# 1NC

## 1

**In means within**

Encarta 7

(<http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861620513>)

in [ [in](http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/Pronounce.aspx?search=in) ] CORE MEANING: a grammatical word indicating that something or somebody is within or inside something. 1. preposition indicates place: indicates that something happens or is situated somewhere He spent a whole year in Russia. 2. preposition indicates state: indicates a state or condition that something or somebody is experiencing The banking industry is in a state of flux. 3. preposition after: after a period of time that will pass before something happens She should be well enough to leave in a week or two. 4. preposition during: indicates that something happens during a period of time He crossed the desert in 39 days. 5. preposition indicates how something is expressed: indicates the means of communication used to express something I managed to write the whole speech in French. 6. preposition indicates subject area: indicates a subject or field of activity She graduated with a degree in biology. 7. preposition as consequence of: while doing something or as a consequence of something In reaching for a glass he knocked over the ashtray. 8. preposition covered by: indicates that something is wrapped or covered by something The floor was covered in balloons and toys. 9. preposition indicates how somebody is dressed: indicates that somebody is dressed in a particular way She was dressed in a beautiful suit. 10. preposition pregnant with: pregnant with offspring The cows were in calf. 11. adjective fashionable: fashionable or popular always knew which clubs were in 12. adjective holding power or office: indicates that a party or group has achieved or will achieve power or authority voted in overwhelmingly

DOE definitions requires that energy projects must operate in the 50 state states and territories to be considered in the US

Kovacs 7

(William, vice president for Environmental, Technology & Regulatory Affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments on Proposed Rule on Loan Guarantees for Projects that Employ Innovative Technologies, 6/29, http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/nopr-comments/comment16.pdf)

DOE defines “United States” as follows:3

United States means the several states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa or any territory or possession of the United States of America.

DOE further states that:4

[loan guarantee] Applications will be denied if: (1) The project will be built or operated outside the United States…

Many planned off-shore renewable energy projects are designed to derive energy from wind as well as the tides, waves, currents, thermal differences and other properties of ocean waters. However, it is unclear to what extent the definition of “United States” as, included in DOE’s proposed rule, would exclude the loan guarantee eligibility of such contemplated projects. This is because, owing to the definition of “United States” it is unclear whether such projects would be considered as “built or operated outside the United States”. To address this concern, DOE should modify the proposed rule to state that in addition to the definition provided, the term “United States” includes: all ocean waters (and airspace above them) of the Atlantic Ocean (including the Gulf of Mexico) and the Pacific Ocean within the jurisdiction of the United States from which energy may be derived through application of winds, solar energy collection, tides, waves, currents, thermal differences, or other means to produce renewable or low carbon energy.

There is precedent for using such a definition of ocean waters as they relate to the United States: **DOE has used a similar definition in its** Final **Rule on** Renewable Energy Production Incentives.5

Vote negative---all of the energy production for the aff occurs outside the US---this explodes the topic because it makes all battlefield energy shifts topical, allows demos in foreign countries and drives the topic toward affs that make very little dent on the domestic energy make-up. Most limiting interpretation is best because it drive in-depth research.

## 2

Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

 "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

The plan changes how energy is produced, rather than restricting how much is produced

This conflation ruins the topic:

1. Including regulations is a limits disaster

Doub 76

 Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy

Annual Review of Energy

Vol. 1: 715-725 (Volume publication date November 1976)

DOI: 10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, 1757 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20036

http://0-www.annualreviews.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

 Mr. Doub is a principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing, which he formed in 1977. Previously he was a partner in the law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1971 - 1974. He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission in 1968 - 1971 and was appointed by the President of the United States to the President's Air Quality Advisory Board in 1970. He is a member of the American Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and Federal Bar Association. He is immediate past Chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference and a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum. He currently serves as a member of the nuclear export policy committees of both the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Energy Council. Mr. Doub graduated from Washington and Jefferson College (B.A., 1953) and the University of Maryland School of Law in 1956. He is married, has two children, and resides in Potomac, Md. He was born September 3, 1931, in Cumberland, Md.

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy selfsufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, the President directed that "a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government." An interagency task force was formed to study this question. With 19 different federal departments and agencies contributing, the task force spent seven months deciphering the present organizational makeup of the federal energy regulatory system, studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. More than 40 agencies were found to be involved with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, most of the 40 could significantly affect the availability and/or cost of energy. For example, in the field of gas transmission, there are five federal agencies that must act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which reportedly must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies. Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

2. Precision: Only direct prohibition is a restriction – key to predictability

Sinha 6

<http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/>

 Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries on 7 November, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 4695 of 2006 PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors. RESPONDENT: M/s. Asian Food Industries DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17008 of 2006] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17558 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J :

 We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus:

"It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

## 3

#### Offshore drilling sacrifices the oceans on the altar of free market economics

Martens ’11 (Emily, Masters’ Thesis paper at the University of Miami for a Master’s Degree in Geography and Regional Studies, overseen by Mazen Labban, Ph.D. and professor of Geography, Terri A. Scandura, Ph.D, Dean of the Graduate School, Jan Nijman, Ph.D. Professor of Geography, and Anna Zalik, Ph.D.,Professor of Environmental Sciences, York University, Toronto, “THE DISCOURSES OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE DEBATE OVER OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING POLICY IN FLORIDA,” http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa\_theses, AM)

The fusion of energy security and environmental protection concerns has since the energy and environmental crises of the 1970s forged a policy aimed at creating environmentally safe extraction and production processes. The emphasis on cheap energy resources, however, has come into contradiction with requirements of costly regulation and oversight practices that are thought to better ensure environmental security. The attempt to reconcile offshore drilling with concerns about environmental protection during the Nixon and Carter years was torn asunder by the hostility to regulation during the Reagan and Clinton years. As a result, a heated debate developed between proponents of offshore oil drilling who argue that (unregulated) offshore oil drilling — and expanded domestic oil production in general — ensures energy security by making the United States energy independent and opponents of offshore oil drilling who do not contest the goal of energy independence but who argue that this should not be at the expense of the protection of marine ecosystems and coastal economies from the destructive effects of offshore drilling, regulated or not. The debate, in other words, developed into a debate between a dominant discourse of energy security and a counter discourse of environmental security — at the core of it were questions of regulation as well as competing commercial interests. Though there are various actors and interests within each of these discourses, the primary tension between proponents and opponents of offshore oil drilling tends to reproduce the tensions embodied in the larger discourses of energy security and environmental security at different geographical scales. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the credence given to either one of these two security discourses at any given time is the result of broader socio-political forces and the changing ideologies within which they operate. Underlying both seemingly opposed discourses, however, is a common logic that informs the path they take and the language they use to establish legitimacy — the logic of the commodity — an abstract representation of space that supports this logic. This space, as Lefebvre (2007: 53) points out, “includes the ‘world of commodities’, its ‘logic’ and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and that of the political state”. As will be shown in the following chapters, each of these competing discourses has organized its arguments around the logics of capitalism to gain public support and federal and local state protections. This is not an arbitrary association but rather the result of specific political developments in the US that have shaped environmental concerns, and the environment, according to free market principles. Prior to the injection of neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization into the environment and discourses on the environment under the Reagan Administration, the Nixon and Carter Administrations were caught between an environmental movement, which attempted to create a new perspective from which human activity could be viewed in light of its often negative impacts on the environment – especially offshore oil drilling as a result of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill – and the volatility of the international oil market which threatened oil imports. The Nixon and Carter strategies attempted to balance the two agendas through the expansion of domestic oil production in tandem with regulations and oversight that would monitor the offshore oil industry’s compliance with environmental standards. This was thought and presented as a temporary measure. Ultimately the aim was to create alternative fuels in the not too distant future to replace oil, in light of evidence and concern that both the production and consumption of oil were proving to be detrimental to the environment which humans depended on for their own survival. Neoliberal restructuring under the Reagan Administration, however, promoted a market-based discourse of energy security above, or more precisely against the discourse of environmental security, advocating reduction of state oversights and reliance on market signals instead as the more efficient means to regulate offshore drilling. Environmental security, in the form of government oversight, became a threat to the accumulation of wealth — a source of insecurity. Instead, environmental security could be entrusted to the multiple interests operating in the free market. The argument rested on the neoliberal mantra that the government was not as efficient as private owners and the market in managing and protecting the environment. As a result, offshore oil drilling activity has since enjoyed lax regulatory oversight, while day-to-day oil pollution continues to disrupt various ecological and economic activities that share ocean space.

#### The system’s unsustainable – debt, offshoring, financialization, eco – only shift from EMPIRE to MULTITUDES averts extinction

Shor 10

<http://www.stateofnature.org/locatingTheContemporary.html>

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Attributing the debilitation of the U.S. economy to a mortgage crisis or the collapse of the housing market misses the truly epochal crisis in the world economy and, indeed, in capitalism itself. As economist Michael Hudson contends, "the financial 'wealth creation' game is over. Economies emerged from World War II relatively free of debt, but the 60-year global run-up has run its course. Financial capitalism is in a state of collapse, and marginal palliatives cannot revive it." According to Hudson, among those palliatives is an ironic variant of the IMF strategies imposed on developing nations. "The new twist is a variant on the IMF 'stabilization' plans that lend money to central banks to support their currencies - for long enough to enable local oligarchs and foreign investors to move their savings and investments offshore at a good exchange rate." The continuity between these IMF plans and even the Obama administration's fealty to Wall Street can be seen in the person of Lawrence Summers, now the chief economic advisor to Obama. As further noted by Hudson, "the Obama bank bailout is arranged much like an IMF loan to support the exchange rate of foreign currency, but with the Treasury supporting financial asset prices for U.S. banks and other financial institutions ... Private-sector debt will be moved onto the U.S. Government balance sheet, where "taxpayers" will bear losses." [4] So, here we have another variation of the working poor getting sapped by the economic elite! In fact, one estimate of U.S. federal government support to the elite financial institutions is in the range of $10 trillion dollars, a heist of unimaginable proportions. [5] Given the massive indebtedness of the United States, its reliance of foreign support of that debt by countries like China, which has close to $2 trillion tied up in treasury bills and other investments, a long-term crisis of profitability, overproduction, and offshoring of essential manufacturing, it does not appear that the United States and, perhaps, even the capitalist system can avoid collapse. Certainly, there are Marxist economists and world-systems analysts who are convinced that the collapse is inevitable, albeit it may take several generations to complete. The question becomes whether a dying system can be resuscitated or, if something else can be put in its place. One of the most prominent world systems scholars, Immanuel Wallerstein, puts the long-term crisis of capitalism and the alternatives in the following perspective: Because the system we have known for 500 years is no longer able to guarantee long-term prospects of capital accumulation, we have entered a period of world chaos. Wild (and largely uncontrollable) swings in the economic, political, and military situations are leading to a systemic bifurcation, that is, to a world collective choice about the kind of new system the world will construct over the next fifty years. The new system will not be a capitalist system, but it could be one of two kinds: a different system that is equally or more hierarchical and inequalitarian, or one that is substantially democratic and equalitarian. [6] What Wallerstein overlooks is the possibility that a global crisis of capitalism with its continuous overexploitation and maldistribution of essential resources, such as water, could lead to a planetary catastrophe. [7] While Wallerstein and many of the Marxist critics of capitalism correctly identify the long-term structural crisis of capitalism and offer important insights into the need for more democratic and equalitarian systems, they often fail to realize other critical predicaments that have plagued human societies in the past and persist in even more life-threatening ways today. Among those predicaments are the power trips of civilization and environmental destructiveness. Such power trips can be seen through the sedimentation of power-over in the reign of patriarchal systems and an evolutionary selection for that power-over which contaminates society and social relationships. Certainly, many of those predicaments can also be attributed to a 5000 year history of the intersection of empire and civilization. Anthropologist Kajsa Ekholm Friedman analyzes that intersection and its impact in the Bronze Age as an "imperialist project..., dependent upon trade and ultimately upon war." [8] However, over the long rule of empire and especially within the last 500 years of the global aspirations of various empires, "no state or empire," observes historian Eric Hobsbawm, "has been large, rich, or powerful enough to maintain hegemony over the political world, let alone to establish political and military supremacy over the globe." [9] While war and trade still remain key components of the imperial project today and pretensions for global supremacy persist in the United States, what is just as threatening to the world as we know it is the overexploitation and abuse of environmental resources. Jared Diamond brilliantly reveals how habituated attitudes and values precluded the necessary recognition of environmental degradation which, in turn, led to the collapse of vastly different civilizations, societies, and cultures throughout recorded history. [10] He identifies twelve contemporary environmental challenges which pose grave dangers to the planet and its inhabitants. Among these are the destruction of natural habitats (rainforests, wetlands, etc.); species extinction; soil erosion; depletion of fossil fuels and underground water aquifers; toxic pollution; and climate change, especially attributable to the use of fossil fuels. [11] U.S. economic imperialism has played a direct role in environmental degradation, whether in McDonald's resource destruction of rainforests in Latin America, Coca-Cola's exploitation of underground water aquifers in India, or Union Carbide's toxic pollution in India. Beyond the links between empire and environmental destruction, unless we also clearly understand and combat the connections between empire and unending growth with its attendant "accumulation by dispossession", we may very well doom ourselves to extinction. According to James Gustave Speth, Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, the macro obsession with growth is also intimately related to our micro habituated ways of living. "Parallel to transcending our growth fetish," Speth argues, "we must move beyond our consumerism and hyperventilating lifestyles ... This reluctance to challenge consumption has been a big mistake, given the mounting environmental and social costs of American "affluenza," extravagance and wastefulness." [12] Of course, there are significant class and ethnic/racial differences in consumerism and lifestyle in the United States. However, even more vast differences and inequities obtain between the U.S. and the developing world. It is those inequities that lead Eduardo Galeano to conclude that "consumer society is a booby trap. Those at the controls feign ignorance, but anybody with eyes in his head can see that the great majority of people necessarily must consume not much, very little, or nothing at all in order to save the bit of nature we have left." [13] Finally, from Vandana Shiva's perspective, "unless worldviews and lifestyles are restructured ecologically, peace and justice will continue to be violated and, ultimately, the very survival of humanity will be threatened." [14] For Shiva and other global agents of resistance, the ecological and peace and justice imperatives require us to act in the here and now. Her vision of "Earth Democracy" with its emphasis on balancing authentic needs with a local ecology provides an essential guidepost to what we all can do to stop the ravaging of the environment and to salvage the planet. As she insists, "Earth Democracy is not just about the next protest or next World Social Forum; it is about what we do in between. It addresses the global in our everyday lives, our everyday realities, and creates change globally by making change locally." [15] The local, national, and transnational struggles and visions of change are further evidence that the imperial project is not only being contested but also being transformed on a daily basis. According to Mark Engler, "The powerful will abandon their strategies of control only when it grows too costly for them to do otherwise. It is the concerted efforts of people coming together in local communities and in movements spanning borders that will raise the costs. Empire becomes unsustainable ... when the people of the world resist." [16] Whether in the rural villages of Brazil or India, the jungles of Mexico or Ecuador, the city squares of Cochabama or Genoa, the streets of Seattle or Soweto, there has been, and continues to be, resistance around the globe to the imperial project. If the ruling elite and many of the citizens of the United States have not yet accepted the fact that the empire is dying and with it the concentric circles of economic, political, environmental, and civilizational crises, the global multitudes have been busy at work, digging its future grave and planting the seeds for another possible world. [17]

#### Reject the aff’s neoliberal ideology

#### Energy debates should focus on CRITIQUE of broad structures INSTEAD of producitivist fixes. Our ROLE OF THE BALLOT is best EVEN IF they win some truth claims – we must SHIFT THE FRAME

Zehner 12

Green illusions,

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Since this book represents a critique of alternative energy, it may seem an unlikely manual for alternative-energy proponents. But it is. Building alternative-energy infrastructure atop America's present economic, social, and cultural landscape is akin to building a sandcastle in a rising tide. A taller sand castle won't help. The first steps in this book sketch a partial blueprint for making alternative-energy technologies relevant into the future. Technological development alone will do little to bring about a durable alternative-energy future. Reimagining the social conditions of energy use will. Ultimately, we have to ask ourselves if environmentalists should be involved in the business of energy production (of any sort) while so many more important issues remain vastly underserved. Over the next several decades, it's quite likely that our power production cocktail will look very much like the mix of today, save for a few adjustments in market share. Wind and biofuel generation will become more prevalent and the stage is set for nuclear power as well, despite recent catastrophes. Nevertheless, these changes will occur over time—they will seem slow. Every power production mechanism has side effects and limitations of its own, and a global shift to new forms of power production simply means that humanity will have to deal with new side effects and limitations in the future. This simple observation seems to have gotten lost in the cheerleading for alternative-energy technologies. The mainstream environmental movement should throw down the green energy pom-poms and pull out the bifocals. It is entirely reasonable for environmentalists to criticize fossil-fuel industries for the harms they instigate. It is, however, entirely unreasonable for environmentalists to become spokespeople for the next round of ecological disaster machines such as solar cells, ethanol, and battery-powered vehicles. Environmentalists pack the largest punch when they instead act as power production watchdogs (regardless of the production method); past environmentalist pressures have cleaned the air and made previously polluted waterways swimmable. This watchdog role will be vital in the future as biofuels, nuclear plants, alternative fossil fuels, solar cells, and other energy technologies import new harms and risks. Beyond a watchdog role, environmentalists yield the greatest progress when addressing our social fundamentals, whether by supporting human rights, cleaning up elections, imagining new economic structures, strengthening communities, revitalizing democracy, or imagining more prosperous modes of consumption. Unsustainable energy use is a symptom of suboptimal social conditions. Energy use will come down when we improve these conditions: consumption patterns that lead to debt and depression; commercials aimed at children; lonely seniors stuck in their homes because they can no longer drive; kids left to fend for themselves when it comes to mobility or sexuality; corporate influence trumping citizen representation; measurements of the nation's health in dollars rather than well-being; a media concerned with advertising over insight, and so on. These may not seem like environmental issues, and they certainly don't seem like energy policy issues, but in reality they are the most important energy and environmental issues of our day. Addressing them won't require sacrifice or social engineering. They are congruent with the interests of many Americans, which will make them easier to initiate and fulfill. They are entirely realistic (as many are already enjoyed by other societies on the planet). They are, in a sense, boring. In fact, the only thing shocking about them is the degree to which they have been underappreciated in contemporary environmental thought, sidelined in the media, and ignored by politicians. Even though these first steps don't represent a grand solution, they are necessary preconditions if we intend to democratically design and implement more comprehensive solutions in the future. Ultimately, clean energy is less energy. Alternative-energy alchemy has so greatly consumed the public imagination over recent decades that the most vital and durable environmental essentials remain overlooked and underfunded. Today energy executives hiss silver-tongued fairy tales about clean-coal technologies, safe nuclear reactors, and renewable sources such as solar, wind, and biofuels to quench growing energy demands, fostering the illusion that we can maintain our expanding patterns of energy consumption without consequence. At the same time, they claim that these technologies can be made environmentally, socially, and politically sound while ignoring a history that has repeatedly shown otherwise. If we give in to accepting their conceptual frames, such as those pitting production versus production, or if we parrot their terms such as clean coal, bridge fuels, peacetime atom, smart growth, and clean energy, then we have already lost. We forfeit our right to critical democratic engagement and instead allow the powers that be to regurgitate their own terms of debate into our open upstretched mouths. Alternative-energy technologies don't clean the air. They don't clean the water. They don't protect wildlife. They don't support human rights. They don't improve neighborhoods. They don't strengthen democracy. They don't regulate themselves. They don't lower atmospheric carbon dioxide. They don't reduce consumption. They produce power. That power can lead to durable benefits, but only given the appropriate context. Ultimately, it's not a question of whether American society possesses the technological prowess to construct an alternative-energy nation. The real question is the reverse. Do we have a society capable of being powered by alternative energy? The answer today is clearly no. But we can change that. Future environmentalists will drop solar, wind, biofuels, nuclear, hydrogen, and hybrids to focus instead on women's rights, consumer culture, walkable neighborhoods, military spending, zoning, health care, wealth disparities, citizen governance, economic reform, and democratic institutions. As environmentalists and global citizens, it's not enough to say that we would benefit by shifting our focus. Our very relevance depends on it.

