# 1NC

## Off

### Cyberterror 1NC

#### Immigration will pass, but status quo is goldilocks—Obama’s behind-the-scene PC is key

Sink 3-26 (Justin, Correspondent, “After Taking Hit in the Polls, Obama Pivots Back to Immigration Reform,” The Hill, 2013, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/290249-after-taking-hit-in-the-polls-obama-pivots-back-to-immigration)

The White House hopes to bolster President Obama’s political standing by shifting attention from the bruising budget battles of the last month to immigration reform and gun control. Democrats welcome the pivot after watching Obama’s standing in polls fall amid fights with Congress over the budget and the automatic spending cuts known as the sequester. They see immigration and gun reform as a better playing field for Obama that could provide political wins for the president. “What the public wants to see right now is him achieving things, leading,” said Tad Devine, a former strategist to Secretary of State John Kerry and former Vice President Gore. “For him, there's real opportunity on all these fronts, and… realistically in the next six months, he can have progress he can bring back to the American people.” On gun control, Obama will travel the country to bolster the case for strengthening background checks on gun purchases. Obama is expected to play an active role in the looming Senate fight over what Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) has described as the “sweet spot” of legislation. A poll released Friday from Quinnipiac University shows that 88 percent of respondents support an expansion of background checks on new weapons purchases. Other provisions banning straw sales and improving gun research programs and school security funding garner similarly commanding poll advantages. "There actually is a lot of strong support for the proposals that the president has put forward, whether it's universal background checks, whether it is, you know, outlawing gun trafficking or straw purchasers," White House spokesman Josh Earnest said. "There's even some support out there in the public for the assault weapons ban." Yet, the assault weapons ban doesn't have the votes to pass the Senate, and neither does background checks — unless a bipartisan deal is reached. Immigration is a better issue for the president, partly because a growing number of Republicans want to pass a bill in the 113th Congress. While Republicans in Congress had little reason to negotiate with Obama on preventing the sequester, they do have reason to offer concessions on immigration. "Immigration reform in particular is something clearly that Latinos and the American public as a whole signaled they wanted in the last election, and Republicans ought to get on the right side of that issue," said Democratic strategist Jamal Simmons. "It doesn't seem like complicated math, and Republicans are basically deciding, do they want to be a House-based party, or do they want to be a national party that competes for the presidency and competes for the control of the Senate?" Moreover, immigration reform — which failed in the George W. Bush administration — would be Obama's most significant legislative achievement behind healthcare reform. “If the administration were able to get an immigration bill that looked anything like comprehensive immigration reform after President Bush had failed on it, President Clinton had failed on it, every president back to Reagan had failed, it would be a big deal,” said Cal Jillson, a political science professor at Southern Methodist University. Democrats are worried that Obama hasn't had a lot of signing ceremonies in 2013 as unresolved budget battles have hit the president's approval ratings. Obama's healthy post-election advantage on the economy has dwindled into a virtual tie with congressional Republicans. Voters equally blame Obama and the GOP for the sequester, which is expected to hit in full force in the coming weeks. “It goes back to a sense in Washington that things aren't getting done,” Devine said. “No matter whose fault that is, when you're president, the buck stops here.” Obama faces a delicate high-wire act on guns and immigration: Claim too much ownership for an issue, and swing-state Republicans who had been considering working with the White House might buck; Sit too far back, and risk losing steam on policy initiatives — or allowing Republicans to take credit. “In both of those policy areas, the president is involving himself carefully, allowing what appears to be some momentum in Congress to manage the issues,” Jillson said. “The president's involvement is modest, if not behind the scenes, because there is still enough post-election bad blood among the House GOP that direct presidential involvement drives away support.”

#### This is really unpopular – costs PC

Kozubek 11 (Jim Kozubek. Synaptic Dynamics, Inc, 11/4/2011,"Airborne Wind Energy Industry Struggles To Fly", idealab.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/11/airborne-wind-energy-industry-struggles-to-take-off.php)

“It is important to the overall U.S. airborne wind energy effort that Makani Power is successful in carrying out the work for the grant awarded” says PJ Shepard, secretary for industry group Airborne Wind Energy Consortium, and a spokesperson for California-based Sky WindPower, another company developing such a glider. One hurdle the nascent industry has to surmount, as most emerging technologies and industries do, is regulation. The Federal Aviation Administration is currently weighing a decision as to whether to allow such tethered gliders to operate. So far a ruling appears at least a year away, Shepard said. For its part, Makani to date has burned through most of its working capital, and is nearing completion of its 18-month ARPA-E grant-funded pilot project. And while the nascent industry awaits an FAA ruling, investors have been skittish of sinking capital into technology. Sky WindPower was named by TIME Magazine as one of the top 50 top inventions of 2008, but has yet to land investment capital; Dmitri Cherny, founder of energy glider developer Highest Wind, was the darling of New Hampshire’s Speed Venture Summit in 2009, only to come away empty-handed from scores of meetings in venture capital circuits in New Hampshire and South Carolina. “There have been only a few limited proofs of aspects of whole concepts because these are expensive undertakings requiring more than just angel and vc support,” Shepard said. “As with development of all new energy supplies and the systems to support the capture of energy that have preceded this new energy field, governments will have to provide additional support.” Whether justified or not, the current environment for that kind of support doesn’t look encouraging. The emerging clean tech sector now faces a more skeptical public and congress in the wake of the bankruptcy of the solar panel company Solyndra. And DOE and ARPA-E’s loan programs are under investigation by the department’s inspector general.

#### Immigration reform generates an effective base of IT experts.

**McLarty 9** (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States. We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward. MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### That deters and solves the impact to cyberattacks

**Saydjari 8** (O. Sami, Cyber Defense Agency, LLC, “Structuring for Strategic Cyber Defense: A Cyber Manhattan Project Blueprint”, 2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, http://www.acsac.org/2008/program /keynotes/saydjari.pdf)

As a step toward a security research plan that includes such capabilities, we should identify endstates— goals in terms of how we want our systems to ideally operate. This fresh perspective includes the overall strategic picture and connects clearly with strategic actions that significantly mitigate strategic vulnerabilities. If, for example, the nation has a capability to quickly recover its critical information infrastructure, then the end-state is that strategic attack damages are mitigated and critical services are restored quickly, possibly deterring adversaries from attempting a future attack. Desired End-States. The National Cyber Defense Initiative (NCDI) Opening Moves Workshop [4] identified important end-states, the outcome of a 10- year research effort to create critical capabilities. The following end-states appear in the workshop proceedings: --Continuity of Critical Information Infrastructure Operations. Create technology that would be the basis for a resilient US cyber infrastructure that would sustain critical functions in the face of attacks, including those that could be affected by determined adversaries. --Well-Defended Critical Assets. Make it economically prohibitive for an adversary to cause strategic damage to critical US infrastructures. Currently, adversaries can attack critical systems without investing substantial resources.

**Nuclear war.**

**Lawson 9** (Sean, Assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, *Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict Escalation*, May 13th 2009, http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477)

Introduction At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, “The Problem with Cyber War,” that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States. He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalation–i.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call “**cross-domain responses**” to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that “The best thing that you could possibly do if you want to start **World War III** is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about cyber war like it’s a practical thing, what they’re really doing is messing with the OK button for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k up.” [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversary’s ability to make rational decisions could backfire. [3] For example, Gregory Witol cautions that “attacking the decision makerÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s ability to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolveÃ¢â‚¬Â¦ Removing the capacity for rational action may result in completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been.” [4] Ã¯Â»Â¿Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern. It’s not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary. What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that “kinetic attacks” (i.e. physical use of force) are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks. Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a **nuclear response** is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a “domain of warfare” equivalent to air, land, sea, and space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary. But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define “cyber attacks” (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war. But what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains? It retaliates. But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked. Rather, responses are typically “cross-domain responses”–i.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military “way of warfare” that emphasizes multidimensional, “joint” operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of “kinetic action” in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]: Of course, the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in “cross-domain response.” And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. **defense policy documents**. From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): “The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical ‘weapons’. They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.” [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, “Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible. It also sets a relevant scale–a cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness.” [7] Asked by the New York Times to comment on this, U.S. defense officials would not deny that nuclear retaliation remains an option for response to a massive cyberattack: “Pentagon and military officials confirmed that the United States reserved the option to respond in any way it chooses to punish an adversary responsible for a catastrophic cyberattack. While the options could include the use of nuclear weapons, officials said, such an extreme counterattack was hardly the most likely response.” [8] The rationale for this policy: “Thus, the United States never declared that it would be bound to respond to a Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional invasion with only American and NATO conventional forces. The fear of escalating to a nuclear conflict was viewed as a pillar of stability and is credited with helping deter the larger Soviet-led conventional force throughout the cold war. Introducing the possibility of a nuclear response to a catastrophic cyberattack would be expected to serve the same purpose.” [9] Non-unique, Dangerous, and In-credible? There are a couple of interesting things to note in response. First is the development of a new acronym, WMD/E (weapons of mass destruction or effect). Again, this acronym indicates a weakening of the requirement of physical impacts. In this new definition, mass effects that are not necessarily physical, nor necessarily destructive, but possibly only disruptive economically or even psychologically (think “shock and awe”) are seen as equivalent to WMD. This new emphasis on effects, disruption, and psychology reflects both contemporary, but also long-held beliefs within the U.S. defense community. It reflects current thinking in U.S. military theory, in which it is said that U.S. forces should be able to “mass fires” and “mass effects” without having to physically “mass forces.” There is a sliding scale in which the physical (often referred to as the “kinetic”) gradually retreats–i.e. massed forces are most physical; massed fire is less physical (for the U.S. anyway); and massed effects are the least physical, having as the ultimate goal Sun Tzu’s “pinnacle of excellence,” winning without fighting. But the emphasis on disruption and psychology in WMD/E has also been a key component of much of 20th century military thought in the West. Industrial theories of warfare in the early 20th century posited that industrial societies were increasingly interdependent and reliant upon mass production, transportation, and consumption of material goods. Both industrial societies and the material links that held them together, as well as industrial people and their own internal linkages (i.e. nerves), were seen as increasingly fragile and prone to disruption via attack with the latest industrial weapons: airplanes and tanks. Once interdependent and fragile industrial societies were hopelessly disrupted via attack by the very weapons they themselves created, the nerves of modern, industrial men and women would be shattered, leading to moral and mental defeat and a loss of will to fight. Current thinking about the possible dangers of cyber attack upon the U.S. are based on the same basic premises: technologically dependent and therefore fragile societies populated by masses of people sensitive to any disruption in expected standards of living are easy targets. Ultimately, however, a number of researchers have pointed out the pseudo-psychological, pseudo-sociological, and a-historical (not to mention non-unique) nature of these assumptions. [10] Others have pointed out that these assumptions did not turn out to be true during WWII strategic bombing campaigns, that modern, industrial societies and populations were far more resilient than military theorists had assumed. [11] Finally, even some military theorists have questioned the assumptions behind cyber war, especially when assumptions about our own technology dependence-induced societal fragility (dubious on their own) are applied to other societies, especially non-Western societies (even more dubious). [12] Finally, where deterrence is concerned, it is important to remember that a deterrent has to be credible to be effective. True, the U.S. retained nuclear weapons as a deterrent during the Cold War. But, from the 1950s through the 1980s, there was increasing doubt among U.S. planners regarding the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence via the threat of “massive retaliation.” As early as the 1950s it was becoming clear that the U.S. would be reluctant at best to actually follow through on its threat of massive retaliation. Unfortunately, most money during that period had gone into building up the nuclear arsenal; conventional weapons had been marginalized. Thus, the U.S. had built a force it was likely never to use. So, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s saw the development of concepts like “flexible response” and more emphasis on building up conventional forces. This was the big story of the 1980s and the “Reagan build-up” (not “Star Wars”). Realizing that, after a decade of distraction in Vietnam, it was back in a position vis-a-viz the Soviets in Europe in which it would have to rely on nuclear weapons to offset its own weakness in conventional forces, a position that could lead only to blackmail or holocaust, the U.S. moved to create stronger conventional forces. [13] Thus, the question where cyber war is concerned: If it was in-credible that the U.S. would actually follow through with massive retaliation after a Soviet attack on the U.S. or Western Europe, is it really credible to say that the U.S. would respond with nuclear weapons to a cyber attack, no matter how disruptive or destructive? Beyond credibility, deterrence makes many other assumptions that are problematic in the cyber war context. It assumes an adversary capable of being deterred. Can most of those who would perpetrate a cyber attack be deterred? Will al-Qa’ida be deterred? How about a band of nationalistic or even just thrill-seeker, bandwagon hackers for hire? Second, it assumes clear lines of **command and control**. Sure, some hacker groups might be funded and assisted to a great degree by states. But ultimately, even cyber war theorists will admit that it is doubtful that states have complete control over their armies of hacker mercenaries. How will deterrence play out in this kind of scenario?

### **FI – Not Procurement – 1NC**

#### **Interpretation –** “financial incentives” are funding for investors to develop a project – that excludes nonfinancial incentives like procurement

**Czinkota et al, 9 -** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### **Violation – procurements are purchases that don’t motivate action – they just buy a technology that already exists**

Nelson 93 (Edward W., Chairman – Payment Subcommittee in OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 6-30, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4)

Definition of Financial Incentives A definition of terms is necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the distinction between "incentive" and "payment" since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, "incentives" do not amount to "purchases" and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

#### Prefer our interpretation –

#### A. Limits – they allow any aff that makes some technology more economically viable. Procurement can be applied to every technology and every industry – that explodes neg burden.

#### B. Neg ground – procurement moves the debate away from “how to motivate action” to just “doing the action” – this guts negative arguments about solvency, DA links, and CP competition based off private sector inducement.

### No New Affs – 1NC

#### Interpretation --- no new Affs at the NDT --- it’s a voting issue:

#### 1. Limits --- creates an infinite research burden, the topic is potentially huge, its better to refine and improve debates about existing arguments

#### 2. Education --- there’s little fact-checking until after the tournament, creates perverse incentives to distort the literature to get a strategic advantage

### 1NC Energy Security

#### Energy security militarizes energy – justifies intervention and causes serial policy failure

Ciuta 10 -- Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre of European Politics, School of Slavonic and East European Studies @ University College London, UK (Felix, 2010, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?" Security Dialogue 41(123), Sage)

Even casual observers will be familiar with the argument that energy is a security issue because it is either a cause or an instrument of war or conflict. Two different strands converge in this logic of energy security. The first strand focuses on energy as an instrument: energy is what states fight their current wars with. We can find here arguments regarding the use of the ‘energy weapon’ by supplier states (Belkin, 2007: 4; Lugar, 2006: 3; Winstone, Bolton & Gore, 2007: 1; Yergin, 2006a: 75); direct substitutions in which energy is viewed as the ‘equivalent of nuclear weapons’ (Morse & Richard, 2002: 2); and rhetorical associations that establish policy associations, as exemplified by the panel ‘Guns and Gas’ during the Transatlantic Conference of the Bucharest NATO Summit. The second strand comes from the literature on resource wars, defined as ‘hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources’ (Victor, 2007: 1). Energy is seen as a primary cause of greatpower conflicts over scarce energy resources (Hamon & Dupuy, 2008; Klare, 2001, 2008). Alternatively, energy is seen as a secondary cause of conflict; here, research has focused on the dynamics through which resource scarcity in general and energy scarcity in particular generate socio-economic, political and environmental conditions such as population movements, internal strife, secessionism and desertification, which cause or accelerate both interstate and intrastate conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994, 2008; Solana, 2008; see also Dalby, 2004). As is immediately apparent, this logic draws on a classic formulation that states that ‘a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able . . . to maintain them by victory in such a war’ (Lippmann, 1943: 51). The underlying principle of this security logic is survival: not only surviving war, but also a generalized quasi-Darwinian logic of survival that produces wars over energy that are fought with ‘energy weapons’. At work in this framing of the energy domain is therefore a definition of security as ‘the absence of threat to acquired values’ (Wolfers, 1952: 485), more recently reformulated as ‘survival in the face of existential threats’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 27). The defining parameters of this traditional security logic are therefore: (1) an understanding of security focused on the use of force, war and conflict (Walt, 1991: 212; Freedman, 1998: 48); and (2) a focus on states as the subjects and objects of energy security. In the war logic, energy security is derivative of patterns of international politics – often captured under the label ‘geopolitics’ (Aalto & Westphal, 2007: 3) – that lend their supposedly perennial attributes to the domain of energy (Barnes, Jaffe & Morse, 2004; Jaffe & Manning, 1998). The struggle for energy is thus subsumed under the ‘normal’ competition for power, survival, land, valuable materials or markets (Leverett & Noël, 2007). A key effect of this logic is to ‘arrest’ issues usually not associated with war, and thus erase their distinctive characteristics. Even the significance of energy qua energy is abolished by the implacable grammar of conflict: energy becomes a resource like any other, which matters insofar as it affects the distribution of capabilities in the international system. As a result, a series of transpositions affect most of the issues ranked high on the energy security agenda. For example, in the European context, the problem is not necessarily energy (or, more precisely, gas, to avoid the typical reduction performed by such accounts). The problem lies in the ‘geopolitical interests’ of Russia and other supplier states, whose strength becomes inherently threatening (Burrows & Treverton, 2007; Horsley, 2006). Energy security policies become entirely euphemistic, as illustrated for example by statements that equate ‘avoiding energy isolation’ with ‘beating Russia’ (Baran, 2007). Such ‘geopolitical’ understanding of international politics also habituates a distinct vocabulary. Public documents, media reports and academic analyses of energy security are suffused with references to weapons, battles, attack, fear, ransom, blackmail, dominance, superpowers, victims and losers. It is therefore unsurprising that this logic is coterminous with the widely circulating narrative of the ‘new’ Cold War. This lexicon of conflict encourages modulations, reductions and transpositions in the meanings of both energy and security. This is evident at the most fundamental level, structuring encyclopaedic entries (Kohl, 2004) and key policy documents (White House, 2007), where energy security becomes oil security (security modulates energy into oil), which becomes oil geopolitics (oil modulates security into geopolitics). Once security is understood in the grammar of conflict, the complexity of energy is abolished and reduced to the possession of oilfields or gas pipelines. The effect of this modulation is to habituate the war logic of security, and also to create a hierarchy between the three constitutive dimensions of energy security (growth, sustenance and the environment). This hierarchy reflects and at the same time embeds the dominant effect of the war logic, which is the militarization of energy (Russell & Moran, 2008), an argument reminiscent of the debates surrounding the securitization of the environment (Deudney, 1990). It is of course debatable whether this is a new phenomenon. Talk of oil wars has been the subject of prestigious conferences and conspiracy theories alike, and makes the headlines of newspapers around the world. A significant literature has long focused on the relationship between US foreign policy, oil and war (Stokes, 2007; in contrast, see Nye, 1982). The pertinence of this argument cannot be evaluated in this short space, but it is worth noting that it too reduces energy to oil, and in/security to war. The key point is that this logic changes not only the vocabulary of energy security but also its political rationality. As Victor (2008: 9) puts it, this signals ‘the arrival of military planning to the problem of natural resources’ and inspires ‘a logic of hardening, securing and protecting’ in the entire domain of energy. There is, it must be underlined, some resistance to the pull of the logic of war, as attested for example by NATO’s insistence that its focus on energy security ‘will not trigger a classical military response’ (De Hoop Scheffer, 2008: 2). Yet, the same NATO official claims that ‘the global competition for energy and natural resources will re-define the relationship between security and economics’, which hints not only at the potential militarization of energy security policy but also at the hierarchies this will inevitably create. New geographies of insecurity will thus emerge if the relationship between the environment, sustenance and growth is structured by the militarized pursuit of energy (Campbell, 2005: 952; Christophe Paillard in Luft & Paillard, 2007).

#### Enframing of security makes macro-political violence inevitable

Burke 7 – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper **bedrock of modern reason** that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but **the apparently solid ground of the real itself**. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: **ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained** as it is.I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: **a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning**, **that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being**, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here **we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state)**. When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to **quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation** either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context **violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion**, at limited cost and with limited impact -- **it permeates being.** This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which **humans are merely utilitarian instruments** for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather **turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction**. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, **instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning**. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including **other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects**. In Heidegger's terms, **technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being**. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22 The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. **The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time**, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28 The conceptual template for such an image of national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity.29 It also, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness': Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.30 Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.31 The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.32 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist: Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.33 Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to the whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'.34 War, in short, is an existential condition: the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.35 Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36 When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification. This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in **terms of the distinction between friend and enemy**; because **the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat**, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) **This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry**, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. **We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable**. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action. Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues that: ...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...39 **Identity**, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.')41 It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians. On the reverse side of such ontologies of national insecurity we find pride and hubris, the belief that martial preparedness and action are vital or healthy for the existence of a people. Clausewitz's thought is thoroughly imbued with this conviction. For example, his definition of war as an act of policy does not refer merely to the policy of cabinets, but expresses the objectives and will of peoples: When whole communities go to war -- whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.42 Such a perspective prefigures Schmitt's definition of the 'political' (an earlier translation reads 'war, therefore, is a political act'), and thus creates an inherent tension between its tendency to fuel the escalation of conflict and Clausewitz's declared aim, in defining war as policy, to prevent war becoming 'a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence'.43 Likewise his argument that war is a 'trinity' of people (the source of 'primordial violence, hatred and enmity'), the military (who manage the 'play of chance and probability') and government (which achieve war's 'subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone') merges the existential and rationalistic conceptions of war into a theoretical unity.44 The idea that national identities could be built and redeemed through war derived from the 'romantic counter-revolution' in philosophy which opposed the cosmopolitanism of Kant with an emphasis on the absolute state -- as expressed by Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bismarkian Realpolitik and politicians like Wilhelm Von Humbolt. Humbolt, a Prussian minister of Education, wrote that war 'is one of the most wholesome manifestations that plays a role in the education of the human race', and urged the formation of a national army 'to inspire the citizen with the spirit of true war'. He stated that war 'alone gives the total structure the strength and the diversity without which facility would be weakness and unity would be void'.45 In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel made similar arguments that to for individuals to find their essence 'Government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre by war'.46 The historian Azar Gat points to the similarity of Clausewitz's arguments that 'a people and a nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction' to Hegel's vision of the ethical good of war in his Philosophy of Right.47 Likewise Michael Shapiro sees Clausewitz and Hegel as alike in seeing war 'as an ontological investment in both individual and national completion...Clausewitz figures war as passionate ontological commitment rather than cool political reason...war is a major aspect of being.'48 Hegel's text argues that war is 'a work of freedom' in which 'the individual's substantive duty' merges with the 'independence and sovereignty of the state'.49 Through war, he argues, the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so the corruption in nations would be the product of a prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.50 Hegel indeed argues that 'sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is a substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal duty...if the state as such, if its autonomy, is in jeopardy, all its citizens are duty bound to answer the summons to its defence'.51 Furthermore, this is not simply a duty, but a form of self-realisation in which the individual dissolves into the higher unity of the state: The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualise this end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality. This form of experience thus contains the harshness of extreme contradictions: a self-sacrifice which yet is the real existence of one's freedom; the maximum self-subsistence of individuality, yet only a cog playing its part in the mechanism of an external organisation; absolute obedience, renunciation of personal opinions and reasonings, in fact complete absence of mind, coupled with the most intense and comprehensive presence of mind and decision in the moment of acting; the most hostile and so most personal action against individuals, coupled with an attitude of complete indifference or even liking towards them as individuals.52 A more frank statement of the potentially lethal consequences of patriotism -- and its simultaneously physical and conceptual annihilation of the individual human being -- is rarely to be found, one that is repeated today in countless national discourses and the strategic world-view in general. (In contrast, one of Kant's fundamental objections to war was that it involved using men 'as mere machines or instruments'.53) Yet however bizarre and contradictory Hegel's argument, it constitutes a powerful social ontology: an apparently irrefutable discourse of being. It actualises the convergence of war and the social contract in the form of the national security state. Strategic Reason and Scientific Truth By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which **all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features.** These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55 Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56 At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. **This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought**. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, **was to condemn hundreds of thousands** **more to die** in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of **a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty**. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61 We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has **deep roots in modern thought**, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66 Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the **Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy**. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment **now threatened its total and absolute destruction**. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather **technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy**. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind **demands that 'nature reports itself** in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes **trapped within its logic**. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where **he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve**. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. **In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.** This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.80 Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81 Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices? I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to **place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies** that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed **reifies) antagonisms**. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that **exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming**, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of **hegemonic forms of knowledge** about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it **drives out every other possibility of revealing**...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but **by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence**. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from **calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then **preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for **a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing**. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this **cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought**, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 **This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning'** as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Reject the affirmative’s security discourse – this untimely intervention is the only chance for a counter-discourse

Calkivik 10 – PhD in Poli Sci @ Univ Minnesota (Emine Asli, 10/2010, "DISMANTLING SECURITY," PhD dissertation submitted to Univ Minnesota for Raymond Duvall, http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/99479/1/Calkivik\_umn\_0130E\_11576.pdf)

