**1ac**

**1ac new plan**

The United States federal government should substantially reduce restrictions on natural gas production in the United States.

**2ac**

**true – ext**

**Warming is real and anthropogenic–best climate data and models**

**Mueller 12**

(The New York Times, Richard A. Mueller, July 28, 2012, “The Conversion of a Climate Change Skeptic” Richard A. Muller, a professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, is the author, most recently, of “Energy for Future Presidents: The Science Behind the Headlines.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all>)

CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort involving a dozen scientists, I concluded that global warming was real and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct. I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. These findings are stronger than those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, which allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. By far the best match was to the record of atmospheric carbon dioxide, measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice. Just as important, our record is long enough that we could search for the fingerprint of solar variability, based on the historical record of sunspots. That fingerprint is absent. Although the I.P.C.C. allowed for the possibility that variations in sunlight could have ended the “Little Ice Age,” a period of cooling from the 14th century to about 1850, our data argues strongly that the temperature rise of the past 250 years cannot be attributed to solar changes. This conclusion is, in retrospect, not too surprising; we’ve learned from satellite measurements that solar activity changes the brightness of the sun very little. How definite is the attribution to humans? The carbon dioxide curve gives a better match than anything else we’ve tried. Its magnitude is consistent with the calculated greenhouse effect — extra warming from trapped heat radiation. These facts don’t prove causality and they shouldn’t end skepticism, but they raise the bar: to be considered seriously, an alternative explanation must match the data at least as well as carbon dioxide does. Adding methane, a second greenhouse gas, to our analysis doesn’t change the results. Moreover, our analysis does not depend on large, complex global climate models, the huge computer programs that are notorious for their hidden assumptions and adjustable parameters. Our result is based simply on the close agreement between the shape of the observed temperature rise and the known greenhouse gas increase.

**at: Framework**

Resolved is to reduce by mental analysis,

**Random House 11** (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve)

**Limits is a bad standard – presumes an objective way to organize evolving, intersubjective meaning – ambiguity is better**

**De Cock 1** (Christian De Cock, Professor of Organizational behaviour, change management, creative problem solving, 2001, “Of Philip K. Dick, reflexivity and shifting realities Organizing (writing) in our post-industrial society” in the book “Science Fiction and Organization”)

**If SF becomes annexed to the academic world it will buy into its own death** . . . Professor Warrick’s pound-and-a-half book with its expensive binding, paper, and dust jacket staggers you with its physical impression, but it has no soul and it will take our soul in what really seems to me to be brutal greed. Let us alone, Dr. Warrick; let us read our paperback novels with their peeled eyeball covers. Don’t dignify us. Our power to stimulate human imagination and to delight is intrinsic to us already. Quite frankly, we were doing fine before you came along. (Dick, 1980/1995, pp. 97–8) So why write this article? A healthy (?) obsession with Dick’s oeuvre I suppose, coupled with the comforting realization that Dick contradicted himself so many times in his lifetime. But to truly answer this question I have to tell the brief story of Philip K. Dick, organization studies and me. My introduction to the world of Philip K. Dick began in 1985 when I was given two Dick books – Ubik and Flow My Tears, the Policeman Said – as a birthday present. The girl in question was from Metz, a very Dickean connection as I found out later,2 the books were written in French and published in flashy golden covers (as far as you can get from the peeled eyeball covers as possible). I remember reading them (my French was a lot better then than it is now), being pretty impressed with Ubik especially, and then filing the books away in my SF collection. Fast forward to 1992. This is the year I started my Ph.D. studies. I came across the Rethinking Organization book by Reed and Hughes, and to my surprise two of my favourite chapters briefly referenced this SF author I vaguely remembered reading a few years earlier (Burrell, 1992, p. 177; Turner, 1992, p. 56). I then bought one of Dick’s short story collections (perhaps in the hope of using it for my Ph.D. studies – I wisely didn’t). And suddenly I was addicted. The next couple of years I tried to collect as many Dick books as possible, including the English editions of my birthday books. A moment I recall with particular fondness is finding a perfect copy of Now Wait for Last Year in a car boot sale for 10p. This sudden obsession was not uncommon as I discovered later: In my role as editor of the Philip K. Dick Society Newsletter, I frequently get letters from people who just a few months ago discovered Dick’s work and have now read fifteen books and must obtain all the others. He tends to be read as he wrote: in large doses. (Williams, 1986, p. 142) Then came the call for papers, first for the special SF issue of Organization in 1997, later for this book. This got me reading Dick’s collected philosophical writings and his Exegesis, as well as some literary criticism of Dick’s work. So, you see, the link between organization studies and Philip K. Dick is self-evident to me. Of course, this still does not provide an answer to the question: ‘How to write something meaningful?’ An academic book presupposes a particular style that does not necessarily do justice to the work of Dick (although Dick himself has written some pretty highbrow stuff). After some pondering I decided upon the following strategy. After introducing the problematic from the perspective of organization studies – the growing awareness of the tenuous nature of organizational reality and the difficulty we have in constructing texts that deal with this tenuous reality in a reflexive way – I explore the key characteristics of Dick’s novels and the essence of his writing techniques. This is followed by a discussion of Ubik to give the reader a flavour of a typical Dickean novel. I conclude with the logical, but rather too predictable, discussion of the importance of Dick for the field of organization studies. Of course, it would be nonsensical to suggest that we can ‘apply’ Dick in the way it has happened with Foucault, Derrida or Elias, but to name a few. Yet there is something curiously attractive about an author who used the most trashy tropes of a genre (SF) to create a body of work that both transcends and invigorates that genre. Could this point to an analogue in organization theory that might enable us to frame new possibilities of writing or reading organizational narratives? Perhaps. Modes of organizing, modes of theorizing and this thing called reality ‘As Marx might have said more generally, ‘all that is built or all that is “natural” melts into image’ in the contemporary global economies of signs and space’ (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 326). The opinion seems to be broadly shared among both academics and practitioners that traditional conceptions of effective organizing and decision-making are no longer viable because we live in a time of irredeemable turbulence and ambiguity (Gergen, 1995). The emerging digital or ‘new’ economy seems to be a technologically driven vision of new forms of organizing, relying heavily on notions of flexibility as a response this turbulence. Corporate dinosaurs must be replaced with smart networks that add value. Words such as ‘cyberspace’3 and ‘cyborganization’ drip easily from tongues (e.g. Parker and Cooper, 1998) and ‘the organization’ becomes more difficult to conceptualize as it ‘dissipates into cyberspace’ and ‘permeates its own boundaries’ (Hardy and Clegg 1997: S6). Organizations are losing important elements of permanence as two central features of the modern organization, namely the assumption of self-contained units and its structural solidity, are undermined (March, 1995). Even the concept of place becomes increasingly phantasmagoric as locales get thoroughly penetrated by social influences quite distant from them (Giddens, 1990). In this new organizational world ‘reality’ seems to have become only a contract, the fabrication of a consensus that can be modified or can break down at any time (Kallinikos, 1997) and the witnessing point – the natural datum or physical reference point – seems to be in danger of being scrapped (Brown, 1997). This notion that reality is dissolving from the inside cannot but be related with feelings of disorientation and anxiety. Casey (1995, pp. 70–1), for example, provides a vivid description of the position of ‘the self ’ within these new organizational realities. This is a world where everyone has lost a sense of everyday competence and is dependent upon experts, where people become dependent on corporate bureaucracy and mass culture to know what to do. The solidity (or absence of it) of reality has of course been debated at great length in the fields of philosophy and social theory, but it remains an interesting fact that organizational scholars have become preoccupied with this issue in recent years. Hassard and Holliday (1998), for example, talk about the theoretical imperative to explore the linkages between fact/fiction and illusion/reality. It is as if some fundamental metaphysical questions have finally descended into the metaphorical organizational street. Over the past decade or so, many academics who label themselves critical management theorists and/or postmodernists (for once, let’s not name any names) have taken issue with traditional modes of organizing (and ways of theorizing about this organizing) by highlighting many irrationalities and hidden power issues. These academics have taken on board the idea that language has a role in the constitution of reality and their work is marked by a questioning of the nature of reality, of our conception of knowledge, cognition, perception and observation (e.g. Chia, 1996a; Cooper and Law, 1995; Czarniawska, 1997). Notwithstanding the importance of their contributions, these authors face the problem that **in order to condemn a mode of organizing or theorizing they need to occupy an elevated position, a sort of God’s eye view of the world**; a position which they persuasively challenge when they deconstruct the claims of orthodox/modern organizational analyses (Parker, 2000; Weiskopf and Willmott, 1997). Chia, for example, writes about the radically untidy, ill-adjusted character of the fields of actual experience – ‘It is only by . . . giving ourselves over to the powers of “chaos”, ambiguity, and confusion that new and deeper insights and understanding can be attained’ (Chia, 1996b, p. 423) – using arguments which could not be more tidy, analytical and precise. This of course raises the issue of reflexivity: if reality can never be stabilized and the research/theorizing process ‘is always necessarily precarious, incomplete and fragmented’ (Chia, 1996a, p. 54), then Chia’s writing clearly sits rather uncomfortably with his ontological and epistemological beliefs. In this he is, of course, not alone (see, e.g., Gephart et al.., 1996; Cooper and Law, 1995). This schizophrenia is evidence of rather peculiar discursive rules where certain ontological and epistemological statements are allowed and even encouraged, but the reciprocate communicational practices are disallowed. Even the people who are most adventurous in their ideas or statements (such as Chia) are still caught within rather confined communicational practices. To use Vickers’ (1995) terminology: there is a disjunction between the ways in which organization theorists are ready to see and value the organizational world (their appreciative setting) and the ways in which they are ready to respond to it (their instrumental system). When Reflexivity and shifting realities 163 we write about reflexivity, paradox and postmodernism in organizational analysis, it is expected that we do this unambiguously.4 And yet, the notion that ‘if not consistency, then chaos’ is not admitted even by all logicians, and is rejected by many at the frontiers of natural science research – ‘a contradiction causes only some hell to break loose’ (McCloskey, 1994, p. 166).

