# 2AC

## Case

#### Pinker’s method doesn’t account for conflict exportation

Gray 11 John Gray, Former Professor @ London School of Economics and visiting Professor @ Harvard, PhD from Exeter College, Oxford, currently retired. "Delusions of peace" Sept 21 [www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2011/09/john-gray-steven-pinker-violence-review/](http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2011/09/john-gray-steven-pinker-violence-review/)

“Today we take it for granted that war happens in smaller, poorer and more backward countries,” Steven Pinker writes in his new book, The Better Angels of Our Nature: the Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes. The celebrated Harvard professor of psychology is discussing what he calls “the Long Peace”: the period since the end of the second world war in which “the great powers, and developed states in general, have stopped waging war on one another.” As a result of “this blessed state of affairs,” he notes, “two entire categories of war—the imperial war to acquire colonies, and the colonial war to keep them—no longer exist.” Now and then there have been minor conflicts. “To be sure, [the super-powers] occasionally fought each other’s smaller allies and stoked proxy wars among their client states.” But these episodes do not diminish Pinker’s enthusiasm about the Long Peace. Chronic warfare is only to be expected in backward parts of the world. “Tribal, civil, private, slave-raiding, imperial, and colonial wars have inflamed the territories of the developing world for millennia.” In more civilised zones, war has all but disappeared. There is nothing inevitable in the process; major wars could break out again, even among the great powers. But the change in human affairs that has occurred is fundamental. “An underlying shift that supports predictions about the future,” the Long Peace points to a world in which violence is in steady decline. A sceptical reader might wonder whether the outbreak of peace in developed countries and endemic conflict in less fortunate lands might not be somehow connected. Was the immense violence that ravaged southeast Asia after 1945 a result of immemorial backwardness in the region? Or was a subtle and refined civilisation wrecked by world war and the aftermath of decades of neo-colonial conflict—as Norman Lewis intimated would happen in his prophetic account of his travels in the region, A Dragon Apparent (1951)? It is true that the second world war was followed by over 40 years of peace in North America and Europe—even if for the eastern half of the continent it was a peace that rested on Soviet conquest. But there was no peace between the powers that had emerged as rivals from the global conflict. In much the same way that rich societies exported their pollution to developing countries, the societies of the highly-developed world exported their conflicts. They were at war with one another the entire time—not only in Indo-China but in other parts of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The Korean war, the Chinese invasion of Tibet, British counter-insurgency warfare in Malaya and Kenya, the abortive Franco-British invasion of Suez, the Angolan civil war, decades of civil war in the Congo and Guatemala, the Six Day War, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet-Afghan war—these are only some of the armed conflicts through which the great powers pursued their rivalries while avoiding direct war with each other. When the end of the Cold War removed the Soviet Union from the scene, war did not end. It continued in the first Gulf war, the Balkan wars, Chechnya, the Iraq war and in Afghanistan and Kashmir, among other conflicts. Taken together these conflicts add up to a formidable sum of violence. For Pinker they are minor, peripheral and hardly worth mentioning. The real story, for him, is the outbreak of peace in advanced societies, a shift that augurs an unprecedented transformation in human affairs. While Pinker makes a great show of relying on evidence—the 700-odd pages of this bulky treatise are stuffed with impressive-looking graphs and statistics—his argument that violence is on the way out does not, in the end, rest on scientific investigation. He cites numerous reasons for the change, including increasing wealth and the spread of democracy. For him, none is as important as the adoption of a particular view of the world: “The reason so many violent institutions succumbed within so short a span of time was that the arguments that slew them belong to a coherent philosophy that emerged during the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment. The ideas of thinkers like Hobbes, Spinoza, Descartes, Locke, David Hume, Mary Astell, Kant, Beccaria, Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton and John Stuart Mill coalesced into a worldview that we can call Enlightenment humanism.” (The italics are Pinker’s.) Yet these are highly disparate thinkers, and it is far from clear that any coherent philosophy could have “coalesced” from their often incompatible ideas. The difficulty would be magnified if Pinker included Marx, Bakunin and Lenin, who undeniably belong within the extended family of intellectual movements that comprised the Enlightenment, but are left off the list. Like other latter-day partisans of “Enlightenment values,” Pinker prefers to ignore the fact that many Enlightenment thinkers have been doctrinally anti-liberal, while quite a few have favoured the large-scale use of political violence, from the Jacobins who insisted on the necessity of terror during the French revolution, to Engels who welcomed a world war in which the Slavs—“aborigines in the heart of Europe”—would be wiped out. The idea that a new world can be constructed through the rational application of force is peculiarly modern, animating ideas of revolutionary war and pedagogic terror that feature in an influential tradition of radical Enlightenment thinking. Downplaying this tradition is extremely important for Pinker. Along with liberal humanists everywhere, he regards the core of the Enlightenment as a commitment to rationality. The fact that prominent Enlightenment figures have favoured violence as an instrument of social transformation is—to put it mildly—inconvenient.

