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#### Fiscal Cliff Will Pass, PC Key. K2 the economy

Benac 11/8/12 (Nancy, Assoc Press, "Obama, GOP leaders lay down markers on budget deal," http://news.yahoo.com/obama-gop-leaders-lay-down-markers-budget-deal-080338986.html)

Taking little time to celebrate, President Barack Obama is setting out to leverage his re-election into legislative success in an upcoming showdown with congressional Republicans over taxes, deficits and the impending "fiscal cliff." House Speaker John Boehner says Republicans are willing to consider some form of higher tax revenue as part of the solution — but only "under the right conditions."¶ All sides are setting out opening arguments for the negotiations to come.¶ Even before returning to Washington from his hometown of Chicago, Obama was on the phone Wednesday with the four top leaders of the House and Senate, including Boehner, to talk about the lame-duck Congress that convenes just one week after Election Day.¶ Obama adviser David Axelrod warned Republican leaders to take lessons from Tuesday's vote. The president won after pledging to raise taxes on American households earning more than $250,000 a year "and was re-elected in a significant way," Axelrod told MSNBC Thursday morning.¶ "Hopefully people will read those results and read them as a vote for cooperation and will come to the table," Axelrod said. "And obviously everyone's going to have to come with an open mind to these discussions. But if the attitude is that nothing happened on Tuesday, that would be unfortunate."¶ He noted that conservative Republican Senate candidate Richard Mourdock in Indiana dismissed the value of compromise and instead said Democrats should join the GOP. "And I note that he's not on his way to the United States Senate," Axelrod said. Mourdock lost to Democratic Rep. Joe Donnelly.¶ Without a budget deal to head off the fiscal showdown, the nation faces a combination of expiring Bush-era tax cuts and steep across-the-board spending cuts that could total $800 billion next year. Economists have warned that could tip the nation back into recession.¶ Vice President Joe Biden, flying to his home in Delaware from Chicago, told reporters aboard Air Force Two that the White House was "really anxious" to get moving on the problem. He said he'd been making a lot of calls and "people know we've got to get down to work and I think they're ready to move." He didn't identify whom he had spoken with but predicted the "fever will break" on past legislative gridlock after some soul-searching by Republicans.¶ The White House held out this week's election results as a mandate from voters for greater cooperation between the White House and Congress. At the same time, it reiterated Obama's top priorities: cutting taxes for middle-class families and small businesses, creating jobs and cutting the deficit "in a balanced way" — through a combination of tax increases on wealthier Americans and spending cuts.¶ Obama told the congressional leaders he believed "the American people sent a message in yesterday's election that leaders in both parties need to put aside their partisan interests and work with common purpose to put the interests of the American people and the American economy first," the White House said in a statement.¶ Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., channeled Obama in calling for a quick solution to the fiscal showdown and saying that asking "the richest of the rich" to pay more should be part of the equation. He added that he'd "do everything within my power to be as conciliatory as possible" but added, "I want everyone to also understand you can't push us around."¶ "Waiting for a month, six weeks, six months, that's not going to solve the problem," Reid said on Capitol Hill. "We know what needs to be done. And so I think that we should just roll up our sleeves and get it done."¶ Former Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle said the postelection congressional session offers a good chance to reset the dynamics between the White House and congressional Republicans in search of compromise.¶ "I think there's the urgency of the matter that probably goes beyond anything we've seen to date," he said. "The urgency of the repercussions of driving off the cliff are so grave that I can't imagine that failure is an option."¶

#### Plan unpopular

Sorenson 12

[Lt. Gen Jeff Sorenson, 9/28/12, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/259163-saving-energy-saving-soldiers-lives>]

From biofuels that could propel the Navy’s Great Green Fleet to spending billions of dollars on renewable energy, the Pentagon’s green energy initiatives have emerged as a contentious topic in Washington. Recent Congressional budget proposals could curtail military efforts to produce alternative fuels because they are currently more expensive than fossil fuels. Yet Pentagon officials insist its focus on energy conservation and renewable energy is essential for national security and improved military capability. Who’s right? Is the Pentagon’s pursuit of green energy an outrageously expensive endeavor or an operational necessity? Yes, the impending concerns about a potential $259 billion budget reduction for the Defense Department over the next five years **might make one question the fiscal sense of investing billions on renewable energy projects.**

#### Extinction

**Auslin 9** (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

#### Kill military power- turns case

Hutchison, 9/21 --- Senator from Texas (Kay Bailey, 9/21/2012, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” <http://hutchison.senate.gov/?p=weekly_column&id=1230>)

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and a potentially catastrophic blow to our national defense and security capabilities in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings. In the absence of U.S. military leadership, upheaval in the Middle East would be worse. As any student of history can attest, instability does not confine itself to national borders. Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological research, development and advantage - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.Sequestration can still be avoided. But that will require leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Fiscal cliff kills human space investment

Clark 12

[Stephen, Spaceflight Now, 9/16/12, http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n1209/14sequestration/]

NASA stands to lose nearly $1.5 billion in 2013 unless Congress acts to reduce budget deficits by the end of the year, and the outlook is even worse for U.S. military space programs, according to a report released on Friday by the White House. The report was ordered by Congress to detail the Obama administration's plans for sequestration, automatic across-the-board budget cuts due to take effect Jan. 2. The White House and Congress agreed on the sequestration plan in 2011 as part of a compromise to raise the federal government's debt limit. Sequestration was meant to be a "poison pill" to compel leaders in both parties to reach an agreement to reign in the budget deficit. But the White House and Congress have not come up with a plan for deficit reduction. House Republicans demand a budget using only spending cuts to put a dent in the deficit, while President Obama and Senate Democrats favor a blueprint with tax increases and funding markdowns. Congress must present a spending plan with targeted cuts by the end of the year, or the sequestration scenario will become a reality. Proposals from the White House and House Republicans have, so far, collected no support from the other side. Under the sequestration plan released by the White House's Office of Management and Budget, military programs would see a 9.4 percent budget cut next year. Like other non-defense agencies, NASA would be hit with a 8.2 percent reduction, equivalent to nearly $1.5 billion less than its fiscal 2013 budget request of $17.7 billion. "While we hope for the best, we certainly are planning in case the worst happens, and it will come at a great cost to the space program," said NASA Deputy Administrator Lori Garver. NASA's space operations budget line, which funds the International Space Station, would be cut by $346 million. Exploration programs, including the Orion capsule, the Space Launch System, and commercial crew development, would be trimmed by $309 million. The sequestration would net $417 million in savings from NASA's science budget. The space agency's science directorate contains funding for climate research satellites and solar system exploration projects to the moon, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Mercury, Pluto, and asteroids. NASA's space technology and aeronautics lines would each receive reductions of $47 million. The agency's cross-agency support costs, which cover overhead and center operations, would be exempt from sequestration. "In an organization like NASA, it doesn't take much to recognize that our very high institutional and overhead costs mean that those things that would be cut ... would be the meat - the programs," Garver said Tuesday at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Space 2012 conference in Pasadena, Calif

#### Space travel investments solve extinction

**Collins and Autino, 10** - \* Life & Environmental Science, Azabu University AND \*\* Andromeda Inc., Italy (Patrick and Adriano, “What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace,” Acta Astronautica 66 (2010) 1553–1562, science direct)

The major source of social friction, including international friction, has surely always been unequal access to resources. People ﬁght to control the valuable resources on and under the land, and in and under the sea. The natural resources of Earth are limited in quantity, and economically accessible resources even more so. As the population grows, and demand grows for a higher material standard of living, industrial activity grows exponentially. The threat of resources becoming scarce has led to the concept of ‘‘Resource Wars’’. Having begun long ago with wars to control the gold and diamonds of Africa and South America, and oil in the Middle East, the current phase is at centre stage of world events today [37]. A particular danger of ‘‘resource wars’’ is that, if the general public can be persuaded to support them, they may become impossible to stop as resources become increasingly scarce. Many commentators have noted the similarity of the language of US and UK government advocates of ‘‘war on terror’’ to the language of the novel ‘‘1984’’ which describes a dystopian future of endless, fraudulent war in which citizens are reduced to slaves. 7.1. Expansion into near-Earth space is the only alternative to endless ‘‘resource wars’’ As an alternative to the ‘‘resource wars’’ already devastating many countries today, opening access to the unlimited resources of near-Earth space could clearly facilitate world peace and security. The US National Security Space Ofﬁce, at the start of its report on the potential of space-based solar power (SSP) published in early 2007, stated: ‘‘Expanding human populations and declining natural resources are potential sources of local and strategic conﬂict in the 21st Century, and many see energy as the foremost threat to national security’’ [38]. The report ended by encouraging urgent research on the feasibility of SSP: ‘‘Considering the timescales that are involved, and the exponential growth of population and resource pressures within that same strategic period, it is imperative that this work for ‘‘drilling up’’ vs. drilling down for energy security begins immediately’’ [38]. Although the use of extra-terrestrial resources on a substantial scale may still be some decades away, it is important to recognise that simply acknowledging its feasibility using known technology is the surest way of ending the threat of resource wars. That is, if it is assumed that the resources available for human use are limited to those on Earth, then it can be argued that resource wars are inescapable [22,37]. If, by contrast, it is assumed that the resources of space are economically accessible, this not only eliminates the need for resource wars, it can also preserve the beneﬁts of civilisation which are being eroded today by ‘‘resource war-mongers’’, most notably the governments of the ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ countries and their ‘‘neo-con’’ advisers. It is also worth noting that the $1 trillion that these have already committed to wars in the Middle-East in the 21st century is orders of magnitude more than the public investment needed to aid companies sufﬁciently to start the commercial use of space resources. Industrial and ﬁnancial groups which proﬁt from monopolistic control of terrestrial supplies of various natural resources, like those which proﬁt from wars, have an economic interest in protecting their proﬁtable situation. However, these groups’ continuing proﬁts are justiﬁed neither by capitalism nor by democracy: they could be preserved only by maintaining the pretence that use of space resources is not feasible, and by preventing the development of low-cost space travel. Once the feasibility of low-cost space travel is understood, ‘‘resource wars’’ are clearly foolish as well as tragic. A visiting extra-terrestrial would be pityingly amused at the foolish antics of homo sapiens using longrange rockets to ﬁght each other over dwindling terrestrial resources—rather than using the same rockets to travel in space and have the use of all the resources they need! 7.2. High return in safety from extra-terrestrial settlement Investment in low-cost orbital access and other space infrastructure will facilitate the establishment of settlements on the Moon, Mars, asteroids and in man-made space structures. In the ﬁrst phase, development of new regulatory infrastructure in various Earth orbits, including property/usufruct rights, real estate, mortgage ﬁnancing and insurance, trafﬁc management, pilotage, policing and other services will enable the population living in Earth orbits to grow very large. Such activities aimed at making near-Earth space habitable are the logical extension of humans’ historical spread over the surface of the Earth. As trade spreads through near-Earth space, settlements are likely to follow, of which the inhabitants will add to the wealth of different cultures which humans have created in the many different environments in which they live. Success of such extra-terrestrial settlements will have the additional beneﬁt of reducing the danger of human extinction due to planet-wide or cosmic accidents [27]. These horrors include both man-made disasters such as nuclear war, plagues or growing pollution, and natural disasters such as super-volcanoes or asteroid impact. It is hard to think of any objective that is more important than preserving peace. Weapons developed in recent decades are so destructive, and have such horriﬁc, long-term side-effects that their use should be discouraged as strongly as possible by the international community. Hence, reducing the incentive to use these weapons by rapidly developing the ability to use space-based resources on a large scale is surely equally important [11,16]. The achievement of this depends on low space travel costs which, at the present time, appear to be achievable only through the development of a vigorous space tourism industry.

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#### Energy policy justified through security perpetuates inequalities, environmental degradation, and inhibits their long-term development – must be examined prior to their enactment

Simpson 7 – Founding Convenor of the APSA Environmental Politics and Policy Group, Lecturer in the International Relations program at the University of South Australia where he coordinates courses on IR and Environmental Politics, Researcher (Full Member) in the Hawke Research Institute and a member of the UniSA Human Rights and Security Cluster Leadership Committee, Associate at the Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre (IPGRC) at the University of Adelaide (Adam, 2007, "The Environment: Energy Security Nexus: Critical Analysis of an Energy 'Love Triangle' in Southeast Asia," Third World Quarterly, 28(3), JSTOR)

The pursuit of energy security has been a dominant policy objective and political tool for governments of various hues throughout the world. While there is no doubt that individuals have certain minimum energy require ments, the rhetoric of energy security has often been used as an excuse for governing elites to pursue centralised industrialisation and grandiose energy projects at the expense of marginalised populations. Mega-dams, gas pipelines and similar projects undertaken in majority, or less affluent, countries in the name of energy security and development are rarely vetted through a process of environmental or social impact assessment.' On the rare occasions when this does occur, the process is often a rubber-stamping exercise with little input from local communities. The situation is exacerbated when the political regime promoting or administering the project is particularly repressive or authoritarian in nature, such as in Burma.2 It is usually the case that the communities surrounding these projects are indigenous, dispossessed or otherwise marginalised and have little chance of mitigating the adverse effects that flow from the development, while most of the benefits are reaped in elite circles of the urban centres, where the development decisions are usually made. The interests of these elites, despite populist overtures, are largely antagonistic to the general populations, and this is reflected in development decision-making processes. Attempts by governments and developers either to enrich themselves or, at best, provide electricity for the urban middle classes invariably result in local ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples bearing the brunt of the environmental and social costs associated with the projects while having little input into the development process itself. While the discourse of national energy security is employed by dominant interests, the environmental security of the local communities can be severely undermined by a project but is rarely considered. Environmental security can be defined quite narrowly or understood more broadly to include the energy security deficit felt by many communities in majority countries, who often see no relief from the deficit when an energy project is completed. While the discourse of energy security is used to justify the project, communities living in its vicinity may remain without electricity following its completion and have other elements of their security, such as food, water or livelihood, undermined.4 In this situation it becomes pertinent to ask whose security whether it be 'energy', 'environmental' or 'financial' is being addressed by the project. Unfortunately, it is often the financial security of governing and business elites that determines project decision making at the expense of the environmental security of local communities.5 The transnational projects to be discussed here include a gas pipeline and various mega-dam projects in Southeast Asia. These projects are at various stages of their development but all relate to the purported pursuit of energy security by the dominant classes in Thailand and the supply thereof by their colleagues in Burma (or Myanmar) and Laos. In Thailand, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party used the rhetoric of economic nationalism to obtain acquiescence to major projects but, in reality, Thaksin and other plutocratic government elements ran much of the economy for their own profit, privatising benefits but socialising costs and risks.6 In Burma the corrupt military regime of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDc) has ensured energy exporting projects bring little but suffering to local communities, with transnational corporations and successive Thai governments also being complicit.7 The SPDC and the military dominate Burma's economy, through both state and individual interests, and following dubious privatisations since 1988 the 'iron glove of the military envelops the invisible hand of the private sector'.8 In Laos corruption is also rampant and the economy is tightly controlled by the state. The state, in turn, is a tool of the sole legal political entity, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, membership of which offers the best guarantee of wealth.9 In all three countries major political and economic interests are virtually indistinguish able, often co-operating with foreign transnational corporations and bodies such as the World Bank to promote large-scale energy projects. By the mid-1990s, however, the success of the environment and anti-dam movements in Thailand made it politically expedient for Thai businesses and governments-including the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) to export the environmental and social problems associated with large dams and other energy pro ects to its more authoritarian neighbours while importing the electricity. 1 In Burma the completed Yadana gas pipeline to Thailand has resulted in significant human and environmental depredations against local ethnic minorities. The preparations being under taken for the Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos and a series of dams on Burma's Salween River to export electricity to Thailand are already having similar impacts, for which recent studies of the Narmada Dams in India would provide a salutary lesson.11 These projects, at various stages of development, illustrate the vast chasm between the security interests of governing elites and those of the local indigenous or ethnic minority communities in these countries. These situations, juxtaposing energy projects with environmental destruc tion and human rights violations, have led to the new concept of 'earth rights', the nexus between human rights and environmental protection.12 Before examining these projects, a brief exposition on the nature of earth rights and environmental and energy security will assist in clarifying the location of this research within the field of critical security studies. The environment-energy security nexus Security is a contested concept, but the field of critical security studies has, since the late 1980s, challenged the state-centric focus of traditional cold war studies.13 Within this field environmental security has now been established as a significant area of interest.14 Barnett's definition of environmental insecurity considers the way in which 'environmental degradation threatens the security of people'.15 His added focus on the inequitable distribution of degradation resonates strongly with environmental justice theory. From this perspective, environmental security focuses more on human security than on threats to national security from environmental degradation or a securing 'of the environment itself.'6 Recent writings linking the concept of human security to that of environmental security have been concerned with 'social disruptions' as the principal source of insecurity.17 In this sense dislocation caused by major development projects such as dams may cause insecurity, but when this is linked to civil conflict the impacts are compounded. There is now a well established link between the exploitation of abundant resources and the propensity for civil strife, indicating that resource exploitation can be linked to both environmental degradation and human insecurity.'8 As my interest here relates to the majority world, one of the most useful concepts to emerge is that of 'earth rights'.' In addition to the benefit of its holistic inferences and simple terminology, most work on the concept is related to the majority world, where the interrelationships between environmental protection and human rights are most acute.20 Implicit in the notion of earth rights is that a degradation of environmental security reflects an erosion of human rights, and often vice versa. In their analysis of this concept Greer and Giannini have produced the most useful description thus far, arguing that: earth rights are those rights that demonstrate the connection between human well-being and a sound environment, and include the right to a healthy environment, the right to speak out and act topirotect the environment, and the right to participate in development decisions. In the projects that this paper investigates, it is these acknowledged rights to act in defence of the environment and the right to a healthy environment that are, for ethnic minority and indigenous communities living in the vicinity of the projects, most at risk. While a rights-based approach has been, to some extent, co-opted by institutions such as the World Bank, it can still provide a useful method of analysing development activities when employed from a critical perspective.22 In addition to theoretical developments in earth rights and environmental security, increased attention has also been given to energy security. It comes as no surprise, however, that discourses of energy security focus particularly on fossil fuels and large-scale electricity projects, given their centrality to military and industrial development. While this article examines this dominant energy discourse, it is only for the purposes of critical analysis. Although I examine cross-border energy projects in three countries, and therefore national issues do arise, it is the security impacts on local communities surrounding these projects that are of particular interest here. An important question to consider before discussing the impacts of these projects is, however, the reasons for the institutional and political momentum behind such large-scale undertakings in the first place. The industrial-scale development paradigm There are numerous reasons for the fixation, both academic and develop mental, on large-scale energy projects. Some relate to academic or government research funding opportunities, but this approach also fits neatly within the predominant large-scale and hierarchical, top-down development paradigm prescribed by financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Much of the national development programmes throughout the 1980s and well into the 1 990s were undertaken within the 'Washington Consensus' model of neoliberal reform and structural adjustments. These policies exacerbated existing exploitative relationships between the North and South, with economic growth considered by these Bretton Woods institutions to be the only possible 'sustainable development', an approach considered to be 'Northern imperial ism, using the language of ecology'.24 The 'Post-Washington Consensus', which emerged within the World Bank and the IMF in response to an avalanche of criticism, revised the emphasis on pure neoliberalism, admitting a limited role for the state in development processes. Poverty and governance became key issues, but this approach continues to show an 'inability or unwillingness to address major issues pertaining to [political] power and its distribution both at the domestic and international levels'.25 In addition, the development modus operandi of the Bretton Woods institutions that produced poverty and inequality in the past is very much a part of the present.26 The World Bank has adopted a rights-based approach, but its interpretation of rights relates more to the rights of private enterprise than to those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27 Undoubtedly rhetoric at organisations such as the World Bank has changed; in terms of energy security there is now a focus on poverty reduction to be achieved through access to 'clean energy' sources. There is, however, a disconnect between World Bank rhetoric and its funding of major projects such as mega-dams that have proven to be environmentally and culturally destructive, while providing little in terms of energy security for local people. Despite some rhetorical revisionism, the discourse of energy security is still employed by government and business elites to justify top-down investments in large-scale energy projects, which require significant initial capital injections and subsequent industrial-scale capital returns. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, this top-down approach to development has caused ecological destruction on a vast scale and tends to perpetuate, rather than ameliorate, inequalities.29 After decades of promoting capitalist industrialisation in the majority world, even the World Bank now recognises that inequality both within and between is increasing and can inhibit development. Nonetheless, the bank still cites 'ine uality of outcomes' as playing an important role in facilitating development.

#### Enframing of national security is a pre-requisite to macropolitical violence

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Altenative – reject the affirmative’s security discourse – only resistance can generate genuine political thought

Neoclous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debatesand discussionsthat animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

### 1NC

#### “reduce” means to “legally remove”

Wordnik No Date (“Reduce,” http://www.wordnik.com/words/reduce)

In Scots law, to set aside by an action at law; rescind or annul by legal means: as, to reduce a deed, writing, etc.

Milit., to take off the establishment and strike off the pay-roll, as a regiment. When a regiment is reduced, the officers are generally put upon half-pay.

#### And – “Restriction” means “on the books” – the plan keeps current restriction on the books

OFR 66 (Office of Federal Register, “Code of Federal Regulations,” Title 32, p. Google Books)

(d) The term "Restriction" means the action by which the use, or appropriation **under existing** public land **laws**, including mineral leasing laws, are limited, restrained or excluded, to assure the integrity of Department of Defense military missions.

#### Vote neg-

#### 1 Limits- infinite amounts of small deviations from current restrictions neg research impossible

#### 2. Ground- deviating from licensing regulations means we can’t get offense based off of removing the restriction- kills core negative generics such as the waivers cp

### 1NC

#### Text: The Department of Defense should enter into binding consultation with local communities surrounding relevant military bases over whether to waive Nuclear Regulatory Commission restrictions preventing the development and deployment of military-oriented small modular reactor technology.

**The Department of Defense should implement the result of the binding consultation. We’ll clarify.**

#### It competes –

#### it tests “resolved” which means “to make a firm decision”, and “should” which is “used to imply obligation or duty”

[American Heritage Dictionary at dictionary.com]

#### DoD nuclear power plants must include genuine consultation – that’s key to integration and overall base success

Parthemore and Rogers 10 (Christine and Will, Bacevich Fellow – CNAS, “Nuclear Reactors on Military Bases May Be Risky,” Center for a New American Security, 5-20, http://www.cnas.org/node/4502)

The media have reported that Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) is proposing a joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense demonstration project to examine the use of small reactors on federal sites. For some Department of Energy sites, such as Oak Ridge National Lab in Alexander’s home state — a site certainly accustomed to housing nuclear technology — demonstrating new nuclear reactor technology is largely a no-brainer. However, using nuclear reactors to power the nation’s defense installations warrants deeper consideration. Proponents of boosting this carbon-free energy source on military bases argue that these installations have unique capacities that would ease concerns over its use, namely more gates and more armed guards already on base 24/7. Likewise, the U.S. military services have unique energy security needs. Consistent energy supplies are a critical component of America’s ability to train at home and to operate globally. Energy is so important that some analysts are even exploring “islanding” the energy systems on some military installations to reduce vulnerabilities related to their reliance on often brittle domestic electric grids. Consideration of nuclear energy as part of these islanding concepts is on the rise. On the other hand, opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary. In most cases, additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns. Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities. Any legislation to consider the option of small nuclear reactors on military bases must include examination of these important concerns.

#### The net-benefit is community-military relations –

#### Status quo negotiation is controlled by the military– the CP creates an open and cooperation relationship

Boccuti, Faul, and Gray 12 (Amanda, analyst for Marstel-Day, LLC, providing analysis and GIS support for U.S. Marine Corps projects, Lauren, analyst for Marstel-Day, LLC, specializing in Strategic Communications, and Lauren, researcher at Marstel-Day, LLC, offering research and analysis of environmental issues for encroachment control plans and communications, outreach and engagement strategies for the U.S. Marine Corps, “Establishing Creative Strategies for Effective Engagement between Military Installations & Communities,” Engaging Cities, 5-12, http://engagingcities.com/article/establishing-creative-strategies-effective-engagement-between-military-installations-communi)

Throughout the Nation’s history, military installations and ranges were historically established in undeveloped areas, except for those forts located to defend cities. Local communities developed near the installations for safety and economic reasons resulting in the installation being the up-to-that-point rural community’s primary economic engine. Routine communication between the installations and local communities were **minimal** because the installation was self-supporting and not subject to local laws and regulations. Communications were primarily social. Starting in the post-World War II era and accelerating as the 20th Century came to a close, installation-adjacent communities increased in both density and size – becoming less rural, more suburban or urban, and more economically diverse. Military missions continue to evolve, incorporating new weapon platforms and training over larger areas and at all hours of the day and night. These changes in both surrounding communities and the installation missions have often lead to competing interests with respect to the economy, natural resource management, and land use. Military installations and local communities must, therefore, focus communication efforts on building partnerships to find mutually acceptable paths forward for resolving their competing interests. Developing collaborative relationships is imperative to **turning** otherwise **conflicting interests into opportunities** for mutually beneficial solutions. The nature of those interactions is defined by issue type, installation and community rapport, and available communication channels. The four military services (i.e., Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force) have service-specific community engagement programs to develop partnerships; all four, however, conduct information sharing through the Public Affairs Office (PAO), which handles media and public relations. Three of the services – the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force – have established encroachment management policies that outline service responsibilities to establish, maintain, and sustain community relationships in order to reduce encroachment effects. This responsibility is usually assigned to a Community Plans and Liaison Office (CPLO) or an equivalent community planner. The CPLO and PAO work with their installation Commander to act as the military’s voice and point of engagement in the community through consistent messaging, establishing an installation presence in community forums, and planning community-engagement events and processes. Though Department of Defense (DoD) mechanisms exist to develop community partnerships, mediating the different interests and priorities among military installations and their surrounding communities is a **complex, nuanced process usually exercised by the services, through their installation leadership**. Siting of renewable energy projects, environmental stewardship responsibilities, noise from training events, and other policy- and planning-related matters invoke difficult questions, such as: how can an installation and its surrounding communities concurrently pursue goals and development in a way that lead to mutual gain, obtaining threshold requirements and fair compromise? Finding interest nexuses and fostering an open, strong relationship in which those nexuses can be explored is key.

#### Locals will say yes. Consultation is key to readiness and avoids base closure

Savage 10 (Melissa, tracks military base issues for NCSL, “Lawmakers are looking for ways to resolve land-use conflicts between civilian communities and military bases,” National Conference of State Legislatures, March, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/making-peace-article.aspx)

Senator Leticia Van de Putte, who represents the district that is home to Fort Sam Houston—another military base near San Antonio—has seen the consequences of residential development near military bases. It’s in her backyard. But she also knows the encroachment issue isn’t confined to San Antonio. It’s a problem for bases across the country, from the Marine’s Camp Pendleton in southern California to the Army’s Fort A.P. Hill in northern Virginia. “For legislators with installations in their district, it’s critical that they stay aware of what’s happening on the bases, in the community and how state legislation can play a role in helping strike a balance **between the community’s needs and ensuring the military base can meet its mission**,” Van de Putte says. “The good news is that, while encroachment is pretty common, states, military bases and local communities are working together. Partnerships among states, cities and military bases are becoming the premier strategy to accomplish common goals.” Role of Military Bases During the last several years of base closures, communities have fought to keep their bases open for many reasons, but mostly because of the huge economic benefits military bases can bring to local communities and states. They generate civilian jobs and pour millions of dollars each year into the local economy. The loss of a base can be devastating to a community. In San Antonio, the U.S. Department of Defense is one of the largest employers, providing jobs to more than 68,000 people, a third of them civilians. According to the Department of Defense, the direct and indirect economic effect of the military in San Antonio was more than $13.3 billion in 2006. As development inches closer to installations, **limiting the ability to conduct effective military training**, the Department of Defense might be left with no other choice than to close bases. Maryland Delegate Sally Jameson knows just what military bases can mean to a community. “For those of us with bases in our districts, we relish the jobs and dollars that spin into our local economies,” she says. “In some areas, the loss of a base could mean the destruction of the local community. “The next step is to realize the significant problems bases can face when dealing with encroachment. It can stand in the way of our bases meeting their No. 1 priority—troop readiness. Staying focused on land issues and **keeping the lines of communication open with base leadership is so important**.” Years ago, when the Department of Defense located many of its current military installations, it looked for land in the middle of nowhere. Having space to train away from cities limits the impact of light pollution on flight paths and keeps citizens on the other side of the fence safe during live fire training exercises. Over the last few decades, as cities have grown closer to the installations, the impact on the military sometimes has been severe. While base commanding officers will tell you they want to be good neighbors, their primary mission is to train soldiers to fight.

#### Readiness collapse causes war – turns basing

Spencer 2K (Jack, Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, 9-15, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1394.cfm>)

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, 3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." 4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. 5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War. 6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby **preserving peace**.

### Solvency

#### Military says no to nuclear even without NRC restrictions

Butler 11 (Lt. Col. Glen Butler, Headquarters, North American Air Defense Command-U.S. Northern Command/J594 (Strategy, Policy, and Plans Directorate), Security Cooperation Integration Branch, 3-1-11, “Not green enough: Why the Marine Corps should lead the environmental and energy way forward and how to do it,” http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/not-green-enough)

Fourth, SMR technology offers the Marine Corps another unique means to lead from the front—not just of the other Services but also of the Nation, and even the world.28 This potential Pete Ellis moment should be seized. There are simple steps we could take,29 and others stand ready to lead if we are not.30 But the temptation to “wait and see” and “let the others do it; then we’ll adopt it” mentality is not always best. Energy security demands boldness, not timidity.

[Their Card Ends]

To be fair, nuclear technology comes with challenges, of course, and with questions that have been kicked around for decades. An April 1990 Popular Science article asked, “Next Generation Nuclear Reactors—Dare we build them?” and included some of the same verbiage heard in similar discussions today.31 Compliance with National Environment Policy Act requirements necessitates lengthy and detailed preaction analyses, critical community support must be earned, and disposal challenges remain. Still, none of these hurdles are insurmountable.32 Yet despite the advances in safety, security, and efficiency in recent years, **nuclear in the energy equation remains the new “n-word” for most military circles**. And despite the fact that the FY10 National Defense Authorization Act called on the DoD to “conduct a study [of] the feasibility of nuclear plants on military installations,” the Office of the Secretary of Defense has yet to fund the study.33

#### Investors won't participate – too much uncertainty

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

The investment climate for military alternative fuel production is highly uncertain. Although the Navy has announced a program that will involve large fuel purchases, it has not yet provided sufficient detail to encourage investment of private funds. Other DoD components have not announced that they will pay a premium price for alternative fuels for use in their tactical systems. This situation means that the private sector will look to the civilian fuel market for signals as to whether to invest in alternative fuels. For civilian applications, the prospects for alternative fuels also remain highly uncertain. At current world market oil prices, the only military alternative fuel that might be competitive without subsidy is an FT jet or FT Navy distillate derived from natural gas, coal, or a mix of coal and a small amount of biomass. But even for these leading technologies, there remains uncertainty regarding investment and production costs, especially for the first production facilities that would be built in the United States. With the $1.00 federal subsidy that has supported biodiesel production, some amount of biodiesel from crops cultivated on farmlands appears to be competitive with petroleum-derived diesel so long as world oil prices are above $50 per barrel (2009 dollars, West Texas Intermediate).1 But for renewable oils that are produced with lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions that are less than those from petroleum products, greater subsidies or higher crude oil prices may be required. As discussed in Chapter Three, there is little information available on the costs of producing hydrotreated renewable oils from jatropha, camelina, or other nontraditional crops, and even less on the economics of algae-derived fuels. Another factor impeding investment in alternative fuels is uncertainty regarding the prospects and details of legislation and regulations aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. Legislation that assigns costs to emitting greenhouse gases will modify the relative competitiveness of different alternative fuels vis-à-vis petroleum-derived fuels. For example, for each $10 per ton charged for emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, the price of conventional JP-8 would increase by about $0.13 per gallon.

#### No solvency—no expertise

Parthemore and Rogers 10 (Christine and Will, Bacevich Fellow – CNAS, “Nuclear Reactors on Military Bases May Be Risky,” Center for a New American Security, 5-20, http://www.cnas.org/node/4502)

The media have reported that Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) is proposing a joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense demonstration project to examine the use of small reactors on federal sites. For some Department of Energy sites, such as Oak Ridge National Lab in Alexander’s home state — a site certainly accustomed to housing nuclear technology — demonstrating new nuclear reactor technology is largely a no-brainer. However, using nuclear reactors to power the nation’s defense installations warrants deeper consideration. Proponents of boosting this carbon-free energy source on military bases argue that these installations have unique capacities that would ease concerns over its use, namely more gates and more armed guards already on base 24/7. Likewise, the U.S. military services have unique energy security needs. Consistent energy supplies are a critical component of America’s ability to train at home and to operate globally. Energy is so important that some analysts are even exploring “islanding” the energy systems on some military installations to reduce vulnerabilities related to their reliance on often brittle domestic electric grids. Consideration of nuclear energy as part of these islanding concepts is on the rise. On the other hand, opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary. In most cases, additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns. Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities. Any legislation to consider the option of small nuclear reactors on military bases must include examination of these important concerns.

### Basing

#### Military has no need for clean energy – adoption fails and hurts military power

O'Keefe 12 -- CEO, George C. Marshall Institute (William, 5/22/12, "DOD’s ‘Clean Energy’ Is a Trojan Horse," http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php)

The purpose of the military is to defend the United States and our interests by deterring aggression and applying military force when needed. It is not to shape industrial policy. As we’ve learned from history, energy is essential for military success, independent of whether it is so called “clean energy” or traditional energy, which continues to get cleaner with time. There are three reasons for the Department of Defense (DOD) to be interested in biofuels—to reduce costs, improve efficiency, and reduce vulnerability. These are legitimate goals and should be pursued through a well thought out and rational Research-and-Development (R&D) program. But it’s not appropriate to use military needs to push a clean energy agenda that has failed in the civilian sector. Packaging the issue as a national security rationale is a Trojan Horse that hides another attempt to promote a specific energy industrial policy. Over the past four decades such initiatives have demonstrated a record of failure and waste. As part of the military’s push for green initiatives, both the Navy and Air Force have set goals to obtain up to 50 percent of their fuel needs from alternative sources. The underlying rationale is to reduce US dependence on foreign oil. But the Rand Corporation, the preeminent military think tank in the nation, recently conducted a study, Alternative Fuels for Military Applications; it concludes, "The use of alternative fuels offers the armed services no direct military benefit." It also concludes that biofuels made from plant waste or animal fats could supply no more than 25,000 barrels daily. That’s a drop in the bucket considering the military is the nation’s largest fuel consumer. Additionally, there is no evidence that commercial technology will likely to be available in the near future to produce large quantities of biofuels at lower costs than conventional fuels. The flipside of that argument is that the cost of conventional fuels is uncertain because of dependence on imports from unstable sources. While that is true, it misses the point. For example, our reliance on imports from the Persian Gulf is declining and could be less if we expanded our own domestic production. Until alternatives that are cost competitive can be developed, DOD should look at alternative ways to reduce price volatility, just as large commercial users do. The second reason for pursuing alternative fuels is related to the first. Greater efficiency reduces costs by reducing the amount of fuel used. The military has been pursuing this goal for some time, as has the private sector. DOD total energy consumption declined by more than 60% between 1985 and 2006, according to Science 2.0. Improvements will continue because of continued investments in new technologies, especially in the private sector, which has market-driven incentives to reduce the cost of fuel consumption. Finally, there is the argument that somehow replacing conventional fuels with bio-fuels will reduce supply chain vulnerability and save lives. Rand also addressed this issue from both the perspective on naval and ground based forces. It concluded that there is no evidence that a floating bio-fuels plant “would be less expensive than using either Navy oilers or commercial tankers to deliver finished fuel products.” It also dismissed the concept of small scale production units that would be co-located with tactical units. It concluded, “any concepts that require delivery of a carbon containing feedstock appear to place a logistical and operational burden on forward-based tactical units that would be well beyond that associated with the delivery of finished fuels.” Future military needs are met by a robust R&D program carried out by the services and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Letting that agency and the services invest in future technologies to meet their specific service needs and maintain our military strength without political meddling is in the nation’s best interest. Advances in military technology that has civilian applications eventually enters the market place. Take for example the DARPA’s research into improved military communication that eventually developed into internet technology that revolutionized how we communicate and obtain and use information. If DOD pursues research focused on lower costs, greater efficiency, and more secure fuel supplies, the civilian economy will eventually benefit. At a time when the military if faced with substantial budget cuts, allocating scarce resources to pursue so called “clean energy” objectives is worse than wasteful. It borders on a dereliction of duty.

#### Military sustainable without renewables

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

Defense Department goals for alternative fuels in tactical weapon systems should be based on potential national benefits, since the use of alternative, rather than petroleum-derived, fuels offers no direct military benefits. While Fischer-Tropsch fuels and hydrotreated renewable fuels are no less able than conventional fuels to meet the Defense Department’s needs, they offer no particular military benefit over their petroleum-derived counterparts. For example, even if alternative fuels can be produced at costs below the prevailing costs for conventional fuels, they will be priced at market rates. Also, we are unable to find any credible evidence that sources to produce jet or naval distillate fuel will run out in the foreseeable future. If conflict or a natural disaster were to abruptly disrupt global oil supplies, the U.S. military would not suffer a physical shortage. Rather, the resulting sharp increase in world prices would cause consumers around the world to curb use of petroleum products. Less usage would ensure that supplies remained available. As long as the military is willing to pay higher prices, it is unlikely to have a problem getting the fuel it requires. If problems do arise, the Defense Production Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-774) contains provisions for performance on a priority basis of contracts for the production, refining, and delivery of petroleum products to the Defense Department and its contractors.

#### Heg is resilient

Wohlforth 7 (William, Professor of Government – Dartmouth College, “Unipolar Stability”, Harvard International Review, Spring, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1611/3/)

US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from “imperial overstretch.” And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term “imperial overstretch” to describe the situation in which a state’s actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed “self-inflicted overstretch”—a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global “war” on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public’s perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With **latent power** in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in **self-reinforcing mechanisms** than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China’s rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States—indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and **tap** potentially **large wellsprings of** latent **power**.

#### Lots of factors prevent great power conflict without hegemony

**Fettweis 10** (Christopher J. Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times-The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 175-6)

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of war – nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms – necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were American to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly,the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.

#### **Navy doesn’t need nuclear**

JRE 12 (Chief of Naval Operations Shore Readiness Division, “Navy issues new shore, energy policy to achieve energy security goals,” Joint Region Edge, 4(25), 7-20, http://www.cnic.navy.mil/navycni/groups/public/documents/document/cnicp\_a292754.pdf)

Since naval forces require constant support from shore installations, Navy is mitigating its vulnerabilities related to the electrical grid - such as outages from natural disasters and man-made events - by lowering consumption, integrating renewable energy sources and increasing control of energy supply and distribution. Energy reliability, resiliency and redundancy are essential components of the Navy’s Critical Infrastructure Protection program. “Energy security is critical because warfighters need assured access to reliable supplies of energy to meet operational needs afloat or ashore,” said Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics, Vice Adm. Phil Cullom. “This instruction is just one example of how we are driving a spartanSpartan energy ethos in our shore operations. We are committed to cost-effectively achieving our energy goals by pursuing energy efficiency, transforming our energy culture, and integrating renewable energy technologies, where viable.” The revised instruction includes specific responsibilities and actions that commands and personnel ashore must take in implementing the Navy Shore Energy program. For example, each **Navy installation will have a tailored energy consumption reduction goal based on its unique energy situation**. By increasing energy efficiency, Navy can reduce operating costs, multiply the impact of current and future alternative energy sources and achieve DoN renewable energy targets.

#### The Navy is no longer useful to prevent conflict

Goure 10—Vice President, Lexington Institute, PhD (Daniel, 2 July 2010, Can The Case Be Made For Naval Power?,<http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171>)  
  
This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers. While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy this is many years off. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others, including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required to reopen the waterway? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses.  
More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

#### Naval power resilient – no challengers to overwhelming U.S. power

**Posen 3** (Barry R., Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony”, International Security, 28(1), Ebsco)

Command of the commons is the military foundation of U.S. political preeminence. It is the key enabler of the hegemonic foreign policy that the United States has pursued since the end of the Cold War. The military capabilities required to secure command of the commons are the U.S. strong suit. They leverage science, technology, and economic resources. They rely on highly trained, highly skilled, and increasingly highly paid military personnel. On the whole, the U.S. military advantage at sea, in the air, and in space will be very diffcult to challenge—let alone overcome. Command is further secured by the worldwide U.S. base structure and the ability of U.S. diplomacy to leverage other sources of U.S. power to secure additional bases and overflight rights as needed.

### Cyber Attacks

#### Can’t solve retaliation – even if we move military bases off the grid, we’ll still lash out against attacks on the civilian grid

#### No risk of cyberattack and no impact if it does happen

Birch, 10/1/12 – former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy (Douglas, “Forget Revolution.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full)

"That's a good example of what some kind of attacks would be like," he said. "You don't want to overestimate the risks. You don't want somebody to be able to do this whenever they felt like it, which is the situation now. But this is not the end of the world." The question of how seriously to take the threat of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure surfaced recently, after Congress rejected a White House measure to require businesses to adopt stringent­ new regulations to protect their computer networks from intrusions. The bill would have required industries to report cyber security breaches, toughen criminal penalties against hacking and granted legal immunity to companies cooperating with government investigations. Critics worried about regulatory overreach. But the potential cost to industry also seems to be a major factor in the bill's rejection. A January study by Bloomberg reported that banks, utilities, and phone carriers would have to increase their spending on cyber security by a factor of nine, to $45.3 billion a year, in order to protect themselves against 95 percent of cyber intrusions. Likewise, some of the bill's advocates suspect that in the aftermath of a truly successful cyber attack, the government would have to bail the utilities out anyway. Joe Weiss, a cyber security professional and an authority on industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid, argued that a well-prepared, sophisticated cyber attack could have far more serious consequences than this summer's blackouts. "The reason we are so concerned is that cyber could take out the grid for nine to 18 months," he said. "This isn't a one to five day outage. We're prepared for that. We can handle that." But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ­­-- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks because hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. But investigators typically come up with key suspects, if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in potential retaliation when planning their operations.

#### New developments sure up grid stability – solves blackouts

Kemp 12 -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)

The hoped-for solution to grid instability is something called the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI), which sounds like something out of Star Trek but is in fact a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control by using modern communications technology. More than 500 phasor monitoring units have so far been installed across the transmission network to take precise measurements of frequency, voltage and other aspects of power quality on the grid up to 30 times per second (compared with once every four seconds using conventional technology). Units are synchronised using GPS to enable users to build up a comprehensive real-time picture of how power is flowing across the grid (www.naspi.org/Home.aspx and). It is a scaled-up version of the monitoring system developed by the University of Tennessee's Power Information Technology Laboratory using inexpensive frequency monitors that plug into ordinary wall sockets. Tennessee's FNET project provides highly aggregated data to the public via its website. The systems being developed under NASPI provide a much finer level of detail that will reveal congestion and disturbances on individual transmission lines and particular zones so that grid managers can act quickly to restore balance or isolate failures ().

#### Military SMRs rely on foreign grids that are fragile – takes out solvency

Smith 11 (Terrence P., Program Coordinator and Research Assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy – CSIS, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2-16, http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations)

Nowhere in these key points is there even a hint of, “Hey this is not necessarily the best thing since sliced bread.” My initial response to each of these “key points”: (1) Takes the assumption it is a good idea and pushes a pursuit of the capability soon and hard to maintain a competitive technological edge, before examining the wisdom of the idea to begin with; (2) Just because DoD is interested in it, does not make it a good idea; (3) Arguing that they are better than larger reactors is not an argument for them being a good idea; (4) See my first point, but add in military advantage. The report describes DoD’s interest in the reactors as stemming from two “critical vulnerabilities”: 1) “the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid,” and 2) “the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations.” The proposed solution: small nuclear reactors that (in many of the proposed plans) are “self-contained and highly mobile.” This would allow the military to use them in forward bases and pack ‘em up and move ‘em out when we are done. But in an era where the U.S. is engaged in global fights with our bases often placed in unfriendly neighborhoods, the idea of driving around nuclear reactors and material (particularly through areas that have “ a fragile civilian electrical grid”) hardly seems like the idea of the century to me. The report counters that “some” designs promise to be “virtually impervious to accidents” and have design characteristics that “might” allow them to be proliferation-resistant. The plans that use low-enriched uranium, sealed reactor cores, ect., do make them a safer option that some current designs of larger nuclear reactors, but, again, if we are going to be trucking these things around the world, when it comes to nuclear material a “might” doesn’t sit well with me.

#### **No US-China war – economics**

Shor 12 (Francis, Professor of History – Wayne State, “Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict?”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 11(1), pp. 157-167)

While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after WWII, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world's largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world's copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of U.S. foreign reserves, e.g. treasury bonds. This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict with the U.S. now, since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, "the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology firms, and other enterprises." [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China's rising economic power, especially as an expression of the U.S. governing elite's ideological commitment to national security.

#### No war – China abides by international law and keeps a low profile

Haixia 12 (Qi, Lecturer at Department of International Relations – Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), Summer, p. 105-127, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/105.full)

Keeping Low Profile China's strategy of keeping low profile constitutes the political foundation of the superficial friendship between the United States and China. After 1989, in the face of sanctions and blockades from the West, Deng Xiaoping told Chinese policy makers: ‘In short, my views about the international situation can be summed up in three sentences. First, we should observe the situation coolly. Second, we should hold our ground. Third, we should act camly. Don’t be impatient; it is no good to be impatient. We should be calm, calm and again calm, and quietly immerse ourselves in practical work to accomplish something – something for China.’48 Deng Xiaoping's counterstrategy was later summed up as ‘keeping a low profile’. It was in 1995 that then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen first introduced this principle of Chinese policy to the world.49 In 1998, President Jiang Zemin summarized the policy as ‘observe calmly, cope with affairs calmly, never seek leadership, hide brightness and cherish obscurity, get some things done.’50 The white paper on China's Peaceful Development issued in 2011 notes that, ‘As a responsible member of the international community, China abides by international law and the generally recognized principles governing international relations, and eagerly fulfills its international responsibility. China has actively participated in reforming international systems, formulating international rules and addressing global issues. It supports the development of other developing countries, and works to safeguard world peace and stability.’51

### Tajikistan

#### Their impacts are ed- impacts inevitable

**Innocent and Carpenter ‘9** (Malau, Foreign Policy – Cato Institute, and Ted Galen, VP for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato, “Escaping the "Graveyard of Empires": A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan"”, 9-14, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf)

Some analysts, including Carnegie Endowment senior associate Robert Kagan, insist that were the United States to evacuate Afghanistan, the political and military vacuum left by our departure would lead to serious instability throughout the region.19 But instability, in the sense of a perpetually anarchic state of nature dominated by tribal warlords and pervasive bloodshed, has characterized the region for decades—even centuries. Thus, the claim that Afghanistan would be destabilized if the United States were to decrease its presence is misleading, since Afghanistan will be chronically unstable regardless. Most Americans are simply oblivious to the region’s history. Numerous tribes along the border of northwest Pakistan and southern and eastern Afghanistan have a long history of war-making and rebellion, now erroneously branded as “Talibanism.”20 King’s College London professor Christian Tripodi, an expert on British colonial-era tribal policy, explains what British administrators confronted when dealing with Pashtun tribes along what is today the frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan: What the British refused to grasp was that tribal raiding and violence was not necessarily a product of poverty or lack of opportunity. The tribes viewed raiding as honourable and possibly quite fun, an activity that was centuries old, rooted in their culture and one of those things that defined a man in a society that placed a premium upon independence and aggression.21

#### No global spillover – can’t solve developing countries

**Socolow and Glaser, 9** – Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University and Assistant Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University (Robert H. and Alexander, Fall. “Balancing risks: nuclear energy & climate change.” Dædalus Volume 138, Issue 4, pp. 31-44. MIT Press Journals.)

In this paper we consider a nuclear future where 1,500 GW of base load nuclear power is deployed in 2050. A nuclear fleet of this size would contribute about one wedge, if the power plant that would have been built instead of the nuclear plant has the average CO2 emissions per kilowatt hour of all operating plants, which might be half of the value for a coal plant. Base load power of 1,500 GW would contribute one fourth of total electric power in a business-as-usual world that produced 50,000 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity per year, two-and-a-half times the global power consumption. However, in a world focused on climate change mitigation, one would expect massive global investments in energy efficiency–more efficient motors, compressors, lighting, and circuit boards–that by 2050 could cut total electricity demand in half, relative to business as usual. In such a world, 1,500 GW of nuclear power would provide half of the power. We can get a feel for the geopolitical dimension of climate change mitigation from the widely cited scenarios by the International Energy Agency (iea) presented annually in its World Energy Outlook (weo), even though these now go only to 2030. The weo 2008 estimates energy, electricity, and CO2 emissions by region. Its 2030 world emits 40.5 billion tons of CO2, 45 percent from electric power plants. The countries of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) emit less than one third of total global fossil fuel emissions and less than one third of global emissions from electric power production. By extrapolation, at midcentury the oecd could contribute only one quarter of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. It is hard for Western analysts to grasp the importance of these numbers. The focus of climate change mitigation today is on leadership from the OECD countries, which are wealthier and more risk averse. But within a decade, the targets under discussion today can be within reach only if mitigation is in full gear in those parts of the developing world that share production and consumption patterns with the industrialized world. The map (see Figure 1) shows a hypothetical global distribution of nuclear power in the year 2050 based on a highnuclear scenario proposed in a widely cited mit report published in 2003. Three-fifths of the nuclear capacity in 2050 as stated in the mit report is located in the oecd, and more nuclear power is deployed in the United States in 2050 than in the whole world today. The worldview underlying these results is pessimistic about electricity growth rates for key developing countries, relative to many other sources. Notably, per capita electricity consumption in almost every developing country remains below 4,000 kWh per year in 2050, which is one-fifth of the assumed U.S. value for the same year. Such a ratio would startle many analysts today–certainly many in China. It is well within limits of credulity that nuclear power in 2050 could be nearly absent from the United States and the European Union and at the same time widely deployed in several of the countries rapidly industrializing today. Such a bifurcation could emerge, for example, if public opposition to nu clear power in the United States and Europe remains powerful enough to prevent nuclear expansion, while elsewhere, perhaps where modernization and geopolitical considerations trump other concerns, nuclear power proceeds vigorously. It may be that the United States and other countries of the oecd will have substantial leverage over the development of nuclear power for only a decade or so. Change will not happen overnight. Since 2006, almost 50 countries that today have no nuclear power plants have approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) for assistance, and many of them have announced plans to build one or more reactors by 2020. Most of these countries, however, are not currently in a good position to do so. Many face important technical and economic constraints, such as grid capacity, electricity demand, or gdp. Many have too few trained nuclear scientists and engineers, or lack an adequate regulatory framework and related legislation, or have not yet had a public debate about the rationale for the project. Overall, the iaea has estimated that “for a State with little developed technical base the implementation of the first [nuclear power plant] would, on average, take about 15 years.” 11 This lead time constrains rapid expansion of nuclear energy today. A wedge of nuclear power is, necessarily, nuclear power deployed widely– including in regions that are politically unstable today. If nuclear power is suf-ficiently unattractive in such a deployment scenario, nuclear power is not on the list of solutions to climate change.

## 2NC – T, Consult, Case

### T Waiver 2NC

#### Waivers are a re-interpretation of restriction – that’s distinct from reduction

Rossi 95 (Jim, Professor of Law – Vanderbilt University, “Making Policy through the Waiver of Regulations at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,” Administrative Law Review, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 260, Hein Online, p. 263-264)

A third source is derivative of FERC's discretion in interpreting the substantive laws it is charged with implementing.33 This source is much less formal than waiver based in a statute or regulation and calls for the agency to waive regulations through the process of statutory interpretation. In some instances, FERC has promulgated regulations that are triggered by words in a statute (e.g., the words "public utility" in section 201(e) of the FPA). FERC may "waive" such regulations by interpreting the regulation-triggering words narrowly, thus exempting a certain class of entities.34 To the extent that a new interpretation becomes entrenched statutory meaning at an agency such as FERC, however, the discretion of the agency to take into account the particularities of the constituent to which the statute applies becomes more questionable.

#### Reduce must be “quantifiable” – that’s GEP. The CP keeps restrictions on the books and changes their effect – that’s not a quantifiable reduction in restrictions.

#### More evidence “reduce” means to “legally remove”

Wordnik No Date (“Reduce,” http://www.wordnik.com/words/reduce)

In Scots law, to set aside by an action at law; rescind or annul by legal means: as, to reduce a deed, writing, etc.

Milit., to take off the establishment and strike off the pay-roll, as a regiment. When a regiment is reduced, the officers are generally put upon half-pay.

#### And – “Restriction” means “on the books” – the CP keeps current restriction on the books

OFR 66 (Office of Federal Register, “Code of Federal Regulations,” Title 32, p. Google Books)

(d) The term "Restriction" means the action by which the use, or appropriation **under existing** public land **laws**, including mineral leasing laws, are limited, restrained or excluded, to assure the integrity of Department of Defense military missions.

#### Waivers aren’t legally binding, they merely result in change --- that’s Rossi. It’s no different than the NPR counterplan that recommended but did not mandate the plan. More evidence.

Hunnicutt 99 (James, JD – Boston College Law School, “Another Reason to Reform the Federal Regulatory System: Agencies' Treating Nonlegislative Rules as Binding Law”, Boston College Law Review, December, 41 B.C. L. Rev 153, Lexis)

1.  Factors Distinguishing Nonlegislative from Legislative Rules To distinguish whether a rule is nonlegislative or legislative, courts consider whether the rule is “substantive” in nature.[77](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F77" \t "LAW_FTN) If a rule has substantive effects, it should have been promulgated as a legislative rule, and therefore, the agency should have performed notice-and-comment to create it.[78](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F78" \t "LAW_FTN) The courts have examined the following factors: Nonlegislative rules do not create law, while legislative rules may impose or remove legal rights and obligations or produce other significant effects on private parties.[79](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F79" \t "LAW_FTN) If evidence shows an agency intended for a rule to have substantive effects or to legally bind the public, then it is probably a legislative rule.[80](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F80" \t "LAW_FTN)

Nonlegislative rules leave agency decisionmakers free to exercise discretion, while legislative rules constrain agency discretion.[81](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F81" \t "LAW_FTN) Nonlegislative rules employ tentative language, such as “may,” while legislative rules use mandatory language, such as “will.”[82](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F82" \t "LAW_FTN) Agencies should publish legislative rules in the Federal Register, whereas agencies need not publish nonlegislative rules.[83](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F83" \t "LAW_FTN) An agency’s contention that a rule is nonlegislative shall carry some weight, but will not be dispositive in a court’s determination whether or not the rule should have been subjected to notice-and-comment rulemaking.[84](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F84" \t "LAW_FTN) [\*PG167]Interpretative rules interpret law while legislative rules create law.[85](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F85" \t "LAW_FTN) General statements of policy operate prospectively and speak to future contingencies, but legislative rules have immediate impacts.[86](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F86" \t "LAW_FTN) Rules of agency organization apply only to internal agency machinations.[87](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F87" \t "LAW_FTN) The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered several of these factors in 1987, in Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, where the court held that certain rules which the FDA had labeled as nonlegislative were actually substantive, and thus should have been adopted as legislative rules.[88](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F88" \t "LAW_FTN) The court found the rules to be substantive because they imposed immediate legal obligations on food producers, they constrained agency discretion and the FDA had referred to them as having the force of law.[89](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F89" \t "LAW_FTN) The Community Nutrition Institute (“CNI”), a public interest group, and other public interest organizations, brought action against the Commissioner of the FDA for granting “action levels” the force and effect of law, even though the FDA produced them without conducting notice-and-comment process.[90](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F90" \t "LAW_FTN) The FDA had been initiating enforcement proceedings against food producers if their goods exhibited levels of aflatoxins—unavoidable contaminants found in foods such as corn—[\*PG168]greater than the action levels.[91](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F91" \t "LAW_FTN) Concerned that the action levels were too low and failed to adequately protect public health, the CNI contended that the action levels should have been adopted only after following notice-and-comment procedures.[92](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F92" \t "LAW_FTN) The FDA argued the action levels fell within the nonlegislative rule exception of � 553(b)(A).[93](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F93" \t "LAW_FTN) The court reasoned that the rule establishing the action levels used mandatory language and created immediate and binding effects.[94](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F94" \t "LAW_FTN) Specifically, the rules declared that if a food product met an action level, the food “will be deemed” to be contaminated.[95](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F95" \t "LAW_FTN) Also, the court found it compelling that the FDA had occasionally intimated that action levels established binding norms.[96](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F96" \t "LAW_FTN) The FDA would not initiate enforcement proceedings against food producers that had amounts of contamination less than the action levels.[97](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F97" \t "LAW_FTN) Thus, the court held that the action levels constrained agency discretion.[98](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F98" \t "LAW_FTN) Also, the court found that the rules were substantive because the FDA required food producers to seek exemptions to the action levels.[99](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F99" \t "LAW_FTN) The court found that if private parties must obtain exemptions to circumvent an agency’s rules, then the agency intends for those rules to be substantive.[100](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F100" \t "LAW_FTN) Therefore, the court held that the action levels were substantive and should have been produced only after notice-and-comment, and thus were invalid.[101](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F101" \t "LAW_FTN) [\*PG169]2. Some Courts Still Use “Substantial Impact” as a Factor Some courts—including the Fourth and Fifth Circuits—use “substantial impact” as a factor to determine whether a rule should have been promulgated following notice-and-comment procedure.[102](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F102" \t "LAW_FTN) If a rule has a substantial impact on private parties, then it is a legislative rule.[103](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F103" \t "LAW_FTN) The courts do not provide extensive explanation as to what qualifies as “substantial impact,” but the case law suggests that if a rule imposes upon private parties dramatic economic changes, the rule has a substantial impact.[104](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F104" \t "LAW_FTN) Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council in 1978, however, the test has fallen into disfavor and most courts ignore it.[105](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F105" \t "LAW_FTN) 3. The “Public Good” Should Not Be a Factor Litigants have argued that public policy should enter into courts’ decision-making, but courts generally rule only on process and do not [\*PG170]incorporate the “public good” into their analyses.[106](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F106" \t "LAW_FTN) Most courts rule that they have only the authority to review whether agencies followed prescribed procedures and whether agencies violated the law, but not whether agencies have formulated flawed opinions.[107](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F107" \t "LAW_FTN) An agency is, ideally, composed of experts in the particular field over which it regulates, and a judge is, ideally, an expert in the field of law.[108](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F108" \t "LAW_FTN) In principle, judges do not substitute agency thinking with their own opinions.[109](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F109" \t "LAW_FTN) Instead, courts generally review agency process, not agency judgment.[110](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F110" \t "LAW_FTN) Hence, courts tend to analyze the agency’s procedure rather than the real world policy effects of agency judgment.[111](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F111" \t "LAW_FTN) As a result, the duty to provide for the public good remains with Congress and the agencies.[112](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F112" \t "LAW_FTN)

II.  The Legal Effects of Rules

Depending on whether a rule is adopted with or without notice-and-comment process, the rule will have different legal effects.[113](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F113" \t "LAW_FTN) Legislative rules produced after notice-and-comment procedures constitute substantive law and legally bind both agencies and private parties in future legal and administrative proceedings.[114](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F114" \t "LAW_FTN) Conversely, nonlegislative rules generally may not have binding legal effects.[115](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F115" \t "LAW_FTN) Nonlegislative rules, however, sometimes have practical legal effects.[116](http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/41_1/05_FTN.htm" \l "F116" \t "LAW_FTN)

#### “Substantial” requires legal effect

Words & Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### Voting issue --- mandated change is key to all ground, otherwise they can say the plan won’t happen or is only done in certain instances --- destroys competition and means the Aff loses on rollback

### Perm Do CP 2NC

#### 1) Perm’s impossible – the CP is plan-minus – it doesn’t approve the plan in the instances in which relevant communities say no

#### 2) The CP is functionally distinct –

#### A) Mutually exclusive – military leaders must choose between independence and open communication

Eriksen 3 (Jan, Rear Admiral – NATO, “NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE,” June, AJP-9, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf)

Communication. Effective communication with civil authorities, agencies, organisations and populations is vital to maintaining consent and cooperation. Differences between military and civilian organisations - whether perceived or otherwise- require an investment in time and understanding to overcome. Civilian organisations with which the military will deal are likely to pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take the view that co-operation with the military and independence are mutually exclusive. The key to minimising these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication. Clear and effective measures to establish and maintain these communication channels through CIMIC staffs with representatives of appropriate civilian organisations and lead agencies should be developed to avoid potential disruptions and misunderstandings. As civilian organisations continue to arrive throughout the operation, they should be encouraged to adapt to the established system.

#### B) Minor modifications – the plan ignores requested modifications like noise reductions, which they’ll ask for.

DOD 4 (Federal Register, 2/12, http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JCVMA/Documents/JCVMArpt.pdf)

(d) The Department did not receive any requests from local governments that a particular installation be closed or realigned pursuant to section 2914(b)(2) of Public Law 101–510, which states that the Secretary shall consider any notice received from a local government in the vicinity of a military installation that the local government would approve of the closure or realignment of the installation. A few private citizens, however, asked that a particular installation be closed or that operations be restricted to limit noise or other community impacts.

#### 3) Severs the funding mechanism

#### A) Procurement contracts are locked-in – can’t allow for changes like the CP

GL 12 (GovLoop, “How to Fix Procurement with Technology,” 7-13, http://www.govloop.com/profiles/blogs/how-to-fix-procurement-with-technology)

What do you see as the biggest challenges with the procurement process? Time & Burden Factor - I think the most immediate challenge with procurement is the time it takes to get from recognizing a need to final delivery. Even if agencies manage to get the budget and resources they need, they may not have the required lead time for procurements that are critical for their mission. Budgets and support contracts are often locked in way in advance of a mission change or new mandate, and acquiring something quickly may sacrifice (more time consuming) open competition and reduce the chance the most possible vendors to compete for business. Worse, agencies may just ignore a policy or opportunity because of the burden of the procurement cycle.

#### B) That’s true of any alternative financing mechanism that uses the military

O’Rourke and Schwartz 12 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs – CRS, and Moshe, Specialist in Defense Acquisition – CRS, “Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 6-27, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41909.pdf)

Funding Approaches vs. Contracting Mechanisms In discussing MYP and BBC, it can be helpful to distinguish funding approaches from contracting mechanisms. The two are often mixed together in discussions of DOD acquisition, sometimes leading to confusion. Stated briefly: • Funding approaches are ways that Congress can appropriate funding for weapon procurement programs, so that DOD can then put them under contract. Examples of funding approaches include traditional full funding (the standard or default approach), incremental funding, and advance appropriations. 2 Any of these funding approaches might make use of advance procurement (AP) funding. 3 • Contracting mechanisms are ways for DOD to contract for the procurement of weapons systems, once funding for those systems has been appropriated by Congress. Examples of contracting mechanisms include annual contracting (the standard or default approach), MYP, and BBC. The use of a particular funding approach in a defense acquisition program does not dictate the use of a particular contracting mechanism. Defense acquisition programs consequently can be implemented using various combinations of funding approaches and contracting mechanisms. Most DOD weapon acquisition programs use a combination of traditional full funding and annual contracting. A few programs, particularly certain Navy shipbuilding programs, use incremental funding as their funding approach. A limited number of DOD programs use MYP as their contracting approach, and to date at least two defense acquisition programs (both Navy shipbuilding programs) use or have used BBC as their contracting approach.

[Continues to Footnote]

For more on these three funding approaches, see CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy— Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett, and CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Advance appropriations, which are not to be confused with advance procurement (AP) funding (see footnote 3), are essentially a legislatively locked-in form of incremental funding. Unlike incremental funding, advance appropriations qualify under budgeting regulations as a form of full funding.

#### C) “Increase” means the incentives must be actualized, not simply proposed

**HEFC 4** (Higher Education Funding Council, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtchar/1> 67/167we98.htm# n43)

9.1 The Draft Bill creates an obligation on the principal regulator to do all that it "reasonably can to meet the compliance objective in relation to the charity".[ 45] The Draft Bill defines the compliance objective as "to increase compliance by the charity trustees with their legal obligations in exercising control and management of the administration of the charity".[ 46] 9.2 Although the word "increase" is used in relation to the functions of a number of statutory bodies,[47] such examples demonstrate that "increase" is used in relation to considerations to be taken into account in the exercise of a function, rather than an **objective** in itself. 9.3 HEFCE is concerned that an obligation on principal regulators to "increase" compliance per se is unworkable, in so far as it does not adequately define the limit**s** or nature of the statutory duty. Indeed, the obligation could be considered to be ever-increasing.

#### Severance is bad – makes the aff a moving target and makes it impossible for the neg to have stable ground. Aff conditionality is worse because it causes shifty, late-breaking debate. Stick them to the plan text – it’s a vital access point to negative preparation, both pre-round and pre-tournament.

#### 4) Severs normal means – they use the DoD which precludes tailored approaches like the CP

DOD 4 (Federal Register, 2/12, http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JCVMA/Documents/JCVMArpt.pdf)

(e) A few commentors expressed concern over the broad nature of the criteria and requested greater detail, including in some cases requests for definitions, specificity regarding select functions, and explanations of when a closure as opposed to a realignment was appropriate. While the Department appreciates a desire for detail, the inherent mission diversity of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies makes it impossible for DoD to specify detailed criteria that could be applied to all installations and functions within the Department. Broad criteria allow flexibility of application across a wide range of functions within the Department.

#### 5) It tests “resolved” which means “to make a firm decision”, and “should” which is “used to imply obligation or duty” – that’s American Heritage.

#### “Substantial” means that the plan must be definite, mandated

Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain: absolute: real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### ‘Should’ necessitates that the plan is mandatory and immediate

Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

### Perm Do Both – 2NC

#### Doesn’t solve the net-benefit –

#### 1) Top-down approach –

#### A) Genuine consultation’s key to military-community relations – the perm is a top-down approach driven by military leadership – fostering an equal and open relationship is key – that’s 1NC Gray Evidence

#### B) The perm maintain military plan’s as the primary consideration

DOD 4 (Federal Register, 2/12, http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JCVMA/Documents/JCVMArpt.pdf)

(k) A few commentors asked the Department to give priority to relocating activities within the same state or local community. The Department recognizes that the economic impact of BRAC reductions can be lessened by moving functions to geographically proximate locations. As specified in the BRAC legislation, however, military value must be the primary consideration when making these decisions. Specifically, those factors that are set out in criteria one through four are the most important considerations when selecting receiving locations.

[NOTE: from BRAC website, “Welcome to the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission's official website. Our goal is to assist the American public, including interested stakeholders, to fully understand the open and transparent process through which our work is conducted”]

#### That destroys any signal sent by the CP

Sugarman 5 (Jeremy, Harvey M. Meyerhoff Professor of Bioethics and Medicine, professor of medicine, professor of health policy and management, and deputy director for medicine of the Berman Institute of Bioethics at the Johns Hopkins University, “Ethical Goals of Community Consultation in Research,” American Journal of Public Health, July; 95(7): 1123–1127, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449329/)

Rather than soliciting input, community consent involves soliciting approval or permission to conduct a study within a community. Community consent may occur after community consultation and does not obviate the need for individual consent.36,37 Rather, the community decides whether to permit investigators to solicit participation from community members. For community consent to be valid, there must be a legitimate political system in place, with representatives properly empowered to make such decisions on behalf of the community.37,38 In many aboriginal communities, such legitimate systems exist. However, disease-based communities and many social groups typically lack a political structure, which makes community consent inappropriate.37,38 Although conceptually distinct, the line between community consultation and community consent is inevitably blurred in practice. It would be disingenuous to enter into a consulting arrangement where the consulting party does not intend, ex ante, to take the consultants’ advice. If relevant consultants have strong negative reactions or endorse particular modifications, those reactions or modifications have significant moral force and warrant respect and careful consideration, even though investigators may sometimes justifiably act contrary to such opinions. Otherwise, community consultation is merely symbolic.39 Despite the clear conceptual distinction between consent and consultation, the degree to which consultants’ support is necessary represents a persistent challenge.15,16,29

#### 2) The perm is a one-size fits all approach – tailored and genuine consultation are key

Origin 12 (“Origin Energy’s Response - to the Draft NSW Planning Guidelines: Wind Farms,” 3-14, Department of Planning and Infrastructure, <http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yjWiCDme6F4%3D&> tabid=205&mid=1081&language=en-US)

Consultation with local authorities, such as council, would also assist in developing a community engagement plan that is appropriate for the project and the local area. Local authorities can also assist in facilitating the dissemination of project information and identify opportunities to maximise public participation. 9 The lengthy nature of wind farm developments means that it is likely multiple community engagement plans may be required to meet the differing engagement needs of different stages of a project. The objectives, tools and methods, frequency of contact and engagement activities should be tailored to each stage. At the appropriate times, seeking specific feedback from stakeholders and/or surveys with the local community would help inform preferred consultation methods and frequency. It is anticipated that the community engagement plan would be revised and updated regularly to incorporate stakeholder feedback and changes to the project. Implementation of the plan and evidence of its implementation should be included in the assessment process. A typical stage-by-stage community engagement approach has been included in Appendix A as a reference. Comments on the Draft Guidelines Origin agrees with the Government’s objectives expressed in the Draft Guidelines that “a comprehensive, detailed and genuine community consultation and engagement process must occur, and that consultation needs to be genuine and aimed at identifying and considering options for eliminating or reducing impacts, not merely informing communities”. However, every community is unique. Different communities may have different preferences on how they wish to receive information and engage. Indeed, no one community is a homogenous entity and it is reasonable to expect that an effective consultation program would be tailored to meet the different needs for different sections/stakeholders within the community. As described earlier, information and consultation requirements during the life of a wind farm (from development, construction to operation and decommissioning) vary greatly. Our experience is that attempts at adopting a one-size-fits-all approach usually fails to deliver on effective community consultation.

#### Independently – that turns hegemony

Schaffer 12 (Douglas J., National Security Analyst with AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare, “Linking Latin America and the Pacific: A Strategy for the Long Term,” National Security Watch, 12(3), July, http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw\_pubs/nationalsecuritywatch/Documents/NSW\_12-3\_web.pdf)

The second benefit is a subset of the United States countering Chinese military presence in Latin America. By taking a nation-by-nation approach, the United States can properly contextualize and tailor its military efforts with Latin America. This is an opportunity for the United States to focus on the non-kinetic aspects of its new defense guidance. Mexico and Colombia may very well need continued hard-power-related resourcing and support from the United States; however, not every nation is consumed by a counternarcotics campaign. The humanitarian relief/ rescue, disaster response, capacity building and even cybersecurity requirements are just as valid for South and Central American nations. 18 A tailored approach will let the United States leverage its military as an institution rather than just as a force. The United States military has levels of expertise, experience and professionalism in many functional areas—such as logistics or personnel—that China cannot match. More joint training exercises, more officer embedding and exchanges, more professional education and more noncombat operations focus (both in equipping/sales and training) will show U.S. allies that the United States takes seriously the nuances of each nation and will force the United States to pay more than lip service to the non-counterterror aspects of its strategic guidance. By being an attentive and responsive security partner that demonstrates a valuation of relationships over material, the United States can contrast itself to China in terms of reliability, longevity and long-term aims for each nation.

#### 3) Genuine consultation generates long term trust between the base and local population

Savage 10 (Melissa, tracks military base issues for NCSL, “Lawmakers are looking for ways to resolve land-use conflicts between civilian communities and military bases,” National Conference of State Legislatures, March, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/making-peace-article.aspx)

Working Together Keeping information flowing to the community regarding training and missions can help build and strengthen the relationships between local residents and the military, says John Conger, deputy undersecretary for Installations and the Environment with the Department of Defense. “It’s important to raise awareness that what’s happening in the community can affect what happens on the base and what’s happening on the base can affect the community. Working together in partnership is a win-win.” Establishing a solid foundation for a successful long-term relationship between the military installation and the community is paramount, given the short-term nature of military post appointments and the election cycle facing many government officials. “Base commanders and elected officials tend to have short-term perspectives given the very nature of their positions,” says Kansas Representative Tom Sloan. “Commanders generally are stationed at the base for a relatively short period of time—usually no longer than two to three years. And elected officials are subject to term limits in some states, and at the very least, elections every few years. “Because of this tendency to focus on the short term, it’s important that legislators and base commanders work together to put a framework in place that ensures the long-term success of the relationship so future base commanders and elected officials can hit the ground running.” Sloan also points out that military bases with strong community partnerships and a plan to minimize civilian impact on training are less likely to be closed. To help foster these relationships, the Department of Defense has a program known as the Readiness and Environmental Protection Initiative. This initiative leverages federal money with local community funding to acquire land that will serve as a buffer between the installation—and its training missions—and the homes, businesses, schools and other community areas surrounding the base. The added benefit is that, in many cases, the community ends up with a significant portion of land that will remain undeveloped forever. This protected land also provides a home for wildlife, and maybe even endangered species like the golden-cheeked warbler.

### Perm Timeframe – 2NC

#### “Should” means “must” and requires immediate legal effect

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling *in praesenti*.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn16)

[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]

[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) *In praesenti* means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is *presently* or *immediately effective*, as opposed to something that *will* or *would* become effective *in the future [in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

### Say Yes – 2NC

#### Framing issue – they have ZERO Evidence that is specific to communities that are adjacent to military bases. Our Savage evidence says they would support keep military bases because of economic benefits when there is open dialogue.

#### More reasons –

#### A) It provides critical services

King 11 (Marcus, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf)

Typically, transmission lines transfer electricity at high voltages over long distances to minimize loss; electricity distribution systems carry medium voltages. For electrical power transmission, very little additional infrastructure is required to incorporate small nuclear power plants because they would be located on or near the DoD installation being serviced. However, redundancy in transmission lines would make the overall network more robust. Electricity control capabilities, such as self-healing 6 and optimization of assets to increase operational efficiency, could improve overall power availability; however, they are not necessary for the integration of small nuclear power plants. Key components for improving electricity control include advanced electricity meters and electricity meter data management. These tools are needed in order to establish islanding, a condition in which a portion of the utility system, which contains both load and generation, is isolated from the remainder of the utility system and continues to operate. Since the power generation capacities of small nuclear power plants are larger than required for most DoD bases, islanding could extend to adjacent communities if sufficient technical upgrades were performed to systems outside of the installation. This contributes to DoD missions because civilians and service members working on the installation often live with their families in adjacent communities. The power would ensure that critical services such as emergency response, waste water treatment, and hospitals could be maintained.

#### B) Economics

DOD 4 (Federal Register, 2/12, http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JCVMA/Documents/JCVMArpt.pdf)

(j) A few commentors cautioned the Department against using the authority provided by section 2914(c) to close and retain installations in inactive status because of the negative effect such action might have on the relevant local community. The Department recognizes that job creation gained through the economic reuse of facilities is critically important to mitigate the negative impact of BRAC recommendations. As such, the Department will exercise the utmost caution and consideration when exercising its authority to retain installations in an inactive status. It should be noted that the Department has always had this authority, even though its appearance in the authorizing legislation for the 2005 round would indicate it is a new authority. As such, the Department’s actions in the four previous base closure rounds demonstrate that it will be exercised judiciously.

[NOTE: from BRAC website, “Welcome to the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission's official website. Our goal is to assist the American public, including interested stakeholders, to fully understand the open and transparent process through which our work is conducted”]

#### **All of this is true DESPITE Fukushima – prefer our studies**

Phuong 12 (Nguyen, Officer – Department of Nuclear Science & Technology Management, “Public Communication Programme for the First Nuclear Power Project,” Ministry of Science and Technology – Vietnam Atomic Energy Agency, January, http://www.iaea.org/nuclearpower/downloads/infrastructure/meetings/2012-01-tm-ws-vienna/day-1/8.publiccommunicationprogramme-for-the-first-npp-nvphuong.pdf)

Results

• Active support from majority of local communities to the Project, some even urge to accelerate the Project

• Official agreement to the Project from the People’s Committees (local authority) of all three levels: Phuoc Dinh & Vinh Hai communes (sites for 2 first NPPs); Ninh Phuoc (now Thuan Nam) & Ninh Hai districts; Ninh Thuan Province

• Continuous public understanding and support , even after Fukushima Accident

#### C) Non-material benefits

Phuong 12 (Nguyen, Officer – Department of Nuclear Science & Technology Management, “Public Communication Programme for the First Nuclear Power Project,” Ministry of Science and Technology – Vietnam Atomic Energy Agency, January, http://www.iaea.org/nuclearpower/downloads/infrastructure/meetings/2012-01-tm-ws-vienna/day-1/8.publiccommunicationprogramme-for-the-first-npp-nvphuong.pdf)

Nuclear power as an engine for national economic development

– Energy security

– Reasonable answer to energy problems in the future

– Solution to improve the national position in the international community

• Benefits of nuclear power projects to the local communities

– Material and non-material benefits

– Local socio-economic development

### Guam – 1NC

#### Second – the perm destroys genuine consultation – that causes the US to get kicked out of Guam

Natividad 10 (Lisa Linda, Assistant Professor with the Division of Social Work at the University of Guam and President of the Guahan Coalition for Peace and Justice, “The Explosive Growth of U.S. Military Power on Guam Confronts People Power: Experience of an island people under Spanish, Japanese and American colonial rule,” Asia-Pacific Journal, 49(3), 12-6, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Victoria\_Lola\_Leon-Guerrero/3454)

While the Department of Defense had been orchestrating the build-up for years, they did little to share their plans with the local community**,** or include local leaders in any of the decisions that were made. Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Department of Defense embarked on the environmental impact assessment process by hiring contractors to assess the potential impact of the proposed build-up. Guahan government leaders received periodic visits from contractors between 2006 and 2009. In addition, meetings were held in 2007 in village community centers of the island to obtain feedback and for local people to voice concerns. The meetings did not, however, allow for the verbal expression of concerns; rather, attendees were told to write their testimonies and place them in trashcan-like receptacles for submission. The result was to fragment criticisms and to deny local communities the opportunity to ascertain and convey community, as opposed to individual sentiment. The Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO) Director, General David Bice, reported that over 900 written comments were received in this process. Articulated concerns included the following: social, economic, and cultural factors; international safety; law enforcement; transportation and infrastructure issues; marine resources/ecology; air and water quality; and overtaxing limited resources and services. Other events related to the proposed Military build-up followed. In 2008, a Congressional hearing convened by Congresswoman Donna Christianson was held on the island. In the following year, the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO) held a number of island-wide public meetings, providing another opportunity for community members to articulate their concerns in the form of written comments. In November 2009 a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was released. The Guahan Coalition for Peace and Justice coordinated a protest on the day of the release of the DEIS themed, “Bogus EIS.” The protest highlighted the lack of genuine consultation with the local population in the preparation of the document. For the first time, the DEIS - in roughly 11,000 pages - revealed the Department of Defense’s plan for the Military build-up to the people of the island. While island leaders had been pleading to be part of the planning process - particularly the development of the Civilian-Military Task Force - it was only with the release of the DEIS that the specific contours of the DOD plan became transparent. The document laid out alternatives for each of its recommendations, as well as indicated its “preferred” alternatives. The public was given a mere 90 days to read 11,000 pages spread across nine volumes and provide comments.

#### Guam kick out causes Chinese attack on Taiwan

Caryl 7 (Washington Chief Editor for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He is a Contributing Editor at Foreign Policy and a Senior Fellow of the Center for International Studies at MIT, <http://www.newsweek.com/2007/02/25/america-s-unsinkable-fleet.html>)

So why all the fuss over a tropical island just 30 miles long, known mainly for its white-sand beaches and glorious sunsets? The answer: the Pentagon has begun a major redeployment of U.S. forces in the region, pulling troops and equipment out of sometimes unreliable allies and beefing up its presence in more-congenial locales. First on its list is Guam, a U.S. territory since 1898 that **is fast becoming the linchpin of Washington's new Asia strategy.** Current U.S. forces on the island number just a few thousand but within a decade will total well over 20,000—about the same size as the Bush administration's planned surge in Iraq. By comparison, there are some 29,000 U.S. troops left in South Korea, yet despite the dangers of a nuclear-armed North, that number is expected to drop significantly. At a time when most of the world's attention is focused on the United States' misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, Pentagon planners are quietly working on ways to fortify the U.S. presence in East Asia. And they're looking to do so in ways that will give them a free hand in a wide range of contingencies—including fighting regional terrorists and a possible showdown with China. Guam offers the U.S. military both proximity to potential hot spots and the advantages of operating off U.S. soil. The transfer of forces to the island also reflects the Pentagon's determination to give regional allies such as South Korea and Japan more responsibility for their own security. Guam, a sleepy but diverse place that looks like a cross between Micronesia and Middle America, has long served as a U.S. air base and way station for troops traveling through the Pacific. At the end of the cold war, the Pentagon began shutting down some facilities on the island. But then came September 11, and a dramatic reassessment of America's global forces. Former secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began to advocate the lily-pad strategy: rather than relying on large, static bases in Germany and South Korea, the Pentagon should create a global network of jumping-off points for quick responses to unpredictable attacks. Guam is an ideal lily pad, since the United States can act there without seeking permission from allies, says Honolulu-based defense analyst Richard Halloran. Declares Carl Peterson of the Guam Chamber of Commerce: "This is the U.S. in Asia. This is the tip of the spear." The island has already become a convenient base for fighting Washington's "Global War on Terror" in Indonesia and the Philippines. Small wonder that Brig. Gen. Douglas H. Owens, the commanding officer of Guam's Andersen Air Force Base, describes the island as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier." It's also well positioned for possible trouble to come. As Rear Adm. Charles Leidig, U.S. Navy commander on Guam, points out, if you take a map and draw a circle with Guam at the center and a radius of 1,500 nautical miles—equivalent to three hours' flying time or two to three days by ship—you come close to the main islands of Japan, Okinawa, Indonesia and the Philippines. China and the Korean Peninsula are only a bit farther off. So are several of the world's most important sea lanes, such as the Strait of Malacca, through which some 50 percent of the world's oil passes each year. The Pentagon, however, may be building up its forces on Guam with even bigger game in mind. "The larger strategic rationale [for the shift] can be summed up in one word, and that's 'China'," says Halloran. "They [the Bush administration] don't want to contain China, and they couldn't. What they are trying to do is to deter the Chinese. That's what the buildup on Guam is all about." The nature of the U.S. reorganization reinforces this point. Washington and Tokyo have agreed to move 8,000 Marines to Guam from Okinawa by 2014, at a cost of $10 billion (60 percent of which will be paid for by the Japanese government). But this is only the most public part of a broader buildup that has largely escaped notice. If all the pieces come together, it could mean billions more in Defense Department funds and a total increase in Guam's population (which is currently just 170,000) of 35,000. Guam is already home to a major U.S. Navy port and one of the biggest bases in the U.S. Air Force, featuring twin two-mile-long runways. Not long after September 11, flights of massive B-52 bombers began returning to Andersen to carry out regular training missions. Now the Air Force has begun to prepare for the deployment of tanker aircraft and up to 48 fighter planes, including the state-of-the-art F-22 Raptor. Andersen has also already started construction of a $52.8 million project that will house up to 10 Global Hawks--large unmanned spy planes that, according to Pacific Command Air Force Gen. Paul Hester, could end up replacing aging U-2 spy planes now based in South Korea. Meanwhile, the Navy has turned its port at Guam's Apra Harbor into a home for two Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, with a third to come later this year. It also plans to refurbish wharves to accommodate aircraft carriers and to transform Guam into a base for its new Littoral Combat Ship (a shallow-draft stealth ship designed to operate close to shore) and Trident submarines. The Tridents, immense cold-war-era craft converted to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles, can also be used by Navy Special Operations Forces, who can set off on missions in mini-submarines launched through the Tridents' missile ports. Guam is already home to an undisclosed number of Navy SEALs, many of whom have seen duty in the war on terror, and their number will likely grow. Guam's new capabilities, however, are designed for more than just low-intensity conflicts. The attack submarines that will soon be based there, for example, probably wouldn't be much use in a conflict with North Korea or Qaeda-allied terrorists in the Philippines; the presence of the subs, experts say, is clearly aimed at the possibility of a naval confrontation with China over the Taiwan Strait. Similarly, analysts argue, the stationing of F-22s and tanker planes on Guam points to the Pentagon's desire to ensure dominance in the air should it have to fight the Chinese. China's media often worry about just this scenario, but not everyone agrees that China is the main target of the Guam buildup. Evan Medeiros of the RAND Corporation says "the initial impetus and primary driver" were to restructure the U.S. military for the wide range of operations it now faces, from fighting the war on terror to chasing pirates and conducting humanitarian missions. In the complicated post-9/11 world, the United States believes it must be able to respond to various threats as flexibly as possible. This means keeping its forces close to the action. In the past that's required basing them in other countries' territories. But Guam offers an almost unique combination of a good location, excellent facilities (including a topnotch harbor, vast warehouses and massive airfields) and a lack of political restraints. As Kurt Campbell, a former White House staffer and Defense Department official now at the Center for a New American Security, says, "[Guam is] a point from which you can do a variety of things. And it's a place to remind people that you're still focused on the region." Campbell points out that these secondary missions, such as protecting sea lanes, countering weapons proliferation and conducting relief missions, remain important; the U.S. military's humanitarian efforts after the tsunami of December 2005 gave a huge boost to the country's reputation in Asia. Brad Glosserman, executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS, a Hawaii-based think tank, agrees. The Asia-Pacific region, he says, "is a jigsaw puzzle where all the pieces are changing shape and size all the time. China's the big story--but there are also changes going in on Japan, India, South Korea, Taiwan." One such development driving the move to Guam has been the steady withdrawal of the United States from South Korea in recent years (more than 9,000 troops have left in the last three years)--a result, in part, of rising anti-Americanism there and Rumsfeld's reluctance to keep troops in politically sensitive places. Some Air Force units that have pulled out of South Korea have already arrived on Guam; others may be yet to come. That, along with the planned removal of the Marines from Okinawa, has led some commentators to characterize the Guam expansion as evidence of a virtual U.S. retreat from East Asia. But Campbell and others disagree: "I would see this not as a retrenchment but as a diversification." Indeed, after years of maintaining an even balance between its Atlantic and Pacific fleets, the U.S. Navy is now clearly emphasizing its force in Asia.

#### Nuclear war

Glaser 11 (Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs – George Washington University, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 9 Iss. 2, March/April)

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

### Global Basing – 1NC

#### **Turns forward basing**

Smith 6 (Sheila A., “Social Change and New Citizen Voices,” *Shifting Terrain: the Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia*, East-West Center, Special Report No. 8, March, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/misc/SR00805SocialChange.pdf)

These women's groups, along with a growing number of scholars, have shed light on what was the dark underside of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Prostituted women, bar workers, and, in some cases, even those who married U.S. servicemen were abandoned by mainstream society and have been portrayed as women unworthy of the protection and advocacy of the state. With changing norms regarding women's rights in each of these societies, there is greater interest in providing relief for the victims of violence and in economically empowering women. Both of these goals play a significant role in high-lighting the particular experiences of the women that have lived alongside the U.S. military. Today, there is much wider and more receptive audience for the ideas and the goal advocated by these women's groups, and the transnational connections between them have become a source of resources as well as learning. They have raised the consciousness of national and international audiences regarding the visible and underappreciated consequences of a sustained foreign troop presence on the human rights of women. In terms of the policy debate over U.S. military bases, it is clear that the past government practice of sanctioning networks of "entertainment" and prostitution in Japan, SOuth Korea, and the Phillippines is increasingly problematic. In South Korea, for example, prostitution in these countries. Again, South Korea was the first of the three societies hosting U.S. forces to pass an anti-trafficking law, and there is intense pressure from the U.S. government for Japan to do the same. Pressure on national governments to address women's rights and security concerns within base communities, therefore, is coming from two directions: from grassroots activism of women's centers in the base communities and from transnational efforts to address the exploitation of women as part of a human rights agenda. Broader currents of social and economic change are exposing the concerns of those who live in proximity to U.S. bases. Civil society activism has played a central role in recasting the national debate on issues such as discrimination and human rights, and this has implication for the way in which local community relations with the U.S. military are being viewed. In each of the three countries, the circumstances of local communities were for decades far removed from the day-to-day experiences of urban residents. But today, these once peripheral areas and the experiences of their residents are as accessible to national audiences as events in Tokyo, Seoul, or Manila. Media coverage, civil society activism, and a greater interest in seeing what happens to any citizens in their interactions with the U.S. military as a national experience suggests that local communities may no longer be as isolated as they once were.

#### [Pick a Module]

### Military Says No 2NC

#### Military says no – DARPA doesn’t wat to deal with the prolif risks

**Ackerman**, 2/18/**2011** (Spencer, Latest Pentagon Brainstorm: Nuke-Powered War Bases, Wired, p. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/02/nuke-bases/)

Buried within Darpa’s 2012 budget request under the innocuous name of “Small Rugged Reactor Technologies” is a $10 million proposal to fuel wartime Forward Operating Bases with nuclear power. It springs from an admirable impulse: to reduce the need for troops or contractors to truck down roads littered with bombs to get power onto the base. It’s time, Darpa figures, for a “self-sufficient” FOB. Only one problem. “The only known technology that has potential to address the power needs of the envisioned self-sufficient FOB,” the pitch reads, “is a nuclear-fuel reactor.” Now, bases could mitigate their energy consumption, like the solar-powered Marine company in Helmand Province, but that’s not enough of a game-changer for Darpa. Being self-sufficient is the goal; and that requires going nuclear; and that requires … other things. To fit on a FOB, which can be anywhere from Bagram Air Field’s eight square miles to dusty collections of wooden shacks and concertina wire, the reactor would have to be “well below the scale of the smallest reactors that are being developed for domestic energy production,” Darpa acknowledges. That’s not impossible, says Christine Parthemore, an energy expert at the Center for a New American Security. The Japanese and the South Africans have been working on miniature nuclear power plants for the better part of a decade; Bill Gates has partnered with Toshiba to build mini-nuke sites. (Although it’s not the most auspicious sign that one prominent startup for modular reactors suspended its operations after growing cash-light last month.) Those small sites typically use uranium enriched to about 2 percent. “It would be really, really difficult to divert the fuel” for a bomb “unless you really knew what you were doing,” Parthemore says. But Darpa doesn’t want to take that chance. Only “non-proliferable fuels (i.e., fuels other than enriched uranium or plutonium) and reactor designs that are fundamentally safe will be required of reactors that may be deployed to regions where hostile acts may compromise operations.” Sensible, sure. But it limits your options: outside of uranium or plutonium, thorium is the only remaining source for generating nuclear fuel. The Indians and now the Chinese have experimented with thorium for their nuclear programs, but, alas, “no one has ever successfully found a way” to build a functioning thorium reactor, Parthemore says, “in a safe and economical manner.”

#### Feasibility issues means the military says no

DC 8-9 (Defense Communities, “Are the Services Considering Nuclear Energy?,” 2012, http://www.defensecommunities.org/are-the-services-considering-nuclear-energy/#)

Without discounting the prospect that nuclear energy someday could become a feasible power source for military installations, the services’ installation chiefs said the technology is not yet ripe for renewable energy projects now under consideration. “We are not opposed, but the others are proven technologies,” Katherine Hammack, the Army’s assistant secretary for installations, energy and environment, said in response to a question during the ADC 2012 Annual Conference as to why the services were focusing only on wind, solar, geothermal and biomass as renewable energy sources. “Everything I’ve seen is in the bench test phase,” she said, adding that the Army is having discussions with the Energy Department about the use of nuclear energy. Terry Yonkers, the Air Force’s assistant secretary for installations, environment and logistics, listed the technology’s principal shortcomings at this point in time — the feasibility of small nuclear reactors has not yet been proven, a permitting process has not yet been developed and the economics are unclear. And “the community may not be ready yet,” he added.

### No Private Interest 2NC

#### Investors won't contract with the military – Bartis & Bibber say climate is too uncertain and lacks detail – DoD is not willing to pay premium prices and production is still too costly – low oil prices mean no investment

#### Military renewable integration not feasible and long-term

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

But the beneficial hydrogen derived from nuclear, solar, and wind energy technologies is not an economically viable option over the near- to mid-term. The trade-off is cost: Producing hydrogen from clean sources in capacities large enough to gain the benefits described above requires very large amounts of generating capacity and would significantly increase the costs of producing liquid fuels. Considering the importance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions during the process of generating electric power for traditional uses, investments in climate-friendly power generation are already likely to be very high over the coming decades. In this context, the additional investment required to construct large amounts of generating capacity dedicated to producing alternative fuels is probably not feasible. For at least the next two decades, it is highly unlikely that hydrogen from nuclear or renewable electric-generating technologies will be a commercially viable option for producing alternative fuels.

#### Companies don't want to engage in procurement

Erwin 12 -- editor of National Defense Magazine (Sandra, 8/7/12, "Army to Renewable-Energy Industry: Show Me the Money," http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=857)

Privatizing the electricity supply is the next step. The cost of building the infrastructure is too high for the Army to bear, and the military lacks the technological know-how of the private sector. The Army Corps of Engineers soon will release a request for proposals to interested vendors. A mix of companies — from defense contractors, renewable energy developers and public utilities — are said to be considering jumping into the fray. Bidders will be vetted and those that are deemed technically and financially qualified will be included in a pool of eligible competitors. Those selected firms will then vie for specific “task orders” for particular projects, to be built on Army-owned land. The plan is to award task orders for about 100 megawatts of renewable energy each year. Because vendors vary in size and capabilities, the Army will break down projects into three categories: Less than 4 megawatts, 4 to 10 megawatts, and larger than 10 megawatts. “Our commitment is to buy the energy,” said Hammack. “No [energy] generation assets will be procured by the Army.” The unorthodox contracting strategy appears to have drawn significant attention from the private sector. “We have been astounded by the interest in this,” Hammack said. A draft RFP published in February drew 900 comments from approximately 130 interested firms, she said. E. Sanderson Hoe, energy industry attorney and partner at McKenna Long & Aldridge, said the RFP has been highly anticipated as proof that the Army is serious about moving forward with this project. Companies, nonetheless, have mixed feelings about the multiple award task-order approach, Hoe said in an interview. Contractors that lack the cash flow and patience to get through the selection process will not find this project attractive, he said. Getting on the “preferred vendors” list is only the first step, and not necessarily an assured path to success, Hoe said.

### Expertise 2NC

#### **Can’t solve – military personnel don’t have enough expertise to deal with reactors**

Parthemore and Rogers 10 (Christine and Will, Bacevich Fellow – CNAS, “Broadening Horizons: Climate Change and the U.S. Armed Forces,” Center for New American Security, April, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Broadening%20Horizons_Carmen%20Parthemore%20Rogers.pdf>)

Many serious complications must be weighed as well. Military base personnel often do not have the necessary training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials. Nuclear reactors would necessitate additional qualified personnel and improved physical security requirements to meet the 24/7 operations needs. As with siting for all energy production, local public resistance could be problematic. When considering the impact of a reactor casualty, the resulting impact on the operational mission effectiveness of the tenant commands on the base must also be considered so as to avoid a single point vulnerability that disables all military operations on site. And while many private companies are touting new designs for small reactors that would work well in this capacity, the technology may still be years away from fully meeting technical requirements and federal regulatory standards.13 Proliferation considerations would also need to be part of any adjudication of what types of reactors are most suitable for these purposes.

### Accidents Turn 1NC

#### **Military nuclear installments will be targeted for sabotage – causes accidents**

Wong 12 (Kelvin, Associate Research Fellow – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, “Beyond Weapons: The Military’s Quest For Nuclear Power – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, 5-22, http://www.eurasiareview.com/22052012-beyond-weapons-the-militarys-quest-for-nuclear-power-analysis/)

Civilian And Military Nuclear Incidents Despite improvements in nuclear safety, public sentiment on nuclear power is generally unfavourable, particularly after a series of high-profile nuclear incidents over the years. Disasters like Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and the recent Fukushima episodes have sorely demonstrated the perils of operating nuclear reactors, emanating be it from human error or natural calamities. Military forces have also been stung by peacetime nuclear incidents. In March 2008, the American nuclear submarine USS Houston leaked minute amounts of radiation into Sasebo naval base while on a port call, triggering condemnation from Japanese citizens in the district. In the same year, the British nuclear submarine HMS Trafalgar leaked hundreds of litres of radioactive wastewater into a nearby river while docked at Devonport naval base, raising concerns from nuclear safety experts. Mainstream Nuclear Power In The Military? Yet military scientists have not ceased to be tempted by the potential of nuclear power. In response to increasing oil prices and global supply uncertainties, and well-documented cases of logistical strain on forces operating in the Middle East in recent conflicts, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) issued a proposal for innovative solutions in deployable compact nuclear reactors in 2010. In the proposal, DARPA outlined the need to reduce the logistical burden of supplying forward operating bases and forces without access to reliable fuel supply lines. The proposal also suggested that materials science have advanced to the stage where it might have a positive impact on deployable nuclear reactor research. While recent developments suggest that nuclear power technology can potentially be employed in unmanned aircraft and on the ground, it is unlikely to have mainstream military utility. The Cold War period was an era when general attitudes towards nuclear energy were quite favourable, and military experimentation was only limited by funding and scientific expertise. In contrast, nuclear power today has become a hotly debated issue despite its importance in powering the economies of advanced nations today. For the military, the problem with nuclear power is not just about cost and safety, but also of the nature of its operating environment. Deploying volatile nuclear reactors into harm’s way on the battlefield, where their destruction and sabotage are likely, should give military planners cause to pause.

