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## 1

#### Aff must specify their agent---vital to education on energy issues

Annual Review of Energy 76

(Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy Annual Review of Energy, Vol. 1: 715-725, November, http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435 )

The ultimate effectiveness of any policy is largely dependent on the individual efficacy and coordination of the agents or agencies that implement it. There are ample illustrations of the truth of this premise in **the recent attempts by the Administration and Congress to formulate and implement a national energy policy, as a result, that policy, irrespective of any intrinsic soundness, could inevitably become trapped in a quagmire of regulatory policies and practices**. The difficulties that energy policymakers in the United States have experienced in 1974 and 1975 arc in many respects symptomatic of the very problem that they have intended to resolve—the lack of a comprehensive and coordinated national energy policy. Decisions concerning energy supply and general policy that have been made over the years have contributed to the creation of areas of special concern and interest, institutionalized them, and nourished them through dedicated sponsorship by either the Congress, the Executive Branch, the independent federal agencies, or industry. The difficulties that stymied congressional consideration and executive implementation of an effective energy policy in 1974 and the first half of 1975 mirror this state of affairs.

## 2

Government energy policy is coercive and inevitable fails

Bradley, CEO and founder – Institute for Energy Research, 3/1/’13

(Robert, “Big-Picture Policy: Talking Points for Economic Liberty (energy included),” <http://www.masterresource.org/2013/03/big-picture-liberty/#more-24526>)

“[T]here are, at bottom, basically two ways to order social affairs. Coercively, through the mechanisms of the state … and voluntarily, through the private interaction of individuals and associations…. Civil society is based on reason, eloquence, and persuasion, which is to say voluntarism. Political society, on the other hand, is based on force.”

- Edward Crane (quotation), founder, Cato Institute

The worldview for entrusting consenting adults with energy is, broadly speaking, libertarian. Consumers are more knowledgeable than government agents on what (energy) products are most valuable in terms of convenience, price, and reliability. And as experience has shown time and again, politicizing energy creates problems rather than solves them. Restated, there is government **failure is the** **quest to** **address alleged market failures.**

Obama’s GOVERNMENT

Arguments about energy also apply to health care, money and banking, and other pillars of the modern economy. And so the science of liberty is at the center of the debate writ large. And it is at odds with President Obama’s out-of-the-closet Big Government model as stated in his second inaugural address.

After paying lip service to the American ideals of freedom and the pursuit of happiness, Obama stated:

But we have always understood that when times change, so must we; that fidelity to our founding principles requires new responses to new challenges; that preserving our individual freedoms ultimately requires collective action. [1]

Is Obama talking about civil society, that huge engine of goodness and progress standing between the “selfish” individual and “good” government? Hardly! He assumes, fallaciously, that economic freedom is the enemy of broad-based progress (including for those most vulnerable to poverty through no fault of their own). He assumes, romantically, that government redistribution can take care of the indigent and elevate the masses.

Sadly, the end state of this implemented philosophy is a growing nation of dependents (including business cronies) and of planners/regulators–and a shrinking productive class. The powerful third force of civil society, as Edward Crane has noted over the decades, falls prey to political society.

#### Moral side constraint

Petro, Wake Forest Professor in Toledo Law Review, 1974

(Sylvester, Spring, page 480)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation: "**It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once**." Thus, **it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration**. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one believed in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then **every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit**.

## 3

Production means extraction of [oil / gas]

Barrett, JD – University of Oklahoma College of Law, ‘93

(Beverly M., 46 Okla. L. Rev. 745)

In such a royalty clause, as a precondition of sale, the oil and gas must be physically removed from the ground. n93 In fact, the oil and gas industry and most courts define production in terms of physical severance of the minerals from the ground. n94 When a pipeline makes take-or-pay payments, unless recoupment gas is physically taken, there is no production and thus no royalty owed. Obviously it would be easier to seek royalty payments under a royalty clause in which the terms "produced" or "production" are not used. n95

Precision—technical definitions are the gold standard in energy debates

Brown, judge – Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, ‘59

(John R., “CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,” Dissenting Opinion, 266 F.2d 208; 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 5196; 10 Oil & Gas Rep. 601)

Indeed, I do not think that my cautious Brothers would have undertaken this excursion had they not first have found (or assumed) a basis for considering production in its ordinary, common usage. For clearly, what the Court says does not follow if the term is used in the sense of the oil and gas field. For example, the Court states, 'In the ordinary language of purchase and sale of a product where it is in deliverable form the stream of gas is, in a sense, 'produced' at the latest after it has passed through the first master valve. \* \* \*.' Again, it states, 'but this does not change the fact that in the ordinary sense of the terms production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground where it is physically deliverable but then is shut in until delivery commences.'To support this approach, the Court frankly states that 'our duty here is not to determine what is generally understood in the industry, in the resolution of other relationships, is meant by 'production." It is, rather, the Court goes on to say 'to determine what Congress meant by the term.' Reading § 1(b) as though it contained only the first part of the sentence and disregarding [\*\*35] altogether the exclusionary phrases at its end, the Court then proceeds to find that the sole Congressional purpose was 'to regulate these interstate sales.' This causes the Court then to reject the industry context and adopt a construction of 'production' which 'is in line with ordinary non-technical usage' so that it will 'effectuate and not \* \* \* frustrate the purpose of the law.'.' The abundant legislative history canvassed by the many Supreme Court cases But Congress was not legislating in an atmosphere of 'ordinary non-technical usage reveals an articulate awareness of the complexities of this whole business. The object of § 1(b) was clearly to define the purpose to regulate [\*220] transportation and sale and companies engaged in such transportation or sale. This was done against the background fully known to Congress that at one end of the process was the production of the natural gas, that at the other end was the consumer, and in between were those who transported and distributed it. As pointed out in Part I above, the Court has been emphatic in ascribing an intention to Congress to exclude those matters which relate to the local production activities [\*\*36] traditionally reserved to states for their exclusive control.We are told that § 1(b) exclusion is a provision '\* \* \* that \* \* \* precludes the Commission from and control over the activity of producing or gathering natural gas. \* \* \*.' Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 1945, 324 U.S. 581, 603, 65 S.Ct. 829, 839, 89 L.Ed. 1206. Two years later this was reiterated in Interstate Natural Gas Company v. FPC, 1947, 331 U.S. 682, 690, 67 S.Ct. 1482, 1487, 91 L.Ed. 1742. 'Clearly, among the powers thus reserved to the States is the power to regulate the physical production and gathering of natural gas in the interests of conservation or of any other consideration of legitimate local concern. It was the intention of Congress to give the States full freedom in these matters.'Within another two years this was reemphasized in FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 1949, 337 U.S. 498, 509-13, 69 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 93 L.Ed. 1499. 'To accept these arguments springing from power to allow interstate service, fix rates and control abandonment would establish wide control by the Federal Power Commission over the production and gathering [\*\*37] of gas. It would invite expansion of power into other phases of the forbidden area. It would be an assumption of powers specifically denied the Commission by the words of the Act as explained in the report and on the floor of both Houses of Congress. The legislative history of this Act is replete with evidence of the care taken by Congress to keep the power over the production and gathering of gas within the states.'How Congress expected to preserve the absolute freedom of the States in matters concerning production unless that term was used in the context of that industry is nowhere made clear by my Brothers. If Congress were to adhere to its purpose, carefully to regulate some but not all of the natural gas moving of dedicated to move in interstate commerce, it was required to prescribe the boundary limits of each in terms of the business and industry to be regulated. That is the usual, not the extraordinary, principle of statutory construction long ago set forth in Unwin v. Hanson, (1891) 2 Q.B. 115, 119, approved in O'Hara v. Luckenback Steamship Co., 1926, 269 U.S. 364, 370-371, 46 S.Ct. 157, 160, 70 L.Ed. 313:'If the act is one [\*\*38] passed with reference to a particular trade, business, or transaction, and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business, or transaction, knows and understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning, though it may differ from the common or ordinary meaning of the words.'And see 50 Am.Jur., Statutes § 277 (1944).What is 'production of natural gas' is to be determined in the light of the actual substantive conditions and engineering-business requirements of that great field of scientific mechanical activity. Such activity is not to be assayed by Judges who, learned in the law, have naught but the limited technical experience and cumulative knowledge of the ordinary person.Judged by the standards of the industry, not only by what was said and uncontradicted, but by what was done on a large scale in this very field, the Commission could only find that all of Continental's facilities were essential to and a part of the production of gas. [\*221] IV.The Court's action and opinion is portentous. It is so precisely because it is based on an erroneous assumption and an equally [\*\*39] erroneous construction. It assumes that we are fact finders to supplant or supplement the expert agency. It finds the capacity to cope with this problem by relieving it of all technical complexities and casting it in the mold of the ordinary meaning of production.The Court finds 'that in the ordinary sense of the term production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground where it is physically deliverable \* \* \*.' (emphasis in the original) Tying this in to the point of delivery (at the very extreme end of Continental's 4-inch master value and at the very beginning of El Paso's swage), the Court has necessarily adopted the approach of the Commission that facilities for the sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission are those 'serving to contain the gas at the point of delivery.' That it means to champion this construction is likewise established by the Court's unqualified approval, both here and in Sun Oil Company v. FPC, 5 Cir., 1959, 266 F.2d 222, of J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 3 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 550, 556 and Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 10 Cir., 1957, 250 F.2d 61, 69, [\*\*40] the latter of which states: 'To us it is clear that facilities necessary to effect a sale of gas in interstate commerce are facilities used in interstate commerce and are within the jurisdiction of the Commission. This would seem to be the plain intent of section 7(c). The Third Circuit has so held in J. M. Huber Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 3 Cir., 236 F.2d 550, 556.'The vice of this rationale is compounded by the Court's interpretation of 'production' or 'production facilities' in terms of ordinary non-industry connotation. But even without this, if the test is to be stated in terms of that piece of equipment which is needed to effectuate the sale or contain the gas at the point of sale delivery, then there is in fact no physical limitation. In those terms the master valve (whether upper or lower, or both) does not alone contain the gas. The master valves are ineffective without the continuation of the leakproof surface casing, the production casing or many other parts of the well, all of which operate simultaneously and indispensably to bring and hold the gas under effective control.That is critical since § 7(c) requires certification [\*\*41] of facilities which are to be constructed or extended. And once a little intrusion is made into the forbidden 1(b) area of production, it is only logical to expect (and justify) application of the full reach of this concept. It stops in a given well where, but only where, the particular piece of equipment may be said to directly assist in the containment of the gas at delivery point. Worse, it means that by the force of § 7(c), the drilling and equipping of a new well could only be done by express approval of the Commission.We and all others have now firmly held that on the commencement of the first jurisdictional sale, the Commission's power attaches at least to the sale. The Court by our present opinion holds that simultaneously power attaches to some piece of gas well equipment. If the jurisdictional sale setting all of this Federal control in motion is in the common form of a long-term dedication-of-reserves- contract by which the mineral owner undertakes to develop a field and deliver all production to the long line pipe line purchaser, the result will be that the drilling of additional wells may not be done except on Commission terms and approval. In such [\*\*42] a situation the 'new' well would, of course, be the means by which to effectuate the sale of the gas. Since this would constitute 'the construction or extension of any facilities' for the sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and would result in the acquisition and operation of 'such facilities or extensions thereof,' it would, as § 7(c) demands, positively require that the Commission issue a certificate of public [\*222] convenience and necessity 'authorizing such acts or operation.'Combining this opinion and Sun Oil, this day decided, this Court binds a gas well owner to produce gas for as long as the Commission prescribes. Neither the length of the contract nor the production-nature of the facility by which the 'service' (sale) is performed are an effective limitation. Until nature shuts off the gas the Commission is the perpetual regulator from whose power the Commission's own brief says, '\* \* \* there is no \* \* \* hiding place.'Congress did not mean to invest its creature with these scriptural powers (Psalms 139:7, 8). Section 1(b) draws the line at production.

Only our interpretation gives meaning to the phrase “energy production”—it’s about producing energy assets

Noyes, non-profit and local government consultant in Wilmington, DE, contributor – Daily Kos, 12/8/’5

(Tommy, “Economics and the Environment, Part 1: What Happens When We Light a Fire,” <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/12/08/170460/--Economics-and-the-Environment-Part-1-What-Happens-When-We-Light-a-Fire>)

If we wish to be precise, we wouldn't use the phrase "energy production." Most of what we call "energy production" involves burning something.

A ton of coal is an asset. Smoke coming out a smokestack is not an asset.

Setting fire to an asset is not production. It can economically useful by keeping us warm or converting iron ore to steel, but it is not, strictly speaking, production, defined as the creation of an asset.

This simple rephrasing of what happens when we light a fire leads to useful insights into economics and the environment. Consider the similar phrase, "timber production." A tree standing in a forest may not be considered to have any economic value. But when a logger cuts down the tree, it becomes an asset as soon as it hits the ground and is hauled off to the lumber mill.

Limits—their interpretation allows affs that impact the entire energy sector

Sagar, PhD materials science, Oliver, PhD engineering, and Chikkatur, PhD physics, ‘5

(Ambuj, Hongyan, and Ananth, all three are research fellows – Kennedy School of Govt @ Harvard, 7 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 1)

The energy sector encompasses activities relating to the production, conversion, and use of energy. Energy production includes the extraction of primary energy forms such as coal, oil, and natural gas, or growing biomass for energy uses. Energy conversion pertains to the transformation of energy into more useful forms: this includes the refining of petroleum to yield products such as gasoline and diesel; the combustion of coal in power plants to yield electricity; the production of alcohol from biomass, etc. Energy end-use encompasses the final use of energy forms in industrial, residential, commercial, transportation and other end-uses.

## 4

#### Financial incentives must be targeted at energy generation

O’Brien, Minister of State, Department for Energy and Climate Change, UK Parliament, 11/18/’8

(Mike, “Clause 20 — Terms and conditions,” <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debate/?id=2008-11-18b.159.3>)

I have quite a lot still to say, so I shall try to give as full a reply, and as brief, as possible. Amendment (b) to Lords amendment No. 42 suggests we replace the term "financial incentives" in proposed new subsection (2)(a) with "payment". The use of the term "financial incentives" clarifies that the general purpose of the scheme is to incentivise low-carbon electricity generation through financial incentives, as opposed to other means such as a regulatory obligation or barrier-busting support, such as help with the planning system. We believe that such clarity is helpful in setting out beyond any doubt the primary purpose of the scheme. However, to give additional reassurances about our intentions, I would point to the powers under proposed new subsection (3) that specifies the term "payment" in all the key provisions that will establish the scheme. In others words, it is explicit that we are dealing with payments to small-scale generators. What is proposed will be a real feed-in tariff scheme.

#### Guaranteed purchasing is a non-financial incentive

Czinkota 9

(Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### Vote Neg—tons of bidirectional mechanisms impact energy tech in ways that could increase production—only direct financial disbursements for increased production create a predictable and manageable topic

EIA, Energy Information Administration, Office of Energy Markets and End Use, U.S. DOE, ‘92

(“Federal Energy Subsidies: Direct and Indirect Interventions in Energy Markets,” <ftp://tonto.eia.doe.gov/service/emeu9202.pdf>)

In some sense, most Federal policies have the potential to affect energy markets. Policies supporting economic stability or economic growth have energy market consequences; so also do Government policies supporting highway development or affordable housing. The interaction between any of these policies and energy market outcomes may be worthy of study. However, energy impacts of such policies would be incidental to their primary purpose and are not examined here. Instead, this report focuses on Government actions whose prima facie purpose is to affect energy market outcomes, whether through financial incentives, regulation, public enterprise, or research and development.

## 5

#### Immigration reform likely but not guaranteed

Julian Zelizer, CNN Contributor, Ph.D, Princeton University History and Public Affairs Professor, 3/25/13, Seize the immigration deal, www.cnn.com/2013/03/25/opinion/zelizer-immigration-reform/index.html

The stars seem to be aligning for immigration reform. The election of 2012 scared many Republicans into thinking that their increasingly hardline stance on immigration is cutting against big demographic changes. These Republicans fear that they might risk writing themselves off for decades to come, if the GOP loses a vital part of the electorate to Democrats. A growing number of prominent Republicans are coming out in favor of a liberalized immigration policy, including the tea party darlings Sens. Rand Paul and Marco Rubio. During a recent speech to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, Paul said that "immigration reform will not occur until conservative Republicans, like myself, become part of the solution." Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York announced that an eight-person bipartisan group will soon reach a deal to move forward in the Senate. So it appears that **the opportunity for bold immigration reform has finally arrived**. But as any observer of congressional history knows, nothing is inevitable on Capitol Hill, particularly in the current Congress, where both parties remain extremely polarized and there are high costs for bucking the party orthodoxy. What needs to happen to close a deal? It is instructive to look back at history when Congress passed two landmark civil rights measures: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Both were highly controversial; but ultimately, they went through as a result of bipartisan deals. Even though Congress is different in this era -- with both parties deeply divided internally and a closed committee system that dampens the power of party leaders to control members -- those historical struggles offer some instructive lessons for today as to how to seize a great opportunity that emerges. The news media have always been a powerful force in our society. At times, they have helped push our political system toward reform. Right now, a new generation of reporters can shine by taking on the biggest stories of the day that would have long-term impact on the direction of our country. This is what happened during the early 1960s, when a young generation of print and television reporters brought the nation vivid reports from the front lines of the civil rights struggle. In those years, reporters covered the brutal clashes that were taking place in southern cities like Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, showing the nation the reality of race relations. When presidential speechwriter Richard Goodwin watched the clashes on his television screen, he instantly understood how the media were transforming the national conversation. He noted, "For a century the violence of oppression had been hidden from the sight of white America. ... But now the simple invention of a cathode ray tube, transforming light into electrons, registering their impact on the magnetic tape, had torn the curtain away. And America didn't like what it saw." Similarly, in the new Internet age that we live in, the media can offer the nation a better understanding of the plight of immigrants who are living in this country and the kinds of problems that legislation can redress. Too often, discussions about immigration have revolved around vague and caricatured images. In the next few months, young and enterprising reporters can help politicians and voters see why the government needs to resolve this issue and how it can best do so. Another important lesson from history is the need to reach out to the other side when a rare opportunity comes along. In the civil rights debate, President Lyndon Johnson depended on the Senate minority leader, Republican Everett Dirksen of Illinois, to deliver the votes needed to end a filibuster in 1964. In order to get Dirksen on his side, Johnson told his administration team and congressional leadership to play to Dirksen's ego and sense of history. The key was to allow Dirksen to shape the bill, within certain parameters, so that he could leave his imprint on the measure. "You get in there to see Dirksen!" Johnson told Sen. Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic whip who was shepherding the bill through the Senate. "You drink with Dirksen! You talk to Dirksen! You listen to Dirksen!" Dirksen made some important changes to the bill during the negotiations but in the end, he delivered over 20 Republican votes, which killed the filibuster. Johnson got what he wanted. President Obama will need to make the same kind of moves, giving Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell some kind of a role so that he can buy into the legislation and win some amount of credit for producing a bill. The president will need to do the same in the House, where Speaker John Boehner will play a vital role as he tries to tame the radicals in his caucus. While giving either Republican such a role might frustrate Democrats who feel that their party is in command, the results could be powerful. Immigration rights activists can sit tight as the final months of the debate unfold. For all the talk about bipartisanship in the 1960s, the reality was that bipartisanship was often produced when legislators felt immense pressure from the grass roots. When the Senate debated the civil rights bill in a lengthy filibuster that lasted 60 days in the spring and summer of 1964, civil rights activists -- who had already forced Congress to deal with the issue through a mass march on Washington -- conducted protests in states and districts and gathered in Washington to lobby members. The immigration rights movement has been extremely effective in recent years, and now it must show its chops once again. It must also form alliances with other organizations, such as civil rights and gay rights groups, that have indicated they are willing to enter into a broader coalition to support this cause. The movement needs to work on legislators who are currently on the fence, especially Republicans who are thinking of joining Rubio, Paul and others. The key is to do this without stimulating some kind of backlash in their constituencies. **The moment for an immigration deal has arrived**. The political incentives for saying yes are strong in both parties, and this is an issue that needs a resolution. **The key question will be whether Congress seizes this opportunity** or whether partisanship paralyzes the institution once again, as it has done so many times before.

Bipart backlash to the plan

Kasperowicz 12

(Pete, “House approves bill tweaking Obama on use of Strategic Petroleum Reserve” 06/21/12, The Hill)

The Obama administration has previously floated the idea of using the SPR to boost supply and lower oil prices. But that has been met with fierce criticism from Republicans, who argue the plan reveals that President Obama does believe that increased supply would lower prices. Based on this logic, Republicans argue, Obama should also be in favor of increasing domestic oil production.

Aside from linking the use of oil reserves to more domestic energy production, the bill also more broadly seeks to speed up the oil drilling permitting process. Republicans argued during the debate that expanding access to oil resources would not just help U.S. energy security, but would also help create jobs.

"The oil and gas industry is the lifeblood of so many communities across our nation," House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) said. "But this president's policies have stifled the development of many of our nation's energy resources.

"Increasing energy production on our nation's public lands and waters can create millions of jobs, boost the economy, lower energy costs and make America more secure."

Democrats largely opposed the bill, and called it another gift Republicans were trying to give to oil companies.

"Today's bill is one more massive giveaway, and it is one more massive assault on the environment," House Energy and Commerce Committee ranking member Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) said.

In addition to the oil-and-gas leasing provisions, the bill block EPA from completing a trio of air pollution rules until a new interagency committee studies the cumulative effects of an array of EPA policies on fuel prices and the economy.

The Democratic opposition was backed by a threat from Obama to veto the legislation.

The White House argued that the bill would "impede the process on important protections for the health of American families," and rejected the idea of linking the SPR to mandating an expansion of onshore oil-and-gas leasing.

"Linking a drawdown of the SPR with the leasing of Federal lands for energy production is entirely without rational basis, either temporally, spatially, or in terms of the Nation's energy needs," the White House wrote.

Republicans allowed consideration of several Democratic amendments to the bill, but accepted just two minor ones, including language that would establish an Office of Energy Employment and Training and an Office of Minority and Women in the Department of the Interior.

The House also approved an amendment that would boost Gulf state oil sharing revenues by $8 billion over a 32-year period, which would benefit Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. That language would amend a 2006 agreement that allowed these states to share offshore oil revenue, and is the second time the House has approved this language.

House passage sends the bill to a Senate that is likely to once again ignore the bill. On Wednesday, House Democrats said the GOP energy plan is not the best way to create jobs, and argued that Congress should be focusing on the highway bill and legislation keeping student loan interest rates low, an argument that will likely resonate with Senate Democrats in the coming weeks.

#### That kills Obama’s immigration push

Amy Harder, National Journal, 2/6/13, In Washington, Energy and Climate Issues Get Shoved in the Closet, www.nationaljournal.com/columns/power-play/in-washington-energy-and-climate-issues-get-shoved-in-the-closet-20130206

At a news conference where TV cameras in the back were nearly stacked on top of each other, an influential bipartisan group of five senators introduced legislation late last month to overhaul the nation’s immigration system. The room was so crowded that no open seats or standing room could be found. A week later, one senator, Republican Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, was standing at the podium in the same room to unveil her energy-policy blueprint. There were several open seats and just a few cameras. At least one reporter was there to ask the senator about her position on President Obama’s choice for Defense secretary, former Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel. “I’m doing energy right now,” Murkowski responded. “I’m focused on that.” Almost everyone else on Capitol Hill is focused on something else. Aside from the broad fiscal issues, **Congress and the president are** galvanizing around immigration reform. Four years ago, the White House prioritized health care reform above comprehensive climate-change legislation. The former will go down in history as one of Obama’s most significant accomplishments. The latter is in the perpetual position of second fiddle. “**To everything**,” **Murkowski interjected** fervently **when asked** by National Journal Daily **whether energy** and climate policy **was second to other policies** in Washington’s pecking order. Murkowski, ranking member of the Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said she hoped the Super Bowl blackout would help the public understand the importance of energy policy. “This issue of **immigration**: Why are we all **focused on that**? Well, it’s because the Republicans lost the election because in part we did not have the Hispanic community behind us,” Murkowski said this week. “What is it that brings about that motivation? Maybe it could be something like a gap in the Super Bowl causes the focus on energy that we need to have. I can only hope.” It will take more than hope. Elections have consequences, but so far the only kind of electoral consequence climate and energy policy has instigated is one that helped some lawmakers who supported cap-and-trade legislation to lose their seats in the 2010 midterm elections. For the pendulum to swing the other way—for lawmakers to lose their seats over not acting on climate and energy policy—seems almost unfathomable right now. Billions of dollars are invested in the fossil-fuel power plants, refineries, and pipelines that the country depends on today. The companies that own this infrastructure have a business interest in keeping things the way they are. Immigration reform doesn’t face such formidable interests invested in the status quo. “They [businesses] have employees—real, visible people—who they value and who they want to make legal as soon as possible,” said Chris Miller, who until earlier this year was the top energy and environment adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. On energy and climate-change policy, Miller added, “You’re probably never going to have anything like the fence in the Southwest or the border-control issue that **push**es action and debate **on immigration**, because climate-change impacts will likely continue to be more abstract in the public's mind until those impacts are so crystal-clear it’s too late for us to do anything.” Another, tactical reason helps build momentum on immigration and not on other issues. **Obama can capitalize on immigration** as it becomes more of a wedge issue within the GOP. On energy and climate policy, Obama faces a unified Republican Party. “The president has cracked the code on how to push his agenda items through. He learned from his victories on the payroll tax and the fiscal cliff that the key is to stake out the political high ground on issues that poll in his favor while exploiting the divisions within the GOP,” said a former Republican leadership aide who would speak only on the condition of anonymity. “With this in mind, the next logical place for him to go is immigration. Unlike issues like energy or tax reform where the GOP is united, he can claim a big win on immigration reform while striking a political blow to Republicans.”

