## 1AC

### China – 1AC (1/6)

#### Advantage\_\_\_: China

#### Senkaku conflict coming and escalation is likely.

**Wittmeyer**, **3/19**/2013 (Alicia – assistant editor at Foreign Policy, Why Japan and China could accidentally end up at war, Foreign Policy, p. <http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/19/china_japan_accidental_war_islands>)

Great. At a time when Chinese authorities seem to be making efforts to dial down tensions with Japan over disputed islands, could a war between East Asian superpowers be sparked by accident -- by some frigate commander gone rogue? That nuclear war could come about in just such a scenario was, of course, a major concern during the Cold War. But decades of tension, as well as apocalyptic visions of global annihilation as a result of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. locking horns, produced carefully designed systems to minimize the damage any one rogue actor could inflict (only the president can access the nuclear codes), and to minimize misunderstandings from more minor incidents (the Kremlin-White House hotline). But East Asia -- relatively free of military buildup until recently -- doesn't have these same systems in place. A soon-to-be-released report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies highlights the danger that emerges when a region's military systems develop faster than its communication mechanisms, and finds that accidental war in East Asia is a real possibility: Across East Asia, advanced military systems such as anti-ship missiles, new submarines, advanced combat aircraft are proliferating in a region lacking security mechanisms that could defuse crises. Bilateral military-to-military ties are often only embryonic. There is a tangible risk of accidental conflict and escalation, particularly in the absence of a strong tradition of military confidence-building measures." The Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands dispute has been marked by an increasing number of deliberate provocations on both sides: surveillance vessels entering nearby waters, patrol planes making passes by the islands, scrambled fighter jets. These are planned actions, designed to incrementally heighten tensions. But the more fighter jets that get scrambled without good communications systems in place, the higher the chances that these deliberate moves escalate beyond what either Japan or China is anticipating.

#### They escalate.

**Auslin**, 1/28/**2013** (Michael – scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Sino-Japanese Standoff, National Review, p. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/338852/sinondashjapanese-standoff-michael-auslin?pg=2)

This Sino–Japanese standoff also is a problem for the United States, which has a defense treaty with Tokyo and is pledged to come to the aid of Japanese forces under attack. There are also mechanisms for U.S.–Japanese consultations during a crisis, and if Tokyo requests such military talks, Washington would be forced into a difficult spot, since Beijing would undoubtedly perceive the holding of such talks as a serious provocation. The Obama administration has so far taken pains to stay neutral in the dispute; despite its rhetoric of “pivoting” to the Pacific, it has urged both sides to resolve the issue peacefully. Washington also has avoided any stance on the sovereignty of the Senkakus, supporting instead the status quo of Japanese administration of the islands. That may no longer suffice for Japan, however, since its government saw China’s taking to the air over the Senkakus as a significant escalation and proof that Beijing is in no mind to back down from its claims. One does not have to be an alarmist to see real dangers in play here. As Barbara Tuchman showed in her classic The Guns of August, events have a way of taking on a life of their own (and one doesn’t need a Schlieffen Plan to feel trapped into acting). The enmity between Japan and China is deep and pervasive; there is little good will to try and avert conflict. Indeed, the people of both countries have abysmally low perceptions of the other. Since they are the two most advanced militaries in Asia, any tension-driven military jockeying between them is inherently destabilizing to the entire region. Perhaps of even greater concern, neither government has shied away from its hardline tactics over the Senkakus, despite the fact that trade between the two has dropped nearly 4 percent since the crisis began in September. Most worrying, if the two sides don’t agree to return to the status quo ante, there are only one or two more rungs on the ladder of military escalation before someone has to back down or decide to initiate hostilities when challenged. Whoever does back down will lose an enormous amount of credibility in Asia, and the possibility of major domestic demonstrations in response. The prospect of an armed clash between Asia’s two largest countries is one that should bring both sides to their senses, but instead the two seem to be maneuvering themselves into a corner from which it will be difficult to escape. One trigger-happy or nervous pilot, and Asia could face its gravest crisis perhaps since World War II.

### China – 1AC (2/6)

#### Energy is the core issue.

**Jackson**, 1/31/**2013** (Allison, The Senkaku Islands Dispute Is Forcing Japan to Rethink How It Trades With the World, Business Insider, p. <http://www.businessinsider.com/diaoyu-dispute-hurts-sino-japanese-trade-2013-1>)

Nevertheless, the dispute over the islands will continue to cause political and economic headaches for China and Japan, with neither acting to defuse the tensions. Abe warned recently that there was “no room for negotiations” with China over the islands. “My resolve to defend our waters and territories has not changed at all,” the hawkish Abe said, according to The Daily Yomiuri, shortly after announcing the first increase in Japanese defense spending in more than a decade. The Chinese also have taken a hard line. Last week, an editorial in the state-controlled Global Times warned its readers to “prepare for the worst” and said the Chinese military “shouldn’t be hesitant to take military revenge” in response to Japanese provocations. A mixture of historical animosity, self-serving politics and energy security is fueling the dispute. As the US increases its strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, China is eager to use the spat with Japan as an opportunity to show off its strength and boost its influence in the region. But energy and the control of potentially large hydrocarbon reserves are at the core of the dispute which ensures lasting tensions between Asia’s economic giants. “They will give you a long, historical explanation of their sovereignty claim. But the idea that there are vast resources under the East China Sea just off their coast is a tremendous motivation for the intensity of their territorial dispute,” Sheila Smith, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C, told National Geographic late last year.

#### Energy mercantilism intensifies rivalries and territorial disputes --- causes escalation.

**Zhao**, 12/7/**2008** (Suisheng – Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Executive Director of the Center for China-US Cooperation, University of Denver, China’s Global Search for Energy, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 49-4-08, p. <http://japanfocus.org/-Suisheng-Zhao/2978>)

China's energy competition and territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific

China's state-centered approach towards energy security has led to a mercantilist strategy to bolster energy supplies by gaining direct control of oil/gas fields and supply routes. This strategy has produced a mixed result in its foreign relations. On the one hand, it has brought an opportunity to enhance cooperation with some of its neighbors, which seem to be giving support to China's claim of pursuing a 'peaceful rise' policy. On the other hand, fueled by the neo-mercantilist approach to locking up energy supplies, the competition for energy resources may become the spark for regional and international instability. As one study indicates, Armed with foreign exchange reserves approaching $1 billion, China has the option of paying whatever it takes to secure the energy resources it needs to fuel economic growth as a cornerstone for social stability. But such a stance, reflecting China's concern about growing energy dependency, runs into conflict with the leadership's declared objective to ensure China's peaceful rise. [54] China's quest for energy resources to fuel its rapid economic growth, therefore, has posed a serious challenge not only to the Western powers but also to many developing countries, including its Asian neighbors. This challenge is not limited to the economic sphere and has spilled over into the political and military spheres. As oil prices continue to rise and China imports an increasing amount of its energy needs, China's search for energy resources is likely to intensify its competition with the US and its Asia-Pacific neighbors. As one American scholar warned, “The results of China's energy diplomacy are being watched with growing unease, especially in Asia but in other parts of the world as well … There is a danger that China's neo-mercantilist strategy to bolster energy security by gaining direct control both of oil and gas fields and supply routes could result in escalating tensions in an already volatile region that lacks regional institutions for conflict resolution and is in the midst of a difficult transition process, which is due in fact to the rise of China. Competition for energy is exacerbating existing rivalries between China and a number of its neighbors.” [55] From this perspective, China's claim to pursuing a 'peaceful ascendancy' policy and putting aside areas of disagreement in favor of creating a stable environment for economic development is limited to areas where China's vital strategic interests are not threatened. It is not by coincidence that China has made progress in resolving its border disputes with Russia, while failing to make progress on territorial disputes with Japan and Vietnam, given that the latter involve access to potential oil and gas resources. China's relations with these neighbors could become testy, if not tempestuous, should Beijing's energy imperative translate into aggressive tactics in border disputes.

### China – 1AC (3/6)

#### Miscalculation is likely --- historical animosity prevents de-escalation.

**He**, 9/18/**2012** (Yinan – expert on Sino-Japan relations, associate professor at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy, Seton Hall University, Nationalism and the China-Japan Island Disputes, Council on Foreign Relations, p. <http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/09/18/nationalism-and-the-china-japan-island-disputes/>)

In the past week mass protests against Japan’s nationalization of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have swept Chinese cities across both coastal and inland areas, unprecedented since 2005 when many Chinese took to the streets to oppose Japan’s revision of history textbooks that whitewashed its wartime aggression. Since then, the damage has been slowly mended thanks to years of painstaking diplomatic efforts on both sides. But in no time things have been pushed back to square one—or even worse. Both long-standing historical grievances powered by nationalist indoctrination and the emerging shift of power in the region account for the new escalation of tension. It all seems to have started in April when the hawkish governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, made a bid to purchase the islands. The central government then stepped in with a nationalization deal. But attentive watchers of Sino-Japanese relations can find deeper roots of the recent crisis. One may point to the previous flare-up two years ago as a trigger for Ishihara’s move. In that incident Tokyo attempted to prosecute the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that collided with Japanese Coast Guard ships near the islands, but ultimately submitted to Beijing’s high-handed diplomacy. A more profound cause of mutual animosity is the decades of nationalist preaching in both countries about a traumatic war they fought from 1937 to 1945, as explained in my book. In an effort to salvage the weakened legitimacy of the Communist regime, patriotic propaganda emphasizing Japanese wartime atrocities and heroic Chinese resistance have since the 1980′s replaced the tired communist ideology. It fueled victim consciousness and a sense of entitlement toward Japan among the Chinese. Meanwhile, with its economic miracle stunted and political reform stagnating, many Japanese politicians played to nationalist groups in order to boost national confidence and win popular votes. While pacifism and the Japanese feeling of war guilt used to keep anti-Chinese nationalism marginal, the old culture has gradually faded, much due to people’s anxiety about an increasingly powerful and assertive China in East Asia. When an ancient feud is inflamed by new fears, overreactions occur. Not only are the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China the largest and vandalism the worst since the two countries normalized relations in 1972, but Chinese surveillance ships also entered Japan’s claimed territorial waters near the islands, hiking the danger of a military clash. Should armed conflicts erupt, the U.S. would have to intervene based on its alliance commitment to Japan, which is about the last thing that Washington wants to do at the moment. But given Japanese public sentiment and oppositional pressure, backpedalling is hardly conceivable for Tokyo. Beijing’s hands are equally tied, as it faces the dilemma of either appearing soft-kneed if it suppresses mass protests too harshly, or suffering damage to China’s social stability and international image should the chaos drag on.

### China – 1AC (4/6)

**Nuclear escalation is likely.**

**Fisher**, 10/31/**2011** (Max – associate editor at the Atlantic, 5 Most Likely Ways the U.S. and China Could Spark Accidental Nuclear War, The Atlantic, p. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/5-most-likely-ways-the-us-and-china-could-spark-accidental-nuclear-war/247616/#slide1)

After 10 years of close but unproductive talks, the U.S. and China still fail to understand one another's nuclear weapons policies, according to a disturbing report by Global Security Newswire. In other words, neither the U.S. nor China knows when the other will or will not use a nuclear weapon against the other. That's not due to hostility, secrecy, or deliberate foreign policy -- it's a combination of mistrust between individual negotiators and poor communication; at times, something as simple as a shoddy translation has prevented the two major powers from coming together. Though nuclear war between the U.S. and China is still extremely unlikely, because the two countries do not fully understand when the other will and will not deploy nuclear weapons, the odds of starting an accidental nuclear conflict are much higher. Neither the U.S. nor China has any interest in any kind of war with one other, nuclear or non-nuclear. The greater risk is an accident. Here's how it would happen. First, an unforeseen event that sparks a small conflict or threat of conflict. Second, a rapid escalation that moves too fast for either side to defuse. And, third, a mutual misunderstanding of one another's intentions. This three-part process can move so quickly that the best way to avert a nuclear war is for both sides to have absolute confidence that they understand when the other will and will not use a nuclear weapon. Without this, U.S. and Chinese policy-makers would have to guess -- perhaps with only a few minutes -- if and when the other side would go nuclear. This is especially scary because both sides have good reason to err on the side of assuming nuclear war. If you think there's a 50-50 chance that someone is about to lob a nuclear bomb at you, your incentive is to launch a preventative strike, just to be safe. This is especially true because you know the other side is thinking the exact same thing. In fact, even if you think the other side probably won't launch an ICBM your way, they actually might if they fear that you're misreading their intentions or if they fear that you might over-react; this means they have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, which means that you have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, in turn raising their incentives, and on and on until one tiny kernel of doubt can lead to a full-fledged war that nobody wants. The U.S. and the Soviet Union faced similar problems, with one important difference: speed. During the first decades of the Cold War, nuclear bombs had to be delivered by sluggish bombers that could take hours to reach their targets and be recalled at any time. Escalation was much slower and the risks of it spiraling out of control were much lower. By the time that both countries developed the ICBMs that made global annihilation something that could happen within a matter of minutes, they'd also had a generation to sort out an extremely clear understanding of one another's nuclear policies. But the U.S. and China have no such luxury -- we inherited a world where total mutual destruction can happen as quickly as the time it takes to turn a key and push a button. The U.S. has the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal with around 5,000 warheads (first-ranked Russia has more warheads but less capability for flinging them around the globe); China has only about 200, so the danger of accidental war would seem to disproportionately threaten China. But the greatest risk is probably to the states on China's periphery. The borders of East Asia are still not entirely settled; there are a number of small, disputed territories, many of them bordering China. But the biggest potential conflict points are on water: disputed naval borders, disputed islands, disputed shipping lanes, and disputed underwater energy reserves. These regional disputes have already led to a handful of small-scale naval skirmishes and diplomatic stand-offs. It's not difficult to foresee one of them spiraling out of control. But what if the country squaring off with China happens to have a defense treaty with the U.S.? There's a near-infinite number of small-scale conflicts that could come up between the U.S. and China, and though none of them should escalate any higher than a few tough words between diplomats, it's the unpredictable events that are the most dangerous. In 1983 alone, the U.S. and Soviet Union almost went to war twice over bizarre and unforeseeable events. In September, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner it mistook for a spy plane; first Soviet officials feared the U.S. had manufactured the incident as an excuse to start a war, then they refused to admit their error, nearly pushing the U.S. to actually start war. Two months later, Soviet spies misread an elaborate U.S. wargame (which the U.S. had unwisely kept secret) as preparations for an unannounced nuclear hit on Moscow, nearly leading them to launch a preemptive strike. In both cases, one of the things that ultimately diverted disaster was the fact that both sides clearly understood the others' red lines -- as long as they didn't cross them, they could remain confident there would be no nuclear war. But the U.S. and China have not yet clarified their red lines for nuclear strikes. The kinds of bizarre, freak accidents that the U.S. and Soviet Union barely survived in 1983 might well bring today's two Pacific powers into conflict -- unless, of course, they can clarify their rules. Of the many ways that the U.S. and China could stumble into the nightmare scenario that neither wants, here are five of the most likely. Any one of these appears to be extremely unlikely in today's world. But that -- like the Soviet mishaps of the 1980s -- is exactly what makes them so dangerous.

### China – 1AC (5/6)

#### Senkaku dispute causes rare earth cut-off --- that collapses Japan’s renewable and tech sectors.

**Foxton**, 9/18/**2012** (Willard – investigative journalist for the Telegraph, Why the latest row between China and Japan is a nightmare for the tech industry, The Telegraph, p. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/willardfoxton2/100007708/why-the-latest-row-between-china-and-japan-is-a-nightmare-for-the-tech-industry/>)

The mines at Baotao have slowed production in the light of the Diaoyou situation; they provide around 99 per cent of the world's supply of rare earths. Indeed, the Chinese government has explicitly stated it will not allow the shipping of these rare earths to Japan, which currently consumes around 60 per cent of Baotao's output. Those rare earths, shipped from Mongolia to Japan, go into practically every gadget we buy or make. Almost every flatscreen TV, every mobile phone, everything that requires memory, requires parts made in Japan with Chinese minerals. The Japanese can't switch suppliers or buy the elements from somewhere else for more money. No rare earths, no manufacturing. It's not just the gadget industry, either. In news that will delight my colleague James Delingpole, the renewables industry is also dependent on the mines of Baotao. You can't make a Prius battery or a wind turbine magnet without Neodymium mined there and machined in Japan. The Japanese have been aware of this nightmare scenario for some time; indeed, they've invested in sci-fi schemes such as underwater rare earth mining to try to wean themselves off their dependence on Chinese minerals. Unfortunately, the crisis has blown up before these projects could bear fruit. If the crisis around the Senkakus, there will be huge consequences for all of us, as supply chains all over the world break at the Japanese link. For all our sakes, let's hope this dispute is resolved quickly.