## 4

#### The United States Federal Government should establish that the penalty for violating restrictions on crude oil extraction from the Alaskan Outer Continental Shelf is entry into a Supplemental Environmental Project.

#### Implementation of the Supplemental Environmental Program should nullify additional legal penalties from the violating action, and any conflicting federal laws and regulations should be modified to provide a narrow exemption for the above penalty.

#### Penalties determine regulatory compliance—restrictions are irrelevant if penalties are marginal

Center for Progressive Regulation, 2008, Environmental Enforcement, progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/environEnforce.html

Effective enforcement is key to ensuring that the ambitious goals of our environmental statutes are realized. Enforcement refers to the set of actions that the government can take to promote compliance with environmental law. . Currently, rates of noncompliance with environmental laws remain disturbingly high; experts believe that as many as twenty to forty percent of firms regulated by federal environmental statutes regularly violate the law. Tens of millions of citizens live in areas out of compliance with the health based standards of the Clean Air Act, and close to half of the water bodies in the country fail to meet water quality standards set by the Clean Water Act. In communities burdened by multiple sources of pollution, noncompliance has particularly serious health consequences for affected residents.

As in virtually every other area of government regulation, environmental enforcement traditionally has been based on the theory of deterrence. This theory assumes that persons and businesses act rationally to maximize profits, and will comply with the law where the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance. The job of enforcement agencies is to make both penalties and the probability of detection high enough that it becomes irrational– unprofitable-- for regulated firms to violate the law.

EPA’s enforcement policies traditionally have reflected these principles. EPA has emphasized the importance of regular inspections and monitoring activity to detect noncompliance, and has responded to violations with swift and appropriate sanctions. EPA’s policies also mandate that the agency recover the economic benefit firms realize through noncompliance, since if a firm is able to profit from illegal activity, it has little incentive to comply in the first place.

#### The CP’s SEP penalty is just that—it causes the same industry response as the aff, without lifting the restriction

David Dana, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 1998, ARTICLE: THE UNCERTAIN MERITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT REFORM: THE CASE OF SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1181, Lexis

The previous analysis illustrates that the inclusion of SEPs in an enforcement regime may lead to negotiated settlements that cost violators substantially less than the standard monetary penalty. The particular implications of this insight for a deterrence analysis depend on whether the standard monetary penalty represents "an optimal penalty" or instead a sub- or super-optimal penalty. As a preliminary matter, a brief discussion of the concept of optimal penalty (PEN<opt>) thus may be in order. Economists typically regard the goal of an enforcement regime as the achievement of "optimal deterrence." The phrase optimal deterrence, of course, implies that absolute or complete deterrence of regulatory violations should not be the goal of an enforcement regime. Rather, the regime should act to prevent violations which will generate social costs in excess of social benefits. Conversely, of course, the regime should not discourage violations that produce net social benefits. In settings involving perfect detection and prosecution of regulatory violations by government agencies, a penalty equalling the social harm of a violation will produce optimal deterrence. Where detection and prosecution are imperfect, a penalty equalling the harm of a violation will result in underdeterrence because potential violators will discount the nominal penalty to take account of the probability that they will evade detection and/or prosecution. To achieve optimal deterrence, therefore, [\*1206] nominal penalties must equal the social harm divided by the probability of detection and prosecution. The standard monetary penalty for any particular regulatory violation - the penalty that would be imposed in the absence of any SEP settlement options - logically can have only one of three relations to the optimal penalty: The standard monetary penalty can be less than the optimal penalty, equal to the optimal penalty, or greater than the optimal penalty. In all three of these cases, the introduction of SEP settlement options into an enforcement regime is troublesome from an optimal deterrence perspective. Each case will be taken in turn. 1. pen[in'mon.std'] < pen<opt> Where the standard monetary penalty is less than the optimal penalty, regulators' exclusive reliance on monetary penalties will produce underdeterrence. n77 That is, some violations will occur even though the social costs of the violations exceed the social benefits. The introduction of SEPs into such regimes will only make matters worse: SEPs will lower regulated entities' expected penalties for regulatory violations n78 and [\*1207] hence produce more underdeterrence and more socially costly violations. For example, imagine that the harm from a particular regulatory violation has a dollar equivalent value of $ 400, and the perceived probability of detection is 0.1. The optimal penalty thus would be $ 400/0.1 or $ 4000. Assume, however, that the standard monetary penalty is only $ 3000 and regulated entities' expected penalty for violating the regulation is thus only $ 300. Profit-maximizing regulated entities will take the risk of violating the regulation if they expect to gain more than $ 300 by doing so. Now assume that a regulatory agency adds SEP settlements to the enforcement regime. The regulated entity in question now believes that there is a fifty percent probability that it could successfully negotiate a SEP in the event government regulators detect its regulatory noncompliance. n79 Assume also that the regulated entity estimates that the SEP discount or savings off the standard monetary penalty would be thirty-three percent, so that the expected cost of a SEP would be $ 2000. The total expected penalty thus would be 0.1[(0.5)($ 3000) + (0.5)(0.66)($ 3000)], or approximately $ 250. This reduction in the expected penalty from $ 300 to $ 250 could translate into real differences in regulated entities' behavior. Under the pre-SEP regime, regulated entities at least would avoid socially undesirable violations offering them less than $ 300 in savings. The addition of SEPs to the regime eliminates deterrence for violations offering between $ 250 and $ 300 in savings. 2. pen[in'mon.std'] = pen<opt> Where the standard monetary penalty equals the optimal penalty, the enforcement regime will achieve optimal deterrence. Regulated entities will be deterred from committing all of the potential violations that result in greater social loss than social gain, but they will not be deterred from [\*1208] committing any potential violations that are, on net, socially beneficial. The introduction of SEPs into the penalty regime will lower expected penalties and thus produce a shift from this state of optimal deterrence to one of underdeterrence.

#### Independently, establishing SEP penalties solves inevitable environmental crisis

Jeff Ganguly, Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Fall 1998, COMMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION THROUGH SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS AND CREATIVE NEGOTIATION: RENEWED COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 189, Lexis

Such a dynamic has been developing through EPA's employment of SEPs as well. While oversight is critical to ensure the SEP program continues to attain breakthrough achievements in creative and effective settlement agreements, the unique ability of SEPs to respond to the individual circumstances of environmental problems must be maintained. Thus, while litigation remains an effective tool to apply pressure and force action in some cases, dispute resolution and creative settlements should become the goal in the new generation of environmental enforcement. The use of SEPs is only one advantage to dispute resolution, as SEP provisions could be written into federal statutes and become an everyday part of adjudicated relief. Dispute resolution also saves time and money. n303 All of these qualities, as evidenced by the MHD settlement, are the most effective means of responding to environmental crises. Apart from outright prevention, dispute negotiation and community remediation through creative settlements and SEPs continue to be one of the most effective means of preserving and protecting human health and the environment.

#### Extinction

Clark and Downes 6

Dana Clark, Center for International Environmental Law, and David Downes, US Interior Dept. Policy Analysis Senior Trade Advisor, 2006, What price biodiversity?, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/summary.html

Biodiversity is the diversity of life on earth, on which we depend for our survival. The variability of and within species and ecosystems helps provide some of our basic needs: food, shelter, and medicine, as well as recreational, cultural, spiritual and aesthetic benefits. Diverse ecosystems create the air we breathe, enrich the soil we till and purify the water we drink. Ecosystems also regulate local and global climate. No one can seriously argue that biodiversity is not valuable.

Nor can anyone seriously argue that biodiversity is not at risk. There are over 900 domestic species listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act, and 4,000 additional species are candidates for listing. We are losing species as a result of human activities at hundreds of times the natural rate of extinction. The current rate of extinction is the highest since the mass extinction of species that wiped out the dinosaurs millions of years ago.

The Economics of Biodiversity Conservation

The question which engenders serious controversy is whether society can afford the costs associated with saving biodiversity. Opponents of biodiversity conservation argue that the costs of protecting endangered species are too high. They complain that the regulatory burden on private landowners is too heavy, and that conservation measures impede development. They seek to override scientific determinations with economic considerations, and to impose cost/benefit analyses on biodiversity policy making.

An equally important question, however, is whether we can afford not to save biodiversity. The consequences of losing this critical resource could be devastating. As we destroy species and habitat, we endanger food supplies (such as crop varieties that impart resistance to disease, or the loss of spawning grounds for fish and shellfish); we lose the opportunity to develop new medicines or other chemicals; and we impair critical ecosystem functions that protect our water supplies, create the air we breathe, regulate climate and shelter us from storms. We lose creatures of cultural importance - the bald eagle is an example of the cultural significance of biodiversity and also of the need for strong regulations to protect species from extinction. And, we lose the opportunity for mental or spiritual rejuvenation through contact with nature.

## 5

#### Simulating conflict scenarios ignores the complexity which taints predictions—the aff’s linear war-planning fails and causes escalating conflict

Jervis, professor of international affairs – Columbia, ‘97

(Robert, “Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University)

Because actions change the environment in which they operate, identical but later behavior does not produce identical results: history is about the changes produced by previous thought and action as people and organizations confront each other through time. The final crisis leading to World War II provides an illustration of some of these processes. Hitler had witnessed his adversaries give in to pressure; as he explained, "Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich."21 But the allies had changed because of Hitler’s behavior. So had Poland. As A.J.P. Taylor puts it, "Munich cast a long shadow. Hitler waited for it to happen again; Beck took warning from the fate of Benes."22 Hitler was not the only leader to fail to understand that his behavior would change his environment. Like good linear social scientists, many statesmen see that their actions can produce a desired outcome, all other things being equal, and project into the future the maintenance of the conditions that their behavior will in fact undermine. This in part explains the Argentine calculations preceding the seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas. Their leaders could see that Britain’s ability to protect its position was waning, as evinced by the declining naval presence, and that Argentina’s claim to the islands had received widespread international support. But what they neglected was the likelihood that the invasion would alter these facts, unifying British opinion against accepting humiliation and changing the issue for international audiences from the illegitimacy of colonialism to the illegitimacy of the use of force. A similar neglect of the transformative power of action may explain why Saddam Hussein thought he could conquer Kuwait. Even if America wanted to intervene, it could do so only with the support and cooperation of other Arab countries, which had sympathized with Iraq’s claims and urged American restraint. But the invasion of Kuwait drastically increased the Arabs’ perception of threat and so altered their stance. Furthermore, their willingness to give credence to Iraqi promises was destroyed by the deception that had enabled the invasion to take everyone by surprise. Germany’s miscalculation in 1917 was based on a related error: although unrestricted submarine warfare succeeded in sinking more British shipping than the Germans had estimated would be required to drive Britain from the war, the American entry (which Germany expected) led the British to tolerate shortages that otherwise would have broken their will because they knew that if they held out, the U.S. would rescue them.23

The failure to appreciate the fact that the behavior of the actors is in part responsible for the environment which then impinges on them can lead observers—and actors as well— to underestimate actors’ influence. Thus states caught in a conflict spiral believe that they have little choice but to respond in kind to the adversary’s hostility. This may be true, but it may have been the states’ earlier behavior that generated the situation that now is compelling. Robert McNamara complains about how he was mislead by faulty military reporting but similarly fails to consider whether his style and pressure might have contributed to what he was being told.24

Products of Interaction as the Unit of Analysis

Interaction can be so intense and transformative that we can no longer fruitfully distinguish between actors and their environments, let alone say much about any element in isolation. We are accustomed to referring to roads as safe or dangerous, but if the drivers understand the road conditions this formulation may be misleading: the knowledge that, driving habits held constant, one stretch is safe or dangerous will affect how people drive—they are likely to slow down and be more careful when they think the road is dangerous and speed up and let their attention wander when it is "safe." It is then the road-driver system that is the most meaningful unit of analysis. In the wake of the sinking of a roll-on roll-off ferry, an industry representative said: With roro’s, the basic problem is that you have a huge open car deck with doors at each end. But people are well aware of this, and it is taken into account in design and operation. You don’t mess around with them. There have not been too many accidents because they are operated with such care.25

#### reject linear scenario planning in favor of complex theoretical analysis

#### Warfighting based on linearity causes extinction—rethinking the terms of the simulation itself is key to grappling with every threat environment

Skyttner, professor of natural science – University of Gâvle, professor – Royal Swedish Military Academy, ‘5

(Lars, “Systems theory and the science of military command and control,” Kybernetes Vol. 34, Issue 7/8, p. 1240-1260)

Military activity has constantly been characterised by the need to design, realize, train and thereafter maintain an organization capable to fight against various kinds of external threats. Such a force has always been used in offensive as well as defensive tasks, e.g. from attacking neighbouring enemies to going together in order to defend oneself from invading forces. To succeed with this, strategical, operational and tactical skill is necessary for the joint effort. Further, a flexible tactical adaptation is necessary when the enemy changes his behaviour or take countermeasure.

The military manoeuvring has always felt the need for some kind of decision support and a management system. The decision support has sometimes manifested itself as good advisors or as today in the shape of advanced high-technological computer-aided expert systems. The management system has always consisted of various communication and control devices. How these systems should be constructed, adapted and developed to challenge new threatening pictures in the constantly changing surrounding world is no simple task.

Today the socio-technical systems of the modern society are increasingly all embracing and tighter integrated. System-relations more and more stand out as untransparent, incomprehensible and unmanageable. Furthermore, the world around is so rapidly changed that circumstantial planning often is a thing of the past.

The uncertainties regarding the nature of future combat therefore bring about great demands of flexibility and adaptability of our command and control systems. That qualities like information-advantage and a realistic surrounding-world apprehension call for increased integration of different sensors, arms and communication systems are nevertheless given. As given is that success in combat always is a function of how command is executed and how danger, stress, obscurity and general confusion which constantly exist will be handled. When the enemy no longer is seen in our binoculars and when we not even know who has released an attack against us, the need for creative thinking is of highest priority. Today an event of war even can lack the attacking component and imply hitherto unknown social phenomena.

As compared with such circumstances, traditional military thinking could not be considered particularly successful. There tactical problems always have been reduced to easily recognizable situations with a well-learned standard response. Quite natural, critical thinking, questioning and creativity have not got a prominent role in this kind of education.

Today the security policy situation of Sweden is radically different from the situation only ten years ago. New, extremely fragmented scenarios of a threat exist. A military threatening picture still exists even if it has deteriorated substantially after the end of the cold war. Russia still has attacking capability via distant and NBC-weapons. A military recovery in this country can result in nonmilitary information operations within a ten-year period. The development is difficult to judge but is coherent with the democratic development and the relations to the West.

Just now the most probable threat comes from terrorism. The last years have signified a development towards an ever increasing extent of terrorist groups with better and better armaments. No doubt, some of these groups have NBC-weapons. Those who not have access to such weapons strive for them. Attacks resulting in thousands of victims among innocent people, today is a reality which has been demonstrated by the assault upon World Trade Centre. It is quite possible that such groups will choose to locate internal controversies to neutral ground like Stockholm with pertinent consequence like taking hostages, etc. When such things happen, the odds are against the anti terrorist forces. The terrorists only need to have success once while the combatting forces must be successful every time.

A third kind of security policy threat are those which are information technology related. States as well as criminal gangs and terrorist organisations already today use IT-related systems as weapons apart from their ordinary use. Attacks can be targeted toward our own IT systems, electricity supply systems, telecommunications and economical systems. In our highly computerized society, a small group can cause damages which early required an army. That the danger of IT-attacks has increased can be related to the simple fact that the more something is exposed, the more the threatening picture is reinforced. A special problem in this context is the difficulty to discover if an attack exists at all. The defence against such information warfare will be a big problem in the foreseeable future for our vulnerable society.

It is also not possible to leave out of account the threats coming from economical warfare. Even if the country today has a reasonably stable economy and is supported by the membership of EU, strongly increased fuel price during a period will destabilize society. Large-scale economical crimes pursued for example by the powerful drug mafia in Colombia can also be a real threat. This organisation has scarcely an interest to capture a geographical area. However, they want to consolidate and expand their economical flows. It is necessary to bear in mind that their financial annual turnover is bigger than most European countries.

Consequently, it is necessary to realise that the old and exact security-policy classification into “war” and “peace” hardly is relevant today. A war-like terror action with disastrous consequence can happen without early warning in a situation which we apprehend to be in deepest peace. The goal can be to crush our basic values – not our geographical area. An enumeration of what the modern societies consider these values to be, can be the following:

territorial integrity in the livingspace;

political sovereignty and democracy;

freedom of thought, religion and speech;

a state governed by law with human rights and minority rights;

free market economy; and

the free university.

In the protection of these values, the extensive invasion and mobilization defence with its mass army no longer has a justification. Not including the frontiers of land, sea and air combat, a new frontier has emerged where the battle is fought with global information systems. There the strategic goals have changed so that destruction has been replaced by manipulation, infiltration and assimilation.

All this taken together is the reason why big-scale problem solving seldom work as before. The traditional way of managing war with a large quantity of troops fighting a well defined and localized enemy is barely no longer possible. The lack of success for traditional methods is visible also on civil frontiers like the war against poverty, the war against drugs, and the attempts to extinct AIDS.

The new, multinational and complex threatening pictures which have replaced the old ones, can only be met with a smaller, more modern and flexible elite-force. The heavy striking-force with small command and intelligence resources will be reduced in favour of a network-defence based on the development within information and communication technology. The designation network will, however, not in the first instance represent the connecting of different technical systems. Instead it will represent a more flexible way of handling a new situation – to combine different entities and components for more complex tasks. One of its main duties will be peace-keeping international contributions. Another task will be to handle attacks realised with nerve-gas or bacteria. High-technological data-virus should also be possible to combat.

The building up of such a defence will demand an entirely new way of thinking regarding decision-making, command and control and use of modern technology. Internationally, this kind of thinking has attracted great interest and got the designation “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). The term is based on a number of technological breakthroughs which have occurred after the end of the cold war about 1990. In several ways, these have changed the ground for modern warfare. Here the most important achievements have been the information-technological progresses which will permit the use of lots of sensors and the capability to transfer and manage big information-flows. Realistic training with the aid of virtual three-dimensional computer scenarios (“Battlefield Computer Games”), has signified a pronounced increase in the combat-skill of tank-crews.

Some important trends within the RMA-concept is presented below:

Unmanned fighting vehicles and aircrafts. Automated, computerized technology will replace drivers and pilots. Start navigation, interpreting of the surrounding world, target-interpretation, target combatting and possible landing, is handled completely automatic. The opportunity of human handling and target combats remain. No consideration regarding the weight of the pilot, G-forces and life-supporting systems is necessary. The construction can be lighter, stronger, more rapid and cheaper. The instruction time can be shorter.

Data-streams, threat-analyses and military preparedness. Miniaturized networks of cheap sensors deliver data from areas which earlier have not been accessible. Immediate processing creates information which is distributed via coded broadband to all units needing it.

Chemical, bacteriological, radiological detection and protection. Micro sensors integrated in new protective clothes will dramatically increase the ability to move and increase freedom of action in contaminated areas. High sensibility and selectivity will make possible an immediate detection of the threat.

Body-armour for fighting soldiers. Extremely strong and light bullet proof materials increase the survival on the battlefield.