#### Nuclear accidents risk extinction

**Caldicott 94** (Helen, Australian Physician, Nuclear Madness, p. 21)

As a physician, I contend that nuclear technology **threatens life on our planet with extinction.** If present trends continue, the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink will soon be contaminated with enough radioactive pollutants to post a potential health hazard far greater than any plague humanity has ever experienced. Unknowingly exposed to these radioactive poisons, some of us may be developing cancer right now. Others may be passing damaged genes, the basic chemical units that transmit hereditary characteristics, to future generations. And more of us will inevitably be affected unless we bring about a dramatic reversal of the world’s pronuclear policies

### Tajikistan

This advantage makes no sense

1) No ev says Tajikistan will get nuclear after the plan -- even if US military gets it, its still probably too expensive to research and develop -- not one card says Tajikistan and nuclear close to one another

2) Impact inevitable -- their own McGLinchey ev says withdrawal from Afghanistan triggers a Jihadist spread -- that's inevitable even with the plan given the current withdrawal timetable -- that civil war can't possibly be solved by small economic gains and decreasing electricity prices

3) No relations -- no reason security cooperation occurs after the plan -- it's probably minor and inevitable

### No Cyber Terror 2NC

#### Studies prove no cyberattacks.

**The Register ’11** (John Leyden, 1/17, “Cyberwar hype is obscuring real security threats.” http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/01/17/cyberwar\_hype\_oecd\_study/)

Cyberwar hype is inhibiting government attempts to develop an appropriate response to cybersecurity threats, say computer scientists. A heavyweight study by UK computer scientists for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concludes that it is "highly unlikely" there will ever be a "pure cyber war”, comparable with recent conflicts in Afghanistan or the Balkans. Suggestions to the contrary are down to "heavy lobbying" by suppliers, the report's authors – Professor Peter Sommer of the London School of Economics and Dr Ian Brown of the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford – conclude. It is unlikely that there will ever be a true cyberwar. The reasons are: many critical computer systems are protected against known exploits and malware so that designers of new cyberweapons have to identify new weaknesses and exploits; the effects of cyberattacks are difficult to predict – on the one hand they may be less powerful than hoped but may also have more extensive outcomes arising from the interconnectedness of systems, resulting in unwanted damage to perpetrators and their allies. More importantly, there is no strategic reason why any aggressor would limit themselves to only one class of weaponry.

**No impact to cyberattacks**

**Lewis 2** – senior fellow and director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (James A, December. “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and

Other Cyber Threats.” <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/021101_risks_of_cyberterror.pdf>)

Infrastructure as Target Cyber-terrorism is not the first time a new technology has been seized upon as creating a strategic vulnerability. While the match between theories of cyber-warfare and air power is not precise, a comparison of the two is useful. In reaction to the First World War, European strategists like Douhet and Trenchard argued that aerial bombing attacks against critical infrastructure well behind the front lines would disrupt and cripple an enemies’ capacity to wage war. Their theories were put to the test by the U.S. Army and Royal Air Forces during World War II in strategic bombing campaigns aimed at destroying electrical power, transportation and manufacturing facilities. Much of the first tranche of literature on cyber attacks resembles in many ways (and owes an unspoken debt to) the early literature on strategic bombing. A key document for understanding how attacks on infrastructure affect societies is the Strategic Bombing Survey conducted by the United State during and after World War II. During the war, Britain and America launched thousands of heavy bombers that dropped millions of tons of high explosives on Germany, seeking to cripple its infrastructure, destroy its industrial base and break the will of the population to continue the war. Early theorists of air warfare had predicted that such an onslaught would paralyze or cripple the target. What the survey found, however, is that industrial societies are impressively resilient. Industrial production actually increased for two years under the bombing and it was not until ground forces occupied Germany that resistance ceased: As the air offensive gained in tempo, the Germans were unable to prevent the decline and eventual collapse of their economy. Nevertheless, the recuperative and defensive powers of Germany were immense; the speed and ingenuity with which they rebuilt and maintained essential war industries in operation clearly surpassed Allied expectations. Germany resorted to almost every means an ingenious people could devise to avoid the attacks upon her economy and to minimize their effects.... The mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control, they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained....1 The U.S. found similar results from aerial bombardment during the Vietnam War. Counter-intuitively, the effect of aerial attack was often to harden and increase popular support for continued resistance. The advent of nuclear weapons (and perhaps large precision-guided munitions) gave air power the ability to disrupt civil infrastructures needed to achieve the visions of Douhet, Trenchard or Mitchell, but cyber attacks do not pose the same level of lethality. One of the Strategic Bombing Survey’s conclusions was that “The German experience showed that, whatever the target system, no indispensable industry was permanently put out of commission by a single attack. Persistent re-attack was necessary.” However, cyber attacks are likely to be single attacks. Once a hacker has gained access and the damage done, the target usually responds quickly to close off the vulnerability that allowed that line of attack and to bring systems back on line. Cyber attackers would continually need to exploit new vulnerabilities and new tactics to ensure sustained disruption. Cyber attacks also seldom if ever produce physical damage that requires time-consuming repairs.

### No War 2NC – Economics

#### Economics places multiple checks on conflict

Haixia 12 (Qi, Lecturer at Department of International Relations – Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), Summer, p. 105-127, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/105.full)

Economic globalization created a strategic need for superficial friendship between China and the United States. While scholars disagree over exactly when economic globalization began, all agree that it sped up after the end of the Cold War. This is because the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in a global market. Meanwhile, the pace of information-flow increased among states, shrinking the size of the globe and leading to popularization of the expression ‘global village’. Levels of interdependence have increased along with the growing proximity of international economic relations. That a strategy of complete confrontation can no longer effectively protect national interests is now obvious. It is for this reason that certain scholars argue that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the security dilemma since end of the Cold War.35 Under the conditions of globalization, interdependence between China and the United States has continued to grow, and for the sake of economic interests, neither is willing to adopt a strategy of all-out confrontation. Economic interdependence, however, will not diffuse the political and security conflicts between the two states. Different interests in different spheres have thus created a foundation for superficial friendship between the United States and China. Involvement in the globalization process has rapidly expanded China's involvement in international organizations

in ever-growing fields,36 within many of which China accepts West-led international norms.37 The country has thus shifted from ‘opposing the international order’ to ‘reforming the international order’ to ‘maintaining the international order’.38 Globalization has changed not only China's but also United States’ behavioral principles. The growth of Sino–US economic interdependence has prompted the United States’ adoption of a two-pronged policy of military and political containment and of economic engagement. Its aim is to reduce the risk of a head-on conflict that could considerably damage United States’ interests. These contradictory strands of US policy towards China are an indicator of superficial friendship. Under the context of economic globalization, China has also developed economic interdependence with United States’ allies. This has reduced incentives to participate in containment of China and also dampened United States’ resolve to maintain a policy of complete containment. As a result, certain scholars argue that enhanced levels of interdependence among China and other nations have diminished the probability of China's opting to rise through forceful expansion.39

### Forward Basing 2NC

#### Military sustainable – no credible ev that fuel sources will run out – supply disruptions won't threaten the US because prices would increase allowing the military to pay higher prices to maintain supplies – that's Bartis and Bibber

#### Fuel disruptions and supply shocks don't hurt the military – reserves check

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

Fuel Supply Disruptions. We also cannot predict whether or when the world oil market will suffer from a large and extended disruption in oil supplies as a result of conflict or natural disaster.2 But if such an abrupt disruption in global oil supplies were to occur, the United States as a whole would not suffer a physical shortage. If the disruption is short-lived, a release of the strategic petroleum reserves held by many oil-importing nations would serve to prevent a significant disruption in deliveries or increase in prices. If the disruption is so large that it cannot be fully mitigated by the release of strategic reserves, world oil prices would rise sharply, and this would cause the United States and other consumers to reduce their use of petroleum products. Prices for alternative fuels would also rise, as they should, to promote market-induced conservation.

### Military Trade-Off 2NC

#### Funding trades off with more important priorities – O'Keefe says scarce funding resources means it trade off with conventional capabilities

#### Military renewables are costly and trade-off with more important funding

Dickenson 12 -- Managing Director at Navigant Consulting and leads the firm's Energy Practice (Bill, 5/22/12, "The Car a 500-Pound Gorilla Drives," http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php)

The military applications that are more or less analogous to everyday civilian applications have similar constraints to those of their civilian counterparts. That is, what will be the cost of the renewable energy supply and how does it compare with the alternative – be it electric power from the grid or fuel oil from a regional refinery? In these situations, decisions become a balancing act between budgetary considerations (will the renewable alternative cost more than conventional sources and blow the budget? And, if so, where will the incremental funding come from?) and policy considerations (do renewables help or hinder the military’s mission? And, are there broader national policy objectives mandating renewables that need to be considered?). At a time when all military budgets are tight, and many military facility maintenance budgets are under-funded (never, however, in a way that affects mission readiness), it becomes difficult for the military to materially support renewables when the cost of renewable energy is substantially higher than the alternatives. Given the geographic variation in the availability of renewable resources, renewables are cost effective in some locations, but not in others. Where renewables are cost-effective, the military can (and does) use renewables as part of their regular course of doing business. In situations where renewable sources of energy are more expensive than conventional alternatives, it seems unfair to ask the military to shoulder extra costs at the expense of much needed maintenance or other activities, unless incremental funding is provided to support the extra costs associated with the renewable implementation decision.

## 1NR – Politics

### Forward Basing 2NC

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#### Fuel disruptions and supply shocks don't hurt the military – reserves check

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### Overview – 2NC

#### Impact outweighs and turns the case –

#### A. Magnitude – US collapse goes global and draws in every major country – treaties increase the probability of draw in and guarantees escalation.

#### B. Timeframe – decline causes lash out and outward pressure to secure economic gains – that’s Auslin.

#### C. Probability -- conflict now is highly likely given other economic stressors

Mootry 9 (Primus, B.A. Northern Illinois University “Americans likely to face more difficult times” - The Herald Bulletin, http://www.theheraldbulletin.com/columns/local\_story\_282184703.html?keyword=secondarystory)

These are difficult times. The direct and indirect costs associated with the war on Iraq have nearly wrecked our economy. The recent $700 billion bailout, bank failures, and the failure of many small and large businesses across the nation will take years — perhaps decades — to surmount. Along with these rampant business failures, we have seen unemployment rates skyrocket, record numbers of home foreclosures, an explosion of uninsured Americans, and other economic woes that together have politicians now openly willing to mention the "D" word: Depression. These are difficult days. We have seen our international reputation sink to all time lows. We have seen great natural disasters such as hurricanes Ike and Katrina leaving hundreds of thousands of citizens stripped of all they own or permanently dislocated. In all my years, I have never seen a time such as this. To make matters worse, we are witnessing a resurgence of animosities between the United States and Russia, as well as the rapid growth of India and China. As to the growth of these two huge countries, the problem for us is that they are demanding more and more oil — millions of barrels more each week — and there is not much we can say or do about it. In the meantime, if America does not get the oil it needs, our entire economy will grind to a halt. In short, the challenges we face are complex and enormous. Incidentally, one of the factors that makes this time unlike any other in history is the potential for worldwide nuclear conflict. **There has never been a time in** the long **history** of man **when**, through his own technologies — and his arrogance — he can destroy the planet. Given the tensions around the world, **a mere spark could lead to global conflagration.**[This evidence has been gender paraphrased].

### Overview – 2NC

#### Indepently- they concede Space investments prevent extinction- leads to space infrastructure on other planets and feasibility means we don’t start resource wars and prevents extinction from disease, nuclear war, and asteroids- that’s Collins and Autino

#### Extinction is inevitable- only getting off the rock can solve

Austen 11 [Ben Austen, contributing editor of Harper’s Magazine, “After Earth: Why, Where, How, and When We Might Leave Our Home Planet,” popular science, http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2011-02/after-earth-why-where-how-and-when-we-might-leave-our-home-planet?page=3]

**Earth won’t always be fit for occupation**. We know that **in two billion years or so, an expanding sun will boil away our oceans, leaving our home in the universe uninhabitable**—unless, **that is, we haven’t already been wiped out by the Andromeda galaxy**, which is on a multibillion-year collision course with our Milky Way. **Moreover, at least a third of the thousand mile-wide asteroids that hurtle across our orbital path will eventually crash into us, at a rate of about one every 300,000 years.** Why? **Indeed, in 1989 a far smaller asteroid, the impact of which would still have been equivalent in force to 1,000 nuclear bombs, crossed our orbit just six hours after Earth had passed. A recent report by the Lifeboat Foundation, whose hundreds of researchers track a dozen different existential risks to humanity, likens that one-in-300,000 chance of a catastrophic strike to a game of Russian roulette**: “**If we keep pulling the trigger long enough we’ll blow our head off, and there’s no guarantee it won’t be the next pull.”** Many of the threats that might lead us to consider off-Earth living arrangements are actually man-made, and not necessarily in the distant future. **The amount we consume each year already far outstrips what our planet can sustain, and the World Wildlife Fund estimates that by 2030 we will be consuming two planets’ worth of natural resources annually.** The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, an international humanitarian organization, reports that **the onslaught of droughts, earthquakes, epic rains and floods over the past decade is triple the number from the 1980s and nearly 54 times that of 1901, when this data was first collected**. Some scenarios have climate change leading to severe water shortages, the submersion of coastal areas, and widespread famine. **Additionally, the world could end by way of deadly pathogen, nuclear war or, as the Lifeboat Foundation warns, the “misuse of increasingly powerful technologies.”** Given the risks humans pose to the planet, we might also someday leave Earth simply to conserve it, with our planet becoming a kind of nature sanctuary that we visit now and again, as we might Yosemite. **None of the threats we face are especially far-fetched. Climate change is already a major factor in human affairs, for instance, and our planet has undergone at least one previous mass extinction as a result of asteroid impact**. **“The dinosaurs died out because they were too stupid to build an adequate spacefaring civilization,”** says Tihamer Toth-Fejel, a research engineer at the Advanced Information Systems division of defense contractor General Dynamics and one of 85 members of the Lifeboat Foundation’s space-settlement board. “**So far, the difference between us and them is barely measurable.” The Alliance to Rescue Civilization, a project started by New York University chemist Robert Shapiro, contends that the inevitability of any of several cataclysmic events means that we must prepare a copy of our civilization and move it into outer space and out of harm’s way—a backup of our cultural achievements and traditions.** In 2005, then–NASA administrator Michael Griffin described the aims of the national space program in similar terms. “If we humans want to survive for hundreds of thousands or millions of years, we must ultimately populate other planets,” he said. “**One day, I don’t know when that day is, but there will be more human beings who live off the Earth than on it.”**

#### Their Aff doesn’t matter- getting off the rock means we can still save humanity

### Asia Pivot – 1NC

#### Turns china

**Domenici, et. al**, June **2012** (Pete – Former Chairman, U.S. Senate Budget Committee; Co-Chair, BPC’s Debt Reduction Task Force; Senior Fellow, BPC, Secretary Dan Glickman – Former U.S. Agriculture Secretary; Former Chairman, U.S. House Select Intelligence Committee; Senior Fellow, BPC, General James Jones – Former National Security Advisor; Former Commander, U.S. European Command; Senior Fellow, BPC, Indefensible: The Sequester’s Mechanics and the Adverse Effects on National and Economic Security, Task Force on Defense Budget and Strategy, Bipartisan Policy Center, p. 20-24)

The FY 2013 sequester will replace the ability of elected leaders to set defense policy with a procedure that will indiscriminately cut 15 percent from defense programs. Indeed, at a time when the military is reorienting its missions to new strategic priorities and seeking to modernize its forces as two major land wars wind down, these across-the-board cuts will make it significantly more difficult to ensure readiness, procure new weapons systems, and invest in new technology to meet emerging threats. The president is charged with defining the threats that the United States is likely to confront and a strategic vision for how to avoid or defeat them. The Pentagon contributes to formulating that strategy, and is responsible for ensuring that our forces are prepared and have the necessary equipment to enact it. Through the authorization and appropriations processes, lawmakers are able to modify that blueprint to best serve the security interests of the nation. But on January 2, 2013, the views of the president, Pentagon, and Congress will matter little. The sequester will deprive all three of these stakeholders of their power to shape the country’s defense policy. Instead, a mechanism that uniformly slashes 15 percent from most defense budget accounts will take the place of the best judgments of our elected representatives and their appointed officials about what is needed to keep us safe. Such cuts, blind to strategic priorities, will leave the U.S. military unable to implement effectively any credible national security strategy – whether President Obama’s or any other one – because arbitrary reductions will have taken the place of deliberative planning. Cuts made in this fashion will eliminate almost all of DoD’s discretion to preserve funding for the most important and efficient national security missions and capabilities. As an example, consider the administration’s Strategic Guidance issued in January 2012 and the capabilities that the Pentagon has deemed necessary. This new strategy highlights that “U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia,”17 and therefore, “we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” Accomplishing this, according to the Pentagon, will require the military to shift toward a leaner, more agile force – one that can effectively project its power across the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean. Accordingly, military planners have identified the need for greater investment in technologically-superior air-, sea- and cyber-power at the cost of heavy ground forces. Additionally, after 10 years of war, military leaders have made it clear that our troops need to recover and aging equipment needs to be repaired. The Pentagon’s budget request for FY 2013 reflects these priorities – increasing funding for weapons platforms that support power projection and other missions critical to the new strategy, and cutting money for programs that military leaders no longer have deemed to be as critical. As Secretary Panetta told an Asian security conference on June 2, 2012: We are investing specifically in those kinds of capabilities – such as an advanced fifth-generation fighter, an enhanced Virginia-class submarine, new electronic warfare and communications capabilities, and improved precision weapons – that will provide our forces with freedom of maneuver in areas in which our access and freedom of action may be threatened. We recognize the challenges of operating over the Pacific’s vast distances. That is why we are investing in new aerial-refueling tankers, a new bomber, and advanced maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft.18 DoD’s budget request strives to meet the demands of the president’s new defense strategy while roughly abiding by the original BCA cap levels for defense spending, lowering the base defense budget by about $5 billion compared to FY 2012, but without accounting for the sequester’s further automatic cuts. Our analysis, however, indicates that the sequester will greatly constrain the Pentagon’s ability to execute any of these strategic shifts in its procurement, planning, and training. Without meaningful reforms, inefficiencies in the defense budget are already eroding funds needed to train, equip, and deploy our forces. Now, the combination of continued FY 2012 funding, which does not reflect the president’s new strategic priorities, and the indiscriminate 15 percent sequester cut mean that funds available to DoD on January 2, 2013, will differ greatly from those it requested. Indeed, some priority projects might receive as much as 75 percent less funding than the Pentagon determined was needed for FY 2013. Conversely, weapons systems for which DoD has requested reduced funding because of their lower priority in light of the new strategy could receive as much as nine times more funding than requested. More specifically, our calculations indicate that refurbishment of the nearly 25-year-old USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier, development and purchases of a new aerial refueling tanker, and funding for resetting and retraining troops could be cut by 72, 57, and 42 percent, respectively, relative to the Pentagon’s FY 2013 request. Additionally, funding could fall roughly $1.7 billion short of the nearly $4 billion requested by DoD and Homeland Security for investments in the personnel, technology, and infrastructure needed to protect our sensitive computer networks by developing offensive cyber capabilities. Simultaneously, funding for Heavy Tactical Vehicles, the M-1 Abrams tank, and Stryker armored vehicles – all ground vehicles that serve little purpose in the Asia-Pacific region – could be increased by 934, 442, and 107 percent, respectively, over the Pentagon’s request for FY 2013. Thus, the sequester will leave military leaders with some combination of three options, each of which will increase risks and costs: • Indefinitely delay implementation of the new strategy, and accept the strategic risks that would flow from not moving to address the threats identified in the Strategic Guidance. • Attempt to pursue the new strategy with fewer of the new capabilities and weapons platforms than the Pentagon has deemed necessary, and accept the operational risks that come from not having enough of the right tools for the job and lower force readiness. • Make do with the older weapons systems that DoD already possesses, and accept the tactical and safety risks of using outdated technology that does not fulfill the requirements of current missions, and is also more likely to fail. The first two options cause contract delays, reductions, and renegotiations, contributing to increases in per-unit costs. The last option will result in increased maintenance costs, as antiquated planes, ships, and helicopters are pushed beyond their expected service lives. Either way, the military eventually will need some of the weapons that the sequester will keep us from purchasing today. Indeed, nearly one-quarter of our ships failed inspection last year. The average age of our fighter jets is 22 years, our bombers 35 years, and our aerial refueling tankers 47 years. The longer we put off modernizing our armed forces, the greater the risk to our troops and the greater the eventual procurement costs will be, defeating the very logic of deficit reduction. Meanwhile, although China’s military power is still inferior to that of the United States, Beijing’s actions – and fear of its intentions – have already led many regional countries to look to the United States for security guarantees and cooperation. If U.S. commitment to these alliances is perceived to be weakening, or our ability to defend them waning, our partners could feel pressured to accommodate China’s growing ambitions.

### Overview – 2NC

#### Cuts all programs- signals weakness- turns their cyber attacks args and clearly turns foreign basing- we have to withdrawal our forces = turns tajik- me instability spills over- that’s all Hutchinson

#### Sequestration is a bigger and faster internal link to every regional war and terror

Skelton, partner with Husch Blackwell and former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 9/20/2012

(“Sequestration means cuts we can’t afford,” Roll Call, Lexis)

**Sequestration will** also **erode America's military superiority over the next decade by cutting even the most essential defense programs**. Any military commander will tell you that our ability to dominate the battlefield is not only dependent on critical thinking but is fueled by superior aircraft, ships, weapons and intelligence. Sequestration would cripple each of these categories, virtually interfere with professional military education at our war colleges, ending the modernization of fighter jets, combat ships, helicopters, ground vehicles, drone aircraft and satellite technologies. Without a thorough study of the art of war and first-rate equipment, **the U.S. military will be far less able to deter gathering conflicts or quickly resolve those conflicts we are unable to avoid**. The "Powell Doctrine" of risking our troops only when backed up by overwhelming force and a clear path to decisive victory could be at risk. With our unique portfolio of global responsibilities, **we could find it difficult to** simultaneously **pursue terrorists**, **contain Iran and North Korea**, **counter a rising China and deal with exploding hot spots such as Syria** today. Those that say we can risk skipping one or two generations of military development are poor students of military history. America rose from a young, regional power to a formidable military force over the course of World War I alone. And Germany rose from the ashes of that war to threaten all of Europe in less than two decades. Today, technology has accelerated the pace of change, and **our adversaries are** certainly **not sitting on their hands. Russia and China** are both building sixth-generation stealth fighters, while Iran and North Korea race to develop nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. **The rise of cyber weapons puts America's highly networked economy and society at particular risk**. We can choose to delay our defenses against these developing threats, but the threats themselves won't wait.

### Navy – 1NC

#### Turns navy

**Dunmire**, 7/18/**2012** (Phil – national president of the Navy League of the United States, Sequestration Set to Damage Defense as No Enemy Could, The Washington Times, p. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/18/dunmire-sequestration-set-damage-defense-no-enemy-/>)

As a maritime nation and with more than 90 percent of global commerce traveling our world’s oceans and seas, the United States is facing a serious threat. This time, the threat is not coming from pirates, rogue nations or extremists — this threat to freedom of our seas is coming from our own Congress. Those in the maritime community and industry know it is our nation’s sea services — the Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Corps and U.S.-flagged Merchant Marine — that help ensure freedom of the seas. Many often take this for granted or may not even realize the critical role our sea services provide on a daily basis. Though the conflict in Afghanistan is drawing down, it is by no means finished. Likewise, the threats on the open seas and at critical chokepoints around the world remain ever-present. Our national command authority has committed our armed forces to a renewed focus and dominant presence in the Pacific — the world’s largest maritime domain. As our global commitments and threats have increased, our nation is facing unprecedented defense cuts through a process called sequestration that will devastate our ability to provide deterrence and power projection, upsetting the balance that makes would-be aggressors think twice before engaging with the United States. The defense and maritime industries are being jeopardized from within. When the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction failed to find a savings agreement, the Budget Control Act of 2011 mandated $487 billion in security cuts over the next 10 years and included a small but devastating provision that will trigger $1.2 trillion in automatic spending cuts, effective January 2013. An estimated $492 billion of those cuts will come from security spending in the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, the National Nuclear Security Administration and other defense- and intelligence-related programs. The bottom line is, programs related to our nation’s defense will absorb half of the sequestration costs despite being just 19 percent of the national spending budget. Not only is the sheer size of those cuts — about $54 billion a year, equal to two years’ worth of all Defense Department shipbuilding and maritime systems — a massive problem, but the implementation is leaving budget planners stumped. Nobody knows how those cuts will be applied or even the exact amount. The Office of Management and Budget has issued no guidance, and the Pentagon has stated that it is not making plans for sequestration. The law requires that the cuts be distributed uniformly at the program, project and activity level across every budget account. This directive only adds to the confusion.

### A2: DOD Pushes

#### DOD won’t push- gets blamed on Obama

Nolan 12

Dan Nolan, DoD Energy Security Blog, 4/25/12, Steropes' Leadership in Energy: DOD Head and Shoulders Above Munchkins, dodenergy.blogspot.com/2012/04/steropes-leadership-in-energy-dod-head.html

Last week I spoke in front of 1200 attendees at a Biomass conference in Denver, CO. This Saturday, I will speak to students at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo (Go Mustangs!) at the California Student Sustainability Coalition conference. The following week I will be attending and addressing the Military Smart Grids and Microgrid Conference in DC. Veterans in clean energy technologies have been appearing in the New York Times, the AP and Dylan Ratigan Show. Even the Harvard Gazette is getting in on the action, but instead of a veteran, they got a real live DOD official. A coalition of veterans and national security organization, Operation Free works tirelessly to share the message of energy security. Only one of these individuals and organizations represents or speak on behalf of the Department of Defense, yet there is constant demand from a diverse audience. The reason is because so many of us are looking for **leadership** in energy policy and, not finding it in the appropriate government agencies, are looking for anyone to share a vision of American Energy Security. Once again, DOD has become the reluctant leader. I say reluctant because no one in DOD wants to lead U.S. energy policy. Unfortunately for them, the actions they are taking to ensure energy security and mission continuity are thrusting them in to that role. Those in and out of government, who **ascribe political motivation to DOD’s work**, fail to understand the strategic importance or, in some cases, even the tactical importance of reducing consumption, distributing intelligently and diversifying sources of energy. DOD does not seek the leadership role. They just happen to be out in front of the crowd and the crowd is following. Where there is a dearth of leadership, DOD’s efforts to secure its own flanks by assured access to mission critical energy appears to be leadership. DOD is simply the one eyed man in the land of the blind. The mission of DOD is to deter aggression and, should that fail, to fight and win our Nation’s wars. When DOD leads in technology, it is not to create a market; it is to meet a critical operational need. When DOD integrated the Armed Forces it was to better utilize the available man (and woman) power to meet combat requirements. I am sure **DOD would rather** that the Congress or President or DOE were the leaders **in energy policy**, but, unfortunately, they are the only ones taking coherent action. Nature abhors a vacuum and DOD’s leadership in energy security is just Nature’s way of saying, “Move out and draw fire!”

### AT: Not Intrinsic

**Any interpretation of fiat that moots the politics DA isn’t real world – you should reject it – kills all DA links based off international response, political process, and funding – those are key to neg ground, promote in-depth and timely research, and increase education on current events. And there’s no brightline to what’s intrinsic, meaning the aff can create ways to spike out of every DA – that’s a voting issue, the aff destroys neg ground**

**And, our link evidence proves germanity to the plan – it’s a necessary outcome**

**And, you can’t vote aff on this – the plan proves the resolution is a good idea, the permutation proves the resolution alone is insufficient**

### AT: Vote No

**1. There’s still a link – our evidence indicates there’d be backlash that drains further capital and kills the agenda**

**2. This is arbitrary – our interpretation is that the judge is an independent, neutral analyst deciding whether the plan is better than the status quo or a competitive policy option, NOT a Congressperson – creates the most objective lens for viewing the debate**

**3. Politics DAs are good – they increase timely research on current events and the Congressional docket, and increase education on the political process, which their interpretation moots**

**Not real world – their interpretation ignores lobbies, party allegiance, and state constituencies**

### Winners Lose

**-- Turn – the plan’s a loss – our link proves Obama would fight it – losers lose**

**Ornstein 1** (Norman, Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, Roll Call, 9-10, Lexis)

In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success - the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory - is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to **disaster**, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not.

**-- No turns – capital can’t be replenished**

**Pika 2** (Joseph, et al., Professor of Political Science – University of Delaware, The Politics of the Presidency, Fifth Edition, p. 293-294)

Resources: Political Capital. One of the **most important** resources for a president is political capital. This is the reservoir of popular and congressional support with which newly elected presidents being their terms. As they make controversial decisions, they “spend” some of their capital, which they are **seldom able to replenish**. They must decide which proposals merit the expenditure of political capital and in what amounts. Reagan, for example, was willing to spend his capital heavily on reducing the role of the federal government, cutting taxes, and reforming the income tax code, but not on antiabortion or school prayer amendments to the Constitution. Material resources determine which proposals for new programs and the emphasis to be placed on existing programs.

**-- Studies prove**

**Bond and Fleisher 96** (Jon R. and Richard, Professors of Political Science – Texas A&M University, The President in Legislation, p. 223)

Presidency-centered variables, however, provide an even weaker explanation of presidential success. We found little support for the thesis that the weakness of legislative parties increases the importance of presidential skill or popularity for determining presidential success on roll call votes. Our analysis reveals that presidents reputed to be highly skilled **do not win consistently more** often than should be expected given the conditions they faced. Similarly, presidents reputed to be unskilled do not win significantly less often than expected. The analysis of presidential popularity reveals that the president's standing in the polls has only a marginal impact on the probability of success or failure.

**-- Wins don’t spill over**

**Nather 8** (David, “Obama’s Steep Climb Ahead”, CQ Politics, 11-9, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docid=news-000002984617)

Taking up measures such as the children’s health bill early on would allow Obama to “go for some of the low-hanging fruit” that’s popular with both parties, Panetta said. “For a new president, it’s very important to establish a record early on that you can get things done.” It’s **no guarantee** of long-term success, though. Clinton also started his presidency by signing long-stalled measures into law, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act. But his fortunes, and those of congressional Democrats, **quickly unraveled** once the easy victories were out of the way.

### 2NC – SMR

#### Obama’s backed off of SMR’s, but the plan causes debt fights which tank capital and disad turns case

Gabriel Nelson 9-24, E&E Reporter, and Hannah Northey, 9/24/12, “DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3

DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt. It's not just wind and solar projects that are waiting for federal help as Congress duels over the importance of putting taxpayer dollars on the line for cutting-edge energy projects. Some of the nation's largest nuclear power companies are anxious to hear whether they will get a share of a $452 million pot from the Department of Energy for a new breed of reactors that the industry has labeled as a way to lessen the safety risks and construction costs of new nuclear power plants. The grant program for these "small modular reactors," which was announced in January, would mark the official start of a major U.S. foray into the technology even as rising construction costs -- especially when compared to natural-gas-burning plants -- cause many power companies to shy away from nuclear plants. DOE received four bids before the May 21 deadline from veteran reactor designers Westinghouse Electric Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co., as well as relative newcomers Holtec International Inc. and NuScale Power LLC. Now the summer has ended with no announcement from DOE, even though the agency said it would name the winners two months ago. As the self-imposed deadline passed, companies started hearing murmurs that a decision could come in September, or perhaps at the end of the year. To observers within the industry, it seems that election-year calculations may have sidelined the contest. "The rumors are a'flying," said Paul Genoa, director of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, in an interview last week. "All we can imagine is that this is now caught up in politics, and the campaign has to decide whether these things are good for them to announce, and how." Small modular reactors do not seem to be lacking in political support. The nuclear lobby has historically courted both Democrats and Republicans and still sees itself as being in a strong position with key appropriators on both sides of the aisle. Likewise, top energy officials in the Obama administration have hailed the promise of the new reactors, and they haven't shown any signs of a change of heart. DOE spokeswoman Jen Stutsman said last week that the department is still reviewing applications, but she did not say when a decision will be made. "This is an important multiyear research and development effort, and we want to make sure we take the time during the review process to get the decision right," she wrote in an email. That the grants haven't been given out during a taut campaign season, even as President Obama announces agency actions ranging from trade cases to creating new national monuments to make the case for his re-election, may be a sign that the reactors are ensnared in a broader feud over energy spending. Grant recipients would develop reactor designs with an eye toward eventually turning those into pilot projects -- and the loan guarantees that these first-of-a-kind nuclear plants are using today to get financing would be blocked under the "No More Solyndras" bill that passed the House last week (Greenwire, Sept. 14). Congress has given the grant program $67 million for fiscal 2012, shy of the amount that would be needed annually to reach full funding. **If the "sequester" kicks in** at year's end and slashes DOE funding or the balance of power changes in Washington, **the amount of money available could dwindle yet again.** Even the staunchest supporters of the federal nuclear program are acknowledging it is a tough time to promise a $452 million check. Former Sen. Pete Domenici, a New Mexico Republican who pushed for new reactors as chairman of both the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, said during a brief interview Tuesday that well-designed loan guarantees won't cost too much because they get repaid over time. The cost could be borne by a "tiny little tax" on the nuclear industry, he said. But when it comes to straight-up spending, like the grants that would support getting these cutting-edge reactors ready for their first demonstrations, the solution may not be so clear. While some Republicans remain staunch supporters of funding for the nuclear power industry, there are others who label the government subsidies as a waste of taxpayer dollars. "It's awful hard, with the needs that are out there and the debt that haunts us, to figure out how you're going to establish priorities," said Domenici, who has advocated for the deployment of new nuclear reactors as a fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center. "I can't stand here and tell you that I know how to do that."

### A2: Grid Add-On

#### 1nc kemp evidence- grid improving now- takes out the impact

#### Short v. long term – grid collapse is gradual – fiscal cliff immediate

#### No black-outs in the US

Wood 12 -- Senior Communications Advisor at Business Roundtable (Carter, 8/2/12, "The grid: After India, America? No, but still…" http://businessroundtable.org/blog/the-grid-after-india-america-no-but-still/)

A blackout of such scale could not happen in the United States. For one thing, we don't have 600 million people. And America's electrical grid is certainly much more resilient than the one in India, a still-developing country with ineffective governments. Still, as The Washington Post reports today, "Aging power grid on overload as U.S. demands more electricity." At CNBC, Jim Cramer asked Thomas F. Farrell II, Chairman, President & CEO of Dominion Resources, about India. Could the same thing happen in the United States? Farrell responded: Our system has a lot more rigor to it and partly because we have reserve margins, meaning we have more power stations than we need to run at any particular moment in time, so that if a power station goes out, there's a back-up to help keep the grid stable. They don't have that much excess power in India, and when they get to the root cause, they'll probably find that was somewhere in there.

#### US grid stable – frequency can be maintained by new technologies

Lamonica 12 -- senior writer covering green tech and cutting-edge technologies, contributor @ Technology Review (Martin, 8/2/12, "Outage in India Could Be a Harbinger for the Rest of the World," http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428685/outage-in-india-could-be-a-harbinger-for-the-rest/)

The primary function of grid operators is to anticipate load and to maintain a steady balance between power supply and demand. The grid signal operates at a set frequency—60 hertz in the U.S. and 50 hertz in India—and when supply and demand fall out of sync, the frequency will either dip or rise. In the U.S., grid operators have "hot" generators on standby to ramp up power in order to keep a close-to-steady frequency, but that's not the case when generators are routinely maxed out. "In a developing world country, it's tough to keep 10 percent of the generation capacity on contingency when you may use it once in a lifetime," Mansoor says. "You're not using the generator, but you still pay for it. That's tough to do." More technologies to keep that frequency steady are emerging. Sensors called phasor measurement units are designed for real-time measurement of grid frequency, and can flag potential problems. Grid operators in the United States are increasingly using automation to manage demand-response programs that lower consumption at big power users at peak times. These types of technologies as well as microgrids (see "Microgrids Keeps the Power Local, Cheap, and Reliable") stand to make electricity grids more reliable as more renewable resources come online and weather-related events, such as heat waves, strain generating resources.

#### Smart grid investments already underway

Kemp 12 -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)

(Reuters) - Smart meters are the most visible part of the power industry's attempt to upgrade the electricity network to cope with rising consumption and the integration of renewable sources of generation such as wind and solar. The U.S. federal government is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to support the roll out of smart meters that will enable more variable power pricing linked to time of use (TOU) or peak demand to encourage ordinary households and small businesses to limit their electricity use when demand is greatest and help manage pressure on the grid. Increasing the amount of "demand-side response" is crucial to improving flexibility and ensuring the grid can cope with the unpredictable output of intermittent power sources such as wind and solar, as well as small-scale distributed generation by households and businesses themselves selling power back into the network at irregular times. But the smart grid is about much more than just smart meters. The Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) programme established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) is also funding the deployment of 877 high-frequency phasor monitoring units (PMUs) linked to satellite communications and the global positioning system. The aim is to improve the robustness and reliability of the transmission grid and prevent a repeat of the cascading power failures that rolled across the north-eastern United States and parts of Canada in 2003.

### Will Pass – 2nc Uniqueness Wall

#### Fiscal cliff deal now- Obama is pushing post re-election, gridlock will get moved past, and failure isn’t an option- that’s Benac

#### More warrants

#### First - markets are optimstic, Obama is pushing for compromise, Boehner is moderating

Ehley 11/9/12 (Briana, Fiscal Times, "CBO Issues New Recession Warning," http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Blogs/Fiscal-Cliff-Notes/2012/11/09/CBO-Issues-New-Recession-Warning.aspx#page1)

S&P: 15 PERCENT CHANCE OF GOING OVER THE CLIFF ¶ Experts and analysts are giving odds on how the fiscal cliff drama is likely to play out, with many predicting at least a short-term fix. Standard & Poors analysts say there is only a 15 percent chance that nothing will get accomplished and that the economy will go sailing off the cliff, Reuters’ reports. “The most likely scenario, in our view, is that policymakers reach sufficient political compromise in time to avoid most, if not all, potential economic effects of the cliff,” S&P analysts wrote. - Read more at Reuters ¶ BIDEN: DEMS READY TO COMPROMISE Vice President Joe Biden said that the president is ready to forge ahead on a compromise to avoid massive year-end spending cuts and tax increases. Biden told CBS News’ Matthew Daily on Wednesday that he believes there are at least six GOP senators ready to compromise on fiscal issues, adding that the real question is whether House Republicans will be willing to do the same.¶ “What is the takeaway going to be on the part of our Republican colleagues? What judgment are they going to make?” Biden asked. “I know it takes a little time to kind of digest what’s going on. But I think people know we’ve got to get down to work and I think they’re ready to move.” The vice president said he believes the election results that gave Obama another four-year term offered a clear mandate on taxes. “Voters are coming much closer to our view about how to deal with tax policy.” - Read more at CBS News¶ CHAMBLISS: ‘RIOTS IN THE STREETS’ Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Georgia), one of the Senate’s bipartisan “Gang of Eight” members working on a deficit reduction plan, told The Washington Post’s Suzy Khimm that Congress needs to deal with the deficit immediately and not kick the can down the road or there will be “drastic” consequences. “You could see riots in the streets of the United States if we don’t do this right,” Chambliss said, in a bit of fiscal hyperbole. “We have the opportunity right now, and it’s imperative that we do, primarily through a $4-5 trillion package over 10 years.” – Read more at The Washington Post  ¶ SCHUMER ‘HEARTENED’ BY BOEHNER’S TONE ¶ After House Speaker John Boehner told reporters Wednesday he was ready to “stand with the president” on a budget deal that included new federal revenue linked to tax reform, Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-NY, told the Christian Science Monitor Thursday he was “heartened by the tone that Speaker Boehner showed yesterday.” However, Schumer said the content of Boehner’s speech “doesn’t quite work,” adding that the idea that tax cuts lead to revenue growth, as the Speaker implied, was “a Rumpelstiltskin fairy tale. You may remember Rumpelstiltskin was the fairy tale figure who turned straw into gold.”¶ Nonetheless, Schumer believes the Speaker has “seen the handwriting on the wall, and it makes me very hopeful we can do something big in the next month and a half.” - Read more at the Christian Science Monitor

#### Second- agreement on tax increases

UPI 11/9/12 ("Aide: Obama to press GOP on 'fiscal cliff'," http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php/sid/210642829/scat/b8de8e630faf3631/ht/Aide-Obama-to-press-GOP-on-fiscal-cliff)

WASHINGTON -- U.S. President Barack Obama Friday is to press for the end of Bush-era tax cuts on taxable household incomes over $250,000, an aide said.¶ The repeated call to end the tax breaks as part of a package of actions needed to avoid the so-called fiscal cliff, which could plunge the economy back into recession, was expected to be part of Obama's first public comments since his re-election.¶ His remarks, to be delivered in the White House East Room at 1:05 p.m., will focus on "the action we need to take to keep our economy growing and reduce our deficit," the White House said Thursday night.¶ Obama feels bolstered by his re-election victory, senior campaign strategist David Axelrod said.¶ "Hopefully people will read those results and read them as a vote for cooperation and will come to the table," Axelrod told MSNBC. "And obviously everyone's going to have to come with an open mind to these discussions."¶ But he added, "If the attitude is that nothing happened on Tuesday, that would be unfortunate."¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, said Thursday House Republicans remained adamantly opposed to raising tax rates but would be willing to talk about it.¶ "Of course we'll talk about it," he told ABC News. "We talk about all kinds of things we may disagree on. I'm the most reasonable, responsible person here in Washington. The president knows it. He knows that he and I can work together. The election's over. Now it's time to get to work."¶ But when told Election Day exit polls found 60 percent of U.S. voters agreeing with Obama's proposal to raise taxes on the wealthiest taxpayers, Boehner insisted the idea was insupportable.¶ "Raising tax rates is unacceptable. And, frankly, it couldn't even pass the House. I'm not sure it could pass the Senate," he said.¶ Obama spoke with Boehner by phone Wednesday about the need to reach a budget compromise in Congress' lame-duck session starting next week, the White House said.¶ "The president reiterated his commitment to finding bipartisan solutions to reduce our deficit in a balanced way, cut taxes for middle-class families and small businesses, and create jobs," a White House read-out of the call said. "The president said he believed that the American people sent a message in [Tuesday's] election that leaders in both parties need to put aside their partisan interests and work with common purpose to put the interests of the American people and the American economy first."¶ After the call, Boehner said, "A 'balanced' approach isn't balanced if it means higher tax rates on the small businesses that are key to getting our economy moving again."¶ Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., who won re-election Tuesday, told The New York Times many Senate Republicans were now willing to agree to a deal that raises more revenue through an overhaul of the tax code. He said additional revenue must be generated by taxation, not just economic growth.¶ "The conditions are there to act," Corker said. "I think the environment is different now."¶ He said he was circulating a draft plan to overhaul the tax code and entitlements and had met with 25 senators from both parties since the election.¶ Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said Thursday he could accept a tax plan that leaves the top tax rate at 35 percent, provided loophole closings in a tax-code overhaul hit the rich, not the middle class.¶ Schumer previously insisted he would accept nothing short of a return to the top tax rate of 39.6 percent from the Clinton administration.¶ "If you kept them at 35, it's still much harder to do," Schumer said. "But obviously there is push and pull, and there are going to be compromises."

#### Third- post election climate

Hoehn 11/9/12 (Katherine, PolicyMic, "What is the 2013 Tax Increase: Everything You Need to Know About Taxmageddon," http://www.policymic.com/articles/18856/what-is-the-2013-tax-increase-everything-you-need-to-know-about-taxmageddon)

Can Congress and the president come to an agreement? ¶ "I remain optimistic that we are going to be able to find common ground," said House Speaker John Boehner to ABC's Diane Sawyer. Referring to President Obama, he said, "I am confident that he and I can find the common ground necessary." ¶ What must Congress and the president do? ¶ Act to address "the long-term imbalance between government spending and revenue, and to prevent a future debt-induced economic crisis," said Erskine Bowles, co-Chairman of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and co-founder of the Fix the Debt Campaign. "We already have the blueprints" for an alternative plan, a bipartisan package, "large enough to put the debt on a clear downward path, relative to the economy, and designed well enough to promote, rather than disrupt, economic growth." ¶ Perhaps most importantly, "it's a package on which bipartisan agreement is possible," he said. Bowles and Senator Alan Simpson founded the Campaign to Fix the Debt to "put America on a better fiscal and economic path." Bipartisan leaders from a variety of social, economic and political perspectives, share the common belief that "America's growing federal debt threatens our future and that we must address it." ¶ When will it happen? ¶ Congress returns on Tuesday. In an interview on Thursday, Speaker Boehner indicated he anticipated the lame duck Congress would vote on a short-term fix to delay the year-end "fiscal cliff." ¶ "As Speaker, I feel pretty strongly that a lame-duck Congress shouldn't do big things," he said. Boehner expressed optimism that an agreement could be made between himself, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and President Obama. He proposes a "bridge" that would extend all of the tax rates for one year, allowing more time for an overhaul of the federal tax code. This "would increase revenue by closing tax loopholes, not by raising the rates individuals pay on their wages."¶ Boehner wants to protect defense programs that would be cut and find other budget items to sacrifice. Democrats want to raise taxes for Americans earning more than $250,000 from 35% to 39.6%. It remains to be seen how much can be accomplished.¶ Why should there be optimism about this finally being resolved? ¶ Quite simply, because it is no longer an election year. The president doesn't have to worry about re-election, and members of Congress won't be up again before 2014 so can negotiate more freely. If they solve the problem and come up with a plan and an agreement, everyone wins. This is a great opportunity to put America back on the right fiscal track. President Obama is scheduled to make a statement about the economy from the White House on Friday afternoon.

### AT: Beckmann

**Beckmann concedes the models for this study are flawed.**

**Beckmann and Kumar 11**. [Matthew, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, Vimal, econ prof at the Indian Institute of Tech, “Opportunism in Polarization”, Presidential Studies Quarterly; Sep 2011; 41, 3]

Before turning to comparative statics analysis of presidents' influence, a few preliminary caveats about the model deserve mention. First, we fully acknowledge the stylized voting model above does not capture the real-world complexities of congressional policy making, nor does it incorporate a broad array of strategies practicing lawmakers deploy. We do this purposefully to focus on our study's central analytical interest - ideological polarization's implications for presidential influence - but are quick to note that future models, with greater verisimilitude, will afford richer insights into the relationship between presidents, polarization, and policy making.

**Best studies prove you’re wrong – capital is key.**

**Beckmann and McGann 8**. [Matthew, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, Anthony, “Navigating the Legislative Divide: Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States” Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol 20]

Here we propose a theory that casts some early rays of light onto the policy consequences of polarization in Congress. Building from a simple theoretical model in which the president seeks to promote his preferred policies in the Senate (see Snyder, 1991; Groseclose, 1996), we assess differences in the chamber’s preference distribution – from normal to unanimous to bimodal – as well as the ‘political capital’ at the president’s disposal.2 Results show that absent the president, ideological polarization makes amassing the votes needed to beat the status quo difficult, so gridlock frequently prevails. The same is true when the president lacks political capital to spend. However, when endowed with abundant capital, facing a polarized legislature enables presidents to pass policies closer to their ideal than would have been possible in an assembly characterized by greater ideological homogeneity. Hence the familiar prediction of blanket ‘gridlock’ is overblown. Instead, comparative statics show that the consequences of ideological polarization in Congress are conditional: they depend on the nature of the preference distribution, the involvement of the president, and the political capi- tal at his disposal.

### DOD – 2NC

#### Plan unpopular- renewables are more expensive – causes budget fights – that’s Sorenson

#### Military renewables cost capital – caught up in larger debates about renewable energy

Cardwell, 8/27 (Diane, “Military Spending on Biofuels Draws Fire”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/business/military-spending-on-biofuels-draws-fire.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0)

When the Navy put a Pacific fleet through maneuvers on a $12 million cocktail of biofuels this summer, it proved that warships could actually operate on diesel from algae or chicken fat. “It works in the engines that we have, it works in the aircraft that we have, it works in the ships that we have,” said Ray Mabus, secretary of the Navy. “It is seamless.” The still-experimental fuels are also expensive — about $27 a gallon for the fuel used in the demonstration, compared with about $3.50 a gallon for conventional military fuels. And that has made them a flash point in a larger political battle over government financing for new energy technologies. “**You’re not the secretary of energy,**” Representative Randy Forbes, a Republican from Virginia, told Mr. Mabus as he criticized the biofuels program at a hearing in February. “You’re the secretary of the Navy.” The House, controlled by Republicans, has already approved measures that would all but kill Pentagon spending on purchasing or investing in biofuels. A committee in the Senate, led by Democrats, has voted to save the program. The fight will heat up again when Congress takes up the Defense Department’s budget again in the fall.

#### Lots of opposition – tight defense budgets

Abramson, 12 (Larry, “Military's Green Energy Criticized By Congress”, NPR, http://www.npr.org/2012/07/05/156325905/militarys-green-energy-criticized-by-congress\_

The military says it's dangerous to depend exclusively on fossil fuels, and has launched a program to develop alternative fuels for use by military vehicles. Energy consumption is a big expense for the Pentagon. But some members of Congress don't think the military should be a laboratory for finding energy alternatives, and say the military should not be spending money on this kind of research **at a time when defense dollars are shrinking**.

#### Costs PC – powerful GOP opposition

Sorcher, 12 (Sara, “Insiders Support Military’s Renewable-Energy Push”, National Journal, June 4, http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-support-military-s-renewable-energy-push-20120604)

The U.S. military is the single largest industrial consumer of oil in the world. “Our military has often led the way for the nation in technological and social change, and they can do so here as well,” one Insider said. But 39 percent of Insiders surveyed sided with the concerns voiced by some Republicans — such as Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., and James Inhofe, R-Okla., who led the effort in the Senate to limit the amount of biofuels that can be used by the military. “Spending precious defense dollars on expensive biofuels is a transparent effort to raid the defense budget to subsidize an industry that is not economically competitive,” one Inside r said. “Dressing this up as a national-security initiative is the height of cynicism.” The military should not be used as a “political football” with regard to energy policy, one Insider said. “The military should not become the poster child for green energy unless that is the most efficient means to achieve the goal of reducing the logistical footprint — which today and for the foreseeable future it is not.” Insiders were even more in accord when the topic turned to the current U.S. military stance toward China.

### NRC – 1NC

#### Plan costs capital – opposition to previous efforts proves

UCS, 10 – Union of Concerned Scientists (6/29, “Experts Urge Senate to Reject 'Streamlined' Approval Process for New Nuclear Reactors.” http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press\_release/streamlined-new-nuclear-reactors-0419.html)

Four nuclear power experts today issued a [letter](http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/NRCstreamliningletter6-28-2010.pdf) to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) urging the Senate to reject proposals that would "weaken important safety protocols and impede the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission]'s ability to ensure that new reactors are safe to operate." "If we've learned anything from the BP disaster in the Gulf," the letter opened, "it's that lax regulation and weak oversight of high-risk industries can prove disastrous to our environment." The signatories on the letter were former Department of Energy Senior Policy Advisor Robert Alvarez, now a senior scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies; former Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Commissioner Peter Bradford, now an adjunct professor at the Vermont Law School; Thomas Cochran, a physicist with the Natural Resources Defense Council; and Edwin Lyman, a physicist with the Union of Concerned Scientists. In the letter, the experts pointed out that Congress and the NRC already have "streamlined" the licensing process for new nuclear reactors, and maintained that any attempts to create more short-cuts would increase the likelihood of accidents and threaten public safety.

### A2: Effects Long Term

#### Bad negotiations causes uncertainty- kills the economy

The Australian, 10/1 (“Investors eye the 'fiscal cliff' as Barack Obama's poll numbers improve,” 10/1/2012, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/us-election/investors-eye-the-fiscal-cliff-as-barack-obamas-poll-numbers-improve/story-fn95xh4y-1226485913043>)

If he's re-elected, Mr Obama will still face a House of Representatives controlled by Republicans the rest of the year. And the new Congress that takes office in January may have a Republican House, too. Investors says that's likely to set up a budget battle similar to August of last year, which ended with the country losing its top credit rating and panicked investors fleeing the stock market. Digital Pass $1 for first 28 Days "If you have any kind of gridlock, you run the risk of inaction," says Tom Simons, a market economist at the investment bank Jefferies. "This is a situation where inaction is the worst outcome." Mr Obama and others like former President Bill Clinton have expressed the belief that House Republicans could be more cooperative once the election is over. "They'll be faced with determining whether we get a recession or not," says Jeff Kleintop, chief market strategist at LPL Financial. Most on Wall Street think Congress and Mr Obama would eventually manage to at least postpone some of impending tax and spending changes before this year is out. The Congressional Budget Office recently laid out the grim consequences of such an event - often compared to dropping off a "fiscal cliff." Starting January 1, tax cuts signed by President George W. Bush expire as do Mr Obama's cuts to payroll taxes. Federal spending on defence and other domestic programs will drop, while emergency unemployment benefits run out. The combined effect off all these changes would shrink the economy nearly 3 per cent at an annual rate in the first half of next year, the CBO estimates, and push unemployment up to 9.1 per cent by the fall. The unemployment rate was 8.1 per cent in August. Recent surveys of businesses suggest the threat is already weighing on the minds of executives when they're making hiring and spending plans. For the world's biggest money managers, the fiscal cliff now ranks as the greatest hazard to the global economy, according to Bank of America's most recent fund manager survey. It topped the European debt crisis, a collapse in Chinese real estate and even a war between Israel and Iran. The danger looms so large to most investors that they believe Washington will find a way to escape it. "Ultimately, I think a deal gets done, but it's just a question of how long it takes to get there," Mr Kleintop says. "By no means is it going to be an easy process. Gridlock means there's a greater chance that this drags on into next year." Analysts at investment firms have kept a close eye on polling numbers and especially on the Intrade, an online marketplace where members can trade predictions on events like elections. Polls show voters leaning toward Mr Obama in key swing states. On Intrade, the odds have swung strongly in Mr Obama's direction, jumping to a 76 per cent chance of re-election, up from 51 per cent at the start of September. Intrade markets put the chance that Republicans will retain control the House at 74 per cent. If these forecasts prove right, the balance of power in Washington would remain the same. Democrats keep the White House and a slim majority in the Senate, and Republicans keep the House. What troubles investors is that the same elected officials who fought over raising the debt ceiling last year could be taking up the same task again while debating how best to manoeuvre around the fiscal cliff. Treasury officials have estimated that Congress won't have to raise the debt limit until January. Expect to see a replay of the debt-ceiling fight, says Ian Lyngen, a senior government bond strategist at CRT Capital. Except that this time what's at stake is the country's borrowing limit and a recession. "I'm sure it's going to go just like it did last time - very messy," Mr Lyngen says. In one dizzying stretch that August, the Dow Jones industrial average dropped 2,000 points in three weeks. "And don't forget," Mr Lyngen adds, "that ultimately got resolved." The widespread belief on Wall Street is that Congress and Mr Obama will start negotiations over raising the debt limit and pushing back the fiscal cliff when they return in late November - the so-called lame-duck session, because newly elected members of Congress will not have taken their seats. Twists in the talks will likely rattle markets as the new year approaches. But if stocks do fall sharply, investors expect that would push Republicans and Democrats to reach a deal. "Ugly negotiations in the lame-duck session could really throw the market for a loop," says Mr Kleintop. "It could be a painful process for investors."

### A2: Case Solves

#### Most significant threat to the economy

Matthew Craft, AP, 9/30, Investors prepare for Obama victory, more expensive gridlock, marketday.nbcnews.com/\_news/2012/09/30/14143239-investors-prepare-for-obama-victory-more-expensive-gridlock?lite

The next fight could get just as messy, but most on Wall Street think Congress and Obama would eventually manage to postpone some of the $600-billion-plus "fiscal cliff" and avoid tipping the economy into a recession. The Congressional Budget Office recently laid out the grim consequences of dropping off the fiscal cliff. The economy would shrink at an annual rate of nearly 3 percent in the first half of next year and push unemployment up to 9.1 percent by the fall. Recent surveys of businesses suggest the threat is already weighing on the minds of executives when they're making hiring and spending plans. For the world's biggest money managers, the fiscal cliff now ranks as the greatest hazard to the global economy, according to Bank of America's most recent fund manager survey. It topped the European debt crisis, a collapse in Chinese real estate and even a war between Israel and Iran.

# Rd 3 vs. Minnesota SS (Oil)

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### Fiscal Cliff Will Pass, PC Key. K2 the economy

Benac 11/8/12 (Nancy, Assoc Press, "Obama, GOP leaders lay down markers on budget deal," http://news.yahoo.com/obama-gop-leaders-lay-down-markers-budget-deal-080338986.html)

Taking little time to celebrate, President Barack Obama is setting out to leverage his re-election into legislative success in an upcoming showdown with congressional Republicans over taxes, deficits and the impending "fiscal cliff." House Speaker John Boehner says Republicans are willing to consider some form of higher tax revenue as part of the solution — but only "under the right conditions."¶ All sides are setting out opening arguments for the negotiations to come.¶ Even before returning to Washington from his hometown of Chicago, Obama was on the phone Wednesday with the four top leaders of the House and Senate, including Boehner, to talk about the lame-duck Congress that convenes just one week after Election Day.¶ Obama adviser David Axelrod warned Republican leaders to take lessons from Tuesday's vote. The president won after pledging to raise taxes on American households earning more than $250,000 a year "and was re-elected in a significant way," Axelrod told MSNBC Thursday morning.¶ "Hopefully people will read those results and read them as a vote for cooperation and will come to the table," Axelrod said. "And obviously everyone's going to have to come with an open mind to these discussions. But if the attitude is that nothing happened on Tuesday, that would be unfortunate."¶ He noted that conservative Republican Senate candidate Richard Mourdock in Indiana dismissed the value of compromise and instead said Democrats should join the GOP. "And I note that he's not on his way to the United States Senate," Axelrod said. Mourdock lost to Democratic Rep. Joe Donnelly.¶ Without a budget deal to head off the fiscal showdown, the nation faces a combination of expiring Bush-era tax cuts and steep across-the-board spending cuts that could total $800 billion next year. Economists have warned that could tip the nation back into recession.¶ Vice President Joe Biden, flying to his home in Delaware from Chicago, told reporters aboard Air Force Two that the White House was "really anxious" to get moving on the problem. He said he'd been making a lot of calls and "people know we've got to get down to work and I think they're ready to move." He didn't identify whom he had spoken with but predicted the "fever will break" on past legislative gridlock after some soul-searching by Republicans.¶ The White House held out this week's election results as a mandate from voters for greater cooperation between the White House and Congress. At the same time, it reiterated Obama's top priorities: cutting taxes for middle-class families and small businesses, creating jobs and cutting the deficit "in a balanced way" — through a combination of tax increases on wealthier Americans and spending cuts.¶ Obama told the congressional leaders he believed "the American people sent a message in yesterday's election that leaders in both parties need to put aside their partisan interests and work with common purpose to put the interests of the American people and the American economy first," the White House said in a statement.¶ Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., channeled Obama in calling for a quick solution to the fiscal showdown and saying that asking "the richest of the rich" to pay more should be part of the equation. He added that he'd "do everything within my power to be as conciliatory as possible" but added, "I want everyone to also understand you can't push us around."¶ "Waiting for a month, six weeks, six months, that's not going to solve the problem," Reid said on Capitol Hill. "We know what needs to be done. And so I think that we should just roll up our sleeves and get it done."¶ Former Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle said the postelection congressional session offers a good chance to reset the dynamics between the White House and congressional Republicans in search of compromise.¶ "I think there's the urgency of the matter that probably goes beyond anything we've seen to date," he said. "The urgency of the repercussions of driving off the cliff are so grave that I can't imagine that failure is an option."¶

#### Offshore drilling costs capital – upsets base

Numerick, 10 (Kevin, "Does the President Treat his Political Opponents Fairly?", Helium, September 5, http://www.helium.com/debates/239736-does-president-obama-treat-his-political-opponents-fairly/side\_by\_side)

President Obama has tried to re-implement nuclear power, which disturbed his base, but is strongly supported by most republicans as a viable and must-have source of energy production in the future. Not long after, he went even further and spoke of adding more off-shore drilling, **which really went against his** base of supporters. Regardless, the Republican Party still said no, accusing him of playing politics. Shortly after, the BP Deep Water Horizon event happened. President Obama is also a supporter of “Clean Coal Technology” which is certainly considered a bipartisan goal, though many Democrats **disagree with it fiercely**.

#### Presidential leadership is key to compromise – failure collapses heg

Hutchison, 9/21 --- Senator from Texas (Kay Bailey, 9/21/2012, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” <http://hutchison.senate.gov/?p=weekly_column&id=1230>)

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and a potentially catastrophic blow to our national defense and security capabilities in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings. In the absence of U.S. military leadership, upheaval in the Middle East would be worse. As any student of history can attest, instability does not confine itself to national borders. Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological research, development and advantage - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.Sequestration can still be avoided. But that will require leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Nuclear war

Kagan 7

(Robert, Senior Associate – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership”, Policy Review, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying —  its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore  to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable

### 1NC

#### High oil prices key to algae competitiveness – it can solve US oil dependency

Taranovich 7/7/12 (Steve, EDN Network, "The power of pond scum," http://www.edn.com/electronics-blogs/anablog/4389792/The-power-of-pond-scum)

Algae, known to most of us as pond scum, might be a promising sustainable source of energy in the 21st century.¶ Fig 1 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This June 2010 satellite photo shows raceway ponds of algae in southern California. The IEEE is endorsing algae as the most promising sustainable fuel source.¶ “There is not an infinite amount of oil in the Earth and we are using it quite rapidly,” says William R. Kassebaum, P.E., the Founder, President & CEO of Stellarwind Bio Energy. ¶ While there’s plenty of debate over when the oil will run dry, “eventually we will need to find other sources to replace these hydrocarbon fuels,” Kassebaum, who is also CEO of Algaeon Inc., an Indiana-based algae producer.¶ The IEEE endorsed algae as “the best candidate to provide a sustainable energy source to meet increasing global demands.”¶ The potential of algae-based biofuel has long been known, but not seriously considered largely because making a barrel of the stuff was too expensive compared to traditional fossil fuels. ¶ “Everyone understands that you have to be able to ship a product at a competitive price with fossil fuels,” Kassebaum said. ¶ 1970’s research on algae-based biofuels was conducted and the price of a barrel of oil was around $20. Today, oil is around $80 with recent spikes over $100 a barrel, a price range where algae fuel producers believe than can compete.¶ Doing so, Kassebaum noted, will take major capital investment and perhaps government support to enable the industry to produce commercially viable quantities, but in the coming years he believes algae “will become part of the oil industry.”¶ The industry will still need to confront concerns such as water supplies – perhaps by producing algae in parts of the country where water supplies are abundant, such as the Midwest, where Algaeon is located.¶ The U.S. could produce enough of the algae-derived fuel to eliminate 48 percent of the fuel it currently imports for transportation needs, according to researchers at the Department of Energy's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. But doing so would require 5.5 percent of the land area in the lower 48 states and consume about three times the water currently used to irrigate crops.¶ The Midwest, Kassebaum noted, is already rich with corn, much of it grown for ethanol. ¶ Kasselbaum also said “An acre of corn can be used to generate 300 gallons of ethanol per year, while an acre of algae can produce 6,000 to 10,000 gallons of light sweet crude oil annually.”

#### Oil dependence risks extinction

Energy Bulletin 4 (9/11, “Australia: Peak Oil - A Perfect Storm,” <http://www.energybulletin.net/2076.html>)

Apparently an imminent peak and subsequent terminal decline in oil production may lead to a global economic collapse with total war precluding any internationalist approach to either global warming, overpopulation, energy alternatives or maintaining even the semblance of democratic order resulting in a globalised capitalist totalitarian feudalism, historically gigantic population culls through war, famine and pestilence accompanied by accelerating biosphere destruction with the end result that within 100 years or so a Permian style planetary extinction event will wipe out 90% or more of all life on earth including us - unless we preempt nature through either adapting to the changes being forced on us or we commit the ultimate genocide and destroy ourselves in a nuclear apocalypse.

#### Algae production results in nutrient recycling of sewage and waste – solves phosphorus fertilizer

Hodge 08 (Nick, The Green Chip Review, October, “Investing in Algae Biofuel”,

<http://www.greenchipstocks.com/report/investing-in-algae-biofuel/109>)

It is possible to use human sewage and wastewater from agricultural endeavors to enhance the growth of algae. In fact, when done right, algae can double and even triple overnight with the addition of these fertilizers. Compare that to the five-month growing season for soy or canola! Plus, as algae grows it absorbs Co2 from the air. MIT has even fed emissions from their on-site power plant directly to algae being cultivated for biofuel production. In addition, fertilizer for other food crops can be produced by using the leftover nutrients that aren't used to make the biofuel. That's like having your algae and eating it too. So let's back up and look at the big picture. We have the technology right now to cultivate algae that can be used as fuel, using human and animal waste as fertilizer. This is waste that would otherwise need to be treated or end up in our nation's ground water. Not a bad deal at all! Then, after the necessary oils have been extracted from the algae, we use the byproducts (phosphorus and nitrogen) as fertilizer for the food crops that feed the nation - all while extracting C02 from the air.

#### Key to solve Ag- extinction

Osava 07 (Mario, correspondant for Inter Press Service, “Farming faces phosphate shortfall,” 10/15, <http://www.energybulletin.net/node/35851>)

RIO DE JANEIRO - Scarcity of phosphate, an indispensable fertilizer for farming, is worrying soil experts, given the voracious plans of Brazil and many other countries in the race for biofuel leadership. A salt of phosphoric acid salt, phosphate is a chemical compound made up of a central phosphorous atom and four oxygen atoms. Phosphorous is a "finite and irreplaceable" mineral, whose known reserves that are economically viable for exploitation could run out in 60 to 100 years if the current pace of global consumption continues, Euripedes Malavolta, veteran agronomist and researcher at the University of Sao Paulo, told Tierramérica. "Without phosphorous there will be no agriculture, nor biofuels, nor life. Humanity will end," he said. Other minerals, like nitrogen, potassium, cobalt, magnesium and molybdenum, are also indispensable, but their sources are not as limited and, except for the first two, their consumption is relatively low. "Phosphate runs the risk of running out before petroleum does," José Oswaldo Siqueira, professor of soil microbiology at the Federal University of Lavras, told a bio-energy conference held Sep. 26 in Sao Paulo.

### 1NC

#### CP Text: The United States Federal Government should pass the Open Fuels Standard Act

#### Counterplan Solves Prices and dependence in the short term

Luft and Korin 12

[Gal Luft and Anne Korin are co-directors of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) and senior advisers to the United States Energy Security Council, August 2012, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1266>]

This leaves only one near term and affordable way of opening cars to natural gas en masse: converting the gas into liquid fuel. A recent MIT study on the future of natural gas determined that the most economical liquid fuel pathway for natural gas is methanol (wood alcohol). Other gas-to-liquids technologies can yield drop-in fuels like gasoline and diesel that can be used in the current automotive infrastructure, but on a per-mile basis these end products are 30 percent costlier than natural-gas-based methanol. Methanol is a globally traded commodity, and its spot price averages $1.10 per gallon. Add taxes, distribution and retail markup, and on a per-mile basis methanol is substantially less expensive than gasoline. (Different fuels have different energy contents, so the proper price comparison is not per gallon but per mile.) China is already blending 15 percent methanol (made primarily from coal in China) into its automotive fuel, and in recent years 26 of its thirty mainland provinces have carried out testing and demonstrations of methanol fuel and methanol fuel vehicles. The economics of methanol are so favorable compared to gasoline that in China illegal methanol blending has become rampant. In the United States, methanol blending will not occur without warranty guarantees for the vehicles into which this fuel is poured. In order for vehicles to run on methanol (and other alcohol fuels such as ethanol) in addition to gasoline, they must be tweaked to manage its greater corrosiveness. Essentially, all the tweaks needed are a fuel sensor and a corrosion-resistant fuel line. The cost? About $100 for a car or light truck. No, that’s not a typo: just one hundred dollars. Such flex-fuel vehicles provide a platform on which liquid fuels can compete, thus placing a variety of commodities (methanol can also be made from coal, biomass and, in the future, recycled carbon dioxide) in competition at the pump and letting the market determine the winning fuels and feedstocks based on economics: comparative per-mile cost. The proliferation of flex-fuel vehicles in Brazil has already driven fuel competition at the pump to the point that in 2008, when oil prices were at record highs, gasoline became the alternative rather than the primary fuel. Nothing like what happened in Brazil can happen in the United States as long as vehicles are warrantied to run exclusively on petroleum fuels, with non-petroleum liquids confined to a protected and limited market as additives. Over the past seven years, as U.S. import dependence dropped, nearly 100 million new petroleum-only vehicles rolled onto America’s roads, each with an average lifespan of 15 years. This has effectively extended the stranglehold of oil (and its possessors) on our economy by two decades. This is a needless tragedy. W e are solidly on track to continue this needless tragedy. At no point so far in the 2012 presidential elections cycle has any major candidate demonstrated even a rudimentary understanding of the actual problem of foreign oil, let alone articulated a solution for it. Clearly, our objective should not be to reduce the magnitude of U.S. oil imports but rather to diminish the strategic importance of oil altogether. The policy needs to be not about learning to endure the impact that price spikes have on the economy, but about banishing those spikes by placing petroleum in competition with other forms of transportation fuel. Clinging to old mantras and new supply developments may bring America closer to self-sufficiency, but that **will not help forestall economic decline**. The most immediate and effective step the U.S. government can take to insulate our economy from oil shocks is **to enact an open fuel standard**, ensuring that new cars are open to fuel competition. This one act would signal that the U.S. transportation fuel market is no longer captive to oil. The capacity expansion among various fuels that flex-fuel vehicles would stimulate will eventually lead to competition over fuel market share and thus drag down the price of oil. The sooner we adjust our thinking and focus on this game-changing, transformational solution instead of inconsequential, time-buying policies, the sooner we will attain true and lasting energy security.

### 1NC

#### Text: The Department of Interior should grant regulatory waivers that exempt all parties from restrictions on the production of crude oil on federal lands. The DOI should summarize the decision in an annual agency publication in the Federal Register.

#### The CP doesn’t reduce – “reductions” must be in quantity, not quality

**GEP 99** (Georgia Environmental Protection , http://www.air.dnr.state.ga.us/bank/forms/faqsheet.pdf)

The reductions **must be "quantifiable;"** i.e., the amount, rate and characteristics of the reduction must be measured or calculated through a reliable method and approved by the Environmental Protection Division;

#### The CP is a functionally different – it keeps the rule “on the books” and tailors it’s application – the plan creates a new rule – rulemaking is distinct from adjudication

Rossi 95 (Jim, Professor of Law – Vanderbilt University, “Making Policy through the Waiver of Regulations at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,” Administrative Law Review, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 260, Hein Online)

A. RULEMAKING VERSUS ADJUDICATION Two distinctive methodologies are available to agencies in formulating law and policy: **rulemaking and ad hoc adjudication**. As defined in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a rule is a statement of general applicability and future effect that implements, interprets, or prescribes **law or policy** or the organization, procedures, and standards for practice before an agency.95 Rules arise from formal or informal rulemaking proceedings before the issuing administrative agency. Rules create law in the form of statements that are binding on those persons or entities to whom they are addressed, regardless whether those persons or entities participated in the rulemaking proceeding that generated the rule. Rules generally bind the agency in future cases, although, as this article suggests, this is not always the case, nor should it be. An adjudicative order, on the other hand, is an agency statement of particular applicability determining the rights of, or applying law or policy to, specific individuals or entities on the basis of their special circumstances.96 Such orders generally arise as the result of an adjudicative proceeding involving persons who have asserted an interest sufficient to meet the agency's intervention standards.97 An individualized adjudicative proceeding allows the agency to tailor application of its law or policy to the specific time, place, and context of persons affected. An adjudicative order generally adopts principles or rules of law on an ad hoc basis as necessary to solve the specific case before the agency. The impact of adjudicative orders, however, is often broader than the specific case at hand because they may serve as precedent in similar future cases. As a general matter, most commentators have argued that agencies should adopt and elaborate law and policy by rulemaking rather than ad hoc adjudica- tion.98 By overlooking the particularities of time, place, and context, rules have the inherent values of predictability, stability, uniformity, and control. Yet, it is these very values about which adjudication is most skeptical. In addition to the inherent values of rules, rulemaking is generally regarded as a preferable decisionmaking methodology for several process-based reasons.99

#### It solves the whole case better- avoids politics

Glicksman and Shapiro 4 (Robert L., Professor of Law – University of Kansas, and Sidney A., Professor of Law – University of Kansas, “Improving Regulation through Incremental Adjustment,” Kansas Law Review, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1179, Hein Online)

Reform of environmental and other regulation has been a popular topic for academics, think-tanks, and interested parties for the last two decades. Claiming that existing regulation is excessive and irrational, critics have successfully convinced Congress and the White House to implement a plethora of procedural requirements to analyze a proposed regulation before it is promulgated.1 In our recent book, Risk Regulation at Risk,2 we argued that the previous initiatives address the possibility of regulatory failure on the wrong end of the regulatory policy implementation process. Current efforts to rationalize environmental and other health and safety regulation at the "front end" of the regulatory process are doomed to fail because of moral, methodological, and informational limitations.3 We suggested that one way of improving regulation would be to rely on incremental adjustments in regulation on the "back end" of the regulatory process.4 One important advantage of proceeding in this manner is that regulatory policy is adjusted in light of its actual impact, as compared to the significant guesswork that is required to use front-end analysis. In this manner, a back-end adjustment process is consistent with the pragmatic approach to public policy that we advocated in the book.5 This article addresses in more detail the potential of two types of back-end processes: (1) deadline extensions and (2) waivers, exceptions, and variances.6 Our analysis proceeds in three steps. Part II describes the almost exclusive focus of regulatory reformers on the front end of the process. Part III offers a close examination of five federal statutes that provide opportunities for the two types of adjustments we are studying. The results confirm our earlier assertion that Congress has authorized agencies such as **the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),** the Occu- pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and **the Interior Department** to make these types of back-end adjustments available in a variety of contexts and for a variety of reasons.7 Our analysis reveals that Congress has established six different grounds for back-end adjustment, and we assess the potential for each of these grounds to improve regulatory policy. Although we recommend the imposition of conditions on the issuance of some of these back-end adjustments, we find that these adjustments are generally consistent with the precautionary tilt of the statutes in which they are located because they still require the regulated entity to do the best it can to protect people and the environment. Where such protective mechanisms are absent, we urge that the statutes be amended to include them. Part IV analyzes the procedures by which requests for back-end adjustments are currently processed. We find that agencies consider most applications for back-end adjustments using informal procedures that include public notice and solicitation of public comments, although in a few instances, more formal procedures apply. We favor the informal approach because it is an efficient way for agencies to respond to the issues raised by requests for back-end adjustments and because more elaborate procedures are not necessary to promote rational decision- making, given the nature of the issues likely to be raised in back-end adjustment proceedings. We are concerned, however, about the extent to which effective public participation will occur under these procedures. We therefore endorse two steps to enhance the transparency of back-end adjustment decision-making: the establishment of electronic reading rooms and the issuance by agencies of **annual reports on back-end adjustments**.8 We argue that these two mechanisms will facilitate involvement by public interest groups and interested citizens by allowing them to prioritize the adjustment proceedings in which they wish to become involved. The result is likely to be enhanced agency accountability and reduced opportunities for agency abuse of the back-end adjustment process.

### 1NC

#### Renewables are competitive now

**Tickell, 8/20**/12 – British journalist, author and campaigner on health and environment issues, and author of the Kyoto2 climate initiative (Oliver, “Does the world need nuclear power to solve the climate crisis?” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/aug/20/world-need-nuclear-power-climate-crisis>)

However, non-hydro renewables are growing very fast – up 15% in 2010. And within this figure just three power sources are responsible for most of the growth: wind power, solar PV and solar hot water. From 2005 to 2010, global solar hot water and wind power capacity both grew at 25% per year, while solar PV capacity grew at over 50% per year. If these growth rates were to be sustained for 35 years, wind capacity would rise 6,300-fold from 200 gigawatts (GW) in 2010 to about 1.25 million GW, solar hot water 6,300-fold from 185 GW to 1.15 million GW, and solar PV 40 million-fold from 40 GW to 1.6 billion GW. These figures are not predictions. Exponential growth will not continue for so long, as prime sites for wind turbines and solar panels get used up. Other technologies, such as concentrated solar power, will also become important. And there will be demand-side constraints: the projected 1.6 billion GW of solar PV capacity alone would produce over 3 billion billion kilowatt hours per year, equivalent to a primary energy burn of some 30 million Mtoe – over 1,000 times our projected world primary energy demand in 35 years. We would not even know what to do with so much energy. But while not predictive, the figures are highly indicative of the low-carbon energy choices the world should make. The one, nuclear power, is expensive and becoming more so. It will be a practical impossibility to increase its capacity to a scale big enough to make a real difference to global climate within a realistic time frame. Worse, if we were somehow to build our 11,000 nuclear reactors, we would face the certainty of repeated catastrophic accidents and the spread of nuclear weapons, not to mention unimaginable liabilities for decommissioning and long-term nuclear-waste management. We can fairly say that nuclear power is both repulsive and utterly wrong. The other choice, renewable power, already costs less than fossil fuels for many applications, thanks in large part to generous subsidies in Germany, Japan and other countries, which have had the effect of greatly reducing prices. Solar electricity is now cheaper than power from diesel generators in the tropics and subtropics – and so the rapid spread of solar power across China, India, Africa and Latin America is being driven not by subsidy but by the market. And it is getting cheaper all the time as increased demand, caused by its lower price, stimulates greater competition among manufacturers, technological advance, and even greater price falls, in a delightful virtuous circle. Moreover, renewable energy is free of catastrophic dangers and long- term liabilities. It is both romantic and right.

#### New oil supplies derail renewables

Styles 12 (Geoffrey, “Could Oil's Surge Sink Renewable Energy?,” The Energy Collective, 7-2-12, <http://theenergycollective.com/node/89161>)

A new forecast of global oil production by the end of the decade attracted a fair amount of attention this week. The study, from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, indicates that oil production could expand by about 20% by 2020 from current levels. The Wall St. Journal's Heard on the Street column cited this in support of the view that the influence of "peak oil" on the market has itself peaked and fallen into decline. I was particularly intrigued by a scenario suggested in MIT's Technology Review that this wave of new oil supplies could trigger an oil price collapse similar to the one in the mid-1980s that helped roll back the renewable energy programs that were started during the oil crises of the 1970s. That's possible, though I'm not sure this should be the biggest worry that manufacturers of wind turbines and solar panels have today.

#### Extinction

**Wood 10**

(Duncan, Director – Program in International Relations and Canadian Studies Program – Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, “Environment, Development and Growth: U.S.-Mexico Cooperation in Renewable Energies,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars – Mexico Institute, May, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/U.S.%20Mexico%20Cooperation%20in%20Renewable%20Energies.pdf)

It is by now common knowledge that the world is facing a climate change crisis caused by the effects of fossil fuel driven industrialization. A significant rise in global temperatures, combined with more severe weather conditions, more frequent floods and droughts, are bringing a paradigm shift to the way we think about our relationship with the planet. For the first time in over 150 years policy makers are thinking seriously about decreasing dependency on fossil fuels and looking for alternatives that may be more expensive in the short and medium terms, but ultimately more sustainable. 7 All of this has happened at the same time as two other, related phenomena. The first is that the global population is reaching new highs and by 2040‐50 will total over 9 billion people. Experts predict that 85% of the world’s population will be located in the developing world, which will mean a rapidly growing demand for goods and for energy. Both of these factors will result in a need to increase energy efficiency as well as find new sources of energy. What’s more, this massive jump in population will coincide not only with climate change but also with increasingly difficult conditions for hydrocarbons exploration and production. As most of the world’s “easy” oil has already been discovered, oil companies and nation states are turning to alternatives such a non‐conventional oil reserves (tar sands, complex fields) and reserves that in the past would have been considered unrecoverable, such as in very deep ocean waters. Furthermore, political conditions in many of the world’s oil rich regions are uncertain, unstable and often unfriendly to private oil companies and to the countries of the West. Climate change and natural disasters The urgency of finding alternatives to fossil fuels has been confirmed in recent years by mounting scientific evidence that we are undergoing a noticeable **anthropogenic shift** in the world’s weather and temperature. Not only are a range of indicators showing that the planet is warming, but the retreat of the polar ice caps, the melting of glaciers, and most importantly in the short term extreme weather conditions and increased incidence of natural disasters have highlighted the consequences of maintaining the status quo in our patterns of energy consumption and industrial development. It is estimated that we have experienced a 1 degree Celsius rise in global temperatures over the past 100 years and that by the end of the current century global temperatures may have risen by as much 7 or 8 degrees. Even with the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that is contemplated by the most ambitious mitigation strategies, global temperatures may rise by as much as 6%. This would have a dramatic and disastrous impact on both developed and developing nations and will **threaten the existence of both humans and animal and plant species**. Though the connection between man‐made greenhouse gases and global warming was denied for many years by industry and governments alike, it has now been accepted that something must be done to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere. Given that 86% of all global energy comes from fossil fuels, and that these fossil fuels produce 27,000,000,000 tons of CO2 emissions annually, finding alternative sources of energy is a crucial component of climate change mitigation strategies.

**Solvency**

**Reserves aren’t sufficient to alter prices or solve demand**

**Baker 11**

[ Dean Baker, PhD, Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research , 3/23/11, <http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/the-imaginary-world-in-which-washington-lives>]

According to the Energy Information Agency, the United States has proven reserves of 22.3 billion barrels of oil. Given our current rate of consumption of 6.9 billion barrels a year, U.S. reserves could meet our demand for oil for less than 3.5 years. That means if we could somehow drill here, now, and everywhere, we could be energy independent until the middle of 2014 and then we would be 100 percent dependent on imported oil. Of course, we cannot suddenly suck all the oil out of the ground at once, it takes time to explore and drill wells and then the oil must be drilled out over time. If we decided that we want to destroy every last national park and coastal region, we may be able to increase production by 1.0-1.5 million barrels a day in 5-10 years. At the high end, this would be a bit less than 2 percent of world supply. Given normal assumptions about how demand responds to price, we would be very lucky to see a 6 percent decline in the price of oil. This means that in the most optimistic "drill everywhere" scenario we would save less than 20 cents from our $4 a gallon gas. More likely the savings would be less than half this size. In other words, when a politician says that they want to end environmental restrictions on drilling in order to end U.S. dependence on foreign oil or bring the price of gas down, **they are speaking utter nonsense.** The correct response of a reporter to such assertions would be to say something like: “Senator, you know that the United States does not have nearly enough oil to be energy independent or to substantially reduce the price of gas.”

**Supply can’t meet U.S. Demand**

**Sanders 10**

[Bernie, US Senator (I-VT), 5/27/10, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/27/oil-spill-bernie-sanders-energy-offshore-drilling>]

Offshore drilling simply does not achieve the goals that its advocates claim, and it is not worth the risk. If we are serious about wanting to break our dependence on foreign oil and move to energy independence; if we want to lower the cost of energy; if we want to combat climate change and cut greenhouse gas emissions; if we want to create millions of new jobs – then more offshore drilling is not the way to go. The simple truth is that we cannot drill our way to energy independence or lower gas prices. The US uses roughly 25% of the world's oil, 7.5bn barrels per year, but we have only 2-3% of the world's proven petroleum reserves. Offshore drilling today provides roughly 1% of the oil we use in the United States.

**Permits and federal lands are unused now- proves no solvency**

**Moulton 12**

[David, Senior Director of Legislative Affaris at The Wilderness Society, 3/22/12, <http://wilderness.org/blog/truth-behind-4-gasoline-big-oil-doesnt-want-you-know>]

What about access for oil and gas drilling? A common complaint from the oil industry is that they are being “locked out” of places to drill – places like the Arctic Refuge in Alaska or in the Rocky Mountains. But the problem isn’t where they are “locked out” – it’s where they have already “locked in” permission to drill. Oil companies have already been granted oil and gas leases on more than 38 million federal acres – as much land as in the state of Florida. But these leases too often sit idle, **despite the high gasoline prices**. The latest report from the Energy Information Administration shows that 2 out of every 3 acres leased are INACTIVE! Next time you hear the industry complaining about the 2 million acre piece of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge where they cannot drill, ask them about the 26 million federal acres already under lease where they can drill. They are hoarding an area the size of Kentucky but not doing anything with it! On top of their Bluegrass-state sized swath of unused leases, the oil and gas industry is also sitting on more than 7,000 unused drilling permits. Drilling permits are the final approval needed to drill for oil or gas, so once they’ve got one, there is nothing to keep them from drilling. What’s more, those 7,000 unused permits account for over half of the permits issued to oil and gas companies. Another question worth asking – why are American refineries exporting precious gasoline even as the price of gasoline is soaring here at home? For the first time since the 1950s, the U.S. shipped more refined petroleum overseas than we imported – including gasoline. So rather than selling the gasoline they produce here in the United States, which would increase supply and possibly lower the price we pay at the pump, more and more refineries have been trying to pad their profits by shipping American-made gasoline overseas. There aren’t many options for quick relief from high prices at the pump. But clearly the sooner we free ourselves from the shackles of oil dependence – foreign and domestic – the sooner we will be free of oil industry profiteering and political pandering. Doubling our fuel economy, as the Administration is already pursuing, is job #1. But clearly Congress has the obligation to immediately eliminate the $4 billion in obsolete oil and gas annual tax subsidies and devote the resources instead to renewable energy and alternative-fuel vehicles.

**Econ**

**Can’t solve the economy**

**Levi 12**

[Michael Levi, senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom”, July 2012, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom?page=0,0>]

The U.S. oil and gas boom has come at an auspicious time. With record numbers of Americans out of work, hydrocarbon production is helping create much-needed jobs in communities from Pennsylvania to North Dakota. Shale gas production alone accounted for an estimated 600,000 U.S. jobs as of 2010, according to the consultancy IHS CERA. It's much harder, though, to extrapolate into the future. In a deeply depressed economy, new development can put people to work without reducing employment elsewhere. That's why boom states have benefited massively in recent years. The same is not true, though, in a more normal economy. Unemployment rates are typically determined by fundamental factors such as the ease of hiring and firing and the match between skills that employers need and that workers have. **The oil and gas boom won't change these much**. That's why we should be skeptical about rosy projections of millions of new jobs. Wood MacKenzie, for example, claims that the energy boom could deliver as many as 1.1 million jobs by 2020, while Citigroup forecasts a whopping 3.6 million. Unless the U.S. economy remains deep in the doldrums for another decade, **these will mostly come at the expense of jobs elsewhere**. That hardly means all the new oil and gas coming online is worthless. In the near term, it can support hundreds of thousands of workers who would otherwise be unemployed. In the long term, it should deliver a boost to the overall U.S. economy, raising GDP by as much as three percentage points, according to my colleague, Citigroup's Daniel Ahn. But **we can't drill our way out of America's job crisis**. The numbers just don't add up.

**Oil independence kills the economy**

**Massy and Avasalara 12**

[ Kevin Massy is associate director of the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. Govinda Avasarala is senior research assistant with the Energy Security Initiative., 8/29/12, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/29/energy-independence-no-thanks/>]

But “energy independence” goes further than theoretical self sufficiency by eliminating our exposure to the global oil market. Such exposure can have its down sides. In the case of imports, foreign barrels are purchased at a price that reflects the marginal cost of oil in the global market. Any disruption in oil markets is reflected in the imported price of oil. The export picture is a little more complex. If we are allowed to export crude (which is, in effect, prohibited today) or petroleum products (which is not), then domestic consumers are also exposed to the global price as producers will export if they can earn a higher price internationally than they can at home. To truly insulate Americans from global oil markets, making us “independent,” **the U.S. must forgo all oil trade.** However, while such a move would insulate the country from external shocks, it would come at a very high price. When imports of oil are allowed as they currently are, the U.S. produces oil to the point at which the marginal cost of domestic production reaches that of imported oil; after that, it is more economical to import, leaving the U.S. exposed to any disruption to the global market, but paying the lowest price it has to. In a truly “energy independent” scenario, in which imports are cut off, U.S. consumers would have to pay prices high enough to justify domestic production to cover all domestic demand – prices likely to be far higher than those in the global market. Regarding exports, with the U.S. likely to produce more and more oil in the coming years, the existing restrictions on exports may start to negatively affect producers and their shareholders. If producers can obtain a higher price internationally, they will sell there instead of at home. If not, it may become uneconomic to produce at the margin, limiting domestic production and producer profits, and causing a potential net cost to the overall economy. Beyond basic comparative advantage, the technical complexities of the oil market make “energy independence” even less economically appealing. Not all oil is created equal: crude from North Dakota’s Bakken field is not same as crude from California or Canada, let alone from Venezuela. Different crudes are used to produce different petroleum products: higher quality crudes tend to produce gasoline and jet fuel while lower quality crudes are generally used for diesel, fuel oil, and other middle and heavy distillates. The reason that the United States both imports and exports petroleum products is that the country has diverse demand needs that depend on regional characteristics and requirements. For instance, the northeast, which does not have easy access to light, sweet crude for gasoline, depends on oil imports from Nigeria. Complex refineries in the Gulf Coast need heavy oil from countries like Canada or Saudi Arabia to produce diesel and other middle distillates. If the move towards theoretical self-sufficiency will be costly, the costs of “energy independence” would be far higher. By eliminating competing imports, the cost of domestic fuels would skyrocket. And, because refineries and pipeline networks would need to serve all parts of the country, expensive infrastructure would need to be built, further raising prices. Global oil trade, contrary to public opinion, is a net benefit to consumers. We can, technically, achieve “energy independence.” But if we’re worried about prices at the pump and the strength of the U.S. economy, we shouldn’t want to.

**Economic decline doesn’t cause war**

**Tir 10** [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425), Ofir]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

**Growth now- increased consumer spending, decreased trade deficit and increasing global demand for US goods.**

**Reuters, 11-8** (“WRAPUP 3-US trade deficit narrows, economy resists global chill” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/08/usa-economy-idUSL1E8M7GD420121108>)

WASHINGTON, Nov 8 (Reuters) - The U.S. trade deficit unexpectedly narrowed in September as exports rose sharply, suggesting global demand for U.S. goods was holding up despite a debt crisis in Europe. Other data on Thursday showed a drop in new claims for jobless benefits last week, although a severe storm that battered the East Coast distorted the figures. The trade gap shrank 5.1 percent to $41.55 billion, the smallest deficit since December 2010, the Commerce Department said. Economists had expected it to widen to $45.0 billion. Exports jumped 3.1 percent, the biggest increase in more than a year. The export gain more than offset a 1.5 percent increase in imports that was centered on purchases of consumer goods. The data was the latest positive sign for the U.S. economy, which has appeared to perk up as consumers spend more freely and home construction quickens. "This was a very encouraging report as the improvement in both export and non-petroleum import activity suggest improving demand both domestically and globally," said Millan Mulraine, an economist at TD Securities in New York. Chinese demand for U.S. products appeared to help exporters in September. [China](http://www.reuters.com/places/china) bought $8.8 billion in U.S. goods and services, up 0.3 percent from a month earlier, although those figures were not seasonally adjusted. Exports to the European Union, where a debt crisis has pushed several countries into recession, were flat. The U.S. government does not seasonally adjust figures for countries and regions as it does for overall imports and exports. The larger-than-anticipated decline in the trade gap suggested U.S. economic growth may have been faster in the third quarter than the 2.0 percent annual rate initially reported. JPMorgan said it pointed to a 2.8 percent growth rate. Analysts on Wall Street had previously increased their estimates for third-quarter growth following stronger-than-expected data on factory orders. The Commerce Department will release a revised GDP growth estimate on Nov. 29.

**US not key—global economies decoupling**

**Caryl, Sr. Fellow @ MIT, 10** [Christian Caryl is a Editor at Foreign Policy and Newsweek and a Senior Fellow of the CSIS at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Crisis? What Crisis?” 4/5/10 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/05/crisis\_what\_crisis?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

We went through a terrifying moment back in the fall of 2008. The financial system in the United States was imploding. It was impossible to predict how the effects would ripple through the rest of the world, but one outcome seemed inevitable: Developing economies were going to take a terrible hit. There was just no way they could escape the maelstrom without seeing millions of their citizens impoverished. Many emerging-market countries did experience sharp drops in GDP. Their capital markets tanked. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), sounded downright apocalyptic: "All this will affect dramatically unemployment, and beyond unemployment for many countries it will be at the roots of social unrest, some threat to democracy, and maybe for some cases it can also end in war." The Economist recently noted, "The Institute of International Finance (IIF), a think-tank in Washington, DC, forecast that net private capital flows into poor countries in 2009 would be 72% lower than at their peak in 2007, an unprecedented shrinkage." Virtually everyone expected to see the countries that had benefited so dramatically from growth in the years leading up to the crisis to suffer disproportionately in its wake. An entirely rational assumption -- except it hasn't turned out that way at all. To be sure, there were far too many poor people in the world before the crisis, and that still remains the case. Some 3 billion people still live on less than $2.50 a day. But the global economic crisis hasn't added appreciably to their ranks. Just take China, India, and Indonesia, Asia's three biggest emerging markets. Although growth in all three slowed, it never went into reverse. China's robust growth through the crisis has been much publicized -- but Indonesia's, much less conspicuously. Those countries, as well as Brazil and Russia, have rebounded dramatically. The Institute of International Finance -- the same people who gave that dramatically skepticism-inducing estimate earlier -- now says that net private capital flows to developing countries could reach $672 billion this year (double the 2009 amount). That's less than the high point of 2007, to be sure. But it still seems remarkable in light of the dire predictions. In short, the countries that have worked the hardest to join the global marketplace are **showing remarkable resilience**. It wasn't always this way. Recall what happened back in 1997 and 1998, when the Thai government's devaluation of its currency triggered the Asian financial crisis. Rioting across Indonesia brought down the Suharto government. The administration of Filipino President Joseph Estrada collapsed. The turbulence echoed throughout the region and into the wider world, culminating in the Russian government default and August 1998 ruble devaluation. Brazil and Argentina trembled. The IMF was everywhere, dispensing advice and dictating conditions. It was the emerging markets that bore the brunt of that crisis. So what's different this time around? The answers differ from place to place, but there are some common denominators. Many of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) learned vital lessons from the trauma of the late 1990s, hence the IMF's relatively low-key profile this time around. (The fund has been most active in Africa, where they still need the help -- unless you count Greece, of course.) Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with healthy balance sheets. In most cases governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or even expanding poverty-reduction programs. Increasingly, the same countries that have **embraced globalization** and markets are starting to **build social safety nets**. And there's another factor: **Trade is becoming more evenly distributed** throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States. Some economists are talking about "emerging market decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the Swiss bank UBS, showed in one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest bout of turmoil -- powerful evidence that **emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America catches a cold**. Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a consultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far shows that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a case in point: "People in this region and at the policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hit export-oriented industries; the government weighed in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been surprised by the extent to which families throughout the region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some. And that, she says, reinforces a major lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis: "Governments should focus more on social policy, on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much directly in the economy itself." This ought to be a big story. But you won't have much luck finding it in the newspapers -- perhaps because it runs so contrary to our habitual thinking about the world economy. The U.N. Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank recently published a report that attempts to assess what effect the crisis will have on the world's progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, benchmarks that are supposed to be achieved by 2015. At first glance the report's predictions are daunting: It states that 21 million people in the developing world are "at risk" of slipping into extreme poverty and warns that the goals are unlikely to be met. Many experts wonder, of course, whether the V-shaped crisis we've witnessed so far is going to turn into a W, with another sharp downturn still to come. Some argue that the Great Recession's real damage has yet to be felt. Yet the report also contains some interesting indications that this might not be the case. "The global economic crisis has been widely predicted to affect international migration and remittances adversely," it notes. "But as the crisis unfolds, it is becoming clear that the patterns of migration and remittances may be more complex than was previously imagined." In other words, these **interconnections are proving to be much more resilient** than anyone might have predicted earlier. As the report notes, receipts of remittances have so far actually increased in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Perhaps migrant workers -- those global experts in entrepreneurship and risk-taking -- know something that a lot of the rest of us don't. So why should we care? Anirudh Krishna, a Duke University political scientist who studies poverty reduction, says that there's a moral to the story: "Certainly cutting countries and people off from markets is no longer a sensible thing to do. Expanding those connections, bringing in a larger part of a talent pool into the high-growth sector -- that is what would make most countries grow faster and more individuals climb out of poverty." Echoing Nguanbanchong, he argues that governments are well-advised to concentrate on providing their citizens with education and health care -- the great enablers in the fight for social betterment. Microfinance and income subsidy programs can fill important gaps -- as long as they aim to empower future entrepreneurs, not create cultures of entitlement. This is not to say the outlook is bright on every front, of course. As the Economist noted, the number of people facing hunger recently topped 1 billion, the highest since 1970. The reason for that has more to do with the 2007-2008 spike in food prices than with the financial crisis. (Remember how the price of rice shot up?) We are still a long way from conquering poverty. There is still a huge -- and in some cases growing -- gap between the world's rich and poor. Yet how remarkable it would be if we could one day look back on the 2008-2009 crisis as the beginning of a more equitable global economy**.**

**Economy’s resilient – can survive shocks**

**Bloomberg 12** (“Fed’s Plosser Says U.S. Economy Proving Resilient to Shocks,” 5-9, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-09/fed-s-plosser-says-u-s-economy-proving-resilient-to-shocks.html)

Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Plosser said the U.S. economy has proven **“remarkably resilient”** to shocks that can damage growth, including surging oil prices and natural disasters. “The economy has now **grown for 11 consecutive quarters**,” Plosser said today according to remarks prepared for a speech at the Philadelphia Fed. “Growth is not robust. But growth in the past year has continued despite significant risks and external and internal headwinds.” Plosser, who did not discuss his economic outlook or the future for monetary policy, cited shocks to the economy last year, including the tsunami in Japan that disrupted global supply chains, Europe’s credit crisis that has damaged the continent’s banking system and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. “The U.S. economy has a history of being **remarkably resilient**,” said Plosser, who doesn’t have a vote on policy this year. “These shocks held GDP growth to less than 1 percent in the first half of 2011, and many analysts were concerned that the economy was heading toward a double dip. Yet, the economy proved resilient and growth picked up in the second half of the year.” Plosser spoke at a conference at the Philadelphia Fed titled, “Reinventing Older Communities: Building Resilient Cities.” Urban Resilience His regional bank’s research department is working on a project to measure the resilience of different cities, to learn more about the reasons that some urban areas suffer more than others in downturns, Plosser said. He mentioned one early finding of the study: Industrial diversity increases a city’s resilience. “I do want to caution you that resilient and vibrant communities are not just about government programs or directed industrial planning by community leaders,” Plosser said. “The economic strength of our country is deeply rooted in our market- based economy and the dynamism and resilience of its citizenry.”