Counterfactuals are rigorous truth procedures – their argument misunderstands causative reasoning

Fuller 8

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AT FIRST GLANCE, most historians do not take counterfactual reasoning more seriously for the simple reason that it is a “fictional” enterprise, in the strict sense of not being sufficiently constrained by the relevant facts. However, if we stop there, it becomes mysterious why counterfactuals should feature so prominently in computer simulations in both the natural and social sciences, in ascriptions of motive and responsibility in law, and in the more quantitative reaches of history (“cliometrics”)—not least economic history, for which a Nobel Prize has already been awarded.1 The mystery is dispelled by observing that historians who oppose counterfactuals are not hardheaded about facts but softheaded about causation.2 The cognitive value of counterfactuals in history comes from the exercise of suspending one assumption about the past and holding as many of the rest intact that whatever happens in the alternate history is attributable to the hypothesized difference in initial conditions. It is not sufficient to ask “What if . . . ?” without a procedure for generating a determinate path or outcome. In this respect, counterfactual reasoning is simply experimental reasoning in the abstract, an idea that is preserved in so-called thought experiments. For philosophers of the inductive method from Francis Bacon to John Stuart Mill and Ernst Mach, “experimental reasoning” was more a general turn of mind than the specific logic of the laboratory. In this original broad sense, experimental reasoning included what historians would easily recognize as the “comparative method,” whereby differences in, say, national destinies are related to distinctive features of peoples who otherwise share many properties and propensities.3 This enabled informed speculations about what would happen were a given people to encounter a specific condition—say, slavery, which animated many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political discussions.

Repression of the history of hiroshima and the radiation-based genocide of the hibakusha inevitably results in the RETURN OF THE REPRESSED, WHICH culminates in extinction

DAVIS 1

DERACINATION: HISTORICITY, HIROSHIMA AND THE TRAGIC Ph.D. 1969 The University of Chicago (with Distinction) English Language and Literature Emphases: Literary Theory, Modern Literature M.A. 1966 Marquette University (with Honors) English Language and Literature B.A. 1964 Marquette University (Cum Laude) Double Major: English and Philosophy March 2002-Present: Professor Emeritus, The Ohio State University, Department of English September 1988-2002: Professor, The Ohio State University, Department of English September 1977-June 1988: Associate Professor, The Ohio State University, Department of English September 1969-June 1977: Assistant Professor, The University of California at Santa Barbara, Department of English

**The mediation** traced above **is driven by a contradiction about which it circles endlessly**. That is what the sublime object of the ego-ratio reveals when read from its crypt. Sublime action seeks an absolute reversal of catastrophic anxiety in the absolute affirmation of unshakable guarantees. **Catastrophe must be reversed because it is that experience of contingency that underlies the horror of contingency in all its forms**, the force driving the search for the guarantees needed to contain it. In catastrophe con-tingency is the other's will as unbounded, unlimited destructiveness. The threat of extinction is the "restraint" here placed on subject. This restraint is prior to the dialectic of "desire restrained and checked" on which Hegel grounds his phenomenology. **Desire** here isn't restrained and checked—it **is turned back against itself in torment**. The other requires my destruction for their pleasure **and assures that end by colonizing the psyche with an aggression that renders impotent** *every effort* **to make a beginning**, a tenta¬tive move toward independence or self-cohesion. There is no exit but one apparently: identification with the aggressor. I become a self by turning someone or something else into an object delivered over to the true golden rule: do onto others what was once done onto you.

**This logic maintains because catastrophic anxiety internalized is death-work as the self-mediation whereby we enact the command of the Other**. *The only way out*, the only way to finalize this process, **is evacuation through a lasting exorcism**. It alone confers on the psyche a certitude beyond all cogitos. **It is** also **the mediation that finds** it, in flight forward, already, in its primitive imaginary, **one with the Bomb**. In its inner world, the catastrophic subject experiences itself as full of death, disease, corruption. *The Bomb alone has the power to cast all "nuclear waste" outside* and beneath oneself in a way that indefinitely extends the temporality of that act. Radiation disease is a death that works inward—invisibly, yet inexorably. **Death thereby breeds itself forth into an indefinite future,** omnipresent in a working, a différance that begets delayed effects as further insurance against Nachtriiglichkeit. **The extension of death's dominion attained in the Bomb serves one grand function: to prevent the return of projections by extending the temporality of the deed into a future** that is lived, by its victims, as a judgment that is inevitable, irreversible, the antithesis of Benjamin's mes¬sianic time, ticking—**a plea to delay death that can only be answered by death**.

The Bomb thus serves as felix culpa to an inner necessity. To do its job a sublime event must exorcize everything within the subject that makes it an object of its own contempt. What better way than Orwell's **boot brought down in an act** of splitting **that magnifies the distance between the terror on the ground and the view from above. Catastrophe is now fully outside onesel**f located in an other who has become nothing but matter, body become spectacle of pain frozen forever in charred sculptures strewn across a devastated landscape, Laöcoon Munched; but with the Howl silenced and deferred until it erupts later from within the survivors in a semiosis that can only be read by the scientists who planted it there and have now come (as biopower/knowledge) to study their handiwork as it blooms and bursts from deep within the body of the hibakusha as further testimony of one's power / jouissance. Evacuation is complete. Death-work has been lodged se¬curely in the Other. **In the hibakusha one gets to see one's Thanatos as a narrative principle,** a force in history. One gets to see, over time, what it is like to live death. Soul-murder as the innermost reality of the crypt, pro¬duces and finds in the hibakusha its dialectical image. As the expressive figura of death incarnate, a terrifying veroeilledoch here attains its objective correlative.