**Their move is not benign – the rhetoric of limits creates a necessarily exclusionary and authoritarian politics**

**Kulynych 97** (Kulynych, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, 1997 Jessica, “Performing Politics," Polity, Winter, v.XXX, n.2, p. 315-325)

II. Disciplining Habermas Political scientists have traditionally understood political participation as an activity that assures individual influence over the political system, protection of private interests, system legitimacy, and perhaps even self-development. Habermas and Foucault describe the impact of the conditions of postmodernity on the possibility for efficacious political action in remarkably similar ways. Habermas describes a world where the possibilities for efficacious political action are quite limited. The escalating interdependence of state and economy, the expansive increase in bureaucratization, the increasingly technical nature of political decisionmaking, and the subsequent colonization of a formerly sacred private sphere by a ubiquitous administrative state render traditional modes of political participation unable to provide influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development.3 As the state is forced to take an ever larger role in directing a complex global, capitalist, welfare state economy, the scope of administration inevitably grows. In order to fulfill its function as the manager of the economy, the administrative state must also manage the details of our lives formerly considered private. Yet, as the state's role in our "private" lives continues to grow, the public has become less and less interested in government, focusing instead on personal and social mores, leisure, and consumption. Ironically, we have become less interested in politics at precisely the same moment when our lives are becoming increasingly "politicized" and administered. This siege of private life and the complicity of this ideology of "civil privatism" in the functioning of the modern administrative state makes a mockery of the idea that there exist private interests that can be protected from state intervention.4 Correlatively, the technical and instrumental rationality of modern policymaking significantly lessens the possibility for public influence on state policy.5 The difficulty of participation in Habermas's world is exacerbated by the added complexity of a political system structured by hierarchical gender and racial norms. Nancy Fraser uses Habermas\*s analysis of the contemporary situation to demonstrate how the infusion of these hierarchical gender and racial norms into the functioning of the state and economy ensures that political channels of communication between citizens and the state are unequally structured and therefore cannot function as mechanisms for the equal protection of interests.6 Accordingly, theorists are much less optimistic about the possibilities for citizens to acquire or develop feelings of autonomy and efficacy from the attempt to communicate interests to a system that is essentially impervious to citizen interests, eschews discussion of long-term goals, and requires exclusively technical and instrumental debate. Similarly, Foucault's complex genealogical descriptions of disciplinary power networks challenge the traditional assumption that political power is located primarily in the formal apparatus of the state. The traditional understanding of political participation tells us nothing about what types of political action are appropriate in a world where power is typically and predominantly disciplinary, productive, and normalizing. As long as we define the purpose of participation only in terms of influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development, we will be unable to see how political action can be effective in the contemporary world. While separately both Habermas and Foucault challenge the traditional understanding of participation, their combined insights further and irrevocably extend that challenge. Theoretical focus on the distinctions between Habermas and Foucault has all too often obscured important parallels between these two theorists. Specifically, the Habermas-Foucault debate has underemphasized the extent to which Habermas also describes a disciplinary society. In his descriptions of bureaucracy, technocracy, and system colonization, Habermas is also describing a world where power is productive and dispersed and where political action is constrained and normalized. Habermas, like Foucault, describes a type of power that cannot be adequately characterized in terms of the intentions of those who possess it. Colonization is not the result of conscious intention, but is rather the unintended consequence of a multitude of small adjustments. The gender and racial subtexts infusing the system are not the results of conscious intention, but rather of implicit gender and racial norms and expectations infecting the economy and the state. Bureaucratic power is not a power that is possessed by any individual or agency, but exists in the exercise of decisionmaking. As Iris Young points out, we must "analyze the exercise of power [in contemporary societies] as the effect of often liberal and humane practices of education, bureaucratic administration, production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine and so on."7 The very practices that Habermas chronicles are exemplary of a power that has no definitive subject. As Young explains, "the conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are simply doing their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression."8 Colonization and bureaucratization also fit the pattern of a power that is not primarily repressive but productive. Disciplinary technologies are, as Sawicki describes, not . .. repressive mechanisms. .. [that] operate primarily through violence ... or seizure ... but rather [they operate] by producing new objects and subjects of knowledge, by inciting and channeling desires, generating and focusing individual and group energies, and establishing bodily norms and techniques for observing, monitoring and controlling bodily movements, processes, and capacities.9 The very practices of administration, distribution, and decisionmaking on which Habermas focuses his attention can and must be analyzed as productive disciplinary practices. Although these practices can clearly be repressive, their most insidious effects are productive. Rather than simply holding people back, bureaucratization breaks up, categorizes, and systemizes projects and people. It creates new categories of knowledge and expertise. Bureaucratization and colonization also create new subjects as the objects of bureaucratic expertise. The social welfare client and the consumer citizen are the creation of bureaucratic power, not merely its target. The extension of lifeworld gender norms into the system creates the possibility for sexual harassment, job segregation, parental leave, and consensual corporate decisionmaking. Created as a part of these subjectivities are new gestures and norms of bodily behavior, such as the embarrassed shuffling of food stamps at the grocery checkout and the demeaning sexual reference at the office copier. Bodily movements are monitored and regularized by means of political opinion polls, welfare lists, sexual harassment protocols, flex-time work schedules, and so forth. Modern disciplinary power, as described by Foucault and implied by Habermas, does not merely prevent us from developing, but creates us differently as the effect of its functioning. These disciplinary techniques not only control us, but also enable us to be more efficient and more productive, and often more powerful. Focusing on the disciplinary elements of the Habermasian critique opens the door for exploring the postmodern character of Habermasian politics. Because Habermas does describe a disciplinary world, his prescription for contemporary democracy (discursive politics) ought to be sensitive to, and appropriate for, a disciplinary world. Foucault's sensitivity to the workings of disciplinary power is central to the articulation of a plausible, postmodern version of discursive politics. In the following discussion I will argue for a performative redefinition of participation that will reinvigorate the micro-politics demanded by Foucault, as well as provide a more nuanced version of the discursive politics demanded by Habermas. III. Habermas and Discursive Participation Habermas regards a public sphere of rational debate as the only possible foundation for democratic politics in the contemporary world. For Habermas, like Schumpeter, democracy is a method. Democracies are systems that achieve the formation of public opinion and public will through a correct process of public communication, and then "translate" that communicative power into administrative power via the procedurally regulated public spheres of parliaments and the judiciary. The extent to which this translation occurs is the measure of a healthy constitutional democracy. Thus, the "political public sphere" is the "fundamental concept of a theory of democracy."10 In this discursive definition of democracy, political participation takes on a new character. Participation equals discursive participation; it is communication governed by rational, communicatively achieved argument and negotiation. Habermas distinguishes two types of discursive participation: problem-solving or decision-oriented deliberation, which takes place primarily in formal democratic institutions such as parlia-ments and is regulated or governed by democratic procedures; and informal opinion-formation, which is opinion-formation "uncoupled from decisions . .. [and] effected in an open and inclusive network of overlapping, subcultural publics having fluid temporal, social and substantive boundaries."11 In many ways this two-tiered description of discursive participation is a radically different understanding of political participation, and one better suited to the sort of societies we currently inhabit. Habermas moves the focus of participation away from policymaking and toward redefining legitimate democratic processes