It is this self-evidence of security even for critical approaches and the antinomy stemming from dissident voices reproducing the language of those they dissent from that constitutes the starting point for this chapter, where I elaborate on the meaning of dismantling security as untimely critique. As mentioned in the vignette in the opening section, the suggestion to dismantle security was itself deemed as an untimely pursuit in a world where lives of millions were rendered brutally insecure by poverty, violence, disease, and ongoing political conflicts. Colored by the tone of a call to conscience in the face of the ongoing crisis of security, it was not the time, interlocutors argued, for self-indulgent critique. I will argue that it is the element of being untimely, the effort, in the words of Walter Benjamin, “to brush history against the grain” that gives critical thinking its power.291 It might appear as a trivial discussion to bring up the relation between time and critique because conceptions of critical thinking in the discipline of International Relations already possess the notion that critical thought needs to be untimely. In the first section, I will tease out what this notion of untimeliness entails by visiting ongoing conversations within the discipline about critical thought and political time. Through this discussion, I hope to clarify what sets apart dismantling security as untimely critique from the notion of untimeliness at work in critical international relations theory. The latter conception of the untimely, I will suggest, paradoxically calls on critical thought to be “on time” in that it champions a particular understanding of what it means for critical scholarship to be relevant and responsible for its times. This notion of the untimely demands that critique be strategic and respond to political exigency, that it provide answers in this light instead of raising more questions about which questions could be raised or what presuppositions underlie the questions that are deemed to be waiting for answers. After elaborating in the first section such strategic conceptions of the untimeliness of critical theorizing, in the second section I will turn to a different sense of the untimely by drawing upon Wendy Brown’s discussion of the relation between critique, crisis, and political time through her reading of Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”292 In contrast to a notion of untimeliness that demands strategic thinking and punctuality, Brown’s exegesis provides a conception of historical materialism where critique is figured as a force of disruption, a form of intervention that reconfigures the meaning of the times and “contest[s] the very senses of time invoked to declare critique ‘untimely’.”293 Her exposition overturns the view of critique as a self-indulgent practice as it highlights the immediately political nature of critique and reconfigures the meaning of what it means for critical thought to be relevant.294 It is in this sense of the untimely, I will suggest, that dismantling security as a critique hopes to recover. I should point out that in this discussion my intention is neither to construct a theory of critique nor to provide an exhaustive review and evaluation of the forms of critical theorizing in International Relations. Rather, my aim is to contribute to the existing efforts that engage with the question of what it means to be critical apart from drawing the epistemological and methodological boundaries so as to think about how one is critical.295 While I do not deny the importance of epistemological questions, I contend that taking time to think about the meaning of critique beyond these issues presents itself as an important task. This task takes on additional importance within the context of security studies where any realm of investigation quickly begets its critical counterpart. The rapid emergence and institutionalization of critical terrorism studies when studies on terrorism were proliferating under the auspices of the so-called Global War on Terror provides a striking example to this trend. 296 Such instances are important reminders that, to the extent that epistemology and methodology are reified as the sole concerns in defining and assessing critical thinking297 or “wrong headed refusals”298 to get on with positive projects and empirical research gets branded as debilitating for critical projects, what is erased from sight is the political nature of the questions asked and what is lost is the chance to reflect upon what it means for critical thinking to respond to its times. In his meditation on the meaning of responding and the sense of responsibility entailed by writing, Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that “all writing is ‘committed.’” 299 This notion of commitment diverges from the programmatic sense of committed writing. What underlies this conception is an understanding of writing as responding: writing is a response to the voice of an other.In Nancy’s words, “[w]hoever writes responds” 300 and “makes himself responsible to in the absolute sense.”301 Suggesting that there is always an ethical commitment prior to any particular political commitment, such a notion of writing contests the notion of creative autonomy premised on the idea of a free, self-legislating subject who responds. In other words, it discredits the idea of an original voice by suggesting that there is no voice that is not a response to a prior response. Hence, to respond is configured as responding to an expectation rather than as an answer to a question and responsibility is cast as an “anticipated response to questions, to demands, to still-unformulated, not exactly predictable expectations.”302 Echoing Nancy, David Campbell makes an important reminder as he suggests that as international relations scholars “we are always already engaged,” although the sites, mechanisms and quality of engagements might vary.303 The question, then, is not whether as scholars we are engaged or not, but what the nature of this engagement is. Such a re-framing of the question is intended to highlight the political nature of all interpretation and the importance of developing an “ethos of political criticism that is concerned with assumptions, limits, their historical production, social and political effects, and the possibility of going beyond them in thought and action.”304 Taking as its object assumptions and limits, their historical production and social and political effects places the relevancy of critical thought and responsibility of critical scholarship on new ground. It is this ethos of critique that dismantling security hopes to recover for a discipline where security operates as the foundational principle and where critical thinking keeps on contributing to security’s impressing itself as a self-evident condition. Critical Theory and Punctuality Within the context of International Relations, critical thought’s orientation toward its time comes out strongly in Kimberley Hutchings’s formulation.305 According to Hutchings, no matter what form it takes, what distinguishes critical international relations theory from other forms of theorizing is “its orientation towards change and the possibility of futures that do not reproduce the hegemonic power of the present.”306 What this implies about the nature of critical thought is that it needs to be not only diagnostic, but also self-reflexive. In the words of Hutchings, “all critical theories lay claim to some kind of account not only of the present of international politics and its relation to possible futures, but also of the role of critical theory in the present and future in international politics.” 307 Not only analyzing the present, but also introducing the question of the future into analysis places political time at the center of critical enterprise and makes the problem of change a core concern. It is this question of change that situates different forms of critical thinking on a shared ground since they all attempt to expose the way in which what is presented as given and natural is historically produced and hence open to change. With their orientation to change, their efforts to go against the dominant currents and challenge the hegemony of existing power relations by showing how contemporary practices and discourses contribute to the perpetuation of structures of power and domination, critical theorists in general and critical security studies specialists in particular take on an untimely endeavor. It is this understanding of the untimely aspect of critical thinking that is emphasized by Mark Neufeld, who regards the development of critical approaches to security as “one of the more hopeful intellectual developments in recent years.”308 Despite nurturing from different theoretical traditions and therefore harboring “fundamental differences between modernist and postmodernist commitments,” writes Neufeld, scholars who are involved in the critical project nevertheless “share a common concern with calling into question ‘prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized.’” 309 The desire for change—through being untimely and making the way to alternative futures that would no longer resemble the present—have led some scholars to emphasize the utopian element that must accompany all critical thinking. Quoting Oscar Wilde’s aphorism—a map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at, Ken Booth argues for the need to restore the role and reputation of utopianism in the theory and practice of international politics. 310 According to Booth, what goes under the banner of realism—“ethnocentric self-interest writ large”311 — falls far beyond the realities of a drastically changed world political landscape at the end of the Cold War. He describes the new reality as “an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty; but alongside it a global community omelette [sic] is cooking.”312 Rather than insisting on the inescapability of war in the international system as political realists argue, Booth argues for the need and possibility to work toward the utopia of overcoming the condition of war by banking on the opportunities provided by a globalizing world. The point that critical thought needs to be untimely by going against its time is also emphasized by Dunne and Wheeler, who assert that, regardless of the form it takes, “critical theory purport[s] to ‘think against’ the prevailing current” and that “[c]ritical security studies is no exception” to this enterprise.313 According to the authors, the function of critical approaches to security is to problematize what is taken for granted in the disciplinary production of knowledge about security by “resist[ing], transcend[ing] and defeat[ing]…theories of security, which take for granted who is to be secured (the state), how security is to be achieved (by defending core ‘national’ values, forcibly if necessary) and from whom security is needed (the enemy).”314 While critical theory in this way is figured as untimely, I want to suggest that this notion of untimeliness gets construed paradoxically in a quite timely fashion. With a perceived disjuncture between writing the world from within a discipline and acting in it placed at the center of the debates, the performance of critical thought gets evaluated to the extent that it is punctual and in synch with the times. Does critical thought provide concrete guidance and prescribe what is to be done? Can it move beyond mere talk and make timely political interventions by providing solutions? Does it have answers to the strategic questions of progressive movements? Demanding that critical theorizing come clean in the court of these questions, such conceptions of the untimely demand that critique respond to its times in a responsible way, where being responsible is understood in stark contrast to a notion of responding and responsibility that I briefly discussed in the introductory pages of this chapter (through the works of Jean-Luc Nancy and David Campbell). Let me visit two recent conversations ensuing from the declarations of the contemporary crisis of critical theorizing in order to clarify what I mean by a timely understanding of untimely critique. The first conversation was published as a special issue in the Review of International Studies (RIS), one of the major journals of the field. Prominent figures took the 25th anniversary of the journal’s publication of two key texts—regarded as canonical for the launching and development of critical theorizing in International Relations—as an opportunity to reflect upon and assess the impact of critical theory in the discipline and interrogate what its future might be. 315 The texts in question, which are depicted as having shaken the premises of the static world of the discipline, are Robert Cox’s 1981 essay entitled on “Social Forces, States, and World Orders”316 and Richard Ashley’s article, “Political Realism and Human Interests.”317 In their introductory essay to the issue, Rengger and Thirkell-White suggest that the essays by Cox and Ashley—followed by Andrew Linklater’s Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations318 —represent “the breach in the dyke” of the three dominant discourses in International Relations (i.e., positivists, English School, and Marxism), unleashing “a torrent [that would] soon become a flood” as variety of theoretical approaches in contemporary social theory (i.e., feminism, Neo-Gramscianism, poststructuralism, and post-colonialism) would get introduced through the works of critical scholars.319 After elaborating the various responses given to and resistance raised against the critical project in the discipline, the authors provide an overview and an assessment of the current state of critical theorizing in International Relations. They argue that the central question for much of the ongoing debate within the critical camp in its present state—a question that it cannot help but come to terms with and provide a response to—concerns the relation between critical thought and political practice. As they state, the “fundamental philosophical question [that] can no longer be sidestepped” by critical International Relations theory is the question of the relation between “knowledge of the world and action in it.”320 One of the points alluded to in the essay is that forms of critical theorizing, which leave the future “to contingency, uncertainty and the multiplicity of political projects” and therefore provide “less guidance for concrete political action”321 or, again, those that problematize underlying assumptions of thought and “say little about the potential political agency that might be involved in any subsequent struggles”322 may render the critical enterprise impotent and perhaps even suspect. This point comes out clearly in Craig Murphy’s contribution to the collection of essays in the RIS’s special issue. 323 Echoing William Wallace’s argument that critical theorists tend to be “monks,”324 who have little to offer for political actors engaged in real world politics, Murphy argues that the promise of critical theory is “partially kept” because of the limited influence it has had outside the academy towards changing the world.Building a different world, he suggests, requires more than isolated academic talk; that it demands not merely “words,” but “deeds.”325 This, according to Murphy, requires providing “knowledge that contributes to change.”326 Such knowledge would emanate from connections with the marginalized and would incorporate observations of actors in their everyday practices. More importantly, it would create an inspiring vision for social movements, such as the one provided by the concept of human development, which, according to Murphy, was especially powerful “because it embodied a value-oriented way of seeing, a vision, rather than only isolated observations.”327 In sum, if critical theory is to retain its critical edge, Murphy’s discussion suggests, it has to be in synch with political time and respond to its immediate demands. The second debate that is revelatory of this conception of the timing of critical theory—i.e., that critical thinking be strategic and efficient in relation to political time—takes place in relation to the contemporary in/security environment shaped by the so-called Global War on Terror. The theme that bears its mark on these debates is the extent to which critical inquiries about the contemporary security landscape become complicit in the workings of power and what critique can offer to render the world more legible for progressive struggles.328 For instance, warning critical theorists against being co-opted by or aligned with belligerence and war-mongering, Richard Devetak asserts that critical international theory has an urgent “need to distinguish its position all the more clearly from liberal imperialism.”329 While scholars such as Devetak, Booth,330 and Fierke331 take the critical task to be an attempt to rescue liberal internationalism from turning into liberal imperialism, others announce the “crisis of critical theorizing” and suggest that critical writings on the nature of the contemporary security order lack the resources to grasp their actual limitations, where the latter is said to reside not in the realm of academic debate, but in the realm of political practice.332 It is amidst these debates on critique, crisis, and political time that Richard Beardsworth raises the question of the future of critical philosophy in the face of the challenges posed by contemporary world politics.333 Recounting these challenges, he provides the matrix for a proper form of critical inquiry that could come to terms with “[o]ur historical actuality.”334 He describes this actuality as the “thick context” of modernity (“an epoch, delimited by the capitalization of social relations,” which imposes its own philosophical problematic—“that is, the attempt, following the social consequences of capitalism, to articulate the relation between individuality and collective spirit”335 ), American unilateralism in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the growing political disempowerment of people worldwide. Arguing that “contemporary return of religion and new forms of irrationalism emerge, in large part, out of the failure of the second response of modernity to provide a secular solution to the inequalities of the nation-state and colonization,”336 he formulates the awaiting political task for critical endeavors as constructing a world polity to resist the disintegration of the world under the force of capital.It is with this goal in mind that he suggests that “responsible scholarship needs to rescue reason in the face irrational war”337 and that intellectuals need to provide “the framework for a world ethical community of law, endowed with political mechanisms of implementation in the context of a regulated planetary economy.”338 He suggests that an aporetic form of thinking such as Jacques Derrida’s—a thinking that “ignores the affirmative relation between the determining powers of reason and history”339 —would be an unhelpful resource because such thinking “does not open up to where work needs to be done for these new forms of polity to emerge.”340 In other words, critical thinking, according to Beardsworth, needs to articulate and point out possible political avenues and to orient thought and action in concrete ways so as to contribute to progressive political change rather than dwelling on the encounter of the incalculable and calculation and im-possibility of world democracy in a Derridean fashion. In similar ways to the first debate on critique that I discussed, critical thinking is once again called upon to respond to political time in a strategic and efficient manner. As critical inquiry gets summoned up to the court of reason in Beardsworth’s account, its realm of engagement is limited to that which the light of reason can be shed upon, and its politics is confined to mapping out the achievable and the doable in a given historical context without questioning or disrupting the limits of what is presented as “realistic” choices. Hence, if untimely critical thought is to be meaningful it has to be on time by responding to political exigency in a practical, efficient, and strategic manner. In contrast to this prevalent form of understanding the untimeliness of critical theory, I will now turn to a different account of the untimely provided by Wendy Brown whose work informs the project of dismantling security as untimely critique. Drawing from her discussion of the relationship between critique, crisis, and political time, I will suggest that untimely critique of security entails, simultaneously, an attunement to the times and an aggressive violation of their self-conception. It is in this different sense of the untimely that the suggestion of dismantling security needs to be situated. Critique and Political Time As I suggested in the Prelude to this chapter, elevating security itself to the position of major protagonist and extending a call to “dismantle security” was itself declared to be an untimely pursuit in a time depicted as the time of crisis in security. Such a declaration stood as an exemplary moment (not in the sense of illustration or allegory, but as a moment of crystallization) for disciplinary prohibitions to think and act otherwise—perhaps the moment when a doxa exhibits its most powerful hold. Hence, what is first needed is to overturn the taken-for-granted relations between crisis, timeliness, and critique. The roots krisis and kritik can be traced back to the Greek word krinõ, which meant “to separate”, to “choose,” to “judge,” to “decide.”341 While creating a broad spectrum of meanings, it was intimately related to politics as it connoted a “divorce” or “quarrel,” but also a moment of decision and a turning point. It was also used as a jurisprudential term in the sense of making a decision, reaching a verdict or judgment (kritik) on an alleged disorder so as to provide a way to restore order. Rather than being separated into two domains of meaning—that of “subjective critique” and “objective crisis”—krisis and kritik were conceived as interlinked moments. Koselleck explains this conceptual fusion: [I]t wasin the sense of “judgment,” “trial,” “legal decision,” and ultimately “court” that crisis achieved a high constitutionalstatus, through which the individual citizen and the community were bound together. The “for and against” wastherefore present in the original meaning of the word and thisin a manner that already conceptually anticipated the appropriate judgment. 342 Recognition of an objective crisis and subjective judgments to be passed on it so as to come up with a formula for restoring the health of the polity by setting the times right were thereby infused and implicated in each other.343 Consequently, as Brown notes, there could be no such thing as “mere critique” or “untimely critique” because critique always entailed a concern with political time: “[C]ritique as political krisis promise[d] to restore continuity by repairing or renewing the justice that gives an order the prospect of continuity, that indeed ma[de] it continuous.”344 The breaking of this intimate link between krisis and kritik, the consequent depoliticization of critique and its sundering from crisis coincides with the rise of modern political order and redistribution of the public space into the binary structure of sovereign and subject, public and private.345 Failing to note the link between the critique it practiced and the looming political crisis, emerging philosophies of history, according Koselleck, had the effect of obfuscating this crisis. As he explains, “[n]ever politically grasped, [this political crisis] remained concealed in historico-philosophical images of the future which cause the day’s events to pale.”346 It is this intimate, but severed, link between crisis and critique in historical narratives that Wendy Brown’s discussion brings to the fore and re-problematizes. She turns to Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” and challenges conventional understandings of historical materialism, which conceives of the present in terms of unfolding laws of history.347 According to Brown, the practice of critical theory appeals to a concern with time to the extent that “[t]he crisis that incites critique and that critique engages itself signals a rupture of temporal continuity, which is at the same time a rupture in political imaginary.”348 Cast in these terms, it is a particular experience with time, with the present, that Brown suggests Benjamin’s theses aim to capture. Rather than an unmoving or an automatically overcome present (a present that is out of time), the present is interpreted as an opening that calls for a response to it. This call for a response highlights the idea that, far from being a luxury, critique is non-optional in its nature. Such an understanding of critical thought is premised on a historical consciousness that grasps the present historically so as to break with the selfconception of the age. Untimely critique transforms into a technique to blow up the present through fracturing its apparent seamlessness by insisting on alternatives to its closed political and epistemological universe.349 Such a conception resonates with the distinction that Žižek makes between a political subjectivity that is confined to choosing between the existing alternatives—one that takes the limits of what is given as the limits to what is possible—and a form of subjectivity that creates the very set of alternatives by “transcend[ing] the coordinates of a given situation [and] ‘posit[ing] the presuppositions’ of one's activity” by redefining the very situation within which one is active.”350 With its attempt to grasp the times in its singularity, critique is cast neither as a breaking free from the weight of time (which would amount to ahistoricity) nor being weighed down by the times (as in the case of teleology).351 It conceives the present as “historically contoured but not itself experienced as history because not necessarily continuous with what has been.”352 It is an attitude that renders the present as the site of “non-utopian possibility” since it is historically situated and constrained yet also a possibility since it is not historically foreordained or determined.353 It entails contesting the delimitations of choice and challenging the confinement of politics to existing possibilities. Rather than positing history as existing objectively outside of narration, what Brown’s discussion highlights is the intimate relation between the constitution of political subjectivity vis-à-vis the meaning of history for the present. It alludes to “the power of historical discourse,” which Mowitt explains as a power “to estrange us from that which is most familiar, namely, the fixity of the present” because “what we believe to have happened to us bears concretely on what we are prepared to do with ourselves both now and in the future.”354 Mark Neocleous concretizes the political stakes entailed in such encounters with history—with the dead—from the perspective of three political traditions: a conservative one, which aims to reconcile the dead with the living, a fascist one, which aims to resurrect the dead to legitimate its fascist program, and a historical materialist one, which seeks redemption with the dead as the source of hope and inspiration for the future.355 Brown’s discussion of critique and political time is significant for highlighting the immediately political nature of critique in contrast to contemporary invocations that cast it as a self-indulgent practice, an untimely luxury, a disinterested, distanced, academic endeavor. Her attempt to trace critique vis-à-vis its relation to political time provides a counter-narrative to the conservative and moralizing assertions that shun untimely critique of security as a luxurious interest that is committed to abstract ideals rather than to the “reality” of politics—i.e., running after utopia rather than modeling “real world” solutions. Dismantling security as untimely critique entails a similar claim to unsettle the accounts of “what the times are” with a “bid to reset time.”356 It aspires to be untimely in the face of the demands on critical thought to be on time; aims to challenge the moralizing move, the call to conscience that arrives in the form of assertions that saying “no!” to security, that refusing to write it, would be untimely. Rather than succumbing to the injunction that thought of political possibility is to be confined within the framework of security, dismantling security aims to open up space for alternative forms, for a different language of politics so as to “stop digging” the hole politics of security have dug us and start building a counter-discourse. Conclusion As an attempt to push a debate that is fixated on security to the limit and explore what it means to dismantle security, my engagement with various aspects of this move is not intended as an analysis raised at the level of causal interpretations or as an attempt to find better solutions to a problem that already has a name. Rather, it tries to recast what is taken-for-granted by attending to the conceptual assumptions, the historical and systemic conditions within which the politics of security plays itself out. As I tried to show in this chapter, it also entails a simultaneous move of refusing to be a disciple of the discipline of security. This implies overturning not only the silent disciplinary protocols about which questions are legitimate to ask, but also the very framework that informs those questions. It is from this perspective that I devoted two chapters to examining and clarifying the proposal to dismantle security as a claim on time. After explicating, in Chapter 4, the temporal structure that is enacted by politics of security and elaborating on how security structures the relation between the present and the future, in this chapter, I approached the question of temporality from a different perspective, by situating it in relation to disciplinary times in order to clarify what an untimely critique of security means. I tried to elaborate this notion of the untimely by exploring the understanding of untimeliness that informs certain conceptions of critical theorizing in International Relations. I suggested that such a notion of the untimely paradoxically calls on critical thought to be on time in the sense of being punctual and strategic. Turning to Wendy Brown’s discussion of the relation between critique and political time, I elaborated on the sense of untimely critique that dismantling security strives for—a critique that goes against the times that are saturated by the infinite passion to secure and works toward taking apart the architecture of security.

### 1NC – Econ

#### Electricity prices are declining

**Burtraw 8/21/12** (one of the nation’s foremost experts on environmental regulation in the electricity sector “Falling Emissions and Falling Prices: Expectations for the Domestic Natural Gas Boom” http://common–resources.org/2012/falling–emissions–and–falling–prices–expectations–for–the–domestic–natural–gas–boom/)

Moreover, the boom in domestic natural gas production could have even more immediate affects for U.S. electricity consumers. The increased supply of gas is expected to lower natural gas prices and retail electricity prices over the next 20 years, according to a [new RFF Issue Brief](http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22019). These price decreases are expected to be even larger if demand for electricity continues on a slow–growth trajectory brought on by the economic downturn and the increased use of energy efficiency.For example, RFF analysis found that delivered natural gas prices would have been almost 35% higher in 2020 if natural gas supply projections had matched the lower estimates released by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2009. Instead, with an increased gas supply, consumers can expect to pay $4.9 per MMBtu for delivered natural gas in 2020 instead of $6.6 per MMBtu. These trends are even more exaggerated if demand for electricity were to increase to levels projected by the EIA just three years ago, in 2009.This decrease in natural gas prices is expected to translate into a decrease in retail electricity prices for most electricity customers in most years out to 2020. Compared to the world with the lower gas supply projections, average national electricity prices are expected to be almost 6% lower, falling from 9.25 cents to 8.75 cents per kilowatt–hour in 2020. Residential, commercial, and industrial customers are all expected to see a price decrease, with the largest price changes occurring in parts of the country that have competitive electricity markets. All of these prices decreases translate into real savings for most electricity customers. The savings are largest for commercial customers, who stand to save $33.9 Billion (real $2009) under the new gas supply projections in 2020. Residential customers also stand to save big, with estimates of $25.8 Billion (real $2009) in savings projected for 2020.

#### Plan spikes prices

Bryce 11 (Robert, Senior Fellow @ Manhattan Institute, "The High Cost of Wind Energy as a Carbon–Dioxide Reduction Method," http://www.manhattan–institute.org/html/ib\_11.htm)

The Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC), an industry group, maintains that reducing the amount of carbon dioxide going into the atmosphere “is the most important environmental benefit from wind power generation.”[27] For its part, the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA), a national trade association, says “there is no need to wait for a new climate solution. Wind power is one of only a few near–term options to reduce emissions.”[28] In its 2008 report, the NREL claimed that if the United States were to derive 20 percent of its electricity from wind, it “could avoid approximately 825 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in the electric sector in 2030.”[29] How does that 825 million tons of carbon dioxide compare with global emissions? In 2010, global carbon–dioxide emissions totaled 33.1 billion tons.[30] Thus, if the United States were somehow able to instantly increase its wind–generated electricity to 20 percent of total consumption, doing so might reduce global emissions by about 2.5 percent. But it is unlikely that global emissions will be the same in 2030 as they were in 2010. By 2030, the International Energy Agency (IEA) expects global emissions will total about 40.2 billion tons.[31] Thus, the 825 million tons that NREL claims might be reduced by achieving the “20 by ‘30” goal will result in a global reduction of just 2 percent.[32] Therefore, to justify a total investment of $850 billion in wind, U.S. policymakers would have to agree that reducing carbon dioxide in the year 2030 is worth spending $1,030 per ton. Of course, that amount would not be spent all at once. Instead it would be allocated over the coming 19 years and would be, in effect, a carbon tax set at $54 per ton. However, the actual cost may be somewhat lower. In its 2008 report, NREL claimed that only 305,000 megawatts of wind capacity would be needed to meet the “20 by ‘30” goal. Recall that the United States has built about 40,000 megawatts of wind capacity at a cost of about $68 billion. Thus, building an additional 265,000 megawatts of wind capacity (again, at $2.43 million per megawatt) at a cost of $644 billion, would lead to a total cost of $712 billion, thereby implying that cutting one ton of carbon dioxide by 2030 would cost about $863. Spread over the next 19 years, the cost would be the equivalent of a carbon levy set at $45 per ton. Achieving the “20 by ‘30” goal will have a significant impact on electricity rates. In 2007, Steven Hayward and Kenneth Green of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) estimated that a $15 carbon tax would likely increase the cost of coal–fired generation by about $0.0163 per kilowatt–hour. Therefore, we can assume that a carbon levy of $54–per–ton could increase electricity rates in coal–reliant regions by about $0.058 per kilowatt–hour. That’s a major increase given that the average price of electricity for residential consumers in the United States is currently $0.12 per kilowatt–hour.[33] Put another way, if the United States were to achieve the “20 by ‘30” goal, U.S. residential electricity prices in coal–dependent regions could increase by about 48 percent over current levels. If we use the lower range of wind costs outlined by NREL in its 2008 report, and assume that reducing a ton of carbon by 2030 will cost $45 per year, the increase in electricity costs in coal–dependent areas will amount to about $0.049 per kilowatt–hour. That would result in an increase of 40 percent over current levels for residential customers in those regions. These higher electricity costs will likely accelerate the pace of electric rate increases now underway around the country. Since 2004, the average cost of residential electricity has gone from $0.0895 per kilowatt–hour to $0.1218 per kilowatt–hour, an increase of 36 percent.[34] Wind energy is not a cost–effective method of reducing carbon–dioxide emissions. Any effort—whether at the state level or the federal level—to dramatically increase the use of wind energy will result in a new tax on electricity consumers. If the United States were to achieve the “20 by ‘30” goal, the effective carbon tax of $45 to $54 per ton would far exceed any such tax regime currently in place. Further, if the stated goal were met by 2030, the likely reduction in carbon dioxide emissions would amount to just 2 percent of the expected global total.

#### Low electricity prices spurs manufacturing "reshoring" and sparks US economic growth via consumer spending and investment

Perry 12 (Mark, Prof of Economics @ Univ. of Michigan, "America's Energy Jackpot: Industrial Natural Gas Prices Fall to the Lowest Level in Recent History," http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2012/07/americas–energy–jackpot–industrial.html)

Building petrochemical plants could suddenly become attractive in the United States. Manufacturers will "reshore" production to take advantage of low natural gas and electricity prices. Energy costs will be lower for a long time, giving a competitive advantage to companies that invest in America, and also helping American consumers who get hit hard when energy prices spike. After years of bad economic news, the natural gas windfall is very good news. Let's make the most of it." The falling natural gas prices also make the predictions in this December 2011 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Shale gas: A renaissance in US manufacturing?"all the more likely: U.S. manufacturing companies (chemicals, metals and industrial) could employ approximately one million more workers by 2025 because of abundant, low–priced natural gas. Lower feedstock and energy cost could help U.S. manufacturers reduce natural gas expenses by as much as $11.6 billion annually through 2025. MP: As I have emphasized lately, America's ongoing shale–based energy revolution is one of the real bright spots in an otherwise somewhat gloomy economy, and provides one of the best reasons to be bullish about America's future. The shale revolution is creating thousands of well–paying, shovel–ready jobs in Texas, North Dakota and Ohio, and thousands of indirect jobs in industries that support the shale boom (sand, drilling equipment, transportation, infrastructure, steel pipe, restaurants, etc.). In addition, the abundant shale gas is driving down energy prices for industrial, commercial, residential and electricity–generating users, which frees up billions of dollars that can be spent on other goods and services throughout the economy, providing an energy–based stimulus to the economy. Cheap natural gas is also translating into cheaper electricity rates, as low–cost natural gas displaces coal. Further, cheap and abundant natural gas is sparking a manufacturing renaissance in energy–intensive industries like chemicals, fertilizers, and steel. And unlike renewable energies like solar and wind, the natural gas boom is happening without any taxpayer–funded grants, subsidies, credits and loans. Finally, we get an environmental bonus of lower CO2 emissions as natural gas replaces coal for electricity generation. Sure seems like a win, win, win, win situation to me.

#### Econ decline risks extinction

Auslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3–6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free–market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide–scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one–third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### Helium

#### Helium supply’s on the brink now---no excess global capacity

Nelson 12 (Walter Nelson – Director, Helium Sourcing and Supply Chain Air Products and Chemicals, Inc, 7/20/12, Helium: Supply Shortages Impacting our Economy, National Defense and Manufacturing, Congressional Documents & Publications, lexis )

There have been planned and unplanned maintenance outages at natural gas processing plants, as well as continuing pipeline allocations on the BLM system during well maintenance that have restricted the supply of crude helium to the U.S. refiners. In Algeria and Qatar, production of helium has decreased due to the fragile worldwide economy, as well as maintenance work at gas palnts. In addition, new helium refining projects have been slow to develop. The delayed start-up of one particular plant in Wyoming has postponed access to major new supplies of helium. Combined, these issues have reduced the global helium supply by as much as 5% to 10%. On top of this, the industry will experience an unprecedented helium shortage this summer. Beyond the developments cited above, there are currently three US plant outages or curtailments that are severely limiting the short-term supply of helium today. First, one company reduced its helium production in Wyoming by approximately 20% beginning early June while performing critical maintenance activities. Full production is not expected to resume until sometime later this summer. The impact of this curtailment is almost five percent of global supply capacity. Second, the crude helium enrichment plant that supplies the BLM pipeline system was shut down July 15th for a planned 10 day safety critical outage. During this outage helium deliveries are limited to pipeline inventory reducing global supply capacity by an additional 25%. Third, a nautral gas plant in Kansas experienced an unplanned helium equipment outage at the end of June and that outage continued through this week. The impact of this outage was another five percent reduction in global supply capacity. In helium circles this has been "the perfect storm." The combination of these issues has resulted in a significant short-term reduction in global helium supply capacity over the summer months. Global inventories would have normally served as a buffer during short-term outage events, minimizing the supply impacts. Unfortunately that's not the case this time. Air Products has had to allocate our customers and I suspect that all helium suppliers have had to do the same. We are caught in a cruch not of our making. We expect some relief soon. Most of the maintenance outages will be completed within weeks, in the U.S. and abroad.That said, it will most probably take months for the global helium supply chains to recover from these summer outages. Helium supplies will continue to remain tight through 2012 and into 2013, when new helium production is expected in Wyoming and Qatar. The Wyoming project is expected to add four percent helium capacity and the Qatar II project may add up to 18% capacity. Only after these two new plants are operational in 2013 and existing plants are running back at full output will the global supply begin to fully stabilize.

#### Plan uses massive amounts of helium

Cahoon 11 (Troy, US air force Captain, Air Force Institute of Technology, Presented to the Faculty Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics Graduate School of Engineering and Management Air Force Institute of Technology Air University Air Education and Training Command In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Aeronautical Engineering, “AIRBORNE WIND ENERGY: IMPLEMENTATION AND DESIGN FOR THE U.S. AIR FORCE,” <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a539255.pdf>)

Another challenge is that the balloon system requires a very large amount of helium. This helium is a very significant portion of the startup and operating costs. Helium also tends to leak over time. But if the balloon membrane is designed well, the leakage rate can be kept down to about 6% per year.11

#### Helium shortages destroy U.S. leadership in basic scientific discovery

Ong 12 (Phuan Ong – the Eugene Higgins Professor of Physics Director, Princeton Center for Complex Materials Department of Physics Princeton University, 7/20/12, Helium: Supply Shortages Impacting our Economy, National Defense and Manufacturing, Congressional Documents & Publications, lexis )

The 2 main reasons why liquid helium is vital for research are: 1) Helium is the only fluid available for cooling samples to temperatures close to absolute zero. All objects follow the universal laws of quantum mechanics. However, at room temperature, large thermal agitations of molecules and atoms largely obscure or destroy the manifestations of quantum physics. Hence quantum behavior seems bizarre and unfamiliar to all of us. Cooling a sample suppresses the thermal agitations, allowing the quantum phenomena to become apparent. Put more directly, liquid helium is the "royal road" to discovery. 2) Helium is used to cool the superconducting wires in superconducting magnets. At present, superconducting magnets using niobium-tin (and tentatively high-Tc cuprates) provide the only known means for producing intense magnetic fields over human-sized volumes. They have to be cooled to 4 Kelvin above absolute zero to remain superconducting. With increasing demands worldwide (in research, MRI machines and in future transport), the demand for liquid helium is expected to rise sharply. To mix metaphors, we may say that liquid helium is the vital "oxygen" that nourishes the large, dynamic U.S. research community. Disrupting this vital flow will deliver a crippling body blow to a large segment of the community, and jeopardize the leadership role of the U.S. in the coming decades. Increasingly, the pre-eminence of the U.S. in this field of physics has come under stiff challenges from groups in Germany, Japan, Netherlands, China and S. Korea. These countries have steeply increased their investments in these areas and "grown" a new generation of physicists, mostly trained in the U.S. The investment stems from the universal consensus that, in contrast to many other fundamental scientific areas, the results here underpin important future technologies. In an increasingly flat world, it is prudent for the U.S. to safeguard the availability of this valuable national resource. From the RandD viewpoint, strong fluctuations in the price of helium or in the supplywould be very harmful to the U.S. national interest.

#### Science leadership’s key to the sustainability and perceived legitimacy of U.S. hegemony---it blunts resentment of the power gap and solves multiple existential threats

Coletta 9 (Damon Coletta – Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy, September 2009, “Science, Technology, and the Quest for International Influence,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536133&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Less appreciated is how scientific progress facilitates diplomatic strategy in the long run, how it contributes to Joseph Nye‘s soft power, which translates to staying power in the international arena. One possible escape from the geopolitical forces depicted in Thucydides‘ history for all time is for the current hegemon to maintain its lead in science, conceived as a national program and as an enterprise belonging to all mankind. Beyond the new technologies for projecting military or economic power, the scientific ethos conditions the hegemon‘s approach to social-political problems. It effects how the leader organizes itself and other states to address well-springs of discontent—material inequity, religious or ethnic oppression, and environmental degradation. The scientific mantle attracts others‘ admiration, which softens or at least complicates other societies‘ resentment of power disparity. Finally, for certain global problems—nuclear proliferation, climate change, and financial crisis—the scientific lead ensures robust representation in transnational epistemic communities that can shepherd intergovernmental negotiations onto a conservative, or secular, path in terms of preserving international order. In today‘s order, U.S. hegemony is yet in doubt even though military and economic indicators confirm its status as the world‘s lone superpower. America possesses the material wherewithal to maintain its lead in the sciences, but it also desires to bear the standard for freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, patronage of basic science does not automatically flourish with liberal democracy. The free market and the mass public impose demands on science that tend to move research out of the basic and into applied realms. Absent the lead in basic discovery, no country can hope to pioneer humanity‘s quest to know Nature. There is a real danger U.S. state and society could permanently confuse sponsorship of technology with patronage of science, thereby delivering a self-inflicted blow to U.S. leadership among nations.

### DOD

#### Budgets are tight – right now biofuels are winning

Peterka, 13 – E&E reporter (Amanda, 1/22. “Airlines piggyback on DOD's test flights, push for expanded production.” http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2013/01/22/archive/5?terms=biofuels)

The military also depends on Congress for funding to test and purchase biofuels, said John Heimlich, vice president and chief economist at Airlines for America, a consortium of 11 airlines that has entered a strategic alliance with the Navy to advance aviation biofuels. "That's one thing that makes the military effective," Heimlich said. "It's not just their know-how and commitment. It's their balance sheet**." But** although the Pentagon could guarantee a market for aviation biofuels, the effort could be toppled by Washington budget battles**.** So far, though, news from Washington has been encouraging for biofuel promoters. PresidentObama signed a defense authorization act last month that included funding for the military's biofuel programs. And early this month, Obama signed a "fiscal cliff" package that extended tax incentives for the cellulosic biofuel and biodiesel industries. To keep momentum going in the industry, Holland said, the military needs to be aggressive about putting those biofuel programs in place.The commercial aviation industry also needs to get off the ground, he said.

#### The aff causes a tradeoff within fuel budgets

**Eoyang 12** – National Security Director @ Third Way (Mieke Eoyang, Julie Zelnick (Policy Advisor for National Security @ Third Way), & Ryan Fitzpatrick (Senior Policy Advisor for the Third Way Clean Energy Program), “Fuel Costs Squeeze Defense Budget,” Third Way Digest, May 2012, pg. 1)

In 2011, Congress passed the Budget Control Act, which put long-term limits on defense spending as part of a broader effort to curb the $15.7 trillion federal budget deficit. Though DOD’s budget will grow over the next 10 years, it will rise at a smaller rate than previously projected. This means DOD’s topline budget going forward will be more flat. Rising costs in one area will come at the expense of others.1 Given such constraints, DOD must carefully scrutinize every cost and find efficiencies where it can. One of those costs is fuel—a critical component of military operations, especially for ground vehicles, ships, and aircraft. DOD spends about $16 billion on fuel each year—more than double what UPS, FedEx, and DHL spend on global shipping operations, combined.3

#### Kills biofuels

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| **Erwin, 12** - Editor of National Defense Magazine (Sandra I, 7/26. “, [‘Policy Uncertainty’ Could Choke Development of Military Biofuels](http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=844).” National Defense. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=844) |

To outsiders, the NDAA debate is just one more partisan battle in Washington’s larger political wars. But anti-biofuel sentiments on Capitol Hill are raising serious alarm bells within the alternative-fuel industry and stirring concerns among Pentagon officials who support green energy because of the chilling effect that the political divide could have on private investment. “If there is a lot of uncertainty, we are going to lose private capital,” said Phyllis Cuttino, director of the Pew Project on National Security, Energy, and Climate. The Defense Department’s plan to become a consumer of alternative fuels is predicated on the ability of the private sector to scale up production and on commercial airlines transitioning to biofuels so prices become more competitive. All that requires substantial private investments that might be at risk if venture capitalists decide that the politics of biofuels pose too big a financial risk. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs Sharon Burke said she does have concerns that legislative restrictions could jeopardize the Defense Department’s goals to diversify its sources of energy. “For the future, our military will need alternatives to petroleum to keep our supplies diverse, especially for our legacy fleet of ships and planes, which will be with us for decades to come,” Burke said in a statement to National Defense. “The private sector will be the leaders in developing a commercially viable alternative fuels industry, and we have concerns that restrictions on the department's ability to obtain the milspec fuel we need to achieve our mission may reduce the development and availability of these alternatives over the long term.” The Defense Department began to step up its pursuit of alternative fuels in 2007, and over the past two years the [Navy and the Air Force have made headlines for their embrace of aviation biofuels](http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=832) as a future hedge against rising oil prices and unreliable foreign oil suppliers. In the wake of the House and Senate NDAA amendments, Pew has mobilized biofuels supporters and [released a letter this week that was signed by more than 350 veterans](http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/energy-innovation-seen-as-needed-to-reduce-dependence-on-foreign-oil-save-money-85899406931), including retired generals and admirals, as well as former Senate and House Armed Services Committee chairmen Sen. John Warner and Rep. Ike Skelton, urging the president and Congress to support the Pentagon’s initiatives to diversify its energy sources. The letter echoes biofuel producers’ belief that the military is needed as an essential anchor customer. Lawmakers in the House and Senate have argued that biofuels are cost prohibitive at a time when the military’s budget is stretched. The Navy’s “great green fleet” effort was particularly criticized by members of the House Armed Services Committee as an example of misplaced priorities when the Navy is cutting back on new ship buys and other modernization programs. The Senate Armed Services Committee agreed to add anti-biofuel provisions to the NDAA. Biofuel supporters’ best hope now lies with Sens. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., and Susan Collins, R-Maine, who vowed in a recent op-ed article that they would fight to protect the Defense Department’s biofuel funds, including a Navy commitment of more than $200 million as part of joint $500 million effort with the Departments of Energy and Agriculture. Cuttino said the green-energy community has been taken aback by the partisan tenor of an issue that has national security implications. “We’ve been dismayed by the politicization of these [military biofuel] efforts,” Cuttino said July 24 during a conference call with reporters. “These issues should not be politicized,” she said. “To have these innovations singled out is unfortunate.” The Pentagon’s financial commitment is being blown out of proportion, she said. Biofuel expenditures are a tiny fraction of what the Defense Department spends on fuel each year, Cuttino said. The Pentagon’s annual energy bill is about $15 billion, three-quarters of which is spent on liquid fuels. Pew estimated that Defense Department biofuel expenditures last year were $1.2 billion, up from $400 million two years ago. A Pew study projects military biofuel purchases will reach $10 billion annually by 2030. When Congress was fighting a year ago over the nation’s debt ceiling, investors were alarmed. The battle over biofuels creates a similar cloud of policy uncertainty that could be damaging to an industry that is just getting off the ground, Cuttino said. The trends in private investment in alternative energy in G-20 countries are cause for concern, she said, as they indicate that investors tend to flee when they see policy indecision. “What we know from all our research over several years is that if there is a question of uncertainty when it comes to policy, private investment will move on to another country where there is more policy certainty.” The United States currently is a world leader in attracting private capital to alternative energy, she said. The European economic crisis might keep the United States in the lead for some time, but venture capitalists also may be souring on U.S. biofuels investments, according to analysts. Interest in capital-intensive industries such as energy is fading, said a July report by Dow Jones VentureSource. Investors are raising red flags about biofuel investment because of the large amounts of capital needed to build infrastructure. “The second quarter is the worst for investment in energy and utilities start-ups since the first quarter of 2009,” said VentureSource. The Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative — a coalition of airlines, aircraft and engine manufacturers, energy producers and U.S. government agencies — cautions that project financing is still the “biggest remaining challenge to the deployment of alternative aviation fuels.” Nevertheless, CAAFI is “confident that environmentally friendly alternative jet fuel derived from several feedstocks will be available in the next two to five years,” the group said in a statement on its website. The barrier to deployment, said CAAFI, is the availability of capital, as production plants cost on the order of $100,000 per barrel per day. FlightGlobal.com reported that, since 2007, more than 1,500 passenger flights have been made using biofuels produced from feedstocks such as household waste and algae. “The major challenge now is to work out how to produce large quantities of sustainable biofuel at a cost that is commercially competitive to airlines,” FlightGlobal noted. Lufthansa, one of the world’s largest airlines, has projected that renewable jet fuel will replace up to 5 percent of the market in the next five to seven years. In the United States, the biofuel industry needs the military to commit to long-term purchases so it can secure investors, Pew said in a statement. “The military’s leadership, cooperation with the private sector, and early adoption have been critical to the commercialization of many technologies such as semiconductors, nuclear energy, the Internet, and the Global Positioning System,” Pew noted. “Maintaining energy innovation, inside and outside the Defense Department, is critical to our national security.”