To purge oneself of catastrophic anxiety, **an utterly dehumanized ob¬ject is not enough**. Neither the Sartrean look nor the Nazi act suffice. The **disorder of the psyche is deeper**, prior to desire (Sartre) and demand (Naz¬ism). *The projection of death-work can never rest* by simply investing one's self-contempt in another. For evacuation to work, **the object must become something one can study, inspect,** perform operations upon. **Catastrophic anxiety is the a proiri that gives Auschwitz and Hiroshima their necessity in the genocidal imagination.** The Bomb constitutes an Event because the psyche reverses its core condition—its cardiac arrest in inner self¬loathing—through a projection that is total and irreversible. If the evacua¬tion of trauma is the abiding motive atop the crypt, there is nothing abstract or Lacanian about the Real that results from its projection. **Evacuation** is that malevolent reversal that *condemns one to endless repetition*. One blows one's self-hatred and one's rage over that state fully out into the world but is thereby rendered powerless to do anything but gape in rapt amaze¬ment at one's creation. That is perhaps why, for over fifty years now, when-ever given the opportunity, Paul Tibbets has proudly repeated the declara¬tion that he has not had a moment's remorse or regret. **Death-work externalized leaves one a spent** and reified **subject, lacking any power other than** be endless **repetition of one's deed**

The wheel thus comes full circle in the only justice granted such subjects. When catastrophic anxiety is only mediated by death-work, the affects that compose subjectivity are rent assunder and scattered in pockets of pure persecution. **With each attempt to compose an inner self-cohesion, death-work, as internal saboteur, rises up in a renewed attack** on the effort to be. **Using the Bomb to reverse this disorder produces** as its result a perfect, attic justice. Guilt and remorse are denied the doers of the deed because to feel such things is to renew a process of self-unraveling. What the Bomb was meant to deliver one from has become the guardian of untroubled sleep. With the call of conscience rendered impossible, **the subject becomes overtly psychotic** and must cling ever more desperately to an untroubled memory of the sublime event. The subject thereby pronounces, without being able to comprehend or mediate it, the truth about itself: **in the ravaged landscape of Hiroshima the founding inner world of the psychotic**—a world of utter fragmentation and the obliteration of every term of reference—**has finally found a home** to which it must say "stay thou art so fair," a home in which nothing inhuman is unheimlich.

#### Simulation through scenario planning legitimizes permanent global war

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Cities Under Siege:

The New Military Urbanism

Professor Stephen Graham

Prof of Cities & Society, Newcastle University

Meanwhile, within the US, dozens of physical simulations of US city districts are joining the simulations of Arab cities. These are the places where lawenforcement and National Guard personnel practise operations against civil unrest, terrorist attack and natural disaster. 'Another architecture is rising in the expanding landscape of preparedness', notes the Center for Land Use Interpretation. 'Condensed simulacra of our existing urban environments are forming within our communities, where the first responders to emergencies, on a small or large scale, practice their craft of dealing with disaster [and where] the police contend with civil decay, robberies, hostage situations, looting, riots, and snipers'."' Military simulations are also helping to produce US cities in another, more direct, way: generating them now takes up large swaths of the US economy, especially in high-tech metropolitan areas. Many of the much-vaunted high-tech suburban hot spots that house what Richard Florida has called the 'creative class'"5 of the US - places such as Washington, DC's 'Beltway', North Carolina's 'Research Triangle', Florida's 'High Tech Corridor', or San Diego's 'clean tech cluster' - are in fact heavily sustained by the production of symbolic violence against both US central and Arab cities. Being not only the foundries of the security state but also the sites of the most militarized and corporatized research universities, these locations are where the vastly profitable and rapidly growing convergence between electronic games and military simulation is being forged. Orlando's hundred large militarysimulator firms, for example, generate about seventeen thousand jobs and are starting to overshadow even Disney as local economic drivers. Behind the blank facades and manicured lawns, thousands of software engineers and games professionals project their Orientalized electronic imaginaries onto the world through the increasingly seamless complex of military, entertainment, media and academic industries. The importance of military simulation industries is not lost on those tasked with the development of local urban economies. The municipality of Suffolk, Virginia, for instance, now proudly claims that a 'world-class cluster of "Modeling and Simulation" enterprises has taken root around the US Joint Forces Command and an Old Dominion University research center' (Figure 6.12)'16 To support further growth in these sectors, partnerships beween local governments and economic developers are springing up to determine 'how the state of Virginia could better support JFCOM [Joint Forces Command] and its mission! This economic convergence gains strength from the Virginia Modeling and Simulation Initiative (VIMSIM), which will be geared to 'stimulate development of a unique high-tech industry with multi-billion dollar revenue potential.' Already, Lockheed Martin has opened a major simulation complex in the area. 'As a growing high technology hub with proximity to major defense, homeland security and other important customer installations', Lockheed Martins CEO, Vance Cotfman, pointed out in 2003, 'Suffolk is the ideal location for our new center'."7 SELF-FULFILLING WORLDS All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing - war."\* The complex constellation of simulations of Arab and global South cities discussed here work powerfully as a collective. The various physical, electronic and blended physical-electronic manifestations operate together, as do all simulacra, by collapsing reality with artifice, so that any simple boundary between the two effectively disappears."' In keeping with what Jean Baudrillard famously stressed, it is best to consider the above simulations, not as 'copies' of the 'real' world, but as hyperreal constructions - simulations of things that don't exist - through which war and violence are constructed, legitimized, and performed. 'Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance', Baudrillard writes, 'It is the generation by models of a real without origins or reality: a hyperreal'.120 The point, then, is not that these simulations are less 'real' than the things they purportedly represent. Rather, they provide spaces through which the violence of the 'War on Terror' can be generated and performed, and which acquire their power from their radical disassociation from any meaningful connection with the real places (or, less commonly, real people) they are said to represent. In the process, these simulacra 'participate in the construction of a discourse of security which is self-fulfilling'.111 Multiple layers and circuits of simulation work collectively to evacuate the possibility of authenticating what might actually be 'real'. 'Since 9/11', writes James Der Derian, 'simulations (war games, training exercises, scenario planning, and modeling) and dissimulations (propaganda, disinformation, infowar, deceit, and lies) [have produced] a hall of mirrors, reducing the "truth" about the "Global War on Terror" to an infinite regression of representations that [defy] authentication.''22 Because the worlds of threat and risk are projected through this simulacral collective, the perpetration of state violence and colonial war emerge from the same collective as necessary, just and honourable. More simulations are rendered necessary in turn to improve the effectiveness of such violence, to tempt and train more recruits, to deal with their psychological devastation once they return home, and so on. It follows that the very notion of 'security', at least as constructed through the military simulacral collective, becomes possible only through permanent war. 'War makes security possible by creating that which is to be protected', writes Abhinava Kumar, 'and what makes war possible [is the] mechanization of soldiers, the obscuring of the enemy and the sanitisation of violence.'113 The mcdiatization of contemporary war is such that the 'fighting' of actual wars takes place as much in TV lounges, at multiplexes, and on YouTube or PlayStation screens as in the real streets and alleys of combatzone cities. As already-vague distinctions between civil and military media and technology dissolve, the military simulacral collective comes to permeate a host of media simultaneously. Previously considered to be largely distinct, multiple media domains are thus in the process of The mediatization of contemporary war is such that the fighting of actual wars takes place as much in TV lounges, at multiplexes, and on YouTube or PlayStation screens as in the real streets and alleys of combatzone cities. As already-vague distinctions between civil and military media and technology dissolve, the military simulacral collective comes to permeate a host of media simultaneously. Previously considered to be largely distinct, multiple media domains are thus in the process of fusing and interpenetrating within and through the military simulacral collective - a process at once confusing, disturbing and extremely fast moving. 'We see that various genres once thought to be discrete are forging new and strange alliances', writes Roger Stahl. As a result, 'wartime news looks like a video game; video games restage the news. Official military training simulators cross over into the commercial entertainment markets; commercial video games are made useful for military training exercises. Advertisements sell video games with patriotic rhetorics; video games arc mobilized to advertise patriotism. The business of play works closely with the military to replicate the tools of state violence; the business of state violence in turn capitalizes on playtime for institutional ends\*124