#### Immigration reform necessary to sustain the economy and competitiveness

Javier Palomarez, Forbes, 3/6/13, The Pent Up Entrepreneurship That Immigration Reform Would Unleash, www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/03/06/the-pent-up-entrepreneurship-that-immigration-reform-would-unleash/print/

The main difference between now and 2007 is that today the role of immigrants and their many contributions to the American economy have been central in the country’s national conversation on the issue. Never before have Latinos been so central to the election of a U.S. President as in 2012. New evidence about the economic importance of immigration reform, coupled with the new political realities presented by the election, have given reform a higher likelihood of passing. As the President & CEO of the country’s largest Hispanic business association, the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC), which advocates for the interests of over 3 million Hispanic owned businesses, I have noticed that nearly every meeting I hold with corporate leaders now involves a discussion of how and when immigration reform will pass. The USHCC has long seen comprehensive immigration reform as an economic imperative, and now the wider business community seems to be sharing our approach. It is no longer a question of whether it will pass. Out of countless conversations with business leaders in virtually every sector and every state, a consensus has emerged: our broken and outdated immigration system hinders our economy’s growth and puts America’s global leadership in jeopardy. Innovation drives the American economy, and without good ideas and skilled workers, our country won’t be able to transform industries or to lead world markets as effectively as it has done for decades. Consider some figures: Immigrant-owned firms generate an estimated $775 billion in annual revenue, $125 billion in payroll and about $100 billion in income. A study conducted by the New American Economy found that over 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies were started by immigrants or children of immigrants. Leading brands, like Google, Kohls, eBay, Pfizer, and AT&T, were founded by immigrants. Researchers at the Kauffman Foundation released a study late last year showing that from 2006 to 2012, one in four engineering and technology companies started in the U.S. had at least one foreign-born founder — in Silicon Valley it was almost half of new companies. There are an estimated 11 million undocumented workers currently in the U.S. Imagine what small business growth in the U.S. would look like if they were provided legal status, if they had an opportunity for citizenship. Without fear of deportation or prosecution, imagine the pent up entrepreneurship that could be unleashed. After all, these are people who are clearly entrepreneurial in spirit to have come here and risk all in the first place. Immigrants are twice as likely to start businesses as native-born Americans, and statistics show that most job growth comes from small businesses. While immigrants are both critically-important consumers and producers, they boost the economic well-being of native-born Americans as well. Scholars at the Brookings Institution recently described the relationship of these two groups of workers as complementary. This is because lower-skilled immigrants largely take farming and other manual, low-paid jobs that native-born workers don’t usually want. For example, when Alabama passed HB 56, an immigration law in 2012 aimed at forcing self-deportation, the state lost roughly $11 billion in economic productivity as crops were left to wither and jobs were lost. Immigration reform would also address another important angle in the debate – the need to entice high-skilled immigrants. Higher-skilled immigrants provide talent that high-tech companies often cannot locate domestically. High-tech leaders recently organized a nationwide “virtual march for immigration reform” to pressure policymakers to remove barriers that prevent them from recruiting the workers they need. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, fixing immigration makes sound fiscal sense. Economist Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda calculated in 2010 that comprehensive immigration reform would add $1.5 trillion to the country’s GDP over 10 years and add $66 billion in tax revenue – enough to fully fund the Small Business Administration and the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce for over two years. As Congress continues to wring its hands and debate the issue, lawmakers must understand what both businesses and workers already know: The American economy needs comprehensive immigration reform.

## 6

#### Obama’s commitment to environmentalists has made Keystone possible – saving relations with Canada

Seib, 2/18

(Wall Street Journal Columnist, “How Obama Might Get to 'Yes' on Keystone Pipeline,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323764804578312290010174614.html)

One of President Barack Obama's trickiest political tasks early in his second term has nothing to do with taxes, budget or the debt ceiling. Rather, it will be his decision this spring on whether to give the go-ahead to the Keystone XL pipeline. Keystone XL—the proposed new spur of a transcontinental pipeline that would carry heavy crude oil from Canada to refineries on the U.S. Gulf Coast—was splitting Mr. Obama's Democratic coalition even before it became highly politicized when a decision was put off during last year's presidential campaign. Now, the temperature is rising. Environmentalists, whose admiration for Mr. Obama is about matched by their hatred of the pipeline and the oil it would transport, were busy over the weekend protesting in Washington in an attempt to stop the pipeline. Still, unions back the idea because of the construction and refining jobs it could create, and nine Democratic senators have joined 44 Republicans in a letter asking for approval. There is ample reason to think the second-term Obama White House, seeing openings to shake America's dependence on Middle East oil, **would like to find a way to give the green light.** And if that's so, **a combination of forces are lining up in a way that should make it possible for Mr. Obama to get to a "yes" answer, while limiting the political fallout.** One argument Mr. Obama can muster for Keystone XL is that the delay in approval that he ordered last year has worked, at least as far as environmental concerns go. It bought time for a change that addresses a principal worry, which was the route of the pipeline. Initially, the pipeline was to go through Nebraska's ecologically sensitive Sand Hills region. Even within deep-red Nebraska, environmental concerns about that route ran high enough to create a roadblock. Now, the route has been changed. A Nebraska state agency said last month the environmental risks of this new route would be "minimal," and Republican Gov. Dave Heineman just gave the pipeline a green light. Environmental groups aren't concerned merely with the route of the pipeline, of course, but with its very reason for existence: its use in facilitating the further burning of oil, and specifically oil extracted from Canada's tar sands, which is dirtier than average to produce. But on this front, the pipeline's symbolic importance outstrips its practical impact. Stopping Keystone won't stop Canada from producing the oil. The Canadians have too much invested in oil-sands extraction to simply stop. One likely effect of shutting down the pipeline—aside from **deeply straining U.S.-Canadian relations**—would be to divert the same oil into exports to Asia, for use by China, a country that is doing far less on other fronts to deal with climate change and dirty auto emissions than is the U.S. More immediately, tar-sands oil still would find its way to the U.S. by other routes—rail, truck and other pipelines—meaning its use won't be extinguished, but the efficiency by which it is brought to market would be diminished. **More important**, though**, is the broader environmental backdrop of the Keystone decisions.** The U.S. is starting to make meaningful progress on reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, despite the hard reality that it can't yet shake its addition to oil. Thanks to a combination of forces—the increasing use of relatively clean natural gas, improved energy efficiency and, yes, a world-wide recession—the U.S. actually is on track to meet its goal of reducing its greenhouse-gas emissions to 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, a goal Mr. Obama laid out in late 2009. The U.S. is outpacing Europe in reducing carbon emissions. Which **opens the door to the real path** Mr. **Obama can travel in selling Keystone XL approval to his party's base**. It is possible to **combine Keystone with other environmental moves** to show that progress in cutting greenhouse gases will continue even as the pipeline is built. In his State of the Union address last week, Mr. Obama called on Congress to construct a "bipartisan, market-based solution to climate change," citing specifically an approach Republican Sen. John McCain and then-Democratic Sen. Joe Lieberman advanced several years ago. But if Congress doesn't act, Mr. Obama said, he would explore "executive actions" to reduce pollution and address climate change. That suggests the president would consider moving beyond an existing Environmental Protection Agency proposal to regulate emissions from new power plants and perhaps put new limits on emissions from existing coal-powered plants. Whatever the president has in mind specifically, it should be easier to sell Keystone XL if that decision is paired with one showing that the progress the U.S. already has made on climate change will continue, even if the U.S. can't soon kick its oil habit. That is precisely the picture Mr. Obama ought to be able to paint as the big decision point nears.

#### SPR expansion causes environmental backlash

Energy Washington, staff writer, 4/5/2006, DOE Petroleum Reserve Plan Sparks Fears Over Worsening Gulf Damage, Lexis

DOE is planning to publish in mid-April a plan for expanding the SPR from 727 million barrels to 1 billion barrels to comply with a provision included in last year's energy law that requires the department to store the maximum authorized volume of petroleum to help with possible fuel shortages. Sources following the planning process say DOE is considering about 15 different storage sites in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. DOE in late 2005 sent a letter to federal agencies, industry and environmental groups located near the expected petroleum reserve expansion sites, asking them to comment on what issues the department should address in its soon-to-be issued environmental impact statement (EIS), which is required by the National Environmental Policy Act for federal actions expected to have significant environmental consequences. DOE is receiving strong backing from the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi, with Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco (D) saying in comments last September that the state would like DOE to consider four previously examined sites for petroleum storage because "the resources and experience of the State would make it an excellent location in which to expand the Strategic Petroleum Reserve." Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour (R) supports four sites previously studied by DOE and suggests additional sites to consider when the department issues its plan this month. But EPA and numerous other agencies and groups are raising concerns that potential environmental damage caused by constructing the petroleum storage sites may be excessive -- especially in light of increased pollution mitigation responsibilities the states are facing after the hurricanes. Numerous groups commented that DOE may need to re-examine whether it can store petroleum in the Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas sites it identified as possible storage areas, saying the recent storm damage and associated pollution may make those sites untenable. EPA Region IV cautions in Dec. 22, 2005, comments against expanding the SPR in a way that would exacerbate hurricane damage. The agency says two inland Mississippi sites are preferable to others under consideration because they have sustained less hurricane damage. "Relative to hurricane influences, the Bruinsburg and Richton sites have the advantage of being further inland than the other considered sites," EPA's comments say. The agency adds, "Aggregation of all SPR sites along coastal areas has obvious disadvantages." Other commenters also say inland locations would be preferable because of potential harm to coastal wetlands, which many agree were severely damaged during the storms. The Louisiana Department of Natural Resources says in Dec. 12, 2005, comments, "The construction and operation of new or expanded SPR facilities that will adversely affect wetlands within the Louisiana Coastal Zone are a primary concern of the State of Louisiana as we have a 'no net loss of wetland policy.'" The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service echoed the Louisiana department's concerns, and DOE received comment from a host of other federal agencies such as the Agriculture Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In addition, a number of environmental groups commented on the DOE plan. The Mississippi chapter of the Sierra Club said in Oct. 28, 2005, comments that DOE's EIS "should consider the cumulative impacts of this project on top of major ecological damage from Hurricane Katrina. "Huge amount[s] of debris and trash were swept into the Mississippi Sound and the Gulf of Mexico when the storm surge retreated," the comments say. "It will take years for this trash to be removed. Also, because of the massive quantities of debris on land, stormwater runoff will be extremely polluted for years to come." A source with the group says the method of storing petroleum in the Gulf Coast states would only worsen water pollution because DOE would have to hollow out large salt domes in the Gulf and release a salty waste into the water in order to make room for the petroleum. The salty discharge "would create a dead zone," the source says, and harm fisheries and other aquatic life already damaged by the hurricanes. The Mississippi Sierra Club's comments say many endangered species including the Gulf Sturgeon, Alabama Red-Bellied Turtle and the Ringed Map Turtle were harmed by the hurricanes, and would face further harm from new petroleum reserve sites. The group also says DOE should consider the cumulative impacts of expanding the SPR with currently permitted energy projects before moving ahead with the expansion. Sierra Club's comments point to a $48-million pipeline being constructed that pumps water from Mississippi's Pascagoula River to the Singing River Island, where private companies have expressed interest in siting an oil refinery. In addition, the Sierra Club says the environmental impacts of the reserve should be considered cumulatively with current proposals to build two onshore and one offshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, which the group says would "require major dredging, increase air pollution in the area, greatly increase safety risks from terrorism or accidents, and put large portions of the waterways off limits to boaters and fishermen while LNG ships are in transit." Another environmental group, the Gulf Restoration Network, also asks that DOE consider "any and all secondary and cumulative impacts of expansion of the SPR" including "those impacts associated with pipelines and any and all associated development stimulated by expansion of existing or creation of a new storage site" when proposing sites for the SPR.

#### Key to Arctic cooperation

Hampson, Chancellor’s Professor and Director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, 7/21/2012

(Fen Osler H. and Derek Burney, Senior Strategic Adviser at Norton Rose Canada, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/how-obama-lost-canada)

**Permitting** the construction of the **Keystone** XL pipeline **should have been an easy diplomatic** and economic **decision** for U.S. President Barack Obama. The completed project would have shipped more than 700,000 barrels a day of Albertan oil to refineries in the Gulf Coast, generated tens of thousands of jobs for U.S. workers, and met the needs of refineries in Texas that are desperately seeking oil from Canada, a more reliable supplier than Venezuela or countries in the Middle East. The project posed little risk to the landscape it traversed. But instead of acting on economic logic, the Obama administration caved to environmental activists in November 2011, **postponing until 2013** the decision on whether to allow the pipeline.

**Obama’s choice** marked a triumph of campaign posturing over pragmatism and diplomacy, and it **brought U.S.-Canadian relations to their lowest point in decades**. It was hardly the first time that the administration has fumbled issues with Ottawa. Although relations have been civil, they have rarely been productive. Whether on trade, the environment, or Canada’s shared contribution in places such as Afghanistan, time and again the United States has jilted its northern neighbor. **If the pattern of neglect continues**, Ottawa will get less interested in cooperating with Washington. Already, Canada has reacted by turning elsewhere -- namely, toward Asia -- for more reliable economic partners.

Economically, Canada and the United States are joined at the hip. Each country is the other’s number-one trading partner -- in 2011, the two-way trade in goods and services totaled $681 billion, more than U.S. trade with Mexico or China -- and trade with Canada supports more than eight million U.S. jobs. Yet the Obama administration has recently jeopardized this important relationship. It failed to combat the Buy American provision in Congress’ stimulus bill, which inefficiently excluded Canadian participation in infrastructure spending.

What’s more, by engaging in protectionism, Washington has violated the substance and spirit of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the trade bloc formed in 1994 among Canada, the United States, and Mexico. As a result, NAFTA, which was initially intended as a template for broader trade expansion by all three partners, has languished while each country has negotiated a spaghetti bowl of bilateral trade agreements with other countries. Trilateral economic summits among the NAFTA partners have become little more than photo-ops accompanied by bland communiqués. Bilateral meetings between U.S. and Canadian leaders, which were a regular feature of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush eras, have also mostly fallen by the wayside. Meanwhile, the United States demanded upfront concessions from Canada as the price of entry to negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a regional free-trade group, while preserving massive agriculture subsidies of its own. The protracted wrangling over a seat at the table does not augur well for meaningful progress.

After years of procrastination, Canada finally secured an agreement for a new Detroit-Windsor bridge -- over which 25 percent of trade between Canada and the United States crosses -- but only after it offered to cover all of the initial costs. The U.S. share is to be repaid over time by the tolls collected, but any shortfalls will rest with Canadian taxpayers. Canada was essentially forced to hold negotiations with Michigan; the U.S. federal government observed quietly from the sidelines.

The United States’ mistreatment of Canada extends beyond economic issues. Washington has also failed to trust and respect its loyal ally. To name one small but telling example, when Canada ran for a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010, the United States offered little support. For whatever reason, Portugal was a more compelling choice.

One would also think the United States and Canada could find **common ground on security**, economic, and environmental **issues in the Arctic**, an area of shared sovereignty and responsibility. Yet there has been little more than senseless bickering and public spats between Ottawa and Washington on who should attend what meeting of Arctic states. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for example, went out of her way to rake Canada over the coals for hosting a meeting of Arctic coastal nations in March 2010 and failing to invite other countries with “legitimate interests” in the region. But she was also taking a jab at Canada’s long-standing claims to the waters of the Arctic archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, which the United States rejects. **While Canada and the** United States **squabble**, **Russia and China are aggressively asserting their own interests in the region**.

Beginning with Obama’s visit to Ottawa in February 2009, Canada has also made repeated overtures to find consensus on climate change, pressing for common North American approaches and fuel standards to curtail carbon emissions. No representative from the Obama administration showed any interest in such a strategy; instead, the administration preferred a unilateral approach, which died in the Senate. The bilateral “clean energy dialogue” Obama touted during his 2009 visit has become a monologue.

In Afghanistan, Canada is now rapidly scaling back its substantial commitment to the military mission, thanks to the United States’ increasingly erratic, if not embarrassing, direction. Canada has spent billions on the war and lost over 150 soldiers, proportionately more than any other ally, but has received no tangible dividend for its support on bilateral or multilateral issues of concern to it. Canada also participated in NATO’s mission in Libya -- where a Canadian, Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, commanded military operations. Canada has no tangible interests of any kind in Afghanistan or Libya. Its participation in those countries, proportionately larger than any other ally, was intended primarily to strengthen the partnership with the United States on the theory that solid multilateral commitments would engender more productive bilateral relations. That proved not to be the case.

The only good news in U.S.-Canadian relations to come out of this White House has been the Beyond the Border declaration, a joint statement that Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued in February 2011. The initiative was supposed to remove much of the bureaucratic sludge that has thickened the U.S.-Canadian border since 9/11, including costly inspection and reporting requirements on virtually all cross-border shipments. Despite the initial fanfare, however, the border initiative has yet to deliver much of substance, and there has been little evidence to suggest that Obama remains engaged.

Of course, the U.S.-Canadian relationship has had its rocky moments before. In the 1970s and 1980s, in response to public concern over the United States’ economic domination of Canada, Ottawa enacted a wide variety of protectionist measures that irritated Washington. Eventually, the two countries recognized their mutual interests and resolved what differences they had, ratifying the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement in 1987 and its successor, NAFTA, seven years later.

**Back then**, **Canada had little choice but to find a way to fix its relationship with the** United States, the only game in town. **Ottawa is in a different position now**. Today, it enjoys a respectable platform of self-confidence, having weathered the financial crisis and ensuing recession far better than the United States. And unlike in the past, Canada can now look beyond its own neighborhood for economic opportunities -- especially to the rising economies of Asia.

Indeed, Canada has made a full-court press in the Asia-Pacific region. It is wooing countries such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea, which are eager to invest and trade in Canadian minerals, energy, and agricultural products. Harper has announced Canada’s intention to explore free-trade negotiations with China, and talks with Japan, Thailand, India, and South Korea are under way. As Harper put it during a visit to China in February, “**We want to sell our energy to people who want to buy our energy**.”

To be sure, Canadian companies will never abandon the U.S. market. Nevertheless, the U.S. recession and the rise of Asia have allowed Canada to diversify its economic relations. In 2010, only 68 percent of Canadian exports were destined for the United States, down from 85 percent in 2000. Canadians are accustomed to benign neglect from a neighbor preoccupied with more urgent global flashpoints, but since that neglect has grown so much as to be malign, **they have begun to reappraise their relationship with the** United States. **As Canada develops closer ties with China and finds more receptive outlets for its exports**, **the** United States **may find itself with a less obliging partner to the north**.

#### That deters conflict

Dobransky ‘12

Steve, Adjunct Professor at Lakeland College. He is completing his Ph.D. at Kent State University and is ABD. He has an M.A. from Ohio University and a B.A. from Cleveland State University. “Military Security, Energy Resources, and the Emergence of the Northwest Passage: Canada’s Arctic Dilemma,” <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2012/0106/ca/dobransky_arctic.html>, AM

If Canada is to achieve its territorial and diplomatic ambitions**,** then it likely requires a much greater civilian and military presence in the Arctic all year-round**.** Yet**,** there is no indication that Canadians are willing to sacrifice their current social system of extensive benefits for a much larger military budget and Arctic force**. And,** there is no evidence that Canadians want to pay much more in taxes or commit to a military draft. Canada has only around 70,000 active-duty military personnel, 30,000 reserve forces, and a $20 billion/year military budget. Its Arctic-ready forces and equipment are just a handful, a few thousand personnel at best who are truly specialists, mainly the Canadian Rangers. Moreover, there is no indication that Canada’s economy will greatly expand in the foreseeable future to produce the necessary surplus wealth to pay for a sizeable increase in an Arctic force. Canada’s economic growth has not been great over the last decade, let alone ever. Thus**,** Canada presents a very vocal casefor the Arctic but has been unable to completely back up its claims with the necessary increases in personnel, materials, ships, and money, which is very telling for the future. If not by now, then when?17If Canada is unwilling to shift or produce enough resources to create a sufficient Arctic force that is capable of fully securing the region over the three thousand miles of waterways, **plus above and beneath the surface, then** it opens up the possibility that other forces outside the region may move in and claim the trillions of dollars in natural resources. Russia is an obvious pursuer. The U.S. is another option. China, with its massively growing need for oil—especially when it runs out of much of its own domestic sources in approximately 10 years—will be looking everywhere for oil opportunities. Any country that can move oil rigs and mining companies into the Arctic area, operate them and maintain them, and have enough forces to possibly defend them will have trillions of reasons to act pro-actively. Hypothetical but quite possible. Can or will Canada defend this entire region on its own? Can or will Canadians risk an all-out war with Russia, China, or some other major power for control over all of the Arctic resources? Is Canada even capable of going into the ring against any of the major powers, especially if and when there is a great need and crisis in energy resources?18 Canada can make many public proclamations and scholarly materials on its claims to the Arctic, but its inability or unwillingness to move aggressively to secure the emerging Arctic regionis a signal to all that this could become an open-season area in the near future. The Arctic is increasingly looking like the grounds for a potential rivalry similar to the Western World’s colonization, **an** Oklahoma land rush**, a** California gold rush**,** and of course an Alaskan and Klondike gold rush**. Maybe** all rolled up into one.There are so many valuable resources in this Arctic area that one can only imagine how aggressively countries will act in the coming years and decades as natural resources become increasingly scarce and they become increasingly desperate for **more resources and** revenues**. The** massive amount of resources in the Arctic are there for the taking unless Canadais willing to make significant sacrifices to secure the area. Much greater taxation, a major reduction in social welfare benefits, lower wages, longer work hours, much greater economic production, and a significantly larger military that may require a draft, are all one and together necessary options if Canada is to establish fully a sizeable force to secure the entire Arctic region on its side year-round. Canadians spent years debating whether or not to spend the money for 6-8 ships for the Arctic,which is miniscule but indicative of Canadian priorities and intentions. Much greater resources and sacrifices have to be made. Ironically, Canadians may have to give up being Canadian and become more like Americans in order to make and implement the necessary policy changes and play successfully the game of power politics. So far, most Canadians do not appear willing to give up most of what it is to be Canadian. But, will this change in the future?19 Canadians can hope that other countries do not eventually move into the Arctic region, but it appears increasingly obvious that Canadiansarepassing the torch and initiative to other countries to make the final decision. Canadians, of course, willreject thisbutthe lack of major action and investment in the Arctic region over the past several decades suggest that Canada’s claims to the region rests **more** on political and legal talk thanreal power and action. There has been no indication for the last several years in which the Arctic is now being freely traversed year-round that Canadians have changed in any significant way. If Canadians have chosen to rest their claims on the hope that other countries in the future will sacrifice their wealth, power, and standard of living, let alone trillions of dollars in economic opportunities, just on their own goodwill or moral conscience**,** then it would be a truly dangerous gamble for Canadians. But, in the end, if Canadians are not willing to make the major sacrifices to protect the Arctic and all of its resources, then it is their free choice. Other countries will take note and act accordingly when the time is right and the imperative arises. Power usually trumps legal arguments and paper trails. The Arctic may be the quintessential example in the future.20

The U.S. Perspective and Future Interests and Policy

The United States may sooner or later come to the official recognition that Canada does not appear willing to commit the necessary resources to maintain adequate security in the Arctic. It may already have done so, unofficially. The U.S. has maintained some strategic forces in the region, mainly submarines, but the U.S. has yet to make anywhere near the aggressive moves and forces as Russia. The U.S. does not have a modern fleet of Arctic icebreakers, but it certainly has the capability to build one. The Russians are expanding rapidly in the Arctic region in terms of claims, exploration, and slowly but surely oil and mining activities. **The U.S. must soon determine its policy on this matter or else the Russians may make the decision for it**. **The U.S. has worked with Canada on joint security throughout the Cold War**, mainly through NORAD and the multiple layers of radar across Canada up to the Arctic. Both the U.S. and Canada have laid down many sonar devices as well. The primary threats to both countries for much of the last half century have been Russian submarines, bombers, and ICBMs. There is less of a threat now with the end of the Cold War, but the security issue remains and could emerge again **in the near future**.21 The existing international security and energy situations are precarious. Any Middle East crisis that cuts off significant amounts of oil will lead many countries to desperately search for new oil reserves to quickly replenish their lost ones. How long the Arctic will remain off the front stage of world affairs is a question that may be answered sooner rather than later. In the future, the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the Arctic may be Canada’s inability or unwillingness to develop an adequate security plan and force to the emerging economic opportunities in the Arctic. The U.S. does not recognize Canada’s claim to the waterways and, thus, cannot establish an official joint security program in areas in which it does not recognize Canadian sovereignty. Canada cannot do this as well without a major diplomatic backlash by the U.S. and others. Neither side can maintain a fiction for long without having the other renounce its claims and oppose its policy. Thus, **strategic threats to North America above and below the Arctic may continue to be addressed jointly by the U.S. and Canada** through NORAD and other existing security bodies, **but the emerging economic opportunities and subsequent security threats have yet to lead to a plausible joint policy program** or organization. This, in the end, may require multinational negotiations or bilateral and individual actions vis-à-vis other countries outside the area. But, this likely will be a very weak and limited policy option with highly questionable results.