Military biofuels will focus on algae

Wolan 11 (Christopher, writer for Forbes, “Can Algae Get Countries to Kick Foreign Oil?” http://blogs.forbes.com/christianwolan/2011/03/09/can-algae-biofuel-get-america-to-kick-its-foreign-oil-addiction/)

Last year, the Department of Agriculture awarded $24 million in grants to three research groups exploring the feasibility of large scale algae production. “The United States must find effective ways to hasten the development of technologies for advanced biofuels made from algae and other renewable resources to reduce our need for foreign sources of oil,” said Cathy Zoi, assistant secretary for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. The U.S. military has also been actively exploring ways to reduce the $14 billion dollar fuel bill it paid in 2010. Last year, the Department of Defense spent $2.7 billion dollars to improve energy efficiency. Noting that fuel supply lines are easy targets for insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, Navy secretary Ray Mabus said a greener armed forces may save lives. An army study found that for every 24 fuel convoys one soldier or marine is killed. By 2020, Mabus wants 50 percent of the Navy’s and Marines’ power to be supplied by renewable sources. The Army and Air Force are also developing biofuels for vehicles and aircraft. Other countries are betting on algae as well. “There is intense interest in algal biofuels and bioproducts in this country and abroad, including in Australia, Chile, China, the European Union, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and others,” a spokes person for the Department of Energy said. “The Asia Pacific region has been culturing algae for food and pharmaceuticals for many centuries, and these countries are eager to use this knowledge base for the production of biofuels.” It is likely that several more years of sustained research, development and demonstration–RD&D–will be necessary to overcome the cost and scale barriers associated with algal biofuels. In the meantime, meaningful quantities of fuels and products will be produced by first-movers that will move the industry closer to realizing the full potential of this technology.”

#### Algae production results in nutrient recycling of sewage and waste – solves phosphorus fertilizer

Hodge 08 (Nick, The Green Chip Review, October, “Investing in Algae Biofuel”,

<http://www.greenchipstocks.com/report/investing-in-algae-biofuel/109>)

It is possible to use human sewage and wastewater from agricultural endeavors to enhance the growth of algae. In fact, when done right, algae can double and even triple overnight with the addition of these fertilizers. Compare that to the five-month growing season for soy or canola! Plus, as algae grows it absorbs Co2 from the air. MIT has even fed emissions from their on-site power plant directly to algae being cultivated for biofuel production. In addition, fertilizer for other food crops can be produced by using the leftover nutrients that aren't used to make the biofuel. That's like having your algae and eating it too. So let's back up and look at the big picture. We have the technology right now to cultivate algae that can be used as fuel, using human and animal waste as fertilizer. This is waste that would otherwise need to be treated or end up in our nation's ground water. Not a bad deal at all! Then, after the necessary oils have been extracted from the algae, we use the byproducts (phosphorus and nitrogen) as fertilizer for the food crops that feed the nation - all while extracting C02 from the air.

#### Extinction – collapse of agriculture

Osava 07 (Mario, correspondant for Inter Press Service, “Farming faces phosphate shortfall,” 10/15, <http://www.energybulletin.net/node/35851>)

RIO DE JANEIRO - Scarcity of phosphate, an indispensable fertilizer for farming, is worrying soil experts, given the voracious plans of Brazil and many other countries in the race for biofuel leadership. A salt of phosphoric acid salt, phosphate is a chemical compound made up of a central phosphorous atom and four oxygen atoms. Phosphorous is a "finite and irreplaceable" mineral, whose known reserves that are economically viable for exploitation could run out in 60 to 100 years if the current pace of global consumption continues, Euripedes Malavolta, veteran agronomist and researcher at the University of Sao Paulo, told Tierramérica. "Without phosphorous there will be no agriculture, nor biofuels, nor life. Humanity will end," he said. Other minerals, like nitrogen, potassium, cobalt, magnesium and molybdenum, are also indispensable, but their sources are not as limited and, except for the first two, their consumption is relatively low. "Phosphate runs the risk of running out before petroleum does," José Oswaldo Siqueira, professor of soil microbiology at the Federal University of Lavras, told a bio-energy conference held Sep. 26 in Sao Paulo.

### 1NC – EIS

#### Text – The United States Federal Government should initiate an environmental impact assessment regarding the consequences of airborne wind energy from kite systems for energy production on Naval ships and adopt such a measure if, and only if, it meets compliance requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act.

#### We’ll clarify.

#### -- Competes –

#### Tests “resolved”

**AHD 6** (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To cause (a person) to reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or express by formal vote.

#### And “should”

**AHD** **92** (American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language) (4ed, 1992); Pg. 1612

Should—1. Used to express obligation or duty: *You should send her a note*.

#### – Counterplans that test the resolution are key to predictable ground

#### -- Net-beneficial –

#### Environmental Impact Assessments solve the aff and avoid environmental consequences

Gilpin 2k (Dr. Alan, Commissioner of Inquiry for Environment and Planning with the New South Wales Government, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): Cutting Edge for the Twenty-first Century, p. 14-15)

Life cycle EIA is a procedure for evaluating the environmental impacts of a product, process, or activity, throughout its whole life cycle; a vertical exercise running from cradle to grave The main purposes of LEIA are: • to assess the environment effects of the retrieval and consumption of the raw materials and other inputs during the different life cycle phases of a product, process, or activity, including the fate of all pollutants and residuals; • to assess the disposal problem, if any, of the superseded process or activity; • to provide information useful for an aggregated EIA of products, processes and activities, throughout the life cycle; • to evaluate the environmental consequences of alternative processes and design concepts, permitting a comparison between products, processes, and activities. Each phase might be accorded a score on environmental index, for example, for: natural resources, raw materials, land use; emissions to air, water, and soil; noise; manufacturing procedures about economy, energy, work and public safety; waste handling; recycling, and ultimate disposal. A LEIA mends beyond the boundaries of responsibility of the individual company or producer, backwards and forwards, into matters entering the public domain, It goes beyond the realm of private ownership into the full social and resource implications of, say, car manufacture and ownership, including the disposal of car tyres, batteries, and abandoned vehicles. The principle could be applied as readily to household appliances, beverage containers, packaging materials, plants, plastics, steels, fuels, lubricants, detergents, cables, fast food, fertilizers, energy production, and major infrastructure developments.

#### EIA provide open public debate about the environment, providing a key global mechanism

Andrews 6 (Richard N.L, Thomas Willis Lambeth Distinguished Professor at the University of North Carolina, “Learning From History: US Environmental Politics, Policies, and the Common Good,” *Environment* Volume 48, Number 9, November 2006)

Most fundamentally, U.S. consumption of energy and material resources continued virtually unchecked, drawing on an increasingly global economy whose environmental and social costs elsewhere remained largely invisible to most U.S. consumers. As historically poorer countries— China in particular—began to adopt U.S. aspirations for material and energy consumption, the prospect was for continued increases in human impacts on natural processes and ecosystems rather than stabilization or reduction of them. In addition to its impacts on environmental outcomes, the environmental era also left an important political legacy. The distinctive positive element of this legacy was the democratization of information, access, and rights of challenge to governmental decisionmaking affecting the environment. Key examples included the Freedom of Information Act, NEPA's environmental impact statements, and statutory rights to sue both businesses and government agencies to enforce the environmental protection statutes. These policies did not fully or permanently neutralize the influence of entrenched commercial interests, but they did substantially open the process to other stakeholders' values, the full range of relevant information, and far more widespread and transparent public debate. Coupled with the concurrent Internet revolution in public access to information and organizational networks, the environmental era produced a powerful and enduring increase in the public's knowledge and its role in environmental decisions. This increase continues to spread worldwide, notwithstanding the resurgence in corporate power and influence that has also occurred. This political legacy did not, of course, automatically favor groups that identified themselves with the organized environmental protection movement. Environmental advocacy groups pioneered in its development and benefited from its initial successes, but over time these procedures proved equally open to groups representing the interests of property owners against environmental regulations, conservative law groups using the tactics of the "green" groups in pursuit of different outcomes, and even front groups for business interests. Nonetheless, by making all the impacts of proposed decisions more visible to everyone who might be affected, this increase in transparency and access marked one of the distinctive and enduring contributions of the environmental era, to environmental policy and to governance more generally.

#### This prevents planetary extinction from eco-collapse

Andrews 6 (Richard N.L, Thomas Willis Lambeth Distinguished Professor at the University of North Carolina, “Learning From History: US Environmental Politics, Policies, and the Common Good,” *Environment* Volume 48, Number 9, November 2006)

In 2005 the United Nation commissioned Millennium ecosystem assessment reported that over the past 50 years rapid and extensive change in human ecosystems has resulted in a substantial and largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life on Earth. More land has been converted to cropland since 1945 than in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries combined, and water withdrawals from rivers and lakes have doubled since 1960. Since 1750, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, the major contributor to global warming, has increased, with 60 percent of that increase happening between 1959 and the present. Fifty percent of all the synthetic nitrogen fertilizer ever used has been applied since 1985; flows of biologically available nitrogen in terrestrial ecosystems have doubled since 1960 and may increase by thirds more by 2050. An estimated 10 to 30 percent of all mammal, bird, and amphibian species are currently threatened with extinction. These changes have contributed to substantial gains in human well-being and economic development at growing costs to the essential services that ecosystems provide to human societies; providing food, water, fuel, wood, and fiber, supporting; and regulating natural processes that are necessary for human life and health (nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, the climate system, and the control of disease organisms) and providing spiritual and recreational values. These damaging trends are substantially reducing the availability of these services for future use. U.S. environmental policies have been prominent causes of these damaging trends and must be part of any solution. Throughout American history, the United States' dominant policies have been to promote the economic exploitation of natural resources, first nationally and now globally. The United States has not been unique in this: European trade and colonization initiated these trends, and other governments have done likewise. But as the world's largest single market for material and energy resources—at least until 2005, when China surpassed it in total consumption—and a leading exporter of both production technologies and consumption lifestyles, the United States has had a prominent influence, and its policies are essential to any solution.

### Variable Subsidy 1NC

#### The United States Navy should establish purchase agreements for wind energy from kite systems for energy production on its ships that is variable based on changes in performance, price, and cost. The incentives should be terminated if the technology fails to reach the price and performance benchmarks. We’ll clarify.

#### The CP solves the case --- it promotes innovation, cost reduction, and commercialization.

**Jenkins et. al**, April **2012** (Jesse – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute, and Mark Muro – Senior Fellow at the Metropolitan Policy Program in the Brookings Institution, Ted Nordhaus – cofounder of the Breakthrough Institute, Michael Shellenberger – cofounder of the Breakthrough Institute, Letha Tawney – Senior Associate at the World Resources Institute, and Alex Trembath – Policy Associate at the Breakthrough Institute, Beyond Boom & Bust: Putting Clean Tech on a Path to Subsidy Independence, p. 38-39)

In particular, many of today’s clean tech deployment subsidies and policies should be reformed to ensure they: → ESTABLISH A COMPETITIVE MARKET. Deployment policies should create market opportunities for advanced clean energy technologies while fostering competition between technology firms. → DRIVE COST REDUCTIONS AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS. Deployment policies should create market incentives and structures that demand and reward continual improvement in technology performance and cost. → PROVIDE TARGETED AND TEMPORARY SUPPORT FOR MATURING TECHNOLOGIES. Deployment policies must not operate in perpetuity, but rather provide targeted and temporary support for clean tech segments that are still maturing and improving. Incentives should be terminated if technology segments either fail to improve in price and performance or become competitive without subsidy. → REDUCE SUBSIDY LEVELS IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING TECHNOLOGY COSTS. Deployment incentives should decline as technologies improve in price and performance to both conserve limited taxpayer and consumer resources and provide clear incentives for continued technology improvement. → AVOID TECHNOLOGY LOCK-OUT AND PROMOTE A DIVERSE ENERGY PORTFOLIO. Deployment incentives should be structured to create market opportunities for energy technologies at various levels of maturity, including new market entrants, to ensure that each has a chance to mature while allowing technologies of similar maturity levels to compete amongst themselves.97 More expensive technologies that are still nascent and have the technical potential to develop into low-cost, high-performance energy sources should not be locked out of markets by more mature clean technologies that have had the benefit of more time to reduce costs. A diverse energy portfolio will strengthen America’s energy security and encourage greater market competition. → PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BUSINESS CERTAINTY. While deployment incentives should be temporary, they must provide sufficient certainty to support key business decisions by private firms and investors. The process for reducing subsidies and the schedule for support should be clear, transparent, and planned over a multi-year horizon. Several policies could be structured to meet these criteria. Competitive deployment incentives could be created for various clean tech segments of similar maturity, with incentives for each segment falling steadily over time to demand and reward continual innovation and price improvements.99 Steadily improving performance-based standards could create both market demand and spur consistent technology improvement.100 Such incentives or performance standards could also be set competitively by “top-runners,” the leading industry performers in each market segment, forcing other firms to steadily innovate to stay competitive in the market.101 Demanding federal procurement opportunities could be created to drive both market opportunities and ensure steady improvement of each successive generation of product, particularly when clean tech products align with strategic military needs.102 And where direct government procurement does not make sense, reverse auction incentives could be established for varying technologies to drive industry competition and innovation.103 If structured to adhere to these criteria, a new era of clean tech deployment policies will neither select “winners and losers” a priori nor create permanently subsidized industries. Rather, these policies will provide opportunities for all emerging clean energy technologies to demonstrate progress in price and performance , foster competitive markets within a diverse energy portfolio, and put clean tech segments on track to full subsidy independence.

## Navy

### Solvency – 1NC

#### Plan only effects one barrier – lack of investment and engineering challenges means high-altitude wind is 20 years away

Levitan 12 (Dave, Freelance Journalist, “High-Altitude Wind Energy: Huge Potential – And Hurdles,” Environment 360, 9-24, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/high\_altitude\_wind\_energy\_huge\_potential\_and\_hurdles/2576/)

The wind turbines that increasingly dot the landscape peak at around 300 feet above ground, with the massive blades spinning a bit higher. The wind, however, does not peak at 300 feet. Winds are faster and more consistent the higher one climbs, maxing out in the jet streams at five miles and above. With conventional wind power facing a litany of obstacles — intermittency, space requirements, not-in-my-backyard complaints — pushing wind power up into the atmosphere could take a lot of uncertainty out of the equation. And despite a host of technical and regulatory challenges, a growing number of small companies are working hard to get up there within the next few years, with numerous designs and ideas aimed at harvesting wind power high in the sky. “The potential is incredibly high,” says Cristina Archer, an associate professor of ocean science and engineering at the University of Delaware. Archer and a colleague published one of two recent detailed analyses of the total energy that could be extracted from the planet’s winds to generate electricity. The other was conducted by well-known climate scientist Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution and Stanford University. Both found an effectively unlimited supply of power, with vastly more available as one moves up away from the ground. But Caldeira and others say that while they see enormous long-term potential in airborne wind, the engineering and regulatory challenges are formidable, particularly if companies want to tap into powerful jet stream winds. “I would be reluctant to remortgage my house and invest the money in these companies, because I think the probability of them being able to compete in the marketplace at scale in, say, the next decade is pretty small,” he says. Nevertheless, he believes that given both its enormous possibilities and the various hurdles it faces, the airborne wind industry is an ideal candidate for public research and development support. The questions surrounding airborne wind are significant. How do you safely suspend airborne turbines hundreds or thousands of feet off the ground? How do you keep them aloft for long periods of time in high winds without having to perform frequent, costly maintenance? And what about interference with aviation? Proponents say, however, that in some ways high-altitude wind power could end up being easier to deploy — and cheaper — than traditional wind energy. Construction costs will be markedly diminished with no need for giant steel and concrete towers, and there will be no need for the yaw mechanism that keeps standard turbines facing into the wind as wind direction changes. Instead, the basic premise of airborne generation is to tether a device to the ground and let it fly around in the strong winds like a kite, either generating power and sending it down a tether to the ground or using the tether itself to produce electricity at its base. The specific devices on the end of the tether vary widely in design. Terrestrial windmill design is largely settled; but up in the sky, it seems like anything goes. There are rigid, carbon-fiber wings outfitted with multiple small turbines; softer kite-like devices that fly in figure-eights and generate power by coiling and uncoiling a tether; devices that resemble a blimp rotating around a horizontal axis; and several other concepts. No consensus exists on an optimal design, though some may be better suited for utility-scale wind farms while others may fit smaller, niche-market applications. One company that seems close to deployment is Makani Power, based in Alameda, California. Makani’s tethered rigid wing has been through seven development iterations and numerous test flights in six years, and the latest prototype can generate 30 kilowatts of power. With close to $20 million in funding from Google and the Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), Makani hopes to build a 92-foot wingspan version rated at 600 kilowatts, which could supply power to about 150 households. Corwin Hardham, the founder and CEO of Makani, says the company has interest from developers and could start building airborne wind farms within a few years. Farther in the future, Hardham hopes his company can build a 5-megawatt behemoth version, with a 213-foot wingspan best suited for offshore use. “That’s where our approach really shines, offshore,” Hardham says, adding that he thinks Makani could eventually produce power at 6 cents per kilowatt-hour at offshore installations. That’s far cheaper than current offshore wind power in Europe and would make it extremely competitive with power produced from coal and natural gas. Another company close to actual wind farm development is Ampyx Power, based in the Netherlands and spun out of research at Delft University. Ampyx’s PowerPlane is a glider that generates electricity by pulling on its tether, which is connected to a ground-mounted generator. The PowerPlane glides around between 1,000 and 2,000 feet; the next iteration of this design should generate 250 to 500 kilowatts continuously, says founder Richard Ruiterkamp. “We’ve been flying autonomously now for about a year,” Ruiterkamp says. “Before the end of the year we will have the full cycle up and running for a number of hours.” The next hurdle, he says, is to operate for multiple days consecutively without human intervention. Ampyx says it expects construction on a wind farm to begin within several years. Two companies with dramatically different ideas are California-based Magenn Power and Boston-based Altaeros. Magenn’s helium-filled, blimp-like structure floats 1,000 feet up, and the entire balloon spins around a horizontal axis as the wind blows past. This technology is about as bird-friendly a design as one could imagine, with no spinning blades, and has undergone successful test flights. Altaeros, meanwhile, also uses a helium-filled device, though to quite different effect. The balloon shell surrounds the blades and hub of a standard turbine in the center, basically serving to lift a normal windmill 1,000 feet off the ground. The company says it successfully tested a prototype earlier this year, and reports that the turbine generated twice the power at 350 feet as the same turbine did at standard heights of about 100 feet. These inflatable designs, along with soft-wing kite designs like that made by North Carolina-based Windlift, may end up being most suitable for off-grid, remote applications, given their easy transportability and quick set-up times, wind industry executives say. “We’re working on small distributed systems rather than big utility-scale systems,” says Andy Stough, the vice president of engineering at Windlift. The company receives substantial funding from the U.S. Marine Corps, which hopes to power bases in remote locations with the soft-wing kite design instead of the expensive and sometimes hazardous necessity of trucking in or airlifting diesel fuel for generators. The Windlift kite involves a 40-square-meter wing flying at a maximum altitude (for the moment) of 500 feet, with the controls and generator on the ground. Beyond the Marine Corps, Stough says anything involving remote power needs — off-grid mobile communications, disaster relief, and so on — could be a good candidate for these types of airborne wind systems. A German company called EnerKite uses a similar design and may be even closer to deployment; both companies have conducted successful test flights in recent years. P.J. Shepard, co-founder of an industry group called the Airborne Wind Energy Consortium, says the progress toward working, power-generating prototypes has been impressive in the last few years. “Some [companies] have proven energy-generation capability, many have demonstrated some level of autonomous control, and a few are planning... power farm development,” she says. But scaling up past the prototype stage won’t be easy. Experts in the industry think that without strong government support, installing even one gigawatt of airborne power (50 GW of standard, terrestrial wind are already installed in the U.S.) could take 20 years or more, an eternity when drastic emissions reductions are the goal. With a relatively modest government investment of $100 million per year, that one gigawatt goal could be attained in fewer than 10 years, wind industry executives say. Some larger companies such as Honeywell and 3M have shown some interest, but the major traditional wind power developers — Siemens, GE, Vestas, and others — have so far left the airborne designs to the startups. Without major investment, some of the specific engineering challenges may be difficult to overcome. According to an industry survey by the nonprofit energy analysis group Near Zero, the biggest remaining issue is reliability: In order to be viable, airborne devices would need to stay aloft for long periods of time with little maintenance required. When it comes to really taking advantage of higher altitude wind, Caldeira points out that reaching as high as the jet stream is the real prize. The Reaching up into the powerful winds of the jet stream is the real prize. power density in Earth’s jet streams is around 100 times that of sunlight hitting a standard photovoltaic cell. “The fact that there is no other renewable energy source available in abundance with such high power densities says to me that we should have a research program trying to exploit it,” Caldeira says. But the differences in engineering requirements between flying a device at 1,000 feet and at five or six miles are enormous. Outside of R&D issues, another huge challenge is regulation. What, exactly, is a 80-foot-wide device, tethered to the ground, flying circles 1,000 feet up in the air? Is it an airplane? A “building” or “obstacle”? There is no clear regulatory framework for the industry, though in 2011 the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration did begin a process meant to include airborne wind systems in their governing structure. For the moment, this will limit testing to 499 feet of altitude, meaning the jet streams are still far out of reach.

### 1NC Senkaku

#### No East China Sea conflict

Rudd 3/14 -- Former Prime Minister and Former Foreign Minister, Member, Australian Parliament, interview with Jonathan Tepperman (Kevin, 2013, "The Situation in North Korea and the Future of U.S.-China Relations," http://www.cfr.org/australasia-and-the-pacific/situation-north-korea-future-us-china-relations/p30230)

What ultimately drives this is a -- is a conflicting set of interests between rampant nationalisms on the one hand and, on the other hand, a pragmatic recognition by governments both in Beijing and Tokyo that conflict, for both of them, would be absolutely disastrous and would retard economic growth and stability in the wider region and would further (retard China's ?) -- primacy of China's own economic development objectives. Now, if they're the two competing poles in this debate, both in Tokyo and Beijing, rational foreign policy actors would conclude that rational self-interest and rational economic self-interest would ultimately (prevail ?). As you know, history cautions us against reaching those conclusions. And I think if you've seen the drift in the numbers, both in terms of Sino-Japanese trade numbers and Sino-Japanese investment numbers over the last six to nine months, the impact in real numbers is palpable and measurable in terms of the state of the China-Japan relationship. I think my friends in Beijing, when I have spoken with them, including the military, I think it's fair to say, are working very actively behind the scenes to find face-saving mechanisms by which this can be managed to the point of stability for the period ahead and then put into some longer-term process with the Japanese. However, when I was last in Beijing, which was prior to the -- (audio interference) -- lock-on incident, the -- it was very much a question within the Chinese minds about how one would do that without actually losing face on the national mistakes in the public discourse both about Japan and with Japan.

### 1NC Middle East War

#### Middle East war doesn’t escalate

Maloney 7 (Suzanne, Senior Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Steve Cook, Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Fellow – Council for Foreign Relations, “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune, 6-28, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm)

Long before the Bush administration began selling "the surge" in Iraq as a way to avert a general war in the Middle East, observers both inside and outside the government were growing concerned about the potential for armed conflict among the regional powers. Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

#### Won’t go nuclear

Dyer 2 (Gwynne, Ph.D. in War Studies – University of London and Board of Governors – Canada’s Royal Military College, The Coming War, Queen’s Quarterly, December, Lexis)

All of this indicates an extremely dangerous situation, with many variables that are impossible to assess fully. But there is one comforting reality here: this will not become World War III. Not long ago, wars in the Middle East always went to the brink very quickly, with the Americans and Soviets deeply involved on opposite sides, bristling their nuclear weapons at one another. And for quite some time we lived on the brink of oblivion. But that is over. World War III has been cancelled, and I don't think we could pump it up again no matter how hard we tried. The connections that once tied Middle Eastern confrontations to a global confrontation involving tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have all been undone. The East-West Cold War is finished. The truly dangerous powers in the world today are the industrialized countries in general. We are the ones with the resources and the technology to churn out weapons of mass destruction like sausages. But the good news is: we are out of the business.

### 2NC US/Japan Relations – Resilient

#### No impact – relations are resilient

China Daily 7 (“PM Amends Diplomatic Policies,” 10-26, Lexis)

Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda's diplomatic policies since taking office have shown three unchanged and three changed aspects from those of his predecessor Shinzo Abe and of the latter's predecessor Junichiro Koizumi. The unchanged aspects are: the principle of diplomacy based on Japan's national interests; the Japan-US ties are the basic axis of Japan's diplomacy, and efforts to strengthen Japan's status and role in the international community. The three changed aspects are in fact modifications to: the practice during Koizumi's administration to use diplomacy as a tool for his political party and politicians to manifest "personal belief" and pan up nationalism; the overly US-oriented diplomacy that was "totally devoted to" and "integrated with" Washington's cause, and Koizumi's decision to downplay relations with other Asian countries. After the Cold War ended the Japan-US alliance aimed at the Soviet Union lost its "common target" for a while. But, as the "only superpower" left in the world, the US felt it must continue using Japan in implementing its global strategy. It was afraid that Japan, if not firmly under US control, might lean toward China and weaken US influence in Asia or even elbow it out. Meanwhile, as a country well-known for its diplomatic tradition to always bond with "the most powerful nation" in the world, Japan was hoping to "piggyback on" the US to reach its goal of becoming a "normal country", so much so it went all out to advance "Japan-US military integration. The marriage of "national interests" of the two countries gave the Japan-US alliance very strong "resilience". The fundamental condition for keeping an alliance is a "common enemy", which gave rise to the question of which country was good enough to substitute the Soviet Union. It was against this backdrop that some people in Japan and the US started chanting the "China threat theory" to make an excuse for keeping joint military efforts against China. The Japanese rightwing even aspired to substitute the "US-Soviet cold war" with a "US-China cold war" in the hope that the rivalry between China and the US would result in both of them being "too hurt to win the war". The reality is, however, China did not have the strategic intent to challenge the hegemonic status of the US. And the China-US cooperation, including on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, was developing closer by the day into a relationship of constructive cooperation. This resulted in the Japan-US ties entering the "best period in history" under the Koizumi administration; the Sino-US relations were approaching maturity and stability as well, whereas the China-Japan relationship was plunged into the "worst period in history" since the normalization of bilateral ties.

#### Alliance resilient – its unbreakable

Burns 11 (William J., “William J. Burns Deputy Secretary Speaks on the Enduring Value of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Targeted News Service, 10-27, Lexis)

It is important to put the significance of our alliance in a global context. Today the world and the United States stand at a pivot point. As Secretary Clinton has said, the Asia-Pacific region is now a key driver of global politics, and greater U.S. commitment here is essential. After World War II, America built a strong and lasting network of institutions and relationships across the Atlantic -- one that pays off to this day. We must now do the same across the Pacific. The time has come for the United States to redouble our investments as a Pacific power, a strategic course set by President Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits. These benefits go both ways: just as Asia is critical to America's future, an engaged America is vital to Asia's future. And there is no question that our treaty alliance with Japan is the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific. One measure of the strength of our alliance is in its impressive ability to adapt to meet new and emerging challenges. That was never clearer than in March of this year when our governments launched the largest joint military operation in our history in response to Japan's devastating earthquake and tsunami. The success of what we called Operation Tomodachi provided a powerful demonstration of what we can accomplish together, as friends, and the lessons learned from this operation have further enhanced our joint capabilities. This experience vividly demonstrated something that I think most Americans and most Japanese had only understood in the abstract -- that our alliance is an unbreakable bond between our people and nations, not just a paper treaty or a series of military bases.

### 1NC Naval Power

#### Naval force readiness high – new ship acquisitions solve

**O'Rourke 12** (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” 8-9-12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf)

In February 2006, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of **313 ships**, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. On March 28, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted to Congress an FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) **shipbuilding plan** that includes a new goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships. The Navy is conducting a force structure assessment, to be completed later this year, that could lead to a refinement of this 310316-ship plan. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests funding for the procurement of **10 new battle force** ships (i.e., ships that count against the 310-316 ship goal). The 10 ships include one Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). These ships are all funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.

#### Navy irrelevant

Holmes 3/13 -- defense analyst for The Diplomat and a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College (James S., 2013, "Surface Combat Fleets: Obsolete?" http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2013/03/13/surface-combat-fleets-obsolete/)

What does the more distant future of surface warfare hold? Suppose antiship missiles come to boast transoceanic ranges — hardly a whimsical prospect if the DF-21D pans out. Sooner or later most of the world's oceans may fall under the shadow of land-based precision weaponry, much as the Allies extended air cover across the Atlantic Ocean during World War II. Bombers flying from shore airfields became potent antiship implements, helping negate the U-boat menace. If missiles fired from land can strike at surface vessels from vast distances, why send out cruisers or destroyers — basically mobile launch platforms — to accomplish the same thing at mortal risk to themselves? Such developments could see the offense-defense balance shift radically toward the defense, obviating the advantages cruise missiles and high-tech combat systems like Aegis bestowed on seaborne forces starting in the 1980s. If so, extended-range fire support coupled with submarine warfare could convert the seas into no-man's lands in wartime. I doubt new technology will empower defenders to command the sea from the shore, but it might well empower them to deny command across broad expanses — making for a Mad Max future on the high seas, a war of all against all. Is the end of surface combat fleets coming into sight? It's not an immediate prospect. Strategic one-upsmanship typifies international competition and conflict. Innovation begets counter-innovation.Nevertheless, the maritime strategic landscape is starting to look grim for "skimmers" such as myself who ply the water's surface. Surface navies doubtless have a future in peacetime. Whether they can contribute in wartime, even if armed with carrier killers, is worth pondering.

### 1NC SCS

#### SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation

Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)

These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them. Vietnam and the Philippines, concerned with the shifting balance of powers in the region, are pushing their maritime claims more aggressively and increasing their efforts to internationalise the question by involving both ASEAN and Washington. Attempts to come up with a common position in ASEAN have failed miserably but as the US re-engages Asia, it is drawn into the troubled waters of the South China Sea. Political dynamics in China – with a once in a decade leadership transition coming up, combined with electoral politics in the US and domestic constraints for both Manila and Hanoi – all augur that the South China Sea will remain turbulent. No government can afford to appear weak in the eyes of domestic hawks or of increasingly nationalistic public opinions. The risk of a miscalculation resulting in prolonged standoffs or skirmishes is therefore higher now than ever before. But there are a number of reasons to believe that even these skirmishes are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict. First, despite the strong current of assertive forces within China, cooler heads are ultimately likely to prevail. While a conciliatory stance toward other claimants is unlikely before the leadership transition, China’s top brass will be equally reluctant to significantly escalate the situation, since this will send southeast Asian governments running to Washington. Hanoi and Manila also recognize that despite their need for assertiveness to appease domestic political constituencies, a direct confrontation with China is overly risky. Second, military pundits in China also realize that the cost of conflict is too high, since it will strengthen Washington’s presence in the region and disrupt trade flows. And even China’s oil company CNOOC, whose portfolio of assets relies heavily on the South China Sea, is diversifying its interests in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.