## T – indirect

We meet – Solar Bank is a federal incentive

Cole et. al 80 (INCENTIVES TO STIMULATE SOLAR ENERGY USEA PROCEEDI~GS OF THE SECOND SEATTLE WORKSHOP September 2-5, 1980 Seattle, Washington R. J. Cole B. ~1. Cone l-I.J. Sheopard P. Sommers A. Marcus D. Lenerz June 1981 Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Pacific Northwest Laboratory http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/5536739-I7mijF/5536739.pdf)

The Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank was authorized by Title V, Subtitle A of the "Energy Security Act of 1980" (Public Law 96-294), signed into law by President Carter on June 30. The establishment of the Bank is considered to be the most significant Federal legislative action to stimulate the use of solar energy since the passage of the residential energy tax credit. The purpose of this paper is to provide an introductory description of the structure and powers of the Bank as it relates to solar energy. As appropriate, reference will be made to similarities and differences with prior Federal incentive programs that have been used to stimulate the production of nonrenewable energy sources.

#### Ci – financial incentives includes grants and loans but excludes indirect incentives

Webb, sessional lecture – Faculty of Law @ University of Ottawa, ‘93

(Kernaghan, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501)

One of the obstacles to intelligent discussion of this topic is the tremendous potential for confusion about what is meant by several of the key terms involved. In the hopes of contributing to the development of a consistent and precise vocabulary applying to this important but understudied area of regulatory activity, various terms are defined below.

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effects which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

## framework

 CLAIMS ABOUT “SHOULD” ARE OVERDETERMINED. IT INDICATES A NEED FOR POLICY ACTION IN PROPOSITION. WE MEET THAT.

**Trapp & Hanson ‘5** Robert Trapp is a Professor of Rhetoric at Willamette University in Salem, Oregon, U.S.A. Christine Hanson is the Press Assistant for United States Senator Bill Nelson (Democrat of Florida) and is a lecturer at George Washington University, “Debating Comparative Propositions of Policy,” Volume 5, Issue 4 June 2005 - IDEA: International Debate Education ... http://www.idebate.org/magazine/files/Magazine436a366e4843f.pdf

Merely by convention, some teachers and writers have insisted that the word “should” is a necessary and a suﬃcient indicator of a policy proposition. This convention, however, is arbitrary and does not mirror ordinary language usage. The term “should” is one of many terms that can signal a logical requirement for a plan of action.

 ERROR REPLICATION – dividing past counterfactual from the present crushes decisionmaking

**Johnson & Sherman ‘90** Marcia K. Johnson is a Sterling Professor of Psychology at Yale University. Steven J. Sherman is Chancellor's Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Indiana University, Bloomington. “Constructing and Reconstructing the Past and the Future in the Present,” in E.T. Higgins & R.M. Sorrentino (Eds) HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITATION, p. 510

Counterfactuals are thus important in determining affective reactions to actual events and to judgments of responsibility and causality. (Perhaps one reason why we are more angered by betrayals by people we trust than by people we do not trust is that we can so easily imagine trusted people as behaving otherwise.) More than this, counter factual generation is important because it affects the ways in which we think about the past and about the future. Without considering alternatives to reality, we must accept the past as having been inevitable and must believe that the future will be no different from the past. The generation of counterfactuals gives us flexibility in thinking about possible futures and prepares us better for those futures. Along these lines, Taylor and Schneider (1989) have proposed a theory of coping that focuses on the mental simulation of past, future, and hypothetical events. Such event simulation serves problem-solving and emotion-regulating functions for stressors by increasing the perceived validity of the imagined experiences, providing a framework for organizing experience, and providing a mechanism for mustering helpful emotions. In this way, counterfactual generation and the mental simulation of events can help in coping with ongoing, anticipated, or past stressful events. It is thus clear that after-the-fact counterfactual reasoning affects feelings and judgments about the past, the present, and the future. Before-the-fact reasoning, in the form of expectancies, hopes, and wishes, likewise affects these feelings and judgments, as we have seen.