#### Extinction

**Wood 10** (Duncan, Director – Program in International Relations and Canadian Studies Program – Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, “Environment, Development and Growth: U.S.-Mexico Cooperation in Renewable Energies,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars – Mexico Institute, May, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/U.S.%20Mexico%20Cooperation%20in%20Renewable%20Energies.pdf)

It is by now common knowledge that the world is facing a climate change crisis caused by the effects of fossil fuel driven industrialization. A significant rise in global temperatures, combined with more severe weather conditions, more frequent floods and droughts, are bringing a paradigm shift to the way we think about our relationship with the planet. For the first time in over 150 years policy makers are thinking seriously about decreasing dependency on fossil fuels and looking for alternatives that may be more expensive in the short and medium terms, but ultimately more sustainable. 7 All of this has happened at the same time as two other, related phenomena. The first is that the global population is reaching new highs and by 2040‐50 will total over 9 billion people. Experts predict that 85% of the world’s population will be located in the developing world, which will mean a rapidly growing demand for goods and for energy. Both of these factors will result in a need to increase energy efficiency as well as find new sources of energy. What’s more, this massive jump in population will coincide not only with climate change but also with increasingly difficult conditions for hydrocarbons exploration and production. As most of the world’s “easy” oil has already been discovered, oil companies and nation states are turning to alternatives such a non‐conventional oil reserves (tar sands, complex fields) and reserves that in the past would have been considered unrecoverable, such as in very deep ocean waters. Furthermore, political conditions in many of the world’s oil rich regions are uncertain, unstable and often unfriendly to private oil companies and to the countries of the West. Climate change and natural disasters The urgency of finding alternatives to fossil fuels has been confirmed in recent years by mounting scientific evidence that we are undergoing a noticeable anthropogenic shift in the world’s weather and temperature. Not only are a range of indicators showing that the planet is warming, but the retreat of the polar ice caps, the melting of glaciers, and most importantly in the short term extreme weather conditions and increased incidence of natural disasters have highlighted the consequences of maintaining the status quo in our patterns of energy consumption and industrial development. It is estimated that we have experienced a 1 degree Celsius rise in global temperatures over the past 100 years and that by the end of the current century global temperatures may have risen by as much 7 or 8 degrees. Even with the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that is contemplated by the most ambitious mitigation strategies, global temperatures may rise by as much as 6%. This would have a dramatic and disastrous impact on both developed and developing nations and will threaten the existence of both humans and animal and plant species. Though the connection between man‐made greenhouse gases and global warming was denied for many years by industry and governments alike, it has now been accepted that something must be done to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere. Given that 86% of all global energy comes from fossil fuels, and that these fossil fuels produce 27,000,000,000 tons of CO2 emissions annually, finding alternative sources of energy is a crucial component of climate change mitigation strategies.

### China – 1AC (6/6)

#### Independently, Chinese mercantilism causes Asian arms races.

**Brandenburg** , 3/24/**2011** (Colonel James A. – United States Air Force, China’s Energy Insecurity and the South China Sea Dispute, USAWC Strategy Research Project, p. 6-7)

In 2010, China reasserted ownership to nearly 80 percent of the South China Sea, supplementing its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. For China and its neighbors, territorial ownership is integral to state sovereignty and security. However, overlapping EEZs, disputes over ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and China’s mercantilist approach to securing resources stand to raise the energy security stakes of interested parties including the US.16 Feelings of insecurity of those with competing interests in either the EEZ or the Spratly or Paracel Islands could prove challenging especially if China expands its offshore production of oil/natural gas and extends its control over the vessels or pipelines that deliver them via the South China Sea. Experts suggest energy shortages provide the necessary catalyst for arms races, nuclear proliferation, and other forms of instability… in essence, greater energy insecurity equates to the greater probability of geopolitical rivalry.17 Like the US, as China becomes more dependent on oil imports, its ability to ensure access to energy at an affordable price becomes even more critical and could prove difficult given increasing global market uncertainty. Ultimately, China’s dependence on imports could lead to a vicious cycle as it struggles to find ways to mitigate risks and protect its investments in order to offset its insecurity.18 Given global dependence on China’s economy and the potential impact of shrinking energy supplies, this warrants special consideration in the geo-political realm.

#### Nuclear war

**Cirincione 2000** (Joseph, Director of the Non-Proliferation Project – CEIP, Foreign Policy, 3-22, Lexis)

The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.

### Oil Shocks – 1AC (1/8)

#### Advantage \_\_\_: Oil Shocks

#### Oil volatility is inevitable and likely.

**Clayton**, 10/4/**2012** (Blake – fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Real Reason Energy Traders Are Losing Sleep, Foreign Policy, p. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/03/the\_real\_reason\_energy\_traders\_are\_losing\_sleep?page=full)

The potential for oil prices to shoot sharply higher or lower in the coming months due to events far outside OPEC's control is real, though still improbable. An Israeli military strike against Iran has the potential to drive oil prices skyward, just as the spread of Europe's debt crisis could cause oil markets to collapse. Add to this mix the threat of a so-called hard landing for China's economy or Washington falling over the fiscal cliff, either of which could send oil prices sharply lower. Yes, unrest in the Middle East is a continuous threat to stable oil prices, but political decision-making in the West and China is injecting more than its fair share of uncertainty into the market. Part of this uncertainty is the result of policy incoherence in Washington. There is more than a little irony in the fact that the White House may decide to tap the SPR, the nation's 695 million barrel emergency fuel stockpile, to prevent a harmful rise in gas prices stemming in part from the decisions of the Fed. The mere announcement of the latest round of quantitative easing by Ben Bernanke, in addition to the already-loose monetary stance of other major central banks, was enough to send oil prices higher, only to crash shortly thereafter. The bounce would no doubt have been larger had many market participants not anticipated the Fed's decision. But the Fed's aggressive monetary easing is partly responsible for putting the Obama administration in the unenviable position of having to consider dipping into the SPR in order to keep a short-supplied market from pushing up prices too high. And yet the policy dissonance in Washington has not been nearly so vexing to the oil market -- or to financial markets more broadly -- as the uncertainty surrounding the eurozone. Hardly a week passes without investors frantically buying or selling oil on the faintest whisper from the European Central Bank, Chancellor Angela Merkel, or the leaders of the most imperiled debtor nations. The unending lurch from Eden to Armageddon on trading floors around the world is typical of the so-called "risk on, risk off" capital-market mentality that has swept across every asset class -- and oil is no exception. Demand for oil correlates closely to global economic growth. When Europe's nagging ills appear on the mend, the outlook for growth appears brighter, causing oil prices to rise. Ditto on the flip side. But the sheer complexity of the problems facing European leaders, not to mention the uncertainty of domestic support for their policy prescriptions and the risk of cross-border contagion, mean oil prices have lurched to-and-fro with unusual velocity. The prospect of a cataclysmic European tailspin is what economists call a left-side tail risk to prices: low in probability, but with the potential to topple the oil market should worldwide growth stall or even shrink. But right-side tail risk -- that oil markets might spike -- is also causing risk managers to lose sleep. The market's primary worry is an Israeli air strike on Iran, possibly with backing from or in coordination with the United States. If that happens, Tehran may well retaliate by disrupting tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, the passage through which 35 percent of all traded seaborne oil flows. These are not idle fears. U.S.-led naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf, which have included mine-sweeping drills, are already underway, and Iran has test fired missiles at ship-like targets near the Strait. Were Washington or its allies to launch a pre-emptive attack on Iran, oil prices would soar. Though Iran may be setting the stage for a confrontation, Western powers may end up being the ones to pull the trigger, setting off energy markets. Even if such a conflict never materializes, efforts by the United States and the European Union to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions have already contributed to rising prices. Tightening U.S. sanctions and an EU ban on Iranian oil imports have caused the country's crude exports to fall to less than half of last year's average. This tightening of the screws has been disastrous for Iran, which depends on oil for 80 percent of its foreign revenue. By causing prices in the United States to rise, however, this strategy for bringing Tehran to the negotiating table has also been painful for American consumers. Whatever one thinks of the wisdom of sanctions in this or any other case, they have clearly caused global oil markets to labor under a strain that they would not have had to grapple with otherwise. Still other wild cards remain far outside the control of OPEC. Market participants are already speculating about what measures Beijing will take to spur waning real economic growth. Oil has bounced along with other assets investors perceive as relatively risky, like emerging market equities, because of guessing about whether China might opt for more aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus in the near future. Market fears persist about the possibility of a so-called Chinese "hard landing" and what it could mean for oil prices. Meanwhile, back in the United States, the much-discussed fiscal cliff looms. Its combination of tax hikes and spending sequestrations, due to drop in January if Congress fails to cut a deal, could weigh on domestic growth and hence oil demand. That loss could shave several percentage points off oil prices over the course of several years, according to a recent Citigroup analysis. Any mixed signals from Congress that cause Wall Street to question if or how it might tackle the approaching legislative deadline are sure to set off fireworks in the oil market in the meantime. Make no mistake: Unrest in the Middle East has the potential to destabilize energy markets. With a civil war raging in Syria and North Africa in the midst of a trying transition period, it's not difficult to see how oil supplies could be interrupted. Trouble elsewhere in Africa, in places like the Sudan and Nigeria, is not helping matters. Given these realities, it's hard to imagine a scenario in which oil prices move significantly higher for an extended period absent something going wrong in that part of the world, which contains 70 percent of known oil reserves. Yet when it comes to sovereign decision-making, moves from Washington, Brussels, and Beijing may prove more unsettling to global energy markets in the months ahead than anything OPEC does.

### Oil Shocks – 1AC (2/8)

#### The risk of Saudi oil infrastructure attacks high

**Shauk**, **3/25**/2013 (Zain – Energy Reporter for the Houston Chronicle, Cyberattack risk high for oil and gas industry, Houston Chronicle, p. http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Cyberattack-risk-high-of-oil-and-gas-industry-4379587.php)

In the months since a virus ripped through 30,000 of Saudi Aramco’s computers, the world’s largest oil company has become the canary of the industry, warning others of the serious threats already lurking on their systems. Although the attack did not disrupt Saudi Aramco’s oil and gas operations, the company’s top man warned in a recent interview with the Houston Chronicle that the risk to the industry remains high. Chief Executive Officer Khalid Al-Falih said that despite aggressive efforts by Saudi Aramco and others to guard against online threats, operations throughout the energy industry will remain in danger unless all companies adopt strong Internet security measures. “What happens to one company affects us all,” Al-Falih said. Saudi Aramco, which is wholly owned by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, produces more hydrocarbons than Exxon Mobil, Chevron and BP combined. But even though the mammoth energy company has increased its focus on Internet security, it continues to deal with a high volume of threats, Al-Falih said.

#### That causes supply shocks.

**Clayton**, 11/9/**2012** (Blake, The New Face of Energy Insecurity, The National Interest, p. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-new-face-energy-insecurity-7715)

The future of energy insecurity has arrived. In August, a devastating cyber attack rocked one of the world’s most powerful oil companies, Saudi Aramco, Riyadh’s state-owned giant, rendering thirty thousand of its computers useless. This was no garden-variety breach. In the eyes of U.S. defense secretary Leon Panetta, it was “probably the most destructive attack that the private sector has seen to date.” What makes this kind of attack so worrying is the risk it poses to energy prices and hence the U.S. economy. Stopping oil production in Saudi Arabia could turn into a catastrophic loss of oil supplies. Even a short outage could cause prices to fly off the handle, setting off a scramble as market participants rushed to buy oil in case the shortage dragged on. Because the oil market is global in nature, a production outage anywhere can cause oil prices the world over to soar. U.S. officials should take note: A cyber threat to a company so central to the world energy market as Saudi Aramco poses a significant risk to the economic well-being of the United States.

#### Al Qaeda attacks on Algeria make oil shocks inevitable.

Wall Street Journal, **1/18**/2013 (Poorly Secured Remote Energy Facilities Invite Terrorist Attacks, p. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323783704578250121106462696.html?mg=id-wsj)

The terrorist attack on a remote gas field in Algeria has underscored security risks facing energy installations in unstable parts of the world, and analysts say the Algerian attack could be just the beginning of a wave of similar strikes at other potentially vulnerable facilities. The rise in al Qaeda-linked activity in Mali and Algeria is a complication for international oil and gas companies still navigating the fallout from the Arab Spring, the Libyan civil war, unrest and domestic terrorism in Nigeria, and continued maritime piracy off the coasts of Africa. It also adds pressure on regional governments to boost security at energy installations. Fadel Gheit, a managing director at Oppenheimer & Co. in New York, said the Algerian incident is a wake-up call for governments in the region. "The question isn't if, it is when and who's going to be next," he said, adding that energy supplies could take a hit if producers throttle back or cease operations in troubled countries. Michael Bagley, head of a Washington firm specializing in security for energy installations, said the Algeria attack could mark an early stage in a "snowballing security breakdown across the Sahel," a volatile region stretching across Africa from Senegal to Eritrea. Energy installations are vulnerable because they are usually far from the settled areas. An official at one European oil company described its North African operations as sitting ducks due to a lack of perimeter fencing or armed security. Al Qaeda and affiliated terror groups make no secret of their desire to target energy facilities. In 2006, al Qaeda's Arabian branch attacked an oil-refining complex in Saudi Arabia, prompting Saudi officials to increase oil-field security. Oil companies have limited options to boost security, especially in states where only the military may carry weapons. Oil firms have invested in advanced perimeter security, including closed-circuit cameras, aerial drones, as well as radar and sonar for coastal installations. So far, the attack on the In Amenas gas field in Algeria has had limited impact on gas supplies to Southern Europe. But security concerns and disruptions constantly threaten global energy supplies and have kept oil prices high despite years of sluggish economic growth.

### Oil Shocks – 1AC (3/8)

#### Even a limited Hormuz shutdown causes spikes.

New York Times, 1/4/**2012** (Oil Price Would Skyrocket if Iran Closed the Strait of Hormuz, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/business/oil-price-would-skyrocket-if-iran-closed-the-strait.html)

Energy analysts say even a partial blockage of the Strait of Hormuz could raise the world price of oil within days by $50 a barrel or more, and that would quickly push the price of a gallon of regular gasoline to well over $4 a gallon. “You would get an international reaction that would not only be high, but irrationally high,” said Lawrence J. Goldstein, a director of the Energy Policy Research Foundation. Just the threat of such a development has helped keep oil prices above $100 a barrel in recent weeks despite a return of Libyan oil to world markets, worries of a European economic downturn and weakening American gasoline demand. Oil prices rose slightly on Wednesday as the political tensions intensified. American officials have warned Iran against violating international laws that protect commercial shipping in international waters, adding that the Navy would guarantee free sea traffic. “If the Iranians chose to use their modest navy and antiship missiles to attack allied forces, they would see a probable swift devastation of their naval capability,” said David L. Goldwyn, former State Department coordinator for international energy affairs. “We would take out their frigates.” More than 85 percent of the oil and most of the natural gas that flows through the strait goes to China, Japan, India, South Korea and other Asian nations. But a blockade would have a ripple effect on global oil prices. Since Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates all rely on the strait to ship their oil and natural gas exports, a blockade might undermine some of those governments in an already unstable region.