### Heg – 1NC

#### No disruptions

**Alic**, former tech and science consultant – Office of Technology Assessment, adjunt professor – Johns Hopkins SAIS, ‘**12**

(John, “Defense Department Energy Innovation: Three Cases,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, March)

Over 80 percent of the petroleum purchased and consumed¶ by the U.S. military consists of jet fuel designated JP-5 or JP-8;¶ diesel fuel makes up nearly all the rest.46 By volume, recent¶ purchases peaked in fiscal 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, then¶ declined even as rising oil prices pushed expenditures upward:¶ fuel doubled as a share of DoD outlays, from 1.5 percent to 3¶ percent, between fiscal years 2004 and 2008. Consumption did¶ not change much, but purchases rose from $7 billion (2004) to¶ $18 billion (2008). Prices then fell back somewhat, but in 2011¶ DoD paid more for jet fuel just as motorists did for gasoline.¶ Even so, the Energy Information Administration (EIA, part of the¶ Energy Department) predicts relatively flat oil prices over the next¶ quarter century, with inflation-adjusted prices in the range of¶ $120 per barrel.47¶ Oil prices respond almost instantaneously to international¶ political events (e.g., the threat of supply constrictions) and to¶ economic fluctuations affecting demand. A small number of big¶ suppliers—state-owned or state-controlled enterprises inside¶ and outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries¶ (OPEC), plus a handful of private multinationals—dominate¶ production. In recent years, most have appeared to pump¶ oil at or near capacity most of the time. By most indications,¶ Saudi Arabia alone retains the ability to affect prices by raising¶ or lowering output. Otherwise suppliers must act together to¶ set prices, and in recent years that has come to seem mostly a¶ theoretical possibility. Periodic fears of disruption linked with¶ political unrest or war have had greater effects, and sharp swings¶ in prices have been common, affected also by asynchronous¶ demand variations in major markets. Price increases have been¶ moderated by declining energy intensity (energy consumption¶ relative to economic output) in most parts of the world. This is¶ the principal reason EIA does not expect the long-term trend to¶ be sharply upward.¶ Acknowledging the more dramatic scenarios some analysts¶ put forward, there seems little in what is actually known about¶ world oil reserves and the workings of the international market to¶ suggest that the U.S. military faces either intolerably burdensome¶ fuel costs or supply risks in the foreseeable future. DoD buys¶ fuel alongside other purchasers. It is a big customer, but not¶ big enough to affect prices. Long-distance transport of crude¶ oil and refined products is routine and inexpensive. So long¶ as the world market remains effectively integrated, it would¶ take a massive injection of substitutable alternatives to affect¶ prices. Private investors, absent proven capability to produce¶ alternatives in substantial quantities at competitive costs—or a¶ package of subsidies such as those for domestic ethanol, perhaps¶ including binding price guarantees—will find little reason to¶ increase production capacity rapidly. Fuel is fuel, and as output¶ of substitutable alternatives builds it will simply flow into the¶ international market at prices little different from those for other¶ refined petroleum products.¶ Given U.S. dependence on imported oil, it is reliability of¶ supply, rather than pricing, that might seem the larger issue.¶ But again, the market is international; indeed, DoD buys much¶ of its fuel abroad—in recent years, something like half (box¶ 2.3). Innovations—perhaps sustainable biofuels—would, once¶ proven, migrate to the lowest-cost-production locations, many of¶ them presumably overseas. (The United States has no monopoly¶ on sunshine and arable land.) DoD and the government might¶ support innovation and subsidize production, but it would be¶ difficult to wall off domestic output without some compelling¶ national security rationale. Wartime supply interruptions¶ might be accepted as justifying government ownership and¶ reservation of output for the military, but not indefinite fears of¶ future interruptions. Private ownership coupled with domestic¶ production and export restrictions would more than likely be¶ seen as contravening bedrock principles of U.S. foreign economic¶ policy, which since World War II has been based on borders¶ nominally open to trade.

#### No impact to cutoff and don’t offer benefits

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

Defense Department goals for alternative fuels in tactical weapon systems should be based on potential national benefits, since the use of alternative, rather than petroleum-derived, fuels offers no direct military benefits. While Fischer-Tropsch fuels and hydrotreated renewable fuels are no less able than conventional fuels to meet the Defense Department’s needs, they offer no particular military benefit over their petroleum-derived counterparts. For example, even if alternative fuels can be produced at costs below the prevailing costs for conventional fuels, they will be priced at market rates. Also, we are unable to find any credible evidence that sources to produce jet or naval distillate fuel will run out in the foreseeable future. If conflict or a natural disaster were to abruptly disrupt global oil supplies, the U.S. military would not suffer a physical shortage. Rather, the resulting sharp increase in world prices would cause consumers around the world to curb use of petroleum products. Less usage would ensure that supplies remained available. As long as the military is willing to pay higher prices, it is unlikely to have a problem getting the fuel it requires. If problems do arise, the Defense Production Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-774) contains provisions for performance on a priority basis of contracts for the production, refining, and delivery of petroleum products to the Defense Department and its contractors.

## Shipping

### Shipping D

#### Asian shipyards outcompete US shipyards now – no coming back

Loyd 10 (Linda, “Aker Philadelphia Shipyard, in a work drought, is counting on a marine-highways system,” 7-18-10, <http://articles.philly.com/2010-07-18/business/24968596_1_aker-philadelphia-shipyard-shipbuilding-industry-shipyard-workers>)

Since World War II, commercial U.S. **shipbuilding has dwindled**, and most of the world's big ships today are **built in Asia** - Korea, China, and Japan. It is a testament to the Philadelphia region that shipbuilding has survived at all. "That Aker is still around and operating is the consequence of achievements in the past," said Paul Bingham, managing director for global commerce and transportation for IHS Global Insight Inc. "A lot of other cities that had shipbuilding 30 years ago have seen their shipyards go away." The hurdle for U.S. shipbuilding is cost - not labor cost, but productivity and economies of scale. Korean shipbuilder Hyundai turns out 70 ships a year in each of its two yards, compared with three to five ships a year for the entire U.S. industry. The more ships a yard builds, the more productive the workers, and the lower the overhead costs. Supplier prices also drop. "U.S. shipyards are **too small** to compete with a much more efficient Asian shipyard, where it's just a critical-mass issue," Bingham said. "An Asian shipyard may launch a vessel every other week, not one per year. It's almost the difference between an assembly line, and something that's handcrafted." Even U.S. yards that cater to the military have **too little work** now because, after the September 2001 attacks, **the Navy** and the Coast Guard have not been building as many ships as they once did. Last week, defense contractor Northrop Grumman Corp. said it would seek to spin off or sell its entire shipbuilding unit and shut its yard in Avondale, La., by 2013 because of less military work.

### 1NC Trade / Protectionism

#### Trade inevitable – globalization.

BRAINARD 08 Vice President and Director for Global Economy and Development

[Lael, Senate Committee on Finance, “America’s Trade Agenda: Examining the Trade Enforcment Act of 2007,” Senate testimony, 5/22/2008, brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0522\_trade\_brainard.aspx]

We are experiencing a period of breathtaking global integration that dwarfs previous episodes. Global trade has more than doubled in the last 7 years alone. The entry of India and China amounts to a 70 percent expansion of the global labor force—with wages less than a tenth of the level in wealthy economies. This expansion is more than three times bigger than the globalization challenge of the 1970s and 80s associated with the sequential advances of Japan, South Korea, and the other Asian tigers. It is also far larger than the more recent integration of the North American market. If, as is now widely expected, these trends in population and productivity growth continue, the time will soon approach where the balance of global economic heft flips. According to my colleague, Homi Kharas, the so-called emerging BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) economies will account for over half of world income by 2050, up from 13 percent today, while the share of the G7 wealthiest economies will slip from 57 percent today to one quarter of world income in 2050. And by 2030, 83 percent of the world’s middle class consumers will reside in what are today considered emerging markets.

#### Doesn’t solve conflict

Gelpi and Greico 05, Associate Professor and Professor of Political Science, Duke University

(Christopher, Joseph, “Democracy, Interdependence, and the Sources of the Liberal Peace”, Journal of Peace Research)

As we have already emphasized, increasing levels of trade between an autocratic and democratic country are unlikely to constrain the former from initiating militarized disputes against the latter. As depicted in Figure 1, our analysis indicates that an increase in trade dependence by an autocratic challenger on a democratic target from zero to 5% of the former's GDP would increase the probability of the challenger’s dispute initiation from about 0.31% to 0.29%. Thus, the overall probability of dispute initiation by an autocratic country against a democracy is fairly high (given the rarity of disputes) at 23 nearly .3% per country per year. Moreover, increased trade does little or nothing to alter that risk. Increases in trade dependence also have little effect on the likelihood that one autocracy will initiate a conflict with another. In this instance, the probability of dispute initiation remains constant at 0.33% regardless of the challenger’s level of trade dependence.

### 2NC Trade – Resilient

#### -- Trade is resilient – no collapse

Perroni and Whally 96 (Carlo, University of Warwick and John, University of Western Ontario, American Economic Review, 86(2), May, p. 60)

Furthermore, trade performance in the period since the late 1940’s also clearly stands in sharp contrast to the events of the 1930’s. The largest players, the United States and the EU have **consistently displayed** a determination to mediate their trade disputes in the 1980’s, triggered by EU enlargement. And today’s global economy is **much more interdependent** than it was in the 1930’s. Firms and industries have become more reliant on export markets, and there is more interindustry trade. There is also the major difference of the presence of the GATT/WTO, accompanied by bindings on tariffs achieved in eight rounds of negotiations; and, despite its weaknesses, a GATT/WTO dispute-settlement procedure has continued to function.

#### Free trade is resilient

Chicago Tribune, 8 – 9 – 08 (“After Doha”, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-0809edit2aug09,0,7859688.story)

#### Even people involved daily in ongoing international trade aren't reacting much differently. They're buying and selling goods across borders and oceans, dealing with the logistical complications of high oil prices, currency fluctuations, the price of labor, unit cost, quality control and the like. This doesn't mean that a successful completion of the Doha talks wouldn't have mattered. It's a big deal that for the first time in half a century, global trade talks have failed. The Doha talks—seven years in negotiation—would have slashed farm subsidies and further opened markets for manufactured goods and services. But with or without Doha, countries will continue to trade aggressively. The benefits and opportunities are just too great. International trade expanded from 40 percent of the world economy in 1990 to more than 55 percent by 2004, according to the World Bank. The fastest growing countries—among them China, Vietnam, Ireland—were those that expanded their trade. Countries left behind, including much of sub-Saharan Africa, traded the least. Even with the current slowdown in the international economy, the WTO predicts that trade will still grow 4.5 percent this year. (That will be down from 8.5 percent in 2006 and 5.5 percent last year.)

#### No risk of collapse – trade is and will remain free

Newsweek, 12 – 8 – 08 (Barrett Sheridan, “Why Barriers Don't Matter; It sounds like economic heresy, but many experts say more free trade won't ease the global crisis”, L/N)

#### A clear majority of global leaders, pundits and economists think more free trade is part of the solution to the global crisis. At the recent G20 summit, one prime minister after another promised to breathe new life into the latest series of negotiations to reduce trade barriers, dubbed the Doha round. Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called it "the best solution to keep[ing] the financial crisis from spilling over to the real economy." Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, the establishment cafa of America's foreign-policy set, said last month, "I can't think of any better stimulus package than a trade agreement." But it's not at all clear that a new free-trade pact would make much difference. A growing chorus of economists argues that since trade barriers are already at all-time lows, cutting a few more percentage points from already-low tariff levels won't add much to global prosperity. To many, this is a heretical notion--as recently as 2006, nearly 88 percent of American economists agreed that "the U.S. should eliminate remaining tariffs and other barriers to trade," according to one survey. But the other 12 percent are winning converts. "I think there's been a shift in the profession," says Paul Blustein, a trade expert at the Brookings Institution's Global Economy and Development Center. "The question of whether more liberalization is good and how to do it is now very much an issue." Everyone with any credibility agrees that trade is good, protectionism is bad, and that we should solidify the gains made so far. Especially in light of the looming global recession, no one wants to fuel the potential for a new era of protectionism Ã la the 1930s, when the United States put in place the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff. But reducing them further? The merits are debatable. "World trade is already so free, we're really talking about stuff at the margins," says Paul Krugman, a Princeton economist and this year's recipient of the Nobel Prize. "Once you are down to tariff rates as low as we have now, a few points up or down doesn't make much difference." Just as important, free-trade deals don't come cheaply; the world might be far better off spending its political capital on projects with a bigger bang-to-buck ratio.

### Warming

#### Warming is irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

#### Long timeframe and adaptation solves

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

# 2NC

## Case

### 1NC Trade / Protectionism

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#### No risk of collapse – trade is and will remain free

Newsweek, 12 – 8 – 08 (Barrett Sheridan, “Why Barriers Don't Matter; It sounds like economic heresy, but many experts say more free trade won't ease the global crisis”, L/N)

#### A clear majority of global leaders, pundits and economists think more free trade is part of the solution to the global crisis. At the recent G20 summit, one prime minister after another promised to breathe new life into the latest series of negotiations to reduce trade barriers, dubbed the Doha round. Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called it "the best solution to keep[ing] the financial crisis from spilling over to the real economy." Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, the establishment cafa of America's foreign-policy set, said last month, "I can't think of any better stimulus package than a trade agreement." But it's not at all clear that a new free-trade pact would make much difference. A growing chorus of economists argues that since trade barriers are already at all-time lows, cutting a few more percentage points from already-low tariff levels won't add much to global prosperity. To many, this is a heretical notion--as recently as 2006, nearly 88 percent of American economists agreed that "the U.S. should eliminate remaining tariffs and other barriers to trade," according to one survey. But the other 12 percent are winning converts. "I think there's been a shift in the profession," says Paul Blustein, a trade expert at the Brookings Institution's Global Economy and Development Center. "The question of whether more liberalization is good and how to do it is now very much an issue." Everyone with any credibility agrees that trade is good, protectionism is bad, and that we should solidify the gains made so far. Especially in light of the looming global recession, no one wants to fuel the potential for a new era of protectionism Ã la the 1930s, when the United States put in place the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff. But reducing them further? The merits are debatable. "World trade is already so free, we're really talking about stuff at the margins," says Paul Krugman, a Princeton economist and this year's recipient of the Nobel Prize. "Once you are down to tariff rates as low as we have now, a few points up or down doesn't make much difference." Just as important, free-trade deals don't come cheaply; the world might be far better off spending its political capital on projects with a bigger bang-to-buck ratio.

### 2NC Trade – No War

#### Trade wars don't escalate

Bearce in ‘3

(David, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. @ U. Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, “Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace”, 47:3, Blackwell-Synergy)

Even as we accept that such trade dispute settlement mechanisms help resolve economic conflict, it is not clear that this finding should have any strong application to the dependent variable of inter-state military conflict. On this point, it is important to distinguish between different types of inter-state conflict—economic versus military (McMillan, 1997:39)—and recognize that disputes about banana tariffs, for example, are not likely to escalate into military confrontations. While military conflict often has economic antecedents, there is little evidence that trade wars ever become shooting wars. In terms of inter-state disagreements with real potential for military conflict, scholars highlight territorial disputes (Vasquez, 1993; Hensel, 2000; Huth, 2000). The trade dispute settlement mechanisms embedded in regional commercial institutions simply have no jurisdiction or power to resolve highly contentious territorial disagreements.

#### Consensus of IR scholars supports us

Haftel in ‘4

(Yoram, Instructor and PhD in Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State. International Studies Quarterly, “From the Outside Looking In: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO”, 48:1, Blackwell-Synergy)

These findings have several theoretical implications as well. First, as my empirical analysis reveals, the growing number of disputes in the WTO reflects the tension between the U.S. and Europe. This rising commercial discord, however, is accompanied by continued peaceful relations among the same states. Thus, fears that economic conflicts might escalate into more severe, militarized conflicts seem unwarranted (see, e.g., Copeland, 1996; Levy and Ali, 1998). In addition, this observation reinforces recent calls by IR scholars to refine the concept of "conflict" and to make a more elaborated distinction between economic conflicts and military conflicts (Mansfield and Pollins, 2001:852).

#### Interdependence doesn’t lead to peace

Friedman and Friedman ’96 (George Friedman, founder and chairman of Stratfor, and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War, 1996, p. 7-9

The argument that interdependence gives rise to peace is flawed in theory as well as in practice. Conflicts arise from friction, particularly friction involving the fundamental interests of different nations. The less interdependence there is, the fewer the areas of serious friction. The more interdependence there is, the greater the areas of friction, and, therefore, the greater the potential for conflict. Two widely separated nations that trade little with each other are unlikely to go to war—Brazil is unlikely to fight Madagascar precisely because they have so little to do with each other. France and Germany, on the other hand, which have engaged in extensive trade and transnational finance, have fought three wars with each other over about seventy years. Interdependence was the root of the conflicts, not the deterrent. There are, of course, cases of interdependence in which one country effectively absorbs the other or in which their interests match so precisely that the two countries simply merge. In other cases, interdependence remains peaceful because the economic, military, and political power of one country is overwhelming and inevitable. In relations between advanced industrialized countries and third-world countries, for example, this sort of asymmetrical relationship can frequently be seen. All such relationships have a quality of unease built into them, particularly when the level of interdependence is great. When one or both nations attempt, intentionally or unintentionally, to shift the balance of power, the result is often tremendous anxiety and, sometimes, real pain. Each side sees the other’s actions as an attempt to gain advantage and becomes frightened. In the end, precisely because the level of interdependence is so great, the relationship can, and frequently does, spiral out of control. Consider the seemingly miraculous ability of the United States and Soviet Union to be rivals and yet avoid open warfare. These two powers could forgo extreme measures because they were not interdependent. Neither relied on the other for its economic well-being, and therefore, its social stability. This provided considerable room for maneuvering. Because there were few economic linkages, neither nation felt irresistible pressure to bring the relationship under control; neither felt any time constraint. Had one country been dependent on the other for something as important as oil or long-term investment, there would have been enormous fear of being held hostage economically. Each would have sought to dominate the relationship, and the result would have been catastrophic. In the years before World War I, as a result of European interdependence, control of key national issues fell into the hands of foreign governments. Thus, decisions made in Paris had tremendous impact on Austria, and decisions made in London determined growth rates in the Ruhr. Each government sought to take charge of its own destiny by shift­ing the pattern of interdependence in its favor. Where economic means proved insufficient, political and military strategies were tried.

#### -- Studies prove

Barbieri 96 (Katherine, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, Journal of Peace Research, February, p. 42-43)

This study provides **little empirical support** for the liberal proposition that trade provides a path to interstate peace. Even after controlling for the influence of conti­guity, joint democracy, alliance ties, and relative capabilities, the evidence suggests that in **most instances** trade fails to deter conflict. Instead, extensive economic inter­dependence increases the likelihood that dyads engage in militarized dispute; how­ever, it appears to have little influence on the incidence of war. The greatest hope for peace appears to arise from symmetrical trading relationships. However, the dampening effect of symmetry is offset by the expansion of interstate linkages. That is, extensive economic linkages, be they sym­metrical or asymmetrical, appear to pose the greatest hindrance to peace through trade. Although this article focuses exclusively on the pre-WWII period, elsewhere I provide evidence that the relationships revealed here are also observed in the post­WWII period and more extended period, 1870—1985 (Barbieri, 1995). Why do the findings differ from those presented in related studies of the trade—conflict re­lationship, which reveal an inverse relation­ship between trade and conflict? Several explanations, other than the temporal domain, can be offered. First, researchers differ in the phenomena they seek to explain, with many studies incorporating both conflictual and cooperative interstate behavior (e.g., Gasiorowski, 1986a, b; Gasiorowski & Polachek, 1982; Polachek, 1980, 1992; Polachek & McDonald, 1992). Studies that focus exclusively on extreme forms of conflict behavior, including dis­putes and wars, differ in their spatial and temporal domains, their level of analysis, and their measurement of central con­structs. Preliminary tests reveal that the composition of dyads in a given sample may have a more dramatic impact on the empiri­cal findings than variations in measurement. For example, the decision to focus exclusively on ‘politically relevant dyads’ may be one source of difference (Oneal et al., 19%). Perhaps the primary component missing from this and related research is the inclusion of a more adequate assessment of the costs and benefits derived from interdepen­dence. I have repeatedly argued that the conflictual or pacific elements of interdepen­dence are directly related to perceptions about trade’s costs and benefits. Yet, a more comprehensive evaluation of these costs and benefits is needed to see whether a link truly exists between the benefits enjoyed in a given trading relationship and the inhibition of conflict in that relationship, or con­versely, the presence of net costs for at least one trading partner and the presence of con­flict in that relationship. For example, are trading relationships that contain two partners believed to benefit from trade less conflict-prone than those containing at least one partner perceived to be worse off from trade? I have merely outlined the types of relationships believed to confer the greatest benefits, but such benefits and costs require a more rigorous investigation.

#### Trade wars won’t occur

Ziemba ‘9 (The Re-Emergence of Global Protectionism: A Newer Version of Smoot-Hawley?

Rachel Ziemba | Mar 4, 2009

However, the **probability of these measures becoming significant** enough to lead to a trade war like the 1930s might be low given that **counties understand that retaliation effects will counter-productive** for domestic growth and jobs. Moreover, **the WTO surveillance mechanism, absent during the 1930s,** will help countries go to the WTO court if they face import barriers **and thus prevent trade wars.**

#### -- Trade conflicts won’t escalate

Nye 96 (Joseph, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government – Harvard University, Washington Quarterly, Winter)

The **low likelihood** of direct great power clashes does not mean that there will be no tensions between them. Disagreements are likely to continue over regional conflicts, like those that have arisen over how to deal with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery are another source of friction, as is the case over Russian and Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran, which the United States steadfastly opposes. The sharing of burdens and responsibilities for maintaining international security and protecting the natural environment are a further subject of debate among the great powers. Furthermore, in contrast to the views of classical Liberals, increased trade and economic interdependence can increase as well as decrease conflict and competition among trading partners. The main point, however, is that such disagreements are **very unlikely to escalate** to military conflicts.

### 2NC Trade – Alt’ Causes

#### Alt caus – ag subsidies

Oxfam International 8/31/2006

(“US Must Reform Agricultural Subsidy Program,” <http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060901_wto_cotton_subsidies>)

Brazil's decision today to begin moves toward trade-related retaliation against the US is a direct result of the US failure over the past year to make sufficient reforms to its $5 billion-cotton subsidy program, said international agency Oxfam. Oxfam said that the US is still paying billions of dollars in trade-distorting subsidies to its cotton farmers, despite having lost a WTO case against Brazil in 2005. The US Congress must now make more meaningful reforms to agricultural subsidies in order to comply with international trade rules and to stop harming developing country farmers. “Trade-distorting subsidies are not just unfair, they are illegal,” said Gawain Kripke, senior policy advisor for Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair campaign. “With the Farm Bill expiring next year, Congress has the opportunity to reform agriculture policies to ensure that supporting US farmers does not undermine the livelihood of millions of poor farmers in Africa and other developing countries.” In 2005, the WTO ruled that US cotton subsidies harmed Brazilian cotton farmers and violated WTO rules. It gave the US until September 2005 to reduce its trade distorting subsidies. Today, Brazil has asked for a WTO “compliance panel” to determine whether the US has done enough to comply with the ruling. The panel has 90 days to make its decision. “It should be little surprise that a new global trade agreement – the Doha Round - has stalled considering that the US has failed to abide by rules of the last agreement,” said Kripke. “Brazil is certainly within its rights to pursue sanctions, especially since the US refused to negotiate serious reforms to US cotton subsidies.” In June 30, 2005, the US Department of Agriculture partly reformed US export credit programs to comply with the ruling, while the US Congress eliminated Step 2 payments at the beginning of this year, which took effect last month. But these programs represent only 10% of the cotton subsidy program and some of the most trade distorting programs, like the counter cyclical payments were left untouched. The US continues to pay billions of dollars in trade distorting subsidies to the largest of its 25,000 cotton producers. In 2005, US cotton subsidies reached almost $5 billion for a crop that was worth less than $4 billion. These subsidies help to depress world cotton prices, hurting developing country cotton farmers including more than 20 million African farmers who rely on cotton for their livelihood. “The case against trade distorting US subsidies has been proven again and again but US taxpayers are still doling them out, increasing the wealth of the biggest producers, encouraging overproduction and undermining production in developing countries,” said Kripke. “But even as Brazil is pushing forward on retaliation, some vested interests and their ready and willing friends in Congress, are calling for a Farm Bill extension to protect the gargantuan amount of taxpayer subsides that go overwhelmingly to a small group of large farming operations.” The suspension of Doha Round negotiations cannot be used as an excuse to delay reforms of the Farm Bill. Oxfam warns that the Brazil cotton case demonstrates how trade distorting US farm programs are vulnerable to challenge.

### 2NC War Turns Trade

#### -- War collapses trade – no reverse link

Layne 98 (Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor of International Relations and Military Strategy – Naval Postgraduate School, Consultant – RAND Corporation, “Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century”, World Policy Journal, 15(2), Infotrac)

These arguments notwithstanding, international economic interdependence does not cause peace. In fact, it has very serious adverse security consequences that its proponents either do not understand or will not acknowledge. Economic relations (whether domestic or international) never take place in a vacuum; on the contrary, they occur within a politically defined framework. International economic interdependence requires certain conditions in order to flourish, including a maximum degree of political order and stability. Just as the market cannot function within a state unless the state creates a stable “security” environment in which economic exchange can occur (by protecting property rights and enforcing contracts), the same is true in international relations. Because there is no world government, it falls to the dominant state to create the conditions under which economic interdependence can take hold (by providing security, rules of the game, and a reserve currency, and by acting as the global economy’s banker and lender of last resort). Without a dominant power to perform these tasks, economic interdependence does not happen. Indeed, free trade and interdependence have occurred in the modern international system only during the hegemonies of Victorian Britain and postwar America.

### 2NC No XTC

#### Adaptation solves catastrophic impacts to warming

Goklany 11 -- PhD, author and researcher associated with IPCC, expert reviewer and U.S. delegate to that organization (Dr. Indur M., 12/11, "Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming," http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf)

So how much of a difference in impact would consideration of both economic development and technological change have made? If impacts were to be estimated for five or so years into the future, ignoring changes in adaptive capacity between now and then probably would not be fatal because neither economic development nor technological change would likely advance substantially during that period. However, the time horizon of climate change impact assessments is often on the order of 35–100 years or more. The Fast Track Assessments use a base year of 1990 to estimate impacts for 2025, 2055 and 2085. 39 The Stern Review’s time horizon extends to 2100– 2200 and beyond. 40 Over such periods one ought to expect substantial advances in adaptive capacity due to increases in economic development, technological change and human capital. As already noted, retrospective assessments indicate that over the span of a few decades, changes in economic development and technologies can substantially reduce, if not eliminate, adverse environmental impacts and improve human well-being, as measured by a variety of objective indicators. 41 Thus, not fully accounting for changes in the level of economic development and secular technological change would understate future adaptive capacity, which then could overstate impacts by one or more orders of magnitude if the time horizon is several decades into the future. The assumption that there would be little or no improved or new technologies that would become available between 1990 and 2100 (or 2200), as assumed in most climate change impact assessments, is clearly naïve. In fact, a comparison of today’s world against the world of 1990 (the base year used in most impacts studies to date) shows that even during this brief 20-year span, this assumption is invalid for many, if not most, human enterprises. Since 1990, for example, the portion of the developing world’s population living in absolute poverty declined from 42% to 25%, 42 and in sub-Saharan Africa Internet users increased from 0 to 50 million, while cellular phone users went from 0 per 100 to 33 per 100. 43 It should be noted that some of the newer impacts assessments have begun to account for changes in adaptive capacity. For example, the CIESIN study of 2006, in an exercise exploring the vulnerability to climate change under various climate change scenarios, allowed adaptive capacity to increase between the present and 2050 and 2100. 44 However, the researchers arbitrarily limited any increase in adaptive capacity to “either the current global mean or to a value that is 25% higher than the current value—whichever is higher.” 45 Such a limitation would, for example, have missed most of the increase in U.S. adaptive capacity during the twentieth century that virtually eliminated death and disease from climate-sensitive water-borne vector diseases. More recently, another study analyzed the sensitivity of deaths from malaria, diarrhea, schistosomiasis and dengue fever to warming, economic development and other determinants of adaptive capacity through the year 2100. 46 The results indicate, unsurprisingly, that economic development alone could reduce mortality substantially. For malaria, for instance, deaths would be eliminated before 2100 in a number of the more affluent sub-Saharan countries. 47

#### Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

#### Warming will be slow, there’s no impact, and adaptation solves

William Yeatman 9, Energy Policy Analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, February 3, 2009, “Global Warming 101: Science,” online: <http://www.globalwarming.org/2009/02/03/global-warming-101-science/>

A “planetary emergency—a crisis that threatens the survival of our civilization and the habitability of the Earth”—that is how former Vice President Al Gore describes global warming. Most environmental groups preach the same message. So do many journalists. So do some scientists.

In fact, at the 2008 annual meeting of Nobel Prize winners in Lindau, Germany, half the laureates on the climate change panel disputed the so-called consensus on global warming.

You have probably heard the dire warnings many times. Carbon dioxide (CO2) from mankind’s use of fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas is building up in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas—it traps heat that would otherwise escape into outer space. Al Gore warns that global warming caused by carbon dioxide emissions could increase sea levels by 20 feet, spin up deadly hurricanes. It could even plunge Europe into an ice age.

Science does not support these and other scary predictions, which Gore and his allies repeatedly tout as a “scientific consensus.” Global warming is real and carbon dioxide emissions are contributing to it, but it is not a crisis. Global warming in the 21 st century is likely to be modest, and the net impacts may well be beneficial in some places. Even in the worst case, humanity will be much better off in 2100 than it is today.

The following is a summary of key points:

Average Annual Heat-Related Mortality: People will not drop like flies from heat waves in a warming world. Heat-related mortality will continue to decline as the world warms.

Far more people die each year from excess cold than from excess heat.

Global warming will not make air pollution worse.

Global warming will not lead to malaria epidemics in Northern Hemisphere countries.

Contrary to Gore, no “strong, new scientific consensus is emerging” that global warming is making hurricanes stronger.

Global Death & Death Rates Due to Extreme Events, 1900-2004: Since the 1920s, death rates related to extreme weather declined by more than 98 percent globally. The impression conveyed by An Inconvenient Truth—that global warming is making the world a more dangerous place—is false.

Gore’s warning that global warming could shut down the Atlantic branch of the oceanic thermohaline circulation (THC) and plunge Europe into an ice age is science fiction.

Gore’s warning that sea levels could rise by 20 feet is science fiction. Sea level rise in the 21 st century is likely to be measured in inches, not in feet.

The world warmed at a rate of 0.17°C per decade since 1978, according to the temperature record compiled by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Since most climate models predict that warming will occur at a constant—that is, non-accelerating—rate, it is reasonable to expect that global warming in the 21 st century will be close to the low end of the IPCC’s forecast range, of 1.4°C to 5.8°C.

The actual warming rate may be only half the 0.17°C per decade rate implied in the IPCC temperature record, because the IPCC has not adequately filtered out the warming biases from local factors like urbanization and improper management of monitoring equipment.

A warming near the low end of the IPCC range would produce both benefits—longer growing seasons, more rainfall, fewer cold deaths—and harms—more heat waves, more drought, some acceleration of sea level rise—but nothing resembling catastrophe.

Even in the IPCC high-end warming forecasts, human welfare would improve dramatically over the next 100 years. In the IPCC fossil-fuel-intensive development scenario, per capita GDP in developing countries increases from $875 per year in 1990 to $43,000 per year in 2100—even after taking into account an additional 110 years of global warming. Even in the IPCC worst-case scenario, global warming is not the civilization-ending catastrophe Al Gore purports it to be.

#### No impact to warming – not a hack

Stafford 3/11 -- interviewing Anthony Watts, 25-year broadcast meteorology veteran (James, 2013, "Climate Change without Catastrophe: Interview with Anthony Watts," http://oilprice.com/Interviews/Climate-Change-without-Catastrophe-Interview-with-Anthony-Watts.html)

Anthony Watts: The premise of the issue for proponents can be summed up very simply: You put CO2 in the atmosphere and it makes it warmer, that’s bad. The reality is that the Earth’s climate system is far more complex than that: It isn’t just a linear relationship between CO2 and temperature, it is a dynamic ever-changing one, and climate is tremendously complex with hundreds of interactive variables and feedbacks. Predicting an outcome of a chaotic system over the long term is a very, very big task, one that we’ve really only scratched the surface of. Dr. Judith Curry of Georgia Tech describes it as a “wicked problem”. But it is being popularly portrayed as a simple black-and-white problem and few really delve much beyond the headlines and the calls for action to understand that it is really many shades of grey. Oilprice.com: As a former TV meteorologist and a developer of weather data dissemination technology, can you tell us more about how your background lends to your “pragmatic scepticism” on climate change? Anthony Watts: In TV, if I was wrong on the forecast, or the temperature reported was inaccurate, I’d hear about it immediately. Viewers would complain. That immediate feedback translates very quickly to making sure you get it right. With climate, the forecast is open-ended, and we have to wait years for feedback, and so the skill level in forecasting often doesn’t improve very much with time. Also, I’ve had a lifetime of experience in designing and deploying weather instrumentation, and like with forecasting, if we don’t get it right, we hear about it immediately. What I learned is that the government weather service (NOAA) had it right at one time, but they’d dropped their guard, and my recent study (preliminary) shows that not only is the deployment of weather stations faulty in siting them, but that the adjustments designed to solve those issues actually make the problem worse. Oilprice.com: Is there any way to remove the “camp” element from the issue of climate change? How far do disastrous weather events—like Hurricane Sandy—go towards reshaping the climate change debate? Anthony Watts: The idea that Hurricane Sandy, a minor class 1 storm, was somehow connected to CO2 driven “climate change” is ludicrous, especially when far worse storms existed in the same area in the past when CO2 was much lower. Hurricane Hazel in October 1954 is a case in point. In my view, the only way to null out the “camp” element is via education. Looking at the history of severe weather, there really aren’t any trends at all. Both the IPCC and The Journal Nature say this clearly, but activists persist in trying to link severe weather and CO2 driven “climate change” because since temperature increases have paused for about 15 years, it is all they have left. But even that doesn’t hold up when you study the data history: There is also some peer-reviewed analysis which goes into some depth on this subject. This analysis concludes that "there is no evidence so far that climate change has increased the normalized economic loss from natural disasters." Oilprice.com: Your message on climate change has been controversial among those who believe this issue is the gravest one facing us today. In what way do you think your message is misunderstood? Anthony Watts: They think and promote that I’m categorically a “denier” in the pay of “big oil” (for the record, I’m paid nothing for this interview) in an effort to minimize my views, while ignoring the fact that I was actually on the proponent side of warming at one time. Now, I’d describe myself as a lukewarmer. Yes, it has gotten warmer, CO2 is partially a factor, but catastrophic predictions of the future just haven’t held up when you look at the observed data compared to the early predictions.

