## 2ac at: framework (2:20)

Counterinterpretation: The affirmative should defend the resolution as a counterfactual statement.

CLAIMS ABOUT “SHOULD” ARE OVERDETERMINED. IT INDICATES A NEED FOR POLICY ACTION IN PROPOSITION. WE MEET THAT.

**Trapp & Hanson ‘5** Robert Trapp is a Professor of Rhetoric at Willamette University in Salem, Oregon, U.S.A. Christine Hanson is the Press Assistant for United States Senator Bill Nelson (Democrat of Florida) and is a lecturer at George Washington University, “Debating Comparative Propositions of Policy,” Volume 5, Issue 4 June 2005 - IDEA: International Debate Education ... http://www.idebate.org/magazine/files/Magazine436a366e4843f.pdf

Merely by convention, some teachers and writers have insisted that the word “should” is a necessary and a suﬃcient indicator of a policy proposition. This convention, however, is arbitrary and does not mirror ordinary language usage. The term “should” is one of many terms that can signal a logical requirement for a plan of action.

We meet resolved – we defend USfg action in the past

Aff turns predicatability –

A. The negative’s silencing move is identical to Reagan’s – we need to be able to contest interpretive frames in order to have democratic debate. Their model ensures a top-down model which eliminates agency.

B. Counterfactuals key to avoid extinction – key to historical contingency, only way we can submit the status quo to critical analysis and avoid catastrophe – that’s Nader

C. Limiting energy to squo possibilities reifies technological determinism and ensures lock-in – this CROWDSDOUT counterfactual analysis

D. Politics is ceded now – Reagan prioritized business interests over DEBATE – that’s Sovacool

E. scenario planning turns engagement – presentist scenario planning prevents coherent political action because we must deal with energy market fear-mongering – also means their education claims are suspect

ERROR REPLICATION – dividing past counterfactual from the present crushes decisionmaking

**Johnson & Sherman ‘90** Marcia K. Johnson is a Sterling Professor of Psychology at Yale University. Steven J. Sherman is Chancellor's Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Indiana University, Bloomington. “Constructing and Reconstructing the Past and the Future in the Present,” in E.T. Higgins & R.M. Sorrentino (Eds) HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITATION, p. 510

Counterfactuals are thus important in determining affective reactions to actual events and to judgments of responsibility and causality. (Perhaps one reason why we are more angered by betrayals by people we trust than by people we do not trust is that we can so easily imagine trusted people as behaving otherwise.) More than this, counter factual generation is important because it affects the ways in which we think about the past and about the future. Without considering alternatives to reality, we must accept the past as having been inevitable and must believe that the future will be no different from the past. The generation of counterfactuals gives us flexibility in thinking about possible futures and prepares us better for those futures. Along these lines, Taylor and Schneider (1989) have proposed a theory of coping that focuses on the mental simulation of past, future, and hypothetical events. Such event simulation serves problem-solving and emotion-regulating functions for stressors by increasing the perceived validity of the imagined experiences, providing a framework for organizing experience, and providing a mechanism for mustering helpful emotions. In this way, counterfactual generation and the mental simulation of events can help in coping with ongoing, anticipated, or past stressful events.

It is thus clear that after-the-fact counterfactual reasoning affects feelings and judgments about the past, the present, and the future. Before-the-fact reasoning, in the form of expectancies, hopes, and wishes, likewise affects these feelings and judgments, as we have seen.

Historical grounding – Extend Nader – the specialized knowledge accumulation in their model is terrible and precludes a holistic understanding of history

Presentist education non-unique – we are the only way to spur CREATIVITY through political change

Limits cause lock-in – Historical analysis of solar energy policy must be able to CHALLENGE existing frameworks of policy formation and their presentist orientation – only direct contestation of existing frames avoids depoliticization

Laird 1

Solar Energy, technology policy and institutional values

Frank Laird Associate Professor and Director, MA in International Studies Education PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology BA, Middlebury College Profile Associate Professor of Technology and Public Policy and Director, MA Degree in International Studies, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver; Interdisciplinary Programs in Health, Harvard School of Public Health (1985-1987); National Science Foundation research grants (1991-1992, 1998-2000, 2006-2008); Consultant, Center for Nanotechnology and Society, Arizona State University (2005-2008); Public Policy Committee, American Solar Energy Society (1999-2008), chair of committee (2002-2004); Board of Directors, American Solar Energy Society (2002-2004); Review Panel, Ethics and Values in Science Program, National Science Foundation (1993-1996); Contributing Editor, "Science, Technology & Human Values" (1993-1996); Faculty Affiliate, Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Colorado (2001-present); Academic Advisory Board and Senior Faculty Associate, Center for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University (1998-2003); American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Political Science Association, American Solar Energy Society, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. Research and Expertise Energy policy, especially with respect to renewable energy; environmental policy, especially with respect to climate change; science and technology policy; democracy and science policy. Programs, Centers and Institutes Center for Sustainable Development and International Peace

IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE The broad importance of energy to all aspects of life in industrial societies needs little discussion. Energy is part of every major technological activity, from agriculture and manufacturing to transportation and telecommunications. The roots of energy policy stem from the U.S. government's deep involvements in energy technologies, resources, and markets, an involvement that goes back over a century and shows no indication of disappearing.30 The government has been and continues to be involved in the research and planning for future energy resources. The Cold War powerfully influenced federal government R8cD priorities, and energy, especially nuclear energy, technologies figured prominently in those programs.31 The Cold War influence went beyond picking R&C.D priorities. As Stuart W. Leslie has argued, the military security orientation of such programs led technology and science policy in particular directions, emphasizing state-ofthe-art high performance often at the expense of technologies that could have important applications in the civilian economy.32 Such planning for the future seemed an immediate and pressing matter during most of the 1970s. It seems less so today, although there is no reason that it should. Planning for the future should not wait until a crisis strikes. Recent price increases remind us that the current low prices and ample supply of oil will not last indefinitely. A recent survey of studies of recoverable crude oil argues that world oil production is likely to peak somewhere between the years 2007 and 2014, and this conclusion does not assume any political events that will interrupt production.33 Energy could be a front-page issue again before long. Solar energy - or renewable energy, as such sources are usually called now - has the potential to be a major part of the world's energy sources as fossil fuels decline in production. As we will see, advocates have long depicted renewables as the resource that will enable the continuation of industrial civilization after the era of fossil fuels, and a recent spate of books and studies have updated and promoted that conclusion. Private analysts, solar and environmental advocates, government agencies such as the fomier Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and some industry groups argue vigorously that renewable energy will be the cornerstone of future energy systems.34 Thus, understanding the history and dynamics of solar energy policy is important for understanding the possible changes in a technological system of great importance, now and in the future. Energy policy mostly focuses on existing sources of energy, their accompanying technological ensembles, and the conflicts of their associated regional economic and political interests. For example, the coal industry for years opposed increasing the quotas of imported residual fuel oil, typically used for home heating, into the United States, fearing that such imports would cut into their market share.35 In this type of conflict, well-established economic interests argue over policies that would affect their shares of wealth and income. The technologies and market structures involved are mature, the various interests have close, long-term relations to government agencies, and everyone acts as if they have a clear idea of which policies will advance their economic interests and which ones will not. In contrast, policy debates over solar energy are arguments over the shape of a large future technological system. Such policies necessarily confront immense uncertainties about interests and outcomes. This class of policies affects, in addition to energy, many of the most consequential technological systems of our time, including environmentally clean manufacturing, rapid changes in agriculture wrought by advances in biotechnology, and the linkages and developments in telecommunications and information technologies. Policies that governments adopt now will influence billions of dollars of investment in complex technological systems that will become constitutive parts of our society for years to come. The approach I take to this case thereby provides insights for analyzing some of these other issues. CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS Those who wish to challenge prevailing public policy must be able to challenge the sets of ideas that underlie the status quo. A democratic technology policy cannot content itself with giving citizens a set of cookie-cutter choices but must instead empower them to contest the underlying judgements and ideas that constitute those choices.36 Woodhouse and Collingridge stress that intelligent democratic processes must take into account the views of diverse partisans, lest unwise policies go unchallenged. Clearly, partisans who cannot challenge institutionalized ideas have very little scope for challenging policies in general. Hajer argues persuasively that substantial changes in policy require the dominance of new discourse coalitions, which entails institutionalizing new ideas.37 Langdon Winner addresses the problem that philosophical and other theoretical analyses seem to have little effect on the technologies that our societies produce, even when some actors in the system recognize that ethical and other normative issues will be greatly affected by the new technologies. Winner concludes that "the trouble is not that we lack good arguments and theories, but rather that modern politics simply does not provide appropriate roles and institutions in which the goal of defining the common good in technology policy is a legitimate project."38 This study takes Winner's critique seriously and asks why various technology policy processes, including those that provide channels through which advocates can participate, do not provide the deliberative institutions and roles that Winner calls for. In constructing technologies we do construct our future, and so our policies for the future, if they are to be democratic, require that citizens be able to challenge the institutionalized ideas that underlie the status quo.