**China**

#### Natural gas solves the entire advantage- oil fails- their author

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities – Bard College and Editor-at-Large – American Interest, “Energy Revolution 2: A Post Post-American Post,” American Interest, 7-15, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/15/energy-revolution-2-a-post-post-american-post/)

Forget peak oil; forget the Middle East. The energy revolution of the 21st century isn’t about solar energy or wind power and **the “scramble for** oil” isn’t going to drive global politics. The energy abundance that helped propel the United States to global leadership in the 19th and 2oth centuries is back; if the energy revolution now taking shape lives up to its full potential, we are headed into a new century in which the location of the world’s energy resources and the structure of the world’s energy trade **support American affluence at home and power abroad**. By some estimates, the United States has more oil than Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran combined, and Canada may have even more than the United States. A GAO report released last May (pdf link can be found here) estimates that up to the equivalent of 3 trillion barrels of shale oil may lie in just one of the major potential US energy production sites. If half of this oil is recoverable, US reserves in this one deposit are roughly equal to the known reserves of the rest of the world combined. Edward Luce, an FT writer usually more given to tracing America’s decline than to promoting its prospects, cites estimates that as early as 2020 the US may be producing more oil than Saudi Arabia. So dramatic are America’s finds, analysts talk of the US turning into the world’s new Saudi Arabia by 2020, with up to 15m barrels a day of liquid energy production (against the desert kingdom’s 11m b/d this year). Most of the credit goes to private sector innovators, who took their cue from the high oil prices in the last decade to devise ways of tapping previously uneconomic underground reserves of “tight oil” and shale gas. And some of it is down to plain luck. Far from reaching its final frontier, America has discovered new ones under the ground. Additionally, our natural gas reserves are so large that the US is likely to become a major exporter, and US domestic supplies for hydrocarbon fuels of all types appear to be safe and secure for the foreseeable future. North America as a whole has the potential to be a major exporter of fossil fuels for decades and even generations to come. Since the 1970s, pessimism about America’s energy future has been one of the cornerstones on which the decline theorists erected their castles of doom; we are now entering a time when energy abundance will be an argument for continued American dynamism. The energy revolution isn’t a magic wand that can make all America’s wishes come true, but it is **a powerful wind in the sails of both America’s domestic economy and of its international goals**. The United States isn’t the only big winner of the energy revolution — Canada, Israel and China among others will also make gains — but the likely consequences of the energy revolution for America’s global agenda are so large, that the chief effect of the revolution is likely to be its role in shoring up the foundations of the American-led world order.

**China will use peaceful means to secure its energy interests - no scenario for energy conflict**

**Pennington 11** (James, MPhil International Relations at The University of Cambridge, University of Leeds, "How Peaceful is China's Rise? The Use of Soft and Hard Power in China's Energy Security Strategy in Central Asia," http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-winter-11/james-pennington.pdf)

This paper will argue that, since becoming an energy importing country, China has ¶ concentrated vast reserves on enhancing its soft power in energy exporting nations, in order ¶ to build an ESC, using a variety of means with notable success. Simultaneously, ¶ securitisation of the issue by hardliners in the Chinese ruling elite has lead to a build-up of ¶ hard power reserves intended to maintain energy security, which, as yet, **are incapable of ¶ impacting global security**, but are steadily increasing. This analysis will first be approached ¶ from a general perspective, constructing a model of the various soft and hard elements of ¶ China's global ESS with reference to securitisation and energy security communities. This ¶ will then be applied to an empirical case study in Central Asia, with special reference to ¶ Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The argument will conclude that both the energy realist's and ¶ energy liberal's predictions relating to soft and hard power in China's energy security are too ¶ simplistic, and a more balanced assessment will be put forward using a constructivist ¶ analytical framework. This will state that due to securitisation of energy in China, hard power ¶ resources are of increasing importance to China's ESS, but that currently, due to its goal of ¶ building ESCs with exporting countries, **soft power plays a more developed and important ¶ role** in China's ESS. What is more, many facets of this soft power strategy, such as the access ¶ it gains to resources, economic integration and involvement in international institutions, also¶ **negate the use of hard power,** further integrating China into the international system.

**Nationalism drives SCS- not oil**

**Nehru 8/23/12** (Vikram, The National Interest, senior associate and Bakrie Chair in Southeast Asian Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Collision Course in the South China Sea," http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/collision-course-the-south-china-sea-7380?page=1)

Certainly, the potential costs of conflict for the region and the world far outweigh any potential economic benefits contained in the seabed of the South China Sea—much of which is unknown in any case. Rather than the availability of hydrocarbons and fisheries, the South China Sea dispute **is now increasingly being driven by domestic public opinion** in the countries concerned that is fueled by military lobbies and strong nationalist sentiments.

**-- South China Seas are stable – China lacks capability and interdependence checks**

**Rosenberg 9** (David, Professor of Political Science – Middlebury College and Research Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies – Australian National University, “Dire Straits: Competing Security Priorities in the South China Sea”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 3-20, http://japanfocus.org/-David-Rosenberg/1773)

From the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca, security concerns are growing around the South China Sea. While the Bush Administration sees a resurgent Chinese military threat across the Taiwan Strait and a terrorist threat in the Strait of Malacca, many countries between the Straits are more concerned about security for their maritime resources from the threats of competitors, traffickers, poachers, and pirates. Security Concerns in the South China Sea Several recent statements and appointments highlight the current Bush administration view of China's threat to Taiwan. Porter Goss, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, warned that improved Chinese capabilities not only threaten Taiwan but also U.S. forces in the (western Pacific) region. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld worried that the Chinese navy was building some amphibious landing ships for possible use across the Taiwan Strait. The appointment of combative neoconservative John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations sends a clear and ominous signal: formerly a paid consultant to the Taiwanese government, Bolton has advocated Taiwan's independence and its full U.N. membership. Then, in February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and their Japanese counterparts announced a significant alteration in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance by identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective." Has there been any big shift in the balance of power around the Taiwan Strait that warrants this U.S. response? The Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years. This year it's up by 12 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing. China is modernizing its defenses -- adding anti-ship missiles to aircraft, acquiring AWACS-airborne early warning and control systems, guided missile destroyers and frigates. However, its power projection capabilities are limited. It lacks any long-range amphibious capability or support infrastructure to supply forces over long distances for a protracted period. It also lacks heavy cargo-carrying aircraft, comprehensive air defenses, seaworthy ships, and aircraft carriers. Given the current state of Chinese equipment and training, the Chinese have **no capability to pursue an expansionist** maritime **policy in the** Taiwan Strait or the **South China Sea**. [1] By contrast, the U.S. has **overwhelming military superiority** and an **expansive network** of military bases across the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Fleet is the world's largest naval command, including approximately 190 ships, about 1,400 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft and 35 shore installations. Over 300,000 Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Intelligence military personnel are integrated under the unified command of PACOM, the U.S. Pacific Command. What are China's strategic goals between the Straits? China's Defense White Paper of 2002 emphasizes the importance of pursuing peaceful external relations initiatives through multilateral, cooperative approaches to promote domestic development. The most recent Defense White Paper, published in December of 2004, reiterates this priority. More important than statements of good intentions, however, China has taken **significant steps** to implement this goal. It was evident in the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, negotiated in November 2002. That led to the agreement signed in November 2004 to implement an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010. Following the 10th Summit Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in Vientiane, Laos in November 2004, Beijing held its own summit with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus One) and then joined Japan and the Republic of Korea in discussions with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus Three, or APT). Beijing had earlier in November hosted the first Security Policy Conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum. It featured an anti-piracy drill and a workshop on countering terrorism. Regional Economic and Financial Agreements Regional economic agreements were the main achievements of these meetings. However, the ASEAN Plus Three sessions identified other areas for cooperation, including deeper cooperation in investment and finance, expanded security dialogue and cooperation, expanded cultural exchanges, and periodic progress reviews. Perhaps the most dramatic developments have occurred in regional financial cooperation. Finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries have launched an Asian Bond Markets Initiative and the regional central bankers group set up two Asian Bond Funds in early 2005. These are key steps in addressing one of the major weaknesses in the region's development as indicated by the currency and financial crisis that struck large parts of the region in 1997: the heavy reliance by firms on short-term bank loans for financing. As Jennifer Amyx notes, many countries in East Asia maintain high savings rates but, because of the absence of stable long-term debt markets, the savings deposited into local banks tended to be funneled out to international financial centers and then back into the region as short-term foreign currency loans. This situation creates a problem referred to as a "double mismatch" -- that is, a mismatch between debt maturities (short-term borrowing for long-term investments) and the denomination of this debt (in foreign rather than local currencies). [2] The ASEAN+3 finance ministers had earlier set up a network of bilateral currency swaps to permit a country beset by a speculative attack to draw on reserves of other nations. The program -- the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) -- went into effect at the end of 2003. Japan, with the largest reserves in the region, led negotiations over swap arrangements and will play the role of arbitrator for currency loans. China, another potential lender with substantial reserves in excess of potential needs, also lent its support to the CMI. Widespread participation by ASEAN Plus Three members in these initiatives encourages smooth financial liberalization processes and thereby bolsters regional stability. It also reinforces the efforts of various working groups to improve transparency and information dissemination and to strengthen settlement systems and regulatory reforms. China's shift to a more proactive position on regional financial cooperation has **greatly facilitated** these recent financial developments. **As a result, interdependence** between the Chinese economy and other economies **in the region has deepened significantly in recent years**. Today, trade by ASEAN member nations with China far exceeds trade conducted within the ASEAN grouping, while China is predicted to soon overtake the United States as Japan's top trading partner. Levels of investment in China by countries in the region are also extremely high. The **worst case scenario** is not Chinese domination but a **Chinese meltdown**, as many regional monetary authorities are quick to note.

**No US-China war – economics**

**Shor 12** (Francis, Professor of History – Wayne State, “Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict?”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 11(1), pp. 157-167)

While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after WWII, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world's largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world's copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the **largest holder of U.S. foreign reserves**, **e.g. treasury bonds**. This may be one of the reasons **mitigating full-blown conflict** with the U.S. now, since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, "the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology firms, and other enterprises." [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China's rising economic power, especially as an expression of the U.S. governing elite's ideological commitment to national security.

**No escalation**

**Bush and O’Hanlon 7** (Richard and Michael, Senior Fellows – Brookings Institution, “U.S. Grapples With China’s Rise, Taiwan”, The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 5-3, Lexis)

But most of the issues and frictions that accompany China's rise can be managed. The good news is that China and the United States, not to mention other key regional players like Japan, now have politicians and bureaucracies that are relatively good at preventing serious problems from becoming grounds for war. China will want to flex its military muscle more in the future, but it also wants economic prosperity for the political stability that comes with it. In addition, the United States and its regional partners know how to maintain open dialogue with Beijing while also sustaining vigorous defense alliances. China has enough reason to worry about nuclear weapons and global instability that it will not be totally oblivious to our concerns about proliferating countries such as Iran and North Korea. Conflict with the littoral nations of Japan, the Philippines or Vietnam over disputed seabed resources (like oil in the East China Sea or small islets in the South China Sea) is **highly unlikely**.

**No war – China abides by international law and keeps a low profile**

**Haixia 12** (Qi, Lecturer at Department of International Relations – Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), Summer, p. 105-127, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/105.full)

Keeping Low Profile China's strategy of **keeping low profile** constitutes the political foundation of the superficial friendship between the United States and China. After 1989, in the face of sanctions and blockades from the West, Deng Xiaoping told Chinese policy makers: ‘In short, my views about the international situation can be summed up in three sentences. First, we should observe the situation coolly. Second, we should hold our ground. Third, we should act camly. Don’t be impatient; it is no good to be impatient. We should be calm, calm and again calm, and quietly immerse ourselves in practical work to accomplish something – something for China.’48 Deng Xiaoping's counterstrategy was later summed up as ‘keeping a low profile’. It was in 1995 that then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen first introduced this principle of Chinese policy to the world.49 In 1998, President Jiang Zemin summarized the policy as ‘observe calmly, cope with affairs calmly, never seek leadership, hide brightness and cherish obscurity, get some things done.’50 The white paper on China's Peaceful Development issued in 2011 notes that, ‘As a responsible member of the international community, China abides by international law and the generally recognized principles governing international relations, and eagerly fulfills its international responsibility. China has actively participated in reforming international systems, formulating international rules and addressing global issues. It supports the development of other developing countries, and works to **safeguard world peace and stability**.’51

#### Alt cause – China’s mercantilist agenda and inward focus ensures

**Herberg 11** (Mikkal, Research Director, Energy Security Program The National Bureau of Asian Research @ New America Foundation, " China’s Energy Rise and the Future of U.S.-China Energy Relations," http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/china\_s\_energy\_rise\_and\_the\_future\_of\_us\_china\_energy\_relations)

Therefore, much will depend on the character of the energy relationship between China and the U.S. Nevertheless, despite its desirability, establishing something resembling an E-2 seems likely to be elusive. China and the U.S. continue to have fundamentally different world views about energy security and how to achieve it. Beijing’s political leaders see energy security in distinctly national terms of establishing national control over energy resources and transportation routes. It is a decidedly “19th Century”, mercantilist agenda. Maintaining adequate, reliable, and growing supplies of energy is viewed as indispensible for ensuring rapid economic growth, job creation, and social and political stability; i.e. the continued claim to legitimacy to rule by the Communist Party. Beijing’s political leaders have little faith in global energy markets to ensure adequate, reliable, and affordable energy to China: energy is simply too important to be left to the markets. Despite gradual market reforms, state control and intervention remain central to China’s approach to energy security. Alternatively, the U.S. has built its conception of energy security over the past 40 years on an international energy structure based on integrated and transparent global markets, competitive pricing, private investment, private technological innovation, and multilateral cooperation. To paraphrase former President Bill Clinton, “it’s the market, stupid”. So each country views energy security through very different prisms. ¶ ¶ Moreover, the potential to view our energy security problems as shared challenges continues to be undermined by the chronic overlay of distrust at a strategic level. Beijing’s leaders suspect that the U.S. seeks to use its energy vulnerabilities as part of a broader effort to contain China. Criticism of the impact of China’s overseas oil investments in pariah states and elsewhere is seen as a cynical ploy to weaken China’s access to vital oil supplies. Pressure from Washington to reduce carbon emissions is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to slow China’s economic growth and frustrate it from achieving its rightful economic role in the world. Washington, on the other hand, sees China’s energy expansion globally as built on predatory collaboration between Beijing and its national oil champions to carve out privileged access to petroleum supplies, an approach that many believe undermines future U.S. access to needed supplies. This strategic suspicion casts a pall of a “zero-sum” atmosphere of national competition over energy access and security that is repeatedly reinforced by rhetoric on both sides. The 2005 episode when China’s CNOOC sought to acquire Unocal and was forced to withdraw its bid due to a firestorm of criticism of China’s strategic energy intentions epitomized the toxic mix of bilateral energy suspicions and mirror-imaging.¶ ¶ Further, to the extent that the U.S. might encourage China to take a stronger leadership role on global energy security cooperation, it is still very unclear what role Beijing would want to take on the world energy stage. This is a corollary to the broader lack of clarity over what role Beijing wants to play in other global issues, from currencies to nuclear proliferation. Beijing remains largely inwardly focused and driven by its domestic search for stability, economic development, and territorial integrity. Consistent with its traditional broader foreign policy of “keeping a low profile”, Beijing has shown relatively little serious interest in multilateral energy cooperation.5 Conversely, assuming China were to show interest in a strategic energy partnership, it is not clear to what extent Washington is truly ready for a “shared global energy partnership”. This would require accommodating very different Chinese views on the role of energy markets and pricing, policies toward key petroleum producers and regions, the role of the IEA and multilateral cooperation, and responsibility for reducing carbon emissions. Washington tends to view a partnership as China simply joining in and becoming enmeshed and integrated into a set of U.S.-sponsored and led energy institutions and policy agendas established by the west. This is highly unlikely to be acceptable to Beijing’s leadership.6

### Russia

#### Give Russia war zero probability – politics, military superiority, and nuclear security

Graham 7 (Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and weakness", http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

**Russia will pursue a moderate foreign policy now.**

**Mankoff 10** (Jeffrey, Adjunct fellow for Russia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Associate director of International Security Studies at Yale University, John M. Olin national security fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies – Harvard University, Henry Chauncey fellow in grand strategy – Yale University, Fellow at Moscow State University, *The Russian Economic Crisis*, Council Special Report, Number 53, April 2010, Accessed Online @ the Council on Foreign Relations)

By exposing structural deficiencies in the Russian economy and high- lighting the limits of its post-1998 resurgence, the crisis forced officials to pull back from sweeping claims about Russia’s imminent return to great-power status and focus attention on problems closer to home. Such foreign policy caution might not endure in the face of another commodity price–driven boom. Yet given the modest economic prognoses for the coming year, Russia’s foreign policy is likely to remain cautious for the near future. A period of foreign policy restraint in Moscow gives the West a window of opportunity to encourage both fundamental economic reform in Russia and greater integration with the global economy. If successful, such integration would diminish the likelihood that a recovered Russia would again pursue regional domination and autarky as the basis for a revisionist foreign policy. The inability of Russian industries to compete globally has long forced them to focus on meeting domestic demand, which has plummeted in the course of the crisis. Yet because of their inability to modernize on their own, Russian companies have increasingly turned to partners in Europe (especially Germany, France, and Italy) for high technology. In the context of the crisis and President Barack Obama’s promise to “reset” relations with Moscow, Russia has also appeared more receptive to political overtures from the United States and the European Union (EU), for instance on sanctions against Iran, strategic arms cuts, and the war in Afghanistan. Even so, renewed (albeit limited) growth and uncertainty about who will lead Russia after Medvedev’s first term expires in 2012 create concern for the future.

#### Not same expansion- energy expansion different from expansionism for nuclear wars

#### Russia expansionism inevitable

Stratfor 8 (“The Russian Resurgence and the New-Old Front”, 9-15,

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20080915\_russian\_resurgence\_and\_new\_old\_front)

Russia is attempting to reforge its Cold War-era influence in its near abroad. This is not simply an issue of nostalgia, but a perfectly logical and predictable reaction to the Russian environment. Russia lacks easily definable, easily defendable borders. There is no redoubt to which the Russians can withdraw, and the only security they know comes from establishing buffers — buffers which tend to be lost in times of crisis. The alternative is for Russia to simply trust other states to leave it alone. Considering Russia’s history of occupations, from the Mongol horde to Napoleonic France to Hitler’s Germany, it is not difficult to surmise why the Russians tend to choose a more activist set of policies.

#### Alt cause- Russia natural gas triggers impact

#### Russia expansionism prevents war

Sanz 8—Oxford University educated author, essayist, and financial analyst (Daniel, For U.S. Security, Next Administration Will Have To Repair Relationship With Russia, 1 October 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-bruno-sanz/for-us-security-next-admi\_b\_130894.html,)

The Obama administration will need to completely overhaul US foreign policy to include de facto recognition of Russia's legitimate security needs and recognition of Russia's sphere of influence, including South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia. Only this way can America's own security be assured. The profligate Bush administration has pledged $1 billion to help Georgia recover from its ill-advised invasion of South Ossetia and consequent beating by the Russian army. This arrogant interference of ours will only enrage the Russians and inflame anti-Americanism. It is not in our interest to confront Russia and set off a new arms race costing billions of dollars that we will have to borrow from abroad while increased geopolitical tensions keep energy prices sky high. The only way to meet America's national security needs is to work with Russia to create a neutral, demilitarized buffer zone around the Russian border. Enormous oceans to the east and the west and docile neighbors to the north and south act as America's buffer zone. Helping Russia achieve peace of mind about its security and true American intentions will reap untold benefits for the United States. The offensive missile batteries in Poland and the Czech Republic need to be withdrawn immediately. The Russians will be more than amenable to a tit-for-tat withdraw of their armed forces from the Western Hemisphere. We need Russian cooperation at the United Nations on a host of issues from nonproliferation to global warming and terrorism. It is not in the interests of the United States to alienate this large and powerful country while sticking up for every thorn in its side. Current American policies towards Russia betray a haughty ignorance of her history and contempt for her people, who approve of Vladimir Putin and the Georgia war. The United States **risks military confrontation** with Russia at its peril.

#### No ev we export gas to Europe- domestic opposition would probably block

#### They kill russia’s economy

**Feifer 11** (Gregory, Editor and Senior Correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Russia's Image as Energy Superpower Benefitting from Middle East Crisis*, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Russia-s-Image-as-Energy-Superpower-Benefitting-from-Middle-East-Crisis.html)

With U.S.-led fighter jets pounding military assets in oil-rich Libya, and Japan still struggling to contain radiation at its stricken Fukushima nuclear plant, concerns are rising around the world about the future of energy supplies. But not in Russia. As the unrest in the Middle East bites into supplies, prices for crude approached $105 a barrel this week. That's helping drive **windfall profits** that are enabling the world's biggest energy exporter to finally emerge from recession triggered by the global financial crisis in 2008. But while that's good news for **Russia's economy**, Kremlin critics say rising energy prices are again shoring up the country's authoritarian **government** -- and that's bad for politics. Energy Savior Russia is using the crises in the Middle East and Japan to **burnish its image** as the world's energy superpower. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin -- who has predicted that Russia's GDP will equal its precrisis level by next year -- exchanged his usually stern demeanor for an uncharacteristically friendly manner last week and promised to help Japan, where the nuclear crisis has forced electricity blackouts. He predicted the effects of the earthquake and tsunami to energy supplies there will be long-term. "In that regard, we have to think of accelerating our plans to develop hydrocarbon-extraction projects -- particularly gas extraction -- in the Far East," he said. Putin offered to pump more gas to Europe by pipeline, freeing shipments of liquefied natural gas for Japan. He also proposed laying an electricity cable to Japan and offered Japanese companies stakes in Siberian gas fields. Moscow has issued more offers since, including encouragement for Japanese companies to invest in Russia's coal industry. But some analysts are warning Russia's heightened focus on its global energy role is eroding any -- already distant -- hopes the government would enact economic reform. The Kremlin vowed to diversify the country's economy after plummeting oil prices dealt the economy a body blow during the global financial crisis. Anti-Westernism Rising Political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky says the latest events in the Middle East are instead helping speed a return to Russia's precrisis situation, when peak oil prices flooded the country with cash. "We're returning to the golden era of 2006 and 2007, with official propaganda slogans extolling a 'great energy power,'" Piontkovsky says. "It's very good for a very limited group of people for a very short time period, but certainly it's very bad for the country." Piontkovsky says the developments are reinforcing the "general mentality" of Russia's leaders, reflected in a return to the kind of strident anti-Western rhetoric that was especially loud during the precrisis oil boom. He points to President Dmitry Medvedev's comments this month in which he blamed Western countries for prompting the Middle East unrest, adding that "they have prepared such a scenario for us." But it's **Putin** who's seen as Russia's supreme leader. He lashed out on March 22 in his strongest anti-Western comments in years, condemning the UN Security Council for authorizing force against Libya. He said last week's resolution enabled Western countries to take action against a sovereign state "under the guise of protecting the civilian population." "It actually resembles medieval calls for crusades when someone called on others to go to a certain place and liberate it," Putin said. Redefining Foreign Policy But the atmosphere in Moscow is more nuanced then the rhetoric suggests. Medvedev rejected Putin's comments, calling them "unacceptable." And despite Putin's displeasure, Russia declined to veto the resolution when it came to a vote last week, instead choosing to abstain. Fyodr Lukyanov, editor of the journal "Russia in Global Affairs," sees that decision as more significant than the tough talk. "It's not typical," he says. "Russia used to take stands for or against, particularly when it comes to issues such as intervention in other countries." He says foreign policy isn't being driven by rising oil prices. "It's about the gradual refocusing of Russian interests and redefining of Russian foreign-policy identity from a global one to a more regional one." That change, he says, reflects a "much more rational calculation of priorities." "It doesn't mean Russia is more pro-Western," Lukyanov says. "Russia is becoming less global, which means that, for example, the idea to challenge Washington everywhere and over everything isn't relevant anymore." Russia's Resources Card Boosting energy exports is among the priorities, as Putin's latest salesmanship reflects. But maintaining current levels won't be as easy as it may appear. Economist Clifford Gaddy of the Brookings Institution says the key question for Russia's future economic success will be how it responds to demand in resource-hungry China. Whatever the rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin, he says, Russia has **little chance** of competing in any other sector. "You can dream all you want about **diversification** and blame Putin or whoever for not diversifying or praise them because they want to diversify," Gaddy says, "but it doesn’t make very **much sense**. Russia's comparative, competitive advantage is not in anything except resources, so the **smart thing to do** is play that card." For now, Gaddy sees few long-term effects for Russia from the Middle East unrest, saying oil prices were predicted to rise to $105 to $108 this year even before it began, while commodity prices are expected to continue rising for the foreseeable future. That's depressing news for Putin's critics. Many believe the prime minister plans to return to the presidency in an election next year, and -- if elected again -- he could remain in office for the next 12 years.

#### Turns case

**Filger 9** (Sheldon, Columnist and Founder – Global EconomicCrisis.com, “Russian Economy Faces Disasterous Free Fall Contraction”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html>)

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

## 2NC – Saudi DA, Case

### Uniqeness

#### Saudi Oil Imports high now- even though overall oil imports are declining we are increasing imports from Saudi Arabia

#### Saudi oil up now

Learsy 8/20

[ Raymond J. Learsy, Author, 'Oil and Finance: The Epic Corruption Continues', 8/20/12, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raymond-j-learsy/americas-increased-relian_b_1809527.html>]

So far this year America's dependence on Saudi Arabian oil has increased by 20 percent, according to a front-page article in the New York Times ("U.S. Reliance On Saudi Oil Goes Back Up" 08.17.12). After nearly four years in office, that the United States is even more dependent on Middle East oil is shocking testimony to the failure of the Obama Administration's energy policies.

### Perception- 2nc

**Reducing reliance on Saudi Oil kills relations**

**Mouawad 9** (Jad, “Saudi Blasts American Energy Policy” 9/25/9, New York Times, <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/saudi-blasts-american-energy-policy/> MGE)

The question of American “energy independence” clearly rankles officials in Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest exporter of crude oil, who seem increasingly puzzled by the energy policy of the United States, the world’s biggest oil consumer. In a short and strongly-worded essay in Foreign Policy magazine, Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former ambassador to the United States and a nephew to King Abdullah, said that for American politicians, invoking energy independence “is now as essential as baby-kissing,” and accuses them of “demagoguery.” All the talk about energy independence, Mr. al-Faisal said, is “political posturing at its worst — a concept that is unrealistic, misguided, and ultimately harmful to energy-producing and consuming countries alike.” There is no technology on the horizon that can completely replace oil as the fuel for the United States’ massive manufacturing, transportation, and military needs; any future, no matter how wishful, will include a mix of renewable and nonrenewable fuels. Considering this, efforts spent proselytizing about energy independence should instead focus on acknowledging energy interdependence. Like it or not, the fates of the United States and Saudi Arabia are connected and will remain so for decades to come. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia date back to the 1930s when American geologists first struck oil in the kingdom. While American companies built the Saudi oil industry, Americans have never shaken off their suspicions and mistrust of the kingdom since the Arab oil embargo of 1973. It’s not the first time a Saudi official has criticized American energy policy, or its growing reliance on renewable fuels. Many of Prince Turki’s arguments recycle Saudi Arabia’s position that for the past 30 years, the oil-rich kingdom has acted in a responsible manner to keep oil markets well supplied. Prince Turki correctly points at the steps taken by Saudi Arabia in recent years to increase its production to make up for lost production in Iraq or elsewhere in times of crisis, and invest close to $100 billion in new capacity over the past five years. On the other hand, he points out that four countries — Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela — failed to live up to expectations that they would raise their production over the past decade for a variety of reasons, including “a U.S. invasion” in the case of Iraq. The Saudis have genuine reasons to fear the effects of the Obama administration’s energy policy and its commitment to reducing oil consumption, as well as efforts to reduce carbon emissions. As Prince Turki points out himself, Saudi Arabia holds 25 percent of the world’s known oil reserves and would like to keep selling oil for several more decades. As such, the Saudis know that **any attempt to reduce gasoline consumption is a threat to the future of the Saudi economy.** It’s an old refrain: in his most famous remark, the former Saudi oil minister, Sheik Yamani, once said that the stone age didn’t end because the world ran out of stones, and the oil age will not end because the world runs out of oil. It will end when something replaces it. The trend has already started. Oil demand in the United States has peaked — instead of rising as it has since the dawn of the age of oil more than a century ago, the nation’s oil consumption has begun its long decline. The question is: how fast will the transition take?

### 2nc- Oil K2 Relations

#### Oil’s key to relations- it guarantees Saudi security and underlies economic cooperation- that’s **Lazazzero**

#### It’s the underlying foundation of cooperation

Kaiser and Ottaway 02

[ Robert G. Kaiser and David Ottaway Washington Post Staff Writers Monday, February 11, 2002, <http://syrianthinkers.org/countries/saudi/articles/OilForSecurityFue.pdf>]

The history of the modern relationship -- much of it never publicized and little understood by Americans -makes clear that it isn't just complicated; it is also intensely intimate in many respects but always colored by profound cultural differences. Saudi Arabia's new horde of "petrodollars" was on Simon's mind as he prepared for his visit to the kingdom. The Americans hoped the Saudis would use much of their windfall to help finance the U.S. budgetd eficit by buying American Treasury bills and bonds. Simon wanted to be sure the Saudis had easy access to these securities. A list of talking points prepared for Simon shows the arguments Americans made to the Saudis, some of which sound like a commercial for Salomon Smith Barney or Merrill Lynch: "Investment directly with the U.S. Treasury can provide great convenience and protection against the adverse movements otherwise likely to face an investor when placing or liquidating large investments." To keep the petrodollars flowing, Simon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger proposed a Saudi-U.S. Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation. Its innocuous name disguised its role in pursuing what Simon called "a new concept of foreign relations . . . to develop a link of relationships" between the two countries "that will permeate many levels of economic life." The idea, according to Charles Schotta, a senior Treasury Department official at the time, was to create a mechanism that would allow Americans to provide technical advice and assistance to Saudis on a broad range of issues, from how to create a modern customs service and how to collect statistics on a fast-growing economy to how to desalinate and distribute drinking water. The arrangement had one unique aspect: The recipient of the assistance, Saudi Arabia, paid for all of it. The Saudis ultimately deposited well over $1 billion in an account at the Treasury Department in Washington to pay the costs of everything done under the auspices of the Joint Commission, including the salaries and living expenses of the Americans who worked for it. Americans administered that fund and, after consultations with Saudis, decided how it would be spent. Its impact is visible today in many ways. Americans taught Saudis how to create the infrastructure of a modern state -- something they had to build from scratchbeginning in the mid-1970s. Not surprisingly, the Americans taught them to do what Americans do. Schotta put it this way: "If you were a U.S. businessperson doing business in Saudi Arabia, the apparatus there would be entirely familiar to you because it looks and operates very much like its counterpart agencies in the U.S." This begins on arrival, Schotta said. "Arriving in Saudi Arabia, going through customs and immigration, is just like arriving in the U.S." The Saudi banking system, financial markets and many other governmental practices and institutions, all were shaped or influenced by advisers hired under the Joint Commission. An Arranged Marriage Like the work of the Joint Commission, the SaudiAmerican relationship went unnoticed, or barely noticed, in the United States. "What the public knew [about the relationship] was not very much," said Don DeMarino, who lived in Saudi Arabia from 1985 to 1987 and was the local director of the Joint Commission. "When I lived there, no Americans were interested." The Saudis liked it that way, according to an American with experience in Saudi Arabia. They "have always preferred to operate this relationship on a small and high pedestal" -- between the most senior officials. Given the differences between them, the Saudi-American relationship was always more like an arranged marriage than a romantic union. On one side, a theocratic monarchy sitting atop one-fourth of the earth's oil, a strict Islamic regime allowing neither freedom of speech nor any political rights to its citizens; on the other, the modern world's oldest, most open democracy and by far its largest consumer of oil. The values, customs and beliefs of either society would horrify the other ifthey were imposed upon it, yet since the time of Simon's visit to Saudi Arabia, the two governments have played the parts of the closest of friends. And they really have been close, relying on each other for national security, oil, political support, money, intelligence and more. The alliance has been convenient for both parties, giving Saudi Arabia the security it craved in a dangerous neighborhood while assuring the United States a reliable supply of oil at -- nearly always -- an affordable price. But there were inherent sources of tension.

#### Specifically its key to military cooperation- prevents prolif

Cockburn 11

[Alexander Cockburn is co-editor with Jeffrey St. Clair of the muckraking newsletter CounterPunch,10/7/11, <https://www.commondreams.org/view/2011/10/07-8>]

Pose a threat to the stability of Saudi Arabia, as the Shiite upsurges are now doing in Qatif and al-Awamiyah in the country's oil-rich Eastern Province, and you're brandishing a scalpel over the very heart of the long-term U.S. policy in the Middle East. The fall of America's ally, the Shah of Iran, in 1979 only magnified the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia. In 1945, the chief of the State Department's Division of Near Eastern Affairs wrote in a memo that the oil resources of Saudi Arabia are a "stupendous source of strategic power and one of the greatest material prizes in world history." The man who steered the Saudi princes towards America and away from Britain, was St. John Philby, Kim Philby's father, and with that one great stroke he wrought far more devastation on the Empire than his son ever did. These days, the U.S. consumes about 19 million barrels of oil every 24 hours, about half of them imported. At 25 percent, Canada is the lead oil supplier. Second comes Saudi Arabia at 12 percent. But the supply of crude oil to the U.S. is only half the story. Saudi Arabia controls the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' oil price and adjusts it carefully with U.S. priorities in the front of their minds. The traffic is not one-way. In the half century after 1945, the United States sold the Saudis about$100 billion in military goods and services. A year ago, the Obama administration announced the biggest weapons deal in U.S. history — a $60 billion program with Saudi Arabia to sell it military equipment across the next 20 to 30 years. Under its terms, the United States will provide Saudi Arabia with 84 advanced F-15 fighter planes with electronics and weapons packages tailored to Saudi needs. An additional 70 F-15's already in Saudi hands will be upgraded to match the capabilities of the new planes. Saudi Arabia will purchase a huge fleet of nearly 200 Apache, Blackhawk and other U.S. military helicopters, along with a vast array of radar systems, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and guided bombs. The U.S. trains and supplies all Saudi Arabia's security forces. U.S. corporations have huge investments in the Kingdom.

#### **Oil’s Key to relations**

Murphy 5/15/08 (Caryle, Foreign Correspondent, The National, "Saudi-US relations hit rocky road," http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080514/FOREIGN/946458903/1011/SPORT&Profile=1011)

Saudis are uncharacteristically blunt when asked about George W Bush, the US president, and what his two-term administration has brought to the Middle East. Most see an abysmal legacy: a dangerous mess in Iraq, a deepening Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a volatile tug-of-war between Washington and Tehran, most recently on display in the embattled boulevards of Beirut.

“We love and admire the United States, I can assure you, and I speak for many people on this matter,” said Saeed al Farha al Ghamdi, a retired government employee in Jeddah. “But, unfortunately their foreign policy is disastrous.”

Many government officials share these sentiments but in true Arab tradition, they will accord Mr Bush the utmost in hospitality when he arrives here on Friday for his second visit in four months – even though they are not sure why he is coming.

Bilateral ties between the two countries have rebounded from the nadir to which they sank after Sept 11 2001. And as long as oil and security are top priorities, the long-standing US-Saudi relationship will remain an important one to both.

### Not Enough Oil- 2nc

#### Don’t have enough here

Ayres and Ayres 09

[ Robert U. Ayres is emeritus professor of technology and economics at the European business school INSEAD, in Fountainbleau, France. Ed Ayres is a former editor of World Watch, 2009, <http://www.worldwatch.org/node/6225>]

Historically, Americans have been strong on big ideas, but not always so strong on the devil in the detail. So, for example, public officials looking for alternatives to imported oil have widely embraced corn ethanol, even though a range of studies assessed by the Natural Resources Defense Council and others show that corn ethanol has a nearly zero net gain in energy output, while taking a heavy toll on human food-producing capacity. Or, many of those looking for "energy independence" still embrace the John McCain mantra to "drill, baby, drill," perhaps because the notion of increased domestic oil output comes across as a manly defiance of the Middle-Eastern chokehold on our gas pumps. More domestic oil might be an attractive concept, except that the numbers say it would add nothing to our energy supply in the next 10 years and would never come close to replacing imports. (The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that U.S. territories, including coastal waters, have 3 percent of the known remaining global oil reserves.) That latter fact has provided Al Gore and others an opening for their claim that renewables, in contrast to more oil drilling, could bring America to full energy independence in a decade. But that claim, too, betrays an embrace of broad concept that isn't completely realistic about numbers.

### A2: Reduce Regulations

#### Regulations key to better drilling- saves the environment which gets public support for the industry

**Levi 12**

[Michael Levi, senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom”, July 2012, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom?page=0,0>]

The technology at the heart of the U.S. oil and gas boom has become central to the battle between the environmental community and the oil and gas industry. Drillers and their allies have often resisted new regulation, insisting that the industry is already heavily regulated at the state level and that fears of fracking are overblown. Barry Smitherman, chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission, captures the sentiment well, warning that more regulation could "kill the technology that's taking us to energy independence." Green groups have hit back with demands for stricter oversight of fracking, highlighting threats to air and water and disruptions to local communities. The Sierra Club has gone so far as to launch a "Beyond Natural Gas" campaign to accompany its efforts to move "Beyond Coal" and "Beyond Oil." Some warnings, like an alarm in early 2011 that Pittsburgh's tap water was radioactive, have been over the top. Executed properly, development of shale gas and oil can be done in ways that safeguard the environment and protect communities. But there are always bad apples and sloppy operators. They require not only solid regulation, which often exists at the state level, but also strong enforcement and penalties to deter and punish violators, which too often do not exist. This is not only about preventing bad behavior -- it's a matter of building public trust. Operators that refuse, for example, to support mandatory disclosure of the chemicals they use in fracking inevitably raise suspicions. That's true regardless of whether those chemicals actually endanger public health. Industry is at its best when it helps craft regulations that protect people and the environment while allowing robust development to proceed apace. But those who instinctively oppose stricter rules are sowing the seeds of their own misfortune: Robust regulation might add a few percentage points to the cost of producing natural gas, but weak regulation will sap confidence, and if communities shut down drilling, the price of natural gas will rise a lot more.

### Russia/US War

#### -- No risk of Russia war

Ball 5 (Desmond, Professor – Strategic Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University, “The Probabilities of ‘On the Beach’ Assessing Armageddon Scenarios in the 21st Century, May, <http://www.manningclark.org.au/papers/se05_ball.html>)

The prospects of a nuclear war between the US and Russia must now be deemed **fairly remote**. There are now no geostrategic issues that warrant nuclear competition and **no inclination** in either Washington or Moscow to provoke such issues. US and Russian strategic forces have been taken off day-to-day alert and their ICBMs 'de-targeted', greatly reducing the possibilities of war by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. On the other hand, while the US-Russia strategic competition is in abeyance, there are several aspects of current US nuclear weapons policy which are profoundly disturbing. In December 2001 President George W. Bush officially announced that the US was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, one of the mainstays of strategic nuclear arms control during the Cold War, with effect from June 2002, and was proceeding to develop and deploy an extensive range of both theatre missile defence (TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) systems. The first anti-missile missile in the NMD system, designed initially to defend against limited missile attacks from China and North Korea, was installed at Fort Greely in Alaska in July 2004. The initial system, consisting of 16 interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force in California, is expected to be operational by the end of 2005. The Bush Administration is also considering withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and resuming nuclear testing. (The last US nuclear test was on 23 September 1992). In particular, some key Administration officials believe that testing is necessary to develop a 'new generation' of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, 'bunker-busting', earth-penetrating weapons specifically designed to destroy very hard and deeply buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers).

#### -- No escalation

Newsday 5 (2-27, Lexis)

Relations between Washington and Moscow are now more like a marriage of convenience. It's no longer the antagonistic, hostile rivalry of the Cold War, and it's unlikely ever to revert to that. One reason is that the United States remains a superpower and Russia is only a shell of the old Soviet Union. Instead, it has turned into a wary relationship defined by a need to cooperate on mutually useful issues and by fundamental disagreements not easily resolved.

#### -- Deterrence checks

Turner 2 (Admiral Stansfield, Former Director – Central Intelligence Agency, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter / Spring, 26 Fletcher F. World Aff. 115, Lexis)

There are, of course, other centrals question to be considered: Would Russian psychology differ from American and would Russian society be willing to accept large numbers of nuclear detonations on their soil in order to perpetrate a nuclear war against the United States? These are difficult questions to answer. The more pertinent concern, however, is that this is an issue of life or death. No head of state could contemplate plunging the world into nuclear conflict without considering both the mortal threat to his or her citizens, and also the likelihood of his or her own death, underground shelters notwithstanding. The presumption that heads of state prefer to live than to die gives us one benchmark. Another is the Cuban missile crisis, in which both Leonid Khruschev and President Kennedy quite visibly backed away from the prospect of very limited nuclear war. Finally, Russia’s economy, being about the size of Belgium’s, is so small that its leaders would be well aware that recovery, even from a small nuclear attack, would be a very lengthy process. In terms of nuclear detonation threats, the United States must consider Russian deterrence as very close to its own.

#### -- No chance of Russian first strike

Turner 97 (Stansfield, Director of the Center for Security and International Relations – University of Maryland, Caging the Nuclear Genie, p. 57)

The probability of Russia being able to coordinate a perfect near-simultaneous attack on even a modest force of ICBMs is **very low**. Enough of them would surely survive, and so the Russians would be **self-deterred**. The ICBM, then, is a liability because of its image of vulnerability. That is what drives us to large numbers and risk readiness procedures that appear to favor taking the offense.

#### -- Common ties, Russian leadership, and defense spending checks

Aron 6 (Leon, Director of Russian Studies – American Enterprise Institute, “The United States and Russia”, 6-29,

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24606/pub\_detail.asp)

Yet the probability of a frontal confrontation and a new Cold War remains **very remote** for at least three reasons. First, despite the erosion, the countries geopolitical assets are still very weighty, as the bedrock issues of anti-terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and energy will continue to force them to seek common ground and at least limited partnership.[17] Second, the restorationist foreign policy notwithstanding, the three basic elements of the 1992-1993 national consensus on the foreign policy and defense doctrine remain largely the same. Russia is to stay a nuclear superpower and the regional superpower, but it seems to have settled for the role of one of the world’s great states, rather than a global superpower engaged in a worldwide competition with the United States. While these desiderata will continue to cause occasional sparring with the United States, they are no longer dedicated to the attainment of goals inimical to the vital interests of the United States and are not likely to ignite a relentless antagonistic struggle to the bitter end**.** Lastly, despite the muscular rhetoric emanating of late from the Kremlin, unlike the Soviet Union twenty years ago and China today, Russia is not a revisionist power. It does not seek radically to reshape the geopolitical balance of forces in its favor. Moscow may rail at the score, but it is unlikely to endeavor to change the rules of the game. For that, one needs a different ideology and, as a result, a different set of priorities. Yet even in today’s Russia flush with petrodollars, the share of GDP devoted to defense (around 3 percent) is not only at least ten times smaller than in the Soviet Union, but also below the 1992-1997 average in a Russia that inherited an empty treasury from the Soviet Union and that was, like every revolutionary government, unable to collect taxes. Calculated in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defense expenditures in 2005 ($47.77 billion) were less than one-eleventh of what the U.S. spent ($522 billion).

#### -- Won’t go nuclear

Manning 00 (Robert A., Senior Fellow and Director of Asian Studies – Council on Foreign Relations, “Abbott and Costello Nuclear Policy”, Washington Times, 3-10, Lexis)

We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence, according to State Department spokesman James Rubin. But how many nukes do we need for deterrence to be credible? China, which President Clinton has talked of as a "strategic partner," has a grand total of 20 - count them - strategic warheads that could hit the United States. Nuclear wannabes like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would have only a handful if they did manage to succeed in joining the nuclear club. Russia, which has 6,000 strategic warheads, is no longer an adversary. During the Cold War, it was not hard to envision a conventional war in Europe escalating into nuclear conflict. But today it is difficult to spin a plausible scenario in which the United States and Russia escalate hostilities into a nuclear exchange. Russia has no Warsaw Pact, and not much of a conventional force to speak of. Yet U.S. nuclear planners still base their targeting plans on prospective Russian targets, though no one will say so.

#### -- Russia isn’t a threat

Perkovich 3 (George, Vice President for Studies – Carnegie Endowment for International Affairs, Foreign Affairs, March/April, Lexis)

As for Russia, a full-scale war between it and the United States now seems inconceivable. Given the desires for larger cuts in nuclear forces that Russia displayed in negotiating the 2002 Moscow Treaty, Russia hardly seems enough of a threat to justify the size and forward-leaning posture of America's present arsenal.

#### -- U.S. first strike would decapitate Russia

Lieber and Press 6 (Keir A., Assistant Professor of Political Science – University of Notre Dame and Daryl G., Professor of Political Science – University of Pennsylvania, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy”, Foreign Affairs, March / April, Lexis)

Even as the United States' nuclear forces have grown stronger since the end of the Cold War, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal has sharply deteriorated. Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days. The true extent of the Russian arsenal's decay, however, is much greater than these cuts suggest. What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use. Russia's strategic bombers, now located at only two bases and thus vulnerable to a surprise attack, rarely conduct training exercises, and their warheads are stored off-base. Over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based ICBMs have exceeded their original service lives, and plans to replace them with new missiles have been stymied by failed tests and low rates of production. Russia's mobile ICBMs rarely patrol, and although they could fire their missiles from inside their bases if given sufficient warning of an attack, it appears unlikely that they would have the time to do so. The third leg of Russia's nuclear triad has weakened the most. Since 2000, Russia's SSBNs have conducted approximately two patrols per year, down from 60 in 1990. (By contrast, the U.S. SSBN patrol rate today is about 40 per year.) Most of the time, all nine of Russia's ballistic missile submarines are sitting in port, where they make easy targets. Moreover, submarines require well-trained crews to be effective. Operating a ballistic missile submarine -- and silently coordinating its operations with surface ships and attack submarines to evade an enemy's forces – is not simple. Without frequent patrols, the skills of Russian submariners, like the submarines themselves, are decaying. Revealingly, a 2004 test (attended by President Vladimir Putin) of several submarine-launched ballistic missiles was a total fiasco: all either failed to launch or veered off course. The fact that there were similar failures in the summer and fall of 2005 completes this unflattering picture of Russia's nuclear forces. Compounding these problems, Russia's early warning system is a mess. Neither Soviet nor Russian satellites have ever been capable of reliably detecting missiles launched from U.S. submarines. (In a recent public statement, a top Russian general described his country's early warning satellite constellation as "hopelessly outdated.") Russian commanders instead rely on ground-based radar systems to detect incoming warheads from submarine-launched missiles. But the radar network has a gaping hole in its coverage that lies to the east of the country, toward the Pacific Ocean. If U.S. submarines were to fire missiles from areas in the Pacific, Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated. Russia's radar coverage of some areas in the North Atlantic is also spotty, providing only a few minutes of warning before the impact of submarine-launched warheads. Moscow could try to reduce its vulnerability by finding the money to keep its submarines and mobile missiles dispersed. But that would be only a short-term fix. Russia has already extended the service life of its aging mobile ICBMs, something that it cannot do indefinitely, and its efforts to deploy new strategic weapons continue to flounder. The Russian navy's plan to launch a new class of ballistic missile submarines has fallen far behind schedule. It is now highly likely that not a single new submarine will be operational before 2008, and it is likely that none will be deployed until later. Even as Russia's nuclear forces deteriorate, the United States is improving its ability to track submarines and mobile missiles, further eroding Russian military leaders' confidence in Russia's nuclear deterrent. (As early as 1998, these leaders publicly expressed doubts about the ability of Russia's ballistic missile submarines to evade U.S. detection.) Moreover, Moscow has announced plans to reduce its land-based ICBM force by another 35 percent by 2010; outside experts predict that the actual cuts will slice 50 to 75 percent off the current force, possibly leaving Russia with as few as 150 ICBMs by the end of the decade, down from its 1990 level of almost 1,300 missiles. The more Russia's nuclear arsenal shrinks, the easier it will become for the United States to carry out a first strike. To determine how much the nuclear balance has changed since the Cold War, we ran a computer model of a hypothetical U.S. attack on Russia's nuclear arsenal using the standard unclassified formulas that defense analysts have used for decades. We assigned U.S. nuclear warheads to Russian targets on the basis of two criteria: the most accurate weapons were aimed at the hardest targets, and the fastest-arriving weapons at the Russian forces that can react most quickly. Because Russia is essentially blind to a submarine attack from the Pacific and would have great difficulty detecting the approach of low-flying stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles, we targeted each Russian weapon system with at least one submarine-based warhead or cruise missile. An attack organized in this manner would give Russian leaders virtually no warning. This simple plan is presumably less effective than Washington's actual strategy, which the U.S. government has spent decades perfecting. The real U.S. war plan may call for first targeting Russia's command and control, sabotaging Russia's radar stations, or taking other preemptive measures -- all of which would make the actual U.S. force far more lethal than our model assumes. According to our model, such a simplified surprise attack would have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM. [See Footnote #1] This finding is not based on best-case assumptions or an unrealistic scenario in which U.S. missiles perform perfectly and the warheads hit their targets without fail. Rather, we used standard assumptions to estimate the likely inaccuracy and unreliability of U.S. weapons systems. Moreover, our model indicates that all of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would still be destroyed even if U.S. weapons were 20 percent less accurate than we assumed, or if U.S. weapons were only 70 percent reliable, or if Russian ICBM silos were 50 percent "harder" (more reinforced, and hence more resistant to attack) than we expected. (Of course, the unclassified estimates we used may understate the capabilities of U.S. forces, making an attack even more likely to succeed.)

### Russia Econ Turn

#### They kill russia’s economy

**Feifer 11** (Gregory, Editor and Senior Correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Russia's Image as Energy Superpower Benefitting from Middle East Crisis*, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Russia-s-Image-as-Energy-Superpower-Benefitting-from-Middle-East-Crisis.html)

With U.S.-led fighter jets pounding military assets in oil-rich Libya, and Japan still struggling to contain radiation at its stricken Fukushima nuclear plant, concerns are rising around the world about the future of energy supplies. But not in Russia. As the unrest in the Middle East bites into supplies, prices for crude approached $105 a barrel this week. That's helping drive **windfall profits** that are enabling the world's biggest energy exporter to finally emerge from recession triggered by the global financial crisis in 2008. But while that's good news for **Russia's economy**, Kremlin critics say rising energy prices are again shoring up the country's authoritarian **government** -- and that's bad for politics. Energy Savior Russia is using the crises in the Middle East and Japan to **burnish its image** as the world's energy superpower. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin -- who has predicted that Russia's GDP will equal its precrisis level by next year -- exchanged his usually stern demeanor for an uncharacteristically friendly manner last week and promised to help Japan, where the nuclear crisis has forced electricity blackouts. He predicted the effects of the earthquake and tsunami to energy supplies there will be long-term. "In that regard, we have to think of accelerating our plans to develop hydrocarbon-extraction projects -- particularly gas extraction -- in the Far East," he said. Putin offered to pump more gas to Europe by pipeline, freeing shipments of liquefied natural gas for Japan. He also proposed laying an electricity cable to Japan and offered Japanese companies stakes in Siberian gas fields. Moscow has issued more offers since, including encouragement for Japanese companies to invest in Russia's coal industry. But some analysts are warning Russia's heightened focus on its global energy role is eroding any -- already distant -- hopes the government would enact economic reform. The Kremlin vowed to diversify the country's economy after plummeting oil prices dealt the economy a body blow during the global financial crisis. Anti-Westernism Rising Political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky says the latest events in the Middle East are instead helping speed a return to Russia's precrisis situation, when peak oil prices flooded the country with cash. "We're returning to the golden era of 2006 and 2007, with official propaganda slogans extolling a 'great energy power,'" Piontkovsky says. "It's very good for a very limited group of people for a very short time period, but certainly it's very bad for the country." Piontkovsky says the developments are reinforcing the "general mentality" of Russia's leaders, reflected in a return to the kind of strident anti-Western rhetoric that was especially loud during the precrisis oil boom. He points to President Dmitry Medvedev's comments this month in which he blamed Western countries for prompting the Middle East unrest, adding that "they have prepared such a scenario for us." But it's **Putin** who's seen as Russia's supreme leader. He lashed out on March 22 in his strongest anti-Western comments in years, condemning the UN Security Council for authorizing force against Libya. He said last week's resolution enabled Western countries to take action against a sovereign state "under the guise of protecting the civilian population." "It actually resembles medieval calls for crusades when someone called on others to go to a certain place and liberate it," Putin said. Redefining Foreign Policy But the atmosphere in Moscow is more nuanced then the rhetoric suggests. Medvedev rejected Putin's comments, calling them "unacceptable." And despite Putin's displeasure, Russia declined to veto the resolution when it came to a vote last week, instead choosing to abstain. Fyodr Lukyanov, editor of the journal "Russia in Global Affairs," sees that decision as more significant than the tough talk. "It's not typical," he says. "Russia used to take stands for or against, particularly when it comes to issues such as intervention in other countries." He says foreign policy isn't being driven by rising oil prices. "It's about the gradual refocusing of Russian interests and redefining of Russian foreign-policy identity from a global one to a more regional one." That change, he says, reflects a "much more rational calculation of priorities." "It doesn't mean Russia is more pro-Western," Lukyanov says. "Russia is becoming less global, which means that, for example, the idea to challenge Washington everywhere and over everything isn't relevant anymore." Russia's Resources Card Boosting energy exports is among the priorities, as Putin's latest salesmanship reflects. But maintaining current levels won't be as easy as it may appear. Economist Clifford Gaddy of the Brookings Institution says the key question for Russia's future economic success will be how it responds to demand in resource-hungry China. Whatever the rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin, he says, Russia has **little chance** of competing in any other sector. "You can dream all you want about **diversification** and blame Putin or whoever for not diversifying or praise them because they want to diversify," Gaddy says, "but it doesn’t make very **much sense**. Russia's comparative, competitive advantage is not in anything except resources, so the **smart thing to do** is play that card." For now, Gaddy sees few long-term effects for Russia from the Middle East unrest, saying oil prices were predicted to rise to $105 to $108 this year even before it began, while commodity prices are expected to continue rising for the foreseeable future. That's depressing news for Putin's critics. Many believe the prime minister plans to return to the presidency in an election next year, and -- if elected again -- he could remain in office for the next 12 years.

#### Turns case

**Filger 9** (Sheldon, Columnist and Founder – Global EconomicCrisis.com, “Russian Economy Faces Disasterous Free Fall Contraction”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html>)

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### NG triggers

Washington Post 9/25 (“ U.S. gas exports could limit Putin’s influence”, 9/25/12, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-natural-gas-exports-could-limit-vladimir-putins-influence/2012/09/25/e949342c-0691-11e2-858a-5311df86ab04_story.html>)

Gazprom finances Russian President Vladimir Putin’s corrupt political system. Under Mr. Putin’s direction, it has also been a notorious international villain, tying delivery of its precious fuel, a matter of life and death during European winters, to the Kremlin’s political agenda. But with the United States no longer demanding massive quantities of liquefied natural gas from Russia or anywhere else — thus freeing up fuel for others — and gas production ramping up elsewhere, the economics that enable Gazprom’s abuse are changing. The company, to be sure, is still a monster. It claimed $44 billion in profit last year — and that’s just what it reported. It provides most or all of the natural gas for many Eastern European nations, and it still has lucrative long-term supply contracts with European customers that link Gazprom’s prices to the price of oil. However, a recent Brookings Institution analysis reported that a looser natural gas market has already empowered German utilities to renegotiate those contracts; some European customers are even ignoring them altogether and buying cheaper liquefied natural gas on spot markets. If the United States begins exporting natural gas, it would only encourage positive long-term structural changes in this international trade — **away from Kremlin domination and toward a larger and more nimble world market.** European countries would not be the only ones to feel this effect. Gazprom intends to enter the gas-hungry Asian market, and **it might find that it has less leverage over its potential customers** than it had expected to wield. If the economic case for allowing U.S. natural-gas exports, which we have made in other editorials, doesn’t persuade those fighting to limit them, the possible geopolitical benefits should. With new supply from America and others sloshing around the world market later this decade, Mr. Putin might have to make a choice — between propping up a dysfunctional and decreasingly profitable monopoly or finally liberalizing the Russian energy sector, to the benefit of customers, shareholders, Russia’s neighbors and, ultimately, Russia, too.

### No Solvency- 2nc

#### Can’t stimulate the economy- No jobs and no price reduction

Jones 12

[Forrest, Moneynews, 3/16/12, <http://www.moneynews.com/Markets/Krugman-Oil-Drilling-Economy/2012/03/16/id/432834>]

Drilling for more oil in the United States won't lower prices at the pump and won't create jobs, says Nobel economist Paul Krugman. Demand for oil is growing worldwide, and drilling in U.S. territories won't produce enough oil in a global market to lower prices at the pump, Krugman writes in his New York Times column. "Oil prices are up because of rising demand from China and other emerging economies, and more recently because of war scares in the Middle East; these forces easily outweigh any downward pressure on prices from rising U.S. production," Krugman writes. Meanwhile, the oil industry wouldn't create more jobs. Take North Dakota, where an energy boom is playing out. Proponents of more drilling argue low unemployment in North Dakota should serve as model for overall U.S. energy policy. "Yes, the oil boom there has pushed unemployment down to 3.2 percent, but that’s only possible because the whole state has fewer residents than metropolitan Albany — so few residents that adding a few thousand jobs in the state’s extractive sector is a really big deal," Krugman says. Natural gas fracking, meanwhile, hasn't made much of a dent in Pennsylvania's employment rates.

### 2NC No War

#### No impact to economic decline – our Tir evidence indicates that not only is there no empirical evidence for that, but a bad economy would create incentives for leaders to avoid war and focus on fixing the economy. Prefer our evidence it cites a host of economic scholars.

#### AND - even if wars occur, they won’t escalate.

Bennett & Nordstrom 2k [Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61]

When engaging in diversionary actions in response to economic problems, leaders will be most interested in a cheap, quick victory that gives them the benefit of a rally effect without suffering the long-term costs (in both economic and popularity terms) of an extended confrontation or war. This makes weak states particularly inviting targets for diversionary action since they may be less likely to respond than strong states and because any response they make will be less costly to the initiator. Following Blainey (1973), a state facing poor economic conditions may in fact be the target of an attack rather than the initiator. This may be even more likely in the context of a rivalry because rival states are likely to be looking for any advantage over their rivals. Leaders may hope to catch an economically challenged rival looking inward in response to a slowing economy. Following the strategic application of diversionary conflict theory and states’ desire to engage in only cheap conflicts for diversionary purposes, states should avoid conflict initiation against target states experiencing economic problems.

#### 93 examples are on our side

Miller 2k [Morris Miller, Winter 2K. economist and adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration and former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 25.4]

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Their chain of causation is backwards

Ferguson 6 (Niall, prof. of history, Foreign Affairs, “The Next War of the World”, lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### Countries can’t start wars when their economies decline—only growth triggers conflict.

Bennett and Nordstrom 2k [Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61]

Alternative relationships between domestic economic performance and international conflict also have been proposed, perhaps most importantly by Blainey (1973, 74). Blainey offers the alternative hypothesis about economics and war that economically challenged countries are more likely to be the target of aggressive military acts than their initiator (1973, 86). Faced with a poor target in a bad economic situation, who is faced with an unhappy populace and possibly limited resources, potential conflict initiators are likely to see opportunity. The argument also parallels the historical notion that leaders would only go to war when their coffers were full—in bad times, leaders may simply not be able to afford to go to conflict. Blainey’s argument appears to pose a challenge to diversionary conflict theory in its emphasis on what is the most likely direction of conflict. Note, however, that its prediction (weak states become targets) differs from a strategic application of diversionary conflict theory.

### Growth Now

#### Growth improving over next four years.

**Huffington Post, 11-**7 (“The economy Obama faces: Slow but gaining steadily” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20121107/us-election-economy/)

Here's the assignment President Barack Obama has won with his re-election: Improve an economy burdened by high unemployment, stagnant pay, a European financial crisis, slowing global growth and U.S. companies still too anxious to expand much. And, oh yes, an economy that risks sinking into another recession if Congress can't reach a budget deal to avert tax increases and deep spending cuts starting in January. Yet the outlook isn't all grim. Signs suggest that the next four years will coincide with a vastly healthier economy than the previous four, which overlapped the Great Recession. Obama has said he would help create jobs by preserving low income tax rates for all except high-income Americans, spending more on public works and giving targeted tax breaks to businesses. He used his victory speech in Chicago to stress that the economy is recovering and promised action in the coming months to reduce the government's budget deficit, overhaul the tax system and reform immigration laws. "We can build on the progress we've made and continue to fight for new jobs and new opportunity and new security for the middle class," Obama said. The jobs picture has already been improving gradually. Employers added a solid 171,000 jobs in October. Hiring was also stronger in August and September than first thought. Cheaper gas and rising home prices have given Americans the confidence to spend slightly more. Retailers, auto dealers and manufacturers have been benefiting. That said, most economists predict the improvement will remain steady but slow. The unemployment rate is 7.9 percent. Obama was re-elected Tuesday night with the highest unemployment rate for any incumbent president since Franklin Roosevelt.

### Econ Res

#### -- Economy is resilient

Behravesh 06 (Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483)

The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.

#### -- US specifically resilient

Main Wire 8 (Reporting the Congressional Budget Office Summer Report on Economic Assessments, “FOMC Seen Hiking FFR Through '09,'10”, 9-9, Lexis)

However, the economic outlook could also improve sooner than CBO is currently forecasting. During the past 25 years, the economy has been **resilient in the face of** **adverse shocks**; since 1983, it has experienced only two relatively mild recessions, and inflation has been much more contained than in earlier years. Some economists attribute that long period of relative stability to a number of developments -- for example, less economic regulation, greater competition in labor and product markets (including globalization), and more-effective monetary policy. They argue that the economy has become more competitive and more flexible, able to respond to shocks because prices can adjust more quickly to reflect relative scarcities. (According to that view, scarce goods and services can be quickly redirected to their most valued uses, and a price shocks negative effect on output will be muted.) The current turbulence in the financial markets is testing that argument, but up to now, the economy has coped with the severe shocks of the past year relatively well. In particular, in a distinct contrast to events following the shocks of the 1970s, the lack of a steady surge in core inflation and unit labor costs, and the degree to which the consumption of petroleum products has declined, indicate an efficient response by businesses and households to skyrocketing oil prices. (For example, initial estimates indicate that the consumption of petroleum products during the second quarter of this year was about 4 percent lower than it was a year ago, even though real GDP was 1.8 percent higher. In contrast to responses to earlier oil price shocks, the reduction in the use of petroleum per unit of GDP has occurred without causing major disruptions.) Moreover, the apparent restraint in core inflation has given the Federal Reserve more latitude to try to mitigate the downturn in the economy. Also, some of the negative effects that the shortage of credit has had on businesses' investment spending may have been alleviated by the relatively healthy balance sheets of nonfinancial corporations.

### Thumpers

**Alt causes – Eurozone and China**

**Roubini 9-13** (Nouriel, professor at NYU’s Stern School of Business and Chairman of Roubini Global Economics“Fiddling at the Fire,” Project Syndicate, 2012, http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/fiddling-at-the-fire-by-nouriel-roubini)

Financial markets have rallied since July on the hope that the global economic and geopolitical outlook will not worsen, or, if it does, that central banks stand ready to backstop economies and markets with additional rounds of liquidity provision and quantitative easing. So, not only has good – or better-than-expected – economic news boosted the markets, but even bad news has been good news, because it increases the probability that central-banking firefighters like US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and European Central Bank President Mario Draghi will douse the markets with buckets of cash. But markets that rise on both good and bad news are not stable markets. “Risk-off” episodes, in which investor sentiment sours, are likely to return if economic news worsens and confidence in policymakers’ effectiveness drops. In the eurozone, euphoria followed the ECB’s decision to provide support with potentially unlimited purchases of distressed countries’ bonds. But the move is not a game changer; it only buys time for policymakers to implement the tough measures needed to resolve the crisis. And the policy challenges are daunting: **the eurozone’s recession is deepening** as front-loaded fiscal consolidation and severe credit rationing continues. And, as eurozone banks and public-debt markets become increasingly balkanized, establishing a banking union, a fiscal union, and an economic union while pursuing macroeconomic policies that restore growth, external balance, and competitiveness will be extremely difficult. Even the ECB’s support is not obvious. Monetary hawks – the Bundesbank and several other core central banks – who were worried about a new open-ended ECB mandate pushed successfully for strict and effective conditionality for countries benefiting from the bond purchases. As a result, they can pull the plug on the program if its stringent criteria are not met. Moreover, Greece could exit the eurozone in 2013, before Spain and Italy are successfully ring-fenced; Spain – like Greece – is **spiraling into depression**, and may need a full-scale bailout by the “troika” (the ECB, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund). Meanwhile, austerity fatigue in the eurozone periphery is increasingly clashing with bailout fatigue in the core. Small wonder, then, that Germany, politically unable to vote on more bailout resources, has outsourced that job to the ECB, the only institution that can bypass democratically elected parliaments. But, again, liquidity provision alone – without policies to restore growth soon – would merely delay, not prevent, the breakup of the monetary union, ultimately taking down the economic/trade union and leading to the **destruction of the single market**. In the United States, the latest economic data – including a weak labor market – confirm that growth is anemic, with output in the second half of 2012 unlikely to be significantly stronger than the 1.6% annual gain recorded in January-June. And, given America’s political polarization and policy gridlock, we can expect more fights on the budget and the debt ceiling, another rating downgrade, and no agreement on a path toward medium-term fiscal consolidation and sustainability – regardless of whether President Barack Obama is reelected in November. On the contrary, we should expect agreement only on the path of least political resistance: avoidance of tough fiscal choices until the bond vigilantes eventually wake up, spike long rates, and force fiscal adjustment on the political system. In China, a **hard economic landing looks increasingly likely** as the investment bubble deflates and net exports shrink. Meanwhile, the reforms necessary to reduce savings and increase private consumption are being delayed. As in Europe and the US, the worst will be avoided in 2012 only by kicking the can down the road with more monetary, fiscal, and credit stimulus. But a hard landing becomes more likely in 2013

, as the stimulus fades, non-performing loans rise, the investment bust accelerates, and the problem of rolling over the debts of provincial governments and their special investment vehicles can no longer be papered over. And, given a new leadership’s caution as it establishes its power, reforms will occur at a snail’s pace, **making social and political unrest more likely**. Meanwhile, Brazil, India, Russia, and other emerging economies are playing the same game. Many have not adjusted as advanced economies’ weakness reduces the room for export-led growth; and many delayed structural reforms needed to boost private-sector development and productivity growth, while embracing a model of state capitalism that will soon reveal its limits. So the recent slowdown of growth in emerging markets is not just cyclical, owing to weak growth or outright recession in advanced economies; it is also structural. Similar dithering is apparent at the geopolitical level as well. The major global powers are still trying negotiations and sanctions to induce Iran to abandon its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. But Iran is playing for time and hoping to reach a zone of immunity. By 2013, an Israel that – rightly or wrongly – perceives Iran’s nuclear program to be an existential threat, and/or the US, which has rejected containment of a nuclear Iran, may decide to strike, leading to a war and a massive spike in oil prices. **Ineffective governments with weak leadership are at the root of the problem**. In democracies, repeated elections lead to short-term policy choices. In autocracies like China and Russia, leaders resist the radical reforms that would reduce the power of entrenched lobbies and interests, thereby fueling social unrest as resentment against corruption and rent-seeking boils over into protest. But, as everyone kicks the can down the road, the can is getting heavier and, in the major emerging markets and advanced economies alike, is **approaching a brick wall**. Policymakers can either crash into that wall, or they can show the leadership and vision needed to dismantle it safely.

#### Housing crushes growth --- outweighs.

**Gara**, **11/9**/2012 (Antoine, Housing Recovery Could Blunt a Fiscal Cliff Standoff, The Street, p. http://www.thestreet.com/story/11762874/1/housing-recovery-could-blunt-a-fiscal-cliff-standoff.html?cm\_ven=GOOGLEN)

Tax rates, whether they remain at current levels for small business or if they increase to pre-Bush levels, aren't the only factor holding back growth and hiring in the sector. Other key issues include still shaky consumer confidence, weakness in large European and emerging market export economies - and most crucially - fragile small business access to capital by way of bank credit or home equity borrowing. The widespread consensus among economists, including Lawrence Yun of the National Association of Realtors, is that home equity - the positive difference between a home's value and an owner's mortgage liability - is a key source of capital for small businesses, in contrast to thawing equity and debt options that are available to mid-and-large-sized businesses. Unfortunately, as a result of the housing bust the 20-City S&P Case-Schiller Home Price Index remains far below pre-crisis levels , and homeowner equity is roughly half what it was at the housing market peak in 2006. Depressed home values remain a key constraint for small business creation and widespread negative home equity in many hard hit regions precludes real estate assets from being used a source of capital for hiring or expansion.

## 1NR – Politics

### Overview – 2NC

#### No impact defense means any risk of da outweighs

#### Heg outweighs- prevents war through bandwagoning, deterrence, economic integration – goes nuclear- that’s Kagan

Turns Russia Overbearing foreign policy

#### Sequestration is a bigger and faster internal link to every regional war and terror

Skelton, partner with Husch Blackwell and former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 9/20/2012

(“Sequestration means cuts we can’t afford,” Roll Call, Lexis)

**Sequestration will** also **erode America's military superiority over the next decade by cutting even the most essential defense programs**. Any military commander will tell you that our ability to dominate the battlefield is not only dependent on critical thinking but is fueled by superior aircraft, ships, weapons and intelligence. Sequestration would cripple each of these categories, virtually interfere with professional military education at our war colleges, ending the modernization of fighter jets, combat ships, helicopters, ground vehicles, drone aircraft and satellite technologies. Without a thorough study of the art of war and first-rate equipment, **the U.S. military will be far less able to deter gathering conflicts or quickly resolve those conflicts we are unable to avoid**. The "Powell Doctrine" of risking our troops only when backed up by overwhelming force and a clear path to decisive victory could be at risk. With our unique portfolio of global responsibilities, **we could find it difficult to** simultaneously **pursue terrorists**, **contain Iran and North Korea**, **counter a rising China and deal with exploding hot spots such as Syria** today. Those that say we can risk skipping one or two generations of military development are poor students of military history. America rose from a young, regional power to a formidable military force over the course of World War I alone. And Germany rose from the ashes of that war to threaten all of Europe in less than two decades. Today, technology has accelerated the pace of change, and **our adversaries are** certainly **not sitting on their hands. Russia and China** are both building sixth-generation stealth fighters, while Iran and North Korea race to develop nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. **The rise of cyber weapons puts America's highly networked economy and society at particular risk**. We can choose to delay our defenses against these developing threats, but the threats themselves won't wait.

#### There will be a short term transition war

Posen and Ross 97

[Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science in the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at MIT, Andrew Ross, Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College, International Security, Winter 1997]

The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation**. There would** like **be more war. W**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction **might be used in** some of **the wars**, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved.

#### Also says ME

**Extinction**

**Russell 9** (James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring)  
“Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers//, #26, \_\_http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf\_\_)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of **miscalculation or the pressures** of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

### Sequestration Bad – Allies 2NC

#### Avoiding sequestration cuts is key to resolve --- assures allies.

**McKeon**, 7/30/**2012** (Howard – Republican who represents California’s 25th District, The danger of Obama’s inaction on sequestration, Washington Post, p. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-danger-of-obamas-inaction-on-sequestration/2012/07/30/gJQAzPvHLX\_story.html)

In the meantime, the president and Senate Democrats’ inaction is doing damage. I fear the assessment one of our senior military leaders expressed privately is spot-on: America’s inability to govern ourselves past sequestration **plays directly into the hands of those who spread a narrative of American decline** and, ultimately, would thrust us into a more dangerous world. If the United States faced an external enemy who threatened to do this kind of damage to our national security, the president would have the primary obligation to resolve it. To avert these cuts is to intimidate our enemies, reassure our allies and keep faith with those who have sacrificed so much for so long. The commander in chief must act.

#### Allies prevent nuclear war.

**Ross**, Winter 1998/**1999** (Douglas – professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Canada’s functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal, p. lexis)

Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international conflict – and thus the containment of the WMD threat. Future American governments will not ‘police the world’ alone. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding **warfare involving nuclear or other WMD**.

### Space Col – 1NC

#### Fiscal cliff kills human space investment

Clark 12

[Stephen, Spaceflight Now, 9/16/12, http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n1209/14sequestration/]

NASA stands to lose nearly $1.5 billion in 2013 unless Congress acts to reduce budget deficits by the end of the year, and the outlook is even worse for U.S. military space programs, according to a report released on Friday by the White House. The report was ordered by Congress to detail the Obama administration's plans for sequestration, automatic across-the-board budget cuts due to take effect Jan. 2. The White House and Congress agreed on the sequestration plan in 2011 as part of a compromise to raise the federal government's debt limit. Sequestration was meant to be a "poison pill" to compel leaders in both parties to reach an agreement to reign in the budget deficit. But the White House and Congress have not come up with a plan for deficit reduction. House Republicans demand a budget using only spending cuts to put a dent in the deficit, while President Obama and Senate Democrats favor a blueprint with tax increases and funding markdowns. Congress must present a spending plan with targeted cuts by the end of the year, or the sequestration scenario will become a reality. Proposals from the White House and House Republicans have, so far, collected no support from the other side. Under the sequestration plan released by the White House's Office of Management and Budget, military programs would see a 9.4 percent budget cut next year. Like other non-defense agencies, NASA would be hit with a 8.2 percent reduction, equivalent to nearly $1.5 billion less than its fiscal 2013 budget request of $17.7 billion. "While we hope for the best, we certainly are planning in case the worst happens, and it will come at a great cost to the space program," said NASA Deputy Administrator Lori Garver. NASA's space operations budget line, which funds the International Space Station, would be cut by $346 million. Exploration programs, including the Orion capsule, the Space Launch System, and commercial crew development, would be trimmed by $309 million. The sequestration would net $417 million in savings from NASA's science budget. The space agency's science directorate contains funding for climate research satellites and solar system exploration projects to the moon, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Mercury, Pluto, and asteroids. NASA's space technology and aeronautics lines would each receive reductions of $47 million. The agency's cross-agency support costs, which cover overhead and center operations, would be exempt from sequestration. "In an organization like NASA, it doesn't take much to recognize that our very high institutional and overhead costs mean that those things that would be cut ... would be the meat - the programs," Garver said Tuesday at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Space 2012 conference in Pasadena, Calif

#### Space travel investments solve extinction

**Collins and Autino, 10** - \* Life & Environmental Science, Azabu University AND \*\* Andromeda Inc., Italy (Patrick and Adriano, “What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace,” Acta Astronautica 66 (2010) 1553–1562, science direct)

The major source of social friction, including international friction, has surely always been unequal access to resources. People ﬁght to control the valuable resources on and under the land, and in and under the sea. The natural resources of Earth are limited in quantity, and economically accessible resources even more so. As the population grows, and demand grows for a higher material standard of living, industrial activity grows exponentially. The threat of resources becoming scarce has led to the concept of ‘‘Resource Wars’’. Having begun long ago with wars to control the gold and diamonds of Africa and South America, and oil in the Middle East, the current phase is at centre stage of world events today [37]. A particular danger of ‘‘resource wars’’ is that, if the general public can be persuaded to support them, they may become impossible to stop as resources become increasingly scarce. Many commentators have noted the similarity of the language of US and UK government advocates of ‘‘war on terror’’ to the language of the novel ‘‘1984’’ which describes a dystopian future of endless, fraudulent war in which citizens are reduced to slaves. 7.1. Expansion into near-Earth space is the only alternative to endless ‘‘resource wars’’ As an alternative to the ‘‘resource wars’’ already devastating many countries today, opening access to the unlimited resources of near-Earth space could clearly facilitate world peace and security. The US National Security Space Ofﬁce, at the start of its report on the potential of space-based solar power (SSP) published in early 2007, stated: ‘‘Expanding human populations and declining natural resources are potential sources of local and strategic conﬂict in the 21st Century, and many see energy as the foremost threat to national security’’ [38]. The report ended by encouraging urgent research on the feasibility of SSP: ‘‘Considering the timescales that are involved, and the exponential growth of population and resource pressures within that same strategic period, it is imperative that this work for ‘‘drilling up’’ vs. drilling down for energy security begins immediately’’ [38]. Although the use of extra-terrestrial resources on a substantial scale may still be some decades away, it is important to recognise that simply acknowledging its feasibility using known technology is the surest way of ending the threat of resource wars. That is, if it is assumed that the resources available for human use are limited to those on Earth, then it can be argued that resource wars are inescapable [22,37]. If, by contrast, it is assumed that the resources of space are economically accessible, this not only eliminates the need for resource wars, it can also preserve the beneﬁts of civilisation which are being eroded today by ‘‘resource war-mongers’’, most notably the governments of the ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ countries and their ‘‘neo-con’’ advisers. It is also worth noting that the $1 trillion that these have already committed to wars in the Middle-East in the 21st century is orders of magnitude more than the public investment needed to aid companies sufﬁciently to start the commercial use of space resources. Industrial and ﬁnancial groups which proﬁt from monopolistic control of terrestrial supplies of various natural resources, like those which proﬁt from wars, have an economic interest in protecting their proﬁtable situation. However, these groups’ continuing proﬁts are justiﬁed neither by capitalism nor by democracy: they could be preserved only by maintaining the pretence that use of space resources is not feasible, and by preventing the development of low-cost space travel. Once the feasibility of low-cost space travel is understood, ‘‘resource wars’’ are clearly foolish as well as tragic. A visiting extra-terrestrial would be pityingly amused at the foolish antics of homo sapiens using longrange rockets to ﬁght each other over dwindling terrestrial resources—rather than using the same rockets to travel in space and have the use of all the resources they need! 7.2. High return in safety from extra-terrestrial settlement Investment in low-cost orbital access and other space infrastructure will facilitate the establishment of settlements on the Moon, Mars, asteroids and in man-made space structures. In the ﬁrst phase, development of new regulatory infrastructure in various Earth orbits, including property/usufruct rights, real estate, mortgage ﬁnancing and insurance, trafﬁc management, pilotage, policing and other services will enable the population living in Earth orbits to grow very large. Such activities aimed at making near-Earth space habitable are the logical extension of humans’ historical spread over the surface of the Earth. As trade spreads through near-Earth space, settlements are likely to follow, of which the inhabitants will add to the wealth of different cultures which humans have created in the many different environments in which they live. Success of such extra-terrestrial settlements will have the additional beneﬁt of reducing the danger of human extinction due to planet-wide or cosmic accidents [27]. These horrors include both man-made disasters such as nuclear war, plagues or growing pollution, and natural disasters such as super-volcanoes or asteroid impact. It is hard to think of any objective that is more important than preserving peace. Weapons developed in recent decades are so destructive, and have such horriﬁc, long-term side-effects that their use should be discouraged as strongly as possible by the international community. Hence, reducing the incentive to use these weapons by rapidly developing the ability to use space-based resources on a large scale is surely equally important [11,16]. The achievement of this depends on low space travel costs which, at the present time, appear to be achievable only through the development of a vigorous space tourism industry.

### A2: T/D

#### Econ fine now- only a risk of fiscal cliff

Newman, chief business correspondent for U.S. News & World Report, 10/26/2012

(Rick, “The Fiscal Cliff Masks an Improving Economy,” http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2012/10/26/the-fiscal-cliff-masks-an-improving-economy)

If President Barack Obama wins a second term, he may **enjoy the kind of honeymoon he didn't get the first time around**. And if Republican challenger Mitt Romney wins, he may wonder why Obama got all that gray hair. At the moment, economists, politicos and pundits are obsessed with the looming election, to be followed by a tense lame-duck session in which Congress and the president must figure out what to do about the "fiscal cliff." If all of the tax hikes and spending cuts set to go into effect at the end of the year actually do, **it could torpedo economic growth and cause another recession**. Congress could also delay those big decisions or dicker indefinitely, **with the economy shackled to political ineptitude**. But if Congress does its job, and legislates some kind of compromise, the prospects for the economy could brighten considerably in 2013. "Assuming the fiscal cliff is resolved in a relatively benign manner, a post-resolution rebound is likely," Bank of America Merrill Lynch advised in a recent report. There are several reasons for optimism: Housing seems to have turned around for good. After a six-year housing bust, prices seemed to have stopped falling in most markets, and mortgage rates remain near record lows. A variety of indicators show that real estate agents, home builders and even buyers are increasingly bullish. That could turn housing from a drag on the economy into a driver of growth. "The odds are strong that housing will resume its long-absent role as a key contributor to GDP growth," says Bernard Baumohl, chief global economist of the Economic Outlook Group. Consumers are surprisingly upbeat. Confidence surveys show an unusual divergence between business leaders, who have been getting gloomier, and ordinary people, who have been feeling better. The gap might exist because business leaders get paid to worry about problems like the fiscal cliff and the European debt crisis, while regular people may be tuning out such worries. If the economy manages to bypass the cliff, rising consumer confidence could generate a kind of self-sustaining lift. Car sales are robust. Auto sales have become one of the stronger segments of the economy, despite higher gas prices and a weak job market. That suggests a few important things: Credit is loosening up, including subprime lending; many consumers feel confident enough to make big purchases; and the Federal Reserve's low-interest-rate policy may actually be working, at least in the car market. Business spending is poised to pick up. CEOs have increasingly voiced their concern over political gridlock in Washington, deferring plans to invest or hire. That's probably slowing the economy today, which partly explains anemic growth of just 2 percent. But that might also indicate pent-up demand. "Corporations have accumulated profits and increased cash, suggesting they are primed for greater investment," according to Merrill Lynch. And with nearly $2 trillion of cash on hand, corporations have the means to administer quite a jolt to the economy, if their leaders choose to.

### A2: Case Solves

#### Most significant threat to the economy

Matthew Craft, AP, 9/30, Investors prepare for Obama victory, more expensive gridlock, marketday.nbcnews.com/\_news/2012/09/30/14143239-investors-prepare-for-obama-victory-more-expensive-gridlock?lite

The next fight could get just as messy, but most on Wall Street think Congress and Obama would eventually manage to postpone some of the $600-billion-plus "fiscal cliff" and avoid tipping the economy into a recession. The Congressional Budget Office recently laid out the grim consequences of dropping off the fiscal cliff. The economy would shrink at an annual rate of nearly 3 percent in the first half of next year and push unemployment up to 9.1 percent by the fall. Recent surveys of businesses suggest the threat is already weighing on the minds of executives when they're making hiring and spending plans. For the world's biggest money managers, the fiscal cliff now ranks as the greatest hazard to the global economy, according to Bank of America's most recent fund manager survey. It topped the European debt crisis, a collapse in Chinese real estate and even a war between Israel and Iran.

### Will Pass – 2nc Uniqueness Wall

#### Fiscal cliff deal now- Obama is pushing post re-election, gridlock will get moved past, and failure isn’t an option- that’s Benac

#### More warrants

#### First - markets are optimstic, Obama is pushing for compromise, Boehner is moderating

Ehley 11/9/12 (Briana, Fiscal Times, "CBO Issues New Recession Warning," http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Blogs/Fiscal-Cliff-Notes/2012/11/09/CBO-Issues-New-Recession-Warning.aspx#page1)

S&P: 15 PERCENT CHANCE OF GOING OVER THE CLIFF ¶ Experts and analysts are giving odds on how the fiscal cliff drama is likely to play out, with many predicting at least a short-term fix. Standard & Poors analysts say there is only a 15 percent chance that nothing will get accomplished and that the economy will go sailing off the cliff, Reuters’ reports. “The most likely scenario, in our view, is that policymakers reach sufficient political compromise in time to avoid most, if not all, potential economic effects of the cliff,” S&P analysts wrote. - Read more at Reuters ¶ BIDEN: DEMS READY TO COMPROMISE Vice President Joe Biden said that the president is ready to forge ahead on a compromise to avoid massive year-end spending cuts and tax increases. Biden told CBS News’ Matthew Daily on Wednesday that he believes there are at least six GOP senators ready to compromise on fiscal issues, adding that the real question is whether House Republicans will be willing to do the same.¶ “What is the takeaway going to be on the part of our Republican colleagues? What judgment are they going to make?” Biden asked. “I know it takes a little time to kind of digest what’s going on. But I think people know we’ve got to get down to work and I think they’re ready to move.” The vice president said he believes the election results that gave Obama another four-year term offered a clear mandate on taxes. “Voters are coming much closer to our view about how to deal with tax policy.” - Read more at CBS News¶ CHAMBLISS: ‘RIOTS IN THE STREETS’ Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Georgia), one of the Senate’s bipartisan “Gang of Eight” members working on a deficit reduction plan, told The Washington Post’s Suzy Khimm that Congress needs to deal with the deficit immediately and not kick the can down the road or there will be “drastic” consequences. “You could see riots in the streets of the United States if we don’t do this right,” Chambliss said, in a bit of fiscal hyperbole. “We have the opportunity right now, and it’s imperative that we do, primarily through a $4-5 trillion package over 10 years.” – Read more at The Washington Post  ¶ SCHUMER ‘HEARTENED’ BY BOEHNER’S TONE ¶ After House Speaker John Boehner told reporters Wednesday he was ready to “stand with the president” on a budget deal that included new federal revenue linked to tax reform, Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-NY, told the Christian Science Monitor Thursday he was “heartened by the tone that Speaker Boehner showed yesterday.” However, Schumer said the content of Boehner’s speech “doesn’t quite work,” adding that the idea that tax cuts lead to revenue growth, as the Speaker implied, was “a Rumpelstiltskin fairy tale. You may remember Rumpelstiltskin was the fairy tale figure who turned straw into gold.”¶ Nonetheless, Schumer believes the Speaker has “seen the handwriting on the wall, and it makes me very hopeful we can do something big in the next month and a half.” - Read more at the Christian Science Monitor

#### Second- agreement on tax increases

UPI 11/9/12 ("Aide: Obama to press GOP on 'fiscal cliff'," http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php/sid/210642829/scat/b8de8e630faf3631/ht/Aide-Obama-to-press-GOP-on-fiscal-cliff)

WASHINGTON -- U.S. President Barack Obama Friday is to press for the end of Bush-era tax cuts on taxable household incomes over $250,000, an aide said.¶ The repeated call to end the tax breaks as part of a package of actions needed to avoid the so-called fiscal cliff, which could plunge the economy back into recession, was expected to be part of Obama's first public comments since his re-election.¶ His remarks, to be delivered in the White House East Room at 1:05 p.m., will focus on "the action we need to take to keep our economy growing and reduce our deficit," the White House said Thursday night.¶ Obama feels bolstered by his re-election victory, senior campaign strategist David Axelrod said.¶ "Hopefully people will read those results and read them as a vote for cooperation and will come to the table," Axelrod told MSNBC. "And obviously everyone's going to have to come with an open mind to these discussions."¶ But he added, "If the attitude is that nothing happened on Tuesday, that would be unfortunate."¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, said Thursday House Republicans remained adamantly opposed to raising tax rates but would be willing to talk about it.¶ "Of course we'll talk about it," he told ABC News. "We talk about all kinds of things we may disagree on. I'm the most reasonable, responsible person here in Washington. The president knows it. He knows that he and I can work together. The election's over. Now it's time to get to work."¶ But when told Election Day exit polls found 60 percent of U.S. voters agreeing with Obama's proposal to raise taxes on the wealthiest taxpayers, Boehner insisted the idea was insupportable.¶ "Raising tax rates is unacceptable. And, frankly, it couldn't even pass the House. I'm not sure it could pass the Senate," he said.¶ Obama spoke with Boehner by phone Wednesday about the need to reach a budget compromise in Congress' lame-duck session starting next week, the White House said.¶ "The president reiterated his commitment to finding bipartisan solutions to reduce our deficit in a balanced way, cut taxes for middle-class families and small businesses, and create jobs," a White House read-out of the call said. "The president said he believed that the American people sent a message in [Tuesday's] election that leaders in both parties need to put aside their partisan interests and work with common purpose to put the interests of the American people and the American economy first."¶ After the call, Boehner said, "A 'balanced' approach isn't balanced if it means higher tax rates on the small businesses that are key to getting our economy moving again."¶ Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., who won re-election Tuesday, told The New York Times many Senate Republicans were now willing to agree to a deal that raises more revenue through an overhaul of the tax code. He said additional revenue must be generated by taxation, not just economic growth.¶ "The conditions are there to act," Corker said. "I think the environment is different now."¶ He said he was circulating a draft plan to overhaul the tax code and entitlements and had met with 25 senators from both parties since the election.¶ Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said Thursday he could accept a tax plan that leaves the top tax rate at 35 percent, provided loophole closings in a tax-code overhaul hit the rich, not the middle class.¶ Schumer previously insisted he would accept nothing short of a return to the top tax rate of 39.6 percent from the Clinton administration.¶ "If you kept them at 35, it's still much harder to do," Schumer said. "But obviously there is push and pull, and there are going to be compromises."

#### Third- post election climate

Hoehn 11/9/12 (Katherine, PolicyMic, "What is the 2013 Tax Increase: Everything You Need to Know About Taxmageddon," http://www.policymic.com/articles/18856/what-is-the-2013-tax-increase-everything-you-need-to-know-about-taxmageddon)

Can Congress and the president come to an agreement? ¶ "I remain optimistic that we are going to be able to find common ground," said House Speaker John Boehner to ABC's Diane Sawyer. Referring to President Obama, he said, "I am confident that he and I can find the common ground necessary." ¶ What must Congress and the president do? ¶ Act to address "the long-term imbalance between government spending and revenue, and to prevent a future debt-induced economic crisis," said Erskine Bowles, co-Chairman of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and co-founder of the Fix the Debt Campaign. "We already have the blueprints" for an alternative plan, a bipartisan package, "large enough to put the debt on a clear downward path, relative to the economy, and designed well enough to promote, rather than disrupt, economic growth." ¶ Perhaps most importantly, "it's a package on which bipartisan agreement is possible," he said. Bowles and Senator Alan Simpson founded the Campaign to Fix the Debt to "put America on a better fiscal and economic path." Bipartisan leaders from a variety of social, economic and political perspectives, share the common belief that "America's growing federal debt threatens our future and that we must address it." ¶ When will it happen? ¶ Congress returns on Tuesday. In an interview on Thursday, Speaker Boehner indicated he anticipated the lame duck Congress would vote on a short-term fix to delay the year-end "fiscal cliff." ¶ "As Speaker, I feel pretty strongly that a lame-duck Congress shouldn't do big things," he said. Boehner expressed optimism that an agreement could be made between himself, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and President Obama. He proposes a "bridge" that would extend all of the tax rates for one year, allowing more time for an overhaul of the federal tax code. This "would increase revenue by closing tax loopholes, not by raising the rates individuals pay on their wages."¶ Boehner wants to protect defense programs that would be cut and find other budget items to sacrifice. Democrats want to raise taxes for Americans earning more than $250,000 from 35% to 39.6%. It remains to be seen how much can be accomplished.¶ Why should there be optimism about this finally being resolved? ¶ Quite simply, because it is no longer an election year. The president doesn't have to worry about re-election, and members of Congress won't be up again before 2014 so can negotiate more freely. If they solve the problem and come up with a plan and an agreement, everyone wins. This is a great opportunity to put America back on the right fiscal track. President Obama is scheduled to make a statement about the economy from the White House on Friday afternoon.

### AT: GOP Block

#### The GOP have greater flexibility --- they will compromise.

New York Times, **11/8**/2012 (Congress Sees Rising Urgency on Fiscal Deal, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/us/politics/congress-sees-rising-urgency-on-fiscal-deal.html#h[])

But members of Congress clearly see recent events creating an opening in the postelection session of Congress, when some retiring and defeated lawmakers could have a freer hand on voting for legislation, absent political consequences. Republicans were weakened by losing seats in both the House and the Senate, while Democrats are eager to move to issues like immigration, which animated Latino voters and helped deliver victory on Tuesday. “The conditions are there to act,” Mr. Corker said. “I think the environment is different now.” Even conservative Republicans are signaling newfound flexibility. Aides said that on a conference call of House Republicans, a number of lawmakers spoke up to say they needed to give their leaders breathing room and avoid brinkmanship.

### AT: Tax Cuts Block

#### Obama will compromise on tax issues.

**CNN Money**, **11/9**/2012 (Fiscal cliff: Tax cuts still partisan tripwire, p. http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/09/news/economy/obama-fiscal-cliff/)

The two parties' differences over taxing the rich may well take the fiscal cliff negotiations down to the wire if not over it. But it's early days yet in the process -- Obama has invited congressional leadership from both parties to the White House next week to begin talks. And congressional scholar Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute thinks there is some wiggle room for the president to cut a deal. "If they can find a way to raise the same money from [those] over [the] $250,000 threshold other than by raising rates -- or if the negotiators as part of the deal raised the threshold to $500,000 -- he would certainly sign on."

#### Compromise on Bush tax cuts coming --- deductible loopholes solve.

**Washington Post**, **11/9**/2012 (A possible compromise on the Bush tax cuts, p. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/11/09/a-possible-compromise-on-the-bush-tax-cuts/>)

Speaker John Boehner seemed to extend an olive branch by saying that Republicans were willing to raise “some additional revenue, via tax reform” — just not by hiking tax rates. That would seem to rule out permitting the Bush tax cuts to lapse for the wealthy. Or would it? Letting the top marginal rate snap back to 39.5 percent raises $32 billion in annual revenue, according to JPMorgan’s chief economist Michael Feroli. But the Bush tax cuts include other tax breaks for upper-income Americans that could be allowed to expire instead, raising revenue without directly raising individual rates by limiting tax exemptions and deductions. These provisions could be “potential areas of compromise,” Feroli points out. For example, the Bush tax cuts temporarily eliminated what’s known as the Pease limit on tax deduction for high-income earners. If that deduction comes back, then all individuals with incomes above $177,550 in 2013 would see their deductions reduced by 3 percent of the amount their income exceeds that threshold, although the reduction would be capped at 80 percent. (My colleague Dylan lays this out in more detail here.) This would raise the effective tax rate on higher-income households by about 1.2 percentage points and generate about $9 billion annually, according to JPMorgan’s Feroli. The Bush tax cuts also eliminated the personal exemption phase-out (PEP) If that’s restored, then single individual filers with incomes above $170,000 and married joint filers above $265,000 would see some or most of their personal exemption deductions eliminated. (Their average deduction is about $3,800.) Feroli estimates that restoring PEP would generate about $3 billion annually. Put together, restoring Pease and PEP would generate about $12 billion annually, targeting high-income households to raise revenue without directly raising tax rates, according to the JPMorgan report. Since these changes are already scheduled to happen by law, they wouldn’t require new legislation, which could make them politically easier to implement. “In one sense the reason to do it is that it’s there,” says Roberton Williams, senior fellow at the Tax Policy Center.

### Oil Lobby Fails

#### Oil lobby weak - congressional defiance proves

Learsy, 9/10 (Raymond J., "No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act': A Presidential Issue And A Test Of Political Integrity", Politics Daily, lexis)

Yet some years ago, in 2007, there was a genuine effort to change the equation in a fundamental way when Congress voted overwhelmingly, in defiance of the oil lobby and their allied interests for the NOPEC bill, so named because it would allow the international oil cartel, OPEC, and its national oil companies operating outside the law, hiding behind our sovereign immunity shield, to be sued and held accountable for what are clearly anti-competetive attempts to limit the world's supply of petroleum and the consequent impact on oil prices. In defiance of oil interests Congress voted overwhelmingly for the Bill (70 votes to 23 in the Senate and 345 to 72 in the House). This was an act of refreshing and courageous leadership by our Congress only to be abandoned after President George W. Bush, that great stalwart of oil interests and friend of Saudi Arabia, made it clear that he would veto the bill should it land on his desk.