Nuclear war

Wallace, 10

(Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia, March, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons A Task Long Overdue”, http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a **zone of increased military competition**. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to **conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons.**” Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but **no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly**. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.”

## 7

#### The fifty States should offer a purchase agreement for crude oil produced in the United States for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

## 8

President Obama should initiate a public campaign for and the United States House of Representative should pass legislation that offers a purchase agreement for crude oil produced in the United States for its Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The United States Senate should filibuster that legislation. The Supreme Court should rule that the Senate’s failure to allow a vote on that legislation is unconstitutional.

#### Filibuster undermines US leadership and ensures policy failure

Ornstein, 12

(11/26, Resident Scholar-American Enterprise Institute, December, “Yes, Congress Is That Bad,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/26/yes\_congress\_is\_that\_bad)

Americans are disgusted by much of what they see in Washington. Congress is deadlocked, and the two major political parties are ideologically polarized and engaged in a permanent state of war. Problem-solving and compromise have given way to pitched doctrinal battles and obstruction at any cost. Even the perilous state of the economy has been insufficient to break the political stalemate. As the public loses faith in the government's capacity to solve pressing problems, the U.S. Congress garners the lowest approval ratings in polling history -- a dismal 10 percent this past summer. What has gone wrong? Two sources of dysfunction are central to the current impasse: The first is a mismatch between the checks and balances built into the U.S. system and the extreme polarization now separating the two major political parties. By constitutional design, U.S. policymaking moves slowly; the president cannot dictate what happens in Congress, and legislators use separate procedures in the House and Senate that then must be reconciled to write law. In the past, eventual compromise was the standard outcome, at least when some legislators worked across party lines. Not anymore. The Democratic and Republican parties have been moving apart ideologically since the 1970s, but in the past 10 years this has dramatically accelerated. For the first time in the more than three decades since National Journal began compiling vote ratings for the U.S. Senate, the tallies for the last Congress showed that there was not a single Democrat more conservative than the most liberal Republican; the center, in other words, cannot hold -- because it has disappeared. Instead, American parties now resemble parliamentary parties: Party leaders crack the whip, and fewer members are willing to flout orders and compromise. The result: gridlock. The second major dysfunction has to do with the asymmetry of this polarization. The Republican Party has become the home of ideologically extreme insurgents who shun conventionally understood facts, evidence, and science, and scorn the very idea of working out compromises with a legitimate political opposition. This radicalized GOP is now willing to use all the levers in the constitutional system even if it means delay and deadlock. In a parliamentary system, a fiercely oppositional minority party is to be expected. In the American system, it cannot work. With the Republicans deciding to use the filibuster in the Senate as a routine tool of obstruction (they have resorted to the filibuster with a frequency in the last three years unprecedented in U.S. history), passing legislation now in effect requires not a majority but 60 votes out of 100. What's more, **any legislation that manages to pass under those conditions,** taken without broad bipartisan consensus, **divides the country and is seen by many as illegitimate or ill-advised**. That is the story of Barack Obama's first two years in office. Democrats, who were in charge of both the House and Senate, pushed through a wide range of measures from health-care reform to economic stimulus to financial regulation, **but the minority made a concerted effort to delegitimize them.** What came after was even worse: The 2010 midterm elections produced a divided-party government, genuine gridlock, and the least productive Congress in memory. This year saw the enactment of only 83 laws, a quarter of them naming post offices or making other symbolic acts. Of course, quality is more important than quantity (whatever else the famous "do-nothing" 80th Congress did, it passed the Marshall Plan). In the case of this 112th Congress, however, the quality is as abysmal as the quantity; the most significant public-policy action was the debacle surrounding the debt ceiling, which resulted in the first credit-rating downgrade in America's history. Now, following that reckless hostage-taking of what should have been a standard legislative act, a totally unnecessary "fiscal cliff" looms, threatening another recession. The problems here are not redeemable with quick fixes because the divisions are tribal and the problems are as much cultural as structural. This lethal combination of forces has serious implications not just for America's ability to solve its problems; it also **poisons America's standing in the world** -- its **ability to project its values abroad, garner the trust and respect of allies, and serve as a role model for nascent democracies** **and a counterpoint to autocracies.**

## oil prices

#### No impact on prices

Andrews and Pirog 11

Anthony and Robert, Specialists in Energy and Defense Policy and Economics. CRS Report

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41687.pdf

There are additional considerations. A unilateral drawdown on U.S. strategic stocks would probably have less impact on the world oil market than a coordinated international drawdown of the sort that occurred after the 2011 release to meet IEA obligations vis-à-vis Libya’s production curtailment. Some might argue that it would be unwise under any scenario for the United States to draw down its strategic stocks while other nations continue to hold theirs at current levels. Additionally, it is always possible that producing nations will reduce production to offset any SPR oil delivered into the market. In the setting of 2012, some might argue that the market is already well supplied and that short-term supply concerns are not keeping prices high, but current and anticipated geopolitical events are contributing to higher prices. Others argue that the oil commodity futures market is behind speculative bidding that is driving prices higher and may be adding as much as $23 to the price of barrel of oil.26

Some have perceived the SPR as a defensive policy tool against high oil prices. If an SPR release has no discernable impact on oil prices, it is possible that the SPR will lose some of whatever psychological advantage it exercises on prices when left as an untapped option.

Exacerbates market uncertainty and price spikes - empirics

Clayton 12

Blake Clayton, senior energy fellow at CFR, Council on Foreign Relations, September 2012, "Lessons Learned From the 2011 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Release", https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&ved=0CDIQFjAAOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fi.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FCFR\_WorkingPaper14\_Clayton.pdf&ei=9XFWUYvCCefyiQKl64CgDQ&usg=AFQjCNGmEmnaX66rXw7RpI\_LpRChpxwoRQ&sig2=tc4DxBEd10CbwpFDs0L2Lg&bvm=bv.44442042,d.cGE

Policymakers should remember that releasing oil from strategic stocks is hardly a free lunch. Tapping emergency inventories may dampen prices in the short term (though even that effect can be highly transient), but it can cause prices to rise soon thereafter.

There are two likely reasons why. First, market participants know that national governments will probably buy oil in the future to replace what they just released. Second, an emergency release also tends to increase the market’s skepticism that oil producers are well equipped to satisfy global demand. As Lawrence Eagles of JPMorgan explained, a release can “send the message that consumer governments have little faith that there is any spare capacity within the producer group, and/or there are concerns over OPEC’s short and long term price aspirations.”9 Market participants tend to be highly skeptical of official estimates of countries’ spare production capacity. Any signal from IEA countries that appears to reinforce those doubts can send prices higher. As analysts at Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO) later wrote, a “temporary release aimed at influencing shortterm prices could actually send an unintended bullish signal to the market that long-term spare capacity in OPEC producers is insufficient to meet supply losses.” Because oil prices are a “function of both near-term supply and demand and perceived long-term balances,” concern among market participants that the market may tighten up later can immediately feed back into higher prices.10

Thus, a release can make markets more anxious, not less, about future conditions in the oil market. Market expectations about higher prices tomorrow can spark higher prices today.

Fluctuations in the forward curve for Brent crude oil around the time of the IEA’s June 23 announcement provides support for these views (see Figure 12). Prices all along the curve fell sharply during trading on June 23, the day of the announcement. But by June 27, just two trading days later (June 25–26 was a weekend), long-term prices had already rebounded to their preannouncement levels. Three days later, the price of oil for delivery after January 2012 was higher than it had been prior to the IEA’s announcement. This jump in prices, though driven in part by a bounce in economic sentiment, suggests that the market may have indeed interpreted the IEA release as putting upward pressure on longer-term prices. It is also broadly consistent with the notion that market fears about longterm conditions are liable to feed back into near-term prices.

#### Beyond sufficient now

Matthew DiLallo, 3/27/13, Do We Still Need the Strategic Petroleum Reserve?, [www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/03/27/do-we-still-need-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve.aspx](http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/03/27/do-we-still-need-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve.aspx)

The crux of his argument is that the SPR was designed to protect us from an interruption of oil imports from OPEC. He notes that we import about 4 million barrels per day from OPEC, though only about 2 million barrels per day come from the Middle East. According to Boone, with the growth of our oil production we don't need to protect ourselves from these Middle Eastern supply shocks.

That begs the question: Are we really on pace to produce enough oil to eliminate the need for the SPR? Consider the Bakken: In January of 2011 the shale was producing about 275,000 barrels of oil per day. By last December, production had skyrocketed to 700,000 barrels of oil per day. The Bakken is probably pumping more than 800,000 barrels of oil per day now, and it has an inventory of more than 30,000 future wells that can be drilled.

It's possible that North Dakota eventually tops Texas as the nation's leading oil-producing state. Leading Bakken oil producer Continental Resources (NYSE: CLR ) sees its production and proven reserves tripling between 2012 and 2017. That's truly breathtaking growth. It's even more remarkable when you consider that exploration and production companies with a global profile like ExxonMobil (NYSE: XOM ) and ConocoPhillips (NYSE: COP ) only expect production growth to hit around 2%-5% annually over the same time frame. The truth of the matter is that both companies would face a production decline if it wasn't for the growth opportunities in their North American properties.

This production growth isn't just seen in the Bakken. ConocoPhillips just announced two major deepwater discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico. ExxonMobil is about to begin production at its massive Kearl Project in the Canadian oil sands. When you begin to add it up, you get the feeling that North America really could be energy independent.

In fact, when you consider the potential of the Monterey Shale, the country really could see that dream become a reality. If you're not familiar with the Monterey, it holds an estimated 15 billion barrels of oil. That equates to an estimated two-thirds of the country's shale oil reserves. The 1,750 square-mile formation is in central California which could make it a bit more difficult to recover, given that it would require hydraulic fracturing to extract the oil. With all of the environmental concerns surrounding fracking, and considering California's environmental leanings, you can see how this could be a problem. That being said, just the fact that the formation exists is reason to hope that energy independence is within our grasp.

#### Iran won’t and can’t close the Strait

Singh, 12

Michael Singh is managing director of The Washington Institute, 1/3/12, The Real Iranian Threat in the Gulf , www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1789

Iran's bellicose rhetoric and Gulf wargames in recent days have given rise to the question of whether Tehran could close the Strait of Hormuz. As many analysts have observed, the answer is no -- not for a meaningful period of time. Less frequently addressed, however, is whether Iran would even try. The answer to that question is also "no" -- even the attempt would have devastating strategic consequences for Iran.

The presumable target of an Iranian effort to close the Strait would be the United States. However, while we would of course be affected by any resulting rise in global oil prices, the U.S. gets little of our petroleum from the Gulf. The U.S. imports only about 49 percent of the petroleum we consume, and over half of those imports come from the Western Hemisphere. Less than 25 percent of U.S. imports came from all the Gulf countries combined in October 2011 -- far less than is available in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, were Gulf supplies to be interrupted.

China, on the other hand, would find its oil supplies significantly threatened by an Iranian move against the Strait. China's most significant oil supplier is Saudi Arabia. China also happens, however, to be Iran's primary oil customer and perhaps its most important ally: Beijing provides Iran with its most sophisticated weaponry and with diplomatic cover at the United Nations. Thus a move to close the Strait would backfire strategically by harming the interests of -- and likely alienating -- Iran's most important patron and cutting off Iran's own economic lifeline, while doing little to imperil U.S. supplies of crude.

It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that China quickly dispatched Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun to Tehran in the wake of Iran's bellicose statements. In typically opaque fashion, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said only that "China hopes that peace and stability can be maintained in the Strait"; this is essentially diplo-speak for "Cool it."

Even if Iran ignored these considerations and proceeded with an effort to close the Strait, the U.S. and others would move to keep it open, and would be unlikely to stop there. As Iran has crept closer to a nuclear weapons capability, the possibility of military action against Iran has also become more imminent. President Obama has been reluctant to threaten Iran militarily, and any U.S. president would think long and hard before engaging in another armed conflict in the Middle East.

An effort by Iran to shut down the oil trade in the Gulf, however, would make such a decision straightforward. The U.S. would react with force, and once engaged in hostilities with Iran, would likely take the opportunity to target Iran's nuclear facilities and other military targets. It is difficult to envision any scenario beginning with an Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz that does not end in a serious strategic setback for the Iranian regime.

#### No impact on oil prices

Faucon 12/28

Benoit Faucon, WSJ, 12/28/11, Strait of Hormuz Closure May Not Be Oil’s Doomsday, blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2011/12/28/strait-of-hormuz-closure-may-not-be-oils-doomsday/

Back in the summer of 2008, a reported Israeli threat to bomb Iran triggered an oil-price jump to an all-time high of $147 a barrel.

Now crude markets are rattled again by repeated warnings by Tehran that it could block the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow corridor through which one-third of the world’s seaborne oil exports transits—in case sanctions escalate into a de facto embargo. Yet, even such a scenario may not end up with the doomsday climax it may appear at first blush—as there would be plenty of ways to mitigate it.

For idle oil traders, toying with oil-supply disruptions in the Persian Gulf has turned into a favorite pastime during numb holiday periods—a bit like watching characters playing ping pong with cannon balls in a Looney Tunes cartoon. A recent report alleging Iran is building nuclear weapons has led to speculation the fuse could soon be lit—either by a preemptive Iranian blockade of the strait or an airstrike by the U.S. or Israel. With the euro zone seemingly on the brink, most oil consumers don’t find the prospect amusing.

But even if one assumes such a scenario were to materialize, it may not be the disaster movie oil markets expect. For one, Gulf oil’s stakeholders have gone through similar turmoil before—and they have now developed an **impressive toolbox to cope with the risk**. For instance, the called “tanker war” between Iran and Iraq led the U.S. to protect third-party oil vessels and, wary of further unrest, Washington has since heavily expanded its naval presence in the region.

Iran doesn’t have the firepower to match and that may limit its chances to close the strait. Tehran may only be able to block the strait for a short period, according to Kevin Liu, a director at U.K. risk consultancy Exclusive Analysis. “Iran has the capability to disrupt shipping in the strait for up to a few weeks but its relative military weakness means it could not block traffic indefinitely,” he wrote in a recent report.

Neither is the strait the only way to ship oil from the Gulf. Arab sheikdoms could still divert some of their crude through onshore pipelines going to the Red Sea or Oman. Releases from strategic stockpiles—set up after an earlier disruption due to a 1973 embargo also emanating from the Gulf—could also act as a buffer.

Finally, Iran itself has sounded conflicting noises, which suggest it would not sustain such a blockade for long. Contrary to hard-liners, officials in the oil industry—which prides itself on being reliable even in the dark days of the war with Iraq—have ruled out a voluntary interruption of supplies. And even the country’s Arab neighbors say it would be against the Islamic republic’s own interests to interrupt its oil exports.

So once the confetti and laces clear up, the strait’s own red herring may deflate like a zeppelin—as fast as it was pumped up. If the Revolutionary Guards were ever to trade in oil futures, I would advise them to buy “short” and sell “long.”

No econ collapse

Gordon, former chairman – National Intelligence Council, former director of policy planning – State Department, director of global macro analysis – Eurasia Group, 1/9/’13

(David, “What to Worry About in 2013,” http://www.cfr.org/united-states/worry-2013/p29793)

But I think that the big story for the last five years has been financial risk in the rich countries, the sort of flipping of the map of risk, where mature markets became the focal point of risk, emerging markets became much more steady, stable, and expectations about growth. I think that we're seeing a flip back now, frankly, that 2013 -- there are financial problems both in Europe and the United States, lot of noise around both. But in Europe, basically, the practical alliance between ECB President Draghi and Chancellor Merkel that came together at the end of last summer really, I think, puts a floor under the European crisis.

Here in the United States, I think we're going to have a really noisy year politically. I think the Obama presidency is, frankly, at some risk. But the U.S. isn't going to be pulled into a recession, and it's not even going to be pulled into a major financial crisis.

When I look at the emerging markets, we're seeing already the least correlation among the emerging markets that we've -- in asset valuations that -- than we've seen in almost a decade. And looking at the big emerging markets, at China, at India, at Russia, Brazil, a lot of others, there are big challenges out there. They're almost all politically driven, not that there is going to be a rapid collapse in growth, but I think investing into this isn't going to be as simple as, wow, emerging markets are growing heads over tails, you just go into these, and it's an easy way to make money.

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Morris Miller, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, ‘2K

(Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

No war

Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two scenarios

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate

the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first

scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system.

One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open

and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of

nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global

economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just

experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences

for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever

the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive

self-interest and rejection of outside interference would

likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the

half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and

the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts,

such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan,

have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions

such as those related to immigration might become

unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could

be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational

approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic

absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled

nationalism.

One symptom that makes such a scenario plausible has become visible.

Many commentators have identified anger or anxiety as a common driver

of the Tea Party movement in the United States and the rise of xenophobic

parties in Europe, perhaps stemming from a self-perception of decline.

Anger (directed towards the neo-colonialist or pro-Israeli West or – especially

recently – domestic authoritarian regimes) has also been associated

with grievances in the Middle East, following the failure of earlier reformist

and secular movements.10 Despite relative popular optimism, anger can

also be detected in Asia, hand in hand with chauvinism and a sense of lack

of appropriate recognition by others, stemming from a self-perception of

rising influence and power.

The opposite scenario contemplates not an unprecedented era of peace

and prosperity, but rather continuity in the international system, with

further consolidation rather than rupture. Current conflicts and those most

likely to emerge from existing tensions are contained, thanks to diplomatic

or coercive instruments, and **major wars are avoided.** Economic and financial

give-and-take is kept under control and gives way to a more stable

global game, including increased safeguarding of public goods such as

the health of the planet. This scenario does not entail the United Nations

becoming a global government, nor the European Union turning into a

fully fledged federation, nor the various ‘Gs’ becoming boards of a global

corporation. But these international organisations, reformed to improve

representativeness and effectiveness, would remain to strengthen the rule

of law globally.

A major factor in the unfolding of this scenario might be the trend

towards increased societal interaction, or even empathy. But there is also a

risk that this transformation might lead to chaos. Domestically, civil society

could become a challenge to the legitimacy and effectiveness of parliaments

in representative democracies or an excuse for authoritarian repression.

Internationally, governance may become more difficult if states are not fully

in control. However, social revolutions driven by advances in science and

technology (particularly telecommunications and the Internet) and improvements

in the status of women worldwide (access to the labour market and

above all control over reproduction), may also gradually enhance transnational

relations and understanding and privilege a conciliatory approach to

human relations over a confrontational one, with obvious but not radical

differences from nation to nation.11

#### No impact to failed states – star this card!

Patrick, senior fellow, director – program on international institutions and global governance @ CFR, 4/15/’11

(Stewart M, “Why Failed States Shouldn’t Be Our Biggest National Security Fear,” <http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/why-failed-states-shouldnt-our-biggest-national-security-fear/p24689>)

In truth, while failed states may be worthy of America's attention on humanitarian and development grounds, most of them are irrelevant to U.S. national security. The risks they pose are mainly to their own inhabitants. Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and unhelpful, providing little guidance to policymakers seeking to prioritize scarce attention and resources.

In 2008, I collaborated with Brookings Institution senior fellow Susan E. Rice, now President Obama's permanent representative to the United Nations, on an index of state weakness in developing countries. The study ranked all 141 developing nations on 20 indicators of state strength, such as the government's ability to provide basic services. More recently, I've examined whether these rankings reveal anything about each nation's role in major global threats: transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime and infectious disease.

The findings are startlingly clear. Only a handful of the world's failed states pose security concerns to the United States. Far greater dangers emerge from stronger developing countries that may suffer from corruption and lack of government accountability but come nowhere near qualifying as failed states.

The link between failed states and transnational terrorism, for instance, is tenuous. Al-Qaeda franchises are concentrated in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia but are markedly absent in most failed states, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Why? From a terrorist's perspective, the notion of finding haven in a failed state is an oxymoron. Al-Qaeda discovered this in the 1990s when seeking a foothold in anarchic Somalia. In intercepted cables, operatives bemoaned the insuperable difficulties of working under chaos, given their need for security and for access to the global financial and communications infrastructure. Al-Qaeda has generally found it easier to maneuver in corrupt but functional states, such as Kenya, where sovereignty provides some protection from outside interdiction.

Pakistan and Yemen became sanctuaries for terrorism not only because they are weak but because their governments lack the will to launch sustained counterterrorism operations against militants whom they value for other purposes. Terrorists also need support from local power brokers and populations. Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, al-Qaeda finds succor in the Pashtun code of pashtunwali, which requires hospitality to strangers, and in the severe brand of Sunni Islam practiced locally. Likewise in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has found sympathetic tribal hosts who have long welcomed mujaheddin back from jihadist struggles.

Al-Qaeda has met less success in northern Africa's Sahel region, where a moderate, Sufi version of Islam dominates. But as the organization evolves from a centrally directed network to a diffuse movement with autonomous cells in dozens of countries, it is as likely to find haven in the banlieues of Paris or high-rises of Minneapolis as in remote Pakistani valleys.

What about failed states and weapons of mass destruction? Many U.S. analysts worry that poorly governed countries will pursue nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons; be unable to control existing weapons; or decide to share WMD materials.

These fears are misplaced. With two notable exceptions — North Korea and Pakistan — the world's weakest states pose minimal proliferation risks, since they have limited stocks of fissile or other WMD material and are unlikely to pursue them. Far more threatening are capable countries (say, Iran and Syria) intent on pursuing WMD, corrupt nations (such as Russia) that possess loosely secured nuclear arsenals and poorly policed nations (try Georgia) through which proliferators can smuggle illicit materials or weapons.

When it comes to crime, the story is more complex. Failed states do dominate production of some narcotics: Afghanistan cultivates the lion's share of global opium, and war-torn Colombia rules coca production. The tiny African failed state of Guinea-Bissau has become a transshipment point for cocaine bound for Europe. (At one point, the contraband transiting through the country each month was equal to the nation's gross domestic product.) And Somalia, of course, has seen an explosion of maritime piracy. Yet failed states have little or no connection with other categories of transnational crime, from human trafficking to money laundering, intellectual property theft, cyber-crime or counterfeiting of manufactured goods.

Criminal networks typically prefer operating in functional countries that provide baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities. They also accept higher risks to work in nations straddling major commercial routes. Thus narco-trafficking has exploded in Mexico, which has far stronger institutions than many developing nations but borders the United States. South Africa presents its own advantages. It is a country where “the first and the developing worlds exist side by side,” author Misha Glenny writes. “The first world provides good roads, 728 airports . . . the largest cargo port in Africa, and an efficient banking system. . . . The developing world accounts for the low tax revenue, overstretched social services, high levels of corruption throughout the administration, and 7,600 kilometers of land and sea borders that have more holes than a second-hand dartboard.” Weak and failing African states, such as Niger, simply cannot compete.

Nor do failed states pose the greatest threats of pandemic disease. Over the past decade, outbreaks of SARS, avian influenza and swine flu have raised the specter that fast-moving pandemics could kill tens of millions worldwide. Failed states, in this regard, might seem easy incubators of deadly viruses. In fact, recent fast-onset pandemics have bypassed most failed states, which are relatively isolated from the global trade and transportation links needed to spread disease rapidly.

Certainly, the world's weakest states — particularly in sub-Saharan Africa — suffer disproportionately from disease, with infection rates higher than in the rest of the world. But their principal health challenges are endemic diseases with local effects, such as malaria, measles and tuberculosis. While U.S. national security officials and Hollywood screenwriters obsess over the gruesome Ebola and Marburg viruses, outbreaks of these hemorrhagic fevers are rare and self-contained.

I do not counsel complacency. The world's richest nations have a moral obligation to bolster health systems in Africa, as the Obama administration is doing through its Global Health Initiative. And they have a duty to ameliorate the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, which continues to ravage many of the world's weakest states. But poor performance by developing countries in preventing, detecting and responding to infectious disease is often shaped less by budgetary and infrastructure constraints than by conscious decisions by unaccountable or unresponsive regimes. Such deliberate inaction has occurred not only in the world's weakest states but also in stronger developing countries, even in promising democracies. The list is long. It includes Nigeria's feckless response to a 2003-05 polio epidemic, China's lack of candor about the 2003 SARS outbreak, Indonesia's obstructionist attitude to addressing bird flu in 2008 and South Africa's denial for many years about the causes of HIV/AIDS.