Field-equipment of lightweight type. New, lightweight materials will decrease the total carrying load for the soldier. Hence endurance and strength will increase. This holds well for uniforms, personal weapons, communication equipment and darkness-optics.

New bio-treatment for augmented performance. Without the use of drugs, human staying power can be doubled. Lack of sleep and impaired vigilance now can be compensated for as well as the impact of physical damage.

A science of command and control

Today's military command and control embrace different kinds of affairs from battle conduct to more administrative activities. It takes place on different strata from lower tactical levels to the highest strategical level. In contrast to civil command and control it includes fundamental questions regarding life and death for involved persons. In battlefields the unmasked principle of causality always rules. There the connection between conclusions and orders and their consequences are terrifyingly short.

A simple definition of the aim of command and control could be the coordination of human actions with different resources to get effects. In practise, this is often considered as something diffuse. Difficulties often arise when analysing the content and form of the activity. Problem solutions too often are seen as applied science without either theories or scientific method. Obstacles to attain a comprehensive view with hitherto used frames of reference have been experienced by both commanders and military theorists.

With this background, an attempt to regard command and control as part of “The Art of War” may be understandable. As an art, it can only be developed and reach its fulfilment inside the born leader with his special creativity, intuition capability and the divine vestige, existing in very few persons. However, such a view will have some less successful consequences, especially for the education of higher commanders. The divine vestige is scarcely possible to gauge and the number of born leaders is not in enough supply for the demands of society. At all events it cannot be the foundation for the recruitment of general staff candidates. Here more measurable and tangible properties must be decisive.

A more fruitful attitude therefore has appeared to be an integration of the problems of military management into a general scientific educational frame and denote it a science of command and control. The military competent at once realise that this area has two central questions at issue, on the one hand to make relevant decisions and on the other to carry them out adequately. With a slight reformulation it is possible to say that decision-making is to determine what should be done. The realization, the command, concerns how it should be done. Here the continuous existing aspect of time is present with its deadlines for thinking, planning, decision-making, taking measures, etc. This kind of activity always embraces the old truism of the equal importance of making the right things as doing things right. Regarding civil decision-making and execution, it often differs marginally (in principle) from the military counterpart. Thus, it is possible to speak of a general science of command and control.

In English, the area is denoted by the words command, control, communication and information with the acronym C3I. Command implies goal-oriented conduct and action, executed by people over people who all are living creatures and thereby process information for their survival. The process of life is to adapt the own situation to an ever-changing environment and a relation between information and control. Control comprises the processing of information, programming, decision and communication. Two-way communication between the controller and the controlled feeds back the result of the action for necessary justification and new activity.

In reality, the described control and command process is a very complex phenomenon. The physical and mental status of the decision-maker as well as deeply existing conceptions and preferences influence the procedure. Also organisational structures and technical equipment will influence the result. “Everything is connected to everything else”. Later in the text, it will be evident that the used English keywords can represent subsets of a comprehensive theory. Without this theory the term science in the label “A science of command and control” should be irrelevant.

To synthesize a new subject field like command and control will imply the finding and understanding of the joint factors existing within different kinds of the area. It also demands definitions regarding basic terms and concepts as a starting point for problem-solving and various kinds of reasoning. Below some fundamental concept are presented.

The theory of command and control is founded on a number of related academic areas. The integration of these creates the theoretical basis which allows a commander to understand the function of command and control. That is to master the prerequisite for relevant decisions and their transformation into reality.

The science of command and control is the application of the theory in a real world. It indicates how a system of command and control should be designed and used for decision-making, execution, followup, and government in a mainly unpredictable and chaotic environment (especially the combat).

A system of command and control is an integrated gathering of people, functions, procedures and equipment which together constitute the function of command and control. This system is the tool of the commander and secures that the capacity of the directed unity is utilized in the best manner in order to fulfill the goal.

The research problem of the science of command and control can be formulated as: How should the intentions of the commander be converted into reality as completely as possible?

Something which must be elucidated in the definitions above is the concept of a commander. The presumption that one can count with an unambiguous, conclusive commander as in military units, civil service departments or oil-tankers are not always correct. A committee, a board or some kind of collective often is the equivalent. This must be considered the rule when controversial political problems should be solved.

The concept of a commander implies that somebody (sometimes several) can formulate a criterion for the best problem solution and take the responsibility for a decision. Likewise that this (or these) people finally shoulder the responsibility for execution even if this can be transferred to other instances.

Today a science of command and control is necessary to adapt managing power and exercise of command to new kinds of organisations and new operational principles. The area is transformed at a rapid pace by social changes and new trends like the internationalisation of economies and knowledge production, globalization of media and knowledge mediation and also changed forms of cooperation and conflicts.

Moreover, modern leadership is often executed at a distance which implies both possibilities and risks. Today's communication technology will permit operations (both surgical and military!) to be literally managed and controlled from the other side of the globe. Modern dispersed organisations thus have their specific problems which cannot be neglected. How should social relations be managed when the personal encounter becomes a rare event and directors are dematerialized to a voice in a satellite-mediated phone call?

Regarding military command and control systems, they are today typically multi-component phenomena. The deciding functions are performed by people, simple decision-support systems in computer-based algorithms and advanced expert-systems. The decision-components are geographically dispersed dependent on the appearance of the environment but also for reason of survival. This distributed system gets its character by the quality of the sensors together with velocity and effectiveness of actual weapons.

The need for a comprehensive theory

For the military scientist it is obvious that studies in such a complex area as command and control scarcely are possible without the help of a theory of generalization, a meta-theory. Such a theory must be able to sum up and explain common factors and problems existing in all kinds of command and control. It must also be able to integrate different knowledge and reflections from various subject fields, which apparently do not seem to be related. In addition it must preferably furnish a hierarchy of theories and models where key-variables and their changes are intelligible and measurable. The supply of relevant models to facilitate studies, simulations and calculations defines the limits for both knowledge acquisition and information-dispersal.

A meta-theory likewise must supply general definitions and a common language, joining all subareas which taken together, will constitute a science of command and control. The application must take place in an area which has an ever growing need for rapid decisions and the mastering of very complex processes despite tight margins, ambiguous and disturbed information. As a frame of reference it must also be able to answer the same questions like other scientific areas, namely:

what theories represent the core of the field?

which methods are used?

which sources are used? and

to what extent are these theories, methods and sources universally applicable?

Does such a theory exist? From the viewpoint of the systems-scientist, the answer is affirmative. General Systems Theory (GST) studies patterns which do not relate to a specific area. It examines generalizations, applicable on specific problems, e.g. in command and control. As meta-discipline it can transfer its knowledge-structure to other areas without calling in question their content. It can supplement a great number of areas and integrate phenomena which had not been successfully handled. Above all this theory will support the generalist, who often is found to solve today's problem better than the specialist with his narrow limits.

A popular formulation could be that systems theory creates a knowledge structure which facilitates the providing of fact to the right place and creates possibilities to see a connected whole. A locution is that its main task is to help scientists to elucidate the complexity of the existence, technologists to make use of it and generalists to learn to live with it.

## 6

#### Hagel will get confirmed thanks entirely to Obama political capital – but it could still come undone

Washington Times 1/8/2013

(http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/8/little-enthusiasm-on-capitol-hill-for-hagel-nomina/#ixzz2HUcSjUfS)

Even before it became official Monday, Mr. Hagel’s nomination had kicked up a cloud of consternation from those on the right who questioned his commitment to Israel and his willingness to get tough with sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program.

Those on the left aren’t overjoyed, either. They would rather have worked with one of their own at the Pentagon, and have questions about criticism in 1998 of a Clinton administration nominee for an ambassadorship for being “openly, aggressively gay.” Mr. Hagel has since apologized, and Democrats appear to be giving him a pass — at least for now.

But Mr. Obama chose his former Senate colleague anyway, **putting the full weight of the presidency behind his selection and risking the political capital it takes to win confirmation battles in the world’s most exclusive club**.

The president “has his hands full at the moment — why would he take on one more chore in dealing with Congress?” said Stephen Hess, a veteran staffer of the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations and presidential scholar at the Brookings Institution. “I guess partly because he really wants this guy.”

Sources familiar with the confirmation process say the **White House would not have nominated Mr. Hagel if it were not certain the votes were there to confirm him**, **although recent history suggests that sometimes even the “safest” picks can unravel during the confirmation process**.

#### Offshore drilling’s a partisan disaster

Hobson 12 (Margaret, Writer for E&E, the leading source for comprehensive, daily coverage of environmental and energy politics and policy., "Obama's development plans gain little political traction in years since Gulf spill", [www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/04/18/1](http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/04/18/1))

President Obama is embracing the offshore oil and gas development policies he proposed in early 2010 but were sidelined in the shadow of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Two years after the BP PLC oil rig exploded, killing 11 people and causing the worst oil spill in U.S. history, Obama's "all of the above" energy policy includes offshore drilling provisions that are nearly identical to his aggressive March 2010 drilling plan. Since the moratorium on offshore oil drilling ended in late 2010, the administration expanded oil and gas development in the western and central Gulf of Mexico and announced plans for lease sales in the eastern Gulf. The White House appears poised to allow Royal Dutch Shell PLC to begin exploring for oil this summer in Alaska's Beaufort and Chukchi seas and to open oil industry access to the Cook Inlet, south of Anchorage. The administration is also paving the way for oil and gas seismic studies along the mid- and south Atlantic coasts, the first such survey in 30 years. While opening more offshore lands to oil and gas development, the Obama administration has also taken steps to make offshore oil drilling safer, according to a report card issued yesterday by Oil Spill Commission Action, an oversight panel formed by seven members of President Obama's oil spill commission. That report criticized Congress for failing to adopt new oil spill safety laws but praised the Interior Department and industry for making progress in improving offshore oil development safety, environmental protection and oil spill preparation. An environmental group was less complimentary. A report yesterday by Oceana charged that the measures adopted by government and industry are "woefully inadequate." As the 2012 presidential campaign heats up and gasoline prices remain stuck near $4 per gallon, Obama's offshore oil development policies aren't winning him any political capital. The environmental community hates the drilling proposals. The Republicans and oil industry officials complain that the White House hasn't gone far enough. And independent voters are confused by the president's rhetoric. According to the GOP political firm Resurgent Republic, independent voters in Colorado and Virginia don't understand what Obama's "all of the above" energy mantra means. The report said, however, that once the policy was "described as oil, gas, coal, nuclear power, solar and other alternative energies, participants became enthusiastic and view such a strategy as credible and necessary to becoming more energy independent." A recent Gallup poll indicated that American voters are polarized on energy issues. The survey found that 47 percent of the public believes energy development is more important than environmental protection, while 41 percent of the public ranks protecting the environment as a bigger priority. In that political climate, Obama's offshore oil development policies are not likely to affect the nation's most conservative or liberal voters, noted Larry Sabato, director of the University of Virginia's Center for Politics. "The environmentalists have no place to go except Obama, and Obama isn't going to convince any conservatives or Republicans to back him" based on his oil and gas proposals, Sabato said. "He's obviously aiming at swing independents," Sabato added. "He's trying to show that he's pursuing a middle path, the one many independents like. Maybe it will work." Back to the original plan, minus 2 pieces Obama's all-of-the-above energy policy is in keeping with his pre-oil-spill offshore oil and gas development proposal. After the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the White House slapped a six-month moratorium on all new oil and gas development. Since the moratorium ended, Obama has systematically reintroduced most of the early oil development proposals. Two pieces of the old plan are missing. Obama backtracked on his proposal to allow oil exploration off Virginia's coast. The new East Coast offshore plan lays the groundwork for seismic studies, but not drilling, along the mid- and south Atlantic. The White House also dropped a proposal to allow exploration in the eastern Gulf of Mexico within 125 miles of Florida, an area off limits due to a congressional moratorium. During 2010 negotiations, the administration offered to allow oil leasing in the region if Congress lifted the moratorium and passed a global warming bill. When the climate change legislation died, however, the drilling provision lost White House favor. Since the Republicans took control of the House in 2011, GOP leaders have advanced a series of bills that would go far beyond Obama's offshore oil drilling policies, essentially allowing development along all U.S. shores. But those measures have been thwarted by the Democrat-controlled Senate.

#### Hagel reigns in personnel benefits

MacGilis, 1-9

Alec MacGillis, Senior Editor at The New Republic, 1-9-2013, “Can Chuck Hagel Cure The Military’s Health Care Problems,” http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/111778/can-chuck-hagel-cure-the-militarys-health-care-problem

The Pentagon, to its credit, recognizes that it has a real problem on its hands. At that same Brookings event, the Department of Defense's comptroller, Robert Hale, [lamented](http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/01/07-defense-spending#ref-id=20120107_keynote) the pressure that rising health care costs are putting on the rest of the military budget, and lamented the difficulty in getting action on this front in Congress. For that is where the real obstacle now lies. Members of both parties are loath to be seen as jacking up out-of-pocket costs for current and former members of the military after a decade of wars whose burdens have been shouldered by a sliver of the American population. It's been easy for groups like the Retired Military Officers Association to exploit that reluctance and make the case against touching Tricare premiums. "What happened was that for the first five years of Tricare, the Clinton administration should’ve raised [the premiums] but didn’t," says Lawrence Korb, a former naval officer and assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, now at the Center for American Progress. "And then after 2001 and the wars and everything, there were guilty feelings over so few of our men and women fighting for us and everyone kept conflating [Tricare costs] with these brave men and women fighting."

But a closer look suggests that the moral calculus is not so simple. The primary beneficiaries of the current policy are healthy retired officers: Veterans wounded in battle are in the care of the VA, and many enlisted men are not even covered by Tricare in their post-military years because they leave short of the 20-year tenure required for retirement benefits. The person benefiting most from Tricare's current terms is more likely to be a retired lieutenant colonel pulling down a big paycheck at Lockheed or SAIC than a former sergeant struggling to make a living on his return home from Iraq. And it's not just that -- the rising cost of Tricare is putting budget pressure on the Pentagon's ability to provide care for those who we'd all agree are neediest of all: wounded veterans and service members in theater. There's only so much money to go around, and the more that is spent on retiree care through Tricare, the more the government needs to scrimp in other areas, whether overseas operations or weapons systems or V.A. care.

"We’re all in this together," one former Defense official in favor of reforming Tricare told me. "There’s no free lunch -- someone’s paying for this bill, and that someone is the taxpayer." He added, "I would remind the larger beneficiary population that in some sense the most crucial part of this system is the people serving the country’s uniform today, and when they come home we want to make sure the very best care is available for them. If those who have already departed the service take too large a share of the total ... what will get shortchanged in that situation is the [care] for those that are serving today. Is that what you really want? Shouldn’t you be willing to say that's who we should put first?"

He noted that this argument has been made on the Hill, but it "did not GAIN traction. People nod their heads and understand but were unwilling to act." The two most recent Pentagon chiefs, Bob Gates and Leon Panetta, [proposed increases](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/us/29tricare.html) in Tricare premiums, but made [little headway](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-03/politics/35232502_1_tricare-premiums-service-members-health-costs) in Congress, which agreed to only the minimal premium bump.

Korb, though, sees reason for optimism in the person of Hagel, the former Nebraska senator Obama has nominated to run the Pentagon, over widespread opposition. Not only is Hagel seemingly more determined than his predecessors to get the military budget under control, as a former enlisted man who was wounded in Vietnam, he's in a good position to make the case for spending health care dollars on those who need them most. "If Hagel gets confirmed, we have a much better chance" of reforming Tricare, says Korb.

#### Key to solve collapse of hard power

Bennett, 2012

John T. Bennett covers national security and foreign policy for U.S. News & World Report, Study Warns Cost of U.S. Troops Unsustainable, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/dotmil/2012/07/12/study-warns-cost-of-us-troops-is-unsustainable

Increasingly costly benefits for U.S. troops, if left unchecked, would force the military to shed so many war fighters that it would struggle to perform even its simplest missions.

The massive cost of America's all-volunteer military is unsustainable, states a blunt report released by a Washington, D.C.-based think tank Thursday.

"Over the past decade, the cost per person in the active duty force increased by 46 percent," the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies concludes.

When those rising personnel bills are placed in context of the entire Defense Department spending picture, analysts arrived at a startling conclusion.

"If personnel costs continue growing at that rate and the overall defense budget remains flat with inflation, military personnel costs will consume the entire defense budget by 2039," CSBA finds.

The military's personnel system and compensation scheme were installed before Washington shifted to an all-volunteer force in the early 1970s. Despite warnings about costs back then, a major overhaul never has been conducted—largely due to political concerns about appearances of disrespecting members of the armed services.

[[Photo Gallery: Sights of Summer](http://www.usnews.com/photos/sights-of-summer).]

The Pentagon spends about 75 percent of its $500 billion budget on personnel costs.

Unless executive branch officials and lawmakers put aside such fears relatively soon, CSBA study author Todd Harrison says Pentagon leaders will have few options but to cut large numbers of forces to save money.

The result?

"You would end up with a military too small for even basic missions," Harrison told a standing room-only audience in downtown Washington on Thursday. "So something's got to give."

Talk of cost-cutting changes to the Pentagon's so-called "people programs" began bubbling around 2008. That's when the first signs appeared that the post-9/11 military spending spree, as former Defense Secretary Robert Gates calls it, was ending.

Another think tank, the Bipartisan Policy Center, issued its own report last month that concludes the Pentagon soon will spend more on health care and other benefits for former military personnel than on troops in uniform today.

But no substantive changes to bring down costs—other than plans to shrink the Army and Marine Corps to around pre-9/11 levels—have been made.

The talk about military personnel reform comes as the Pentagon faces shrinking annual budgets. Some analysts and senior defense officials say if the costs of troops' pay, retirement and healthcare aren't pared soon, the Pentagon will run out of monies to buy combat hardware.

#### Turns – independently, nuclear war

Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon 7, Fred’s a resident scholar at AEI, Michael is a senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April, <http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf>

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, SinoTaiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

## arctic adv

#### Lots of drilling now

Conathan 12 (Michael Conathan is the Director of Ocean Policy at American Progress. His work focuses on driving progressive solutions to the multitude of problems facing the world’s oceans. Prior to joining American Progress, Mike spent five years staffing the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation’s Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard—initially serving a one-year appointment as a Dean John Knauss Marine Policy Fellow before joining the committee full-time as a professional staff member in 2007. In that capacity Mike worked primarily for Subcommittee Ranking Member Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-ME), as well as the Ranking Members of the full committee, Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX). He oversaw enactment of multiple key pieces of ocean legislation, including the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act, the Integrated Coastal and Ocean Observing Act, the Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act, and the Shark Conservation Act. A native Cape Codder, Mike received a master’s degree in marine affairs from the University of Rhode Island in 2005 and also holds a Bachelor of Arts in English literature from Georgetown University., 2/29/2012, "More Drilling Won’t Lower Gas Prices", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/02/29/11091/more-drilling-wont-lower-gas-prices/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/02/29/11091/more-drilling-wont-lower-gas-prices/))

It hasn’t worked yet. There are currently more oil rigs operating on U.S. lands and waters than in the rest of the world combined, production is at an eight-year high, and the most recent “Short-Term Energy Outlook” from the Energy Information Administration projects production to continue growing at least through 2013 based on current activity. By the end of President Obama’s recently issued five-year drilling plan, fully 75 percent of our undiscovered, technically recoverable offshore reserves will be open to drilling. All that additional activity hasn’t stemmed the recent gas price spike. If oil companies wanted to increase production, they could. In March 2011 the Department of the Interior released a report revealing two-thirds of oil-and-gas companies’ offshore leases and more than half of their onshore leases are not being produced. Pumping oil takes time. Opening new offshore areas will take seven years to produce any new oil, and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge will take 10 years to produce a single drop of oil. Even if more production would lower prices, it wouldn’t happen tomorrow. And the Energy Information Administration finds that even if we wave the green flag for our entire exclusive economic zone, it will do nothing more than reduce the cost of gasoline by two cents, and not until 2030.