#### Volatility collapses developing economies.

**McNally and Levi**, July/August **2011** (Robert – President of the Rapidan Group, served as Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council under President George W. Bush, and Michael – David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations, A Crude Predicament, Foreign Affairs, p. EBSCO Host)

Greater oil price volatility will also bedevil macroeconomic policy officials and central bankers. Policymakers may have to compensate for depressed demand by lowering interest rates or pursuing fiscal stimulus. On the other hand, rapidly rising oil prices could fuel inflation, prompting monetary policy officials to raise interest rates, which could further hamper economic growth. The precise causal links between oil prices and the well-being of national economies are murky and much debated, but as the economist James Hamilton has noted, all but one of the 11 recessions the United States has experienced since World War II were associated with a rapid increase in the price of oil. U.S. policymakers will inevitably worry that greater swings in oil prices will translate into greater macroeconomic volatility and respond accordingly. Developing economies, many of which are particularly dependent on oil, will also be hurt. And their attempts to insulate themselves from price volatility will have global reverberations. These states have historically subsidized gasoline and diesel prices at home in order to shield their citizens and domestic companies from international volatility. But these subsidies have had pernicious effects on prices worldwide. With prices kept artificially low in the parts of the world with subsidies, the burden of adjusting to the mismatch between global demand and global supply has fallen on the smaller subset of consuming countries that do not have subsidies. There have been some tentative moves away from gasoline and diesel subsidies in the last few years, most notably in China and India, because these incentives have placed unsustainable strains on government treasuries. The G-20 has also launched an effort requiring its members to develop plans to phase out inefficient subsidies in the medium term. But further reforms may stall in the face of renewed price swings and popular demand for protection; in the worst cases, recent improvements might even be reversed.

### Oil Shocks –1AC (4/8)

#### That causes resentment and backlash --- escalates to nuclear war.

Goldstein 10 (Joshua, Professor of International Relations – American University, “Changing World Order – Engaging the South”, International Relations, http://wps.ablongman.com/long\_goldstein\_ir\_7/38/9780/25 03754.cw/index.html)

In the last chapter’s “Changing World Order” section, there was mention of how a smallpox epidemic launched from the global South and aimed at the global North would most likely return to do most damage in the South. This quality of global rebound operates from North to South as well. Actions the North takes in the South, such as arming Islamic extremists to fight Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan in the 1980s, come back to haunt the North later—as when Afghan-based Islamic extremists attacked the United States. The problem of unintended consequences of distant actions has been called “blowback.”\* September 2001 demonstrated the increased interdependence of the global North and South. The extreme disparities of wealth and power between North and South create conflicts and resentments that can reach out of the South to punish the privileged citizens of the North who had been oblivious to the problems of poor countries. In the world order of the 1990s, disparities sharpened and prosperity cut unevenly with both winners and losers. The continent of Africa, along with zones of festering war and poverty in countries like Afghanistan, were losers in the 1990s. To let a continent or even a country descend into despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism. Their fate ultimately may be the fate of the North that ignores them. This is the century in which desperate African states will be able to press their demands with weapons of mass destruction, and in which fanatics may destroy cities with nuclear weapons. To combat terrorism may—though this is disputed—require addressing poverty, repression, and war throughout the poorest world regions. Furthermore, these issues may be less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions than are military responses to terrorism. Thus, the need to address “root causes” of terrorism may draw the United States into closer cooperation with the UN and other international institutions in the years to come.

#### Oil volatility collapses consumer confidence --- no time to adapt.

**Levi**, 3/19/**2012** (Michael A. – Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations, Hot to Handle Oil Price Volatility, p. <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/handle-oil-price-volatility/p27667>)

There is a myth, popular among both politicians and the public, that high oil prices are the greatest economic risk that the United States faces when it comes to energy. They're wrong; wildly changing prices, not high ones per se, are what really do damage. Rapidly rising prices drain consumers' wallets without giving them time to adapt; frequent change also makes long-term investments more difficult. People may applaud when prices crash, but to turn a cliché on its head, what goes down must go up. Policymakers should focus their responses along two dimensions: steps that blunt intolerable volatility and ones that help consumers cope with the consequences of whatever remains. Some volatility is natural and quite tolerable. Markets aren't perfect predictors of the future, which means that prices will shift to and fro. Since there's no reason to think that governments would be smarter, they usually shouldn't try to override what the markets do. Moreover, modest volatility can prompt consumers to take steps, like shifting to more fuel-efficient cars that will help them if volatility later explodes. There are, however, exceptions to the general rule that government should stay out of the market. Markets are ill-equipped to handle the sorts of large price swings that would result from major geopolitical events like, for example, a confrontation with Iran. Those sorts of occasions call for the government to use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in order to buffer the market.

### Oil Shocks – 1AC (5/8)

#### No econ resiliency --- collapsing confidence kills it.

**Naroff**, 11/11/**2012** (Joel – president and chief economist of Naroff Economic Advisors Inc., "Fiscal cliff' poses risks of another recession, Philly Inquirer, p. <http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20121111__quot_Fiscal_cliff__poses_risks_of_another_recession.html>)

The problem with falling into another recession is that there are no policies left to stimulate the economy. The Federal Reserve is out of bullets, and fiscal policy is restrictive. It is hard to cut interest rates when they already are at zero percent. While Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and his merry band of monetary policymakers keep telling us they have more tricks up their sleeves, few believe they would be very effective. As for fiscal policy, it is spending cuts and tax increases that would be implemented, the exact opposite of what you would want to see being put in place in a recession. In other words, the economy would have to fix itself without any help. While it is not unreasonable to think that would happen, the ability to adjust would depend on how badly consumer and business confidence would be hurt. Estimates, which don't include any impacts on confidence, are that going off the cliff would cause the unemployment rate to rise above 9 percent. But if confidence tanks, the jobless rate could easily go back to double digits. The recession would become longer and steeper. Is there an upside to the austerity imposed by the tax increases and spending cuts? Yes, the budget deficit would be cut. And there are few who don't realize that the current deficits are unsustainable. Once growth resumes, we would be in better fiscal shape and have the potential to grow even faster. That is the source of the argument that says we would have some short-term pain with some long-term gain. Of course, we would also have a lot higher taxes and less spending. Though it is nice to hope that we could get out of the recession in a short period of time, when you start with an economy that has been weakened as much as ours has, it is not clear how long it would take to turn it around. The Great Depression was a series of recessions and failed recoveries that lasted a decade. The Great Recession and its disappointing recovery have already lasted five years. Another recession could put us in the same time frame as the Great Depression, and that is a risk most people don't want to take.

### Oil Shocks – 1AC (6/8)

#### Supply shocks are distinct --- studies prove that they disrupt the economy.

**Cashin** **et. al**, **2012** (Paul – Research Department at the International Monetary Fund, Kamiar Mohaddes – Faculty of Economis and Girton College, University of Cambridge, Maziar Raissi – Department of Mathematical Sciences at George Mason University, and Mehdi Raissi, The Differential Effects of Oil Demand and Supply Shocks on the Global Economy, IMF Working Paper, p. 5-6)

We estimate the 38 individual VARX\* models over the period 1979Q2–2011Q2. Having solved the GVAR model, we examine the effect of oil-demand and oil-supply shocks on the macroeconomic variables of different countries. Our results indicate that the economic consequences of a supply-driven oil-price shock are very different from those of an oil-demand shock driven by changes in global economic activity; and very different for oil-importing countries when compared with energy exporters. We ﬁnd that while oil importers typically face a long-lived fall in economic activity in response to a supply-driven surge in oil prices, the impact is positive for energy-exporting countries that possess large proven oil/gas reserves. However, in response to an oil-demand disturbance, almost all countries in our sample experience long-run inﬂationary pressures, and a short-run increase in real outputs. Our paper is related to several important contributions in the literature. Using a VAR framework for the case of the United States, Kilian (2009) decomposes oil-price shocks into three types— an oil-supply shock, an oil-demand shock driven by economic activity, and an oil-speciﬁc demand shock driven by expectations about future changes in oil conditions— and concludes that the macroeconomic effect of the most recent oil price surge was generally moderate until mid-2007. This observation could be interpreted as evidence of the key role played by the demand side in explaining the recent boom in oil prices. Had the shock been triggered by supply-side factors, global aggregate demand would have fallen, because a negative supply shock is perceived to be a tax on oil consumers (with a high propensity to consume) in favor of oil producers (with a lower propensity to consume). Following a supply-driven oil price shock and in the presence of non-linearities in the product and labor markets (for example price and wage rigidities), production costs increase and as a result inﬂation rises; often prompting central banks to raise their policy rates, and placing additional downward pressure on growth. 1 However, in response to a demand-driven oil price shock, combined with a near vertical oil supply curve, inﬂation rises temporarily, see for instance Kilian (2009). Overall, while the increase in oil prices in the run-up to ﬁnancial crisis (2002-07) can be attributed to booming economic activity in emerging economies, and higher demand for oil (as well as other commodities), the stagﬂationary situation post-2007, can be associated with supply side factors. Indeed, Hamilton (2009) argues that the economic recession of the past few years was precipitated by high oil prices. Most papers in the literature that investigate the effects of oil shocks on macroeconomic variables have focused on a handful of industrialized/OECD countries, and in most cases they have looked at the impact of oil shocks exclusively on the United States (and in isolation from the rest of the world). Moreover, the focus of those analysis has predominantly been on net oil importers— see, for example, Blanchard and Gali (2007), Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009), and Peersman and Van Robays (2012). Esfahani et al. (2012a) is an exception, as they look at the direct effects of oil-revenue shocks on domestic output for 9 major oil exporters, six of which are OPEC members. But they do not investigate the differential effects of demand-versus supply-driven oil-price shocks. Another exception is Chapter 4 of International Monetary Fund (2012) World Economic Outlook (WEO), which provides a discussion of the effects of commodity price shocks on commodity exporters, using the methodology in Kilian (2009). 2 Therefore, our paper is complementary to the analysis of the effects of oil-price shocks on advanced economies, given its wide country coverage, including both major oil exporters (located in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America) as well as many developing countries.

#### Goes nuclear.

Merlini 11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even **involving the use of nuclear weapons**. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular **rational approach would be sidestepped** by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

### Oil Shocks – 1AC (7/8)

#### Studies prove that economic decline causes war.

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### U.S. decline alone causes nuclear great power wars.

**Lieberthal and O’Hanlon**, 7/10/**2012** (Kenneth – Director of the John L. Thorton China Center, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Michael – Senior Fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt, p. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

### Oil Shocks – 1AC (8/8)

#### Independently, oil volatility sparks great power war --- forces U.S. intervention and goes nuclear.

**King**, September **2008** (Neil, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, p. 14-17)

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

### Solvency – 1AC (1/5)

#### Contention \_\_\_: Solvency

#### The SPR is vulnerable --- past drawdowns have not been replaced.

**LaRochell**, 4/24/**2012** (Mark – manager of Information services at the Education & Research Service in Washington, D.C., The Debunker: Why Tapping the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is a Bad Idea, Human Events, p. http://www.humanevents.com/2012/04/24/the-debunker-why-tapping-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve-is-a-bad-idea/)

Last year, Obama released 30 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve—the largest withdrawal ever—as part of a 60 million barrel release coordinated by the International Energy Agency. This massive release, in response to supply disruptions in Libya and other countries during the “Arab Spring” revolts, flooded the market last summer, but by January prices were on their way back up again. Never before has a president released oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve without having replaced previous withdrawals. But, already carrying a $1.3 trillion deficit, Obama has not been able to replace last year’s drawdown. To withdraw from the reserve two years in a row would be unprecedented; moreover, further reduction of our strategic reserve would increase the risk of a serious shortage in the event of a real emergency.

#### More drawdowns coming.

**Walsh**, 3/16/**2012** (Bryan – senior writer for TIME Magazine, Oil: Should President Obama Tap the Strategic Petroleum Reserve?, Time, p. <http://science.time.com/2012/03/16/oil-should-president-obama-tap-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve/>)

There’s little doubt that tapping the SPR would reduce gas prices in the short term, if only because it would sting speculators who’ve been betting billions on continued high prices. And since Obama is coming under a lot of pressure from both the public and Republicans to do something about gas prices, it’s probably inevitable that he’ll tap the SPR, if only because he otherwise has virtually no tools at his disposal. That’s what Steve Levine of Foreign Policy thinks: Look for President Barack Obama to order a significant release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the emergency stockpile held by the federal government. At most, it may trigger a short-lived drop in today’s high gasoline prices. But Obama is battling history: Since Richard Nixon, gas prices have snuck up and startled otherwise occupied presidents, and led them into a flurry of actions that, while usually ineffective, have the virtue of making them look like they are doing something. Now is Obama’s turn at the rite.

#### Only a full SPR gets credit in the market.

**Beaubouef 2007** (Bruce A. – managing editor of Hart Publications, Ph.D. in history from the University of Houston, The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: U.S. Energy Security and Oil Politics, 1975-2005, p. 238)

In past energy crises, rising prices and uncertainty over future sup- ply have led various industry players to hold onto stocks, even add to them, taking more oil off the market and inflating prices further. Here the value of government-held stockpiles, in their capacity to bring extra supply to a tight and nervous market, is best seen. The SPR did not hold enough oil for a credible drawdown in 1979, and a policy decision not to draw down in the full of I990 hindered its price-blunting capability. Yet in any future supply crisis, as in the past, consumers will fear loss of fuel products; downstream segments of the industry will fear loss of feedstock. Those fears cannot help but be allayed by the knowledge that the government will make extra supply available. And as fears are eased, the market forces that inﬂate energy prices are mitigated. Of course, the reserve has to be credibly stocked to have this psychologi-cal effect, and at 600 million barrels plus, it is not too small to affect the nation's oil market. The SPR’s ability to replace some 22 percent of U.S. daily petroleum consumption is far from negligible.

### Solvency – 1AC (2/5)

#### Perception of a strong and effective SPR controls market speculation and deters price spikes.

**Clayton**, 9/21/**2012** (Blake – fellow for Energy and National security at the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve Needs Fixing–Fast, Council on Foreign Relations, p. http://www.cfr.org/energy/us-strategic-petroleum-reserve-needs-fixingfast/p29103)

Speculation among experts is rife that the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is no longer able to release oil to the market as quickly as the Department of Energy claims it can. If true – and there is good reason to believe it is – it could destroy the White House's ability to prevent oil prices from skyrocketing if the commotion in the Middle East worsens. This needs to be fixed – and fast. The SPR is the nation's last defense against a dire loss of oil supplies capable of sending the economy into a tailspin. The potential for a military confrontation between Israel and Iran, which could require the United States to release oil from the SPR, makes this resource more critical than ever. But analysts are skeptical that the U.S. federal government is as functional as advertised. The Department of Energy has offered only a weak denial of these allegations. For a lesson in how a lack of transparency can end up hurting the very market it aims to calm, Washington need look no further than Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia holds the lion's share of OPEC spare capacity – in other words, oil left unused but which could be brought online quickly and sustainably if need be. Its exalted place among producers stems in part from its ability to convince the market that it can plug an unforeseen gap in supplies, and thus keep prices stable. But traders have balked for years at Riyadh's claims that it can quickly ramp up its production as high as it says it can. Analysts are rightfully skeptical: after all, its assertions are based on untested assumptions, and the Kingdom has an incentive to overestimate them. Moreover, the Saudis are loath to give outsiders information about their domestic oil industry, a veil of secrecy that provides fodder for market speculation. Americans love to pick at Saudi opacity, yet Washington itself faces similar problems. The SPR is a powerful tool for reassuring the market that the United States, along with other major consuming countries, stands ready to stabilize the market in the case of a severe supply disruption. But market participants are becoming increasingly cynical about whether the SPR is up to the challenge. Edward Morse, a former U.S. energy official who now leads Citigroup's commodities research team, argued compellingly earlier this year that recent years' changes to North American oil infrastructure have rendered the SPR "significantly less usable than advertised." Many of the pipelines that could deliver the oil to market quickly can no longer move SPR oil. Instead, the oil would need to be exported by sea, a method that may take seven times longer than it would via pipelines. This difference in flow rates would have big consequences: the SPR would not come close to covering the loss of Iranian crude exports, for example, should they be interrupted. An anonymous official at the Department of Energy roundly rejected this sort of speculation in March: the Department is "confident," he said, "that, if needed, it could effectively react to a situation" requiring it to inject into the market the 4.25 million barrels per day of oil it claims it can. He stressed that the department "conducts routine and thorough analysis of commercial distribution capabilities to ensure accurate assessments." This rebuttal falls well short of what is needed to reassure the market that the SPR can do what U.S. officials have long said it can. If Washington is sincere about dispelling growing doubts, it needs to give traders more evidence than an unproven, anonymous "not so." U.S. officials should investigate the issue via a test drawdown and sale, and publicly disclose their findings. If market participants harbor doubts about the flow capacity of the U.S. SPR, they may discount its ability to help offset any sudden supply shortages, rendering it a less effective tool for calming the market. As any Saudi oil official knows, the market will remain skeptical of words until they are backed by actions. Greater transparency about the SPR's capabilities, particularly in light of profound recent changes in the North American oil landscape, is critical.