Topicality is sufficient – resolution is the only predictable standard – any other violation is arbitrary and short-circuits the neg

Rigged debates – The framework constraints of 70s energy policy disguised the normative commitments of path choices. The artificial FRAMEWORK constraints empirically worked to RIG DEBATES

Laird 1

Solar Energy, technology policy and institutional values

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J U.S. energy policy makers held remarkably consistent normative and technical ideas (sometimes called values and beliefs) about energy technologies lor over three decades. Both types of ideas shaped the problem frame that officials used in thinking about energy policy. Policy elites ^who thought about the future and about new energy sources conceptualized their problems in terms of economic benefits and national secu' rity. Notions of economic benefits changed over time, from the idea that energy should be chcap to promote maximum economic growth to more refined notions that energy markets ought to be efficient to get optimal economic performance. Nonetheless, both notions point to getting energy at the lowest possible price. Discussions of national security emphasized importing oil from sources that would not be interrupted by political acts. Precisely how policy makers expressed their values and beliefs depended on the contingent circumstances iu which they found themselves, but both sets of dominant ideas made for a problem definition that greatly disadvantaged solar advocates. Because of its high market prices, solar was hardpressed to compete with fossil fuels, and because of its diffuse nature, it did not fit into the existing energy production system the way nuclear power promised to do. Although policy makers began to include an assortment of environmental protection values into their frames, that did little to alter the situation^ ' In addition, normative and technical ideas interacted in complex ways, and the boundary between them was ambiguous and contested.1 For example, consider the apparently empirical notion held by a White House aide about the infeasibility of solar energy as a major energy " source. As cited in the previous chapter, this aide took from a discussion k. with Congressman Mike McCormack what the aide called a "Solar fact" , that getting one percent of rhe country's total energy from solar would require converting ten percent of all houses to solar, and would cost S70-105 billion.2 The aide called this a "fact," the most solidly empirical of appellations. And yet. contained within this alleged fact were a number of normative and questionable empirical assumptions. It assumed empirically that the price of solar systems would not go down much. It also assumed normatively that the United States should remain a very high-consumption society, which in itself contains assumptions about the technological possibilities for energy efficiency and rhe normative desirability of ever-increasing material consumption. Changes m any of these underlying ideas would change rhis apparently simple "fact." At a more aggregate level of policy discussions, the normative and empirical ideas became just as enmeshed. As I showed in Chapter 5, Nixon administration officials regarded high levels of energy consumption as normatively desirable, as indicators of a good and progressive society.' The empirical fact of high energy consumption became a normative standard. Thus the official energy policy frame made sustaining and enlarging that consumption more than just preserving the empirical status quo; growing energy consumption was a valued social goal, nor just an empirical fact. This problem frame stacked the odds against solar energy in normative as well as empirical terms. By this normative standard. the sorts of technological changes rhar would most cnhance solar energy's prospects, particularly large improvements in energy efficiency, look normatively undesirable, whatever their technical feasibility. Conventional energy policy analysts held these intertwined empirical and normative goals deeply, as shown by their bitter attacks on Amory Lovins when he challenged that problem frame, as detailed in Chapter J l or thirty-five years solar advocates presented their technologies that used a variety of renewable energy sources as a way to exploit a vast, inexhaustible, but diffuse, resource. Most of them for most of the period did not think that creating a solar society entailed significant social or political change. Hoyt Hottel, Maria Telkes, Farrington Daniels, and rhc other early solar pioneers of the 1940s and 1950s all soughr to make solar affordable, largely with the assumption rhat it would plug into the existing energy systems, replacing fossil fuels, and enabling socicty and polity to continue functioning as before, with greater security and, perhaps, less pollution. Most of them saw no contradiction in promoting research and development in both solar and nuclcar power, or solar and synthetic fuels, and their only complaint was that nuclcar got an unfairly large portion of federal subsidies. A few of them, such as Daniels and Eugene Ayers, sometimes hinted that a substantial changc in such a major technological system would affect more than how one heated a room or lit a lamp. Bur for most of these advocates, solar energy technology offered just another way of securing tlie status quo against the end of fossil fuels. They sought a new technological system to prevent the social changes that would accompany scarcity. By the 1970s a new type of solar advocate emerged. These activists came to the technology from a part of the environmental movement that believed that the fundamental structures of society and politics - those concerned with industrial and agricultural production, housing, settlemenr patterns, and transportation - were, in some deep sense, flawed.4 These ecological advocates did not simply want any and all solar technologies. They sought technologies that would reinforce and be more compatible with a qualitatively different society and politics, one in which ecological sustainability and local community self-reliance would displace increasing ecological damage, bureaucratic centralization, and anomic. For them, making a drastic change in the energy technology system would l>c akin to making a legislative change for all of society.5 Whether the technologies they sought would have given them the society that they desired is not the point here. Rather, the point is that their social goals and ideas about technology as a social force led them to a very different framing of the energy problem and solar's role in it. Within their problem frame, solar was not only a feasible solution to the energy problem, it was the only desirable solution, rhe only energy technology ensemble that would encourage and strengthen the sorr of society thar they desired. In their frame, issues such as high initial costs and an immature industry were problems to be solved, not barriers to policy. This shared meaning of solar energy technologies bound together ecological advocates as a social group and drove their choices, leading them to champion smaller, more decentralized solar technologies and to reject schemes like the solar-powered satellites." The problem frame that came out of this meaning led them to regard problems like costs as secondary considerations, just the opposite of conventional frames. Top-level policy makers never shared thar framing of the problem or the normative values that went with it. Their public pronouncements and written internal debates show no hint that they ever even considered rhis alternative problem frame and set of values. The presidents and their top aides - in every administration - talked about energy almost exclusively in economic and national security terms, with occasional references to narrowly construed environmental values. Even in rhc Carter administration, no oiK' outside of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) gave any sign that they even thought about some of the more radical alternatives, and