#### Aff doesn’t boost drilling---no incentive

**CBO 12** (Congressional Budget Office, August 2012, "Potential Budgetary Effects of Immediately Opening Most Federal Lands to Oil and Gas Leasing", [www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12\_Oil-and-Gas\_Leasing.pdf](http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12_Oil-and-Gas_Leasing.pdf))

Leasing Offshore Federal Lands The geographic scope of leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf has changed often over the past few decades.3 CBO anticipates that, under current law, DOI will offer leases for most of the acreage in the OCS over the next several decades. Until the early 1980s, DOI offered leases in all of the OCS, including the areas off the Atlantic, Pacific, and Florida coasts. In 1990, after the Congress imposed a series of temporary restrictions, President George H.W. Bush withdrew large portions of the OCS in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the eastern Gulf of Mexico from the leasing program. Those restricted areas were subsequently expanded by President Clinton. Then, in 2008, President George W. Bush narrowed the restrictions to include only areas that had been designated as National Marine Sanctuaries. In 2010, President Obama removed Alaska’s Bristol Bay area from the leasing program until the end of June 2017. Since 2008, policies on leasing in the Atlantic and Pacific OCS have varied, reflecting differences between the two most recent Administrations. In January 2009, DOI issued a proposed five-year plan that included lease sales in the Atlantic and Pacific OCS for the 2010–2015 period. The program proposed in June 2012 does not include an option for sales in those areas between 2012 and 2017. Neither plan involved the areas in the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the Florida coast in which leasing is now prohibited until the end of June 2022.4 Other than the temporary ban on leasing in the eastern Gulf of Mexico, there currently are no statutory restrictions on OCS leasing. Decisions about leasing are made administratively—in consultation with industry and the states—for five-year periods. Leases cannot be offered for areas that are not included in a five-year plan, but the available regions may change whenever a new plan is adopted. The next plan is expected to go into effect in August 2012 and will extend for five years unless a future Administration chooses to restart the process before that plan expires. Historical experience suggests that only a fraction of the leases awarded in the OCS will eventually be brought into production. Almost 60 percent of the OCS leases issued in the Gulf of Mexico through 2007 either expired or were relinquished without producing any oil or natural gas.5 CBO estimates that almost 90 percent of the 2011 OCS production was from leases issued before 2001, reflecting the long lead times associated with exploring and developing oil and gas fields. 6

#### Aff doesn’t solve---takes 5 years to boost production

CFAP 8 (Center for American Progress, 9/15/2008, "Ten Reasons Not to Expand Offshore Drilling", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/))

6. Production would be expensive, would not start for a long time, and would have no short-term effect on oil prices. The average oil field size in the OCS is smaller than the average in the Gulf of Mexico, which is already being developed. As a result, much of the oil in the OCS would be expensive to extract, and is only becoming attractive now as a result of high oil prices. According the Energy Information Administration, it would take at least five years for oil production to begin. EIA predicted that there would be no significant effect on oil production or price until nearly 20 years after leasing begins.

#### No drilling equipment

CFAP 8 (Center for American Progress, 9/15/2008, "Ten Reasons Not to Expand Offshore Drilling", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/))

7. There isn’t enough drilling equipment. Due to the high price of oil, existing drilling ships are “booked solid for the next five years,” and demand for deepwater rigs has driven up the price of such ships. Oil companies just don’t have the resources to explore oil fields in the OCS.

No arctic conflict

Dyer 12 (Gwynne Dyer, OC is a London-based independent Canadian journalist, syndicated columnist and military historian., His articles are published in 45 countries, 8/4/2012, "Race for Arctic Mostly Rhetoric", www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/columnists/race-for-arctic-mostly-rhetoric-164986566.html)

Russian television contacted me last night asking me to go on a program about the race for Arctic resources. The ice is melting fast, and it was all the usual stuff about how there will be big strategic conflicts over the seabed resources -- especially oil and gas -- that become accessible when it's gone. The media always love conflict, and now that the Cold War is long gone, there's no other potential military confrontation between the great powers to worry about. Governments around the Arctic Ocean are beefing up their armed forces for the coming struggle, so where are the flashpoints and what are the strategies? It's great fun to speculate about possible wars. In the end I didn't do the interview because the Skype didn't work, so I didn't get the chance to rain on their parade. But here's what I would said to the Russians if my server hadn't gone down at the wrong time. First, you should never ask the barber if you need a haircut. The armed forces in every country are always looking for reasons to worry about impending conflict, because that's the only reason their governments will spend money on them. Sometimes they will be right to worry, and sometimes they will be wrong, but right or wrong, they will predict conflict. Like the barbers, it's in their professional interest to say you need their services. So you'd be better off to ask somebody who doesn't have a stake in the game. As I don't own a single warship, I'm practically ideal for the job. And I don't think there will be any significant role for the armed forces in the Arctic, although there is certainly going to be a huge investment in exploiting the region's resources. There are three separate "resources" in the Arctic. On the surface, there are the sea lanes that are opening up to commercial traffic along the northern coasts of Russia and Canada. Under the seabed, there are potential oil and gas deposits that can be drilled once the ice retreats. And in the water in between, there is the planet's last unfished ocean. The sea lanes are mainly a Canadian obsession, because the government believes the Northwest Passage that weaves between Canada's Arctic islands will become a major commercial artery when the ice is gone. Practically every summer, Prime Minister Stephen Harper travels north to declare his determination to defend Canada's Arctic sovereignty from -- well, it's not clear from exactly whom, but it's a great photo op. Canada is getting new Arctic patrol vessels and building a deep-water naval port and Arctic warfare training centre in the region, but it's all much ado about nothing. The Arctic Ocean will increasingly be used as a shortcut between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific, but the shipping will not go through Canadian waters. Russia's "Northern Sea Route" will get the traffic, because it's already open and much safer to navigate. Then there's the hydrocarbon deposits under the Arctic seabed, which the U.S. Geological Survey has forecast may contain almost one-fourth of the world's remaining oil and gas resources. But from a military point of view, there's only a problem if there is some disagreement about the seabed boundaries. There are only four areas where the boundaries are disputed. Two are between Canada and its eastern and western neighbours in Alaska and Greenland, but there is zero likelihood of a war between Canada and the United States or Denmark (which is responsible for Greenland's defence). In the Bering Strait, there is a treaty defining the seabed boundary between the United States and Russia, signed in the dying days of the Soviet Union, but the Russian Duma has refused to ratify it. The legal uncertainty caused by the dispute, however, is more likely to deter future investment in drilling there than lead to war. And then there was the seabed-boundary dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, which led Norway to double the size of its navy over the past decade. But last year, the two countries signed an agreement dividing the disputed area right down the middle and providing for joint exploitation of its resources. So no war between NATO (of which Norway is a member) and the Russian Federation. Which leaves the fish, and it's hard to have a war over fish. The danger is rather that the world's fishing fleets will crowd in and clean the fish out, as they are currently doing in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica. If the countries with Arctic coastlines want to preserve this resource, they can only do so by creating an international body to regulate the fishing. And they will have to let other countries fish there, too, with agreed catch limits, since they are mostly international waters. They will be driven to co-operate, in their own interests. So no war over the Arctic. All we have to worry about now is the fact the ice is melting, which will speed global warming (because open water absorbs far more heat from the sun than highly reflective ice), and ultimately melt the Greenland icecap and raise sea levels worldwide by seven metres. But that's a problem for another day.

## russia

**No extinction**

Easterbrook 3(Gregg, senior fellow at the New Republic, “We're All Gonna Die!”, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set>=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote *Remembrance of Things Past* while lying in bed.

#### Species adapt and migrate

Ian **Thompson et al.**, Canadian Forest Service, Brendan Mackey, The Australian National University, The Fenner School of Environment and Society, College of Medicine, Biology and Environment, Steven McNulty, USDA Forest Service, Alex Mosseler, Canadian Forest Service, 20**09**, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity “Forest Resilience, Biodiversity, and Climate Change” Convention on Biological Diversity

 While resilience can be attributed to many levels of organization of biodiversity, the genetic composition of species is the most fundamental. Molecular genet- ic diversity within a species, species diversity within a forested community, and community or ecosystem diversity across a landscape and bioregion represent expressions of biological diversity at different scales. The basis of all expressions of biological diversity is the genotypic variation found in populations. The individuals that comprise populations at each level of ecological organization are subject to natural se- lection and contribute to the adaptive capacity or re- silience of tree species and forest ecosystems (Mull- er-Starck et al. 2005). Diversity at each of these levels has fostered natural (and artificial) regeneration of forest ecosystems and facilitated their adaptation to dramatic climate changes that occurred during the quaternary period (review by: DeHayes et al. 2000); this diversity must be maintained in the face of antici- pated changes from anthropogenic climate warming. Genetic diversity (e.g., additive genetic variance) within a species is important because it is the basis for the natural selection of genotypes within popu- lations and species as they respond or adapt to en- vironmental changes (Fisher 1930, Pitelka 1988, Pease et al. 1989, Burger and Lynch 1995, Burdon and Thrall, 2001, Etterson 2004, Reusch et al. 2005, Schaberg et al. 2008). The potential for evolutionary change has been demonstrated in numerous long- term programmes based on artificial selection (Fal- coner 1989), and genetic strategies for reforestation in the presence of rapid climate change must focus on maintaining species diversity and genetic diversi- ty within species (Ledig and Kitzmiller 1992). In the face of rapid environmental change, it is important to understand that the genetic diversity and adap- tive capacity of forested ecosystems depends largely on in situ genetic variation within each population of a species (Bradshaw 1991). Populations exposed to a rate of environmental change exceeding the rate at which populations can adapt, or disperse, may be doomed to extinction (Lynch and Lande 1993, Burger and Lynch 1995). Genetic diversity deter- mines the range of fundamental eco-physiological tolerances of a species. It governs inter-specific competitive interactions, which, together with dispersal mechanisms, constitute the fundamental de- terminants of potential species responses to change (Pease et al. 1989, Halpin 1997). In the past, plants have responded to dramatic changes in climate both through adaptation and migration (Davis and Shaw 2001). The capacity for long-distance migration of plants by seed dispersal is particularly important in the event of rapid environmental change. Most, and probably all, species are capable of long-distance seed disper- sal, despite morphological dispersal syndromes that would indicate morphological adaptations primarily for short-distance dispersal (Cwyner and MacDon- ald 1986, Higgins et al. 2003). Assessments of mean migration rates found no significant differences be- tween wind and animal dispersed plants (Wilkinson 1997, Higgins et al. 2003). Long-distance migration can also be strongly influenced by habitat suitabil- ity (Higgins and Richardson 1999) suggesting that rapid migration may become more frequent and vis- ible with rapid changes in habitat suitability under scenarios of rapid climate change. The discrepancy between estimated and observed migration rates during re-colonization of northern temperate forests following the retreat of glaciers can be accounted for by the underestimation of long-distance disper- sal rates and events (Brunet and von Oheimb 1998, Clark 1998, Cain et al. 1998, 2000). Nevertheless, concerns persist that potential migration and ad- aptation rates of many tree species may not be able to keep pace with projected global warming (Davis 1989, Huntley 1991, Dyer 1995, Collingham et al. 1996, Malcolm et al. 2002). However, these models refer to fundamental niches and generally ignore the ecological interactions that also govern species dis- tributions.

## econ

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Morris Miller, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, ‘2K

(Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Drilling doesn’t insulate the US from price shocks

Luft and Korin 12 (Gal Luft and Anne Korin are co-directors of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) and senior advisers to the United States Energy Security Council. They are co-authors of Turning Oil into Salt: Energy Independence through Fuel Choice (2009) and Petropoly: The Collapse of America’s Energy Security Paradigm (Forthcoming, 2012)., July/August 2012, "The Folly of Energy Independence", [www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1266](http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1266))

All but two of the post-World War II recessions were preceded by a sharp spike in oil prices; there is no question that the fivefold increase in oil prices since 2003 has contributed to the current economic dislocation. For perspective, forty years ago, at the zenith of the Cold War, the United States spent $4 billion on oil imports, an amount that equaled 1.2 percent of the defense budget. In 2006, the United States paid $296 billion, equal to half of the defense budget. By 2008, U.S. foreign oil expenditures grew so much they almost equaled the entire defense budget. The energy security paradox of the 21st century, then, is that a country can reduce oil imports but end up paying a much higher oil import bill. What this means is that, given the current state of the global economy, a new oil shock—whether caused by war in the Persian Gulf, instability in North Africa or Nigeria, or even anxious investors rushing to buy oil futures to hedge against falling currencies—would sink Western economies. As it is, the rising cost of oil is hollowing out the U.S. economy, and no fuel economy standards or new oil discovery will stop this tide. What is needed is a new energy paradigm. As we have already noted, dreams of autarky in oil still dominate U.S. energy policy discourse. The pledge to cut a third of oil imports by 2020 is at the core of President Obama’s energy policy, and talk about reducing imports from the Middle East continues to be one of the best applause lines of all presidential and congressional candidates across the political spectrum. This rhetoric relies on two false premises. First, America is not dependent on the Persian Gulf for its oil supply. Imports from the Persian Gulf never exceeded 15 percent of total U.S. petroleum consumption; currently, the figure stands at 9 percent. And again, these numbers are really nominal, since oil is fungible and swap arrangements the oil companies employ to reduce transportation costs make it impossible to know where any given barrel of oil really came from. Most U.S. oil imports originate in North America. Second, even if all U.S. oil imports originated from Canada and Mexico, America would be just as vulnerable to the impact of oil price spikes due to volatility in the Persian Gulf and other unstable regions as it is today. Self-sufficiency in oil would not, indeed cannot, shield U.S. consumers from oil price shocks. In 2008, when oil prices reached an historic high, the United Kingdom produced most of the oil it needed, yet the price spike affected its citizens just as much as it did Americans. When the price of oil spikes, it spikes for everyone. The United States imports hardly any oil from Libya, but when the 2011 Libyan upheavals caused a supply disruption, American motorists were as affected by the resulting $25 per barrel price hike as the motorists of Libya’s major oil purchasers.

#### Studies prove no impact

Perumal, business reporter – Gulf Times, 9/14/’11

(Santhosh, <http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=458158&version=1&template_id=48&parent_id=28>)

Oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries as a 25% increase in oil prices causes their GDP (gross domestic product) to fall by about half of 1% or less, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper. “Across the world, oil price shock episodes have generally not been associated with a contemporaneous decline in output but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports,” the paper said. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies, but the magnitude has typically been small, said the paper, authored by Tobias N Rasmussen and Agustín Roitman. For a given level of world GDP, the paper found that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports.  “The effect is still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25% increase in oil prices will cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of 1%, spread over 2–3 years,” the authors said.

One likely explanation for this relatively modest impact is that part of the greater revenue accruing to oil exporters will be recycled in the form of imports or other international flows, thus contributing to keep up demand in oil-importing economies, the paper said. “The negative impact of oil price shocks on oil-importing countries is partly offset by concurrent increases in exports and other income flows,” it said.

#### Drilling doesn’t solve unemployment

Levi 11 (Michael Levi, CFR Energy Security and Climate Change Program Director, Senior Fellow, 10/18/11, “New Energy Jobs Won't Solve the U.S. Unemployment Problem”, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136599/michael-levi/new-energy-jobs-wont-solve-the-us-unemployment-problem)

U.S. President Barack Obama and the leading Republican candidates for president don't agree on much, particularly when it comes to jobs and energy. But they do appear to share a conviction that a vibrant energy sector is central to solving the U.S. unemployment problem. Obama has put clean energy jobs at the center of his economic message. On the Republican side, both Texas Governor Rick Perry and Mitt Romney, his rival, claim that the oil, gas, and coal industries is where the real future of American job growth lies, contrasting their approach with one that has produced the recent Solyndra debacle. Alas, on the one point on which everyone seemingly agrees, they are all wrong. There is no doubt the energy sector could employ many more Americans. But exactly how many matters. The Republican candidates have made bold and concrete predictions. Perry is running on his record of job creation in Texas, which included a big boost from the booming oil and gas sector employment. Romney claims that expanded drilling could create 1.2 million energy jobs and that shale gas operations in the Northeast could add another 280,000 and Perry offers similar numbers. This is an exaggeration. The American Petroleum Institute, which is hardly an impartial arbiter (it is the oil industry lobby), projects that opening all U.S. lands to drilling while loosening a range of regulations would create 400,000 new energy-sector jobs and perhaps one million support and spinoff jobs by 2030. The real potential for oil and gas jobs is smaller. For his part, Obama placed clean-energy jobs at the core of his economic recovery plans, promising five million by 2030 if his energy plans were enacted into law. The Center for American Progress, a liberal-leaning think tank that is inclined to be favorable to the president, estimated that his plans could have actually created about 1.8 million jobs at clean-energy businesses and their suppliers. Either way, Republicans and some Democrats have blocked most of the clean energy policies that the president advocated. The problem is that even if Obama, Perry, and Romney all had their way and, in fact, created millions of energy sector jobs, these numbers would be incommensurate with the scale of the United States' current employment challenge. In a country where 14 million job seekers are unemployed and an additional 9.3 million are involuntarily working part time, energy jobs will not bridge the gap. And many, if not most, of the promised jobs -- whether in oil drilling or turbine manufacturing -- would take more than a decade to materialize. Setting aside such problems, the full complement of jobs promised by the American Petroleum Institute and the Center for American Progress would tweak unemployment by about one percent. All of this also fails to mention that in the longer term, many if not most of the new jobs would come at the expense of employment in other sectors, pushing those job creation numbers down even further. The underwhelming numbers should not be surprising. After all, energy production is not a large part of the U.S. economy. The mining sector -- which includes oil, gas, and coal production -- makes up only 1.9 percent of U.S. GDP. The utilities sector, which includes both clean and traditional energy production as well as a wide range of other activities, adds another 1.9 percent. Motor vehicle manufacturing accounts for 0.9 percent more. This is nothing to scoff at -- in real terms it means nearly a trillion dollars per year -- but national prosperity will not come from jobs growth in sectors that collectively make up less than five percent of the economy.