Unfortunately, misperceptions about the dangers of failed states have transformed budgets and bureaucracies. U.S. intelligence agencies are mapping the world's “ungoverned spaces.” The Pentagon has turned its regional Combatant Commands into platforms to head off state failure and address its spillover effects. The new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review completed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development depicts fragile and conflict-riddled states as epicenters of terrorism, proliferation, crime and disease.

Yet such preoccupations reflect more hype than analysis. U.S. national security officials would be better served — and would serve all of us better — if they turned their strategic lens toward stronger developing countries, from which transnational threats are more likely to emanate.

## china

Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

No Senkaku aggression

Holmes 12

James, Defense analyst for The Diplomat and a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College where he specializes in U.S., Chinese and Indian maritime strategy and U.S. diplomatic and military history. He is co-author of Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best Foreign Affairs Book for 2010 and a former US Navy surface warfare officer. Can China ‘Win’ Without Fighting?

http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2012/10/25/can-china-win-without-fighting/

There’s a boxing metaphor for China’s peacetime strategy as well. Retired Japanese vice admiral Yoji Koda says Beijing is “shadowboxing” with fellow Asian powers in the East China Sea. Sparring with them individually makes China the stronger competitor. Because numbers are on its side, for instance, China’s leadership can keep law-enforcement ships on station near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, send PLA Navy task forces through the Miyako Strait and other waterways as a matter of routine, and otherwise overtax finite Japanese military and law-enforcement resources. It can dance around the ring constantly—compelling its opponent to follow. So long as Tokyo feels the need to monitor Chinese maritime movements, it may wear out its coast guard and navy. In short, Beijing can impose a hyperactive operating tempo on the Japanese sea services—dispersing and enfeebling them while disheartening the Japanese leadership and electorate over time. Ultimately Tokyo may throw in the towel, acknowledging it can no longer keep pace. China’s navy and police services can sustain such a tempo indefinitely without breaking equipment or tiring out crews. That’s the luxury of being the stronger party to peacetime competition. Shadowboxing, then, is a more offensive variety of the rope-a-dope strategy in which the boxer has no desire to knock out his opponent. He’s determined to win on points—even if it takes the full fifteen rounds, or another bout, or another one after that.

#### miscalc won’t escalate

Trefor Moss, The Diplomat, 2/10/13, 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War, thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the **numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions**, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war woud be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. **As the new leaders find their feet** and jockey for position amongst themselves, **they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions** – **war with** Japan and possibly **the U.S. being the biggest of them all**. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations. However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. **Even if a small skirmish** between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft **occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle** unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

War is inevitable

Friedberg 11

Aaron L. Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, The National Interest, July/August 2011, "Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics", http://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439

THE UNITED States and the People’s Republic of China are locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world. And in spite of what many earnest and well-intentioned commentators seem to believe, the nascent Sino-American rivalry is not merely the result of misperceptions or mistaken policies; it is driven instead by forces that are deeply rooted in the shifting structure of the international system and in the very different domestic political regimes of the two Pacific powers.

Throughout history, relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as the defenders of an international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line, with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

The fact that the U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers: Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been the richest and most powerful nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been growing most rapidly. America is still “number one,” but China is fast gaining ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict particularly fraught.

At least insofar as the dominant powers are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a nation’s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home; to defend their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world.

As they begin to assert themselves, ascendant states typically feel impelled to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutions and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were still relatively weak. Like Japan in the late nineteenth century, or Germany at the turn of the twentieth, rising powers want their place in the sun. This, of course, is what brings them into conflict with the established great powers—the so-called status quo states—who are the architects, principal beneficiaries and main defenders of any existing international system.

The resulting clash of interests between the two sides has seldom been resolved peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat to their position, dominant powers (or a coalition of status quo states) have occasionally tried to attack and destroy a competitor before it can grow strong enough to become a threat. Others—hoping to avoid war—have taken the opposite approach: attempting to appease potential challengers, they look for ways to satisfy their demands and ambitions and seek to incorporate them peacefully into the existing international order.

But however sincere, these efforts have almost always ended in failure. Sometimes the reason clearly lies in the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler’s Germany, an aggressor may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively consigning themselves to servitude or committing national suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less onerous, the dominant states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and triggering a spiral of escalating demands. Successful policies of appeasement are conceivable in theory but in practice have proven devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition, when a new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state, have so often been marked by war.

WHILE THEY are careful not to say so directly, China’s current rulers seem intent on establishing their country as the preponderant power in East Asia, and perhaps in Asia writ large. The goal is to make China the strongest and most influential nation in its neighborhood: a country capable of deterring attacks and threats; resolving disputes over territory and resources according to its preferences; coercing or persuading others to accede to its wishes on issues ranging from trade and investment to alliance and third-party basing arrangements to the treatment of ethnic Chinese populations; and, at least in some cases, affecting the character and composition of their governments. Beijing may not seek conquest or direct physical control over its surroundings, but, despite repeated claims to the contrary, it does seek a form of regional hegemony.

Such ambitions hardly make China unique. Throughout history, there has been a strong correlation between the rapid growth of a state’s wealth and potential power, the geographic scope of its interests, the intensity and variety of the perceived threats to those interests, and the desire to expand military capabilities and exert greater influence in order to defend them. Growth tends to encourage expansion, which leads to insecurity, which feeds the desire for more power. This pattern is well established in the modern age. Looking back over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Samuel Huntington finds that

““every other major power, Britain and France, Germany and Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union, has engaged in outward expansion, assertion, and imperialism coincidental with or immediately following the years in which it went through rapid industrialization and economic growth.””

As for China, Huntington concludes, “no reason exists to think that the acquisition of economic and military power will not have comparable effects” on its policies.

Of course the past behavior of other states is suggestive, but it is hardly a definitive guide to the future. Just because other powers have acted in certain ways does not necessarily mean that China will do the same. Perhaps, in a world of global markets and nuclear weapons, the fears and ambitions that motivated previous rising powers are no longer as potent. Perhaps China’s leaders have learned from history that overly assertive rising powers typically stir resentment and opposition.

But China is not just any rising power, and its history provides an additional reason for believing that it will seek some form of regional preponderance. It is a nation with a long and proud past as the leading center of East Asian civilization and a more recent and less glorious experience of domination and humiliation at the hands of foreign invaders. As a number of historians have recently pointed out, China is not so much “rising” as it is returning to the position of regional preeminence that it once held and which its leaders and many of its people still regard as natural and appropriate. The desire to reestablish a Sino-centric system would be consistent with what journalist Martin Jacques describes as

““an overwhelming assumption on the part of the Chinese that their natural position lies at the epicentre of East Asia, that their civilization has no equals in the region, and that their rightful position, as bestowed by history, will at some point be restored in the future.””

Conservative scholar Yan Xuetong puts the matter succinctly: the Chinese people are proud of their country’s glorious past and believe its fall from preeminence to be “a historical mistake which they should correct.” If anything, the “century of humiliation” during which China was weak and vulnerable adds urgency to its pursuit of power. For a nation with China’s history, regaining a position of unchallengeable strength is not seen as simply a matter of pride but rather as an essential precondition for continued growth, security and, quite possibly, survival.

US nuke superiority means no impact—but modernization causes future escalation

Walt 12

Stephen Walt, IR Prof at Harvard, Foreign Policy, August 27, 2012, "Inflating the China threat", http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/27/inflating\_the\_china\_threat

What is really going on here? Not much. China presently has a modest strategic nuclear force. It is believed to have only about 240 nuclear warheads, and only a handful of its ballistic missiles can presently reach the United States. By way of comparison, the United States has over 2000 operational nuclear warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs, and cruise missiles, all of them capable of reaching China. And if that were not enough, the U.S. has nearly 3000 nuclear warheads in reserve.

Given its modest capabilities, China is understandably worried by U.S. missile defense efforts. Why? Chinese officials worry about the scenario where the United States uses its larger and much more sophisticated nuclear arsenal to launch a first strike, and then relies on ballistic missile defenses to deal with whatever small and ragged second-strike the Chinese managed to muster. (Missile defenses can't handle large or sophisticated attacks, but in theory they might be able to deal with a small and poorly coordinated reply).

This discussion is all pretty Strangelovian, of course, but nuclear strategists get paid to think about all sorts of elaborate and far-fetched scenarios. In sum, those fiendish Chinese are doing precisely what any sensible power would do: they are trying to preserve their own second-strike deterrent by modernizing their force, to include the development of multiple-warhead missiles that would be able to overcome any defenses the United States might choose to build. As the Wall Street Journal put it:

The [Chinese] goal is to ensure a secure second-strike capability that could survive in the worst of worst-case conflict scenarios, whereby an opponent would not be able to eliminate China's nuclear capability by launching a first strike and would therefore face potential retaliation. As the U.S. Defense Department's Ballistic Missile Defense Review points out, "China is one of the countries most vocal about U.S. ballistic missile defenses and their strategic implications, and its leaders have expressed concern that such defenses might negate China's strategic deterrent."

China is rapidly modernizing its military - specifically Area Denial and Space capabilities

Friedberg 12

Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2012, "Bucking Beijing", http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138032/aaron-l-friedberg/bucking-beijing?page=show

The stakes could hardly be higher. Since the mid-1990s, China has been piecing together what Pentagon planners describe as asymmetric "anti-access/area-denial" (A2/AD) capabilities. At their heart is the development of an arsenal of accurate, relatively inexpensive, conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles. With these weapons, China can target virtually every air base and port in the western Pacific, as well as threaten to sink enemy surface vessels (including U.S. aircraft carriers) operating hundreds of miles off its coasts. The People's Liberation Army has also been experimenting with cyberwarfare and antisatellite weapons, and it has begun to expand its small force of intercontinental nuclear missiles.

Absent a strong U.S. response, Chinese planners might eventually come to believe that their growing A2/AD capabilities are sufficiently impressive to scare the United States off from intervening or provoking a confrontation in the region. Worse still, they might convince themselves that if the United States were to intervene, they could cripple its conventional forces in the western Pacific, leaving it with few options other than the threat of nuclear escalation. Maintaining stability requires reducing the likelihood that China's leaders could ever see initiating such an attack as being in their interest. A direct U.S.-Chinese military confrontation is, of course, extremely unlikely. But the aim of the balancing half of U.S. strategy must be to ensure that it remains so, even as China's power grows.

Failing to respond adequately to Beijing's buildup could undermine the credibility of the security guarantees that Washington extends to its Asian allies. In the absence of strong signals of continuing commitment and resolve from the United States, its friends may grow fearful of abandonment, perhaps eventually losing heart and succumbing to the temptations of appeasement. To prevent them from doing so, Washington will have to do more than talk. Together, the United States and its allies have more than sufficient resources with which to balance China. But if Washington wants its allies to increase their own defense efforts, it will have to seriously respond to China's growing capabilities itself. When it comes to Asia, the United States does not have the option of what The New Yorker first described as the Obama administration's penchant for "leading from behind."

#### Area denial causes Chinese aggression, allied prolif and kills heg

Friedberg, 2009

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Sep-Oct 2009, “Menace,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/greatdebate/dragons/menace-3818

FAST-FORWARD to the present. America's ability to project power into the western Pacific, once unchallenged, is now threatened by the maturation of what Pentagon planners refer to as China's "anti-access/area-denial" strategy. The goal here is not to match the Americans ship-for-ship and plane-for-plane but rather to develop certain specialized capabilities designed to make it difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. forces to operate freely anywhere close to China's coasts. In the past decade, Beijing has made considerable progress toward achieving this goal. Every one of the relative handful of bases on which the United States relies to sustain its presence in East Asia will soon be within range of bombardment by repeated salvos of precisely targeted Chinese conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. At the same time, the PLA is in the process of knitting together a network of satellites, onshore radars and other sensors that will permit it to locate and track an enemy's surface ships hundreds of miles off its coasts and then use a combination of torpedoes, high-speed cruise missiles and land-based ballistic missiles to sink or disable them. America's huge and costly aircraft carriers are the key to its global power-projection capabilities. In a future crisis, Washington might have little choice but to pull them far back from China's coasts, well beyond the effective range of their aircraft. This would dramatically reduce their ability to provide air defense for U.S. friends or to conduct strikes against Chinese forces on land or at sea. In addition to these more direct modes of attack, the PLA is experimenting with antisatellite weapons and techniques for taking down an enemy's computer networks, thereby rendering him deaf and blind during the critical opening phases of a war. On the defensive side of the equation, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is turning out attack submarines at a record pace and developing sophisticated undersea mines; it is in the process of completing a massive new submarine base adjacent to the South China Sea, and has reportedly begun to deploy an undersea detection system that would aid it in engaging U.S. submarines operating off its shores. Finally, China is investing heavily in "passive defenses" (hiding or hardening critical facilities) and in advanced radars and surface-to-air missiles, including some that may be effective against "stealthy" Western aircraft and cruise missiles. THIS COMBINATION of rapidly advancing offensive and defensive capabilities is beginning to raise doubts in the region about America's ability to defend its allies and project its power. What is worse, over the next several years there will be an increasing danger that, in an extreme crisis, China's leaders might believe that they have a chance of starting a war by effectively knocking the United States out of the western Pacific and blunting its initial, retaliatory response, all without striking the American homeland and without the need to fire a single nuclear weapon. If it were successful, such an attack would leave a president with some agonizing choices. Much as during the cold war, if faced with the possibility of a quick conventional defeat in Western Europe, American decision makers would have to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. But, as was true then, the plausibility of escalatory threats will diminish as the probability of retaliation rises. Beijing is fast approaching the point where it will have a secure second-strike force capable of dealing a devastating blow no matter how hard the United States might try to prevent it. As risky as an American attack on Chinese nuclear forces, ports, airfields and communications centers would be today, it will be considerably more so a few years from now. Beijing is in the process of deploying intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will be far less vulnerable than their predecessors. In addition to its small force of fixed, single-warhead ICBMs, over the next few years China will place in service several dozen hard-to-locate road-mobile and submarine-launched missiles, each capable of striking the United States with multiple warheads. OF COURSE, there are alternatives to the nightmare of nuclear war. If Washington chose not to use nuclear weapons, it might respond to a Chinese attack by engaging in "horizontal escalation," hitting back at another location where the opponent is vulnerable and U.S. forces still enjoy an overwhelming advantage. The most obvious way to do this, though perhaps not the only one, would be to use America's global naval strength and airpower to cut China off from the sea. This is an arena of military competition in which the United States maintains overwhelming superiority. While the PLAN may be able to contest control of its immediate coastal waters, its capabilities fall off rapidly with distance. If the United States wanted tomorrow to constrict China's maritime access to oil, minerals and markets, there would be very little Beijing could do in direct response. Chinese strategists are acutely aware of this potential vulnerability and they are hard at work on a variety of projects which, taken together, may help to mitigate the danger. Included among these are: a strategic petroleum reserve; transcontinental pipelines to Russia and Central Asia; the pursuit of undersea resources close to China's coasts; new transportation routes through Southeast Asia that would permit oil and gas from the Middle East to bypass the narrow straits off Indonesia; the construction of ports and airfields in Myanmar and Pakistan that could be used in an emergency by a future Chinese air and naval "rapid-deployment force"; a deepening strategic relationship with Iran that could provide a bridgehead to the Persian Gulf; and the development of aircraft carriers and long-range nuclear-powered attack submarines, and the construction of large numbers of diesel subs, which will give the PLAN some capacity to defend China's sea-lanes and perhaps to attack the shipping of its rivals. If produced in sufficient numbers, the same antiship ballistic missiles (ASBM) that will soon threaten American aircraft carriers could also be used against commercial vessels. Using a combination of missiles and submarines, Beijing might be able to impose a blockade of its own on key American allies like Japan, perhaps weakening its will to stay in the fight or, better yet, dissuading it from ever joining with the United States in the first place. AMERICA'S INFLUENCE in and access to Asia will be drastically reduced, with harmful long-term consequences for its security, prosperity and ability to promote the spread of liberal democracy, if it is seen to be in long-term decline relative to China or, even worse, if it appears irresolute, incompetent, unwilling or simply unable to fulfill its commitments. Other governments will then have no choice but to reconsider their national strategies either by developing their own nuclear capabilities or-worse-by bandwagoning with Beijing.

# 2NC

## Oil

## AT: Oil Wars

#### Cooperation solves oil conflicts

War for oil’s fiction – best ev disproves

Hossein-zadeh 9

An Iranian-born Kurd, Ismael Hossein-zadeh came to the United States in 1975 to pursue his formal education in economics. After completing his graduate work at the New School for Social Research in New York City (1988), he joined Drake University faculty where he has been teaching classes in political economy, comparative economic systems, international economics, history of economic thought and development economics. His published work covers significant topics such as financial instability, economic crises and restructuring policies, currency-trade relations, globalization and labor, international/sovereign debt, determinants of presidential economic policies, economics of war and military spending, roots of conflict between the Muslim world and the West, long waves of economic expansion and decline, and the Soviet model of non-capitalist development

The Political Economy of US Wars of Choice: Are They Really Oil Wars? Author: Hossein-Zadeh, Ismael Journal: Perspectives on global development and technology ISSN: 1569-1500 Date: 04/2009 Volume: 8 Issue: 2 Page: 295 DOI: 10.1163/156914909X423908

Despite the fact that oil companies nowadays view war and political turmoil in the Middle East as detrimental to their long-term interests and, therefore, do not support policies that are conducive to war and militarism, and despite the fact that war is no longer the way to gain access to oil, the widespread perception that every US military engagement in the region, including the current invasion of Iraq , is prompted by oil considerations continues. Th e question is why? Behind the Myth of War for Oil The widely-shared but erroneous view that recent US wars of choice are driven by oil concerns is partly due to precedence: the fact that for a long time military force was key to colonial or imperialist control and exploitation of foreign markets and resources, including oil. It is also partly due to perception: the exaggerated notion that both President Bush and Vice President Cheney were “oil men” before coming to the White House. But, as noted earlier, George W. Bush was never more than an ineff ective minor oil prospector and Dick Cheney was never really an oil man; he headed the notorious Halliburton company that sold, and still sells, services to oil companies and the Pentagon .

## Ext—SPR Sufficient

80 days of supply

Clayton 13

Blake Clayton, Fellow for Energy and National Security, Council on Foreign Relations, January 10, 2013, "Five Critical Questions About the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve", http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2013/01/10/five-critical-questions-about-the-u-s-strategic-petroleum-reserve/

Some analysts are calling for the SPR to be downsized in light of the country’s declining net import levels, thanks to growing domestic production and declining consumption. The 695 million barrels of crude oil in the SPR are currently around 80 days’ worth of net imports (at 2012 net petroleum imports of 8.72 mb/d). If current trends hold, net imports could fall to roughly 6 mb/d within 3-4 years. That would mean that trimming down the SPR to the International Energy Agency (IEA)-mandated 90-days of net imports (using government stocks alone) could free up around 155 million barrels of SPR oil, which could be sold on the open market to generate substantial public revenue.

#### Squo is already excessive—increase definitely not key

Javier David, 3/20/13, US Strategic Reserve May Be Past Its Prime: Analysts, [www.cnbc.com/id/100574506](http://www.cnbc.com/id/100574506)

Has the U.S. government's emergency oil stockpile outlived its usefulness, especially with the country on a fast track toward energy independence?

Created in 1975, the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) is a network of storage facilities in key oil-producing states. It has a capacity of 727 million barrels, designed hold about a 90-day supply in the event of a severe oil market disruption.

Yet as the world's largest energy consumer produces more of its own energy supplies and imports less foreign oil, a growing number of energy experts believe the SPR concept may be past its prime. In a CNBC interview on Tuesday, alternative energy advocate T. Boone Pickens called for its abolition.

"Things have changed. Resources are better understood," the BP Capital chief said. Without killing the SPR, he said, the government still needs to acquire and store the oil more efficiently.

Additionally, critics argue that a federal oil sale smacks of market manipulation or domestic political calculations. According to information from Department of Energy, the SPR has sold oil five times since 1985. Of those occasions, only two—in the 1990 Gulf War and the 2011 invasion of Libya—were to offset a disruption in the global supply chain.

The SPR is "useless," said Philip Verleger, an energy analyst who served as a senior staff economist on the Council of Economic Advisers when the SPR was created.

"We store the oil in the Gulf Coast, and much of the design was planned to move oil inland," he said, adding that **the logistics of moving crude from the South to the North make it hard to distribute in the event of a crisis.**

Although the government should be careful not to liquidate oil in a way that disrupts markets, Verleger said, the SPR "is an asset that we don't need anymore. If we are producing enough crude oil, we don't need a strategic reserve."

Squo SPR is sufficient - decreasing demand and increasing production

Andrews and Pirog 12

Anthony Andrews, Specialist in Energy and Defense Policy, Robert Pirog, Specialist in Energy Economics, Congressional Research Service, June 18, 2012, "The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Authorization, Operation, and Drawdown Policy", http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42460.pdf

The ability of the SPR to supplement the domestic U.S. supply of crude oil and effectively replace imports depends on the size of the reserve as well as its drawdown capabilities. Its effectiveness also depends on the volume of U.S. imports and the rate of U.S. consumption.

Crude oil imports are the difference between U.S. demand and domestic production. If either demand falls, or domestic production rises, the need for imports declines. Because of a number of factors, some temporary, including the recession, high prices, and conservation, U.S. consumption of petroleum products has declined since 2005 by about 9.5%. This decline in consumption has reduced the demand for crude oil. Over the same period, U.S. production of crude oil increased from 5.18 million b/d to 5.67 million b/d, an increase of 9.5%. The combination of falling consumption and increasing production has reduced the share of imports in total consumption from 49% in 2005 to 45% in 2011. In addition, Canada increasingly provides the United States with crude oil imports, and arguably represents a secure source of supply.

If the trends of the last six years continue, the U.S. will rely less on crude oil imports. Consequently, the SPR, even if its capacity and contents remain fixed, may be better able to meet U.S. requirements in times of supply shortage on the world market.

## Ext—fails

#### Here is their 1AC solvency card correctly underlined. SPR is ineffective, which means supply increases are irrelevant.

Blake Clayton, Council on Foreign Relations, 9/21/12, U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve Needs Fixing—Fast, [www.cfr.org/energy/us-strategic-petroleum-reserve-needs-fixingfast/p29103](http://www.cfr.org/energy/us-strategic-petroleum-reserve-needs-fixingfast/p29103)

Speculation among experts is rife that the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is no longer able to release oil to the market as quickly as the Department of Energy claims it can. If true – and there is good reason to believe it is – it could destroy the White House's ability to prevent oil prices from skyrocketing if the commotion in the Middle East worsens. This needs to be fixed – and fast.

The SPR is the nation's last defense against a dire loss of oil supplies capable of sending the economy into a tailspin. The potential for a military confrontation between Israel and Iran, which could require the United States to release oil from the SPR, makes this resource more critical than ever.

But analysts are skeptical that the U.S. federal government is as functional as advertised. The Department of Energy has offered only a weak denial of these allegations. For a lesson in how a lack of transparency can end up hurting the very market it aims to calm, Washington need look no further than Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia holds the lion's share of OPEC spare capacity – in other words, oil left unused but which could be brought online quickly and sustainably if need be. Its exalted place among producers stems in part from its ability to convince the market that it can plug an unforeseen gap in supplies, and thus keep prices stable.

But traders have balked for years at Riyadh's claims that it can quickly ramp up its production as high as it says it can. Analysts are rightfully skeptical: after all, its assertions are based on untested assumptions, and the Kingdom has an incentive to overestimate them. Moreover, the Saudis are loath to give outsiders information about their domestic oil industry, a veil of secrecy that provides fodder for market speculation.

Americans love to pick at Saudi opacity, yet Washington itself faces similar problems. The SPR is a powerful tool for reassuring the market that the United States, along with other major consuming countries, stands ready to stabilize the market in the case of a severe supply disruption. But market participants are becoming increasingly cynical about whether the SPR is up to the challenge.

Edward Morse, a former U.S. energy official who now leads Citigroup's commodities research team, argued compellingly earlier this year that recent years' changes to North American oil infrastructure have rendered the SPR "significantly less usable than advertised." Many of the **pipelines that could deliver the oil to market quickly can no longer move SPR oil**. Instead, the oil would need to be exported by sea, a method that may take seven times longer than it would via pipelines. This difference in flow rates would have big consequences: the SPR would not come close to covering the loss of Iranian crude exports, for example, should they be interrupted.

#### SPR fails-government timing

CNBC 13

US Strategic Reserve May Be Past Its Prime: Analysts.