#### A well-stocked SPR prevents U.S. military intervention.

**Beaubouef 2007** (Bruce A. – managing editor of Hart Publications, Ph.D. in history from the University of Houston, The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: U.S. Energy Security and Oil Politics, 1975-2005, p. 221)

But the Arab oil-producing nations opposed and feared the IEA oil stockpiling programs, at least in their early years, and there is some evi- dence to suggest that they still do. Those programs, along with efforts to foster conservation and alternative energies, threatened their foreign policy prerogatives, which were wholly based on their oil—producing ca-pacity. These facts suggest that credibly stocked strategic reserves have helped remove the oil weapon as a diplomatic tool. Indeed, since 1973, there has not been an overt use of the oil weapon, although there have been oil-supply disruptions, as in 1979, 1980, and 1990. These types of disruptions can certainly happen again in the future, and herein the SPR will continue to have an important role to play. Besides its deterrent value, the reserve also strengthens U.S. for-eign policy by affording diplomatic ﬂexibility. A well-stocked SPR af- fords the United States the luxury of adopting a wait—and-see approach in most disruption scenarios, at least in the near term. In a major dis-ruption, the president will not be forced into an immediate choice be- tween military intervention, foreign policy concessions, harsh demand restraint measures, or severe damage to the U.S. economy. As one SPR project manager said, the reserve gave the president “a card to play” before sending in the Marines.

### Solvency – 1AC (3/5)

#### Weak SPR increases pressure for conflict.

**McNally and Levi**, July/August **2011** (Robert – President of the Rapidan Group, served as Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council under President George W. Bush, and Michael – David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations, A Crude Predicament, Foreign Affairs, p. EBSCO Host)

Low levels of spare capacity will also complicate U.S. foreign policy. The smaller the spare capacity, the bigger the threat of a price spike from any political disruption. These higher stakes will put pressure on the United States--still the indispensable nation when it comes to providing global stability--to intervene in conflicts that threaten even relatively small volumes of oil, whether in West Africa, the Middle East, or Central Asia. Similarly, as U.S. policymakers ratchet up pressure on Tehran over Iran's nuclear program, they are considering crimping Iran's crude oil exports. But with OPEC's spare capacity now barely larger than Iran's exports, that strategy could send oil prices spiraling upward--even if Iran did not threaten the Strait of Hormuz and even if the United States and its allies released oil from their strategic reserves.

#### Only an unconditional and clear signal of SPR management solves.

**Jaffe**, 8/24/**2012** (Amy – Wallace S. Wilson fellow for energy studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute, America’s Real Strategic Reserve, Foreign Policy, p. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/24/Saudi\_Arabia\_Strategic\_Petroleum\_Reserve?page=full)

There is no question that the United States should get more oil onto the market, not only because prices have been rising but also because the war drums are beating again over Iran. But within the constraints posed by poorly designed energy policies, the president has made it harder for himself by adopting a non-committal approach. The optimum utilization of strategic oil stocks requires broad diplomatic coordination, a transparent policy, and well-articulated procedures. In 1991, that coordination was well advertised months in advance and markets knew what to expect. As a result, the oil-price impact of the Gulf war was small (by today's standards) and short-lived, and its impact on the U.S. and global economy was muted compared with other similar crises. Where the oil markets are concerned, the president's coy, "see what you can get first" negotiating strategy with Western and Middle East allies might be less than useful. Transparency and planning are what takes volatility out of prices. In days gone by, a photo-op of senior U.S. and Saudi officials shaking hands was enough to convince the markets that oil would be there in a crisis. In the volatile post-Arab Spring world, however, this style of oil diplomacy can no longer be implemented without unexpected political consequences -- suggesting that the United States needs to shift its thinking about how it manages the SPR and oil crises in general. The time to revise the trigger mechanism for the SPR is now, before we hit a major crisis. Dithering only helps our enemies and puts the global recovery at risk. That said, there is no wrong answer for when to time an SPR release. Given how long the process takes, an early release now means that markets would be physically well supplied by the time a possible war breaks out, potentially muting the impact on prices then. If the president waits, however, and announces perhaps an even larger release at the time of a crisis, it could have greater psychological power to move prices sharply lower all at once. The only wrong policy is to be indecisive. Having no policy means that market participants cannot plan whether to build commercial inventory or not. It gives speculators free rein and increases the chance American consumers will pay unnecessary fuel-risk premiums. The geopolitics of the Middle East has likely changed forever as a result of the Arab Spring, and the United States has neither the resources nor the power to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. We must acknowledge this fact and forge an emergency oil stocks policy that fits 21st-century realities. Not only does Washington need to break its habit of falling back on the Saudis, it needs clearer definitions for the goals and mechanisms of an SPR release. It should also consider requiring U.S. refiners to hold a mandated minimum level of gasoline inventories (as is done in Europe and Japan) to ensure that Americans have immediate supplies of fuel in the event of a major oil disruption from the Middle East. Such domestic fuel stocks proved invaluable to Japan in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear crisis last spring. A more transparent and effective strategic stocks policy would not only better protect the U.S. economy in times of oil-market uncertainty, it would also give America more freedom of maneuver in the new Middle East.

### Solvency – 1AC (4/5)

#### A purchase agreement guarantee generates enough oil to fill the SPR.

**Fine**, 4/26/**2007** (Daniel – research associate at the Mining and Minerals Institute at MIT, energy expert at the New Mexico Center for Energy Policy, Oil Shale: Toward a Strategic Unconventional Fuels Supply Policy, p. http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/oil-shale-toward-a-strategic-unconventional-fuels-supply-policy)

The resource, again, is in the trillions of barrels of oil, and if you compare, Saudi Arabia's official reserves are about 289 billion barrels. The New York Times said last week that it had discovered what is called essentially unconventional fuel, which is the topic today, and the petroleum industry is looking at how to get more oil out of existing fields. The Saudi response to that was, "We too can do that; we can potentially double our reserves, albeit with extraordinary investment." If the Saudis upgraded their own recovery technology, which would take billions to do, they would still have one-half of the reserves in oil shale discovered in Colorado. We're talking still about 1.2 trillion, 1.3 trillion ; the Rocky Mountain region is the Saudi Arabia of oil shale. The United States has 75 percent of the world resource, which is about 1.8 trillion barrels. Brazil is next. As the size of the resource grows, you can see the geopolitical configuration follows. China has announced government incentives for shale development in the last six weeks, while Washington is silent on Section 369. Then there is a series of interesting countries in the Middle East without conventional oil: Morocco, Israel, and Jordan are the next shale reserve holders in the world. This is a configuration of potential shale producers that might have an international organization, an OPEC of shale one day, and transfer of the technology. I should add Estonia, which develops much of its energy from oil shale. Where are we with regard to the market today and investment? The price of oil will continue as the uncertain variable, and that's why the recommendations are still to look at shale and market risk reduction. Secondly, there is the permitting process. Shale was once seen in the United States as so valuable that anti-monopoly issues dominated government shale policy. The government decided at one point that it wanted competition in shale and limited the acreage to 5,000 acres per company. We changed that in 2005 to 25,000 in five different locations; but if you look at the acreage per resource, 1 million barrels of oil from oil shale per acre, you'll get the idea of what acreage does. Do your computation: Bureau of Land Management R&D leases are 160 acres each. Underneath an R&D lease, there are roughly around 250 million barrels of oil, or over five months of Saudi Arabian spare capacity needed to stabilize the world market. How long can oil shale last? There is enough shale to sustain United States consumption of crude oil easily through 2120. One of the arguments in the energy security debate has been foreign oil import dependence. Some elements of the national security community in Washington have joined the alternative fuels community, the biofuels community, under the notion that we are dependent upon potentially hostile supply sources after 9/11, which could be disrupted or politically manipulated. The national security argument, or the energy security argument, centers on foreign oil import dependency. If shale is commercialized by 2012, we can, under production from Colorado alone, eliminate dependency on Middle East oil by 2020. The President wants to lower it by 20 percent by 2017. Shale production will eliminate it altogether, and that dependence is roughly 2.3 million barrels a day. The projection is that when it is commercialized, with the ramp-up that will occur, and with everything favorable-that is, world price-we would be at 2 million barrels a day, or the objective of the Department of Energy in the shale process. Currently, we're getting 2.2 million barrels a day from the entire Middle East: 19 percent of our total imports. Our major sources of imports are Canada and Mexico-that is, North America-and oil shale would expand a North American domestic energy source, which minimizes and reduces foreign oil dependency with GDP benefits to the American people. Some of the projections are that when shale is commercialized in the next three to five years, the market price will decrease at least $5 a barrel. That's conservative, but that depends on supply and demand worldwide and the growth of economies worldwide. There's been a great deal of excitement about biofuels, and as you know, in Mexico and New Mexico and Arizona, the prime base for a staple tortilla is white corn. Because of the biofuels investment, U.S. farmers are beginning to turn their crops from food to fuel, and white corn has almost disappeared from the market. Even though Mexico has a NAFTA quota of 460,000 tons a year, Mexico is not getting it, so the price of tortilla corn in Mexico has had people demonstrating in the street and has caused low-income families difficulties in buying daily bread. I introduce that in contrast to the notion that we have a resource that has no impact whatsoever on food supply. I'll conclude with a point about the history of this. When you leave here, the question is, Why is there silence today, in this Administration, on shale? There is a strategic task force that for two years has been meeting with five governors, and they have recommendations. There are two major companies with leases moving through R&D incrementally. A week ago, Shell had community discussions to bring in 600 employees into the shale area in the Rocky Mountain slopes. That's big news; that's jobs and so forth. The perception is that something is going to happen, and something rather big. But there is a gap between the technology, the availability of the resource, the commercialization that is coming, and Washington policy. Probably the most effective signal, apart from releasing the DOE report, derives from the President's proposal in the State of the Union to add 750 million barrels of oil to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve by the year 2020. I would propose a long-term contract with shale oil producers, that all of the production from 2013 in shale oil from Colorado and the Rocky Mountains to 2020 be dedicated to the SPR. Under existing law-again, the Energy Policy Act of 2005-the U.S. government can enter into long-term purchase agreements and buy oil from shale for the SPR. That would be an internal oil supply; it eliminates the national security risk of foreign oil import beneficiaries. This would be a powerful incentive for the oil shale industry. It would itself reduce market risk without subsidies to a phenomenally low level, and it would put the U.S. government in the forefront of assuring energy security. The Department of Defense could also be a buyer of jet fuel, along with the SPR, and this would accelerate rapid commercialization. So if the intention is to add to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to improve energy security, then buy into strategic, unconventional fuel produced in the United States. That would mitigate historic market risk a century after discovery.

### Solvency – 1AC (5/5)

#### Strong SPR management bolsters U.S. energy leverage --- that prevents Chinese energy mercantilism.

**Victor** July/August **2008** (David – Professor at Stanford Law School, Director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University, and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Sarah – Research Associate in National Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, In the Tank, Foreign Affairs, p. EBSCO Host)

THE BETTER management of oil reserves in the United States could help with reserves worldwide by allowing Washington to lead by example and exert more leverage with other IEA members. For starters, new standards are needed to better reflect the realities of the oil trade today. The IEA rule requiring that members hold reserves to cover 90 days of imports is arbitrary and ineffective: with domestic markets integrated into global ones, the exact volume of a country's oil imports is unimportant. All IEA members should instead be required to hold reserves in proportion to the amount of oil they consume, and the IEA should develop metrics that could be used to adjust members' reserve requirements according to their exposure to interruptions in supply and delivery. That approach, rather than a focus on the sheer volume of imports, would give countries incentives to invest in securing their supply networks--in the case of the United States, for example, the oil platforms and ports along the Gulf of Mexico. The IEA should also assess its members' compliance based on their reserve management. Reserves that are overseen by independent professional authorities and are fully integrated into the IEA's reserve-coordination system--such as would be the case under the Oil Reserve Board--would be deemed most reliable because the IEA could count on their being more readily available in times of need than those managed by opaque and unpredictable processes or institutions vulnerable to political interference. The IEA should also encourage countries to count the stocks they hold outside their territories as part of the fulfillment of their reserve obligations. This approach would encourage Japan and South Korea, for example, to satisfy their reserve requirements by holding strategic stocks anywhere along the supply chain, from the Persian Gulf to their own shores, at a fraction of current costs. (Japan currently relies heavily on steel tanks on high-value property at home to store its reserves.) This approach would also make for a more constructive interaction between producers and consumers: it would encourage producers to keep their oil stocks in large importing countries, which would mean more reliable deliveries and so be good for consumers, too. South Korea already counts as part of its strategic reserves oil stored for it by Norway's StatoilHydro, and Saudi Arabia is exploring a similar option with Chinese and Indian companies. Oversight of the strategic-oil-management procedures of the IEA's members could be added to the agency's existing reviews of national energy policies. The IEA's review teams should grade each country's strategic-oil-reserve system according to the credibility, transparency, and independence of its management. Such an approach on the part of the IEA would make it easier for states to integrate their choices about strategic oil reserves with other aspects of their energy policies. For example, a country that could reliably reduce its demand for oil in a crisis--by either using other fuels or relaxing environmental standards temporarily to allow for the use of high-sulfur crude--would not be required to hold as large a stockpile as one that could not. With such a system in place, the international management of oil stocks would in time come to be less dominated by energy ministries and more by the type of coordination exercised by central bankers and financial-market regulators. SHOCK ABSORBERS MUCH OF U.S. energy policy to date has focused on measures that poll well but do not have much impact on real security, such as expanding mandates for the production of corn-based ethanol (a very costly way to save oil and one that wreaks ecological havoc). Many elements of a sensible energy policy, such as increasing energy efficiency and boosting investment in research and development, are well known. But others, including a better management system for the SPR, have largely been ignored. This is unfortunate because in addition to increasing U.S. energy security, the better management of the country's oil reserves would create a tremendous opportunity to engage the rising powers of China and India. Both countries have recently become major oil consumers, but, unsure how best to manage their growing needs, they have tried to promote their energy security by seeking direct access to supplies overseas--a practice that has bred instability in already fragile countries and undercut patient efforts by the West to promote good governance there. They have also started building oil reserves (China is filling a cache with 100 million barrels) but have not signaled how they will manage them. A first step toward helping these countries understand that energy security comes above all from well-functioning markets is to enlist them in the IEA and reform the agency's standards so that it prizes good and independent management. A better-run and better-coordinated international system of oil caches (including greater reserves of their own) could help convince China and India that treating oil as a true commodity and trusting the markets more are better ways to improve their energy security than pursuing oil mercantilism. The better management of strategic reserves at home and worldwide will not by itself eliminate the United States' and the world's excessive dependence on oil. Solving that problem will require a comprehensive strategy that limits overall demand for oil, develops more sources of supplies, and encourages the use of alternative types of energy. But the current system will not turn on a dime, and such a comprehensive strategy would not bear fruit for decades. In the meantime, shock absorbers such as properly managed strategic oil reserves have a central role to play in limiting the effects of the crises that periodically convulse the world oil market.

### Uniqueness – 1AC (1/1)

#### Oil production is up.

Wall Street Journal, **1/18**/2013 (U.S. Oil-Production Rise is Fastest Ever, p. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323468604578249621718888086.html?KEYWORDS=us+oil+production+rising)

U.S. oil production grew more in 2012 than in any year in the history of the domestic industry, which began in 1859, and is set to surge even more in 2013. Daily crude output averaged 6.4 million barrels a day last year, up a record 779,000 barrels a day from 2011 and hitting a 15-year high, according to the American Petroleum Institute, a trade group. It is the biggest annual jump in production since Edwin Drake drilled the first commercial oil well in Titusville, Pa., two years before the Civil War began. The U.S. Energy Information Administration predicts 2013 will be an even bigger year, with average daily production expected to jump by 900,000 barrels a day. The surge comes thanks to a relatively recent combination of technologies—horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which involves pumping water, chemicals and sand at high pressures to break apart underground rock formations.