they never committed them to paper, suggesting thar such ideas were nor welcome in policy deliberations. These facts suggest a new inrcrprctarion of solar energy policy, particularly its rapid rise and fall in the 1970s. The conventional explanations for energy policy and solar's failure to establish itself within ir do not explain all of the events recounted here. It was not enough that solar was expensive and its future costs were uncertain. That could bosaid of all future energy technologies, including nuclcar energy. And it f. was not enough that the Reagan administration was ideologically hostile to solar energy. Solar advocates began losing their battles for support while President Carter was still 111 officc, and the ideological explanation „ begs the question of why Reagan and his people evinced such hostility to solar energy. The association of solar energy with the ecological wing of the solar movement was a phenomenon of the 1970s, not what one mighr have predicted in the 1950s or 1960s. Perhaps most importantly, the events analyzed here require us to reexamine the pluralist account of solar energy policy. Pluralism must, to explain events adequately, incorporate the importance of ideas, normative and empirical, being institutionalized into official problem framesy SOLAR ADVOCATES' LIMITED INFLUENCE ON POLICY ("Standard notions of American pluralism claim that any organized interest group can influence public policy by mobilizing rhe appropriate polit- / ical resources, such as votes, money, public opinion, and the like. From ^ this perspective one can evaluate a group's influence or effectiveness by ^ the extent to which it gets those policy outcomes that it desires. By thar measure, rhe solar movement, particularly the ecological wing of it, ^ appeared very powerful and effective for a brief period in the late 1970s. '' The question is why it both rose and then fell with such speed. The advocates pushing solar energy did not suddenly lose public support or their ability to argue their case.\* Instead, the values that ecological advocates / asstxiatcd with solar energy and the solar movement were in stark contrast to the conceptualization of the energy policy problem by top-level , decision makers. The official problem frame, and the values thar drove it, did not change, despite the considerable efforts of the solar movement to argue for an alternative. Thus the history of solar energy policy presents anomalies to pluralism. Prior to rhc energy crisis, prominent scientists, engineers, and businessmen advocated for solar energy, beginning after World War II and continuing for over twenty years. Wcll-placcd wirhin the rcchnical, government, and business community, these advocates should have been influential among important policy analysts and makers. On numerous occasions they were able to make their case to legislative and executivebranch officials, including some cabinet secretaries, members of the House and Senate, and, in a few instances, ro the president via his top aides. Many of the advocates spoke with the authority of impeccable technical credentials, exemplified by Farrington Daniels, a veteran of the Manhattan Project, member of the National Academy of Sciences, and president of the American Chemical Society. By the middle 1950s such advocacy became formalized with the creation of the Association for Applied Solar Energy (later becoming the International Solar Energy Society and the American Solar Energy Society), broadening solar's constituency to include business people, bankers, and so on. So why were these groups not more successful? Part of the explanation certainly lies in unfortunate contingent circumstances, such as President Truman's firing Interior Secretary Julius Krug only weeks after Krug had decided to launch a very large solar energy research program. Part of the explanation lies in unpropitious structural circumstances, such as the steady drclinc in energy prices in rhe 1950s and 1960s. And parr of the explanation lies in traditional interest group analysis. Solar energy did not have the same level of business, scientific, military, or congressional support that nuclear power enjoyed. But these factors do not constitute an adequate explanation. To develop a better one 1 have focused on recent policy literature that argues for the importance of ideas, both empirical and normative, in shaping and changing public policy. The case study itself - the history of solar energy policy - demonstrates the importance of ideas, particularly the importance of institutionalizing new problem frames and rhc technical and normative ideas that go with them. Absent institutionalizing new ideas, substantial, sustained changes in policy remain unlikely. Prior to the energy crisis, most energy policy concerned disputes between diffcrcnr fuels and rhc different regions of rhc country thar produced and consumed them. With policy makers accepting a problem frame based in such disputes, solar energy had little to offer cxccpr as a possible alternative in the distant future. However, since analysts and policy makers expected future energy demand to be immense, it seemed that future alternatives needed to produce large quantities of bulk energy, a task for which most people considered nuclear power to be better equipped. Policy advisors did frequently note that the governmenr underfunded solar R&D, especially compared to nuclear power, bur, absent a pressing crisis, nuclear s better fir wirh existing problem frames, along with its greater political resources, kept the subsidies flowing, while solar only got research targeted to auxiliary goals, such as NASA's funding for the development of photovoltaics for use on its satellites. The beginnings of the energy crisis in 1970-1971 coincided with the rise of institutionalized environmental protection values in the form of new legislation and the Environmental Protection Agency to implement that legislation. Those ideas had some effect on energy policy, but not enough to put solar energy at ccntcr stage. Nonetheless, Presidents Nixon and l ord began pouring money into all alternative forms of energy. including solar, quickly increasing solar R&I) budgets, sometimes as a response to Congressional initiatives. That said, the definition of the energy problem, the way it was framed, as discussed at length in earlier chapters, changed little, merely acquiring a sense of urgency from the energy crisis. Solar energy policy in the Carter administration shows the difference between successfully pressuring for a policy and successfully institutionalizing a new set of beliefs and values associated with some technology. Those years marked the time when the solar movement was the closest it ever came to being a mainstream movement, claiming to provide a feasible solution to an urgent problem. At rhc very time that solar technologies were commanding increasing resources, the ecological wing ol the solar movement became increasingly influential in policy circles. The Solar Lobby and related groups began to form a very effective pressure group for solar energy, and they clearly got most of what rhev wanted out of Carter's solar Domestic Policy Review process. But ir is equally clear that high-level policy makers never took the advocates' values or framing of the problem seriously. The advocates' political and social issues were never part of official discourse or debate. Even advocates' particular conceptions of environmental concerns never penetrated discussions in the White House. Policy makers simply never accepted, at least not in writing or in policy, the notion that the environmental problems related to energy suggested a deeper critique of existing energy, social, and political systems.

Better ground – there is more predictable literature analyzing past policies

We solve limits – infinite number of future policies, only a few VITAL historical decisionpoints

COUNTERFACTUALS ARE INEVITABLE AND INCREASE NEG GROUND – policy, economics and the law requires counterfactuals and there’s historical and empirical data on our aff