<http://www.cnbc.com/id/100574506>

Has the U.S. government's emergency oil stockpile outlived its usefulness, especially with the country on a fast track toward energy independence? Created in 1975, the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) is a network of storage facilities in key oil-producing states. It has a capacity of 727 million barrels, designed hold about a 90-day supply in the event of a severe oil market disruption. Yet as the world's largest energy consumer produces more of its own energy supplies and imports less foreign oil, a growing number of energy experts believe the SPR concept may be past its prime. In a CNBC interview on Tuesday, alternative energy advocate T. Boone Pickens called for its abolition. "Things have changed. Resources are better understood," the BP Capital chief said. Without killing the SPR, he said, the government still needs to acquire and store the oil more efficiently. (Read More: US Doesn't Need an Oil Reserve--Get Rid of It: Pickens) Additionally, critics argue that a federal oil sale smacks of market manipulation or domestic political calculations. According to information from Department of Energy, the SPR has sold oil five times since 1985. Of those occasions, only two—in the 1990 Gulf War and the 2011 invasion of Libya—were to offset a disruption in the global supply chain. The SPR is "useless," said Philip Verleger, an energy analyst who served as a senior staff economist on the Council of Economic Advisers when the SPR was created. "We store the oil in the Gulf Coast, and much of the design was planned to move oil inland," he said, adding that the logistics of moving crude from the South to the North make it hard to distribute in the event of a crisis. Although the government should be careful not to liquidate oil in a way that disrupts markets, Verleger said, the SPR "is an asset that we don't need anymore. If we are producing enough crude oil, we don't need a strategic reserve." In order to fulfill its obligations to the International Energy Agency, the U.S. must maintain 90 days of crude stocks. Verleger, however, said that Canada—a fully energy-independent country—"doesn't hold it because they don't import anything." (Read More: Power Shift: Energy Boom Dawning in America) Still, doing away with a touchstone of U.S. energy policy may be easier said than done, other analysts say. In a world where oil-producing countries are in turmoil and domestic producers are subject to extreme weather that can wreak havoc on domestic production and create supply bottlenecks, there are compelling strategic reasons to stockpile oil. In the event of a hurricane or a supply shock "government can supply oil and enter markets to stabilize prices," said Peter Hartley, an energy economist at Rice University. Indeed, in 2005 the government sold oil to offset the impact of Hurricane Katrina on production in the Gulf Coast. "Because prices will spike, having oil to sell at those times would pay for having extra reserves available," he added. Hartley also said the country's massive military needs made having an emergency stockpile useful, especially in the event of a 1970s-style OPEC embargo. However, he added that a big flaw in the SPR's maintenance was that the government often fails to time its oil purchases with the ebb and flow of world prices. "A private firm would have to buy cheap and sell high," Hartley said. "Unfortunately the government doesn't do that." In particular, he cited instances during President George W. Bush's administration, when the SPR inexplicably bought oil when crude was surging. To be certain, the U.S. would be taking a gamble by not holding its own reserves, which could leave it at the mercy of foreign countries like Saudi Arabia. Still, Hartley argues there would be one added benefit. "If the government wasn't in [the oil market], the private sector would have incentive to hold more reserves itself," he said. Maintaining the SPR indefinitely "could end up destabilizing markets rather than stabilizing them, and ruin the incentive for private agents to have their own storage facilities."

Fails to have a meaningful impact - empirics

Clayton 12

Blake Clayton, senior energy fellow at CFR, Council on Foreign Relations, September 2012, "Lessons Learned From the 2011 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Release", https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&ved=0CDIQFjAAOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fi.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FCFR\_WorkingPaper14\_Clayton.pdf&ei=9XFWUYvCCefyiQKl64CgDQ&usg=AFQjCNGmEmnaX66rXw7RpI\_LpRChpxwoRQ&sig2=tc4DxBEd10CbwpFDs0L2Lg&bvm=bv.44442042,d.cGE

Policymakers should be modest about expecting an emergency release to lower oil prices in absolute terms. Although oil prices may fall sharply immediately after a release is announced, they are liable to rebound quickly if market conditions warrant a release. That is exactly what occurred following the June 23, 2011, announcement of an impending release. No sooner had the IEA made the media aware that it would be holding a major press conference than prices began tumbling. The price of Brent crude oil, a benchmark for global oil prices, fell 6 percent the day of the announcement and an additional 2 percent the next day (see Figure 1). Policymakers in Washington, DC, who had favored the release were privately delighted by how responsive prices were to the news.2

But the immediate collapse in prices proved short lived. By the first week of July 2011, oil prices had reclaimed all their lost ground and then some, closing four dollars per barrel higher than they had the day of the announcement (see Figure 2).

## AT: Oil Shocks

No impact to oil shocks

Kahn 11 (Jeremy, Jeremy Kahn is an independent journalist who writes about international affairs, politics, business, the environment and the arts. His work has recently appeared in Newsweek International, The New York Times, The Atlantic, Smithsonian, The Boston Globe, The New Republic, Slate, Foreign Policy, Fortune, and Inc., as well as other publications. He has also contributed to the public radio program "Marketplace." Kahn was the managing editor at The New Republic from 2004 to 2006. There he had a hand in most of the magazine's politics and world affairs coverage. He also oversaw the magazine's "Notebook" section. Kahn was twice named one of America's 30 top financial journalists under the age of 30 by the trade publication TJFR. 2/13, “Crude reality”, <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/>)

The idea that a sudden spike in oil prices spells economic doom has influenced America’s foreign policy since at least 1973, when Arab states, upset with Western support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War, drastically cut production and halted exports to the United States. The result was a sudden quadrupling in crude prices and a deep global recession. Many Americans still have vivid memories of gas lines stretching for blocks, and of the unemployment, inflation, and general sense of insecurity and panic that followed. Even harder hit were our allies in Europe and Japan, as well as many developing nations. Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.

## no war – 2nc

#### Recent empirics go neg

Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9

(Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

## China

## d

#### miscalc won’t escalate

Trefor Moss, The Diplomat, 2/10/13, 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War, thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the **numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions**, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war woud be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. **As the new leaders find their feet** and jockey for position amongst themselves, **they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions** – **war with** Japan and possibly **the U.S. being the biggest of them all**. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations. However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. **Even if a small skirmish** between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft **occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle** unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

## AT: Asia War

#### No escalation—assumes their warrants

Xudong ‘12

Han, professor at the PLA University of National Defense, “Risk of armed Asian conflict on the rise, but trade links rule out war,” <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/735653.shtml>

Island sovereignty and maritime interest disputes in the Asia-Pacific region have attracted an increasing amount of global attention recently. With external powers ready to intervene, conflicts among the relevant parties have intensified and the unrest has gotten worse. If the trend cannot be curbed, armed conflicts are more likely. With the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and the global economic focus moving toward the region, the region has gradually entered into a troubled period. The US has set the region as the focus of its overseas military deployment and is taking advantage of the unrest in the region so as to adjust the power structure. Moreover, the US has carried out military exercises with relevant countries to create unrest and instigated them to confront neighboring countries. For example, over the Huangyan Island dispute, the US backs the Philippines through holding joint military exercises on island defense, as it has done with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands dispute. This is the usual tactic by the US to back relevant countries' confront actions with China. As the territorial disputes among relevant countries are closely related to core national interests, no involved parties will compromise easily. Relevant countries usually use comprehensive national strength, especially military strength, as a lever to adjust their interests. Take the dispute over the South Kuril Islands between Russia and Japan. Russia has increased its military presence on the islands and used military power to deal with Japanese provocations. Similarly, South Korea has begun to deploy its forces on Dokdo Islands, where it has disputes with Japan. At present, while China has repeatedly advocated a peaceful settlement of the Diaoyu Islands dispute, the nation has sufficient confidence and courage to face up to the challenges and safeguard its sovereignty and interests. All those conflicts mentioned above have the potential to further deteriorate. After all, international politics is the continuation and manifestation of domestic politics. Since the beginning of this year, key players in hot issues of the Asia-Pacific region all have been confronted with the sensitivity of domestic power transition. Russia had its presidential election in March. And South Korea, Japan, the US and China will soon see elections or leadership change. At such a critical moment, attitudes on safeguarding the core interests of the nation had been used as a stake to gain support, as particularly seen in Japan. Currently, the right-wing forces in Japan are promoting the campaigners to form a consistent approach over the Diaoyu Islands dispute, that is, to take an increasingly tough stance and policy. Japan hasn't made a full reflection on its war crimes. The right-wing frequently blusters about the use of force to solve the territorial disputes. This adds to the uncertainty of the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. But one certain thing is that a war is unlikely in the Asia-Pacific. Even if the parties in a dispute had a collision of forces, it wouldn't develop into full-blown war. The use of force is the highest means but the last resort to maintain core interests of nations. The current situation is totally different from other periods in history. With global economic integration, the expanding of armed conflicts will be no good to any country involved. Therefore, the relevant countries all hope the scale of conflicts could be restrained. Besides, the US is not willing to see a regional war in the Asia-Pacific. A turbulent situation without war is in its best interests. From this perspective, the Asia-Pacific region does face the potential danger of low intensity conflicts and operations. The possibility of an armed collision is on the rise, but the scale will be limited

#### Doesn’t escalate

Washburn 3/10/13

Taylor, a lawyer studying Northeast Asia at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “a lawyer studying Northeast Asia at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.,” http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/03/10/averting-asias-great-war-by-taylor-washburn/

In a recent Financial Times essay, “The Shadow of 1914 Falls Over the Pacific,” Gideon Rachman compares the current situation in East Asia to that in Europe a century ago. Like Germany in the early 20th century, China is a country on the rise, concerned that status quo powers will seek to block its ascent. In prewar Europe, a German military buildup and growing nationalism around the region helped create a dynamic in which the assassination of an obscure Austrian noble could trigger a devastating multinational war. The parallels with East Asia today are clear, Rachman says, and “the most obvious potential spark is the unresolved territorial dispute between Japan and China over the islands known as the Diaoyu to the Chinese and the Senkaku to the Japanese.” There is no denying the gravity of the danger posed by this row. Violent anti-Japanese riots erupted across China last fall after Japan’s government purchased the islands from a private owner, and Tokyo has recently claimed that a Chinese frigate locked its missile-guidance radar on a Japanese destroyer in the East China Sea. With ships and planes from both nations mingling in the vicinity of the islands, peace depends not only on the prudence of politicians in Beijing and Tokyo, but also the temperament and skill of a handful of sailors and pilots. The U.S.-Japan security treaty has played a pivotal role in ensuring Asia’s postwar stability, and will help deter Chinese aggression going forward, but as Rachman observes, the pact also recalls the alliance network that contributed to the expansion of World War I. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that major powers have often clashed without escalation. The example of 1914, in which a seemingly insignificant event forced all of Europe’s great military machines to shudder to life, is the exception rather than the rule. Since the bloody aftermath of their 1947 partition, India and Pakistan have skirmished repeatedly–and even engaged in several limited wars–without descending into full-scale conflict. In the 1960s, China fought with first India and then the Soviet Union over land, yet on neither occasion did combat spread beyond the frontier. Indeed, large interstate wars since World War I have not generally begun with a trigger akin to an assassination or a scuffle between forces on a remote perimeter, but rather with a major attack or colonial collapse.

## AT: China/Japan War

#### Diplomacy and US retaliation check escalation.

Reuters 9/24/12

“Japan, China Military Conflict Seen Unlikely Despite Row,” http://www.cnbc.com/id/49142182

Hawkish Chinese commentators have urged Beijing to prepare for military conflict with Japan as tensions mount over disputed islands in the East China Sea, but most experts say chances the Asian rivals will decide to go to war are slim. A bigger risk is the possibility that an unintended maritime clash results in deaths and boosts pressure for retaliation, but even then Tokyo and Beijing are expected to seek to manage the row before it becomes a full-blown military confrontation. "That's the real risk — a maritime incident leading to a loss of life. If a Japanese or Chinese were killed, there would be a huge outpouring of nationalist sentiment," said Linda Jakobson, director of the East Asia Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. "But I still cannot seriously imagine it would lead to an attack on the other country. I do think rational minds would prevail," she said, adding economic retaliation was more likely. A feud over the lonely islets in the East China Sea flared this month after Japan's government bought three of the islands from a private owner, triggering violent protests in China and threatening business between Asia's two biggest economies. Adding to the tensions, China sent more than 10 government patrol vessels to waters near the islands, known as the Diaoyu in China and the Senkaku in Japan, while Japan beefed up its Coast Guard patrols. Chinese media said 1,000 fishing boats have set sail for the area, although none has been sighted close by. Despite the diplomatic standoff and rising nationalist sentiment in China especially, experts agree neither Beijing nor Tokyo would intentionally escalate to a military confrontation what is already the worst crisis in bilateral ties in decades. US Pressure "The chances of a military conflict are very, very slim because neither side wants to go down that path," said former People's Liberation Army officer, Xu Guangyu, now a senior consultant at a government-run think tank in Beijing. Pressure from the United States, which repeated last week that the disputed isles were covered by a 1960 treaty obliging Washington to come to Japan's aid if it were attacked, is also working to restrain both sides, security experts said. "I very seriously do not think any of the involved parties — Japan, China and including the United States because of its defence treaty (with Japan) — want to see a military conflict over this dispute," said the Lowy Institute's Jakobson. "They don't want to risk it, they don't seek it and they do not intend to let it happen." Still, the possibility of a clash at sea remains. While the presence of the Chinese surveillance ships — none of which is a naval vessel — and Japan Coast Guard ships in the area might appear to set the stage for trouble, military experts said each side would try to steer clear of the other. "The bad news is that China sent ships to the area. The good news is that they are official ships controlled by the government," said Narushige Michishita at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. "This is good news because they are not likely to engage in aggressive action because that would really exacerbate the situation and turn it into a major crisis," said Michishita. The Chinese ships, he said, had another mission besides asserting China's claims to the islands and nearby waters. "My guess is that some (Chinese) official patrol boats are there to watch out for fishing boats ... to stop them from making problems," Michishita said. Fishing Boats Wild Card Military specialists say the Chinese patrol vessels are well disciplined as are the Japan Coast Guard ships, while the two sides have grown accustomed to communicating. "Both sides are ready, but both sides are very well under control," said a former senior Japanese military official. What worries observers most is the risk that a boat carrying Chinese fishermen slips through or activists try to land, sparking clashes with Japan's Coast Guard that result in deaths - news of which would spread like wildfire on the Internet. In 1996, a Hong Kong activist drowned in the nearby waters. Diplomatic and economic relations chilled sharply in 2010 after Japan arrested a Chinese trawler captain whose boat collided with a Japan Coast Guard vessel. This time, tensions are already high and China is contending with a tricky once-in-a-decade leadership change while Japan's ruling party faces a probable drubbing in an election expected in months. "Two rational governments of major countries would not intentionally decide to enter into a major war with each other over a few uninhabited rocks," said Denny Roy, an Asia security expert at the East-West Center in Hawaii. "But unfortunately, you can arrive at war in ways other than that — through unintended escalation, in which both countries start out at a much lower level, but each of them think that they must respond to perceived provocation by the other side, both very strongly pushed into it by domestic pressure. That seems to be where we are now and it is difficult to see how countries can get out of that negative spiral." Others, however, were more confident that an unplanned clash could be kept from escalating into military conflict. "That's not really a major possibility, because there are still broad channels of communication between the two sides, and they would help prevent that happening. Both sides could still talk to each other," said former senior PLA officer Xu. "Even before anything happened, you would also have the U.N Secretary General and others stepping in to ensure that the situation does not get out of control."

## AT: Prolif

#### No impact – every actor has incentives to overstate consequences

**Farley 11**, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, (Robert, "Over the Horizon: Iran and the Nuclear Paradox," 11-16, [www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10679/over-the-horizon-iran-and-the-nuclear-paradox](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10679/over-the-horizon-iran-and-the-nuclear-paradox))

But states and policymakers habitually overestimate the impact of nuclear weapons. This happens among both proliferators and anti-proliferators. Would-be proliferators seem to expect that possessing a nuclear weapon will confer “a seat at the table” as well as solve a host of minor and major foreign policy problems. Existing nuclear powers fear that new entrants will act unpredictably, destabilize regions and throw existing diplomatic arrangements into flux. These predictions almost invariably turn out wrong; nuclear weapons consistently fail to undo the existing power relationships of the international system.

The North Korean example is instructive. In spite of the dire warnings about the dangers of a North Korean nuclear weapon, the region has weathered Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation in altogether sound fashion. Though some might argue that nukes have “enabled” North Korea to engage in a variety of bad behaviors, that was already the case prior to its nuclear test. The crucial deterrent to U.S. or South Korean action continues to be North Korea’s conventional capabilities, as well as the incalculable costs of governing North Korea after a war. Moreover, despite the usual dire predictions of nonproliferation professionals, the North Korean nuclear program has yet to inspire Tokyo or Seoul to follow suit. The DPRK’s program represents a tremendous waste of resources and human capital for a poor state, and it may prove a problem if North Korea endures a messy collapse. Thus far, however, the effects of the arsenal have been minimal.

Israel represents another case in which the benefits of nuclear weapons remain unclear. Although Israel adopted a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear program, most in the region understood that Israel possessed nuclear weapons by the late-1960s. These weapons did not deter Syria or Egypt from launching a large-scale conventional assault in 1973, however. Nor did they help the Israeli Defense Force compel acquiescence in Lebanon in 1982 or 2006. Nuclear weapons have not resolved the Palestinian question, and when it came to removing the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, Israel relied not on its nuclear arsenal but on the United States to do so -- through conventional means -- in 2003. Israeli nukes have thus far failed to intimidate the Iranians into freezing their nuclear program. Moreover, Israel has pursued a defense policy designed around the goal of maintaining superiority at every level of military escalation, from asymmetrical anti-terror efforts to high-intensity conventional combat. Thus, it is unclear whether the nuclear program has even saved Israel any money.

The problem with nukes is that there are strong material and normative pressures against their use, not least because states that use nukes risk incurring nuclear retaliation. Part of the appeal of nuclear weapons is their bluntness, but for foreign policy objectives requiring a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer, they are useless. As a result, states with nuclear neighbors quickly find that they can engage in all manner of harassment and escalation without risking nuclear retaliation. The weapons themselves are often more expensive than the foreign policy objectives that they would be used to attain. Moreover, normative pressures do matter. Even “outlaw” nations recognize that the world views the use of nuclear -- not to mention chemical or biological -- weapons differently than other expressions of force. And almost without exception, even outlaw nations require the goodwill of at least some segments of the international community.

Given all this, it is not at all surprising that many countries eschew nuclear programs, even when they could easily attain nuclear status. Setting aside the legal problems, nuclear programs tend to be expensive, and they provide relatively little in terms of foreign policy return on investment. Brazil, for example, does not need nuclear weapons to exercise influence in Latin America or deter its rivals. Turkey, like Germany, Japan and South Korea, decided a long time ago that the nuclear “problem” could be solved most efficiently through alignment with an existing nuclear power.

Why do policymakers, analysts and journalists so consistently overrate the importance of nuclear weapons? The answer is that everyone has a strong incentive to lie about their importance. The Iranians will lie to the world about the extent of their program and to their people about the fruits of going nuclear. The various U.S. client states in the region will lie to Washington about how terrified they are of a nuclear Iran,

warning of the need for “strategic re-evaluation,” while also using the Iranian menace as an excuse for brutality against their own populations. Nonproliferation advocates will lie about the terrors of unrestrained proliferation because they do not want anyone to shift focus to the manageability of a post-nuclear Iran. The United States will lie to everyone in order to reassure its clients and maintain the cohesion of the anti-Iran block.

None of these lies are particularly dishonorable; they represent the normal course of diplomacy. But they are lies nevertheless, and serious analysts of foreign policy and international relations need to be wary of them.

Nonproliferation is a good idea, if only because states should not waste tremendous resources on weapons of limited utility. Nuclear weapons also represent a genuine risk of accidents, especially for states that have not yet developed appropriately robust security precautions. Instability and collapse in nuclear states has been harrowing in the past and will undoubtedly be harrowing in the future. All of these threats should be taken seriously by policymakers. Unfortunately, as long as deception remains the rule in the practice of nuclear diplomacy, exaggerated alarmism will substitute for a realistic appraisal of the policy landscape.

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## 2NC - We Win/No Impact

US first strike means no escalation and no extinction

Lieber and Press 13

Keir A. Lieber, Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan Dickey Center, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2013, "The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict", http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring\_13/lieber.pdf

The first set of arguments is about an important, yet virtually unnoticed, consequence of changes in military technology and the balance of power. In a nutshell, the same revolution in accuracy that has transformed conventional warfare has had equally momentous consequences for nuclear weapons and deterrence. 2 Very accurate delivery systems, new reconnaissance technologies, and the downsizing of arsenals from Cold War levels have made both conventional and nuclear counterforce strikes against nuclear arsenals much more feasible than ever before. Perhaps most surprising, pairing highly accurate delivery systems with nuclear weapons permits target strategies that would create virtually no radioactive fallout, hence, vastly reduced fatalities.

For nuclear analysts weaned on two seeming truths of the Cold War era—that nuclear arsenals reliably deter attacks via the threat of retaliation, and that nuclear weapons use is tantamount to mass slaughter—the implications of the counterforce revolution should be jarring.

The conventional view linking nuclear weapons to stalemate and slaughter was correct during the latter decades of the Cold War. By the mid 1960s, a truly effective nuclear counterforce strike by either side— that is, a disarming blow by one superpower against the nuclear arsenal of the other—had become impossible. 3 Each of the superpowers wielded an enormous arsenal, which was deployed on a diverse set of delivery systems. The sheer number of targets that would have to be destroyed, combined with the limitations of contemporary guidance systems, virtually guaranteed that any disarming attack would fail, leaving the enemy with a large number of surviving weapons with which to retaliate. Furthermore, any significant counterforce strike would have produced enormous quantities of lethal radioactive fallout and hence caused millions of civilian casualties. 4 Most Cold War strategists—many of whom are still active in the nuclear analytical community today—came to instinctively associate nuclear weapons with stalemate and nuclear use with Armageddon.

But nuclear weapons—like virtually all other weapons—have changed dramatically over the past four decades. Modern guidance systems permit nuclear planners to achieve “probabilities of damage” against hardened nuclear targets that were unheard of during the Cold War. And heightened accuracy also permits nontraditional targeting strategies that would further increase the effectiveness of counterforce strikes and greatly reduce casualties. 5 The revolution in accuracy and sensors, and the relatively small contemporary arsenals, mean that nuclear balances around the world—for example, between the United States and China, the United States and North Korea, and perhaps in the future between Iran and Israel—bear little resemblance to the Cold War

superpower standoff.

To illustrate the revolution in accuracy, in 2006 we modeled the hardest case for our claim: a hypothetical US first strike on the next largest nuclear arsenal in the world, that of Russia. The same models that were used during the Cold War to demonstrate the inescapability of stalemate—the condition of “mutual assured destruction,” or MAD—now suggested that even the large Russian arsenal could be destroyed in a disarming strike. 6 Furthermore, the dramatic leap in accuracy—which is the foundation for effective counterforce—is based on widely available technologies within reach of other nuclear-armed states, including Russia, China, Pakistan, and others. Our overriding message is not about the US-Russian nuclear balance per se. Rather, our point is that key beliefs about nuclear weapons have been overturned; scholars and analysts need to reexamine their underlying assumptions about nuclear stalemate and deterrence.

Since 2006, we have discussed these issues with many nuclear analysts, US government officials, and military officers involved with the nuclear mission. Almost everything we learned reinforced our views about the counterforce revolution and suggests our earlier work understated the leap in US counterforce capabilities—with one exception. We previously argued that US “nuclear primacy”—the ability to use nuclear weapons to destroy the strategic forces of any other country—appeared to be an intentional goal of US policymakers. We noted that even as the United States greatly reduced its nuclear arsenal, it retained, and in some cases improved, those nuclear forces that were ideally suited to the counterforce mission. Based on what we have subsequently learned, we would recast and sharpen this part of our argument to contend that the United States is intentionally pursuing “strategic primacy”—meaning that Washington seeks the ability to defeat enemy nuclear forces (as well as other WMD)—but that US nuclear weapons are but one dimension of that effort. In fact, the effort to neutralize adversary strategic forces—that is, achieve strategic primacy—spans nearly every realm of warfare: for example, ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, intelligencesurveillance-and-reconnaissance systems, offensive cyber warfare, conventional precision strike, and long-range precision strike, in addition to nuclear strike capabilities.

## AT: Draw-In

#### Everyone will take the US side

Kissinger, Former Secretary of State, 6/13/’5

(Henry, “China: Containment Won’t Work,” Washington Post)

In a U.S. confrontation with China, the vast majority of nations will seek to avoid choosing sides. At the same time, they will generally have greater incentives to participate in a multilateral system with America than to adopt an exclusionary Asian nationalism. They will not want to be seen as pieces of an American design. India, for example, perceives ever closer common interests with the United States regarding opposition to radical Islam, some aspects of nuclear proliferation and the integrity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It sees no need to give these common purposes an ideological or anti-Chinese character. It finds no inconsistency between its dramatically improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a strategic partnership with China. American insistence on an ideological crusade and on a Cold War-type of containment might accelerate such gestures. And it would risk inflaming India's Muslim population.