#### No consensus on catastrophic climate change – it’s unlikely

Boslough 13 -- PhD, Caltech-trained experimental and computational physicist, Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry (Mark, 1/6/2013, "Global Warming: Scholarship vs. Pseudoscholarship," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-boslough/global-warming-scholarshi\_b\_2422438.html)

What is not settled is the degree of climate change. In the peer-reviewed scientific literature there is a healthy, open, honest, and vigorous scientific debate. The best scientific estimate of the amount of warming (when CO2 levels double, which is likely to happen this century) is about 6 ºF. There are those who disagree, and have published the basis for their disagreement. The most useful assessments are not limited to the best estimate, but include quantification of the uncertainty, which is one of the hallmarks of honesty in science. There is a broad range of possibility, from below 4 ºF to greater than 11 ºF. One recent paper estimates a likelihood of about 2.5% that average temperature increases could exceed 14 ºF; a change that would probably lead to the collapse of global ecosystems, loss of civilization, and possible human extinction. There is no way to prove or disprove these quantitative estimates, other than to wait and see what happens. That said, it is hard to ignore a scholarly paper (emphasis on the word "scholarly") that gives longer odds for civilization than for a shuttle launch.

#### Past temperatures disprove human loss

Fowler 12 -- adjunct professor of engineering at George Mason University, retired systems engineer, doctorate is in systems and control theory from George Washington University (Thomas B., 9/1/2012, "THE GLOBAL WARMING CONUNDRUM," Modern Age, EBSCO)

Longer-Term Findings Perhaps the best way to put the current global warming controversy into perspective is to look at temperature records over longer historical periods. These records are obtained by proxies, and the main proxy used is ice core samples from central Creenland, made by NOAA. These are shown in Figure 4, beginning with the period from AD 1400 to the present, illustrating the controversial "hockey stick": It appears that things may be getting pretty bad today. But let us move to a slightly longer term, going back to the year 800, illustrated in Figure 5: Now things start to become more interesting. The well-documented Medieval Maximum is clearly visible and shows a much higher temperature deviation than the modern record. (This is disputed by some climate researchers and by the IPCC, which claims that its top is below that of the modern instrument record.)\* Nonetheless the ice core data agree with documentation that grapes were grown in England, for example, during that period. It was also a period of great awakening in Europe. But we must look further back, so we turn to the period from about 3000 BC to the present, given in Figure 6. Now more ttends become apparent. In particular, there is a peak corresponding to the Roman Empire, well documented, around the year 50 BC or so, known as the "Roman Maximum," which dwarfs the Medieval Maximum; and an even larger peak at the time of the late Bronze Age, about 1200 BC, which in turn dwarfs even the Roman Maximum. The late Bronze Age was also a very fertile period for human activity. There is also a smaller peak during the period now usually called "Late Antiquity," around the years AD 400-500. Note that even the dip between the Roman Maximum and this Late Antiquity peak had temperatures that equal or exceed that of the recent past, as did the dip in temperatures from the end of the Late Bronze Age peak to the Roman Maximum. Still, we must persevere and go back even further, this time to about 11,000 BC, shown in Figure 7. Now the last Ice Age clearly comes into view, a cold period that ended about 10,000 BC. There are several other peaks prior to the Late Bronze Age, but now the record makes the peaks and dips from about 8000 BC to the present look like noise on top of a much larger signal. We are not yet at the end of our quest. We now go back about fifty thousand years, shown in Figure 8. From this graph it is clear that the latter days, that is, the past twelve thousand years, have been abnormally warm. Much cooler temperatures appear to be the norm, with much greater variability. Note that the last Ice Age, with its great glacial ice sheets, was a maximum about twenty thousand years ago. Still, this is not the best we can do. We shall go back now 450,000 years, shown in Figure 9 (page 54). From this vantage point, it is quite clear that there is a distinct cyclical pattern to the earth's temperature, with a period of about 100,000 years, in which there is a sharp rise in temperatures to roughly current levels, followed quickly by a rapid decline. What is especially interesting is the relatively short time these peaks persist, only to be followed by some type of ice age.

#### Previous temperature spikes disprove the impact

Singer 11 (S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

Research from locations around the world reveal a significant period of elevated air temperatures that immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, during a time that has come to be known as the Little Medieval Warm Period. A discussion of this topic was not included in the 2009 NIPCC report, but we include it here to demonstrate the existence of another set of real-world data that do not support the IPCC‘s claim that temperatures of the past couple of decades have been the warmest of the past one to two millennia. In one of the more intriguing aspects of his study of global climate change over the past three millennia, Loehle (2004) presented a graph of the Sargasso Sea and South African temperature records of Keigwin (1996) and Holmgren et al. (1999, 2001) that reveals the existence of a major spike in surface air temperature that began sometime in the early 1400s. This abrupt and anomalous warming pushed the air temperatures of these two records considerably above their representations of the peak warmth of the twentieth century, after which they fell back to pre-spike levels in the mid-1500s, in harmony with the work of McIntyre and McKitrick (2003), who found a similar period of higher-than-current temperatures in their reanalysis of the data employed by Mann et al. (1998, 1999).

#### No impact to warming

Idso and Idso 11 (Craig D., Founder and Chairman of the Board – Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, and Sherwood B., President – Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, “Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future Pursuing the Prudent Path,” February, <http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/> prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf)

As presently constituted, earth’s atmosphere contains just slightly less than 400 ppm of the colorless and odorless gas we call carbon dioxide or CO2. That’s only four-hundredths of one percent. Consequently, even if the air's CO2 concentration was tripled, carbon dioxide would still comprise only a little over one tenth of one percent of the air we breathe, which is far less than what wafted through earth’s atmosphere eons ago, when the planet was a virtual garden place. Nevertheless, a small increase in this minuscule amount of CO2 is frequently predicted to produce a suite of dire environmental consequences, including dangerous global warming, catastrophic sea level rise, reduced agricultural output, and the destruction of many natural ecosystems, as well as dramatic increases in extreme weather phenomena, such as droughts, floods and hurricanes. As strange as it may seem, these frightening future scenarios are derived from a single source of information: the ever-evolving computer-driven climate models that presume to reduce the important physical, chemical and biological processes that combine to determine the state of earth’s climate into a set of mathematical equations out of which their forecasts are produced. But do we really know what all of those complex and interacting processes are? And even if we did -- which we don't -- could we correctly reduce them into manageable computer code so as to produce reliable forecasts 50 or 100 years into the future? Some people answer these questions in the affirmative. However, as may be seen in the body of this report, real-world observations fail to confirm essentially all of the alarming predictions of significant increases in the frequency and severity of droughts, floods and hurricanes that climate models suggest should occur in response to a global warming of the magnitude that was experienced by the earth over the past two centuries as it gradually recovered from the much-lower-than-present temperatures characteristic of the depths of the Little Ice Age. And other observations have shown that the rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations associated with the development of the Industrial Revolution have actually been good for the planet, as they have significantly enhanced the plant productivity and vegetative water use efficiency of earth's natural and agro-ecosystems, leading to a significant "greening of the earth." In the pages that follow, we present this oft-neglected evidence via a review of the pertinent scientific literature. In the case of the biospheric benefits of atmospheric CO2 enrichment, we find that with more CO2 in the air, plants grow bigger and better in almost every conceivable way, and that they do it more efficiently, with respect to their utilization of valuable natural resources, and more effectively, in the face of environmental constraints. And when plants benefit, so do all of the animals and people that depend upon them for their sustenance. Likewise, in the case of climate model inadequacies, we reveal their many shortcomings via a comparison of their "doom and gloom" predictions with real-world observations. And this exercise reveals that even though the world has warmed substantially over the past century or more -- at a rate that is claimed by many to have been unprecedented over the past one to two millennia -- this report demonstrates that none of the environmental catastrophes that are predicted by climate alarmists to be produced by such a warming has ever come to pass. And this fact -- that there have been no significant increases in either the frequency or severity of droughts, floods or hurricanes over the past two centuries or more of global warming -- poses an important question. What should be easier to predict: the effects of global warming on extreme weather events or the effects of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations on global temperature? The first part of this question should, in principle, be answerable; for it is well defined in terms of the small number of known factors likely to play a role in linking the independent variable (global warming) with the specified weather phenomena (droughts, floods and hurricanes). The latter part of the question, on the other hand, is ill-defined and possibly even unanswerable; for there are many factors -- physical, chemical and biological -- that could well be involved in linking CO2 (or causing it not to be linked) to global temperature. If, then, today's climate models cannot correctly predict what should be relatively easy for them to correctly predict (the effect of global warming on extreme weather events), why should we believe what they say about something infinitely more complex (the effect of a rise in the air’s CO2 content on mean global air temperature)? Clearly, we should pay the models no heed in the matter of future climate -- especially in terms of predictions based on the behavior of a non-meteorological parameter (CO2) -- until they can reproduce the climate of the past, based on the behavior of one of the most basic of all true meteorological parameters (temperature). And even if the models eventually solve this part of the problem, we should still reserve judgment on their forecasts of global warming; for there will yet be a vast gulf between where they will be at that time and where they will have to go to be able to meet the much greater challenge to which they aspire

### 1NC Not Happening / Anthropogenic

#### No warming and not anthropogenic

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Climate change itself is already in the process of definitively rebutting climate alarmists who think human use of fossil fuels is causing ultimately catastrophic global warming. That is because natural climate cycles have already turned from warming to cooling, global temperatures have already been declining for more than 10 years, and global temperatures will continue to decline for another two decades or more. That is one of the most interesting conclusions to come out of the seventh International Climate Change Conference sponsored by the Heartland Institute, held last week in Chicago. I attended, and served as one of the speakers, talking about The Economic Implications of High Cost Energy. The conference featured serious natural science, contrary to the self-interested political science you hear from government financed global warming alarmists seeking to justify widely expanded regulatory and taxation powers for government bodies, or government body wannabees, such as the United Nations. See for yourself, as the conference speeches are online. What you will see are calm, dispassionate presentations by serious, pedigreed scientists discussing and explaining reams of data. In sharp contrast to these climate realists, the climate alarmists have long admitted that they cannot defend their theory that humans are causing catastrophic global warming in public debate. With the conference presentations online, let’s see if the alarmists really do have any response. The Heartland Institute has effectively become the international headquarters of the climate realists, an analog to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has achieved that status through these international climate conferences, and the publication of its Climate Change Reconsidered volumes, produced in conjunction with the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). Those Climate Change Reconsidered volumes are an equivalently thorough scientific rebuttal to the irregular Assessment Reports of the UN’s IPCC. You can ask any advocate of human caused catastrophic global warming what their response is to Climate Change Reconsidered. If they have none, they are not qualified to discuss the issue intelligently. Check out the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming (and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally caused climate cycles. For example, temperatures dropped steadily from the late 1940s to the late 1970s. The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due around now. In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late 1990s, a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage. The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures. Central to these natural cycles is the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). Every 25 to 30 years the oceans undergo a natural cycle where the colder water below churns to replace the warmer water at the surface, and that affects global temperatures by the fractions of a degree we have seen. The PDO was cold from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, and it was warm from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, similar to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO). In 2000, the UN’s IPCC predicted that global temperatures would rise by 1 degree Celsius by 2010. Was that based on climate science, or political science to scare the public into accepting costly anti-industrial regulations and taxes? Don Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University, knew the answer. He publicly predicted in 2000 that global temperatures would decline by 2010. He made that prediction because he knew the PDO had turned cold in 1999, something the political scientists at the UN’s IPCC did not know or did not think significant. Well, the results are in, and the winner is….Don Easterbrook. Easterbrook also spoke at the Heartland conference, with a presentation entitled “Are Forecasts of a 20-Year Cooling Trend Credible?” Watch that online and you will see how scientists are supposed to talk: cool, rational, logical analysis of the data, and full explanation of it. All I ever see from the global warming alarmists, by contrast, is political public relations, personal attacks, ad hominem arguments, and name calling, combined with admissions that they can’t defend their views in public debate. Easterbrook shows that by 2010 the 2000 prediction of the IPCC was wrong by well over a degree, and the gap was widening. That’s a big miss for a forecast just 10 years away, when the same folks expect us to take seriously their predictions for 100 years in the future. Howard Hayden, Professor of Physics Emeritus at the University of Connecticut showed in his presentation at the conference that based on the historical record a doubling of CO2 could be expected to produce a 2 degree C temperature increase. Such a doubling would take most of this century, and the temperature impact of increased concentrations of CO2 declines logarithmically. You can see Hayden’s presentation online as well. Because PDO cycles last 25 to 30 years, Easterbrook expects the cooling trend to continue for another 2 decades or so. Easterbrook, in fact, documents 40 such alternating periods of warming and cooling over the past 500 years, with similar data going back 15,000 years. He further expects the flipping of the ADO to add to the current downward trend. But that is not all. We are also currently experiencing a surprisingly long period with very low sunspot activity. That is associated in the earth’s history with even lower, colder temperatures. The pattern was seen during a period known as the Dalton Minimum from 1790 to 1830, which saw temperature readings decline by 2 degrees in a 20 year period, and the noted Year Without A Summer in 1816 (which may have had other contributing short term causes). Even worse was the period known as the Maunder Minimum from 1645 to 1715, which saw only about 50 sunspots during one 30 year period within the cycle, compared to a typical 40,000 to 50,000 sunspots during such periods in modern times. The Maunder Minimum coincided with the coldest part of the Little Ice Age, which the earth suffered from about 1350 to 1850. The Maunder Minimum saw sharply reduced agricultural output, and widespread human suffering, disease and premature death. Such impacts of the sun on the earth’s climate were discussed at the conference by astrophysicist and geoscientist Willie Soon, Nir J. Shaviv, of the Racah Institute of Physics in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Sebastian Luning, co-author with leading German environmentalist Fritz Vahrenholt of The Cold Sun. Easterbrook suggests that the outstanding question is only how cold this present cold cycle will get. Will it be modest like the cooling from the late 1940s to late 1970s? Or will the paucity of sunspots drive us all the way down to the Dalton Minimum, or even the Maunder Minimum? He says it is impossible to know now. But based on experience, he will probably know before the UN and its politicized IPCC.

### 2NC Not Anthropogenic

#### Warming not anthropogenic and if it is it’s inevitable

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The IPCC stated in its last 2007 Summary for Policymaker’s Report that “Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperature since the mid-20th century [which is very small] is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic [human-caused] greenhouse gas concentrations.” And there can be no doubt here that they are referring to CO2, not water vapor, which constitutes the most important greenhouse gas of all. That’s because the climate models don’t know how to “observe” it, plus there aren’t any good historic records to enable trends to be revealed. Besides, unlike carbon, there is little incentive to attach much attention to anthropogenic water vapor. After all, no one has yet figured out a way to regulate or tax it. A key problem in determining changes and influences of water vapor concentrations in the Earth’s atmosphere is that they are extremely variable. Differences range by orders of magnitude in various places. Instead, alarmists sweep the problem to one side by simply calling it a CO2 “feedback” amplification effect, always assuming that the dominant feedback is “positive” (warming) rather than “negative” (cooling). In reality, due to clouds and other factors, those feedbacks could go both ways, and no one knows for sure which direction dominates climate over the long run. Treating water vapor as a known feedback revolves around an assumption that relative humidity is a constant, which it isn’t. Since it is known to vary nearly as widely as actual water vapor concentrations, no observational evidence exists to support a CO2 warming amplification conclusion. But let’s imagine that CO2 is the big greenhouse culprit rather than a bit-player, and that its influences are predominately warming. Even if CO2 levels were to double, it would make little difference. While the first CO2 molecules matter a lot, successive ones have less and less effect. That’s because the carbon that exists in the atmosphere now has already “soaked up” its favorite wavelengths of light, and is close to a saturation point. Those carbon molecules that follow manage to grab a bit more light from wavelengths close to favorite bands, but can’t do much more…there simply aren’t many left-over photons at the right wavelengths. For those of you who are mathematically inclined, that diminishing absorption rate follows a logarithmic curve. Who Hid the Carbon Prosecuting Evidence? Since water vapor and clouds are so complex and difficult to model, their influences are neglected in IPCC reports. What about other evidence to support an IPCC claim that “most” mid-century warming can “very likely” be attributed to human greenhouse emissions? Well, if it’s there, it must me very well hidden, since direct measurements seem not to know where it is. For example, virtually all climate models have predicted that if greenhouse gases caused warming, there is supposed to be a telltale “hot spot” in the atmosphere about 10 km above the tropics. Weather balloons (radiosondes) and satellites have scanned these regions for years, and there is no such pattern. It wasn’t even there during the recent warming spell between 1979 (when satellites were first available) and 1999. How have the committed greenhouse zealots explained this? They claim that it’s there, but simply hidden by “fog in the data”…lost in the statistical “noise”. Yet although radiosondes and satellites each have special limitations, their measurements show very good agreement that the “human signature” doesn’t exist. Suggestions to the contrary are based upon climate model data outputs which yield a wide range of divergence and uncertainty…an example of garbage in, gospel out. Why Did the Last Ice Age End and the Good Times Begin? A recent study conducted by researchers at Grenoble University in France and published in Science magazine suggests that atmospheric carbon dioxide levels produced from natural factors contributed to the sharp warming that ended the last Ice Age about 15,000 years ago. Scientists have long recognized that Ice Ages and brief interglacial interludes (like our current one) are caused by variations in the Earth’s orbit around the sun. It is also well known that when oceans warm (in this instance due to intensification of sunlight energy), huge amounts of absorbed CO2 are released, exactly like the off-gassing of a carbonated drink when warmed. The bottom line is that past atmospheric CO2 is wholly controlled by the Earth’s temperature and climate, not the other way around. The Grenoble study authors did not factor in influences the warming oceans would have had upon evaporated water vapor, that primary atmospheric greenhouse gas. Rather, it focused upon analyzing air bubbles trapped in Antarctic ice cores to determine the trace CO2 concentrations at different times over thousands of years, concluding that the last Ice Age ended within 200 years or less after CO2 levels rose…and possibly that there was no time lag at all. This finding challenges previous research indicating that CO2 levels rose some 600-800 years or so after temperatures increased. There is another possibility warranting consideration as well, one involving slight differences in Arctic and Antarctic deglaciation time cycles. Since atmospheric CO2 is a global condition, and the solar “Milankovich” mechanism of deglaciation begins with warming in the high North, it is plausible to imagine that Arctic warming would have preceded and subsequently influenced Antarctic deglaciation through the release of both water vapor and CO2. This, in turn, might help to explain different temperature lag conclusions. Still, if true, might this “lock-step” relationship between CO2 and temperature increases be interpreted to suggest that a CO2 greenhouse effect may have accelerated (amplified) the warming? That’s not smoking gun evidence, but it is certainly possible, and even quite probable. So if this truly is the case, then by how much? Determining that is the big rub, because the findings can be interpreted in different ways. Consider, for example, that atmospheric CO2 concentrations at the end of the last Ice Age, when rapid deglaciation occurred were less than half of today’s levels. At the same time, the influence of that lower concentration would also have been much greater than today due to the logarithmic absorption pattern. Therefore, the CO2 amplification factor might have contributed proportionately much more influence than today, causing it to be less relevant to current circumstances. Accurate dating of samples is very difficult and subject to large unknowns. And while carbon dioxide levels have been constantly increasing, most of all estimated warming since 1900 occurred before the mid-1940s. Despite those continuously rising CO2 levels, global mean temperatures have been flat over at least the past decade. Regarding That Confidence That We Are Changing the Climate. While even IPCC admits that correlation between different occurrences, however convincing, doesn’t prove cause and effect, this uncertainty principle is often given little priority in summary conclusions they convey to the public. In their first 1990 report, IPCC played on this confusion, claiming: “The size of this warming is broadly consistent with the predictions of climate models, but is also of the same magnitude as natural climate variability.” They could have just as easily said that the greenhouse theory didn’t explain climate, but natural variability did. Later, the IPCC artfully changed the term “correlation” to “attribution”, meaning that even if observations couldn’t be objectively correlated, they could be subjectively attributed if those who wrote the “consensus” conclusions wished to do so. That consensus is what anonymous, politically-determined representatives who approve the entire reports decide fits their preferred narrative. The final draft of IPCC’s second report for example, contained a passage which was removed which said: “None of these studies cited has shown clear evidence that we can attribute the observed changes [in global temperature] to the specific cause of increases in greenhouse gases.” Yet, the final, printed 1996 report claimed: “…there is evidence of an emerging pattern of climate response to forcings by greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols…from geographical, seasonal and vertical patterns of temperature change…These results point towards human influence on climate.” The IPCC Summary concludes that “the balance of evidence” suggests a discernible human influence on climate. Remarkably, another 1996 publication “The Holocene”, written by some of the same Summary authors said: “Estimates of…natural variability are critical to the problem of detecting an anthropogenic [human] signal…We have estimated the spectrum…from paleo-temperature proxies and compared it with…general [climate] circulation models…none of the three estimates of the natural variability spectrum agree with each other…Until…resolved, it will be hard to say, with confidence, that an anthropogenic climate signal has or has not been detected.” The True Nature of Climate Change…It Ain’t a New Thing. Keep in mind that cyclical, abrupt and dramatic global and regional temperature fluctuations have occurred since long before humans invented agriculture, industries, internal combustion engines and carbon-trading schemes. Yet atmospheric CO2 levels have remained relatively low over the past 650,000 years, even during the six previous interglacial periods when global temperatures were as much as 9ºF warmer than temperatures we currently enjoy. Many natural factors are known to contribute to these changes, although even the most sophisticated climate models and theories they are based on cannot predict the timing, scale (either up or down), or future impacts- much less the marginal influences we humans might contribute. So let’s be very thankful for the good times that global warming affords as long as we are fortunate to have it. The real climate crisis will arrive when our planet’s warm Ice Age vacation ends.

#### We can’t definitively say C02 is responsible

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What percent of recent warming can reasonably be attributed to human activity? The answer appears to be "some," but we cannot say definitively how much. It depends, partly, on how much confidence one places in the hockey stick graph. Various other explanations have been given, including the Pacific Decadal Oscillation,^^ solar activity, and changes in the earth's albedo.^^ A cautionary estimate of 50% seems reasonable, provided that one acknowledges that the actual number could ' be anywhere from 5% to 95%, and that it may be decades before we have enough empirical data for an accurate estimate.

#### CO2 is not the one cause for climate change – solar radiation and ocean interactions are ignored

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WHAT CAUSES WARMING? It is likely that the cyclical warming and cooling of the earth results from a number of different causes, none of which, taken alone, is dominant enough to be entirely responsible. The more important ones are solar changes (including both irradiance and magnetic field effects), atmosphere–ocean interaction (including both multidecadal climatic oscillations and unforced internal variability), and greenhouse gases. All of these factors have been discussed by IPCC, but the first two have been dismissed as negligible in comparison with the greenhouse-gas effect and man’s contribution to it through anthropogenic CO2 . It is claimed (e.g. Revelle and Suess 1957) that the particular infrared absorption bands of CO2 provide it with a special ability to absorb and reradiate the sun’s longer wavelength radiation, causing warming of the troposphere and an increase in high-altitude (cirrus) cloud, further amplifying the heating process. Detailed arguments against this conclusion can be found in Spencer et al. (2007) and Gerlich and Tscheuschner (2009). These scientists point out (among other arguments, which include the logarithmic decrease in absorptive power of CO2 at increasing concentrations), that clouds have poor ability to emit radiation and that the transfer of heat from the atmosphere to a warmer body (the earth) defies the Second Law of Thermodynamics. They argue that the Plank and Stefan-Boltzman equations used in calculations of radiative heat transfer cannot be applied to gases in the atmosphere because of the highly complex multi-body nature of the problem. Veizer (2005) explains that, to play a significant role, CO2 requires an amplifier, in this case water vapour. He concludes that water vapour plays the dominant role in global warming and that solar effects are the driver, rather than CO2 . A comprehensive critique of the greenhouse gas theory is provided by Hutton (2009).

#### Warming not anthropogenic – most recent studies supports

Idso and Idso 11 [Craig D., founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, B.S. in Geography from Arizona State University, his M.S. in Agronomy from the University of Nebraska - Lincoln, and his Ph.D. in Geography from Arizona State University, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy, faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology at Arizona State University; and Sherwood, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, former Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at ASU, M.S from UMinnesota, receipt of the Arthur S. Flemming Award, "Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future," 1-31-11, <http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf>]

Ljungqvist also notes that “decadal mean temperatures in the extra-tropical Northern Hemisphere seem to have equaled or exceeded the AD 1961-1990 mean temperature level during much of the Roman Warm Period and the Medieval Warm Period,” and he says that “the second century, during the Roman Warm Period, is the warmest century during the last two millennia,” while adding that “the highest average temperatures in the reconstruction are encountered in the mid to late tenth century,” which was during the Medieval Warm Period. He warns, however, that the temperature of the last two decades “is possibly higher than during any previous time in the past two millennia,” but adds that “this is only seen in the instrumental temperature data and not in the multi-proxy reconstruction itself,” which is akin to saying that this possibility only presents itself if one applies Michael Mann’s “Nature trick” of comparing “apples and oranges,” which is clearly not valid, as discussed earlier in this report. This new study of Ljungqvist is especially important in that it utilizes, in his words, “a larger number of proxy records than most previous reconstructions,” and because it “substantiates an already established history of long-term temperature variability.” All of these facts, taken together, clearly demonstrate that there is nothing unusual, nothing unnatural or nothing unprecedented about the planet’s current level of warmth, seeing it was just as warm as, or even warmer than, it has been recently during both the Roman and Medieval Warm Periods, when the atmosphere’s CO2 concentration was more than 100 ppm less than it is today. And this latter observation, together with the realization that earth’s climate naturally transits back and forth between cooler and warmer conditions on a millennial timescale, demonstrates that there is absolutely no need to associate the planet’s current level of warmth with its current higher atmospheric CO2 concentration, in clear contradiction of the worn-out climate-alarmist claim that the only way to explain earth’s current warmth is to associate it with the greenhouse effect of CO2. That claim -- for which there is no supporting evidence, other than misplaced trust in climate models -- is unsound. With respect to the recent rate at which the earth has warmed, we examine the results of a number of studies that have investigated recent temperature changes in the Arctic, which Meadows (2001) described as “the place to watch for global warming, the sensitive point, the canary in the coal mine.” Here, in comparing the vast array of prior Holocene climate changes with what climate alarmists claim to be the “unprecedented” anthropogenic-induced warming of the past several decades, White et al. (2010) recently determined that “the human influence on rate and size of climate change thus far does not stand out strongly from other causes of climate change.” Other scientists preceded White et al. with similar conclusions. Chylek et al. (2006) studied two century-long temperature records from southern coastal Greenland -- Godthab Nuuk on the west and Ammassalik on the east -- both of which are close to 64°N latitude, concentrating on the period 1915-2005. And in doing so, as they describe it, they determined that “two periods of intense warming (1995-2005 and 1920-1930) are clearly visible in the Godthab Nuuk and Ammassalik temperature records.” However, they state that “the average rate of warming was considerably higher within the 1920-1930 decade than within the 1995-2005 decade.” In fact, they report that the earlier warming rate was 50% greater than the most recent one. And in discussing this fact, they say that “an important question is to what extent can the current (1995-2005) temperature increase in Greenland coastal regions be interpreted as evidence of man-induced global warming?” In providing their own answer, they noted that “the Greenland warming of 1920 to 1930 demonstrates that a high concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is not a necessary condition for [a] period of warming to arise,” and that “the observed 1995-2005 temperature increase seems to be within [the] natural variability of Greenland climate.” A similar study was conducted two years later by Mernild et al. (2008), who described "the climate and observed climatic variations and trends in the Mittivakkat Glacier catchment in Low Arctic East Greenland from 1993 to 2005 ... based on the period of detailed observations (19932005) and supported by synoptic meteorological data from the nearby town of Tasiilaq (Ammassalik) from 1898 to 2004.” This work revealed that “the Mittivakkat Glacier net mass balance has been almost continuously negative, corresponding to an average loss of glacier volume of 0.4% per year.” And during the past century of general mass loss, they found that “periods of warming were observed from 1918 (the end of the Little Ice Age) to 1935 of 0.12°C per year and 1978 to 2004 of 0.07°C per year,” with the former rate of warming being fully 70% greater than the most recent rate of warming. Last of all, Wood et al. (2010) constructed a two-century (1802-2009) instrumental record of annual surface air temperature within the Atlantic-Arctic boundary region, using data obtained from recently published (Klingbjer and Moberg, 2003; Vinther et al., 2006) and historical (Wahlen, 1886) sources that yielded four station-based composite time series that pertain to Southwestern Greenland, Iceland, Tornedalen (Sweden) and Arkhangel’sk (Russia). This operation added seventy-six years to the previously available record, the credibility of which result, in Wood et al.’s words, “is supported by ice core records, other temperature proxies, and historical evidence.” And the U.S. and Icelandic researchers determined that their newly extended temperature history and their analysis of it revealed “an irregular pattern of decadalscale temperature fluctuations over the past two centuries,” of which the early twentiethcentury warming (ETCW) event -- which they say “began about 1920 and persisted until midcentury” -- was by far “the most striking historical example.” In further discussing their findings, Wood et al. write that “as for the future, with no other examples in the record quite like the ETCW, we cannot easily suggest how often -- much less when -- such a comparably large regional climate fluctuation might be expected to appear.” Nevertheless, they say that if past is prologue to the future, “it would be reasonable to expect substantial regional climate fluctuations of either sign to appear from time to time,” and, therefore, that “singular episodes of regional climate fluctuation should be anticipated in the future,” which also implies that any rapid warming that may subsequently occur within the Atlantic-Arctic boundary region need not be due to rising greenhouse gas concentrations, as it could well be caused by the same unknown factor that caused the remarkable ETCW event, which further implies that the Arctic is not the “canary in the coal mine” that climate alarmists make it out to be. With respect to the cause of earth’s recent warming, we note that the truly unprecedented and increasing magnitude of anthropogenic CO2 emissions over the past few decades has not resulted in any similar increase in the rate of Arctic warming. Looking first at three coastal stations in southern and central Greenland that possess almost uninterrupted temperature records between 1950 and 2000, for example, Chylek et al. (2004) discovered that “summer temperatures, which are most relevant to Greenland ice sheet melting rates, do not show any persistent increase during the last fifty years.” In fact, working with the two stations with the longest records (both over a century in length), they determined that coastal Greenland’s peak temperatures occurred between 1930 and 1940, and that the subsequent decrease in temperature was so substantial and sustained that then-current coastal temperatures were “about 1°C below their 1940 values.” Furthermore, they noted that at the summit of the Greenland ice sheet the summer average temperature had “decreased at the rate of 2.2°C per decade since the beginning of the measurements in 1987.” Thus, as with the Arctic as a whole, Greenland did not experience any net warming over the most dramatic period of atmospheric CO2 increase on record. In fact, it cooled during this period ... and cooled significantly. At the start of the 20th century, however, Greenland was warming, as it emerged, along with the rest of the world, from the depths of the Little Ice Age. What is more, between 1920 and 1930, when the atmosphere’s CO2 concentration rose by a mere 3 to 4 ppm, there was a phenomenal warming at all five coastal locations for which contemporary temperature records were available. In fact, in the words of Chylek et al., “average annual temperature rose between 2 and 4°C [and by as much as 6°C in the winter] in less than ten years.” And this warming, as they noted, “is also seen in the 18 O/ 16 O record of the Summit ice core (Steig et al., 1994; Stuiver et al., 1995; White et al., 1997).” In commenting on this dramatic temperature rise, which they called the great Greenland warming of the 1920s, Chylek et al. concluded that “since there was no significant increase in the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration during that time, the Greenland warming of the 1920s demonstrates that a large and rapid temperature increase can occur over Greenland, and perhaps in other regions of the Arctic, due to internal climate variability such as the Northern Annular Mode/North Atlantic Oscillation, without a significant anthropogenic influence.” Other studies demonstrated pretty much the same thing for the entire Arctic, as well as the Antarctic region of the globe. Overpeck et al. (1997), for example, combined paleoclimatic records from lake and marine sediments, trees and glaciers to develop a 400-year history of circum-Arctic surface air temperature. From this record they determined that the most dramatic warming of the last four centuries (1.5°C) occurred between 1840 and 1955, over which period the air’s CO2 concentration rose from approximately 285 ppm to 313 ppm, or by 28 ppm. Then, from 1955 to the end of the record (about 1990), the mean circum-Arctic air temperature actually declined by 0.4°C, while the air’s CO2 concentration rose from 313 ppm to 354 ppm, or by 41 ppm. On the basis of these observations, which apply to the entire Arctic, it is not possible to assess the influence of atmospheric CO2 on surface air temperature within this region, or even conclude that it has any effect at all. Why? Because over the first 115 years of warming, as the air’s CO2 concentration rose by an average of 0.24 ppm/year, the air temperature rose by an average of 0.013°C/year; while over the final 35 years of the record, when the increase in the air’s CO2 content really began to accelerate, rising at a mean rate of 1.17 ppm/year (nearly five times the rate at which it had risen in the prior period), the rate of rise of surface air temperature did not accelerate anywhere near that fast. In fact, it did not accelerate at all. In fact, it decelerated, to a mean rate of change (0.011°C/year) that was nearly the same as the rate at which it had previously risen but in the opposite direction, i.e., downward. Clearly, there was something that totally overpowered whatever effect the rise in the air’s CO2 content over the first period may, or may not, have had on the temperature of the Arctic, as well as the effect of the nearly five times greater rate of rise in the air’s CO2 content over the second period. Concentrating wholly on directly-measured temperatures, as opposed to the reconstructed temperatures derived by the proxy approach of Overpeck et al. (1997), Polyakov et al. (2003) derived a surface air temperature history that stretched from 1875 to 2000 based on data obtained at 75 land stations and a number of drifting buoys located poleward of 62°N latitude. This effort allowed the team of eight U.S. and Russian scientists to determine that from 1875 to about 1917, the surface air temperature of the huge northern region rose hardly at all; but then it took off like a rocket, climbing 1.7°C in just 20 years to reach a peak in 1937 that has yet to be eclipsed. During this 20-year period of rapidly rising air temperature, the atmosphere’s CO2 concentration rose by a mere 8 ppm. But then, over the next six decades, when the air’s CO2 content rose by approximately 55 ppm, or nearly seven times more than it did throughout the 20-year period of dramatic warming that preceded it, the surface air temperature of the region poleward of 62°N experienced no net warming and, in fact, may have actually cooled a bit. In light of these results, it is difficult to claim much about the strength of the warming power of the approximate 75-ppm increase in the atmosphere’s CO2 concentration that occurred from 1875 to 2000, other than to say it was miniscule compared to whatever other forcing factor, or combination of forcing factors, was concurrently having its way with the climate of the Arctic. One cannot, for example, claim that any of the 1917 to 1937 warming was due to the 8-ppm increase in CO2 that accompanied it, even if augmented by the 12-ppm increase that occurred between 1875 and 1917; for the subsequent and much larger 55-ppm increase in CO2 led to no net warming over the remainder of the record, which suggests that just a partial relaxation of the forces that totally overwhelmed the warming influence of the CO2 increase experienced between 1937 and 2000 would have been sufficient to account for the temperature increase that occurred between 1917 and 1937. And understood in this light, the air’s CO2 content does not even begin to enter the picture. But what about earth’s other polar region: the Antarctic? Here, too, one can conclude nothing about the influence of atmospheric CO2 on surface air temperature. Why? Because for the continent as a whole (excepting the Antarctic Peninsula), there had been a net cooling over the pre-1990 period, stretching back to at least 1966 (Comiso, 2000; Doran et al., 2002; Thompson and Solomon, 2002). And when the real-world air temperature declines when the theoretical climate forcing factor is rising, one cannot even conclude that the forcing has any positive effect at all, much less determine its magnitude. Hence, there is absolutely no substance to the claim that earth’s polar regions are providing evidence for an impending CO2-induced warming of any magnitude anywhere. So what does the future hold in terms of global temperature? The answer is anyone’s guess. What we do know, however, is that earth's thermal future can not be validly described by current state-of-the-art climate models that base their simulations on projections of future anthropogenic CO2 emissions. There is just too much real-world evidence to place any confidence at all in what the climate models suggest.