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Based on the temporal frame of these hypothetical resolutions, affirmative and negatives burdens change. For the Vietnam resolution, the affirmative would be bounded by the historical policies followed by the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. Claims could be empirical or probabilistic. Empirical claims would be verifiable in terms of historical data. Probabilistic claims would be speculative in nature. Negative claims could point to "actual" disadvantages stemming from the affirmative policy. Additional negative claims could speculate on policy alternatives. For example, the affirmative could argue the "domino theory" that all countries in southeast Asia would have fallen to the communists if not for US intervention. This claim is an example of a counterfactual conditional. This proposition takes the generic form "If it had been the case that C (or not C), it would have been the case that E (or not E)" (Fearon, 1991, p. 169). Debating historical propositions would entail extensive use of counterfactual logic. Historical analysis inherently involves a level of counterfactual reasoning. Murphy (1969) argues that "counterfactuals were an essential method of historians; these were by their nature (are) unverifiable propositions" (p. 15). The fact that they are unverifiable has led to criticism of counterfactuals as a form of logic. Thus, standards need to be applied in the assessment of counterfactual scenarios. Standards for Debating Historical Propositions? It should be noted that counterfactuals are a common model of logic. Their use transcends both specialized and general argumentative fields. Counterfactuals are commonly used in a variety of scholarly disciplines. Fearon (1991) states that "scholars in comparative politics and international relations routinely evaluate causal hypotheses by discussing or simply referring to counterfactual cases in which a hypothesized causal factor is supposed to have been absent" (p. 169). Conterfactual reasoning is common in legal argumentation. Counterfactual thinking is related to plaintiff compensation. In this context, "jurors are presented alternative event scenarios by the opposing parties" (Bothwell & Duhon, 1994, p. 705). Research indicates that there was a significant relationship between counterfactual thinking and plaintiff compensation (Miller & McFarland, 1986; Bothwell & Duhon, 1994). Counterfactuals are common to the study of economics. Murphy (1969) argues: that we cannot judge any economic policy without counterfactuals, we cannot estimate consumer surplus, we cannot calculate the effects of a tax or a subsidy, the removal of international trade barriers, indeed we cannot judge any recommendation to change the status-quo unless we consider the alternative state of affairs. (p. 18) Counterfactuals are also common in generalized fields of argumentation. Landman and Manis (1992) found "that personally relevant counterfactual thought is commonly engaged in by people outside the laboratory" (p. 476). Roese (1994) argues that "the ability to imagine alternative, or counterfactual, versions of actual events appears to be a pervasive, perhaps even essential, feature of human consciousness" (p. 805). Given the widespread use of counterfactuals, evaluation of counterfactuals can be extrapolated from existing standards. Meyer and Conrad (1957) argue that even though "counterfactuals cannot be directly tested, it is possible to consider the statement within a valid deductive system, independently of the acknowledged falsity of the conditional clause" (p. 540). Such a derivation is clearly an intuitive one and is not a matter of formal logic (Murphy, 1969).

Theory not the team – they only have offense to our INTERPRETATION of a topical plan

Structural limits – DoE creation and solvency advocates check counterfactual explosion

**Our counterfactual analysis is necessary to create democratic engagement**

Laird 1

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My argument makes no claim about whether the various, sides inthis debate were correct in their views, or even if their arguments were thought our well. Some of those arguments have since been persuasively critiqued, sometimes by analysts sympathetic to the ecological solar advocates.-1 The key point is that they at least formed the linkages and began the discussion. Despite these efforts, solar advocates never achieved technological citizenship. A sufficiently, open, influential, and authoritative forum eluded rhem, or perhaps they did not have enough time in the arenas that were available to them. Eirher way, the values dominant in energy policy remained consistent from the Truman to the Carter administrations, and there was never adequate political space in which alternative visions of society and polity could be articulated and associated with the choiccs of energy technologies. Solar, when ir was discussed at the highest policy levels, was interpreted through those traditional values, and such a problem definition made the cask of solar advocates quite difficult. Existing institutions responsible for energy policy showed no interest in changing the policy problem frame or the values associated with it, and new institutions, such as the Department of Kncrgy, also failed to provide a place for such normative debates. Brief appearances at agency or congressional hearings did not enable advocates to change problem frames "rjiojicy narratives. Neither did occasional meetings with White House staff or even a sympathetic president. Changing problem frames means gerting a new policy narrative accepted at many levels of society and is a long-rerm project. A democracy should develop the institutions thar provide opportunities for discussing problem frames. Those discussions might well challenge the normative and empirical ideas thar shape policy problem frames, for energy issues as for any other. Advocates of different technological systems will need to argue their case at the grassroots as well as the White House levels, and to do so consistently for years, to have their normative and empirical ideas thoroughly considered. While no crises currently confront energy policy, governments srill need to create policies for the future. New technological systems emerging in the coming decades will engender as profound changes in society as such systems have had in rhc past rwo cenruries. All too often those changes have been wrenching, and all too often they have left us with deep social, political, and environmental problems. The history of solar energy policy shows us thar doing better requires a critical examination of all parts ol a policy problem, including deeply cntrcnchcd institutional];^ ideas Forms of low-cost learning and technological citizcnship may be as important to such an enterprise as the technical expertise that wc also require. We have only glimpsed the means for accomplishing such lofty goals, but thar is no excuse for neglecting them. Our growing-technological power requires increasingly democratic and intelligent policies for rhc future. /

Shively is aff choice – debate needs a stasis point – we chose ours – they’re trying to change it

## at: states cp (0:45)

Permutation do both

50 state fiat bad – no real world decisionmaker could choose between the two – not a logical opportunity cost – education – no literature defends uniform 50 state action – skews debate towards the neg

Permutation – the Solar Bank should fund state programs

President key for problem framing

Laird 1

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INSTITUTIONS AND PROBLEM FRAMES Problem frames, and the ideas that constitute them, operate within institutions. As Schon and Rein put it, "Frames are not free-floating but are grounded in the institutions that sponsor them."21 Other scholars agree. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane argue that ideas become powerful when they become institutionalized, and that such deeply embedded ideas can explain the phenomenon of policy inertia, of institutions sticking to a policy long after one might have expected it to change.22 To understand the ways that ideas, problems, frames, and so on influence public policy, we must investigate the ways in which ideas get institutionalized. Particular ideas come to dominate the official definition of a problem and the conceptualization of its possible solutions. These ideas also shape the institution's rules, organizational norms, and operating procedures. Substantial, enduring changes in policy require changes in the institutionalized ideas that influence policy, which can mean either changing ideas within an institution or changing which institution controls some policy. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones emphasize the latter to change institutionalized ideas and policies: This [policy] process is the interaction of beliefs and values concerning a particular policy, which we term the policy image, with the existing set of political institutions - the venues of policy action. In a pluralist political system, subsystems can be created that are highly favorable to a given industry. But at the same time, there remain other institutional venues that can serve as avenues for appeal for the disaffected.13 In short, if some policy advocates consistently fail to get the policy they want from some government institution, they can try taking their arguments to a different institution, perhaps a different congressional committee or executive branch agency. Jurisdiction over policy areas sometimes changes, and if that new institution becomes dominant, then the policy can change rapidly. The difficulty with this solution is that the new institution may not end up having decisive influence over the policy of concern, which in fact is what happened in the case of solar energy policy. Alternatively, advocates can stick with the dominant institution and try to change the ideas that guide it. New ideas can change the meaning or understanding associated with some policy solution, in this case a technology, so that it looks like a more plausible solution to an old problem. Similarly, changes in ideas can change the way the problem is framed, so that the relevant government officials consider as a plausible solution technologies that they previously rejected or did not even take seriously. Maarten Hajer's work on discourse coalitions alerts us to an important pitfall in the analysis of institutionalized ideas used to explain policy change, or the lack of it. He describes discourses as "an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena. Discourses frame certain problems, that is to say, they distinguish some aspects of a situation rather than others." The relationship of Hajer's discourses to the ideas and frames discussed above is obvious. He reminds us that we cannot conclude that ideas are influencing policy just because some institution has started using a particular discourse in its statements, but that we must look at the institution's practices and decisions before we conclude that the par-ticular discourse has become institutionalized and dominant in some part of policy making. Important actors may start speaking the stories of a new discourse, what he calls discourse structuration, but we must also analyze what the institutions do to see which discourses are in fact institutionalized."4 For the case of solar energy, and other future-oriented energy policies, we need to analyze which government officials were in a position to influence this kind of change and the institutional structures in which they operated, including the means by which nongovernmental actors had access to them. We will also need to analyze the ways that institutionalized ideas shaped the official definitions of problems and how some actors tried to change those definitions. The ideas held at the top levels of policy making, especially in the executive branch, are more important than are usually given credit in the policy literature. In the solar case, what appeared to be a substantial and enduring change during the 1970s, particularly at the agency level, was in fact ephemeral because, in part, of the stability of the way the issue was defined at the presidential level, despite vigorous efforts to change that definition. Making a large change in this type of institutionalized problem frame entails dramatic changes in a massive part of the nation's technological infrastructure, with all the accompanying political, economic, and social changes. Such policy changes must have high-level support, s|nce they will conflict with many other ideas, goals, and interests held by previously persuasive stakeholders and hence encounter stiff resistance from those who prize the status quo.25 Thus the key for this study will be how new values were, or were not, institutionalized in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). I will also analyze congressional actions to some extent, but on solar energy policy these were mostly reactive to executive branch actions, even in the late 1970s. The EOP was the key barrier to substantial energy policy change. I do not mean by these comments to dismiss Congress as an important influence on policy. Assorted energy advocates used congressional committees very successfully as a means of promoting their technologies and keeping pressure on the executive branch. This pressure was felt most intensely in the appropriations process. My analysis will carefully depict the interaction of the Congress with energy advocates and the executive branch. That said, this analysis still focuses primarily on the executive branch because it retained the ability to set the dominant frame for the issue. Throughout the history of energy policy, the president and his advisors remained the crucial actors for undertaking new policy initiatives linked to new ideas about policy.