## T

## Link—Power Purchasing

#### Procurements are purchases that don’t motivate action – they just buy a technology that already exists

Nelson 93

(Edward W., Chairman – Payment Subcommittee in OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 6-30, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4)

**Definition of Financial Incentives**  A definition of terms is **necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives** for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the **distinction between "incentive" and "payment"** since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, **"incentives" do not amount to "purchases"** and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

## at: webb

#### Webb is Canadian, which makes him stupid. But it also matters because their tax system is completely boned so his delineations of incentives makes no sense and is not precise

MacNevin, Tax Evaluation Division – Federal Department of Finance, ‘93

(Alex, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 539)

Not surprisingly, Mr. Webb's perspective is primarily legal in focus; he is concerned with what he views as deficiencies in legal structure and channels of legal authority and recourse. As an economist, I am not qualified to discuss the legal issues raised by Mr. Webb. However, his passing reference, in a related paper to be delivered at this conference, refers to the Auditor General's estimates that there are $41 billion and $28 billion in, respectively, direct expenditure incentives and tax expenditure incentives.1 Incentives are thus ultimately about money -- that is, who gets it, why, how, how much, what is the effect and how is this accounted for -- and therefore have important economic as well as legal dimensions. While Mr. Webb's paper deals with both expenditure and tax incentives, my comments concentrate on the latter, with which I am most familiar.

II. THE IDENTIFICATION OF TAX INCENTIVES

One fundamental problem with respect to accountability in the area of taxation arises because of difficulties in defining what is or is not a tax expenditure or a tax incentive. A central aspect of accountability relates to the seemingly simple basic requirement for documenting the amounts of money foregone through various incentives. Mr. Webb notes that information on the costs of tax incentives are reported only sporadically in tax expenditure accounts, the last of which was put out by the Minister of Finance in 1985. He also points out that tax incentives are removed from the normal budgeting and estimating procedures that apply to many other incentives on the expenditure side (which, incidentally, he views as generally deficient).

The infrequent release of tax expenditures (or, as they were called in the 1985 document, selective tax measures) tables may in part reflect the absence of a legal requirement that they be produced on a regular basis.2 They also, however, reflect significant conceptual difficulties encountered in constructing such accounts as well as prevailing concerns about the extent of their usefulness, including their interpretation. Difficulties in this regard were highlighted in a 1988 conference on tax expenditures and accountability in taxation that was jointly sponsored by the Department of Finance and the John Deutsch Institute of Queen's University.3

In the opinion of many of the public finance experts who participated in the conference, tax expenditures often cannot easily be distinguished from structural parameters of the tax system. Identification of tax incentives necessitates comparison of the actual tax system with an ideal "benchmark" tax system. This is entirely different from the case of direct expenditures where no comparable reference base is required. One practical difficulty confronting tax expenditure accounting is that any view about what the tax base should be is essentially a value judgement and hence will vary from individual to individual. The result is that items which may be viewed as tax expenditures under one particular benchmark tax system may not be viewed as such under another benchmark. For example, tax deductions for retirement savings plans are a tax expenditure under an annual income tax benchmark, but are not tax expenditures under lifetime income tax or consumption tax benchmarks. Since the federal tax system contains a mixture of elements of all three of these tax regimes, considerable difficulties in identifying tax expenditures exist.

Related additional complexities arise because an actual tax system can only approximate the desirable characteristics of any particular normative view as to what should be taxed. For example, while economists may be able to define fairly precisely what real economic income is over a particular period of time under an income tax base, it is impractical to design an income tax system that has the actual characteristics dictated by theory. The result of is that in some instances, it is not clear how a particular tax measure or group of related tax measures should be viewed under an actual tax system that is inevitably only an imperfect approximation of a chosen "benchmark" tax system.4

Many examples can be given to illustrate the difficulties that arise in this respect. For example, considerable uncertainty arises about how the various provisions relating to the taxation of capital gains should be treated for tax expenditure accounting purposes under an income tax regime that taxes nominal gains on a realization basis rather than real gains on an accrual basis. The integration of the personal and corporate income tax systems gives rise to other examples. Under a view that treats the integrated personal and corporated tax systems as the benchmark, the dividend tax credit is not a tax expenditure. Under one that treats the personal and corporate tax systems as separate benchmark systems, it is.

The tax expenditure treatment of cash accounting for farmers and fishermen provides another example. Economists are uncomfortable on tax principle grounds with the deductibility of expenditures on inventory because such expenditures merely reflect the transfer of one asset (cash) into another asset (inventory). Accrual accounting rules, which are required of other types of businesses, effectively result in unsold inventories being added back into income at the end of the year so that no deduction in the year is permitted. Past tax expenditure accounts have identified cash accounting as a tax expenditure, although it is far from obvious that, at least for full-time farmers and fishermen, cash accounting on balance results in lower tax liabilities over time or that from their perspective it is anything more than a peculiar tax wrinkle. It is notable that there is no dollar estimate of the value of cash accounting in previous tax expenditure accounts.

III. THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF TAX INCENTIVES

One common theme that emerged from the conference on tax expenditures and accountability was that, in light of the many difficulties in identifying tax expenditures, it might be desirable to present tax expenditure information from the perspective of a number of different normative benchmark systems. This would highlight aspects of the tax system from these different perspectives. It would, however, achieve this at the cost of considerable added complexity in interpreting the accounts, particularly to users of the accounts who were not tax experts. There may, therefore, be somewhat of a conflict between the usefulness of tax expenditure accounts in their role as an instrument of tax analysis versus their role as an accountability instrument where clarity and simplicity of presentation and interpretation have high priority. It may be possible to strike a compromise by, for example, ensuring that tax expenditure accounts clearly identify the key tax measures that most reasonably could be substituted for direct expenditure programs. This would facilitate comparisons of tax expenditures data with those for comparable programs on the direct expenditure side in the Public Accounts and thereby permit a more complete assessment of the incentives and subsidies applying to particular sectors, geographical regions, and so on. Such an approach would foster the accountability objective of "functional equivalence" identified by Mr. Webb.

Problems with compiling tax expenditures accounts are highlighted when the very structure of the tax system undergoes major changes, such as with the income tax reform of 1988 and with the introduction of the GST to replace the manufacturers sales tax. In such circumstances, presentation of tax expenditure information must be thoroughly reformulated to reflect the revised tax regimes and, indeed, the changing benchmark norms. This can give rise to problems of lack of continuity and comparability of data over time. As an additional practical matter, significant lags in the availability of taxation data may delay the release of tax expenditure tables that reflect the new regimes. There are two and three year lags for, respectively, personal income tax data and corporate income tax data.

Delays in the availability of taxation data are particularly problematic since it is typically much more difficult to forecast the ultimate cost of tax incentives than is the case for direct expenditure incentives. The main reason for this is that tax incentives are almost always open-ended while direct expenditure incentives are typically subject to an overall budget constraint. The total cost of a tax incentive thus depends entirely on the usually difficult to predict take-up response of taxpayers, which can give rise to considerable uncertainty in budgeting.5

There are thus significant difficulties with tax expenditure analysis even as an accounting device for providing estimates of the cost of individual tax measures. Judged by the other criteria identified above they are substantially more deficient since they provide no insight whatsoever into the questions of who benefits from tax incentives, why, and what are their effects. Analytical techniques, (such as full evaluations) in addition to accounting techniques, are required in order to provide a complete picture of both the cost and the efficacy of tax measures. I would note, however, that the problems in identifying tax expenditures, particularly in an environment of changing tax structures or norms, make it difficult to systematically evaluate tax expenditures or incentives on a routine cyclical basis as is done for direct expenditure programs.

The limitations of tax expenditures information naturally raise questions about the appropriate amount of scarce analytical resources that should be devoted to the preparation of tax expenditure tables, rather than to alternative or complementary tools of accountability such as in-depth studies of the rationale and cost-effectiveness of particular tax measures and related groupings of tax measures; irrespective of whether there is a consensus as to their tax expenditure status under any particular benchmark tax system. The Department of Finance has long wrestled with the practical difficulties and trade-offs involved in compiling tax expenditure data and other accountability information that is, on balance, most revealing with respect to the underlying structure of the tax system. The proceedings of the John Deutsch Conference indicate clearly that there are no easy solutions to the problems.

IV. CONCLUSION

As noted earlier, Mr. Webb also makes reference to the adequacy of current budgeting procedures for tax incentives. The problem of identifying and measuring tax incentives separately from the "normal" parameters of the tax system hints at the intimate relationship between tax expenditures or (tax incentives) policy and the more limited process of modifying and improving the tax system -- that is the strict design of tax policy. This latter process is a natural component of the government's routine budget procedures and is subject to well-known budget conventions. Procedures relating to the introduction or modification of tax incentives must therefore inevitably be conducted within that somewhat restrictive environment. Can improvements be made which reflect both the need for improved budgeting procedures for tax incentives and the unique environment in which tax measures are designed and modified? I am sure they can but I am considerably less sure that such procedures can be routinized through legislative structure or guidelines.

In summary, I fully support the general thrust of Mr. Webb's paper of the need for improved structures and instruments of accountability. In my view, however, the pursuit of that objective must be tempered by recognition of the significant practical obstacles that arise because of the unique characteristics of tax incentives.

## at: waxman

#### Waxman def is based on DOE order 5700.5

Waxman, 98 **–** Solicitor General of the US (Seth, Brief for the United States in Opposition for the US Supreme Court case HARBERT/LUMMUS AGRIFUELS PROJECTS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1998/0responses/98-0697.resp.opp.pdf)

2 On November 15, 1986, Keefe was delegated “the authority, with respect to actions valued at $50 million or less, to approve, execute, enter into, modify, administer, closeout, terminate and take any other necessary and appropriate action (collectively, ‘Actions’) with respect to Financial Incentive awards.” Pet. App. 68, 111-112. Citing DOE Order No. 5700.5 (Jan. 12, 1981), the delegation defines “Financial Incentives” as the authorized financial incentive programs of DOE, “including direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase agreements, price supports, guaranteed market agreements and any others which may evolve.” The delegation proceeds to state, “[h]owever, a separate prior written approval of any such action must be given by or concurred in by Keefe to accompany the action.” The delegation also states that its exercise “shall be governed by the rules and regulations of [DOE] and policies and procedures prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate(s).” Pet. App. 111-113.

#### That’s no longer statute

DOE, 5/8/2K

(“DOE N 251.35, Cancellation of Directives,” [https://www.directives.**doe**.gov/directives/0251.035-CNotice](https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives/0251.035-CNotice))

Effective immediately the following directives are canceled:

• DOE Order 5484.1, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROTECTION INFORMATION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, dated 2-24-81;

• DOE Order 1332.2, UNIFORM REPORTING SYSTEM FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE, dated 10-31-83;

• DOE Order 5700.5A, POLICY AND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES FOR FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PROGRAMS, dated 6-8-92; and

• HQ 1325.1, ACTION COORDINATION AND TRACKING SYSTEM, dated 7-30-79.

## at: reasonability

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

## cp

## 2NC Kick CP/Aff Can’t Solve

#### Best studies prove this means they can’t solve—no one will invest if policies are viewed as illegitimate

Davis, 12

(Prof-U-Chicago Business School, “Roadblocks: Policy uncertainty and the slow recovery,” http://www.chicagobooth.edu/capideas/oct-2012/roadblocks.aspx)

Many analysts claim that uncertainty about economic policies and their consequences has been an important factor slowing recovery. Uncertainty about taxes and the effects of policy on interest rates, prices, health costs, and other economic variables can lead households to defer consumer spending, and companies to cut back on capital investments, new product development, hiring, and worker training. Because new projects are expensive to reverse and because workers are costly to hire and fire, companies have an **incentive to wait for greater political stability and policy certainty** before proceeding with new business undertakings. If too many companies adopt a cautious stance in response to policy uncertainties, economic recovery may not take hold. The price of policy uncertainty indeed could be high, according to a recent study titled, "Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty" by Chicago Booth professor Steven J. Davis, with Stanford University professor Nicholas Bloom and Stanford University graduate student Scott R. Baker. The authors developed a new index of policy-related economic uncertainty. The index reaches historically high levels after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and again over the past year in reaction to the euro-zone crisis and the US debtceiling impasse. The authors estimate that an increase in policy uncertainty of the size experienced from 2006 to 2011 leads to a fall in real Gross Domestic Product of 3.2 percent, a sharp drop in business investment spending of 16 percent, and a loss of about 2.3 million jobs. The financial crisis and recession presented new and difficult challenges for policy makers. Davis believes that unusual policy challenges created by extraordinary economic disturbances were the main sources of elevated policy uncertainty in 2008 and 2009. The most threatening aspects of the financial crisis were contained by the middle of 2009, causing the authors' policy uncertainty index to fall substantially in the latter part of 2009. The index rises again in 2010 and 2011, however, reaching even higher levels than it did at the peak of the financial crisis. High levels of policy uncertainty in the past two years partly reflect deliberate policy choices and political gridlock, in Davis's view. A clear example is the debt-ceiling dispute in the summer of 2011 between Democrats and Republicans, which created a real threat of a partial government shutdown. Congress eventually raised the debt ceiling, but agreement came at the last minute and with huge market volatility. "Much of the high levels of policy uncertainty in 2011 were caused by policy decisions and policy maker conflicts over how to proceed," Davis says. CONSTRUCTING A POLICY UNCERTAINTY INDEX The authors' policy-related economic uncertainty index combines three components. The first component quantifies the frequency of references to the economy and policy uncertainty in newspaper articles. Starting from January 1985, Baker, Bloom, and Davis performed month-by-month searches and counted the number of articles in 10 major US newspapers that contained terms pertaining to uncertainty, the economy, and policy areas, including phrases and words such as "federal reserve," "tax," "deficit," and "regulation." They scaled the raw count of these newspaper articles by the number of articles containing the term "today," to account for trends in the length and number of news articles. The second component captures the importance and number of federal tax code provisions set to expire over the next 10 years, based on reports from the Joint Committee on Taxation of the US Congress. Scheduled tax code provisions are an important source of uncertainty for households and businesses, because Congress often extends or modifies the provisions at the last minute after big political fights, thereby undermining stability and certainty about the tax code, the authors say. An important recent example is the Bush-era income tax cuts originally set to expire at the end of 2010. After an acrimonious and protracted political battle about whether the tax cuts should be reversed and, if so, for which taxpayers, Congress finally decided in December 2010 to extend the tax cuts for all taxpayers. However, the tax cuts were extended for only two years, setting the stage for another partisan battle as the deadline approaches, and leaving households unsure about tax rates beyond 2012. The third component of the policy uncertainty index summarizes the extent of disagreement among economic forecasters about future government purchases and about consumer prices, variables that are influenced by fiscal and monetary policy, respectively. Using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Survey of Professional Forecasters, the authors treat the dispersion in the fourquarter- ahead forecasts of these variables as proxies for uncertainty about future monetary policy and future government spending. The aggregated measure of policy uncertainty shows clear spikes corresponding to several well-known events including presidential elections, the Gulf wars, the 9/11 terrorist attack, and contentious budget battles. The index also shows a substantially higher level of policy uncertainty since the onset of the Great Recession in 2007. In fact, the index more than doubled between 2006-the last year before the unfolding of the financial crisis - and 2011. POLICY UNCERTAINTIES AS ROADBLOCKS Concerns about policy-related economic uncertainty became increasingly important after September 2001, the study finds. Since then, there has been a higher level of uncertainty and a much closer link between overall economic uncertainty and policy-related uncertainty. Stock market volatility also rose dramatically in the past four years compared with the previous three decades, and policyrelated news developments became a much more important source of equity market volatility. An important aspect of high policy uncertainty in recent years, according to the authors, involves uncertainty about the direction and consequences of monetary policy. The federal funds rate, an important monetary policy variable, has pressed against the "zero lower bound" on nominal interest rates since 2008. There has been uncertainty about how long the Fed would maintain a near-zero rate and about the effects of Fed actions in this unusual economic environment. The Fed also engaged in a number of large-scale programs to purchase longer-term debt securities in an effort to stimulate the economy. The impact of these policy actions on interest rates and the real economy were, and remain, imperfectly understood. Observers also have speculated about whether the Fed will conduct additional rounds of debt purchases, and about how the Fed will eventually unwind the huge recent expansions of its balance sheet. Another issue is whether the unconventional policy actions taken by the Fed in response to the financial crisis will erode its independence and undermine its ability to withstand political pressures, Davis says. Fiscal and tax policies also have caused extraordinary policy uncertainty in recent years, according to the study. The United States faces a large fiscal imbalance over the long term, Davis says, because the government is set to spend much more under current policies and demographic trends than it will collect in future revenues under the current tax system. "The longer policy makers wait to resolve these fiscal imbalances, the greater the uncertainties about the ultimate resolution and the impact of large fiscal imbalances on future economic performance," says Davis. Other contributors to elevated policy uncertainty levels in recent years include sovereign debt problems in Europe, financial regulation, labor regulation, energy and environmental policies, and health care policy. In Davis's view, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signed into law in March 2010 intensified rather than reduced the economic, political, and legal uncertainties surrounding the US health care system. The law imposes new burdens on businesses and individuals, seeks to remake much of the health care delivery system, and rests heavily on unproven initiatives that supporters think will reduce costs. In pushing the legislation through Congress, the Democratic leadership opted to pursue the most radical plan that could muster 60 votes in the Senate and a thin majority in the House. As a result, the legislation failed to attract a single Republican vote in either house. That political strategy ensured the law would become the **focus of future electoral battles and rollback efforts**. There were also grave legal challenges: key provisions of the health care law faced constitutional challenges before the Supreme Court. "A simpler, more transparent, and less aggressive health care reform with a broader base of political support would have involved much less uncertainty," says Davis. Uncertainty is a fact of economic life, and will never be eliminated entirely. But Davis thinks policy makers' actions and, in some cases, lack thereof, can greatly influence the degree of economic uncertainty facing businesses and households.

#### Lack of credibility from political backlash dooms energy development—outweighs the benefits of more federal support

Johnson, 11

(Sr. Correspondent-Chemical & Engineering News, Uncertainty Slows Energy Investments, 11/21, http://cen.acs.org/articles/89/i47/Uncertainty-Slows-Energy-Investments.html)

Energy economists and clean energy advocates and industries fear that confusion over U.S. government policies will curb private domestic investments in clean energy. Of particular concern are the uncertain policy implications of a congressional investigation into the Obama Administration’s clean energy loan programs. The loss of private capital is likely to financially cripple U.S. companies in a global chase for the lucrative, emerging global marketplace for clean energy. “**A murky energy policy environment scares investors**,” says Phyllis Cuttino, director of clean energy programs for the Pew Charitable Trusts, a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy organization. A recent study by Pew and research partner Bloomberg New Energy Finance found that the once-first-place U.S. had dropped to third place, behind China and Germany, in clean energy investments for product development and manufacturing. Pew puts the size of this potential renewable energy investment market at a whopping $2.3 trillion over the next decade. Cuttino underscores that these investments translate to jobs, exports, and a growing economy, all based on private capital. Cuttino blames the drop in ranking in large part on a “climate of uncertainty” in the U.S., which drives investors to put their money in more dependable ventures and other countries, rather than investing in U.S. clean energy production. Contributing to this uncertainty has been on-again, off-again government support for renewable energy. The uncertainty will continue, Cuttino says. Instability is springing from the high-profile investigation by the House of Representatives into the Department of Energy’s loan guarantee program and the steady drumbeat of politically partisan accusations spinning from the bankruptcy of solar manufacturer Solyndra. “Money is not patriotic,” Cuttino says. “Investors have a bottom line: They want to make money, and they will go to where they can get a reliable rate of return.” Congressional criticism of federal support for clean energy has also **influenced public perceptions**, according to a recent poll by Pew Research Center and the Washington Post. The poll found a decline in public support for federal renewable energy investments, saying it is at its lowest ebb since 2006. Public support for renewable energy—wind, solar, hydrogen—still tops public backing for fossil fuels, according to the poll released on Nov. 10. But the data reveal a sharp decline from the 80% of the public who endorsed greater federal spending on clean energy a few years ago to 68% today. For much of this year, Republican House leaders have criticized DOE’s clean energy aid programs and the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009—the stimulus plan—which gave the DOE programs a two-year funding burst that is now over. In late summer, the House Energy & Commerce Committee began a series of well-publicized oversight hearings examining the DOE loan guarantee program and specifically investigating a multi-million-dollar loan guarantee to solar panel manufacturer Solyndra. The company announced its bankruptcy at the end of August. The failure is expected to cost taxpayers $535 million (C&EN, Sept. 5, page 12). In their investigation, Republican Committee members and staff have obtained—voluntarily and through subpoena—thousands of internal Administration documents and e-mails. And they have selectively leaked portions of the materials to the media, occasionally before making them available to the public, committee Democrats, or hearing witnesses. Heightening publicity, the media releases were frequently timed to generate front-page news articles on the day of the committee’s hearings. Although some 80,000 pages of material have been presented to committee Republicans, Energy & Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-Mich.) on Nov. 4 issued a subpoena to the White House requesting all material related to the Solyndra loan guarantee going back to Jan. 1, 2009, before President Barack Obama was inaugurated. On Nov. 11, the White House released more material, which Republicans say they are reviewing. Committee Republicans charge that Obama pressed DOE to grant the guarantee to Solyndra—over the objections of department career staff. They claim the President did so at the bidding of campaign contributor and Solyndra investor George Kaiser, an allegation Kaiser, the White House, and DOE strongly dispute. The debate has broadened to raise doubts about government loans, subsidies, and other support for renewable energy. Several House members have accused DOE and Obama of making inept decisions and unsuccessfully trying to pick winners and losers. Many have urged that the government end its support of renewable energy. Rep. Cliff B. Stearns (R-Fla.), chairman of the Energy & Commerce Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee, which is leading the investigation, bluntly warned that “even [with oil] at $140 a barrel, the idea that solar will ever break even is questionable.” Other House Republicans have weighed in. Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis.), vice chairman of the House Science, Space & Technology Committee, has introduced legislation to require an independent assessment of all past and future renewable energy loans, grants, and direct payments. And the House Oversight Committee, led by Rep. Darrell E. Issa (R-Calif.), joined the fray with a Sept. 22 hearing titled “How Obama’s Green Energy Agenda Is Killing Jobs.” Issa too has requested a long list of internal documents related to solar loans and guarantees. Like Solyndra, 39 companies have obtained $36 billion in loan guarantees through the program, which Congress created in 2005. Originally established to guarantee private loans to fund construction of nuclear reactors, the program was expanded by Congress to cover clean energy sources, but no loans were guaranteed until the Obama Administration. The program was created to encourage private investors to back risky technologies. Congress expected some loans to fail and required funds to be set aside for failure. Solyndra was an original applicant and successfully passed examination by the George W. Bush Administration. When Energy Secretary Steven Chu was appointed, he was quizzed by several members of Congress over the loan guarantee program delays and he promised to quickly make guarantees. Using stimulus money, Chu chose Solyndra for his first approval. With much fanfare, Obama announced the selection, pointing to jobs that would be created, the profits that would occur, and the export potential. None of that happened, and the loan was lost. Solyndra made an unusual rooftop cylindrical solar energy system that was quick and simple to install. The tubular design captured a wider angular range of sunlight than did flat panels, and unlike conventional panels, it avoided using polysilicon, which in 2005 was in short supply. However, the company’s product was much more expensive than conventional panels. When polysilicon prices dropped and solar panel prices plummeted, Solyndra folded (C&EN, Oct. 3, page 28). The lost taxpayer funds also angered House Democrats, and they too question Chu’s selection process. But they opposed the Republicans’ sweeping investigation, claiming it is a partisan attack on Obama and the stimulus program. The House Solyndra hearings have resulted in intense bickering between both parties, with witness testimony often rendered irrelevant. The Senate has not followed suit. Sen. Jeff Bingaman Jr. (D-N.M.), chairman of the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee, is unlikely to call such hearings, says committee communications director Bill Wicker. Oversight hearings at this time, he says, would “generate more heat than light” and “devolve” into speech making. “A more thoughtful look at the financing gap for advanced energy technologies between the U.S. and its international competitors, like China, does make sense,” Wicker adds, and Bingaman hopes to look at that issue later in this Congress. Advocates of renewable energy worry that House Republican opposition to Solyndra and loan guarantees could morph into opposition of general federal support for clean energy. On the record, however, representatives of solar and wind energy trade associations C&EN contacted for this article were reluctant to speak and feared being tainted with the brush of Solyndra. **Fickle congressional support for renewable energy has long dragged down the U.S. renewable energy industry**, notes Frank Laird, associate professor of technology and public policy at the University of Denver. Particularly unhelpful, he says, is the history of on-again, off-again federal tax credits for clean energy technologies. The size of the credit matters less than keeping it in place long enough to provide consistency for investors, Laird says. “**This seesaw drives renewable industries crazy. They can’t plan.” § Marked 10:10 §** “We found that **policy consistency has been critical for China and Germany**,” Pew’s Cuttino adds. “The constant examination and uncertainty that is going on right now in the U.S. makes investors queasy, and of course they are going to go to a China or Germany or some other country where they have stability. The U.S. has such potential. So much investment could happen here.” Stimulus money fueled Obama’s drive for clean energy projects, and in large part it fueled Republican opposition, notes David Goldston, who was staff director from 2001 to 2006 for the House Science Committee when it was in Republican Party hands. Today, he is director of government affairs for the Natural Resources Defense Council, an environmental group.

