most pundits interpreted as a midterm election that was largely a referendum on the Bush presidency, the impact of “local” factors dwarfs “national” factors in explaining House results. (I urge those interested in how these figures are calculated to email me at dickinso@middlebury.edu and I’ll take you through the process. I’m currently working to calculate the 2008 results and will present them when I can). The same pattern is revealed when looking at presidential election years; local forces typically outweigh national forces in determing the outcomes of House elections. Note, in particular, the 2004 election. The point, I hope, is clear: members of Congress respond to different political incentives than does Obama because they represent different constituencies. Even in years when national tides run strong, as in 2004 and 2006, the primary influences on House elections are still local forces. So while it is true that most voters want Obama to govern in bipartisan fashion, they also want their elected Representative or Senator to stick up for local interests. And that often means espousing party principles, at the risk of appearing partisan. That’s why Obama failed so miserably at keeping earmarks out of his budget proposal – his interests were trumped by the interests of members of Congress looking to the needs of their own constituents. Given these incentives, Obama decided to declare victory and move on, rather than upholding his campaign pledge to end the use of earmarks and opposing the bill. It was a pragmatic decision. As further evidence of the difficulty Obama faces in developing bipartisan congressional voting coalitions, consider the following data (see here). Congressional Quarterly has calculated that only 19% (83) of the 435 House districts split their vote by supporting a member of one party for the House and the presidential candidate of the opposing party. Similarly, exit polls indicate that only 19% of individual voters in House elections split their ballot in this manner. The number of House districts with split votes is the second smallest number since 1952, trumped only by the lowest number that occurred four years earlier, in 2004, when only 59 districts (14%) split their vote as Bush won reelection along with a 232-member House Republican majority. In short, the two most recent presidential elections have returned the smallest number of split districts in the last half century of national elections. Put another way, there is a dwindling number of districts in which a House representative has any incentive to work with a president of the opposing party. To quote the well- known political scientist Gertrude Stein, when it comes to the moderate middle in Congress, “There is no there, there.” In the next several posts I will present more data developing this basic point: voters may wish for bipartisanship in the abstract, but the signals they send in specific elections often belie that wish. We may decry the lack of bipartisanship in national politics today. But the cure means reducing, if not eliminating, the ability of members of Congress to represent their constituents’ interests, as indicated in their votes. In opposing Obama on many domestic issues, Republicans aren’t being obstructionist – they are being effective representatives, just as Democrats believed they were representing their districts when they used the threat of filibusters to bring Senate consideration of Bush’s judicial nominees to a grinding halt when Democrats were in the minority. This is not to say that bipartisanship will never occur during Obama’s presidency. In fact, we have already seen signs of it, contrary to what the pundits who claim Republicans will never support Obama would have you believe. I will develop this point in greater detail in another post, but in the areas of prisoner rendition, surveillance techniques, troop levels in Iraq and the strategy in Afghanistan, Obama’s choices have been largely consistent with Bush’s, and have attracted broad Republican support even at the risk of offending the Far Left of the Democratic Party. The reason, of course, is that voters in Republican-represented districts largely support Obama’s initiatives in these areas. But it is also the case that Obama has a bit more freedom to maneuver in these areas, because – as yet – they involve actions that do not require a congressional vote. Can Obama govern in bipartisan fashion? Yes – but only when Republicans believe their constituents will support Obama’s policies, and Democrats do not oppose such initiatives. For reasons I have described in multiple posts, the incentives for members of Congress in both parties to do so have declined in recent years.

#### Hagel nomination kills capital --- trades off with budget battles.

**Ratnam**, **12/30**/2012 (Gopal, Obama’s political, policy and Pentagon dilemma, The Bulletin, p. <http://www.bendbulletin.com/article/20121230/NEWS0107/212300381/>)

Having dropped U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice and named Massachusetts Democratic Sen. John Kerry to replace Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, Obama runs the risk of appearing weak if he bows to political opposition again and chooses someone other than former Nebraska Republican senator Chuck Hagel to lead the Pentagon. Picking another candidate would show for a second time “that the president’s important choices for personnel can be vetoed by two or three senators," said Sean Kay, a professor of politics and government at Ohio Wesleyan University in Delaware, Ohio, who specializes in U.S. foreign and defense policy. “The White House will come out of this significantly weakened." If Obama sticks with Hagel in the face of opposition from an ad hoc coalition of Republican advocates of muscular defense policies, Democratic supporters of Israel and gay rights activists, though, Obama might be forced to spend political capital he needs for the bigger battle over the federal budget and deficit reduction.