that serve as the necessary background for subsequent policymaking. While only a limited number of specially trained individuals can reasonably engage in decisionmaking participation, the entire populous can and must participate in the informal deliberation that takes place outside of, or uncoupled from, formal decisionmaking structures. This informal participation is primarily about generating "public discourses that uncover topics of relevance to all of society, interpret values, contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good reasons, and debunk bad ones."12 Informal participation has two main functions. First, it acts as a "warning system with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society."13 This system communicates problems "that must be processed by the political system."14 Habermas labels this the "signal" function. Second, informal participation must not only indicate when problems need to be addressed, it must also provide an "effective problematization" of those issues. As Habermas argues, from the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes.15 Informal participation is crucial because it is the source of both legitimacy and innovation in formal decisionmaking. As long as decisionmaking is open to the influence of informal opinion-formation, then state policies are legitimate because they are grounded in free and equal communication that meets the democratic requirement of equal participation. Informal participation originating in the public sphere is also the resource for innovative descriptions and presentations of interests, preferences, and issues. If they ignore informal participation, state decisionmakers have no connection to the center of democracy: the political public sphere. Habermas's description of discursive participation is also novel and effective due to its broad construal of the participatory act. Participation is defined very broadly because the concept of the public sphere remains quite abstract. The public sphere is a "linguistically constituted public space."16 It is neither an institution nor an organization. Rather, it is a "network for communicating information and points of view [which are] .. . filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions."17 Public spheres are defined not by a physical presence but rather by a "communication structure." According to Habermas, "the more they detach themselves from the public's physical presence and extend to the virtual presence of scattered readers, listeners, or viewers linked by public media, the clearer becomes the abstraction that enters when the spatial structure of simple interactions is expanded into a public sphere.'"8 In other words, actually being present in a "concrete locale" is unnecessary for the existence of a public sphere, and hence unnecessary for active participation. Participation is not limited to large, organized discussions in formal settings; it also includes "simple and episodic encounters" in which actors "reciprocally [attribute] communicative freedom to each other."19 This abstraction makes participation easier and extremely inclusive. As Habermas describes, "every encounter in which actors do not just observe each other but take a second-person attitude, reciprocally attributing communicative freedom to each other, unfolds in a linguistically constituted public space."20 Thus, the concerns that political scientists have had about unequal resource distribution and its effect on one's capability to act are mitigated in Habermas's broad definition of discursive participation. Even though limited resources may prevent active interventions in decisionmaking and policymaking processes, for Habermas the "communicative structures of the public sphere relieve the public of the burden of decision-making."21 In a similar vein, Habermas does not limit participation to a specific set of activities, but defines it procedurally or contextually. Participation is not limited to traditional activities such as voting, campaigning, or letter-writing, but is instead designated by the discursive quality of the activity. In other words, it is not the intent to influence policy that defines participation, but rather the communication structure in which the activity takes place. That communication structure must be equitable and inclusive, social problems must be openly and rationally deliberated, and they must be thematized by people potentially affected. However, Habermas's discursive formulation is inadequate primarily because it does not explicitly and rigorously attend to the disciplinary effects of contemporary societies explained so creatively by Foucault. Habermas has been routinely criticized for ignoring the productive nature of contemporary power. His juxtaposition of system and life-world in The Theory of Communicative Action relies on a separation of good power from bad (communicative power v. steering media), and posits an ideal speech situation freed from the distortions of power.22 More importantly, Habermas's theorization of discursive participation is exceedingly abstract and does not adequately attend to the ways in which power informs discourse. A number of theorists have effectively argued that women and men do not stand in equal relationship to language. For example, Linda Zerilli argues that discursive space is a "fraternal community of unique and symbolic dimensions."23 Women utilize language in this discursive world "whose 'common' and symbolic language . . . enables one user to understand what another is saying; just as it compels each speaker to constrain himself within the limits of an existing political vocabulary."24 In this case the content of speech is systematically limited in direct violation of the required conditions for the ideal speech situation. The foundations of communication are not the ideal equal relationships that Habermas imagines, but are instead an exclusive, learned, and gendered, symbolic heritage. As Carole Pateman points out, women enter into public discussion on a very tenuous plane. The symbolic heritage that defines the meaning of key communicative concepts such as consent systematically excludes women from the category of individuals capable of consenting.25 The mere existence of a debate over whether "no means no" with regard to consensual sexual relations and rape is a manifestation of this heritage. Women can hardly be seen as equal participants when they do not have the same opportunity to express their intent. Certainly, one might suggest that the above cases are really just failures of speech, and, therefore, not a critique of ideal speech as it is formulated by Habermas. Indeed Seyla Benhabib reformulates Habermas's speech act perspective to make it sensitive to the above critique. She argues that feminists concerned with the discourse model of democracy have often confused the historically biased practices of deliberative assemblies with the normative ideal of rational deliberation.26 She suggests that feminists concerned with inequities and imbalances in communication can actually benefit from the Habermasian requirement that all positions and issues be made " 'public' in the sense of making [them] accessible to debate, reflection, action and moral-political transformation."27 The "radical proceduralism" of the discourse model makes it ideally suited to identify inequities in communication because it precludes our accepting unexamined and unjustified positions.28 Even such a sophisticated and sensitive approach to ideal speech as Benhabib's cannot cleanse communicative action of its exclusivity. It is not only that acquiring language is a process of mastering a symbolic heritage that is systematically gendered, but the entire attempt to set conditions for "ideal speech" is inevitably exclusive. The model of an ideal speech situation establishes a norm of rational interaction that is defined by the very types of interaction it excludes. The norm of rational debate favors critical argument and reasoned debate over other forms of communication.29 Defining ideal speech inevitably entails defining unacceptable speech. What has been defined as unacceptable in Habermas's formulation is any speech that is not intended to convey an idea. Speech evocative of identity, culture, or emotion has no necessary place in the ideal speech situation, and hence persons whose speech is richly colored with rhetoric, gesture, humor, spirit, or affectation could be defined as deviant or immature communicators. Therefore, a definition of citizenship based on participation in an ideal form of interaction can easily become a tool for the exclusion of deviant communicators from the category of citizens. This sort of normalization creates citizens as subjects of rational debate. Correlatively, as Fraser explains, because the communicative action approach is procedural it is particularly unsuited to address issues of speech content.30 Therefore, by definition, it misses the relationship between procedure and content that is at the core of feminist and deconstructive critiques of language. A procedural approach can require that we accommodate all utterances and that we not marginalize speaking subjects. It cannot require that we take seriously or be convinced by the statements of such interlocutors. In other words, a procedural approach does not address the cultural context that makes some statements convincing and others not. I would suggest that Habermas recognizes this problem, but has yet to explicitly theorize it. As I noted above, Habermas requires that informal discursive participation not only identify problems but also "convincingly and influentially thematize them." A thematization is legitimate, Habermas argues, only when it stems from a communicative process that "develops out of communication taking place among those who are potentially affected."31 Thus, the extent to which a position is convincing seems to rely primarily on whether the affected parties have had a say in its articulation (a procedural requirement). What Habermas does not explicitly recognize is that whether a problem is convincingly thematized is not just a matter of utilizing correct procedure.