#### Politicians aren’t swayed- proves no support

NFN, 12 (News From Nowhere, “The Politics of Energy”, July 6, http://newsfromnowhere.info/archive/issue-15-april-20-2012/the-politics-of-energy)

The oil industry is one of America's biggest recipients of corporate welfare, sucking up $4 billion in taxpayer subsidies every year. It's a worthy cause, of course: Big guns like Exxon-Mobil rake in a paltry $9 billion each quarter in profits (free and clear – not gross income), so they need the charity of the working-class taxpayer to stay afloat. But the oil industry came pretty close to losing their subsidies last week, when the Close Big Oil Tax Loopholes Act, backed by President Obama, came to a vote in the U.S. Senate. The bill failed on a 51-48 vote. Even though a majority supported the bill, proponents didn’t get the 60 votes they needed for ‘cloture,’ which moves the bill to a vote. Some 88% of oil and gas industry campaign contributions went to Republicans last year, and the investment paid off. In the Senate that was able to buy the votes of all but two – Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins, the two famously moderate Republicans from Maine. The 48 Senators who voted against removing the oil industries subsidies received almost $18 million in campaign contributions from the employees and political action committees of oil and gas companies during their Congressional careers, while the 51 Senators who voted to get rid of the taxpayer subsidies received $3.7 million. Want to know what’s driving America’s politics? Follow the money. Certainly **today's political climate is** not nearly as favorable to the oil industry as the halcyon days of the Bush administration. With the former CEO of Arbusto Petroleum at as Chief Executive and his trusty sidekick Dick Cheney of Halliburton fame occupying the White House, they stacked federal agencies with oil executives and lobbyists, appointing the industry's most vacal supporters to oversee regulation. Gale Norton, protege of James Watt at the Mountain States Legal Foundation, spent her career as a lawyer defending the biggest polluters in the oil industry, was appointed as Secretary of the Interior, in charge of the Bureau of Land Management, the agency that regulates most federal oil and gas operations. (Now she works for Shell). Steven Griles, a notorious coalbed methane industry lobbyist who did a lot of his dirty work in Wyoming's Powder River Basin, was appointed Assistant Secretary in charge of Lands and Minerals.

### OCS – 2NC

#### OCS costs capital- pisses off Obama’s base and GOP accuses him of playing politics- that’s Numerick

Forces political energy fights- saps capital

Geman 10

[Ben, The Hill, 4/1/10, <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/90137-drilling-push-shakes-up-climate-fight->]

While most of the drilling proposal can be undertaken using executive power, expanded drilling in the eastern Gulf of Mexico would require congressional approval. That will surely play a role in the fight over energy and climate legislation that Democrats hope to bring to the floor. Republicans called Obama’s plan too narrow, as it closes off or delays leasing or sales in other areas. The energy consulting firm ClearView Energy Partners, in a research note Wednesday, said the limits of the White House plan give architects of the Senate energy and climate bill an opening to woo new support. “One obvious implication of today’s announcement: delaying and canceling OCS [Outer Continental Shelf] sales gives lawmakers the opportunity to ‘sweeten’ a climate bill by restoring or accelerating sales,” ClearView states. But the White House and the architects of Senate legislation — Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) **— risk losing support among liberal Democrats and environmentalists as they seek expanded drilling**. For instance, Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) attacked the plan Wednesday. “Drilling off the Virginia coast would endanger many of New Jersey’s beaches and vibrant coastal economies,” Lautenberg said in a prepared statement. Environmental groups that are on board with efforts to craft a compromise climate change and energy bill — such as the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council — **also slammed the proposal.**

#### Bipartisan opposition

Greenwire 6 (“Rough going seen for efforts to lift congressional moratoria,” 5-26-6,

http://www.noia.org/website/download.asp?id=295)

With a growing number of Republican lawmakers facing stiff midterm races, efforts to open more offshore areas to oil and gas drilling will find tough going on Capitol Hill, environmentalists and others tracking the issue say. For now, industry groups say momentum is on their side. Though the House voted 217-203 on Thursday to reject removing congressional moratoria on most offshore natural gas drilling, industry lobbyists point out that Rep. John Peterson's (R-Pa.) plan got 46 more votes than it did last year. If there is an offshore drilling component to an upcoming House energy package, it is expected to be shaped largely by House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo (R-Calif.). Pombo's plan would allow states to "opt-out" of offshore oil and gas drilling bans. States that opt-out would receive a share of offshore production revenues. Environmentalists are hopeful the bipartisan coastal coalition that opposes wider leasing will not be swayed in sufficient numbers to endorse an opt-out plan or other efforts that are less aggressive than Peterson's but still relax current bans. Heather Taylor, deputy legislative director for the Natural Resources Defense Council, called the argument that Thursday's vote puts industry within striking distance of winning changes to current restrictions a "stretch." "We still won. Period," Taylor said in an interview Friday. "The bottom line is that [the] vote proves that people care about our coasts, and any proposal that comes through that hurts our coasts will be rejected." Also, a House floor vote last week that would also have lifted congressional coastal oil drilling bans lost by a large margin. That prompted an environmentalist to note that an opt-out covering both oil and gas would face hurdles that could be greater than Peterson's gas-only proposal. One lobbyist who works on environmental and energy issues does not believe the House is ready to adopt the opt-out idea, which was most recently floated through legislation offered by Rep. Bobby Jindal (R-La.) that largely mirrors an opt-out and state revenue-sharing plan Pombo floated last year. "I don't see how an opt-out passes," the lobbyist said. "We have never lost a vote on this on the floor," added an aide to a Democratic lawmaker. "To succeed, Pombo has to play the middle ground. I am not sure if he is there yet." Still, an industry lobbyist seeking wider drilling said Friday the vote on Peterson's plan "proves a nuanced approach to things ... has a lot of credibility on the Hill right now." Yet the fight could get tougher if it does not happen this year. Republicans are bracing for a tough midterm election, and while votes on offshore drilling are not quite partisan showdowns, more Democrats oppose wider offshore leasing.

Pisses off Obama’s base

Maize, 10 (Kennedy, “Copenhagen: The Case for Climate Adaptation”, Managing Power, March 1, http://www.managingpowermag.com/opinion\_and\_commentary/Copenhagen-The-Case-for-Climate-Adaptation\_227.html)

Energy legislation is dead for 2010, except for possible subsidies for nuclear power, clean coal, and offshore drilling, designed to appeal to Republicans. But that reach across the partisan divide likely will enrage Obama’s base among liberals and environmentalists. The predictable outcome: more gridlock and name-calling. No action.

#### That Tanks capital

Campbell, 11 (James E., Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department and the University of Buffalo, “Political Forces on the Obama Presidency: From Elections to Governing”, http://www.polsci.buffalo.edu/documents/ObamaPresidencyChapter4.pdf)

Since neither the ideological base of a party not its supporters in the center can be ignored-—and since both have different demands—presidents must arrive at some balance between them. In no small part, the success of presidents in governing depends on their success in striking the right balance between governing to please their party’s base and governing to please the political center. Like every presidency before his, **this is the challenge for Obama’s presidency.** Its success in governing the nation, as well as the possibility of a second term, may hinge on how well the president strikes the right balance between appealing to his liberal base and simultaneously to his supporters in the political center. The principal reason why a president’s success in office depends on his ability to maintain the support of the president’s electoral coalition **(the combined partisan base and centrist supporters)** is that this is also his governing coalition. Since political views are generally stable, a president should expect to receive most of his support while in office from the same quarters that supported him in his election. As a consequence, the success of a president in office depends to a great extent on his ability to maintain both the support of his base and the center. Just as the president’s electoral success depended on maintaining his electoral coalition, his success in governing depends on maintaining the support of that same coalition. In effect, there is no bright line between the politics of governing and the politics of elections. In its most basic sense, the “permanent campaign” to maintain the president’s constituency of supporters from election to office and on to the next election is fundamental to presidential politics.

#### Plan is a flip flop

Sexton 12

[John, 3/30/12, <http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/03/30/Atlantic-Oil-And-Gas>]

Yesterday the Obama administration announced a delaying tactic which will put off the possibility of new offshore oil drilling on the Atlantic coast for at least five years: The announcement by the Interior Department sets into motion what will be at least a five year environmental survey to determine whether and where oil production might occur.

#### Tanks capital

Goddard, 9 (Taegan, Creator – Political Wire, (One of the Most Widely-Read and Influential Political Web Sites on the Internet), "Does Obama Practice a Different Kind of Politics?", CQ Politics, 3-19, [http://innovation.cq.com/ liveonline/51/landing](http://innovation.cq.com/liveonline/51/landing))

Dan from Philadelphia: How quickly is Obama burning through his political capital? Will he have anything left to actually keep some of his promises? With potential shifts from his campaign stances on the question of Gitmo, Iraq troop withdrawals and taxing employer healthcare benefits, it seems he is in for tough fights on all fronts. # Taegan Goddard: That's a great question. I think Obama spends some of his political capital every time he makes an exception to his principles -- such as hiring a lobbyist to a key position or overlooking an appointee not paying their taxes. Policy reversals such as the ones you note burn through even more of this precious capital.

### A2: Lifting Moratorium Popular

#### Even if it has support- triggers Congressional battles which sap capital

AP 12

[Associated Press, 7/25/12, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/25/house-gop-rejects-obama-plan-for-offshore-drilling/>]

In an election-year swipe at President Barack Obama's energy policies, the Republican-led House on Wednesday voted to revoke Obama's five-year plan for offshore drilling, replacing it with its own plan that calls for more ambitious oil and gas development off the U.S. coast. The legislation will likely go nowhere in the Senate and the White House has issued a veto threat, but as with the tax and regulatory bills the House is also taking up this month, it puts lawmakers on the record on the issues that divide the two parties. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., chairman of the Natural Resources Committee, said the bill would offer lawmakers a choice between Obama's restrictive plan and the far more expansive Republican version that opens up areas off the Atlantic and southern California for drilling. The Republican proposal passed 253-170 with 25 Democrats supporting it. The House also voted 261-164 to reject the president's plan. The Interior Department on June 28 announced its 2012-2017 offshore oil and gas leasing program that schedules 12 potential lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico and three off the coast of Alaska. The White House, in its veto threat issued earlier this week, said its plan makes available for development more than 75 percent of estimated, technically recoverable oil and gas resources in U.S. oceans. The House bill, by contrast, provides for 29 lease sales over the same five-year period, and includes areas of the Atlantic coast from Maine to Virginia, and areas off the southern coast of California as well as Alaska and Gulf areas. Hastings said the administration's plan proposed fewer leases than any administration since the Jimmy Carter presidency. Singling out an election swing state, he said "Virginia will be left out in the cold" until 2017 at the earliest, cheating the commonwealth of thousands of jobs. The Obama plan, he said, keeps 85 percent of America's offshore areas off-limits to energy production. He and other Republicans said the Bush administration, responding to $4 gas prices in the summer of 2008, had newly opened nearly all offshore areas to energy production, but that Obama tossed that decision aside when he took office in 2009. The Obama administration, he said, has spent the past 3 1/2 years on a plan "that effectively re-imposes the drilling moratoria lifted in 2008." Hastings said the GOP plan would generate $600 million in additional revenue and create tens of thousands of new jobs. But Rep. Ed Markey of Massachusetts, top Democrat on the Natural Resources Committee, chided Republicans for bringing six "giveaways to Big Oil" to the House floor, "all far too extreme to pass the Senate." The Republican bill, he said "would place drill rigs right off our beaches in Southern California" as well as off beaches in Maine and other eastern states. Democrats also argued that more domestic oil is in production today than at any time during the past 14 years and that oil companies already have leases in the Gulf that contain 18 billion barrels of oil and are sitting idle. The White House said the GOP bill would mandate Outer Continental Shelf lease sales in areas "without regard for significant issues such as state and local concerns and impacts on important fishing areas and with inadequate consideration of military use conflicts."

### Capital Key

#### Obama’s capital is key to resolve fiscal policy.

**Atkins**, **11/8**/2012 (Kimberly, Prez returns to D.C. with more clout, Boston Herald, p. http://bostonherald.com/news/columnists/view/20221108prez\_returns\_to\_dc\_with\_more\_clout)

When President Obama returned yesterday to the White House, he brought with him political capital earned in a tough re-election fight as well as a mandate from voters — which means bold changes and bruising fights could lie ahead. The first agenda item is already waiting for him: reaching an agreement with lawmakers to avert the looming fiscal cliff. GOP lawmakers have previously shot down any plan involving tax increases. Obama’s win — based in part on a message of making the wealthiest Americans pay more — may already be paying dividends. In remarks at the Capitol yesterday, House Speaker John Boehner seemed to acknowledge the GOP has to take a different tack than the obstructionism that has marred progress in the past. “The president has signaled a willingness to do tax reform with lower rates. Republicans have signaled a willingness to accept new revenue if it comes from growth and reform,” Boehner said. “Let’s start the discussion there.” Obama’s fresh political clout could extend to longer term fiscal policies beyond the fiscal cliff, though don’t expect GOP pushback to vanish. House Republicans still have plenty of fight in them. Comprehensive immigration reform — designed to smooth the path to citizenship while also strengthening the nation’s borders — also will be high on the president’s priority list. But unlike in his first term, when such a plan got little more than lip service in the face of staunch GOP opposition, Obama’s 3-to-1 support from Latinos on Election Day gives him the incentive to get it done. It also robs Republicans, who learned firsthand that dwindling support from Hispanics and other minority groups is costing them dearly, of any reason to stand in the way. An influx of new female voices in the Senate could also make Obama’s next four years the “Term of the Woman,” putting a new focus on equal pay and reproductive rights. U.S. Sen. Patty Murray of Washington state, who chairs the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, told reporters yesterday that having a historically high 20 women in the Senate in January won’t just mean more attention to women’s issues. She said the Senate will function better overall with “great women who have really strong voices” on board, such as U.S. Sen.-elect Elizabeth Warren. “There is no stronger advocate for middle-class Americans,” Murray said of Warren. None of this, of course, will be a cakewalk, but unlike his first term, Obama will have more power to push back.

#### Even if capital fails, a partisan fight alone triggers the link.

**Bruce**, **11/9**/2012 (Andy, Partisan fight over “fiscal cliff” will harm U.S. economy – poll, Chicago Tribune, p. http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-rt-usa-economycliff-polll5e8m99xr-20121109,0,1840865,full.story)

Any partisan squabbling over the United States' looming budget crisis will harm its economy, according to a strong majority of economists polled by Reuters after Tuesday's presidential election. While most said political leaders will avert by Jan. 1 a "fiscal cliff" of automatic tax hikes and spending cuts worth $600 billion, respondents warned that confidence in the economy will be hit hard if talks descend into a major fight. Democratic President Barack Obama's first item of business after winning the White House for a second term is to negotiate with a Republican majority in the House of Representatives to avoid a budget crunch before the start of next year. Both Obama and senior Republicans -- defeated presidential candidate Mitt Romney and House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner -- have stated their desire to cooperate. Forty-two out of 50 economists described as "high" the risk that fraught budget talks will harm investor and consumer confidence, while the remaining eight were "neutral". But some of the damage has already been done. "The uncertainty around the cliff has and will continue to weigh on activity," said Michael Hanson, senior U.S. economist at Bank of America-Merrill Lynch. "You've seen signs of that in capital goods spending orders and shipments -- and it's very possible that we'll see hiring hit towards the end of the year, or early next year, depending on how the negotiations turn out." There are already signs in corporate America that the budget uncertainty has sapped confidence in the economy, which is growing at a weak pace and is vulnerable to shocks.

## 2NR – Politics

### Grand Bargin Now

#### Congress is working together --- a compromise is coming.

New York Times, **11/8**/2012 (Congress Sees Rising Urgency on Fiscal Deal, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/us/politics/congress-sees-rising-urgency-on-fiscal-deal.html#h[])

Senior lawmakers said Thursday that they were moving quickly to take advantage of the postelection political atmosphere to try to strike an agreement that would avert a fiscal crisis early next year when trillions of dollars in tax increases and automatic spending cuts begin to go into force. Senator Bob Corker, Republican of Tennessee, said he had begun circulating a draft plan to overhaul the tax code and entitlements, had met with 25 senators from both parties and “been on the phone nonstop since the election.” Senator Olympia J. Snowe, the Maine Republican who will retire at the end of the year, made it clear that she intended to press for a deal to avert the so-called fiscal cliff and get serious on the deficit, lame duck or not. “The message and signals we send in the coming days could bear serious consequences for this country,” she said. “It could trigger another downgrade. It could trigger a global financial crisis. This is a very consequential moment.” Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York, the No. 3 Senate Democrat, extended an olive branch to Republicans, suggesting Thursday that he could accept a tax plan that leaves the top tax rate at 35 percent, provided that loophole closings would hit the rich, not the middle class. He previously had said that he would accept nothing short of a return to the top tax rate of Bill Clinton’s presidency, 39.6 percent. “If you kept them at 35, it’s still much harder to do,” Mr. Schumer said, “but obviously there is push and pull, and there are going to be compromises.” The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office underscored the stakes in a report Thursday that framed Washington’s dilemma. It said that if automatic spending cuts go into force and all the Bush-era tax cuts expire, the nation would slip into recession next year and unemployment would rise to 9.1 percent, from October’s rate of 7.9 percent. But simply canceling those deficit-reduction measures would risk a financial crisis that would make matters worse, the report said. The accelerated activity in Washington showed that members of Congress believed the election had amplified the imperative to strike a deal. Still, signs that the two sides are open to some compromise are no guarantee that they can reach an agreement after warring for two years. Many Republicans will continue to resist any proposal that can be read as increasing taxes, and many Democrats will balk at changes in entitlement programs and spending cuts.

### Winners Lose

**1. No evidence the plan would be a win – if unpopular policies were all it took to trigger the link turn Obama’s approval rating would be sky-high now**

**2. Link outweighs the link turn on timeframe**

**Silber 07** [PhD Political Science & Communication – focus on the Rhetoric of Presidential Policy-Making – Prof of Poli Sci – Samford, [Marissa, WHAT MAKES A PRESIDENT QUACK?, Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 2nd, 2007, UNDERSTANDING LAME DUCK STATUS THROUGH THE EYES OF THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS]

Important to the discussion of **political capital** is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends **political capital** on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). **Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent**. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of **political capital**, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition of a lame duck President must be developed.

**3. Winners don’t win – controversies hurt capital – Obama will do a poor job spinning the plan**

**GERSON 12 – 19 – 10** Washington Post Political Commentator

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121604039.html>

In some areas - such as education reform or the tax deal - Obama's governing practice is better than his political skills. But these skills matter precisely because political capital is limited. The early pursuit of ambitious health-care reform was a political mistake, as former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel internally argued. But every president has the right to spend his popularity on what he regards as matters of principle. Political risks, taken out of conviction with open eyes, are an admirable element of leadership. Yet political errors made out of pique or poor planning undermine the possibility of achievement. Rather than being spent, popularity is squandered - something the Obama administration has often done. Why so many unforced mistakes? The ineffectiveness of Obama's political and communications staff may be part of the problem - and the administration is now hinting at significant White House personnel changes in the new year. But an alternative explanation was on display this week. Perhaps Democrats did not elect another Franklin Roosevelt or John Kennedy but another Woodrow Wilson - a politician sabotaged by his sense of superiority.

### A2: Plan Bipart

#### Every energy policy is polarizing

Whitman 12, Christine Todd CASEnergy Co-Chair, Former EPA Administrator and New Jersey Governor, “Nuclear Power Garners Bipartisan Support”, August 13, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?rss=1&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+njgroup-energy+%28Energy+%26+Environment+Experts--Q+with+Answer+Previews%29#2237728

It’s clear from the debate around the merits and drawbacks of various electricity and fuel sources that energy policy can be a highly polarizing topic. In fact, it’s arguable that there is no energy option that holds a truly bipartisan appeal: Every form of energy faces pockets of dissent. This makes crafting universally accepted energy policy particularly challenging.

#### Ensures fights

Beschloss, 8/30 (Morris, senior analyst for The World Report, he is also editor in chief of Global Outlook, “Fossil Fuel/Green Energy Confrontation Becomes increasingly Political”, My Desert, http://beschloss.blogs.mydesert.com/2012/08/30/fossil-fuelgreen-energy-confrontation-becomes-increasingly-political/)

It should come as no surprise that the increasing polarization between advocates of renewable energy and traditional fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) would increase in fierceness during the current hot-button election campaign. To punctuate the increasing antagonism emerging between the two energy approaches, each side has found a home in the forthcoming platforms of the contending political parties. These will be made public at the respective GOP and Democrat conventions, around the end of August and into September. Although the current energy confrontation did not originally emerge as a political confrontation, but was centered around the global warming debate, both President Obama and presumptive Republican Presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, have taken diametrically opposed positions in their visions of America’s energy future.

#### Partisanship outweighs

McEntee, 8/13 (Christine, Executive Director and CEO, American Geophysical Union, “Finding the Sweet Spot: Bipartisan Energy and Environment Policies”, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php)

As convenient as it would be to say that a single change could alleviate the gridlock we are experiencing, the reality is that there are a number of critical obstacles keeping us from passing energy and environmental legislation. We know that objective scientific knowledge is needed to inform good policy decisions – and that objective knowledge exists – but all too often we are allowing politics and ideology to take precedence over, or be pitted against, science. This not only risks the legitimacy of the science, but also the strength of the policy and its ability to protect the security, health and welfare of the American people, and support a healthy and thriving economy. The current rhetoric on climate change is a perfect example. We also know that the biggest obstacles to passage of energy and environmental legislation are disagreements about the extent to which the federal government can and should regulate business, and reluctance to launch new initiatives that will add to the deficit. The science tells us that small initiatives that require only nominal investments can't begin to address the environmental and energy challenges we face; and legislation big enough to achieve significant results will cost more than Congress is willing to spend. Environmental legislation is also held prisoner to partisan gridlock, with far less bipartisan support than many energy proposals. Even environmental legislation that saves many times its cost in medical and health care savings cannot advance in the current Congress. One recent example is the defeat of legislation to limit the release of airborne particulates proven to adversely affect the respiratory health of children and seniors. Dissonance about the role of federal regulation, its cost-effectiveness, and potential to impose costs on private sector that might adversely impact economic recovery further complicate energy/environmental legislative calculus. For these reasons, it is difficult for Congress to pass new energy and/or environmental initiatives, even where there is wide bipartisan support for a given bill. Lastly, we know that Congress is not likely to make much real progress on either energy or environmental issues until voters demand such action. Research shows that most voters, including Independents in swing states, do not list energy and environmental issues as a major determinant of how they vote, despite their significant impact on local, state and national economies, public health and national security. This needs to change. Historically, a major energy or environmental disaster has sometimes generated a major change in voter sentiment, e.g., the Cuyahoga River fire that helped launch the Clean Water Act. Unfortunately, it may take a major environmental or energy disaster to get sufficient voter support for significant legislation on these issues.

# Rd 6 vs. Harvard DT (IFR’s)

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### Grand bargain now --- Obama has leverage and momentum.

**Green**, **11/7**/2012 (Joshua, Obama’s Strengthened Hand May Force Republican Opponents to Deal, Bloomberg, p. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-08/obama-s-strengthened-hand-may-force-republican-opponents-to-deal.html)

But don’t be fooled. The political dynamic of the next four years will be almost exactly the opposite of the last four. Sure, partisan bickering will endure. There will still be Red America and Blue America, Fox News and MSNBC. But with one big difference: During Obama’s first term, and particularly in the last two years, the Republican Party had most of the leverage. Republicans’ willingness to reject stimulus, default on the debt and sabotage the nation’s credit rating --- threats that shook financial markets --- often put the White House at the mercy of the opposition, Bloomberg Businessweek reports in its Nov. 12 edition. In Obama’s second term, leverage will shift to the Democrats on almost every issue of importance. And that shift has already begun. The defining struggle in Obama’s first term was the battle for revenue. From the president’s original 2009 stimulus package to last year’s showdown over renewing the payroll tax cut, Obama was unsuccessful in his attempts to generate higher tax revenue to enable further spending. Obama confronted a Republican party determined to starve government and convinced that its path back to power lay in engineering his failure. As Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, a Kentucky Republican, said in 2010, “The single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president.” Hold the Line Republicans mostly held the line. To keep the economy afloat, the White House cut the deals it felt it had to. Many, such as Obama’s agreement to extend all of the Bush tax cuts in 2010, were poorly received by Democrats. Now comes the payoff. The expiration of those cuts and the automatic reductions set to take effect at year’s end --- the so-called fiscal cliff --- mean that Obama and the Democrats can gain a huge source of new revenue by doing nothing at all. Republican priorities are the ones suddenly in peril. The combination of tax increases on the rich, higher capital-gains taxes and sharp cuts in defense spending have congressional Republicans deeply worried. To mitigate these, they will have to bargain. Tough Talk Despite their post-election tough talk, Republican leaders have dealt themselves a lousy hand. Obama can propose a “middle- class tax cut” for the 98 percent of American households earning less than $250,000 a year, while letting the Bush tax cuts expire for those earning more, and dare the Republicans to block it. If they do, everyone’s taxes will rise on Jan. 1. It’s true that going over the fiscal cliff, as some Democrats believe will happen, would set back the recovery and could eventually cause a recession. But Democratic leaders in Congress believe the public furor would be too intense for Republicans to withstand for long. Going over the cliff would also weaken the Republicans’ greatest point of leverage: renewing their threat to default on the national debt. Right now, the Treasury expects to hit the debt ceiling in February. But if the cliff can’t be avoided, tax rates will rise and government coffers will swell, delaying the date of default, thus diminishing the Republicans’ advantage. Date Pushed Back Alice Rivlin, the founding director of the Office of Management and Budget and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, says that “as quickly as the IRS began changing the withholding schedule, the date would be pushed back.” This new, post-election reality should compel both sides toward the “Grand Bargain” on entitlement and tax reform that President Barack Obama and House Speaker John Boehner, an Ohio Republican, tried, and failed, to strike in the summer of 2011. Most people in Washington expect these negotiations to dominate the 2013 calendar year. Here again, leverage has shifted from Republicans to Democrats. “The message of this election is twofold,” says Senator Chuck Schumer, a New York Democrat. “Americans want us to come together around a balanced compromise. And the major issue surrounding the fiscal cliff that was litigated in the election was revenues. Voters clearly sided with us. The president made it a campaign issue, and he won.”

#### Plan unpopular

Korte, 12 (Gregory, “Politics stands in the way of nuclear plant's future”, USA Today, April 27, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-04-13/usec-centrifuges-loan-guarantees/54560118/1)

Three dozen 43-foot-tall centrifuges swirl quietly in a cavernous building in southern Ohio, ready to turn uranium hexafluoride into the enriched fuel that can power America's nuclear power plants. They stand like stacks of poker chips on a table — the ante for what could be a $2 billion national gamble on nuclear energy. Energy company USEC wants federal loan guarantees to allow it to build 11,000 centrifuges here, which would spin out enough fuel to power about three dozen nuclear power plants non-stop. But while plenty of politicians whose districts could benefit from the project support it, the Piketon plant remains stymied by a political standoff. Many Republicans who back the project — called the American Centrifuge Project — have savaged the Obama administration loan program that would pay for it, while the Obama Energy Department, burned by Republican criticism, has voiced tentative support for the plan but won't authorize federal money for it without congressional approval. For almost a year, congressional Republicans have criticized the administration's $535 million loan guarantee to now-bankrupt solar panel maker Solyndra. The administration, they say, is unfairly picking "winners and losers" in energy. Both sides say they want the project to move forward. Both support short-term "bridge" funding to keep the project going until the financing can be worked out. Both say the other side has to make the first move. **The stakes are high:** It's an election year, and Ohio is a swing state. USEC estimates the project at its peak will generate 3,158 jobs in Ohio, and 4,284 elsewhere. Pike County, home to the centrifuges, has a 13% unemployment rate — the highest in Ohio. The median household income is about $40,000. The average job at USEC pays $77,316.

#### Capital is key to resolve fiscal policy.

**Atkins**, **11/8**/2012 (Kimberly, Prez returns to D.C. with more clout, Boston Herald, p. http://bostonherald.com/news/columnists/view/20221108prez\_returns\_to\_dc\_with\_more\_clout)

When President Obama returned yesterday to the White House, he brought with him political capital earned in a tough re-election fight as well as a mandate from voters — which means bold changes and bruising fights could lie ahead. The first agenda item is already waiting for him: reaching an agreement with lawmakers to avert the looming fiscal cliff. GOP lawmakers have previously shot down any plan involving tax increases. Obama’s win — based in part on a message of making the wealthiest Americans pay more — may already be paying dividends. In remarks at the Capitol yesterday, House Speaker John Boehner seemed to acknowledge the GOP has to take a different tack than the obstructionism that has marred progress in the past. “The president has signaled a willingness to do tax reform with lower rates. Republicans have signaled a willingness to accept new revenue if it comes from growth and reform,” Boehner said. “Let’s start the discussion there.” Obama’s fresh political clout could extend to longer term fiscal policies beyond the fiscal cliff, though don’t expect GOP pushback to vanish. House Republicans still have plenty of fight in them. Comprehensive immigration reform — designed to smooth the path to citizenship while also strengthening the nation’s borders — also will be high on the president’s priority list. But unlike in his first term, when such a plan got little more than lip service in the face of staunch GOP opposition, Obama’s 3-to-1 support from Latinos on Election Day gives him the incentive to get it done. It also robs Republicans, who learned firsthand that dwindling support from Hispanics and other minority groups is costing them dearly, of any reason to stand in the way. An influx of new female voices in the Senate could also make Obama’s next four years the “Term of the Woman,” putting a new focus on equal pay and reproductive rights. U.S. Sen. Patty Murray of Washington state, who chairs the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, told reporters yesterday that having a historically high 20 women in the Senate in January won’t just mean more attention to women’s issues. She said the Senate will function better overall with “great women who have really strong voices” on board, such as U.S. Sen.-elect Elizabeth Warren. “There is no stronger advocate for middle-class Americans,” Murray said of Warren. None of this, of course, will be a cakewalk, but unlike his first term, Obama will have more power to push back.

#### Fiscal cliff collapses the global economy.

**Vanguard Group**, 10/23/**2012** (Who else would fall of a U.S. fiscal cliff?, p. https://global.vanguard.com/international/americas/news/who-else-would-fall-off-a-US-fiscal-cliff.html)

If the U.S. economy were to fall off a “fiscal cliff,” how would that affect the Americas and the rest of the world’s economies? Roger Aliaga-Díaz, Ph.D., senior economist in Vanguard Investment Strategy Group, suggests that the event would trigger shock waves that would reverberate globally, affecting the biggest U.S. trading partners the most. The fiscal cliff is a combination of $600 billion in automatic spending cuts and the expiration of tax cuts that would occur all at once in January 2013 unless the U.S. Congress takes action to avert it. The value is equivalent to about 5% of anticipated 2013 U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Action to avert the fiscal cliff is unlikely before the 6 November U.S. presidential and congressional elections, Mr. Aliaga-Díaz said. A hard hit to U.S. GDP growth Removing $600 billion from the U.S. economy would likely result in a 4- to 5-percentage-point impact on U.S. GDP growth in the first quarter of 2013, Mr. Aliaga-Díaz said. That would translate into a 2% to 3% first-quarter economic contraction. The most recent reading of real GDP by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, for the second quarter of 2012, showed growth of 1.3%. With growth already weak, the fiscal cliff would cause the U.S. economy to contract for two quarters, Mr. Aliaga-Díaz added. Even if growth resumed in the third quarter, he said, the full-year reading of GDP growth would be negative. The U.S. economy is central to the global economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) translates a 1-percentage-point hit to the U.S. economy into a 25-basis-point hit to annual global growth. So a 4-point reduction in U.S. GDP growth would shave a percentage point off global growth. Contagion to Canada, Mexico The effect would be greater on two of the United States’ biggest trading partners, Canada and Mexico, whose economies depend significantly on U.S. demand for their goods. Mr. Aliaga-Díaz pointed out that 70% of Canada’s exports are bound for the United States, accounting for about 20% of Canadian GDP. And each percentage-point drop in U.S. GDP would trigger a decrease of about 44 basis points in Canadian GDP, he said. In Mexico, where exports to the United States account for about a quarter of GDP, the fiscal cliff would cut into GDP by about 80 basis points for each 1-percentage-point decline in U.S. GDP, Mr. Aliaga-Díaz said. Automobile production in Mexico would be especially vulnerable, he noted, taking into account not only exports but also auto industry investment. The overall effect on Latin America would be about 50 basis points for each 1-percentage-point U.S. decline, Mr. Aliaga-Díaz said. He noted a potential mitigating effect for Canada and Mexico. A global economic contraction would reinforce the United States’ safe haven status, despite the U.S. fiscal difficulties. “That could increase investment in U.S. Treasuries, which could strengthen the U.S. dollar compared with the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso,” he said, “making Canada’s and Mexico’s exports less expensive in the United States.” Effects on China, Europe In China, where economic growth has already slowed this year, GDP growth would fall by 20 to 25 basis points for each 1-percentage-point drop in U.S. GDP growth, based on IMF estimates. The United States overtook the European Union as China’s largest export market early this year, according to the IMF. China is where reverberating shock waves would be most pronounced, Mr. Aliaga-Díaz said. As China’s growth slows, its demand for copper from Chile, iron ore from Australia, and oil from the Middle East would shrink. Europe, in a years-long struggle to work out its own serious fiscal problems, would face yet another strong challenge. Its primary avenue for growth—increased exports owing to a weaker euro—would be compromised in a global recession.

#### Extinction

**Auslin 9** (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang

#### Turns heg

Hutchison, 9/21 --- Senator from Texas (Kay Bailey, 9/21/2012, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” <http://hutchison.senate.gov/?p=weekly_column&id=1230>)

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and a potentially catastrophic blow to our national defense and security capabilities in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings. In the absence of U.S. military leadership, upheaval in the Middle East would be worse. As any student of history can attest, instability does not confine itself to national borders. Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological research, development and advantage - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.Sequestration can still be avoided. But that will require leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

### 1NC

**Energy policy justified through security perpetuates inequalities, environmental degradation, and inhibits their long-term development – must be examined prior to their enactment**

**Simpson 7** – Founding Convenor of the APSA Environmental Politics and Policy Group, Lecturer in the International Relations program at the University of South Australia where he coordinates courses on IR and Environmental Politics, Researcher (Full Member) in the Hawke Research Institute and a member of the UniSA Human Rights and Security Cluster Leadership Committee, Associate at the Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre (IPGRC) at the University of Adelaide (Adam, 2007, "The Environment: Energy Security Nexus: Critical Analysis of an Energy 'Love Triangle' in Southeast Asia," Third World Quarterly, 28(3), JSTOR)

The pursuit of energy security has been a dominant policy objective and political tool for governments of various hues throughout the world. While there is no doubt that individuals have certain minimum energy require ments, the rhetoric of energy security has often been used as an excuse for governing elites to pursue centralised industrialisation and grandiose energy projects **at the expense of marginalised populations**. Mega-dams, gas pipelines and similar projects undertaken in majority, or less affluent, countries in the name of energy security and development are rarely vetted through a process of environmental or social impact assessment.' On the rare occasions when this does occur, the process is often a rubber-stamping exercise with little input from local communities. The situation is exacerbated when the political regime promoting or administering the project is particularly repressive or authoritarian in nature, such as in Burma.2 It is usually the case that the communities surrounding these projects are indigenous, dispossessed or otherwise marginalised and have little chance of mitigating the adverse effects that flow from the development, while most of the benefits are reaped in elite circles of the urban centres, where the development decisions are usually made. The interests of these elites, despite populist overtures, are largely **antagonistic to the general populations**, and this is reflected in development decision-making processes. Attempts by governments and developers either to enrich themselves or, at best, provide electricity for the urban middle classes invariably result in local ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples bearing the brunt of the environmental and social costs associated with the projects while having little input into the development process itself. While the discourse of national energy security is employed by dominant interests, the environmental security of the local communities can be severely undermined by a project but is rarely considered. Environmental security can be defined quite narrowly or understood more broadly to include the energy security deficit felt by many communities in majority countries, who often see no relief from the deficit when an energy project is completed. While the discourse of energy security is used to justify the project, communities living in its vicinity may remain without electricity following its completion and have other elements of their security, such as food, water or livelihood, undermined.4 In this situation it becomes pertinent to ask **whose security** whether it be 'energy', 'environmental' or 'financial' is being addressed by the project. Unfortunately, it is often the financial security of governing and business elites that determines project decision making at the expense of the environmental security of local communities.5 The transnational projects to be discussed here include a gas pipeline and various mega-dam projects in Southeast Asia. These projects are at various stages of their development but all relate to the purported pursuit of energy security by the dominant classes in Thailand and the supply thereof by their colleagues in Burma (or Myanmar) and Laos. In Thailand, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party used the rhetoric of economic nationalism to obtain acquiescence to major projects but, in reality, Thaksin and other plutocratic government elements ran much of the economy for their own profit, privatising benefits but socialising costs and risks.6 In Burma the corrupt military regime of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDc) has ensured energy exporting projects bring little but suffering to local communities, with transnational corporations and successive Thai governments also being complicit.7 The SPDC and the military dominate Burma's economy, through both state and individual interests, and following dubious privatisations since 1988 the 'iron glove of the military envelops the invisible hand of the private sector'.8 In Laos corruption is also rampant and the economy is tightly controlled by the state. The state, in turn, is a tool of the sole legal political entity, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, membership of which offers the best guarantee of wealth.9 In all three countries major political and economic interests are virtually indistinguish able, often co-operating with foreign transnational corporations and bodies such as the World Bank to promote large-scale energy projects. By the mid-1990s, however, the success of the environment and anti-dam movements in Thailand made it politically expedient for Thai businesses and governments-including the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) to export the environmental and social problems associated with large dams and other energy pro ects to its more authoritarian neighbours while importing the electricity. 1 In Burma the completed Yadana gas pipeline to Thailand has resulted in significant human and environmental depredations against local ethnic minorities. The preparations being under taken for the Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos and a series of dams on Burma's Salween River to export electricity to Thailand are already having similar impacts, for which recent studies of the Narmada Dams in India would provide a salutary lesson.11 These projects, at various stages of development, illustrate the vast chasm between the security interests of governing elites and those of the local indigenous or ethnic minority communities in these countries. These situations, juxtaposing energy projects with environmental destruc tion and human rights violations, have led to the new concept of 'earth rights', the nexus between human rights and environmental protection.12 Before examining these projects, a brief exposition on the nature of earth rights and environmental and energy security will assist in clarifying the location of this research within the field of critical security studies. The environment-energy security nexus Security is a contested concept, but the field of critical security studies has, since the late 1980s, challenged the state-centric focus of traditional cold war studies.13 Within this field environmental security has now been established as a significant area of interest.14 Barnett's definition of environmental insecurity considers the way in which 'environmental degradation threatens the security of people'.15 His added focus on the inequitable distribution of degradation resonates strongly with environmental justice theory. From this perspective, environmental security focuses more on human security than on threats to national security from environmental degradation or a securing 'of the environment itself.'6 Recent writings linking the concept of human security to that of environmental security have been concerned with 'social disruptions' as the principal source of insecurity.17 In this sense dislocation caused by major development projects such as dams may cause insecurity, but when this is linked to civil conflict the impacts are compounded. There is now a well established link between the **exploitation of abundant resources** and the propensity for **civil strife**, indicating that resource exploitation can be linked to both **environmental degradation** and human insecurity.'8 As my interest here relates to the majority world, one of the most useful concepts to emerge is that of 'earth rights'.' In addition to the benefit of its holistic inferences and simple terminology, most work on the concept is related to the majority world, where the interrelationships between environmental protection and human rights are most acute.20 Implicit in the notion of earth rights is that a degradation of environmental security reflects an erosion of human rights, and often vice versa. In their analysis of this concept Greer and Giannini have produced the most useful description thus far, arguing that: earth rights are those rights that demonstrate the connection between human well-being and a sound environment, and include the right to a healthy environment, the right to speak out and act topirotect the environment, and the right to participate in development decisions. In the projects that this paper investigates, it is these acknowledged rights to act in defence of the environment and the right to a healthy environment that are, for ethnic minority and indigenous communities living in the vicinity of the projects, most at risk. While a rights-based approach has been, to some extent, co-opted by institutions such as the World Bank, it can still provide a useful method of analysing development activities when employed from a critical perspective.22 In addition to theoretical developments in earth rights and environmental security, increased attention has also been given to energy security. It comes as no surprise, however, that discourses of energy security focus particularly on fossil fuels and large-scale electricity projects, given their centrality to military and industrial development. While this article examines this dominant energy discourse, it is only for the purposes of critical analysis. Although I examine cross-border energy projects in three countries, and therefore national issues do arise, it is the security impacts on local communities surrounding these projects that are of particular interest here. An important question to consider **before discussing the impacts of these projects** is, however, the **reasons for the institutional and political momentum behind such large-scale undertakings in the first place**. The industrial-scale development paradigm There are numerous reasons for the fixation, both academic and develop mental, on large-scale energy projects. Some relate to academic or government research funding opportunities, but this approach also fits neatly within the predominant large-scale and hierarchical, top-down development paradigm prescribed by financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Much of the national development programmes throughout the 1980s and well into the 1 990s were undertaken within the 'Washington Consensus' model of neoliberal reform and structural adjustments. These policies exacerbated existing exploitative relationships between the North and South, with economic growth considered by these Bretton Woods institutions to be the only possible 'sustainable development', an approach considered to be **'Northern imperial ism, using the language of ecology'**.24 The 'Post-Washington Consensus', which emerged within the World Bank and the IMF in response to an avalanche of criticism, revised the emphasis on pure neoliberalism, admitting a limited role for the state in development processes. Poverty and governance became key issues, but this approach continues to show an 'inability or unwillingness to address major issues pertaining to [political] power and its distribution both at the domestic and international levels'.25 In addition, the development modus operandi of the Bretton Woods institutions that produced poverty and inequality in the past is very much a part of the present.26 The World Bank has adopted a rights-based approach, but its interpretation of rights relates more to the rights of private enterprise than to those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27 Undoubtedly rhetoric at organisations such as the World Bank has changed; in terms of energy security there is now a focus on poverty reduction to be achieved through access to 'clean energy' sources. There is, however, a disconnect between World Bank rhetoric and its funding of major projects such as mega-dams that have proven to be environmentally and culturally destructive, while providing little in terms of energy security for local people. Despite some rhetorical revisionism, the discourse of energy security is still employed by government and business elites to justify top-down investments in large-scale energy projects, which require significant initial capital injections and subsequent industrial-scale capital returns. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, this top-down approach to development has caused **ecological destruction on a vast scale and tends to perpetuate**, rather than ameliorate, **inequalities**.29 After decades of promoting capitalist industrialisation in the majority world, even the World Bank now recognises that inequality both within and between is increasing and can **inhibit development**. Nonetheless, the bank still cites 'ine uality of outcomes' as playing an important role in facilitating development.

**Enframing of national security is a pre-requisite to macropolitical violence**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the **product of hegemonic forms of knowledge** about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the **most destructive features of contemporary modernity** -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, **policymakers' choices become necessities**, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

**Altenative – reject the affirmative’s security discourse – only resistance can generate genuine political thought**

**Neoclous 8 –** Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps **to eschew the logic of security altogether** - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it **marginalises all else, most notably** the constructive conflicts, **debates** and discussions **that animate political life.** The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: **maybe there is no hole**."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an **alternative political language** which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to **blind ourselves** to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a **different conception of the good.** We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but **bracketing it out** and handing it to the state; **it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'**

### 1NC

#### Saudi Oil imports now

IER 8/28

[Institute for Energy Research, 8/28/12, <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/08/28/u-s-oil-imports-from-the-persian-gulf-and-saudi-arabia-grow-in-2012-and-administration-policies-may-be-to-blame/>]

The Obama Administration is touting that our “dependence on foreign oil has gone down every year during the Obama Administration, including a reduction in net oil imports by ten percent—or one million barrels a day—in the last year alone.”[i] While good news, this trend is happening not because of policies or actions taken by the Obama administration, but because of 1) a poor economy and high oil prices resulting in a lower demand for oil, 2) an increase in oil production on private and state lands (not federal lands) due to less bureaucratic red tape in leasing and permitting on private and state lands, and 3) an increase in biofuel (mainly ethanol) production due to the mandates from the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The bad news is that while we have reduced our dependence on imports, we are getting more dependent on oil imports from the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. During the first five months of this year, oil imports from the Persian Gulf increased by 33 percent compared to the first five months of 2011. This was mainly due to an increase of oil imports from Saudi Arabia of 29 percent. At the same time, our total oil imports fell by 6 percent. Thus, the Persian Gulf’s share of U.S. oil imports is up 6 percentage points—from 15 percent for the first 5 months of last year to 21 percent for the first 5 months of this year—and the share of our oil imports from Saudi Arabia is up 4 percentage points, from 10 percent to 14 percent.[ii] According to data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the United States imported a daily average of almost 1.5 million barrels of Saudi Arabian crude over the first five months of this year, compared to a daily average of about 1.1 million barrels over the same period last year. The corresponding numbers for oil imports from the Persian Gulf oil are an average of 2.2 million barrels per day for the first 5 months of this year compared to 1.7 million barrels per day for the first 5 months of last year. The increase in oil exports from Saudi Arabia to the United States began slowly last summer and has increased this year. Even though domestic oil production is increasing, the Obama administration is finding it difficult to lower its dependence on Persian Gulf oil, especially the heavy grades of crude oil that Saudi Arabia exports and that our refineries in the Gulf of Mexico use. Some oil analysts indicate that this increasing dependency may only last a few years—until more Canadian and Gulf of Mexico production comes on line. These are issues that have been caused by the Obama administration. First, their moratorium and “permitorium” on offshore drilling after the Macondo accident resulted in 17 percent less oil production in offshore federal waters in fiscal year 2011 than the year before. Then, their failure to permit the Keystone XL pipeline that would bring heavy crude oil from Canada postponed new supplies from our Northern Ally. David L. Goldwyn, former State Department coordinator for international energy affairs in the Obama administration, stated “Until we have the ability to access more Canadian heavy oil through improved infrastructure, the vulnerability will remain.”[iii] But, the Obama Administration is not worried because it can tap into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the event of a self-defined crisis, it sees domestic oil production continuing to grow, and it believes Gulf area refineries can adjust their equipment to use sweeter crude oil if need be. Most of our new domestic production comes from shale oil fields in North Dakota and Texas that produce high-quality sweet grades of oil while refineries on the Gulf of Mexico coast are designed to refine the heavier oils that the United States traditionally imports from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela. Refiners are importing more oil from the Persian Gulf to replace the declining production and imports from Mexico and Venezuela and the reduced production output from the Gulf of Mexico due to the moratorium and de facto moratorium on drilling. There is also insufficient pipeline capacity from Canada to replace those losses with Canadian crude, accentuating the need for the Keystone XL pipeline. In recent years, U.S. oil imports have been declining due to increased domestic production on private and state lands, production of shale oil using hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technology, increased production of corn-based ethanol and government mandates requiring its increased usage by refineries, and lower oil demand due to high oil prices and a poor economy. Before the Macondo accident in the Gulf of Mexico, monthly oil production from the Gulf was as high as 1.71 million barrels a day and growing, but because of the moratorium on new drilling, monthly oil production from the Gulf after the accident was as low as 1.09 million barrels per day with much of that lower oil production being replaced by imports of Saudi crude oil. Oil production from the Gulf is not expected to regain its higher production levels through 2013, according to EIA, whose forecast for offshore Gulf of Mexico oil production for this year and next is averaging about 1.35 million barrels per day.

#### Plan causes Saudi backlash

**Hulbert 9/11**

[Matthew, Forbes Contributor, 9/11/12, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/09/11/saudi-oil-snub-dont-take-riyadh-for-granted-mr-president/>]

Admittedly, the independence line might win domestic votes, but it loses America international friends. OPEC – and especially Saudi Arabia – is painfully aware of the 22mb/d liquid potential North America holds over the next ten to fifteen years. They hardly need reminding of that when they’re being asked to dump more oil onto a well-supplied market for U.S. electoral gain. Just to rub it in, the unofficial architect of the Romney energy plan (Citigroup’s Ed Morse), noted in international media today that ‘the U.S. need no longer sacrifice a moral foreign policy based on human rights and democracy to secure co-operation from resource-rich despotic regimes’. Such hyperbole is neither constructive nor wise. The best revolutions are always the silent ones. The louder America shouts about its energy revolution, the bumpier any transition from a world of perceived scarcity to one of ‘total abundance’ will be. Saudi Arabia will make sure of it. America should see this Saudi snub as a warning shot; take Riyadh for granted at your peril. You won’t like the price, or indeed political implication that holds when the dream of U.S. energy independence is rudely awoken by the nightmare of on-going global energy realities.

#### Dependence on Saudi Oil key to relations

Lazazzero 08

[Joseph A. Lazazzero, Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 2008, <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Lazazzero.pdf>]

Just as the U.S.-Saudi alliance was important during World War I and the Cold War, this relationship is still of significant value in contemporary politics. As in previous years, the benefits of a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship affect everything from oil dependence to international conflicts. With a limited supply of oil and growing demands from an industrializing China, the United States needs to solidify its oil agreements with Saudi Arabia. An improved Saudi-American relationship would also help to resolve the United States’ failed efforts in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. More importantly, both the United States and Saudi Arabia have stakes in winning the War on Terrorism. Oil Dependence The United States’ demand for oil first initiated the U.S.-Saudi alliance, and it continues to be one of its most crucial components today. Roughly, 60 percent of the world’s oil supply is in the Gulf, and 25 percent of that is under Saudi soil (Cordesman, 28-42). Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil producer, and the United States is the largest oil consumer (Appendix 2-1). Both parties have stakes in a stable oil market (US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981). Not only does Saudi Arabia have the most oil, it has also proven itself a reliable partner in the oil industry. Saudi Arabia’s spare production capacity has allowed it to answer oil production shortages in the past. Saudi Arabia enacted such policies in 1979 after the fall of the Shah, when the Gulf War decreased oil production in both Iraq and Kuwait, in 2003 on the verge of the second Iraq war and even today with instability in oil-producing countries like Venezuela and Nigeria (Bahgat, 115). These measures have shown that Saudi Arabia is committed to keeping oil costs low and production constant. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also proven itself a more stable oil partner for the United States than other oil-producing countries. Saudi Arabia has easily managed to nationalize foreign oil companies. Unlike the bitter dispute that existed between Iran and the British Petroleum Company in the 1950’s, Saudi Arabia has slowly acquired the American company Aramco, and U.S. investors and contractors still serve on the company’s board of directors (Bahgat, 115). Prince Abdullah visited Washington DC in 1998 to meet with U.S. oil companies and called for a greater strategic energy partnership (Bahagt, 115 & Ottaway & Hamilton, A1). Thus, not only is the United States in a unique position with access to the world’s largest oil producer, but it also has serious influence and economic footholds in Saudi Arabia’s oil companies. Oil dependence between the United States and Saudi Arabia benefits the Saudi government as well. Since the first discovery of oil in 1933, Saudi Arabia has changed itself into a regional superpower. Saudi Arabia has used much of its newfound wealth on military expenditures, but it has also utilized its money to make domestic improvements. For example, Saudi Arabia committed nearly $20.14 billion to local markets in an attempt to diversify its economy. Saudi Arabia has also debated entering the World Trade Organization, a move that would undoubtedly insert an Arab voice in the Westernized globalization of the international economy (Champion, 169-171). The money from oil production has allowed Saudi Arabia to become one of the wealthiest countries in the region. Such wealth has allowed Saudi Arabia to become a member of the modernized world, increasing everything from electrical output to mobile phones.(Appendix 1-1 & 12) (Al-Farsay, 31) The importance of a continued U.S.-Saudi economic partnership in oil investments is just as significant for Saudi Arabia’s development and power in the region as it is for the United States’ demand for foreign oil. Of course, there are other countries willing to buy Saudi oil, but here is where the significance of dual protection comes into play. Starting with the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, which declared that an attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil fields would be equivalent to an attack on the United States, the United States can make a promise no other nation can, of protection from the world’s most powerful military (Ashton, 103-113). Thus, even if there are other countries willing to purchase Saudi oil, Saudi Arabia is still gaining significant security from its alliance with the United States.

**Relations solve Saudi Prolif**

**Levi 03**, Michael, Science And Technology Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Brookings Institution, 2003 [The New Republic , June 2 http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/Brookings/perspex-brookings-levi-060203.htm]

Realists counter that the United States needs Saudi oil and Saudi military bases. But there's a less obvious argument for making sure the long-standing Washington-Riyadh partnership doesn't fracture: If it does, the Saudis might well go nuclear. Saudi Arabia could develop a nuclear arsenal relatively quickly. In the late '80s, Riyadh secretly purchased between 50 and 60 CSS-2 missiles from China. The missiles were advanced, each with a range of up to 3,500 kilometers and a payload capacity of up to 2,500 kilograms. What concerned observers, though, was not so much these impressive capabilities but rather the missiles' dismal accuracy. Mated to a conventional warhead, with a destructive radius of at most tens of meters, these CSS-2 missiles would be useless—their explosives would miss the target. But the CSS-2 is perfect for delivering a nuclear weapon. The missile itself may miss by a couple of kilometers, but, if the bomb's destructive radius is roughly as large, it will still destroy the target. The CSS-2 purchase, analysts reasoned, was an indication that the Saudis were at least hedging in the nuclear direction. July 1994 brought more news of Saudi interest in nuclear weapons when defector Mohammed Al Khilewi, a former diplomat in the Saudi U.N. mission, told London's Sunday Times that, between 1985 and 1990, Saudi Arabia had actively aided Iraq's nuclear weapons program, both financially and technologically, in return for a share of the program's product. Though Khilewi produced letters supporting his claim, no one has publicly corroborated his accusations. Still, the episode was unsettling. Then, in July 1999, *The New York Times* reported that Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud had recently visited sensitive Pakistani nuclear weapons sites. Prince Sultan toured the Kahuta facility where Pakistan produced enriched uranium for nuclear bombs—and which, at the same time, was allegedly supplying materiel and expertise to the North Korean nuclear program. The Saudis refused to explain the prince's visit. If Saudi Arabia chose the nuclear path, it would most likely exploit this Pakistani connection. Alternatively, it could go to North Korea or even to China, which has sold the Saudis missiles in the past. Most likely, as Richard L. Russell, a Saudi specialist at National Defense University, argued two years ago in the journal *Survival*, the Saudis would attempt to purchase complete warheads rather than build an extensive weapons-production infrastructure. Saudi Arabia saw Israel destroy Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, and it is familiar with America's 1994 threat to bomb North Korea's reactor and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. As a result, it would probably conclude that any large nuclear infrastructure might be preemptively destroyed. At the same time, Riyadh probably realizes that America's current hesitation to attack North Korea stems at least in part from the fact that North Korea likely already has one or two complete warheads, which American forces would have no hope of destroying in a precision strike. By buying ready-made warheads, Riyadh would make a preemptive attack less likely. And, unlike recent proliferators such as North Korea, the Saudis have the money to do so.

#### Global nuclear war

**Edelman, 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Eric S, January/February. “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran.” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering **a regional nuclear war**. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

#### Plan causes Saudi Arabia to flood the market- turns case

IB Times 11 (The International Business Times is an online global business newspaper, comprising of 17 editions, published in 10 languages across 13 countries. It is among the top ten online business newspapers in the world. The publication, sometimes called IBTimes, offers news, analysis and opinion on geo-politics, global economy, markets, large and small cap companies, science and technology, and business life and culture. May 30, 2011 “Why lower Saudi oil prices kill alternative energy” http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/154524/20110530/saudi-arabia-oil.htm )

The biggest obstacle to alternative energy is money. Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal seems to understand this. In a CNN interview, he admitted Saudi Arabia wants lower oil prices because it doesn’t “want the West to go and find alternatives.” Covers the leading players in the finance industry Sample Alternative energy hasn’t taken off in the US because its development largely depends on the private sector. Currently, it’s simply cheaper to buy oil from countries like Saudi Arabia, so not many private companies bother to develop alternative sources. For example, if Saudi oil average $80 per barrel in the long-term, why bother extracting oil from oil sands and oil shale if doing so cost $85 per barrel? Why turn to electric cars if the whole ordeal – the research, electric cars, and electric grid – cost more than filling up convention cars with imported fossil fuel? On the other hand, if oil skyrockets to $200 per barrel, it would make absolutely sense to develop oil sands, oil shale, and electric cars. Experts generally put the threshold at which alternative energy becomes viable at a long-term sustained price of $80 per barrel. A recent Federal Reserve research, for example, puts the figure for oil sands at $70 per barrel in 2005 terms, which translates to $77.5 in 2010. According to Al-Waleed, Saudi Arabia probably estimates the threshold to be $80 per barrel. The cost of many alternative energy sources is front-loaded. For example, once a solar farm is constructed and the electric grid is built, the cost of harvesting additional electricity becomes extremely cheap. The danger for oil producers like Saudi Arabia is that once a sustained period of high oil prices induces the Western private sector to invest the upfront costs of setting up alternative sources, the price of energy will be lowered permanently. The optimal strategy for Saudi Arabia, therefore, is to avoid a sustained period of high oil prices. For Western countries, the optimal strategy to bite the bullet, pay the upfront cost, and save money in the long-run with cheap alternative energy sources. Western capitalism, however, can be short-sighted and decentralized; if oil prices stay reasonablely low, not enough players in the private sector will have the resolve to eat the enormous upfront costs of developing alternative energy sources.

### 1NC

#### The United States Federal Government should provide initial funding for commercial Integral Fast Reactors in the United States that is variable based on changes in performance, price, and cost. The incentives should be terminated if the technology fails to reach the price and performance benchmarks. We’ll clarify.

#### Subsidy dependence crushes innovation, cost reduction, and commercialization.

**Jenkins et. al**, April **2012** (Jesse – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute, and Mark Muro – Senior Fellow at the Metropolitan Policy Program in the Brookings Institution, Ted Nordhaus – cofounder of the Breakthrough Institute, Michael Shellenberger – cofounder of the Breakthrough Institute, Letha Tawney – Senior Associate at the World Resources Institute, and Alex Trembath – Policy Associate at the Breakthrough Institute, Beyond Boom & Bust: Putting Clean Tech on a Path to Subsidy Independence, p. 38-39)

In particular, many of today’s clean tech deployment subsidies and policies should be reformed to ensure they: → ESTABLISH A COMPETITIVE MARKET. Deployment policies should create market opportunities for advanced clean energy technologies while fostering competition between technology firms. → DRIVE COST REDUCTIONS AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS. Deployment policies should create market incentives and structures that demand and reward continual improvement in technology performance and cost. → PROVIDE TARGETED AND TEMPORARY SUPPORT FOR MATURING TECHNOLOGIES. Deployment policies must not operate in perpetuity, but rather provide targeted and temporary support for clean tech segments that are still maturing and improving. Incentives should be terminated if technology segments either fail to improve in price and performance or become competitive without subsidy. → REDUCE SUBSIDY LEVELS IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING TECHNOLOGY COSTS. Deployment incentives should decline as technologies **improve in price and performance** to both conserve limited taxpayer and consumer resources and provide clear incentives for continued technology improvement. → AVOID TECHNOLOGY LOCK-OUT AND PROMOTE A DIVERSE ENERGY PORTFOLIO. Deployment incentives should be structured to create market opportunities for energy technologies at various levels of maturity, including new market entrants, to ensure that each has a chance to mature while allowing technologies of similar maturity levels to compete amongst themselves.97 More expensive technologies that are still nascent and have the technical potential to develop into low-cost, high-performance energy sources should not be locked out of markets by more mature clean technologies that have had the benefit of more time to reduce costs. A diverse energy portfolio will strengthen America’s energy security and encourage greater market competition. → PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BUSINESS CERTAINTY. While deployment incentives should be temporary, they must provide sufficient certainty to support key business decisions by private firms and investors. The process for reducing subsidies and the schedule for support should be clear, transparent, and planned over a multi-year horizon. Several policies could be structured to meet these criteria. Competitive deployment incentives could be created for various clean tech segments of similar maturity, with incentives for each segment falling steadily over time to demand and reward continual innovation and price improvements.99 Steadily improving performance-based standards could create both market demand and spur consistent technology improvement.100 Such incentives or performance standards could also be set competitively by “top-runners,” the leading industry performers in each market segment, **forcing other firms to steadily innovate to stay competitive** in the market.101 Demanding federal procurement opportunities could be created to drive both market opportunities and ensure steady improvement of each successive generation of product, particularly when clean tech products align with strategic military needs.102 And where direct government procurement does not make sense, reverse auction incentives could be established for varying technologies to drive industry competition and innovation.103 If structured to adhere to these criteria, a new era of clean tech deployment policies will neither select “winners and losers” a priori nor create permanently subsidized industries. Rather, these policies will provide opportunities for all emerging clean energy technologies to demonstrate progress in price and performance , foster competitive markets within a diverse energy portfolio, and put clean tech segments on track to full subsidy independence.

#### Avoids politics

The New York Times, 5/5/**2012** (The End of Clean Energy Subsidies?, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-clean-energy-subsidies.html?\_r=2)

This alarming news is contained in a new report from experts at the Brookings Institution, the World Resources Institute and the Breakthrough Institute. It is a timely effort to attach real numbers to an increasingly politicized debate over energy subsidies. While Mr. Obama is busily defending subsidies, the Republicans have used the costly market failure of one solar panel company, Solyndra, to indict the entire federal effort to encourage nascent technologies. The Republican assault obscures real successes that simply would not have been possible without government help. Wind power is a case in point. By spurring innovation and growth, a federal production tax credit for wind amounting to 2.2 cents per kilowatt-hour has brought the cost of electricity from wind power to a point where it is broadly competitive with natural gas, sustaining 75,000 jobs in manufacturing, installation and maintenance. But the tax credit is scheduled to expire at the end of this year, with potentially disastrous results: a 75 percent reduction in new investment and a significant drop in jobs. That is just about what happened the last time the credit was allowed to lapse, at the end of 2003. This is clearly the wrong time to step away from subsidies. But it may be the right time, the report says, to institute reforms, both to make the programs more effective and to make them more salable to budget hawks. One excellent proposal is to make the subsidies long term (ending the present boom or bust cycles) but rejigger them to **reward lower costs and better performance**. The idea is not to prop up clean tech industries forever. It is to get them to a point where they can stand on their own — an old-fashioned notion that, one would hope, might appeal even to House Republicans.

### 1NC

#### No spillover -- IFRs too costly and take too long

Makhijani 1 (Arjun, PhD in Engineering, President –Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, “Letters to the Editor” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May, 57(3), p. 4-5)

As for IFRs, the 1996 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study cited by Stanford concluded that there were several safety issues that remain to be resolved and that using advanced sodium-cooled reactors for transmutation “would require substantial development, testing, and large-scale demonstration under Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety review and licensing before one could proceed with confidence.” Even if all the technical problems posed by IFRs were to be solved, the **costs of using this technology would be prohibitive**. In the United States alone, IFRs would have to fission roughly 80,000 metric tons of heavy metal (about 99 percent of which is uranium). To transmute this amount of heavy metal over 40 years would require the building of about 2,000 IFRs of 1,000-megawatts capacity each. To manage the worldwide stock of spent fuel (both current and projected) in this way would require roughly four times as many reactors. Even assuming that one IFR reactor was brought on line a week, it would take 150 years to build them. The NAS study also expressed skepticism that the reprocessing technology associated with the IFR could be made as economical as its proponents claim. The IFR requirement of collocating the reprocessing element with the reactor would result in even **higher costs** because of the small scale of collocated plants. NAS's conclusion that there would be a 2 to 7 percent increase in electricity costs was based on low reactor costs and transmutation costs that were “likely to be no less than $50 billion and easily could be over $100 billion” for 600 metric tons of tran-suranics only. If the cost of reprocessing uranium is added, the total cost would increase to $300 billion—$900 billion for the United States alone. It is easy to see why no current transmutation scheme seriously proposes to transmute all the uranium in spent fuel.

#### IFR’s take too long to build

Green, 10 – national nuclear campaigner for Friends of the Earth and a member of the EnergyScience Coalition, PhD in nuclear engineering (Justin, February. , “NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR POWER & INTEGRAL FAST REACTORS,” <http://foe.org.au/sites/default/files/IFR-FoEA-web-Feb2010.pdf>)

Integral fast reactors (IFRs) are reactors proposed to be fuelled with a metallic alloy of uranium and plutonium, with liquid sodium as the coolant. 'Fast' because they would use unmoderated neutrons (as with¶ the better-known fast breeder reactors). 'Integral because they would operate in conjunction with on-site¶ electrolytic 'pyroprocessing' to separate plutonium and¶ other long-lived radioisotopes and to re-irradiate (both¶ as an additional energy source and to convert longlived waste products into shorter-lived, less problematic wastes). **IFRs don't exist and it is unlikely that they will exist any time soon**. For example, South Korea recently announced its intention to embark on a program to assess the economic and technical viability of IFRs by the year 2028. That's the best part of **two decades** –just to assess the concept. In theory, there's lots to like about the IFR concept – e.g. destroying nuclear waste and fissile (weapons) material and producing electricity in the process. In practice, there's every likelihood they would be problematic. Nuclear engineer Dave Lochbaum from the Union of Concerned Scientists has summed up the dilemma: "The IFR looks good on paper. So good, in fact, that we should leave it on paper. For it only gets ugly in moving from blueprint to backyard."

#### Nuclear’s too expensive

Folbre 12 (Nancy, Professor of Economics – University of Massachusetts, Amherst, “The Nurture of Nuclear Power,” New York Times, 3-26, <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/the-nurture-of-nuclear-power/>)

Remember the brouhaha about $563 million in Obama administration loan guarantees to Solyndra, the solar panel manufacturer that went belly up last fall? Neither President Obama nor Republicans in Congress have voiced opposition to an expected $8.3 billion Energy Department guarantee to help the Southern Company, a utility giant, build nuclear reactors in Georgia. Pressed to respond to the comparison, Representative Cliff Stearns, Republican of Florida and chairman of the Energy and Commerce subcommittee on oversight and investigations, explained that the loan guarantee for nuclear power plant construction was for a “proven industry that has been successful and has established a record.” The nuclear power industry has certainly established a record – for terrifying accidents. Most recently, the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in Japan led to the evacuation of 90,000 residents who have yet to return home and to the resignation of the prime minister. It prompted the German government to begin phasing out all nuclear generation of electricity by 2022. Yet the industry has proved remarkably successful at garnering public support in the United States, ranging from public insurance against accident liability to loan guarantees. An article last year in The Wall Street Journal observed that subsidies per kilowatt hour during its initial stages of development far exceeded those provided to solar and wind energy technologies. According to a detailed report published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, subsidies to the nuclear fuel cycle have often exceeded the value of the power produced. Buying power on the open market and giving it away for free would have been less costly. Heightened concerns about safety have driven recent cost estimates even higher, scaring off most private investors. Travis Hoium, an analyst who has written extensively about the industry on the investment Web site The Motley Fool, calls nuclear power a dying business. In an article, “Warren Buffett Wants a Subsidy From You,” he clearly explains recent efforts to shift risk from investors to ratepayers by allowing utilities to charge for construction in advance. Investor interest in nuclear-generated electricity has declined partly as a result of the boom in shale gas extraction. But energy sources that don’t increase carbon emissions are also playing a major role, with wind, hydropower and other renewables projected to provide about 30 percent of expected additions to power generation capacity in the United States between 2010 and 2035.

#### **Natural gas blocks investment**

Domenici and Miller 12 (Pete, Senator – New Mexico, and Dr. Warren F., Co-Chair – Nuclear Initiative; Former Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy – Department of Energy, “Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets,” Bipartisan Policy Center, July, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Leadership%20in%20Nuclear%20Energy%20Markets.pdf)

Prospects for new reactor construction in the United States have constricted significantly in recent years. In the years following passage of EPACT05, 18 utilities applied for combined construction and operating licenses (COLs) to build a total of 28 reactors. 2 In addition, DOE received 19 applications for loan guarantees to support financing for 21 proposed reactors. A combination of factors—including downward revisions to electricity demand projections, difficulty executing the EPACT05 loan guarantee program as intended, and drastically reduced natural gas prices—has put all but two projects on hold. While these projects, comprising four reactors, have received NRC licenses and are currently under construction in Georgia and South Carolina, these plants still face financial, regulatory, and construction challenges. 3 And, though natural gas prices have historically been quite volatile, the ability to tap large shale gas reserves will likely keep natural gas prices sufficiently low to make financing additional new reactor construction very difficult for at least the next decade, if not longer.

#### Lack of nuclear workforce kills solvency

**Retief, 10** – Product Manager, Bentley Systems, Incorporated (Hilmar, December. “Knowledge Management: Solving the Nuclear Industry’s Brain Drain: How to Capture and Manage Your Company’s Institutional Knowledge for Immediate Action.” A Bentley White Paper. http://ftp2.bentley.com/dist/collateral/docs/assetwise/wp\_knowledge-management\_hilmar-retief.pdf)

As the nuclear renaissance takes shape, many organizations in this industry face a shortage of skills and knowledge due to retiring baby boomers. These retirements threaten nuclear facility bottom lines and compromise the safety and reliability of plant operations. The heyday of global nuclear development drew top talent from the best universities and an abundant pool of engineering and nuclear knowledge workers. However, in the United States, there hasn’t been a new nuclear power plant come online since the mid-1980s. This latency in the evolution of nuclear power not only reduced the number of university programs dedicated to nuclear, but also discouraged new engineers from pursuing disciplines in the nuclear field. The global freeze on new nuclear plant development during this same period further limited the amount of new talent entering the industry. Today, the new emphasis on green energy, smaller carbon footprints, and reducing the ecological impact and cost of fossil fuels is reviving the nuclear industry, resulting in more demand for nuclear professionals and an increased awareness of the need to maintain, sustain, and increase the nuclear knowledge base. But the growth of the industry will be impeded unless viable solutions are implemented to capture and apply the knowledge of the existing nuclear workforce. In 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published a report titled Risk Management of Knowledge Loss in Nuclear Industry Organizations. The report states that the U.S. is facing a ‘graying’ workforce in which literally half the current workers will reach retirement age within the next five years. And the bad news doesn’t stop there. It goes on to say that, “The lead time required to produce an individual capable of safely operating the complex nuclear systems and technologies may exceed the time frame available until substantial retirement of the existing workforce begins.”

#### Plan’s initial commercialization wont spillover – too many uncertainties

**Fahring, 11** – J.D. from the University of Texas School of Law, law clerk at the Texas Eleventh Court of Appeals interested in energy law, environmental law, and tax law (T.L., “NOTE: Nuclear Uncertainty: A Look at the Uncertainties of a U.S. Nuclear Renaissance.” Texas Environmental Law Journal, 41 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 279, Lexis.)

But this **initial success does not** necessarily **ensure that new nuclear construction will take place:** In announcing the new reactor license applications ... **utilities have** made clear **that they are not committed to actually building the reactors, even if the licenses are approved**. Large uncertainties about nuclear plant construction costs still remain ... All those problems helped cause the long cessation of U.S. reactor orders and will need to be addressed before financing for new multibillion-dollar nuclear power plants is likely to be obtained. n268

#### Financial incentives lock in inefficiency – kills competition

Loris, 11 – analyst at The Heritage Foundation (Nick, May. “Stop Picking Energy Winners and Losers with the Tax Code.” http://[www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/05/stop-picking-energy-winners-and-losers-with-the-tax-code](http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/05/stop-picking-energy-winners-and-losers-with-the-tax-code))

First, special tax credits for cherry-picked technologies artificially reduce the price for consumers. This makes them seem far more competitive than they actually are. Rather than increase competition, the artificial market distortion gives these technologies an unfair price advantage over other technologies. The more concentrated the subsidy or preferential treatment, the worse the policy is because the crowding-out effect for other technologies is larger. If subsidized technologies are market viable, then the tax break merely offsets private-sector costs for investments that would have been made either way. This creates industry complacency and perpetuates economic inefficiency by disconnecting market success from production costs. Furthermore, when the government becomes involved in the decision-making process, it increases the business incentive to send lobbyists to Capitol Hill to make their pitch why their industry needs those tax credits. Industries will plead that they need five years of tax credits then they’ll be good to go on their own. Five years later, they’re asking for five more years. These specific carve outs reduce the incentive for producers to be cost competitive with technologies that do not rely on help from the government.

### Warming

#### Plan Doesn’t solve warming

Green 9 (Dr. Jim, Senior Vice President for Resource Development – United Way of the Greater Triangle, “Nuclear Weapons and 'Fourth Generation' Reactors,” Friends of the Earth Australia, July, http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons/g4nw)

'Integral fast reactors' and other 'fourth generation' nuclear power concepts have been gaining attention, in part because of comments by US climate scientist James Hansen. While not a card-carrying convert, Hansen argues for more research: "We need hard-headed evaluation of how to get rid of long-lived nuclear waste and minimize dangers of proliferation and nuclear accidents. Fourth generation nuclear power seems to have the potential to solve the waste problem and minimize the others." Others are less circumspect, with one advocate of integral fast reactors promoting them as the "holy grail" in the fight against global warming. There are two main problems with these arguments. Firstly, nuclear power could at most make a modest contribution to climate change abatement, mainly because it is used almost exclusively for electricity generation which accounts for about one-quarter of global greenhouse emissions. Doubling global nuclear power output (at the expense of coal) would reduce greenhouse emissions by about 5%. Building six nuclear power reactors in Australia (at the expense of coal) would reduce Australia's emissions by just 4%.

#### Transportation outweighs

**Gordon, 10** – nonresident senior associate in Carnegie’s Energy and Climate Program, where her research focuses on climate, energy, and transportation issues in the United States and China (Deborah, December. “The Role of Transportation in Driving Climate Disruption.” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/transport\_climate\_disruption.pdf)

Climate impacts differ by sector. On-road transportation has the greatest negative effect on climate, especially in the short term. This is primarily because of two factors unique to on-road transportation: (1) nearly exclusive use of petroleum fuels, the combustion of which results in high levels of the principal warming gases (carbon dioxide, ozone, and black carbon); and (2) minimal emissions of sulfates, aerosols, and organic carbon from on-road transportation sources to counterbalance warming with cooling effects. Scientists find that cutting on-road transportation climate and air-pollutant emissions would be unambiguously good for the climate (and public health) in the near term. Transportation’s role in climate change is especially problematic, given the dependence on oil that characterizes this sector today. There are too few immediate mobility and fuel options in the United States beyond oil-fueled cars and trucks. U.S. and international policy makers have yet to tackle transportationclimate challenges. In its fourth assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that the global transportation sector was responsible for the most rapid growth in direct greenhouse gas emissions, a 120 percent increase between 1970 and 2004. To further complicate matters, the IPCC projects that, without policy intervention, the rapidly growing global transportation sector has little motivation to change the way it operates, because consumer choices are trumping best practices. Herein lies a fundamental mismatch between the climate problem and solutions: transportation is responsible for nearly one of every three tons of greenhouse gas emissions but represents less than one of every twelve tons of projected emission reductions. Clearly this sector is a major contributor to climate change; therefore, it should be the focus of new policies to mitigate warming. Government must lead this effort as the market alone cannot precipitate the transition away from cars and oil, which dominate this sector.

#### Can’t solve developing countries

**Socolow and Glaser, 9** – Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University and Assistant Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University (Robert H. and Alexander, Fall. “Balancing risks: nuclear energy & climate change.” Dædalus Volume 138, Issue 4, pp. 31-44. MIT Press Journals.)

In this paper we consider a nuclear future where 1,500 GW of base load nuclear power is deployed in 2050. A nuclear fleet of this size would contribute about one wedge, if the power plant that would have been built instead of the nuclear plant has the average CO2 emissions per kilowatt hour of all operating plants, which might be half of the value for a coal plant. Base load power of 1,500 GW would contribute one fourth of total electric power in a business-as-usual world that produced 50,000 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity per year, two-and-a-half times the global power consumption. However, in a world focused on climate change mitigation, one would expect massive global investments in energy efficiency–more efficient motors, compressors, lighting, and circuit boards–that by 2050 could cut total electricity demand in half, relative to business as usual. In such a world, 1,500 GW of nuclear power would provide half of the power. We can get a feel for the geopolitical dimension of climate change mitigation from the widely cited scenarios by the International Energy Agency (iea) presented annually in its World Energy Outlook (weo), even though these now go only to 2030. The weo 2008 estimates energy, electricity, and CO2 emissions by region. Its 2030 world emits 40.5 billion tons of CO2, 45 percent from electric power plants. The countries of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) emit less than one third of total global fossil fuel emissions and less than one third of global emissions from electric power production. By extrapolation, at midcentury the oecd could contribute only one quarter of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. It is hard for Western analysts to grasp the importance of these numbers. The focus of climate change mitigation today is on leadership from the OECD countries, which are wealthier and more risk averse. But within a decade, the targets under discussion today can be within reach only if mitigation is in full gear in those parts of the developing world that share production and consumption patterns with the industrialized world. The map (see Figure 1) shows a hypothetical global distribution of nuclear power in the year 2050 based on a highnuclear scenario proposed in a widely cited mit report published in 2003. Three-fifths of the nuclear capacity in 2050 as stated in the mit report is located in the oecd, and more nuclear power is deployed in the United States in 2050 than in the whole world today. The worldview underlying these results is pessimistic about electricity growth rates for key developing countries, relative to many other sources. Notably, per capita electricity consumption in almost every developing country remains below 4,000 kWh per year in 2050, which is one-fifth of the assumed U.S. value for the same year. Such a ratio would startle many analysts today–certainly many in China. It is well within limits of credulity that nuclear power in 2050 could be nearly absent from the United States and the European Union and at the same time widely deployed in several of the countries rapidly industrializing today. Such a bifurcation could emerge, for example, if public opposition to nu clear power in the United States and Europe remains powerful enough to prevent nuclear expansion, while elsewhere, perhaps where modernization and geopolitical considerations trump other concerns, nuclear power proceeds vigorously. It may be that the United States and other countries of the oecd will have substantial leverage over the development of nuclear power for only a decade or so. Change will not happen overnight. Since 2006, almost 50 countries that today have no nuclear power plants have approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) for assistance, and many of them have announced plans to build one or more reactors by 2020. Most of these countries, however, are not currently in a good position to do so. Many face important technical and economic constraints, such as grid capacity, electricity demand, or gdp. Many have too few trained nuclear scientists and engineers, or lack an adequate regulatory framework and related legislation, or have not yet had a public debate about the rationale for the project. Overall, the iaea has estimated that “for a State with little developed technical base the implementation of the first [nuclear power plant] would, on average, take about 15 years.” 11 This lead time constrains rapid expansion of nuclear energy today. A wedge of nuclear power is, necessarily, nuclear power deployed widely– including in regions that are politically unstable today. If nuclear power is suf-ficiently unattractive in such a deployment scenario, nuclear power is not on the list of solutions to climate change.

#### Warming is irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

#### Alt cause- china

**Hale 11** (Thomas, PhD Candidate in the Department of Politics – Princeton University and a Visiting Fellow – LSE Global Governance, London School of Economics, “A Climate Coalition of the Willing,” Washington Quarterly, Winter, http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter\_Hale.pdf)

Intergovernmental efforts to limit the gases that cause climate change have all but failed. After the unsuccessful 2010 Copenhagen summit, and with little progress at the 2010 Cancun meeting, it is hard to see how major emitters will agree any time soon on mutual emissions reductions that are sufficiently ambitious to prevent a substantial (greater than two degree Celsius) increase in average global temperatures. It is not hard to see why. No deal excluding the United States and China, which together emit more than 40 percent of the world’s greenhouse gases (GHGs), is worth the paper it is written on. But domestic politics in both countries effectively block ‘‘G-2’’ leadership on climate. In the United States, the Obama administration has basically given up on national cap-and-trade legislation. Even the relatively modest Kerry-Lieberman-Graham energy bill remains dead in the Senate. The Chinese government, in turn, faces an even harsher constraint. Although the nation has adopted important energy efficiency goals, the Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy and political survival on raising the living standard of average Chinese. Accepting international commitments that stand even a small chance of reducing the country’s GDP growth rate below a crucial threshold poses an unacceptable risk to the stability of the regime. Although the G-2 present the largest and most obvious barrier to a global treaty, they also provide a convenient excuse for other governments to avoid aggressive action. Therefore, the international community should not expect to negotiate a worthwhile successor to the Kyoto Protocol, at least not in the near future.

#### **No resource wars**

Pinker 11 (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Google Books)

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is "maybe, but maybe not." Though climate change can cause plenty of misery and deserves to be mitigated for that reason alone, it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharn countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, **but wars involving them are not**. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to armed conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or two, he concluded, "those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support in the large-N literature." Salehyan adds that relatively inexpensive advances in water use and agriculture practices in the developing world can yield massive increases in productivity with a constant or even shrinking amount of land, and that better governance can mitigate the human costs of environmental damage, as it does in developed democracies. Since the state of the environment is at most one ingredient in a mixture that depends far more on political and social organization, resource wars are far from inevitable, even in a climate-changed world.

#### Long timeframe and adaptation solves

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

### Nuclear Leadership

#### Competitiveness is a myth – overwhelming evidence proves

Bruno 9 [Isabelle, Lille Centre for Politics and Administration (CERAPS), University of Lille, The “Indefinite Discipline” of Competitiveness Benchmarking as a Neoliberal Technology of Government Minerva A Review of Science, Learning and Policy © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009, 17 September 2009]

The pertinence of discussing the national competitiveness of a country is much debated among economists. In his now famous Foreign Affairs article, Paul Krugman criticized the “competitive metaphor”—i.e. the image “that, in the words of President Clinton, each nation is like a big corporation competing in the global marketplace” (1994, p. 29)—as economically meaningless, politically misguided and socially damaging. His demonstration countered the progressively established orthodoxy, which made the design of a “competitive state” consensual, desirable, and hence free of debate. More than economic nonsense, Krugman argued that it had in fact become a “dangerous obsession”: The idea that a country’s economic fortunes are largely determined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly **wrong**. […] The growing obsession in most advanced nations with international competitiveness should be seen, not as a well-founded concern, but as a view held in the face of **overwhelming contrary evidence.** And yet it is clearly a view that people very much want to hold – a desire to believe that is reflected in a remarkable tendency of those who preach the doctrine of competitiveness to support their case with **careless, flawed arithmetic**. (Krugman 1994, p. 30)

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

**Fettweis 10** (Christopher J. Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times-The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 175-6)

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of war – nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms – necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were American to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly,the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.

#### --Turn – India

#### India is winning the nuclear export race in the status quo

CSIS ‘10 [“India’s Nuclear Push” <http://csis.org/blog/india%E2%80%99s-nuclear-push>]

**“**In India's statement to the 54th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Indian Atomic Energy Commission chairman Srikumar Banerjee said that Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) is ‘ready to offer Indian PHWRs of 220 MWe or 540 MWe for export’”**.** ¶It’s happening– second-tier nuclear suppliers from China, South Korea, and now India are waking up to the opportunities that may emerge from intensified interest in nuclear power. India is entering the nuclear supply business at a time when new nuclear states are looking for alternatives to the huge, expensive reactors sold by the French, Russians, Japanese, Canadians, and Americans. ¶ ¶ Last year, Korea won the plum contract in the Middle East – a $20 billion agreement to build 4 nuclear power reactors in the United Arab Emirates. The UAE plans to construct a total of 10 reactors, using one contractor. China, while busily constructing nuclear power plants at home, will build a few new reactors in Pakistan and reportedly is interested in Turkish and Arab state plans to import. India will be next off the starting block of this export race.¶ ¶ There’s no way to predict how price-competitive India’s export reactors will be. NPCIL is a public enterprise under the control of the government’s Department of Atomic Energy. One of the suggested virtues of the U.S.-India nuclear deal was that the Indian nuclear sector would be forced to clean up its act as foreign competition grew in India.One way for the NPCIL to become more self-sustaining is through exports. ¶ ¶What will motivate nuclear power newcomers to buy Indian, Korean or Chinese? First, the reactor vendors from the advanced nuclear states are in disarray. AREVA has its much-publicized cost overruns in Olkiluoto; Japanese vendors do not have an export history; and Russian reactors were previously sold only in the Eastern bloc countries or allies. Russia will expand from reactors in India and Iran to potential contracts with Turkey and Vietnam.¶ ¶ China, South Korea and Indiaallhave smaller reactors to offer**.** In the United States, while there is interest in small modular reactors, there aren’t any licensed**.** These smaller reactors are more likely to fit the needs of states that are new to nuclear power. Not only do they lack the billions of dollars it takes to build large 1000MWe-1600MWe reactors, but they also lack the extensive transmission grids to accommodate large, centralized electricity generators.

#### Nuclear market lead key to Indian leadership - plan prevents this

K1 Team ’12 (The K1 Criticality Project is a think-tank led by Emlyn Hughes and Dr. Ivana Nikolic Hughes @ Columbia University, Citing Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, <http://k1project.org/energy/fissile-material-indias-investments-in-new-nuclear/>, July 2012)

With a population of 1.2 billion that is expected to multiply over the next couple of decades, India has taken a keen interest in new nuclear technologies and is fast becoming a key player in the energy arena. The International Energy Agency, an energy research organization, expects that India’s energy demand will “more than double by 2030”. It is furthermore clear that India will need to expand its power grid in order to reach the significant portion of the country that currently does not have electricity. With pressure coming from the international community to reduce its carbon emissions, India is looking for energy investments that will pay-off in the long-term. As Rajendra K. Pachauri, chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, astutely stated, “India cannot emulate developed countries. We have to find a path that is distinctly different”. Part of the answer lies in India’s exploitation of new nuclear technologies. Currently, uranium can be purchased on the market at a competitive price, which seems to preclude the much needed investment in research and development of new nuclear technologies. However, it is imperative that these newer technologies receive adequate attention because nuclear energy seems to be a likely interim fuel source for the transition from carbon-based fuels to fully-renewable energy sources. In its current state, nuclear energy does not seem to be safe or efficient enough to win wide-spread trust from citizens and policy-makers. Therefore, the need for new nuclear technologies is becoming ever the more pressing. One important technology that India is making inroads on is the thorium-fueled fast breeder nuclear reactor. As India’s Department of Atomic Energy clearly recognizes, “We have rather meager reserves of uranium…We, however, have nearly a third of the entire world’s thorium…Our strategies for large scale deployment of nuclear energy must be, and are therefore, focused towards utilisation of thorium.” India currently has a three-stage nuclear power program that will eventually allow it to make full use of its thorium reserves. In the first stage, the fast neutron reactors that India is developing will burn uranium in pressurized-heavy water reactors to produce plutonium. During the second stage, the fast neutron reactors will burn the plutonium with a uranium and thorium blanket. Thorium itself is a fertile element, and while it has the capacity to fission, it needs a boost from low-enriched uranium or plutonium, which can be sourced from spent fuel or decommissioned nuclear weapons. Thus, using thorium addresses many of the waste disposal, proliferation, and safety hazards that are often associated with conventional, uranium-based nuclear reactors. Investing in thorium-based reactors is cost efficient for India more so than for many other countries for two primary reasons: one being the vast thorium reservces, and the other being its limited reactor base. Both these factors would reduce the comparative cost that India would undertake with this investment. Gradually, as the country approaches the third stage of the nuclear program, the reactors will burn the U-233 from the second stage and the fuel blanket will be primarily composed of thorium. Thus, about two-thirds of the reactor’s power will be fueled by thorium. Additionally, thorium fuel bundles can last much longer than conventional uranium fuel bundles. Thus, the spent uranium would eventually be replaced by thorium, eventually creating a fully thorium-fueled reactor. In 2002, construction on a prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam was approved by the regulatory authority, and it is expected to progress to the second stage of the program by 2013. Six additional fast reactors are slated for construction, with four of them planned for 2020. Within 25 years, India plans to increase its use of nuclear power for electricity generation from 2.8% to 9%. With the passing of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, which allows India even greater independence in the trade of nuclear energy and technologies with other countries, India may eventually be established as a preeminent center for nuclear technologies. There is speculation that India is offering for export the designs of its heavy-water reactors, and this would allow India’s considerable investments to become a global energy investment. Dr. S. Banerjee, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, mentioned in a 2010 address to the IAEA that the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited is “ready to offer Indian PHWRs of 220 MWe or 540 MWe capacity for export”. India’s investments will provide India with the electricity capacity that it desperately needs, while simultaneously providing the global energy market with a competitive source of safer and more efficient nuclear energy. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses writes that “The time has also come for India to think beyond domestic development of nuclear power reactors and showcase its civilian nuclear capabilities abroad.”

#### Indian leadership solves extinction

Kamdar ‘7 (Mira Kamdar, World Policy Institute, 2007, Planet India: How the fastest growing democracy is transforming America and the world, p. 3-5)

No other country matters more to the future of our planet than India. There is no challenge we face, no opportunity we covet where India does not have critical relevance. From combating global terror to finding cures for dangerous pandemics, from dealing with the energy crisis to averting the worst scenarios of global warming, from rebalancing stark global inequalities to spurring the vital innovation needed to create jobs and improve lives—India is now a pivotal player. The world is undergoing a process of profound recalibration in which the rise of Asia is the most important factor. India holds the key to this new world. India is at once an ancient Asian civilization, a modern nation grounded in Enlightenment values and democratic institutions, and a rising twenty-first-century power. With a population of 1.2 billion, India is the world’s largest democracy. It is an open, vibrant society. India’s diverse population includes Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians, Jews, and animists. There are twenty-two official languages in India. Three hundred fifty million Indians speak English. India is the world in microcosm. Its geography encompasses every climate, from snowcapped Himalayas to palm-fringed beaches to deserts where nomads and camels roam. A developing country, India is divided among a tiny affluent minority, a rising middle class, and 800 million people who live on less than $2 per day. India faces all the critical problems of our time—extreme social inequality, employment insecurity, a growing energy crisis, severe water shortages, a degraded environment, global warming, a galloping HIV/AIDS epidemic, terrorist attacks—on a scale that defies the imagination. India’s goal is breathtaking in scope: transform a developing country of more than 1 billion people into a developed nation and global leader by 2020, and do this as a democracy in an era of resource scarcity and environmental degradation. The world has to cheer India on. If India fails, there is a real risk that our world will become hostage to political chaos, war over dwindling resources, a poisoned environment, and galloping disease. Wealthy enclaves will employ private companies to supply their needs and private militias to protect them from the poor massing at their gates. But, if India succeeds, it will demonstrate that it is possible to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.  It will prove that multiethnic, multireligious democracy is not a luxury for rich societies.  It will show us how to save our environment, and how to manage in a fractious, multipolar world.  India’s gambit is truly the venture of the century.

#### -- Turn – Russia

#### Russian nuclear expansion k2 economy – opens up massive energy exports

Daly 9 -- UPI Int'l Correspondent (John CK, 4/21/12, "Analysis: Russia's ambitious nuclear-power expansion plans," http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Energy-Resources/2009/04/21/Analysis-Russias-ambitious-nuclear-power-expansion-plans/UPI-20531240328864/)

WASHINGTON, April 21 (UPI) -- The global recession has severely hammered the world's leading energy producers as oil has fallen from its July 2008 record high of $147.27 per barrel to slightly more than $50 a barrel today. For Russia, the world's second-largest oil producer, the news has not led to a reduction in production, as on April 16 its Energy Ministry issued a statement noting that it does not expect the country's 2009 crude oil output to fall this year from last year's rate of 9.735 million barrels per day. Declining oil prices have nevertheless played havoc with Russia's economy, which last year before the recession began had experienced a straight decade of growth averaging 7 percent annually since the 1998 fiscal crisis. Of Russia's 9.7 mbpd production, approximately 2.7 mbpd was consumed domestically, freeing about 7 mbpd for export. Even at depressed world prices, Russia relies on income from its oil and gas exports for a substantial portion of its budget revenues; accordingly, to free up hydrocarbons for export, Russia is looking to supply its future energy needs by increasing its nuclear-power program. The Russian Federation currently operates 10 nuclear power plants housing 31 reactor units, which supply approximately 16 percent of Russia's energy needs. Except for the Bilibino Nuclear Power Plant in eastern Siberia, the other nine complexes are all located in European Russia. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is proposing a massive expansion of Russia's nuclear-power complex, which, if implemented, would effectively double the amount of Russian electricity generated by nuclear power. During an April 15 meeting on the development of the country's nuclear-energy program with Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Russia's State Atomic Energy Corp., Rosatom, at the Kalinin Nuclear Power Plant near Udomlya, about 120 miles northwest of Moscow, Putin said starkly, "We need to build 26 units." He added, "We have formed extremely ambitious, but fully realistic, plans. By 2030, the share of nuclear generation in (Russia's) overall energy production should total 25-30 percent. Today it's 16 percent. Taking into account the current situation, the realization of these plans requires special attention. It's clear that we need to look at how we are going to resolve this issue given the global economic and financial crisis. No matter what happens, we should fulfill the goal that I spoke of." Ironically, Putin's call for increased nuclear generation of electricity comes amid declining consumer demand, as Russians, in common with other depressed nations, have cut back on power consumption; according to the Russian Energy Ministry, demand for electricity could decline by about 4 percent by the end of the year. Putin, however, dismisses the dip as temporary, commenting, "Experts say that we'll reach the pre-crisis growth rates in power consumption of about 3 percent per year by 2012. I think that demand for energy resources will start to gradually increase once again in 2010, and by 2012 we will return to the pre-crisis growth rates in energy consumption." Putin is willing to back up his government's ambitions with financial resources, telling Kiriyenko that his administration would support the state nuclear corporation's request for nearly 50 billion rubles ($1.47 billion) in additional capitalization. Rosatom's investment program is currently 164 billion rubles ($4.83 billion); 73.3 billion rubles ($2.16 billion) is allocated from the federal budget, with 26 billion rubles ($766 million) in the form of loans. Despite Putin's largesse, however, Rosatom is facing financial difficulties, and Kiriyenko appealed to the prime minister for his organization to be able to issue bonds, saying, "The ability for infrastructure bonds is needed. We have prepared the corresponding proposal, but governmental (permission) is needed." In true capitalist fashion and in a not-so-subtle swipe at Russia's banks, Kiriyenko complained, "An obvious question is the loan interest rate. This is very important for the sector. The results of current talks with the banks indicate that even the most discounted rate will be about 16 percent annually. Building the nuclear plants at 16 percent interest is not possible. Ten percent is the maximum." Lastly, in a final flourish of salesmanship, the Rosatom boss urged that Putin push for swift approval of the federal program on new nuclear technologies aimed at development of a fourth generation of reactors, saying, "The program is ready, it has been agreed with everyone. In the near future the Economic Development Ministry will report on it to the government." One issue that apparently was not raised during the Kalinin discussions but permeates both Rosatom and the government's perceptions about the nation's nuclear program is that it is a source of foreign revenue, as nations considering nuclear-power generation look to Moscow for possible assistance. Worldwide, 30 countries operate 439 nuclear reactors for electricity generation, which collectively provide about 16 percent of the world's electricity production, while 11 nations are building 30 new nuclear-power facilities. Russia is eager to enter this market; while its involvement with Iran's Bushehr reactor is Russia's best-known nuclear diplomacy, Russia is also involved worldwide in the rush for nuclear business, from a tender to build reactors for Turkey's first nuclear power plant complex at Akkuyu on the Mediterranean to Nigeria. The ultimate potential prize, however, remains Russia's superpower neighbor China. Of China's 11 nuclear power plants, the oldest, Qingshan-1, only came online in 1991. While Western attention is focused on growing Chinese involvement in the global energy market, Beijing has already announced plans to spend $50 billion to build an additional 32 nuclear plants by 2020; Rosatom's involvement could generate far more revenue than issuing bonds in the deepest bear market in decades. Putin's ambitions notwithstanding, it is more than a little ironic that the world's second- and third-largest oil exporters, Russia and Iran, are pursuing nuclear-energy programs at a time when plummeting oil prices amid the global recession have tempered the global flush of enthusiasm of a year ago for nuclear power when oil prices hit record highs. Nuclear power has high capital costs and low variable costs, while with oil- and gas-fired plants, the opposite is true. In 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Ernest Moniz co-authored "The Future of Nuclear Power" and concluded that electricity generated by a nuclear plant was about 60 percent more expensive than power from traditional gas- and coal-driven plants and maintained several years later that there was no reason why the report's pricing conclusions would need to be changed substantially for today's market. Should Moniz's conclusions prove correct, then Kiriyenko is going to have to issue a lot more bonds in a crowded market, as last week Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said that Russia may raise foreign loans in 2010. Even worse, on April 14 Kudrin told a meeting of the Finance Ministry's collegiums, "We will have to revise the budget in 2010 to account for a projected drop in revenue of more than 30 percent compared with planned revenue this year," cutting Russian federal budget spending from 10.3 trillion rubles ($303.5 billion) to 9 trillion rubles ($265.1 billion). Things can only remain unsettled so long as the Russian government depends on energy revenues for the bulk of its income in the midst of a global recession. While estimates vary widely, both the International Monetary Fund and World Bank believe that hydrocarbon exports generate more than 60 percent of the Russian government's export revenues.