Limits cause lock-in – Historical analysis of solar energy policy must be able to CHALLENGE existing frameworks of policy formation and their presentist orientation – only direct contestation of existing frames avoids depoliticization

Laird 1

Solar Energy, technology policy and institutional values

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IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE The broad importance of energy to all aspects of life in industrial societies needs little discussion. Energy is part of every major technological activity, from agriculture and manufacturing to transportation and telecommunications. The roots of energy policy stem from the U.S. government's deep involvements in energy technologies, resources, and markets, an involvement that goes back over a century and shows no indication of disappearing.30 The government has been and continues to be involved in the research and planning for future energy resources. The Cold War powerfully influenced federal government R8cD priorities, and energy, especially nuclear energy, technologies figured prominently in those programs.31 The Cold War influence went beyond picking R&C.D priorities. As Stuart W. Leslie has argued, the military security orientation of such programs led technology and science policy in particular directions, emphasizing state-ofthe-art high performance often at the expense of technologies that could have important applications in the civilian economy.32 Such planning for the future seemed an immediate and pressing matter during most of the 1970s. It seems less so today, although there is no reason that it should. Planning for the future should not wait until a crisis strikes. Recent price increases remind us that the current low prices and ample supply of oil will not last indefinitely. A recent survey of studies of recoverable crude oil argues that world oil production is likely to peak somewhere between the years 2007 and 2014, and this conclusion does not assume any political events that will interrupt production.33 Energy could be a front-page issue again before long. Solar energy - or renewable energy, as such sources are usually called now - has the potential to be a major part of the world's energy sources as fossil fuels decline in production. As we will see, advocates have long depicted renewables as the resource that will enable the continuation of industrial civilization after the era of fossil fuels, and a recent spate of books and studies have updated and promoted that conclusion. Private analysts, solar and environmental advocates, government agencies such as the fomier Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and some industry groups argue vigorously that renewable energy will be the cornerstone of future energy systems.34 Thus, understanding the history and dynamics of solar energy policy is important for understanding the possible changes in a technological system of great importance, now and in the future. Energy policy mostly focuses on existing sources of energy, their accompanying technological ensembles, and the conflicts of their associated regional economic and political interests. For example, the coal industry for years opposed increasing the quotas of imported residual fuel oil, typically used for home heating, into the United States, fearing that such imports would cut into their market share.35 In this type of conflict, well-established economic interests argue over policies that would affect their shares of wealth and income. The technologies and market structures involved are mature, the various interests have close, long-term relations to government agencies, and everyone acts as if they have a clear idea of which policies will advance their economic interests and which ones will not. In contrast, policy debates over solar energy are arguments over the shape of a large future technological system. Such policies necessarily confront immense uncertainties about interests and outcomes. This class of policies affects, in addition to energy, many of the most consequential technological systems of our time, including environmentally clean manufacturing, rapid changes in agriculture wrought by advances in biotechnology, and the linkages and developments in telecommunications and information technologies. Policies that governments adopt now will influence billions of dollars of investment in complex technological systems that will become constitutive parts of our society for years to come. The approach I take to this case thereby provides insights for analyzing some of these other issues. CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS Those who wish to challenge prevailing public policy must be able to challenge the sets of ideas that underlie the status quo. A democratic technology policy cannot content itself with giving citizens a set of cookie-cutter choices but must instead empower them to contest the underlying judgements and ideas that constitute those choices.36 Woodhouse and Collingridge stress that intelligent democratic processes must take into account the views of diverse partisans, lest unwise policies go unchallenged. Clearly, partisans who cannot challenge institutionalized ideas have very little scope for challenging policies in general. Hajer argues persuasively that substantial changes in policy require the dominance of new discourse coalitions, which entails institutionalizing new ideas.37 Langdon Winner addresses the problem that philosophical and other theoretical analyses seem to have little effect on the technologies that our societies produce, even when some actors in the system recognize that ethical and other normative issues will be greatly affected by the new technologies. Winner concludes that "the trouble is not that we lack good arguments and theories, but rather that modern politics simply does not provide appropriate roles and institutions in which the goal of defining the common good in technology policy is a legitimate project."38 This study takes Winner's critique seriously and asks why various technology policy processes, including those that provide channels through which advocates can participate, do not provide the deliberative institutions and roles that Winner calls for. In constructing technologies we do construct our future, and so our policies for the future, if they are to be democratic, require that citizens be able to challenge the institutionalized ideas that underlie the status quo.

Rigged debates – The framework constraints of 70s energy policy disguised the normative commitments of path choices. The artificial FRAMEWORK constraints empirically worked to RIG DEBATES

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Solar Energy, technology policy and institutional values