 **at: eco-authoritarianism good**

**The biosphere’s being pushed to the brink now – we need a mindset shift away from dominant eco-paradigms to solve**

**ROCKSTRÖM 2012**

Johan, executive director of the Stockholm Environment Institute, head of the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Professor in Environmental Science at Stockholm University, vice-chair of the science advisory board of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact research (PIK), chairs the visioning process on global environmental change of ICSU, the International Council for Science, FOKUS magazine’s ‘Swedish Person of the Year’ 2009, momentum, Winter, 2012, <http://environment.umn.edu/momentum/issue/4.1w12/rockstrom.html>,

Why do we need to think about protecting Earth’s systems from catastrophic failure? The basic reason is that major advances in Earth system science now show that humanity is facing the risk of large-scale, potentially catastrophic tipping points that could hamper human development. The evidence shows that we may have entered a whole new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, where humans constitute the main geological force changing planet Earth. The planetary boundaries framework was developed to address this new reality. But the insight of the Anthropocene gives you only the very first step, because it just indicates we have a high degree of human pressure. The second is the risk of nonlinear change, which comes out of resilience theory and from empirical evidence that particular ecosystems have multiple stable states. We see evidence that lakes and forests and wetlands can have different equilibria—so you have a savanna system that may be stable and thriving, but it can also tip over and become an arid steppe if pushed too far by warming, land degradation and biodiversity loss. A clear-water lake can become a murky, biodiversity-low anoxic lake. Unfortunately, the science is increasingly showing that even large systems can tip. There’s paleoclimatic evidence that if oceans get an overload of phosphorus, they could collapse with large dead zones. The largest ice sheets also show evidence of shifts between ice-covered and ice-free states. We asked ourselves: OK, so if we are in the Anthropocene, and if we are at risk or have evidence of large regional to global tipping points, then what is our desired state for planet Earth? What is the state at which Earth needs to be in order to support human well-being in a world of 7—soon to be 9—billion people? Paleoclimatic records show clearly that the past 10,000 years, the Holocene, is a remarkably stable period in which we went from being a few hunters and gatherers to become more sedentary agriculture-based civilizations, which then moved us to the current populated modern era. So there’s robust evidence that the Holocene is our desired state and the only state we know that can support the modern economy. If we know that, we can also define the biophysical preconditions: What are the Earth system processes that determine the Holocene’s familiarity? Can we for those processes identify tipping points we want to avoid? The insight of the importance of the Holocene stability provides humanity with a science-based analysis of global sustainability goals that should be met to provide us safe operating space for human development. What would it take to protect Earth’s systems from catastrophic failure? There are so many challenges and steps that need to be taken. But if one thinks of it as entering a funnel, I think a broad entry point is the need for a shift in mind-set. It might sound a bit awkward—the first thing one thinks of is probably new economic paradigms, really hard new governance structures, new policies. All of that is of course required, but the precondition is that modern society reconnect to the biosphere, which in turn requires a mind shift. Today we operate the world with our growth paradigm and our economic imperative and our social imperative as being the supreme goals for our societies. We then add, at best, sustainable development, corporate social responsibility and all the good work we’re doing with clean tech and efforts to be more efficient, all with the explicit goal of minimizing environmental impacts within the overarching growth paradigm. The insights of the Anthropocene and tipping points show this paradigm doesn’t work anymore. We have to reverse the whole order and agree that the biosphere is the basis for everything else. This is quite dramatic, because it means human development has to be subordinate to Earth system boundaries. It changes the whole idea of macroeconomic theory, because macroeconomic theory basically states that as long as you put the right price on the environment, you automatically get the most cost-efficient way of solving environmental problems. The second dimension is the idea of planetary stewardship, which means taking ourselves from 196 nation-states operating in their own interest as individual entities to joint governance at the planetary scale. We need to strengthen global governance. We need a global agency that governs, monitors, verifies and reports on whether we’re on aggregate meeting planetary boundaries. That is something a world environment organization could do. This is not to say bottom-up initiatives are not important. On the contrary, they are a precondition for success. But in the Anthropocene, where we need to urgently bend the global curves of negative environmental change, we need to provide leadership also at the global scale. This is lacking today. How urgent is this? There is more and more scientific evidence that suggests it is very urgent. For climate, biodiversity and nitrogen, we are already in the slippery danger zone where we cannot exclude tipping over thresholds. On climate, we’re seeing evidence of a destabilization of the Arctic ice sheet. On nitrogen, we’re seeing clear evidence of major tipping points where lakes are losing their capacity to support human well-being due to overuse of nitrogen and phosphorus particularly in modern agriculture. On biodiversity, we’ve reached the point where humanity is causing an extinction of species equivalent to losing the dinosaurs 65 million years ago—at the same time we’re also learning how much we depend on biodiversity. We have increasing evidence we need to back off also on phosphorus and that we’re approaching dangerous boundaries for freshwater and for land. **So we have a decade right now that is very decisive**. And the reason it’s urgent is not that we risk catastrophic outcomes in one year or five years or 10 years. It is because what we do today injects changes in Earth systems that may cause thresholds in 50 years’ time, 100 years’ time. The future of coming generations is thus truly in this generation’s hands. And we have already committed ourselves to major risks of tipping points in the coming century. That’s why we need to go much, much faster on turning back into the safe operating space. For the boundaries that we have already transgressed, we can’t exclude that this decade is a determining decade, that we need to bend the curves of negative environmental change before 2020. There’s a lot of strong evidence that’s the case. What if we do take this to heart? What could we hope for? That’s a very interesting question, because there’s very little or no science to suggest that a global transition to sustainability, a global transition to a future within planetary boundaries, would be a worse world than the world we know today. On the contrary, there is increasing evidence to suggest that a transition can be done while providing us with good chances of prosperity even on a crowded planet.

**This public/private distinction flawed – the state will act as a private individual and terrible**

**Zizek 7**

http://www.lacan.com/zizecology1.htm

The first step is to admit that **the solution is not to limit the market and private property by direct interventions of the State** and state ownership. **The domain of State itself is** also in its own way “**private”**: private in the precise Kantian sense of the “private use of Reason” **in** State **administrative and ideological apparatuses:** The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men. The private use of one’s reason, on the other hand, may often be very narrowly restricted without particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. By public use of one’s reason I understand the use which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him. What one should add here, moving beyond Kant, is that there is **a privileged social group** which, on account of its lacking a determinate place in the “private” order of social hierarchy, **directly stands for universality: it is only the reference to those Excluded**, to those who dwell in the blanks of the State space, **that enables true universality. There is nothing more “private” than a State community which perceives the Excluded as a threat and worries how to keep the Excluded at a proper distance**. In other words, **in the** series of the **four antagonisms, the one between the Included and the Excluded is the crucial one, the point of reference for the others**; without it, all others lose their subversive edge: ecology turns into a “problem of sustainable development,” intellectual property into a “complex legal challenge,” biogenetics into an “ethical” issue. **One can sincerely fight for ecology**, defend a broader notion of intellectual property, oppose the copyrighting of genes, **while not questioning the antagonism between the Included and the Exclude**d - **even** more, one can even f**ormulate** some of **these struggles in the terms of the Included threatened by the polluting Excluded**. In this way, we get no true universality, only “private” concerns in the Kantian sense of the term. Corporations like Whole Foods and Starbucks continue to enjoy favor among liberals even though they both engage in anti-union activities; the trick is that they sell products that contain the claim of being politically progressive acts in and of themselves. One buys coffee made with beans bought at above fair-market value, one drives a hybrid vehicle, one buys from companies that provide good benefits for their customers (according to the corporation’s own standards), etc. Political action and consumption become fully merged. In short, **without the antagonism between the Included and the Excluded, we may well find ourselves in a world in which** Bill Gates is the greatest humanitarian fighting against poverty and diseases, and **Rupert Murdoch the greatest environmentalist** mobilizing hundreds of millions through his media empire.

**The historical nature of sovereign power proves neo-malthusianism degenerates into ecocide and genocide. only an ethic of autonomy solves**

**Smith 8**

Suspended Animation: Radical Ecology, Sovereign Powers, and Saving the (Natural) World Mick Smith. Journal for the Study of Radicalism. East Lansing: 2008. Vol. 2, Iss. 1; pg. 1, 25 pgs Associate Professor and Queen's National Scholar, queens university, ontario Ph.D. (Humanism and Anti-humanism in Environmental Values), University of Stirling, UK (1993); M.A. (Modern European Thought), Thames Polytechnic, UK (1988); M.Phil (The Ecology of Basidiobolus and Conidiobolus in Soils and Plant Litters), North Staffordshire Polytechnic, UK (1988); B.Sc. Hons. (Ecology), University of York, UK (1982).