#### Nuclear war Filger 9 – Columnist and Founder – Global EconomicCrisis.com (Sheldon, 5/10/09, “Russian Economy Faces Disasterous Free Fall Contraction”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html)

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

#### **Russia is the nuclear power leader now – this is increasing their influence**

Alexeenkova 10 – managing director of the alternative investments department at Gazprombank (Marina V., 12/10/12, "Russia Flexing New Nuclear Might In Global Reactor, Fuel Markets," http://www.theenergydaily.com/Commentary/)

Years ago, the world feared Russia’s nuclear activities. These days, more and more countries are depending on the Russian nuclear sector—and likely will do so well into the future. In fact, Russia has been a world leader for years in peaceful nuclear energy. With more interest than ever in nuclear energy as the world seeks safe, efficient and clean alternatives to fossil fuels, Russia’s expanding nuclear activities offer a mutually beneficial opportunity for commercial and diplomatic cooperation in this growing field of alternative energy. During the past five years, Russia has dramatically increased its activity and presence in the global nuclear sector and currently controls around 17 percent of the global nuclear fuel market. As competitors from the U.S., Canada, France and Japan look on, Russian nuclear technologies have greatly advanced under the direction of Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation. By 2030, the country plans to expand its market share to 25 percent. This implies the expansion of Russia’s uranium mining, enrichment and fuel fabrication as well as increased participation by Russian companies in the construction of nuclear power plants around the globe, particularly in Asia. Already, Russia has negotiated an agreement for the construction of 12 reactors with India, which plans to increase the number of Russian-designed reactors it has from 19 to 25 in five years as its energy needs grow. Similar deals are under way in China, Vietnam, Eastern Europe and other regions. But beyond the tangible results of Russia’s nuclear expansion is an equally important geopolitical implication—that along with Russia’s nuclear deals come increased international cooperation with its customers and partners along both commercial and political lines. Furthermore, the long-term nature of nuclear partnerships means that these relationships will not be fleeting. For example, Russia’s recent agreements to build nuclear power plants in Vietnam and India are not one-off deals, but rather will require long-term cooperation for the construction, management and maintenance of the plants. Russia first got its foothold in the international nuclear energy sector in the otherwise trying years right after the Cold War, when it began to accumulate huge technological and research potential that placed Russia among the leading nuclear countries—where it remains today. The country now controls about 40 percent of the world’s uranium enrichment capacity—much more than it needs to service its domestic reactors. One of Russia’s first major nuclear deals in the post-Cold War era was the so-called Megatons to Megawatts 20-year agreement with the United States, which began in 1993. Under the deal, Russia began supplying diluted weapons-grade uranium to U.S. nuclear power plants. As a result of Megatons to Megawatts, power companies such as Pacific Gas & Electric and Constellation Energy have enjoyed the abundance of fuel that came onto the market at reduced prices, which has benefited their customers, their profit margins and their shareholders. The Nuclear Energy Institute estimates that former bomb material from Russia now accounts for 45 percent of the fuel for American nuclear reactors. Although some efforts are being made to extend the agreement between the two nations, which expires in 2013, it is clear that a new stage of U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation is dawning: direct commercial contracts between Russian nuclear producers and U.S. electricity generators. In 2009, Russia signed its first purely commercial contract to supply low-enriched uranium to U.S. utilities and plans to deliver directly to customers starting from 2013. Such direct market access for Russian fuel supplies will allow for life-long contracts between Russian suppliers and customers, including those in the U.S. as well as emerging markets such as India, China and Vietnam. Indeed, with the world turning to nuclear energy as a low-cost, proven alternative, Russia will play a leading role in making increased access to nuclear energy a reality. And as Russia’s emerging market peers continue their upward economic trajectory, it is safe to say the Russian nuclear industry will undoubtedly rise to meet their growing energy demands, thereby aligning these markets in more ways than one.

#### US interference results in numerous scenarios for nuclear war

**Cohen 10**—prof, Russian Studies and History, NYU. Prof emeritus, Princeton (Stephen, US-Russian Relations in an Age of American Triumphalism: An Interview with Stephen F. Cohen, 25 May 2010, http://www.thenation.com/article/us-russian-relations-age-american-triumphalism-interview-stephen-f-cohen,)

The third post-1991 conflict is stated like a mantra by American policymakers: Russia cannot have the sphere of influence it wants in the former Soviet territories. This issue, **the fundamental, underlying conflict in U.S.-Russian relations**, needs to be rethought and openly discussed. The United States had and has spheres of influence. We had the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America and tacitly cling to it even today. More to the point, the expansion of NATO is, of course, an expansion of the American sphere of influence, which brings America's military, political, and economic might to new member countries. Certainly, this has been the case since the 1990s, as NATO expanded across the former Soviet bloc, from Germany to the Baltic nations. All of these countries are now part of the U.S. sphere of influence, though Washington doesn't openly use this expression. So American policy is this: The United States can have spheres of influence but Russia cannot, not even in its own security neighborhood. Moscow understands this, and has reacted predictably. If U.S. policymakers and their accommodating media really care about American national security, which requires fulsome Russian cooperation in many areas, they would rethink this presumption. Instead, leaders like Senator McCain and Vice President Biden repeatedly visit Tblisi and Kiev to declare that Russia is not entitled to influence in those capitals while trying to tug those governments into NATO. Unless we want a **new, full-scale cold war** with Russia, we must ask what Moscow actually wants in former Soviet republics like Georgia and Ukraine. There are, of course, Russian political forces that would like to restore them to their Soviet status under Moscow’s hegemony. But for the Kremlin leadership, from Putin to Medvedev, their essential demand is an absence of pro-American military bases and governments in those neighboring countries. In a word, that they not become members of NATO. Is that unreasonable? Imagine Washington’s reaction if pro-Russian bases and governments suddenly began appearing in America's sphere, from Latin America and Mexico to Canada. Of course, there has been no such discussion in the United States. And that has created the fourth major conflict with Russia since 1991: Moscow's perception that U.S. policy has been based on an unrelenting, triumphalist double standard, as it has been. Washington can break solemn promises, but Moscow cannot. The United States can have large and expanding spheres of influence, but Russia can have none. Moscow is told to make its vast energy reserves available to all countries at fair-market prices, except to those governments Washington has recruited or is currently recruiting into NATO, such as the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia, which Moscow should supply at sharply below-market prices. Moscow is asked to support Washington's perceived national interests in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, but without considering that Moscow may have legitimately different security or economic interests in those places. And so it goes. Journal: What have been the consequences of this attitude toward Russia? Cohen: I think we've had an omen: the so-called "Russian-Georgian" war in August 2008. It's called the "Russian-Georgian" war, but was also a proxy American-Russian war. Washington created Saakashvili's Georgian regime and continues to support it. Washington created his fighting force and supplied it with American military minders. American leaders were in Tblisi in the days and weeks leading up to the war. Georgia fired the first shots, as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has confirmed. And since then Washington and the mainstream U.S. media have made excuses for what Georgia did by blaming Russia. What they should be focusing on instead is that this was the first ever American-Russian proxy war on Russia's own borders, potentially the most dangerous moment in American-Russian relations since the Cuban Missile Crisis. What would have happened, for example, if an American with or near Saakashvili's forces had been killed by the Russians? There would have been clamor in the United States for military retaliation. Or if Moscow thought, as it seemed to have at first, that the Georgian attack on South Ossetia would be backed by NATO forces if necessary? In July 2009, President Obama went to Moscow and told President Medvedev that Russia was a co-equal great power with legitimate national interests, implying that Washington's reckless policy that led to the Georgian war would end. A few days later, an American warship sailed into a Georgian port. Moscow wondered who sent it, and who is running current U.S. policy. Journal: Is the current U.S. policy toward Russia putting us in greater danger than during the Cold War? Cohen: The real concern I have with this "we won the Cold War" triumphalism is the mythology that we are safer today than we were when the Soviet Union existed. Though it is blasphemous to say so, we are not safer for several reasons, one being that the Soviet state kept the lid on very dangerous things. The Soviet Union was in control of its nuclear and related arsenals. Post-Soviet Russia is "sorta" in control, but "sorta" is not enough. There is no margin for error. Reagan's goal in the 1980s was not to end the Soviet Union, but to turn it into a permanent partner of the United States. He came very close to achieving that and deserves enormous credit. He did what had to be done by meeting Gorbachev half-way. But since 1991, the arrogance of American policymaking toward Russia has either kept the Cold War from being fully ended or started a new one. The greatest threats to our national security still reside in **Russia**. This is not because it's communist, but because it **is laden with** all these **nuclear, chemical, and biological devices**

**—that’s the threat**. The reaction of the second Bush administration was to junk decades of safe-guarding agreements with Moscow. It was the first time in modern times that we have had no nuclear control reduction agreement with the Russians. **What should worry us** every day and nightis the triumphalist notion **that nuclear** war is no longer possible. It **is now possible in even more ways than before, especially accidental ones**. Meanwhile, the former Soviet territories remain a Wal-Mart of dirty material and know-how. If terrorists ever explode a dirty device in the United States, even a small one, the material is likely to come from the former Soviet Union. The Nunn-Lugar Act (1992) was the best program Congress ever enacted to help Russia secure its nuclear material and know-how, a major contribution to American national security. But no one in Washington connects the dots. Take Senator Lugar himself. He seems not to understand that we need Russia's complete cooperation to make his own legislation fully successful, but he repeatedly speaks undiplomatically, even in ugly ways, about Russia’s leaders, thereby limiting their cooperation and undermining his own legacy. In other words, to have a nuclear relationship with Russia that will secure our national security, we must have a fully cooperative, trusting political relationship with Moscow. That’s why all the talk about a replacement for the expired START agreement, which Obama has been having trouble reaching with the Kremlin, is half-witted. Even if the two sides agree, and even if the Senate and Russian Duma ratify a new treaty, the agreement will be unstable because the political relationship is bad and growing worse. Evidently, no one in the Administration, Congress, or the mainstream media, or, I should add in the think tanks, can connect these dots.

## 2NC – Case

### Clean Tech Leadership 2NC

#### Only subsidy independence can win the clean tech leadership race --- it’s key to access the international markets.

**Jenkins**, 10/26/**2011** (Jesse – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute, A Clean Energy Comeback Strategy, The Breakthrough Institute, p. <http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/a_clean_energy_comeback_strate>)

Without substantial innovation to improve the performance and reduce the cost of clean energy technologies, the promise that the clean energy sector might become economically viable, much less a cornerstone of American economic revival, will never be realized. The real clean energy race is thus to invent, commercialize, progressively improve, and mass-produce cheap and reliable clean energy technologies that can compete on cost not just with international competitors but also with fossil fuels. In short, the race is to make clean energy cheap and subsidy-independent. The ultimate economic prize is a $5 trillion global energy market expected to double over the next forty years. That economic opportunity dwarfs the value of today's subsidy-dependent and often-volatile clean energy markets. For security, economic, and environmental reasons, the global energy system is modernizing and diversifying. Developing and developed nations alike will move toward new forms of advanced energy technologies that reduce dependence on foreign nations, insulate their economies from volatile energy markets, and are cleaner and thus less costly from a public health perspective. Supplying this massive global market with reliable and affordable clean energy technologies thus represents one of the most significant market opportunities of the 21st century. In this clean energy race, pole position is still up for grabs.

### Costs Outweigh 2NC

#### Previous attempts prove solvency is doomed – nuclear can’t compete

Lovins, 10 – Chair and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute (Amory B, 10/25. "Nuclear Socialism." Weekly Standard, VOL. 16, NO. 06. http://[www.weeklystandard.com/articles/nuclear-socialism\_508830.html?page=1](http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/nuclear-socialism_508830.html?page=1))

With such juicy incentives, why won’t private investors finance reactors? In 2005-08, with the strongest subsidies, capital markets, and nuclear politics in history, why couldn’t 34 proposed reactors raise any private capital? Because there’s **no business case**. As a recent study by Citibank U.K. is titled “New Nuclear—the Economics Say No.” That’s why central planners bought all 61 reactors now under construction worldwide. None were free-market transactions. Subsidies can’t reverse bleak fundamentals. **A defibrillated corpse will jump but won’t revive**. American taxpayers already reimburse nuclear power developers for legal and regulatory delays. A unique law caps liability for accidents at a present value only one-third that of BP’s $20 billion trust fund for oil-spill costs; any bigger damages fall on citizens. Yet the competitive risks facing new reactors are uninsured, high, and escalating. Since 2000, as nuclear power’s cost projections have more than tripled, its share of global electricity generation has fallen from 17 percent to 13 percent. That of cogeneration (making electricity together with useful heat in factories or buildings) and renewables (excluding big hydropower projects) rose from 13 percent to 18 percent. These bite-sized, modular, quickly built projects—with financial risks, costs, and subsidies generally below nuclear’s and declining​—now dominate global power investments. Last year, renewables (wind, water, solar, geothermal), excluding large hydroelectric dams, attracted $131 billion of private capital and added 52 billion watts. Global nuclear output fell for the past three years, capacity for two.

#### No global adoption – waste and costs

Biello, 12 – Scientific American's associate editor for environment and energy (David, 3/21. “Can Fast Reactors Speedily Solve Plutonium Problems?” https://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=fast-reactors-to-consume-plutonium-and-nuclear-waste)

That additional level of transmutation might prove too costly, both in terms of getting the technology licensed to operate in the U.K. and in constructing the reactor itself. Such fast reactors are more expensive than even traditional reactors, such as Westinghouse's new AP-1000 under construction in China and the U.S., which are estimated to cost roughly $7 billion apiece. Conventional light-water reactors can also "consume" plutonium, if need be. "If I was going to try to get rid of 100 tons of plutonium, I'd burn it in a light-water reactor," Cochran says, by making it into the mixed oxide fuels. And "the cheapest thing to do is vitrify it [convert it to glass] and mix it with other nuclear waste." Plus, the U.K. has a poor record in the past with its own experimental fast reactor designs—the Dounreay Fast Reactor and the Prototype Fast Reactor—including multiple sodium leaks. Dounreay also suffered an explosion at its dumping ground for used sodium coolant that may have contributed to radioactive particles from spent fuel turning up on nearby beaches. The Dounreay and Prototype cleanup and decommissioning continue today, despite both having been shut down for decades. Originally, such fast reactors were developed to solve a problem that never panned out: scarcity in the global supply of uranium. The idea was to create fuel within the reactors themselves once fission began, in effect making more than they consumed. But, factoring in inflation, uranium prices remain the same today as they were at the dawn of the nuclear era. "Like all minerals, improvements in the efficiency of extraction and the ability to dig for deeper ores outpaces the depletion of the resource over 100 years or more," Cochran notes. "Economically, fast reactors are not competitive and they're never going to be competitive." "We're not going to run out of uranium," Loewen admits. "Here's a solution for this stuff that's piled up." Ultimately, however, the core problem may be that such new reactors don't eliminate the nuclear waste that has piled up so much as transmute it. Even with a fleet of such fast reactors, nations would nonetheless require an ultimate home for radioactive waste, one reason that a 2010 M.I.T. report on spent nuclear fuel dismissed such fast reactors. Or, as Cochran puts it: "If you want to get rid of milk, don't feed it to cows."

#### Uncertainty guarantees high costs – blocks adoption

**Fahring, 11** – J.D. from the University of Texas School of Law, law clerk at the Texas Eleventh Court of Appeals interested in energy law, environmental law, and tax law (T.L., “NOTE: Nuclear Uncertainty: A Look at the Uncertainties of a U.S. Nuclear Renaissance.” Texas Environmental Law Journal, 41 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 279, Lexis.)

The rising projected costs of nuclear construction in the United States may also be related to rising costs for materials, labor, and capital. From 2000 to 2008, the cost of building any type of new plant more than doubled. [n151](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n151) Among the factors behind this [\*293] increase: high international demand for generating equipment, rising labor costs, and rising costs for construction materials (cement, steel, and copper). [n152](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n152) The costs associated with nuclear construction, however, are increasing at a faster rate than construction costs for its fossil fuel rivals. [n153](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n153) From 2003 to 2008, the projected cost of nuclear power plant construction increased at a rate of fifteen percent a year. [n154](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n154) In part, the greater increase in costs for nuclear construction reflects the atrophy of the industry in the United States over the last few decades. [n155](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n155) For instance, two decades ago the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) licensed 400 nuclear suppliers and 900 sub-suppliers in the United States; as of 2011, ASME license only eighty suppliers and 200 sub-suppliers. [n156](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n156) Moreover, world-wide forging supply of reactor components is limited. [n157](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n157) Today, only two companies are qualified to supply heavy forgings needed for nuclear construction: Japan Steel Works and Creusot Forge, and only Japan Steel Works can manufacture ultra-heavy forgings. [n158](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n158) The limited supply of ultra-heavy forgings alone could double or triple nuclear construction costs. [n159](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n159) In addition, the lack of skilled labor for nuclear construction could prolong construction times and increase costs. [n160](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n160) Further increasing costs of nuclear construction is the cost of capital. Technical uncertainty, input-cost uncertainty, and operating and revenue uncertainty associated with nuclear power combine to increase the cost of capital in financing nuclear construction. [n161](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n161) For instance, Standard & Poor argued in 2005 that "the industry's legacy of cost growth, technological problems, and cumbersome political and regulatory oversight and the newer risks brought about by competition ... may have kept the credit risk too high for even [federal legislation providing loan guarantees] to overcome." [n162](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n162) D. Absence of Recent Nuclear Construction in the United States As noted above, the history of nuclear power has led to a fourth factor causing uncertainty to developers: the fact that it has been over a decade since the last nuclear power was constructed to completion in the United States. [n163](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n163) Current projections of the cost for new construction in the United States rely on the costs of recent foreign builds. [n164](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n164) Differences in regulation, access to alternative technologies, and public acceptance between the United States and these foreign countries render the accuracy of [\*294] projections based on foreign builds uncertain. [n165](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n165) Because the amounts of time, effort, and materials needed to build a new nuclear plant in the United States are unclear, the lack of recent U.S. nuclear construction represents a technical uncertainty to developers. [n166](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347308966718&returnToKey=20_T15488658602&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.346870.9370703187" \l "n166)

### Long Timeframe 2NC

#### The demonstration project alone takes a decade – can’t solve fast enough to solve the energy crisis

ANS 5 (American Nuclear Society, “Fast Reactor Technology: A Path to Long-Term Energy Sustainability.” November, http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps74.pdf)

Reaping the full benefits of fast reactor technology will take a decade or more for a demonstration reactor, followed by buildup of a fleet of operating power stations. For now and in the intermediate-term future, the looming short-term energy shortage must be met by building improved, proven thermal-reactor power plants. To assure longer-term energy sustainability and security, the American Nuclear Society sees a need for cooperative international efforts with the goal of building a fast reactor demonstration unit with onsite reprocessing of spent fuel.

### Nat Gas Blocks 2NC

#### Prefer our evidence – recent trends decisively conclude neg, but their authors always think that the Renaissance is around the corner

Maize 12 (Kennedy, Staff Writer – POWER Magazine, “A Bumpy Road for Nukes,” 8-6, POWERnews, http://www.powermag.com/nuclear/4859.html)

It’s been a rough road for nuclear advocates in the U.S. of late, although nothing seems to dent the Pollyanna armor of the nuclear crowd, always appearing to believe a revival is just over the horizon and headed into view. Here are a few fraught developments for the nuclear business that suggest the positive vision just might be a mirage. \* GE CEO Jeff Immelt in a recent interview with the Financial Times revealed a surprising and somewhat uncharacteristic realism with regard to the company’s nuclear future and that of its partner in radioactivity, Hitachi. In London for the Summer Olympics, Immelt told a reporter for the FT, “It’s really a gas and wind world today. When I talk to the guys who run the oil companies, they say look, they’re finding more gas all the time. It’s just hard to justify nuclear, really hard. Gas is so cheap, and at some point, really, economics rule.” For the nuclear industry, economics has always been the fundamental enemy – not the green-tinged, hairy anti-nuke activists, but the folks with the green eye shades, sharp pencils and, today, even sharper spreadsheets. The nuclear execs long have pursued governments as their bulwark against markets, and that has often worked. Today, as Immelt notes, gas has made the market forces so overwhelming, at least in those places such as the U.S. where gas is astonishingly abundant, that even government likely can’t come to the rescue of nuclear power. Could that have something to do with the abject failure of the 2005 Energy Policy Act’s loan guarantee provisions, which have not worked for renewables any better than they have worked for nukes? Indeed, the threat of gas is at least as potentially toxic for many wind and solar projects as it is for nuclear and coal new build. \* In Georgia, the Southern Company is facing what looks like growing problems with its Vogtle project, which aims for two new nuclear units using the unproven but promising Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design. With its federal loan in jeopardy (Southern says it can go ahead without taxpayer funds) and the project running behind schedule and over budget, the Atlanta-based utility now faces lawsuits brought by the reactor vendor and the construction contractor Shaw Group. The amount in dispute, some $29 million, is tiny compared to the multi-billion-dollar price tag for the project. But it may be revealing of ruptures in the deal. Robert Marritz, an energy lawyer and veteran industry observer, publisher of ElectricityPolicy.com, commented that “the very filing of a lawsuit at this stage of the first nuclear plant construction in decades is stunning, reflecting stresses in a relationship that should, one would think, be contained and resolved rather than boiling over into public view.” Indeed, the parties are also engaged in a larger, perhaps nastier, dispute involving $800 million that has not gotten much public exposure. And that’s real money. \* Moving to California, the long-running saga of Edison International’s San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS, how’s that for an inept acronym?) continues, with little clarity in sight. The plant has been out of service since January as a result of unexpected and still unexplained tube wear in the plant’s steam generators. According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, the outage is costing the utility about $1.5 million a day just in lost revenue. The cost to the state in jeopardized reliability hasn’t been calculated, although Edison has started up mothballed gas capacity to fill the supply gap. There is no firm date for restart at the nuclear plant. In the meantime, the California Public Utilities Commission is planning a formal investigation of the outage and Edison’s response, but recently decided to delay that until the utility files a legally-required report with the CPUC November 1. CPUC President Mike Peevey is a former executive with the Los Angeles-based utility.

#### Gas destroys nuclear – more predictable, cheaper, and faster

Smith 12 (Rebecca, Staff Writer, “Cheap Natural Gas Unplugs U.S. Nuclear-Power Revival,” 3-15, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304459804577281490129153610.html)

What killed the revival wasn't last year's nuclear accident in Japan, nor was it a soft economy that dented demand for electricity. Rather, a shale-gas boom flooded the U.S. market with cheap natural gas, offering utilities a cheaper, less risky alternative to nuclear technology. "It's killed off new coal and now it's killing off new nuclear," says David Crane, chief executive of NRG Energy Inc., NRG +3.58% a power-generation company based in Princeton, N.J. "Gas has come along at just the right time to upset everything." Across the country, utilities are turning to natural gas to generate electricity, with 258 plants expected to be built from 2011 through 2015, federal statistics indicate. Not only are gas-fired plants faster to build than reactors, they are much less expensive. The U.S. Energy Information Administration says it costs about $978 per kilowatt of capacity to build and fuel a big gas-fired power plant, compared with $5,339 per kilowatt for a nuclear plant. Already, the inexpensive natural gas is putting downward pressure on electricity costs for consumers and businesses. The EIA has forecast that the nation will add 222 gigawatts of generating capacity between 2010 and 2035—equivalent to one-fifth of the current U.S. capacity. The biggest chunk of that addition—58%—will be fired by natural gas, it said, followed by renewable sources, including hydropower, at 31%, then coal at 8% and nuclear power at 4%. "What utility doesn't want cheap fuel?" says Steve Piper, associate director of energy fundamentals at SNL Financial, a research company. He predicts natural gas will remain the "default fuel" for as long as gas production remains high and prices stay low.

### No Workforce 2NC

#### Lack of manufacturing capacity and workforce dooms nuclear investment

Grunwald, 11 – TIME's senior national correspondent (Michael, 3/25. “The Real Cost of U.S. Nuclear Power.” http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2059603,00.html)

Nevertheless, investors refuse to bet on nukes. The steady increases in electricity demand that were supposed to justify new reactors have been wiped out by the global recession, and energy-efficiency advances could keep demand flat. Natural gas prices have plummeted, Congress appears unlikely to put a price on carbon, and the U.S. still lacks a plan for nuclear waste. It also turns out that building safe places to smash atoms is hard, especially after such a long hiatus. The U.S. has lost most of its nuclear manufacturing capacity; it would have to import Japanese steel forgings and other massive components, while training a new generation of nuclear workers. And though industry lobbyists have persuaded the NRC to ease onerous regulations governing everything from fire safety to cooling systems, it's still incredibly tough to get a reactor built.

#### Can’t solve – lack of skilled workers

**Johnson, 11** – deputy editor at the Council on Foreign Relations (Toni, 3/18. “Nuclear Power Expansion Challenges.” http://www.cfr.org/united-states/nuclear-power-expansion-challenges/p16886#p2)

Skilled Workers. Another issue both for construction and operation of reactors is lack of trained personnel. In the United States, 35 percent of nuclear workers will reach retirement age (US News) within the next few years. University majors and other educational programs supporting the industry have diminished in the past two decades, as has the number of students going into such programs.

### General Framing 2NC

#### View their ev w/ skepticism – nuclear lobby are hacks.

Todhunter 9/14 [Colin, Global Research, Nuclear Power: The Energy of Protest. The Future could be Renewable September 14, 2012 http://www.globalresearch.ca/nuclear-power-the-energy-of-protest-the-future-could-be-renewable/?utm\_source=rss&utm\_medium=rss&utm\_campaign=nuclear-power-the-energy-of-protest-the-future-could-be-renewable]

Proliferation concerns aside, the role that the powerful pro-nuclear lobby plays in shaping the debate about nuclear energy should not be underestimated. The US Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is described by Dr Helen Caldicott as the propaganda wing for the US nuclear industry, which spends millions of dollars annually to engineer public opinion. The NEI forwards the message that nuclear energy is clean, safe and cheap and in promoting this message has often attacked opponents and targeted legislators and policy makers via ‘independent’ reports, phoney claims and ‘donations’. Journalism Professor Karl Grossman of the State University of New York suggests the misinformation from General Electric and Westinghouse, the ‘Coke and Pepsi’ of the nuclear industry (who will incidentally both benefit enormously from India’s lucrative, multi billion dollar expanding nuclear sector), have made the money put into PR and lobbying by the tobacco companies appear miniscule. Perhaps such a level of spending and propaganda is not surprising because Harvey Wasserman, writer and activist, says this is an industry that can’t solve its waste problems, can’t operate without leaking radiation, can’t pay for itself and can’t get private insurance against terror or error.

### IFR’s Not Solve – 2NC Framing

#### IFR’s are like every new reactor in history – costlier, slower, and less feasible than claimed on paper – view their evidence with a high degree of skepticism, empirics are on our side

Lovins, 9 – co-founder, chairman and chief scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute (Amory B, 3/21. ““New” nuclear reactors, same old story.” http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2009-07\_NuclearSameOldStory)

No new kind of reactor is likely to be much, if at all, cheaper than today’s LWRs, which remain grossly uncompetitive and are getting more so despite five decades of maturation. “New reactors” are precisely the “paper reactors” Admiral Rickover described in 1953:

An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics: (1) It is simple. (2) It is small. (3) It is cheap. (4) It is light. (5) It can be built very quickly. (6) It is very flexible in purpose. (7) Very little development will be required. It will use off-the-shelf components. (8) The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now.

On the other hand a practical reactor can be distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) It is being built now. (2) It is behind schedule. (3) It requires an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. (4) It is very expensive. (5) It takes a long time to build because of its engineering development problems. (6) It is large. (7) It is heavy. (8) It is complicated.

*Every* new type of reactor in history has been costlier, slower, and harder than projected. IFRs’ low pres­sure, different safety profile, high temperature, and potentially higher thermal efficiency (if its helium turbines didn’t misbehave as they have in all previous reactor projects) come with countervailing disadvantages and costs that advocates assume away, contrary to all experience.

### Doesn’t Solve 2NC

#### Nuclear doesn’t solve warming –

#### A) Not cost-competitive and can’t produce enough hydrogen

Ahearne et al, 12 – adjunct scholar for Resources for the Future and an adjunct professor of engineering at Duke University (John F, February. Federation of American Scientists. “The Future of Nuclear Power in the United States.” http://www.fas.org/pubs/\_docs/Nuclear\_Energy\_Report-lowres.pdf)

In response to mitigating climate change, many countries will ﬁnd that nuclear power is neither the least-cost nor the quickest approach to reducing carbon dioxide emissions.1 Until nuclear energy is able to produce hydrogen or process heat, or until transportation sectors are electriﬁed, nuclear energy’s potential contribution to reducing carbon dioxide emissions will be somewhat limited.

#### B) Takes too long and can’t reduce emissions

**Madsen and Dutzik, 9** – Policy Analyst at Frontier Group and senior policy analyst with Frontier Group (Travis and Tony, November. With Bernadette Del Chiaro and Rob Sargent of the Environment America Research & Policy Center. “Generating Failure: How Building Nuclear Power Plants Would Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming.” http://www.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/Generating-Failure---Environment-America---Web\_0.pdf)

Building 100 new nuclear reactors would happen too slowly to reduce global warming pollution in the near-term, and would actually increase the scale of emission cuts required in the future. At best, the nuclear industry could have a new reactor up and running by 2016, assuming that construction could be completed in four years. This pace would be faster than 80 to 95 percent of all reactors completed during the last wave of reactor construction in the United States. 70 If construction follows historical patterns, it could take nine years after a license is issued before the first reactor is up and running – into the 2020s. Under this very plausible scenario, new nuclear power could make no contribution toward reducing U.S. emissions of global warming pollution by 2020 – despite the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars for the construction of nuclear power plants. And even if the industry completed 100 new reactors by 2030, which is highly unlikely, these reactors would reduce cumulative power plant emissions of carbon dioxide over the next two decades by only 12 percent below business as usual, when a reduction of more than 70 percent is called for. In other words, 100 new nuclear reactors would be too little, too late to successfully meet our goals for limiting the severity of global warming.

#### IFRs too costly and too long term to solve warming – also trades off with short-term renewable tech that solves better

Cochran 9 (Thomas, Senior Scientist, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, “Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing; To receive testimony on nuclear energy development; Testimony by Thomas Cochran, Senior Scientist, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council” March 18, 2009, Congressional Documents and Publications)

B. Spent Fuel Reprocessing. The federal government should not encourage or support commercial spent fuel reprocessing. Putting aside for the moment the serious proliferation and security concerns involved in any future global shift toward reprocessing, it's clear that combating climate change is an urgent task that requires near term investments yielding huge decarbonization dividends on a 5 to 20 year timescale. For thermal reactors, the closed fuel cycle (spent fuel reprocessing and recycling plutonium) is unlikely ever to be less costly than the once-through fuel cycle, even assuming significant carbon controls. But setting aside such near-term cost barriers, commercial viability for a closed fuel cycle employing fast reactors is an even longer-term proposition. So even fervent advocates of nuclear power need to put the reprocessing agenda aside for a few decades, and focus on swiftly deploying and improving the low-carbon energy solutions. Think about it. In pursuit of closing the fuel cycle, the U.S. government could easily spend on the order of $ 150 billion over 15 years just to get to the starting line of large-scale commercialization. But all that spending will not yield one additional megawatt of low-carbon electricity beyond what could be obtained by sticking with the current once-through cycle, much less by investing that $150 billion in renewable and efficient energy technologies. Spent-fuel reprocessing, plutonium recycle, and fast reactor waste transmutation are currently uneconomical, higher-risk, 100-year answers to an urgent climate question that now requires low-risk 5 to 20 year solutions. For now, Congress and the new Administration should terminate funding for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and its associated efforts to close the nuclear fuel cycle and introduce fast burner reactors in the United States. At any point along the way, Mr. Chairman, we can revisit this issue to assess whether there may be truly disruptive innovations in nuclear technology that would alter this negative assessment, and induce us to view closing the fuel cycle as a more costeffective pathway to decarbonization than the host of cheaper alternatives we have available to us today.

### Transportation Outweighs 2NC

#### Can’t solve without reducing transportation emissions – leading cause of warming

**Gordon, 10** – nonresident senior associate in Carnegie’s Energy and Climate Program, where her research focuses on climate, energy, and transportation issues in the United States and China (Deborah, December. “The Role of Transportation in Driving Climate Disruption.” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/transport\_climate\_disruption.pdf)

Through the twenty-first century, on-road transportation is expected to be a leading climate-forcing activity worldwide. Cars and trucks emit almost no sulfates (cooling agents) but are major emitters of carbon dioxide, black carbon, and ozone—all of which cause warming and are detrimental to human health. U.S. on-road transportation is responsible for 40 percent of global on-road climate warming (“radiative forcing” in climate terms). U.S. on-road transportation is projected to have a net radiative forcing of 66 mWm-2 on a twenty-year horizon, as shown in Figure 11. U.S. on-road transportation represents nearly half (41 percent) of global radiative forcing in this sector over a twenty-year timeframe.

#### Can’t solve transportation sector – that’s key to warming and oil dependence which is what Klare is about.

Carr and Fernandes 8 [Jessie Carr and Dulce Fernande, staff of Nuclear information and resource center, http://www.nirs.org/falsepromises.pdf]

The nuclear industry claims that nuclear power is the only energy source that can effectively replace fossil fuels. But, building new nuclear facilities does nothing to address the transportation sector, which is responsible for a large part of GHG emissions. For example, electricity generation in the US is responsible for only 40 percent of the country’s total CO2 emissions.25 Likewise, transportation is the primary sector responsible for global oil consumption (corresponding to more than half of the oil consumed worldwide everyday), generating a full 40 percent of global CO2 emissions. As oil accounts for only seven percent of worldwide electricity generation, the transportation sector is a major source of GHGs and would not be affected by any changes in nuclear power generating capacity.26

### Warming Irreversible 2NC

#### Low threshold—less than 2 degrees is sufficient to cause their impacts

Harvey 11 (Fiona, Environment Reporter – Guardian, 11/9, “World headed for irreversible climate change in five years, IEA warns,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

Climate scientists estimate that global warming of 2C above pre-industrial levels marks the limit of safety, beyond which climate change becomes catastrophic and irreversible. Though such estimates are necessarily imprecise, warming of as little as 1.5C could cause dangerous rises in sea levels and a higher risk of extreme weather – the limit of 2C is now inscribed in international accords, including the partial agreement signed at Copenhagen in 2009, by which the biggest developed and developing countries for the first time agreed to curb their greenhouse gas output.

#### Too little, too late

Harris 9 (Richard, Science Reporter for National Public Radio, Peabody Award Winner, American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism Award, “Global Warming Irreversible, Study Says,” January 26th, NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903)

Climate change is essentially irreversible, according to a sobering new scientific study. As carbon dioxide emissions continue to rise, the world will experience more and more long-term environmental disruption. The damage will persist even when, and if, emissions are brought under control, says study author Susan Solomon, who is among the world's top climate scientists. "We're used to thinking about pollution problems as things that we can fix," Solomon says. "Smog, we just cut back and everything will be better later. Or haze, you know, it'll go away pretty quickly." That's the case for some of the gases that contribute to climate change, such as methane and nitrous oxide. But as Solomon and colleagues suggest in a new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, it is not true for the most abundant greenhouse gas: carbon dioxide. Turning off the carbon dioxide emissions won't stop global warming. "People have imagined that if we stopped emitting carbon dioxide that the climate would go back to normal in 100 years or 200 years. What we're showing here is that's not right. It's essentially an irreversible change that will last for more than a thousand years," Solomon says. This is because the oceans are currently soaking up a lot of the planet's excess heat — and a lot of the carbon dioxide put into the air. The carbon dioxide and heat will eventually start coming out of the ocean. And that will take place for many hundreds of years.

### No Resource Wars 2NC

#### **Prefer our evidence – every statistical study delinks resource scarcity and violence – their authors cherry-pick examples – that’s Pinker.**

#### Resource ‘conflicts’ don’t escalate – negotiations and compromise are the norm

Goldstone 2 (Jack, Professor of Public Policy – George Mason, “Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict”, Journal of International Affairs, 56, Fall, p. 123)

Should we therefore dismiss the environment as a cause of conflict? No, although I believe we can be free of the fear that environmental decay will unleash wars and revolutions across the globe. Rather, what research has shown is that although environmental issues do cause international and domestic conflicts, they are of the kind that are **generally settled by negotiation and compromise** and do not lead to taking up arms. The reason for that is straightforward. Where the problem faced by two groups, or two nations, is over the degradation or depletion of an environmental resource, war neither solves the problem (it cannot make more of the resource) nor is it an economically efficient way to redistribute the resource (the costs of war almost invariably far outweigh the cost of gaining alternative resources or paying more for a share of the resource). For example, if two nations have a conflict over sharing river water—such as India and Bangladesh over the Ganges, Israel and Jordan over the river Jordan[ [12](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=106&sid=b52b09a2-e198-49a9-9721-f665c7920b18%40sessionmgr109#bib12#bib12)] or Hungary and Slovakia over the Danube they may threaten violence but in fact are most likely to produce non-violent resolution through negotiation or arbitration rather than war (and indeed all of these conflicts led to treaties or international arbitration. The reason is that for one party to insist on all the water would in fact be a casus belli; and to risk a war to simply increase one's access to water is economically foolhardy. Throughout the world, the main use of freshwater (over three-quarters) is for irrigation to produce food. A reduction in water can be compensated either by adopting more efficient means of irrigation (drip rather than ditch); by switching to less water-intensive crops (dry grains rather than rice; tree crops rather than grains); or by importing food rather than producing it. All of these steps, though costly, are far, far, less costly than armed conflict. Thus for both the country with the ability to take more water and the country dependent on downstream flows, the issue will be how to use and negotiate use of the resource most efficiently; resort to war would inevitably be more costly than any gains that could be made from increased access to the resource. No nations have ever gone to war strictly over access to water; nor are any likely to do so in the future.

#### History proves – no resource wars

Victor 7 (David G., Professor of Law – Stanford Law School and Director – Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, “What Resource Wars?”, The National Interest, 11-12, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020)

If resource wars are actually rare-and when they do exist, they are part of a complex of causal factors-then much of the conventional wisdom about resource policies needs fresh scrutiny. A full-blown new strategy is beyond this modest essay, but here in the United States, at least three lines of new thinking are needed. First, the United States needs to think differently about the demands that countries with exploding growth are making on the world's resources. It must keep their rise in perspective, as their need for resources is still, on a per capita basis, much smaller than typical Western appetites. And what matters most is that the United States must focus on how to accommodate these countries' peaceful rise and their inevitable need for resources. Applied to China this means getting the Chinese government to view efficient markets as the best way to obtain resources-not only because such an approach leads to correct pricing (which encourages energy efficiency as resources become more dear), but also because it transforms all essential resources into commodities, which makes their particular physical location less important than the overall functioning of the commodity market. All that will, in turn, make resource wars even less likely because it will create common interests among all the countries with the greatest demand for resources. It will transform the resource problem from a zero-sum struggle to the common task of managing markets. Most policymakers agree with such general statements, but the actual practice of U.S. policy has largely undercut this goal. Saber-rattling about CNOOC's attempt to buy Unocal-along with similar fear-mongering around foreign control of ports and new rules that seem designed to trigger reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States when foreigners try to buy American-owned assets-sends the signal that going out will also be the American approach, rather than letting markets function freely. Likewise, one of the most important actions in the oil market is to engage China and other emerging countries fully in the International Energy Agency-which is the world's only institution for managing the oil commodity markets in times of crisis-yet despite wide bipartisan consensus on that goal, nearly nothing is ever done to execute such a policy. Getting China to source commodities through markets rather than mercantilism will be relatively easy because Chinese policymakers, as well as the leadership of state enterprises that invest in natural resource projects, already increasingly think that way. **The sweep of history points against** classic **resource wars**. Whereas colonialism created long, oppressive and often war-prone supply chains for resources such as oil and rubber, most resources today are fungible commodities. That means it is almost always cheaper and more reliable to buy them in markets.

### No Impact 2NC

#### Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

#### Warming will be slow, there’s no impact, and adaptation solves

William Yeatman 9, Energy Policy Analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, February 3, 2009, “Global Warming 101: Science,” online: <http://www.globalwarming.org/2009/02/03/global-warming-101-science/>

A “planetary emergency—a crisis that threatens the survival of our civilization and the habitability of the Earth”—that is how former Vice President Al Gore describes global warming. Most environmental groups preach the same message. So do many journalists. So do some scientists.

In fact, at the 2008 annual meeting of Nobel Prize winners in Lindau, Germany, half the laureates on the climate change panel disputed the so-called consensus on global warming.

You have probably heard the dire warnings many times. Carbon dioxide (CO2) from mankind’s use of fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas is building up in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas—it traps heat that would otherwise escape into outer space. Al Gore warns that global warming caused by carbon dioxide emissions could increase sea levels by 20 feet, spin up deadly hurricanes. It could even plunge Europe into an ice age.

Science does not support these and other scary predictions, which Gore and his allies repeatedly tout as a “scientific consensus.” Global warming is real and carbon dioxide emissions are contributing to it, but it is not a crisis. Global warming in the 21 st century is likely to be modest, and the net impacts may well be beneficial in some places. Even in the worst case, humanity will be much better off in 2100 than it is today.

The following is a summary of key points:

Average Annual Heat-Related Mortality: People will not drop like flies from heat waves in a warming world. Heat-related mortality will continue to decline as the world warms.

Far more people die each year from excess cold than from excess heat.

Global warming will not make air pollution worse.

Global warming will not lead to malaria epidemics in Northern Hemisphere countries.

Contrary to Gore, no “strong, new scientific consensus is emerging” that global warming is making hurricanes stronger.

Global Death & Death Rates Due to Extreme Events, 1900-2004: Since the 1920s, death rates related to extreme weather declined by more than 98 percent globally. The impression conveyed by An Inconvenient Truth—that global warming is making the world a more dangerous place—is false.

Gore’s warning that global warming could shut down the Atlantic branch of the oceanic thermohaline circulation (THC) and plunge Europe into an ice age is science fiction.

Gore’s warning that sea levels could rise by 20 feet is science fiction. Sea level rise in the 21 st century is likely to be measured in inches, not in feet.

The world warmed at a rate of 0.17°C per decade since 1978, according to the temperature record compiled by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Since most climate models predict that warming will occur at a constant—that is, non-accelerating—rate, it is reasonable to expect that global warming in the 21 st century will be close to the low end of the IPCC’s forecast range, of 1.4°C to 5.8°C.

The actual warming rate may be only half the 0.17°C per decade rate implied in the IPCC temperature record, because the IPCC has not adequately filtered out the warming biases from local factors like urbanization and improper management of monitoring equipment.

A warming near the low end of the IPCC range would produce both benefits—longer growing seasons, more rainfall, fewer cold deaths—and harms—more heat waves, more drought, some acceleration of sea level rise—but nothing resembling catastrophe.

Even in the IPCC high-end warming forecasts, human welfare would improve dramatically over the next 100 years. In the IPCC fossil-fuel-intensive development scenario, per capita GDP in developing countries increases from $875 per year in 1990 to $43,000 per year in 2100—even after taking into account an additional 110 years of global warming. Even in the IPCC worst-case scenario, global warming is not the civilization-ending catastrophe Al Gore purports it to be.

#### No impact to warming

Idso and Idso 11 (Craig D., Founder and Chairman of the Board – Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, and Sherwood B., President – Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, “Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future Pursuing the Prudent Path,” February, http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/ prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf)

As presently constituted, earth’s atmosphere contains just slightly less than 400 ppm of the colorless and odorless gas we call carbon dioxide or CO2. That’s only four-hundredths of one percent. Consequently, even if the air's CO2 concentration was tripled, carbon dioxide would still comprise only a little over one tenth of one percent of the air we breathe, which is far less than what wafted through earth’s atmosphere eons ago, when the planet was a virtual garden place. Nevertheless, a small increase in this minuscule amount of CO2 is frequently predicted to produce a suite of dire environmental consequences, including dangerous global warming, catastrophic sea level rise, reduced agricultural output, and the destruction of many natural ecosystems, as well as dramatic increases in extreme weather phenomena, such as droughts, floods and hurricanes. As strange as it may seem, these frightening future scenarios are derived from a single source of information: the ever-evolving computer-driven climate models that presume to reduce the important physical, chemical and biological processes that combine to determine the state of earth’s climate into a set of mathematical equations out of which their forecasts are produced. But do we really know what all of those complex and interacting processes are? And even if we did -- which we don't -- could we correctly reduce them into manageable computer code so as to produce reliable forecasts 50 or 100 years into the future? Some people answer these questions in the affirmative. However, as may be seen in the body of this report, real-world observations fail to confirm essentially all of the alarming predictions of significant increases in the frequency and severity of droughts, floods and hurricanes that climate models suggest should occur in response to a global warming of the magnitude that was experienced by the earth over the past two centuries as it gradually recovered from the much-lower-than-present temperatures characteristic of the depths of the Little Ice Age. And other observations have shown that the rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations associated with the development of the Industrial Revolution have actually been good for the planet, as they have significantly enhanced the plant productivity and vegetative water use efficiency of earth's natural and agro-ecosystems, leading to a significant "greening of the earth." In the pages that follow, we present this oft-neglected evidence via a review of the pertinent scientific literature. In the case of the biospheric benefits of atmospheric CO2 enrichment, we find that with more CO2 in the air, plants grow bigger and better in almost every conceivable way, and that they do it more efficiently, with respect to their utilization of valuable natural resources, and more effectively, in the face of environmental constraints. And when plants benefit, so do all of the animals and people that depend upon them for their sustenance. Likewise, in the case of climate model inadequacies, we reveal their many shortcomings via a comparison of their "doom and gloom" predictions with real-world observations. And this exercise reveals that even though the world has warmed substantially over the past century or more -- at a rate that is claimed by many to have been unprecedented over the past one to two millennia -- this report demonstrates that none of the environmental catastrophes that are predicted by climate alarmists to be produced by such a warming has ever come to pass. And this fact -- that there have been no significant increases in either the frequency or severity of droughts, floods or hurricanes over the past two centuries or more of global warming -- poses an important question. What should be easier to predict: the effects of global warming on extreme weather events or the effects of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations on global temperature? The first part of this question should, in principle, be answerable; for it is well defined in terms of the small number of known factors likely to play a role in linking the independent variable (global warming) with the specified weather phenomena (droughts, floods and hurricanes). The latter part of the question, on the other hand, is ill-defined and possibly even unanswerable; for there are many factors -- physical, chemical and biological -- that could well be involved in linking CO2 (or causing it not to be linked) to global temperature. If, then, today's climate models cannot correctly predict what should be relatively easy for them to correctly predict (the effect of global warming on extreme weather events), why should we believe what they say about something infinitely more complex (the effect of a rise in the air’s CO2 content on mean global air temperature)? Clearly, we should pay the models no heed in the matter of future climate -- especially in terms of predictions based on the behavior of a non-meteorological parameter (CO2) -- until they can reproduce the climate of the past, based on the behavior of one of the most basic of all true meteorological parameters (temperature). And even if the models eventually solve this part of the problem, we should still reserve judgment on their forecasts of global warming; for there will yet be a vast gulf between where they will be at that time and where they will have to go to be able to meet the much greater challenge to which they aspire

#### Previous temperature spikes disprove the impact

Singer 11 (S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

Research from locations around the world reveal a significant period of elevated air temperatures that immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, during a time that has come to be known as the Little Medieval Warm Period. A discussion of this topic was not included in the 2009 NIPCC report, but we include it here to demonstrate the existence of another set of real-world data that do not support the IPCC‘s claim that temperatures of the past couple of decades have been the warmest of the past one to two millennia. In one of the more intriguing aspects of his study of global climate change over the past three millennia, Loehle (2004) presented a graph of the Sargasso Sea and South African temperature records of Keigwin (1996) and Holmgren et al. (1999, 2001) that reveals the existence of a major spike in surface air temperature that began sometime in the early 1400s. This abrupt and anomalous warming pushed the air temperatures of these two records considerably above their representations of the peak warmth of the twentieth century, after which they fell back to pre-spike levels in the mid-1500s, in harmony with the work of McIntyre and McKitrick (2003), who found a similar period of higher-than-current temperatures in their reanalysis of the data employed by Mann et al. (1998, 1999).

### Competitiveness Wrong 2NC

#### Competitiveness not key to heg

Brooks and Wohlforth, 8 [Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “World out of Balance, International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy,” p. 32-35]

American primacy is also rooted in the county's position as the world's leading technological power. The United States remains dominant globally in overall R&D investments, high-technology production, commercial innovation, and higher education (table 2.3). Despite the weight of this evidence, elite perceptions of U.S. power had shifted toward pessimism by the middle of the first decade of this century. As we noted in chapter 1, this was partly the result of an Iraq-induced doubt about the utility of material predominance, a doubt redolent of the post-Vietnam mood. In retrospect, many assessments of U.S. economic and technological prowess from the 1990s were overly optimistic; by the next decade important potential vulnerabilities were evident. In particular, chronically imbalanced domestic finances and accelerating public debt convinced some analysts that the United States once again confronted a competitiveness crisis.23 If concerns continue to mount, this will count as the fourth such crisis since 1945; the first three occurred during the 1950s (Sputnik), the 1970s (Vietnam and stagflation), and the 1980s (the Soviet threat and Japan's challenge). None of these crises, however, shifted the international system's structure: multipolarity did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s, and each scare over competitiveness ended with the American position of primacy retained or strengthened.24

Our review of the evidence of U.S. predominance is not meant to suggest that the United States lacks vulnerabilities or causes for concern. In fact, it confronts a number of significant vulnerabilities; of course, this is also true of the other major powers.25 The point is that adverse trends for the United States will not cause a polarity shift in the near future. If we take a long view of U.S. competitiveness and the prospects for relative declines in economic and technological dominance, one takeaway stands out: relative power shifts slowly. The United States has accounted for a quarter to a third of global output for over a century. No other economy will match its combination of wealth, size, technological capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future (tables 2.2 and 2.3).

The depth, scale, and projected longevity of the U.S. lead in each critical dimension of power are noteworthy. But what truly distinguishes the current distribution of capabilities is American dominance in all of them simultaneously. The chief lesson of Kennedy's 500-year survey of leading powers is that nothing remotely similar ever occurred in the historical experience that informs modern international relations theory. The implication is both simple and underappreciated: the counterbalancing constraint is inoperative and will remain so until the distribution of capabilities changes fundamentally. The next section explains why.

### Exports Alt Cause 2NC

#### Even if our tech is superior, export restrictions make that meaningless

NEI 12 (Nuclear Energy Institute, “Improved Policies for Commercial Nuclear Trade Will Create American Jobs,” June, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/policybrief/improved-policies-for-commercial-nuclear-trade-will-create-american-jobs)

While U.S. firms offer some of the most innovative and safest nuclear energy technologies, they are hampered by cumbersome trade regulations, lack of coordination among the federal agencies involved, an inefficient export licensing process, limited options for financing nuclear exports and the absence of an international liability regime. These companies face intense competition from suppliers in nations with less restrictive policies and substantial government subsidies for their nuclear industries. To facilitate a greater U.S. role in the global commercial nuclear market, government support must be integrated into a seamless mechanism that includes coordination of nuclear trade policy, creation of bilateral agreements, export control reform and enhanced export financing. It also is vital that the United States pursue the international adoption of effective civil nuclear liability regimes.

### Competitiveness Alt Causes 1NC

#### Alt cause to competitiveness – A) debt crisis

**Goff 9-7**-12 [Emily, Research Associate at The Heritage Foundation, “U.S. Falls in World Economic Competitiveness Rankings,” <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/09/07/u-s-falls-in-world-economic-competitiveness-rankings/>]

The United States’ competitive edge in the global economy is not what it used to be. The World Economic Forum (WEF) reported that the U.S. dropped from fifth to seventh place—the fourth consecutive year it has fallen in the rankings. Chief among the reasons is the one-two punch of skyrocketing debt and uncertainty among businesses that Washington will address the country’s fiscal and economic problems. Gee, that sounds familiar. National debt recently cruised past the $16 trillion mark and is continuing its ascent toward the current debt limit of $16.394 trillion. It has already eclipsed the size of the entire U.S. economy. Reaching the debt limit again will serve as a grave reminder that Washington’s spending spree and failure to reform entitlement programs that are driving spending is wreaking havoc on the budget. That not only threatens to saddle future generations with crushing levels of debt—and taxes to pay for it—but also compromises the health of the U.S. economy right now. Such irresponsibility in Washington—manifest in over-spending, huge and chronic budget deficits, and massive debt—diminishes the business community’s trust that the government can and will get the country’s fiscal house in order. Whether it is a failure to stave off Taxmageddon’s tax hikes now, rein in federal spending, or reprioritize the sequestration’s automatic spending cuts scheduled to deliver a serious blow to our national defense, Washington is only generating the bad kind of uncertainty—and lots of it. Because there is such distrust of political leaders and institutions, and government is grossly misusing its resources, businesses, investors, and families feel their hands are tied. Tepid economic growth results—a point we see reinforced by the latest in a slew of mediocre jobs reports. The Heritage Foundation’s own Index of Economic Freedom tells a similar story: The U.S. dropped to tenth place in 2012 and has been relegated from a “free” status to “mostly free.” As the Index authors write: Restoring the U.S. economy to the status of a “free” economy will require significant policy changes to reduce the size of government, overhaul the tax system, and transform costly entitlement programs. While certain measures of competitiveness in the U.S. remain strong, the overall trend is headed in the wrong direction. If for some reason Congress and the President needed additional urging to address these “escalating and unaddressed weaknesses,” as the WEF report calls them, this year’s report should do just that.

#### B) Poor education system

**Harvard Magazine ’12** [“Capitalism Concerns,” http://harvardmagazine.com/2012/01/harvard-business-school-survey-weaker-u-s-economic-competitiveness]

AT A TIME of deep concern about unemployment, the American economy, and the federal budget, Harvard Business School’s U.S. Competitiveness Project—announced on December 13—today published “Prosperity at Risk,” a sobering assessment of American business competitiveness, based on nearly 10,000 responses to a survey of 50,000 alumni. It finds “a series of structural changes that began well before the Great Recession [of late 2007 to mid 2009] and threaten to undermine the long-term competitiveness of the U.S.” The report’s authors, project directors Michael E. Porter, Lawrence University Professor and a leader in the field of corporate strategy, and Jan W. Rivkin, Rauner professor of business administration, observe: During the past year, more than 1,700 respondents were personally involved in decisions about whether to place business activities and jobs in the U.S. or elsewhere. In these choices, the United States competed with virtually the entire world and fared poorly, losing two-thirds of the decisions that were resolved. Facilities involving large numbers of jobs, high-end work, and groups of activities located together moved out of the U.S. much faster than they moved in. That is, it is not merely low-wage, low-skill employment that is vulnerable to competition. Indeed, although the survey findings show that “low wage rates” were a leading reason for moving existing activities out of the United States, a slightly larger portion of respondents cited “better access to skilled labor” for decisions to move activities from this country than for decisions to retain such activities (and their accompanying employment) in the United States. (Coincidentally, the National Science Foundation issued a report documenting decreases in state funding for public research universities, where a significant portion of U.S. engineering and technical education takes place; read the news release here. Developing nations, as widely reported, are significantly increasing their investment in such institutions and scientific, engineering, and technical training.) Although the respondents regarded American universities, the context for entrepreneurship, and the innovation infrastructure very favorably as they evaluated the business environment, a majority held the American K-12 education system, political system, and tax code in very low regard. Majorities felt that regulation, economic policy, transportation infrastructure, the complexity of the tax code, K-12 education, and the effectiveness of the domestic political system were all factors in making the United States fall behind in competitive terms. They found far more signs of weak and deteriorating conditions than of strong or improving ones. “For the first time in decades,” Porter and Rivkin write of structural changes in the economy, “the business environment in the United States is in danger of falling behind the rest of the world,” compounding pressure on jobs, wages, and living standards.

### Prolif Leadership High 1NC

#### US nuclear leadership high now – Vogtle project proves

**Peterson, 12** – Senior Vice President of Communications, Nuclear Energy Institute (J. Scott, 2/21. “New Nuclear Construction Will Help Secure U.S. Energy Technology Leadership.” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/j-scott-peterson/new-nuclear-construction-\_b\_1292429.html)

Ayers, who leads the AFL-CIO's building trades unions, understands the value of 4,000 to 5,000 construction jobs that will be created by the Vogtle nuclear energy project -- the largest construction project ever in Georgia. The two reactors, awarded federal construction permits last week, represent "a strong and unmistakable signal that nuclear energy will now assume an important role in a low-carbon energy future." Chu, at the Vogtle site on Wednesday, reviewed for hundreds of workers the Obama administration's commitment to nuclear energy, and announced an investment of $10 million in advanced nuclear technologies research. Nuclear energy, Chu said, will have growing influence globally as nations confront a changing climate and increasing energy demand. Southern Company already has invested more than $1.5 billion in two advanced reactors that will power about 1.5 million homes. Two existing reactors at Vogtle already serve 600,000 customers in the fast-growing Southeast market. The region is the most hospitable to nuclear energy, with about one-third of America's 104 reactors in seven Southeastern states. The Southern States Energy Board -- a band of government leaders from 14 southern states -- recognizes the economic and environmental benefits of safely operated reactors: "Without nuclear energy, carbon dioxide emissions would have been 28 percent greater... and an additional 700 million tons of carbon dioxide would have been emitted each year." The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is expected to vote in the coming weeks on the construction permits for two more reactors in South Carolina. In addition, the Tennessee Valley Authority is completing its Watts Bar 2 reactor in Tennessee, a facility where construction started many years ago but was never completed. New reactors are becoming a reality in the face of low-priced natural gas for several reasons. Nuclear energy facilities are large, 24/7 power producers that operate at industry-leading levels of reliability. Around the clock production, coupled with low uranium fuel prices, results in low production costs for residential and industrial customers alike. That's an important economic driver for companies that are migrating to the Southeast, where regulated electricity markets provide stability and predictability in energy costs. Add to that package of benefits the fact that nuclear energy facilities emit no greenhouse gases in the production of electricity and the prospect for powering electric vehicles, and one can understand the appeal to long-term energy planners. Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, wrote last week that an expansion of nuclear power "shows that the United States is serious about meeting growing energy demand without pumping more carbon into the atmosphere. At a time when political support for some kind of carbon cap or tax has seemingly collapsed, that's an important sign that Americans aren't giving up on protecting the Earth's climate." Given our troubled economy, public concern over climate change has taken a back seat to more pressing policy issues. Americans are more concerned about the safety and price of electricity options, but climate and environmental issues remain strong drivers. That's why 82 percent of Americans believe that U.S. companies should learn and apply the lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan, but continue to develop new reactors to supply electricity here at home, according to a September 2011 survey by Bisconti Research Inc. Nuclear energy, like all energy sources, has hurdles it must clear. The capital investment required for new reactors makes it difficult to build new projects in competitive electricity markets with today's gas prices. The industry also has suffered from decades of intractable federal policy on used fuel management. The Energy Department, which is 15 years in arrears of meeting contractual obligations to take used uranium fuel rods from commercial reactors, now will make recommendations to Congress to revamp the program. This is a political problem however, not a technical challenge. The Vogtle project, featuring U.S. reactor innovation, is a significant signal of American leadership in nuclear energy technology, which the Commerce Department forecasts to be a $740 billion global market over the next decade. It would be shortsighted for our nation to cede this leadership, and tens of thousands of jobs, to other nations by not building on this momentum.

### Prolif Leadership Fails 1NC

#### Nuke leadership fails – it’s an ineffective tool and outdated

Weiss 9 (Leonard, Affiliated Scholar – Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Reliable Energy Supply and Nonproliferation,” Nonproliferation Review, 16(2), July, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-2\_weiss.pdf)

Part of the problem is that its value as a nonproliferation tool was at its height at the beginning of the nuclear age**,** when few countries were in a position to achieve nuclear autarky. The probability of consensus on establishing a worldwide regime in which there are fuel guarantees and no nationally owned fuel cycle facilities has been on a decreasing slope. Technology denial has become a less effective tool, thanks especially to A.Q. Khan and others. The spread of fuel cycle technologies has perhaps reached a tipping point in which the technology is**,** if not widely available, then sufficiently available to any determined party**.** Hence, the argument made by proponents of internationalization that giving up national nuclear development in favor of more restrictive international efforts will result in much greater security for all does not have the power it may once have had.

#### Alt cause – nuclear hypocrisy

**Caldicott, 6** – Founder and President of the Nuclear Policy Research Institute (Helen, “Nuclear Power is not the answer.” pp. 134-135)

In light of terrorist attacks using conventional weapons, it is only a matter of time before someone steals enough plutonium to make an adequate nuclear weapon. Then we proceed into the age of nuclear terrorism. Meanwhile, with the world awash in plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the Bush administration pursues its own nuclear armament development policy that makes it increasingly likely that a rogue nation will procure and possibly use nuclear weapons. The United States has adopted three contradictory stances at the same time: It is aggressively forging ahead to build more nuclear weapons, stating that it will use them preemptively even against non- nuclear nations. It is instrumental in denying the right to build nuclear weapons to all but a handful of countries. In the context of promoting nuclear energy, it has offered dozens of countries nuclear technology and access to nuclear power fuel. The fission process makes plutonium, which can then be separated by reprocessing and converted to fuel for nuclear weapons. While the Bush proposal includes taking the spent fuel back to the United States, it is not clear that that process can be undertaken with no cheating. Thus, even as there is much hand-wringing at the United Nations about the possibility that Iran and North Korea may be developing nuclear weapons, eight nation-states-Russia, the United States, France, China, Britain, India, Israel, and Pakistan- possess their own nuclear arsenals, and others are free to develop weapons without the admonitions that the United States and the United Nations are imposing upon Iran and North Korea. This strange juxtaposition of opposing attitudes needs to be examined in the context of the sixty-five-year history of nuclear fission and related weapons development.

#### Alt cause – waste management

**Moniz, 11** – Cecil and Ida Green Distinguished Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at MIT, served as Undersecretary of the U.S. Department of Energy in 1997-2001 (Ernest, December. “Why We Still Need Nuclear Power.” Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec2011, Vol. 90, Issue 6, EBSCO.)

The United States' dysfunctional nuclear waste management system has an unfortunate international side effect: it limits the options for preventing other countries from using nuclear power infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons. If countries such as Iran are able to enrich uranium to make new reactor fuel and separate out the plutonium to recover its energy value, they then have access to the relevant technology and material for a weapons program. Safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency are intended to make sure that civilian programs do not spill over into military ones, but the agency has only a limited ability to address clandestine programs.

### Heg D

#### Extend 1NC 1 – No wars absent hegemony – nuclear deterrence, globalization, insituitions and democracy will exist with or without the US and will check great power conflict

#### Reject their vague assertions for conflict scenarios absent hegemony – their authors overestimate the importance of the US - *star this card*

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p]

**Assertions that without** the combination of **U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return** to Europe and the Pacific Rim **are usually rendered in rather vague language**. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “**the world will become a more dangerous place** and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 **From where would this danger arise? Who** precisely **would do the fighting, and over what issues?** Without the United States, **would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack** mainland **China again**, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, **where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace?** With one exception, **these questions are rarely addressed**. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon theworldwould witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed Chin a is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, **decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese** regional, must less global, political **expansion.** Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. **Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind** a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, **specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers**. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. **Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination.**  Overestimating Our Importance One of **the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential** upon their behavior **as we perceive them to be.** A great deal of **experimental evidence exists to support the notion that** people (and therefore **states) tend to overrate the degree to which** **their behavior is responsible for the actions of others.** Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both ofwhichwould seem to be especially relevant in theU.S. case. 55 First, **believing that we are responsible** **for their actions gratifies our national ego** (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 **U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders**. **If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States.** Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might**, it is not possible to** fully **understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective.** The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. **They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one**. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 **It is natural**, therefore, **for U.S**. policymakers and **strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does**. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, **we are probably not as important to them as we think**. **The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated**. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, **the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven**. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. **Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with**, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, **with or without the United States**.

#### Empirically the world grew more peaceful when heg declined

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

It is perhaps worth noting that **there is no evidence to support a** direct **relationship between** the relative level of **U.S. activism and international stability**. In fact, **the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. 51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 52 On the other hand, if the paciﬁc trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered** by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. **The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a** pressing **concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities**. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conﬂict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending ﬁgures by themselves are insufﬁcient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was signiﬁcantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global paciﬁc trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never ﬁnal; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conﬂict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulﬁlled. If increases in conﬂict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, **the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military** spending. Evidently **the rest of the world can operate** quite effectively **without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.**

#### International trade and economics aren’t dependent on military intervention

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

Second, it should be equally simple to demonstrate that these **states remain vigorously engaged in international trade and** **economics.** In fact, fourteen of the fifteen “most globalized” countries in 2010 are in Europe, according to the Swiss Economic Institute.10 The **major U.S. allies** appear to **believe that the market does not need protection**, and that **prosperity is no longer dependent upon active military intervention** abroad. **Multinational corporations** today **can** generally **access the entire world without** much **fear of** undue **harassment from host governments, who have strong incentives to provide a healthy, well-regulated environment for trade** and prosperity to flourish. Threats to free trade still exist from a variety of criminal predators, but their solution, according to this point of view, hardly requires costly military action. If and when local law enforcement agencies prove incapable of providing protection for the businesses that operate in their territory, modern multinationals surely have the resources to either provide it for themselves, or move out. In other words, the allies have reached the conclusion that **Microsoft does not need the Marine Corps** **and great powers no longer have to use force to guard their economic interests. Today’s market will take care of itself**.

#### Trade routes and globalization check conflict post-decline

**Preble 10** [Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/]

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab

#### Unipolarity is comparatively meaningless to other factors in preventing conflict

**Legro 11** (Jeffrey W. – professor of politics and Randolph P. Compton Professor in the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, Sell unipolarity? The future of an overvalued concept in International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, p. EBook)

Such a view, however, is problematic. What seems increasingly clear is that the role of polarity has been overstated or misunderstood or both. This is the unavoidable conclusion that emerges from the penetrating chapters in this volume that probe America’s current dominant status (unipolarity) with the question “does the distribution of capabilities matter for patterns of international politics?”3 Despite the explicit claim that “unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics”4 what is surprising is how ambiguous and relatively limited that influence is across the chapters. The causal impact of unipolarity has been overvalued for three fundamental reasons. The first is that the effects of unipolarity are often not measured relative to the influence of other causes that explain the same outcome. When the weight of other factors is considered, polarity seems to pale in comparison. Second, rather than being a structure that molds states, polarity often seems to be the product of state choice. Polarity may be more outcome than cause. Finally, while international structure does exist, it is constituted as much by ideational content as by material capabilities. Again polarity loses ground in significance.

#### Hegemonic decline will not result in great power wars.

**Ikenberry 11** (G. John – Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, A World of Our Making, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Summer, p. <http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all>)

There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First, the old and traditional mechanism for overturning international order—great-power war—is no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power peace in the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weapons—and the deterrence they generate—give great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states. They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the system—war, invasion, and conquest between great powers—that historically provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is introduced into the system. Second, the character of liberal international order itself—with or without American hegemonic leadership—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance. Third, the states that are rising today do not constitute a potential united opposition bloc to the existing order. There are so-called rising states in various regions of the world. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are perhaps most prominent. Russia is also sometimes included in this grouping of rising states. These states are all capitalist and most are democratic. They all gain from trade and integration within the world capitalist system. They all either are members of the WTO or seek membership in it. But they also have very diverse geopolitical and regional interests and agendas. They do not constitute either an economic bloc or a geopolitical one. Their ideologies and histories are distinct. They share an interest in gaining access to the leading institutions that govern the international system. Sometimes this creates competition among them for influence and access. But it also orients their struggles toward the reform and reorganization of governing institutions, not to a united effort to overturn the underlying order. Fourth, all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system. All the great powers—old and rising—are status-quo powers. All are beneficiaries of an open world economy and the various services that the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states. All worry about religious radicalism and failed states. Great powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in various key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But the opportunities for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist and will grow. Overall, the forces for continuity are formidable. Of course, there are many forces operating in the world that can generate upheaval and discontinuity. The collapse of the global financial system and an economic depression that triggers massive protectionism are possibilities. Terrorism and other forms of transnational violence can also trigger political panic and turmoil that would lead governments to shut down borders and reimpose restrictions on the movement of goods and people. But in the face of these seismic events in world politics, there are deep forces that keep the system anchored and stable.

#### The alternative to hegemony is regional cooperation -- not war.

**Buzan 11** [Barry, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, "The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers Decentred Globalism," International Relations, 4-1, vol. 25 no. 1 3-25]

In 2004 I argued, in line with much mainstream thinking, that the most likely scenario for the coming decades was continuation of the US as the sole superpower accompanied by several great powers. This idea still forms the core of the debates about polarity. Its main theme is whether or not the US will be able to preserve its sole superpower status, or whether rising challengers, mainly China, will soon return the world order to bipolarity. It is typical of the Western part of this debate to be looking for ways to preserve US hegemony/leadership either by maintaining and exploiting a power advantage or by relegitimizing its leading role using institutions to accommodate rising powers. 1 My second most likely scenario from 2004 was one in which there would be no superpowers, only great powers, and I argued that this would produce a rather uncertain world. I now think that this scenario is becoming more likely, but can be seen in a more positive light. I argue here that it offers an alternative third way of thinking about the coming world order: not whether there will be one superpower or more, but no superpowers, only great powers. We may be heading quite quickly into such a world, and this may be no bad thing. The mainstream polarity debates typically ignore the fact that there is an alternative to having either to balance against the US or bandwagon with it. Others can, and increasingly do, use the diminished power and authority of the US as a reason to ignore or circumscribe it, and to carve their own pathways in regional and global politics. 2 Continued US leadership is neither necessary nor, arguably, desirable to keep the world order from falling into 1930s-style imperial competition. This argument, therefore, steps outside the main lines of the current debates about polarity. It also steps outside the neorealist framework created by Waltz in two ways. First, I differentiate between superpowers and great powers in a way that neorealists cannot, and see that distinction as being crucial to understanding an international system operating on a truly global scale. By superpower I mean a polity whose political, military, cultural and economic reach extends across the whole international system; by great power I mean one whose reach extends only across more than one region. 3 Second, I reject the neorealist assumption that the major powers of the day will necessarily fall into competition to dominate the whole system. I focus instead on the underpinnings within such a regionalized world order for a coexistence international society with some elements of cooperation. The main part of the article defines superpowers and great powers, and shows why superpowers are dying out. The second section argues that a world with only great powers is likely to take a more regionalized form, and the third section explores why this might work quite well. The fourth section suggests the possible downsides of a more regionalized international society, and the conclusions reflect on some policy implications.

## 1NR – Politics

### Heg

#### No heg impact- empirically denied

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

It is perhaps worth noting that **there is no evidence to support a** direct **relationship between** the relative level of **U.S. activism and international stability**. In fact, **the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. 51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 52 On the other hand, if the paciﬁc trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered** by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. **The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a** pressing **concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities**. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conﬂict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending ﬁgures by themselves are insufﬁcient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was signiﬁcantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global paciﬁc trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never ﬁnal; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conﬂict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulﬁlled. If increases in conﬂict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, **the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military** spending. Evidently **the rest of the world can operate** quite effectively **without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.**

### Overview – 2NC

#### Impact outweighs and turns the case –

#### A. Magnitude – US collapse goes global and draws in every major country – treaties increase the probability of draw in and guarantees escalation.

#### B. Timeframe – decline causes lash out and outward pressure to secure economic gains – that’s Auslin.

#### C. Probability -- conflict now is highly likely given other economic stressors

Mootry 9 (Primus, B.A. Northern Illinois University “Americans likely to face more difficult times” - The Herald Bulletin, http://www.theheraldbulletin.com/columns/local\_story\_282184703.html?keyword=secondarystory)

These are difficult times. The direct and indirect costs associated with the war on Iraq have nearly wrecked our economy. The recent $700 billion bailout, bank failures, and the failure of many small and large businesses across the nation will take years — perhaps decades — to surmount. Along with these rampant business failures, we have seen unemployment rates skyrocket, record numbers of home foreclosures, an explosion of uninsured Americans, and other economic woes that together have politicians now openly willing to mention the "D" word: Depression. These are difficult days. We have seen our international reputation sink to all time lows. We have seen great natural disasters such as hurricanes Ike and Katrina leaving hundreds of thousands of citizens stripped of all they own or permanently dislocated. In all my years, I have never seen a time such as this. To make matters worse, we are witnessing a resurgence of animosities between the United States and Russia, as well as the rapid growth of India and China. As to the growth of these two huge countries, the problem for us is that they are demanding more and more oil — millions of barrels more each week — and there is not much we can say or do about it. In the meantime, if America does not get the oil it needs, our entire economy will grind to a halt. In short, the challenges we face are complex and enormous. Incidentally, one of the factors that makes this time unlike any other in history is the potential for worldwide nuclear conflict. **There has never been a time in** the long **history** of man **when**, through his own technologies — and his arrogance — he can destroy the planet. Given the tensions around the world, **a mere spark could lead to global conflagration.**[This evidence has been gender paraphrased].

### Turns Nuclear

#### Econ decline tanks nuke power – undermines necessary investment

Simpson 9 (Fiona, associate director of New York University's Center on International Cooperation, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, "The recession alone won't stop nuclear power's growth," http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-recession-alone-wont-stop-nuclear-powers-growth)

None of the IAEA's projections, however, account for the financial crisis, which may negatively impact the appeal of nuclear energy. Clearly, investors that need credit to build new nuclear plants face a great deal more uncertainty and difficulty securing financing. Such a situation, on the surface, would indicate that nuclear power will be less attractive to investors. The downturn also may reduce electricity demand and thus, potentially, make the need for new power plants less urgent.¶ At the same time, prices for natural gas and oil have fallen from earlier highs, increasing their attractiveness as energy sources (although the price of each has increased recently). Additionally, nuclear power plants have significant "front-loaded" costs, requiring much more investment at the outset than fossil-fuel burning plants, even if nuclear plants may eventually be cheaper to run. In light of the ongoing credit crunch, investors in countries that don't rely on state-owned enterprises may find the economic circumstances simply too difficult to justify an investment in nuclear power--especially if there's reliable (and domestic) access to natural gas, coal, or oil. One also would expect private lenders to shy from nuclear projects--both because they have less money to lend and because of nuclear power's history of cost overruns and delays. Finally, from the point of view of developing countries interested in nuclear power, multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, tend to prohibit investment in new nuclear projects.

Conceded 1nc ev- turns heg- sequestration cuts military power which signals weakness to our allies- turns heg

If they win heg internal then econ power turns

#### Sequestration is a bigger and faster internal link to every regional war and terror

Skelton, partner with Husch Blackwell and former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 9/20/2012

(“Sequestration means cuts we can’t afford,” Roll Call, Lexis)

**Sequestration will** also **erode America's military superiority over the next decade by cutting even the most essential defense programs**. Any military commander will tell you that our ability to dominate the battlefield is not only dependent on critical thinking but is fueled by superior aircraft, ships, weapons and intelligence. Sequestration would cripple each of these categories, virtually interfere with professional military education at our war colleges, ending the modernization of fighter jets, combat ships, helicopters, ground vehicles, drone aircraft and satellite technologies. Without a thorough study of the art of war and first-rate equipment, **the U.S. military will be far less able to deter gathering conflicts or quickly resolve those conflicts we are unable to avoid**. The "Powell Doctrine" of risking our troops only when backed up by overwhelming force and a clear path to decisive victory could be at risk. With our unique portfolio of global responsibilities, **we could find it difficult to** simultaneously **pursue terrorists**, **contain Iran and North Korea**, **counter a rising China and deal with exploding hot spots such as Syria** today. Those that say we can risk skipping one or two generations of military development are poor students of military history. America rose from a young, regional power to a formidable military force over the course of World War I alone. And Germany rose from the ashes of that war to threaten all of Europe in less than two decades. Today, technology has accelerated the pace of change, and **our adversaries are** certainly **not sitting on their hands. Russia and China** are both building sixth-generation stealth fighters, while Iran and North Korea race to develop nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. **The rise of cyber weapons puts America's highly networked economy and society at particular risk**. We can choose to delay our defenses against these developing threats, but the threats themselves won't wait.

### Turns Investment

#### Sequestration turns the case---creates investor uncertainty that prevents commercialization/adoption of new energy

Malone 9/26 Scott is a Reuters writer. “Analysis: Corporate America sweats as U.S. nears fiscal cliff,” 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-usa-economy-fiscalcliff-idUSBRE88P1PX20120927

Top U.S. executives have less confidence in the business outlook now than at any time in the past three years - and a key reason is fear of gridlock in Washington over the fiscal deficit and tax policy. **The uncertainty**, coupled with slowing demand in Asia and Europe, **is forcing corporate leaders to postpone decisions on** major investments and hiring, and hurting sales of everything from textbooks to telephone lines. "If we don't deal with the fiscal cliff and don't deal with predictability on taxes for both citizens and business, with the rest of the world in a struggling state, this is really bad for us," John Chambers, CEO of network equipment maker Cisco Systems Inc (CSCO.O), told Reuters on Tuesday. Some 34 percent of U.S. CEOs plan to cut jobs in the United States over the next six months, up from 20 percent a quarter ago, according to a Business Roundtable survey released on Wednesday. Only 30 percent plan to raise capital spending, compared with 43 percent previously. The group's index of CEO confidence fell to its lowest point since the third quarter of 2009, when the United States had just emerged from its worst recession in 80 years. The main culprit is the fiscal cliff -- Washington's self-imposed year-end deadline to agree on a plan to shrink the federal budget or trigger $600 billion in spending cuts and higher taxes that were put in place last summer. The sharpest pain would be felt by the defense and healthcare sectors, which face direct funding cuts. But any **resulting slowdown could send shockwaves across the economy.**

### Satellites Impact – 2NC

#### Sequestration cuts kill EOS missions

Clark 12

[Stephen, Spaceflight Now, 9/16/12, http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n1209/14sequestration/]

NOAA's satellite budget would be slashed of $149 million meant for the next-generation GOES-R weather observatories and polar-orbiting spacecraft. The Air Force's missile procurement account, which contains military communications, early warning, and navigation satellites, would be cut 9.4 percent next year, or about a $668 million reduction from the service's expected budget. "The report leaves no question that the sequestration would be deeply destructive to national security, domestic investments, and core government functions," the White House report said. "The sequestration itself was never intended to be implemented," the White House report said. "The administration strongly believes that sequestration is bad policy, and that Congress can and should take action to avoid it by passing a comprehensive and balanced deficit reduction package." A joint "super committee" - with membership from both parties in both houses of Congress - failed to agree on a deficit reduction plan last fall.

**Turns warming**

**Lewis et al 10** [James A., Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program – CSIS, Sarah O. Ladislaw, Senior Fellow, Energy and National Security Program – CSIS, Denise E. Zheng, Congressional Staffer - Salary Data, “Earth Observation for Climate Change,” June, http://csis.org/files/publication/100608\_Lewis\_EarthObservation\_WEB.pdf]

Climate change will have pervasive and unavoidable effects on economic and national security. Managing these consequences and mitigating them when possible are new and difficult tasks for governments. Progress in mitigating and adapting to climate change will require the world’s countries to agree to coordinate their actions. Reaching such agreement will be no easy task. That said, **climate change offers a unique opportunity for the United States** to engage other nations in pursuing common interests and addressing future challenges. Not only is the United States well positioned to lead on this issue because of its significant space and scientific capacity, it also faces global expectations that it should shoulder the leadership burden for climate change. A commitment to building the space and information infrastructure needed to manage climate change **could demonstrate the U.S. leadership**, based on competence and advancing the global good, that the world respects and admires. Operationalization is the next step for dealing with climate change—to make the data and knowledge generation by satellites and science easier to use in policymaking. Operationalization requires a new approach. Climate change has largely been an issue of science. The existing vehicles for international cooperation and data sharing are aimed at the scientific community. Effective global management of climate requires a new approach with three integrated elements—space, networks, and collaboration. Our belief is that a concerted effort to analyze and share data from the many national efforts could significantly advance our understanding of the risks and causes of climate change, better measure the effects of mitigation policies, and guide planning on how to adapt to changes in the environment. Achieving such a concerted effort will require coordination must occur on several different levels if it is to have a meaningful effect. The first—the collection and measurement of relevant data—depends largely on satellites. **Without the proper data**, it would be very difficult to develop and aggregate a global picture of climate change and its nature and pace. It would be difficult to measure the effects of mitigation efforts, determine when or whether policies are effective, or predict when and how climate effects will affect local communities. The second level is to expand the analysis and sharing of information. In some ways, we are only in the early stages of developing a global enterprise for assessing climate change. Much of the research and analysis conducted thus far has been focused on understanding the nature and pace of climate change, forecasting future changes in Earth’s natural systems based on changes in different variables, and substantiating theories about how human efforts to reduce the effects of climate change might actually have some effect. More work is needed in each area to improve our understanding and update it as the natural environment continues to change. Finally, data must move from the scientific community to the policy community—to governments and policymakers—if data are to guide change. While the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change tailored analysis to meet policymakers’ needs in the hopes of reaching a global consensus for action, the challenge today is to extend and strengthen connections between the science and policy communities. A coordinated multinational effort to better inform the policy process can change this. Our belief is that a concerted effort to analyze and share data from the many national efforts could significantly advance our understanding of the risks and causes of climate change, better measure the effects of mitigation, and guide planning on adapting to changes in the environment. To this end, our recommendations follow: The U.S. approach to climate change policy needs to inform decisionmakers and planners in both government and the private sector by providing understandable metrics and analyses of the effectiveness of, and compliance with, mitigation programs and adaption plans. The customers for this should include federal agencies, state and local governments, private sector users, and other nations. To better serve the national interest, **the United States should increase its Earth observation capabilities—especially space-based sensors for carbon monitoring—to improve our ability to understand the carbon cycle and to inform any future international agreement**. This means that until these capabilities are adequate for monitoring climate change, investment in Earth observation satellites should take precedence over other space programs. Increased spending on earth observation satellites specifically designed for climate change should be maintained until the current capability shortfall is eliminated.

### Will Pass – 2nc Uniqueness Wall

#### Fiscal cliff deal now-Obama has leverage post election and a compromise is coming now due to momentum - that’s Green

#### Fiscal Cliff Has Momentum and public support.

**Huey-Burns**, **11/9**/2012 (Caitlin, Congressional Leaders Make Opening Statements in Budget Debate, Real Clear Politics, p. http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/11/09/schumer\_sounds\_hopeful\_notes\_on\_fiscal\_deal\_116114.html)

Since neither side “ran the table” in congressional elections, “I think it’s pretty clear that [voters] said, ‘Come to a compromise, get a handle on spending, but raise some revenues,’ ” Sen. Chuck Schumer told reporters at an event hosted by the Christian Science Monitor. The New York lawmaker said Congress needs to seize the political moment and strike a so-called grand bargain during the upcoming lame-duck session while sentiment supporting such action -- as reflected by Tuesday’s exit polling -- is still fresh. As Washington prepares to get back to business after a divisive election season, congressional leaders are making opening statements of sorts in what will likely be a difficult legislative process to avert the $600 billion bundle of tax increases and across-the-board budget cuts set to kick in at year’s end. The president’s re-election does grant him some leverage in the negotiations. Obama pegged his candidacy, in part, to a call for high-income earners to pay more in taxes in order to reduce the deficit. Exit polling this week found 60 percent of voters support that notion, and nearly half specifically back Obama’s proposal to let higher-end tax cuts expire on Dec. 31. Schumer interpreted those results to mean a majority endorsement for the president’s economic plan. The 2010 elections that swept scores of Republicans into the House of Representatives and awarded John Boehner the speaker’s gavel sent a message to Democrats to control government spending, Schumer said. But voter behavior on Tuesday indicated Americans want a balanced approach to deficit reduction that includes both spending cuts and revenue increases, he asserted.

#### Congress is working together --- a compromise is coming.

New York Times, **11/8**/2012 (Congress Sees Rising Urgency on Fiscal Deal, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/us/politics/congress-sees-rising-urgency-on-fiscal-deal.html#h[])

Senior lawmakers said Thursday that they were moving quickly to take advantage of the postelection political atmosphere to try to strike an agreement that would avert a fiscal crisis early next year when trillions of dollars in tax increases and automatic spending cuts begin to go into force. Senator Bob Corker, Republican of Tennessee, said he had begun circulating a draft plan to overhaul the tax code and entitlements, had met with 25 senators from both parties and “been on the phone nonstop since the election.” Senator Olympia J. Snowe, the Maine Republican who will retire at the end of the year, made it clear that she intended to press for a deal to avert the so-called fiscal cliff and get serious on the deficit, lame duck or not. “The message and signals we send in the coming days could bear serious consequences for this country,” she said. “It could trigger another downgrade. It could trigger a global financial crisis. This is a very consequential moment.” Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York, the No. 3 Senate Democrat, extended an olive branch to Republicans, suggesting Thursday that he could accept a tax plan that leaves the top tax rate at 35 percent, provided that loophole closings would hit the rich, not the middle class. He previously had said that he would accept nothing short of a return to the top tax rate of Bill Clinton’s presidency, 39.6 percent. “If you kept them at 35, it’s still much harder to do,” Mr. Schumer said, “but obviously there is push and pull, and there are going to be compromises.” The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office underscored the stakes in a report Thursday that framed Washington’s dilemma. It said that if automatic spending cuts go into force and all the Bush-era tax cuts expire, the nation would slip into recession next year and unemployment would rise to 9.1 percent, from October’s rate of 7.9 percent. But simply canceling those deficit-reduction measures would risk a financial crisis that would make matters worse, the report said. The accelerated activity in Washington showed that members of Congress believed the election had amplified the imperative to strike a deal. Still, signs that the two sides are open to some compromise are no guarantee that they can reach an agreement after warring for two years. Many Republicans will continue to resist any proposal that can be read as increasing taxes, and many Democrats will balk at changes in entitlement programs and spending cuts.

#### More warrants

#### First - markets are optimstic, Obama is pushing for compromise, Boehner is moderating

Ehley 11/9/12 (Briana, Fiscal Times, "CBO Issues New Recession Warning," http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Blogs/Fiscal-Cliff-Notes/2012/11/09/CBO-Issues-New-Recession-Warning.aspx#page1)

S&P: 15 PERCENT CHANCE OF GOING OVER THE CLIFF ¶ Experts and analysts are giving odds on how the fiscal cliff drama is likely to play out, with many predicting at least a short-term fix. Standard & Poors analysts say there is only a 15 percent chance that nothing will get accomplished and that the economy will go sailing off the cliff, Reuters’ reports. “The most likely scenario, in our view, is that policymakers reach sufficient political compromise in time to avoid most, if not all, potential economic effects of the cliff,” S&P analysts wrote. - Read more at Reuters ¶ BIDEN: DEMS READY TO COMPROMISE Vice President Joe Biden said that the president is ready to forge ahead on a compromise to avoid massive year-end spending cuts and tax increases. Biden told CBS News’ Matthew Daily on Wednesday that he believes there are at least six GOP senators ready to compromise on fiscal issues, adding that the real question is whether House Republicans will be willing to do the same.¶ “What is the takeaway going to be on the part of our Republican colleagues? What judgment are they going to make?” Biden asked. “I know it takes a little time to kind of digest what’s going on. But I think people know we’ve got to get down to work and I think they’re ready to move.” The vice president said he believes the election results that gave Obama another four-year term offered a clear mandate on taxes. “Voters are coming much closer to our view about how to deal with tax policy.” - Read more at CBS News¶ CHAMBLISS: ‘RIOTS IN THE STREETS’ Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Georgia), one of the Senate’s bipartisan “Gang of Eight” members working on a deficit reduction plan, told The Washington Post’s Suzy Khimm that Congress needs to deal with the deficit immediately and not kick the can down the road or there will be “drastic” consequences. “You could see riots in the streets of the United States if we don’t do this right,” Chambliss said, in a bit of fiscal hyperbole. “We have the opportunity right now, and it’s imperative that we do, primarily through a $4-5 trillion package over 10 years.” – Read more at The Washington Post  ¶ SCHUMER ‘HEARTENED’ BY BOEHNER’S TONE ¶ After House Speaker John Boehner told reporters Wednesday he was ready to “stand with the president” on a budget deal that included new federal revenue linked to tax reform, Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-NY, told the Christian Science Monitor Thursday he was “heartened by the tone that Speaker Boehner showed yesterday.” However, Schumer said the content of Boehner’s speech “doesn’t quite work,” adding that the idea that tax cuts lead to revenue growth, as the Speaker implied, was “a Rumpelstiltskin fairy tale. You may remember Rumpelstiltskin was the fairy tale figure who turned straw into gold.”¶ Nonetheless, Schumer believes the Speaker has “seen the handwriting on the wall, and it makes me very hopeful we can do something big in the next month and a half.” - Read more at the Christian Science Monitor

#### Second- agreement on tax increases

UPI 11/9/12 ("Aide: Obama to press GOP on 'fiscal cliff'," http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php/sid/210642829/scat/b8de8e630faf3631/ht/Aide-Obama-to-press-GOP-on-fiscal-cliff)

WASHINGTON -- U.S. President Barack Obama Friday is to press for the end of Bush-era tax cuts on taxable household incomes over $250,000, an aide said.¶ The repeated call to end the tax breaks as part of a package of actions needed to avoid the so-called fiscal cliff, which could plunge the economy back into recession, was expected to be part of Obama's first public comments since his re-election.¶ His remarks, to be delivered in the White House East Room at 1:05 p.m., will focus on "the action we need to take to keep our economy growing and reduce our deficit," the White House said Thursday night.¶ Obama feels bolstered by his re-election victory, senior campaign strategist David Axelrod said.¶ "Hopefully people will read those results and read them as a vote for cooperation and will come to the table," Axelrod told MSNBC. "And obviously everyone's going to have to come with an open mind to these discussions."¶ But he added, "If the attitude is that nothing happened on Tuesday, that would be unfortunate."¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, said Thursday House Republicans remained adamantly opposed to raising tax rates but would be willing to talk about it.¶ "Of course we'll talk about it," he told ABC News. "We talk about all kinds of things we may disagree on. I'm the most reasonable, responsible person here in Washington. The president knows it. He knows that he and I can work together. The election's over. Now it's time to get to work."¶ But when told Election Day exit polls found 60 percent of U.S. voters agreeing with Obama's proposal to raise taxes on the wealthiest taxpayers, Boehner insisted the idea was insupportable.¶ "Raising tax rates is unacceptable. And, frankly, it couldn't even pass the House. I'm not sure it could pass the Senate," he said.¶ Obama spoke with Boehner by phone Wednesday about the need to reach a budget compromise in Congress' lame-duck session starting next week, the White House said.¶ "The president reiterated his commitment to finding bipartisan solutions to reduce our deficit in a balanced way, cut taxes for middle-class families and small businesses, and create jobs," a White House read-out of the call said. "The president said he believed that the American people sent a message in [Tuesday's] election that leaders in both parties need to put aside their partisan interests and work with common purpose to put the interests of the American people and the American economy first."¶ After the call, Boehner said, "A 'balanced' approach isn't balanced if it means higher tax rates on the small businesses that are key to getting our economy moving again."¶ Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., who won re-election Tuesday, told The New York Times many Senate Republicans were now willing to agree to a deal that raises more revenue through an overhaul of the tax code. He said additional revenue must be generated by taxation, not just economic growth.¶ "The conditions are there to act," Corker said. "I think the environment is different now."¶ He said he was circulating a draft plan to overhaul the tax code and entitlements and had met with 25 senators from both parties since the election.¶ Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said Thursday he could accept a tax plan that leaves the top tax rate at 35 percent, provided loophole closings in a tax-code overhaul hit the rich, not the middle class.¶ Schumer previously insisted he would accept nothing short of a return to the top tax rate of 39.6 percent from the Clinton administration.¶ "If you kept them at 35, it's still much harder to do," Schumer said. "But obviously there is push and pull, and there are going to be compromises."

#### Third- post election climate

Hoehn 11/9/12 (Katherine, PolicyMic, "What is the 2013 Tax Increase: Everything You Need to Know About Taxmageddon," http://www.policymic.com/articles/18856/what-is-the-2013-tax-increase-everything-you-need-to-know-about-taxmageddon)

Can Congress and the president come to an agreement? ¶ "I remain optimistic that we are going to be able to find common ground," said House Speaker John Boehner to ABC's Diane Sawyer. Referring to President Obama, he said, "I am confident that he and I can find the common ground necessary." ¶ What must Congress and the president do? ¶ Act to address "the long-term imbalance between government spending and revenue, and to prevent a future debt-induced economic crisis," said Erskine Bowles, co-Chairman of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and co-founder of the Fix the Debt Campaign. "We already have the blueprints" for an alternative plan, a bipartisan package, "large enough to put the debt on a clear downward path, relative to the economy, and designed well enough to promote, rather than disrupt, economic growth." ¶ Perhaps most importantly, "it's a package on which bipartisan agreement is possible," he said. Bowles and Senator Alan Simpson founded the Campaign to Fix the Debt to "put America on a better fiscal and economic path." Bipartisan leaders from a variety of social, economic and political perspectives, share the common belief that "America's growing federal debt threatens our future and that we must address it." ¶ When will it happen? ¶ Congress returns on Tuesday. In an interview on Thursday, Speaker Boehner indicated he anticipated the lame duck Congress would vote on a short-term fix to delay the year-end "fiscal cliff." ¶ "As Speaker, I feel pretty strongly that a lame-duck Congress shouldn't do big things," he said. Boehner expressed optimism that an agreement could be made between himself, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and President Obama. He proposes a "bridge" that would extend all of the tax rates for one year, allowing more time for an overhaul of the federal tax code. This "would increase revenue by closing tax loopholes, not by raising the rates individuals pay on their wages."¶ Boehner wants to protect defense programs that would be cut and find other budget items to sacrifice. Democrats want to raise taxes for Americans earning more than $250,000 from 35% to 39.6%. It remains to be seen how much can be accomplished.¶ Why should there be optimism about this finally being resolved? ¶ Quite simply, because it is no longer an election year. The president doesn't have to worry about re-election, and members of Congress won't be up again before 2014 so can negotiate more freely. If they solve the problem and come up with a plan and an agreement, everyone wins. This is a great opportunity to put America back on the right fiscal track. President Obama is scheduled to make a statement about the economy from the White House on Friday afternoon.

### Capital Key

#### Capital key to resolve the fiscal cliff --- Obama will spend it persuade the GOP to compromise. That’s the 1NC Atkins 11/8 evidence.

#### Even if capital fails, a partisan fight alone triggers the link.

**Bruce**, **11/9**/2012 (Andy, Partisan fight over “fiscal cliff” will harm U.S. economy – poll, Chicago Tribune, p. http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-rt-usa-economycliff-polll5e8m99xr-20121109,0,1840865,full.story)

Any partisan squabbling over the United States' looming budget crisis will harm its economy, according to a strong majority of economists polled by Reuters after Tuesday's presidential election. While most said political leaders will avert by Jan. 1 a "fiscal cliff" of automatic tax hikes and spending cuts worth $600 billion, respondents warned that confidence in the economy will be hit hard if talks descend into a major fight. Democratic President Barack Obama's first item of business after winning the White House for a second term is to negotiate with a Republican majority in the House of Representatives to avoid a budget crunch before the start of next year. Both Obama and senior Republicans -- defeated presidential candidate Mitt Romney and House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner -- have stated their desire to cooperate. Forty-two out of 50 economists described as "high" the risk that fraught budget talks will harm investor and consumer confidence, while the remaining eight were "neutral". But some of the damage has already been done. "The uncertainty around the cliff has and will continue to weigh on activity," said Michael Hanson, senior U.S. economist at Bank of America-Merrill Lynch. "You've seen signs of that in capital goods spending orders and shipments -- and it's very possible that we'll see hiring hit towards the end of the year, or early next year, depending on how the negotiations turn out." There are already signs in corporate America that the budget uncertainty has sapped confidence in the economy, which is growing at a weak pace and is vulnerable to shocks.

#### Capital key to securing a fiscal cliff deal – even Republicans are calling for leadership

Tobin 11/8/12 (Jonathan, Commentary, "Must GOP Bow to Obama’s Fiscal Demands?," http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/11/08/must-tgop-bow-to-obamas-fiscal-demands/)

With the president’s election victory still fresh in their minds, Democrats are assuming that Tuesday’s results mean that Congressional Republicans are bound to bow to their demands for tax increases. Such sentiments are understandable given the Democrats’ clear victory in the presidential contest as well as their gains in Congress. Having campaigned on a platform of raising taxes on the wealthy, there may be little reason to assume President Obama is going to back down on his demands and, as many liberals have already pointed out, he’s going to be bitterly criticized if he does compromise on his soak-the-rich approach. Yet though Republicans may still be shell shocked by the election returns, there is no reason for them to cave in on their principles just because the president and his media cheering section expect them to.¶ House Speaker John Boehner sounded an appropriate note, albeit one that was pure political boilerplate, when he said yesterday, “Mr. President, this is your moment. We’re ready to be led — not as Democrats or Republicans, but as Americans. We want you to lead, not as a liberal or a conservative, but as president of the United States of America.” But his airy rhetoric contains a kernel of truth. If the country is to avoid going over the fiscal cliff in the next month, and avoid the terrible consequences that would result from a failure to reach a budget deal, it is going to require the kind of presidential leadership and ability to compromise that Obama has never been willing to provide in his first four years in office. The question before the country is not so much the one that liberals have been asking about Republicans simply waving the white flag as it is whether the president can actually bargain in good faith and get a deal.