Permutation do the plan then the counterplan –

Doesn’t solve symbolism – Reagan’s decision to cancel the Solar Bank shut down debate – not the lack of state incentives – only reversal on the federal level solves

CP links to the net benefit –

S deficit – states counterfactually analyzing not the same as counterfactually analyzing state action – we need to do the counterfactual analysis not the states – hold them to the CP text

## 2ac – generic (1:30)

Case outweighs –

a. Tech Determinism leads to extinction – blinds us to the social costs and risks of catastrophe in developments by focusing on a technological utopia

b. Technocracy turns –

Energy scenario planning FAILS –

DEBATE proves this – we’ve been predicting doom since the 70s – we’re literally WORSE THAN RANDOM – multiple energy resolutions proves

ENERGY debates specifically prove – LABBAN says Shell has been riding the scenario train since the 70s and it is ALWAYS WRONG. They have no subject specific defense of methodology – this is empirically proven by 70s solar debates – oil crisis rhetoric was used to disallow a consideration of the solar bank and alternative paradigms

#### Determine scenario planning’s future GENEALOGICALLY – scenario planning in energy was a CONTINGENT not RATIONAL determination

Mason 6

Arthur Mason Department of Anthropology, University of Calgary, Canada and School of Justice and Social Inquiry, Arizona State University, USA ticle: Images of the energy future Author: Mason, Arthur Journal: Environmental research letters ISSN: 1748-9326 Date: 10/2006 Volume: 1 Issue: 1 Page: 014002 DOI: 10.1088/1748-9326/1/1/014002

In this article I argue that such images of the energy future and the role these visions play in policy and planning call attention to a subtle but pervasive change in US energy prediction since the 1970s. This change can be seen as the birth of a system of energy forecasting on the basis of a singular reaction to a shift in energy availability. The 1970s’ energy crisis, apparently, could not be experienced as otherwise1. By examining attitudes toward energy planning between 1969 and 1976, I show how a system of energy forecasting emerges from a period characterized in terms of limits to growth. From this narrow organization of experience rises the condition of possibility for today’s images of the energy future. My description of the energy future since the 1970s retrieves historically specific meanings which are both fragile and ordered. These meanings also reveal a past whose coherence when seen from our vantage point appears as a system of contradictions. My approach is inspired by Michel Foucault, from his analysis of modern power relations. The subject matter of Foucault’s work is the history of ideas in Europe over the last 400 years and the startling sense of rediscovery these ideas provoke when it is revealed that our thinking no longer resembles a thought from the past [5]. By refusing to see the past through the opinions and facts of our time, Foucault invites us to witness the ground on which various types of knowledge could make sense and could produce truth within a particular age. By applying a Foucaultian analysis of power/knowledge to the realm of energy planning, I claim to rediscover the overall organization of meanings that bind institutions, experiences and doctrines and to which these meanings refer when elements of them refer to the energy future.

EVEN IF they win some residual advantage, PRIORITIZE our impacts – scenario planning’s PRIMARILY ideology even if it accidentally gets it right now and then. Kritik impacts are IMMANENT and SYSTEMIC so don’t rely on their epistemology.

DEPRIORITIZE their links – we are not a time machine – counterfactual examination of energy policies is more important for political engagement – that’s Laird

**This form of SCENARIO PLANNING creates a prophetic futures market in violence that creates a globalized system of pre-emptive violence**

Bratton 4

<http://jordancrandall.com/underfire/binnen-def.pdf>

Benjamin H. Bratton is Associate Professor of Visual Arts at the University of California, San Diego and Director of The Center for Design and Geopolitics think-tank at Calit2, The California Institute of Telecommunications and Information Technology. He is an American sociologist, architectural and design theorist, known for a mix of philosophical and aesthetic research, organizational planning and strategy, and for his writing on the cultural implications of computing and globalization[1][2][3][4][5][6][7].

Something that Ana wrote – about the Battlefield 1942 game, and the way in which the miniaturized war works as a sort of medium for eliciting of multiple scenarios – got me thinking about the logics of instrumental gaming and scenario planning and their kinship to other, less rationalized forms of prophecy. Here are some initial thoughts. > Donald Rumsfeld’s now infamous “Things we don’t know we don’t know” are discursive (and physical) potentialities of violence that might erupt (from some virtual plan) into our “homeland” and must be first rigorously anticipated and then ceremonially prevented: a governance by hypothetical negation. > “We didn’t game for that,” the general explains. War is the futurology of war. The globalization of what Rumsfeld calls “the security environment” has produced (as explained in the Eschatology’s of Virilio) a dangerously monocultural web of war space and wartime, one in which arms markets (large and small) are enmeshed not only with resource markets, labor markets, production markets, but are enrolled as basic currencies of the futures markets (secular and sacred) that motor the production of that war space as a collaborative prophecy. > This strategy-by-scenario is related to but not exclusive to the contemporary history of war gaming. The scenario planning methodologies that Kees van der Heijden employed for Shell matured on the sun-soaked tables of the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, and were used to help steer the Vietnam War. The Policy Analysis Market, the aborted Darpa-funded project to draw upon the swarm intelligence of selfinterested market players to anticipate terrorist incursions is a maturation/extrapolation of these efforts. As are the computational technologies of simulation, such as BattleScape, an information visualization package developed by Autometric and now marketed by Boeing that allows military commanders to both see the battlefield in a kind of videogame miniature, and thereby game virtual scenarios, but now also (according to their literature) to use the simulation as an interface to the battlefield to actually administer forces there. > But this is not just precession of the simulacra. I think there is something more “religious” at work here (in Derrida’s ontic sense of the term). The institutional power of prophecy works for several agendas of mobilization. “Terrorist violence” constitutes a sort of virtual product, one through which the supply chain management of various militia is modulated by demand chain technologies. But in an almost embarrassingly Durkheimian sense these futures markets also rationalize the prophetic meta-discourses of fighting “evil,” whether understood as the profane America, or as that Terror which would attack America in the name of its own competing prophecies: the persistent militarization of teleology.