### Solvency – Heavy Crude 1AC

#### Filling the SPR with heavy crude bolsters its effectiveness by improving compatibility with refineries.

Government Accountability Office, 2/26/**2008** (Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Options to Improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Filling the Reserve, p. 5-6)

Including heavier oil would have the additional benefit of making the composition of SPR oil more compatible with U.S. refineries. In recent years, many refiners in the United States have upgraded their facilities so they can process heavy oil. Our analysis of DOE’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) data shows that, of the approximately 5.6 billion barrels of oil that U.S. refiners accepted in 2006, approximately 40 percent was heavier than that stored in the SPR.10 Refineries that process heavy oil cannot operate at normal capacity if they run lighter oils. For instance, DOE’s December 2005 study found that the types of oil currently stored in the SPR would not be fully compatible with 36 of the 74 refineries considered vulnerable to supply disruptions. DOE estimated that if these 36 refineries had to use SPR oil, U.S. refining throughput would decrease by 735,000 barrels per day, or 5 percent, substantially reducing the effectiveness of the SPR during an oil disruption, especially if the disruption involved heavy oil. To improve the compatibility of SPR oil with refineries in the United States, the DOE study concluded that the SPR should contain about 10 percent heavy oil. However, our August 2006 report found that DOE may have underestimated how much heavy oil should be in the SPR to maximize compatibility with refiners. We also found DOE may have underestimated the potential impact of heavy oil disruptions on gasoline production. Several refiners who process heavy oil told us that they would be unable to maintain normal levels of gasoline production if forced to rely on SPR oil as currently constituted. For example, an official from one refinery stated that if it exclusively used SPR oil in its heavy crude unit, it would produce 11 percent less gasoline and 35 percent less diesel. Representatives from other refineries told us they might need to shut down portions of their facilities if they could not obtain heavy oil. For these reasons, we recommended that DOE conduct a new review of the optimal oil mix in the SPR and determine the maximum volume of heavy oil that could be effectively put in the reserve.heavy oil. For these reasons, we recommended that DOE conduct a new review of the optimal oil mix in the SPR and determine the maximum volume of heavy oil that could be effectively put in the reserve.

#### That solves both management and effectiveness of the SPR.

**Shages**, 9/8/**2008** (John, D. – former deputy assistant secretary for petroleum reserves at the Department of Energy, Obama Has a Plan To Manage Our Oil Reserve, Wall Street Journal, p. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122083244190708517.html?mod=opinion\_main\_commentaries)

Fortunately, we do not have to resolve these philosophical differences. Instead, we can improve the management of the SPR and maximize its value to the taxpayer. The oil in the reserve now is all light crude, which is easier and cheaper to refine into gasoline, a reflection of refining capability at the time the SPR was created. Over the past three decades, however, U.S. refining capacity has become increasingly sophisticated and complex, because the world's oil is increasingly heavy and harder to refine. Today, about 40% of our refining capacity is configured to handle heavier crude oil. We now confront a mismatch between U.S. refining capacity and the oil mix in the SPR. In a 2007 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that in an emergency this mismatch could reduce U.S. refinery capacity by 5% or over 735,000 barrels per day in total as some refineries scale back production to accommodate the SPR oil. The GAO recommended that the Energy Department change the reserve's oil mix to at least 10% heavy oil, roughly 70 million barrels. This could be accomplished through a swap. From a policy perspective, this would enhance the utility of the reserve, aligning its oil with U.S. refining capacity, while also putting short-term downward pressure on oil prices. From a business perspective, the DOE could craft an exchange to either increase the oil in the reserve, yield a cash bonus, or both. Light crude is more valuable than heavy crude (by about $12 to $18 a barrel), so swapping one for the other could bring in about $1 billion at today's prices.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should acquire, through a purchase agreement, heavy crude oil produced in the United States necessary to fill the Reserve.

## 2AC

### Financial Incentive 2AC

#### Counter-interpretation --- financial incentive is the disbursement of funds to influence behavior --- that sets the best limit.

Webb 93 (Dr. Kernaghan, Associate Professor of Law and Business – Ryerson University's Ted Rogers School of Management, Adjunct Research Professor – School of Public Policy and Administration and Department of Law –Carleton University, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives,” Alta Law Review, 31 Alta L. Rev 501-535, Hein Online, p.505-6)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures."' Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies."' In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.2' Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.2- And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration. By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effects which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,3 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### Predictable --- it’s the government’s definition.

**Waxman et. al**, October **1998** (Seth – Solicitor General at the Department of Justice, Frank W. Hunger – Assistant Attorney General at the Department of Justice, David M. Cohen – Attorney at the Department of Justice, and Mark Melnick – Attorney at the Department of Justice, Harbert/Lumms Agrifuels Projects, et al., v. United States America on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Brief for the United States in Opposition, p. http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1998/0responses/98-0697.resp.opp.pdf)

2 On November 15, 1986, Keefe was delegated “the authority, with respect to actions valued at $50 million or less, to approve, execute, enter into, modify, administer, closeout, terminate and take any other necessary and appropriate action (collectively, ‘Actions’) with respect to Financial Incentive awards.” Pet. App. 68, 111-112. Citing DOE Order No. 5700.5 (Jan. 12, 1981), the delegation defines “Financial Incentives” as the authorized financial incentive programs of DOE, “including direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase agreements, price supports, guaranteed market agreements and any others which may evolve.” The delegation proceeds to state, “[h]owever, a separate prior written approval of any such action must be given by or concurred in by Keefe to accompany the action.” The delegation also states that its exercise “shall be governed by the rules and regulations of [DOE] and policies and procedures prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate(s).” Pet. App. 111-113.

### Generic K 2ac

#### 1. Framework- the role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against a competitive policy option

#### Net benefits-

#### First- Fairness- they moot the entirety of the 1ac, makes it impossible to be affirmative

#### Second – Education- Policy education is good- it teaches future decisionmaking

#### K doesn’t come first

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Third- Their framework is a rigged game and should be rejected – non falsifiable

Robinson 2004 (Andrew, Postgraduate student, School of Politics at the University of Nottingham, BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, v6, p. 251)

As should by now be clear, the central claims of Lacanian theory are ontological rather than political. Indeed, **since Lacan's work deals with politics only very occasionally, the entire project of using Lacan politically is fraught with hazards. With rare exceptions. Lacanian theorists put ontology in the driving seat**, allowing it to guide their political theorising. **Political discourse and events are subsumed into a prior theoretical framework in a manner more reminiscent of an attempt to confirm already-accepted assumptions than of an attempt to assess the theory itself**. Among the authors discussed here, Zizek takes this the furthest: the stuff of theory is 'notions', which have a reality above and beyond any referent, so that, if reality does not conform to the notions, it is 'so much the worse for reality' (in Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000, 244). **The selection and interpretation of examples**, whether in concrete analysis of political discourse or in theoretical exegesis, **is often selective** in a way which appears to confirm the general theory only because inconvenient counterexamples are ignored. **The entire edifice often appears wholly a priori and non-falsifiable. and the case for its acceptance is extremely vague. Most often, the imperative to adopt a Lacanian as opposed to (say) a Rawlsian** or an orthodox Marxist **approach is couched in terms of dogmatically-posited demands that one accept the idea of constitutive lack. A failure to do so is simply denounced as 'shirking', 'blindness', 'inability to accept' and so on. In this way. Lacanian theory renders itself almost immune to analytical critique on terms it would find acceptable**. Furthermore, a slippage frequently emerges between the external 'acceptance' of antagonism and its subjective encouragement. For instance, Ernesto Laclau calls for a 'symbolisation of impossibility as such as a positive value' (in Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000, 1999, original emphasis).

#### They make debating impossible, without a nod to rationality, not desire it is impossible to judge or evaluate the very claims they advance

Roger Solt, Debate Coach at the University of Kentucky, Demystifying the Critique, 1993, <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Solt1993Health.htm>

The critique of rationality provides another good example of why critiques are likely not to be absolute. "Reason" may be a flawed instrument; there may be occasions when we should give greater weight to our emotions or intuitions. But rationality clearly has a **vital place** in human life. If you had been falsely accused of murder, you would want the jury to listen to the reasons you could give for your innocence, not just vote on whether they like you or not. The fact that you were in Lexington at the time that this murder was being committed in Austin is a sound logical reason for why you couldn't have committed it. My point is that no critique of rationality can discredit all forms of rational thought. Furthermore, it cannot do so with complete certainty. It should be next to impossible for the negative to win that rational reasons have no probative value. It's better to decide on the basis of a flawed rationality than it is to flip a coin. The third main approach to attacking the critique is to argue it in its own terms. While I would not recommend this as a sole strategy, I believe that it has considerable merit in combination with other arguments. Most critiques simply are not that strong. There may well be a good reason why the assumption that the critique attacks is rarely questioned. At minimum, it is likely to be an assumption which most people (including most judges) happen to share. Thus, the degree of persuasion required to sustain that assumption may be minimal. Consider the rationality example. The necessity of reason in a public policy debate seems obvious. We try to give reasons for our conclusions because reasons can be evaluated and compared. If one side claims that its intuition is that a policy is wrong and the other says that its intuition is that the policy is right, we have **no grounds for debate**. We can emote or intuit at each other all day without getting anywhere. Reasoned argument offers our only real hope of peacefully settling intuitive disagreements. It can never he established logically that logic is correct; to do so would be circular. But the elementary rules of logic are simply self-evident. If I was in Lexington, Kentucky at the time which someone was stabbed to death in Austin, Texas, I couldn't have been the one to do the stabbing. Similarly, given the way in which our minds are constructed, empiricism seems to be by nature compelling. Logically, we can't know that the sun will rise tomorrow; the future may not repeat the past. But our past experience is the best thing that we have to go on; life requires that we act and judge with some degree of uncertainty.

They link to their kritik – politics da

#### Nuclear war precedes the kritik

Bok 88

(Sissela, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Rosenthal and Shehadi, Ed.)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such responsibility seriously – perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical Imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences. Acknowledging such a rift would post a strong challenge to the unity and simplicity of Kant’s moral theory.

#### 2. Science disproves the k

Bunge 10 **(**Mario, philosopher at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, “Should Psychoanalysis Be in the Science Museum?” <http://stirling-westrup-tt.blogspot.com/2010/11/tt-ns-2780-robert-bud-and-mario-bunge.html>

We should congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy. Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body. Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513). More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups. In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience. This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted. For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on. As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies. Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

#### 3. Case outweighs - by saying our impacts are constructed, they never take actions to solve them –repressing fears causes them to occur

Joanna Macy General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist 95, Ecopsychology

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.

#### And wouldn’t be laughable – congressman say we must do something to prevent oil shocks all the time

#### 4. Permutation- do both – that solves

**Sharpe, 2002** (Matthew, recently submitted a doctoral thesis, "The Critical Theory of Slavoj Zizek," al the University of Melbourne, CULTURAL LOGIC: AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF MARXIST THEORY AND PRACTICE, November 15, http://eserver.oi,g/clogic/2002/sharpe.html)

38.1 hope now to have defended the two contentions I announced in my introduction. My contention in Part i. was that Zizek's turn to Lacan to theoretically formalise the elementary devices and functions of ideology provides us with useful heuristic devices to understand aspects of September 11 the event, and as an ideological trope. Decisive here, I claimed, are two incisive contributions he makes. The first is that ideology has an ontological function, structuring the way subjects experience the world "from the ground up". The second is that ideological fantasies serve to externalise the causes of socio-political trauma through the elevatidh of sublime "good" objects (in this case "America", "freedom") held to be under threat by what I have termed "sublime bad objects" ("evil", "terror", "Al Qaida"). My contention in Part ii., however, was that **the attempt to deploy Zizek's Lacanian-psvchoanalvtic categories to try to understand what It is that historical ideologies serve to politically occlude shows how it cannot of itself be taken as a newlv paradigmatic** and total **theory of ideology**. An analysis of what the current hegemonic symbolisarion of September 11 and "terrorism'' serve to foreclose from public consideration, I believe, shows that **what ideologies function to "repress" is never solely their own inability to repress the insistence of** what Lacan designated as **"the Real". If we are to property speak of an ideology**. I maintain, **it is always something more than this, and something more politically concrete, that is at stake**. 39. Note that, in developing my position, I am placing myself in parity with Elizabeth Bellamy's argument in "Discourses of Impossibility: Can Psychoanalysts be Political?". Bellamy comments of Zizek's critique of ideology using Lacan: To say that society is not a unified totality... is to assert that society is inconsistent; [but/ it is this highly complex inconsistency that is not necessarily analogous to this Lacanian Real.u What I want to again stress in closing, though, is that the type of criticism of Zizek that I am proffering here is not a total one. As the title of this paper indicates, and as I have repeated, what I think we confront when we try to apply Zizek's adoption of Lacan to the critique of historical ideologies and their functioning, are the limits of this approach. To repeat my assertion is only that, **when we consider a concrete case like the hegemonic rewriting of September 11. we see that the notion of the "non-existence" of the big Other** that Zizek imports from Lacanian psychoanalysis to political theory **is at once ontologicallv too profound, and politically too bloodless, to do the work that we require of it. Older conceptions of ideology need also to be retained, which assert that ideologies work to hide** from subjects' constructions of reality **not simply the ontological finitude of their own political self-representations, but also how the historical actions set in place by hegemonic regimes produce some unpalatable consequences, at least when they are unjust**, 40. **What this indicates**. I think, is not the complete obsolescence of Zizek's theory of ideology, nof its irrelevance as a proffered contribution to political theory. What it indicates, I would instead hold, is how what we may need to venture, **in the light of Zizek's** very real **contribution to political theory, is something like the formulation that: There where a Lacanian theory of ideology detects** symptomatic inconsistency in a hegemonic ideology, and there where we observe **the externalisation ofpoints ofinternal semantic inconsistency throueh the workings of ideological fantasy** and the elevation ofsublime objects of ideology, **there also we should look to see the foreclosure from public debate of concrete historical injustice, past, contemporary, or anticipated. A Zizekian style critique of ideology can only be taken to be wholly inconsistent with the older Leftist figurines of this topos. I believe, if we are stuck in a deleteriouslv transferential relationship with Lacanian theory**.

5. **Our threats aren’t constructed- our 1ac authors have done significant research to determine that they are real- at worst the alt can’t solve- which means err aff on uniqueness**

**Robinson, 2005** (Andrew, PhD in political theory, University of Nottingham, THEORY AND EVENT, v8, nl)

It is in this pragmatism that the ambiguity of **Lacanian political theory** resides, for, **while on a theoretical level** it **is based on an almost sectarian "radicalism", denouncing everything that exists for its complicity in illusions and guilt for the present, its "alternative" is little different from what it condemns (the assumption apparently being that the "symbolic" change in the psychological coordinates** of attachments in reality **is directly effective, a claim assumed - wrongly - to follow from the claim that social reality is constructed discursively). Just like in the process of psychoanalytic cure, nothing actually changes on the level of specific characteristics**. The only change is in how one relates to the characteristics, a process Zizek terms 'dotting the "i's"' in reality, recognizing and thereby installing necessity32. **All that changes**, in other words, **is the interpretation: as long as they are reconceived as expressions of constitutive lack, the old politics are acceptable**. Thus, Zizek claims that de Gaulle's "Act" succeeded by allowing him 'effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures' which others pursued unsuccessfully!!. More recent examples of Zizek's pragmatism include that his alternative to the U.S. war in Afghanistan is only that 'the punishment of those responsible' should be done in a spirit of'sad duty', not 'exhilarating retaliation'34. and his "solution" to the Palestine-Israel crisis, which is NATO control of the occupied territories35. If this is the case for Zizek, the ultra-"radical" "Marxist-Leninist" Lacanian, it is so much the more so for his more moderate adversaries. Jason Glynos, for instance, offers an uncompromizing critique of the construction of guilt and innocence in anti-"crime" rhetoric, demanding that demonization of deviants be abandoned, only to insist as an afterthought that, 'of course, this... does not mean that their offences should go unpunished'36. **Lacanian theory tends**, therefore, **to produce an "anything goes" attitude to state action: because everything else is contingent, nothing is to limit the practical consideration of tactics by dominant elites**.