#### Political capital key to brokering a deal to avert sequestration and hitting the fiscal cliff

Baltimore Sun 11/6/12 ("Obama's mandate," http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-11-06/news/bs-ed-obama-20121106\_1\_presidential-election-election-day-mandate)

President Barack Obama won re-election yesterday thanks to a narrow edge in a swath of key battleground states. His prize: another four years as the leader of a sharply divided nation facing a series of seemingly intractable problems, chief among them the economy, the debt and employment. The first order of business must be to avoid the fiscal cliff looming over the country at year's end that will mandate tax increases and deep, across-the-board cuts to defense, entitlement programs and domestic spending programs unless he and Congress can agree on a way forward.¶ Mr. Obama needs to act immediately to persuade Congress to extend the deadline for sequestration another six months to provide time to avoid the massive damage to the economy and employment these draconian cuts in government would bring about.¶ Another close presidential election — accompanied by split control of Congress, with Republicans maintaining control of the House and Democrats holding the Senate — might lead many to the conclusion that President Obama doesn't have much of a mandate. Quite the contrary; he can have a robust mandate if he chooses to use it. The lesson of this election and Mr. Obama's election in 2008 is that Americans are hungry for big solutions to the nation's problems, but that they don't believe that the stale platforms of either party, dominated by the interests of the far left and far right, are the answer.¶ Mr. Obama won a decisive victory in 2008 on the promise of a new kind of politics, but after four years of allowing himself to become entangled in the entrenched partisan warfare of Congress, he faced a nation skeptical of his ability to bring change. Mitt Romney's transformation into a "severe conservative" got him through the GOP primaries, but it was killing his chances in the general election — until he made a sharp tack to the center, starting with the first presidential debate and continuing until Election Day. There is a lesson here.¶ Mr. Obama might imagine that without the unifying goal of ensuring his defeat, congressional Republicans will be more willing to cut a deal that includes new tax revenues. But they might also conclude that they paid no price for resisting him during his first term and that Mr. Romney's fault was that he was insufficiently conservative.¶ That possibility was underscored recently when Republican House Speaker John Boehner said in an interview with Politico that his congressional colleagues won't under any circumstances even consider a plan that raises taxes on people making more than $1 million a year. He sent a tweet to the same effect even before all the returns were in last night. Mr. Boehner's comments reflect how tough it would have been even for a Romney presidency to escape the trap of his party's most extreme elements, let alone the problems President Obama will have keeping his campaign promise to increase taxes on individuals earning more than $250,000 a year.¶ The president, freed from the constraints of re-election, needs to start making some politically bold moves. He should embrace something very much like the Bowles/Simpson deficit reduction plan. He should campaign for it with the same vigor he put into winning a second term in the White House, and he should dare Republicans not to meet him in the political center. He should follow that with a comprehensive immigration reform plan, building on the ideas former President George W. Bush failed to get past his own party. He should start talking about climate change and propose something more than the cap-and-trade regime that Congressional Republicans have already rejected — perhaps a revenue-neutral carbon tax.

#### Capital key to securing a fiscal cliff deal

Davis and Dorning 11/7/12 (Julie and Mike, Bloomberg, "Obama Success on Fiscal Cliff May Hinge on Congress Ties," http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-08/obama-success-on-fiscal-cliff-may-hinge-on-better-congress-ties.html)

President Barack Obama, his re- election victory sealed, is reaching out to congressional leaders to revive bipartisan deficit-reduction negotiations whose failure was a defining disappointment of his first term.¶ His chances of success, say Republicans and Democrats, depend on Obama’s willingness in his second term to build a rapport he has lacked with lawmakers from both parties and take a stronger role than he has to date in steering negotiations on sweeping changes to entitlements, taxes and spending.¶ “He’s simply going to have to take a more active and forceful role,” said Democratic strategist Jim Manley, a former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada. “He never got involved in the nitty-gritty of the legislative process. In light of the hyper-partisanship that still surrounds Capitol Hill, he’s going to have to change, and he’s going to have to take more of a lead in breaking the logjam.”¶ There are already indications that Obama is ready to do so. The president, who said in his Nov. 6 victory speech that he was “looking forward to reaching out and working with leaders of both parties to meet the challenges we can only solve together,” spoke yesterday by telephone with the top congressional Democratic and Republican leaders of the House and Senate.

#### Capital key to fiscal cliff compromise

Gotlieb and Kergin 11/7/12 (Allan and Michael, senior advisers to Bennett Jones LLP and former Canadian ambassadors to the United States, "America’s cliff is Canada’s priority," http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/americas-cliff-is-canadas-priority/article5032433/)

Which brings us to the edge of the Congress mandated "fiscal cliff": dramatic rises in taxes, accompanied by large cuts in expenditures, half of which come from national defence. Termed a "suicide pact," and never intended to be implemented, Congress passed legislation designed to force reluctant politicians to make tough budget choices. This fiscal “abyss” arrives Jan. 1, unless Mr. Obama can use his replenished political capital to muscle a compromise with the lame-duck Congress.

### AT: No Impact – Kick-The-Can Solves

#### Short-term fixes collapse the economy --- just as dangerous as the cliff.

**Eaglen**, **11/2**/2012 (Mackenzie – member of the AOL Defense Board of Contributors, defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, It’s Not Just Defense Cuts: Sequester Would Cripple Our Economy, AOL Defense, p. <http://defense.aol.com/2012/11/02/its-not-just-defense-cuts-sequester-would-cripple-our-economy/>)

The second option available to Congress is to simply cancel sequestration without a long-term framework for debt reduction. However, this ignores our growing debt challenge and increases the likelihood of another sovereign debt downgrade, which could bring additional economic and market complications. Under CBO's alternative fiscal scenario -- which reverses most of the fiscal cliff policies -- real GDP growth would be roughly 1.7 percent in 2013, and the unemployment rate would be a full percentage point lower than under the fiscal cliff scenario. However, this short-term growth would come with a cost. Debt held by the public would rise to 90 percent of GDP by 2022. This kick-the-can "solution" could wind up being as detrimental as careening off the fiscal cliff.

### Nuclear Power – 2NC

#### Plan unpopular – GOP ties nuclear spending to Solyndra- causes backlash – that’s Korte

#### Nuclear loans cost capital – caught in the Solyndra cross-fire

NYT, 11 (New York Times, “Will Solyndra Scandal Spill Over to Scald Nuclear Loan Guarantees?”, October 7, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/07/07greenwire-will-solyndra-scandal-spill-over-to-scald-nucle-3933.html?pagewanted=all)

The implosion of government-backed solar firm Solyndra has handed Republicans both the tools for a slow-burn inquiry that keeps the White House on the defensive and a ready-made target for ideological barbs at federal loan guarantee programs. But beneath the bombast of GOP pleas to stop government from "picking winners and losers" is near-party unity in favor of nuclear loan guarantees, and even a support base for keeping the Department of Energy in the renewable-power business. As a result, the Obama administration's sharpest critics on Solyndra must walk a fine line when it comes to the future of a program created by a Republican-controlled Congress and White House. Watching with interest, the nuclear industry is growing concerned that broad shots at DOE loan guarantees could catch them in the cross fire, despite key differences between the program's treatment of their sector versus renewables.

#### Plan costs capital – enrages Obama’s base

Maize, 10 (Kennedy, “Copenhagen: The Case for Climate Adaptation”, Managing Power, March 1, http://www.managingpowermag.com/opinion\_and\_commentary/Copenhagen-The-Case-for-Climate-Adaptation\_227.html)

Energy legislation is dead for 2010, except for possible subsidies for nuclear power, clean coal, and offshore drilling, designed to appeal to Republicans. But that reach across the partisan divide likely will enrage Obama’s base among liberals and environmentalists. The predictable outcome: more gridlock and name-calling. No action. These are salutary developments for the U.S. and the world. As Ronald Reagan was wont to say, “Stand there, don’t just do something.” This is particularly true as some of the alleged science behind the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007 report turns out to be bogus. Claims of glacial retreat in India and the Andes are based on entirely unreliable sources. The same is true about hand-wringing on devastation of Amazon rainforests and the social impact of sea level rises, particularly in Bangladesh. The latest scientific developments—and it is good that the mainstream media is actually beginning to examine the IPPC’s claims with some skepticism—don’t mean that global warming is not real. They mean that the IPCC’s assessments are unreliable. The science may unravel further as it gets greater scrutiny. We don’t know what to believe. Attempts at global international collaboration, as in Kyoto and Copenhagen, were doomed to depravation by roving bands of governmental pirates, seeking economic rents. The operative word was “extortion.” Copenhagen reminded me of the International Law of the Sea Treaty negotiations over seabed mining, which I covered in the mid-1970s. The impetus for the negotiations was to provide a way to regulate deep seabed minerals mining. The talks deteriorated into attempts by poor countries to extort money from rich countries in the name of “fairness.” After decades of diplomacy and negotiations, the U.S. ultimately refused to become a party to the treaty. Ironically, seabed minerals mining (Hoovering up manganese nodules from the ocean floor) has never come to pass. The same sort of political game pitting rich nations against poor occurred in Copenhagen. The result: nothing of substance from the negotiations in a frigid Denmark. The U.S. government wasn’t alone in getting stalled in the Copenhagen gridlock. The Europeans, particularly Germany, banked on an economic agreement fostering a carbon trading market benefiting German bankers. Given the complex global politics, that wasn’t likely; the German agenda was kaputt gegangen even before the international meeting began. The U.S., Germany, and the other European nations knew when they landed their luxury jets in Copenhagen that no real deal was in the works. So they floated the fake notion of a “political” agreement, an agreement to agree in the future. That fell apart. Instead, there was no agreement except on civil disagreement. Advocates of aggressive international governmental regulatory approaches to climate change are wringing their hands and whining about failed opportunities. The Euros knew that what they were attempting—a draconian global climate control regime that favored them—was unlikely. The U.S. knew nothing would come of Copenhagen. Now the spin brigades are marching. In a commentary in The Energy Daily, Anne Lauvergeon of Areva and Jim Rogers of Duke Energy argued: “The fact that representatives from so many countries and organizations were willing to meet in Copenhagen is clear proof of their willingness and desire to work together.” That argument, of course, is baloney. The nations and organizations were willing to party together. Work together? Forget it. Rich nations that gave at least lip service in Copenhagen to what they argue is the potential catastrophic impact of climate warming—that includes the Obama administration—are trying to cobble together new multinational approaches to global warming. That approach is doomed. It rests on the notion that nations will yield their own interests on behalf of a distant, and not-well-understood, global goal. What to do? The answer to global warming, if it is real, isn’t global. It’s local. Given the long time frame of potential global warming effects, local adaptation appears to be the least-cost and most efficient approach. A lot of the modes of adaptation, such as using energy and water better, make sense regardless of the state of the climate. Analysts Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, writing in Foreign Policy magazine in January (“The End of Magical Climate Thinking”) observed that the Obama administration’s approach to global warming adopted a fundamentally regulatory paradigm. “Obama was following two decades of magical thinking among both greens and liberal Democrats about energy technology,” they wrote. “In this view, energy efficiency pays for itself, solar and wind power are already nearly cost competitive with fossil fuels, and both can quickly and cheaply reduce emissions. This Pollyanna view of fossil fuel alternatives and efficiency, which makes going green seem cheap and easy—little more than the cost of ‘a postage stamp a day’—has provided the justification for green-policy advocacy that has overwhelmingly focused on pollution regulations and carbon pricing while ignoring serious investment in energy research and development.” Given the long time frame of potential global warming effects, local adaptation, including honest, industry-driven R&D (as distinguished from the junk science that recent revelations have disclosed when it comes to warming science and much Department of Energy R&D), appears to be a preferable, practical approach to global climate issues. Research the issues. Adapt at home. Watch the global issues take care of themselves. There is no case for precipitous action, despite the overwrought claims of many environmentalists. I don’t want to mislead anybody here about my views. I don’t regard global warming, if it is occurring, as necessarily a bad thing. While warming evangelists have been screeching about the calamities that will flow from a warmer world, they have dramatically overhyped the threat. There will be winners and losers from a warmer world, if that is in the climate cards. It’s a difficult, probably impossible, math to balance the climate account. Will the net be positive or negative for the world we live in? Nobody knows, or can know. My suspicion is that a warmer world is desirable, and the costs of trying to forestall that far exceed the potential benefits. Admittedly, that’s pure speculation. But we know that the climate changes, and has changed significantly for as far back as we can measure. There was a “Medieval Warm Period” and a modern “Ice Age.” Beyond that, we just don’t know the order or the direction of the changes. So it makes sense to move cautiously, hedge bets, employ rigorous science, and adapt where possible. What does this mean for managers in the power business? I suspect there will be less urgency in coming years to develop carbon dioxide emissions control strategies that can’t meet real-world economic criteria. If warming is real, and if there can be no global approach to combating it, then it makes sense (and it always did) to look at low-cost local options. That’s adaptation. To me, that suggests more gas generation, along with longer-term development of coal gasification as an economic alternative to conventional pulverized coal technology. New nukes, and improved existing nuclear plants, are very useful adaptive strategies, but not silver bullets. New nukes are way too expensive today. The Obama administration’s proposal to double or triple loan guarantee subsidies for nukes could move the industry forward and overcome Wall Street reluctance to finance new plants. But that’s far from certain. Nor is it certain that Congress will go along with the big bump for nuclear loan guarantees. Obama is courting Republicans with this proposal but **risks losing a substantial portion of his Democratic base of support**.

#### More evidence -- upsets democratic base

Washington Times, 12 ("Obama: It's not doable unless it's renewable", January 17, lexis)

The Obama administration's latest move to block access to sources of conventional energy should surprise no one. Since taking office more than three years ago, Mr. Obama has misused the power of the presidency to wage a relentless campaign against affordable commodities like petroleum and coal. His liberal political base despises nuclear power in particular, associating it with American military might, and prefers costly, inefficient and pointless windmills and solar panels. Following the BP Gulf oil spill in 2010, Mr. Obama imposed a virtual ban on coastal drilling while encouraging petroleum production in Brazil. In December, he put off an opportunity to increase the flow of oil to U.S. markets by delaying approval of the Keystone XL pipeline that would deliver oil from western Canada to the Gulf coast. Miffed, the House of Representatives included in its recent payroll tax-cut deal a provision requiring the president to rule on the pipeline's future by Feb. 21. However, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper isn't waiting around - he's already trying to sell the oil to China. Beyond its use in nuclear power and atomic weapons, uranium is a valuable energy asset with applications in medical devices and scientific instruments. Even if some in Washington view this precious commodity with **fear and loathing**, states fortunate to possess it ought to be free to determine its responsible use in their own backyards.

### IFR Link

#### IFR’s unpopular-funding concerns

Dardenon 9

[Steve is a writer for The Seeker Blog. “How The Integral Fast Reactor Was killed,” Oct 21, http://nuclearstreet.com/nuclear\_power\_industry\_news/b/nuclear\_power\_news/archive/2009/10/21/how-the-integral-fast-reactor-was-killed-10214.aspx]

Here’s a concise history of the Integral Fast Reactor, including how Sen. John Kerry orchestrated the killing: The anti-IFR forces were led by John Kerry. He was the principal speaker and the floor manager of the anti forces in the Senate debate. He spoke at length, with visual aids; he had been well prepared. His arguments against the merits of the IFR were not well informedand many were clearly wrong. But what his presentation lacked in accuracy it made up in emotion. He attacked from many angles, but principally he argued proliferation dangers from civilian nuclear power. While all serious weapons development programs everywhere in the world have always taken place in huge laboratories, in specialized facilities, behind walls of secrecy, and there has been negligible involvement with civilian nuclear power, it is impossible to argue that there CAN be none. For this reason the IFR processes were specifically designed to further minimize such possibilities, and, if developed, they would have represented a significant advance over the present situation. This did not slow Senator Kerry, as he went through the litany of anti-nuclear assertions, articulately and confidently. After both sides had their say the vote came, and the pro-IFR forces prevailed. But now the funding bill had to go to conferencea compromise committee of both houses whose job was to consolidate the different versions passed by the two houses into one bill to be sent to the President for signature into law. There was brief hope that IFR development could continue even in the face of the powerful opposition. But the conference committee, behind the closed doors normal to such meetings, upheld the House position. There was to be no IFR funding. The IFR was dead. A few weeks later, the mid-term elections swept Republicans into power in Congress. The IFR votes had always been politicized. With some significant exceptions, in fact just enough each year to fund the IFR, the vote had always been along party lines. Had the IFR been able to hang on for a few more weeks its development almost certainly would have gone on to completion.

### A2: Link Turn

#### No link turns – nuclear has no political clout – there’s not enough of a constituency

**Tucker, 12** – veteran journalist whose work has appeared in Harper’s, the Atlantic Monthly, the American Spectator, the Weekly Standard, National Review, Reason, the New Republic, Reader’s Digest, the Wall Street Journal, and many other publications; author of Terrestrial Energy: How a Nuclear-Solar Alliance Can Rescue the Planet (William, 8/16. “Nuclear’s Problem — Too Much Energy, Not Enough Jobs.” Nuclear Townhall. http://www.nucleartownhall.com/blog/william-tucker-nuclear%E2%80%99s-problem-%E2%80%94-too-much-energy-not-enough-jobs/)

So there you have it. America’s energy future is a contest between coal and wind. Which can create more jobs? If you think there’s a better option, you don’t have a place at the table. And that’s where nuclear stands today. Sure, there may be questions about potential accidents and the effects of radiation, but the real problem is this: Nuclear is so energy intensive that it doesn’t produce enough jobs to create a political constituency. Why does coal still have such enormous political clout? The answer is simple. It requires so much mining and transportation of raw material that hundreds of thousands of workers – whole states, in fact – become involved in the task. There are now 1300 coal mines in 27 states employing 88,000 workers. More than half a dozen of these states identify themselves as “coal states” – West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Colorado and Wyoming just fir a start. The state with the biggest coal reserves – Montana – hasn’t really started developing them yet. Next to farming, coal mining is most widely entrenched resource-based industry in the country. There is good reason for all this job creation. A1000-MW coal plant must be resupplied by a 110-car unit train arriving every 30 hours. Almost half the railroad freight in the U.S. is coal. Economists say there’s a real question of whether the railroads actually own the coal companies or the coal companies own the railroads. In any case, all this produces huge work forces with powerful labor union backing. Wind energy works the same way. Because each giant 45-story windmills produces only about 2 MW, thousands upon thousands will be required to produce electricity in commercial quantities. This creates a huge work force. The American Wind Energy Association claims 90,000 employees in the wind industry with more than 4,000 in California, Texas, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania and North Dakota. Building out the transmission lines to carry this electricity to population centers will eventually employ thousands more. Wind is nothing if not labor intensive.So how does nuclear do by comparison? According to the Uranium Producers of America, there are 13 uranium mines in the U.S. employing 1635 people. Their annual output was 16, 000 tons of uranium oxide – the equivalent of two coal trains leaving the Powder River Basin (where one now departs every eight minutes). Our domestic production of uranium has actually been suppressed over the last two decades because we have been using former Soviet weapons material for half our fuel in the Megatons to Megawatts program, although the pace may pick up when the treaty expires next year. Worldwide there are only 46 uranium mines – as opposed to 450 coal mines in Kentucky alone. Recently the Russians have proposed supplying the entire world out of one uranium mine in Siberia. Nuclear’s great energy density has one glaring weakness – there is no possibility of building a huge mining and transport constituencies that can support the technology. Uranium does require reprocessing and there are major facilities in Kentucky and Ohio. But even those hardly constitute more than a ripple in the two states’ economies. Traditionally, the only places where nuclear has gained a political foothold is those states that have national laboratories. New Mexico’s Democratic Senator Pete Domenici was long a leading supporter because of the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, which hosts Oak Ridge and the Tennessee Valley Authority, has now picked up the mantle. But Tennessee is much more involved in the auto industry and there is no “nuclear state” to match the half-dozen coal states. Well then, what about the 104 reactors that operate around the country? Don’t they generate some political support? The average reactor employs about 650 people and is extremely popular in its home territory. Bisconti Research has found that support for nuclear increases to around 85 percent in communities that host reactors. But this support tends to be highly localized and reactors create little ancillary employment. Replacing the fuel rods, for instance, requires only six tractor trailers arriving once every 18 months. Illinois gets almost half its electricity from nuclear and even Barack Obama was known to say a few nice things about it while he was Senator from Illinois. But most states with large nuclear complexes are equally committed to coal. Even in a state that is highly dependent on nuclear, the work force is so small as to be inconsequential. Vermont gets 60 percent of its electricity form Vermont Yankee, yet its efforts to close down the reactor have generated very little pushback. Vernon, the tiny town of 2,000 that supplies all this energy, is 100 percent in favor of keeping the reactor. But its interests are completed swamped by 623,000 other Vermonters who only get clean, cheap energy from nuclear and think they can do the same by covering the green mountains with 45-story windmills. The only place where nuclear has built a true constituency is in the South. This is partly because of the many military veterans in the region, since a large portion of the nuclear workforce has come up through the Nuclear Navy. South Carolina is probably the most pro-nuclear state in the country with Georgia and Tennessee also strongly in favor. It is no accident that the four new reactors licensed for construction will be built in Georgia and South Carolina. Areva is also completing its plutonium recycling plant at the Savannah River Site. But all these states are pretty much locked up for Republicans and have very little impact at the national level. So nuclear’s weakness is plain to see. It does very poorly at creating the kind of widespread employment that builds political constituencies. It is only good at producing energy.

### A2: saves money

#### Even if the plan saves money- near term losses causes fights

Snider 12

[Annie, E&E reporter, 1/16/12, “Pentagon still can't define 'energy security,' much less achieve it,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/01/16/1]

But this is not a good time to be requesting money at the Pentagon. Military budget planners have spent the past year carving nearly a half-trillion dollars in budget cuts, while top brass have worn out the thesaurus' list of synonyms for "decimate" as they decry the damage that additional looming cuts would do to their forces and weapons. At the same time, **no one has yet made the business case for investing in energy** security. Current rules require that renewable energy and efficiency projects prove they will bring savings over the long run, even if they carry an added security benefit. In fact, because the Pentagon operates on a five-year budget cycle, projects that pencil out to great investments over the long term often get turned down because they register to the budget as a near-term loss. Microgrids are still in the pilot phase and the military has not yet decided what the business model will be for them. Because the technology would help energy managers use power more efficiently on a day-to-day basis, for instance by bringing unnecessary loads offline during peak demand times, some officials say microgrids may be able to create enough savings to pay for themselves. Not all of industry is convinced, though, and a group of business executives will be suggesting financial models to Robyn's office in a report this spring. Ultimately, many say the military is going to have to decide what "secure energy" is worth to it if it wants to fix its vulnerabilities. "Until someone establishes the value of energy security, **I only have the business case to rely on, because right now the value of energy security is apparently zero**," said Dan Nolan, a retired Army colonel who writes a defense energy blog. The Navy has made a rough attempt to do this for its Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Va. Like many military installations, the base sits at the end of the power line. Last year it lost electricity 11 times. Capt. Kenneth Branch, the commander for Naval Facilities Engineering Command Washington, estimates that the two days the center was without power during Hurricane Irene this summer cost it $60,000. "That's just lost industrial productivity," he said, noting that the numbers helped him justify infrastructure investments. "I also spend a lot of money on my labor trying to figure what were the problems and get back up and online." A fuller accounting could also count the costs associated with backup generators, including labor required for maintenance, the price of buying and transporting fuel, and the risk of failure. Pentagon officials say they are beginning to think through some of these calculations, but nobody is sure yet whether extra money would follow. "If the military is really serious about this, are we going to have to spend some dedicated funds on energy security?" the Army's Kidd said. "I don't know the answer to that, but I think those are the questions we need to start to ask." Looking to Congress Ultimately, the answers to those questions will come from Capitol Hill, where lawmakers have been bitterly divided on energy policy. Indeed, a military energy issue that has become a symbol of the larger energy policy debate was one of the final points to be resolved in last month's congressional budget deal. Republicans mounted an effort to exempt the military from a 2007 ban on purchasing fuels like liquefied coal that have a higher greenhouse gas content than traditional petroleum, but in the end they acquiesced, leaving the ban intact.

### A2: Plan Bipart

#### Every energy policy is polarizing

Whitman 12, Christine Todd CASEnergy Co-Chair, Former EPA Administrator and New Jersey Governor, “Nuclear Power Garners Bipartisan Support”, August 13, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?rss=1&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+njgroup-energy+%28Energy+%26+Environment+Experts--Q+with+Answer+Previews%29#2237728

It’s clear from the debate around the merits and drawbacks of various electricity and fuel sources that energy policy can be a highly polarizing topic. In fact, it’s arguable that there is no energy option that holds a truly bipartisan appeal: Every form of energy faces pockets of dissent. This makes crafting universally accepted energy policy particularly challenging.

#### Ensures fights

Beschloss, 8/30 (Morris, senior analyst for The World Report, he is also editor in chief of Global Outlook, “Fossil Fuel/Green Energy Confrontation Becomes increasingly Political”, My Desert, http://beschloss.blogs.mydesert.com/2012/08/30/fossil-fuelgreen-energy-confrontation-becomes-increasingly-political/)

It should come as no surprise that the increasing polarization between advocates of renewable energy and traditional fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) would increase in fierceness during the current hot-button election campaign. To punctuate the increasing antagonism emerging between the two energy approaches, each side has found a home in the forthcoming platforms of the contending political parties. These will be made public at the respective GOP and Democrat conventions, around the end of August and into September. Although the current energy confrontation did not originally emerge as a political confrontation, but was centered around the global warming debate, both President Obama and presumptive Republican Presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, have taken diametrically opposed positions in their visions of America’s energy future.

#### Partisanship outweighs

McEntee, 8/13 (Christine, Executive Director and CEO, American Geophysical Union, “Finding the Sweet Spot: Bipartisan Energy and Environment Policies”, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php)

As convenient as it would be to say that a single change could alleviate the gridlock we are experiencing, the reality is that there are a number of critical obstacles keeping us from passing energy and environmental legislation. We know that objective scientific knowledge is needed to inform good policy decisions – and that objective knowledge exists – but all too often we are allowing politics and ideology to take precedence over, or be pitted against, science. This not only risks the legitimacy of the science, but also the strength of the policy and its ability to protect the security, health and welfare of the American people, and support a healthy and thriving economy. The current rhetoric on climate change is a perfect example. We also know that the biggest obstacles to passage of energy and environmental legislation are disagreements about the extent to which the federal government can and should regulate business, and reluctance to launch new initiatives that will add to the deficit. The science tells us that small initiatives that require only nominal investments can't begin to address the environmental and energy challenges we face; and legislation big enough to achieve significant results will cost more than Congress is willing to spend. Environmental legislation is also held prisoner to partisan gridlock, with far less bipartisan support than many energy proposals. Even environmental legislation that saves many times its cost in medical and health care savings cannot advance in the current Congress. One recent example is the defeat of legislation to limit the release of airborne particulates proven to adversely affect the respiratory health of children and seniors. Dissonance about the role of federal regulation, its cost-effectiveness, and potential to impose costs on private sector that might adversely impact economic recovery further complicate energy/environmental legislative calculus. For these reasons, it is difficult for Congress to pass new energy and/or environmental initiatives, even where there is wide bipartisan support for a given bill. Lastly, we know that Congress is not likely to make much real progress on either energy or environmental issues until voters demand such action. Research shows that most voters, including Independents in swing states, do not list energy and environmental issues as a major determinant of how they vote, despite their significant impact on local, state and national economies, public health and national security. This needs to change. Historically, a major energy or environmental disaster has sometimes generated a major change in voter sentiment, e.g., the Cuyahoga River fire that helped launch the Clean Water Act. Unfortunately, it may take a major environmental or energy disaster to get sufficient voter support for significant legislation on these issues.

### Energy Spending – 2NC

#### Any energy policy without a clear link to revenue generation poisons the well

**Macauley 12**

(1/6, Vice President for Research and Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future, “It’s Economics,” http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/01/whats-in-store-for-2012.php)

**Congressional action on energy**, climate, or both **seems unlikely** unless a clear link to the economy is perceived. **The nation’s fiscal distress calls for attention to revenue, tax reform, and spending reductions**. All of these can be addressed by a variety of actions, but worth a long look is a reasonable carbon tax. A $20 per ton tax would raise $100+ billion and could be used directly for deficit reduction or to reform the US tax code by lowering payroll and corporate income taxes, in turn accelerating economic growth and job creation. It’s also clear that the public welcomes new energy supplies but there are risks that we need to manage from unconventional energy production, whether drilling in ultradeep Gulf waters, in the Arctic, or in shale-gas and oil-sands rich regions. More study—and informed public debate—is needed. Actions by the US EPA under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to both cut carbon and push for stronger control of traditional pollutants, taken together, will influence the fate of coal power. With Congress unlikely to do anything this year – although a carbon tax really should be on the table -- the Act is the only federal tool for regulating carbon. But the EPA’s carbon regulatory program is under attack, both in the courts and by some in Congress. Analysis indicates that using the CAA will not cause the "train wreck" critics predict, and could lead to meaningful carbon cuts - though it is true that the tools in the Act are far from perfect, and using them well requires the EPA to be both smart and bold. The Act is worth protecting and using to target carbon emissions, but in the long term it will need to be supplanted by new legislation. The **political tradeoffs** **involved** in this switch **will be difficult**. The economics are also large, but **without a clearer perceived link to solving fiscal problems, it is very hard to see them happening this year.**

### AT: Not Intrinsic

**Any interpretation of fiat that moots the politics DA isn’t real world – you should reject it – kills all DA links based off international response, political process, and funding – those are key to neg ground, promote in-depth and timely research, and increase education on current events. And there’s no brightline to what’s intrinsic, meaning the aff can create ways to spike out of every DA – that’s a voting issue, the aff destroys neg ground**

**And, our link evidence proves germanity to the plan – it’s a necessary outcome**

**And, you can’t vote aff on this – the plan proves the resolution is a good idea, the permutation proves the resolution alone is insufficient**

### Winners Lose

**1. No evidence the plan would be a win – if unpopular policies were all it took to trigger the link turn Obama’s approval rating would be sky-high now**

**2. Link outweighs the link turn on timeframe**

**Silber 07** [PhD Political Science & Communication – focus on the Rhetoric of Presidential Policy-Making – Prof of Poli Sci – Samford, [Marissa, WHAT MAKES A PRESIDENT QUACK?, Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 2nd, 2007, UNDERSTANDING LAME DUCK STATUS THROUGH THE EYES OF THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS]

Important to the discussion of **political capital** is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends **political capital** on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). **Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent**. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of **political capital**, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition of a lame duck President must be developed.

**3. Winners don’t win – controversies hurt capital – Obama will do a poor job spinning the plan**

**GERSON 12 – 19 – 10** Washington Post Political Commentator

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121604039.html>

In some areas - such as education reform or the tax deal - Obama's governing practice is better than his political skills. But these skills matter precisely because political capital is limited. The early pursuit of ambitious health-care reform was a political mistake, as former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel internally argued. But every president has the right to spend his popularity on what he regards as matters of principle. Political risks, taken out of conviction with open eyes, are an admirable element of leadership. Yet political errors made out of pique or poor planning undermine the possibility of achievement. Rather than being spent, popularity is squandered - something the Obama administration has often done. Why so many unforced mistakes? The ineffectiveness of Obama's political and communications staff may be part of the problem - and the administration is now hinting at significant White House personnel changes in the new year. But an alternative explanation was on display this week. Perhaps Democrats did not elect another Franklin Roosevelt or John Kennedy but another Woodrow Wilson - a politician sabotaged by his sense of superiority.

### PC Key/Real

**Best studies prove you’re wrong – capital is key.**

**Beckmann and McGann 8**. [Matthew, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, Anthony, “Navigating the Legislative Divide: Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States” Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol 20]

Here we propose a theory that casts some early rays of light onto the policy consequences of polarization in Congress. Building from a simple theoretical model in which the president seeks to promote his preferred policies in the Senate (see Snyder, 1991; Groseclose, 1996), we assess differences in the chamber’s preference distribution – from normal to unanimous to bimodal – as well as the ‘political capital’ at the president’s disposal.2 Results show that absent the president, ideological polarization makes amassing the votes needed to beat the status quo difficult, so gridlock frequently prevails. The same is true when the president lacks political capital to spend. However, when endowed with abundant capital, facing a polarized legislature enables presidents to pass policies closer to their ideal than would have been possible in an assembly characterized by greater ideological homogeneity. Hence the familiar prediction of blanket ‘gridlock’ is overblown. Instead, comparative statics show that the consequences of ideological polarization in Congress are conditional: they depend on the nature of the preference distribution, the involvement of the president, and the political capi- tal at his disposal.

**DICKINSON CONCLUDES NEG – prefer this evidence because its from a peer reviewed journal and isn’t just a random blog post.**

Dickinson, yes the same damn one, 2009 (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D 2009)

Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). **To some scholars, these results indicate** that Neustadt's **"president-centered" perspective is incorrect** (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The misinterpretation of the findings as they relate to PP **stems** in part **from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing presidential influence** (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? **Scholars often argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress**, often through quid pro quo exchanges, **at critical junctures during the lawmaking sequence**. **Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots" within Congress.** This logic finds empirical support in vote-switching studies that indicate that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keith **Krehbiel** analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto and **finds** "modest **support for the** sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly, David **Brady** **and** Craig **Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that** presidents do influence the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, Matthew **Beckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda** (more on this later). **These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote** (Beckmann 2008, n.d.).

### AT: No Impact

#### Van guard group- investor uncertainty

#### Their evidence assumes a rational response --- the fiscal cliff will spark a fear-driven sell off and triggers panic in the market.

Christian Science Monitor, **11/9**/2012 (The fiscal cliff isn’t gradual, and it will matter, p. http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-Reformed-Broker/2012/1109/The-fiscal-cliff-isn-t-gradual-and-it-will-matter)

Now there is a new meme going around that some of the more prominent bloggers have repeated, wherein we hear about how "the changes don't all take effect at once" and "this whole thing is just like Y2K" and "actually, it will probably have very little effect on the economy at all." The bloggers who are repeating this are technically correct. But they tend to be either journalists or economists, and not market people necessarily. And so I think that here's what they miss: 1. What the fiscal cliff's actual impact on the economy will ultimately be is not the point, it is the perception. 2. In the short-term, stocks trade on psychology and sentiment. This happens en masse and things change quickly. Fear over increased taxes, lower government spending and a further contraction of economic growth will not lead to a gradual adjustment of risk asset prices. Rather, it will mean a fear-driven race to the exits all at once. I don't care what your surveys say, deep down everyone who is in the stock market right now is operating under the assumption that a compromise will occur, on time, and one that kicks the can on all of the big issues. Any hint that we're deviating from this script will show up in the tape. 3. Economists and journalists who do fact-based empirical work sometimes forget that most people, including investors, do not behave rationality or react to the data in proportion with its actual meaning. Many people in this world, even some successful ones, can turn from reasonable human beings into hysterical monkeys when their fight-or-flight instinct is triggered. And nothing triggers it like a whiff of panic in the air and the threat of the unknown, in this case the question of how the economy will weather the effects of the Cliff. So while Fiscal Slope may turn out to be the reality, intelligent people who have figured this out ought not to assume that that's how "the market" will react to it in the short-term. Especially if the calendar turns and we've gone "over it." Expect hysterical monkeys to rule the markets in that scenario rather than human beings at that point, even if their fear turns out to be unfounded.

#### Lack of a fiscal compromise leads to irrational economic behavior.

**Eaglen**, **11/2**/2012 (Mackenzie – member of the AOL Defense Board of Contributors, defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, It’s Not Just Defense Cuts: Sequester Would Cripple Our Economy, AOL Defense, p. <http://defense.aol.com/2012/11/02/its-not-just-defense-cuts-sequester-would-cripple-our-economy/>)

Congress must tackle a complex array of major issues -- what Beltway wallahs are calling the "fiscal cliff" -- all at the same time. The cliff is the net effect of sequestration spending cuts when combined with massive tax increases scheduled to go into effect at the start of 2013. Together, they would reduce the federal budget deficit by close to $500 billion in 2013 alone and threaten to push the economy into a recession. Can Congress cope with such fundamental issues in a speedy and effective manner? One senior Pentagon official, in discussing sequestration, recently said that "in the absence of certainty, people will tend to gravitate to the most negative behaviors." This seems to reflect market behavior across the economy right now.

### Fiscal Cliff Goes Global

#### Fiscal cliff collapses the economy --- spills over to other countries.

**Bloomberg**, **11/9**/2012 (Fitch Sees Risk of U.S. Recession on Fiscal Cliff Concern, p. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-09/fitch-sees-risk-of-u-s-recession-on-fiscal-cliff-concern.html)

The U.S. risks entering a recession that will hurt economic growth worldwide should policy makers fail to avoid the so-called fiscal cliff of automatic tax increases and spending cuts next year, Fitch Ratings said. “We think that will tip the U.S. back into recession,” Fitch Managing Director Ed Parker said in an interview in Istanbul yesterday. “This should be a wholly avoidable, unnecessary recession.” U.S. stocks have tumbled, sending the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index to its biggest two-day drop in a year, after U.S. President Barack Obama’s re-election, as concern deepened that lawmakers will be unable to reach a budget compromise to avoid more than $600 billion in spending cuts and tax increases. The Congressional Budget Office reiterated that a failure to strike a deal would lead to a recession in the first half of 2013. Fitch, which rates the U.S. AAA, its highest investment grade status, on Nov. 7 warned that the U.S. may be downgraded next year unless lawmakers avoid automatic tax boosts and budget cuts and raise the debt ceiling, while Moody’s Investors Service said it will wait to see the economic impact should the nation experience a fiscal shock. S&P stripped the U.S. of its AAA credit rating on Aug. 5, 2011, after months of political wrangling over the debt ceiling. “If the U.S. goes into recession, given it has such a big weight in the global economy, then that will knock quite a lot of global growth,” Fitch’s Parker said. “That will affect the growth of pretty much every country in the world.”

# Rd 8 vs. Idaho State CI (Queer Theory / Nuclear)

## 1NC

### 1

A. Interpretation – debate is a game that requires the aff to defend USFG action on energy policy –

#### --‘resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### --“United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

B. Violation – they claim to win for reasons other than the desirability of that action

C. Reasons to prefer:

#### 1. Predictability – debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### 2. Ground – the resolution exists to create balanced difficulty, creating a topic that is supposed to be moral and controversial – games requires acceptance of rules whose purpose is to forbid the easiest means to a goal – this makes the game meaningful

Hurka 6 – philosopher who serves as the Jackman Distinguished Chair in Philosophical Studies at the University of Toronto (Thomas, 2006, "Games and the Good," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 80, http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~thurka/docs/pass\_games.pdf)

I take this admiration to rest on the judgement that excellence in games is good in itself, apart from any pleasure it may give the player or other people but just for the properties that make it excellent. The admiration, in other words, rests on the perfectionist judgement that skill in games is worth pursuing for its own sake and can add value to one’s life. This skill is not the only thing we value in this way; we give similar honours to achievements in the arts, science, and business. But one thing we admire, and to a significant degree, is excellence in athletic and nonathletic games. Unless we dismiss this view, one task for philosophy is to explain why such excellence is good. But few philosophers have attempted this, for a well-known reason. A unified explanation of why excellence in games is good requires a unified account of what games are, and many doubt that this is possible. After all, Wittgenstein famously gave the concept of a game as his primary example of one for which necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be given but whose instances are linked only by looser “family resemblances.”2 If Wittgenstein was right about this, 2 there can be no single explanation of why skill in games is good, just a series of distinct explanations of the value of skill in hockey, skill in chess, and so on. But Wittgenstein was not right, as is shown in a little-known book that is nonetheless a classic of twentieth-century philosophy, Bernard Suits’s The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia. Suits gives a perfectly persuasive analysis of playing a game as, to quote his summary statement, “the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”3 And in this paper I will use his analysis to explain the value of playing games. More specifically, I will argue that the different elements of Suits’s analysis give game-playing two distinct but related grounds of value, so it instantiates two related intrinsic goods. I will also argue that game-playing is an important intrinsic good, which gives the clearest possible expression of what can be called a modern as against a classical, or more specifically Aristotelian, view of value. But first Suits’s analysis. It says that a game has three main elements, which he calls the prelusory goal, the constitutive rules, and the lusory attitude. To begin with the first, in playing a game one always aims at a goal that can be described independently of the game. In golf, this is that a ball enter a hole in the ground; in mountain-climbing, that one stand on top of a mountain; in Olympic sprinting, that one cross a line on the track before one’s competitors. Suits calls this goal “prelusory” because it can be understood and achieved apart from the game, and he argues that every game has such a goal. Of course, in playing a game one also aims at a goal internal to it, such as winning the race, climbing the mountain, or breaking par on the golf course. But on Suits’s view this “lusory” goal is derivative, since achieving it involves achieving the prior prelusory goal in a specified way. This way is identified by the second element, the game’s constitutive rules. According to 3 Suits, the function of these rules is to forbid the most efficient means to the prelusory goal. Thus, in golf one may not carry the ball down the fairway and drop it in the hole by hand; one must advance it using clubs, play it where it lies, and so on. In mountain-climbing one may not ride a gondola to the top of the mountain or charter a helicopter; in 200-metre sprinting, one may not cut across the infield. Once these rules are in place, success in the game typically requires achieving the prelusory goal as efficiently as they allow, such as getting the ball into the hole in the fewest possible strokes or choosing the best way up the mountain. But this is efficiency within the rules, whose larger function is to forbid the easiest means to the game’s initial goal. These first two elements involve pursuing a goal by less than the most efficient means, but they are not sufficient for playing a game. This is because someone can be forced to use these means by circumstances he regrets and wishes were different. If this is the case – if, for example, a farmer harvests his field by hand because he cannot afford the mechanical harvester he would much rather use – he is not playing a game. Hence the need for the third element in Suits’s analysis, the lusory attitude, which involves a person’s willingly accepting the constitutive rules, or accepting them because they make the game possible. Thus, a golfer accepts that he may not carry the ball by hand or improve his lie because he wants to play golf, and obeying those rules is necessary for him to do so; the mountaineer accepts that he may not take a helicopter to the summit because he wants to climb. The restrictions the rules impose are adhered to not reluctantly but willingly, because they are essential to the game. Adding this third element gives Suits’s full definition: “To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means permitted by the rules ..., where the rules prohibit the use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are 4 accepted just because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude].” Or, in the summary statement quoted above, “playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”4 This analysis will doubtless meet with objections, in the form of attempted counterexamples. But Suits considers a whole series of these in his book, showing repeatedly that his analysis handles them correctly, and not by some ad hoc addition but once its elements are properly understood. Nor would it matter terribly if there were a few counterexamples. Some minor lack of fit between his analysis and the English use of “game” would not be important if the analysis picks out a phenomenon that is unified, close to what is meant by “game,” and philosophically interesting. But the analysis is interesting if, as I will now argue, it allows a persuasive explanation of the value of excellence in games. Suits himself addresses this issue of value. In fact, a central aim of his book is to give a defence of the grasshopper in Aesop’s fable, who played all summer, against the ant, who worked. But in doing so he argues for the strong thesis that playing games is not just an intrinsic good but the supreme such good, since in the ideal conditions of utopia, where all instrumental goods are provided, it would be everyone’s primary pursuit. The grasshopper’s game-playing, therefore, while it had the unfortunate effect of leaving him without food for the winter, involved him in the intrinsically finest actvity. Now, I do not accept Suits’s strong thesis that gameplaying is the supreme good – I think many other states and activities have comparable value – and I do not find his arguments for it persuasive. But I will connect the weaker thesis that playing games is one intrinsic good to the details of his analysis more explicitly than he ever does.

#### 3. Education – debate as a competitive political game is the best framework to solve dogmatism and human brutality

Carter 8 – prof @ The Colorado College, research support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the staff of the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Benezet Foundation at The Colorado College (Lief H, 2008, "LAW AND POLITICS AS PLAY," Chicago-Kent Law Review, 83(3), http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf)

Vico asked his audience at the University of Naples in 1708 to debate two competing ways of knowing: Cartesian rationality versus the poetic world of the ancients. Vico, the “pre-law advisor” of his day, saw law as a rhetorical game. That is, he understood the civic (ethical) value of competi-tion itself.12 He understood that Cartesian rationality, like religious and ideological fundamentalism, generates a kind of certainty that shuts down robust debate. Vico’s comprehensive vision suggests, in effect, that people should practice law and politics not as the search for the most rational or logically correct outcomes but rather as passionate and embodied yet peaceful competitive play. Vico inspires this vision of law and politics as play because he sees that all things in the human mind, including law and politics, are at one with the human body. As Vico put it as he concluded his 1708 address, “[T]he soul should be drawn to love by means of bodily images; for once it loves it is easily taught to believe; and when it believes and loves it should be inflamed so that it wills things by means of its normal intemperance.”13 Vico had no hope that such abstract moral principles as liberty, equality, justice, and tolerance could effectively offset the “crude and rough” nature of men.14 The Holy Bible and the Qur’an contain normative principles of love, tolerance, equal respect, and peace, but these commands have not forestalled ancient and modern religious warfare. This essay proposes that humans learn how to keep the peace not by obeying the norms, rules, and principles of civil conduct but by learning how to play, and thereby reintegrating the mind and the body. People do law, politics, and economic life well when they do them in the same ways and by the same standards that structure and govern good competitive sports and games. The word “sport” derives from “port” and “portal” and relates to the words “disport” and “transport.” The word at least hints that the primitive and universal joy of play carries those who join the game across space to a better, and ideally safer, place—a harbor that Vico him-self imagined. This essay’s bold proposition honors Vico in many ways. Its “grand theory” matches the scope of Vico’s comprehensive and integrated vision of the human condition. It plausibly confirms Vico’s hope for a “concep-tion of a natural law for all of humanity” that is rooted in human historical practice.15 Seeing these core social processes as play helps us to escape from arid academic habits and to “learn to think like children,” just as Vico urged.16 Imagining law and politics as play honors Vico above all because, if we attain Ruskin’s epigraphic ideal,17 we will see that the peace-tending qualities of sports and games already operate under our noses. Seeing law and politics as play enables us “to reach out past our inclination to make experience familiar through the power of the concept and to engage the power of the image. We must reconstruct the human world not through concepts and criteria but as something we can practically see.”18 If at its end readers realize that they could have seen, under their noses, the world as this essay sees it without ever having read it, this essay will successfully honor Vico. As Vico would have predicted, formal academic theory has played at best a marginal role in the construction of competitive games. Ordinary people have created cricket and football, and common law and electoral politics and fair market games, more from the experience of doing them than from formal theories of competitive games. When they play interna-tional football today, ordinary people in virtually every culture in the world recreate the experience of competitive games. Playing competitive games unites people across cultures in a common normative world.19 Within Vico’s social anthropological and proto-scientific framework, the claim that competitive play can generate peaceful civic life is purely empirical: law and politics in progressively peaceful political systems already are nothing more or less than competitive games. All empirical description operates within some, though too often ob-scured, normative frame. This essay’s normative frame is clear. It holds, with Shaw’s epigraph, above: Human brutalities waged against other hu-mans—suicide bombings, genocides, tribal and religious wars that provoke the indiscriminate rape, murder, torture, and enslavement of men, women, and children, often because they are labeled “evil”—are the worst things that we humans do. We should learn not to do them. In Vico’s anti-Cartesian, non-foundational world, no method exists to demonstrate that this essay’s normative core is “correct,” or even “better than,” say, the core norm holding that the worst thing humans do is dishonor God. Readers who reject Shaw’s and this essay’s normative frame may have every reason to reject the essay’s entire argument. However, this essay does describe empirically how those whose core norm requires honoring any absolute, including God, above all else regu-larly brutalize other human beings, and why those who live by the norms of good competitive play do not. People brutalize people, as Shaw’s Caesar observed, in the name of right and honor and peace. Evaluated by the norm that human brutality is the worst thing humans do, the essay shows why and how the human invention of competitive play short circuits the psy-chology of a righteousness-humiliation-brutality cycle. We cannot help but see and experience on fields of contested play testosterone-charged males striving mightily to defeat one another. Yet at the end of play, losers and winners routinely shake hands and often hug; adult competitors may dine and raise a glass together.20 Whether collectively invented as a species-wide survival adaptation or not, institutionalized competitive play under-cuts the brutality cycle by displacing religious and other forms of funda-mentalist righteousness with something contingent, amoral, and thus less lethal. Play thereby helps humans become Shaw’s “race that can under-stand.”

#### 4. Decision-making – debate gaming through dramatic rehearsal strengthens decision-making – only maintained by a confined educational space

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansendsschemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). 86 This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and 87 risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

#### Decisionmaking is a trump impact—it improves all aspects of life regardless of its specific goals

Shulman 9, president emeritus – Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, (Lee S, Education and a Civil Society: Teaching Evidence-Based Decision Making, p. ix-x)

These are the kinds of **questions** that **call for** the exercise of practical reason, **a form of thought that draws concurrently from theory and practice**, from **values and experience, and from** critical thinking and human empathy. **None of these attributes is likely to be thought of no value and thus able to be ignored.** Our schools, however, are unlikely to take on all of them as goals of the educational process. The goal of education is not to render practical arguments more theoretical; nor is it to diminish the role of values in practical reason. Indeed, all three sources—**theoretical knowledge**, practical knowhow and **experience, and** deeply held **values and identity**—**have legitimate places** in practical arguments. **An educated person**, argue philosophers Thomas Green (1971) and Gary Fenstermacher (1986), **is someone who has transformed the premises of her or his** practical **arguments** from being less objectively reasonable to being more objectively reasonable. That is, **to the extent that** they employ probabilistic reasoning or interpret data from various sources, **those judgments and interpretations** conform more accurately to well-understood principles and are less susceptible to biases and distortions. To the extent that **values**, cultural or religious **norms**, or **matters of personal preference** or taste are at work, they **have been rendered more explicit, conscious, intentional, and reflective.** In his essay for this volume, Jerome Kagan reflects the interactions among these positions by arguing: We are more likely to solve our current problem, however, if teachers accept the responsibility of guaranteeing that all adolescents, regardless of class or ethnicity, can read and comprehend the science section of newspapers, solve basic mathematical problems, detect the logical coherence in non-technical verbal arguments or narratives, and insist that all acts of maliciousness, deception, and unregulated self-aggrandizement are morally unacceptable. **Whether choosing** between **a Prius and a Hummer**, an **Obama or** a **McCain**, installing **solar panels or** planting taller **trees**, **a well-educated person has learned to combine** their **values, experience, understandings, and evidence in a thoughtful and responsible manner.** Thus do habits of mind, practice, and heart all play a significant role in the lives of citizens.

#### Ignorance of climate is preventing action on energy

**Gifford 11** – Ph.D in psychology, is a Professor of psychology at University of Victoria specializing in Environmental Psychology and is President of the Environmental Division of the International Association of Applied Psychology (Robert, American Psychologist, “The dragons of inaction: Psychological Barriers That Limit Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation”, May/June 2011, Vol. 66.4: 290–302)

Ignorance For some, ignorance can be a barrier to action in two general ways: not knowing that a problem exists and not knowing what to do once one becomes aware of the problem. Most polls (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2006) find that a proportion of respondents answer “don't know” to questions about climate change. Even today, some people around the world remain entirely unaware of climate change as a problem. Obviously, this segment of the global population is not likely to take deliberate action aimed at ameliorating climate change. 3 The second dimension of ignorance, found among the much larger proportion of the global population that is aware of the problem, is characterized by a lack of knowledge about the cause and extent of climate change (e.g., Bord, O'Connor, & Fisher, 2000). This lack leads to ignorance about (a) which specific actions to take, (b) how to undertake actions of which one is aware, and (c) the relative beneficial impacts of different actions. Given that most people are not technical experts, they generally do not have or know the relative magnitude of beneficial impacts of various actions. Such knowledge is developing, and in broad terms we know what should be done (e.g., Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, & Vandenbergh, 2009; Gardner & Stern, 2008). However, much remains to be learned, even by technical experts, partly because the answers are not always universal (e.g., a best practice in New York may not be a best practice in Vancouver) or obvious (e.g., New Zealand–raised lamb eaten in the United Kingdom has a smaller carbon footprint than United Kingdom–raised lamb eaten in the United Kingdom) and partly because life-cycle analyses of products are complex, in part because of the large number of ingredients or component parts in many commercial products (cf. Goleman, 2009). Widespread (but understandable) **ignorance about the differential effectiveness of behavioral options naturally dampens the adoption of climate-related action.**

### 2

#### Their anti-exclusionary politics is deeply imbedded in liberal multiculturalism. It will be commodified by the market.

**Dean,** Teaches Political Theory @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 200**5** [Jodi, Žižek’s Politics, p.115-9]

Unlike most critical thinkers identified with the Left, Žižek rejects the current emphasis on multicultural tolerance. He has three primary reasons for rejecting multiculturalism as it is currently understood in cultural studies and democratic theory. First, agreeing with Wendy Brown, he argues that multiculturalism today rests on an acceptance of global capitalism. Insofar as Capital's deterritorializations create the conditions for the proliferation of multiple, fluid, political subjectivities, new social movements and identity politics rely on a political terrain established by global capitalism. As I explained with regard to the notion of class struggle in Chapter Two, multiculturalism ultimately accepts and depends on the depoliticization of the economy: "the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things."^" We might think here of feminist struggles over the right to an abortion, political work toward marriage benefits for same-sex couples, and energies spent on behalf of movies and television networks that target black audiences. In efforts such as these, political energy focuses on culture and leaves the economy as a kind of unquestioned, taken-for granted basis of the way things are. This is not to say that identity politics are trivial. On the contrary, Žižek fully acknowledges the way these new forms of political subjectivization "thoroughly reshaped our entire political and cultural landscape." The problem is that capitalism has adapted to these new political forms, incorporating previously transgressive urges and turning culture itself into its central component. To be sure, Žižek ‘s argument would be stronger were he to think of new social movements as vanishing or displaced mediators. Identity politics opened up new spaces and opportunities for capitalist intensification. As new social movements transformed the lifeworld into something to be questioned and changed, they disrupted fixed identities and created opportunities for experimentation. The market entered to provide these opportunities. Consider gay media. Joshua Gamson observes that while gay portal sites initially promised to offer safe and friendly spaces for gay community building, they now function primarily "to deliver a market share to corporations." In this gay media, "community needs are conflated with consumption desires, and community equated with market."41 Social victories paved the way for market incursions into and the commodification of ever more aspects of experience. Once cultural politics morphed into capitalist culture, identity politics lost its radical edge. With predictable frequency, the Republican Right in the United States regularly accuses the 110 Left of playing the race card whenever there is opposition to a non- Anglo political appointee. A second argument Žižek employs against multiculturalism concerns the way multicultural tolerance is part of the same matrix as racist violence. On the one hand, multicultural respect for the other is a way of asserting the superiority of the multiculturalists. The multiculturalist adopts an emptied-out, disembodied perspective toward an embodied, ethnic other. The ethnic other makes the universal position of the multiculturalist possible. Not only does this attitude disavow the particularity of the multiculturalist's own position, but it also repeats the key gesture of global corporate capitalism: the big corporations will eat up, colonize, exploit, and commodity anything. They are not biased. They are empty machines following the logic of Capital. On the other hand, tolerance toward the other "passes imperceptibly into a destructive hatred of all ('fundamentalist') Others who do not fit into our idea of tolerance-in short, against all actual Others." The idea is that the liberal democrat, or multiculturalist, is against hatred and harassment. Tolerance is tolerance for another who also does not hate or harass, that is, tolerance for an other who is not really so other at all. It thus works in tandem with a right not to be harassed, not to be victimized, inconvenienced by, or exposed to the particular enjoyment of another. To this extent, the multicultural position blurs into a kind of racism such that respect is premised on agreement and identity. The Other with deep fundamental beliefs, who is invested in a set of unquestionable convictions, whose enjoyment is utterly incomprehensible to me, is not the other of multiculturalism. For Žižek, then, today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism is "an experience of the Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while practices like wife-beating remain out of sight . . .)."48 Just as in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, so today's reflexive multicultural tolerance has as its opposite, and thus remains caught in the matrix of, a hard kernel of fundamentalism, of irrational, excessive, enjoyment. The concrete realization of rational inclusion and tolerance coincides with contingent, irrational, violence. Finally, Žižek's third argument against multiculturalism is that it precludes politicization. Žižek uses the example of the animated film series about dinosaurs, The Land Before Time, produced by Steven Spielberg The clearest articulation of the hegemonic liberal multiculturalist ideology," The Land Before Time iterates the basic message that everyone is different and all should learn to live with these differences-big and small, strong and weak, carnivore and herbivore. In the films, the dinosaurs sing songs about how one should not worry about being eaten because underneath those big teeth are real fears and anxieties that everyone shares. Of course, this image of cooperative dinosaurs is profoundly false. As Žižek asks, what does it really mean to say that it takes all kinds? "Does that mean nice and brutal, poor and rich, victims and torturer^?"^^ The vision of a plurality of horizontal differences precludes the notion of a vertical antagonism that cuts through the social body. Some are more powerful. Some do want to kill-and denying this in an acceptance of differences prevents the politicization of this inequality. To say that in our difference we are really all alike, underneath it all, disavows the underlying social antagonism. It prevents us from acknowledging and confronting the way that class struggle cuts through and conditions the multiplicity of differences. We can approach the same point from another direction. Identity politics today emphasizes the specificity of each identity and experience. Particular differences are supposed to be acknowledged and respected. As Žižek points out, the notion of social justice that corresponds to this view depends on asserting the rights of and redressing the wrongs inflicted upon victims. Institutionally, then, identity politics "requires an intricate police apparatus (for identifying the group in question, for punishing offenders against its rights . . . for providing the preferential treatment which should compensate for the wrong this group has suffered."'" Rather than opening up a terrain of political struggle, functioning as human rights that designate the very space of politicization, identity politics works through a whole series of depoliticizing moves to locate, separate, and redress wrong^."^ Systemic problems are reformulated as personal issues. No particular wrong or harm can then stand in for the "universal wrong."'" Multiculturalism is thus a dimension of postpolitics insofar as it prevents the universalization of particular demands.

#### Capitalism causes extinction while entrenching racist and sexist violence, outweighs everything about the aff

Brown 5 — Professor of Economics and Research Scientist at the University of Michigan (Charles Brown, http://www.mail-archive.com/pen-l@sus.csuchico.edu/msg04868.html)

The capitalist class owns the factories, the banks, and transportation-the means of production and distribution. Workers sell their ability to work in order to acquire the necessities of life. Capitalists buy the workers' labor, but only pay them back a portion of the wealth they create. **Because the capitalists own the means of production, they are able to keep the surplus wealth created by workers above and beyond the cost of paying worker's wages and other costs of production. This surplus is called "profit" and consists of unpaid labor that the capitalists appropriate and use to achieve ever-greater profits. These profits are turned into capital which capitalists use to further exploit the producers of all wealth-the working class.** Capitalists are compelled by competition to seek to maximize profits. The capitalist class as a whole can do that only by extracting a greater surplus from the unpaid labor of workers by increasing exploitation. **Under capitalism, economic development happens only if it is profitable to the individual capitalists, not for any social need or good. The profit drive is inherent in capitalism, and underlies or exacerbates all major social ills of our times.** With the rapid advance of technology and productivity, new forms of capitalist ownership have developed to maximize profit. **The working people of our country confront serious, chronic problems because of capitalism. These chronic problems become part of the objective conditions that confront each new generation of working people. The threat of nuclear war, which can destroy all humanity, grows with the spread of nuclear weapons, space-based weaponry, and a military doctrine that justifies their use in preemptive wars and wars without end. Ever since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been constantly involved in aggressive military actions big and small. These wars have cost millions of lives and casualties, huge material losses, as well as trillions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Threats to the environment continue to spiral,** threatening all life on our planet**.** Millions of workers are unemployed or insecure in their jobs, even during economic upswings and periods of "recovery" from recessions. Most **workers experience long years of stagnant real wages, while health and education costs soar. Many workers are forced to work second and third jobs to make ends meet**. Most workers now average four different occupations during their lifetime, being involuntarily moved from job to job and career to career. Often, retirement-age workers are forced to continue working just to provide health care for themselves. **With capitalist globalization, jobs move as capitalists export factories and even entire industries to other countries. Millions of people continuously live below the poverty level; many suffer homelessness and hunger. Public and private programs to alleviate poverty and hunger do not reach everyone, and are inadequate even for those they do reach. Racism remains the most potent weapon to divide working people. Institutionalized racism provides billions in extra profits for the capitalists every year due to the unequal pay racially oppressed workers receive for work of comparable value.** All workers receive lower wages when racism succeeds in dividing and disorganizing them. **In every aspect of economic and social life, African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Asian and Pacific Islanders, Arabs and Middle Eastern peoples, and other nationally and racially oppressed people experience conditions inferior to that of whites. Racist violence and the poison of racist ideas victimize all people of color no matter which economic class they belong to.** The attempts to suppress and undercount the vote of the African American and other racially oppressed people are part of racism in the electoral process. **Racism permeates the police, judicial and prison systems, perpetuating unequal sentencing, racial profiling, discriminatory enforcement, and police brutality. The democratic, civil and human rights of all working people are continually under attack.** These attacks range from increasingly difficult procedures for union recognition and attempts to prevent full union participation in elections, to the absence of the right to strike for many public workers. They range from undercounting minority communities in the census to making it difficult for working people to run for office because of the domination of corporate campaign funding and the high cost of advertising. These attacks also include growing censorship and domination of the media by the ultra-right; growing restrictions and surveillance of activist social movements and the Left; open denial of basic rights to immigrants; and, violations of the Geneva Conventions up to and including torture for prisoners. **These abuses all serve to maintain the grip of the capitalists on government power. They use this power to ensure the economic and political dominance** of their class. **Women still face a considerable differential in wages for work of equal or comparable value. They also confront barriers to promotion, physical and sexual abuse, continuing unequal workload in home and family life, and male supremacist ideology perpetuating unequal and often unsafe conditions.** The constant attacks on social welfare programs severely impact single women, single mothers, nationally and racially oppressed women, and all working class women. **The reproductive rights of all women are continually under attack ideologically and politically. Violence against women in the home and in society at large remains a shameful fact of life in the U.S.**

#### Vote negative to reject every instance of capitalism – the aff’s reformism will fail

Herod 4 (James, The Strategy Described Abstractly, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm)

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There *is* no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must *want something else* and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction.

#### We should act as if we are in the midst of anti-capitalist utopia

**Zizek, ’04** (Slavoj, Senior Researcher, Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Revolution at the Gates, p. 259-60)

As Deleuze saw very clearly, we cannot provide in advance an unambiguous criterion which will allow us to distinguish "false" violent outburst from the "miracle" of the authentic revolutionary breakthrough. The ambiguity is irreducible here, since the "miracle" can occur only through the repetition of previous failures. And this is also why violence is a necessary ingredient of a revolutionary political act. That is to say: what is the criterion of a political act proper? Success as such clearly does not count, even if we define it in the dialectical terms of Merleau-Ponty: as the wager that the future will retroactively redeem our present horrible acts (this is how Merleau-Ponty, in Humanism and Terror, provided one of the more intelligent justifications of the Stalinist terror: retroactively, it will become justified if its final outcome is true freedom);129 neither does reference to some abstract-universal ethical norm. The only criterion is the absolutely inherent one: that of the enacted utopia. In a genuine revolutionary breakthrough, the utopian future is neither simply fully realized, present, nor simply evoked as a distant promise which justifies present violence – it is rather as if in a unique suspension of temporality, in the short circuit between the present and the future, we are – as if by Grace – briefly allowed to act as if the utopian future is (not yet fully here, but) already at hand, there to be seized. Revolution is experienced not as a present hardship we have to endure for the sake of the happiness and freedom of future generations, but as the present hardship over which this future happiness and freedom already cast their shadow – in it, we are already free even as we fight for freedom; we are already happy even as we fight for happiness, no matter how difficult the circumstances. **Revolution** is not a Merleau-Pontyan wager, an act suspended in the futur anterieur, to be legitimized or de-legitimized by the long-term outcome of present acts; **it is**, as it were**, its own ontological proof, an immediate index of its own truth.**

### 3

**TEXT: WE EMBRACE THE INTERNATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY OF MONSTER QUEERBOTS IN RELATION TO THE “BECOMING ONE” OF SOLAR ENERGY. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR SOCIETY DOES NOT ASPIRE TOWARD A NUCLEAR FUTURE, BUT RATHER A SANITIZED PLENTITUDE OF PURPORTEDLY CLEAN ENERGIES – ALL THE WHILE IGNORING AND ATTEMPTING TO ERADICATE THEIR EXCESS(ES).**

### Case

#### Nuke power causes extinction – prolif, accidents, terror, water shortages and biodiversity

**Haskell, 8** – Physicist and Senior Science Fellow at the Institute of Energy and Environmental Research (Hugh, 10/14. “Nuclear power: the negatives.” http://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/columns/story/1254081.html)

Proponents of nuclear power speak of a "nuclear renaissance." The facts show that rather than a renaissance, we face a nuclear apocalypse, heralded by, instead of the traditional four horsemen, five horsemen: cost, proliferation, risk, waste, and water consumption. Consider them individually: COST. In spite of early claims that nuclear power would be "too cheap to meter," nuclear power started out expensive, requiring large subsidies and loan guarantees from the government, and it has stayed that way. A preliminary estimate for two new 1,000 megawatt nuclear plants proposed by Progress Energy in Florida is $17 billion, and that cost is likely to grow as required revisions to Westinghouse's AP-1000 advanced reactor design add years to the time before those reactors will be ready for use. An industry estimate puts the cost of new nuclear power at 14c per kilowatt-hour, and rising -- higher than all other sources of energy except solar, whose cost is falling. Potential financiers of nuclear power remain leery -- cost and potential safety problems make the risks of new nuclear power too high. PROLIFERATION. Nuclear proliferation is a serious problem worldwide. Israel, India, South Africa and North Korea all created nuclear weapons by clandestine diversion of fissile material from their reactor programs, and Iran appears to be doing the same. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, sponsored by the Department of Energy, which emphasizes reprocessing of nuclear fuel for use by cooperating nations, is also a potential enabler of covert diversion of plutonium to a weapons program. RISK. Unlike other sources of energy, with nuclear power we risk catastrophic consequences from a serious accident. Although the likelihood of an accident is low, it multiplies with the addition of new plants. Our existing fleet of reactors is nearing its design lifetime, when the possibility of failures starts to increase; the new design reactors are untested and possible failure modes largely unknown. The confluence of those two factors should give everyone reason for concern. Moreover, the industry has been plagued with safety violations and accidents of varying degrees of severity. NC WARN has repeatedly documented problems in the management and operation of the Shearon Harris plant, where Progress Energy is considering building two new reactors. WASTE. Nuclear generation is the only source of electric power that creates seriously dangerous waste for which no acceptable means of disposal yet exists. Long-term storage at Yucca Mountain in Nevada is mired in bureaucratic, political, cost and scientific quagmires, and its opening, if ever, is now 2020 or later, by which time there will be enough waste stored at reactor sites around the country to fill it, even if we build no new reactors. Geologists have raised legitimate concerns about the feasibility of Yucca Mountain to protect the material stored there for the requisite thousands of years. DOE admits that it must create "engineered" barriers within the storage area to prevent leakage into local ground water -- the natural barriers assumed to exist when Yucca Mountain was chosen have been shown to be inadequate. Meanwhile waste has nowhere to go and piles up at reactors, becoming an increasingly attractive target for terrorists. WATER. Keeping the reactor cool and condensing the steam from the generating turbines demand a large and reliable supply of water -- upwards of 20 million gallons of water is evaporated into the atmosphere daily from a typical nuclear plant with a closed-cycle cooling system. According to Progress Energy, operating the two proposed reactors at Shearon-Harris would require raising the level of Harris Lake by 20 feet (thereby intercepting runoff that would otherwise go to the Cape Fear River) to provide sufficient cooling water. Replacing the water evaporated in the cooling process will require withdrawing up to 87 million gallons per day from the Cape Fear River itself. During times of water scarcity, reactors may have to be shut down for safety reasons, as happened at the Browns Ferry reactor in Alabama during the 2007 drought. In addition, cooling water discharged into a river or the ocean re-enters the stream at a higher temperature which can have detrimental effects on downstream marine life. One must wonder how a problematic and expensive technology, whose increased capacity will not be effective for at least 10 years, can help us meet a crisis whose solution must begin today, when existing clean and safe technologies that can be providing increasing capacity during the next 10 years await only a nod of approval from the energy companies that can make it happen.

#### Accidents cause extinction

Wasserman 2 (Harvey, Senior Editor – Free Press, Earth Island Journal, Spring, www.earthisland.org/eijournal/new\_articles.cfm?articleID=457&journalID=63)

The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the work force. A terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water, they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Thousands of square miles would be saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. Infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Pregnant women would spontaneously abort or give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Heart attacks, stroke and multiple organ failure would kill thousands on the spot. Emphysema, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence, asthma and blindness would afflict hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Then comes the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up are still dying from their exposure. At Indian Point, the molten cores would burn uncontrolled for days, weeks and years. Who would volunteer for such an American task force? The immediate damage from an Indian Point attack (or a domestic accident) would render all five boroughs of New York City an apocalyptic wasteland. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, natural ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed. Spiritually, psychologically, financially and ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere 40 miles on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this. There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse operating in the US. They generate a mere 8 percent of our total energy. Since its deregulation crisis, California cut its electric consumption by some 15 percent. Within a year, the US could cheaply replace virtually all the reactors with increased efficiency. Yet, as the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking the extension of the Price-Anderson Act, a form of legal immunity that protects reactor operators from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack.  Do we take this war seriously? Are we committed to the survival of our nation?  If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.

#### Terror attack nuke power

**Wasserman, 1** – senior editor of Free Press (Harvey, October. “America's Terrorist Nuclear Threat to Itself.” <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/10/00_wasserman_nuclear-threat.htm>)

The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. So are the hellish levels of radioactivity.¶ Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl, which ran only four years before it exploded.¶ Some believe the WTC jets could have collapsed or breached either of the Indian Point containment domes. But at very least the massive impact and intense jet fuel fire would destroy the human ability to control the plants' functions. Vital cooling systems, backup power generators and communications networks would crumble.¶ Indeed, Indian Point Unit One was shut because activists warned that its lack of an emergency core cooling system made it an unacceptable risk. The government ultimately agreed.¶ But today terrorist attacks could destroy those same critical cooling and control systems that are vital to not only the Unit Two and Three reactor cores, but to the spent fuel pools that sit on site.¶ The assault would not require a large jet. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a wide range of easily deployed small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the operating work force. Dozens of US reactors have repeatedly failed even modest security tests over the years. Even heightened wartime standards cannot guarantee protection of the vast, supremely sensitive controls required for reactor safety.¶ Without continous monitoring and guaranteed water flow, the thousands of tons of radioactive rods in the cores and the thousands more stored in those fragile pools would rapidly melt into super-hot radioactive balls of lava that would burn into the ground and the water table and, ultimately, the Hudson.¶ Indeed, a jetcrash like the one on 9/11 or other forms of terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Prevailing winds from the north and west might initially drive these clouds of mass death downriver into New York City and east into Westchester and Long Island.¶ But at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, winds ultimately shifted around the compass to irradiate all surrounding areas with the devastating poisons released by the on-going fiery torrent. At Indian Point, thousands of square miles would have been saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created or imagined, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever.¶ In nearby communities like Buchanan, Nyack, Monsey and scores more, infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Virtually all pregnant women would spontaneously abort, or ultimately give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Emphysema, heart attacks, stroke, multiple organ failure, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinance, sterility and impotence, asthma, blindness, and more would kill thousands on the spot, and doom hundreds of thousands if not millions. A terrible metallic taste would afflict virtually everyone downwind in New York, New Jersey and New England, a ghoulish curse similar to that endured by the fliers who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagaskai, by those living downwind from nuclear bomb tests in the south seas and Nevada, and by victims caught in the downdrafts from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.¶ Then comes the abominable wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented, and new dimensions of agony will beg description.¶ Indeed, those who survived the initial wave of radiation would envy those who did not.¶ Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Bridges and highways would become killing fields for those attempting to escape to destinations that would soon enough become equally deadly as the winds shifted.¶ Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. At Chernobyl, pilots flying helicopters that dropped boron on the fiery core died in droves. At Indian Point, such missions would be a sure ticket to death. Their utility would be doubtful as the molten cores rage uncontrolled for days, weeks and years, spewing ever more devastation into the eco-sphere. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees were forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up. They are dying in droves. Who would now volunteer for such an American task force?¶ The radioactive cloud from Chernobyl blanketed the vast Ukraine and Belarus landscape, then carried over Europe and into the jetstream, surging through the west coast of the United States within ten days, carrying across our northern tier, circling the globe, then coming back again.¶ The radioactive clouds from Indian Point would enshroud New York, New Jersey, New England, and carry deep into the Atlantic and up into Canada and across to Europe and around the globe again and again.¶ The immediate damage would render thousands of the world's most populous and expensive square miles permanently uninhabitable. All five boroughs of New York City would be an apocalyptic wasteland. The World Trade Center would be rendered as unusable and even more lethal by a jet crash at Indian Point than it was by the direct hits of 9/11. All real estate and economic value would be poisonously radioactive throughout the entire region. Irreplaceable trillions in human capital would be forever lost.¶ As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, and as at Chernobyl, where soil, water and plant life have been hopelessly irradiated, natural eco-systems on which human and all other life depends would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed,¶ Spiritually, psychologically, financially, ecologically, our nation would never recover.¶ This is what we missed by a mere forty miles near New York City on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this.¶ There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse now operating in the United States. They generate just 18% of America's electricity, just 8% of our total energy. As with reactors elsewhere, the two at Indian Point have both been off-line for long periods of time with no appreciable impact on life in New York. Already an extremely expensive source of electricity, the cost of attempting to defend these reactors will put nuclear energy even further off the competitive scale.¶ Since its deregulation crisis, California---already the nation's second-most efficient state---cut further into its electric consumption by some 15%. Within a year the US could cheaply replace virtually with increased efficiency all the reactors now so much more expensive to operate and protect.¶ Yet, as the bombs fall and the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking a form of legal immunity to protect the operators of reactors like Indian Point from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack.¶ Why is our nation handing its proclaimed enemies the weapons of our own mass destruction, and then shielding from liability the companies that insist on continuing to operate them?¶ Do we take this war seriously? Are we committed to the survival of our nation?¶ If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.

#### Water shortages Extinction.

Marlow 1 (Maude, Spring) National Chairperson of the Council of Canadians and IFG Committee on the Globalization of Water. “BLUE GOLD: The Global Water Crisis and the Commodification of the World's Water Supply,” http://www.ratical.org/co-globalize/BlueGold.pdf.

Perhaps the most devastating analysis of the global water crisis comes from hydrological engineer Michal Kravèík and his team of scientists at the Slovakia non-governmental organization (NGO) People and Water. Kravèík, who has a distinguished career with the Slovak Academy of Sciences, has studied the effect of urbanization, industrial agriculture, deforestation, dam construction, and infrastructure and paving on water systems in Slovakia and surrounding countries and has come up with an alarming finding. Destroying water's natural habitat not only creates a supply crisis for people and animals, it also dramatically diminishes the amount of available fresh water on the planet. Kravèík describes the hydrologic cycle of a drop of water. It must first evaporate from a plant, earth surface, swamp, river, lake or the sea, then fall back down to earth as precipitation. If the drop of water falls back onto a forest, lake, blade of grass, meadow or field, it cooperates with nature to return to the hydrologic cycle. "Right of domicile of a drop is one of the basic rights, a more serious right than human rights," says Kravèík. However, if the earth's surface is paved over, denuded of forests and meadows, and drained of natural springs and creeks, the drop will not form part of river basins and continental watersheds, where it is needed by people and animals, but head out to sea, where it will be stored. It is like rain falling onto a huge roof, or umbrella; everything underneath stays dry and the water runs off to the perimeter. The consequent reduction in continental water basins results in reduced water evaporation from the earth's surface, and becomes a net loss, while the seas begin to rise. In Slovakia, the scientists found, for every 1 percent of roofing, paving, car parks and highways constructed, water supplies decrease in volume by more than 100 billion meters per year. Kravèík issues a dire warning about the growing number of what he calls the earth's "hot stains"—places already drained of water. The "drying out" of the earth will cause massive global warming, with the attendant extremes in weather: drought, decreased protection from the atmosphere, increased solar radiation, decreased biodiversity, melting of the polar icecaps, submersion of vast territories, massive continental desertification and, eventually, "global collapse."

#### Renewables are competitive now

**Tickell, 8/20**/12 – British journalist, author and campaigner on health and environment issues, and author of the Kyoto2 climate initiative (Oliver, “Does the world need nuclear power to solve the climate crisis?” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/aug/20/world-need-nuclear-power-climate-crisis>)

However, non-hydro renewables are growing very fast – up 15% in 2010. And within this figure just three power sources are responsible for most of the growth: wind power, solar PV and solar hot water. From 2005 to 2010, global solar hot water and wind power capacity both grew at 25% per year, while solar PV capacity grew at over 50% per year. If these growth rates were to be sustained for 35 years, wind capacity would rise 6,300-fold from 200 gigawatts (GW) in 2010 to about 1.25 million GW, solar hot water 6,300-fold from 185 GW to 1.15 million GW, and solar PV 40 million-fold from 40 GW to 1.6 billion GW. These figures are not predictions. Exponential growth will not continue for so long, as prime sites for wind turbines and solar panels get used up. Other technologies, such as concentrated solar power, will also become important. And there will be demand-side constraints: the projected 1.6 billion GW of solar PV capacity alone would produce over 3 billion billion kilowatt hours per year, equivalent to a primary energy burn of some 30 million Mtoe – over 1,000 times our projected world primary energy demand in 35 years. We would not even know what to do with so much energy. But while not predictive, the figures are highly indicative of the low-carbon energy choices the world should make. The one, nuclear power, is expensive and becoming more so. It will be a practical impossibility to increase its capacity to a scale big enough to make a real difference to global climate within a realistic time frame. Worse, if we were somehow to build our 11,000 nuclear reactors, we would face the certainty of repeated catastrophic accidents and the spread of nuclear weapons, not to mention unimaginable liabilities for decommissioning and long-term nuclear-waste management. We can fairly say that nuclear power is both repulsive and utterly wrong. The other choice, renewable power, already costs less than fossil fuels for many applications, thanks in large part to generous subsidies in Germany, Japan and other countries, which have had the effect of greatly reducing prices. Solar electricity is now cheaper than power from diesel generators in the tropics and subtropics – and so the rapid spread of solar power across China, India, Africa and Latin America is being driven not by subsidy but by the market. And it is getting cheaper all the time as increased demand, caused by its lower price, stimulates greater competition among manufacturers, technological advance, and even greater price falls, in a delightful virtuous circle. Moreover, renewable energy is free of catastrophic dangers and long- term liabilities. It is both romantic and right.

#### Expansion of nuclear power directly trades-off with investment in renewables

**Porritt et al, 12** – founder director of Forum for the Future Forum for the future, chairman of the UK Sustainable Development Commission and author of Capitalism as if the World Matters (Jonathon, 4/27, with Tom Burke, Tony Juniper, Charles Secrett. “Climate Change and Energy Security.” http://www.jonathonporritt.com/sites/default/files/users/BRIEFING%205%20-%20Climate\_and%20energy%20security\_27\_April%202012.pdf)

The costs of nuclear new build are extremely high. UK governments, both Labour and the Coalition Government, have made it clear that money for new nuclear must come from the private sector, and yet, despite promising not to, have then gone on to attract private sector investment, thus committing large amounts of public money not available for other energy supply or demand management options. The scale of both the financial and the political investment required are such that they will crowd out equivalent investment in renewables and energy efficiency. The cost of the new nuclear build that Coalition Governments hopes for is in the region of £50 billion. Since private investors money is to be channelled through energy utilities (either as equity borrowing or simple bank lending), it will come from the same funding pools that other types of energy generation investment would access; part of the opportunity cost of nuclear power is that it will inevitably draw investment away from alternatives. But it’s not just the scale of the investment needed that undermines other possibilities. The massive timescales for bringing nuclear power online are also important - once investment has begun in nuclear, the entirety of the investment must remain in nuclear or be lost. Renewables are much nimbler – if problems occur, the project can be scaled down and still provide some generated energy. Lastly, there is a substantial political opportunity cost. When governments throw their weight behind a particular course of action, they divert resources from all others. In the past decade, UK governments of both parties have established over three dozen taxpayer-funded quangos and agencies to support the nuclear industry. It is inevitable that the pronuclear perspective of these bodies will pervade the thinking of the Civil Service, and of politicians and business investors too. Speaking about Finland’s experience with the disastrous Olkiluoto reactor, Oras Tynkynnen, a former climate policy advisor to the Office of the Finnish Prime Minister, said: “We concentrated so much on nuclear that we lost sight of everything else ... And nuclear has failed to deliver. It has turned out to be a costly gamble for Finland, and for the planet”.

#### Renewables key to solve extinction from warming.

**Jagger, 8** – Chair of the World Future Council (Bianca, 3/6. CQ Congressional Testimony, “RENEWABLE ENERGY,” Lexis.)

"If we go beyond the point where human intervention can no longer stabilise the system, then we precipitate unstoppable runaway climate change. That will set in motion a major extinction event comparable to the five other extinction crises that the earth has previously experienced." I find it deeply mystifying that the vast majority of the media are still not adequately expressing the scale of the danger we face. Professor John Holdren, President of the AAAS, said in August, "We have already passed the stage of dangerous climate change. The task now is to avoid catastrophic climate change." And as George Monbiot, in an article he wrote for the Guardian in July, said: "Unaware of the causes of our good fortune, blissfully detached from their likely termination, we drift into catastrophe." This clearly demonstrates what the World Future Council, the organisation I chair, is advocating. If we are serious about averting climate change catastrophe, we must think in revolutionary terms, and transform our way of life, restoring rather than destroying life on earth. We must embark upon a global renewable energy revolution: if we are to achieve the necessary carbon reduction by 2020, we must replace our carbon- driven economy with a renewable energy economy."

#### Heteronormativity is incoherent and is based on an obsolete model of sexual politics.

Steven **SEIDMAN** Sociology @ SUNY (Albany) **‘9** “Critique of Compulsory Heterosexuality” *Sexual Research & Social Policy* 6 (1) p. 23

As a theoretical account of gender, the critique of compulsory heterosexuality borders on **incoherence**. Its political-moral critique drives a gender structuralism that provides consistency, but at considerable cost. If one defends this structuralism in a consistent manner, either agency and transformative change are impossible or else agency becomes an extension of the structural order itself. In this case, the critique of compulsory heterosexuality contributes to suppressing or obscuring everyday acts of gender variance and transgression. Furthermore, a robust notion of agency and a recognition of gender variance significantly weaken the analytical and political force of the notion of compulsory heterosexuality. Compulsory Heterosexuality and Sexual Politics, Revisited Lesbian feminist and gay liberationist critics of compulsory heterosexuality have also stipulated a sexual order organized around a heterosexual-homosexual hierarchy. The effort, especially by gay liberationists, to analytically differentiate sexual and gender politics has proven to be important in critical sex studies (e.g., Rubin, 1984; **Sedgwick**, 1990). But what do liberationists assume about the relationship between compulsory heterosexuality and sexuality and about sexual politics? Liberationists forcefully argued that the compulsory status of heterosexuality is maintained in part by representations of the homosexual as the polluted other compared with the pure heterosexual. However, liberationists often treat the figure of the homosexual in homophobic practices as an abstract other when in fact the polluted homosexual is a concrete other who is always associated with specific psychological dispositions, personality traits, and social behaviors—for example, the salience of lustful or carnal motivations, a narcissistic personality, or manipulative and seductive behavior. At times, in postwar Anglo-European discourses, the homo- sexual has been presented as a reviled social type, such as a predator, molester, seducer, libertine, or hedonist. However, liberationists neglected the ways that homophobic representations and practices condition or structure the formation of homosexual identity. Homosexuals may identify with homophobic representations and either revise or reverse the moral meaning of these representations by identifying respectively as normal or queer. Each identity position also suggests a distinct politic: Homophobic identification suggests the closet as resistance; disavowing homophobic identification by linking homosexuality to dispositional and behavioral markers of normal heterosexuality implies a politic of assimilation. Reversing the moral status of the dispositions and behaviors linked to homosexuality suggests a politic of transgression—for example, erotic experimentation or gender fluidity might be championed as liberating. The point I wish to underscore is the following: Compulsory heterosexuality produces not the homosexual but differences, conflicts, and hierarchies among homosexualities at the level of identity, culture, and politics. However, these multiple homosexualities and their stratification were largely ignored by liberationist critics who enforced a sexual politics centered on the homosexual challenge to compulsory heterosexuality. Liberationists were, for good reasons, preoccupied with how compulsory heterosexuality shaped the personal and social worlds of homosexually oriented individuals. Accordingly, the analysis of the conditions of the closet, coming out, and the formation of individual and collective identity were central in their discourses (Seidman, 2008). However, the concept of compulsory heterosexuality also stipulates differences and hierarchies among heterosexualites (those who are behaviorally heterosexual). Specifically, compulsory heterosexuality not only enforces the normative status of heterosexuality but also enforces a normative order within heterosexuality or establishes a standard of so-called normal heterosexuality. Of course, norms of heterosexuality vary across populations and change over time. Still, to the extent that heterosexuality is normative, model heterosexuality will be defined in opposition to the cluster of dispositions, personality traits, and behaviors associated with homosexuality. If homosexuals are imagined as body- and pleasure- centered, nonmonogamous, and predatory, so-called normal heterosexuality will be associated with person- centeredness, monogamy, and the binding of sex to intimacy and love. Or if, as is increasingly the case in the United States and across Europe, homosexuals are understood as having intimate relationships, these will be represented as unstable and transitory in contrast to heterosexual love, whose normal condition will be de- scribed as stable and solid because it is assumed to be founded on deep affectional and social commitments. Thus, it is not just homosexuality that is disrespected under conditions of compulsory heterosexuality; so, too, are heterosexual practices that deviate from models of what is considered normal heterosexuality. The logic of compulsory heterosexuality suggests that some hetero- sexuals (e.g., the sex worker, the libertine, or the pornog- rapher) will occupy an outsider social status comparable with that of the homosexual. These figures will experience something of the scandalous and menacing status of the homosexual or the nonnormalized homosexual in the United States or the United Kingdom today. The notion of compulsory heterosexuality, then, implies differences and hierarchies among homosexualities and heterosexualities. Given these hierarchies, sexual politics exceed the politics of gender preference, sparking, for example, conflicts over the purpose of sexuality (procreation, love, pleasure, expressive values), over norms of intimate behavior and arrangements (mar- riage, cohabitation, monogamy), over gender norms of sexuality, over norms regulating sex and the private- public sphere, and so on. These conflicts have their own distinct patterns of division and hierarchy, as well as their own strategies of regulation and resistance. More- over, it is not obvious that the politics of gender prefer- ence should be a privileged site of sexual politics (Rubin, 1984; Sedgwick, 1990). By framing sexual politics as a critique of compulsory heterosexuality, as well as by as- suming that the heterosexual-homosexual division is the chief axis of sexual injustice, these critics marginalize and suppress sexual conflicts that are not centrally about gender preference. Queer Theory: From Compulsory Heterosexuality to Heteronormativity The critique of compulsory heterosexuality, developed by lesbian feminists and gay liberationists in the 1960s and 1970s, was supplanted in the 1990s when queer theory appeared as a reconstructed critical sex theory. Queer theorists have not abandoned the idea of compulsory heterosexuality as a structural order, but at least some have restated it in cultural terms, as a critique of the heteronormative structure of representations. Here is how Butler (1989) framed the critique of com- pulsory heterosexuality: I use the term heterosexual matrix...to designate...a hegemonic discursive/epistemic model [italics added] of gender intelligibility that assumes that for bodies to cohere and make sense there must a stable sex expressed through a stable gender that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory status of heterosexuality. (p. 151) Some queer theorists have sought to identify the discursive strategies that sustain and resist heteronormativity without reducing such strategies to dichotomies of either repression versus expression or invisibility versus visibility. Instead, they speak of signifying and resignifying or normalizing and reversing, and they underscore the instability of oppositions and hierarchies. Against their lesbian feminist predecessors, queer critics reclaim an emphatic idea of agency by highlighting the role of a signifying subject. However, queer perspectives rarely link the signifying agent to his or her social status or connect text to institution; in the main, they have abandoned the central role that gender played in the critique of compulsory heterosexuality. Consider (briefly) David Halperin’s (1995) “The Queer Politics of Michel Foucault.” Heterosexist author- ity in the contemporary United States, Halperin wrote, is enforced less by specific agents of oppression, such as gay-bashers or the police...[or] formal, explicit interdictions, such as sodomy laws, [or by]...particular, hostile in- stitutions, such as the Supreme Court, but [by] pervasive and multiform strategies of homophobia that shape public and private discourses [and] saturate the entire field of cultural representations. (p. 32) Having claimed an empirical shift in the social basis of heterosexist authority from social structure to discourse, Halperin (1995) framed a queer critique and politics as a cultural practice of resignification and de- mystification. He neither addressed nor cited the social structural conditions that make representational resistance possible—such as, for example, the institutional spaces of universities or queer subcultures. The social structural conditions of lesbian and gay subjugation and resistance, as well as the gendered aspects of the politics of heterosexist authority, do little or no analytical work in this queer perspective. Another key text of queer studies is Diana Fuss’s (1991) introduction in Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories. Fuss maintained an exclusive focus on the discursive operation of normative heterosexuality, which is understood in relation to the general trope of inside-out: Heterosexuality and homosexuality gain their meaning and coherence in their relationship of contrast and opposition. In this view, heterosexuality establishes its identity and definitional boundaries not by repressing a preexisting homosexuality but by producing the idea of homosexuality. To secure its normative status, heterosex- uality must evoke the homosexual as a threatening other. Paradoxically, homosexuality may actually threaten het- erosexuality insofar as the representation engenders de- siring subjects who claim to speak on their own behalf or demand to declare and affirm their homosexuality. Accordingly, heterosexuality must simultaneously produce and exile homosexuality to the space of the invis- ible and the voiceless—to the closet. Homosexuality then occupies a status as a way of being that is exterior and infe- rior to heterosexuality. In this stunning example of queer discourse analysis, the heteronormative text is never con- nected to social structure, institutions, or social dynamics of gendering or racialization. The only constraint in Fuss’s (1991) account of the heterosexual-homosexual figure is representational. Fuss has effectively abandoned a notion of compulsory heterosexuality but without providing an epistemological or sociological rationale. The queer critique of compulsory heterosexual- ity surrenders too much of the lesbian feminist and gay liberationist institutional and gender-based understand- ing of power (cf. Butler, 1994). Moreover, in the absence of a social structural perspective, queer critique cannot explain the formation of resisting selves. In fact, queer perspectives have not examined the sociohistorical con- ditions that make the signifying agent of queer theory and politics possible. In other words, what blinded earlier critics of compulsory heterosexuality to agentic considerations was not only their political investment but also their sociohistorical context—namely, that they were politically engaged at the very time that the conditions of compulsory heterosexuality were being aggressively enforced by a state-driven nationwide antigay politic. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the prominence of a signifying agent in queer perspectives is related to changing social conditions that have made possible new opportunities for individual and collective action. I will briefly explore this conjecture as I consider the sociohistorical scope of the critique of compulsory heterosexuality.

#### State mobilization and their genocide claim are no longer viable.

Steven **SEIDMAN** Sociology @ SUNY (Albany) **‘9** “Critique of Compulsory Heterosexuality” *Sexual Research & Social Policy* 6 (1) p. 25

The queer critique of compulsory heterosexuality surrenders too much of the lesbian feminist and gay liberationist institutional and gender-based understanding of power (cf. Butler, 1994). Moreover, in the absence of a social structural perspective, queer critique cannot explain the formation of resisting selves. In fact, queer perspectives have not examined the sociohistorical conditions that make the signifying agent of queer theory and politics possible. In other words, what blinded earlier critics of compulsory heterosexuality to agentic considerations was not only their political investment but also their sociohistorical context—namely, that they were politically engaged at the very time that the conditions of compulsory heterosexuality were being aggressively enforced by a state-driven nationwide antigay politic. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the prominence of a signifying agent in queer perspectives is related to changing social conditions that have made possible new opportunities for individual and collective action. I will briefly explore this conjecture as I consider the sociohistorical scope of the critique of compulsory heterosexuality. Normative Heterosexuality Without Compulsory Heterosexuality Is the concept of compulsory heterosexuality credible in the contemporary United States? Furthermore, if this notion is abandoned, does that mean surrendering the core of critical sex studies? For the major U.S. national political organizations, from Lambda Legal Defense to the Human Rights Campaign, their politics seem to rest on the claim that the dominant trend in the United States is the deinstitutionalization of normative heterosexuality. From this perspective, sexual inequality persists but is maintained less by the state and social institutions than by the power of specific individuals, organizations, groups, and political administrations. For reformers such as Bruce Bawer (1993) and Andrew Sullivan (1996), gay and lesbian visibility, tolerance, and integration signal the end of compulsory heterosexuality. In one respect, I think Bawer and Sullivan are right—there has been a retreat from systemic discriminatory and homophobic practices in many U.S. institutions. Although social incorporation is considerably more mixed at the state level in the United States than in the United Kingdom or western Europe, the integration of gay men and lesbians into bureaucratic and cosmopolitan-type organizations such as civil service agencies or the professions, normalization in key sectors of public and popular culture, and the retreat of the state from a politics of the closet underscore empirical trends supporting the claim of the decline of compulsory hetero-sexuality (cf. Eskridge, 1999; Gamson, 2002; Raeburn, 2004; Seidman, 2003; Walters, 2002).

#### Death anxiety is critical to recognizing a value to life.

Geshe **Kelsang**, Internationally Renowned Teacher of Buddhism, **99**

[“Fear of Death,” http://www.tharpa.com/background/fear-of-death.htm]

A healthy fear of death would be the fear of dying unprepared, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can avert. If we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger, we are encouraged to prepare for a peaceful and successful death and are also inspired to make the most of our very precious human life instead of wasting it. This "sense of danger" inspires us to make preparations so that we are no longer in the danger we are in now, for example by practicing moral discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulating as much merit, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seat belt out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road, and that seat belt protects us from going through the windshield. We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through the windscreen if someone crashes into us. Dying with regrets is not at all unusual. To avoid a sad and meaningless end to our life we need to remember continually that we too must die. Contemplating our own death will inspire us to use our life wisely by developing the inner refuge of spiritual realizations; otherwise we shall have no ability to protect ourself from the sufferings of death and what lies beyond.