## K

### 2NC Overview

#### K outweighs the case

#### -- Magnitude -- logic of security created the most destructive features of the international system -- war, oppression, and ecological destruction are all inevitable when particular decisions become necessities. Try or die -- voting aff makes their impacts inevitable.

#### -- Turns case --

#### -- Independent impact --

#### -- Alt' solves case -- rejecting dominant political discourse challenges the root cause of violent identity construction, undermining the solar reason for war. It's a prerequisite to better policy-making and a matter of sequencing -- good theory now causes better action later.

### AT Framework – Short

#### **-- Counter interpretation – aff must defend their discourse. The judge is an academic challengning the values and assumptions of the 1AC.**

#### -- Our form of education outweighs – we are educators not policy-makers – we all take government classes to learn about the policy-making process – individuals must be able to point out the weak spot in dominant narratives.

#### -- Cost-benefit analysis – aff gets strategic gains from reading hyperbolic impact scenarios -- cost is that they should have to defend the desirability of how their represent those impacts.

#### -- Coherence – only incorporation of representations can make sense of political reality

Jourde 6 – Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, B.Sc., Political Science, Université de Montréal (Cedric, 2006, “1995 Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under George W Bush,” Ed. David and Grondin p. 182-3)

Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable\*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor's and group of actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints**.** Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other\* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'.

#### -- Kritik proper is offense – means their interpretation excludes vital discussions that implicate how the plan is enacted – at worst we turn case

### AT Threats Real

#### 1. It’s impossible to assign an identity to their threats because their statements are vitriolic and exciting – aggression cannot be evaluated outside of our understanding of the international system that causes us to be competitors – that’s Burke.

#### 2. The aff can’t solve this –these underlying tensions will manifest as future reasons for conflict or the US will start these conflicts because of same nationalist reasons.

#### 3. Dehumanization outweighs securitization of threats

Burke 7 – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony “What security makes possible,” Working Paper 2007 p.11-12)

**Even if threats are credible and existential**, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legial innovation in counter-terrorism policy. And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that **systematically dehumanized their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungreivable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’**. If nothing else, it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitization theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalacy. The existential threat of human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a **very different policy logic** than outlined by the Copenhagen School. As Rocanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. This would seem to be implicit in the way Waever, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with ontological grounding. There he states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist’:

#### Prefer our disjunctive scenarios to their short-term conjunctive scenarios.

Yudkowsky 6 – Research Fellow & Director @ Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence (Eliezer, 8/31/. Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks,” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf)

The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, **people tend to overestimate the probability that**, e.g., **seven events of 90% probability will all occur**. Conversely, **people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur**. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

#### Don’t multiply probability times magnitude – methodological black-mail that causes error replication

Hagmann & Cavelty 12 -- \*senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies, lecturer at the Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, ETH Zürich, holds a Doctorate and an MA in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva AND \*\*lecturer for security studies and a senior researcher in the field of risk and resilience at the Center for Security Studies, PhD, studied International Relations, History, and International Law at the University of Zurich (Jonas and Myriam Dunn, 2/15/2012, "National risk registers: Security scientism and the propagation of permanent insecurity," Security Dialogue 43(1), Sage)

Risk registers’ adoption of conventional risk-assessment methodology – the formula that defines risk as likelihood multiplied by impact – also has a distinct influence on how insecurity is to be understood and handled. On the one hand, the emphasis on ‘likelihood’ initiates a consequential rationalization of danger occurrence. This rationalization, of course, is geared towards forecasting future developments. It is methodologically grounded in an in-depth analysis of danger’s ‘natural’ patterns of manifestation. As already mentioned, existing datasets and historical case studies are central elements in the identification of these patterns. The rationalization of risks based on past events is analytically efficacious, given that it empowers a projection of the past into the future. There is an implicit argument in the methodological measurement of ‘likelihood’ to the effect that the future essentially emulates history – the risk themes described in risk registers are extrapolations of misfortunes already experienced (Bigo, 2007; Jasanoff, 2009). Focusing on these risk themes, then, not only means focusing on past insecurities. It also means that, as technologies, risk registers project the very same insecurities into the future. With this, the very variable of ‘likelihood’ empowers an inert view of reality. This is problematic in the case of those risks that openly rely on, or are mediated by, social actors. Social actors are capable of adopting new types of behaviour over time. The risk of terrorism, for instance, can only be regarded as a persistent one under the assumption that terrorists will never cease, or be induced to cease, their activities. Given their commitment to engineering and econometric risk-assessment methodology, then, risk registers advance a regularized assessment of future practices. They leave little room for contingency, change and alternative trajectories, and so they tend to project a rather fatalist account of public insecurity. Another effect then adds to this projection. The reliance on past experiences as proof of the existence of risks negates the need to test their current viability. There is no requirement to prove that these issues will ever ‘actually’ become relevant in the future. Together with risk registers’ reliance on probability syllogisms, this causes these projected risks to gain a very specific kind of traction in the present. As risks are claimed to exist, but their date and place of materialization are held impossible to predict, a sense of comprehensive and ever-present insecurity is created. Insecurity comes to be regarded as substantial if not all-encompassing, always present and always possible – an understanding that directly caters to the permanent mobilization of a comprehensive kind of security dispositif. On the other hand, the focus on ‘impact’ as a determinant of risks also implies larger analytical claims. The problem here is the intimate focus of risk registers on damaging effects as such. The focus on material damage and financial costs in particular raises difficult questions as to what kinds of harmful effects can be claimed to be relevant to human beings and political collectives. In the risk registers, this question is simply delegated to the underlying risk formula. There are no selection criteria underlying risk registers other than a cost–benefit rationale, which comes into play when everything that seemed relevant to experts is compared by its calculated magnitude in the risk matrix. Another problematic aspect is the fact that while analyses of quantities of harm reveal a lot about damage, such an approach is of limited use in understanding how public dangers are created in the first place. The classic lines of enquiry in risk assessment are: ‘What can go wrong? What is the likelihood of it going wrong? What are the consequences if it goes wrong?’ (Haimes, 1998: 54–5). This means that risk assessments do not ask why something can go wrong, or how one’s own actions might be complicit in engendering such dangers. The focus on risk as harmful ‘impact’, then, not only implies debatable assumptions about relevant measures. Its focus on the consequences of risks and ignorance of their origins also poses limits to the reflexivity with which risks are approached.

### 2NC Alt Solvency

#### The alternative reject's the affirmative's security discourse – think of the alternative as a broader process rather thean a finished product – our untimely rejection in the face of impending threats overturn what it means to be relevant – only a rupture of the political imaginary can challenge the confinement of the present to security – refusing to take part in security politics is our only hope for a counter-discourse – tha's **Calkivik**

#### Only resistance to security logic can generate genuine political thought

Neocleous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debatesand discussionsthat animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

### AT Perm – Do Both

#### 1. Cross-apply framework – the aff must prove there’s value in incorporating their discourse and epistemology. Testing competitiveness with the plan is nonsensical because our kritik is about their scholarship.

#### 2. Theory – permutations must include 1AC representations, they’re the majority of the opening speech. Severance makes the aff a moving target and being neg becomes impossible. The aff isn’t selected in a vacuum, they had infinite prep to select advantages they had defenses of.

#### 3. The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings

Burke 7 – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis **relate not only to the** most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, **but also to their available** (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, **but also their mainstream critique**s - whether they take the form **of liberal policy approaches** in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement **about major concepts**, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique**.**

**4. Multiple perms are a VI – no risk option for the aff that demands lots of block time and are impossible to generate offense against, sandbags explanation to the 1AR screwing the neg, ci – they get 1 permutation.**

#### Embedded in their 1ac discourse –

### Baylor – AWE

#### Liberal security --

#### Griswold -- fellow at Cato -- cites declining war and just assumes that is due to trade, not other factors like o-pop -- also proves UQ and that we don't need a Navy in the first place

#### Brooks -- just says Trade binds nations -- doesn't assume those that get excluded -- also an undergrad journalist

#### Liberal method of building security causes mass biopolitical violence

Dillon & Reid 9 -- Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of LancasterAND \*\*lecturer in International Relations at King’s College, visiting professor in International Relations at the University of Lapland (Michael and Julian, "The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live," p.31-33)

Deciding on what elements and expression of the human both serve and threaten is the definitive operation by which liberalism constitutes its referent object of war and rule: that of the biohuman. Whatever resists the constitution of the biohuman is hostile and dangerous to it, even if it arises within the species itself. Indeed, as we shall show, since life is now widely defined in terms of continuous emergence and becoming, it is a continuous becoming-dangerous to itself. The locus of threat and danger under the liberal way of rule and war progressively moves into the very morphogenic composition and re-composability of living systems and of living material. The greatest source of threat to life becomes life. It is very important to emphasize that this discourse of danger is precisely not that which commonly arises in the political anthropologies of human cupidity of early modern political theory going back classically, for example, to Hobbes and Locke, which was nonetheless still formulated in a context still circumscribed by the infinity of divine providence, however obscure this was becoming, and however much this obscurity helped fuel the crisis of their times. The analytics of finitude, rather than the analytics of redemption, circumscribe late modem discourses of governance and danger now, instead. Biology, one might therefore also say, itself arose as a science of finitude; of the play of species life and death out with the play of human life and redemption. The same might very well be said for modern 'political science.' Biology does not, of course, recognize cupidity. Cupidity arises in a different, anthro-political, order of things. These days, especially, biology recognizes only the dynamics of complex adaptive evolutionary emergence and change of living systems, whose vary laws of formation it increasingly understands in informational terms. These, additionally, empower it to re-compose living material according to design rather than nature in order to rectify the infelicities of nature, or, indeed, pre-empt its expression by positively creating new nature, rather than merely negating existing nature. Pre-emption here is not negative, it is positive. It is not precaution, so much as creative production. The discourse of danger being elaborated throughout the liberal way of rule and war, in the age of life as information, is therefore related to the possibility that complex adaptive emergence and change can go acerbic. The possibility of catastrophe lies, immanently, in the very dynamics of the life process itself. Neither is this a discourse of danger which revolves around traditional othering practices alone, however pervasive and persistent these politically toxic devices remain. This is a discourse of danger which hyperbolicizes fear in relation to the radically contingent outcomes upon which they very liveliness of life itseld is now said to depend. Biohumanity - itself is an expression of the attempt to give concrete form to finitude politically - is therefore both threat and promise. the corollary is therefore also clear: enemies of the species must be cast out from the species as such. 'Just war' in the cause of humanity here - a constant liberal trope (Douzinas 2003) - takes a novel turn when the humanity at issue is biohumanity. For just war has constantly to be waged for biohumanity against the continuous becoming-dangerous of life itseld; and less in the form of the Machiavellian or Hobbesian Homo lupus than in the form of continuously emergent being, something which also prompts the thought that Foucault's analytics of finitude might itself have to be revised to take account the infinity of becoming which now also characterizes the contemporary ontology of life sciences. Since the object is to preserve and promote the biohuman, any such war to end war becomes war without end; thus turning Walzer's arguments concerning the justification of liberal war inside out (Walzer 2000: 329-35). The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process. In a way, as a matter of its biopolitical logic, there is little particularly startling about this claim. Immanent in the biopoliticization of the liberal rule, it is only a matter of where, when and how it finds expression. As the very composition and dynamics of species life become the locus of the threat to species life, so the properties of species life offer themselves in the form of a new kind of promise: war may be removed from the species should those properties be attended to differently. Consider, for example, Kant's 'Idea for a Universal History': if he lives among others for his own species, man is an animal who needs a master . . . he requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free. But where is he to find such a master? Nowhere else but in the human species. (Kant 2005: 46; emphasis added) 'Nowhere else but in the human species.' Here Kant, too, discloses the circumscription of his reflections by the analytics of finitude. Put simply, liberalism's strategic calculus of necessary killing has, then, to be furnished by the laws and dynamics, the exigencies and contingencies, derived from the properties of the biohuman itself. Making life live becomes the criterion against which the liberal way of rule and war must seek to say how much killing is enough. In a massive, quite literally terrifying, paradox, however, since the biohuman is the threat it cannot, itself, adjudicate how much self-immolation would be enough to secure itself against itself without destroying itself. However much the terror of the liberal way of rule and war currently revolves around the 'figure' of Al-Qaeda, the very dispotif of terror which increasingly circumscribes the life of the biohuman at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the fear induced by its very own account of life. No specific manner or form is proper, then, to the biohuman other than this: its being continuously at work instrumentally reassigning itself in order, it is said, to survive, but in fact to secure itself against its own vital processes. Within the compass of this biopolitical imaginary of species existence, the biohuman becomes the living being to whom all manner of self-securing work must be assigned. The task thus posed through the liberal way of rule and war by its referent object of rule and war - the biohuman - is no longer that, classically, of assigning the human its proper nature with a view to respecting it. The proper nature of the biohuman has become the infinite re-assignability of the very pluripotency itself. This is the strategic goal of the liberal way of war because it has become the strategic goal of the liberal way of rule. From the analytics of finitude, politically, has thus arisen an infinity of securitization and fear.

#### Warming apocalypse --

#### Ward -- asks "could warming cause XTC" -- that can't be discounted, not that it's a certainty -- you act like it is

#### Apocalyptic warming rhetoric disables effective approaches to warming – we control uniqueness

Barrett & Gilles 12 -- \*nonprofit director and consultant for over a decade, her writing has appeared in newspapers, magazines, and blogs nationwide AND \*\*consulted for numerous political campaigns, advocacy organizations, and global NGOs, and has been profiled in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Boston Globe, and Fast Company (Mel and Metthew Barrett, 4/23/12, "How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action," http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-taking-political-action/255758/)

To understand why fewer people believe in climate change even as evidence mounts, we must look beyond the industry-funded movement to deny the reality and effects of climate change. Perhaps equally important -- if not quite equally culpable -- has been the extent to which both the proponents and opponents of human-made climate change have led us down a cul-de-sac of conversation by exploiting the apocalyptic metaphor to make their case. Whether by design or by accident, the initial warnings of environmentalists -- of oceans rising to engulf our most beloved metropolises, of amber waves of grain scorched into a desert landscape -- activated the apocalyptic impulse. The focus on disastrous repercussions for our behavior at some point in the future echoed the warnings of the Israelite priests to wayward Jews in Babylon or, later, to those who submitted too willingly to Alexander's process of Hellenization. It was a familiar story: change, and change radically, or face hell on earth. Perhaps there was no other way to sound the alarm about the devastating threat presented by global climate change, but that echo of apocalyptic warning was quickly seized upon by the naysayers to dismiss the evidence out of hand. We've heard this story before, the deniers insisted, and throughout history those who have declared the end of the world was near have always been proven wrong. As early as 1989, the industry front man Patrick Michaels, a climatologist and global warming skeptic, was warning in the op-ed pages of the Washington Post of this new brand of "apocalyptic environmentalism," which represented "the most popular new religion to come along since Marxism." That the solutions to global warming (a less carbon-intensive economy, a more localized trade system, a greater respect for nature's power) parallel so perfectly the dream of environmentalists, and that the causes of global warming (an unrestrained industrial capitalism reliant on the continued and accelerating consumption of fossil fuels) parallel the economic dream of conservatives, has simply exacerbated the fact that global warming has now become just another front in the culture wars. By seizing upon and mocking the apocalyptic imagery and rhetoric of those sounding the alarm, the industry front groups succeeded in framing the debate about global warming into a question about what one believes. Thus, entangled with the myth of apocalypse -- and its attendant hold on our own sense of belief and self-identity -- the debate about anthropogenic climate change has reached an impasse. You believe in the Rapture; I believe in global warming -- and so the conversation stops. But global climate change is not an apocalyptic event that will take place in the future; it is a human-caused trend that is occurring now. And as we expend more time either fearfully imagining or vehemently denying whether that trend will bring about a future apocalypse, scientists tell us that the trend is accelerating. Talking about climate change or peak oil through the rhetoric of apocalypse may make for good television and attention-grabbing editorials, but such apocalyptic framing hasn't mobilized the world into action. Most of us are familiar with the platitude "When the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." In a similar way, our over-reliance on the apocalyptic storyline stands between us and our ability to properly assess the problems before us. Some see the looming crises of global warming and resource and energy depletion and conclude that inaction will bring about the end of civilization: only through a radical shift toward clean energy and conservation, those on the Left argue, can we continue the way of life that we have known. Those on the Right dismiss the apocalyptic threats altogether, because the proposed solutions to peak oil, global warming, and overpopulation conflict with core conservative beliefs about deregulation and the free-market economy, or with a religious worldview that believes humanity is not powerful enough to alter something as large as our climate. Still others dismiss the catalog of doom and gloom as mere apocalypticism itself. Surely, we convince ourselves, all the dire warnings about the effects of global warming aren't that different from the world-ending expectations of the Rapturists? The result is that the energy we could expend addressing the problems before us is instead consumed by our efforts to either dismiss the threat of apocalypse or to prove it real. Ultimately, the question becomes not what to do about the threats before us but whether you believe in the threats before us. By allowing the challenges of the 21st century to be hijacked by the apocalyptic storyline, we find ourselves awaiting a moment of clarity when the problems we must confront will become apparent to all -- or when those challenges will magically disappear, like other failed prophecies about the end of the world. Yet the real challenges we must face are not future events that we imagine or dismiss through apocalyptic scenarios of collapse -- they are existing trends. The evidence suggests that much of what we fear in the future -- the collapse of the economy, the arrival of peak oil and global warming and resource wars -- has already begun. We can wait forever, while the world unravels before our very eyes, for an apocalypse that won't come. The apocalyptic storyline becomes a form of daydreaming escape: the threat of global warming becomes a fantasy to one day live off the grid, or buy a farm, or grow our own food; economic collapse becomes like a prison break from the drudgery of meaningless and increasingly underpaid work in a soul-crushing cubicle; peak oil promises the chance to finally form a community with the neighbors to whom you've never spoken. Yet despite the fantasia peddled by Hollywood and numerous writers, a world battered by natural disasters and global warming, facing declining natural resources and civic unrest, without adequate water or energy or food, with gross inequalities between the rich and the poor, is not a setting for a picaresque adventure, nor is it the ideal place to start living in accord with your dreams. The deeper we entangle the challenges of the 21st century with apocalyptic fantasy, the more likely we are to paralyze ourselves with inaction -- or with the wrong course of action. We react to the idea of the apocalypse -- rather than to the underlying issues activating the apocalyptic storyline to begin with -- by either denying its reality ("global warming isn't real") or by despairing at its inevitability ("why bother recycling when the whole world is burning up?"). We react to apocalyptic threats by either partying (assuaging our apocalyptic anxiety through increased consumerism, reasoning that if it all may be gone tomorrow, we might as well enjoy it today), praying (in hopes that divine intervention or mere time will allow us to avoid confronting the challenges before us), or preparing (packing "bugout" packs for a quick escape or stocking up on gold, guns, and canned food, as though the transformative moment we anticipate will be but a brief interlude, a bad winter storm that might trap us indoors for a few days or weeks but that will eventually melt away). None of these responses avert, nor even mitigate, the very threats that have elicited our apocalyptic anxiety in the first place. Buying an electric car doesn't solve the problem of a culture dependent on endless growth in a finite world; building a bunker to defend against the zombie hordes doesn't solve the growing inequities between the rich and poor; praying for deliverance from the trials of history doesn't change that we must live in the times in which we were born. Indeed, neither partying, nor preparing, nor praying achieves what should be the natural goal when we perceive a threat on the horizon: we should not seek to ignore it, or simply brace for it, but to avert it.

#### Naval dominance --

#### Burke -- an intern at National Security project -- says only increased presence can deter China and the rest of Asia

#### Eaglan -- former Naval officer and director at Heritage -- says the only reason we haven't had world wars was Navy's -- only reason trade has remained

#### Your threats are psychological paranoia and cause irrational policy and intervention

Fettweis 10 (Christopher J., Professor of Political Science at Tulane, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival 52.2, Informaworld)