### Traverse the Fantasy – 2AC

#### Our specific fantasy is correct – and not the totalizing image that enables violence

**Tuathail 00** (Gearoid O., Associate Professor of Political Geography – Virginia Tech University, Geopolitics at the Millennium, Paranoid Fantasies and Technological Fundamentalism Amidst the Contradictions of Contemporary Modernity)

History indicates that the everyday practice of geopolitics is often motivated and given meaning by paranoid fantasies of various sorts. In the twentieth century the paranoid fantasies that informed geopolitics were state-centric and nationalist territorial visions of world domination and control. There is no shortage of paranoid visions of the future at the opening of the twenty first century. Rather than dismiss all paranoid fantasies as irrational, it is may be worthwhile in the coming century to distinguish between counter-modern ones (usually based on religious and/or nationalist romantic visions) that attempt to impose certitude upon modernity, classic modern fantasies about limitless progress and growth that recycle already bankrupt myths to serve particularistic interests, and reflexively modern visions that sometimes throw the contradictions of the contemporary geopolitical condition into stark relief. The paranoid visions of environmentalists and peace activists today are part of the struggle to imagine and transform the future of modernity. Though these visions sometimes appear fantastic they are far from being crazy. **Unlike** the **paranoid power fantasies** and conspiracies that gave meaning to international politics for much of the twentieth century, visions of increasing planetary temperatures and rising ocean levels, unfolding global pandemics and irreversible technoscientific manipulations, proliferating weapons of destruction and deepening vulnerability to potentially catastrophic accidents, can be **empirically documented** and **supported** in great scientific detail. As Athansiou remarks about those studying the rising levels toxicity in the environment, ‘**the paranoids, it happens, do not have a bad record at all**.31

#### Turn – they give up on any hope of progress

**Tallis 97** (Raymond, Professor of Medicine – University of Manchester, Enemies of Hope: A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism, p. 379-380)

This is a deeply disturbing conclusion, not simply because we can­not live without explicitly Utopian ideals. Many men of goodwill have done so. But because, as already indicated, modest melioristic ambi­tions, dreams of bringing about improvements in a small sphere of one's own expertise and concern, shade imperceptibly into the hope of leaving the world a better place than one had found it - into the hope of bringing about net overall gain. It would be an odd social conscience that was unconcerned if the improvements brought about in one sphere were exactly offset, or worse, by deterioration in other places. The socially concerned, whilst oppressively aware that there is much misery that they must leave to others to sort out, at least assume that the happiness they spread will not bring about deepen­ing immiseration elsewhere. This assumption is not, of course, always well founded: society is not only the sum of intended actions and their intended consequences but also of the unintended consequences of actions. Nevertheless, all melioristic instincts, however narrowly expressed, have the seed of Utopianism in them; bear within them the assumption that many progressive actions will add up to overall net progress for the world, that they have a deeper meaning inas­much as they may contribute, in howsoever small a fashion, towards the forwards and upwards movement of humanity as a whole out of want, fear, pain, impoverishment of all sorts; that the effects of these actions will converge in similar or compatible goals even if they are not strictly synergistic; and that, while Utopia will not be achieved as the outcome of a single revolutionary convulsion, it will be approxi­mated, even if never achieved, as an asymptote approached by huge numbers of small advances. To abandon Utopian ideas, therefore, is not merely to foreswear the visionary passions of fanatics and luna­tics, but to **throw into question the very dimension of hope** in human affairs. It is difficult to be anti-Utopian without being against **progress itself**; for there is no clear or sharp distinction between arrogant claims to provide universal - in both senses of 'global' and 'universally ap­plicable' - solutions to the woes of mankind and wanting to contrib­ute, however modestly, to making the world overall a better place. The two major elements of the hope of progress - to alleviate the sufferings of mankind (the world of means); and to extend the capa­city of human beings to realise new possibilities that men and women have invented (the world of ends) - are necessary for [hu]mankind to find **any kind of meaning** in its struggles beyond the brute desire for one's own survival and pleasures and the survival and pleasures of one's children and a circle of dependants and friends. This dimen­sion of hope - making the indefinite future of humanity the secular analogue of the eternity of religious hope - is deep-rooted in our con­sciousness. Since we cannot, as we have agreed, become 'religious' by decree, we have to ask ourselves what secular society will become without the hope of progress and without fostering the visions of those who dream unselfishly of making the world a progressively better place? The implicitly Utopian hope of progress is an **essential regulative idea** for collective human morality in precisely the same Kantian sense as the notion of progress towards the truth is the regu­lative idea of science. Because we cannot forgo the dream of Utopia, however muted and low-key, without denying the hope of progress and hence rendering collective human action headless and amoral, we must take account of the fears that the spectre of Utopia awaken.'

#### The impact is extinction

**Tallis 97** (Raymond, Professor of Medicine – University of Manchester, Enemies of Hope: A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism, p. 406-409)

There may be some who feel that the 'ancient prescriptions' ask too much of mankind; or that Berlin's list of the Great and the Good is suspiciously Eurocentric; or that, even if these 'prescriptions' are acceptable, genuine human universals, they will never bring about net progress because sooner or later they run into contradictions — if only because, they argue, the sum of even well-intended actions will inevitably bring about unintended consequences most of which will be unpleasant. To such we can only say that there is no a priori rea­son why progress is not possible. Yes, we still have a long way to go; there is much that is sickening, angering, horrifying about the condi­tion in which a significant part of humanity still lives. But it is never­theless still possible to admit that there has been progress (in some places) without being complacent or cruelly indifferent to the con­tinuing avoidable suffering of many of our fellow-men and without denying that progress for some has been bought at the cost of further immiseration of others. This, surely, cannot be too difficult to under­stand — so long as one is not a humanist intellectual with a vested interest in crying universal woe. And acknowledging the serious things that are amiss with the modern world, some of them resulting from misapplied technology, does not justify crying 'failure!' If we deny or rubbish the progress that mankind has already made, and at the same time are aware of the huge efforts mankind have made to ameliorate the human condition, we shall inevitably conclude that no progress is possible. Such 'principled' despair will be a **thou­sand times worse** in terms of quietism than the most arrant care-nothing, do-nothing conservatism. An attitude wavering between fatalism, cyni­cism and moral superiority may suit the purposes of humanist intel­lectuals who prefer the comfort of the seminar room to the relative discomfort of the places where the real work of bringing about a bet­ter future must take place. It **lets them morally off the hook** — just as does the idea that there is no truth (only the dominant rhetoric of particular interpretive communities) and no genuine agency (only passivity in the seas of history, discourse, the unconscious, or what­ever). 'Drooping despondency' makes very little demands on one's free time.' But we must refute those for whom (to parody Keats) 'the miseries are the world are misery and let them rest'. For, as Medawar has pointed out,' although humans have been around for 500 000 years, it is only during the past 5000 years that they have won any kind of reward for their special capabilities and only during the past 500 years have they begun to be, in the biological sense, a success. 'Only during the past 10 to 15 minutes of the human day has life on earth been anything but precarious.' Technology has been really ef­fective — because driven by science and a fundamental understanding of natural laws — only in the last 50 years. Reason is a comparative newcomer in human affairs and a neonate in the history of living things.' Opposition in principle to the idea of progress, based upon assump­tions about the nature of mankind — Original Sin, aggressive animal nature (ethology, Social-Darwinism), incurable irrationality (anthro­pology) — or about society (it is too deep to be understood, a collec­tion of opaque forces rather than the summed activity of human agents) — simply fails to see the whole story. None of the theoretical reasons for denying the hope of progress is decisive. Nor, it must be admit­ted, are there irrefutable reasons for assuming that progress is guaran­teed or inevitable. One would have to be a Hegelian or a Marxist to be stupid enough to believe that progress will come about of its own accord. If we believe, as I believe, that it has to be brought about by human effort, human beings mobilising the abstract intelligence and universalising goodwill that they uniquely possess, there is no certainty that the future will be better than the past. So we are left with a secular equivalent of Pascal's wager, which I commend to the reader. As Pascal pointed out, nobody can be absolutely certain that God exists. We are in the position of best-guessing gamblers, making ab­solute and irreversible decisions in the context of uncertainty. What, then, should we do? Pascal recommends believing in God, for this will place the believer in a no-lose situation. If he is right, then he will be appropriately rewarded when he meets his Maker face to face. If he is wrong, he will will not suffer for his credulity in the after-life of total oblivion. If, on the other hand, he wagers on the non-exist­ence of God, his reward, if there is no God after all, is to enjoy the same oblivion as the believer. But if God really does exist, then he will be condemned to Eternal Damnation as punishment for his er­ror. Pascal's wager is not an entirely full or fair statement of the case, if only because there is quite a range of gods to choose from and the result of choosing the wrong one could be persecution on earth and damnation in the after-life. Nor does it take account of the psychol­ogy of religious belief: the true experience of God should be (as Nijinsky proclaimed) 'a fire in the head' rather than the outcome of a prudent calculation of probabilities. We can, however, usefully transpose Pas­cal's wager to the secular sphere and use it to think about the hope of progress. If we believe in the possibility of progress, we may or may not be successful in bringing it about. But if we deny the possi­bility of progress, then, since it will not happen of its own accord, we shall ensure that progress shall most definitely not come about. For the sake of the hungry child in the dust, we should not allow those who prophesy doom and gloom to speak unopposed; otherwise their prophecies will help to bring about their own hideous fulfilment. And more hungry children will die in the dust, while the prophets of gloom, of course, continue to enjoy life in the library and the seminar room. And perhaps for our own sake as well. Once you throw away be­lief in progress and the desire to make progress — the passion to alle­viate human suffering here and now and in the future, on a small scale and on a large scale, locally and globally (and, as we denizens of the global village are aware, the distinction between these catego­ries is not absolute) — then you have thrown away one of the deepest and most noble and fertile sources of goodness in human beings and, effectively, much of the **underpinning of civilisation**. For a truly hu­man culture is always — though never exclusively — preoccupied with improving the lot of mankind and in modern times this has taken the form of concern about justice for all, about the rights of the many, about enrichment of the poor and empowerment of the powerless. Great, rich cultures have a generosity that is implicitly on the side of progress (even if it is not Utopian or explicitly progressive). The only question for such cultures is whether progress is pursued well or badly, effectively or ineffectively. As Medawar has said, 'The idea of im­provement must be pretty well coeval with human speculative thought. In one form or another it embodies almost the whole spiritual history of mankind!' The enemies of hope have found their own reasons for dismissing the Enlightenment dream, without, perhaps fully realising what they are doing — or what they would be doing if the world took them seriously. Hitherto, those who have rejected earthly happiness have had alternative, next-worldly, futures to look forward to. In the ab­sence of such alternatives, to dispense with the hope of progress, to mock 'the grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment', is to **lead humanity towards** a **collective despair** perhaps unprecedented in articulate cultures. Or, more likely, since even the most articulate pessimists are not notably lacking in personal ambition and concern for self-advancement, to set an example to the well-heeled sections of the race that will encourage them to pursue their own happiness and forget that of humanity as a whole. **For the sake of** our **humanity**, then, **as well as** **for the** welfare of those whose **lives would otherwise be** **Hell on earth**, we must believe in, and strive for, progress, as did those noble philosophers of the Enlightenment." 'To deride the hope of progress', as Medawar says, 'is the ultimate fatuity, the last word in poverty of spirit and mean­ness of mind.' This book has been written in the hope that such pov­erty of spirit and meanness of mind will not have the last word.

#### Case turns the impact – short-term violence triggers social anxiety and the impulse for exclusion

**Robinson 4** (Andrew, Early Career Fellow in the School of Politics – University of Nottingham, “The Politics of Lack”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6)

An even more crucial problem arises because the institutions of liberal democracy do not map on to Lacanian theory very effectively. Stavrakakis’ volume is part of a series designed to give clear introductions to important critical theorists and also to explain how each theorist can be applied in the field of politics. While Stavrakakis succeeds magnificently on the first count, his attempts on the second are impeded by the difficulty involved in trying to reconcile an ontology of lack with support for the heavily symbolic and representational structures of contemporary liberal democracies. It is, according to Stavrakakis, **necessary** to have a **social order**, and this **requires** social **exclusion** (1999, 33–34). Order is necessary to produce social integration (ibid., 126) and avoid an **anxiety-inducing meaninglessness** (ibid., 138), and the state is therefore necessary to subject ‘all spheres of society to the imperative of organisation’ (ibid., 79)

**Traversing the fantasy fails**

**Robinson & Tormey, 2005** (Andrew, Doctoral student, school of Politics; Simon, teaches in the school of Politics and Critical Theory, University of Nottingham, THESIS ELEVEN, n80, February, p. 100-102)

**Zizek uses an example Irom the film The UsualSuspects where the hero shoots his family** to give him a pretext for chasing the gang who held them hostage. **This is the 'crazy’, impossible choice of** in a way, **shooting** at himself, at **that which is most precious** to himself, **through which the subject gains a 'space of free decision'** by 'cutting himself loose from the precious object through whose possession the enemy kept him in check', and clears the terrain for a new beginning (Butler et al., 2000: 122-3). **Through an Act**, one negates one's position in the social system and destroys the person one was before. The concept of the Act is therefore palingenetic: **one destroys one's former self to go through a moment of rebirth**, but a rebirth **grounded on a desire tor Nothingness rather than on anv particular programme of change** (Zizek, 2000; 166-7). **For Zizek 'the only legitimation of revolution is negative, the will to break with the Past’, and revolutionaries should not have positive conceptions of an alternative** to be realized (Butler et al.. 2000. 131). **Ruthlessness is characteristic of the Act: Zizek hates soft-heartedness** because it 'blurs the subject"s pure ethical stance' **and calls for an Act 'impervious to any call of the Other’** (Zizek, 2001b: 111, 175). The Act thus reproduces in the socio-political field the Lacanian concept of traversing the fantasy. **Traversing the fantasy** involves 'accepting' that there is no way one can be satisfied, and therefore a 'full acceptance of the pain ... as inherent to the excess of pleasure which is jouissance', as well as a rejection of every conception of radical difference (Zizek, 1997a-. 30-1). It means 'an acceptance of the fact that there is no secret treasure in me" (Zizek, 1997a: 10), and a transition from being the 'nothing' we are today to being 'a Nothing humbly aware of itself, a Nothing paradoxically made rich through the very awareness of its lack (Zizek, 2000: 146-7). It **involves being reduced to a zero point** or ‘ultimate level' **similar to that seen in the 'most broken concentration-camp inmates** (f Kelt," 2001b; 76-7, 86), so the rote of analysis is 'to throw out the baby" in order to confront the patient with his 'dirty bathwater' (Zizek, 1997a: 62-3), **inducing not an improvement but a transition 'from Bad to Worse', which is 'inherently "terroristic**” (Zizek, 1999: 377). **It is also not freedom in the usual sense, but prostration "before the call of the truth-event, 'something violently imposed** on me from the Outside through a traumatic encounter that shatters the very foundation of my being' (Zizek, 1999: 377). **With shades of Orwell Zizek claims that the Act involves 'the highest freedom and also the utmost passivity with a reduc¬tion to a lifeless automaton who blindly performs its gestures'. In other words**, in the Act freedom equals slavery (Zizek, 1999: 377). So the Act is a rebirth - but a rebirth as what? **The parallel with Lacan's concept of 'traversing the fantasy’ is crucial because, for Lacan. there is no escape ttom the symbolic order or the Law of the Master**. We are trapped In the existing wona, complete witn its dislocation, lack, alienation and antagonism, and no transcendence can overcome the deep structure of this world, which is fixed at the level of subject-formatioa The most we can hope for is to go from incapable neurosis to mere alienated subjectivity. **In Zizek's politics, therefore, a fundamental social transformation is imposs¬ible. Alter the break initiated by an Act, a system similar to the present one is** **restored**, the subject undergoes identification with a Cause, leading to a new 'proper symbolic Prohibition' revitalized by the process of rebirth (Zizek, 1999: 154, 368), enabling one 'effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures' (Zizek, 1997b: 72-3), which may be the same ones as today. It Is on this ground that Zizek is relaxed about supporting measures that, far from challenging or undermining the status quo, give added support to it - as, for example, in his refusal to denounce structural adjustment policies (Zizek, 1996: 32). This is all because, in his view, it is possible to start a 'new life', but only by replacing one symbolic fiction with another (Zizek, 1999: 331). As a Lacanian, Zizek is opposed to any idea of realizing Utopian 'fullness’ and thus in escaping the vicissitudes of the political qua antagonism. Any change in the basic structure of existence, whereby one may overcome dislocation and disorientation, is out of the question. However, he also rejects practical solutions to problems as a mere displace¬ment (Zizek, 1999: 383-4). So **an Act neither solves concrete problems nor achieves drastic improvements; it merely removes blockages to existing modes of thought** and action. It transforms the 'constellation which generates social symptoms' (Butler et al., 2000: 124), shifting exclusion from one group to another, but it does not achieve either drastic or moderate concrete changes. It "means that we accept the vicious circle of revolving around the object [the Real] and find jouissance in it, renouncing the myth that jouissance is amassed somewhere else' (Zilek, 1988: 109-10). It also offers those who take part in it a 'dimension of Otherness, that moment when the absolute appears in all its fragility’, a 'brief apparition of a future Utopian Otherness to which every authentic revolutionary stance should cling' (ZBek, 2000: 159-60). This absolute, however, can only be glimpsed. The leader, Act and Cause must be betrayed so the social order can be refounded. The leader, or 'mediator", 'must erase himself [sic] from the picture' (Zizek, 2001b: 50), retreating to the horizon of the social to haunt history as spectre or phantasy (Zizek, 2000: 64). Every Great Man must be betrayed so he can assume his fame and thereby become compatible with the status quo (Zizek, 1999; 90-1, 316); **once one glimpses the sublime Universal, therefore, one must commit suicide** - as -Zizek claims the Bolshevik oarty did, via the Stalinist purges (1997c).