Current energy boom is sufficient to solve your advantage

Mills, Their Author, 10-30

Mark, Senior fellow of the Manhattan Institute, and founder and CEO of the Digital Power Group, a tech-centric capital advisory group. He was formerly the co-founder and chief tech strategist for Digital Power Capital, a boutique venture fund. He co-founded and served as Chairman and CTO of ICx Technologies helping take it public in a 2007 IPO. Mark is a member of the Advisory Council of the McCormick School of Engineering and Applied Science at Northwestern University, and serves on the Board of Directors of the Marshall Institute.

http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/mills.htm

There are good reasons for this shift. The nation is in desperate need of jobs. And technology has unleashed a surprising increase in domestic oil and gas output.[1] The U.S. now has a glut of natural gas, such that applications have backed up to convert facilities originally intended for imports into export terminals. At the same time, the 40-year decline in domestic oil production has been reversed. Add to this the rush to export abundant high-quality coal to soaring world demand and not only are lower prices now in play, but energy independence is in sight for the first time. Policies that would take advantage of this hydrocarbon abundance could spark widespread employment growth at time when unemployment is a central concern for many citizens, and can be a critical issue in political "swing" states. About 10 million Americans are already employed directly and indirectly in businesses associated with oil, natural gas, and coal production.[2] These jobs are widely distributed across the nation: 16 states have more than 150,000 people employed in hydrocarbon-related activities. As for the future, accelerating domestic hydrocarbon energy production will create at least three to four million jobs in the immediate future.[4] Five electoral "swing states" are among the 12 states that stand to gain the most from policies that would promote the boom. Over a half-million jobs would be generated in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, Michigan, and Colorado.[5] The employment opportunities reach far beyond those directly associated with drilling and digging in the field. Hydrocarbon jobs ripple throughout the economy. For every direct hydrocarbon job, about six jobs are added in sectors from manufacturing to information services.[6] New employment from hydrocarbons could amount to one-fifth to three-fourths of the jobs needed by people in over 20 states counted as unemployed or underemployed, including Wisconsin, Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.[7] While hydrocarbon jobs can't be the only answer to the country's staggering jobs deficit, they represent the largest single opportunity for near-term jobs, and one that requires no federal spending.[8] The broad economic benefits that come from privately-financed expansions in domestic production would generate at least $2 trillion for the country.[9] Put another way, each hydrocarbon job created brings an average societal benefit of $500,000 per job.[10] It bears noting that half of all existing hydrocarbon jobs and the major share of the recent increase in domestic production of oil and natural gas come from 18,000 small and mid-sized companies. And the expansion has occurred on private and state lands, without federal stimulus and despite regulatory headwinds.[11] It should be unsurprising that there are a lot of jobs associated with hydrocarbon industries. Over 80 percent of the U.S. and world's energy needs are met with hydrocarbons.[12] Meanwhile, today barely 2 percent of total energy consumption comes from the popularly discussed alternatives of solar, wind and biofuels.[13] For the coming two decades, oil, gas, and coal are forecast to supply 60 to 80 percent of world growth according to all major forecasts, including the U.S. Department of Energy.[14] America lost over 8.4 million jobs from February 2008 to 2010. Since then, through August 2012, only 4.4 million jobs were added. America needs more jobs, and needs them soon—and the hydrocarbon sector alone could add over 4 million more jobs. Over the long term, innovation and new technologies across all sectors of our economy will surely revitalize the economy and create a new cycle of job growth, and doubtless in some unexpected ways.[15] It is critical to have policies that ensure this great cycle is encouraged. But the depth and magnitude of job destruction from the Great Recession means that creating jobs in the near-term is vital.

No escalation-Chinese strategic incompetence means decisive American win

Xueqin 12

Jiang, Why the PLA would struggle to fight a war. Jiang Xueqin is a China-born writer and educator. His work has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, the Chronicle of Higher Education and The Diplomat among other publications.

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/13/why-the-pla-would-struggle-to-fight-a-war/

Never has there been so much fear and anxiety over China’s naval intentions in the South China Sea. Each People’s Liberation Army action, whether it be an aggressive patrol into disputed territory or a deployment of a new aircraft carrier, only feeds into this fear and anxiety. But neither big fast ships nor arrogant swagger will win a naval war, and China’s PLA suffers from three institutional weaknesses that will ultimately sink its naval ambitions in the South China Sea. The first and most important weakness is the Communist Party’s institutional control over the PLA, which Richard MacGregor discusses in his book The Party. In China’s Leninist military structure, the political power of commissars, whose only virtue is their blind loyalty to Party, trumps the tactical expertise of officers. Ultimately, whatever military ambitions the PLA has to be a modern professional fighting force capable of exerting its influence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans must be subordinate to the political exigencies of a ruling party fast losing its authority and legitimacy. Second, because of the military’s top-down hierarchical structure enforced by commissars to ensure Party control, the PLA has never really developed the non-commissioned officer system, which as Robert Kaplan explains in his book Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts has made the American military the finest fighting machine the world has ever known. In The Party, MacGregor suggests both Chinese and American officers understand how severe this limitation is to the PLA’s fighting potential: “‘What kills the military is the political system,’ a [Chinese] retired officer told me. ‘We don’t have a sergeant system, and the sergeants and the likes are the ones who do most of the real military work.’ What the Chinese officer called the sergeant system is the tradition in western militaries of vesting substantial authority in non-commissioned officers…to make many-on-the-ground decisions. ‘In our culture, delegating actually enhances authority. It shows that a commander listens,’ said a senior US military officer who has studied the PLA. ‘It is difficult to have an NCO system in a culture which does not like to delegate authority. In China, where so much is vested in face, you maintain your authority not just by being in charge but by appearing to be in charge.’’’ To visualize what this difference represents, think of the PLA’s top-down hierarchy as concrete and the American military’s more flexible command structure as play-doh. While the PLA seems tough and hard, a precise strike would break the concrete into permanent pieces. But not even concerted strikes could break the play-doh; the sergeant system means the American military has achieved the engineering ideal of being “ductile.” In his book War, meanwhile, Sebastian Junger vividly recounts how an American platoon patrolling in the mountains of Afghanistan got snared in a Taliban pincer attack, but by working together and by trusting the experience and expertise of their sergeants they fought their way out of the deadly trap with minimal casualties. On-the-spot judgment and decision-making would matter a great deal in the wind-swept waters and on the fragile islands of the South China Sea, and that’s one reason why China’s large top-down navy could be more of a liability than an asset in any engagement. Third, the South China Sea is politically chaotic and complex, a situation that because of its first two weaknesses, the PLA finds difficult to fathom institutionally. Any naval action has political ripple effects, and the PLA’s aggressiveness and swagger is only driving all of China’s neighbors into America’s open arms. Because of America’s counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the inextricability of military maneuvers from political consequences is now part of the American military’s DNA. Because the People’s Liberation Army has engaged in very few conflicts, institutionally it has not changed much since it “liberated” the Chinese people in 1949. Indeed, in the Korean War, the first and last time the PLA engaged the American military, we can see how fatal the PLA’s weaknesses were. First, the PLA’s entry into the Korean War was ultimately a political decision that Mao Zedong made against the violent protestations of his military advisors; General Peng Dehuai presciently argued that the PLA did not possess the logistical and organizational capacity to fight on the Korean peninsula. And, as the war dragged on, Chinese casualties skyrocketed, as PLA commanders just threw their troops into American heavily-fortified positions; in the rare instances when sheer numbers and blind courage over-ran machine gun nests, Chinese soldiers were at a loss as to what to do next, and reportedly listlessly waited for orders from the top that never came, allowing the Americans to quickly re-take hills and choke-points. Third and most important is how Mao Zedong badly misjudged the political situation. He allegedly trusted Stalin to provide air support, which Stalin did not do because he coldly and correctly calculated Russia had more to benefit from a chastened PLA than a victorious one. And because China interceded on behalf of belligerent North Korea, it inadvertently helped to justify a permanent American military presence in the region – something that China had aimed to prevent with its entry into the Korean War, ironically enough. While the Korean War went down in history as a stalemate, in reality it was an overwhelming American victory. If China were to provoke a conflict in the South China Sea, history would very likely repeat itself. Chinese pride themselves as diligent and dedicated students of history. The question now is how true that is.

# 2NC

## at we meet

Production means extraction of [oil / gas]

Barrett, JD – University of Oklahoma College of Law, ‘93

(Beverly M., 46 Okla. L. Rev. 745)

In such a royalty clause, as a precondition of sale, the oil and gas must be physically removed from the ground. n93 In fact, the oil and gas industry and most courts define production in terms of physical severance of the minerals from the ground. n94 When a pipeline makes take-or-pay payments, unless recoupment gas is physically taken, there is no production and thus no royalty owed. Obviously it would be easier to seek royalty payments under a royalty clause in which the terms "produced" or "production" are not used. n95

Oil drilling is distinct from production—the aff searches for energy, doesn’t produce it

Fairfax 99

<http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22839>

 RICHARD FAIRFAX, Director, Directorate of Compliance Programs

 OSHA has stated in previous interpretation letters that production facilities, including related oil, gas, and water separation facilities, are excluded from PSM coverage under the oil and gas well drilling and servicing exemption, 29 C.F.R. §1910.119(a)(2)(ii). Several factors, however, demonstrate that the conclusions reached in these letters are erroneous. As a result, these letters are hereby rescinded.The letters in question fail to take into account the distinction between wells in production and those undergoing initial drilling or in a servicing status.1 Production, as recognized by the petroleum industry, is a phase of well operations that deals with bringing well fluids to the surface, separating them, and then storing, gauging and otherwise preparing the product for the pipeline. This production phase occurs after a well has been drilled, completed, and placed into operation, or after it has been returned to operation following workover or servicing. A completed well includes a "Christmas tree" (control valves, pressure gauges and choke assemblies to control the flow of oil and gas) which is attached at the top of the well where pressure is expected. It is at this point, the top of the well, where the covered PSM process begins. The distance between separation equipment and the well is not a factor when determining PSM applicability for production facilities. Oil well drilling and servicing is distinct from production and covers activities related to the initial drilling of a well and later, maintenance work necessary to maintain or enhance production. Normally, such operations are occurring if a drilling rig or truck mounted rig or mast is present on the well. Oil well drilling and servicing includes the following activities: the actual drilling and associated activities of the well; Well completion activities (i.e. activities and methods necessary to prepare a well for the production of oil and gas). Well servicing (i.e. the maintenance work performedon an oil or gas well to improve or maintain the production from a formation already producing. Usually it involves repairs to the pump, rods, gas-lift valves, tubing, packers and so forth); and Workover activities (i.e. the performance of one or more of a variety of remedial operations on a producing oil well to try to increase production. Examples of workover operations include deepening, plugging back, pulling and resetting liners, squeeze cementing and so on. [FOOTNOTE] Two sources of recognition by the industry of this distinction can be found in A Primer of Oilwell Drilling, 5th Edition, Revised (published by the Petroleum Extension Service in cooperation with the International Association of Drilling Contractors) and A Primer of Oilwell Service, Workover, and Completion, 5th Edition (published by the Petroleum Extension Service in cooperation with the Association of Energy Service Companies)

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Federal Energy regs are FIVE MILLION RESEARCH HOURS

Tugwell 88

 The Energy Crisis and the American Political Economy:

Politics and Markets in the Management of Natural Resources

 Previously, Dr. Tugwell was the executive director of the Heinz Endowments of Pittsburgh, the founder and president of the Environment Enterprises Assistance Fund, and as a senior consultant for International Projects and Programs at PG&E Enterprises. He served as a deputy assistant administrator at USAID (1980-1981) and as a senior analyst for the energy program at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1979-1980). Dr. Tugwell was also a professor at Pomona College and an adjunct distinguished professor at the Heinz School of Carnegie Mellon University. Additionally, he serves on the Advisory Board and International Committee of the American Council on Renewable Energy and on the Joint Board of Councilors of the China-U.S. Center for Sustainable Development. He also serves on the Board of Eucord (European Cooperative for International Development). Dr. Tugwell received a PhD in political science from Columbia University.

 Finally, administering energy regulations proved a costly and cumbersome endeavor, exacting a price all citizens had to pay. As the energy specialist Paul MacAvoy has noted: "More than 300,000 firms were required to respond to controls, ranging from the three dozen major refining companies to a quarter of a million retailers of petroleum products. The respondents had to file more than half a million reports each year, which probably took more than five mil- lion man-hours to prepare, at an estimated cost alone of $80 mil- lion."64 To these expenditures must be added the additional costs to the government of collecting and processing these reports, monitor- ing compliance, and managing the complex process associated with setting forth new regulations and adjudicating disputes. All to- gether, it seems likely that the administrative costs, private and public, directly attributable to the regulatory process also exceeded $1 billion a year from 1974 to 1980.^

## Arctic

## their cards

Their evidence about artic leadership cites multiple alt causes and barriers to leadership—LOST, lack of bilateral arrangements

Borgerson 10

SCOTT G. BORGERSON is International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard, April 2008, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20032581.pdf?acceptTC=true>

But even as it pushes for a multilateral diplomatic solution, the United States should undertake a unilateral effort to shore up U.S. interests in the Arctic. The few in the United States who still stubbornly oppose U.S. accession to UNCLOS claim that by ratifying the treaty Washington would cede too much U.S. sovereignty and that customary international law and a powerful navy already allow the United States to protect its Arctic interests. But these are not enough. The United States is the only major country that has failed to ratify UNCLOS, and Washington is therefore left on the outside looking in as a nonmember to various legal and tech nical bodies. In addition to becoming a party to the convention, the United States must publish an updated Arctic policy, invest in ice-mapping programs, and breathe new life into its inefficient, uncompetitive shipyards, thus enabling it to update the country's geriatric icebreaker fleet, as soon as possible. The United States should also strike a deal with Canada, leading to a joint management effort along the same lines as the 1817R ush Bagot Agreement, which demilitarized the Great Lakes and led to the creation (albeit more than a century later) of the nonprofit St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation to manage this critical, and sometimes ice-covered, binational waterway. In the same spirit, the United States and Canada could combine their resources to help police thousands of miles of Arctic coastline. Washington and FOR E IG N AF FA IR S March/A pril2008 [7 5 ] This content downloaded on Wed, 9 Jan 2013 22:20:32 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Scott G. Borgerson Ottawa now work collaboratively on other sea and land borders and togetherb uilt the impressivNe orth American AerospaceD efense Command, or NORADs,y stemT. hey arep erfectlyc apableo f doing

the same on the Arctic

#### Arctic drilling is critical to retain global U.S. primacy

Hobson ’12 - Energy and Environmental Correspondent for the National Journal

White House candidates for polar summit, Iceland president tells Alaskans, Margaret Kriz Hobson, August 27, 2012, Warrant Cites Rubenstein – Co-Founder of Carlyle Group & Energy, Politics & Economics Expert, [www.eenews.net](http://www.eenews.net); and, http://www.arcticimperative.com/?page\_id=2078

Grimsson noted that despite the increased international interest in oil and gas development in the American Arctic, the United States has been less involved in Arctic policy issues than any other Arctic nation, particularly much less so than Russia.¶ He also said that when he visited China, Singapore and South Korea, the heads of state buttonholed him to support their request to become permanent observers to the Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental forum that addresses issues faced by Arctic governments and indigenous people in the region.¶ Grimsson said China, which has no coastal lands located on the Arctic, recently launched a new heavy-duty icebreaker designed to travel through the polar waters. By contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard has only one older operating research icebreaker, the Healy, and no new ice ships under construction.¶ “There’s something profound in the political system of the United States that prevents Washington from becoming as active as China is now in the Arctic,” Grimsson said. “I’m not talking about Russia. It would take you a long time to catch up with Russia. But you can hopefully in the next few years match China in the interest in the Arctic.”¶ Meanwhile, investor David Rubenstein told the conference that Washington isn’t likely to consider underwriting new ice breakers or prioritizing Alaska issues unless the nation suddenly faces a crisis in the Arctic.¶ The co-founder of the Carlyle Group, Rubenstein compared today’s lack of federal investment in the Arctic infrastructure and Coast Guard activities to the 1950s when the government ignored space exploration until Russia launched the Sputnik, the first earth satellite.¶ In the aftermath, the Kennedy administration inspired the nation by channeling federal funds into the space race and beating Russia to land a man on the moon.¶ “What’s going to have to happen is that somebody from outside the United States, perhaps Russia, will have to take such a compelling lead in the Arctic that our national security and our economic viability is clearly threatened in ways that people in Washington see it,” Rubenstein said.¶ “I think you need to have a boogeyman,” he suggested. “[Russian President Vladimir] Putin might be the best one in some respects. He said that the Arctic is his strategic reserve for the 21st century. And people in Washington need to remember what he said. Because if it’s his strategic reserve, then it’s not our strategic reserve.”¶ Iceland President Grimsson said that as the world increasingly looks to the Arctic for resource extraction and international shipping, America must take a larger role in Arctic policy issues or risk losing its primacy on the world political scene.¶ “Quite seriously,” he said, “I cannot see how the United States of America is going to conduct a comprehensive, responsible foreign policy in the coming decades without being the leader of the Arctic.”

#### The Arctic will be the next area of great power conflict---oil production results in investments that prevent escalation

Talmadge 12 (Eric – AP, Huffington Post, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity’, 4/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-military-activity\_n\_1427565.html)

To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. They are preparing for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and a slew of potential conflicts. By Arctic standards, the region is already buzzing with military activity, and experts believe that will increase significantly in the years ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever — Exercise Cold Response — with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, so will the need for policing, border patrols and — if push comes to shove — military muscle to enforce rival claims. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia, Canada and the United States have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia — one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle — has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's superpower. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic countries — Norway, Denmark and Canada — to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in the region. This is only going to increase as time goes on." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "We want to maintain our edge up there," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in the Arctic has never really waned. It remains very important." But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it lacks ships able to operate in or near Arctic ice, support facilities and adequate communications. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers.

## plan no boost

#### Most contracts are idle – at best it takes a decade to solve

**CBO 12** (Congressional Budget Office, August 2012, "Potential Budgetary Effects of Immediately Opening Most Federal Lands to Oil and Gas Leasing", [www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12\_Oil-and-Gas\_Leasing.pdf](http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12_Oil-and-Gas_Leasing.pdf))

Leasing Offshore Federal Lands The geographic scope of leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf has changed often over the past few decades.3 CBO anticipates that, under current law, DOI will offer leases for most of the acreage in the OCS over the next several decades. Until the early 1980s, DOI offered leases in all of the OCS, including the areas off the Atlantic, Pacific, and Florida coasts. In 1990, after the Congress imposed a series of temporary restrictions, President George H.W. Bush withdrew large portions of the OCS in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the eastern Gulf of Mexico from the leasing program. Those restricted areas were subsequently expanded by President Clinton. Then, in 2008, President George W. Bush narrowed the restrictions to include only areas that had been designated as National Marine Sanctuaries. In 2010, President Obama removed Alaska’s Bristol Bay area from the leasing program until the end of June 2017. Since 2008, policies on leasing in the Atlantic and Pacific OCS have varied, reflecting differences between the two most recent Administrations. In January 2009, DOI issued a proposed five-year plan that included lease sales in the Atlantic and Pacific OCS for the 2010–2015 period. The program proposed in June 2012 does not include an option for sales in those areas between 2012 and 2017. Neither plan involved the areas in the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the Florida coast in which leasing is now prohibited until the end of June 2022.4 Other than the temporary ban on leasing in the eastern Gulf of Mexico, there currently are no statutory restrictions on OCS leasing. Decisions about leasing are made administratively—in consultation with industry and the states—for five-year periods. Leases cannot be offered for areas that are not included in a five-year plan, but the available regions may change whenever a new plan is adopted. The next plan is expected to go into effect in August 2012 and will extend for five years unless a future Administration chooses to restart the process before that plan expires. Historical experience suggests that only a fraction of the leases awarded in the OCS will eventually be brought into production. Almost 60 percent of the OCS leases issued in the Gulf of Mexico through 2007 either expired or were relinquished without producing any oil or natural gas.5 CBO estimates that almost 90 percent of the 2011 OCS production was from leases issued before 2001, reflecting the long lead times associated with exploring and developing oil and gas fields. 6

## can’t drill

#### Not enough refineries

CFAP 8 (Center for American Progress, 9/15/2008, "Ten Reasons Not to Expand Offshore Drilling", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/))

8. We can’t refine the oil we would extract. In a June speech, President George W. Bush noted that, “Refineries are the critical link between crude oil and the gasoline and diesel fuel that drivers put in their tanks.” Yet refineries are already so stretched that last year, the United States had to import almost 150 million barrels of gasoline. The Wall Street Journal reported oil companies are not building new refineries because it would be bad for their bottom line: “Building a new refinery from scratch, Exxon believes, would be bad for long-term business.”