For the architects of US foreign policy, one belief has remained constant since the Second World War: we are living in dangerous times. In the 1950s, fears of communism caused the United States to raise and maintain an enormous peacetime military for the first time in its history, an action that would have horrified the founding generation. The Cold War ended, but the perception of threat lived on. Today, the Committee on the Present Danger, first established in the 1950s, has re-emerged to assure America that mortal danger had not gone the way of the Soviet Union. Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich is typical of many American leaders in his belief that the challenges of the current era are every bit as great as those faced by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, taking it as given that America's present enemies pose a 'mortal threat to our survival as a free country'.11 To US foreign policymakers, the world is full of enemies and evil, and America must never relax its guard. More than one observer has noted that the United States displays a level of threat perception that is far higher than that of the other great powers.12 This feeling of insecurity is not limited to US leaders. Six in ten Americans apparently think that a Third World War is 'likely to occur' in their lifetime; others, including influential opinion-makers, believe it has already begun.13 In April 2007, 82% of Americans told pollsters that the world is a more dangerous place than it used to be, and that it is getting worse. One year later, another poll by the same firm found that a 'significant majority' of Americans were anxious about US security, demonstrating that in the United States, 'anxiety remains steady over time'.14 This level of anxiety is striking when compared to public opinion in other post-Cold War powers. Whether the issue is Islamic fundamentalist terrorism or rogue actors such as Saddam Hussein or Hugo Chaacutevez, the United States detects higher levels of danger than any other state. During the Cold War, the pattern was the same: the United States feared an attack by the Warsaw Pact far more than did its West European allies, who presumably had more to lose if such an event occurred; it worried about the influence of communist China more than did South Korea, Japan or the ASEAN states; and it obsessed over the potential pernicious influence of Fidel Castro and the Sandinistas more than did the smaller states of the region.15 Despite the fact that virtually all other states are demonstrably weaker than the United States, and therefore presumably more vulnerable to a variety of threats, they do not seem to worry about their safety nearly as much as does Uncle Sam. Is the US perception justified? Just because a country is paranoid does not mean that there are not forces seeking to do it harm. Any modern state is confronted with a number of possible dangers and threats. The question is whether those facing the twenty-first-century United States are quite as dire as its leaders seem to believe. Conventional security threats Compared to any other country in the long history of international affairs, the United States is fundamentally safe from conventional assault. It is hard to imagine how even the combined military and economic might of Eurasia (if such a combination were possible) could be harnessed to mount a successful trans-oceanic invasion. Today, a few nuclear weapons would probably suffice to deter any imaginable approaching armada, but even before the nuclear age few serious strategists considered invasion a realistic possibility. 'Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant, to step the Ocean, and crush us at a blow?' wondered Abraham Lincoln in 1838: Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with a Bonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years.16 Princeton international-relations scholars Harold and Margaret Sprout spoke for many security analysts when they argued in 1939 that by the time the United States entered the First World War, 'it was manifest, both from indisputable data publicly available at that time and from inferences easily and fairly deductible therefrom' that a trans-oceanic invasion 'simply could not occur'.17 Not only is the invasion and conquest of the United States virtually unthinkable, but warfare of all kinds is everywhere on the decline. Since the end of the Cold War, inter-and intra-national conflict and crises have steadily declined in number and intensity.18 The risk for the average person of dying in battle has plummeted since the Second World War, especially since the end of the Cold War.19 The incidence of new wars is also at an all-time low.20 Only one international war has been fought since the invasion of Iraq, and it can be counted only if the common understanding of 'war' is stretched a bit. Despite the sound and fury that accompanied the 2008 Russo-Georgian clash, the combined battle-death figure appears to be under 1,000, which means it would not even qualify as a war using the most-used definitions.21 By virtually all measures, the world is a far more peaceful place than it has been at any time in recorded history. This trend is apparent on every continent. At the beginning of 2010, the only conflict raging in the Western Hemisphere was the ongoing civil war in Colombia, but even this conflict is far less severe today than it was ten years ago. Europe, which has in the past been the most war-prone of continents, is entirely calm, without even the threat of inter-state conflict. Little war planning now goes on among the European powers, a rather stark departure from previous eras.22 Every one of the two billion or so people of the Pacific Rim is currently living in a society at peace. The brief but bloody Sri Lankan civil war was Asia's only conflict in 2009. In Africa, despite a variety of serious on-going challenges, levels of conflict are the lowest they have been in the centuries of written history we have about the continent. In the greater Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian issue continues to simmer, if at a relatively low level, as do the civil war in Yemen and the two counterinsurgency campaigns in which the United States and its allies currently find themselves bogged down. None of this is to suggest that these places are without problems, or that war is impossible. But given the rapid increase in the world's population and the number of countries (the League of Nations had 63 members at its peak between the wars, while the United Nations currently has 192), a pure extrapolation of historical trends might lead one to expect a great deal more warfare than there actually is. Conquest, it seems, is far less common today than it has been throughout history. Territorial disputes, the most common cause of warfare in the past, have dropped to record low levels, especially among the great powers. International borders have all but hardened. By any reasonable measure, the world is living in a golden age of peace and security, even if it may not always appear so. If indeed major war is all but obsolete, as an increasing number of prominent observers believe,23 then surely even the most diehard pessimists can admit that the United States need not fear invasion and conquest. State survival, the key factor behind state behaviour according to 'defensive realists', is today all but assured for even the smallest states.24 To be sure, throughout most of human history, the obliteration of political entities was a distinct possibility. Polities as diverse as Central Asian empires, Greek poleis and German 'princely states' were all at risk of conquest or absorption by powerful neighbours. That this no longer occurs is an under-appreciated break from the past. Since the Second World War, precisely zero UN members have been forcibly removed from the map.25 Today, states are safe from complete annihilation. The stronger countries are even safer; the strongest is the safest. A variety of explanations have been proposed to account for this peaceful trend. Some realists take the view that nuclear weapons have thrust peace upon the otherwise conflictual system.26 Liberal explanations include the expanding number of democracies, multilateral institutions and the deepening complexity of economic interdependence.27 Constructivists do not necessarily deny the importance of any of these factors, but give primary credit to a change in ideas in contemporary international society.28 Those factors exogenous to the human mind are important only to the extent that they affect the way people think, and that society functions. It is ideational evolution, and the corresponding change in behavioural norms regarding conflict, that has been decisive in this view. All these explanations share one important factor: the change they describe is likely to be irreversible. Nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, and no defence against their use is ever going to be completely foolproof. The pace of globalisation and economic interdependence shows no sign of slowing. Democracy seems to be firmly embedded in the cultural fabric of many of the places it currently exists, and may well be in the process of spreading to the places where it does not. The United Nations shows no signs of disappearing. Finally, normative progress, like that which brought an end to slavery and duelling, tends to be unidirectional. One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated. Unconventional security threats Conventional war, much less outright assault, is not the leading security challenge in the minds of most Americans today. Instead, irregular or non-state actors, especially terrorists, top the list of threats to the West since 11 September 2001. The primary guiding principle of US foreign policymaking, for better or worse, is the continuing struggle against terrorism. President Bush repeatedly used the term 'Islamofascists' to describe the enemy that he re-oriented the US defence establishment to fight, transforming al-Qaeda from a ragtag band of lunatics into a threat to the republic itself. It is not uncommon for even sober analysts to claim that Islamic terrorists present an 'existential threat' to the United States, especially if they were ever to employ nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Perhaps it is Parkinson's Law that inspires some analysts to compare Islamic fundamentalists with the great enemies of the past, such as the Nazis or the Communists, since no rational analysis of their destructive potential would allow such a conclusion. Threat is a function of capabilities and intent; even if al-Qaeda has the intent to threaten the existence of the United States, it does not possess the capability to do so. This is not to deny that Islamist terrorists pose a danger to the United States, or to suggest that policymakers are poised to 'let down their guard', as President Bush has worried. A rational United States, however, would interpret this issue for what it is: a law-enforcement challenge of the first order rather than an existential strategic threat. Fortunately, there is no meaningful dissension in the industrialised world about modern transnational problems such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, human trafficking, drug smuggling or piracy. Multilateral cooperation, coordination and intelligence-sharing to address such issues are in the interest of every state and occur at high, if often under-reported, levels. Police action against terrorism is much less expensive than war, and is likely to be far more productive. Even terrorists equipped with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would be incapable of causing damage so cataclysmic that it would prove fatal to modern states. Though the prospect of terrorists obtaining and using such weapons is one of the most consistently terrifying scenarios of the new era, it is also highly unlikely and not nearly as dangerous as sometimes portrayed. As the well-funded, well-staffed Aum Shinrikyo cult found out in the 1990s, workable forms of weapons of mass destruction are hard to purchase, harder still to synthesise without state help, and challenging to use effectively. The Japanese group managed to kill a dozen people on the Tokyo subway system at rush hour. While tragic, the attack was hardly the stuff of apocalyptic nightmares. Super-weapons are simply not easy for even the most sophisticated non-state actors to use.31 If terrorists were able to overcome the substantial obstacles and use the most destructive weapons in a densely populated area, the outcome would of course be terrible for those unfortunate enough to be nearby. But we should not operate under the illusion that doomsday would arrive. Modern industrialised countries can cope with disasters, both natural and man-made. As unpleasant as such events would be, they do not represent existential threats. Responsibility lies with those who ought to know better The American public can be forgiven for being afraid of nuclear-, biological-or chemical-armed terrorists, since the messages they have been receiving from US leaders have been uniformly apocalyptic, informed by worst-case thinking. The responsibility for this pathological fear lies with those who ought to know better - who know, for instance, that plastic sheeting and duct tape are not realistic protections against anything, but who recommend their stockpiling anyway. Terrorists can kill people and scare many more, but the localised damage they can cause is by itself incapable of changing the character of Western civilisation. Only the people of the West, largely through their own overreaction, can accomplish that. While US analysts spend time worrying about such events, it is worth recalling that the diplomats of any prior age would likely have been quite grateful to have our problems in lieu of their own. Today's security debate often seems to be driven less by actual threats than vague, unnamed dangers. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned about 'unknown unknowns': the threats 'we don't know we don't know', which 'tend to be the difficult ones'.32 Kristol and Kagan worry that if the United States fails to remain highly engaged, the international system 'is likely to yield very real external dangers, as threatening in their own way as the Soviet Union was a quarter century ago'.33 What exactly these dangers are is left open to interpretation. In the absence of identifiable threats, the unknown can provide us with an enemy, one whose power is limited only by the imagination. This is what Benjamin Friedman and Harvey Sapolsky call 'the threat of no threats', and is perhaps the most frightening danger of all.34 Even if, as folk wisdom has it, anything is possible, not everything is plausible. Vague, generalised dangers should never be acceptable replacements for specific threats when crafting national policy. There is no limit to the potential dangers the human mind can manufacture, but there are very definite limits to the specific threats the world contains. 'To make any thing very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary', noted Edmund Burke. 'When we know the full extent of any danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes.'35 The full extent of today's dangers is not only knowable, but relatively minor. Non-security threats: liberty and prosperity Security is not the only vital national interest, of course. Prosperity and democracy are typically items included on the short list of issues for which the United States should be willing to fight. During the Cold War, neither could be taken for granted. The health of the US economy would presumably have been at grave risk if the rest of the world had been swept into the communist camp. A united, hostile, Soviet-led Eurasia could have posed a major threat to the United States. Embargoes or other forms of economic warfare could have proved devastating to the US standard of living. Furthermore, as economist and political theorist (and later national security advisor) Walter Rostow argued at the time, if totalitarian dictatorships had come to power across the world, the very survival of democracy in the United States would have been imperiled.36 The precarious balance that every country must strike between liberty and security might have tilted decisively toward the latter if the United States were left alone in a hostile world. It was difficult for Rostow to imagine how American democracy could have long survived as an island in a totalitarian sea. It was therefore imperative for the United States to oppose the spread of communism in Eurasia, to secure the future of both prosperity and liberty. The vigour with which post-Cold War American administrations have pursued the promotion of democracy around the world might make one believe that without a strong ally, liberty and freedom are powerless and doomed, and even under threat in the United States. One need not be convinced that history has ended, however, to accept the notion that the collapse of communism has left no viable political challenger to democracy and no economic alternative to free markets.37 No political ideology exists around which to rally a hostile coalition of states against the major democratic powers. Communism and fascism, while perhaps not completely dead, are relegated to the background, and although totalitarianism persists in some regions of the world, political legitimacy in today's international society comes from a mandate from the masses. Even if democracy does not soon infiltrate those last bastions of illiberalism (and it might), it is not losing ground to other forms of government. Meanwhile, 'waves' of democracy have at times swept over the world with very little direct aid from abroad, and it is reasonable to assume that the values of liberty and freedom will endure even without US efforts to promote them.38 In addition, although the flavours may differ, free-market capitalism is today almost universally recognised as the fastest route to prosperity and wealth. Were a group of unfriendly governments to come to power in Eurasia, they would still find it in their interest to maintain trade and financial relations with the United States. No state would benefit from cutting ties with the world's largest market and producer of goods. Economic inter-dependence is, after all, a two-way street; the major trading partners of the United States are all more dependent upon the US market than vice versa.39 As long as capitalism remains the dominant form of economic organisation, and there is little reason to believe that any change is on the horizon, the economic danger presented by even the most hostile of coalitions will remain extremely low. Explaining the pathology If a mismatch between perceptions of threat and reality indeed exists in the United States, how can it be explained? If the connection between power and paranoia is an example of a political pathology, one that compels irrational reactions and behaviour, why is it present? Potential explanations draw from structural features of the international system; those unique to the American experience; and factors of individual psychology. Systemic-level explanations Since great powers have broader interests than do smaller powers, one might expect that the lone hyperpower in a unipolar system would have the broadest interests of all.40 With great power comes both great flexibility to pursue a wide variety of goals and great responsibility to affect the progression of events. 'Most countries are primarily concerned with what happens in their neighborhoods', says Robert Jervis, 'but the world is the unipole's neighborhood'.41 As interests expand, new threats appear which, if states are not careful, can soon take on an inflated importance and inspire unnecessary action. Threats to secondary interests can rapidly be misinterpreted as significant dangers if not kept in perspective by a constant, conscious process of evaluation. The expansion of interests as power grows is natural, but the interpretation of those new interests as vital is not. Vital national interests do not change from decade to decade, much less from administration to administration, but interest inflation is a central aspect of foreign-policy pathology in unipolar systems. Great powers of the past have often proved unable to disconnect vital interests from peripheral ones as expansion occurred. Newly perceived dangers have seemed to require action, which has often taken the form of further expansion, leading to the identification of new threats. There will never be a time when no threats can be generated by the human imagination. States can never be fully safe if all interests are vital and all threats dire. Insecurity has no natural limits, and if not kept in check can easily lead to overexpansion, overspending and decline.42 Historical examples are not difficult to find. Two millennia after its collapse, it is easy to forget that insecurity contributed to the growth of the Roman Empire. Many of its most prominent conquests, from Gaul to Dacia to Iberia, were driven not only by the desire for glory or plunder but also by the sincere belief that the populations along Rome's widening periphery could represent a threat. Cicero observed that many Romans felt that expansion was thrust upon them, as part of a project to rid themselves of 'frightening neighbours'.43 The fact that most of these neighbours were manifestly weaker did not matter. As its power grew, so too did Rome's insecurity. Even Rome's most ardent defenders stop short of claiming that Roman expansion can be fully explained with reference to virtuous, defensive motives. But prestige and financial gain were not the only motivations of Roman strategists. As both Cicero and Virgil argued, Rome never felt safe as long as it had enemies, both real and imagined.44 The most powerful - and in many ways safest - society in the ancient world was unconvinced that its security was assured as long as it had neighbours. Their mere existence constituted a potential threat. Great Britain exhibited a similar level of insecurity as its power grew throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As the boundaries of its empire expanded, new dangers constantly appeared just over the horizon. British politicians and strategists felt that turbulence on colonial borders 'pulled them toward expansion', in the words of historian John Galbraith.45 The notion that empire could never be safe until all potential threats were addressed encouraged unnecessary and strength-sapping forays into such places as Afghanistan, Zululand and the Crimea. There is little doubt that the empires of the past did have real enemies that could have been the cause of genuine security concerns. Insecurity is only pathological when elevated to disproportionate, irrational levels. Today the United States faces far fewer existential dangers than did either the Roman or British empires. American dominance is far greater, as is the strength of its pathology. State-level explanations Given that the geographic position of the United States occasionally allows its people the luxury of forgetting about the problems of the world, greaterthan-average shock follows when that seeming isolation is shattered by surprise attack.46 The vast distance separating the United States from any potential foe tends to create the preconditions for overreaction if and when its presumed safety is violated. As a result, surprise attacks have a greater influence on the development of the national-security posture of the United States than any other great power.47 Since the attacks of September 2001 were a major shock, one might expect a US reaction that was out of proportion to extant threats. As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman put it, '9/11 made us stupid'.48 The liberal tradition encourages a Manichaean worldview The United States might also be peculiarly susceptible to the insecurity pathology because of what political scientist Louis Hartz called the 'liberal tradition' in the United States, at least as compared with those states whose intellectual inheritances are based more squarely in the lessons of realpolitik.49 This liberal political tradition encourages a Manichaean worldview and a simultaneous acceptance of messianic responsibilities. It is unsurprising to American liberals that their country - a major force for good in the world - is the target of a variety of evil-doers. Islamist fundamentalist terrorists, they argue, harbour hatred for the United States not based upon what it has done, but what it is: the world's leading voice for freedom, democracy and modernity.50 Realists are usually somewhat more sanguine about the threats facing a state, and are by nature less prone to exaggeration. Liberalism has been particularly influential in the White House over the past 16 years. The administration of George W. Bush contained a number of people who inhabited the far end of the threat-perception spectrum, and who drove it in a decidedly liberal direction. There is no doubt that the neo-conservatives, who represent a muscular version of the American liberal tradition, tend to perceive more danger in the international system than do many other observers. Indeed, inherent in many of the definitions of neoconservatism is a high perception of threat; it is an essential part of what differentiates a neocon from other analysts.51 The extent to which the United States overestimates the level of danger in the world is at least in part directly related to the influence of neo-conservatives both directly upon policymaking and indirectly in the marketplace of ideas. When neo-conservatives are prominent, as they have been since the Cold War ended, either in administrations or as leading voices of the opposition, the people of the United States are bound to feel more insecure than they actually are. The liberal tradition has helped foster a sense of moral superiority that is a central feature of the American historical narrative. While it is normal for people to take pride in their country or culture, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.52 A key component of the US national self-image is moral, driven in part by the comparative strength of religious belief in the United States: America is not only unique and essential, but good. And good cannot exist without evil. The greater the power of good, the greater the threat it represents to evil, which will respond in diabolical ways, employing all of the cunning and deception at its disposal. No amount of security will ever be enough to assure safety in a world beset by the forces of darkness; as US strength grows, so too will that of Satan's minions, even if they are not always detectable. Finally, the United States is served, or held hostage, by a 24-hour news cycle that thrives on conflict and danger. Fear is an essential component of the business model of both CNN and Fox News, a necessary tool to keep fingers away from remote controls during commercial breaks. Voices of reason tend to spoil the fun, and may inspire people to seek excitement elsewhere. News outlets win by presenting stories that are more frightening, angry and simple than those of their competitors, not by supplying historical perspective and reassurance. If no danger exists, it must be created, or at least creatively implied. Truth, as George Kennan noted, is sometimes a poor competitor in the marketplace of ideas. 'The counsels of impatience and hatred can always be supported by the crudest and cheapest symbols', he wrote: For the counsels of moderation, the reasons are often intricate, rather than emotional, and difficult to explain. And so the chauvinists of all times and places go their appointed way: plucking the easy fruits, reaping the little triumphs of the day at the expense of someone else tomorrow, deluging in noise and filth anyone who gets in their way, dancing their reckless dance on the prospects for human progress.53 The noise and filth produced by the American media is louder and thicker than in any other state. Individual explanations At least three mental processes may help account for the overestimation of threat among US policymakers. Firstly, a number of scholars have proposed that the creation of enemies is a natural and inevitable part of human social interaction, for both individuals and groups.54 People need enemies for their own self-image; it is meaningless to be the good guy if there is no corresponding bad guy. Evil will always be found, even if none exists. In the absence of clear enemies foreign policy tends to flounder, as critics accused US foreign policy of doing in the 1990s. The attacks of 2001 merely con-firmed what many already believed: our enemies are massing against us. But the psychological need to have a rival does not make a danger real. Secondly, there seems to be a tendency towards a correlation between power and insecurity, or even paranoia, in individual leaders.55 Time and again, people who have exhibited borderline deranged behaviour have attracted followers, solidified bases, come to power and remained there for extended periods across a wide variety of settings. It could be there are times when paranoia is advantageous for the would-be leader, since broad purges surely kill conspirators alongside innocents. US leaders are not autocrats, of course, but they do enjoy an unprecedented level of power, which is virtually uncheckable by the international system. Perhaps they too, like the dictator or the king, though not to the same degree, are affected by the destabilising effects of great power. Finally, security discourse itself may help explain the high level of threat perception in the United States. That we live in a dangerous world has become something of a truism, a shared belief in the foreign-policy community that is rarely subjected to rational analysis. Official discourse can not only affect popular perceptions but frame potential reactions and shape state behaviour. Constant repetition of the idea that we live in a dangerous world can, over time, easily lead to genuine belief, for leaders and followers alike.56 A more rational examination of threats could therefore be useful in altering the current conventional wisdom in both popular and strategic circles. US leaders have repeatedly decided to raise threat levels to encourage Americans to support otherwise unpopular policy choices. This is not new phenomenon; H.L. Mencken observed that in order to create support for America's entry into the First World War, Woodrow Wilson and other US liberals realised that 'the only way to make the mob fight was to scare it half to death'.57 More recently, the American public showed little enthusiasm for the first Gulf War until President George H.W. Bush began injecting the threat of Iraqi nuclear weapons into his speeches. Likewise, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Dick Cheney were fond of arguing that a failure to attack Iraq could well result in a nuclear attack on the United States. When faced with such choices, the American people understandably go along. Manipulation of popular perceptions by individual leaders surely contributes to the national pathology. Stoking such fires not only has effects for the short term, raising support for otherwise unnecessary action, but tends to do long-term damage as well. Once lit, such fires are hard to extinguish. Fear and anxiety persist long after they are useful, and continue to drive decisions. It can prove beyond the power of more rational leaders to control them. President Barack Obama has repeatedly demonstrated an instinct toward restraint and moderation, but time and again has decided that the political situation requires hyperventilation, or at least that overreaction would not be costly. On a range of issues, including the Russian incursion into Georgia, the Iranian nuclear programme and the so-called 'Underpants Bomber', Obama's instincts initially produced measured and calm reactions, but each time, criticism from the right, and comparisons with the perceived weaknesses of the Jimmy Carter administration, convinced him to change his reaction and become much more belligerent. Only in a deeply pathological society is reason a synonym for weakness. It will probably never be possible to determine the precise explanatory power of any of these explanations, none of which are mutually exclusive. But in the final analysis, understanding the cause is not as urgent as recognition, treatment and cure. Policymakers would be wise to take account of Parkinson's Law, the natural tendency to see more threats as power grows. In unipolar systems, the dominant state sees more monsters in need of destruction than do lesser states. Unnecessary ventures follow, accompanied by overextension, overspending and eventual decline. Perhaps this tendency to identify more threats as power increases is one of the natural levelling forces of international politics. Unless US leaders wish to see the unipolar moment end sooner than need be, they must recognise that the threats they perceive are generally less dire than they appear. The pathological, exaggerated sense of threat among many Americans is potentially harmful to the future of the country and the world. Born in irrationality, it inspires equally irrational actions, many of which are costly beyond any possible benefit. With a new administration in power and serious economic uncertainty gripping the nation, one can hope that the American public will be receptive to a more reasonable conception of danger, now that it has seen the results of overreaction. As with alcoholics, sometimes a nation must hit rock bottom before it sees the need to make drastic changes. Iraq should be that rock bottom for America. If the consequences lead the United States to return to its traditional, restrained grand strategy, then perhaps the whole experience will not have been in vain.

#### Also says both world wars were solved by our Navy -- yea right, rmr Navy?

#### Lists a million different conflicts that COULD happen without Navy -- that threat perception causes intervention

#### Yellow Peril --

#### NcCurry -- a staff writer -- says we're the only thing preventing China from attaching Taiwan

#### Emmot says a bunch of barriers to nuclear war

#### Also says escalates in the short-term which means you can't solve and it's just a question of how we represent the situation

#### **Threats of Chinese escalation justify US intervention which prevents peaceful resolution**

Chen 12 -- Senior Professor, Law School, Xiamen University, People’s Republic of China; Chairman, Chinese Society of International Economic Law, 1993–2011; International Arbitrator, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the Washington Convention, since 1993 (An, 2012, "On the Source, Essence of “Yellow Peril” Doctrine and Its Latest Hegemony “Variant” – the “China Threat” Doctrine: From the Perspective of Historical Mainstream of Sino-Foreign Economic Interactions and Their Inherent Jurisprudential Principles," http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/docserver/22119000/13/1/22119000\_013\_01\_S01\_text.pdf?expires=1359819574&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=F52EBADF2C41BB3C4ABD9774E2A182EA)

These questions have been quarreled for over at least 140 years. They are not only historical issues, but also important reality problems. One recent relating example is as follows: for the past few years, the dispute between China and various South Asian countries as Vietnam and Philippine on the matter of territorial entitlement of numerous islands in China’s South Sea has been gradually heating up. On the one hand, Chinese Government emphasizes that huge amount of historical recordings demonstrate the irrefutable fact that such disputed islands as Xisha (Paracel Islands) and Nansha (Spratly Islands) are entitled to China from ancient times to the present; and it is one of the core interests of China to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the other hand, China also insists on a peaceful and good-neighborly policy, proposing to “shelve disputes and seek joint development”; and it is endeavoring to resolve the disputes separately through bilateral consultation between disputing parties on an equal footing. 1 However, in order to maintain and expand its vested hegemonic interests in Asia, the U.S., although lying as far as across the Pacific Ocean, spares no effort in the interference into above disputes. It drives a wedge in-between China and its contending parties as Vietnam and Philippine by instigating and supporting the latter to act as its “cat’s paws” and adopt various extreme unilateral measures vis-à-vis China’s peaceful and reasonable proposals, so that it could gain profits therefrom. In fact, the conducts of America have posed a severe threat to the regional stability of Southeastern Asia, as well as to a possible friendly cooperation among the countries therein. Yet again and again, the U.S. plays the trick of a thief crying “Stop thief!” by wantonly preaching “China Threat Doctrine”. Recently, many high-ranking American officials and various American Medias made an issue on the trial voyage of China’s first aircraft carrier, claiming that: Chinaʼs aircraft carrier has posed not only a political and military threat to its neighboring countries, but also a long-term potential threat to the interests of America in Asia-Pacific region. Chinaʼs aircraft carrier could and might be used to threaten its neighboring countries, as well as allies and friends of America. Together with China’s other military facilities, the Carrier could be used to endanger interests of America in Asia-Pacific region. 2

#### US interference messes with territorial resolutions – turns the advantage

Storey 3/20 -- PhD, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore (Ian, 2013, "Slipping Away? A South China Sea Code of Conduct Eludes Diplomatic Efforts," http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\_Bulletin\_Storey\_Slipping\_Away.pdf)

Fifth, the growing competition between the United States and China in Asia has exacerbated divisions within ASEAN and called into question its aspirations for “centrality” in the evolving regional security architecture. Over the past few years, the United States has pursued diplomatic and security policies, such as relocating troops and equipment, to promote stability and reassure Southeast Asian countries of its commitment to the region that have fed China’s paranoid geopolitical views. When U.S. officials raise the South China Sea dispute at regional meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, the Chinese see this as “meddling” and part of a sustained effort to internationalize the problem. China views U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Philippine armed forces as a way to strengthen Manila’s ability to confront China’s maritime agencies. The United States wants to discuss the South China Sea dispute bilaterally with China, but Beijing thinks it is none of Washington’s business. U.S. support for resolving the dispute multilaterally runs counter to China’s preference to resolve the disputes bilaterally with each individual claimant.

#### Alliance --

#### White -- says not supporting Tokyo would signal us abandoning the alliance -- a slightly better Navy doesn't affect that

#### Our understandings of Japan are rooted in our understandings of WWII-era Japan – that prevents true co-operation

**Teramoto 01** (Fukimo Teramoto, Masters in Communication, Culture, and Technology at Georgetown University, pg 5-7, Japan in an American Mirror: A Critical Study of American Perceptions of Japan)

The analysis of psychology of national trauma explains American attitudes toward Japanese Americans immediately after the Pearl Harbor incident and the outrage of the American public following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. on the same footing. Both incidents can be categorized as national trauma and both strong responses were resulted from collective sadness and anger. Nonetheless, it is obvious that different perspectives are required to understand each response appropriately. In other words, the theory of national trauma is insufficient to explain American attitudes towards Japanese Americans in those days. In his further discussion, Neal describes American attitudes to the internment of Japanese Americans as follows: The deep-seated racial prejudice toward Orientals prior to the war now became ethically embellished and perceived as justified. The combination of extreme racism with anger and fear produced a highly volatile situation. (1998, 67) It is thus possible to say that the racial prejudice was awoken and took a hostile form through the war, which is an ultimately negative form of interactions between the two countries. Neal writes that “in telling and retelling the stories of our past, the events in question became stereotyped and selectively distorted as they become embedded in collective memories” (1998, 201). Undoubtedly, a historical event such as World War II, which caused American national trauma, has become embedded in collective memories. World War II memories have remained unchanged not only at the personal level but also at the national level in the United States. Halbwachs discusses collective memory as the form of the reconstruction of the past. Halbwachs views collective memory as being “under the influence of the present social milieu” (1992, 49). That is, the past is reconstructed in the framework of the present society, which will reshape and even distort memories to a large extent. While Halbwachs suggests the social restriction of collective memory, Neal points out that collective memories are frequently drawn upon to support a political position and that memories of World War II and the Vietnam War were reflected in the policy on the Gulf War. Although national traumas cause collective fear, sadness, and anger, as I discussed above, they also forge the collective identity of any given group of people. According to Neal, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor followed by World War II “produced nationally unprecedented feeling of cohesion, membership, belonging, and community” among Americans (1998, 25). The strong identity of Americans grew out of the trauma of the Pearl Harbor. This sense of collective identity can be another reason for long-enduring memory of World War II in the United States. When identity, community, and sense of unity have become weak in the course of the socio-cultural changes, collective memory might have filled the sense of American identity. Not only in the United States but also in many countries public ceremonies or monuments in commemoration of war can be seen as a symbol of collective fear, sadness, and anger and also collective identity of the time and of subsequent times. From a more critical standpoint, Said raises an example of controversial attempt of the Enola Gay.

#### Kawashima -- gives a laundry list of scenarios that could happen

# 1NR

### K Cards

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### Solves Navy

#### **Solves navy fuel problems, its cost competitive**

Biron 12

[Carey, Inter Press Service, “Funding Restored for U.S. Military Biofuels Programme”, 12/19/12, http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/12/funding-restored-for-u-s-military-biofuels-programme/’

Since 2009, much of the military’s biofuels vision has been spearheaded by the U.S. Navy. In turn, this has been pushed particularly by Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, who recently wrote that “if the Navy can fully pursue its initiatives, (advanced biofuel) will reach cost-competitiveness in 2016.” Together with the departments of energy and agriculture, the navy has entered into an agreement to develop cost-effective advanced biofuels, the high-quality type needed to replace jet fuel and other high-end energy sources. That agreement is worth some 510 million dollars, a critical part of which has been and will be used to build the costly refineries that can produce new alternative fuels to specification. In July, the three departments announced 30 million dollars in matching funds for related research this year. That same month saw the start of a six-week test mission of non-retrofitted U.S. Navy fighters and cruisers, referred to as the Great Green Fleet, that sailed around the Pacific powered in part by biofuel, the largest such experiment ever undertaken. (The navy also considers nuclear power to be an alternative fuel.)

### 2NC – Econ Impact Overview

#### Impact outweighs and turns the case –

#### A. Magnitude – US collapse goes global and draws in every major country – treaties increase the probability of draw in and guarantees escalation.

#### B. Timeframe – decline causes lash out and outward pressure to secure economic gains – that’s Auslin.

### Econ Outweighs – Probability

#### Probability –– conflict now is highly likely given other economic stressors

Mootry 9 (Primus, B.A. Northern Illinois University “Americans likely to face more difficult times” – The Herald Bulletin, http://www.theheraldbulletin.com/columns/local\_story\_282184703.html?keyword=secondarystory)

These are difficult times. The direct and indirect costs associated with the war on Iraq have nearly wrecked our economy. The recent $700 billion bailout, bank failures, and the failure of many small and large businesses across the nation will take years — perhaps decades — to surmount. Along with these rampant business failures, we have seen unemployment rates skyrocket, record numbers of home foreclosures, an explosion of uninsured Americans, and other economic woes that together have politicians now openly willing to mention the "D" word: Depression. These are difficult days. We have seen our international reputation sink to all time lows. We have seen great natural disasters such as hurricanes Ike and Katrina leaving hundreds of thousands of citizens stripped of all they own or permanently dislocated. In all my years, I have never seen a time such as this. To make matters worse, we are witnessing a resurgence of animosities between the United States and Russia, as well as the rapid growth of India and China. As to the growth of these two huge countries, the problem for us is that they are demanding more and more oil — millions of barrels more each week — and there is not much we can say or do about it. In the meantime, if America does not get the oil it needs, our entire economy will grind to a halt. In short, the challenges we face are complex and enormous. Incidentally, one of the factors that makes this time unlike any other in history is the potential for worldwide nuclear conflict. **There has never been a time in** the long **history** of man **when**, through his own technologies — and his arrogance — he can destroy the planet. Given the tensions around the world, **a mere spark could lead to global conflagration.**[This evidence has been gender paraphrased].

### Econ Collapse = War

#### Decline cause miscalculation and conflict – prefer statistically significant evidence

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213–215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre–eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre–eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self–reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic–security debate and deserves more attention.

### Turns Military

#### Manufacturing strength is key to military power

Ettlinger and Gordon 11 (Michael and Kate, the Vice President for Economic Policy at the Center for American Progress, former director of the Economic Analysis and Research Network of the Economic Policy Institute and Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center for American Progress. Most recently, Kate was the co–director of the national Apollo Alliance, where she still serves as senior policy advisor. Former senior associate at the Center on Wisconsin Strategy, "The Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing" [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf–)](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf-))

Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations, the strength of our country rested on the power of our factory floors—both the machines and the men and women who worked them. We need manufacturing to continue to be a bedrock of strength for generations to come. Manufacturing is woven into the structure of our economy: Its importance goes far beyond what happens behind the factory gates. The strength or weakness of American manufacturing carries implications for the entire economy, our national security, and the well–being of all Americans. Manufacturing today accounts for 12 percent of the U.S. economy and about 11 percent of the private–sector workforce. But its significance is even greater than these numbers would suggest. The direct impact of manufacturing is only a part of the picture. First, jobs in the manufacturing sector are good middle–class jobs for millions of Americans. Those jobs serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to hard–working, middle–skill workers. This creates upward mobility and broadens and strengthens the middle class to the benefit of the entire economy. What’s more, U.S.–based manufacturing underpins a broad range of jobs that are quite different from the usual image of manufacturing. These are higher–skill service jobs that include the accountants, bankers, and lawyers that are associated with any industry, as well as a broad range of other jobs including basic research and technology development, product and process engineering and design, operations and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work. Many of these jobs are critical to American technology and innovation leadership. The problem today is this: Many multinational corporations may for a period keep these higher–skill jobs here at home while they move basic manufacturing elsewhere in response to other countries’ subsidies, the search for cheaper labor costs, and the desire for more direct access to overseas markets, but eventually many of these service jobs will follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves, the feedback loop from the manufacturing floor to the rest of a manufacturing operation—a critical element in the innovative process—is eventually broken. To maintain that feedback loop, companies need to move higher–skill jobs to where they do their manufacturing. And with those jobs goes American leadership in technology and innovation. This is why having a critical mass of both manufacturing and associated service jobs in the United States matters. The "industrial commons" that comes from the crossfertilization and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness. Manufacturing also is important for the nation’s economic stability. The experience of the Great Recession exemplifies this point. Although manufacturing plunged in 2008 and early 2009 along with the rest of the economy, it is on the rebound today while other key economic sectors, such as construction, still languish. Diversity in the economy is important—and manufacturing is a particularly important part of the mix. Although manufacturing is certainly affected by broader economic events, the sector’s internal diversity—supplying consumer goods as well as industrial goods, serving both domestic and external markets— gives it great potential resiliency. Finally, supplying our own needs through a strong domestic manufacturing sector protects us from international economic and political disruptions. This is most obviously important in the realm of national security, even narrowly defined as matters related to military strength, where the risk of a weak manufacturing capability is obvious. But overreliance on imports and substantial manufacturing trade deficits weaken us in many ways, making us vulnerable to everything from exchange rate fluctuations to trade embargoes to natural disasters.

### Turns Wind Power

#### Econ decline tanks wind – reduced access to credit/investment

Clayton 8 (Mark, Staff @ Christian Science Monitor, "Amid economic crisis, wind power spins more slowly," 10/28, http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Energy/2008/1028/amid–economic–crisis–wind–power–spins–more–slowly)

America’s credit crisis is shaking up not only smaller alternative energy sectors like solar and geothermal, but also the largest renewable electricity sector – wind power. As a result, wind generation may grow far more slowly in the United States next year, experts say. Financing for wind projects is likely to shift more to deep–pocketed utilities and other companies far from Wall Street – including big foreign companies searching for a foothold in the United States. Until this fall, plowing billions into new wind farms from North Dakota to Texas to California had been the epitome of renewable–energy investing for hedge funds and big banks. But even though the US may still be the “Saudi Arabia of wind power,” tapping that resource will be far tougher. “We all know that with the impact of the credit crisis on the economy, there’s no way that this sector will not also be hurt,” Randall Swisher, executive director of the American Wind Energy Association told reporters during a teleconference call last week. With the cost of capital rising and access to credit more difficult, “eventually that’s going to have an impact on our members’ ability to do business,” he says.

### Turns Warming

#### Econ decline causes countries to backtrack on global warming commitments

Biello 08 (David, Editor for the Scientific American. “Is a Global Recession Good for the Environment?” http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=is–a–global–recession–good–for–the–08–11–132)

Times are tough when a millionaire oil man can't get a wind farm built. T. Boone Pickens backed off of his much ballyhooed mega–wind project in Texas this week, citing the declining cost of natural gas. Fossil fuel burning power plants are still too good of a deal to bother investing $2 billion into wind turbines. A bear market might seem like a boon for the environment: less overall economic activity, like manufacturing and driving, means less overall pollution. Right? Actually, as the Pickens example proves, global economic downturns take a toll on the environment by restrain economic activity that could improve the situation. But that's not all. Over–farming and drought led to 400,000 square kilometers of prime top soil blowing away in the wind in the 1930s, exacerbating, and exacerbated by, the Great Depression. And the economic crises that crippled the economies of southeast Asia in the 1990s also set in motion a rapid uptick in environmentally damaging pursuits such as illegal logging and cyanide fishing, according to the World Bank. Even as I speak, economic worries have prompted some European countries to begin backpedaling on their commitments to cut back on global warming pollution. So an economic downturn is no friend of the environment. Brother, can you spare a turbine?

### Solar/Wind – 1NC

#### Renewable energy skyrockets electricity prices – cost of production and transmission lines

Bryce 12 (Robert, Senior Fellow @ Center for Energy Policy and the Environment – Manhattan Institute, "The High Cost of Renewable Energy Mandates," http://www.manhattan–institute.org/html/eper\_10.htm)

Although supporters of renewable energy claim that the RPS mandates will bring benefits, their contribution to the economy is problematic because they also impose costs that must be incorporated into the utility bills paid by homeowners, commercial businesses, and industrial users. And those costs are or will be substantial. Electricity generated from renewable sources generally costs more—often much more—than that produced by conventional fuels such as coal and natural gas. In addition, large–scale renewable energy projects often require the construction of many miles of high–voltage transmission lines. The cost of those lines must also be incorporated into the bills paid by consumers. These extra costs amount to a "back–end way to put a price on carbon," says Suedeen Kelly, a former member of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.[5] Indeed, with Congress unwilling to approve national carbon dioxide restrictions or renewable–energy quotas, the RPS mandates have become a sprawling state system of de facto carbon–reduction taxes.

### Electricity Prices Link – Airborne Wind

#### High altitude wind produces electricity that is MORE expensive than conventional wind

Roberts 12 (Brian, Director @ Altitude Energy, "Cost and Security of Electricity Generated by High Altitude

Winds," http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/Associate%20Papers/FDI\_Associate\_Paper\_Cost\_and\_Security\_of\_Electricity\_Generated\_by\_High\_Altitude\_Winds.pdf)

There is a tendency to dismiss this table on the grounds that the LCOE for altitude wind is ¶ unrealistically low. The net LCOE of $23.8/MWh for altitude wind is primarily due to the ¶ large capacity or availability factor of 70% (see row 4 of the table). This 70% factor,¶ compared to 28% for ground-level wind, means that the altitude wind system produces two ¶ and a half times more energy per annum. In other words, the airborne system is more ¶ expensive to install and operate, but it gives an outstanding increase in energy output per ¶ annum; this produces the superior cost per MWh quoted in the table. Fundamentally, this is ¶ due to the greater persistence of the winds at altitude. The capacity factors involved in ¶ Figure 4 dominate the LCOE calculations.

**A2 Wind/Solar Now: 2NC**

**Natural gas outcompeting renewables now**

**Rosenthal 3/23** (Elizabeth, reporter on environment and health for The New York Times, “Life After Oil and Gas,” 3-23-13, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/sunday-review/life-after-oil-and-gas.html?pagewanted=all>)

He cautioned that a **rapid expansion** of renewable power would be complicated and costly. Using large amounts of renewable energy often requires modifying national power grids, and renewable energy is still generally **more expensive** than using fossil fuels. That is particularly true in the United States, where **natural gas** is plentiful and, therefore, a cheap way to generate electricity (while producing half the carbon dioxide emissions of other fossil fuels, like coal). Promoting wind and solar would mean higher electricity costs for consumers and industry. Indeed, many of the European countries that have led the way in adopting renewables had little fossil fuel of their own, so electricity costs were already high. Others had strong environmental movements that made it politically acceptable to endure higher prices in order to reduce emissions. But Dr. Birol predicted that the price of wind power would continue to drop, while the **price of natural gas** would rise in coming years, with the two potentially **reaching parity** by 2020. He noted, too, that countries could often get 25 percent of their electricity from renewable sources like wind and solar without much modification to their grids. A few states, like Iowa and South Dakota, get nearly that much of their electricity from renewable power (in both states, wind), while others use little at all.

**PTC Extension came too late – wind projects decreasing**

**NAW 3/19** (North American Windpower, “Where Is The Wind Energy Market Headed?,” 3-19-13,

<http://www.nawindpower.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.11263#.UU4UxRysiSo>)

**The wind** energy industry averted disaster by securing a one-year extension of the production tax credit (PTC) and is likely to benefit from the "begin construction" language contained in the latest iteration of the incentive. But as the threat of the boom-and-bust cycle looms, what can the industry expect in the years ahead? Some companies - including GE, the world's largest wind turbine manufacturer in terms of megawatts installed in 2012 - have expressed concerns about where the wind power market is headed for the remainder of 2013, as the **PTC's** eleventh-hour extension came **too late** for many firms to resurrect their **development plans** for this year. A new report released by MAKE Consulting corroborates those expectations. Order flow at the end of 2012 for announced conditional and firm orders was down by 13%, which leads to expectations for a weaker 2013, MAKE says, noting that pricing has stabilized in all regions. The firm predicts that wind power installations will drop by about 7% this year compared to last year.