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## impact ov

#### Collapse is coming

Gittelson 3/26

(Robert, president, Conservatives for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 03/26/13, “Immigration reform: Future flow must meet economic need” The Hill)

For me and my colleagues in the Conservatives for Comprehensive Immigration Reform coalition, we want to see a fair, pragmatic, and just immigration reform that respects the rule of law; secures our borders, our businesses, and our visa process; ensures fairness to taxpayers; protects the unity of the immediate family; and especially respects the God­given dignity of every person. Furthermore, we strongly feel that our nation has a moral imperative to assure that any immigration reform establishes a path toward earned legalization and eventual citizenship for those that are currently undocumented, and can qualify for this program. However, at the end of the day, we also want to see a reform of our legal immigration system that will actually work to solve the problems inherent in the broken immigration system that have led us to the dysfunctional situation that America is mired in today. Therefore, it is with some measure of frustration that we find ourselves at a stalemate on the very important issue of "future flow." Make no mistake, one of the main reasons why we now have 11,000,000 undocumented individuals in this country today, is because the legal immigration system that we currently have, did not sufficiently address the issue of future flow when it was enacted in 1986. Other than the issues of a legalization of the undocumented, and the various security and enforcement issues mentioned above, nothing will ensure a successful immigration overhaul more than getting this aspect of an immigration solution correct. Without a sufficient supply of future immigrant workers, we will not be able to achieve the economic expansion that will be mandatory to balance our future budgets, or to save our future entitlement programs. Those are hard facts, but they represent an accurate assessment of the reality of our fiscal requirements in the 21st century.

#### It solves long-term sustainable growth

Krudy 1/29

(Edward, “Analysis: Immigration reform could boost U.S. economic growth” Jan 29, 2013, Reuters)

The sluggish U.S. economy could get a lift if President Barack Obama and a bipartisan group of senators succeed in what could be the biggest overhaul of the nation's immigration system since the 1980s. Relaxed immigration rules could encourage entrepreneurship, increase demand for housing, raise tax revenues and help reduce the budget deficit, economists said. By helping more immigrants enter the country legally and allowing many illegal immigrants to remain, the United States could help offset a slowing birth rate and put itself in a stronger demographic position than aging Europe, Japan and China. "Numerous industries in the United States can't find the workers they need, right now even in a bad economy, to fill their orders and expand their production as the market demands," said Alex Nowrasteh, an immigration specialist at the libertarian Cato Institute. The emerging consensus among economists is that immigration provides a net benefit. It increases demand and productivity, helps drive innovation and lowers prices, although there is little agreement on the size of the impact on economic growth. President Barack Obama plans to launch his second-term push for a U.S. immigration overhaul during a visit to Nevada on Tuesday and will make it a high priority to win congressional approval of a reform package this year, the White House said. The chances of major reforms gained momentum on Monday when a bipartisan group of senators agreed on a framework that could eventually give 11 million illegal immigrants a chance to become American citizens. Their proposals would also include means to keep and attract workers with backgrounds in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. This would be aimed both at foreign students attending American universities where they are earning advanced degrees and high-tech workers abroad. An estimated 40 percent of scientists in the United States are immigrants and studies show immigrants are twice as likely to start businesses, said Nowrasteh. Boosting legal migration and legalizing existing workers could add $1.5 trillion to the U.S. economy over the next 10 years, estimates Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, a specialist in immigration policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. That's an annual increase of 0.8 percentage points to the economic growth rate, currently stuck at about 2 percent. REPUBLICANS' HISPANIC PUSH Other economists say the potential benefit to growth is much lower. Richard Freeman, an economist at Harvard, believes most of the benefits to the economy from illegal immigrants already in the United States has already been recorded and legalizing their status would produce only incremental benefits. While opposition to reform lingers on both sides of the political spectrum and any controversial legislation can easily meet a quick end in a divided Washington, the chances of substantial change seem to be rising. Top Republicans such as Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana are not mincing words about the party's need to appeal to the Hispanic community and foreign-born voters who were turned off by Republican candidate Mitt Romney's tough talk in last year's presidential campaign. A previous Obama plan, unveiled in May 2011, included the creation of a guest-worker program to meet agricultural labor needs and something similar is expected to be in his new proposal. The senators also indicated they would support a limited program that would allow companies in certain sectors to import guest workers if Americans were not available to fill some positions. An additional boost to growth could come from rising wages for newly legalized workers and higher productivity from the arrival of more highly skilled workers from abroad. Increased tax revenues would help federal and state authorities plug budget deficits although the benefit to government revenues will be at least partially offset by the payment of benefits to those who gain legal status. In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that proposed immigration reform in that year would have generated $48 billion in revenue from 2008 to 2017, while costing $23 billion in health and welfare payments. There is also unlikely to be much of a saving on enforcement from the senators' plan because they envisage tougher border security to prevent further illegal immigration and a crackdown on those overstaying visas. One way to bump up revenue, according to a report co-authored by University of California, Davis economist Giovanni Peri, would be to institute a cap-and-trade visa system. Peri estimated it could generate up to $1.2 billion annually. Under such a system, the government would auction a certain number of visas employers could trade in a secondary market. "A more efficient, more transparent and more flexible immigration system would help firms expand, contribute to more job creation in the United States, and slow the movement of operations abroad," according to a draft report, soon to be published as part of a study by the Hamilton Project, a think tank. There was no immediate sign that either the Obama or the senators' plan would include such a system. The long-term argument for immigration is a demographic one. Many developed nations are seeing their populations age, adding to the burden of pension and healthcare costs on wage-earners. Immigration in the United States would need to double to keep the working-age population stable at its current 67 percent of total population, according to George Magnus, a senior independent economic adviser at UBS in London, While Magnus says a change of that magnitude may prove too politically sensitive, the focus should be on attracting highly skilled and entrepreneurial immigrants in the way Canada and Australia do by operating a points system for immigrants rather than focusing mainly on family connections. "The trick is to shift the balance of migration towards those with education (and) skills," he added. HARD ROAD Academics at major universities such as Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology often lament that many of their top foreign graduates end up returning to their home countries because visas are hard to get. "We have so much talent that is sitting here in the universities," said William Kerr, a professor at Harvard Business School. "I find it very difficult to swallow that we then make it so hard for them to stay." The last big amnesty for illegal immigrants was in 1986 when President Ronald Reagan legalized about 3 million already in the country. Numerous studies have shown that subsequently their wages rose significantly. Research on how immigration affects overall wages is inconclusive. George Borjas at Harvard says immigration has created a small net decrease in overall wages for those born in the United States, concentrated among the low-skilled, while Giovani Peri at UC Davis found that immigration boosts native wages over the long run. Hinojosa-Ojeda stresses that any reform needs to make it easier for guest workers to enter the country to avoid a new build-up of illegal workers. "If we don't create a mechanism that can basically bring in 300,000 to 400,000 new workers a year into a variety of labor markets and needs, we could be setting ourselves up for that again," said Hinojosa-Ojeda. Nowrasteh at Cato also believes an expanded guest worker program would stem illegal immigration and allow industries to overcome labor shortages. He found that harsher regulations in recent years in Arizona were adversely affecting agricultural production, increasing financial burdens on business and even negatively impacting the state's struggling real estate market. Some large companies have fallen foul of tougher enforcement regulations. Restaurant chain Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc fired roughly 500 staff in 2010 and 2011 after undocumented workers were found on its payrolls. Putting the chill on other employers, it is now subject of an ongoing federal criminal investigation into its hiring. "The current system doesn't seem to work for anyone," Chipotle spokesman Chris Arnold said.

#### Immigration key to ag

Abou-Diwan 1/28

(Antoine, “Bipartisan immigration proposal acknowledges agriculture's needs” January 28, 2013, Imperial Valley Press)

Bipartisan immigration proposal acknowledges agriculture's needs

The bipartisan proposal unveiled Monday paves the way to legalization of the nation’s 11 million undocumented immigrants with a program described as “tough but fair.”

It also addresses the concerns of the agricultural industry, whose labor pool by some estimates is composed of some 50 to 70 percent unauthorized workers.

“Agricultural workers who commit to the long-term stability of our nation’s agricultural industries will be treated differently than the rest of the undocumented population because of the role they play in ensuring that Americans have safe and secure agricultural products to sell and consume,” states the proposal.

Total farmworkers in Imperial County fluctuated between 8,000 and 11,000 in 2012, according to data from the Employment Development Department.

“There’s definitely recognition that agriculture will be taken care of,” said Steve Scaroni, a Heber farmer who has lobbied Washington extensively on immigration reform.

The proposal is based on four broad principles: a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants living in the United States, reform of the system to capitalize on characteristics that strengthen the economy, the creation of an effective employment verification system and improving the immigration process for future workers.

The principles are broad and many details need to be worked out.

“The principles acknowledge that the situation in agriculture is distinct and requires different treatment,” said Craig Regelbrugge, chairman of the Agricultural Coalition for Immigration Reform, a group that represents the landscape and nursery industry.

Access to a legal and stable work force is vital, Regelbrugge said, as is a workable program that eliminates or reduces hurdles for a future work force.

“We would like to see the agriculture legalization program attractive so there are incentives for them to work in the sector,” Regelbrugge noted.

The proposals also acknowledge that the United States immigration system is broken, and address criticism that not enough is being done to enforce existing immigration laws. To that end, Monday’s proposals are contingent on secure borders.

But, the acknowledgement of the agriculture sector’s needs allows for some optimism.

“As long as the labor supply solutions are there, we can support the enforcement solutions,” Regelbrugge said.

**Extinction**

**Lugar 2k**

(Richard, a US Senator from Indiana, is Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a member and former chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee. “calls for a new green revolution to combat global warming and reduce world instability,” pg online @ <http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html>)

In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclear threats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the long-range challenges. **But we do so at our peril.** One of the most daunting of them is meeting the world’s need for food and energy in this century. At stake is not only preventing starvation and saving the environment, but also world peace and security. History tells us that states may go to war over access to resources, and that poverty and famine have often bred fanaticism and terrorism. Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute to global instability and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. With the world population expected to grow from 6 billion people today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for affordable food will increase well beyond current international production levels. People in rapidly developing nations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric intake. Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for feed grain at the same time that the growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating a solution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developing countries often use limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing populations. As good land disappears, people destroy timber resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves. The long-term environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire globe. Productivity revolution To meet the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the United States will have to grow roughly three times more food on the land we have. That’s a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per hectare – typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an annual average of 25 tonnes per hectare. Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, it’s been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water, improved machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 – on our farm back then, my dad produced 2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar increases. But of course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those results again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet world demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that money toward projects that promise to have significant national and global impact. For the United States, that will mean a major shift in the way we conduct and fund agricultural science. Fundamental research will generate the innovations that will be necessary to feed the world. The United States can take a leading position in a productivity revolution. And our success at increasing food production may **play a decisive** humanitarian **role in the survival of** billions of people and the health of **our planet.**

## at: hennesey

#### PC solves delay

Carrie Dann, Political Reporter, 3/27 [“Obama optimistic on immigration legislation,” NBC News, 2013, http://firstread.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/03/27/17490075-obama-optimistic-on-immigration-legislation?lite]

As a bipartisan group of senators chips away at the remaining obstacles to an immigration deal, President Barack Obama says he is optimistic that – if lawmakers release a draft bill early next month – he will be able to sign comprehensive immigration reform into law before autumn.¶ “If we have a bill introduced at the beginning of next month -- as these senators indicate it will be -- then I'm confident that we can get it done certainly before the end of the summer,” Obama said in an interview with Telemundo on Wednesday.¶ Alfonso Aguilar, the Executive Director for the Latino Partnership for Conservative Principles, Democratic pollster Margie Omero, and Nathan Gonzales, the Deputy Editor of the Rothenberg Political Report and contributing writer for Roll call, join The Daily Rundown to talk about immigration legislation.¶ **The president repeated that he could still introduce a White House-drafted version of the legislation if the “Gang of Eight” Senate group is not able to put forward a bill**. But he said he’s confident that lawmakers will be able to work out the final snags in the negotiations in time to unveil their proposal when they return from a two-week Easter recess next month.¶ Advertise | AdChoices¶ “I'm optimistic,” he said. “ I've always said that if I see a breakdown in the process, that I've got my own legislation. **I'm prepared to step in**. But I don't think that's going to be necessary. I think there's a commitment -- among this group of Democratic and Republican senators to get this done.”¶ The negotiations have been held up in part by continuing disputes between business and labor groups about the conditions of a guest-worker program, particularly the wages and treatment ensured to temporary workers compared to those for American workers pursuing similar jobs.¶ But the president said he doesn’t believe that the dispute could scuttle the whole reform framework.¶ “There are still some areas about … the future flow of guest workers,” he said. “Labor and businesses may not always agree exactly on how to do this. But this is a resolvable issue.”¶ White House Spokesman Josh Earnest expresses optimism over the ongoing negotiations of the Gang of 8 relating to immigration reform.¶ While he expressed optimism that a final bill will contain a path to citizenship for those currently in the country illegally, Obama would not offer specifics on how long the process of obtaining citizenship should take.¶ And he declined to outline how the security of the nation’s border should be assessed, saying only that there should be no border security “trigger” that must be met before undocumented persons are eligible to begin the process of seeking legal status.¶ “We don't want to make this earned pathway to citizenship a situation in which it's put off further and further into the future,” he said. “There needs to be a certain path for how people can get legal in this country, even as we also work on these strong border security issues.”¶ While the White House has deferred to the Senate group on the legislative language, the **president has used the bully pulpit** in recent days to urge lawmakers to action and remind the public of the general framework for reform that he supports – including a path to citizenship.¶ In addition to the Telemundo interview, he also sat down with Spanish-language channel Univision on Wednesday. Earlier this week, the president urged Congress to show “political courage” on the issue during remarks at a naturalization ceremony at the White House.¶ President Barack Obama signs a bill creating the Charles Young Buffalo Soldiers National Monument in Ohio during a ceremony in the Oval Office of the White House March 25, 2013 in Washington, DC.¶ Earlier Wednesday, Republican Sens. John McCain and Jeff Flake of Arizona held a joint press conference with Democrats Chuck Schumer of New York and Michael Bennet of Colorado. The lawmakers traveled to Arizona’s southern border to survey the state of security there, a tour that offered a very real illustration of the illegal immigration issue when they spotted a woman scaling a border fence. (She was later apprehended by border security officers, McCain said.)¶ Advertise | AdChoices¶ At a press conference, Schumer told reporters there that negotiators are “90 percent of the way there” on a compromise bill, adding that the trip offered a glimpse into what further resources are needed to ensure full border security.

#### The group of eight is close to finishing – it’s top of the docket

Julie Pace, Associated Press White House correspondent, 3/26 [“Overhaul immigration laws now, Obama tells Congress,” Boston Globe, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/25/obama-calls-for-speedy-debate-immigration-bill/1iFS3WuovsEw0Vj626WTXK/story.html]

A bipartisan group of eight senators **is close to finishing** draft work on a bill that would dramatically reshape the US immigration and employment landscape, putting 11 million illegal immigrants on a path to citizenship. The measure also would allow tens of thousands of new high- and low-skilled workers into the country.¶ The president applauded the congressional effort so far**, but pressed lawmakers to wrap up their discussions** quickly.¶ ‘‘We’ve got a lot of white papers and studies,’’ Obama said. ‘‘We’ve just got to, at this point, work up the political courage to do what’s required.’’¶ **Immigration** shot to the forefront **of Obama’s domestic agenda following the November election**. Hispanics made up 10 percent of the electorate and overwhelmingly backed Obama, in part because of the tough stance on immigration that Republicans took during the campaign.¶ The election results spurred Republicans to tackle immigration reform for the first time since 2007 in an effort to increase the party’s appeal to Hispanics and keep the GOP competitive in national elections.¶ Obama and the bipartisan Senate group are in agreement on the key principles of a potential immigration bill, including a pathway to citizenship, strengthening the legal immigration system, and cracking down on businesses that employ illegal immigrants.¶ The White House has largely backed the Senate process but says **it has its own immigration bill ready if the debate on Capitol Hill stalls.**

#### He’s pushing from behind the scenes, which solves oppposition

Julie Pace, Associated press white house correspondent, 3/27/13, Obama: Immigration bill could pass by summer, www.timesunion.com/news/politics/article/Obama-back-at-forefront-of-immigration-debate-4389183.php

President Barack Obama pressed for swift action on a sweeping immigration bill Wednesday, saying last-minute obstacles are "resolvable" and predicting Congress could pass historic legislation by the end of the summer. In back-to-back interviews with Spanish-language television networks, Obama repeatedly voiced confidence in a bipartisan Senate group that appears to be on the cusp of unveiling a draft bill. And he said that while he is still prepared to step in with his own bill if talks break down, he doesn't expect that step to be necessary. "If we have a bill introduced at the beginning of next month as these senators indicate it will be, then I'm confident that we can get it done certainly before the end of the summer," Obama told Telemundo. While overhauling the nation's patchwork immigration laws is a top second term priority for the president, he has ceded the negotiations almost entirely to Congress. He and his advisers have calculated that a bill crafted by Capitol Hill stands a better chance of winning Republican support than one overtly influenced by the president. In his interviews Wednesday, Obama tried to stay out of the prickly policy issues that remain unfinished in the Senate talks, though he said a split between business and labor on wages for new low-skilled workers was unlikely to "doom" the legislation. "This is a resolvable issue," he said. The president also spoke Wednesday with Univision. His interviews followed a citizenship ceremony conducted Monday at the White House where he pressed Congress to "finish the job" on immigration, an issue that has vexed Washington for years. The president made little progress in overhauling the nation's fractured immigration laws in his first term, but he redoubled his efforts after winning re-election. The November contest also spurred some Republicans to drop their opposition to immigration reform, given that Hispanics overwhelmingly backed Obama. In an effort to keep Republicans at the negotiation table, Obama has stayed relatively quiet on immigration over the last month. He rolled out his immigration principles during a January rally in Las Vegas and made an impassioned call for overhauling the nation's laws during his early February State of the Union address, then purposely handed off the effort to lawmakers. The president has, however, privately called members of the Senate working group, and the administration is providing technical support to the lawmakers. The Gang of Eight is expected to unveil its draft bill when Congress returns from a two-week recess the week of April 8. Obama and the Senate group are in agreement on some core principles, including a pathway to citizenship for most of the 11 million illegal immigrants already in the country, revamping the legal immigration system and holding businesses to tougher standards on verifying their workers are in the country legally. But they're at odds over key issues. The Senate group wants the citizenship pathway to be contingent on securing the border, something Obama opposes. The president has also sidestepped the contentious guest-worker issue, which contributed to derailing immigration talks in 2007. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO have reached significant agreements on a new visa program that would bring up to 200,000 lower-skilled workers to the country each year. But they reached a stalemate Friday over wages for the workers, with the labor union pushing for higher wages than the chamber has agreed to so far. Since then, talks have resumed and negotiators are "back on the right track," Ana Avendano, a lead AFL-CIO negotiator, said Wednesday. Avendano declined to offer specifics but said the chamber had moved off what she termed its insistence on "poverty-level wages" for the new workers. "We're very hopeful that we're moving," Avendano told reporters after a briefing for congressional staff on temporary-worker programs. While **Obama tries to keep the pressure on lawmakers** this week, four members of the Senate immigration group toured Arizona's border with Mexico to inspect the conditions there. Arizona's Republican Sens. John McCain and Jeff Flake were joined by Democratic Sens. Chuck Schumer of New York and Michael Bennet of Colorado for the border tour.

## at: delamaide

#### Delamaide is about budget fights – those have been sidelined

Roger Runningen, Bloomberg, 3/26/13, Obama Inks 2013 Funding Bill Locking in Cuts He Opposes, www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-26/obama-inks-2013-funding-bill-locking-in-cuts-he-opposes.html

President Barack Obama signed into law a catchall government-funding bill that ends the 2013 budget fight and locks in $85 billion in spending cuts he opposes.

#### Obama backed off budget fights to get immigration through

John Ford, PolicyMic, 3/28/13, Why Obama Signing Sequestration Into Law Was a Strategic Move , www.policymic.com/articles/31012/why-obama-signing-sequestration-into-law-was-a-strategic-move/421387

President Barack Obama finally signed the Sequester into law, locking the infamous spending cuts into place, at least until this September. It is rare for a president to sign into a law a program that he actively opposes – President Obama called them "dumb" – so why did this one allow these cuts with relatively little confrontation?

At the risk of seeming weak, President Obama is engaging in a tactical withdrawal here, not a retreat. The president sees that no more can be done on the budget stalemate at this time; **with public opinion favoring him, and a popular mandate still only four months fresh,** he is better off using his political capital on other reforms.

With over half of his term gone, and a huge laundry list of initiatives still tabled, **every move Obama makes is a** time management puzzle. And with another inevitable fight on the budget scheduled for the summer, it **is time for him to focus on other things for the spring**.

What is next for the president now that the budget is, for the moment, a settled issue? According to the White House, he is going to emphasize projects that do not require budgetary support: a raise to the minimum wage, immigration, and housing, for example.

## at: murray

#### Murray is about one line in a speech Obama gave, he also says in the 2-point font that immigration comes first and is almost at the finish line

Murray 3-28 (Mark, “First Thoughts: Obama jumps back into the gun debate,” NBC News, <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/28/17501341-first-thoughts-obama-jumps-back-into-the-gun-debate?lite>)

*Obama jumps back into the gun debate*: With some GOP senators vowing to filibuster the legislation coming to the floor *next month* and with some analysts saying that reformers have already lost, President Obama today steps back into the gun debate with an event at the White House at 11:40 am ET. Per the White House, Obama will stand with mothers, law-enforcement officials, and Vice President Biden in urging Congress to take action on the upcoming Senate legislation, which includes universal background checks. As we have written before, those checks -- supported overwhelmingly in public opinion polls -- will ultimately define success or failure for gun-control advocates. Democrats, led by Sen. Chuck Schumer, are trying to get Republicans to back some type of compromise on background checks, given that the filibuster threat means 60 votes will be needed to even begin considering the legislation. That’s why Michael Bloomberg’s Mayors Against Illegal Guns is airing TV ads in key states to also apply pressure. Meanwhile, Politico reports that Sen. Chuck Grassley, the top GOP lawmaker on the Senate Judiciary Committee, is drafting his own Republican gun bill (without background checks), which “could further complicate what will already be a *difficult lift* for Democrats and the White House.” \*\*\* Obama, bipartisan group still optimistic on immigration reform: While*Obama uses the bully pulpit today on guns*, yesterday he used it on immigration by granting interviews to the top Spanish-language TV news outlets. “If we have a bill introduced at the beginning of next month -- as these senators indicate it will be -- then I'm confident that we can get it done certainly before the end of the summer,” Obama told Telemundo regarding the Senate bipartisan activity on immigration, per NBC’s Carrie Dann. “I'm optimistic,” he added. “I've always said that if I see a breakdown in the process, that I've got my own legislation. I'm prepared to step in. But I don't think that's going to be necessary. I think there's a commitment among this group of Democratic and Republican senators to get this done.” Speaking of that bipartisan group senators, four of them (Schumer, John McCain, Jeff Flake, and Michael Bennet) held a press conference yesterday in Arizona, where they also expressed optimism. “I’d say we are 90 percent there,” Schumer said, according to Roll Call. “We have a few little problems to work on; we’ve been on the phone all day talking to our other four colleagues who aren’t here. McCain chimed in: “Nobody is going to be totally happy with this legislation -- no one will be because we are having to make compromises, and that’s what makes for good legislation. It’s compromise that brings everybody together.”

## link

#### Their rampton evidence says in the un-underline the GOP is holding out for oil leases, which agrees with our 1nc ev that says they only like production – it also says they don’t solve

Rampton 12 (Roberta, “US Republicans seek drilling boost if oil reserves tapped”, 3/28, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/us-oil-reserves-congress-idUSBRE82R1HI20120328)

(Reuters) - Republicans in the U.S. Congress are proposing measures that would require President Barack Obama to allow more domestic oil production **if he decides to tap emergency oil reserves**. The proposals are unlikely to become law, but they give Republicans another opportunity to slam Obama's energy policy as consumers fret about high gasoline prices leading up to November's presidential election. France is in talks with the United States and Britain on a possible release of strategic oil stocks that could happen "in a matter of weeks," France's energy minister said on Wednesday. The White House said no decisions nor specific proposals had been made. Many Democrats in Congress have said they would support using the SPR to help alleviate surging gasoline prices caused by fears that Western sanctions constricting Iran's oil exports at a time of tight supplies could hurt the economy. In the Democratic-controlled Senate, David Vitter, a Louisiana Republican, has proposed that any sale from the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve should trigger expedited leases for oil shale resources. "Any short-term impact that may come from opening our or any country's SPR would not resolve broader market concerns or energy security concerns here in the U.S.," Vitter said. In the House of Representatives, Republican Cory Gardner on the Energy and Commerce Committee has proposed that **the "quick fix" of drawing down the SPR be paired with a "longer-term approach" of increasing oil** and gas **leases on land** owned by the federal government. The idea was panned as "burdensome" by a senior Energy Department official at a Capitol Hill hearing on Tuesday, who said it would make it harder to quickly respond to supply interruptions. "Draw-downs are already complicated procedures," said Chris Smith, deputy assistant secretary for oil and natural gas. "This bill, if enacted, will make it more difficult for the SPR to achieve its mission to respond promptly to supply interruptions with emergency crude oil," Smith said. But Fred Upton, the committee's chairman, said he hopes the legislation will advance after a two-week break in April. "If we're going to take oil out of the SPR, we're going to make sure there's the offset," Upton said. The Republican-controlled House already has passed a suite of bills that would reduce regulatory hurdles and boost U.S. oil production offshore and in protected areas of Alaska.