**Methodological changes don’t shape reality**

Roth 00 (Brad R., Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science and Adjunct Professor of Law, Wayne State University, “Governmental Illegitimacy And Neocolonialism: Response To Review By James Thuo Gathii”, Michigan Law Review, May, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2056, Lexis)

"Critical" scholars frequently seem to imagine that, in struggling against the methodological norms of their disciplines, they are struggling against the very structure of the power relations that exploit and repress the poor and weak - the metaphor being, in their minds, somehow transubstantiated into reality. The result is, all too often, an  [\*2057]  **illusory radicalism**, rhetorically colorful but **programmatically vacuous**. The danger is that a fantasized radicalism will lead scholars to abandon the defense of the very devices that give the poor and weak a modicum of leverage, when defense of those devices is perhaps the **only thing of practical value** that scholars are in a position to contribute. [3](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n3" \t "_self) My main problem with Gathii's critique, then, is not (as he might imagine) that it is political, but that it is **politically dysfunctional**. More specifically, for all of Gathii's anticolonial posturing, my book is, I insist, far more effectively anticolonial than is his critique of it. I. The Law and Politics of Governmental Illegitimacy Professor Gathii is fully justified in subjecting Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law to an essentially political critique, for the book, like all legal scholarship, has political implications - in this case, designedly so. [4](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n4" \t "_self) This is not to say, as "critical" scholars sometimes seem to imply, that law or legal scholarship is reducible to ordinary politics. Law is a purposive project, and thus not exclusively an empirical phenomenon; "law as it is" cannot be wholly separated from "law as it ought to be." [5](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n5" \t "_self) The purposes that drive the project, however, must be demonstrably immanent in social reality, not merely superimposed according to the predilections of the jurist; the jurist's task, at once creative and bounded, is to render a persuasive account of how those immanent purposes bind powerful actors to worthy projects  [\*2058]  (such as the self-determination of Third-World peoples) that they would not otherwise be inclined to undertake. [6](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n6" \t "_self) That legal scholarship impress those who are not natural political allies is the test, not only of its scholarly merit, but also of its political merit; that friends may be disappointed is of far lesser significance. This task is not to everyone's taste, and some in the academy have devoted their considerable talents to discrediting the project of legal reasoning, as conventionally understood. [7](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n7" \t "_self) But their efforts, though often of great intellectual sophistication, are profoundly misguided. In their zeal to "unmask" law's legitimation of exercises of power, they fail to appreciate that law can legitimate such exercises only insofar as it simultaneously constrains them. Power holders seeking the imprimatur of legality can benefit only to the extent that they accept its limits, for violation of the limits necessarily reverses the process of legitimation. [8](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n8" \t "_self) To deny such a relationship between legitimation and constraint is to assert that putative legal limits are a remarkably effective ruse - that legal rhetoric, rather improbably, fools most of the people all of the time. (Presumably, the power holders are not thought to be fooling themselves, since if the constraints, though objectively illusory, seem real enough to them, the rule of law would be a reality in political terms even if a chimera in philosophical terms.) On the other  [\*2059]  hand, if law does constrain as well as legitimate the exercise of power, to neglect that point is to miss an important political opportunity. [9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n9" \t "_self) Thus, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, in developing legal grounds for limiting the intervention of foreign powers in the internal affairs of weak states, is highly conventional in its method, except in one important respect. Because there has only recently come into being an international law of the internal character of domestic political systems, there is no tradition in international law scholarship of interpreting the relevant practices and pronouncements of states in light of the diversity of political principles and power arrangements that have been efficacious in the international community. The task of legal interpretation in this area implicates the fields of political theory and comparative politics; without an understanding of the political ideals and structures that have had a voice and a vote in the international system, one tends to read the source material in light of highly parochial assumptions about political life. Thus, Chapters Two, Three, and Four, as interdisciplinary aids to legal interpretation, distinguish the book from more standard international law scholarship. For this limited interpretive purpose, however, one need understand only empowered approaches to political legitimacy - that is to say, approaches that have been influential among state actors (Western, Socialist, and Nonaligned) whose deeds and words are the source material of international law in the relevant periods. That other, disempowered approaches may more authentically represent cultural norms in much of the world (e.g., in postcolonial states ruled by unrepresentative, Western-influenced leaders) would be interesting to know, but unhelpful to this particular project. The book does not purport to be a thoroughgoing examination of the question of political legitimacy in general; that would be a project so immense as to be imponderable. Rather, the book seeks to be a thoroughgoing examination of the international norm emerging to govern the exceptional case: the de facto government so manifestly unrepresentative as to be arguably without standing to resist, in the name of the sovereignty belonging to the underlying political community, external impositions. The question, then, is what indication of representativeness is minimally required to deem a ruling apparatus the state's "government" for purposes of international law. The orthodox approach to this question has been the "effective control doctrine," the linchpin of  [\*2060]  which is popular acquiescence in governance (pp. 137-42). A sharp break from orthodoxy is implicit in liberal-internationalist assertions of a "democratic entitlement," the linchpin of which is a liberal-democratic institutional structure. [10](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n10" \t "_self) The former approach is clearly giving way to a significant extent, and there are those who argue, on the basis of a fair amount of evidence, that the latter approach is emerging as the basis of a new norm that would open the door to "prodemocratic" intervention, perhaps including even the use of force, especially where a "freely and fairly elected" government has been overthrown. [11](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n11" \t "_self) Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law elaborately argues two politically relevant propositions: (1) that the case for the democratic entitlement as the emerging norm in international law is weaker than is generally supposed; and (2) that liberal-democratic legitimism (i.e., the use of the democratic entitlement as the basis for disregarding a government's legal prerogatives) is dangerous both to self-determination and to peace. The book presents the second proposition as relevant to the first, inasmuch as one may appropriately amplify those aspects of the source material that stem from enlightened considerations. The book thereby intends to strike a blow for anticolonialism. It denies the existence of, and opposes the establishment of, a broad-ranging legal license for external intervention in the affairs of weak states. It associates such a license with great-power initiatives of the past that have been misguided at best, oppressive and exploitative at worst. Confronting a dismal subject matter that admits only of bleak choices, the book maintains a presumption in favor of what I, none too facetiously, often refer to as "the right to be ruled by one's own thugs," though it concedes a limited range of blatant thuggery that overcomes this presumption. [12](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n12" \t "_self) The book does not, as Gathii charges, "celebrate[] Haiti as the exemplary contemporary case of successful prodemocracy intervention," [13](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n13" \t "_self) but merely accepts that in a certain class of cases, of which Haiti is archetypical, one can no longer, and should not want to, deny the existence of an exception to the nonintervention norm. What  [\*2061]  Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law seeks to promote is a balanced norm, one that finds ample support in state practice and opinio juris and that serves, to the extent possible, the long-term interests of the inhabitants of weak states. II. Confessions of a "Neoconservative Realist" Gathii's characterization of my work as an exemplar of "neo-conservative realism" presents several difficulties. There are certain aspects of the book that can fairly be characterized as "conservative" and as "realist," at least in counterposition to liberal internationalism, if special definitions of those terms are designated with sufficient care. The book is conservative in the limited sense that it seeks to rationalize and to bolster the conception of international legal order, premised on the twin principles of self-determination of peoples and non-intervention in internal affairs, that was dominant throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but that now faces significant challenges. [14](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n14" \t "_self) The book is realist to the extent that it takes states (qua political communities entitled to self-government) seriously as units of the international system, and that it treats skeptically efforts to superimpose idealist blueprints on complex and unruly realities. [15](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n15" \t "_self) Gathii's own efforts to define the terms, however, lead only to confusion. The prefix "neo-" is especially troubling, because although Gathii at times seems to intend it in a more generic sense, the term "neoconservative" cannot be disassociated from a specific movement among right-wing American intellectuals that stands for propositions diametrically opposed to the book's central arguments. It is jarring to see the word used to characterize, for example, a discussion of U.S. intervention in Central America so overtly adverse to that emblematic neoconservative project of the 1980s (pp. 290-303, 347-61). Indeed, Gathii's accurate assertion that "the neoconservative tradition... is embedded in American exports such as neoliberalism and democracy promotion programs" [16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n16" \t "_self) goes far in explaining the book's chilly reception  [\*2062]  of the latter; but how, then, can the book conceivably be identified with neoconservatism? This glitch could be dismissed as a detail if it were not reflective of Gathii's broader misperception of the political spectrum. Gathii complains of "binary thinking" as a " "pathological' feature of Western knowledge systems," [17](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n17" \t "_self) but ironically, it is his organization of the material, not mine, that suffers from this pathology. Thus, Gathii does not discern that my approach to the question of governmental illegitimacy charts a middle way between the effective control doctrine and the democratic entitlement, one that seeks to appreciate the vast diversity of legitimacy rationales without embracing an abject relativism. To the extent that the book seeks to categorize the elements of that diversity, it does so expressly for the sake of convenience alone, and in a tone of self-deprecation. [18](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n18" \t "_self) For all of his complaints about my neglect of non-Western approaches to legitimacy, Gathii nowhere explains how the book excludes that which it does not expressly discuss. Nonetheless, this either-or motif is the relentless theme of his essay. According to Gathii's dichotomous reasoning, "Western" approaches to international relations amount to a dyad of liberal internationalist and neoconservative realist tendencies. Thus, the idea of "liberalism overextending itself" - which well captures my adverse characterization of the effort to exalt liberal-democratic institutional norms as legal criteria for governmental legitimacy - is, for Gathii, necessarily of a piece with Right-of-Center critiques of the New Deal welfare state. [19](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n19" \t "_self) Yet the considerations that underlie my critique of liberal internationalism cannot, on any careful reading, be imagined to emanate from the Right. Gathii's reasoning turns on an assertion that my "examination of only the legitimacy or illegitimacy of state authority invariably endorses the inequalities inherent in the private order which overlays the authority of any government providing its public imprimatur in private ordering." [20](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n20" \t "_self) But given that my project concerned a very narrow (albeit  [\*2063]  grandly complex) question - namely, when does a ruling apparatus in effective control lack standing to assert rights, incur obligations, and authorize acts on behalf of the state in the international system? - Gathii's assertion seems merely to reflect a methodological prejudice against treating anything as a discrete issue. [21](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n21" \t "_self) For Gathii, either one expressly discusses economic and social inequality in every context, or one is unconcerned with it. Ironically, part of the book's criticism of the democratic entitlement thesis is precisely that the latter emphasizes institutional criteria at the expense of contextual factors such as economic and social conditions (pp. 104-06, 120, 424-26) - an aspect that would, I had supposed, be hard to miss if one were reading the book for its political implications. The book's defense of sovereign prerogative overtly reflects an interest in maintaining political space for the very resistance to private-sector predation that Gathii seeks to champion. [22](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n22" \t "_self) Moreover, Gathii's complaint that I "ignore" international economic domination [23](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n23" \t "_self) could not be more misplaced, since I not only discuss the various pronouncements of intergovernmental organizations against coercive economic measures, but seek to establish for those pronouncements a legal significance that, though modest, goes beyond what most Western international lawyers tend to admit. [24](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n24" \t "_self) To make use of legal discourse, however, is to accept that its political worth - its credibility with influential actors who do not share one's interests and values - can be maintained only by resisting the temptation to assert as law one's entire political and moral wish list. I do not contend that the lending conditions imposed by international financial institutions are violations of international law, as Gathii  [\*2064]  would like, [25](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n25" \t "_self) because the absence of any broadly accepted basis would render the contention useless and self-discrediting. Furthermore, I do not denounce the absence of a doctrinal basis for this contention as a failing of international law, because that body of law has never pretended to exhaust the question of international distributive justice. Like many "critical" theorists, Gathii, in so busily demonstrating the truism that law is political, fails to appreciate the distinctiveness of law's role in politics, and therefore curses its necessary limitations. The supreme example of Gathii's binary thinking, however, and by far the most disturbing, is the neat division between "Eurocentric" and "Third-World" approaches. The irony of Gathii's condemnation of my "Eurocentrism" (apart from the difficulty of reconciling it with my copious quotations from Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Raul Castro, and the like) is that the reconstructed image of the contemporary sovereign state system that I present reflects the influences, direct and indirect, of the Nonaligned Bloc, quite as much as it does those of Westphalia or even of the drafters of the United Nations Charter. As the book details, the era of decolonization and its aftermath profoundly affected legal norms, as both Western and Socialist blocs purchased Third-World political support by, inter alia, affirming the inviolability of weak states (pp. 6, 113-18, 160-71). In repudiating conventional legal analysis as Eurocentric, Gathii dismisses both the significance of Third-World participation in shaping contemporary norms and the extent of the Third World's stake in the continued vitality of those norms - an attitude not, so far as I can tell, broadly shared among Third-World leaders, scholars, or peoples. International law's basic categories do, of course, stem from European sources, [26](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n26" \t "_self) but then so, too, in large measure, do the ideologies of the postcolonial state governments. Gathii may see this as itself a corruption of authentic African, Asian, and Latin-American traditions, [27](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n27" \t "_self) but the struggle over authenticity is internal to those  [\*2065]  societies and cultures. If Gathii is intent on regarding Third-World authenticity as excluding Western political thought - Rousseau and Marx as much as Locke and Mill, and by extension all African, Asian, and Latin-American thinkers who have drawn inspiration from them - his notion of "Third-World approaches" cannot help but be a highly tendentious rendering. Gathii is correct to assert that my analysis treats colonialism as a legal aberration rather than as "ingrained in international law as we know it today." [28](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n28" \t "_self) But he fails altogether to explain why it would be useful, in terms of his purported political goals, to do otherwise. Characterizing contemporary international law as essentially continuous with patterns of past Western domination (thereby belittling the hard-won achievements of anticolonialist struggles) scarcely promises a more effective defense to the phenomena - economic disempowerment, cultural imperialism, and proposals to subject "failed states" to trusteeship [29](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n29" \t "_self) - against which he inveighs. Gathii undoubtedly believes that Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, in failing to attack the structure of international law itself, subtly reinforces these phenomena. But the first two exist despite, not because of, the conception of international law that the book embodies, and the last is most effectively opposed by invoking that conception. Conclusion Professor Gathii's substantive concerns about neocolonialism and neoliberalism are the very concerns that underlie Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law. It is thus ironic - though, in light of recent scholarly trends, not very surprising - that he should regard my book as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. It would be different if the methodological radicalism of Gathii and others of his persuasion entailed a **programmatic alternative**. But it does not. Instead, it disdains to engage in the only consequential struggle in which its adherents are, by training and position, equipped to participate. It therefore reflects neither the interests nor, it is a sure bet, the views of those on whose behalf it purports to operate. Faced with the alternative that it presents to more traditional modes of scholarship, I much prefer to take the advice of an old mentor: "the more radical the message, the more conservative the suit."

#### Only focusing on death allows us to truly follow our dreams and live life to our full potential

Steve **Jobs**, CEO of Apple Computers, June 12, **2005** http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/june15/jobs-061505

My third story is about death. When I was 17, I read a quote that went something like: "If you live each day as if it was your last, someday you'll most certainly be right." It made an impression on me, and since then, for the past 33 years, I have looked in the mirror every morning and asked myself: "If today were the last day of my life, would I want to do what I am about to do today?" And whenever the answer has been "No" for too many days in a row, I know I need to change something. Remembering that I'll be dead soon is the most important tool I've ever encountered to help me make the big choices in life. Because almost everything – all external expectations, all pride, all fear of embarrassment or failure - these things just fall away in the face of death, leaving only what is truly important. Remembering that you are going to die is the best way I know to avoid the trap of thinking you have something to lose. You are already naked. There is no reason not to follow your heart. About a year ago I was diagnosed with cancer. I had a scan at 7:30 in the morning, and it clearly showed a tumor on my pancreas. I didn't even know what a pancreas was. The doctors told me this was almost certainly a type of cancer that is incurable, and that I should expect to live no longer than three to six months. My doctor advised me to go home and get my affairs in order, which is doctor's code for prepare to die. It means to try to tell your kids everything you thought you'd have the next 10 years to tell them in just a few months. It means to make sure everything is buttoned up so that it will be as easy as possible for your family. It means to say your goodbyes. I lived with that diagnosis all day. Later that evening I had a biopsy, where they stuck an endoscope down my throat, through my stomach and into my intestines, put a needle into my pancreas and got a few cells from the tumor. I was sedated, but my wife, who was there, told me that when they viewed the cells under a microscope the doctors started crying because it turned out to be a very rare form of pancreatic cancer that is curable with surgery. I had the surgery and I'm fine now. This was the closest I've been to facing death, and I hope its the closest I get for a few more decades. Having lived through it, I can now say this to you with a bit more certainty than when death was a useful but purely intellectual concept: No one wants to die. Even people who want to go to heaven don't want to die to get there. And yet death is the destination we all share. No one has ever escaped it. And that is as it should be, because Death is very likely the single best invention of Life. It is Life's change agent. It clears out the old to make way for the new. Right now the new is you, but someday not too long from now, you will gradually become the old and be cleared away. Sorry to be so dramatic, but it is quite true. Your time is limited, so don't waste it living someone else's life. Don't be trapped by dogma - which is living with the results of other people's thinking. Don't let the noise of other's opinions drown out your own inner voice. And most important, have the courage to follow your heart and intuition. They somehow already know what you truly want to become. Everything else is secondary.

## 2NC – Framework

### 2NC Overview – Long Shell

**The aff must defend topical USFG action on energy policy – we view debate as a competitive political game that has only a few rules, one of them being the resolution – this is the best framework**

**1. Predictability – the resolution serves as a universal starting point – these pre-designed scenarios create a domain-specific game space that allows for in-depth research and information processing – their broad focus collapses meaningful discussions and the educational value of any debate – that's Haghoj.**

**2. Ground – yes, they have a problem with the resolution, that's the point – it creates controversial ground that allows for balanced difficulty, and forbids the most efficient means to a goal – excellence in games is intrinsically good but requires the participants to willingly accept the rules that are essential to the game because that difficulty makes achievement meaningful – that's Hurka.**

#### Difficulty outweighs – process is more important that product– multiple philosophical perspectives conclude value is not gained by external goals

Hurka 6 – philosopher who serves as the Jackman Distinguished Chair in Philosophical Studies at the University of Toronto (Thomas, 2006, "Games and the Good," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 80, http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~thurka/docs/pass\_games.pdf)

But a good that is not fundamental can nonetheless be paradigmatic, because it gives the clearest possible expression of a certain type of value. If difficult activities are as such good, they 14 must aim at a goal: it is achieving that which is challenging. But their value does not derive from properties of that goal considered in itself, depending instead on features of the process of achieving it. Yet this can be obscured if the goal is independently good, since then the activity, if successful, will be instrumentally good, and this can seem the most important thing about it. If the farmer who works by hand successfully harvests a crop, his work contributes to the vital good of feeding his family, and this can distract us from the value it has in itself. But there is no such danger if the goal is intrinsically valueless, as it most clearly is in games. Since a game’s prelusory goal – getting a ball into a hole in the ground or standing atop a mountain – is intrinsically trivial, the value of playing the game can depend only on facts about the process of achieving that goal. And this point is further emphasized by the lusory attitude, which chooses that process just as a process, since it willingly accepts rules that make achieving the goal harder. Game-playing must have some external goal one aims at, but the specific features of this goal are irrelevant to the activity’s value, which is entirely one of process rather than product, journey rather than destination. This is why playing in games gives the clearest expression of a modern as against an Aristotelian view of value: because modern values are precisely ones of process or journey rather than of the end-state they lead to. The contrary Aristotelian view, which denigrates these values, was expressed most clearly in Aristotle’s division of all activities into the two categories of kinesis and energeia and his subsequent judgements about them.13 An Aristotelian kinesis – often translated as “movement” – is an activity aimed at a goal external to it, as driving to Toronto is aimed at being in Toronto. It is therefore brought to an end by the achievement of that goal, which means that a kinesis can be identified by a grammatical test: if the fact that one has X-ed implies that one is no 15 longer X-ing, as the fact that one has driven to Toronto implies that one is no longer driving there, then X-ing is a kinesis. But the main point is that a kinesis aims at an end-state separate from it. By contrast, an energeia – translated variously as “actuality,” “activity,” or “action” – is not directed at an external goal but has its end internal to it. Contemplation is an energeia, because it does not aim to produce anything beyond itself, as is the state of feeling pleased. And energeiai do not pass the above grammatical test and therefore, unlike kineseis, can be carried on indefinitely: that one has contemplated does not imply that one is not contemplating now or will not continue to do so. Contemplation, like driving to Toronto, is an activity, but it does not aim to produce anything apart from itself. Now, Aristotle held that energeiai are more valuable than kineseis, so the best human activities must be ones that can be carried on continuously, such as contemplation. This is because he assumed that the value of a kinesis must derive from that of its goal, so its value is subordinate and even just instrumental to that of the goal. As he said at the start of the Nicomachean Ethics, “Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities.”14 But it is characteristic of what I am calling modern values to deny this assumption, and to hold that there are activities that necessarily aim at an external goal but whose value is internal to them in the sense that it depends entirely on features of the process of achieving that goal. Suits cites expressions of this modern view by Kierkegaard, Kant, Schiller, and Georg Simmel,15 but for an especially clear one consider Marx’s view that a central human good is transforming nature through productive labour. This activity necessarily has an external goal – one cannot produce without producing some thing – and in conditions of scarcity this goal will be something vital for humans’ survival or comfort. But Marx held that 16 when scarcity is overcome and humans enter the “realm of freedom” they will still have work as their “prime want,” so they will engage in the process of production for its own sake without any interest in its goal as such. Or consider Nietzsche’s account of human greatness. In an early work he said the one thing “needful” is to “give style to one’s character,” so its elements are unified by “a single taste,” and that it matters less whether this taste is good or bad than whether it is a single taste.16 Later he said the will to power involves not the “multitude and disgregation” of one’s impulses but their coordination under a single predominant impulse.17 In both discussions he deemed activities good if they involve organizing one’s aims around a single goal whatever that goal is. So for both Marx and Nietzsche a central human good was activity that on the one side is necessarily directed to a goal but on the other derives its value entirely from aspects of the process of achieving it. This is why the type of value they affirm is paradigmatically illustrated by playing in games; when one’s goal is trivial, the only value can be that of process. Marx and Nietzsche would never put it this way, but what each valued is in effect playing in games, in Marx’s case the game of material production when there is no longer any instrumental need for it, in Nietzsche’s the game of exercising power just for the sake of doing so.

**3. Political education – framing debate as a legal game with strict rules is our only chance to engage power institutions – it unites cultures under a common normative framework – this displaces the human brutality cycle with amoral rules capable of short-circuiting righteousness – encompasses a broad range of violence – that’s Carter.**

[INSERT ROOT CAUSE CARD]

**4. Decision-making – dramatic rehearsal of possible courses of action in domain-specific scenarios provide a meaningful way for participants to make mistakes without consequences and project outcomes – that's Haghoj. Decision-making outweighs because it's the only portable skill – Shulman says critical thinking has intrinsic value – even absent a specific goal, it improves all aspects of life.**

**5. Energy education -- allowing switch-side debate is critical to improve climate policy outcomes -- Mitchell says policy arguments were essential to past EPA deliberation that contested unstated assumptions and conflicting interpretations -- challenging convictions led to institutional convergence. That's k2 motivate responses -- MArs et al says imagined scenarios help the public and policy-makers understand the consequences of conflict and take preventitive actions.**

**That outweighs -- action on energy and environment is critical to resolve problems of past interventions and save our species from eco-catastrophe -- causes mass death and triggers increasaed violence to subjugated populations in the midst of collapse.**

### conditionality good: ks

#### Key to fairness against critical affs – it’s tough to predict what they’ll defend, so we need multiple angles to pre-empt morphing.

#### Unfair debate’s bad because the neg never wins, and it’s POLITICALLY bad because there’s no DIALECTIC absent ENGAGEMENT.

#### AND unique side bias against critical affs – we have to prepare for a dozen obscure literatures – they just answer cap and framework – ditching T supercharges the EXPERTISE GAP

#### Logical decisionmaking –multiple forms of scrutiny create the most rigorous truth test in any framework – we all make decisions. A demand for fixed commitment is a formula for blind groupthink. THEY BAN THE BRAINSTORM.

#### Contradictory positions crucial to solve AUTHORITARIAN pedagogy and lead to critical thinking - outweighs because only education spills over

Lewis and Dehler 00

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U Cincinnati College of Business, Professor Lewis is the Interim Associate Dean of Undergraduate Programs and Professor of Management. She also leads the Kolodzik Business Scholars Program, as its themes of innovation, collaboration and globalization are closely linked to her research and teaching interests. Indeed, her work addresses paradoxes that impede and enable innovation. In particular, Dr. Lewis explores the need to manage paradoxes in three domains.

Gordon E. Dehler, PhD. Associate Professor. The College of Charleston. School of Business and Economics. Department of Management & Entrepreneurship

Teaching with paradox requires “walking the talk.” If students are truly going to be inspired to think outside the box, we need not only to help them critique the box of oversimplified, polarized frames but also to model paradoxical thinking ourselves. As Farson (1996) noted, paradoxical thinking taps the power of uncertainty and ambiguity: “Absurdly, our most important human affairs—marriage, education, leadership—do best when there is an occasional loss of control and an increase in personal vulnerability, times when we do not know what to do” (p. 38). Recalling our earlier discussion of the control/flexibility paradox, the paradox of teaching with paradox lies in the need to provide order and foster creative tension. In this regard, we have found that teaching with paradox offers a valuable learning opportunity for instructors as well as students. By being self-reflective ourselves, we have become highly conscientious of our own defenses—our desire to control the classroom—and the paradoxical need to allow, even cultivate, an element of confusion to enable more insightful experiences. This requires resisting the temptation to overuse teaching paradigm tactics, that is, refraining from merely telling students about paradoxes and regulating their experiences and instead constructing boundaries within which they may comfortably question inadequacies of their understandings. Such needs complement and extend those of other learning paradigm strategies. For instance, Mallinger (1998) recently wrote of the need to give up control, to maintain control when using collaborative learning approaches, whereas Dennehy, Sims, and Collins (1998) examined the conflicting needs of experiential learning. Ambiguity is necessary so that individuals are personally stretched to apply concepts to real situations. It may seem paradoxical that the pursuit of a conceptual model for debriefing is urged, yet ambiguity is also urged, to meet the subjective needs of individuals. Both requirements (structure and ambiguity), however, can be met if the management educator is cognizant of . . . the debriefing model and uses it as a road map to facilitate discussion so that all learning states are experienced. (p. 18) Barrett’s (1998) seven injunctions of the “Paradox Mind-Set” remind instructors to be purposeful, open, skeptical, contrary, paralogical, imaginative, and courageous, as they encourage students to do likewise. Modeling paradoxical thinking entails remaining focused on the process and objectives of intentional learning while displaying curiosity, honesty, and selfreflection. By provoking insightful debate, conflict can become a source of creativity, and playing devil’s advocate may help students identify their underlying assumptions and more complicated questions to move beyond which alternative is “right” (Dehler &Welsh, 1993). Critiquing oversimplified explanations and taken-for-granted, often nonsensical, conventions, students can be inspired to seek and accommodate opposing views, to creatively make sense of contradictions by transcending either/or logic and overcoming fears of sounding absurd. Finally, the potential value of students’ leaving the classroom with some confusion or dissatisfaction should not be overlooked as a constructive tactic. Palmer (1998) proposed that “good education is always more process than product . . . [and] may leave students deeply dissatisfied, at least for a while” (p. 94). Likewise, French (1997) explained that teachers may use anxiety to foster creative tension and energy while avoiding an excess that freezes students within their defenses. Using the learning space provided by paradox requires staying with the uncertainty long enough to explore contradictions rather than suppress them, examining the ambivalence of mixed feelings, conflicting demands, and uncertainty. Rather than providing oversimplified closure to a complicated discussion, leaving a class with unresolved questions may spur further exploration to reduce confusion and complexity. A degree of unresolved tension or “dissatisfaction may be a sign that real education has happened” (Palmer, 1998, p. 94).

### AT C/I – General

**Doesn’t solve our offense – debate games require a specific set of pre-determined rules to harness the educational value of the game and you aren’t playing by them – this opens up infinite frameworks for discussion that destroys decision-making and difficulty – this is impacted above**

#### Topical way to do the aff -- embrace global expansion of nuclear power and its associated toxic waste as an affirmation of heteronormativity -- solves the same warrants and historical analysis of the 1ac but makes debate harder for them because forces them to defend that aspects of the topic that guarantee negative ground.

### AT Resolution Bad

#### 1. The resolution is supposed to be controversial so as to spark intellectual conflict – this is an essential part of learning

Johnson & Johnson 9 – professor in the Department of Educational Psychology, University of Minnesota and professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Minnesota (David W. and Roger T., Jan/Feb 2009, "Energizing Learning: The Instructional Power of Conflict," Educational Researcher, 38(37), Ebsco)

Whether teachers desire it or not, conflicts among students inevitably will occur in any classroom. The purpose of this article is to present evidence that intellectual conflict is not only highly desirable but also an essential instructional tool that energizes student efforts to learn. In doing so, it is necessary to summarize the conflicting views about conflict, define constructive controversy, describe how it is used in academic situations, summarize its underlying theory, and review the research demonstrating its effectiveness. Is Conflict Constructive or Destructive? Conflict Is Constructive Conflict is to student learning what the internal combustion engine is to the automobile. The internal combustion engine ignites the fuel and the air with a spark to create the energy for movement and acceleration. Just as the fuel and the air are inert without the spark, so, ideas in the classroom are inert without the spark of intellectual conflict. Intellectual conflict is the spark that energizes students to seek out new information and study harder and longer (Johnson, Johnson, & Johnson, 1976; Johnson & Johnson, 2007; please note that all references to “Johnson & Johnson” refer to D. W. Johnson and R. Johnson unless otherwise indicated.). By structuring intellectual conflict in a lesson, instructors can grab and hold students’ attention and energize students to learn at a level beyond what they may have intended. More specifically, intellectual conflict has the potential to accomplish the following: 1. Focus student attention on the material to be learned and on the instructional tasks. 2. Energize students to complete instructional tasks, seek out new information, and study harder and longer. 3. Motivate students to learn and to continue learning about the subject after the course has ended. 4. Produce higher levels of cognitive reasoning in completing the instructional tasks. 5. Increase accuracy and frequency of perspective taking. 6. Produce higher levels of achievement and retention of the material being studied. 7. Produce higher levels of creativity and divergent thinking. 8. Build more positive relationships among students. 9. Increase students’ self-esteem. (Johnson & Johnson, 2005b, 2007)

**2. Switch-side solves – you get those args on the neg but we force the game to become more difficult on the opposite side.**

**3. Aff creativity solves – we're just asking you to tether your args to the resolution -- Mitchell ev proves this is successful in alliance building -- you just have to defend the ultimate instrumental adoption of USFG action on energy policy.**

### AT Rules / Limits Bad

**1. Rules are awesome and the only thing that makes the game possible – otherwise achievement becomes meaningless and there’s no education gained – that’s Hurka.**

#### This form of difficulty is an educational end in itself

Hurka 6 – philosopher who serves as the Jackman Distinguished Chair in Philosophical Studies at the University of Toronto (Thomas, 2006, "Games and the Good," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 80, http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~thurka/docs/pass\_games.pdf)

But though Suits defines the generic concept of game-playing, this is not what he defends as the supreme intrinsic good. His argument, recall, is that in utopia, where all instrumental goods are provided, game-playing would be everyone’s primary activity. But this description of utopia implies that it would contain no professional players; since no one would need to play a game as a means to anything, all players would be amateurs who chose the game for itself. But then they would have Rashdall’s lusory attitude of accepting the rules because they make the game difficult, and Suits explicitly agrees. He describes how one utopian character decides to build houses by carpentry rather than order them up telepathically because carpentry requires more skill. And he starts his discussion of utopia by saying he will defend the value of game12 playing as a specific form of play, where he has earlier denied that playing a game necessarily involves playing: to play is to engage in an activity for its own sake, and a pure professional does not do that.10 So the activity Suits defends as supremely good is game-playing that is also play, or what I will call “playing in a game.” And that activity involves accepting the rules not just because they make the game possible, but also because they make it difficult. I will follow Suits here and narrow my thesis further: not only will I explain the value only of playing good games, I will explain the value only of playing in these games, or of playing them with an at least partly amateur attitude. But this is not in practice much of a restriction, since most people do play games at least partly for their own sakes. Consider Pete Rose, an extremely hard-nosed baseball player who was disliked for how much he would do to win. Taking the field near the end of the famous sixth game of the 1975 World Series, and excited by the superb plays that game had involved, he told the opposing team’s third base coach, “Win or lose, Popeye, we’re in the fuckin’ greatest game ever played”; after the game, which his team lost, he made a similar comment about it to his manager. Intensely as he wanted to win, Pete Rose also loved baseball for itself.11 So the game-playing whose value I will explain involves accepting the rules of the game because they make it difficult. But then the elements that define this type of game-playing are internally related: the prelusory goal and constitutive rules together give it a feature, namely difficulty, and the lusory attitude chooses it because of this feature. More specifically, if difficulty is as such good, the prelusory goal and rules give it a good-making feature and the lusory attitude chooses it because of that good-making feature. This connects the lusory attitude to an attractive view that has been held by many philosophers, namely that if something is 13 intrinsically good, the positive attitude of loving it for the property that makes it good, that is, desiring, pursuing, and taking pleasure in it for that property, is also, and separately, intrinsically good. Thus, if another person’s happiness is good, desiring, pursuing, and being pleased by her happiness as happiness is a further good, namely that of benevolence; likewise, if knowledge is good, desiring, pursuing, and being pleased by knowledge is good. Aristotle expressed this view when he said that if an activity is good, pleasure in it is good, whereas if an activity is bad, pleasure in it is bad,12 and it was accepted around the turn of the 20th century by many philosophers, including Rashdall, Franz Brentano, G.E. Moore, and W.D. Ross. And it applies directly to playing in games, which combines the good of difficulty with the further good of loving difficulty for itself. The prelusory goal and constitutive rules together give playing in games one ground of value, namely difficulty; the lusory attitude in its amateur form adds a related but distinct ground of value, namely loving something good for the property that makes it so. The second ground depends on the first; loving difficulty would not be good unless difficulty were good. But it adds a further, complementary intrinsic good. When you play a game for its own sake you do something good and do it from a motive that fixes on its good-making property.

#### 2. Debate allows for a dialogue between different voices which is uniquely empowering

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

The previous sections sketched the outline of a dialogical game pedagogy. Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

#### 3. Games occur in a fixed space with precise rules that are the source of enhanced performance

Garris et al 2 – research psychologist with the Science and Technology Division of the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division (Rosemary, Robert Ahlers, PhD, research psychologist with the Science and Technology Division of the Naval AirWarfare Center Training Systems Division, James Driskell, PhD, president and senior scientist of Florida Maxima Corporation and adjunct professor of psychology at Rollins College, December 2002, "Games, motivation, and learning: A research and practice model," Simulation and Gaming, 33(4), http://www.thaisim.org/articles/Garris%20et%20al%20-%202002%20-%20Games,%20motivation,%20and%20learning%20-%20441.pdf)

Although game activity takes place apart from the real world, it occurs in a fixed space and time period with precise rules governing game play. Caillois (1961) noted that in a game, the rules and constraints of ordinary life are temporarily suspended and replaced by a set of rules that are operative within the fixed space and time of the game. Moreover, when play violates these boundaries, when the ball goes out of bounds or the person responds out of character, play is stopped and brought back into the agreed boundaries. The rules of a game describe the goal structure of the game. One of the most robust findings in the literature on motivation is that clear, specific, and difficult goals lead to enhanced performance (Locke & Latham, 1990). Clear, specific goals allow the individual to perceive goal-feedback discrepancies, which are seen as crucial in triggering greater attention and motivation. That is, when feedback indicates that current performance does not meet established goals, individuals attempt to reduce this discrepancy. Under conditions of high goal commitment (i.e., the individual is determined to reach the goal), this discrepancy leads to an increase in effort and performance (Kernan & Lord, 1990). Therefore, game contexts that are meaningful and that provide welldifferentiated, hierarchical goal structures are likely to lead to enhanced motivation and performance.

#### 4. Games are world-building encounters that are only maintained by mutual rules

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Goffman defines an encounter as a social occurrence where people orient to one another in face-to-face interaction. This is accomplished through a “single visual and cognitive focus”, a “mutual and preferential openness to communication”, a “heightened mutual relevance of acts”, and an “eye-to-eye ecological huddle” (Goffman, 1961a: 18). For Goffman, an encounter is the ultimate social reality where “the real work of the world is done” (Henricks, 2006: 150). Thus, games represent a particular form of focused encounters that create their own worlds: A matrix of possible events and a cast of roles through whose enactment the events occur constitute together a field for fateful dramatic action, a plane of being, an engine of meaning, a world in itself, different from all other worlds except the ones generated when the same game is played at other times… Games, then, are world-building activities (Goffman, 1961a: 25). 96 Furthermore, game encounters are characterised by three specialised rules that determine the relationship between the game world and the world beyond the game event. The first rule is termed rules of irrelevance and describes how successful games require certain issues or themes to be taken out of consideration, for example, the cost of a chess piece or of the board itself is of absolutely no importance to the course of play. Here, Goffman cites Bateson to describe how games place an interpretive “frame” around the events that determine what does and does not make sense within the game (Bateson, 1955: 44). According to this logic, games are not only dependent on the exclusion, but also the inclusion of specific elements. Thus, the second rule designates how games employ realised resources; that is, how certain elements are defined as being “in play” and help establish the micro-cosmos of the game world. For instance, if a pawn was from missing from a chess set, a bottle cap could easily be a fine replacement.33 Finally, Goffman identifies a third set of norms that he terms transformation rules. Although participants use games to create worlds of their own, games still have “boundaries” that are semi-permeable. Certain issues inevitably pass through from the exterior world into the game world in the form of, for example a ringing phone that interrupts the game or personal comments between players that refer to their social identity outside of the game. Thus, transformation rules may both “inhibit” or “facilitate” the way external issues are “given expression inside the encounter” (Goffman, 1961a: 31). For Goffman, game encounters are principally enacted and maintained through mutual rules of relevance and irrelevance. As tempting as it may be to view games as ontological worlds of their own, the possibility always exists that exterior events or issues may sneak in and change the game. To emphasise this point, Goffman makes a useful distinction between playing and gaming, which can be used to open the “black box” or break the “magic circle” of games (cf. chapter 2). While playing a game only describes “the process of move-taking” in a game-strategic sense, gaming describes “activity that is not strictly relevant to the outcome of the play and cannot be defined in terms of the game” (Goffman, 1961a: 33). Correspondingly, Goffman also distinguishes between players and participants. In doing so, he criticises the rational approach taken in game theory, which only focuses on the moves taken by players in narrowly defined contests and settings (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).34 As Goffman argues: “while it is as players that we can win, it is only as participants that we can get fun out of this winning” (Goffman, 1961a: 34).

### AT Fairness Rigged / Delgado

**1. All of our internal links to education still apply – cross-apply from above.**

**2. Not about debate – their ev argues that in sexual asssault and tobacco cases, superior parties are able to force their doctrines onto others – they have to prove that specific aspects of debate are structurall unfair.**

#### 3. Games occur in clearly framed and transparent spaces with amoral rules – this provides the incentive for perpetual curiosity

Carter 8 – prof @ The Colorado College, research support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the staff of the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Benezet Foundation at The Colorado College (Lief H, 2008, "LAW AND POLITICS AS PLAY," Chicago-Kent Law Review, 83(3), http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf)

6. Game Transparency Games take place in clearly framed spaces and in bounded times. This framing process makes information flow to players and spectators manage-able. Although the sheer speed of the game’s action may momentarily con-fuse players and spectators, a good game is, nearly all of the time, transparent to players and observers alike. Bill Bradley wrote of basket-ball’s transparency: As a form of human endeavor it is understandable and pure. The per-formance demands maximum effort, as one sees clearly at courtside. Un-encumbered by masks, pads, or hats, the players reveal their bodies as well as their skills. People come and see and know that what they see is real.122 Sports rules do not condemn athletes who enhance their performances through surgical repair of torn knees and shoulders. These procedures are transparently reported in the press. But they do condemn concealed dop-ing.123 The drive to ensure that players and fans unquestionably experience games as they “really are” led to the lifetime exclusion of Pete Rose from baseball for gambling on games in spite of the fact that he was not accused of deliberately altering the outcomes of games in which he participated.124 The very existence of the wager prevents people from knowing, as Bradley put it, “that what they see is real.” 7. Deception Competitive games are amoral in all respects. “Anything goes” unless a rule prohibits it and a player gets caught violating it. Games capitalize on the human tendency to better oneself by deceiving others. Games permit all things not prohibited by rule. Clock-stopping instances of faked injuries by players on teams playing from behind in the last stages of close college football games and the art of “diving” in international football, for exam-ple, are presumed permissible. Squads of basketball referees routinely de-cide how physically they will permit the teams to play, and they communicate their expectations, how closely or loosely they will call fouls, to the coaches and players prior to the game. Illegal deceptions on the field are, moments after the fact, transparently evident to players and spectators. If referees do not catch them, suddenly-angry coaches and the aggrieved crowd will let the errant referees know soon enough. 8. Minimization of Chance Good sports and games minimize the effects of purely random acci-dents on outcomes.125 The chance elements that remain are either highly transparent, such as starting a game with a coin flip; randomly distributed, like a crazy bounce of the ball; or impact both teams equally, as does a sudden rainstorm. 9. Curiosity and Institutionalized Error Correction The transparency of games, the precision of their framing in time and space, the minimization of chance elements, and the desire to win provide players with every incentive to perceive mistakes in their play and to cor-rect them. Because players and teams define themselves as “skilled,” but never “just” or “entitled to win,” they constantly seek to discard habits and strategies that do not work. To avoid overconfidence, coaches regularly exhort their players to take the worth and merit of their opponents, even apparently weak ones, seriously. In competitive gaming, teams and players imagine that when they lose, they can improve, play again, and hope to win another day. The game context thus overcomes the human impulse to keep their fears of death at bay by believing in their own righteousness. Like the scientific method, competition teaches the benefits of perpetual curiosity. Through games people come to know the satisfactions that flow from em-bracing life’s endlessly surprising novelty.

#### 4. Good games create curiosity that replaces the human tendency to brutality – competitors are able to merge identities which displaces racism

Carter 8 – prof @ The Colorado College, research support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the staff of the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Benezet Foundation at The Colorado College (Lief H, 2008, "LAW AND POLITICS AS PLAY," Chicago-Kent Law Review, 83(3), http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf)

Good games neutralize turf and, by legitimizing losing, reduce or eliminate the irrational and often self-defeating effects of Kahneman’s loss aversion, specifically the urge to double down and send good money after bad.127 Like legal education and legal practice, and like Vico’s rhetorical debating games, competitive games over time construct for players and fans a continuing civic education. The desire to win a competition moti-vates players to become keenly curious about the rules of the game, the conditions on the field of play, the skills of the opponent, and so on. In games people return to and practice the “thought of sense.”128 In games, players must base their calculations on what is real, not on what they imag-ine or hope for. Games thus rewire the remarkably plastic human brain in the direction of the classical rationality of “economic man” like no other social context. People come to belie Franklin’s belief that men only use reason to justify everything they have a mind to do. Through the behavior of playing, people reconfigure their brains to be more conventionally ra-tional. In play people create the sense that Faulkner thought they lacked.129 Curiosity necessarily humanizes opponents instead of “despeciating” them, as so often happens in the brutality cycle.130 Kahneman observes that each opponent in a conventional conflict believes that the other side acts out of malice and hostile motives,131 but just the opposite happens in games. Competitors merge identities. Each knows that the other experi-ences the same world, “thinks the way I think,” “wants what I want,” and “needs to know me as much as I need to know her.” Opponents do not “take it personally.”132 Competitive games, without any help from post-modern philosophers, convert believers into pragmatists. In games people delight in the particulars of concrete situations. Good play helps realize Whitman’s wise urging to turn from curiosity about God to curiosity about each other.133 The curiosity that players must develop to play well dis-places ethnocentrism, xenophobia, moral superiority, and the other brutaliz-ing tendencies of the human mind described by Hood, Milgram, Zimbardo, Pinker, Damasio, and Frith, and noted in Part I. Curiosity overcomes, or very much reduces, the impulse to hate.134 Good play has the same effect on players as does the naming of a doll or an animal. It creates a kind of love.

### AT Overlimits

**1. At least we have some limits – unrestricted affirmation allows for infinite possibilities which destroys the educational value of debate – that’s Haghoj.**

#### 2. We don’t overlimit – still limitless roles and perspectives within the resolution that are empowering

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

In contrast to the rationalist approach, this dissertation views debate games from a dialogical approach inspired by the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984a, 1986). In everyday use, the term “dialogic” often means “pertaining to dialogue” (Wegerif, 2007: 14). But this connotation reduces dialogue to “physical” aspects of communication (i.e. turn-taking, eye contact, recurring patterns of initiation-response-feedback between teachers and students) and leaves out the “conceptual and epistemological” dynamics of communication, which are central to Bakhtin’s philosophy (Marková, 1990: 131). Bakhtin’s notion of “dialogic” hence refers to relations where “two or more perspectives are held together in tension at the same time”, which “always opens up an unbounded space of potential perspectives” (Wegerif, 2007: 8). Seen from this dialogical perspective, debating and arguing cannot be understood only by focusing on the argument and the arguer. Instead, it is necessary to explore the active role of the audience and the influence of the sociocultural context in shaping particular dialogues (Tindale, 2004: 89). Similarly, the debate activities of The Power Game do not only imply spoken dialogue since the election scenario also creates a dialogical space for meaning-making, inquiry and learning. As Wegerif argues: Dialogic teaching should not aim only at the appropriation of particular voices in a debate but also the ‘appropriation’ of the dialogical space of the debate. Such teaching combines the construction of knowledge with what could reasonably be called the ‘de-construction’ of knowledge (Wegerif, 2007: 51). Thus, debate games should not be reduced to prescribed procedures and rationalist assumptions of “right” and “wrong” arguments. Instead, this thesis aims to describe and analyse how teachers and students enact the parliamentary election scenario of The Power Game as a dialogical space for learning, which involves the “interanimation and struggle between one’s own and another’s word” (Bakhtin, 1981: 269). To my knowledge, no studies exist of debate games that are based on a dialogical approach. However, there is a growing field of research that explores dialogical aspects of teaching and learning within a classroom context. More specifically, I am referring to research on “dialogical instruction” (Nystrand, 1997), “dialogic inquiry” (Wells, 1999), “dialogical pedagogy” (Dysthe, 2006; Skidmore, 2006; Matusov, 2007), “dialogic teaching” (Alexander, 2008), and “dialogic education” (Wegerif, 2007). These authors are inspired in a variety of ways by Bakhtin, but they all stress the educative potential of teacher-student interaction that “enables students to play an active part in shaping the agenda of classroom discourse” (Skidmore, 2006: 503). Thus, one of the main points of Bakhtin’s philosophy is that speakers and listeners are mutually responsive as they both take active part in forming dialogical relationships: Thus an active understanding, one that assimilates the world under consideration into a new conceptual system, that of the one striving to understand, establishes a series of complex interrelationships, consonances and dissonances with the word and enriches it with new elements. It is precisely such an understanding that the speaker counts on. Therefore his orientation toward the listener is an orientation toward a specific conceptual horizon, toward the specific world of the listener; it introduces totally new elements into his discourse; it is in this way, after all, that various different points of view, conceptual horizons, systems for providing expressive accents, various social "languages" come to interact with one another. The speaker strives to get a reading on his own word, and on his own conceptual system of the understanding receiver; he enters into dialogical relationships with certain aspects of this system. The speaker breaks through the alien conceptual horizon of the listener, constructs his own utterance on alien territory, against his, the listener's, apperceptive background (Bakhtin, 1981: 282). According to Olga Dysthe, this quote offers a theoretical explanation of how understanding and learning can grow out of dialogical interchange (Dysthe, 1996: 390). In relation to this study, the different roles and positions of The Power Game created a “polyphony” of classroom discourses where students spoke and listened through ideological voices, which challenged their conceptual horizons. In this way, the debate game changed the dialogical context of a classroom, which also meant changing the conditions for learning by affording different opportunities for students to participate in the construction of knowledge. As Nystrand argues: Specific modes or genres of discourse engender particular epistemic roles for the conversants, and these roles, in turn, engender, constrain, and empower their thinking. The bottom line for instruction is that the quality of student learning is closely linked to the quality of classroom talk (Nystrand, 1997: 29). Obviously, there is no guarantee that the dialogical interplay between teachers, students and debate scenarios necessarily results in valuable learning processes. However, several empirical studies of classroom dialogue indicate that students are able to acquire in-depth understanding of particular subjects if they are able to connect their own conceptual horizons with the epistemic perspectives of other voices in ways which are meaningful and relevant. Two such examples include “role writing”, where students are asked to write on a controversial issue from the perspective of a particular role (Dysthe, 1996: 402), or when students “retell stories” in their own words by “using paraphrase, speculation and counter-fictional utterances” (Skidmore, 2006: 503).

### AT State Bad

**1. Even if the state is bad, that just proves debating about it is good – learning the inner-workings of the dark arts is critical to challenge those dogmatic perspectives in the first place**

#### 2. Educational gaming through dramatic rehearsal of specific institutions is simply our inquiry as social actors – we develop socially in relation to a generalized other

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

According to the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey, the meaning-making processes of learning, thinking, deliberating, and playing games all involve inquiry as social actors must be able question and explore situated problems in order to construct and reconstruct different aspects of knowledge (Dewey, 1916). For Dewey, the outcomes or “warranted assertions” of an inquiry are contingent as they – in principle – are constantly open to new inquiries (Dewey, 1938a: 9). In this way, no final criteria exist for validating knowledge. Moreover, the process of inquiry is holistic as it both involves logical thinking and creative imagination as well as individual and social dimensions. Dewey also describes the process of inquiry as a “dramatic rehearsal” of “various competing possible lines of action”, which refers to the tension between acts “tried out in imagination” and actual events (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This means that educational games represent problem-based scenarios as they allow participants to actively imagine, explore and project the problems, knowledge aspects and contingent outcomes of a particular game world in relation to real-world phenomena. By combining Barth and Dewey’s perspectives, the assertions of educational game scenarios can also be described as epistemological models intended (designed) to be realised through meaningful interaction – both in relation to a teacher perspective (facilitation) and a student perspective (participation). Arguing along similar lines, the interactionist perspectives offered by Erving Goffman and George Herbert Mead describe and illuminate the social organisation of educational games. Mead assumes that the self is developed socially by adopting and playing with roles in relation to a “generalized other” (Mead, 1934: 154). Thus, in order to learn from educational games, students must be able to relate their roles to a more generalised perspective, i.e. that of a politician. Partly building upon Mead, Goffman’s dramaturgical sociology assumes that individuals “perform” and present themselves through different forms of “impression management”, i.e. in order to avoid losing “face” as a professional politician (Goffman, 1959). Moreover, Goffman analyses games as “focused gatherings” where game participants are expected to mutually sustain the rules and validate the on-going social interaction in relation to the interpretive “frames” of a particular game encounter (Goffman, 1961a, 1974). In this way, the process of playing games – and educational gaming in particular – cannot be reduced to an end in itself since game encounters are always open 23 to the possibility that exterior issues may transform the meaning of the game. Seen from this interactionist perspective, the social organisation of educational gaming represents an on-going negotiation between everyday teacher-student roles and the assigned roles of a particular game scenario. Finally, Barth’s focus on communicative knowledge can be further developed through the dialogical philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin. According to Bakhtin, human communication is dialogical in the sense that it presupposes mutual understanding and responsiveness (Bakhtin, 1981). Furthermore, Bakhtin assumes that we always communicate through various speech genres where speakers and listeners position themselves in relation to different aspects of referentiality, expressivity and addressivity, i.e. the semantic “content” of political ideologies, the expressive language of political discourse, and modes of addressing an audience in a parliamentary debate (Bakhtin, 1986). Thus, educational games challenge the speaker-hearer relationships of an educational setting as teachers and students are expected to position themselves in relation to the particular speech genres, ideological voices and semiotic resources of a given game scenario. In this way, educational games are able to create dialogical spaces (Wegerif, 2007) involving both ideological tensions and discursive criteria for validating the knowledge communicated between the game participants.

#### 3. Policy relevance doesn’t cause cooption – it can be used to challenge the status quo

Stoker 10 – Professor of Politics and Governance at the University of Southampton (Gerry, 2010, “Blockages on the Road to Relevance: Why has Political Science Failed to Deliver?” European Political Science, Volume 9, No 1)

Before looking at some of the intellectual challenges that have come to grip, let me consider one objection that I find less convincing. One proffered reason to object to relevance is that when political scientists have pursued relevance they have often ended up putting their research into the hands of established power holders and simply acted to provide so-called expert judgement to underwrite partisan policymaking (Norton, 2004; Piven, 2004). There is the kernel of a truth in this observation, as an engaged political science is inherently connected to the play of power. The political scientist in pursuit of relevance, however, does not need to be a technician of the state working for power and against the powerless. There are some cases in which political scientists have sided with power and some in which they have not. A careful and detailed empirical study by a variety of American academics (Macedo, 2005) into the failings of the political system of the United States – a study under the auspices of the American Political Science Association – has produced a set of reform measures that are sufficiently radical not to be seen as a defence of the status quo. There are difficulties and challenges that social scientists have dealing with power. Political scientists, in particular, should be sensitive to these issues but this objection to relevance is not one of the strongest.

#### 4. The state can still be redeemed through political engagement

Brubaker 4

Rogers Brubaker, Department of Sociology, UCLA, 2004, In the Name of the Nation: Reflectionson Nationalism and Patriotism, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, [www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf](http://www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf)

This, then, is the basic work done by the category ‘nation’ in the context of nationalist movements—movements to create a polity for a putative nation. In other contexts, the category ‘nation’ is used in a very different way. It is used not to challenge the existing territorial and political order, but to create a sense of national unity for a given polity. This is the sort of work that is often called nation-building, of which we have heard much of late. It is this sort of work that was evoked by the Italian statesman Massimo D’Azeglio, when he famously said, ‘we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians’. It is this sort of work that was (and still is) undertaken—with varying but on the whole not particularly impressive degrees of success—by leaders of post-colonial states, who had won independence, but whose populations were and remain deeply divided along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. It is this sort of work that the category ‘nation’ could, in principle, be mobilized to do in contemporary Iraq—to cultivate solidarity and appeal to loyalty in a way that cuts across divisions between Shi’ites and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, North and South.2 In contexts like this, the category ‘nation’ can also be used in another way, not to appeal to a ‘national’ identity transcending ethnolinguistic, ethnoreligious, or ethnoregional distinctions, but rather to assert ‘ownership’ of the polity on behalf of a ‘core’ ethnocultural ‘nation’ distinct from the citizenry of the state as a whole, and thereby to define or redefine the state as the state of and for that core ‘nation’ (Brubaker, 1996, p. 83ff). This is the way ‘nation’ is used, for example, by Hindu nationalists in India, who seek to redefine India as a state founded on Hindutva or Hinduness, a state of and for the Hindu ethnoreligious ‘nation’ (Van der Veer, 1994). Needless to say, this use of ‘nation’ excludes Muslims from membership of the nation, just as similar claims to ‘ownership’ of the state in the name of an ethnocultural core nation exclude other ethnoreligious, ethnolinguistic, or ethnoracial groups in other settings. In the United States and other relatively settled, longstanding nation-states, ‘nation’ can work in this exclusionary way, as in nativist movements in America or in the rhetoric of the contemporary European far right (‘la France oux Franc¸ais’, ‘Deutschland den Deutshchen’). Yet it can also work in a very different and fundamentally inclusive way.3 It can work to mobilize mutual solidarity among members of ‘the nation’, inclusively defined to include all citizens—and perhaps all long-term residents—of the state. To invoke nationhood, in this sense, is to attempt to transcend or at least relativize internal differences and distinctions. It is an attempt to get people to think of themselves— to formulate their identities and their interests—as members of that nation, rather than as members of some other collectivity. To appeal to the nation can be a powerful rhetorical resource, though it is not automatically so. Academics in the social sciences and humanities in the United States are generally skeptical of or even hostile to such invocations of nationhood. They are often seen as de´passe´, parochial, naive, regressive, or even dangerous. For many scholars in the social sciences and humanities, ‘nation’ is a suspect category. Few American scholars wave flags, and many of us are suspicious of those who do. And often with good reason, since flag-waving has been associated with intolerance, xenophobia, and militarism, with exaggerated national pride and aggressive foreign policy. Unspeakable horrors—and a wide range of lesser evils—have been perpetrated in the name of the nation, and not just in the name of ‘ethnic’ nations, but in the name of putatively ‘civic’ nations as well (Mann, 2004). But this is not sufficient to account for the prevailingly negative stance towards the nation. Unspeakable horrors, and an equally wide range of lesser evils, have been committed in the name of many other sorts of imagined communities as well—in the name of the state, the race, the ethnic group, the class, the party, the faith. In addition to the sense that nationalism is dangerous, and closely connected to some of the great evils of our time—the sense that, as John Dunn (1979, p. 55) put it, nationalism is ‘the starkest political shame of the 20th-century’— there is a much broader suspicion of invocations of nationhood. This derives from the widespread diagnosis that we live in a post-national age. It comes from the sense that, however well fitted the category ‘nation’ was to economic, political, and cultural realities in the nineteenth century, it is increasingly ill-fitted to those realities today. On this account, nation is fundamentally an anachronistic category, and invocations of nationhood, even if not dangerous, are out of sync with the basic principles that structure social life today.4 The post-nationalist stance combines an empirical claim, a methodological critique, and a normative argument. I will say a few words about each in turn. The empirical claim asserts the declining capacity and diminishing relevance of the nation-state. Buffeted by the unprecedented circulation of people, goods, messages, images, ideas, and cultural products, the nation-state is said to have progressively lost its ability to ‘cage’ (Mann, 1993, p. 61), frame, and govern social, economic, cultural, and political life. It is said to have lost its ability to control its borders, regulate its economy, shape its culture, address a variety of border-spanning problems, and engage the hearts and minds of its citizens. I believe this thesis is greatly overstated, and not just because the September 11 attacks have prompted an aggressively resurgent statism.5 Even the European Union, central to a good deal of writing on post-nationalism, does not represent a linear or unambiguous move ‘beyond the nation-state’. As Milward (1992) has argued, the initially limited moves toward supranational authority in Europe worked—and were intended—to restore and strengthen the authority of the nation-state. And the massive reconfiguration of political space along national lines in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War suggests that far from moving beyond the nation-state, large parts of Europe were moving back to the nation-state.6 The ‘short twentieth century’ concluded much as it had begun, with Central and Eastern Europe entering not a post-national but a post-multinational era through the large-scale nationalization of previously multinational political space. Certainly nationhood remains the universal formula for legitimating statehood. Can one speak of an ‘unprecedented porosity’ of borders, as one recent book has put it (Sheffer, 2003, p. 22)? In some respects, perhaps; but in other respects—especially with regard to the movement of people—social technologies of border control have continued to develop. One cannot speak of a generalized loss of control by states over their borders; in fact, during the last century, the opposite trend has prevailed, as states have deployed increasingly sophisticated technologies of identification, surveillance, and control, from passports and visas through integrated databases and biometric devices. The world’s poor who seek to better their estate through international migration face a tighter mesh of state regulation than they did a century ago (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, pp. 30–1, 267). Is migration today unprecedented in volume and velocity, as is often asserted? Actually, it is not: on a per capita basis, the overseas flows of a century ago to the United States were considerably larger than those of recent decades, while global migration flows are today ‘on balance slightly less intensive’ than those of the later nineteenth and early twentieth century (Held et al., 1999, p. 326). Do migrants today sustain ties with their countries of origin? Of course they do; but they managed to do so without e-mail and inexpensive telephone connections a century ago, and it is not clear—contrary to what theorists of post-nationalism suggest—that the manner in which they do so today represents a basic transcendence of the nation-state.7 Has a globalizing capitalism reduced the capacity of the state to regulate the economy? Undoubtedly. Yet in other domains—such as the regulation of what had previously been considered private behavior—the regulatory grip of the state has become tighter rather than looser (Mann, 1997, pp. 491–2). The methodological critique is that the social sciences have long suffered from ‘methodological nationalism’ (Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 2002; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002)—the tendency to take the ‘nation-state’ as equivalent to ‘society’, and to focus on internal structures and processes at the expense of global or otherwise border-transcending processes and structures. There is obviously a good deal of truth in this critique, even if it tends to be overstated, and neglects the work that some historians and social scientists have long been doing on border-spanning flows and networks. But what follows from this critique? If it serves to encourage the study of social processes organized on multiple levels in addition to the level of the nation-state, so much the better. But if the methodological critique is coupled— as it often is—with the empirical claim about the diminishing relevance of the nation-state, and if it serves therefore to channel attention away from state-level processes and structures, there is a risk that academic fashion will lead us to neglect what remains, for better or worse, a fundamental level of organization and fundamental locus of power. The normative critique of the nation-state comes from two directions. From above, the cosmopolitan argument is that humanity as a whole, not the nation- state, should define the primary horizon of our moral imagination and political engagement (Nussbaum, 1996). From below, muticulturalism and identity politics celebrate group identities and privilege them over wider, more encompassing affiliations. One can distinguish stronger and weaker versions of the cosmopolitan argument. The strong cosmopolitan argument is that there is no good reason to privilege the nation-state as a focus of solidarity, a domain of mutual responsibility, and a locus of citizenship.8 The nation-state is a morally arbitrary community, since membership in it is determined, for the most part, by the lottery of birth, by morally arbitrary facts of birthplace or parentage. The weaker version of the cosmopolitan argument is that the boundaries of the nation-state should not set limits to our moral responsibility and political commitments. It is hard to disagree with this point. No matter how open and ‘joinable’ a nation is—a point to which I will return below—it is always imagined, as Benedict Anderson (1991) observed, as a limited community. It is intrinsically parochial and irredeemably particular. Even the most adamant critics of universalism will surely agree that those beyond the boundaries of the nation-state have some claim, as fellow human beings, on our moral imagination, our political energy, even perhaps our economic resources.9 The second strand of the normative critique of the nation-state—the multiculturalist critique—itself takes various forms. Some criticize the nation-state for a homogenizing logic that inexorably suppresses cultural differences. Others claim that most putative nation-states (including the United States) are not in fact nation-states at all, but multinational states whose citizens may share a common loyalty to the state, but not a common national identity (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 11). But the main challenge to the nation-state from multiculturalism and identity politics comes less from specific arguments than from a general disposition to cultivate and celebrate group identities and loyalties at the expense of state-wide identities and loyalties. In the face of this twofold cosmopolitan and multiculturalist critique, I would like to sketch a qualified defense of nationalism and patriotism in the contemporary American context.10 Observers have long noted the Janus-faced character of nationalism and patriotism, and I am well aware of their dark side. As someone who has studied nationalism in Eastern Europe, I am perhaps especially aware of that dark side, and I am aware that nationalism and patriotism have a dark side not only there but here. Yet the prevailing anti-national, post-national, and trans-national stances in the social sciences and humanities risk obscuring the good reasons—at least in the American context—for cultivating solidarity, mutual responsibility, and citizenship at the level of the nation-state. Some of those who defend patriotism do so by distinguishing it from nationalism.11 I do not want to take this tack, for I think that attempts to distinguish good patriotism from bad nationalism neglect the intrinsic ambivalence and polymorphism of both. Patriotism and nationalism are not things with fixed natures; they are highly flexible political languages, ways of framing political arguments by appealing to the patria, the fatherland, the country, the nation. These terms have somewhat different connotations and resonances, and the political languages of patriotism and nationalism are therefore not fully overlapping. But they do overlap a great deal, and an enormous variety of work can be done with both languages. I therefore want to consider them together here. I want to suggest that patriotism and nationalism can be valuable in four respects. They can help develop more robust forms of citizenship, provide support for redistributive social policies, foster the integration of immigrants, and even serve as a check on the development of an aggressively unilateralist foreign policy. First, nationalism and patriotism can motivate and sustain civic engagement. It is sometimes argued that liberal democratic states need committed and active citizens, and therefore need patriotism to generate and motivate such citizens. This argument shares the general weakness of functionalist arguments about what states or societies allegedly ‘need’; in fact, liberal democratic states seem to be able to muddle through with largely passive and uncommitted citizenries. But the argument need not be cast in functionalist form. A committed and engaged citizenry may not be necessary, but that does not make it any less desirable. And patriotism can help nourish civic engagement. It can help generate feelings of solidarity and mutual responsibility across the boundaries of identity groups. As Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 7) put it, the nation is conceived as a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’. Identification with fellow members of this imagined community can nourish the sense that their problems are on some level my problems, for which I have a special responsibility.12 Patriotic identification with one’s country—the feeling that this is my country, and my government—can help ground a sense of responsibility for, rather than disengagement from, actions taken by the national government. A feeling of responsibility for such actions does not, of course, imply agreement with them; it may even generate powerful emotions such as shame, outrage, and anger that underlie and motivate opposition to government policies. Patriotic commitments are likely to intensify rather than attenuate such emotions. As Richard Rorty (1994) observed, ‘you can feel shame over your country’s behavior only to the extent to which you feel it is your country’.13 Patriotic commitments can furnish the energies and passions that motivate and sustain civic engagement.

### AT Inequality / Exclusion

**1. We’re solely defending the game in the abstract – even if the activity has had problems, we agree those should be corrected because the rules of a debate game are grounded in equality – that’s Carter.**

#### 2. Competitive game model would reform the state to help resolve inequality – only maintained by rules clearly defined by the judge

Carter 8 – prof @ The Colorado College, research support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the staff of the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Benezet Foundation at The Colorado College (Lief H, 2008, "LAW AND POLITICS AS PLAY," Chicago-Kent Law Review, 83(3), http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf)

If the United States approached domestic politics the way sports league commissioners, team owners, and rules committees work to equalize competition, Americans would, for the same self-interested motives, seek to level the political and social playing fields. They would insure that less-advantaged children received the same quality of education and health care as do otherwise more-advantaged children. They would no more perpetuate the tax policies and social programs that profoundly skew wealth distribu-tion toward the rich than sports leagues would allow winning teams to face only weak opponents on their schedules.141 A society that aspired to noth-ing more than good competitive legal and political games among its people would not question the propriety of taxing large wealth transfers by those whose wealth greatly exceeds the average.142 In international trade, wealthy nations, for their own self-interest, would treat developing nations as the Marshall Plan sought to bring the economies of Europe, devastated after World War II, effectively into the competitive economic game.143 A community that sought no more than to promote good economic competi-tion among producing nations would not at the same time prevent develop-ing countries from competing to sell their agricultural products at lower costs in world markets by wastefully subsidizing the more costly produc-tion of the same commodities at home. Precision of rules and unquestioned authority of judges: Substantive legal rules can seem notoriously ambiguous when compared to the codified rules of organized sports, but this is misleading.144 By the principle that “you can’t play the game without agreeing on the rules,” Roberts’ Rules of Order and the sometimes arcane accumulation of rules of procedure in legislative chambers precisely structure legislative tactics and debate just as The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation structures formal written legal advocacy and the rules of evidence and procedure govern formal litigation. More significantly, political and social play, like organized sports, requires regulatory and judicial independence from the “democratic game” itself. Fareed Zakaria recently reviewed for a general audience the horror sto-ries—the election of Hitler, for example—produced by popular democracy and suggests that other dynamics, and particularly “the rule of law,” con-tribute more to progressive government than does popular democracy it-self.145 Just as umpires, referees, and rules committees act outside competitive play, so a good political game depends on popular trust in the impartiality of judicial and regulatory decision making. The Federal Re-serve Board, the independent regulatory commissions, and ideally the judi-ciary itself, play the critical role of political and economic rules committees effectively only if they do not operate democratically but rather off the playing field altogether. Indeed, given the indeterminacy of substantive principles of morality and justice, rules committees—a category that includes courts of law in common law legal systems—can only be said to act sensibly when they rule (using the good-game criteria noted above) so as to make the game a better game, and not by “seeking justice.” Good political games, hence, require something like the wrongly ma-ligned practice of “judicial activism,” where judges, like calls of umpires and referees, make the rules of the game clear in the moment of play. South Dakotan voters presumably sensed the importance of independent judicial authority when they rejected, by a ratio of nearly nine to one, the proposal on their 2006 ballots to allow a person to sue judges for rendering decisions that he or she didn’t like.146 When the United States Supreme Court issued its deeply flawed result in Bush v. Gore,147 the loser, Gore, and most Americans, accepted the result and moved on.148 The Bush administra-tion’s attempt to justify a “unitary executive” power to operate independent of legal checks from the other political branches is the equivalent of a bat-ter insisting that he, having the power to define the strike zone and dis-agreeing with the umpire’s called third strike on a 3–2 count, trots to first base. The administration’s unitary executive claim, and its patterned disre-gard of legality more generally, ignores an unbroken line of precedents balancing Article I’s legislative powers with those of the executive in Arti-cle II going back to 1804.149

#### 3. Good games create curiosity that merge competitors to solve inequality through competition

Carter 8 – prof @ The Colorado College, research support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the staff of the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Benezet Foundation at The Colorado College (Lief H, 2008, "LAW AND POLITICS AS PLAY," Chicago-Kent Law Review, 83(3), http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf)

Good games neutralize turf and, by legitimizing losing, reduce or eliminate the irrational and often self-defeating effects of Kahneman’s loss aversion, specifically the urge to double down and send good money after bad.127 Like legal education and legal practice, and like Vico’s rhetorical debating games, competitive games over time construct for players and fans a continuing civic education. The desire to win a competition moti-vates players to become keenly curious about the rules of the game, the conditions on the field of play, the skills of the opponent, and so on. In games people return to and practice the “thought of sense.”128 In games, players must base their calculations on what is real, not on what they imag-ine or hope for. Games thus rewire the remarkably plastic human brain in the direction of the classical rationality of “economic man” like no other social context. People come to belie Franklin’s belief that men only use reason to justify everything they have a mind to do. Through the behavior of playing, people reconfigure their brains to be more conventionally ra-tional. In play people create the sense that Faulkner thought they lacked.129 Curiosity necessarily humanizes opponents instead of “despeciating” them, as so often happens in the brutality cycle.130 Kahneman observes that each opponent in a conventional conflict believes that the other side acts out of malice and hostile motives,131 but just the opposite happens in games. Competitors merge identities. Each knows that the other experi-ences the same world, “thinks the way I think,” “wants what I want,” and “needs to know me as much as I need to know her.” Opponents do not “take it personally.”132 Competitive games, without any help from post-modern philosophers, convert believers into pragmatists. In games people delight in the particulars of concrete situations. Good play helps realize Whitman’s wise urging to turn from curiosity about God to curiosity about each other.133 The curiosity that players must develop to play well dis-places ethnocentrism, xenophobia, moral superiority, and the other brutaliz-ing tendencies of the human mind described by Hood, Milgram, Zimbardo, Pinker, Damasio, and Frith, and noted in Part I. Curiosity overcomes, or very much reduces, the impulse to hate.134 Good play has the same effect on players as does the naming of a doll or an animal. It creates a kind of love.

## 1NR – Case

**Warming: 2NC**

**Disad outweighs and turns the case ---**

**Causes extinction**

#### Turns case – warming locks in global suffering – voting Neg is the only ethical position

Cerutti 7 (Furio, Professor of Political Philosophy – University of Florence, Global Challenges for Leviathan: A Political Philosophy of Nuclear Weapons and Global Warming, p. 112-113)

In ethical terms the inertia phenomenon burdens on us a still greater responsibility towards future generations (granted we recognize any such responsibility, a fundamental problem which shall be discussed later in this book). If we live in an environment threatened by possibly irreversible inertial processes, we are responsible for not worsening the life conditions of those who will later dwell on a planet that will be more endangered than it is for us, because the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and their inertial impact will be in any case greater than it is in our time. Hence arises to us an obligation to decrease emissions as far as it is compatible with the preserva­tion not of our "life style," but of acceptable standards of civilization and consumption, which entails economic growth, but not growth of any kind and at any cost. Further enhancement of our knowledge about climate change and especially the role of inertia may justify strengthening or abating the precautionary measures the present stand of knowledge leads us to take. The "precautionary principle" is a wide and (because of its costs) problematic ethical matter, which shall not be examined in this book. For our inquiry suffice it to say that precaution in matters of global challenges establishes an obligation to act for the care of future generations with measures whose volume may seem to be disproportionate to the present degree of certainty about the threat level. In other words, if our doing nothing or little can endanger their elementary life conditions, we are justified by the dimension of what might be at stake if we take those measures. Even if there is no certainty, the simple likelihood of a very large human suffering is reason enough to be cautious, as we have seen in the risk chapter (one) of this book. The need to learn more and not draw wholesome and hurried conclusions is one thing, cheap skepticism on present knowledge versus reasonable preoccupation with it is another."

### Nuclear: 2NC

**Expanding nuclear power directly trades off with renewables and energy efficiency measures – that’s our 1NC Porritt ’12 evidence – nuclear crowds out alternatives because it sinks investment for the foreseeable future**

**And, the aff kills renewables worldwide – decisions made in the US shape global investment**

**Porritt et al, 12** – founder director of Forum for the Future Forum for the future, chairman of the UK Sustainable Development Commission and author of Capitalism as if the World Matters (Jonathon, 4/27, with Tom Burke, Tony Juniper, Charles Secrett. “Climate Change and Energy Security.” http://www.jonathonporritt.com/sites/default/files/users/BRIEFING%205%20-%20Climate\_and%20energy%20security\_27\_April%202012.pdf)

For an example of how this pro-nuclear bias can undermine alternative forms of electricity generation, one need look no further than news reports in March 2012 that the Coalition Government has begun lobbying the European Commission to give nuclear power full parity with renewables. At present, member states are obliged to source at least 20% of their energy from renewables by 2020. But the Coalition Government is arguing that instead of increasing this figure for the next target date, 2030, the obligation should be for ‘low-carbon’ electricity generation, a move that clearly sets nuclear and renewables in competition with each other for subsidy-led investment. This demonstrates that the Coalition Government’s obsession with the nuclear option has already begun to undermine a critically important Europe-wide renewables policy, with potentially huge consequences for extra GHG emissions in a large number of countries. Moreover, the implications of the policy do not end in Europe - they are inevitably global. Vijay Vaitheeswaran, The Economist’s environment and energy correspondent until 2006, says: ‘Decisions taken in the next few years about energy in rich countries like Britain and the United States will shape investments made in energy infrastructure around the world for a generation or more. After all, nuclear and coal plants and oil refineries last for decades – and that sunk investment displaces or discourages nimbler, cleaner, and more distributed options like micropower. If we want to shift to a clean, secure, low-carbon energy system during this century, the time to start is now’.

**And, R&D link – giving nuclear another chance wastes finite R&D resources**

Verbruggen, 8 – Full professor at the University of Antwerp (Aviel, 28 July. “Renewable and nuclear power: A common future?” Energy Policy 36 (2008) 4036–4047. ScienceDirect.)

For realizing a low carbon electricity supply, there are not a thousand options. Only two antagonists are now in the ring: nuclear power and the twin efﬁciency/renewable power. What could be the ultimate backstop power generation technology? First the ‘unlimited source’ aspect of the backstop supply technology has to be extended with the criteria of sustainability (WCED, 1987). On the sustainability balance, the performance of nuclear power weighs very light (Table 2), contrary to efﬁciency/ renewable power technologies (Table 3). Therefore it is quite rational that a large majority of the population prefers the latter above the former (Eurobarometer, 2007). For getting a third chance for nuclear power, its advocates want to arrange a marriage with the renewable energy sector. There are ﬁve arguments as to why the efﬁciency/renewable power option should reject the nuclear advances. First, nuclear power is architect of the business-as-usual that has to be changed urgently and drastically. Second, nuclear and renewable power need a very different add-on by fossil-fuelled power plants; for nuclear the add-on is bulky and expansive, and for renewable power it is distributed, ﬂexible and contracting over time. Third, the power grids for spreading bulky nuclear outputs are of another kind than the interconnection between millions of distributed power sources requires. Fourth, the risks and externalities of nuclear power make this technology non-sustainable and therefore without a future, while efﬁciency/renewable power are still in their infancy. Fifth, the antagonist options also ﬁght for RD&D resources and for production capacities. Now that the skewed distribution in favour of nuclear starts to be adjusted somewhat, it is time to stop wasting money on the expensive and dangerous water cookers that nuclear reactors are. Better to turn to the real future-oriented technologies that drive efﬁciency and renewable power. Summarizing, nuclear and efﬁciency/renewable power have **no common future** in safeguarding ‘‘Our Common Future’’. The nuclear technology has had two chances of unseen means in human history to prove its validity, and failed. Giving nuclear a third chance will waste the scarce RD&D resources and solidify barriers against its sustainable antagonist: electricity efﬁciency and renewable power technologies.

### Consequences

#### -- Evaluate consequences – allowing violence for the sake of moral purity is evil

**Isaac 2** (Jeffrey C., Professor of Political Science – Indiana-Bloomington, Director – Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, Ph.D. – Yale, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the **clean conscience** of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about **unintended consequences** as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### -- Governments must weigh consequences

**Harries 94** (Owen, Editor and Founder – National Interest and Senior Fellow – Centre for Independent Studies, “Power and Civilization”, The National Interest, Spring, Lexis)

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?”, Lee immediately answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. While an **individual** is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, **governments** **must always weigh consequences** and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.

#### -- Extinction mandates consequentialism

**Bok 88** (Sissela, Professor of Philosophy – Brandeis College, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. Rosenthal and Shehadi, p. 202-203)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake.For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

#### -- Utility maximizes value to life and precludes zeroing anyone out

**Dworkin 77** (Ronald, Professor of Law and Philosophy – New York University, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 274-275)

Utilitarian arguments of policy, however, would seem secure from that objection. They do not suppose that any form of life is inherently more valuable than any other, but instead base their claim, that constraints on liberty are necessary to advance some collective goal of the community, just on the fact that that goal happens to be desired more widely or more deeply than any other. Utilitarian arguments of policy, therefore, seem not to oppose but on the contrary to embody the **fundamental right** of equal concern and respect, because they treat the wishes of each member of the community on a par with the wishes of any other, with no bonus or discount reflecting the view that the member is more or less worthy of concern, or his views more or less worthy of respect, than any other.

#### -- Calculations stop the zero-point by increasing diversity and social limitation. Rejecting it increases violence and exclusion

**Williams 5** (Michael, Professor of International Politics – University of Wales-Aberystwyth, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 165-166)

Yet it is my claim that the willful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a willfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculation is not just a consequence of a need to act — the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a form of responsibility to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by — at least initially — reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of limitation: a willful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited — both epistemically and politically — in the name of a politics of toleration: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterised as one of modus vivendi. If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern constructions of identity. action, and responsibility. As Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities are inescapably indebted to otherness, do not in themselves provide a foundation for practice, particularly in situations where identities are ‘sedimented’ and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice (and not just in philosophic practice) the essentialist dynamics it confronts. Here, a responsibility to act must go beyond deconstruction to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices. To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward ‘blackmail of the Enlightenment’ and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility.85 While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essentialist stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses a legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and institutions) that might viably be mobilised in order to offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary identities. It requires, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of compelling ‘as if’ stories around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Wilful Realism, I submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such ‘stories’ within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they be limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dichotomies.

#### Nuke power causes extinction – prolif, accidents, terror, water shortages and biodiversity

Haskell, 8

### Defense

#### State mobilization and their genocide claim are no longer viable.

Steven **SEIDMAN** Sociology @ SUNY (Albany) **‘9** “Critique of Compulsory Heterosexuality” *Sexual Research & Social Policy* 6 (1) p. 25

The queer critique of compulsory heterosexuality surrenders too much of the lesbian feminist and gay liberationist institutional and gender-based understanding of power (cf. Butler, 1994). Moreover, in the absence of a social structural perspective, queer critique cannot explain the formation of resisting selves. In fact, queer perspectives have not examined the sociohistorical conditions that make the signifying agent of queer theory and politics possible. In other words, what blinded earlier critics of compulsory heterosexuality to agentic considerations was not only their political investment but also their sociohistorical context—namely, that they were politically engaged at the very time that the conditions of compulsory heterosexuality were being aggressively enforced by a state-driven nationwide antigay politic. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the prominence of a signifying agent in queer perspectives is related to changing social conditions that have made possible new opportunities for individual and collective action. I will briefly explore this conjecture as I consider the sociohistorical scope of the critique of compulsory heterosexuality. Normative Heterosexuality Without Compulsory Heterosexuality Is the concept of compulsory heterosexuality credible in the contemporary United States? Furthermore, if this notion is abandoned, does that mean surrendering the core of critical sex studies? For the major U.S. national political organizations, from Lambda Legal Defense to the Human Rights Campaign, their politics seem to rest on the claim that the dominant trend in the United States is the deinstitutionalization of normative heterosexuality. From this perspective, sexual inequality persists but is maintained less by the state and social institutions than by the power of specific individuals, organizations, groups, and political administrations. For reformers such as Bruce Bawer (1993) and Andrew Sullivan (1996), gay and lesbian visibility, tolerance, and integration signal the end of compulsory heterosexuality. In one respect, I think Bawer and Sullivan are right—there has been a retreat from systemic discriminatory and homophobic practices in many U.S. institutions. Although social incorporation is considerably more mixed at the state level in the United States than in the United Kingdom or western Europe, the integration of gay men and lesbians into bureaucratic and cosmopolitan-type organizations such as civil service agencies or the professions, normalization in key sectors of public and popular culture, and the retreat of the state from a politics of the closet underscore empirical trends supporting the claim of the decline of compulsory hetero-sexuality (cf. Eskridge, 1999; Gamson, 2002; Raeburn, 2004; Seidman, 2003; Walters, 2002).

#### Death anxiety is critical to recognizing a value to life.

Geshe **Kelsang**, Internationally Renowned Teacher of Buddhism, **99**

[“Fear of Death,” http://www.tharpa.com/background/fear-of-death.htm]

A healthy fear of death would be the fear of dying unprepared, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can avert. If we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger, we are encouraged to prepare for a peaceful and successful death and are also inspired to make the most of our very precious human life instead of wasting it. This "sense of danger" inspires us to make preparations so that we are no longer in the danger we are in now, for example by practicing moral discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulating as much merit, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seat belt out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road, and that seat belt protects us from going through the windshield. We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through the windscreen if someone crashes into us. Dying with regrets is not at all unusual. To avoid a sad and meaningless end to our life we need to remember continually that we too must die. Contemplating our own death will inspire us to use our life wisely by developing the inner refuge of spiritual realizations; otherwise we shall have no ability to protect ourself from the sufferings of death and what lies beyond.

### Method

#### Methodology is a trap – should assess outcomes first

Wendt 95 (Alexander, Professor of Political Science – Yale University, International Theory: Critical Investigations, Ed. James Der Derian, p. 104-5)

An attempt to use a structurationist-symbolic interactionist discourse to bridge the two research traditions, neither of which subscribes to such a discourse, will probably please no one. But in part this is because the two ‘sides” have become hung up on differences over the epistemological status of social science. The state of the social sciences and, in particular, of international relations, is such that epistemological prescriptions and conclusions are at best premature. Different questions involve different standards of inferences, to reject certain questions because their answers cannot conform to the standards of classical physics is to **fall into the trap of method-driven rather than question-driven social science**. By the same token, however, giving up the artificial restrictions of logical positivist conceptions of inquiry does not force us to give up on ‘Science.’ Beyond this, there is little reason to attach so much importance to epistemology. Neither positivism, nor scientific realism, nor poststructuralism tells us about the structure and dynamics of international life. Philosophies of sciences are not theories of international relations. The good news is that strong liberals and modern and postmodern constructivists are asking broadly similar questions about the substance of international relations that differentiate both groups from the neorealist-rationalist alliance. Strong liberals and constructivists have much to learn from each other if they can see through the smoke and heat of epistemology.

**Their criticism is a retreat from political change – causes suffering to occur while philosphers talk- makes the impact inevitable- only the plan can solve**

**McClean, 2001** (David, New School University, "The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope," Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, [http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, **leftist critics continue to cite and refer to** the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of **people like** those just mentioned, and a litany of others including **Derrida. Deleuze. Lvotard**. Jameson, **and Lacan. who are** to me hugely more **irrelevant** than Habermas **in their** narrative **attempts to sueeest policy prescriptions** (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that **it is time for** American **social critics who are enamored with this eroup**. those who actually want to be relevant, **to recognize that they have a disease**, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. **The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon**. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. .. . **These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats** from activism **and adopts a spectatorial approach** to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations''(italics mine).\*^1 Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes,.... or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. **Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities** in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve **our** country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. **We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is vet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing** - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the **character** of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) **This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences**. **This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not vet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers** and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

# Doubles vs. Emory PS (DoD SMR’s)

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### Congress will avoid the fiscal cliff --- this includes a framework for a broader deal.

**Litvan**, **11/11**/2012 (Laura, Lawmakers in Both Parties See Resolution to U.S. Fiscal Cliff, Bloomberg, p. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-11/lawmakers-in-both-parties-see-resolution-to-u-dot-s-dot-fiscal-cliff)

Top lawmakers in both political parties today predicted a resolution to the standoff on the U.S. fiscal cliff that threatens to yield $607 billion in tax increases and automatic spending cuts in January. They said details of a debt-cutting deal may come later. Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad, a North Dakota Democrat, said he thinks lawmakers can reach a “framework agreement” directing tax and spending panels in Congress to craft a broad deal next year that cuts soaring budget deficits. At the same time, he said, they could agree now to a smaller package of spending cuts and some tax-code changes before the year is over. If the legislative panels don’t act, all sides would have to agree to a fallback plan that would be more acceptable than the automatic approach that is sparking economic uncertainty, Conrad said on “Fox News Sunday.” “I absolutely believe there is room for agreement,” Conrad said. Senator Bob Corker, a Tennessee Republican, said he agrees there is little chance of the automatic policies occurring, and said Republicans are open to some tax increases if Democrats would be willing to embrace a broad reform of the Medicare health insurance system for the elderly to yield big cost savings. Short of a broad-based deal, he said at the very least any extension of current policies shouldn’t be the type of several-months stop-gap that has marked the deadlocked fiscal policy debate. “I hope we’ll at least go substantially down the road toward solving the problem,” said Corker, who also appeared on the “Fox News Sunday” show.

#### Plan unpopular

Sorenson 12

[Lt. Gen Jeff Sorenson, 9/28/12, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/259163-saving-energy-saving-soldiers-lives>]

From biofuels that could propel the Navy’s Great Green Fleet to spending billions of dollars on renewable energy, the Pentagon’s green energy initiatives have emerged as a contentious topic in Washington. Recent Congressional budget proposals could curtail military efforts to produce alternative fuels because they are currently more expensive than fossil fuels. Yet Pentagon officials insist its focus on energy conservation and renewable energy is essential for national security and improved military capability. Who’s right? Is the Pentagon’s pursuit of green energy an outrageously expensive endeavor or an operational necessity? Yes, the impending concerns about a potential $259 billion budget reduction for the Defense Department over the next five years **might make one question the fiscal sense of investing billions on renewable energy projects.**

#### PC is key to a compromise – failure causes middle east war

Hutchison, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the **dire consequences**, **America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff**, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, **unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement** on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and **a** potentially **catastrophic blow to our** national defense and **security capabilities** in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. **Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year**. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. **We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings**. **In the absence of U.S. military leadership**, **upheaval in the Middle East would be worse**. **As any student of history can attest**, **instability does not confine itself to national borders**. **Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region**. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, **a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological** research, development and **advantage** - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities. Sequestration can still be avoided. **But that will require leadership from the President** that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

**Extinction**

**Russell 9** (James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring)  
“Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers//, #26, \_\_http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf\_\_)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of **miscalculation or the pressures** of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

### 1NC

#### Electricity prices are declining

**Burtraw 8/21/12** (one of the nation’s foremost experts on environmental regulation in the electricity sector. “Falling Emissions and Falling Prices: Expectations for the Domestic Natural Gas Boom” http://common-resources.org/2012/falling-emissions-and-falling-prices-expectations-for-the-domestic-natural-gas-boom/)

Moreover, the boom in domestic natural gas production could have even more immediate affects for U.S. electricity consumers. The increased supply of gas is expected to lower natural gas prices and retail electricity prices over the next 20 years, according to a [new RFF Issue Brief](http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22019). These price decreases are expected to be even larger if demand for electricity continues on a slow-growth trajectory brought on by the economic downturn and the increased use of energy efficiency.For example, RFF analysis found that delivered natural gas prices would have been almost 35% higher in 2020 if natural gas supply projections had matched the lower estimates released by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2009. Instead, with an increased gas supply, consumers can expect to pay $4.9 per MMBtu for delivered natural gas in 2020 instead of $6.6 per MMBtu. These trends are even more exaggerated if demand for electricity were to increase to levels projected by the EIA just three years ago, in 2009.This decrease in natural gas prices is expected to translate into a decrease in retail electricity prices for most electricity customers in most years out to 2020. Compared to the world with the lower gas supply projections, average national electricity prices are expected to be almost 6% lower, falling from 9.25 cents to 8.75 cents per kilowatt-hour in 2020. Residential, commercial, and industrial customers are all expected to see a price decrease, with the largest price changes occurring in parts of the country that have competitive electricity markets. All of these prices decreases translate into real savings for most electricity customers. The savings are largest for commercial customers, who stand to save $33.9 Billion (real $2009) under the new gas supply projections in 2020. Residential customers also stand to save big, with estimates of $25.8 Billion (real $2009) in savings projected for 2020.

#### Plan boosts prices

Cooper 9 (Mark, SENIOR FELLOW FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT¶ VERMONT LAW SCHOOL, "THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS: RENAISSANCE OR RELAPSE?," http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/Cooper%20Report%20on%20Nuclear%20Economics%20FINAL%5B1%5D.pdf)

Within the past year, estimates of the cost of nuclear power from a new generation of ¶ reactors have ranged from a low of 8.4 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) to a high of 30 cents. This ¶ paper tackles the debate over the cost of building new nuclear reactors, with the key findings as ¶ follows: ¶ • The initial cost projections put out early in today’s so-called “nuclear renaissance” were about ¶ one-third of what one would have expected, based on the nuclear reactors completed in the ¶ 1990s. ¶ • The most recent cost projections for new nuclear reactors are, on average, over four times as ¶ high as the initial “nuclear renaissance” projections. ¶ • There are numerous options available to meet the need for electricity in a carbon-constrained ¶ environment that are superior to building nuclear reactors. Indeed, nuclear reactors are the worst ¶ option from the point of view of the consumer and society. ¶ • The low carbon sources that are less costly than nuclear include efficiency, cogeneration, ¶ biomass, geothermal, wind, solar thermal and natural gas. Solar photovoltaics that are presently ¶ more costly than nuclear reactors are projected to decline dramatically in price in the next ¶ decade. Fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage, which are not presently available, are ¶ projected to be somewhat more costly than nuclear reactors. ¶ • Numerous studies by Wall Street and independent energy analysts estimate efficiency and ¶ renewable costs at an average of 6 cents per kilowatt hour, while the cost of electricity from ¶ nuclear reactors is estimated in the range of 12 to 20 cents per kWh. ¶ • The additional cost of building 100 new nuclear reactors, instead of pursuing a least cost ¶ efficiency-renewable strategy, would be in the range of $1.9-$4.4 trillion over the life the ¶ reactors. ¶ Whether the burden falls on ratepayers (in electricity bills) or taxpayers (in large subsidies), ¶ incurring excess costs of that magnitude would be a substantial burden on the national economy and ¶ add immensely to the cost of electricity and the cost of reducing carbon emissions.

#### High electricity prices kills the economy

Perry 7/31/12 (Mark, Prof of Economics @ Univ. of Michigan, "America's Energy Jackpot: Industrial Natural Gas Prices Fall to the Lowest Level in Recent History," http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2012/07/americas-energy-jackpot-industrial.html)

Building petrochemical plants could suddenly become attractive in the United States. Manufacturers will "reshore" production to take advantage of low natural gas and electricity prices. Energy costs will be lower for a long time, giving a competitive advantage to companies that invest in America, and also helping American consumers who get hit hard when energy prices spike.¶ After years of bad economic news, the natural gas windfall is very good news. Let's make the most of it." ¶ The falling natural gas prices also make the predictions in this December 2011 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Shale gas: A renaissance in US manufacturing?"all the more likely: ¶ U.S. manufacturing companies (chemicals, metals and industrial) could employ approximately one million more workers by 2025 because of abundant, low-priced natural gas.¶ Lower feedstock and energy cost could help U.S. manufacturers reduce natural gas expenses by as much as $11.6 billion annually through 2025.¶ MP: As I have emphasized lately, America's ongoing shale-based energy revolution is one of the real bright spots in an otherwise somewhat gloomy economy, and provides one of the best reasons to be bullish about America's future. The shale revolution is creating thousands of well-paying, shovel-ready jobs in Texas, North Dakota and Ohio, and thousands of indirect jobs in industries that support the shale boom (sand, drilling equipment, transportation, infrastructure, steel pipe, restaurants, etc.). In addition, the abundant shale gas is driving down energy prices for industrial, commercial, residential and electricity-generating users, which frees up billions of dollars that can be spent on other goods and services throughout the economy, providing an energy-based stimulus to the economy. ¶ Cheap natural gas is also translating into cheaper electricity rates, as low-cost natural gas displaces coal. Further, cheap and abundant natural gas is sparking a manufacturing renaissance in energy-intensive industries like chemicals, fertilizers, and steel. And unlike renewable energies like solar and wind, the natural gas boom is happening without any taxpayer-funded grants, subsidies, credits and loans. Finally, we get an environmental bonus of lower CO2 emissions as natural gas replaces coal for electricity generation. Sure seems like a win, win, win, win situation to me.

#### Econ decline risks extinction

Auslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### 1NC

**Energy policy justified through security perpetuates inequalities, environmental degradation, and inhibits their long-term development – must be examined prior to their enactment**

**Simpson 7** – Founding Convenor of the APSA Environmental Politics and Policy Group, Lecturer in the International Relations program at the University of South Australia where he coordinates courses on IR and Environmental Politics, Researcher (Full Member) in the Hawke Research Institute and a member of the UniSA Human Rights and Security Cluster Leadership Committee, Associate at the Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre (IPGRC) at the University of Adelaide (Adam, 2007, "The Environment: Energy Security Nexus: Critical Analysis of an Energy 'Love Triangle' in Southeast Asia," Third World Quarterly, 28(3), JSTOR)

The pursuit of energy security has been a dominant policy objective and political tool for governments of various hues throughout the world. While there is no doubt that individuals have certain minimum energy require ments, the rhetoric of energy security has often been used as an excuse for governing elites to pursue centralised industrialisation and grandiose energy projects **at the expense of marginalised populations**. Mega-dams, gas pipelines and similar projects undertaken in majority, or less affluent, countries in the name of energy security and development are rarely vetted through a process of environmental or social impact assessment.' On the rare occasions when this does occur, the process is often a rubber-stamping exercise with little input from local communities. The situation is exacerbated when the political regime promoting or administering the project is particularly repressive or authoritarian in nature, such as in Burma.2 It is usually the case that the communities surrounding these projects are indigenous, dispossessed or otherwise marginalised and have little chance of mitigating the adverse effects that flow from the development, while most of the benefits are reaped in elite circles of the urban centres, where the development decisions are usually made. The interests of these elites, despite populist overtures, are largely **antagonistic to the general populations**, and this is reflected in development decision-making processes. Attempts by governments and developers either to enrich themselves or, at best, provide electricity for the urban middle classes invariably result in local ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples bearing the brunt of the environmental and social costs associated with the projects while having little input into the development process itself. While the discourse of national energy security is employed by dominant interests, the environmental security of the local communities can be severely undermined by a project but is rarely considered. Environmental security can be defined quite narrowly or understood more broadly to include the energy security deficit felt by many communities in majority countries, who often see no relief from the deficit when an energy project is completed. While the discourse of energy security is used to justify the project, communities living in its vicinity may remain without electricity following its completion and have other elements of their security, such as food, water or livelihood, undermined.4 In this situation it becomes pertinent to ask **whose security** whether it be 'energy', 'environmental' or 'financial' is being addressed by the project. Unfortunately, it is often the financial security of governing and business elites that determines project decision making at the expense of the environmental security of local communities.5 The transnational projects to be discussed here include a gas pipeline and various mega-dam projects in Southeast Asia. These projects are at various stages of their development but all relate to the purported pursuit of energy security by the dominant classes in Thailand and the supply thereof by their colleagues in Burma (or Myanmar) and Laos. In Thailand, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party used the rhetoric of economic nationalism to obtain acquiescence to major projects but, in reality, Thaksin and other plutocratic government elements ran much of the economy for their own profit, privatising benefits but socialising costs and risks.6 In Burma the corrupt military regime of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDc) has ensured energy exporting projects bring little but suffering to local communities, with transnational corporations and successive Thai governments also being complicit.7 The SPDC and the military dominate Burma's economy, through both state and individual interests, and following dubious privatisations since 1988 the 'iron glove of the military envelops the invisible hand of the private sector'.8 In Laos corruption is also rampant and the economy is tightly controlled by the state. The state, in turn, is a tool of the sole legal political entity, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, membership of which offers the best guarantee of wealth.9 In all three countries major political and economic interests are virtually indistinguish able, often co-operating with foreign transnational corporations and bodies such as the World Bank to promote large-scale energy projects. By the mid-1990s, however, the success of the environment and anti-dam movements in Thailand made it politically expedient for Thai businesses and governments-including the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) to export the environmental and social problems associated with large dams and other energy pro ects to its more authoritarian neighbours while importing the electricity. 1 In Burma the completed Yadana gas pipeline to Thailand has resulted in significant human and environmental depredations against local ethnic minorities. The preparations being under taken for the Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos and a series of dams on Burma's Salween River to export electricity to Thailand are already having similar impacts, for which recent studies of the Narmada Dams in India would provide a salutary lesson.11 These projects, at various stages of development, illustrate the vast chasm between the security interests of governing elites and those of the local indigenous or ethnic minority communities in these countries. These situations, juxtaposing energy projects with environmental destruc tion and human rights violations, have led to the new concept of 'earth rights', the nexus between human rights and environmental protection.12 Before examining these projects, a brief exposition on the nature of earth rights and environmental and energy security will assist in clarifying the location of this research within the field of critical security studies. The environment-energy security nexus Security is a contested concept, but the field of critical security studies has, since the late 1980s, challenged the state-centric focus of traditional cold war studies.13 Within this field environmental security has now been established as a significant area of interest.14 Barnett's definition of environmental insecurity considers the way in which 'environmental degradation threatens the security of people'.15 His added focus on the inequitable distribution of degradation resonates strongly with environmental justice theory. From this perspective, environmental security focuses more on human security than on threats to national security from environmental degradation or a securing 'of the environment itself.'6 Recent writings linking the concept of human security to that of environmental security have been concerned with 'social disruptions' as the principal source of insecurity.17 In this sense dislocation caused by major development projects such as dams may cause insecurity, but when this is linked to civil conflict the impacts are compounded. There is now a well established link between the **exploitation of abundant resources** and the propensity for **civil strife**, indicating that resource exploitation can be linked to both **environmental degradation** and human insecurity.'8 As my interest here relates to the majority world, one of the most useful concepts to emerge is that of 'earth rights'.' In addition to the benefit of its holistic inferences and simple terminology, most work on the concept is related to the majority world, where the interrelationships between environmental protection and human rights are most acute.20 Implicit in the notion of earth rights is that a degradation of environmental security reflects an erosion of human rights, and often vice versa. In their analysis of this concept Greer and Giannini have produced the most useful description thus far, arguing that: earth rights are those rights that demonstrate the connection between human well-being and a sound environment, and include the right to a healthy environment, the right to speak out and act topirotect the environment, and the right to participate in development decisions. In the projects that this paper investigates, it is these acknowledged rights to act in defence of the environment and the right to a healthy environment that are, for ethnic minority and indigenous communities living in the vicinity of the projects, most at risk. While a rights-based approach has been, to some extent, co-opted by institutions such as the World Bank, it can still provide a useful method of analysing development activities when employed from a critical perspective.22 In addition to theoretical developments in earth rights and environmental security, increased attention has also been given to energy security. It comes as no surprise, however, that discourses of energy security focus particularly on fossil fuels and large-scale electricity projects, given their centrality to military and industrial development. While this article examines this dominant energy discourse, it is only for the purposes of critical analysis. Although I examine cross-border energy projects in three countries, and therefore national issues do arise, it is the security impacts on local communities surrounding these projects that are of particular interest here. An important question to consider **before discussing the impacts of these projects** is, however, the **reasons for the institutional and political momentum behind such large-scale undertakings in the first place**. The industrial-scale development paradigm There are numerous reasons for the fixation, both academic and develop mental, on large-scale energy projects. Some relate to academic or government research funding opportunities, but this approach also fits neatly within the predominant large-scale and hierarchical, top-down development paradigm prescribed by financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Much of the national development programmes throughout the 1980s and well into the 1 990s were undertaken within the 'Washington Consensus' model of neoliberal reform and structural adjustments. These policies exacerbated existing exploitative relationships between the North and South, with economic growth considered by these Bretton Woods institutions to be the only possible 'sustainable development', an approach considered to be **'Northern imperial ism, using the language of ecology'**.24 The 'Post-Washington Consensus', which emerged within the World Bank and the IMF in response to an avalanche of criticism, revised the emphasis on pure neoliberalism, admitting a limited role for the state in development processes. Poverty and governance became key issues, but this approach continues to show an 'inability or unwillingness to address major issues pertaining to [political] power and its distribution both at the domestic and international levels'.25 In addition, the development modus operandi of the Bretton Woods institutions that produced poverty and inequality in the past is very much a part of the present.26 The World Bank has adopted a rights-based approach, but its interpretation of rights relates more to the rights of private enterprise than to those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27 Undoubtedly rhetoric at organisations such as the World Bank has changed; in terms of energy security there is now a focus on poverty reduction to be achieved through access to 'clean energy' sources. There is, however, a disconnect between World Bank rhetoric and its funding of major projects such as mega-dams that have proven to be environmentally and culturally destructive, while providing little in terms of energy security for local people. Despite some rhetorical revisionism, the discourse of energy security is still employed by government and business elites to justify top-down investments in large-scale energy projects, which require significant initial capital injections and subsequent industrial-scale capital returns. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, this top-down approach to development has caused **ecological destruction on a vast scale and tends to perpetuate**, rather than ameliorate, **inequalities**.29 After decades of promoting capitalist industrialisation in the majority world, even the World Bank now recognises that inequality both within and between is increasing and can **inhibit development**. Nonetheless, the bank still cites 'ine uality of outcomes' as playing an important role in facilitating development.