#### Technical barriers

**CBO 12** (Congressional Budget Office, August 2012, "Potential Budgetary Effects of Immediately Opening Most Federal Lands to Oil and Gas Leasing", [www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12\_Oil-and-Gas\_Leasing.pdf](http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12_Oil-and-Gas_Leasing.pdf))

Offshore Leasing For this analysis, CBO used EIA’s estimates of the potential for new areas to produce oil or gas after 2022. EIA expects that any initial production from newly opened areas in the Atlantic, Pacific, and eastern Gulf of Mexico would be far less than is produced by current operations in the Gulf of Mexico (see Figure 2). In its Annual Energy Outlook 2011, EIA estimated that if leasing commenced in those OCS regions by 2023, production through 2035 would amount to around 0.35 billion BOE—or about 3 percent of the 13.5 billion BOE that the agency projected would be produced from federal leases in the Gulf of Mexico over that 13-year period.17 EIA’s estimates reflect its assumption that “local infrastructure issues and other potential nonfederal impediments are resolved.”18 In CBO’s view, such factors probably would slow or limit production, as they sometimes have in the past. The federal government has spent about $1.5 billion to compensate firms for leases that were canceled or relinquished because of state or local concerns about oil and gas development off the coasts of California, North Carolina, and Florida and in Bristol Bay in Alaska.19 According to DOI, 24 localities in California have “enacted ordinances that either bar the construction of onshore support facilities for offshore oil and gas development or subject the approval of such facilities to a vote by local citizens.”20 Any development in the Atlantic OCS would involve siting and building new pipelines and related onshore facilities, which would require approval by state and local authorities. Other technical complications and economic factors add to the uncertainty surrounding forecasts of production in new areas of the OCS. DOI’s resource assessments suggest that much of the undiscovered oil in the eastern Gulf of Mexico is located in ultradeep water—water that is more than 2,400 meters (about 7,900 feet) deep—where few leases can be brought into production in any year because of the cost and complexity of their development. 21 Other factors could slow production in new areas, including the need for exploratory drilling and the expectation that most of the fields will be relatively small.22 Historically, production facilities have been installed at a slower pace in the California OCS than in the Gulf of Mexico.23

#### Plan doesn’t increase drilling

**CBO 12** (Congressional Budget Office, August 2012, "Potential Budgetary Effects of Immediately Opening Most Federal Lands to Oil and Gas Leasing", [www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12\_Oil-and-Gas\_Leasing.pdf](http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12_Oil-and-Gas_Leasing.pdf))

Long-Term Budgetary Effects of Expanded Leasing Whether future Administrations will make areas in the Atlantic, Pacific, or eastern Gulf of Mexico available for oil and gas leasing by 2023 is not known, but CBO expects that such leasing will occur over time without any changes in law. Legislation to require immediate leasing of those areas would accelerate development but probably would not affect the total amount of development in those areas over the next several decades.

## 2nc at: arctic conflict

Their author

Tassinari 9/7

Fabrizio Tassinari is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and the Head of Foreign Policy and EU Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies, September 7, 2012, “Avoiding a Scramble for the High North”,

http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/09/07/avoiding-a-scramble-for-the-high-north/

For a peaceful Arctic environment to emerge, the political discourse and ensuing practices need rebalancing. Besides abstract musings about the normative virtues of multilateralism, straightforward considerations of enlightened self-interest should justify the drive for cooperation. As The Economist put it in a recent report, “The five Arctic littoral countries … would sooner develop the resources they have than argue over those they do not have.” Some recent developments point in this direction. The Arctic Council, the main regional forum grouping the littoral countries plus Iceland, Sweden, and Finland, has grown into a premier venue of high-level interaction among Arctic powers. The stature of outsiders queuing up for permanent observer status, including China and the EU, testifies to the growing importance of this body. In 2011, the Council’s members strengthened cooperation on search and rescue operations (a crucial matter for such a territorially vast area). In 2008, the five littoral countries joined together in a statement, the Ilulissat Declaration, by which they committed to settle in an orderly manner disagreements that may arise on issues such as navigation rights and delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf.

#### Economics trump—competition won’t escalate

IISS, International institute for Strategic Studies, 11/28/12, Russia in the Arctic: Economic Interests Trump Military Ambitions, www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/11/28/russia\_in\_the\_arctic\_economic\_interests\_trump\_military\_ambitions\_100373-2.html

A recent mission by a Russian nuclear submarine to the floor of the Arctic Ocean has threatened to reignite the media narrative that regional disputes over the right to unlock the economic potential of the Arctic could result in military confrontation. But it is their mutual economic interests that mean that the five Arctic coastal states are motivated to pursue legal and diplomatic avenues to achieve their aspirations, and have no desire to jeopardise the status quo. During the Russian operation, known as Arktika-2012, geological material was collected from one of the two underwater mountain ranges that extend from the Russian landmass towards the North Pole. Russia wants to prove that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges are extensions of Russia's continental shelf and part of the Eurasian plate, which, according to the current legal framework, would allow Russia exclusive rights to any potential future resources under the seabed. The details of the project were intended to remain secret, but in November 2012 several news stories about the submarine appeared, citing a Russian defence ministry source. Despite efforts to build good regional relations among Arctic countries, Russia's neighbours do have concerns about its increasing military presence in the Arctic and its sometimes assertive, anti-Western rhetoric. However, considered in the wider context of Russia's post-Cold War military re-development, its Arctic positioning is not as confrontational as it may seem. The Arctic is a key part of Russia's reassertion of what it sees as its rightful place in international affairs, and it has far greater territory, presence and capability in the Arctic than its neighbours. Rich in hydrocarbons, the region was highlighted in Moscow's Arctic policy of 2008 as the country's primary source of energy for the twenty-first century: approximately 15% of the country's GDP and 25% of its exports come from there, while 80% of the gas in the Arctic lies within Russia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). There are major on-shore gas installations, and plans to further develop off-shore drilling, though these have met with some logistical difficulties with international partners. Along with hydrocarbons, maritime transport is a major economic development priority. The Northern Sea Route, the new shipping route most likely to become commercially viable in the coming decades as the summer ice recedes, and promises to connect Europe and Asia, runs through Russia's territorial waters or EEZ. However, the lack of infrastructure along the route will hold back the development of commercial shipping. Arktika-2012 The planting of a titanium Russian flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean during a previous mission, Arktika-2007, created a powerful image, but it had no legal significance. It did, however, pique international interest in the Arctic and encouraged a media narrative about competition over the region's territory and resources. The objective of Russia's latest mission, Arktika-2012, was to prove that its landmass extends to the North Pole by drilling into the sea floor to collect rock samples for scientific analysis. In September, the Kalitka, a Losharik-class nuclear-powered auxiliary submarine, was used to guide the Kapitan Dranitsyn and Dickson ice breakers in drilling three boreholes at two different sites on the Mendeleev ridge, collecting over 500kg of rock samples. This was the first known mission for the Kalitka. Equipped with space-station-grade air and water regeneration systems, the submarine can remain submerged for months. During this operation, it remained 2.5-3 kilometres below the surface for 20 days. (Though the battery-powered civilian Mir stations used in the Arktika-2007 expedition can also operate at such depths, they can only stay submerged for 72 hours.) It was mounted to the underside of a larger nuclear-powered auxiliary submarine (the Orenburg, a redesigned Kalmar or Delta III stretch) to transport it to the drilling site and was supported by the larger boat during the operation. Continental-shelf claims and maritime borders In collecting the geological samples, Russia was responding to a request by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that it submit supporting evidence for its claim to a broad continental shelf that extends beyond its landmass under the Arctic Ocean. The five Arctic coastal states - Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway and Denmark - in 2008 issued a joint statement, known as the Ilulissat Declaration, committing to settling territorial claims diplomatically, using existing legal mechanisms. The primary legal body for maritime border delimitation in the Arctic is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which rules that maritime countries' EEZs extend 200 nautical miles from their shore. The CLCS covers continental-shelf claims beyond that zone, up to a maximum of 350nm. hould it be determined that the claimed portion of the ocean floor has the same geological makeup as the Russian continental landmass, then the CLCS will rule that it is an extension of Russia's continental shelf, granting Russia sovereign rights to resources under the seabed up to 350nm from its shoreline. In a submission to CLCS in 2001, Russia claimed the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges, as well as the seabed below the North Pole. If this claim is verified, Russia's continental shelf would be extended by 1.2 million square kilometres, and give Russia exclusive rights to the resources below the seabed. Russia's Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment tested the samples and found that they did match the make-up of its landmass. Its next submission to CLCS will likely be ready by the end of 2013, to be submitted in 2014. (The CLCS's ruling will be final and binding.) Following Russia's lead, all Arctic countries are preparing to submit claims to the CLCS: Norway's is already complete, while the United States is going ahead with its preparations even though it has not yet ratified UNCLOS and is, therefore, not a party to its adjudication. There is considerable support for acceding to UNCLOS within the US State Department and Department of Defense, and the claim is being put together in anticipation of eventual ratification. Further sources of friction between Arctic nations on the issue of maritime border delimitation include bilateral disagreements between the US and Canada, and between Denmark and Canada, and a trilateral dispute between Russia, Canada and Denmark. The 2,000km-long Lomonosov ridge, meanwhile, is particularly contentious: Canada claims that the ridge is an underwater extension of Ellesmere Island, while Denmark argues that it is an extension of Greenland's landmass. The US, in turn, has stated that Lomonosov is an oceanic ridge and thus cannot be an extension of any country's continental shelf. However, joint efforts to map the seabed in more detail are under way. In 2011, the US and Canada concluded a five-year mapping operation of their continental shelf, and Canada and Denmark conducted a seismic exploration in 2007. In September 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for the creation of a joint scientific council with Canada to allow potentially overlapping continental-shelf claims to be discussed, and Canada responded positively. In addition to the joint surveys, scientists and officials from Arctic nations have met annually since 2007 to discuss issues related to their continental shelves, which may overlap. Of the known oil and gas deposits in the region, 97% lie within the Arctic states' EEZs, meaning there is not much competition between states for access to them. Most of these deposits may not be recoverable in the near term, due to the difficulties of hydrocarbon extraction in remote, harsh and ecologically sensitive environments. But in making maximal continental-shelf claims, Arctic states are hedging that there may be new discoveries or technological developments that will make these deposits more accessible in future. The area that the Russian Federation is claiming is not thought to be rich in hydrocarbons, but does include the North Pole, which has symbolic value. Receive email alerts International Institute for Strategic Studies Arctic Russia Cooperation likely to produce best results Though the CLCS will rule on the extent of the continental shelf in the Arctic, it will not draw the boundaries within the area designated as continental shelf. It is for the countries concerned to come to an agreement on the division of that continental shelf, and the outer boundaries of their national claims, as Russia and Norway did over their Barents Sea border in 2010. However, the CLCS requires that conflicting claims be resolved before it makes its recommendation on the boundary between international oceanic space and national jurisdiction. Differences of opinion among Arctic states over the extent of their shelves could be resolved by discussing CLCS claims before they are submitted, reaching mutually agreeable findings and submitting parallel or joint applications. Each country submits its data to the CLCS confidentially, and its meetings are held in private. UNCLOS scholars believe that Russia has been in communication with Canada and possibly Denmark on the division of their respective claims to the Lomonosov ridge, but there is no information in the public domain about these negotiations. Potential joint submissions are likewise not being prepared openly. Military activity in the Arctic Apart from its economic potential, the strategic importance of the Arctic is not lost on any regional state and all of them have increased the number and complexity of their military exercises there. After a long period of stagnation, Russia is devoting considerable resources to rebuilding and streamlining its military forces. Military exercises have increased for all of the Russian military, including the Northern Fleet, which is based on Russia's northwest coast, inside the Arctic Circle, and is the main locus of its sea-based nuclear deterrent. Its air assets include long-range bombers and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. On the ground, its capabilities include naval infantry and an army brigade on the Kola Peninsula. In 2009, Russia announced its plans to develop further specialised forces to protect its Arctic territory. Russia expressed its unease about the further militarisation of the region in 2009, when Norway moved its armed forces' headquarters to Reitan, in the north of the country. It considered Cold Response - a 15-country exercise that took place in northern Norway and Sweden in March 2012 and involved 16,300 troops - a provocation, and reacted with an exercise involving its 200th motor rifle brigade from Murmansk, including T-80 tanks with gas-turbine engines suited for the Arctic climate. However, Russia has also undertaken joint exercises with both Norway and the US. Confidence-building measures such as these, as well as forums to openly address security matters, have been considered constructive. Moscow's 2008 Arctic policy placed its emphasis not on a military build-up but on maritime law enforcement duties. It also focused on enforcing shipping and fishing regulations, and providing search-and-rescue capabilities. Russia's northern border includes almost 40,000km of coastline, which is becoming more exposed as summer sea ice retreats and economic activity increases. Though Russia has a coastal border guard, only a few of its ships are suitable for Arctic operations, and its ability to monitor its coast and EEZ, and enforce regulations, is limited. As with other Arctic countries, meeting its constabulary requirements is a more immediate and pressing challenge than rebuilding military structures to tackle comparatively notional security threats. Mutual economic interest Despite the signs of heightened military activity in the region, the greatest stabilising factor in the region is mutual economic interest, and the points of friction around border delimitation and military activity are unlikely to override this. Russia, in particular, is eager to open up the Northern Sea Route for trade purposes, as it perceives great potential for commerce along its otherwise remote northern coast and the possibility of imposing transit fees for shipping through the route. Russia's relations with NATO and the US will have a major impact on levels of cooperation or mistrust in the Arctic. Rebuilding its decaying infrastructure and managing the Northern Sea Route that can connect Europe and Asia will advance Russia's strategic goals in the region more effectively than an unnecessary military build-up.

No opportunity and coop solves – prefer experts

Young, Professor – Institutional and International Governance, Environmental Institutions @ UCSB, Arctic expert, PhD – Yale, ‘11

(Oran R, “The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?” *International Affairs* 87:1, p. 185-193)

Popular accounts of the Arctic’s jurisdictional issues are regularly couched in terms of provocative phrases like the afore-mentioned ‘who owns the Arctic’ or ‘use it or lose it’. But these phrases turn out to be highly misleading in this context. There are virtually no disputes in the Arctic regarding sovereignty over northern lands; no one has expressed a desire to redraw the map of the Arctic with regard to the terrestrial boundaries of the Arctic states. Most of the disagreements are to do with jurisdiction over marine areas where the idea of ownership in the ordinary sense is irrelevant. While some of these disagreements are of long standing and feature relatively entrenched positions, they are not about establishing ownership, and they do not indicate that some level of ‘use’ is required to avoid the erosion of sovereignty. There is little prospect that these disputes will spawn armed clashes. As both Michael Byers and Shelagh Grant make clear in their excellent analyses of Arctic sovereignty, recent efforts to address matters involving sovereignty in the Arctic are marked by a spirit of rule-based problem-solving, rather than an escalating spiral of politically charged claims and counterclaims. The process of delineating jurisdictional boundaries regarding the seabed beyond the limits of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) is taking place in conformity with the rules and procedures set forth in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Norway and Russia have signed an international treaty resolving their differences regarding jurisdictional boundaries in the Barents Sea. There are signs that Canada and the United States are interested in a similar approach with regard to the Beaufort Sea. The Russians, whose much ballyhooed 2007 initiative to plant the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole is widely discussed in the books under review, have acted in conformity with the relevant rules of international law in addressing jurisdictional matters and repeatedly expressed their readiness to move forward in a cooperative manner in this realm. There are, of course, significant sensitivities regarding the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and especially the Northwest Passage. But given that commercial traffic on these routes is likely to be limited during the near future, and that the use of these routes will require the active cooperation of the coastal states, regardless of their formal legal status, opportunities arise for devising pragmatic arrangements governing the use of these waterways. The progress now being made regarding the development of a mandatory Polar Code covering Arctic shipping is good news. The fact that ‘hot spots’ in the search for oil and gas in the Arctic are located, for the most part, in areas that are not subject to jurisdictional disputes is also helpful. Overall, it seems fair to conclude that the Arctic states are living up to their promises to deal with jurisdictional issues in the region in a peaceful manner.

## Russia

## no solve

#### They don’t solve this adv---their author says permitting delays and state restrictions key—squo resolves it all

Sullivan 12 Dan Sullivan, a former state attorney general, is the commissioner of Alaska's Department of Natural Resources, “Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy and Power”, August 2, 2012, <http://dnr.alaska.gov/commis/testimony/Sullivan_House%20Energy_Power_8_2_2012.pdf>

In recent years, regulatory delay in the United States has become the rule rather than the exception. Over the years, Congress and the executive branch have developed and accepted a regulatory system that almost guarantees significant delay and endless litigation for resource development projects.

Take for example the minerals sector in the United States. In 2012, the investment firm Behre Dolbear Group’s annual global survey of the mineral sector ranked the United States the lowest out of 25 countries in the category of “permitting delays” tying with Papua New Guinea. This was attributed to the fact that because of federal rules that states are bound to enforce results in a 7- to 10-year waiting period to complete permitting work before mine construction and development can begin in the United States. By contrast, in other industrialized countries like Australia and Canada, the average permitting time is about three years.

Overlapping jurisdictions and the endless opportunities provided to opponents of resource development to litigate a project add to these permitting delays. Alaskans witness this type of litigation on almost every resource development or infrastructure expansion project in the state.

C. Jobs and the Environment are Undermined

Unfortunately, potential investors have expressed reluctance to pursue resource development projects in the United States and Alaska, in particular, because of the risk of permitting delays and litigation. We believe that such a reputation discourages investment, significantly hurts job creation and undermines global environmental protection. By discouraging responsible development in our own country, we are passing energy and mineral investment to countries with substandard environmental regulations and little capacity or desire to protect the environment. Take the Russian hydrocarbon sector. Last year, some of America’s largest energy companies announced multi-billion dollar investments in the Russian Arctic, even though the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that offshore and onshore Alaska has greater oil potential. The fact that the U.S. regulatory system has delayed or blocked many hydrocarbon development projects in Alaska was likely a factor driving American companies to invest in Russia.

Alaska has some of the world’s most comprehensive environmental protections regarding the oil sector. And Russia? Last year, the Associated Press investigated Russia’s abysmal record regarding oil spills and pollution. The estimates given in the AP article ranged from 5 million to 20 million tons of oil leaked a year. Even at the lower end, that would be the equivalent of a Deepwater Horizon blowout about every two months. Russia experienced approximately 18,000 oil pipeline ruptures in 2010 – the figure in the U.S. for the same year was 341.

Clearly, the global environment would be much better off if hydrocarbons and other natural resources were produced in countries with the highest environmental standards rather than some of the lowest. Yet, the significant flaws in our own system are partly to blame for the investment in lax overseas jurisdictions where environmental degradation is common.

D. The Good News: Growing Consensus that Regulatory Reform and Modernization is Needed

The good news is the growing recognition that something serious needs to be done. The Economist recently ran a cover story called “Over-regulated America” in which it concluded that “America needs a smarter approach to regulation” that will “mitigate a real danger: that regulation may crush the life out of America’s economy.” Former President Bill Clinton has weighed in similarly. In a Newsweek article last year, he lamented that it can take three years or more to permit major economic development projects. His number one recommendation to put Americans back to work was to speed up the regulatory approval process and grant state waivers on environmental rules to hasten start times on construction projects.

We recognize that there are efforts to reform our regulatory system that are being undertaken by the U.S. House of Representatives and I testified last year in support of the U.S. House Natural Resources Committee’s American Energy Initiative. The introduction and passage from committee of H.R. 4382 Providing Leasing Certainty for American Energy Act and H.R. 4383 Streamlining Permitting of American Energy Act are steps in the right direction and we hope that these two bills will be passed on the House floor and transmitted to the U.S. Senate. Another positive sign has been the House passage of H.R. 4402, National Strategic and Critical Minerals Protection Act.