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J U.S. energy policy makers held remarkably consistent normative and technical ideas (sometimes called values and beliefs) about energy technologies lor over three decades. Both types of ideas shaped the problem frame that officials used in thinking about energy policy. Policy elites ^who thought about the future and about new energy sources conceptualized their problems in terms of economic benefits and national secu' rity. Notions of economic benefits changed over time, from the idea that energy should be chcap to promote maximum economic growth to more refined notions that energy markets ought to be efficient to get optimal economic performance. Nonetheless, both notions point to getting energy at the lowest possible price. Discussions of national security emphasized importing oil from sources that would not be interrupted by political acts. Precisely how policy makers expressed their values and beliefs depended on the contingent circumstances iu which they found themselves, but both sets of dominant ideas made for a problem definition that greatly disadvantaged solar advocates. Because of its high market prices, solar was hardpressed to compete with fossil fuels, and because of its diffuse nature, it did not fit into the existing energy production system the way nuclear power promised to do. Although policy makers began to include an assortment of environmental protection values into their frames, that did little to alter the situation^ ' In addition, normative and technical ideas interacted in complex ways, and the boundary between them was ambiguous and contested.1 For example, consider the apparently empirical notion held by a White House aide about the infeasibility of solar energy as a major energy " source. As cited in the previous chapter, this aide took from a discussion k. with Congressman Mike McCormack what the aide called a "Solar fact" , that getting one percent of rhe country's total energy from solar would require converting ten percent of all houses to solar, and would cost S70-105 billion.2 The aide called this a "fact," the most solidly empirical of appellations. And yet. contained within this alleged fact were a number of normative and questionable empirical assumptions. It assumed empirically that the price of solar systems would not go down much. It also assumed normatively that the United States should remain a very high-consumption society, which in itself contains assumptions about the technological possibilities for energy efficiency and rhe normative desirability of ever-increasing material consumption. Changes m any of these underlying ideas would change rhis apparently simple "fact." At a more aggregate level of policy discussions, the normative and empirical ideas became just as enmeshed. As I showed in Chapter 5, Nixon administration officials regarded high levels of energy consumption as normatively desirable, as indicators of a good and progressive society.' The empirical fact of high energy consumption became a normative standard. Thus the official energy policy frame made sustaining and enlarging that consumption more than just preserving the empirical status quo; growing energy consumption was a valued social goal, nor just an empirical fact. This problem frame stacked the odds against solar energy in normative as well as empirical terms. By this normative standard. the sorts of technological changes rhar would most cnhance solar energy's prospects, particularly large improvements in energy efficiency, look normatively undesirable, whatever their technical feasibility. Conventional energy policy analysts held these intertwined empirical and normative goals deeply, as shown by their bitter attacks on Amory Lovins when he challenged that problem frame, as detailed in Chapter J l or thirty-five years solar advocates presented their technologies that used a variety of renewable energy sources as a way to exploit a vast, inexhaustible, but diffuse, resource. Most of them for most of the period did not think that creating a solar society entailed significant social or political change. Hoyt Hottel, Maria Telkes, Farrington Daniels, and rhc other early solar pioneers of the 1940s and 1950s all soughr to make solar affordable, largely with the assumption rhat it would plug into the existing energy systems, replacing fossil fuels, and enabling socicty and polity to continue functioning as before, with greater security and, perhaps, less pollution. Most of them saw no contradiction in promoting research and development in both solar and nuclcar power, or solar and synthetic fuels, and their only complaint was that nuclcar got an unfairly large portion of federal subsidies. A few of them, such as Daniels and Eugene Ayers, sometimes hinted that a substantial changc in such a major technological system would affect more than how one heated a room or lit a lamp. Bur for most of these advocates, solar energy technology offered just another way of securing tlie status quo against the end of fossil fuels. They sought a new technological system to prevent the social changes that would accompany scarcity. By the 1970s a new type of solar advocate emerged. These activists came to the technology from a part of the environmental movement that believed that the fundamental structures of society and politics - those concerned with industrial and agricultural production, housing, settlemenr patterns, and transportation - were, in some deep sense, flawed.4 These ecological advocates did not simply want any and all solar technologies. They sought technologies that would reinforce and be more compatible with a qualitatively different society and politics, one in which ecological sustainability and local community self-reliance would displace increasing ecological damage, bureaucratic centralization, and anomic. For them, making a drastic change in the energy technology system would l>c akin to making a legislative change for all of society.5 Whether the technologies they sought would have given them the society that they desired is not the point here. Rather, the point is that their social goals and ideas about technology as a social force led them to a very different framing of the energy problem and solar's role in it. Within their problem frame, solar was not only a feasible solution to the energy problem, it was the only desirable solution, rhe only energy technology ensemble that would encourage and strengthen the sorr of society thar they desired. In their frame, issues such as high initial costs and an immature industry were problems to be solved, not barriers to policy. This shared meaning of solar energy technologies bound together ecological advocates as a social group and drove their choices, leading them to champion smaller, more decentralized solar technologies and to reject schemes like the solar-powered satellites." The problem frame that came out of this meaning led them to regard problems like costs as secondary considerations, just the opposite of conventional frames. Top-level policy makers never shared thar framing of the problem or the normative values that went with it. Their public pronouncements and written internal debates show no hint that they ever even considered rhis alternative problem frame and set of values. The presidents and their top aides - in every administration - talked about energy almost exclusively in economic and national security terms, with occasional references to narrowly construed environmental values. Even in rhc Carter administration, no oiK' outside of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) gave any sign that they even thought about some of the more radical alternatives, and they never