**Enframing of national security is a pre-requisite to macropolitical violence**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the **product of hegemonic forms of knowledge** about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the **most destructive features of contemporary modernity** -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, **policymakers' choices become necessities**, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

**Altenative – reject the affirmative’s security discourse – only resistance can generate genuine political thought**

**Neoclous 8 –** Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps **to eschew the logic of security altogether** - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it **marginalises all else, most notably** the constructive conflicts, **debates** and discussions **that animate political life.** The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: **maybe there is no hole**."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an **alternative political language** which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to **blind ourselves** to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a **different conception of the good.** We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but **bracketing it out** and handing it to the state; **it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'**

#### You are a specific intellectual challenging the crude assumptions of the 1AC’s discourse

Owen 94 David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy @ University of Southampton, 1994 (Maturity and Modernity, pp 209-210)

The ‘universal’ intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth’ of our being (e.g.. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic forms of this type of intellectual practice is the central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of the ‘specific’ intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. (PPC p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in so far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticisms which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest’ (PPC p. 154)This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s points if intelligence if we recognize his concerns to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident as one believed to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for reposting of the question ‘ who are we?’ The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on the behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space within which their struggles become visible such that these others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this critical activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

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#### Saudi Oil imports now

IER 8/28

[Institute for Energy Research, 8/28/12, <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/08/28/u-s-oil-imports-from-the-persian-gulf-and-saudi-arabia-grow-in-2012-and-administration-policies-may-be-to-blame/>]

The Obama Administration is touting that our “dependence on foreign oil has gone down every year during the Obama Administration, including a reduction in net oil imports by ten percent—or one million barrels a day—in the last year alone.”[i] While good news, this trend is happening not because of policies or actions taken by the Obama administration, but because of 1) a poor economy and high oil prices resulting in a lower demand for oil, 2) an increase in oil production on private and state lands (not federal lands) due to less bureaucratic red tape in leasing and permitting on private and state lands, and 3) an increase in biofuel (mainly ethanol) production due to the mandates from the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The bad news is that while we have reduced our dependence on imports, we are getting more dependent on oil imports from the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. During the first five months of this year, oil imports from the Persian Gulf increased by 33 percent compared to the first five months of 2011. This was mainly due to an increase of oil imports from Saudi Arabia of 29 percent. At the same time, our total oil imports fell by 6 percent. Thus, the Persian Gulf’s share of U.S. oil imports is up 6 percentage points—from 15 percent for the first 5 months of last year to 21 percent for the first 5 months of this year—and the share of our oil imports from Saudi Arabia is up 4 percentage points, from 10 percent to 14 percent.[ii] According to data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the United States imported a daily average of almost 1.5 million barrels of Saudi Arabian crude over the first five months of this year, compared to a daily average of about 1.1 million barrels over the same period last year. The corresponding numbers for oil imports from the Persian Gulf oil are an average of 2.2 million barrels per day for the first 5 months of this year compared to 1.7 million barrels per day for the first 5 months of last year. The increase in oil exports from Saudi Arabia to the United States began slowly last summer and has increased this year. Even though domestic oil production is increasing, the Obama administration is finding it difficult to lower its dependence on Persian Gulf oil, especially the heavy grades of crude oil that Saudi Arabia exports and that our refineries in the Gulf of Mexico use. Some oil analysts indicate that this increasing dependency may only last a few years—until more Canadian and Gulf of Mexico production comes on line. These are issues that have been caused by the Obama administration. First, their moratorium and “permitorium” on offshore drilling after the Macondo accident resulted in 17 percent less oil production in offshore federal waters in fiscal year 2011 than the year before. Then, their failure to permit the Keystone XL pipeline that would bring heavy crude oil from Canada postponed new supplies from our Northern Ally. David L. Goldwyn, former State Department coordinator for international energy affairs in the Obama administration, stated “Until we have the ability to access more Canadian heavy oil through improved infrastructure, the vulnerability will remain.”[iii] But, the Obama Administration is not worried because it can tap into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the event of a self-defined crisis, it sees domestic oil production continuing to grow, and it believes Gulf area refineries can adjust their equipment to use sweeter crude oil if need be. Most of our new domestic production comes from shale oil fields in North Dakota and Texas that produce high-quality sweet grades of oil while refineries on the Gulf of Mexico coast are designed to refine the heavier oils that the United States traditionally imports from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela. Refiners are importing more oil from the Persian Gulf to replace the declining production and imports from Mexico and Venezuela and the reduced production output from the Gulf of Mexico due to the moratorium and de facto moratorium on drilling. There is also insufficient pipeline capacity from Canada to replace those losses with Canadian crude, accentuating the need for the Keystone XL pipeline. In recent years, U.S. oil imports have been declining due to increased domestic production on private and state lands, production of shale oil using hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technology, increased production of corn-based ethanol and government mandates requiring its increased usage by refineries, and lower oil demand due to high oil prices and a poor economy. Before the Macondo accident in the Gulf of Mexico, monthly oil production from the Gulf was as high as 1.71 million barrels a day and growing, but because of the moratorium on new drilling, monthly oil production from the Gulf after the accident was as low as 1.09 million barrels per day with much of that lower oil production being replaced by imports of Saudi crude oil. Oil production from the Gulf is not expected to regain its higher production levels through 2013, according to EIA, whose forecast for offshore Gulf of Mexico oil production for this year and next is averaging about 1.35 million barrels per day.

#### Plan causes Saudi backlash

**Hulbert 9/11**

[Matthew, Forbes Contributor, 9/11/12, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/09/11/saudi-oil-snub-dont-take-riyadh-for-granted-mr-president/>]

Admittedly, the independence line might win domestic votes, but it loses America international friends. OPEC – and especially Saudi Arabia – is painfully aware of the 22mb/d liquid potential North America holds over the next ten to fifteen years. They hardly need reminding of that when they’re being asked to dump more oil onto a well-supplied market for U.S. electoral gain. Just to rub it in, the unofficial architect of the Romney energy plan (Citigroup’s Ed Morse), noted in international media today that ‘the U.S. need no longer sacrifice a moral foreign policy based on human rights and democracy to secure co-operation from resource-rich despotic regimes’. Such hyperbole is neither constructive nor wise. The best revolutions are always the silent ones. The louder America shouts about its energy revolution, the bumpier any transition from a world of perceived scarcity to one of ‘total abundance’ will be. Saudi Arabia will make sure of it. America should see this Saudi snub as a warning shot; take Riyadh for granted at your peril. You won’t like the price, or indeed political implication that holds when the dream of U.S. energy independence is rudely awoken by the nightmare of on-going global energy realities.

#### Dependence on Saudi Oil key to relations

Lazazzero 08

[Joseph A. Lazazzero, Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 2008, <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Lazazzero.pdf>]

Just as the U.S.-Saudi alliance was important during World War I and the Cold War, this relationship is still of significant value in contemporary politics. As in previous years, the benefits of a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship affect everything from oil dependence to international conflicts. With a limited supply of oil and growing demands from an industrializing China, the United States needs to solidify its oil agreements with Saudi Arabia. An improved Saudi-American relationship would also help to resolve the United States’ failed efforts in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. More importantly, both the United States and Saudi Arabia have stakes in winning the War on Terrorism. Oil Dependence The United States’ demand for oil first initiated the U.S.-Saudi alliance, and it continues to be one of its most crucial components today. Roughly, 60 percent of the world’s oil supply is in the Gulf, and 25 percent of that is under Saudi soil (Cordesman, 28-42). Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil producer, and the United States is the largest oil consumer (Appendix 2-1). Both parties have stakes in a stable oil market (US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981). Not only does Saudi Arabia have the most oil, it has also proven itself a reliable partner in the oil industry. Saudi Arabia’s spare production capacity has allowed it to answer oil production shortages in the past. Saudi Arabia enacted such policies in 1979 after the fall of the Shah, when the Gulf War decreased oil production in both Iraq and Kuwait, in 2003 on the verge of the second Iraq war and even today with instability in oil-producing countries like Venezuela and Nigeria (Bahgat, 115). These measures have shown that Saudi Arabia is committed to keeping oil costs low and production constant. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also proven itself a more stable oil partner for the United States than other oil-producing countries. Saudi Arabia has easily managed to nationalize foreign oil companies. Unlike the bitter dispute that existed between Iran and the British Petroleum Company in the 1950’s, Saudi Arabia has slowly acquired the American company Aramco, and U.S. investors and contractors still serve on the company’s board of directors (Bahgat, 115). Prince Abdullah visited Washington DC in 1998 to meet with U.S. oil companies and called for a greater strategic energy partnership (Bahagt, 115 & Ottaway & Hamilton, A1). Thus, not only is the United States in a unique position with access to the world’s largest oil producer, but it also has serious influence and economic footholds in Saudi Arabia’s oil companies. Oil dependence between the United States and Saudi Arabia benefits the Saudi government as well. Since the first discovery of oil in 1933, Saudi Arabia has changed itself into a regional superpower. Saudi Arabia has used much of its newfound wealth on military expenditures, but it has also utilized its money to make domestic improvements. For example, Saudi Arabia committed nearly $20.14 billion to local markets in an attempt to diversify its economy. Saudi Arabia has also debated entering the World Trade Organization, a move that would undoubtedly insert an Arab voice in the Westernized globalization of the international economy (Champion, 169-171). The money from oil production has allowed Saudi Arabia to become one of the wealthiest countries in the region. Such wealth has allowed Saudi Arabia to become a member of the modernized world, increasing everything from electrical output to mobile phones.(Appendix 1-1 & 12) (Al-Farsay, 31) The importance of a continued U.S.-Saudi economic partnership in oil investments is just as significant for Saudi Arabia’s development and power in the region as it is for the United States’ demand for foreign oil. Of course, there are other countries willing to buy Saudi oil, but here is where the significance of dual protection comes into play. Starting with the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, which declared that an attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil fields would be equivalent to an attack on the United States, the United States can make a promise no other nation can, of protection from the world’s most powerful military (Ashton, 103-113). Thus, even if there are other countries willing to purchase Saudi oil, Saudi Arabia is still gaining significant security from its alliance with the United States.

**Relations solve Saudi Prolif**

**Levi 03**, Michael, Science And Technology Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Brookings Institution, 2003 [The New Republic , June 2 http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/Brookings/perspex-brookings-levi-060203.htm]

Realists counter that the United States needs Saudi oil and Saudi military bases. But there's a less obvious argument for making sure the long-standing Washington-Riyadh partnership doesn't fracture: If it does, the Saudis might well go nuclear. Saudi Arabia could develop a nuclear arsenal relatively quickly. In the late '80s, Riyadh secretly purchased between 50 and 60 CSS-2 missiles from China. The missiles were advanced, each with a range of up to 3,500 kilometers and a payload capacity of up to 2,500 kilograms. What concerned observers, though, was not so much these impressive capabilities but rather the missiles' dismal accuracy. Mated to a conventional warhead, with a destructive radius of at most tens of meters, these CSS-2 missiles would be useless—their explosives would miss the target. But the CSS-2 is perfect for delivering a nuclear weapon. The missile itself may miss by a couple of kilometers, but, if the bomb's destructive radius is roughly as large, it will still destroy the target. The CSS-2 purchase, analysts reasoned, was an indication that the Saudis were at least hedging in the nuclear direction. July 1994 brought more news of Saudi interest in nuclear weapons when defector Mohammed Al Khilewi, a former diplomat in the Saudi U.N. mission, told London's Sunday Times that, between 1985 and 1990, Saudi Arabia had actively aided Iraq's nuclear weapons program, both financially and technologically, in return for a share of the program's product. Though Khilewi produced letters supporting his claim, no one has publicly corroborated his accusations. Still, the episode was unsettling. Then, in July 1999, *The New York Times* reported that Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud had recently visited sensitive Pakistani nuclear weapons sites. Prince Sultan toured the Kahuta facility where Pakistan produced enriched uranium for nuclear bombs—and which, at the same time, was allegedly supplying materiel and expertise to the North Korean nuclear program. The Saudis refused to explain the prince's visit. If Saudi Arabia chose the nuclear path, it would most likely exploit this Pakistani connection. Alternatively, it could go to North Korea or even to China, which has sold the Saudis missiles in the past. Most likely, as Richard L. Russell, a Saudi specialist at National Defense University, argued two years ago in the journal *Survival*, the Saudis would attempt to purchase complete warheads rather than build an extensive weapons-production infrastructure. Saudi Arabia saw Israel destroy Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, and it is familiar with America's 1994 threat to bomb North Korea's reactor and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. As a result, it would probably conclude that any large nuclear infrastructure might be preemptively destroyed. At the same time, Riyadh probably realizes that America's current hesitation to attack North Korea stems at least in part from the fact that North Korea likely already has one or two complete warheads, which American forces would have no hope of destroying in a precision strike. By buying ready-made warheads, Riyadh would make a preemptive attack less likely. And, unlike recent proliferators such as North Korea, the Saudis have the money to do so.

#### Nuclear war

**Edelman, 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Eric S, January/February. “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran.” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering **a regional nuclear war**. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

### 1NC

#### Interpretation – “financial incentives” are funding for investors to develop a project – that excludes government purchases

**Czinkota et al, 9 -** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### Violation – Purchases that don’t motivate action – they just buy a technology that already exists

Nelson 93 (Edward W., Chairman – Payment Subcommittee in OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 6-30, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4)

Definition of Financial Incentives A definition of terms is **necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives** for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the distinction between "incentive" and "payment" since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, "incentives" do not amount to "purchases" and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

#### Prefer our interpretation –

#### A. Limits – they allow any aff that makes some technology more economically viable. Procurement can be applied to every technology and every industry – that explodes neg burden.

#### B. Neg ground – procurement moves the debate away from “how to motivate action” to just “doing the action” – this guts negative arguments about solvency, DA links, and CP competition based off private sector inducement.

### 1NC

#### Text: The Department of Defense should enter into binding consultation with local communities surrounding relevant military bases over whether to obtain electricity from small modular reactors for critical military installations in the United States and exempt the Department of Defense from relevant small modular reactor restrictions.

**The Department of Defense should implement the result of the binding consultation. We’ll clarify.**

#### It competes –

#### it tests “resolved” which means “to make a firm decision”, and “should” which is “used to imply obligation or duty”

[American Heritage Dictionary at dictionary.com]

#### DoD nuclear power plants must include genuine consultation – that’s key to integration and overall base success

Parthemore and Rogers 10 (Christine and Will, Bacevich Fellow – CNAS, “Nuclear Reactors on Military Bases May Be Risky,” Center for a New American Security, 5-20, http://www.cnas.org/node/4502)

The media have reported that Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) is proposing a joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense demonstration project to examine the use of small reactors on federal sites. For some Department of Energy sites, such as Oak Ridge National Lab in Alexander’s home state — a site certainly accustomed to housing nuclear technology — demonstrating new nuclear reactor technology is largely a no-brainer. However, using nuclear reactors to power the nation’s defense installations warrants deeper consideration. Proponents of boosting this carbon-free energy source on military bases argue that these installations have unique capacities that would ease concerns over its use, namely more gates and more armed guards already on base 24/7. Likewise, the U.S. military services have unique energy security needs. Consistent energy supplies are a critical component of America’s ability to train at home and to operate globally. Energy is so important that some analysts are even exploring “islanding” the energy systems on some military installations to reduce vulnerabilities related to their reliance on often brittle domestic electric grids. Consideration of nuclear energy as part of these islanding concepts is on the rise. On the other hand, opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary. In most cases, additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns. Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities. Any legislation to consider the option of small nuclear reactors on military bases must include examination of these important concerns.

#### Status quo negotiation is controlled by the military– the CP creates an open and cooperation relationship

Boccuti, Faul, and Gray 12 (Amanda, analyst for Marstel-Day, LLC, providing analysis and GIS support for U.S. Marine Corps projects, Lauren, analyst for Marstel-Day, LLC, specializing in Strategic Communications, and Lauren, researcher at Marstel-Day, LLC, offering research and analysis of environmental issues for encroachment control plans and communications, outreach and engagement strategies for the U.S. Marine Corps, “Establishing Creative Strategies for Effective Engagement between Military Installations & Communities,” Engaging Cities, 5-12, http://engagingcities.com/article/establishing-creative-strategies-effective-engagement-between-military-installations-communi)

Throughout the Nation’s history, military installations and ranges were historically established in undeveloped areas, except for those forts located to defend cities. Local communities developed near the installations for safety and economic reasons resulting in the installation being the up-to-that-point rural community’s primary economic engine. Routine communication between the installations and local communities were **minimal** because the installation was self-supporting and not subject to local laws and regulations. Communications were primarily social. Starting in the post-World War II era and accelerating as the 20th Century came to a close, installation-adjacent communities increased in both density and size – becoming less rural, more suburban or urban, and more economically diverse. Military missions continue to evolve, incorporating new weapon platforms and training over larger areas and at all hours of the day and night. These changes in both surrounding communities and the installation missions have often lead to competing interests with respect to the economy, natural resource management, and land use. Military installations and local communities must, therefore, focus communication efforts on building partnerships to find mutually acceptable paths forward for resolving their competing interests. Developing collaborative relationships is imperative to **turning** otherwise **conflicting interests into opportunities** for mutually beneficial solutions. The nature of those interactions is defined by issue type, installation and community rapport, and available communication channels. The four military services (i.e., Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force) have service-specific community engagement programs to develop partnerships; all four, however, conduct information sharing through the Public Affairs Office (PAO), which handles media and public relations. Three of the services – the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force – have established encroachment management policies that outline service responsibilities to establish, maintain, and sustain community relationships in order to reduce encroachment effects. This responsibility is usually assigned to a Community Plans and Liaison Office (CPLO) or an equivalent community planner. The CPLO and PAO work with their installation Commander to act as the military’s voice and point of engagement in the community through consistent messaging, establishing an installation presence in community forums, and planning community-engagement events and processes. Though Department of Defense (DoD) mechanisms exist to develop community partnerships, mediating the different interests and priorities among military installations and their surrounding communities is a **complex, nuanced process usually exercised by the services, through their installation leadership**. Siting of renewable energy projects, environmental stewardship responsibilities, noise from training events, and other policy- and planning-related matters invoke difficult questions, such as: how can an installation and its surrounding communities concurrently pursue goals and development in a way that lead to mutual gain, obtaining threshold requirements and fair compromise? Finding interest nexuses and fostering an open, strong relationship in which those nexuses can be explored is key.

#### Locals will say yes. Consultation is key to readiness and avoids base closure

Savage 10 (Melissa, tracks military base issues for NCSL, “Lawmakers are looking for ways to resolve land-use conflicts between civilian communities and military bases,” National Conference of State Legislatures, March, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/making-peace-article.aspx)

Senator Leticia Van de Putte, who represents the district that is home to Fort Sam Houston—another military base near San Antonio—has seen the consequences of residential development near military bases. It’s in her backyard. But she also knows the encroachment issue isn’t confined to San Antonio. It’s a problem for bases across the country, from the Marine’s Camp Pendleton in southern California to the Army’s Fort A.P. Hill in northern Virginia. “For legislators with installations in their district, it’s critical that they stay aware of what’s happening on the bases, in the community and how state legislation can play a role in helping strike a balance **between the community’s needs and ensuring the military base can meet its mission**,” Van de Putte says. “The good news is that, while encroachment is pretty common, states, military bases and local communities are working together. Partnerships among states, cities and military bases are becoming the premier strategy to accomplish common goals.” Role of Military Bases During the last several years of base closures, communities have fought to keep their bases open for many reasons, but mostly because of the huge economic benefits military bases can bring to local communities and states. They generate civilian jobs and pour millions of dollars each year into the local economy. The loss of a base can be devastating to a community. In San Antonio, the U.S. Department of Defense is one of the largest employers, providing jobs to more than 68,000 people, a third of them civilians. According to the Department of Defense, the direct and indirect economic effect of the military in San Antonio was more than $13.3 billion in 2006. As development inches closer to installations, **limiting the ability to conduct effective military training**, the Department of Defense might be left with no other choice than to close bases. Maryland Delegate Sally Jameson knows just what military bases can mean to a community. “For those of us with bases in our districts, we relish the jobs and dollars that spin into our local economies,” she says. “In some areas, the loss of a base could mean the destruction of the local community. “The next step is to realize the significant problems bases can face when dealing with encroachment. It can stand in the way of our bases meeting their No. 1 priority—troop readiness. Staying focused on land issues and **keeping the lines of communication open with base leadership is so important**.” Years ago, when the Department of Defense located many of its current military installations, it looked for land in the middle of nowhere. Having space to train away from cities limits the impact of light pollution on flight paths and keeps citizens on the other side of the fence safe during live fire training exercises. Over the last few decades, as cities have grown closer to the installations, the impact on the military sometimes has been severe. While base commanding officers will tell you they want to be good neighbors, their primary mission is to train soldiers to fight.

#### Readiness collapse causes war – turns basing

Spencer 2K (Jack, Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, 9-15, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1394.cfm>)

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, 3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." 4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. 5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War. 6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby **preserving peace**.

### Solvency

#### Siting requirements blocks solvency

King 11 (Marcus, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf)

A reactor owner/operator, typically a utility, will select a site and may apply for an early site permit from the NRC. They select a reactor design, (certified under a separate process), to construct on the site and then apply for a combined operating license. Construction begins after approval. With respect to the requirement to “consider the potential impact on the quality of life of personnel stationed at military installations at which a nuclear power plant is installed and ways to mitigate those impacts,” it is impossible to talk in specific terms without knowing details about which specific power plant is being considered and the specific locations being considered. In general terms, finding an appropriate site will be challenging. Part of the reason finding an appropriate site will be challenging is because the NRC site consideration process will force full consideration of these factors. Describing the NRC site assessment process is the best and most relevant information that can be provided with respect to this aspect of feasibility at this stage in the process. The NRC approval process described in this section will require that any potential impacts on the quality of life of personnel stationed at military installations at which a nuclear power plant is proposed will be fully consdered and that ways are planned to mitigate those impacts.

#### No solvency—no expertise

Parthemore and Rogers 10 (Christine and Will, Bacevich Fellow – CNAS, “Nuclear Reactors on Military Bases May Be Risky,” Center for a New American Security, 5-20, http://www.cnas.org/node/4502)

The media have reported that Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) is proposing a joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense demonstration project to examine the use of small reactors on federal sites. For some Department of Energy sites, such as Oak Ridge National Lab in Alexander’s home state — a site certainly accustomed to housing nuclear technology — demonstrating new nuclear reactor technology is largely a no-brainer. However, using nuclear reactors to power the nation’s defense installations warrants deeper consideration. Proponents of boosting this carbon-free energy source on military bases argue that these installations have unique capacities that would ease concerns over its use, namely more gates and more armed guards already on base 24/7. Likewise, the U.S. military services have unique energy security needs. Consistent energy supplies are a critical component of America’s ability to train at home and to operate globally. Energy is so important that some analysts are even exploring “islanding” the energy systems on some military installations to reduce vulnerabilities related to their reliance on often brittle domestic electric grids. Consideration of nuclear energy as part of these islanding concepts is on the rise. On the other hand, opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary. In most cases, additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns. Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities. Any legislation to consider the option of small nuclear reactors on military bases must include examination of these important concerns.

#### Investors won't participate – too much uncertainty

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

The investment climate for military alternative fuel production is highly uncertain. Although the Navy has announced a program that will involve large fuel purchases, it has not yet provided sufficient detail to encourage investment of private funds. Other DoD components have not announced that they will pay a premium price for alternative fuels for use in their tactical systems. This situation means that the private sector will look to the civilian fuel market for signals as to whether to invest in alternative fuels. For civilian applications, the prospects for alternative fuels also remain highly uncertain. At current world market oil prices, the only military alternative fuel that might be competitive without subsidy is an FT jet or FT Navy distillate derived from natural gas, coal, or a mix of coal and a small amount of biomass. But even for these leading technologies, there remains uncertainty regarding investment and production costs, especially for the first production facilities that would be built in the United States. With the $1.00 federal subsidy that has supported biodiesel production, some amount of biodiesel from crops cultivated on farmlands appears to be competitive with petroleum-derived diesel so long as world oil prices are above $50 per barrel (2009 dollars, West Texas Intermediate).1 But for renewable oils that are produced with lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions that are less than those from petroleum products, greater subsidies or higher crude oil prices may be required. As discussed in Chapter Three, there is little information available on the costs of producing hydrotreated renewable oils from jatropha, camelina, or other nontraditional crops, and even less on the economics of algae-derived fuels. Another factor impeding investment in alternative fuels is uncertainty regarding the prospects and details of legislation and regulations aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. Legislation that assigns costs to emitting greenhouse gases will modify the relative competitiveness of different alternative fuels vis-à-vis petroleum-derived fuels. For example, for each $10 per ton charged for emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, the price of conventional JP-8 would increase by about $0.13 per gallon.

#### DoD doesn’t drive the domestic market

Dimotakis 6 (Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006, December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf)

The 2006 DoD fossil-fuel budget is, approximately, 2.5-3% of the national-defense budget, the range dependent on what is chosen as the total national-defense budget. iv Larger (percentage) fuel costs are borne by families and many businesses, for example, and fuel costs have only relatively recently become noticeable to the DoD. 3. At present, there is a large spread between oil-production cost and crude-oil prices. Many projections, however, including that of the U.S. Energy Information Agency, indicate that crude oil prices may well decrease to $40-$50/barrel within the next few years, as production and refining capacity increases to match demand. 4. DoD is **not a sufficiently large customer to drive the domestic market** for demand and consumption of fossil fuel alternatives, or to drive fuel and transportation technology developments, in general. Barring externalities, e.g., subsidies, governmental and departmental directives, etc., non-fossil-derived fuels are not likely to play a significant role in the next 25 years. 5. DoD fuel consumption constraints and patterns of use **do not align well with those of the commercial sector**. Most commercial-sector fuel use, for example, is in ground transportation, with only 4% of domestic petroleum consumption used for aviation. In contrast, almost 60% of DoD fuel use is by the Air Force, with additional fuel used in DoD aviation if Naval aviation consumption is included. Options for refueling ships at sea are more limited (or nonexistent) compared to those for commercial vehicles in urban areas. Options for DoD use of electrical energy on ground vehicles are limited, since one can not expect to plug into the grid in hostile territory, for example, to refuel/recharge an electric vehicle. Furthermore, drive cycles for DoD ground vehicles differ significantly from EPA drive cycles that, as a consequence, provide poor standards for fuel consumption.

### Water Wars

#### Desalination trades off with more effective strategies that manage demand

Food and Water Watch, 9 – nonprofit consumer organization that works to ensure clean water and safe food (February, “DESALINATION: An Ocean of Problems.” http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Desal-Feb2009.pdf)

With all costs considered, ocean desalination is a risky water supply option. This means that while policymakers are dealing with ocean desalination proposals, they are distracted from evaluating and implementing better options. In fact, emphasis on ocean desalination ignores the fact that the water shortages in our country are not due to a lack of natural water resources, but rather to shortsighted water policy that focuses on finding new water resources instead of managing existing resources wisely. Further, our country loses 6 billion gallons of water per day due to problems such as leaking pipes. Utilities cannot account for this water because many have not implemented comprehensive leak monitoring programs. 104 Meanwhile, all of the desalination plants in the United States today operating at their full capacity 105 could only produce a quarter of that unaccounted for water. \* Numerous academic studies show that management alternatives and efficiency programs offer great potential for alleviating water supply problems at a much lower cost and without the dangers associated with large scale reverse osmosis plants. According to the National Research Council report on desalination, simply redistributing water can be much cheaper than desalination and more efficient. 106 The proposed Massachusetts Conservation Standards agree. They state that “finding new water by investing in efficiency and demand management is almost always more cost-effective than developing a new source.” 107 Likewise, a World Bank official told the World Wildlife Fund that “saving water rather than the development of new sources is often the best ‘next’ source of water both from an economic and from an environmental point of view.” 108

#### NO evidence that countries who will go to war want smr’s- they won’t adopt it

#### Desalination kills oceans- turns case

Food and Water Watch, 9 – nonprofit consumer organization that works to ensure clean water and safe food (February, “DESALINATION: An Ocean of Problems.” http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Desal-Feb2009.pdf)

In Tampa Bay, where water authorities created the largest ocean desalination plant in the country to avoid shortages, other options were actually more effective. While the desalination plant experienced technical and bureaucratic failures, Tampa Bay Water built a new reservoir and treatment plant, and implemented conservation programs. In this time, groundwater pumping decreased from 192 million to 121 million gallons per day, despite increased population. 117 This meant savings of 71 million gallons a day — almost three times as much as the 25 million gallons a day that the desalination plant was supposed to produce. Conclusion Ocean desalination is not a safe or affordable drinking water option. Water from these plants costs far more than other water supply options, which means rate hikes that fall disproportionately on the very citizens who can least afford them. Meanwhile, the associated water pollution, chemical contaminants, marine life destruction, global warming and privatization could cause irreparable damage to our remaining clean water resources and public drinking water systems.

#### No global spillover – can’t solve developing countries

**Socolow and Glaser, 9** – Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University and Assistant Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University (Robert H. and Alexander, Fall. “Balancing risks: nuclear energy & climate change.” Dædalus Volume 138, Issue 4, pp. 31-44. MIT Press Journals.)

In this paper we consider a nuclear future where 1,500 GW of base load nuclear power is deployed in 2050. A nuclear fleet of this size would contribute about one wedge, if the power plant that would have been built instead of the nuclear plant has the average CO2 emissions per kilowatt hour of all operating plants, which might be half of the value for a coal plant. Base load power of 1,500 GW would contribute one fourth of total electric power in a business-as-usual world that produced 50,000 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity per year, two-and-a-half times the global power consumption. However, in a world focused on climate change mitigation, one would expect massive global investments in energy efficiency–more efficient motors, compressors, lighting, and circuit boards–that by 2050 could cut total electricity demand in half, relative to business as usual. In such a world, 1,500 GW of nuclear power would provide half of the power. We can get a feel for the geopolitical dimension of climate change mitigation from the widely cited scenarios by the International Energy Agency (iea) presented annually in its World Energy Outlook (weo), even though these now go only to 2030. The weo 2008 estimates energy, electricity, and CO2 emissions by region. Its 2030 world emits 40.5 billion tons of CO2, 45 percent from electric power plants. The countries of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) emit less than one third of total global fossil fuel emissions and less than one third of global emissions from electric power production. By extrapolation, at midcentury the oecd could contribute only one quarter of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. It is hard for Western analysts to grasp the importance of these numbers. The focus of climate change mitigation today is on leadership from the OECD countries, which are wealthier and more risk averse. But within a decade, the targets under discussion today can be within reach only if mitigation is in full gear in those parts of the developing world that share production and consumption patterns with the industrialized world. The map (see Figure 1) shows a hypothetical global distribution of nuclear power in the year 2050 based on a highnuclear scenario proposed in a widely cited mit report published in 2003. Three-fifths of the nuclear capacity in 2050 as stated in the mit report is located in the oecd, and more nuclear power is deployed in the United States in 2050 than in the whole world today. The worldview underlying these results is pessimistic about electricity growth rates for key developing countries, relative to many other sources. Notably, per capita electricity consumption in almost every developing country remains below 4,000 kWh per year in 2050, which is one-fifth of the assumed U.S. value for the same year. Such a ratio would startle many analysts today–certainly many in China. It is well within limits of credulity that nuclear power in 2050 could be nearly absent from the United States and the European Union and at the same time widely deployed in several of the countries rapidly industrializing today. Such a bifurcation could emerge, for example, if public opposition to nu clear power in the United States and Europe remains powerful enough to prevent nuclear expansion, while elsewhere, perhaps where modernization and geopolitical considerations trump other concerns, nuclear power proceeds vigorously. It may be that the United States and other countries of the oecd will have substantial leverage over the development of nuclear power for only a decade or so. Change will not happen overnight. Since 2006, almost 50 countries that today have no nuclear power plants have approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) for assistance, and many of them have announced plans to build one or more reactors by 2020. Most of these countries, however, are not currently in a good position to do so. Many face important technical and economic constraints, such as grid capacity, electricity demand, or gdp. Many have too few trained nuclear scientists and engineers, or lack an adequate regulatory framework and related legislation, or have not yet had a public debate about the rationale for the project. Overall, the iaea has estimated that “for a State with little developed technical base the implementation of the first [nuclear power plant] would, on average, take about 15 years.” 11 This lead time constrains rapid expansion of nuclear energy today. A wedge of nuclear power is, necessarily, nuclear power deployed widely– including in regions that are politically unstable today. If nuclear power is suf-ficiently unattractive in such a deployment scenario, nuclear power is not on the list of solutions to climate change.

#### Status quo solves and nuclear desalination is ineffective

Smith 11 (Gar, Editor Emeritus of Earth Island Journal, a former editor of Common Ground magazine, a Project Censored Award-winning journalist, and co-founder of Environmentalists Against War, "NUCLEAR ROULETTE: THE CASE AGAINST A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE," June, International Forum on Globalization series focused on False Solutions, <http://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear_Roulette_book.pdf>)

By 2025, 3.5 billion people will face severe fresh-water shortages. Nuclear proponents groping for justifications to expand nuclear power have argued that the waste heat from power plants can provide a “cheap and clean” solution to the inherently costly process of removing salt from seawater. Desalination plants (there are 13,080 worldwide, mostly oil- and gas-fired and mostly in wealthy desert nations) already produce more than 12 billion gallons of drinkable water a day. 153 The first nuclear desalinator was installed in Japan in the late 1970s and scores of reactor-heated desalination plants are operating around the world today.¶ But nuclear desalination is another False Solution. The problem with atomic water-purifiers is that using heat to treat seawater is an obsolete 20 th -century technology. Thermal desalination has given way to new reverse osmosis systems that are less energy intensive and 33 times cheaper to operate. 154 Nuclear desalination advocates claim that wind, solar, and wave power aren’t up to the task while new low-temperature evaporation technology may be able to produce high purity water at temperatures as low as 122° Fahrenheit. 155 Promoting reactors as a solution to the world’s water shortage is especially ludicrous since nuclear power plants consume more water than any other energy source. 156¶ Even proponents admit there is a potential risk that running seawater through a radioactive environment might contaminate the drinking water produced. 157 Undeterred, scientists in Russia and India have proposed anchoring small atom-powered water-plants offshore near densely populated coastal cities. But this would provide no relief for the billions of people living inland in water-starved regions of North Africa and Asia.¶ Desalination is merely a way of giving a marginal new purpose to existing reactors whose balance sheets would be improved if they were retrofitted with desalination chambers. As with power generation, so with desalination: efficiency in water use (better irrigation technology, crop selection, eliminating transit losses, etc.) beats new production.¶ A real solution to the growing global water shortage needs to address the increasing amount of water diverted to wasteful agricultural and industrial practices and concentrate on preventing the water from being contaminated in the first place—by, among other things, capping the size of local populations to match locally available water supplies.

#### No water wars – empirics vote neg

Allouche 11 (Jeremy, Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food PolicyVolume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8 Accessed via: Science Direct Sciverse)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change **and greater inputs of capital** have **dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture.** More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries **humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable**.¶ Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an **instrumental purpose**; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none **of these declarations have been followed up by military action**.¶ The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ None **of the** various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, **more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale** (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however **no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict**. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).¶ In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity **does not make much sense in the light of the recent** historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, **the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin** ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

#### Desalination fails

AP, 12 (Associated Press, Jason Dearing and Alicia Chang, 9/22. “Desalination no panacea for Calif. water woes.” http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/sep/22/desalination-no-panacea-for-calif-water-woes/)

Squeezing salt from the ocean to make clean drinking water is a worldwide phenomenon that has been embraced in thirsty California, with its cycles of drought and growing population. There are currently 17 desalination proposals in the state, concentrated along the Pacific where people are plentiful and fresh water is not. But many projects have been stymied by skyrocketing construction costs, huge energy requirements for running plants, regulatory delays and legal challenges over environmental impacts on marine life. Only one small plant along Monterey Bay is pumping out any drinking water. From Marin County to San Diego, some water districts are asking themselves: How much are we willing to pay for this new water? "We found that our demand for water had dropped so much since the time we started exploring desalination, we didn't need the water," said Libby Pischel, a spokeswoman for the Marin Municipal Water District. "Right now, conservation costs less than desalination." Desalination plants can take water from the ocean or drill down and grab the less salty, brackish water from seaside aquifers. Because of their potential impacts to marine life, the California Coastal Commission reviews each project case-by-case. There was great fanfare in 2009 when the last regulatory hurdle was cleared to build the Western Hemisphere's largest desalination plant in Carlsbad, north of San Diego. At the time, it was proposed that the $320 million project would suck in 100 million gallons of seawater and be capable of producing 50 million gallons of drinking water a day. It was expected to come online by this year. Since then, the plant owner, Poseidon Resources LLC, has been negotiating a water purchase agreement and is close to clinching a 30-year deal with the San Diego County Water Authority, a wholesaler to cities and agencies that provide water to 3.1 million people. The compact is essential for Poseidon to obtain financing to build what has become a $900 million project, which includes the seaside plant and a 10-mile pipeline. The San Diego agency hopes the plant opens in 2016 and anticipates desalination will account for 7 percent of the region's supply in 2020. It estimates the cost is comparable to other new, local sources of drinking water, such as treated toilet water or briny groundwater. Interest is still high, but "people are realizing that desalination isn't a magic fix to the state's water issues," said coastal commission water expert Tom Luster. Water can be de-salted in different ways. Poseidon's project will use reverse osmosis. Other plants shoot ocean or brackish water at high pressure through salt-removing membrane filters. Because pumps must be used constantly to move massive amounts of water through filters, these facilities are extremely energy intensive. Also, in many cases, desalinated water is pricier than importing water the old-fashioned way - through pipes and tunnels. And it is cheaper to focus on conservation when possible: new technologies like low-flow toilets and stricter zoning laws that require less water-intensive landscaping have helped curb demand in communities throughout the state.

#### SMR’s for desalination already exist

WNA 12 (World Nuclear Association, July 2012, “Nuclear Desalination,” <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf71.html>)

SMART: South Korea has developed a small nuclear reactor design for cogeneration of electricity and potable water. The 330 MWt SMART reactor (an integral PWR) has a long design life and needs refuelling only every 3 years. The main concept has the SMART reactor coupled to four MED units, each with thermal-vapour compressor (MED-TVC) and producing total 40,000 m3/day, with 90 MWe.

CAREM: Argentina has designed an integral 100 MWt PWR suitable for cogeneration or desalination alone, and a prototype is being built next to Atucha. A larger version is envisaged, which may be built in Saudi Arabia. NHR-200: China's INET has developed this, based on a 5 MW pilot plant. Floating nuclear power plant (FNPP) from Russia, with two KLT-40S reactors derived from Russian icebreakers, or other designs for desalination. (If primarily for desalination the twin KLT-40 set-up is known as APVS-80.) ATETs-80 is a twin-reactor cogeneration unit using KLT-40 and may be floating or land-based, producing 85 MWe plus 120,000 m3/day of potable water. The small ABV-6 reactor is 38 MW thermal, and a pair mounted on a 97-metre barge is known as Volnolom floating NPP, producing 12 MWe plus 40,000 m3/day of potable water by reverse osmosis. A larger concept has two VBER-300 reactors in the central pontoon of a 170 m long barge, with ancillary equipment on two side pontoons, the whole vessel being 49,000 dwt. The plant is designed to be overhauled every 20 years and have a service life of 60 years. Another design, PAES-150, has a single VBER-300 unit on a 25,000 dwt catamaran barge.

#### Indus Waters Treaty solves

Tir and Stinnett 12 (Jaroslav Tir and Douglas M. Stinnett, Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia AND assistant professor of international affairs in UGA's School of Public &. International Affairs, "Weathering climate change: Can institutions mitigate international water conflict?" January, Vol. 49, Issue 1, Sage Journals)

Conflict management¶ To cope with disagreements among signatories, some river treaties specify a variety of formal procedures for dispute management. The Permanent Indus Commission, for example, is responsible for resolving disputes between India and Pakistan over the implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty. Disputes are managed primarily through regular meetings of the officials that make up the two national sections of the Commission (Zawahri, 2009b). At the opposite end of the spectrum lie mandates for binding arbitration or adjudication by an existing international institution. For example, Hungary and Slovakia have resorted to the ICJ to resolve a dispute involving a 1977 treaty governing water infrastructure projects on the Danube (McCaffrey, 2003).¶ Dispute resolution provisions can address different sources of noncompliance, including those related to anticipated consequences of climate change. A formal process of resolving disputes can address overt cheating by raising the visibility of noncompliance (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). By increasing the costs of violations – some of which may appear particularly tempting due to the effects of climate change (e.g. unilaterally increase withdrawal rates to compensate for lack of water due to a number of dry years) – dispute settlement mechanisms can improve compliance.¶ Conflict management institutions can also address disputes over an agreement’s exact obligations. If climate change causes changes to a river system that were not envisioned at the time of the treaty signing, such as lower flow or greater seasonal variation, then these conditions will make the treaty less effective and increase the risk of conflict. In these circumstances, provisions in a treaty for dealing with unforeseen conditions will become important for preventing conflict. The rulings of a third-party arbitration panel, court, or even informal mediation through a secretariat or intergovernmental body can clarify the terms of a treaty (Chayes & Chayes, 1995). This enhances compliance by limiting the occurrence of unintended violations that result from treaty ambiguities or changed circumstances.

#### The aff can’t solve – wars inevitable over dam construction and geopolitics

Daly, 12 – chief analyst at the energy news site Oilprice.com, Ph.D. from the University of London (John C.K., 4/13. “Troubled Waters: Has The India-Pakistan Water Conflict Reached A Boiling Point?” http://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/has-the-india-pakistan-water-conflict-reached-a-boiling-point.13-04.html)

In an editorial entitled “War With India Inevitable” published in Lahore's ‘The Nation’ on Sunday, the newspaper's Editor-in-Chief and Nazaria-i-Pakistan Trust Chairman, Majid Nizami, asked his fellow citizens to prepare for a war with India over water issues. Nizami also told those attending the "Pakistan-India relations: Our rulers’ new wishes" session at Aiwan-e-Karkunan Tehrik-e-Pakistan, that, "Indian hostilities and conspiracies against the country will never end until she is taught a lesson."   While The Nation – a conservative daily that is part of the Nawa-i-Waqt publishing group – may have a circulation of just 20,000 readers, its close ties to Pakistan's highest military circles mean that Nizami's comments should hardly be rejected out of hand. Tellingly, Nizami's audience at the session also included some high ranking Pakistani officials, including Nazaria-i-Pakistan Vice Chairman Dr Rafique Ahmed; Pakistan Movement Workers-Trust Chairman, retired Colonel Jamshed Ahmed Tareen; former Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed Khan; Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan Secretary General Qari Zawar Bahadur; retired Air Marshall Khurished Anwar Mirza; retired Brigadier Hamid Saeed Akhtar and Jamaat-e-Islami Lahore Chief Ameer-ul-Azeem, among others. At the heart of the issue are Pakistan's concerns over India's ongoing construction of two hydroelectric dams on the upper reaches of the Indus River. The Indus, which begins in Indian-controlled Kashmir and flows through both India and Pakistan, is Pakistan's primary freshwater source, on which 90 percent of its agriculture depends. The 45-megawatt, 190-feet tall Nimoo-Bazgo concrete dam and the 44-megawatt Chutak hydroelectric power project, Islamabad believes, will reduce the Indus River's flow towards Pakistan, and are capable of storing up to 4.23 billion cubic feet of water, which will violate the terms of the bilateral 1960 Indus Water Treaty. “Already the Indus is experiencing water flows that are down 30 percent from its normal levels. According to a number of Pakistani agriculture and water experts, the nation is heading towards a massive water shortage in the next couple of years due to insufficient water management practices and storage capacity, which will be exacerbated by the twin Indian hydroelectric projects.” So, if push comes to shove, who's got Pakistan's back? China.    During the Boao Forum for Asia held in China's southern Hainan Island on 1 April, Pakistan and China agreed to support each other "in all circumstances" and vowed to uphold their sovereignty and territorial integrity at all costs. Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani told Chinese Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang: "China's friend is our friend, and China's enemy is ours," adding that Pakistan considers China's security as its own security and supports China's position on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. Li replied that China would support Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity in every situation, telling Gilani: "No matter what changes take place at international level, we will uphold Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity."   It might be noted here that in October 1962, coinciding with the Cuban missile crisis, India and China fought a brief but bitter war along their disputed Himalayan border. Fifty years later, China and India have yet to resolve their border issues over Kashmir; and China continues to claim most of India's Arunachal Pradesh territory to the base of the Himalayas in the absence of any definitive treaty delineating the border. Kashmir today also remains the site of the world's largest and most militarized territorial dispute with portions under the de facto administration of China (Aksai Chin), India (Jammu and Kashmir), and Pakistan (Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas).   No guesses therefore as to whom Beijing might back should Pakistani-Indian tensions continue to rise. Accordingly, the only way to keep the peace may be, as to paraphrase Ronald Reagan in Berlin: "Prime Minister Singh, tear down those dams!" Just don't bet on it.

**Marine ecosystems are resilient.**

**Kennedy et al 02** [Victor S. Kennedy et al, University of Maryland, COASTAL AND MARINE ECOSYSTEMS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF U.S. RESOURCES, 2002, p. <http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm>]

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.

**Size means no impact**

Bjørn **Lomborg 01**, Director, Environmental Assessment Institute, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST, 2001 p. 189

But the oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been astoundingly insignificant - the oceans contain more than 1,000 billion liters of water. The UN’s overall evaluation of the oceans concludes: “The open sea is still relatively clean. Low levels of lead, synthetic compounds and artificial radionuclides, though widely detectable, are biologically insignificant. Oil slicks and litter are common among sea leans, but are, at present, a minor consequences to communities of organisms living in ocean waters.

### DoD

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

**Fettweis 10** (Christopher J. Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times-The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 175-6)

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of war – nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms – necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were American to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly,the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.

#### No risk of cyberattack and no impact if it does happen

Birch, 10/1/12 – former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy (Douglas, “Forget Revolution.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full)

"That's a good example of what some kind of attacks would be like," he said. "You don't want to overestimate the risks. You don't want somebody to be able to do this whenever they felt like it, which is the situation now. But this is not the end of the world." The question of how seriously to take the threat of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure surfaced recently, after Congress rejected a White House measure to require businesses to adopt stringent­ new regulations to protect their computer networks from intrusions. The bill would have required industries to report cyber security breaches, toughen criminal penalties against hacking and granted legal immunity to companies cooperating with government investigations. Critics worried about regulatory overreach. But the potential cost to industry also seems to be a major factor in the bill's rejection. A January study by Bloomberg reported that banks, utilities, and phone carriers would have to increase their spending on cyber security by a factor of nine, to $45.3 billion a year, in order to protect themselves against 95 percent of cyber intrusions. Likewise, some of the bill's advocates suspect that in the aftermath of a truly successful cyber attack, the government would have to bail the utilities out anyway. Joe Weiss, a cyber security professional and an authority on industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid, argued that a well-prepared, sophisticated cyber attack could have far more serious consequences than this summer's blackouts. "The reason we are so concerned is that cyber could take out the grid for nine to 18 months," he said. "This isn't a one to five day outage. We're prepared for that. We can handle that." But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ­­-- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks because hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. But investigators typically come up with key suspects, if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in potential retaliation when planning their operations.

#### Retaliation inevitable –terrorists will still attack conventional grid

#### Cyber-terror has minimal impact and similar attacks occur all the time

Friedman 5 (Ben, Doctoral Candidate Pol. Sci. @ MIT, “Think Again: Homeland Security”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3079&page=2

“Terrorists Will Soon Mount a Crippling Cyberattack” Nonsense. Cyberattacks are costly and annoying, but they are not a threat to U.S. national security. Here, some historical perspective is useful. Alarmists warn that cyberterrorists could cripple American industry. Yet, even during World War II, the Allied bombing campaign against Germany failed to halt industrial production. Modern economies are much more resilient. A 2002 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, for instance, notes that just because the U.S. national infrastructure uses vulnerable communications networks does not mean that the infrastructure itself is vulnerable to attack. The U.S. power grid is run by some 3,000 providers that rely on diverse information technology systems. Terrorists would have to attack a large swath of these providers to have a significant effect. That’s a difficult task. Hackers, unlike summer heat waves and thunderstorms, have never caused a blackout. The U.S. water system is similarly robust, as is the U.S. air traffic control system. Although dams and air traffic control rely on communications networks, hacking into these networks is not the same as flooding a valley or crashing a plane. Viruses and denial–of–service attacks are everyday occurrences, but they are not deadly. Most attacks pass unnoticed. Because terrorists aim to kill and frighten, they are unlikely to find these sorts of attacks appealing. Even if they do, they will merely join a crowd of existing teenagers and malcontents who already make cyberattacks a major business expense. The annual costs of viruses alone reportedly exceed $10 billion in the United States. A 2003 Federal Trade Commission report put the annual cost of identity theft, much of which occurs online, at more than $50 billion. Cybersecurity gurus have far more to worry about from traditional hackers than from terrorists.

#### New developments sure up grid stability – solves blackouts

Kemp 12 -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)

The hoped-for solution to grid instability is something called the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI), which sounds like something out of Star Trek but is in fact a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control by using modern communications technology. More than 500 phasor monitoring units have so far been installed across the transmission network to take precise measurements of frequency, voltage and other aspects of power quality on the grid up to 30 times per second (compared with once every four seconds using conventional technology). Units are synchronised using GPS to enable users to build up a comprehensive real-time picture of how power is flowing across the grid (www.naspi.org/Home.aspx and). It is a scaled-up version of the monitoring system developed by the University of Tennessee's Power Information Technology Laboratory using inexpensive frequency monitors that plug into ordinary wall sockets. Tennessee's FNET project provides highly aggregated data to the public via its website. The systems being developed under NASPI provide a much finer level of detail that will reveal congestion and disturbances on individual transmission lines and particular zones so that grid managers can act quickly to restore balance or isolate failures ().

#### Military SMRs rely on foreign grids that are fragile – takes out solvency

Smith 11 (Terrence P., Program Coordinator and Research Assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy – CSIS, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2-16, http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations)

Nowhere in these key points is there even a hint of, “Hey this is not necessarily the best thing since sliced bread.” My initial response to each of these “key points”: (1) Takes the assumption it is a good idea and pushes a pursuit of the capability soon and hard to maintain a competitive technological edge, before examining the wisdom of the idea to begin with; (2) Just because DoD is interested in it, does not make it a good idea; (3) Arguing that they are better than larger reactors is not an argument for them being a good idea; (4) See my first point, but add in military advantage. The report describes DoD’s interest in the reactors as stemming from two “critical vulnerabilities”: 1) “the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid,” and 2) “the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations.” The proposed solution: small nuclear reactors that (in many of the proposed plans) are “self-contained and highly mobile.” This would allow the military to use them in forward bases and pack ‘em up and move ‘em out when we are done. But in an era where the U.S. is engaged in global fights with our bases often placed in unfriendly neighborhoods, the idea of driving around nuclear reactors and material (particularly through areas that have “ a fragile civilian electrical grid”) hardly seems like the idea of the century to me. The report counters that “some” designs promise to be “virtually impervious to accidents” and have design characteristics that “might” allow them to be proliferation-resistant. The plans that use low-enriched uranium, sealed reactor cores, ect., do make them a safer option that some current designs of larger nuclear reactors, but, again, if we are going to be trucking these things around the world, when it comes to nuclear material a “might” doesn’t sit well with me.

#### Backup capacity solves blackouts

Aimone 9-12 (Dr. Michael, Director of Business Enterprise Integration – Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), “Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies,” 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf)

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk. 1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely **through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment**. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has standby generators in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the **generators are primed and ready to work**, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can **bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage**. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

#### Military has no need for clean energy – adoption fails and hurts military power

O'Keefe 12 -- CEO, George C. Marshall Institute (William, 5/22/12, "DOD’s ‘Clean Energy’ Is a Trojan Horse," http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php)

The purpose of the military is to defend the United States and our interests by deterring aggression and applying military force when needed. It is not to shape industrial policy. As we’ve learned from history, energy is essential for military success, independent of whether it is so called “clean energy” or traditional energy, which continues to get cleaner with time. There are three reasons for the Department of Defense (DOD) to be interested in biofuels—to reduce costs, improve efficiency, and reduce vulnerability. These are legitimate goals and should be pursued through a well thought out and rational Research-and-Development (R&D) program. But it’s not appropriate to use military needs to push a clean energy agenda that has failed in the civilian sector. Packaging the issue as a national security rationale is a Trojan Horse that hides another attempt to promote a specific energy industrial policy. Over the past four decades such initiatives have demonstrated a record of failure and waste. As part of the military’s push for green initiatives, both the Navy and Air Force have set goals to obtain up to 50 percent of their fuel needs from alternative sources. The underlying rationale is to reduce US dependence on foreign oil. But the Rand Corporation, the preeminent military think tank in the nation, recently conducted a study, Alternative Fuels for Military Applications; it concludes, "The use of alternative fuels offers the armed services no direct military benefit." It also concludes that biofuels made from plant waste or animal fats could supply no more than 25,000 barrels daily. That’s a drop in the bucket considering the military is the nation’s largest fuel consumer. Additionally, there is no evidence that commercial technology will likely to be available in the near future to produce large quantities of biofuels at lower costs than conventional fuels. The flipside of that argument is that the cost of conventional fuels is uncertain because of dependence on imports from unstable sources. While that is true, it misses the point. For example, our reliance on imports from the Persian Gulf is declining and could be less if we expanded our own domestic production. Until alternatives that are cost competitive can be developed, DOD should look at alternative ways to reduce price volatility, just as large commercial users do. The second reason for pursuing alternative fuels is related to the first. Greater efficiency reduces costs by reducing the amount of fuel used. The military has been pursuing this goal for some time, as has the private sector. DOD total energy consumption declined by more than 60% between 1985 and 2006, according to Science 2.0. Improvements will continue because of continued investments in new technologies, especially in the private sector, which has market-driven incentives to reduce the cost of fuel consumption. Finally, there is the argument that somehow replacing conventional fuels with bio-fuels will reduce supply chain vulnerability and save lives. Rand also addressed this issue from both the perspective on naval and ground based forces. It concluded that there is no evidence that a floating bio-fuels plant “would be less expensive than using either Navy oilers or commercial tankers to deliver finished fuel products.” It also dismissed the concept of small scale production units that would be co-located with tactical units. It concluded, “any concepts that require delivery of a carbon containing feedstock appear to place a logistical and operational burden on forward-based tactical units that would be well beyond that associated with the delivery of finished fuels.” Future military needs are met by a robust R&D program carried out by the services and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Letting that agency and the services invest in future technologies to meet their specific service needs and maintain our military strength without political meddling is in the nation’s best interest. Advances in military technology that has civilian applications eventually enters the market place. Take for example the DARPA’s research into improved military communication that eventually developed into internet technology that revolutionized how we communicate and obtain and use information. If DOD pursues research focused on lower costs, greater efficiency, and more secure fuel supplies, the civilian economy will eventually benefit. At a time when the military if faced with substantial budget cuts, allocating scarce resources to pursue so called “clean energy” objectives is worse than wasteful. It borders on a dereliction of duty.

## 2NC – Case, Security

### 2NC – Ext. 1

#### Extend 1NC 1 – No wars absent hegemony – nuclear deterrence, globalization, insituitions and democracy will exist with or without the US and will check great power conflict

#### Reject their vague assertions for conflict scenarios absent hegemony – their authors overestimate the importance of the US - *star this card*

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

**Assertions that without** the combination of **U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return** to Europe and the Pacific Rim **are usually rendered in rather vague language**. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “**the world will become a more dangerous place** and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 **From where would this danger arise? Who** precisely **would do the fighting, and over what issues?** Without the United States, **would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack** mainland **China again**, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, **where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace?** With one exception, **these questions are rarely addressed**. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon theworldwould witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed Chin a is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, **decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese** regional, must less global, political **expansion.** Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. **Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind** a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, **specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers**. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. **Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination.**  Overestimating Our Importance One of **the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential** upon their behavior **as we perceive them to be.** A great deal of **experimental evidence exists to support the notion that** people (and therefore **states) tend to overrate the degree to which** **their behavior is responsible for the actions of others.** Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both ofwhichwould seem to be especially relevant in theU.S. case. 55 First, **believing that we are responsible** **for their actions gratifies our national ego** (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 **U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders**. **If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States.** Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might**, it is not possible to** fully **understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective.** The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. **They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one**. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 **It is natural**, therefore, **for U.S**. policymakers and **strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does**. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, **we are probably not as important to them as we think**. **The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated**. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, **the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven**. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. **Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with**, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, **with or without the United States**.

#### Empirically the world grew more peaceful when heg declined

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

It is perhaps worth noting that **there is no evidence to support a** direct **relationship between** the relative level of **U.S. activism and international stability**. In fact, **the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. 51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 52 On the other hand, if the paciﬁc trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered** by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. **The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a** pressing **concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities**. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conﬂict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending ﬁgures by themselves are insufﬁcient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was signiﬁcantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global paciﬁc trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never ﬁnal; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conﬂict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulﬁlled. If increases in conﬂict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, **the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military** spending. Evidently **the rest of the world can operate** quite effectively **without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.**

#### International trade and economics aren’t dependent on military intervention

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

Second, it should be equally simple to demonstrate that these **states remain vigorously engaged in international trade and** **economics.** In fact, fourteen of the fifteen “most globalized” countries in 2010 are in Europe, according to the Swiss Economic Institute.10 The **major U.S. allies** appear to **believe that the market does not need protection**, and that **prosperity is no longer dependent upon active military intervention** abroad. **Multinational corporations** today **can** generally **access the entire world without** much **fear of** undue **harassment from host governments, who have strong incentives to provide a healthy, well-regulated environment for trade** and prosperity to flourish. Threats to free trade still exist from a variety of criminal predators, but their solution, according to this point of view, hardly requires costly military action. If and when local law enforcement agencies prove incapable of providing protection for the businesses that operate in their territory, modern multinationals surely have the resources to either provide it for themselves, or move out. In other words, the allies have reached the conclusion that **Microsoft does not need the Marine Corps** **and great powers no longer have to use force to guard their economic interests. Today’s market will take care of itself**.

### No Cyber Terror 2NC

#### Studies prove no cyberattacks.

**The Register ’11** (John Leyden, 1/17, “Cyberwar hype is obscuring real security threats.” http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/01/17/cyberwar\_hype\_oecd\_study/)

Cyberwar hype is inhibiting government attempts to develop an appropriate response to cybersecurity threats, say computer scientists. A heavyweight study by UK computer scientists for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concludes that it is "highly unlikely" there will ever be a "pure cyber war”, comparable with recent conflicts in Afghanistan or the Balkans. Suggestions to the contrary are down to "heavy lobbying" by suppliers, the report's authors – Professor Peter Sommer of the London School of Economics and Dr Ian Brown of the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford – conclude. It is unlikely that there will ever be a true cyberwar. The reasons are: many critical computer systems are protected against known exploits and malware so that designers of new cyberweapons have to identify new weaknesses and exploits; the effects of cyberattacks are difficult to predict – on the one hand they may be less powerful than hoped but may also have more extensive outcomes arising from the interconnectedness of systems, resulting in unwanted damage to perpetrators and their allies. More importantly, there is no strategic reason why any aggressor would limit themselves to only one class of weaponry.

**No impact to cyberattacks**

**Lewis 2** – senior fellow and director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (James A, December. “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and

Other Cyber Threats.” <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/021101_risks_of_cyberterror.pdf>)

Infrastructure as Target Cyber-terrorism is not the first time a new technology has been seized upon as creating a strategic vulnerability. While the match between theories of cyber-warfare and air power is not precise, a comparison of the two is useful. In reaction to the First World War, European strategists like Douhet and Trenchard argued that aerial bombing attacks against critical infrastructure well behind the front lines would disrupt and cripple an enemies’ capacity to wage war. Their theories were put to the test by the U.S. Army and Royal Air Forces during World War II in strategic bombing campaigns aimed at destroying electrical power, transportation and manufacturing facilities. Much of the first tranche of literature on cyber attacks resembles in many ways (and owes an unspoken debt to) the early literature on strategic bombing. A key document for understanding how attacks on infrastructure affect societies is the Strategic Bombing Survey conducted by the United State during and after World War II. During the war, Britain and America launched thousands of heavy bombers that dropped millions of tons of high explosives on Germany, seeking to cripple its infrastructure, destroy its industrial base and break the will of the population to continue the war. Early theorists of air warfare had predicted that such an onslaught would paralyze or cripple the target. What the survey found, however, is that industrial societies are impressively resilient. Industrial production actually increased for two years under the bombing and it was not until ground forces occupied Germany that resistance ceased: As the air offensive gained in tempo, the Germans were unable to prevent the decline and eventual collapse of their economy. Nevertheless, the recuperative and defensive powers of Germany were immense; the speed and ingenuity with which they rebuilt and maintained essential war industries in operation clearly surpassed Allied expectations. Germany resorted to almost every means an ingenious people could devise to avoid the attacks upon her economy and to minimize their effects.... The mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control, they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained....1 The U.S. found similar results from aerial bombardment during the Vietnam War. Counter-intuitively, the effect of aerial attack was often to harden and increase popular support for continued resistance. The advent of nuclear weapons (and perhaps large precision-guided munitions) gave air power the ability to disrupt civil infrastructures needed to achieve the visions of Douhet, Trenchard or Mitchell, but cyber attacks do not pose the same level of lethality. One of the Strategic Bombing Survey’s conclusions was that “The German experience showed that, whatever the target system, no indispensable industry was permanently put out of commission by a single attack. Persistent re-attack was necessary.” However, cyber attacks are likely to be single attacks. Once a hacker has gained access and the damage done, the target usually responds quickly to close off the vulnerability that allowed that line of attack and to bring systems back on line. Cyber attackers would continually need to exploit new vulnerabilities and new tactics to ensure sustained disruption. Cyber attacks also seldom if ever produce physical damage that requires time-consuming repairs.

### Military Backup 1NC

#### The military isn’t stupid – backup capacity solves blackouts

Aimone 9-12 (Dr. Michael, Director of Business Enterprise Integration – Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), “Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies,” 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf)

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk. 1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely **through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment**. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has standby generators in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the **generators are primed and ready to work**, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can **bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage**. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

### Grid Safe Now 1NC

#### No black-outs in the US

Wood 12 -- Senior Communications Advisor at Business Roundtable (Carter, 8/2/12, "The grid: After India, America? No, but still…" http://businessroundtable.org/blog/the-grid-after-india-america-no-but-still/)

A blackout of such scale could not happen in the United States. For one thing, we don't have 600 million people. And America's electrical grid is certainly much more resilient than the one in India, a still-developing country with ineffective governments. Still, as The Washington Post reports today, "Aging power grid on overload as U.S. demands more electricity." At CNBC, Jim Cramer asked Thomas F. Farrell II, Chairman, President & CEO of Dominion Resources, about India. Could the same thing happen in the United States? Farrell responded: Our system has a lot more rigor to it and partly because we have reserve margins, meaning we have more power stations than we need to run at any particular moment in time, so that if a power station goes out, there's a back-up to help keep the grid stable. They don't have that much excess power in India, and when they get to the root cause, they'll probably find that was somewhere in there.

#### US grid stable – frequency can be maintained by new technologies

Lamonica 12 -- senior writer covering green tech and cutting-edge technologies, contributor @ Technology Review (Martin, 8/2/12, "Outage in India Could Be a Harbinger for the Rest of the World," http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428685/outage-in-india-could-be-a-harbinger-for-the-rest/)

The primary function of grid operators is to anticipate load and to maintain a steady balance between power supply and demand. The grid signal operates at a set frequency—60 hertz in the U.S. and 50 hertz in India—and when supply and demand fall out of sync, the frequency will either dip or rise. In the U.S., grid operators have "hot" generators on standby to ramp up power in order to keep a close-to-steady frequency, but that's not the case when generators are routinely maxed out. "In a developing world country, it's tough to keep 10 percent of the generation capacity on contingency when you may use it once in a lifetime," Mansoor says. "You're not using the generator, but you still pay for it. That's tough to do." More technologies to keep that frequency steady are emerging. Sensors called phasor measurement units are designed for real-time measurement of grid frequency, and can flag potential problems. Grid operators in the United States are increasingly using automation to manage demand-response programs that lower consumption at big power users at peak times. These types of technologies as well as microgrids (see "Microgrids Keeps the Power Local, Cheap, and Reliable") stand to make electricity grids more reliable as more renewable resources come online and weather-related events, such as heat waves, strain generating resources.

### AT Framework – Long

#### -- Coherence – only incorporation of representations can make sense of political reality

Jourde 6 – Cedric Jourde \* Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, 2002 \* M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, 1996 \* B.Sc., Political Science, Université de Montréal, Montréal, 1995 Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under George W Bush Ed. David and Grondin p. 182-3 2006

Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are **interpretative prisms** through which decision-makers **make sense of a political reality**, through which they define and assign **a subjective value** to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine **what are significant** international political **issues**.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable\*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. It must be clear that representations are **not objective** or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor's and group of actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations **constrain and enable** the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are **politically thinkable** and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor **helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded**. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other\* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'.

### AT Owen

#### 2. Owen concedes that epistemology and ontology are important and shape policies

Owen 2 (David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3, Sage)

 Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn.

**3. Out of context – Owen concludes inevitable confusion in IR causes his ‘vicious cycle’, not our critical interrogation**

Owen 2 (David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3, Sage)

[YELLOW]

 It should be noted that I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate. Having specified these dangers, however, I want to turn to a confusion within much of IR that has, I will argue, acted to encourage this philosophical turn and so increase its exposure to these risks. As a preface to this task, though, it is useful to sketch out two main lines of debate within the IR theory wars; these are not the only lines of debate, but they are important ones.

### AT Perm – Do Both

#### 3. The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 3-4]

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1

It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis **relate not only to the** most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, **but also to their available** (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, **but also their mainstream critique**s - whether they take the form **of liberal policy approaches** in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement **about major concepts**, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically **wards off critique.**

### Link Walll

#### They prompt resistance and create a permanent state of conflict

**Chernus 6** (Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program – University of Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, p. 53-54)

The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it won’t stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons’ efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has “unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended.” Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: “For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.”39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that don’t. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. It’s no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a “secret plan” for world conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer “a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution.” They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: “We should not try to convince people that things are getting better.” Michael Ledeen: “The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.”40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons’ fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a **permanent state of conflict**, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the “manly virtues” of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The neocons’ story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy. Just as neocons need monsters abroad, they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget). The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it, and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a “window of vulnerability.” The quest for strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

#### This lends ideological support to mass violence and recreate their harms

John Collins, Assistant Professor of Global Studies at St. Lawrence University, and Ross Glover, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002 (Collateral Language, p. 6-7)

The Real Effects of LanguageAs any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

#### Culminates in planetary annihilation

**Dallymayr 4** (Fred, Professor of Philosophy and Political Science – University of Notre Dame, “The Underside of Modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel”, Constellations, 11(1))

What Dussel here calls asymmetry is otherwise often called hegemony – or else the onset of a new global imperialism (involving the rule of the “West” over the “Rest”). In such a situation, nothing can be more important and salutary than the cultivation of global critical awareness, of critical counter-discourses willing and able to call into question the presumptions of global imperial rule. The dangers of such totalizing domination are becoming more evident every day. With the growing technological sophistication of weaponry we are relentlessly instructed about the underside of modernity, about the fateful collusion of power and knowledge in the unfolding of modern enlightenment (as analyzed by Adorno and Horkheimer). Coupled with the globalizing momentum, military sophistication greatly enhances the prospect of global warfare – indeed of **global “total” warfare** (as envisaged by Heidegger in the 1930s). Such warfare, moreover, is profiled against the backdrop of hegemonic asymmetry (as seen by Dussel): the vastly unequal possession of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In this situation, the goal of global warfare is bound to be the **“total” subjugation of** less developed or **subaltern societies** – a subjugation accomplished through longdistance military offensives capable of inflicting maximum casualties on enemies while minimizing the attackers’ costs.25 Given the intoxicating effects of global rule, must one not also anticipate corresponding levels of total depravity and corruption among the rulers? In fact, must one not fear the upsurge of a new breed of “global master criminals” (planetarische Hauptverbrecher) whose actions are likely to match those of their twentieth-century predecessors, and perhaps even surpass them (behind a new shield of immunity)? Armed with unparalleled nuclear devices and unheard-of strategic doctrines, global masters today cannot only control and subjugate populations, but in fact destroy and incinerate them (from high above). In the words of Arundhati Roy, addressed to the world’s imperial rulers:To slow a beast, you break its limbs. To slow a nation, you break its people; you rob them of volition. You demonstrate your absolute command over their destiny. You make it clear that ultimately it falls to you to decide who lives, who dies, who prospers, who doesn’t. To exhibit your capability you show off all that you can do, and how easily you can do it – how easily you could **press a button and annihilate the earth**.26

#### This scenario planning creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and reactionary militarization – turns the case and only the alt’ can solve

Guslits 11 Bayly Guslits Political Science Department University of Western Ontario “The War on Water: International Water Security” February 28, 2011http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/gradsymp11/Guslits.pdf

The world is facing a water crisis, but there is still much that can be done to address the problems causing the emergency. First, "securitization" of the water crisis can become a self-fulfilling prophecy if it is not approached from a holistic viewpoint that takes into consideration ecological, human and state water security needs. If academics and policymakers continue to debate over whether the "water wars" scenario will ever come true, states may take this as a cue to securitize and militarize their water resources, and this will certainly lead to political and even violent conflict. However, if instead policymakers and government leadership use a holistic and diplomatic approach to address ecological and human water needs sustainably, international water security can be achieved. Whether this approach is branded a "post-security" or "environmental security" paradigm, the ultimate goal lies in changing policy and practice to address the root causes of water scarcity, and thus ensure water availability for environmental and anthropogenic purposes.

#### Be highly skeptical – Western representations exaggerate Central Asian threats

Heathershaw and Megoran, 11 – Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, working on the politics of aid and conflict resolution in Central Asia; and political geography lecturer at Newcastle Univerity, in the school of Geography, Politics and Sociology (John and Nick, 6/16. Central Asia: the discourse of danger,” <http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/john-heathershaw-nick-megoran/central-asia-discourse-of-danger>.)

Question: What do a recently-released International Crisis Group report (‘Tajikistan: the changing insurgent threats’) and the latest Red River computer game (‘Operation Flashpoint’) have in common? Answer: They both feature Islamist insurgents infiltrating Tajikistan and posing a threat to Western security. In fact such portrayals of Central Asia are commonplace in the West, from popular culture to the quasi-academic work of policy analysts. In research conducted since the 1990s, we have charted how UK and US representations of Central Asia routinely present it as especially dangerous, fusing the traditional insecurities of the Orient to dysfunctional post-Soviet authoritarianism.  This has elicited a small debate on the margins of Central Asian studies about the significance of the discourse of danger. In response, we wrote a paper on the subject that was presented at Chatham House and recently published in the journal International Affairs (‘Contesting danger: a new agenda for policy and scholarship on Central Asia’), outlining three features of the Western discourse of danger on Central Asia.  By ‘Western discourse of danger on Central Asia’ we mean how Western policy, popular and even academic accounts identify Central Asia as obscure, ethnically and politically fractious, essentially Oriental and—for these reasons—dangerous.  Typically, Central Asia is spuriously identified as a source of a considerable Islamic terrorist threat as in the recent International Crisis Group report on Tajikistan. It can also mean that ethnic conflict is misread and great power conflict is assumed where in fact it may not exist.  Why does the overlap between popular culture and policy analysis matter?  The link we make between computer games and policy reports may seem trite. Surely these are incommensurable genres of discourse for quite diverse audiences and with wholly different intentions? Surely one is primarily for the entertainment of adolescent males, and the other seeks serious understanding in order to change policy?  We should not be too quick to dismiss the effect of popular culture on policy making. Many of the Western military misadventures which have been undertaken since the end of the Cold War may have been made more likely by the feeling of interconnectedness generated by new technologies and cultural forms such as the internet. The portrayal of the military and intelligence services in the era of the ‘war on terror’ are often critical, but most ascribe to governments an ability to get things done which far exceeds what is practically possible in a globalised world.  There are three reasons why popular culture matters in policymaking, and which justify the making of links between forms of representations from quite different genres.  Firstly, there is the basic point that in Western democracies government are more or less responsive to public opinion. If citizens feel Afghanistan is an essentially dangerous place then they are more likely to accept the problematic argument of their governments that threats to the West will continue to come from that country unless we offer military support to a government we have placed in power.  On the other hand, public interest in Central Asia is so limited that few votes are cast and few letters are sent to MPs on the basis of concern about the region. Public opinion only indirectly affects foreign policy and we should not overstate the link between the two. In many respects it is the effect of popular culture on those that do research and make decisions, in governments and non-governmental organisations, that is most significant. Secondly, the dearth of knowledge on the region amongst so-called experts means that popular culture and quasi-academic studies have greater significance. Misguided applications of the ‘great game’ or the idea of Muslim radicalisation are frequently left unchallenged.   Moreover, even powerful Western governments have relatively few people with knowledge of the region and its languages. Area studies has been in decline for decades and nowhere is the phenomenon more acute than Central Asia where there was very little knowledge of the region even during the Cold War when funding was poured into the development of Sovietology.   Finally, and most importantly, knowledge is produced interpretatively. This means that where ideas about the region emerge that associate it with conflict, Islamism and great power conflict they are often difficult to shift even when academic knowledge seems to refute these claims.

### Case is a Lie

#### Prefer our evidence – the Aff is epistemologically bankrupt. Their evidence is manufactured and distorted by the threat industry.

Pieterse 7 (Jan, Professor of Sociology – University of Illinois (Urbana), “Political and Economic Brinkmanship”, Review of International Political Economy, 14(3), p. 473)

Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of ‘deniability’ the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, ‘stuff happens’. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.

### Risk Calc

#### Prefer our disjunctive scenarios to their short-term conjunctive scenarios.

Eliezer **Yudkowsky**, 8/31/**2006**. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks,” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.

The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, **adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable**. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." **Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security**, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, **people tend to overestimate the probability that**, e.g., **seven events of 90% probability will all occur**. Conversely, **people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur**. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

#### Security necessitates calculation – causes instrumentalization of beings – that outweighs

**Burke 2007** lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, “What security makes possible,” Working Paper 2007 p.11-12

Even if threats are credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legial innovation in counter-terrorism policy. And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that systematically dehumanized their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungreivable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’. If nothing else, it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitization theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalacy. The existential threat of human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a very different policy logic than outlined by the Copenhagen School. As Rocanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. This would seem to be implicit in the way Waever, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with ontological grounding. There he states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist’:

## 1NR – Case, Consult CP

### Impact Defense

#### No great power involvement in Africa

Barrett 5 (Robert, Ph.D. Student in the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies – University of Calgary, “Understanding the Challenges of African Democratization through Conflict Analysis”, 6-1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=726162)

Westerners eager to promote democracy must be wary of African politicians who promise democratic reform without sincere commitment to the process. Offering money to corrupt leaders in exchange for their taking small steps away from autocracy may in fact be a way of pushing countries into anocracy. As such, world financial lenders and interventionists who wield leverage and influence must take responsibility in considering the ramifications of African nations who adopt democracy in order to maintain elite political privileges. The obvious reason for this, aside from the potential costs in human life should conflict arise from hastily constructed democratic reforms, is the fact that Western donors, in the face of intrastate war would then be faced with channeling funds and resources away from democratization efforts and toward conflict intervention based on issues of human security. This is a problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa hotspots after experiencing firsthand the unpredictable and unforgiving nature of societal warfare in both Somalia and Rwanda. On a costbenefit basis, the West continues to be somewhat **reluctant to get to get involved in Africa’s** dirty **wars**, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without having intervened, the United States, recently using the label ‘genocide’ in the context of the Sudanese conflict (in September of 2004), has only proclaimed sanctions against Sudan, while dismissing any suggestions at actual intervention (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that traditional military and diplomatic approaches at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires have yielded little in Africa. **No powerful nations want to get embroiled** in conflicts they cannot win – especially those conflicts in which the intervening nation has **very little interest**.

#### Shocks cause cooperation – not escalation

Collins and Wohlforth 4 (Kathleen, Professor of Political Science – Notre Dame and William, Professor of Government – Dartmouth, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations”, Strategic Asia 2003-4: Fragility and Crisis, p. 312-313)

Conclusion The popular great game lens for analyzing Central Asia fails to capture the declared interests of the great powers as well as the best reading of their objective interests in security and economic growth. Perhaps more importantly, it fails to explain their actual behavior on the ground, as well the specific reactions of the Central Asian states themselves. Naturally, there are competitive elements in great power relations. Each country’s policymaking community has slightly different preferences for tackling the challenges presented in the region, and the more influence they have the more able they are to shape events in concordance with those preferences. But these clashing preferences concern the means to serve ends that all the great powers share. To be sure, policy-makers in each capital would prefer that their own national firms or their own government’s budget be the beneficiaries of any economic rents that emerge from the exploitation and transshipment of the region’s natural resources. But the scale of these rents is marginal even for Russia’s oil-fueled budget. And for taxable profits to be created, the projects must make sense economically—something that is determined more by markets and firms than governments. Does it matter? The great game is an arresting metaphor that serves to draw people’s attention to an oft-neglected region. The problem is the great-game lens can distort realities on the ground, and therefore bias analysis and policy. For when great powers are locked in a competitive fight, the issues at hand matter less than their implication for the relative power of contending states. Power itself becomes the issue—one that tends to be nonnegotiable. Viewing an essential positive-sum relationship through zero sum conceptual lenses will result in missed opportunities for cooperation that leaves all players—not least the people who live in the region—poorer and more insecure. While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least conditional and relative optimism. Given the confluence of their chief strategic interests, the major powers are in a better position to serve as a stabilizing force than analogies to the Great Game or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress that the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror attacks was increased cooperation between local governments and China and Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less cooperation among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that “great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’ relations that have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.

### Global Basing – 1NC

#### Global backlash towards US forward posture is occurring now because of weak military-community relations

Smith 6 (Sheila A., “Social Change and New Citizen Voices,” *Shifting Terrain: the Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia*, East-West Center, Special Report No. 8, March, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/misc/SR00805SocialChange.pdf)

These women's groups, along with a growing number of scholars, have shed light on what was the dark underside of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Prostituted women, bar workers, and, in some cases, even those who married U.S. servicemen were abandoned by mainstream society and have been portrayed as women unworthy of the protection and advocacy of the state. With changing norms regarding women's rights in each of these societies, there is greater interest in providing relief for the victims of violence and in economically empowering women. Both of these goals play a significant role in high-lighting the particular experiences of the women that have lived alongside the U.S. military. Today, there is much wider and more receptive audience for the ideas and the goal advocated by these women's groups, and the transnational connections between them have become a source of resources as well as learning. They have raised the consciousness of national and international audiences regarding the visible and underappreciated consequences of a sustained foreign troop presence on the human rights of women. In terms of the policy debate over U.S. military bases, it is clear that the past government practice of sanctioning networks of "entertainment" and prostitution in Japan, SOuth Korea, and the Phillippines is increasingly problematic. In South Korea, for example, prostitution in these countries. Again, South Korea was the first of the three societies hosting U.S. forces to pass an anti-trafficking law, and there is intense pressure from the U.S. government for Japan to do the same. Pressure on national governments to address women's rights and security concerns within base communities, therefore, is coming from two directions: from grassroots activism of women's centers in the base communities and from transnational efforts to address the exploitation of women as part of a human rights agenda. Broader currents of social and economic change are **exposing the concerns of those who live in proximity to U.S. bases**. Civil society activism has played a central role in recasting the national debate on issues such as discrimination and human rights, and this has **implication for the way in which local community relations with the U.S. military are being viewed**. In each of the three countries, the circumstances of local communities were for decades far removed from the day-to-day experiences of urban residents. But today, these once peripheral areas and the experiences of their residents are as accessible to national audiences as events in Tokyo, Seoul, or Manila. Media coverage, civil society activism, and a greater interest in seeing what happens to any citizens in their interactions with the U.S. military as a national experience suggests that local communities may no longer be as isolated as they once were.

### Perm Do Both – 2NC

#### Doesn’t solve the net-benefit –

#### 1) Top-down approach –

#### A) Genuine consultation’s key to military-community relations – the perm is a top-down approach driven by military leadership – fostering an equal and open relationship is key – that’s 1NC Gray Evidence

#### B) The perm maintain military plan’s as the primary consideration

DOD 4 (Federal Register, 2/12, http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JCVMA/Documents/JCVMArpt.pdf)

(k) A few commentors asked the Department to give priority to relocating activities within the same state or local community. The Department recognizes that the economic impact of BRAC reductions can be lessened by moving functions to geographically proximate locations. As specified in the BRAC legislation, however, military value must be the primary consideration when making these decisions. Specifically, those factors that are set out in criteria one through four are the most important considerations when selecting receiving locations.

[NOTE: from BRAC website, “Welcome to the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission's official website. Our goal is to assist the American public, including interested stakeholders, to fully understand the open and transparent process through which our work is conducted”]

#### That destroys any signal sent by the CP

Sugarman 5 (Jeremy, Harvey M. Meyerhoff Professor of Bioethics and Medicine, professor of medicine, professor of health policy and management, and deputy director for medicine of the Berman Institute of Bioethics at the Johns Hopkins University, “Ethical Goals of Community Consultation in Research,” American Journal of Public Health, July; 95(7): 1123–1127, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449329/)

Rather than soliciting input, community consent involves soliciting approval or permission to conduct a study within a community. Community consent may occur after community consultation and does not obviate the need for individual consent.36,37 Rather, the community decides whether to permit investigators to solicit participation from community members. For community consent to be valid, there must be a legitimate political system in place, with representatives properly empowered to make such decisions on behalf of the community.37,38 In many aboriginal communities, such legitimate systems exist. However, disease-based communities and many social groups typically lack a political structure, which makes community consent inappropriate.37,38 Although conceptually distinct, the line between community consultation and community consent is inevitably blurred in practice. It would be **disingenuous to enter into a consulting arrangement** where the consulting party does not intend, ex ante, to take the consultants’ advice. If relevant consultants have strong negative reactions or **endorse particular modifications**, those reactions or modifications have significant moral force and warrant respect and careful consideration, even though investigators may sometimes justifiably act contrary to such opinions. Otherwise, community consultation is merely symbolic.39 Despite the clear conceptual distinction between consent and consultation, the degree to which consultants’ support is necessary represents a persistent challenge.15,16,29

#### 2) The perm is a one-size fits all approach – tailored and genuine consultation are key

Origin 12 (“Origin Energy’s Response - to the Draft NSW Planning Guidelines: Wind Farms,” 3-14, Department of Planning and Infrastructure, <http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yjWiCDme6F4%3D&> tabid=205&mid=1081&language=en-US)

Consultation with local authorities, such as council, would also assist in developing a community engagement plan that is appropriate for the project and the local area. Local authorities can also assist in facilitating the dissemination of project information and identify opportunities to maximise public participation. 9 The lengthy nature of wind farm developments means that it is likely multiple community engagement plans may be required to meet the differing engagement needs of different stages of a project. The objectives, tools and methods, frequency of contact and engagement activities should be tailored to each stage. At the appropriate times, seeking specific feedback from stakeholders and/or surveys with the local community would help inform preferred consultation methods and frequency. It is anticipated that the community engagement plan would be revised and updated regularly to incorporate stakeholder feedback and changes to the project. Implementation of the plan and evidence of its implementation should be included in the assessment process. A typical stage-by-stage community engagement approach has been included in Appendix A as a reference. Comments on the Draft Guidelines Origin agrees with the Government’s objectives expressed in the Draft Guidelines that “a comprehensive, detailed and genuine community consultation and engagement process must occur, and that consultation needs to be genuine and aimed at identifying and considering options for eliminating or reducing impacts, not merely informing communities”. However, every community is unique. Different communities may have **different preferences on how they wish to receive information and engage**. Indeed, no one community is a homogenous entity and it is reasonable to expect that an effective consultation program would be **tailored to meet the different needs for different sections/stakeholders within the community**. As described earlier, information and consultation requirements during the life of a wind farm (from development, construction to operation and decommissioning) vary greatly. Our experience is that attempts at adopting a one-size-fits-all approach usually fails to deliver on effective community consultation.

#### Independently – that turns hegemony

Schaffer 12 (Douglas J., National Security Analyst with AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare, “Linking Latin America and the Pacific: A Strategy for the Long Term,” National Security Watch, 12(3), July, http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw\_pubs/nationalsecuritywatch/Documents/NSW\_12-3\_web.pdf)

The second benefit is a subset of the United States countering Chinese military presence in Latin America. By taking a nation-by-nation approach, the United States can properly contextualize and **tailor its military efforts** with Latin America. This is an opportunity for the United States to focus on the non-kinetic aspects of its new defense guidance. Mexico and Colombia may very well need continued hard-power-related resourcing and support from the United States; however, not every nation is consumed by a counternarcotics campaign. The humanitarian relief/ rescue, disaster response, capacity building and even cybersecurity requirements are just as valid for South and Central American nations. 18 A tailored approach will let the United States lev**erage its military as an institution rather than just as a force**. The United States military has levels of expertise, experience and professionalism in many functional areas—such as logistics or personnel—that China cannot match. More joint training exercises, more officer embedding and exchanges, more professional education and more noncombat operations focus (both in equipping/sales and training) will show U.S. allies that the United States takes seriously the nuances of each nation and will force the United States to pay more than lip service to the non-counterterror aspects of its strategic guidance. By being an attentive and responsive security partner that demonstrates a valuation of relationships over material, the United States can contrast itself to China in terms of reliability, longevity and long-term aims for each nation.

#### 3) Genuine consultation generates long term trust between the base and local population

Savage 10 (Melissa, tracks military base issues for NCSL, “Lawmakers are looking for ways to resolve land-use conflicts between civilian communities and military bases,” National Conference of State Legislatures, March, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/making-peace-article.aspx)

Working Together **Keeping information flowing** to the community regarding training and missions can help build and strengthen the relationships between local residents and the military, says John Conger, deputy undersecretary for Installations and the Environment with the Department of Defense. “It’s important to raise awareness that what’s happening in the community can affect what happens on the base and what’s happening on the base can affect the community. **Working together in partnership is a win-win**.” Establishing a solid foundation for a successful long-term relationship between the military installation and the community is paramount, given the short-term nature of military post appointments and the election cycle facing many government officials. “Base commanders and elected officials tend to have short-term perspectives given the very nature of their positions,” says Kansas Representative Tom Sloan. “Commanders generally are stationed at the base for a relatively short period of time—usually no longer than two to three years. And elected officials are subject to term limits in some states, and at the very least, elections every few years. “Because of this tendency to focus on the short term, it’s important that legislators and base commanders work together to put a framework in place that ensures the long-term success of the relationship so future base commanders and elected officials can hit the ground running.” Sloan also points out that military bases with strong community partnerships and a plan to minimize civilian impact on training are less likely to be closed. To help foster these relationships, the Department of Defense has a program known as the Readiness and Environmental Protection Initiative. This initiative leverages federal money with local community funding to acquire land that will serve as a buffer between the installation—and its training missions—and the homes, businesses, schools and other community areas surrounding the base. The added benefit is that, in many cases, the community ends up with a significant portion of land that will remain undeveloped forever. This protected land also provides a home for wildlife, and maybe even endangered species like the golden-cheeked warbler.

### Perm Do CP 2NC

#### 1) Perm’s impossible – the CP is plan-minus – it doesn’t approve the plan in the instances in which relevant communities say no

#### 2) The CP is functionally distinct –

#### A) Mutually exclusive – military leaders must choose between independence and open communication

Eriksen 3 (Jan, Rear Admiral – NATO, “NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE,” June, AJP-9, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf)

Communication. Effective communication with civil authorities, agencies, organisations and populations is vital to maintaining consent and cooperation. Differences between military and civilian organisations - whether perceived or otherwise- **require an investment in time and understanding to overcome**. Civilian organisations with which the military will deal are likely to pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take the view that co-operation with the military and independence are mutually exclusive. The key to minimising these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication. Clear and effective measures to establish and maintain these communication channels through CIMIC staffs with representatives of appropriate civilian organisations and lead agencies should be developed to avoid potential disruptions and misunderstandings. As civilian organisations continue to arrive throughout the operation, they should be encouraged to adapt to the established system.

#### B) Minor modifications – the plan ignores requested modifications like noise reductions, which they’ll ask for.

DOD 4 (Federal Register, 2/12, http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JCVMA/Documents/JCVMArpt.pdf)

(d) The Department did not receive any requests from local governments that a particular installation be closed or realigned pursuant to section 2914(b)(2) of Public Law 101–510, which states that the Secretary shall consider any notice received from a local government in the vicinity of a military installation that the local government would approve of the closure or realignment of the installation. A few private citizens, **however**, asked that a particular installation be closed or that operations be restricted to limit noise or other community impacts.

#### 3) Severs the funding mechanism

#### A) Procurement contracts are locked-in – can’t allow for changes like the CP

GL 12 (GovLoop, “How to Fix Procurement with Technology,” 7-13, http://www.govloop.com/profiles/blogs/how-to-fix-procurement-with-technology)

What do you see as the biggest challenges with the procurement process? Time & Burden Factor - I think the most immediate challenge with procurement is the time it takes to get from recognizing a need to final delivery. Even if agencies manage to get the budget and resources they need, they may not have the required lead time for procurements that are critical for their mission. Budgets and support contracts are often locked in way in advance **of a mission change or new mandate**, and acquiring something quickly may sacrifice (more time consuming) open competition and reduce the chance the most possible vendors to compete for business. Worse, agencies may just ignore a policy or opportunity because of the burden of the procurement cycle.

#### B) That’s true of any alternative financing mechanism that uses the military

O’Rourke and Schwartz 12 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs – CRS, and Moshe, Specialist in Defense Acquisition – CRS, “Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 6-27, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41909.pdf)

Funding Approaches vs. Contracting Mechanisms In discussing MYP and BBC, it can be helpful to distinguish funding approaches from contracting mechanisms. The two are often mixed together in discussions of DOD acquisition, sometimes leading to confusion. Stated briefly: • Funding approaches are ways that Congress can appropriate funding for weapon procurement programs, so that DOD can then **put them under contract**. Examples of funding approaches include traditional full funding (the standard or default approach), incremental funding, and advance appropriations. 2 Any of these funding approaches might make use of **advance procurement** (AP) funding. 3 • Contracting mechanisms are ways for DOD to contract for the procurement of weapons systems, once funding for those systems has been appropriated by Congress. Examples of contracting mechanisms include annual contracting (the standard or default approach), MYP, and BBC. The use of a particular funding approach in a defense acquisition program does not dictate the use of a particular contracting mechanism. Defense acquisition programs consequently can be implemented using various combinations of funding approaches and contracting mechanisms. Most DOD weapon acquisition programs use a combination of traditional full funding and annual contracting. A few programs, particularly certain Navy shipbuilding programs, use incremental funding as their funding approach. A limited number of DOD programs use MYP as their contracting approach, and to date at least two defense acquisition programs (both Navy shipbuilding programs) use or have used BBC as their contracting approach.

[Continues to Footnote]

For more on these three funding approaches, see CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy— Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett, and CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Advance appropriations, which are not to be confused with advance procurement (AP) funding (see footnote 3), are essentially a legislatively locked-in form of incremental funding. Unlike incremental funding, advance appropriations qualify under budgeting regulations as a form of full funding.

#### C) “Increase” means the incentives must be actualized, not simply proposed

**HEFC 4** (Higher Education Funding Council, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtchar/1> 67/167we98.htm# n43)

9.1 The Draft Bill creates an obligation on the principal regulator to do all that it "reasonably can to meet the compliance objective in relation to the charity".[ 45] The Draft Bill defines the compliance objective as "to increase compliance by the charity trustees with their legal obligations in exercising control and management of the administration of the charity".[ 46] 9.2 Although the word "increase" is used in relation to the functions of a number of statutory bodies,[47] such examples demonstrate that "increase" is used in relation to considerations to be taken into account in the exercise of a function, rather than an **objective** in itself. 9.3 HEFCE is concerned that an obligation on principal regulators to "increase" compliance per se is unworkable, in so far as it does not adequately define the limit**s** or nature of the statutory duty. Indeed, the obligation could be considered to be ever-increasing.

#### Severance is bad – makes the aff a moving target and makes it impossible for the neg to have stable ground. Aff conditionality is worse because it causes shifty, late-breaking debate. Stick them to the plan text – it’s a vital access point to negative preparation, both pre-round and pre-tournament.

#### 4) Severs normal means – they use the DoD which precludes tailored approaches like the CP

DOD 4 (Federal Register, 2/12, http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JCVMA/Documents/JCVMArpt.pdf)

(e) A few commentors expressed concern over the broad nature of the criteria and requested greater detail, including in some cases requests for definitions, specificity regarding select functions, and explanations of when a closure as opposed to a realignment was appropriate. While the Department appreciates a desire for detail, the inherent mission diversity of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies makes it impossible for DoD to specify detailed criteria that could be applied to all installations and functions within the Department. Broad criteria allow flexibility of application across a wide range of functions within the Department.

#### 5) It tests “resolved” which means “to make a firm decision”, and “should” which is “used to imply obligation or duty” – that’s American Heritage.

#### “Substantial” means that the plan must be definite, mandated

Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain: absolute: real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### ‘Should’ necessitates that the plan is mandatory and immediate

Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

### Say Yes – 2NC

#### Framing issue – they have ZERO Evidence that is specific to communities that are adjacent to military bases. Our Savage evidence says they would support keep military bases because of economic benefits when there is open dialogue.

#### More reasons –

#### A) It provides critical services

King 11 (Marcus, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf)

Typically, transmission lines transfer electricity at high voltages over long distances to minimize loss; electricity distribution systems carry medium voltages. For electrical power transmission, very little additional infrastructure is required to incorporate small nuclear power plants because they would be located on or near the DoD installation being serviced. However, redundancy in transmission lines would make the overall network more robust. Electricity control capabilities, such as self-healing 6 and optimization of assets to increase operational efficiency, could improve overall power availability; however, they are not necessary for the integration of small nuclear power plants. Key components for improving electricity control include advanced electricity meters and electricity meter data management. These tools are needed in order to establish islanding, a condition in which a portion of the utility system, which contains both load and generation, is isolated from the remainder of the utility system and continues to operate. Since the power generation capacities of small nuclear power plants are larger than required for most DoD bases, islanding could extend to adjacent communities if sufficient technical upgrades were performed to systems outside of the installation. This contributes to DoD missions because civilians and service members working on the installation often live with their families in adjacent communities. The power would ensure that **critical services such as emergency response, waste water treatment, and hospitals** could be maintained.

#### B) Economics

DOD 4 (Federal Register, 2/12, http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JCVMA/Documents/JCVMArpt.pdf)

(j) A few commentors cautioned the Department against using the authority provided by section 2914(c) to close and retain installations in inactive status because of the negative effect such action might have on the relevant local community. The Department recognizes that job creation gained through the economic reuse of facilities is critically important to mitigate the negative impact of BRAC recommendations. As such, the Department will exercise the utmost caution and consideration when exercising its authority to retain installations in an inactive status. It should be noted that the Department has always had this authority, even though its appearance in the authorizing legislation for the 2005 round would indicate it is a new authority. As such, the Department’s actions in the four previous base closure rounds demonstrate that it will be exercised judiciously.

[NOTE: from BRAC website, “Welcome to the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission's official website. Our goal is to assist the American public, including interested stakeholders, to fully understand the open and transparent process through which our work is conducted”]

#### All of this is true DESPITE Fukushima – prefer our studies

Phuong 12 (Nguyen, Officer – Department of Nuclear Science & Technology Management, “Public Communication Programme for the First Nuclear Power Project,” Ministry of Science and Technology – Vietnam Atomic Energy Agency, January, http://www.iaea.org/nuclearpower/downloads/infrastructure/meetings/2012-01-tm-ws-vienna/day-1/8.publiccommunicationprogramme-for-the-first-npp-nvphuong.pdf)

Results

• **Active support** from majority of local communities to the Project, some even urge to accelerate the Project

• Official agreement to the Project from the People’s Committees (local authority) of all three levels: Phuoc Dinh & Vinh Hai communes (sites for 2 first NPPs); Ninh Phuoc (now Thuan Nam) & Ninh Hai districts; Ninh Thuan Province

• **Continuous public understanding and support , even after Fukushima Accident**

#### C) Non-material benefits

Phuong 12 (Nguyen, Officer – Department of Nuclear Science & Technology Management, “Public Communication Programme for the First Nuclear Power Project,” Ministry of Science and Technology – Vietnam Atomic Energy Agency, January, http://www.iaea.org/nuclearpower/downloads/infrastructure/meetings/2012-01-tm-ws-vienna/day-1/8.publiccommunicationprogramme-for-the-first-npp-nvphuong.pdf)

Nuclear power as an engine for national economic development

– Energy security

– Reasonable answer to energy problems in the future

– Solution to improve the national position in the international community

• Benefits of nuclear power projects to the local communities

– Material and non-material benefits

– Local socio-economic development