Alaska, other states and Canada are not waiting for federal regulators to take action. They are undertaking reforms to make state permitting processes more efficient, timely, and certain. States as politically diverse as Alaska, California, Massachusetts, Indiana, and Kansas are fully engaged in modernizing their regulatory systems. This is a bipartisan effort driven by policymakers’ recognition of the economic benefits of allowing large-scale development projects to proceed in a responsible manner.

#### They don’t get companies to come back----Russia’s leadership locked in

Forbes 1/3/13

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/01/03/why-shell-should-just-quit-its-alaska-drilling-fiasco/>

Russia will not impose environmental restrictions on Arctic drilling as tight as those the U.S. EPA has forced on Shell, which was required to spend millions to reduce diesel emissions from the Kulluk. But as Shell has shown in spades, the operational risks are enormous. Can it be done? Of course. Shell and others successfully drilled a handful of wells in the Alaskan Arctic in the 1970s and ’80s. But regulation and oversight were more lax then. It’s different today, in this post Deepwater Horizon world. BP has shown that the cost of a deepwater blowout is upwards of $60 billion. The cost of a blowout in the Arctic, far from land, in frigid waters, is incalculable. Is Arctic drilling worth those risks? Not yet. Not when the $5 billion spent so far is just an ante on a development project that would require at least another $5 billion to drill out the wells, and (assuming successful discoveries) to build out the infrastructure to get the oil to market. And not when there are so many other options onshore. Granted, when Shell acquired the Arctic drilling leases from the Federal government, the U.S. boom in shale drilling was only just beginning. But for the same $5 billion that it’s plugged into Alaska, Shell could have bought up a massive position in a low-risk, oily shale play like the Eagle Ford or Bakken, the Permian Basin or Mississippi Lime — and started generating new volumes and cash flow in months, instead of decades.

#### With new contracts

Forbes 4/18/12

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/04/18/exxons-new-russian-oil-finds-not-for-sale-til-maybe-2018/>

Both companies announced plans on Monday to establish two joint ventures to explore East Prinovozemelsky Blocks 1, 2 and 3 in the Kara Sea in the frigid Russian Arctic and another area as well in the Black Sea. Russian publicly traded oil firm Rosneft will hold 66.7% in both joint ventures, according to Ria Novosti. Rosneft and Exxon Mobil signed a $3.2 billion agreement to work jointly at these projects last year. “Considering that drilling begins in 2015, in two to three years production drilling may be launched and production may start in 2018-2020,” Sechin said at a presentation for investors and analysts in Moscow.

## Econ

## no war – 2nc

#### Recent empirics go neg

Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9

(Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

#### History disproves causality between crisis and war

Ferguson 6 (Niall, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard, a Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College at Oxford, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, “The War of the World”, Penguin Books, pg. xxxviii)

Nor can economic crises explain all the violent upheavals of the century. As noted already, perhaps the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography leads from the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of war. Yet on closer inspection this pleasing story falls apart. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression became fascist regimes; nor did all the fascist regimes engage in wars of aggression. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe, but only after its economy had recovered from the Depression. The Soviet Union, which started the war on Hitler’s side, was cut off from the world economic crisis, yet ended up mobilizing and losing more soldiers than any other combatant. For the century as a whole, no general rule is discernible. Some wars came after periods of growth; others were the causes rather than the consequence of economic crisis. And some severe economic crisis did not lead to wars. Certainly, it is now impossible to argue (thought Marxists long tried to) that the First World War was the result of a crisis of capitalism; on the contrary, it abruptly terminated a period of extraordinary global economic integration with relatively high growth and low inflation.

## drilling high

The BLM is going H.A.M. on oil and the plan doesn’t translate into production

Goad 8-2-12

Jessica, Message To House GOP About Drilling On Public Lands: ‘All Of The Above’ Does Not Mean ‘All Of The Acres’, Jessica is the Manager of Research and Outreach for the Public Lands Project at the Center for American Progress Action Fund.

http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/02/631571/message-to-house-gop-about-drilling-on-public-lands-all-of-the-above-does-not-mean-all-of-the-acres/

The House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power held a hearing this morning about the differences between drilling for oil and gas on private versus public lands. GOP members of the committee tried to use the hearing to claim the Administration is hampering oil and gas development. However, a number of witnesses testified to the contrary, saying that there is a substantial amount of drilling occurring on public lands. The Center for American Progress Action Fund’s Christy Goldfuss was one of them: Regarding new lands offered for oil and gas development, the Bureau of Land Management held three of the top five largest sales in the agency’s history in calendar year 2011, and this year, it has approved controversial projects to drill in the Arctic Ocean and close to wilderness areas near Desolation Canyon, Utah. With this level of oil and gas activity on public lands, it is clear why a recent New York Times article about oil and gas production on public lands said, “The score card shows that the industry is winning.” And yet members like Rep. Ed Whitfield (R-KY) claimed that “the Obama administration has substantially cut back on new energy leasing in these federal lands and offshore areas.” The oil and gas industry agreed with this sentiment in its testimony. Kathleen Sgamma,Vice President of Government & Public Affairs for the Western Energy Alliance, acknowledged that the oil and gas business is booming, but also complained that production on public lands “is simply not keeping pace” with the current boom in unconventional oil plays on private lands in North Dakota and Texas. However, while the oil and gas industry demands more access to public lands, it is sitting on thousands of leases. A report from the Department of the Interior found that 56 percent of the acres leased onshore and 72 percent of the acres leased offshore are not in production or exploration. Goldfuss and other witnesses cautioned that many federal public lands — which are managed by the government on behalf of all Americans — are meant for multiple uses, of which oil and gas development is only one. Other uses of public lands include hunting, fishing, recreation, grazing, and renewable energy development. In response to industry calling for more land to be leased, Goldfuss said: … an “all of the above” energy strategy does not mean an “all of the acres” or “oil above all” strategy. Today’s hearing is the eleventh in the House Energy and Commerce and Natural Resources Committees thus far in 2012 on how to increase drilling.

Squo production boom solves the aff

Fahey 10/23 (Jonathan Fahey, AP Energy Writer, 10/23/2012, "US may soon become world's top oil producer", finance.yahoo.com/news/us-may-soon-become-worlds-top-oil-producer-173753430--finance.html)

NEW YORK (AP) — U.S. oil output is surging so fast that the United States **could soon overtake Saudi Arabia as the world's biggest producer**.

Driven by high prices and new drilling methods, U.S. production of crude and other liquid hydrocarbons is on track to rise 7 percent this year to an average of 10.9 million barrels per day. This will be the fourth straight year of crude increases and the biggest single-year gain since 1951.

The boom has **surprised even the experts**.

"Five years ago, if I or anyone had predicted today's production growth, people would have thought we were crazy," says Jim Burkhard, head of oil markets research at IHS CERA, an energy consulting firm.

The Energy Department forecasts that U.S. production of crude and other liquid hydrocarbons, which includes biofuels, will average 11.4 million barrels per day next year. That would be a record for the U.S. and just below Saudi Arabia's output of 11.6 million barrels. Citibank forecasts U.S. production could reach 13 million to 15 million barrels per day by 2020, helping to make North America "the new Middle East."

The last year the U.S. was the world's largest producer was 2002, after the Saudis drastically cut production because of low oil prices in the aftermath of 9/11. Since then, the Saudis and the Russians have been the world leaders.

The United States will still need to import lots of oil in the years ahead. Americans use 18.7 million barrels per day. But thanks to the growth in domestic production and the improving fuel efficiency of the nation's cars and trucks, imports could fall by half by the end of the decade.

The increase in production hasn't translated to cheaper gasoline at the pump, and prices are expected to stay high relatively high for the next few years because of growing demand for oil in developing nations and political instability in the Middle East and North Africa. Still, producing more oil domestically, and importing less, **gives the economy a significant boost**.

The companies profiting range from independent drillers to large international oil companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, which increasingly see the U.S. as one of the most promising places to drill. ExxonMobil agreed last month to spend $1.6 billion to increase its U.S. oil holdings.

Increased drilling is driving economic growth in states such as North Dakota, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Montana and Texas, all of which have unemployment rates far below the national average of 7.8 percent. North Dakota is at 3 percent; Oklahoma, 5.2.

Businesses that serve the oil industry, such as steel companies that supply drilling pipe and railroads that transport oil, aren't the only ones benefiting. Homebuilders, auto dealers and retailers in energy-producing states are also getting a lift.

IHS says the oil and gas drilling boom, which already supports 1.7 million jobs, **will lead to the creation of 1.3 million jobs across the U.S. economy** by the end of the decade.

"It's the most important change to the economy since the advent of personal computers pushed up productivity in the 1990s," says economist Philip Verleger, a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute of International Economics.

The major factor driving domestic production higher is a newfound ability to squeeze oil out of rock once thought too difficult and expensive to tap. Drillers have learned to drill horizontally into long, thin seams of shale and other rock that holds oil, instead of searching for rare underground pools of hydrocarbons that have accumulated over millions of years.

To free the oil and gas from the rock, drillers crack it open by pumping water, sand and chemicals into the ground at high pressure, a process is known as hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking."

While expanded use of the method has unlocked enormous reserves of oil and gas, it has also raised concerns that contaminated water produced in the process could leak into drinking water.

#### The status quo is solving without policy changes – market forces are producing huge increases in U.S. production

Salt Lake Tribune 10/27/2012

(http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/55156068-82/production-oil-american-domestic.html.csp)

The good news: **Production of petroleum in the United States is soaring**.

**Next year promises to set a record for domestic production and**, at current rates, **the good ol’ U.S. of A. will be the top oil producer in the world**, **surpassing Saudi Arabia**, **by the year 2020**.

This puts the lie to the Republican claim that the Obama administration has the desire, or the ability, to squash domestic production and leave us increasingly vulnerable to a dangerous dependence on foreign sources of energy.

The bad news: Production of petroleum in the United States is soaring.

The continuing high prices for raw crude, prompted by increasing demand from China, India and other rapidly industrializing nations, has encouraged drillers to invest in new methods and expand their exploration to areas previously thought too low-yield to bother with. The result is pressure to drill in places, and in ways, that threaten our environment, from the appearance of national treasures to the safety of our water.

The most important thing to understand about this situation is that **the price of oil**, and thus the price you pay for gasoline, **has little to do with any decision made in Washington**. It has more to do with the world oil market, currently driven by the exploding demand of many nations.

With that fact should come the understanding that, to a significant degree, the American desire for energy independence and our wish for cheap gas are mutually exclusive. **The increase in domestic production has** almost **nothing to do with rules** laid down, or **relaxed, by puny governments and everything to do with the incentive of mighty markets**.

## oil prices

#### Drilling doesn’t solve energy security

Yetiv 12 (Steve A. Yetiv, a professor of political science at Old Dominion University, is the author, most recently, of “The Petroleum Triangle: Oil, Globalization, and Terror.”, 9/4/2012, "Is the Energy Boom a Mirage?", www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/opinion/is-the-energy-boom-a-mirage.html?\_r=1)

But what does this oil boom really mean? Will it deliver lower oil prices and enhance energy security, which is what most Americans want and many may expect? We should not be overly optimistic. First, the boom would mean far more if America alone used its own oil resources. But oil is a global commodity. Imagine a giant pool of oil. No matter where the oil comes from, buyers will pay roughly the same price for it. And all of that extra American oil will be sold chiefly on global oil markets, not set aside for Americans. As an extreme example, Norway is a net exporter of oil but its gas prices are very high, even after accounting for that country’s higher fuel taxes. Second, it follows that because oil is traded globally, a supply disruption or development anywhere in the world affects oil prices for all consumers. Even if the United States were to import little oil because of a homegrown energy boom, Americans would still be vulnerable to global events that raise the price of oil. Third, the energy boom probably won’t stop oil speculation — the purchase of oil futures to make a quick buck rather than to obtain oil. Tens of billions of dollars went into the nation’s energy commodity markets in the past few years, earmarked to buy oil futures contracts. Institutional and hedge funds are investing increasingly in oil, which has prompted President Obama and others to call for curbs on oil speculation. Data released in March 2011 by Bart Chilton, a member of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission who has urged limits on speculation, suggest that speculators increased their positions in energy markets by 64 percent between June 2008 and January 2011. The rub is that despite the domestic oil boom, speculators will still buy oil futures whenever they think oil prices will rise. Of course, extra American oil on the market might temper speculation under some conditions, but then again, it might not. Fourth, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries won’t sit by idly if America’s boom begins to hurt oil prices seriously. Its members will most likely agree to decrease their production to try to keep prices higher. For instance, in June, when the price of oil dropped to around $80 a barrel from $107 in March, fellow OPEC producers pressured Saudi Arabia to cut output. Producers need oil revenues to maintain their cradle-to-grave welfare states; otherwise, they could face Arab Spring revolts at home, which most oil-rich countries have avoided by using their wealth to quell dissent and maintain domestic control. Fifth, a backlash against hydraulic fracturing, which can pollute water, is growing as Americans learn more about it. Technological breakthroughs may make the process, popularly known as fracking, safer, but it’s not apparent when or if they could be implemented at reasonable cost. To be sure, the American boom has its positives. The world needs all forms of energy to meet its rising demand, and the boom will help in that regard. It could also dampen the impact of oil disruptions, especially if the drilling revolution goes global down the road. Use of America’s abundant natural gas can also offset reliance on dirtier coal. But let’s not exaggerate what the energy boom can do for the United States and American consumers. At its current pace, the oil boom probably won’t significantly lower prices — though it may temper their rise at times. Greater oil independence does not equal greater oil price independence — something lost in our national debate. And finally, a boom in fossil fuels is hardly something to celebrate, given the urgency of climate change.

#### Proves aff can’t lower oil prices—their authors

#### Why 2013 Will End in a Severe Recession, Gail Tverberg, Tue, 08 January 2013

http://oilprice.com/Finance/the-Economy/Why-2013-will-End-in-a-Severe-Recession.html

We have been hearing a lot about escaping the fiscal cliff, but our problem isn’t solved. The fixes to date have been partial and temporary. There are many painful decisions ahead. Based on what I can see, the most likely outcome is that the US economy will enter a severe recession by the end of 2013.¶ My expectation is that credit markets are likely see increased defaults, as workers find their wages squeezed by higher Social Security taxes, and as government programs are cut back. Credit is likely to decrease in availability and become higher-priced. It is quite possible that credit problems will adversely affect the international trade system. Stock markets will tend to perform poorly. The Federal Reserve will try to intervene in credit markets, but if the US government is one of the defaulters (at least temporarily), it may not be able to completely fix the situation.¶ Less credit will tend to hold down prices of goods and services. Fewer people will be working, though, so even at reduced prices, many people will find discretionary items such as larger homes, new cars, and restaurant meals to be unaffordable. Thus, once the recession is in force, car sales are likely to drop, and prices of resale homes will again decline.¶ Oil prices may temporarily drop. This price decrease, together with a drop in credit availability, is likely to lead to a reduction in drilling in high-priced locations, such as US oil shale (tight oil) plays.¶ Other energy sources are also likely to be affected. Demand for electricity is likely to drop. Renewable energy investment is likely to decline because of less electricity demand and less credit availability. By 2014 and 2015, less government funding may also play a role.¶ This recession is likely be very long term. In fact, based on my view of the reasons for the recession, it may never be possible to exit from it completely.¶ I base the foregoing views on several observations:¶ 1. High oil prices are a major cause of the United States Federal Government’s current financial problems. The financial difficulties occur because high oil prices tend to lead to unemployment, and high unemployment tends to lead to higher government expenditures and lower government revenue. This is especially true for oil importers.¶ 2. The United States and world’s oil problems have not been solved. While there are new sources of oil, they tend to be sources of expensive oil, so they don’t solve the problem of high-priced oil. Furthermore, if our real economic problem is high-priced oil, and we have no way of permanently reducing oil prices, high oil prices can be expected to cause a long-term drag on economic growth.

## 2NC Jobs

#### Not enough jobs are created

Krugman 12 (Paul Krugman joined The New York Times in 1999 as a columnist on the Op-Ed Page and continues as professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Mr. Krugman received his B.A. from Yale University in 1974 and his Ph.D. from MIT in 1977. He has taught at Yale, MIT and Stanford. At MIT he became the Ford International Professor of Economics., 3/15/2012, "Natural Born Drillers", [www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/krugman-natural-born-drillers.html?\_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/krugman-natural-born-drillers.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss))

Meanwhile, what about jobs? I have to admit that I started laughing when I saw The Wall Street Journal offering North Dakota as a role model. Yes, the oil boom there has pushed unemployment down to 3.2 percent, but that’s only possible because the whole state has fewer residents than metropolitan Albany — so few residents that adding a few thousand jobs in the state’s extractive sector is a really big deal. The comparable-sized fracking boom in Pennsylvania has had hardly any effect on the state’s overall employment picture, because, in the end, not that many jobs are involved. And this tells us that giving the oil companies carte blanche isn’t a serious jobs program. Put it this way: Employment in oil and gas extraction has risen more than 50 percent since the middle of the last decade, but that amounts to only 70,000 jobs, around one-twentieth of 1 percent of total U.S. employment. So the idea that drill, baby, drill can cure our jobs deficit is basically a joke.

#### At best .2% of growth

Levi 11 (Michael A. Levi David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment, 9/28/2011, "Do America’s Future Jobs Lie in Traditional Energy?", blogs.cfr.org/levi/2011/09/28/do-americas-future-jobs-lie-in-traditional-energy/)

Ultimately, though, a sense of scale is essential. This blog shared some back of the envelope numbers a couple weeks ago that suggested that a massive extractives boom might at best add about 0.2% directly to national GDP growth, barring very big increases in the price of oil and other mined commodities. That’s not the sort of thing that makes a decisive difference to employment. Potentially more important is the possible impact on oil prices (in tandem with steadily more aggressive fuel economy standards), though again, it’s difficult to paint a picture where U.S. actions yield overwhelming change. Bright spots are always welcome where people are struggling, but it’s dangerous to extrapolate them to a point that yields false hope.