committed them to paper, suggesting thar such ideas were nor welcome in policy deliberations. These facts suggest a new inrcrprctarion of solar energy policy, particularly its rapid rise and fall in the 1970s. The conventional explanations for energy policy and solar's failure to establish itself within ir do not explain all of the events recounted here. It was not enough that solar was expensive and its future costs were uncertain. That could bosaid of all future energy technologies, including nuclcar energy. And it f. was not enough that the Reagan administration was ideologically hostile to solar energy. Solar advocates began losing their battles for support while President Carter was still 111 officc, and the ideological explanation „ begs the question of why Reagan and his people evinced such hostility to solar energy. The association of solar energy with the ecological wing of the solar movement was a phenomenon of the 1970s, not what one mighr have predicted in the 1950s or 1960s. Perhaps most importantly, the events analyzed here require us to reexamine the pluralist account of solar energy policy. Pluralism must, to explain events adequately, incorporate the importance of ideas, normative and empirical, being institutionalized into official problem framesy SOLAR ADVOCATES' LIMITED INFLUENCE ON POLICY ("Standard notions of American pluralism claim that any organized interest group can influence public policy by mobilizing rhe appropriate polit- / ical resources, such as votes, money, public opinion, and the like. From ^ this perspective one can evaluate a group's influence or effectiveness by ^ the extent to which it gets those policy outcomes that it desires. By thar measure, rhe solar movement, particularly the ecological wing of it, ^ appeared very powerful and effective for a brief period in the late 1970s. '' The question is why it both rose and then fell with such speed. The advocates pushing solar energy did not suddenly lose public support or their ability to argue their case.\* Instead, the values that ecological advocates / asstxiatcd with solar energy and the solar movement were in stark contrast to the conceptualization of the energy policy problem by top-level , decision makers. The official problem frame, and the values thar drove it, did not change, despite the considerable efforts of the solar movement to argue for an alternative. Thus the history of solar energy policy presents anomalies to pluralism. Prior to rhc energy crisis, prominent scientists, engineers, and businessmen advocated for solar energy, beginning after World War II and continuing for over twenty years. Wcll-placcd wirhin the rcchnical, government, and business community, these advocates should have been influential among important policy analysts and makers. On numerous occasions they were able to make their case to legislative and executivebranch officials, including some cabinet secretaries, members of the House and Senate, and, in a few instances, ro the president via his top aides. Many of the advocates spoke with the authority of impeccable technical credentials, exemplified by Farrington Daniels, a veteran of the Manhattan Project, member of the National Academy of Sciences, and president of the American Chemical Society. By the middle 1950s such advocacy became formalized with the creation of the Association for Applied Solar Energy (later becoming the International Solar Energy Society and the American Solar Energy Society), broadening solar's constituency to include business people, bankers, and so on. So why were these groups not more successful? Part of the explanation certainly lies in unfortunate contingent circumstances, such as President Truman's firing Interior Secretary Julius Krug only weeks after Krug had decided to launch a very large solar energy research program. Part of the explanation lies in unpropitious structural circumstances, such as the steady drclinc in energy prices in rhe 1950s and 1960s. And parr of the explanation lies in traditional interest group analysis. Solar energy did not have the same level of business, scientific, military, or congressional support that nuclear power enjoyed. But these factors do not constitute an adequate explanation. To develop a better one 1 have focused on recent policy literature that argues for the importance of ideas, both empirical and normative, in shaping and changing public policy. The case study itself - the history of solar energy policy - demonstrates the importance of ideas, particularly the importance of institutionalizing new problem frames and rhc technical and normative ideas that go with them. Absent institutionalizing new ideas, substantial, sustained changes in policy remain unlikely. Prior to the energy crisis, most energy policy concerned disputes between diffcrcnr fuels and rhc different regions of rhc country thar produced and consumed them. With policy makers accepting a problem frame based in such disputes, solar energy had little to offer cxccpr as a possible alternative in the distant future. However, since analysts and policy makers expected future energy demand to be immense, it seemed that future alternatives needed to produce large quantities of bulk energy, a task for which most people considered nuclear power to be better equipped. Policy advisors did frequently note that the governmenr underfunded solar R&D, especially compared to nuclear power, bur, absent a pressing crisis, nuclear s better fir wirh existing problem frames, along with its greater political resources, kept the subsidies flowing, while solar only got research targeted to auxiliary goals, such as NASA's funding for the development of photovoltaics for use on its satellites. The beginnings of the energy crisis in 1970-1971 coincided with the rise of institutionalized environmental protection values in the form of new legislation and the Environmental Protection Agency to implement that legislation. Those ideas had some effect on energy policy, but not enough to put solar energy at ccntcr stage. Nonetheless, Presidents Nixon and l ord began pouring money into all alternative forms of energy. including solar, quickly increasing solar R&I) budgets, sometimes as a response to Congressional initiatives. That said, the definition of the energy problem, the way it was framed, as discussed at length in earlier chapters, changed little, merely acquiring a sense of urgency from the energy crisis. Solar energy policy in the Carter administration shows the difference between successfully pressuring for a policy and successfully institutionalizing a new set of beliefs and values associated with some technology. Those years marked the time when the solar movement was the closest it ever came to being a mainstream movement, claiming to provide a feasible solution to an urgent problem. At rhc very time that solar technologies were commanding increasing resources, the ecological wing ol the solar movement became increasingly influential in policy circles. The Solar Lobby and related groups began to form a very effective pressure group for solar energy, and they clearly got most of what rhev wanted out of Carter's solar Domestic Policy Review process. But ir is equally clear that high-level policy makers never took the advocates' values or framing of the problem seriously. The advocates' political and social issues were never part of official discourse or debate. Even advocates' particular conceptions of environmental concerns never penetrated discussions in the White House. Policy makers simply never accepted, at least not in writing or in policy, the notion that the environmental problems related to energy suggested a deeper critique of existing energy, social, and political systems.