**Simulation through scenario planning legitimizes permanent global war**

Graham 11

Cities Under Siege:

The New Military Urbanism

Professor Stephen Graham

Prof of Cities & Society, Newcastle University

Meanwhile, within the US, dozens of physical simulations of US city districts are joining the simulations of Arab cities. These are the places where lawenforcement and National Guard personnel practise operations against civil unrest, terrorist attack and natural disaster. 'Another architecture is rising in the expanding landscape of preparedness', notes the Center for Land Use Interpretation. 'Condensed simulacra of our existing urban environments are forming within our communities, where the first responders to emergencies, on a small or large scale, practice their craft of dealing with disaster [and where] the police contend with civil decay, robberies, hostage situations, looting, riots, and snipers'."' Military simulations are also helping to produce US cities in another, more direct, way: generating them now takes up large swaths of the US economy, especially in high-tech metropolitan areas. Many of the much-vaunted high-tech suburban hot spots that house what Richard Florida has called the 'creative class'"5 of the US - places such as Washington, DC's 'Beltway', North Carolina's 'Research Triangle', Florida's 'High Tech Corridor', or San Diego's 'clean tech cluster' - are in fact heavily sustained by the production of symbolic violence against both US central and Arab cities. Being not only the foundries of the security state but also the sites of the most militarized and corporatized research universities, these locations are where the vastly profitable and rapidly growing convergence between electronic games and military simulation is being forged. Orlando's hundred large militarysimulator firms, for example, generate about seventeen thousand jobs and are starting to overshadow even Disney as local economic drivers. Behind the blank facades and manicured lawns, thousands of software engineers and games professionals project their Orientalized electronic imaginaries onto the world through the increasingly seamless complex of military, entertainment, media and academic industries. The importance of military simulation industries is not lost on those tasked with the development of local urban economies. The municipality of Suffolk, Virginia, for instance, now proudly claims that a 'world-class cluster of "Modeling and Simulation" enterprises has taken root around the US Joint Forces Command and an Old Dominion University research center' (Figure 6.12)'16 To support further growth in these sectors, partnerships beween local governments and economic developers are springing up to determine 'how the state of Virginia could better support JFCOM [Joint Forces Command] and its mission! This economic convergence gains strength from the Virginia Modeling and Simulation Initiative (VIMSIM), which will be geared to 'stimulate development of a unique high-tech industry with multi-billion dollar revenue potential.' Already, Lockheed Martin has opened a major simulation complex in the area. 'As a growing high technology hub with proximity to major defense, homeland security and other important customer installations', Lockheed Martins CEO, Vance Cotfman, pointed out in 2003, 'Suffolk is the ideal location for our new center'."7 SELF-FULFILLING WORLDS All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing - war."\* The complex constellation of simulations of Arab and global South cities discussed here work powerfully as a collective. The various physical, electronic and blended physical-electronic manifestations operate together, as do all simulacra, by collapsing reality with artifice, so that any simple boundary between the two effectively disappears."' In keeping with what Jean Baudrillard famously stressed, it is best to consider the above simulations, not as 'copies' of the 'real' world, but as hyperreal constructions - simulations of things that don't exist - through which war and violence are constructed, legitimized, and performed. 'Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance', Baudrillard writes, 'It is the generation by models of a real without origins or reality: a hyperreal'.120 The point, then, is not that these simulations are less 'real' than the things they purportedly represent. Rather, they provide spaces through which the violence of the 'War on Terror' can be generated and performed, and which acquire their power from their radical disassociation from any meaningful connection with the real places (or, less commonly, real people) they are said to represent. In the process, these simulacra 'participate in the construction of a discourse of security which is self-fulfilling'.111 Multiple layers and circuits of simulation work collectively to evacuate the possibility of authenticating what might actually be 'real'. 'Since 9/11', writes James Der Derian, 'simulations (war games, training exercises, scenario planning, and modeling) and dissimulations (propaganda, disinformation, infowar, deceit, and lies) [have produced] a hall of mirrors, reducing the "truth" about the "Global War on Terror" to an infinite regression of representations that [defy] authentication.''22 Because the worlds of threat and risk are projected through this simulacral collective, the perpetration of state violence and colonial war emerge from the same collective as necessary, just and honourable. More simulations are rendered necessary in turn to improve the effectiveness of such violence, to tempt and train more recruits, to deal with their psychological devastation once they return home, and so on. It follows that the very notion of 'security', at least as constructed through the military simulacral collective, becomes possible only through permanent war. 'War makes security possible by creating that which is to be protected', writes Abhinava Kumar, 'and what makes war possible [is the] mechanization of soldiers, the obscuring of the enemy and the sanitisation of violence.'113 The mcdiatization of contemporary war is such that the 'fighting' of actual wars takes place as much in TV lounges, at multiplexes, and on YouTube or PlayStation screens as in the real streets and alleys of combatzone cities. As already-vague distinctions between civil and military media and technology dissolve, the military simulacral collective comes to permeate a host of media simultaneously. Previously considered to be largely distinct, multiple media domains are thus in the process of The mediatization of contemporary war is such that the fighting of actual wars takes place as much in TV lounges, at multiplexes, and on YouTube or PlayStation screens as in the real streets and alleys of combatzone cities. As already-vague distinctions between civil and military media and technology dissolve, the military simulacral collective comes to permeate a host of media simultaneously. Previously considered to be largely distinct, multiple media domains are thus in the process of fusing and interpenetrating within and through the military simulacral collective - a process at once confusing, disturbing and extremely fast moving. 'We see that various genres once thought to be discrete are forging new and strange alliances', writes Roger Stahl. As a result, 'wartime news looks like a video game; video games restage the news. Official military training simulators cross over into the commercial entertainment markets; commercial video games are made useful for military training exercises. Advertisements sell video games with patriotic rhetorics; video games arc mobilized to advertise patriotism. The business of play works closely with the military to replicate the tools of state violence; the business of state violence in turn capitalizes on playtime for institutional ends\*124

## 2ac at: elections – uniq

Romney will win – electoral college

Chambers, 9-15

Dean Chambers, writer for the Examiner, 9-15-2012, “Mitt Romney victory likely due to electoral college landscape,” http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-victory-likely-due-to-electoral-college-landscape