#### Finally the release happened so the squo solves the disagreement and their ev is way too old – that’s in the dlougy card

**Dlouhy**, 6/23/**2011** (Jennifer A. – covers energy policy and other issues for the Houston Chronicles, Obama boosts oil supply, feels political heat already, Fuel Fix, p. <http://fuelfix.com/blog/2011/06/23/feds-to-release-30m-barrels-of-oil-from-emergency-stockpile/>)

The Obama administration pitched its decision Thursday to release 30 million barrels of oil from emergency stockpiles as a way to bolster the U.S. economy, soothe consumers’ concerns and make up for a decline in crude supplies from Libya. But Republicans decried the move as purely political and poorly timed, given that gasoline and oil prices are down from peaks a few weeks ago, and some independent analysts argued that whether justified or not, the extra oil in the market won’t have much effect at the pump. The announcement of the sale of oil from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve coincided with a 30 million-barrel release by other International Energy Agency member countries and sent oil prices to a four-month low in trading Thursday. The administration insisted the move was essential to restoring stability to the market and offsetting the loss of 1.5 million barrels of high-quality light, sweet crude oil daily from Libya during the summer driving season. “We are taking this action in response to the ongoing loss of crude oil due to supply disruptions in Libya and other countries and their impact on the global economic recovery,” said Energy Secretary Steven Chu. The U.S. coordinated the action with the International Energy Agency, whose 28 member countries pledged to release a total of 60 million barrels of oil in coming months – half from the U.S., 30 percent from Europe and 20 percent from Asia. IEA Executive Director Nobuo Tanaka said the decision – only the third like it in the agency’s nearly four-decade history – would help ensure “a soft landing for the world economy.” Effects hard to calculate Daniel J. Weiss, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank, said that if stockpiled oil sales do reduce gasoline prices, it “will act like a tax cut for American families.” Weiss estimated that the sale of U.S. stockpiles should generate at least $2.5 billion for the federal treasury, while lowering gasoline prices 25 cents per gallon, based on previous reserve releases. But the short-term and long-term effects on gasoline prices are tough to calculate, said Craig Pirrong, a finance professor and commodities expert at the University of Houston. “Releasing oil from storage increases supply today but decreases potential supply tomorrow,” Pirrong said. There may be “some initial relief, perhaps, but it’s not a long-term palliative.” Former Bush administration energy official Randa Fahmy Hudome also was skeptical that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve sale would lower gasoline prices, because, she said, the market is already well supplied. “The only thing I can assume is that this was done for a political need to satisfy consumers,” she said. “It creates a slippery slope. The SPR is supposed to be used for an emergency situation.” She questioned whether gasoline prices constitute an emergency. “Gas prices are high, yes,” she said, “but they’re not so unbearably high that this is the only thing affecting the economy today.” Stock markets have been down broadly amid poor U.S. job figures, and concerns about softening demand already have sent benchmark crude down from more than $110 a barrel in late April. After Thursday’s SPR announcement, West Texas Intermediate crude for August delivery fell $4.39 to $91.02 in trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Amy Myers Jaffe, a senior fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute of Public Policy, said the release is both politically and economically motivated but is still the right thing to do. “Given the instability in the Middle East it is important to signal that the SPR is on the table and that a supply crisis can be avoided,” Jaffe said. Because Libyan unrest has disrupted deliveries of the light sweet crude preferred by most refiners, a reserve release was the only way to inject that high-quality oil into the market, Jaffe said. The stockpiled oil could be in the hands of refiners in less than two weeks, following an Energy Department auction. The government historically has contacted refiners to gauge interest before a sale, companies said they heard nothing ahead of Thursday’s surprise announcement. Buyers not lined up yet Some of the nation’s biggest refiners, including Shell, Exxon Mobil Corp. and BP – citing competitive concerns – declined to say if they would they would be interested in buying the stockpiled oil. Valero Energy said it was still getting information about the plan. U.S. officials said they had been in talks with IEA countries about releasing reserves for some time. The discussions may have picked up earlier this month when members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries angered Western nations by refusing to boost production. The reserve sell-off now is meant to send a message to the cartel, said U.S. Rep. Gene Green, D-Houston. “The joint move sends a message to OPEC that we will not be held captive by their pricing,” Green said. Even backers uncertain Even some supportive lawmakers questioned the timing of the move, given that oil and gasoline prices have backed off recent highs. Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., noted that “the decision would have been more timely if made when the disruption in Libyan oil supplies first occurred.” Republicans said reducing the stockpiles could weaken U.S. security in case of a natural disaster or other market-disrupting emergency. “Tapping the SPR simply to manipulate oil prices defeats the purpose of the reserve,” said Rep. Pete Olson, R-Sugar Land, adding that it “looks like a politically motivated move to avoid implementing a sound energy policy that will reduce our dependence on Middle East oil.” Republican Sen. John Cornyn of Texas called the SPR release “a public relations strategy.”

#### Tanks the bill

Alex Mooney, CNN White House Producer, 2/6/13, Unions could again be key to immigration reform, www.cnn.com/2013/02/05/politics/immigration-reform-unions

It should come as no surprise that prominent union leaders are among the first group President Barack Obama courts as he seeks support for overhauling immigration policy. It was organized labor that helped **ensure defeat** of a bipartisan effort to reform the nation's immigration laws five years ago. At that time, the AFL-CIO and other prominent union groups came out against the initiative, fearing a proposal for a temporary guest worker program for seasonal workers would weaken union membership and bargaining clout. That led to a handful of liberal-leaning Democrats to vote against the bill, including Sens. Sherrod Brown, Tom Harkin and Debbie Stabenow. Mindful that a potential split in the Democratic coalition this time around could again prove fatal to the passage of an immigration bill, Obama met on Tuesday with more than a dozen labor leaders.

#### PC is key

Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Bloomberg, 3/22/13, Guest-Worker Visas Sticking Point on Immigration Rewrite, www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-22/guest-worker-visas-sticking-point-on-immigration-rewrite.html

With Senate Republicans and Democrats **moving closer to an agreement** to grant a chance at U.S. citizenship to 11 million undocumented immigrants, a long- simmering dispute between organized labor and the business lobby risks sapping the measure’s momentum. The two constituencies are at odds over a new program to provide U.S. work visas to low-skilled foreign workers, placing pressure on lawmakers poised for a compromise. Unions are pressing for a limited visa system that guarantees better wages for future immigrant workers, while businesses seek a broader program more responsive to their hiring needs. It’s the thornier side of what is otherwise a broadening consensus in both parties around an immigration plan, whose centerpiece is a path to U.S. citizenship for undocumented immigrants. A bipartisan group of eight senators is nearing a deal to bolster border security and workplace verification while revamping the legal immigration system. Republican Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, a member of the group, called the guest-worker issue “one of the more difficult parts” of the negotiations. “I’m not going to be part of a bill that doesn’t create a process whereby people can come to this country temporarily in the future if we need them,” Rubio said yesterday. “**There’s no secret that the broader labor movement**, with some exceptions, **would rather not even have an immigration bill.”** Political Consequences The disagreement carries significant political consequences for Republicans and Democrats alike, essentially making them choose between their strongest constituencies -- organized labor for Democrats and big business for Republicans -- and achievement of an overriding policy goal that both parties increasingly see as an electoral imperative. Hispanics accounted for 10 percent of voters in the 2012 presidential election. President Barack Obama won 71 percent of their votes, and just 27 percent backed Republican nominee Mitt Romney, who had proposed “self-deportation” for undocumented immigrants. Since then, a growing chorus of Republicans has publicly backed legal status for undocumented immigrants. Meanwhile, a group of Republican officials who unveiled a top-to-bottom review this week called for the party to back “comprehensive immigration reform” or see its appeal shrink. “It is in neither party’s interest for one group within a party to stop this, because it is bad for the economy if we don’t have immigration reform,” former Mississippi Governor and Republican National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour said this week, referring to labor unions’ objections to a guest-worker program. Worker Program Former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, a Democrat co- chairing an immigration task force with Barbour at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, said it is ultimately up to Obama to persuade Democrats not to abandon the bill if the immigrant-worker program doesn’t match the unions’ agenda. “If we don’t get guest-worker provisions that are exactly in line with what labor wants, we can’t hold up the bill because of that,” Rendell said. “We’ve got to do the best we can to preserve and protect the interests of organized labor, but in the end you can’t always get what you want.” **Obama**, he added, **has “his work cut out for him.”**

## winners win

#### Wins don’t spillover—capital is finite and decreases—prioritizing it is key to 100-day agenda success

David Schultz, professor at Hamline University School of Business, 1/22/13, Obama's dwindling prospects in a second term, www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2013/01/obamas-dwindling-prospects-second-term

Four more years for Obama. Now what? What does Barack Obama do in his second term and what can he accomplish? Simply put, his options are limited and the prospects for major success quite limited.

Presidential power is the power to persuade, as Richard Neustadt famously stated. Many factors determine presidential power and the ability to influence including personality (as James David Barber argued), attitude toward power, margin of victory, public support, support in Congress, and one’s sense of narrative or purpose.

Additionally, presidential power is temporal, often greatest when one is first elected, and it is contextual, affected by competing items on an agenda. All of these factors affect the political power or capital of a president.

Presidential power also is a finite and generally decreasing product. The first hundred days in office – so marked forever by FDR’s first 100 in 1933 – are usually a honeymoon period, during which presidents often get what they want. FDR gets the first New Deal, Ronald Reagan gets Kemp-Roth, George Bush in 2001 gets his tax cuts.

Presidents lose political capital, support

But, over time, presidents lose political capital. Presidents get distracted by world and domestic events, they lose support in Congress or among the American public, or they turn into lame ducks. This is the problem Obama now faces.

Obama had a lot of political capital when sworn in as president in 2009. He won a decisive victory for change with strong approval ratings and had majorities in Congress — with eventually a filibuster margin in the Senate, when Al Franken finally took office in July. Obama used his political capital to secure a stimulus bill and then pass the Affordable Care Act. He eventually got rid of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and secured many other victories. But Obama was a lousy salesman, and he lost what little control of Congress that he had in the 2010 elections.

#### Even if a confrontational strategy is key, that doesn’t mean the plan’s singular win spills-over—it’s more likely to undermine Obama’s careful strategy on that issue

Ryan Lizza, 1/7/13, Will Hagel Spike the G.O.P.’s Fever?, www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/how-much-will-the-nomination-of-chuck-hagel-hurt-obamas-second-term-agenda.html

But Obama’s victory has made almost no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of the members of the G.O.P. who matter most: the House Republicans. The idea that a bloc of conservative, mostly Southern, Republicans would start to coöperate with the President on issues like tax policy and immigration may have rested on a faulty assumption.

The past few weeks of fiscal-cliff drama have taught us that “breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor. There is no one event—even the election of a President—that can change a political party overnight. Congress is a co-equal branch of government, and House Republicans feel that they have as much of a mandate for their policies as Obama does for his. Shouldn’t House Republicans care that their views on Obama’s priorities, like tax cuts for the rich and immigration, helped cost Romney the White House and will make it difficult for their party’s nominee to win in 2016? In the abstract, many do, but that’s not enough to change the voting behavior of the average House Republican, who represents a gerrymandered and very conservative district.

A better metaphor for the coming battles with Congress may be what Woody Hayes, the college-football coach, famously called “three yards and a cloud of dust”: a series of grinding plays where small victories are earned only after lots of intense combat. While the fiscal-cliff showdown demonstrated that there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making in the Senate, passing any Obama priority through the House of Representatives is nearly impossible unless the political pressure is extremely intense.

The fiscal-cliff bill passed the House only when Speaker John Boehner’s members realized that their only alternative was blowing up the settlement negotiated by Joe Biden and Mitch McConnell—and accepting all the blame and consequences.

That episode offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending, immigration, and gun control—three issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. Deals will have to be negotiated in the Senate and gain the imprimatur of some high-profile Republicans. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House.

## pc true

#### Political capital is finite and drives decisionmaking

**Schier 9**, Professor of Poliitcal Science at Carleton, (Steven, "Understanding the Obama Presidency," The Forum: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Berkely Electronic Press, <http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol7/iss1/art10>)

In additional to formal powers, a president’s informal power is situationally derived and highly variable. Informal power is a function of the “political capital” presidents amass and deplete as they operate in office. Paul Light defines several components of political capital: party support of the president in Congress, public approval of the presidential conduct of his job, the President’s electoral margin and patronage appointments (Light 1983, 15). Richard Neustadt’s concept of a president’s “professional reputation” likewise figures into his political capital. Neustadt defines this as the “impressions in the Washington community about the skill and will with which he puts [his formal powers] to use” (Neustadt 1990, 185). In the wake of 9/11, George W. Bush’s political capital surged, and both the public and Washington elites granted him a broad ability to prosecute the war on terror. By the later stages of Bush’s troubled second term, beset by a lengthy and unpopular occupation of Iraq and an aggressive Democratic Congress, he found that his political capital had shrunk. Obama’s informal powers will prove variable, not stable, as is always the case for presidents. Nevertheless, he entered office with a formidable store of political capital. His solid electoral victory means he initially will receive high public support and strong backing from fellow Congressional partisans, a combination that will allow him much leeway in his presidential appointments and with his policy agenda. Obama probably enjoys the prospect of a happier honeymoon during his first year than did George W. Bush, who entered office amidst continuing controversy over the 2000 election outcome. Presidents usually employ power to disrupt the political order they inherit in order to reshape it according to their own agendas. Stephen Skowronek argues that “presidents disrupt systems, reshape political landscapes, and pass to successors leadership challenges that are different from the ones just faced” (Skowronek 1997, 6). Given their limited time in office and the hostile political alignments often present in Washington policymaking networks and among the electorate, presidents must force political change if they are to enact their agendas. In recent decades, Washington power structures have become more entrenched and elaborate (Drucker 1995) while presidential powers – through increased use of executive orders and legislative delegation (Howell 2003) –have also grown. The presidency has more powers in the early 21st century but also faces more entrenched coalitions of interests, lawmakers, and bureaucrats whose agendas often differ from that of the president. This is an invitation for an energetic president – and that seems to describe Barack Obama – to engage in major ongoing battles to impose his preferences.

## impact

#### Reform key to biotech leadership

Schuster 2/17

(Dr. Sheldon – President @ Keck Graduate Institute, “Immigration Reform Could Lead to Great Things, Including Better Science and Better Science Education” 02/17/2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-sheldon-schuster/immigration-reform-could-\_b\_2706832.html)

These students and young researchers not only do amazing things while they're here but their ideas and their drive enhances the quality of education for all of our students and the quality of life for all of our citizens. There can be a multiplying effect to innovation when international knowledge and ideas gain their own traction in homegrown academic institutions and industries. German rocket scientists who came to work in the U.S. in the wake of World War II were not solely responsible for landing Neil Armstrong on the moon. But they were the core from which a great international community of scholars and engineers were able to take NASA to astounding heights. The input of international students teaches all of our students how to integrate ideas that may vary greatly from their own and how to approach problems from a global perspective -- two skills that are required for success in the life science industry and that we need if we are to continue to remain the world leader in the rapidly advancing biotechnologies, such as individualized human genome sequencing. Reforming our immigration system so that more young professionals like these have the option to work in the United States not only boosts the national economy and strengthens the biotech hubs here in Southern California, which are so important to my state's economy, it also improves the quality of U.S. academic institutions, and, ultimately, is likely to hasten the pace of scientific discovery and innovation. It will certainly go a long way toward keeping the U.S. and its academic institutions at the center of such discovery and innovation.

**Breakthroughs in biotechnology key to rapid global expansion of GM agriculture**

**Martino-Catt and Sachs, 8**

[Susan J. Martino-Catt, Monsanto Company Member of Plant Physiology Editorial Board, Eric S. Sachs Monsanto Company Member of ASPB Education Foundation Board of Directors, “ Editor's Choice Series: The Next Generation of Biotech Crops,” Plant Physiology 147:3-5 (2008)]

**Crop genetic modification** using traditional methods **has been essential for improving food quality and abundance**; however, f**armers** globally **are steadily increasing the area planted to crops improved with modern biotechnology**. **Breakthroughs in science and genetics have expanded the toolbox of genes available** for reducing biotic stressors, such as weeds, pests, and disease, which reduce agricultural productivity. Today, plant scientists are leveraging traditional and modern approaches in tandem to increase crop yields, quality, and economic returns, while reducing the environmental consequences associated with the consumption of natural resources, such as water, land, and fertilizer, for agriculture.

**The current need to accelerate agricultural productivity on a global scale has never been greater or more urgent.** At the same time, **the need to implement more sustainable approaches to conserve natural resources and preserve native habitats is also of paramount importance**. **The challenge** for the agricultural sector **is to:** (1) **deliver twice as much food in 2050 as is produced today** (Food and Agricultural Organization of the World Health Organization, 2002Go); (2) **reduce environmental impacts by producing more from each unit of land, water, and energy invested in crop production** (Raven, 2008Go); (3) **adapt cropping systems to climate changes that threaten crop productivity and food security on local and global levels**; and (4) encourage the development of new technologies that deliver economic returns for all farmers, small and large. **These are important and challenging goals, and are much more so when real or perceived risks lead to regulatory and policy actions that may slow the adoption of new technology**. Optimistically, **the adoption of rational approaches for introducing new agricultural and food technologies should lead to more widespread use that in turn will help address the agricultural challenges and also increase the acceptance of modern agricultural biotechnology** (Raven, 2008Go).

In the 12 years since commercialization of the first genetically modified (GM) crop in 1996, farmers have planted more than 690 million hectares (1.7 billion acres; James, 2007Go) without a single confirmed incidence of health or environmental harm (Food and Agricultural Organization of the World Health Organization, 2004Go; National Academy of Sciences, 2004Go). In the latest International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications report, planting of biotech crops in 2007 reached a new record of 114.3 million hectares (282.4 million acres) planted in 23 countries, representing a 12.3% increase in acreage from the previous year (James, 2007Go). Farmer benefits associated with planting of GM crops include reduced use of pesticides and insecticides (Brookes and Barfoot, 2007Go), increased safety for nontarget species (Marvier et al., 2007Go; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007Go), increased adoption of reduced/conservation tillage and soil conservation practices (Fawcett and Towry, 2002Go), reduced greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural practices (Brookes and Barfoot, 2007Go), as well as increased yields (Brookes and Barfoot, 2007Go).

**The first generation of biotech crops focused primarily on the single gene traits of herbicide tolerance and insect resistance**. These traits were accomplished by the expression of a given bacterial gene in the crops. In the case of herbicide tolerance, expression of a glyphosate-resistant form of the gene CP4 EPSPS resulted in plants being tolerant to glyphosate (Padgette et al., 1995Go). Similarly, expression of an insecticidal protein from Bacillus thuringiensis in plants resulted in protection of the plants from damage due to insect feeding (Perlak et al., 1991Go). Both of these early biotech products had well-defined mechanisms of action that led to the desired phenotypes. Additional products soon came to market that coupled both herbicide tolerance and insect resistance in the same plants. As farmers adopt new products to maximize productivity and profitability on the farm, they are increasingly planting crops with "stacked traits" for management of insects and weeds and "pyramided traits" for management of insect resistance. The actual growth in combined trait products was 22% between 2006 and 2007, which is nearly twice the growth rate of overall planting of GM crops (James, 2007Go).

**The next generation of biotech crops promises to include a broad range of products that will provide benefits to both farmers and consumers,** **and continue to meet the global agricultural challenges.** These products will most likely involve regulation of key endogenous plant pathways resulting in improved quantitative traits, such as yield, nitrogen use efficiency, and abiotic stress tolerance (e.g. drought, cold). These quantitative traits are known to typically be multigenic in nature, adding a new level of complexity in describing the mechanisms of action that underlie these phenotypes**. In addition to these types of traits, the first traits aimed at consumer benefits, such as healthier oils and enhanced nutritional content, will also be developed for commercialization**.

As with the first generation, successful delivery of the next generation of biotech crops to market will depend on establishing their food, feed, and environmental safety. Scientific and regulatory authorities have acknowledged the potential risks associated with genetic modification of all kinds, including traditional cross-breeding, biotechnology, chemical mutagenesis, and seed radiation, yet have established a safety assessment framework only for biotechnology-derived crops designed to identify any potential food, feed, and environmental safety risks prior to commercial use. Importantly, it has been concluded that **crops developed through modern biotechnology do not pose significant risks over and above those associated with conventional plant breeding** (National Academy of Sciences, 2004Go). The European Commission (2001)Go acknowledged that **the greater regulatory scrutiny given to biotech crops and foods probably make them even safer than conventional plants and foods**. The current comparative safety assessment process has been repeatedly endorsed as providing assurance of safety and nutritional quality by identifying similarities and differences between the new food or feed crop and a conventional counterpart with a history of safe use (Food and Drug Administration, 1992Go; Food and Agricultural Organization of the World Health Organization, 2002Go; Codex Alimentarius, 2003Go; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003Go; European Food Safety Authority, 2004Go; International Life Sciences Institute, 2004Go). Any differences are subjected to an extensive evaluation to determine whether there are any associated health or environmental risks, and, if so, whether the identified risks can be mitigated though preventative management.

**Biotech crops undergo detaile**d phenotypic, agronomic, morphological, and compositional **analyses to identify potential harmful effects that could affect product safety.** This process is a rigorous and robust assessment that is applicable to the next generation of biotech crops that potentially could include genetic changes that modulate the expression of one gene, several genes, or entire pathways. The safety assessment will characterize the nature of the inserted molecules, as well as their function and effect within the plant and the overall safety of the resulting crop. **This well-established and proven process will provide assurance of the safety of the next generation of biotech crops and help to reinforce rational approaches that enable the development and commercial use of new products that are critical to meeting agriculture's challenges.**

**Only way to Solve Extinction**

**Trewavas 2k** (Anthony, Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology – University of Edinburgh, “GM Is the Best Option We Have”, AgBioWorld, 6-5, <http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html>)

There are some Western critics who oppose any solution to world problems involving technological progress. They denigrate this remarkable achievement. These luddite individuals found in some Aid organisations instead attempt to impose their primitivist western views on those countries where blindness and child death are common. This new form of Western cultural domination or neo-colonialism, because such it is, should be repelled by all those of good will. Those who stand to benefit in the third world will then be enabled to make their own choice freely about what they want for their own children. But these are foreign examples; **global warming is the problem that requires the** UK to **develop GM technology**. 1998 was the warmest year in the last one thousand years. Many think global warming will simply lead to a wetter climate and be benign. I do not. Excess rainfall in northern seas has been predicted to halt the Gulf Stream. In this situation, average UK temperatures would fall by 5 degrees centigrade and give us Moscow-like winters. **There are already worrying signs of salinity changes in the deep oceans. Agriculture would be seriously damaged and necessitate the rapid development of new crop varieties to secure our food supply. We would not have much warning.** Recent detailed analyses of arctic ice cores has shown that the climate can switch between stable states in fractions of a decade. **Even if the climate is only wetter and warmer new crop pests and rampant disease will be the consequence. GM technology can enable new crops to be constructed in months and to be in the fields within a few years. This is the unique benefit GM offers**. The UK populace needs to much more positive about GM or we may pay a very heavy price. In 535A.D. **a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs**. **The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops** here and elsewhere **in the Northern hemisphere failed completely.** **The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals**. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But **the planet recovered**. **Such examples of benign nature's wisdom**, in full flood as it were**, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment**. **There are** apparently **100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great.** And **even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply**. Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would destroy much of our civilisation. **Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival.** **Colliding asteroids are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that technological advance may be the only buffer between us and annihilation**. When people say to me they do not need GM, I am astonished at their prescience, their ability to read a benign future in a crystal ball that I cannot. Now is the time to experiment; not when a holocaust is upon us and it is too late. **GM is a technology whose time has come and just in the nick of time.** **With each billion that mankind has added to the planet have come technological advances to increase food supply**. In the 18th century, the start of agricultural mechanisation; in the 19th century knowledge of crop mineral requirements, the eventual Haber Bosch process for nitrogen reduction. In the 20th century plant genetics and breeding, and later the green revolution. Each time population growth has been sustained without enormous loss of life through starvation even though crisis often beckoned. For the 21st century, **genetic manipulation is our primary hope to maintain developing and complex technological civilisations**. **When the climate is changing in unpredictable ways, diversity in agricultural technology is a strength and a necessity not a luxury**. Diversity helps secure our food supply. We have heard much of the precautionary principle in recent years; my version of it is "be prepared".