**Their alternative does nothing to effectively challenge ideologies – the real fantasy is the myth of critical theory they use to support a fictional theoretical activism**

**Nicol, 2001** (Bran, Lecturer in the school of English at University College - Chichester, PARAGRAPH, July, v24, n2, p. 152-3)

Perhaps there is a note of anxiety in all the compulsive energy of **Zizek’s project**: he **brilliantly unmasks the workings of ideology as if we can overthrow them, but is only too aware that this is impossible**. Alternatively, this might well be the source of a certain critical jouissance we can detect in his continual affirmation of the unassailable quality of the big Other. **In this respect Zizek himself shifts between the hysterical and the perverse positions in his theory: exposing the fragile status of the big Other by questioning it, while also investing in its ultimate status as the Law. Zizek's very method of exposing the ideological mechanism, in other words reinforces its inevitability**. The paradox bears a strong similarity to Baudrillard's critique of Marxism in The Mirror of Production, that it depends upon precisely the same ideology (the idea of self-production) as the late-capitalist political economy it claims to deconstruct16 Zizek's ubiquitous interpretative mechanism functions as the mirror of the transcendent processes he identifies at the heart of culture. **We might even see its status in Zizek's work as the equivalent of the fundamental fantasy at the core of the individual, supporting his very identity as a theorist. Like Clarice Starling, who thinks she need only rescue one more victim and the lambs will stop crying, it is as if Zizek imagines he need give us just one more example of the traumatic encounter with the real and the dominance of the Big Other will be exposed and overthrown. This, as Hannibal Lecter might say, is no more than a fantasy**.

### Truth Good: 2AC

#### Descriptions of objective reality are necessary to combat all social ills – literally every progressive movement in the past 100 years has relied on de-mystification

Alan D. Sokal, Department of Physics, New York University, A PHYSICIST EXPERIMENTS WITH CULTURAL STUDIES, 1996, <http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/lingua_franca_v4/lingua_franca_v4.html>

**Why did I do it?** While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking *per se*, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. At its best, a journal like *Social Text*raises important questions that no scientist should ignore -- questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters. In short, my concern over the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). There *is* a real world; its properties are *not* merely social constructions; facts and evidence *do* matter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths -- the utter absurdity of it all being concealed through obscure and pretentious language. *Social Text*'s acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual arrogance of Theory -- meaning postmodernist *literary* theory -- carried to its logical extreme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult a physicist. If all is discourse and ``text,'' then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another branch of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and ``language games,'' then internal logical consistency is superfluous too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. Incomprehensibility becomes a virtue; allusions, metaphors and puns substitute for evidence and logic. My own article is, if anything, an extremely *modest* example of this well-established genre. Politically, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical *volte-face*. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the *mystifications promoted by the powerful* -- not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many ``progressive'' or ``leftist'' academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about ``the social construction of reality'' won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.

### Link Defense

#### Turn: *Strategic* alteration within the frame of zero-sum identity relationships between the U.S.-China-and Taiwan is the only way to improve tolerance and trust. Alternative’s attempt to wish away conflicting identities and goals fails.

Jennifer **STERLING-FOLKER** Poli Sci @ Connecticut (Stamford) **AND** Rosemary SHINKO **IR @ Connecticut (Stamford)** ‘5 **“Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide” *Millennium* 33 (3) p.**  658-660

Granting that postmodernism is seeking out the sources for radical change in and of the Westphalian sovereign system, how else are sources for reinscripting to become translated into change in the Chinese-Taiwanese relationship except via the nations of China and Taiwan, their respective states, and the **strategic relationship** they share with the US? Doesn't the Taiwanese state also protect identity difference from Chinese repression? Collective identities may be **socially-constructed**, but their content can still be **zero-sum.** What would it have meant for the individuals of Taiwan in the 1970s to have refused the national, territorial security discourses of realism and to have embraced identity tolerance with China instead? Certainly the latter could only have been achieved by embracing China on its own terms, and so it would have involved the political and economic subjugation of the Taiwanese people to Beijing. The vast majority of Taiwanese were already victims of identity intolerance at, the hands of the Nationalist KMT, but they were neither Mandarin-speaking, nor did they identify with the Chinese mainland. Although the KMT were initially welcomed by the Taiwanese population as liberators from the Japanese occupation, Soong notes that 'the expectation that Taiwanese could now share power with their "mainland brothers" was crushed by the KMT'." Clashes and civil unrest ensued over KMT authoritarianism, corruption, and favoritism, and in 1947 the KMT declared martial law. The formation of political parties was banned, the military was given considerable legal and censorship powers, thousands of opponents were executed, and for the next thirty-five years Taiwan became a virtual police state dominated by Mainlanders who insisted that Mandarin be the official language. While the KMT remained obsessed with returning to mainland China, it was not a goal shared by many Taiwanese. Those who dreamt of Taiwanese independence from China developed underground or overseas movements that later evolved into the DPP. There was little desire among the majority of Taiwanese to embrace identity tolerance with China on the latter's terms. Simultaneously, there was the possibility of greater participation in the political institutions of Taiwan itself. For the Taiwanese, at that moment, to have refused the national, territorial security discourses of IR in favor of ambiguity and tolerance would have been to refuse the very identity and goals that distinguished them from the KMT and mainland Chinese (and for which many of them had suffered). It would have meant a refusal of themselves, which hardly seems likely or even desirable. As Elshtain puts it, 'we are dealing with identities, remember, not easily sloughed off external garments'." To say that if the Taiwanese stop thinking of China as a problem then tensions will dissolve is true in an abstract sense but not in any **practical** sense for the vast majority of **people who live these identities**. It was the Taiwanese desire to embrace statehood and the Parameters of the Westphalian system that, along with US strategic deterrence, prevented a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. To argue that the individuals of Taiwan would be safer if they refused statehood is to Ignore the Chinese commitment since 1949 to subjugate Taiwan according to its own identity parameters. It is also to ignore the desire of the vast majority of Taiwanese not to be subjugated according to those parameters. The ROC would not even exist if it had not been for classic balance-of-power politics between two nation-states, the US and China, in the context of the early Cold War. Its evolution into a democracy is just as indebted to its relationship with the US, since it was the US decision to improve its relations with China in the 1970s that forced the KMT to pursue democratisation as means of national consciousness. Simultaneously, the goal of Taiwanese nation-state building was to confirm for other nation-states that the ROC had a legitimate claim to sovereignty (in opposition to China's claim that it is only a province), because the ROC government has the legitimate support of its population. Hence the increasing identity tolerance between Taiwan and China has only been realised through **the avenues and mechanisms of national identity politics** and the governing institutions of China and Taiwan, not outside or beyond them. Certainly nations have the option of refusing to become nation-states, but it would make little sense for nations and the individuals who comprise them to do so, when those parameters promise control over a specified territory via intra-national decision-making institutions. This is why civil wars are endemic to the Westphalian system and why nations will pursue statehood even when they are, in relative terms, politically and economically comfortable. If we don't examine particular, historical contexts, identities, and institutions — that is, if we insist upon, in Morgenthau's words, the 'neglect of the contingencies of history and of the concreteness of historical situations'" — then we will miss the way in which radical ideas **work through and shape existing institutions and practices**, and are in turn shaped by them. Thus we will miss the most essential link between that which changes (namely, history), and what remains the same (namely, structure).

### 1NC US/EU Relations

#### US-EU ties resilient

Dennison 13 -- fellow at the London-based think tank, the European Council on Foreign Relations (Susi, 2/22/2013, "Kerry's first trip gives clues on EU-US relations," http://euobserver.com/opinion/119168)

When US leader Barack Obama first announced, in autumn 2011, that he was to intensify the US' role in the Asia-Pacific region, it prompted much hand-wringing in Europe. But it is unclear whether EU-US relations suffered as a result. The European Council on Foreign Relations' (ECFR) latest "scorecard," which tracks the effectiveness of European foreign policy year on year, found that in 2012 EU-US ties were resilient. We cited as evidence the success of the G8 summit at Camp David and the Nato summit in Chicago in May 2012, compared with the G20 summit in Los Cabos a month later, which delivered little and drew precious little attention. Whatever the intention may have been with regard to continuing or reducing US resources in MENA, throughout 2012, American attention kept being drawn to the region. From supporting Arab transitions, most notably in Egypt, to the ongoing conflict in Syria, to the Iranian nuclear programme and Israel's Operation Pillar of Defence in Gaza in autumn, the US remained watchful. In the majority of these dossiers co-ordination with the EU has remained close, on the E3+3 process on Iran, through the Friends of Syria Group and at the UN. As a result, the European External Action Service (EEAS) delegation in Washington is one of a select few EEAS missions which has begun to play a serious negotiation and co-ordination role in advancing EU policy.

### Impact D

#### No impact—multiple reasons

Mueller 10 [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. @ UCLA, Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press]

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could potentially, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. Such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

### Immigration NU

#### Agenda’s dead and everything thumps

Delamaide 3-27 (Darrell, “Obama gains no traction on fiscal, economic fronts,” Market Watch, 2013, <http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-03-27/commentary/38051670_1_obama-gains-climate-change-second-term>)

President Barack Obama’s second term is only two months old, but it may not be too early to write his political obituary as a mediocre president who meant well. The president stands by — or worse, goes off to play golf with Tiger Woods — while other people make the decisions that determine our economy and many other things in our lives. Congress continues to squabble over budgets and sequestration, with the White House seeming to have little effect on these deliberations. Obama will have to sign a temporary funding bill this week that preserves most of the spending cuts he objects to just to keep the government from shutting down. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee are keeping the economy afloat with an accommodative monetary policy and no help at all from the administration. Most of the initiatives that Obama announced boldly in his inaugural speech and State of the Union — gun control, immigration and tax reform, action on climate change — seem to be going nowhere fast. His biggest success so far seems to be his ability to play the brackets in March Madness. His recent trip to the Middle East produced little more than an opportunity for Obama to visit the historic Petra site in Jordan. The president who spent most of his first term relying on a lackluster cabinet and abdicating most of the important policy work to a divided Congress, seems intent in his second term on relying on an even more lackluster cabinet and an even more divided Congress. The two biggest accomplishments of Obama’s first term — the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank financial reform — were largely designed by congressional committees and are proving themselves to be unwieldy and difficult to implement. In his new term, after declaring climate change to be a top priority, Obama appointed the chief executive of a sporting goods manufacturer and Mobil Oil veteran to the key post of Interior secretary. After reaffirming his support for alternative energies, he appointed an academic who champions fracking and nuclear energy as his Energy secretary. Faced with persistent concern about banks being too big to fail, especially in the wake of damaging revelations about the breakdown of risk controls at the country’s largest bank, the president keeps on an attorney general who admits to Congress it’s too difficult to bring big banks to justice because the financial system might collapse if he did. He appoints a Treasury secretary who held a lucrative position at Citigroup in between Democratic administrations and got a handsome payoff when he returned to public service. He nominated a new head of the Securities and Exchange Commission whose biggest claim to fame as a defense attorney is squelching an SEC investigation into possible insider trading by the former head of Morgan Stanley. So just two months into this president’s second term, there’s virtually no trace of the hope and change he promised when he swept to victory in his first presidential campaign in 2008. Instead, the electoral machine that successfully got him elected to the second term has now become more about campaigning than governing. It’s hard to discern exactly what Obama is campaigning for, however. He cannot run for a third term. If what he wants is public pressure to get his policies enacted, or ultimately a renewed Democratic majority in both houses of Congress in 2014, jetting to rallies around the country may not be the best way to get it. Instead, with increasing defections among key Democratic senators — South Dakota’s Tim Johnson is set to announce his retirement — it is looking harder than ever to preserve that party’s slim majority in the Senate, which is ineffective in any case given the lack of filibuster reform. In the meantime, we are stuck with what appears to be a federal government limping along from one fiscal Band-Aid to another. Policy is being made by a sequestration law that was designed to be so abhorrent it would never come into effect. Obama may be tenacious enough to get something done. But right now, after an initial flutter of hope from November’s electoral victory, it’s hard to imagine anything like real change from this administration.

#### Gun control thumps

Murray 3-28 (Mark, “First Thoughts: Obama jumps back into the gun debate,” NBC News, <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/28/17501341-first-thoughts-obama-jumps-back-into-the-gun-debate?lite>)

Obama jumps back into the gun debate: With some GOP senators vowing to filibuster the legislation coming to the floor next month and with some analysts saying that reformers have already lost, President Obama today steps back into the gun debate with an event at the White House at 11:40 am ET. Per the White House, Obama will stand with mothers, law-enforcement officials, and Vice President Biden in urging Congress to take action on the upcoming Senate legislation, which includes universal background checks. As we have written before, those checks -- supported overwhelmingly in public opinion polls -- will ultimately define success or failure for gun-control advocates. Democrats, led by Sen. Chuck Schumer, are trying to get Republicans to back some type of compromise on background checks, given that the filibuster threat means 60 votes will be needed to even begin considering the legislation. That’s why Michael Bloomberg’s Mayors Against Illegal Guns is airing TV ads in key states to also apply pressure. Meanwhile, Politico reports that Sen. Chuck Grassley, the top GOP lawmaker on the Senate Judiciary Committee, is drafting his own Republican gun bill (without background checks), which “could further complicate what will already be a difficult lift for Democrats and the White House.” \*\*\* Obama, bipartisan group still optimistic on immigration reform: While Obama uses the bully pulpit today on guns, yesterday he used it on immigration by granting interviews to the top Spanish-language TV news outlets. “If we have a bill introduced at the beginning of next month -- as these senators indicate it will be -- then I'm confident that we can get it done certainly before the end of the summer,” Obama told Telemundo regarding the Senate bipartisan activity on immigration, per NBC’s Carrie Dann. “I'm optimistic,” he added. “I've always said that if I see a breakdown in the process, that I've got my own legislation. I'm prepared to step in. But I don't think that's going to be necessary. I think there's a commitment among this group of Democratic and Republican senators to get this done.” Speaking of that bipartisan group senators, four of them (Schumer, John McCain, Jeff Flake, and Michael Bennet) held a press conference yesterday in Arizona, where they also expressed optimism. “I’d say we are 90 percent there,” Schumer said, according to Roll Call. “We have a few little problems to work on; we’ve been on the phone all day talking to our other four colleagues who aren’t here. McCain chimed in: “Nobody is going to be totally happy with this legislation -- no one will be because we are having to make compromises, and that’s what makes for good legislation. It’s compromise that brings everybody together.”