The latest of the extremely accurate Rasmussen Reports Daily Presidential Tracking Poll released today indicates that Mitt Romney holds on to his lead nationally, 48 percent to 46 percent over President Obama. Additionally, Obama faces a 49 percent approval and a 50 percent disapproval in that same poll released today. There some new key state polling data from yesterday and today as well. Rasmussen Reports has Romney leading 51 percent to 45 percent in North Carolina. A Denver Post/SurveyUSA poll reports a statistical dead heat in Colorado, with Obama 47 percent to Romney at 46 percent. Another Rasmussen poll of Virginia reports a statistical tie, with Obama leading 49 percent to 48 percent over Mitt Romney. A Philadelphia Inquirer survey shows Obama leading Romney by a 50 percent to 39 percent margin. That poll indicates a likely Obama win in Pennsylvania if the votes were cast today, but the lack of a clear majority for Obama indicates the possibility that Romney could catch up in Pennsylvania before November. Winning the election this year for Mitt Romney means he will need to finish stronger than the losing nominee from the 2008 election, John McCain who was defeated by Barack Obama. First, Romney must win the states that McCain won in 2008, that were worth 173 electoral votes then. But due to population shifts measured by the 2010 Census, those states are worth 180 electoral votes in this year's election. Even the Real Clear Politics electoral vote projection map, cited by many, but flawed due to including skewed polls, shows Romney winning those states won by McCain in 2008. That is 180 electoral votes that strongly likely to be in Romney electoral vote count on election day. Many were surprised to see Obama win Virginia and North Carolina in 2008. As cited above, North Carolina is leaning strongly to Romney. Virginia, although tied in the poll cited above, would go for Romney when most undecided voters go against President Obama. Recent polls are showing Romney with a strong lead in Indiana, a normally Republican-leaning state that Obama eked out narrowly in 2008. Those states are worth 39 electoral votes and adding them puts Romney up to 219 electoral votes. Most observers of the election agree that Mitt Romney has to win Florida, worth 29 electoral votes, to win the election. The RCP average of Florida polls, that includes some skewed polls, is Obama 47.8 percent to Romney 46.5 percent. That is nearly a statistical tie. Removing the NBC/WSJ/Marist poll from the average, because it over-samples Democrats, the average is Obama 47.6 to Romney 47.0, a statistical tie. Clearly the undecided voters will breakly strongly to Romney as he will carry Florida. This would put Romney at 248 electoral votes. Romney clearly needs to win Ohio. Ohio has voted for the winner in nearly all recent presidential elections and does tend to go Republican in most close elections. The RCP Average of polls for Ohio shows four polls, not surprisingly the heavily skewed NBC/WSJ/Marist poll is most favorable to Obama. The average of the other three polls for Ohio, including a Rasmussen poll and one by Democrat-leaning Public Policy Polling, calculates to 48.0 percent for Obama and 44.7 percent for Romney. Rasmussen is known for being extremely accurate and reports a statistical tie of the race in Ohio, with Obama leading 47 percent to 46 percent. Given that undecided voters will break for Romney, this will put Romney ahead to win Ohio. Adding Ohio's 18 electoral voters put Romney at 266 electoral voters. From here, the path to 270 electoral votes requires only winning one of the following states: New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Iowa, Colorado or Nevada. RCP has them all shaded as gray states that are in toss-up status. These five states are worth 35 electoral votes. Obama won them all in 2008 but he is clearly polling less strongly in them this year. In all of these states Obama is well below 50 percent in the average of polls not including the blatantly skewed polls (below 50 in the averages that do contain skewed polls as well) they are all close enoug that the undecided voters will swing them all to Romney this year. These states will give Romney 31 more electoral votes than he needs, placing him at 301 electoral votes.

## 2ac at: elections – link

No comebacks in the last fifteen presidential elections

Klein, 9-17

Ezra Klein, author of the Washington Post’s Wonk Blog, “The Romney campaign is in trouble,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/09/17/romney-is-behind-and-the-debates-arent-likely-to-save-him/

On the presidential level, where everyone running campaigns is very, very good at their jobs, campaign infighting and incoherence tend to be the result of a candidate being behind in the polls, not the cause of it. Romney is behind and has been there for quite some time. According to the Real Clear Politics average of head-to-head polls, Romney hasn’t led the race since October 2011. The closest he came to a lead in the polls this year was during the Republican National Convention, when he managed to … tie Obama.

Romney is also behind in most election-forecasting models. Political scientist James Campbell rounded up 13 of the most credible efforts to predict the election outcome: Romney trails in eight of them. He’s also behind in Nate Silver’s election model, the Princeton Election Consortium’s meta-analysis, Drew Linzer’s Votamatic model and the Wonkblog election model.

But I didn’t realize quite how dire Romney’s situation was until I began reading “The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How Campaigns Do and Don’t Matter,” a new book from political scientists Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien.

What Erikson and Wlezien did is rather remarkable: They collected pretty much every publicly available poll conducted during the last 200 days of the past 15 presidential elections and then ran test after test on the data to see what we could say about the trajectory of presidential elections. Their results make Romney’s situation look very dire.

For instance: The least-stable period of the campaign isn’t early in the year or in the fall. It’s the summer. That’s because the conventions have a real and lasting effect on a campaign.

“The party that gains pre- to post-convention on average improves by 5.2 percentage points as measured from our pre- and post-convention benchmarks,” write Erikson and Wlezien. “On average, the party that gains from before to after the conventions maintains its gain in the final week’s polls. In other words, its poll numbers do not fade but instead stay constant post-conventions to the final week.”

This year, it was the Democrats who made the biggest gains from before to after the conventions. Obama is leading by 3 percent in the Real Clear Politics average of polls, about double his lead before the Republican convention. If that doesn’t fade by the end of the week or so — that is, if it proves to be a real lead rather than a post-convention bounce — then there’s simply no example in the past 15 elections of a candidate coming back from a post-convention deficit to win the popular vote.

This is about the point where I’m supposed to write: That said, the race remains close, and the debates are coming soon. It’s still anyone’s game.

But the most surprising of Erikson and Wlezien’s results, and the most dispiriting for the Romney campaign, is that unlike the conventions, the debates don’t tend to matter. There’s “a fairly strong degree of continuity from before to after the debates,” they write. That’s true even when the trailing candidate is judged to have “won” the debates. “Voters seem to have little difficulty proclaiming one candidate the ‘winner’ of a debate and then voting for the opponent,” Erikson and Wlezien say.

Gallup agrees. The august polling firm reviewed the surveys it did before and after every televised presidential debate and concluded they “reveal few instances in which the debates may have had a substantive impact on election outcomes. “

The Romney campaign tends to point to two elections to show how its candidate could win this thing. There’s 1980, when Jimmy Carter supposedly led Ronald Reagan until the debates, and 1988, when Michael Dukakis was leading by 13 points after his convention. In fact, Reagan led going into the 1980 debates. And although Dukakis’s convention bounce was indeed large, it was wiped out by Bush’s convention bounce, which put him back in the lead.

That’s not to say Romney couldn’t win the election. A 3 percent gap is not insurmountable. But we’re quickly approaching a point where his comeback would be unprecedented in modern presidential history. And if the Romney campaign begins to crack under the pressure, then that comeback becomes that much less likely.

## russia

#### Russian threat constructions are rooted in western racism

Øyvind **Jæger,** @ Norweigian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, **2k** [Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, “Securitizing Russia: Discoursive Practice of the Baltic States,” <http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=18>]

The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows. In much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia. As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of insecurity – already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence – unity behind the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and the construction of the enemy within. This is what David Campbell (1992) points out when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy.