Agamben, whose philosophical trajectory has often been associated with the radical left in Italy, selectively adapts this notion of biopolitics from the work of Michel Foucault, combining it with a complex analysis of the idea and role of sovereignty based in a critical reading of the legal philosophy of Carl Schmitt.10 His purpose, in a series of closely related works-most especially in The Coming Community and in the series of volumes beginning with Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare-Life11-is to provide a critique of the very notion of sovereignty in all its associations with state power and especially contemporary repressive uses of this power to reduce politics to nothing more than the administration and management of human brains, bodies, and biology. He argues that the establishment of such reductive biopolitical regimes constitutes a denial, even a destruction, of everything that makes human politics so vital a source of creative political possibilities, everything that frees us to take our lives into our own hands and make of them something unique in association with others. The danger of this biopolitical reduction is present wherever a "state of emergency" (of exception), a term Agamben borrows from Walter Benjamin, becomes a "period of permanent crisis and the state decides to undertake the management of the biological life of the nation directly as its own task."12 Unfortunately, as Benjamin himself suggested, political experience teaches us that "the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule."13 Sovereignty, the power to rule over others and determine matters of life and death, is in today's world primarily legitimated through the constant presence of emergencies, whether manufactured (fictitious) or real. Indeed, in a technologically enframed (and politically diminished) condition, our reality itself is, to an increasing extent, manufactured (in the rather different sense that it is made manifest by and through socio-economic processes that constantly transform reality). Discussion of whether the reality of any situation merits the suspension of politics and ethics is beside the radical ecological political point (because such a suspension must always be resisted), although the question of the extent of sovereign power's involvement in manufacturing (producing) a crisis situation, including an ecological crisis like global warming, is clearly not. The real concern is that sovereign power (and here, remember, Agamben is thinking primarily of state power) has, as part of its self-definition as "sovereign," accrued to itself the sole right to decide this question.14 That is to say, the sovereign power invested in a state's juridico-political system is exemplified precisely in those cases in which it politically manufactures (produces) a situation where the ethico-political norms-the protection of which, after all, form the very basis for its original claim to wield legitimate power-are deemed no longer to apply. The rule (of law) as an expression of sovereign power over life and death declares a state of emergency where "suspending itself, [it] gives rise to the exception and, [simultaneously] maintains itself in relation to the exception."15 There is thus a real, and devastatingly ironic, possibility that the idea of an ecological crisis, so long and so vehemently denied by every state, will now find itself recuperated by the very powers so responsible for bringing that crisis about, as the latest and most comprehensive justification for a political state of emergency, a condition that serves to insulate those powers against all political and ethical critique. We may find that the global war on terror will segue seamlessly into the crisis of global warming, a condition produced by previous technological interventions in the natural world, interventions of a kind that were initially deemed politically unchallengeable by everyone except radical ecologists. The growing (political and ecological) danger is that this emergency is used to legitimate further technocratic interventions, to further extend the state and corporate management of biological life, including the continuing reduction of humanity to bare life. We should be clear what is at stake here: nothing less than the ecological future of the natural world and the ethico-political future of humanity. The dry bed of the Aral Sea, the burning forests of Southeast Asia, the devastated landscape wrought by the exploitation of the Athabasca oil-tar sands, the industrial-scale slaughter of seal pups on Canada's east coast, and a million other examples all reveal the likely destiny of the natural world without ethico-political intervention. As for the reduction of humanity to bare life, Agamben controversially suggests that its paradigmatic, and most extreme, materialization appears in the "final solution" of the concentration camp, a place where the political exception becomes the rule, where people are excised by sovereign power from the political sphere, with devastating results. In such localities, we encounter a peculiarly human form of "suspended animation," one where human possibilities for political and ethical involvement are removed, where human life becomes bare life. "Inasmuch as its inhabitants have been stripped of every political status and reduced completely to naked life [bare life], the camp is also the most biopolitical space that has ever been realised."16 For Agamben, then, the camp "is the sign of the system's inability to function without transforming itself into a lethal machine." However, he also argues that precisely for this reason, "we must learn to recognise it [the camp] in all of its metamorphoses," and there are many.17 Of course, they are rarely, if ever, so extreme, but the reduction of people to bare life is, Agamben argues, the sign of an increasingly pervasive form of biopolitics. He mentions the former Yugoslavia-and Guantánamo Bay also, inevitably, springs to mind- as a locality where, according to Judith Butler, bare life reaches its maximum indeterminacy.18 More frequently, this biopolitics is less localizable and for this reason less extreme in its immediate effects, though no less systematic in their distribution. The corporate patenting of individuals' DNA, their exclusion from medical insurance on genetic grounds, the taking, storing, and ordering of biological information at border crossings, facial recognition technology-all might provide cases in point. Here too we find corporations and the state moving toward the biopolitical management of populations; here too the procedures are justified by "exceptional" circumstances that become the new rules. A more localized and ecological exemplar might be found in the state of emergency declared in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Here, what was portrayed as a failure to predict or manage a natural event led to the ethical and political abandonment of a largely African American, urban population and the simultaneous imposition of martial law on that same population. The concern, if Agamben is right, is that the disastrous consequences of such instances only increase the likelihood of further technological interventions and the call for more rigorous bureaucratic control and police powers, on an ever increasing scale. Back to Nature The camp stands as a constant possibility for, and a warning to, our times of the dangers of stripping humans of their ethical and political possibilities. But we should reemphasize that a reading of Heidegger might suggest something more than this, namely that such particular forms of inhumanity become more likely when the world itself comes to be enframed as nothing more than a standing reserve. Unless we can think the roots of this technological Gestell-and then employ this thinking as a basis for political and ethical action-such biopolitical dangers will remain with us.19 In other words, from a radical ecological perspective, we cannot save politics and ethics from this technological enframing without saving nature, too. A weakness in Agamben's approach would seem to be its failure to be concerned about the designation of the nonhuman world as being placed in a permanent state of exception.20 Indeed we might say that the natural world is precisely where the state of exception originally takes the form of the rule, at least where dominant modern western philosophical and political traditions are concerned. Nature enters politics and ethics primarily as that over and against which ruling powers define their present political state, as that "apolitical" realm over which they first and foremost claim to exercise sovereign power (as exemplified in Locke).21 The natural world is thereby reduced to both resource and to its definitional role as a necessary counterpart to human uniqueness, to humanity's own self-decreed, political and ethical, exceptionality from so-called laws of nature. To point this out is not, however, to support yet another form of biological or ecological reductionism. It is not a call to recognize the natural primacy of the sovereignty of nature over all human activities, including ethics and politics. This charge is often levelled at radical ecologists, and it is true that some environmentalists may indeed be guilty of aiding and abetting a scientistic reductionism, that they too may be in the sway of that technological enframing that fosters such assumptions, for example, by trying to reduce human politics and ethics to neo-Malthusian matters of ecological carrying capacity and resource depletion. But this is precisely what radical ecology is not. It is a political and ecological critique of sovereignty per se, both natural and political. The breadth and depth of this critique is why radical ecology is potentially the most radical form of politics, and why it offers the most fundamental challenge to the established order of things. This, again, is why we can say that radical ecology tries to save politics and ethics (and not only the natural world), to recognize their "relative autonomy" and their vital importance in constituting a good life for human communities within, and not constitutionally positioned as a sovereign power above, a "more than human" world.22 This being so, the question now becomes one of the ways, and there are many possibilities, in which one might envisage the relative autonomy of nature, politics, and ethics, of saving them in such a way that all are released into (as Heidegger might put it) their essence (into natural and social histories), free from the biopolitics of sovereign power and its technological enframing of the world. "Saving does not only snatch something from a danger. To save really means to set something free into its own essence."23