### 2NC SCS

#### South China Sea stable now

Chaibi 3/4 -- 3rd year visiting student from Princeton University in the Department of Engineering Science (Abraham, 2013, "The outlook for continuing stability in the South China Sea," http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/)

East Asia’s rapid economic and military development has captured global attention, but pundits are quick to point to the South China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan as potential obstacles to the region’s continued growth. Analysis of news coverage demonstrates that regional economies and tensions have been growing in tandem. The South China Sea has historically been of particular interest because of the number of conflicting claims on the islands and sea-lanes it encompasses. China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, among others, have often engaged in bilateral disagreements with resulting spikes in diplomatic tension and even military confrontation. Of note, these conflicts have never escalated to a full-scale regional war. Direct extrapolation suggests that previous restraint in military interactions implies the nations involved do not consider the potential benefits sufficient to justify an upset to the balance of power. However, contemporary changes in economic and security conditions complicate the issue. While current tensions appear unlikely to lead to a full-scale military conflict, the diversion of national resources needed to maintain the status quo is substantial. Institutional changes to increase transparency; clarify US treaties with ASEAN nations; and increase states’ internal enforcement of international agreements, although initially costly, would allow the neighbouring states to redirect these resources to long-term growth. Historically, China has been involved in a majority of the military conflicts in the South China Sea. A 1947 Chinese map delineates China’s controversial claim to approximately 80% of the sea. China aggressively used its navy to conclude a dispute with Vietnam in the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then in 1988 during the Johnson South Reef Skirmish for the Spratly Islands. Conflict was narrowly averted in 1995 when the Philippines chose not to shell fort-like Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef (China maintained they were only intended as shelter for fisherman); however, the Philippines continues to assert that this is an example of “creeping occupation”. This form of venting tensions, while far short of total war, is extremely costly over the long run; the combination of of resources, energy, and lives expended to establish a claim to the islands creates a significant and avoidable opportunity cost. These skirmishes are not merely an imprint of the 20th century but continue today as witnessed by the Chinese establishment of the Sansha garrison-city in 2012 and the Sino-Philippines stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal. What then is the evidence suggesting a continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation? Although in the past conflict has often arisen between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), the China-ASEAN relationship is one of fundamental interdependence of production, visible in the prevalence of international supply chaining in manufacturing processes, rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. The burgeoning economic interdependence and growth of neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to prevent a conflagration. $5.3 trillion of trade, of which approximately 20% is US, transits the South China Sea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues, but would also very likely guarantee US military intervention[ii]. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002 Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea disputes. Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area (ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security. Economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, however, is not the sole factor at play. In areas with considerable interstate tension sub-state actors have often contributed to the deterioration of international relations, most prominently with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand tipping Europe into World War I. Recent developments in state-level Chinese political and military discourse reflect a strong interest in cooperation. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2011 discussions with Filipino President Corazon Aquino firmly expressed the hope that “the countries concerned may put aside disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas”[iii]. Additionally in 2011 the Chinese State Council Information Office released a white paper with a similar emphasis on joint development. Yet China is also reported to have developed internal fractures in its South China Sea policy, with a number of different ministries controlling paramilitary units that are not under express government oversight[iv]. For example, the Bureau of Fisheries Administration (BFA) now directs a relatively well-equipped law enforcement fleet that is tasked with patrolling Chinese-owned fishing areas. Such interest groups repeatedly instigate minor disputes with their ASEAN counterparts and the US navy that exacerbate state-level discussions and risk eventually drawing unintended consequences (characteristically, in 2004 two BFA vessels obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea). The region has also seen a rise in high-tech militarization, with rapid development in areas ranging from aircraft carriers and submarines to cyber-espionage; this is likely to further increase due to the 2011 US “pivot to Asia” and military surge. The pivot is considered to be a sign that the US intends to continue playing a leadership role in East Asia, a strategy at odds with China’s vision[v]. An associated complication is the imprecise definition of US commitments to its ally nations in the event of disputes in contested territories, especially vis-à-vis the Philippines and Vietnam, and the possibility that alliances will be used to escalate a small battle into a regional affair. The US is making efforts to address these complications; for the first time since RIMPACS’s creation in 1971, China has been invited to participate in a US-led naval exercise. Positive near-term repercussions of growing US involvement have also been postulated; analysts suggest that one of the root causes behind Chinese interest in cooperation is the fear that aggression in the South China Sea will drive other parties to strengthen their ties with the US[vi]. The relative wealth of economic and diplomatic compromises on all sides presents a compelling argument that under current conditions, disputes in the South China Sea will continue to be restrained to small-scale skirmishes that do not threaten overall stability. This is not to say that the increase in regional tension is insignificant, but rather that the involved parties all have a strong interest in maintaining mutual growth and have demonstrated their willingness to make strategic sacrifices to maintain the status quo. Furthermore as China is the common link in the majority of the disputes, it is probable that it will be at the heart of any conflict — and China has frequently shown restraint in this regard (though not so, for example, in Tibet). In terms of China’s priorities, policy analysts tend to agree that if China were to begin a large-scale military campaign, Taiwan would most likely be the focus of its aggression[vii].

#### No SCS conflict

Economist 12 (9/22, "Could Asia really go to war over these?" http://www.economist.com/node/21563316)

Optimists point out that the latest scuffle is mainly a piece of political theatre—the product of elections in Japan and a leadership transition in China. The Senkakus row has boiled over now because the Japanese government is buying some of the islands from a private Japanese owner. The aim was to keep them out of the mischievous hands of Tokyo’s China-bashing governor, who wanted to buy them himself. China, though, was affronted. It strengthened its own claim and repeatedly sent patrol boats to encroach on Japanese waters. That bolstered the leadership’s image, just before Xi Jinping takes over. More generally, argue the optimists, Asia is too busy making money to have time for making war. China is now Japan’s biggest trading partner. Chinese tourists flock to Tokyo to snap up bags and designer dresses on display in the shop windows on Omotesando. China is not interested in territorial expansion. Anyway, the Chinese government has enough problems at home: why would it look for trouble abroad? Asia does indeed have reasons to keep relations good, and this latest squabble will probably die down, just as others have in the past. But each time an island row flares up, attitudes harden and trust erodes. Two years ago, when Japan arrested the skipper of a Chinese fishing boat for ramming a vessel just off the islands, it detected retaliation when China blocked the sale of rare earths essential to Japanese industry.

#### No SCS escalation

Storey 12 -- Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, specializes in Asian security issues, with a focus on Southeast Asia (Ian, Interviewed by Ann Jung, 7/16/12, "ASEAN and the South China Sea: Deepening Divisions," http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=262)

The worst-case scenario for the United States, and indeed all stakeholders in the South China Sea, is a serious confrontation in which military force is employed. But frankly I think the chances of that happening are not very high. The best-case scenario is for China and ASEAN to agree on a credible and effective CoC that ameliorates tensions, leads to the implementation of confidence-building measures, and thereby creates an environment conducive to a peaceful resolution. I don’t think the chances of that outcome are very high either. So I think what we will see for the foreseeable future is a continuation of the status quo in the South China Sea: tensions will continue to ebb and flow, the claimants will protest each other’s moves, and ASEAN and China will keep the DoC/CoC process going if only to show that they are doing something. How long the status quo can continue is another matter. I think it has a limited shelf life, though what the post–status quo will look like is impossible to say at this point in time. But it could be very messy.

#### -- South China Seas are stable – China lacks capability and interdependence checks

Rosenberg 9 (David, Professor of Political Science – Middlebury College and Research Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies – Australian National University, “Dire Straits: Competing Security Priorities in the South China Sea”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 3-20, http://japanfocus.org/-David-Rosenberg/1773)

From the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca, security concerns are growing around the South China Sea. While the Bush Administration sees a resurgent Chinese military threat across the Taiwan Strait and a terrorist threat in the Strait of Malacca, many countries between the Straits are more concerned about security for their maritime resources from the threats of competitors, traffickers, poachers, and pirates. Security Concerns in the South China Sea Several recent statements and appointments highlight the current Bush administration view of China's threat to Taiwan. Porter Goss, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, warned that improved Chinese capabilities not only threaten Taiwan but also U.S. forces in the (western Pacific) region. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld worried that the Chinese navy was building some amphibious landing ships for possible use across the Taiwan Strait. The appointment of combative neoconservative John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations sends a clear and ominous signal: formerly a paid consultant to the Taiwanese government, Bolton has advocated Taiwan's independence and its full U.N. membership. Then, in February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and their Japanese counterparts announced a significant alteration in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance by identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective." Has there been any big shift in the balance of power around the Taiwan Strait that warrants this U.S. response? The Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years. This year it's up by 12 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing. China is modernizing its defenses -- adding anti-ship missiles to aircraft, acquiring AWACS-airborne early warning and control systems, guided missile destroyers and frigates. However, its power projection capabilities are limited. It lacks any long-range amphibious capability or support infrastructure to supply forces over long distances for a protracted period. It also lacks heavy cargo-carrying aircraft, comprehensive air defenses, seaworthy ships, and aircraft carriers. Given the current state of Chinese equipment and training, the Chinese have no capability to pursue an expansionist maritime policy in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. [1] By contrast, the U.S. has overwhelming military superiority and an expansive network of military bases across the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Fleet is the world's largest naval command, including approximately 190 ships, about 1,400 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft and 35 shore installations. Over 300,000 Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Intelligence military personnel are integrated under the unified command of PACOM, the U.S. Pacific Command. What are China's strategic goals between the Straits? China's Defense White Paper of 2002 emphasizes the importance of pursuing peaceful external relations initiatives through multilateral, cooperative approaches to promote domestic development. The most recent Defense White Paper, published in December of 2004, reiterates this priority. More important than statements of good intentions, however, China has taken significant steps to implement this goal. It was evident in the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, negotiated in November 2002. That led to the agreement signed in November 2004 to implement an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010. Following the 10th Summit Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in Vientiane, Laos in November 2004, Beijing held its own summit with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus One) and then joined Japan and the Republic of Korea in discussions with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus Three, or APT). Beijing had earlier in November hosted the first Security Policy Conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum. It featured an anti-piracy drill and a workshop on countering terrorism. Regional Economic and Financial Agreements Regional economic agreements were the main achievements of these meetings. However, the ASEAN Plus Three sessions identified other areas for cooperation, including deeper cooperation in investment and finance, expanded security dialogue and cooperation, expanded cultural exchanges, and periodic progress reviews. Perhaps the most dramatic developments have occurred in regional financial cooperation. Finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries have launched an Asian Bond Markets Initiative and the regional central bankers group set up two Asian Bond Funds in early 2005. These are key steps in addressing one of the major weaknesses in the region's development as indicated by the currency and financial crisis that struck large parts of the region in 1997: the heavy reliance by firms on short-term bank loans for financing. As Jennifer Amyx notes, many countries in East Asia maintain high savings rates but, because of the absence of stable long-term debt markets, the savings deposited into local banks tended to be funneled out to international financial centers and then back into the region as short-term foreign currency loans. This situation creates a problem referred to as a "double mismatch" -- that is, a mismatch between debt maturities (short-term borrowing for long-term investments) and the denomination of this debt (in foreign rather than local currencies). [2] The ASEAN+3 finance ministers had earlier set up a network of bilateral currency swaps to permit a country beset by a speculative attack to draw on reserves of other nations. The program -- the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) -- went into effect at the end of 2003. Japan, with the largest reserves in the region, led negotiations over swap arrangements and will play the role of arbitrator for currency loans. China, another potential lender with substantial reserves in excess of potential needs, also lent its support to the CMI. Widespread participation by ASEAN Plus Three members in these initiatives encourages smooth financial liberalization processes and thereby bolsters regional stability. It also reinforces the efforts of various working groups to improve transparency and information dissemination and to strengthen settlement systems and regulatory reforms. China's shift to a more proactive position on regional financial cooperation has greatly facilitated these recent financial developments. As a result, interdependence between the Chinese economy and other economies in the region has deepened significantly in recent years. Today, trade by ASEAN member nations with China far exceeds trade conducted within the ASEAN grouping, while China is predicted to soon overtake the United States as Japan's top trading partner. Levels of investment in China by countries in the region are also extremely high. The worst case scenario is not Chinese domination but a Chinese meltdown, as many regional monetary authorities are quick to note.

#### South China Sea is no longer a concern

Bitzinger and Desker 08 Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Senior Fellow with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

(Richard and Barry, Why east asian war is unlikely [Survival](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919), Volume [50](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919%7Etab=issueslist%7Ebranches=50#v50), Issue [6](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=g906414492) December 2008 , pages 105 – 128)

#### Nowhere, perhaps, is this new 'play-nice' strategy and good-neighbour approach more tangible than in China's recent handling of the Spratly Islands dispute. From its supposed flashpoint status during the 1990s, the Spratlys have calmed down considerably, and today the status of the islands is 'no longer discussed as a major security concern'.[20](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a906256449&fulltext=713240928#EN0020) To its credit, China has made a concerted effort not to let the South China Sea issue become a major domestic political football (unlike the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan), nor has it seized or occupied additional islands in the Spratlys since 1995. In particular, in 2002 Beijing and ASEAN agreed to a joint Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which affirmed the intention of the signatories to peacefully resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes, to exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea and to avoid actions that would 'complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability', including refraining from further construction on the presently uninhabited islands. In addition, in March 2005 Beijing also signed bilateral agreements with the Philippines and Vietnam for the joint exploration for oil in areas of overlapping sovereignty claims**.** (At the same time, estimates of likely oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea have been revised downward considerably, so there may be much less to fight over than originally believed.) This is not to say that the Spratly Islands dispute has been settled once and for all (fishing rights, for example, will continue to be important). It does stand a much better chance of being resolved peacefully, however, and without adding to tensions or hostility between China and Southeast Asia.

#### Existing agreements solve Chinese aggression

PDI 08 (3/13, "SPRATLYS DEAL NOTHING TO WORRY ABOUT FVR", L/N)

FORMER PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS Yesterday allayed fears over the governments joint oil exploration deal with China inthe Spratlys, saying bilateral and multilateral agreements have long been in place to ensure the peaceful resolution of border disputes. We should not panic... Because there is so much goodwill already built up among the claimants especially between China, who is the big power in this area, and the other claimants, Ramos said in an interview. After addressing an international forum on the Asean Charter, Ramos told reporters yesterday that the controversial Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) should not be a cause for concern since military superpower China would honor previous agreements made to ensure the non-violent resolution of lingering border questions on the Spratly islands.

#### China’s avoiding Spratlys conflict and any dispute won’t esclate

Teves 08 (Catherine J., 10/5, News.Balita, “Chinese aggression over Spratlys far-fetched: expert observer,” http://news.balita.ph/2008/10/05/chinese-aggression-over-spratlys-far-fetched-expert-observer/)

A Beijing-based Filipino journalist believes Chinese aggression over internationally disputed Spratly Islands is unlikely. ”China doesn’t want these Spratlys to be the bone of contention in Asia,” said ABC News Beijing Bureau chief producer Chito Sta. Romana at Kapihan sa Sulo forum, noting the Chinese prefer to maintain good relations with neighboring countries which are also their trading partners. He said China will likely handle the Spratly issue by continuing to use its ‘soft power’ approach consisting of investing in and aiding its neighbors instead. ”The Chinese want to avoid conflict as much as possible –- they’d rather negotiate and exert influence,” he said. Sta. Romana expressed this view as concern on possible Chinese aggression over the Spratlys re-emerged amidst Congress’ discussions on the baseline bill that’ll define the country’s territorial limits. Government is aiming to include several of the islands as part of Philippine territory. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, China and the Philippines are pushing for respective claims over the Spratlys, a group of islands in South China Sea. Studies indicating possible presence of oil and natural gas reserves in the area further heightened these countries’ claims. China, Asia’s former ‘Sleeping Dragon,’ has financial resources for investments and aid to other countries as Sta. Romana pointed out the economy there is growing, placing it fourth worldwide. He cited trade liberalization, tempered State control and the Chinese’s determination to achieve progress as the major factors that drive their country’s economy. ”That country’s already an economic super power, having the biggest foreign reserves amounting to some US$ 1.8 trillion,” he said. If China continues such growth, he said its economy by the mid-21st century will surpass that of the United States. Sta. Romana however noted China dislikes the super power tag. ”China doesn’t want to be a super power and that means it doesn’t want to have troops worldwide,” he said. Despite economic progress, Sta. Romana said China’s armed forces still lags behind US military power. (PNA)

#### -- No escalation

Bush and O’Hanlon 7 (Richard and Michael, Senior Fellows – Brookings Institution, “U.S. Grapples With China’s Rise, Taiwan”, The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 5-3, Lexis)

But most of the issues and frictions that accompany China's rise can be managed. The good news is that China and the United States, not to mention other key regional players like Japan, now have politicians and bureaucracies that are relatively good at preventing serious problems from becoming grounds for war. China will want to flex its military muscle more in the future, but it also wants economic prosperity for the political stability that comes with it. In addition, the United States and its regional partners know how to maintain open dialogue with Beijing while also sustaining vigorous defense alliances. China has enough reason to worry about nuclear weapons and global instability that it will not be totally oblivious to our concerns about proliferating countries such as Iran and North Korea. Conflict with the littoral nations of Japan, the Philippines or Vietnam over disputed seabed resources (like oil in the East China Sea or small islets in the South China Sea) is highly unlikely.

#### -- Many factors check South China Sea war

-- Geography -- ASEAN

-- Shipping Lanes -- Political Costs

Joyner 98 (Chris, Professor of International Relations – Georgetown University, New England Law Review, Spring, Lexis)

Nevertheless, several factors suggest the unlikelihood of large-scale military conflict over the Spratlys in the foreseeable future. For one, there is the geography: These islands are scattered over an immense area, nearly 200,000 square kilometers. Considerable room is available for naval patrols to maneuver and miss contact with one another. Relatedly, the Spratlys are more than 300 kilometers (185 miles) from [\*837] the Philippine and Vietnamese coasts, and more than 1000 kilometers (600 miles) from mainland China. This distance presents serious difficulties for any claimant government to patrol more than a small area of the Spratly archipelago at any one time, especially given these states’ relatively weak capabilities for projecting armed forces. No claimant state possesses sufficient logistical support capabilities to ensure effective occupation and maintain extended control over these islands, which underscores the importance of relative naval size. Even so, these conditions presumably should permit greater opportunities for confidence building measures to be considered as alternative strategies. 50 The Cold Wars passing has also fostered a sense of rapprochement throughout Asia, which makes the political costs of a large-scale military conflict in Spratlys less acceptable to the PRC or Taiwan. 51 The dynamic economic expansion of ASEAN counties, increasingly close links with the international community, and strategically significant shipping lanes through the South China Sea -- all converge to dissuade overt attempts by any state, including the PRC, to strive for regional military domination. That the economies of both the PRC and Taiwan have become increasingly interdependent with those of Southeast Asian states, including other claimants to the Spratlys, underscores that reluctance.

### 2NC Senkaku

#### Cooperation over Senkaku now

Yoshioka 3/22

[Keiko, Asahi Shimbun, Japanese economic leaders, Beijing politicos seek to improve ties, 3/22/13, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201303220084]

Members of the Japan-China Economic Association met with a former Chinese state official on March 21 in the Chinese capital to discuss ways to improve ties between the two countries, which have been strained since last fall over the Senkaku Islands dispute. Fujio Cho, Toyota Motor Corp. chairman, and Hiromasa Yonekura, chairman of Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), told Tang Jiaxuan, a former Chinese state councilor and chairman of the China-Japan Friendship Association, that they would be glad to help China solve its serious air pollution problems in Beijing and other cities. About 500 member companies of the Japan-China Economic Association are ready to pass along their technologies and experiences through private-sector exchanges, and they hope to find a path to negotiations within the economic field during the latest visit. The association previously planned to visit Beijing in September, but the storm of anti-Japan demonstrations across China after the Japanese government purchased three of the Senkaku Islands the same month caused the meeting to be postponed. The approximately 20 members in Beijing on March 21 represent only about one-10th the number the group had originally planned to send. "(Sino-Japanese relations are) in the toughest situation since the normalization of our diplomatic relationship," Tang told the Japanese representatives. "We both have to make efforts so that we can get back on track toward the normalization (of our bilateral ties) as soon as possible. “The economies of Japan and China have been molded into one. It will be better to promote exchanges and cooperation (in economic fields) as planned.”

### 2NC Naval Power – Useless

#### Naval power is good for nothing

Reed 8 [John T. Reed, West Point Graduate and platoon leader in the 82nd Airborne Division., June, 2008.<"Are U.S. Navy surface ships sitting ducks to enemies with modern weapons?"http://www.johntreed.com/sittingducks.html]

I have read media stories that said whenever the U.S. Navy did computer war games against the Soviet Union, all significant U.S. Navy surface ships were destroyed by the Soviets within about **20 minutes** of the start of the computerized war. How? Nukes. A reader says that the Soviet submarines in the Cuban missile crisis had nuclear torpedoes which they would have used if we did an amphibious landing. I have no way to confirm that. Although the Navy ships and their carrier-based planes perform spectacularly well against third-rate enemies like Afghanistan and Iraq, I wonder how they would do against Argentina or any other enemy equipped with modern weapons. In short, I wonder if **U.S. Navy surface vessels are obsolete.** Think about it. They are large, slow-moving, metal objects that float on the surface of the ocean—in the Twenty-First Century! Ocean liners were the main way to get across the oceans for civilian passengers until the second half of the Twentieth Century. Since then, most people have used planes because they are much faster and cheaper. Except the U.S. military. Civilians essentially got rid of their “navy” around 1950. Only the hidebound military would still have a Navy in the Twenty-First Century. Nowadays, civilians only ride passenger ships for pleasure cruises. An argument can be made that the Navy does the same. Only maybe the old line, “you can tell the men from the boys by the size of their toys” is a more accurate way to put it. Navy brass want to grow up to captain a ship. A big ship. The bigger the better. Before WW II, they wanted to be captains of battleships. After WW II, British historian B.H. Liddell Hart said, “A battleship had long been to an admiral what a cathedral is to a bishop.” Now Navy officers want to captain aircraft carriers. Very exciting. Very romantic. Great fun. But obsolete. WW II in the Pacific last time they were not obsolete The last time we used them to fight worthy opponents was in the Pacific during World War II. At that time, warring navies had to send out slow-moving patrol planes to search for the enemy’s ships. The motion picture Midway does an excellent job of showing both the Japanese and the Americans doing this. Low-visibility weather would often hide ships back then. Easily detected- Those days are long gone. Surface ships are not only easily seen by the human eye absent fog or clouds, they are also easily detected, pinpointed, and tracked by such technologies as radar, sonar, infrared detectors, motion detectors, noise detectors, magnetic field detectors, and so forth. Nowadays, you can probably create an Exocet-type, anti-ship missile from stuff you could buy at Radio Shack. Surface ships can no longer hide from the enemy like they did in World War II. Satellites- Satellites and spy planes obviate the need for World War II-type patrol planes and blimps, unless someone shoots them down, in which case planes can accomplish the same thing.. Too slow- Anti-ship missiles can travel at speeds up to, what, 20,000 miles an hour in the case of an ICBM aimed at a carrier task force. Carriers move at 30 knots or so which is 34.6 miles per hour. Too thin-skinned- Can you armor the ships so anti-ship missiles do not damage them? Nope. They have to stay relatively light so they can float and go 34.6 miles per hour. Cannot defend themselves-Can you arm them with anti-missile defenses? They are trying. They have electronic Gatling guns that automatically shoot down the incoming missiles. But no doubt those Gatling guns have a certain capacity as to number of targets they can hit at a time and range and ammunition limitations. They also, like any mechanical device, would malfunction at times. Generally, one would expect that if the enemy fired enough missiles at a Gatling-gun-equipped ship, one or more would eventually get through. How many? Let’s say the capacity of an aircraft carrier and its entourage body-guard ships to stop simultaneous Exocet-type anti-ship missiles is X. The enemy then need only simultaneously fire X + 1 such missiles to damage or sink the carrier. In the alternative, the enemy could fire one Exocet-type missile at a time at the carrier. Unless they are programmed otherwise, having only one such target, all the relevant guns would fire at it, thereby exhausting the carrier task force’s anti- missile ammunition more quickly, in which case fewer than X +1 Exocet-type missiles might be enough to put the carrier out of action. As Japan’s top WW II Admiral Yamamoto said, There is no such thing as an unsinkable ship. The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants. U.S. warships also have electronic warfare jamming devices that screw up the guidance systems of some types of incoming missiles. These, of course, are ineffective against nuclear-tipped missiles that need little guidance. Furthermore, if the enemy uses 20,000-miles-per-hour nuclear missiles, there is no known anti-missile defense. They move too fast for the electronic Gatling guns and do not need to ever get within the Gatling guns’ range to destroy the ships. Our enemy certainly would use nukes if they had enough of them and were in an all-out war against us. Cannot hide, run, or defend themselves In summary, Navy surface ships cannot hide from a modern enemy. They cannot run from a modern enemy. And they cannot defend themselves against a modern enemy. Accordingly, they are only useful for action against backward enemies like Afghanistan and Iraq or drug smugglers.

#### New weapons make naval power obsolete

AFP, 10 (US naval power threatened by new weapons: Gates, <http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_naval_power_threatened_by_new_weapons_Gates_999.html>)  
Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday said new weapons threatened US dominance of the high seas and questioned the US Navy's reliance on costly aircraft carriers and submarines. Anti-ship missiles and stealthy submarines could undermine the US military's global reach, putting carriers and American subs at risk, Gates said in a speech to retired members of the US Navy. "We know other nations are working on asymmetric ways to thwart the reach and striking power of the US battle fleet," Gates said. He cited the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah, which had used anti-ship missiles against Israel in 2006, and Iran's arsenal of missiles, mines and speedboats that he said were designed "to challenge our naval power in that region." The US military's "virtual monopoly" in precision guided weapons was "eroding" and the spread of missiles jeopardized Washington's means of "projecting power," he said. More sophisticated submarines -- that are more difficult to track -- along with other underwater weapons "could end the operational sanctuary our navy has enjoyed in the Western Pacific for the better part of six decades." The new "anti-access" weapons could potentially render America's costliest vessels obsolete, with vast sums of money devoted to "wasting assets," he said. "Our navy has to be designed for new challenges, new technologies, and new missions -- because another one of history's hard lessons is that, when it comes to military capabilities, those who fail to adapt often fail to survive," he said. With the United States fleet of attack submarines and warships far exceeding any other country, Gates questioned if it was wise to spend billions more on the same programs given the changing strategic landscape. "At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the nation can really afford a navy that relies on three- to six-billion-dollar destroyers, seven-billion-dollar submarines and 11-billion-dollar carriers." To reduce a dependence on carriers and regional bases, naval commanders will need to develop ways to strike at longer range with the help of robotic, unmanned aircraft as well as smaller subs and unmanned underwater vessels, he said. It was a blunt message from Gates, who has not shied away from cutting some big weapons programs with roots in the Cold War, including the F-22 fighter jet. For the past year Gates has argued that defense spending should be based on "realistic" threats and reflect what troops in Iraq and Afghanistan need, pushing for more helicopters and unmanned planes while cutting back some high-priced conventional weapons projects. New technology as well as budget pressures will force future leaders of the navy and the US Marine Corps to take a second look at long-held assumptions about US military power, he warned.

### Resilient

#### Navy resilient – assumes oil disruptions

**Alic**, former tech and science consultant – Office of Technology Assessment, adjunt professor – Johns Hopkins SAIS, ‘**12**

(John, “Defense Department Energy Innovation: Three Cases,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, March)

Over 80 percent of the petroleum purchased and consumed¶ by the U.S. military consists of jet fuel designated JP-5 or JP-8;¶ diesel fuel makes up nearly all the rest.46 By volume, recent¶ purchases peaked in fiscal 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, then¶ declined even as rising oil prices pushed expenditures upward:¶ fuel doubled as a share of DoD outlays, from 1.5 percent to 3¶ percent, between fiscal years 2004 and 2008. Consumption did¶ not change much, but purchases rose from $7 billion (2004) to¶ $18 billion (2008). Prices then fell back somewhat, but in 2011¶ DoD paid more for jet fuel just as motorists did for gasoline.¶ Even so, the Energy Information Administration (EIA, part of the¶ Energy Department) predicts relatively flat oil prices over the next¶ quarter century, with inflation-adjusted prices in the range of¶ $120 per barrel.47¶ Oil prices respond almost instantaneously to international¶ political events (e.g., the threat of supply constrictions) and to¶ economic fluctuations affecting demand. A small number of big¶ suppliers—state-owned or state-controlled enterprises inside¶ and outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries¶ (OPEC), plus a handful of private multinationals—dominate¶ production. In recent years, most have appeared to pump¶ oil at or near capacity most of the time. By most indications,¶ Saudi Arabia alone retains the ability to affect prices by raising¶ or lowering output. Otherwise suppliers must act together to¶ set prices, and in recent years that has come to seem mostly a¶ theoretical possibility. Periodic fears of disruption linked with¶ political unrest or war have had greater effects, and sharp swings¶ in prices have been common, affected also by asynchronous¶ demand variations in major markets. Price increases have been¶ moderated by declining energy intensity (energy consumption¶ relative to economic output) in most parts of the world. This is¶ the principal reason EIA does not expect the long-term trend to¶ be sharply upward.¶ Acknowledging the more dramatic scenarios some analysts¶ put forward, there seems little in what is actually known about¶ world oil reserves and the workings of the international market to¶ suggest that the U.S. military faces either intolerably burdensome¶ fuel costs or supply risks in the foreseeable future. DoD buys¶ fuel alongside other purchasers. It is a big customer, but not¶ big enough to affect prices. Long-distance transport of crude¶ oil and refined products is routine and inexpensive. So long¶ as the world market remains effectively integrated, it would¶ take a massive injection of substitutable alternatives to affect¶ prices. Private investors, absent proven capability to produce¶ alternatives in substantial quantities at competitive costs—or a¶ package of subsidies such as those for domestic ethanol, perhaps¶ including binding price guarantees—will find little reason to¶ increase production capacity rapidly. Fuel is fuel, and as output¶ of substitutable alternatives builds it will simply flow into the¶ international market at prices little different from those for other¶ refined petroleum products.¶ Given U.S. dependence on imported oil, it is reliability of¶ supply, rather than pricing, that might seem the larger issue.¶ But again, the market is international; indeed, DoD buys much¶ of its fuel abroad—in recent years, something like half (box¶ 2.3). Innovations—perhaps sustainable biofuels—would, once¶ proven, migrate to the lowest-cost-production locations, many of¶ them presumably overseas. (The United States has no monopoly¶ on sunshine and arable land.) DoD and the government might¶ support innovation and subsidize production, but it would be¶ difficult to wall off domestic output without some compelling¶ national security rationale. Wartime supply interruptions¶ might be accepted as justifying government ownership and¶ reservation of output for the military, but not indefinite fears of¶ future interruptions. Private ownership coupled with domestic¶ production and export restrictions would more than likely be¶ seen as contravening bedrock principles of U.S. foreign economic¶ policy, which since World War II has been based on borders¶ nominally open to trade.

#### No impact to cutoff and don’t offer benefits

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

Defense Department goals for alternative fuels in tactical weapon systems should be based on potential national benefits, since the use of alternative, rather than petroleum-derived, fuels offers no direct military benefits. While Fischer-Tropsch fuels and hydrotreated renewable fuels are no less able than conventional fuels to meet the Defense Department’s needs, they offer no particular military benefit over their petroleum-derived counterparts. For example, even if alternative fuels can be produced at costs below the prevailing costs for conventional fuels, they will be priced at market rates. Also, we are unable to find any credible evidence that sources to produce jet or naval distillate fuel will run out in the foreseeable future. If conflict or a natural disaster were to abruptly disrupt global oil supplies, the U.S. military would not suffer a physical shortage. Rather, the resulting sharp increase in world prices would cause consumers around the world to curb use of petroleum products. Less usage would ensure that supplies remained available. As long as the military is willing to pay higher prices, it is unlikely to have a problem getting the fuel it requires. If problems do arise, the Defense Production Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-774) contains provisions for performance on a priority basis of contracts for the production, refining, and delivery of petroleum products to the Defense Department and its contractors.

### 2NC Naval Power – Resilient

#### No challengers – pirates are a bigger threat than peer competitors

Barrett Tillman, Historian specializing in naval and aviation topics, 2009. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, “Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era,” http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY\_ID=1896

In attempting to justify a Cold War force structure, many military pundits cling to the military stature of China as proof of a possible large conventional-war scenario against a pseudo-peer rival. Since only China possesses anything remotely approaching the prospect of challenging American hegemony—and only in Asian waters—Beijing ergo becomes the "threat" that justifies maintaining the Cold War force structure. China's development of the DF-21 long-range antiship ballistic missile, presumably intended for American carriers, has drawn much attention. Yet even granting the perfection of such a weapon, the most obvious question goes begging: why would China use it? Why would Beijing start a war with its number-two trading partner—a war that would ruin both economies?10 Furthermore, the U.S. Navy owns nearly as many major combatants as Russia and China combined. In tonnage, we hold a 2.6 to 1 advantage over them. No other coalition—actual or imagined—even comes close. But we need to ask ourselves: does that matter? In today's world the most urgent naval threat consists not of ships, subs, or aircraft, but of mines-and pirates.11

#### No challengers

Friedman, 07 (George Friedman, The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power, April 10, 2007, <http://www.stratfor.com/limitations_and_necessity_naval_power>)

The issue for the United States is not whether it should abandon control of the seas — that would be irrational in the extreme. Rather, the question is whether it has to exert itself at all in order to retain that control. Other powers either have abandoned attempts to challenge the United States, have fallen short of challenging the United States or have confined their efforts to building navies for extremely limited uses, or for uses aligned with the United States. No one has a shipbuilding program under way that could challenge the United States for several generations.

One argument, then, is that the United States should cut its naval forces radically — since they have, in effect, done their job. Mothballing a good portion of the fleet would free up resources for other military requirements without threatening U.S. ability to control the sea-lanes. Should other powers attempt to build fleets to challenge the United States, the lead time involved in naval construction is such that the United States would have plenty of opportunities for re-commissioning ships or building new generations of vessels to thwart the potential challenge.

#### -- Naval power resilient – no challengers to overwhelming U.S. power

Posen 3 (Barry R., Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony”, International Security, 28(1), Ebsco)

Command of the commons is the military foundation of U.S. political preeminence. It is the key enabler of the hegemonic foreign policy that the United States has pursued since the end of the Cold War. The military capabilities required to secure command of the commons are the U.S. strong suit. They leverage science, technology, and economic resources. They rely on highly trained, highly skilled, and increasingly highly paid military personnel. On the whole, the U.S. military advantage at sea, in the air, and in space will be very difficult to challenge—let alone overcome. Command is further secured by the worldwide U.S. base structure and the ability of U.S. diplomacy to leverage other sources of U.S. power to secure additional bases and overflight rights as needed.