## 2ac at: generic (1:00)

No link – their links assume an endorsement of present policy by the USfg – we’re a descriptive statement about past policy that allows us to resist technocracy

Technocracy outweighs –

Their politics is authoritarian and depoliticizing – it forecloses certain political strategies in favor of top-down, imposed out-lefting that pretends the state doesn’t exist – this empirically failed in the 60s and 70s with energy decentralization

Permutation do both – \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ - it improves the alternatives political stance – any reactivation of agency needs to be coupled with a recognition of contingency – we have to consider the system and figure out how it was constructed

#### Recognizing contradictory ideas in the context of technological determinism improves communication and discussion to break down technoscience

Rosales 2009

Janna Metcalfe, thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department and Centre for the Study of Religion University of Toronto, “WHEN THE “TWILIGHT OF JUSTICE” MEETS THE “DAWN OF NANOTECHNOLOGY”: A CRITIQUE OF TRANSHUMANISM AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE IN THE LIGHT OF GEORGE GRANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY,” https://exams.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/17824/6/Rosales\_Janna\_M\_200906\_PhD\_thesis.pdf

For those who cannot give up that transcendental framework, the contradiction between the good and the triumph of the will lives itself out in the kinds of visceral “nerveracking situations of justice” (Grant, 1984/1998, pp. 440-441) from which we make sense of being, whether that entails taking a stance on reproductive ethics, euthanasia, nuclear energy, cybernetics, eugenics, germ-line genetic engineering, or molecular manufacturing. While one may be tempted to seek definitive resolutions to ethical dilemmas or to gloss over evidence of contradictions when deliberating over the issues, the efforts of both Grant and Simone Weil demonstrate that trying to pay due credit to contradictory ideas is not necessarily “evidence of a discreditable intellectual weakness” (Forbes, 2007, p. 201). Sometimes reality shows us incompatible truths that no amount of intellectual refinement or methodical reasoning can dispel; in this case the point is not to skim over or hide the inconsistencies, but rather, in the true spirit of a dialectical approach, to identify both complementarity and irreducible differences between ideas. To recognize contradictory ideas, as Weil (1956) insists, is to “experience the fact that we are not All” (p. 411). This too is an experience with otherness, one that is better apprehended through love rather than a logic that simply seeks consistency. As I stated in chapter 1, Grant considered the dialectical method to be grounded in eros, in that to know a thing is also to love it. I think nanoethics can benefit from this interpretation of the dialectical approach because currently the terms of engagement are set up more as a struggle between opponents, where there are debates to be won and lost, whether between Drexler and Smalley, Kurzweil and Joy, Hughes and Kass, transhumanists and bioconservatives. Too much emphasis on out-arguing one’s opponent and refuting contradictions closes down on channels of communication and excludes more constructive ways to frame the discussion. As a case in point, Langdon Winner (1986) observes that our debates about technology, society, and the environment often take a narrow view of what constitutes an acceptable discussion, usually drawing on concepts of efficiency and risk to define the parameters (p. x). What Grant does is bring challenging concepts to the table as a way to lift us out of an exclusively technoscientific mindset.

## 2ac solar add-on (0:30)

#### Solar power necessitates decentralization and breaking up of energy monopolies

Scheer 2K2

(Hermann, Fmr. Asst. Prof. of Economics @ Technical Univ. of Stuttgart, Member of German Parliament, General Chairman of the World Council for Renewable Energy, President of EUROSOLAR, The Solar Economy: Renewable Energy for a Sustainable Global Future, Pg. 87-89)

The representatives of the fossil energy industry have been written out of the script for the renewable energy story, or allotted at most a secondary role; the market for renewable energy will no longer have a niche for conventional sources at least, not with turnover at high as it is at present. Conventional energy companies are bound to old fossil fuel structures by the sheer scale of their investments; their business models, based on large-scale industrial plant, will prove their own undoing in the transition to renewable energy. A solar resource base makes it impossible to retain or ever re-create the power structure that has hitherto prevailed in the energy sector. The extent to which industrial concentration and monopolization is inevitable with fossil fuels and avoidable or impossible with solar energy is compared in Table 2.2 The short supply chains for renewable energy sources will end the pressure to globalize that comes from the fossil resource base. The dense interconnections between individual energy companies and between energy companies and other industries that result from fossil fuel supply chains will no longer be necessary. Shorter renewable energy supply chains also make it impossible to dominate entire economies. Renewable energy will liberate society from fossil fuel dependency and from the webs spun by the spiders of the fossil economy.

#### Fossil fuel energy monopolies depoliticize society

Scheer 2K2

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Fossil-fuelled power corporations present more than just an acute environmental danger. Their control of electricity supplies and their influence on the mineral resources industry, plus the support of the large investment banks, makes them the most powerful element in the economy as a whole**.** They hold all the cards they need to construct a comprehensive commodity supply and media empire. They are closely bound up with the fossil fuel extraction and processing industry, and by extension with the chemicals industry. This latter has not only ensured that agriculture remains dependent on its supplies of fertilizers and pesticides. It is also harnessing biotechnol\*ogy and patent law to massively deepen this dependency, and it has extensive links with the food-processing industry. The power corporations have links to the waste management indus\*try, and are currently seeking to bring the municipal water utilities under their control. They are attempting to erect toll\*gates on information and media networks. They are systematically taking over all the former public sector supply networks, but with no trace of public accountability or control. They are wreaking havoc on the environment, democracy and the free market**.**  Even if this is not their explicit intention, the power corpo\*rations are well on the way to becoming a uniquely powerful cartel. To this end they have no need of grand strategic visions. They merely have to follow, step for step, the economic logic of their existing supply chains. In this respect, their behaviour is as 'normal' as that of other firms; it is simply that the oppor\*tunities open to them and the resultant consequences are comprehensive and crushing. It is an unparalleled failure of political institutions that they not only do not oppose this development, but are even seeking to advance it.

## 2ac – at: k alts (0:20)

Political engagement is key – utopian visions crushed solar and just resulted in nihilist apocalypse mongering

Madrigal 11

Powering the Dream

Alexis Madrigal is a senior editor at The Atlantic, where he oversees the Technology channel. He's the author of Powering the Dream: The History and Promise of Green Technology.

But what if there is a global problem that requires nearly all the worlds citizens to work together? What happens if we need to cut global carbon emissions by something like 80 percent? What happens if, to preserve the biodiversity of the world, wc need to beat existing technologies in countries without democratically elected governments? Even with the same ecologically sane frame of reference, the most impactful actions of the 1970s and this decade may be quite different. One MIT study calculated that no American, no matter how abstemious their lifestyle, could reduce their carbon footprint below 8.5 tons or their total energy usage below 130 gigajoules.vs Even if you beg for vegetarian scraps from town to town, societal things like roads, police service, fire departments, libraries, the courts, and the military are all carried out on your behalf. And those things require energy. To reduce the carbon footprint of the country—which is more than twice the global average—society as a whole has to change.

For that to happen, the presentation of a real alternative is necessary. In truth, the solar transcendcntalists were too caught up with the Bomb induced apocalyptophilia of the time to present such a unified vision of a different society. Instead of organizing politically or socially, they were learning the "survival" skills that they almost seemed to darkly hope they would need in the postcivilization future. DeKomc held that It is not, however, within the scope of this book to explore the almost insurmountable problems to be solved before our societycould be expected to function within an ecologically sane frame of reference. Indeed, it is the authors opinion that the last meaningful chance for a societal change in this direction was passed sometime just before World War II. At any rate, survival is now an individual responsibility, and it is to individual solutions that this book addresses itself."4

However, most solar transcendentalists drifted away from their intense stances on energy. Some returned to "straight society" whereas others looked for transcendence without the sun. Jim DeKorne moved on to "life's greatest challenge: the souls Gnostic commitment to the Great Work of transformation—the impossibly perilous journey through the infinite maze of hyperspace" He wrote a book on psychedelic shamanism and moved to Hawaii.,T By 1979 one contemporary historian observed that "Numerous 1960s activists had moved from protest politics to self-awareness." Though some remained active fighting nuclear power, increasingly "looking inward seemed more fulfilling than changing the world."\*® Societal change by individual example had given way to a broader navel-gazing that left energy out of the picture. By the time Bill Clinton was elected president, it seemed all that remained of the solar transcendentalist movement was the popular memory of lukewarm solar hot water-heated showers and a few odd pieces of architecture.