COUNTERFACTUALS ARE INEVITABLE AND INCREASE NEG GROUND – policy, economics and the law requires counterfactuals and there’s historical and empirical data on our aff

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Based on the temporal frame of these hypothetical resolutions, affirmative and negatives burdens change. For the Vietnam resolution, the affirmative would be bounded by the historical policies followed by the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. Claims could be empirical or probabilistic. Empirical claims would be verifiable in terms of historical data. Probabilistic claims would be speculative in nature. Negative claims could point to "actual" disadvantages stemming from the affirmative policy. Additional negative claims could speculate on policy alternatives. For example, the affirmative could argue the "domino theory" that all countries in southeast Asia would have fallen to the communists if not for US intervention. This claim is an example of a counterfactual conditional. This proposition takes the generic form "If it had been the case that C (or not C), it would have been the case that E (or not E)" (Fearon, 1991, p. 169). Debating historical propositions would entail extensive use of counterfactual logic. Historical analysis inherently involves a level of counterfactual reasoning. Murphy (1969) argues that "counterfactuals were an essential method of historians; these were by their nature (are) unverifiable propositions" (p. 15). The fact that they are unverifiable has led to criticism of counterfactuals as a form of logic. Thus, standards need to be applied in the assessment of counterfactual scenarios. Standards for Debating Historical Propositions? It should be noted that counterfactuals are a common model of logic. Their use transcends both specialized and general argumentative fields. Counterfactuals are commonly used in a variety of scholarly disciplines. Fearon (1991) states that "scholars in comparative politics and international relations routinely evaluate causal hypotheses by discussing or simply referring to counterfactual cases in which a hypothesized causal factor is supposed to have been absent" (p. 169). Conterfactual reasoning is common in legal argumentation. Counterfactual thinking is related to plaintiff compensation. In this context, "jurors are presented alternative event scenarios by the opposing parties" (Bothwell & Duhon, 1994, p. 705). Research indicates that there was a significant relationship between counterfactual thinking and plaintiff compensation (Miller & McFarland, 1986; Bothwell & Duhon, 1994). Counterfactuals are common to the study of economics. Murphy (1969) argues: that we cannot judge any economic policy without counterfactuals, we cannot estimate consumer surplus, we cannot calculate the effects of a tax or a subsidy, the removal of international trade barriers, indeed we cannot judge any recommendation to change the status-quo unless we consider the alternative state of affairs. (p. 18) Counterfactuals are also common in generalized fields of argumentation. Landman and Manis (1992) found "that personally relevant counterfactual thought is commonly engaged in by people outside the laboratory" (p. 476). Roese (1994) argues that "the ability to imagine alternative, or counterfactual, versions of actual events appears to be a pervasive, perhaps even essential, feature of human consciousness" (p. 805). Given the widespread use of counterfactuals, evaluation of counterfactuals can be extrapolated from existing standards. Meyer and Conrad (1957) argue that even though "counterfactuals cannot be directly tested, it is possible to consider the statement within a valid deductive system, independently of the acknowledged falsity of the conditional clause" (p. 540). Such a derivation is clearly an intuitive one and is not a matter of formal logic (Murphy, 1969).

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* 1. past and future counterfactuals are distinct, only revisting the past unlocks contingency

**Broda-Bahm 94** (Ken Broda-Bahm Towson State University PhD Counterfactuals: Quasi-Answers to Questions http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~jonathan/debate/ceda-l/archive/CEDA-L-Aug-1994/msg00009.html)

I think Dave is right - Counterfactuals are not, as they've been treated, a weird and special kind of argument. We are used to saying "they run counterfactuals" in hushed tones in tournament hallways, as if we're describing an especially tricky stratagem, but counterfactuals are components of virtually all arguments in a debate. Remember, to say that A causes B is to say that in the (counterfactual) absence of A, there would be no or less B. To say that A would be good is to say that in the (counterfactual) presence of A, some consequent would happen more readily. Counterfactuals are part of natural language. As Creath (1989) says, "there is nothing special about counterfactuals which should make us reject them" (p. 101). It is the counterfactual ANALYSIS that seems so exotic, not the counterfactuals themselves. To get closer to Dave's point, the counterfactual analysis of affirmative and negative in a policy context seems uncontroversial. A negative disadvantage comments on a possible world - just like an advantage does. These type of future oriented counterfactuals have not led to much confusion. What has led to much of the eyebrow raising has been counterfactuals about the past: if we had never had a critical news media... if the industrial revolution hadn't happened... If Hitler had gotten the atomic bomb." I don't know why we are more upset about past counterfactuals than future counterfactuals. David Lewis (1979) says that it is because we see future as being less deterministic than the past: "We tend to regard the future as a multitude of alternative possibilities, a 'garden of forking paths'...whereas we regard the past as a unique, settled, immutable actuality" (p. 459), so we intuitively get more upset when debaters mess with it. Seeing counterfactuals as a common way of thinking helps. Debaters say, "if A, then C": when A is a potentiality, then the counterfactual is about the future, but when A looks at the absence of something present and/or settled, then the counterfactual must generally posit some repair of the past.

#### It’s the only mechanism that bridges the credit gap for ordinary people

Ferrey ‘81

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The Bank may transact business with the national network of lending institutions by two methods. First, in order to provide assistance to eligible recipients,'79 the Bank may make lumpsum payments to financial institutions. These payments in turn would be used to reduce the principal or interest on conservation or solar energy loans made to eligible recipients'80 or to make grants for conservation to low-income tenants and owners. ' Second, the Bank is empowered to engage in secondary-market loan financing by purchasing any loans made in whole or in part for residential solar energy or conservation improvements.' 82 Significantly, this secondary-market authority is limited to residential properties and can be employed to purchase loans made to residential customers by utilities. 83 The Energy Security Act also deletes the provision'84 of NECPA prohibiting utilities from financing or installing (through independent contractors) residential energy conservation and solar energy improvements. 85 By requiring conservation loan terms of at least five years, 86 prohibiting prepayment penalties,'87 restricting Bank establishment of security requirements for small conservation loans to low-income persons, 88 and requiring lenders not to establish minimum conservation loan requirements greater than $600 for terms of less than five years,'89 the Bank bridges many of the credit gaps which otherwise frustrate access to credit by ordinary borrowers.