 **Technology in the abstract can’t *save* the environment because it gets reinvested into production – we must restructure societal values**

**York et al. 3**

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THE TREADMILL OF PRODUCTION AND THE SECOND CONTRADICTION OF CAPITALISM. For Schnaiberg and Gould (Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994) the "treadmill of production" is the driving force behind modem economies-and ultimately environmental impacts as well. To maintain profits, producers must constantly seek to expand production. Seeking to expand production while lowering costs, producers invest in economically efficient technologies that have higher yields per unit of labor. This results in the displacement of "costly" workers, and the only way to absorb the displaced workers is to further expand production. Workers, seeking to avoid unemployment, are trapped into supporting the increased production necessary to compensate for the increase in worker productivity. Governments, too, support increased production because it increases tax revenues, thereby providing them with the means to fund social and environmental policies. Through the continual expansion of production, the treadmill increases environmental impacts by placing greater demands on resources and by producing greater volumes of waste. Schnaiberg (1975, 1980), then, identifies a fundamental conflict: the dialectic between society and the environment-between economic production and ecosystems. Contrary to ecological modernization theory, Schnaiberg argues that producers will not willingly internalize the environmental costs of production because doing so would reduce profits, the primary concern of producers. Furthermore, because of the political power of the economic elite, reform-oriented social and political action is unlikely to substantially alter the power of producers or to reduce environmental externalities. From the treadmill perspective, the only solution to the "enduring conflict" (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994) between society and the environment is to radically restructure society so as to limit the hegemony of producers. O'Connor (1988, 1994, 1998), after Marx ([1867] 1967) and echoing the work of Schnaiberg and colleagues, argues that modern production economies, particularly capitalist ones, are growth dependent. Producers continually seek to reduce the costs of production, especially by reducing labor costs with improved technology. This leads to unemployment and, concomitantly, to a decline in the number of consumers with incomes to purchase the goods produced. The result is the first contradiction of capitalism: a demand crisis in which production and consumption are unbalanced. One potential route out of this crisis is to expand markets. However, expansion is limited because the number of markets is bounded and natural resources are ultimately finite. This leads to O'Connor's (1988, 1994) second contradiction of capitalism: Escalating production depletes the natural resources required to sustain production, which escalates costs and results in shrinking profits. The continued depletion of resources can lead to an environmental crisis, as nature's capital and services are lost. The fundamental assumption of the political economy perspective is that economic production is in fundamental conflict with ecological limits. The only way to prevent further ecological deterioration is to curb economic growth in its traditional form. Technology that improves the efficiency of resource use, superficially appearing to reduce environmental impacts, **only serves to ultimately increase impacts because the resulting increased profits are inevitably reinvested to increase production** (often in a different industry or firm) and thereby accelerate growth and expand impacts.14 This is a point often missed by ecological modernization theorists: The political economy perspective focuses on economy-wide impacts, not necessarily on the impacts of any one industry or firm. From a political economy perspective, ecological modernization theorists (e.g., Mol 1995; Sonnenfeld 1998) are typically using the wrong unit of analysis when they focus on transformations in a single industry. WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY. World-system theory applies the logic of the neo-Marxist political economy perspective at a global scale and has recently extended its reach to examine environmental impacts (Bunker 1984, 1985; Burns et al. 1994; Kick et al. 1996; Roberts and Grimes 2002). The central point of world-system theory is that all nations of the world are organized into a single global economy that is dominated economically, politically, and militarily by wealthy nations (Wallerstein 1974). The theory sees nations as divided roughly into three basic structural locations: core, semiperiphery, and periphery. Wealthy influential nations, such as the United States, Japan, and most western European nations, are the core nations that largely control trade relationships with other nations and dominate politics. Peripheral nations, such as most nations in sub-Saharan Africa, have small, typically minimally industrialized, economies and lack global political power. Semiperipheral nations, such as emerging economies like Brazil and Mexico, occupy a position of intermediate power relative to the core and the periphery. Consistent with the political economy perspective, world-system theory identifies economic production as the primary driving force behind environmental impacts. However, the theory adds a key point: Core nations are the predominant global producers and consumers, but they extract the basic resources they need for production (e.g., timber, minerals) from, and export (often hazardous) waste to, peripheral nations (Bunker 1984, 1985; Prey 1994, 1995, 1998a, b). Thus, for world-system theory, evidence demonstrating an environmental Kuznets curve of reduced environmental impacts in core nations via ecological modernization is spurious. Indeed, Roberts and Grimes (1997) have shown that, for carbon dioxide emissions, the overall pattern of an environmental Kuznets curve can be explained by nations at different positions in the world-system being locked into different trajectories of fossil fuel use. Evidence of an environmental Kuznets curve typically has been found only for local impacts, which calls into question whether development ultimately reduces impacts or simply shifts them elsewhere (Nordstrom and Vaughan 1999; Rothman 1998; Stern 1998). The assumption that impacts are geographically coterminous with the populations causing them is fundamentally flawed-an example of the "Netherlands fallacy"15 (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971). Similar to Rothman's (1998) argument, world-system theory argues that core nations have the power to distance themselves from the impacts they generate, and it is, therefore, misleading to focus only on the impacts a society generates within its national borders. The general logic of world-system theory argues that a focus on total impacts, those generated within and beyond national borders, is essential to a theoretical understanding of threats to sustainability. The political economy perspective anticipates that environmental impacts will continually increase with economic growth, but will not occur entirely within the borders of the nations generating the economic growth. The dotted curve in Figure 1 illustrates this expectation-a clear contrast with the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis. SUMMARY OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE. The political economy perspective identifies economic growth as the key driving force behind environmental impacts. Although this tradition emphasizes the inherent anti-ecological nature of capitalistic growth, the arguments can be generalized to include all modern growth-dependent production economies. The fundamental point is that technological development and reform-oriented policy will not solve the problem of environmental degradation. The fundamental solution rests on a restructuring of societies away from economic expansion and toward ecological sustainability.