#### Not intrinsic – rational policymaker can do the plan and pass immigration – k2 effective decision-making

#### Debt ceiling thumps

Parkinson 3-21 (John, “Budget and Funding Done but Debt Limit Battle Brewing,” ABC News, 3-21, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/03/budget-and-funding-done-but-debt-limit-battle-brewing/>)

After the House of Representatives passed a budget and a stop-gap measure to fund the government through the end of the fiscal year today, Congress is now poised to turn its attention to a fresh battle over a looming debt limit increase.

### Politics – Obama Good 2AC

#### A logical policy-maker would do the plan and pass \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

#### GOP loves the plan

United Press International, 7/1/**2011** (Plan for refilling strategic oil reserves?, p. <http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/07/01/Plan-for-refilling-strategic-oil-reserves/UPI-28661309537073/>)

A group of Republican lawmakers have called on President Obama to release a plan on how the administration intends to refill the U.S. emergency oil stockpile. They denounced Obama's June 23 decision to provide half of the 60 million barrels released by International Energy Agency countries in response to the disruption of Libyan sweet crude, saying it raises "serious concerns" about the administration's energy policy.

#### **GOP wants more oil production for the SPR**

Rampton 12 (Roberta, “US Republicans seek drilling boost if oil reserves tapped”, 3/28, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/us-oil-reserves-congress-idUSBRE82R1HI20120328)

(Reuters) - Republicans in the U.S. Congress are proposing measures that would require President Barack Obama to allow more domestic oil production if he decides to tap emergency oil reserves. The proposals are unlikely to become law, but they give Republicans another opportunity to slam Obama's energy policy as consumers fret about high gasoline prices leading up to November's presidential election. France is in talks with the United States and Britain on a possible release of strategic oil stocks that could happen "in a matter of weeks," France's energy minister said on Wednesday. The White House said no decisions nor specific proposals had been made. Many Democrats in Congress have said they would support using the SPR to help alleviate surging gasoline prices caused by fears that Western sanctions constricting Iran's oil exports at a time of tight supplies could hurt the economy. In the Democratic-controlled Senate, David Vitter, a Louisiana Republican, has proposed that any sale from the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve should trigger expedited leases for oil shale resources. "Any short-term impact that may come from opening our or any country's SPR would not resolve broader market concerns or energy security concerns here in the U.S.," Vitter said. In the House of Representatives, Republican Cory Gardner on the Energy and Commerce Committee has proposed that the "quick fix" of drawing down the SPR be paired with a "longer-term approach" of increasing oil and gas leases on land owned by the federal government. The idea was panned as "burdensome" by a senior Energy Department official at a Capitol Hill hearing on Tuesday, who said it would make it harder to quickly respond to supply interruptions. "Draw-downs are already complicated procedures," said Chris Smith, deputy assistant secretary for oil and natural gas. "This bill, if enacted, will make it more difficult for the SPR to achieve its mission to respond promptly to supply interruptions with emergency crude oil," Smith said. But Fred Upton, the committee's chairman, said he hopes the legislation will advance after a two-week break in April. "If we're going to take oil out of the SPR, we're going to make sure there's the offset," Upton said. The Republican-controlled House already has passed a suite of bills that would reduce regulatory hurdles and boost U.S. oil production offshore and in protected areas of Alaska.

#### Winners win.

**Halloran 10** (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital fails

Edwards, 12 (George C., Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. editor of Presidential Studies Quarterly and holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies in the Bush School, *Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency*, p. 1-2)

In 2008, America suffered from war and economic crisis. Partisan polarization was extraordinarily high while faith in government was exceptionally low. In such times, the reflexive call is for new—and better—leadership, especially in the White House. Barack Obama answered the call, presenting himself as a transformational leader who would fundamentally change the policy and the politics of America. Even though both the public and commentators are frequently disillusioned with the performance of individual presidents and recognize that stalemate is common in the political system, Americans eagerly accept what appears to be the promise of presidential leadership to renew their faith in the potential of the presidency. Many Americans enthusiastically embraced Obama’s candidacy and worked tirelessly to put him in the White House. Once there, the new president and his supporters shared an exuberant optimism about the changes he would bring to the country. There is little question that Obama was sincere in wanting to bring about change. So were his followers. Yet a year into his administration, many were frustrated—and surprised—by the widespread resistance to his major policy proposals. The public was typically unresponsive to the president’s calls for support. Partisan polarization and congressional gridlock did not disappear. As a result, the promised transformation in energy, environmental, immigration, and other policies did not occur. When the president succeeded on health care reform, it was the result of old-fashioned party leadership, ramming the bill through Congress on a party line vote. Even worse, from the Democrats’ perspective, the 2010 midterm elections were a stunning defeat for the president’s party that would undermine the administration’s ability to govern in the succeeding years. How could this bright, articulate, decent, and knowledgeable new president have such a difficult time attaining his goals? Did the president fumble the ball, making tactical errors in his attempts to govern? Although no president is perfect, the Obama White House has not been severely mismanaged, politically insensitive, or prone to making avoidable mistakes. Ineffective implementation of a strategy is not the explanation for the lack of progress in transforming policy and politics. Instead, the problem was in the strategies themselves—in the belief that they could succeed. A common premise underlying the widespread emphasis on political leadership as the wellspring of change is that some leaders have the capability to transform policy by reshaping the influences on it. As we will see, the Obama White House believed in the power of the bully pulpit. The president and his advisors felt that he could persuade the public to support his program. They also believed that the president could obtain bipartisan support in Congress through efforts to engage the opposition. As a result of these premises, the White House felt comfortable advancing an extraordinarily large and expensive agenda. These premises were faulty, however. There is not a single systematic study that demonstrates that presidents can reliably move others to support them. Equally important, we now have a substantial literature showing that presidents typically fail at persuasion.1 In ἀe Strategic President, I challenged the conventional understanding of presidential leadership, arguing that presidential power is not the power to persuade. Presidents cannot reshape the contours of the political landscape to pave the way for change by establishing an agenda and persuading the public, Congress, and others to support their policies.2 The point is not that presidents do not matter. Of course they do. The question is how they matter—how do they bring about change? The answer I offer is that successful presidents facilitate change by recognizing opportunities in their environments and fashioning strategies and tactics to exploit them. In other words, presidents who are successful in obtaining support for their agendas have to evaluate the opportunities for change in their environments carefully and orchestrate existing and potential support skillfully.3

### IEA – 2AC

#### Extinction

**Kissinger**, 10/14/**2009** (Henry – recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, former National Security Advisor for Nixon and Secretary of State for Ford, The Future Role of the IEA, p. <http://www.henryakissinger.com/speeches/101409.html>)

In many ways we are confronted with a parallel, albeit broader, challenge to the one we faced in 1973-1974. At its core the energy system is again on an unsustainable path, threatening the political, economic, and social stability necessary for continued world progress. Energy security endures as a central and concerning feature of the current landscape. We remain challenged to ensure the availability of reliable and affordable energy supplies to maintain economic growth. Propelled by rising populations and brisk economic growth in developing nations, increasing energy demand threatens to outpace our capacity to produce and deliver needed energy supplies. This rise in non-OECD consumption represents a watershed event in a changing market landscape. The developing (rather than the developed) world is expected to account for the lion’s share of global energy demand growth for the next several decades. The IEA’s own projections indicate that portions of the Middle East, China and India will be primarily responsible for future growth in energy consumption as OECD demand stagnates. Oil continues to be a vital part of our energy mix, particularly in the transportation sector as we remain without viable alternatives that can substitute at meaningful scale anytime soon. Despite impressive advances in technology, conventional oil supplies are becoming increasingly concentrated geographically and difficult to access. Non-conventional oil supplies (e.g. oil sands in Canada, heavy oil in Venezuela, and oil shale in the United States), while abundant, are subject to potentially constraining challenges of their own. Thus our capability to replace existing oil supplies and expand capacity in order to meet future growth will depend largely on the investment choices and actions of a small number of major producers, all of whom have agendas, priorities, and internal needs that may not always align with those of major consuming nations. As global demand continues to grow, investment cycles, technologies, and supporting infrastructure will be critical. However, our inability to anticipate fundamental movements in supply and demand, as evidenced by the last two years, continues to result in price volatility that hampers our ability to make long-term strategic investments to deliver the appropriate mix of fuels and technologies. Those examples illustrate the continuing importance of energy security issues. However, this is no longer the only challenge. The world has changed considerably since 1973. In order to be effective in this new landscape the IEA must be prepared to evolve with it, aligning strategies and priorities to reflect these new realities. Deeply connected to the energy system and the existing mandate of the IEA, today we face new challenges of imposing magnitude: global climate change and a changing geopolitical landscape. Just as we failed to foresee the security consequences of altered oil market fundamentals leading up to the energy crisis of 1973-1974, we failed for many years to appreciate the environmental consequences of intensive fossil fuel use that have now led us to the brink of a climate crisis. This complex problem is not only a moral dilemma, but one of imminent significance for governance, international security, and the global economy. A continuation on our current path risks catastrophic impacts across many parts of the globe (including in currently producing areas) manifest in coastal flooding, drought, crop decline, and species extinctions. With little difficulty we can envision these leading to more human-oriented problems — hunger, disease, population displacement, and conflict — problems that could grow unmanageable from governance and international security perspectives. Climate change also promises to impact the global economy. It will require us to fundamentally alter the profile of our energy use and derive growth from fuels and technologies that emit less carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, and to adapt to the climatic changes that our actions are too late to prevent. We must recognize that developing nations view mitigating climate change as a threat to their aspirations for continued economic growth. This, however, is a false choice. For without meaningful action to reduce global emissions, the impacts of climate change will certainly inhibit economic growth. To effectively deal with climate change requires an overarching framework and a set of tools that that are not yet fully developed. We need clear goals and timelines, as well as analysis of true costs and benefits — difficult tasks compounded by the degrees of uncertainty that persist. We must continue to advance our understanding of climate science. We must develop energy policies that facilitate and coincide with climate objectives. And we must rapidly develop and deploy a full suite of low-carbon and energy efficient technologies — and this includes an expansion of nuclear energy. Existing energy security concerns, § Marked 14:30 § coupled with the prospect of global climate change, portend an unsustainable future that we must strive to avoid at all costs. The daunting but necessary task before us then requires nothing less than a transformation of our current energy system to one that is at once more secure, flexible, adaptive, and environmentally benign. In doing so, however, we must be thoughtful and creative in implementing policies that balance the goals of security, economic growth, and environmental stewardship. Though nations may emphasize these broad goals differently, they are most assuredly ones that we can all share and embrace. We must approach these challenges with some urgency, but we must also understand that the transformation cannot occur overnight. Remaking the energy system will take decades. Therefore, managing the transition is key. We should seize immediate opportunities to support technology, research, efficiency, and low-carbon fuels while simultaneously ensuring that the current energy system remains robust. As we begin that transformation, the IEA and other multinational institutions must evolve in ways that allow them to more accurately reflect changing global realities. In the past 35 years the world has undergone notable geopolitical shifts: we have a more unified Europe; we have witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of new nations. We have seen how persistently high energy prices have impacted all global economies and how major energy exporters have attempted to leverage their resource wealth to assert geopolitical influence. And we all recognize how China and India have emerged as major market actors. Chinese oil consumption in 1973 was inconsequential. China is now the second largest consumer and importer of oil. Its total energy consumption today is exceeded only by the United States. China, together with India, is projected to account for half of the energy demand growth that will occur between now and 2030. As I noted earlier, that nations outside of the OECD (and the IEA) now account for the majority of global energy consumption is a change of great significance. Increased access to and use of energy should of course be viewed as a positive development enabling nations and their peoples to achieve greater prosperity, but the fact that this bloc of rising major consumers resides outside of the cooperative framework of the IEA compromises the organization’s ability to effectively address global energy security and climate concerns and concurrently deprives these nations of the full benefits of IEA membership. A Vision for the IEA Given its core roles of fostering international cooperation and assisting governments in shaping better energy policies, energy security and climate change are challenges the IEA is particularly well suited to address. I am fond of noting that even the best consultative machinery cannot substitute for common vision and shared goals. Herein lies at least part of the dilemma faced by the agency as it confronts a changing global landscape. One of the strengths of the IEA is that its members are bound by common interests and similar values and goals. Expanding the circle to an equivalent of the G20 on energy issues would bring broader representation and a more complete segment of the consumer market, but also could challenge the institution’s fundamental structure. Without more fully integrating additional countries that will have an increasingly important role in shaping the global energy system of the future, the IEA risks becoming outdated, irrelevant, and unable to effectively accomplish even its historical objectives.

## 1AR

### FW K2 Activism

#### Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the cautious detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

#### -- Mutual economic ties check trade wars

Ahearn 7 (Raymond J., Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division – Congressional Research Service, “Trade Conflict and the U.S.-European Union Economic Relationship”, 4-11, http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL30732.pdf)

Foreign Policy Conflict Unlike traditional trade conflicts, foreign policy inspired trade squabbles tend to lack the same kind of institutional arrangements and pressures that dampen the supply of and demand for protection. Nor are these conflicts easily framed along free trade and protectionism lines. Some of these conflicts, but not all, may be moderated in the future by lobbying efforts of big business on both sides of the Atlantic to maintain stable commercial ties. However, if Brussels or Washington is determined to use trade to achieve foreign policy objectives, lobbying efforts are unlikely to be successful in the absence of a transatlantic agreement to treat these issues in a more consistent fashion.

### Cyber Terror

#### No risk of cyberattack and no impact if it does happen

Birch, 10/1/12 – former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy (Douglas, “Forget Revolution.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full)

"That's a good example of what some kind of attacks would be like," he said. "You don't want to overestimate the risks. You don't want somebody to be able to do this whenever they felt like it, which is the situation now. But this is not the end of the world." The question of how seriously to take the threat of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure surfaced recently, after Congress rejected a White House measure to require businesses to adopt stringent­ new regulations to protect their computer networks from intrusions. The bill would have required industries to report cyber security breaches, toughen criminal penalties against hacking and granted legal immunity to companies cooperating with government investigations. Critics worried about regulatory overreach. But the potential cost to industry also seems to be a major factor in the bill's rejection. A January study by Bloomberg reported that banks, utilities, and phone carriers would have to increase their spending on cyber security by a factor of nine, to $45.3 billion a year, in order to protect themselves against 95 percent of cyber intrusions. Likewise, some of the bill's advocates suspect that in the aftermath of a truly successful cyber attack, the government would have to bail the utilities out anyway. Joe Weiss, a cyber security professional and an authority on industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid, argued that a well-prepared, sophisticated cyber attack could have far more serious consequences than this summer's blackouts. "The reason we are so concerned is that cyber could take out the grid for nine to 18 months," he said. "This isn't a one to five day outage. We're prepared for that. We can handle that." But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ­­-- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks because hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. But investigators typically come up with key suspects, if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in potential retaliation when planning their operations.

### A2: Democrats Link – Oil

#### Obama supports oil now

Kling 13

[Michael, Money News, Wash. Post: Democrats Should Follow Obama's Lead on Shale Oil, 2/17/13, http://www.moneynews.com/StreetTalk/Democrats-Obama-Shale-Oil/2013/02/17/id/490763]

Praising the natural gas boom in his State of the Union address, Obama said his administration will keep cutting red tape and speeding up new oil and gas permits. New York Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo and Democrats in Maryland and elsewhere should listen, asserts the Post's editorial board. While the president is moving ahead, other Democrats are standing still .Cuomo's administration recently said it will miss another deadline for creating new fracking rules. Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley stopped issuing new drilling permits to wait for an environmental study, and now says the state may need more studies even after that study, due by August 2014, is completed. "The president’s approach is better," the Post argues. "While praising the energy boom for all its benefits, he has also concluded that reasonable new regulations could make extracting gas much cleaner, and his administration has gone about writing them."