**bioweapons**

**biofear discourse is grounded in a sense of vulnerability that turns the advantage – alt is key to solve**

**Kittelsen, 9** – Researcher for the Security programme @ the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (Sonja, “Conceptualizing Biorisk: Dread Risk and the Threat of Bioterrorism in Europe,” Security Dialogue vol. 40, no. 1, February)

The dread that the prospect of bioterrorism elicits thus not only compounds the distinction between actual and imagined threat, but also challenges the conventional spatio-temporal relationship between ‘threat’ and ‘security’, in that it reinforces a sense of imminence and pervasiveness of possible attack. Its imperceptible nature means that insecurity can exist independent of an actual attack occurring, the mere threat of infection and contagion carrying the capacity to evoke a heightened sense of fear long before and well after an attack has been identified as ever having taken place. In the absence of fact about a threat that deliberately evades detection, the demand on governments to act proactively has become all the more salient, and providing for security has taken a precautionary turn. Strategies aimed at mitigating the threat of bioterrorism have thus involved attempts at delineating security through spatio-temporal techniques that involve intervening in the present in order to avoid the potential for serious and irreversible damage in the future. They constitute an attempt at rearticulating the boundary between ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’ space through the active act of anticipation. Inherent in such an anticipatory logic, however, is an in-built vulnerability, in that this logic is necessarily informed by the subjective insecurities that the threat of bioterrorism elicits. It simultaneously functions within and constitutes a product of the dread that the threat of bioterrorism evokes, and accordingly does not so much serve to reduce the threat of bioterrorism as it serves to mitigate the effects of what is considered an inevitable occurrence. It there- by runs the risk of perpetuating insecurity to the extent that it facilitates threat through its enactment. Engaging with the threat of bioterrorism, then, neces- sarily requires recognizing how the same logic that informs the dread that bioterrorism elicits also serves to inform the security practices pursued to confront it. Just as the molecular body is no longer conceptualized as a unified whole, so too is Europe less a self-contained entity than a site of circulation and exchange. Mitigating the threat of bioåterrorism, then, necessitates explor- ing the ways in which security practices and perceptions of threat interact with each other and with the more tangible aspects of the threat of bioterror- ism to make Europe not only vulnerable to biological insecurity, but also a producer and perpetuator of it. This article argues that it is by conceptualizing bioterrorism through the notion of ‘dread risk’ that this self-perpetuation of vulnerability and threat can be exposed and the necessary inroads provided by which to engage more critically with the threat of bioterrorism, its produc- tion and perpetuation, as well as with the constitution of ‘security’ itself.

**1ar**

**eco authority**

**Yes going past planetary boundaries means extinction – and yes our science is solid**

**ASU news citing Nature 2009**

<https://asunews.asu.edu/20090923_planetaryboundaries>

Humans are overstepping environmentally safe ‘Planetary Boundaries' Human activities have already pushed the earth system beyond three of the planet's biophysical thresholds, with consequences that are detrimental or even catastrophic for large parts of the world; six others may well be crossed in the next decades, conclude 29 European, Australian and U.S. scientists in an article in the Sept. 24 issue of the scientific journal Nature. Both Arizona State University and the University of Arizona are represented on the international list of co-authors of this groundbreaking report. Scientists have been warning for decades that the explosion of human activity since the industrial revolution is pushing the earth's resources and natural systems to their limits. The data confirm that 6 billion people are capable of generating a global geophysical force the equivalent to some of the great forces of nature — **just by going about their daily lives**. This force has given rise to a new era — Anthropocene — in which human actions have become the main driver of global environmental change. "On a finite planet, at some point, we will tip the vital resources we rely upon into irreversible decline if our consumption is not balanced with regenerative and sustainable activity," says co-author Sander van der Leeuw, who directs the School of Human Evolution and Social Change at Arizona State University. Van der Leeuw is an archaeologist and anthropologist specializing in the long term impacts of human activity on the landscape. He also co-directs ASU's Complex Adaptive Systems Initiative that focuses ASU's interdisciplinary strength on large-scale problems where an integrated effort is essential to finding solutions.

Defining planetary boundaries

It started with a fairly simple question: How much pressure can the earth system take before it begins to crash? "Until now, the scientific community has not attempted to determine the limits of the earth system's stability in so many dimensions and make a proposal such as this. We are sending these ideas out through the Nature article to be vetted by the scientific community at large," explains van der Leeuw, whose experience includes leading interdisciplinary initiatives in ASU's College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. "We expect the debate on global warming to shift as a result, because it is not only greenhouse gas emissions that threaten our planet's equilibrium. There are many other systems and they all interact, so that crossing one boundary may make others even more destabilized," he warns. Nine boundaries were identified, including climate change, stratospheric ozone, land use change, freshwater use, biological diversity, ocean acidification, nitrogen and phosphorus inputs to the biosphere and oceans, aerosol loading and chemical pollution. The study suggests that three of these boundaries -climate change, biological diversity and nitrogen input to the biosphere — may already have been transgressed. "We must make these complicated ideas clear in such a way that they can be widely applied. **The threats are so enormous that it is too late to be a pessimist**," says van der Leeuw.

"A safe operating space for humanity"

Using an interdisciplinary approach, the researchers looked at the data for each of the nine vital processes in the earth system and identified a critical control variable. Take biodiversity loss, for example, the control variable is the species extinction rate, which is expressed in extinctions per million species per year. They then explored how the boundaries interact. Here, loss of biodiversity impacts carbon storage (climate change), freshwater, nitrogen and phosphorous cycles, and land systems. In the Nature report titled "A safe operating space for humanity," the scientists propose bold move: A limit for each boundary that would maintain the conditions for a livable world. For biodiversity, that would be less than 10 extinctions per million species per year. The current status is greater than 100 species per million lost per year, whereas the pre-industrial value was 0.1-1. The researchers stress that their approach does not offer a complete roadmap for sustainable development, but does provide an important element by identifying critical planetary boundaries. "Human pressure on the earth system has reached a scale where abrupt global environmental change can no longer be excluded. To continue to live and operate safely, humanity has to stay away from critical ‘hard-wired' thresholds in earth's environment, and respect the nature of planet's climatic, geophysical, atmospheric and ecological processes," says lead author professor Johan Rockström, director of the Stockholm Resilience Centre at Stockholm University. "Transgressing planetary boundaries may be devastating for humanity, but if we respect them we have a bright future for centuries ahead," he continues.

Alarm bells for Arizona "Our attempt to identify planetary boundaries that, if crossed, could have serious environmental and social consequences has a special resonance in the southwest where pressures on biodiversity, land use, and water are likely to intersect with climate change to create tremendous challenges for landscapes and livelihoods," explains co-author Diana Liverman, a professor of geography and development at the University of Arizona. Liverman, who also is professor of environmental science and a senior fellow of Oxford University's Environmental Change Institute, is currently attending an international climate conference at Oxford, United Kingdom. Participants are discussing the implications for humans and earth ecosystems of a 4 degree Centigrade global temperature rise. She adds: "Three of the boundaries we identify — 350 parts per million of atmospheric carbon dioxide, biodiversity extinction rates more than 10 times the background rate, and no more than 35 million tons of nitrogen pollution per year — have already been exceeded with fossil fuel use, land use change and agricultural pollution, driving us to unsustainable levels that are producing real risks to our survival."