## jobs

High-wage jobs up now

CNN Money 11-1-12

http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/01/news/economy/wages-jobs/index.html

Don't just call it a low-wage recovery. It's true that the economy has added a lot of low-paying jobs over the last two years. Restaurants and bars, which pay a median wage of just $9 an hour, have accounted for 15% of all the jobs created in the recovery. Retailers, which pay a median $11 an hour, make up another 9%. But it's not as if fast food joints and shopping centers are the only places adding jobs. Plenty of well-paying industries are hiring too. Factories that make aircraft, cars and machinery have made up a good chunk of the job gains over the last two years, as have hospitals and doctors' offices. So too have professional fields -- particularly those that specialize in computer services or technology. And wages in these industries are hardly low. All of them typically pay well above the median hourly wage of $16.57 an hour. Related: U.S. wages climb Since the bottom of the job market in February 2010, health care alone has accounted for 17% of the 4 million jobs added back into the U.S. economy. While wages in the field vary, many health care positions pay high wages. People working in ambulatory care -- such as medical and dental offices -- earn a median wage of $18 an hour, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For those working at hospitals, it's $23 an hour. Registered nurses earn around $32 an hour. Related: Jobs that make the world a worse place Another hot sector for job growth has been professional and technical services, a broad category that includes accountants, lawyers, architects and computer engineers. This industry, which boasts a median wage of $28 an hour, has accounted for 13% of all U.S. jobs added since the recovery began in early 2010. Software developers are especially high in demand. The job pays a median $43 an hour, and that's likely to rise further as employers say they can't find enough workers with the right science, math and business skills to fill these tech jobs. "Even though we know that the unemployment situation has obviously been pretty grim and difficult, in the technology sector the unemployment rate is much lower," said Shami Khorana, president of HCL Technologies' America division. The global IT and software company hired about 2,000 people in the U.S. last year and is planning to hire another 10,000 employees in both the U.S. and Europe by 2015. Khorana said he's looking for employees ranging from business analysts and software programmers, to senior-level managers. Many of these positions offer six-figure salaries to candidates who bring the right mix of experience and education. "It is quite difficult and requires a lot of energy to find the right folks," he said. "The skill sets are somewhat scarce." So what about blue collar jobs? While surely there are fewer, high-paying opportunities for the 4.4 million unemployed Americans who do not have a college education, some manufacturing jobs have started to come back. These jobs often require advanced technical training, but not necessarily a four-year degree. "When you look since the end of the recession, we've had almost 500,000 jobs created in manufacturing, and almost all of those jobs have come from the durable goods sector -- primarily aerospace, motor vehicles, metals, computers, and machinery," said Chad Moutray, chief economist for the National Association of Manufacturers. "Those are high-wage jobs." Durable goods manufacturing jobs have accounted for 11% of the jobs gained in the recovery. The median wage for assembly workers at auto factories, for example, is $25 an hour

## navy

A) Bureaucratic reluctance to deploy, delayed response

Watts 12

Robert, graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, Captain Watts has served six sea tours with the Navy and Coast Guard, most recently commanding USCGC Steadfast (WMEC 623). A qualified Surface Warfare Officer and Cutterman, he holds advanced degrees from the Naval War College, Old Dominion University, American Military University, and the Naval Postgraduate School, and he is currently a doctoral candidate at the Royal Military College of Canada (War Studies). The New Normalcy-Sea Power and Contingency Operations in the Twenty-First Century

http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/87e866a1-24dd-4e91-9ffa-cb0f64f15144/The-New-Normalcy--Sea-Power-and-Contingency-Operat.aspx

The inherent mobility of sea power means largely what it does in the traditional role—modern technology allows global reach in three dimensions and almost instant operational coordination worldwide. But the primary barrier to mobility in crisis-contingency operations is not technological. If mobility is to be exercised, ships must actually sail, and it is here—in the commitment of resources to a crisis —that things become culturally problematic. Despite the need, the answer to a crisis contingency is not always to employ sea power immediately. This cultural hesitancy has two aspects. The first is so deeply ingrained in the American psyche that it is more a matter of legend than of practical discussion. The United States has a long-standing tradition of rejecting the use of military forces in the domestic context, a rejection that dates back to the Revolution. It was codified in law with the passing of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which directs that military forces (specifically the U.S. Army) cannot engage in domestic law enforcement.18 The legislation is often misinterpreted as meaning that any domestic use of military forces is illegal; that is not the case, but it is nevertheless widely believed in both civilian and military 56 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW circles.19 Thus before naval forces can be committed to a crisis, a comprehensive legal review is often demanded, something that takes time—time that is usually not available. Another cultural barrier arises from service ethos. Bluntly, warships are designed and train to fight. In the modern high-tech era, naval warfare is a very specific (and expensive) proposition. It demands very sophisticated and specialized equipment. The radar on an Aegis cruiser, for example, is exceptionally good at tracking and destroying enemy aircraft—but only that. In a crisis contingency that marginalizes that purpose of a platform’s defining systems, the purpose of the platform itself could be called into question. According to this logic, if a vessel is employed (albeit successfully) for a purpose for which it is not designed, the door is opened for its increasing use for that purpose and not its proper one. In the grand scheme of things, warships used for other purposes are not training for war; in the short term this leads to a loss of readiness for combat, while in the longer term it could mean the elimination of platforms altogether in favor of others more suitable for noncombat missions. Although this seems to be a largely philosophical argument, in a shrinking budget environment it is not without a certain politically compelling logic. The effects of these factors are not insignificant. In recent crisis contingencies (the mass migration operations of 1994 and Katrina) the arrival of naval vessels was delayed while legal and operational impact issues were addressed, in the Katrina case so long as to become a national embarrassment.20 Bureaucratic reasons, not materiel, were the culprits, ultimately to the detriment of the response. Hesitancy can be fatal in an operation requiring rapid response, and culture and bureaucracy can conspire to encourage just that.

## scs

#### No war

Shuo 9/12/12 (Wang Shuo, managing editor of Caixin Media: the top English-language magazine covering business and finance in China, "Closer Look: Why War Is Not an Option", english.caixin.com/2012-09-12/100436770.html)

It is highly unlikely that China will fight a hot war with any of its neighbors over territorial disputes, but it should still reexamine who its friends really are

There won't be a war in East Asia.

The United States has five military alliances in the western Pacific: with South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, and American battleships are busy patrolling the seas. Without a go-ahead from Washington, there is no possibility of a hot war between battleships of sovereign countries here. As to conflicts between fishing boats and patrol boats, that's not really a big deal.

The Chinese have to ponder several questions: If the country has battleship wars with Japan, can it win without using ground-based missiles? Will the war escalate if missiles are deployed? What will happen if the war continues with no victory in sight?

In the last few days, one country bought islands, and the other announced the base points and the baselines of its territorial waters. But look closely, China and Japan have at least two things in common in this hostile exchange: At home they fan up nationalism, and in the international arena no activities have exceeded the scope of previous, respective claims on sovereignty.

This means there is no possibility of a war in East Asia, not even remotely.

From the East Sea to the South Sea, China has reached a new low in relations with Asian neighbors. It's hard to remove the flashpoints in territorial disputes, but the country can surely reduce their impacts. And the key is relations with the United States.

#### No escalation from energy conflict

Rogers 12

(Will, CNAS Energy fellow, “Navigating U.S. Policy in the South China Sea,” 9-5-12, http://www.cnas.org/node/8960)

"Access to the South China Sea's potential petroleum resources is increasingly viewed as zero-sum and is a key driver of the region's territorial contest. But conflict over those energy reserves is far from inevitable. States compete for access to natural resources all over the world without escalation to political or military conflict. U.S. policy in the region must help tilt the balance away from competition over these resources by encouraging states to pursue joint development and other cooperative activities that will enable all countries in the region to benefit from the sea's natural resource wealth."

ASEAN solves

Cooley 12

Brendan, Fall, A Sea Change or a Wave of Backlash? The South China Sea and Changing Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia. Peace, War and Defense Program The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Global Security Studies, Fall 2012, Volume 3, Issue 4

http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Cooley%20South%20China%20Sea.pdf

The disputes could take a very different path, however. Continued aggression by China, or continued fears about the consequences of its rise might unite ASEAN against their northern neighbor. This contingency has some historical precedent. Although ASEAN members have divergent interests and their own conflicting claims in the South China Sea, China’s occupation of Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in 1994 united the regional organization against China’s aggression.61 62 ASEAN’s collective strength, and the commitment of diplomatic, economic, and military support from outside players would limit Chinese influence, and continue the multipolar competition for influence in the region. The disputes are likely to take a path between these two poles, which could take many forms. The players may find enough political capital to allow international law to resolve the conflicts, greatly reducing (but probably not eliminating) internal and external tensions in the region. The claimants could also agree to bilateral or multilateral treaties that resolve the conflicts in a mutually beneficial manner, or agree to establish a multilateral institutional framework to govern these commons. This framework might include joint regulation of fishing and oil exploration efforts, provide an international law enforcement mechanism, or allow for joint naval patrols of the sea.63 This section of the paper will explore under what conditions the disputes might follow one track over another.

Squo deterrence is enough

Buszynski 12

Leszek, The Internationalization of the Visiting Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

The Australian National University

Conflict prevention is about preventing conflicts before they break out and erupt into uncontrolled violence and embraces diplomatic initiatives, preventive negotiation, mediation, and judicial arbitration. Conflict management is about preventing escalation in a conflict that has already erupted, and bringing about its eventual settlement. The basis of both prevention and management of conflict is the rapid and immediate communication of intentions to prevent the other side from assuming the worst case scenario and escalating in turn. Chinese efforts to defuse tensions with Vietnam indicate that Beijing has been concerned about regional and global reactions to its pressure upon claimants and external powers in the South China Sea. The agreement with Vietnam is insufficient for this purpose and it should be extended to the multilateral level. There should be a conflict prevention agreement on two levels to deal with the risk of conflict in the South China Sea. This would differ from the code of conduct sought by ASEAN in several ways; it would not be legally binding and would be observed as self interested measure to prevent conflict escalation in which the Chinese have a stake. At one level there should be an agreement between ASEAN and China which would cover incidents at sea, oil exploration and fishery disputes and would lay down guidelines for their negotiation 15 | P a g e and resolution. It would also include procedures to resolve clashes between fishing fleets and confrontations between naval and/or coast guard vessels. At another level there has to be a similar agreement between the US, China and external powers such as India which would cover surveillance and exploration activities perceived as threatening by China. It would also maintain the principle of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Provisional agreements to prevent conflict would not touch upon the legal claims but they would disarm the claimants from resorting to forceful measures to enforce them. Herein is one of the reasons why China might procrastinate in its usual manner given that agreements of this nature deprive China of the means of exerting pressure on the other claimants. Nonetheless, it cannot press Vietnam or the Philippines too far over the issue without pushing them both more closely to the US and for this reason a conflict prevention agreement would be in its interests. One major difficulty with such agreements is that they remain provisional and are subject to the balance of forces as China perceives them. As China gains in power and confidence renewed pressure upon the ASEAN claimants may be anticipated if the US is perceived as weakening or losing interest in the South China Sea. If it was the prospect of closer American involvement which induced the Chinese to move to a conciliatory posture towards Vietnam then the US presence would deter further Chinese pressure against the ASEAN claimants. The involvement of the US may not be to China‟s liking but it would reduce that pressure on the ASEAN claimants and create the conditions for an uneasy stability, which is the best one can hope for at present.

## chem industry

Industry resilient - empirics

Picker 09

Stefan Picker and David Große Kathöfer, editors for the Journal of Business Chemistry, Journal of Business Chemistry, January 2009, "Discussing challenges in the chemical industry for five years", Volume 6, Issue 1,

http://www.businesschemistry.org/article/?article=27

This will likely be even more so the case in the near future, with an omnipresent financial and economic crisis around us, that yet has to unfold its total impact. As a large supplier for most of the highly affected industrial sectors, the chemical industry and all its partners are facing challenging and turbulent times. Measures to cut costs, shrinking markets and severe restructurings will be the effect. However, we are confident that the chemical industry will, in the end, be strengthened. Whatever risks and opportunities the chemical industry will face, the need for a discussion platform on business chemistry issues will only increase. The JoBC hopes it can help to share best practice examples and provide detailed academic analyses of how to act and react in an era of fundamental change.

# 1NR

## russia

No escalation – disagreements remain limited

Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely **remain limited and compartmentalized**. Russia and the West **do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over**. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

#### Dutch disease inevitable, even if Putin falls

Berglöf, Chief Economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 12/13/2012

(Erik, overseeing the staff of the EBRD, “Diversifying Russia,” <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/publications/specials/diversifying-russia.pdf>)

A range of policies have been tried with a view to diversifying the Russian economy. The pioneering Gref programme under the first Putin administration contained a broad range of measures designed to stimulate both the entry of new firms and the growth of existing small and medium-sized enterprises. Putin’s second term saw determined state-led efforts to stimulate innovation and kick-start strategic non-commodity industries. The Medvedev presidency was then marked by the global financial crisis. While it broadly curtailed direct aid to specific sectors, the balance sheets of state-backed financial institutions expanded dramatically. President Medvedev also launched a number of high-profile initiatives aimed at stimulating innovation.

**Despite these efforts, the Russian economy is arguably more dependent on natural resources today than it was at the turn of the millennium**. The government’s heavy investment in the promotion of high-tech industries has yielded only limited results. While China and India have both managed to dramatically increase the percentage of exports of goods and services accounted for by information and communication technology, the corresponding shares have hardly changed at all in Russia. Barely 20 per cent of Russia’s manufacturing exports are products with high skill content.

#### He’s invincible

Roxburgh 3-14-12

Angus, Author of The Strongman, a book about Vladmir Putin

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/how-the-anti-putin-movement-missed-the-point?page=show#

 I could not help but recall the great stirrings of democracy in Russia that I witnessed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when, without the help of the Internet or Twitter, hundreds of thousands of Russians spilled into the streets to hear Boris Yeltsin, the future president, and Andrei Sakharov, a nuclear physicist and human rights activist, condemn the communist system and the excesses of its rulers. In those days, the crowd waited with mounting excitement for the appearance of the boldfaced speakers, who commanded almost universal respect. Today's opposition lacks the top talent that could perform Yeltsin and Sakharov's unifying and rallying role. Indeed, some of the movement's leaders did not even turn up on Saturday. Nemtsov was at home with a cold. Kasyanov said he was happy to leave the proceedings to the election observers to tell their stories, and Navalny -- perhaps the most promising of the younger generation of opposition heavyweights -- was milling in the crowd but did not appear on the stage. Besides their lack of inspiration, the speeches on Saturday were perhaps chasing the wrong message. Of course, they were right to highlight the alleged impropriety at the polls. There were credible reports of "carousel" voting, in which loyal voters were bussed from polling station to polling station to vote for Putin, and evidence of ballot stuffing and miscounting. But the fraud was much less significant than during the December elections to the State Duma. More important, the ballot tampering was far less damaging than the monumental lopsidedness of the media coverage that preceded the election. The central television stations not only devoted far more time to Putin than to the other candidates (the channels chose to designate coverage of his activities as news about the prime minister rather than as electioneering), but they also aired whole documentaries portraying Putin as a hero who saved Russia from the chaos of the Yeltsin years and from the allegedly meddling hands of the West. Putin's allegations that Western governments were "paying" the protesters and plotting an Orange Revolution like Ukraine's in 2004 went without challenge. Securing access to state television should now be the immediate concern of the opposition. It is the total control of the country's most powerful media -- not vote-rigging -- that makes Putin all but invincible. Nemtsov has claimed that just one hour of live televised debate with Putin would ensure that the latter would never win another election. That may be wishful thinking, but if the main channels were allowed to debate and investigate freely, it would certainly dramatically alter the political scene here. There is another reason, too, why Russia's winter of protests did not develop into an Orange Revolution. In Ukraine in 2004, a rigged election actually changed the result: It handed victory to the loser, the pro-Russian, "official" candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, and robbed the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko of his rightful victory. Hundreds of thousands protested, forcing the authorities to rerun the election, which Yushchenko won. Not so in Russia. In the March 4 election, no other candidate was robbed of victory. Opposition leaders concede that Putin would have won even if there had been no fraud. True, the election might have gone to a runoff between Putin and his nearest rival. But few imagine that any of the other contenders could have matched Putin's popularity. That is a problem that has dogged Russian politics since the collapse of communism. For more than 20 years, democratically minded politicians have vied against one another rather than work out a common platform. So many new, separate parties have formed and then crumbled that Russia has almost run out of original names for them. Today, a good dozen of Russia's top democrats are scattered across several different parties, whose differences are much less than the similarities that should unite them against Putin. Even when they try to come together -- as Kasyanov, Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, and others have in PARNAS -- they cannot agree which of them should be the figurehead. Until they are able to do so, Putin will continue to reign as a giant among squabbling political rivals. Still, it would have been hard to find a single protester on Saturday who felt that the battle was over -- even if it must now change form. An opinion poll conducted by the Ekho Moskvy radio station found that 80 percent of respondents believed the protests were worthwhile. In an interview with the same station, Kasyanov said that the most pressing task was to ensure that some small reforms promised by President Dmitry Medvedev in response to the December protests become a reality. He said that protesters must continue to insist that a new law easing the registration of political parties, for example, should be passed before Putin is inaugurated in May. The next step, he said, would be to achieve a rerun of the flawed parliamentary election that provoked the protests in the first place. It is implausible, though, that Putin, now comfortable in his belief that he has taken the steam out of the opposition, will make such a huge concession. The fact is that Putin's Kremlin has everything under control, and the opposition -- without effective leadership and no access to national television -- faces a long and uphill struggle.

## at: haberman

#### Hagel has the votes now, but the plan definitively collapses his confirmation

Todd, NBC News, 1/8/2013

(Chuck, http://firstread.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/01/08/16412788-first-thoughts-no-margin-for-error-in-hagel-nomination?lite)

\*\*\* No margin for error in Hagel nomination: Yesterday’s official rollout of Chuck Hagel for defense secretary went about as well as it could have for the Obama White House. Statements of praise for Hagel by folks like Colin Powell and Robert Gates? Check. A statement of past praise from John McCain (who said in 2006 Hagel would make a “great secretary of state”), even though McCain is now taking a skeptical look at the nominee? Check. And getting Chuck Schumer, perhaps the Democratic senator with the most reservations about Hagel, to issue a non-committal statement? Check. So the White House feels pretty good about where things stand, although this won’t be an easy fight. Yet what Team Obama can’t afford is any new negative information, any other shoe to drop. Bottom line: There is no margin for error from this point onward. Hagel’s support, at best, in the Senate is an inch deep and that “inch” would get him the votes he needs. But it wouldn’t take much for the bottom to, well, fall out. This is going to be a precarious few weeks. Very few senators are in D.C. right now, so the interest groups will be front and center. Hagel needs his confirmation hearing sooner, rather than later, but right now, it’s unclear when those hearings will be scheduled. Hagel also needs FACE time with senators, and he won’t have that opportunity for a good week or so.

#### Leverage solves

Jeremy Herb, The Hill, 1/8/13, White House dares GOP to oppose Hagel, thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/275997-white-house-confident-in-hagel

The White House is all but daring Republicans to oppose President Obama’s nomination of former Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) to lead the Pentagon.

The administration believes Hagel’s standing as a Republican war hero — he was awarded two Purple Hearts for his service in Vietnam — means Republicans would be making a mistake in opposing his nomination.

“Are they really going to turn this guy down?” asked one administration official. “Seems pretty unlikely to me.”

Obama is in a strong position politically after his reelection and the fiscal-cliff fight, which divided Republicans and exposed unease in the House over Speaker John Boehner’s (R-Ohio) leadership.

White House aides see Obama as having leverage with congressional Republicans on a host of issues, including the debt ceiling, gun control and immigration, and increasingly are signaling they intend to take a tougher approach in dealing with House Republicans — including with the Hagel nomination.

When push comes to shove, aides believe, the GOP will back down before filibustering a former infantry squad leader who, if confirmed, would become the first enlisted man and Vietnam War veteran to head the Department of Defense.

“It's one thing to hold your fire or say something on a Sunday show — it's another to look him in the eye, this guy who is a Vietnam veteran with two Purple Hearts,” said one senior administration official. “That would be a very difficult thing for Republicans to do.”

Republicans, however, say the Obama administration’s optimism might be suffering from a dose of overconfidence.

One Senate GOP aide said the conference was “very surprised” that Obama ultimately chose Hagel.

“It’s not looking good. I don’t see strong support for him from either side of the aisle,” the aide said. “This is not a bipartisan nomination. The only thing bipartisan about this nomination is the opposition to it.”

A handful of Republican senators on Monday said they would vote against Hagel in part because of statements on Israel, with House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) criticizing the former senator’s “incendiary views” and calling him the “wrong man for the job.”

Pro-Israel groups teed off on Hagel’s statements that the “Jewish lobby” intimidates people in Washington and hammered him for supporting diplomacy with Iran and Hamas.

Many other GOP lawmakers kept their cards close to the vest, saying they had serious concerns but electing to wait until his confirmation hearing to decide whether to oppose him.

## agency

#### Agency action links to politics

Thomas McGarity, Endowed Chair in Administrative Law, University of Texas School of Law, May 2012, ARTICLE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT: POLICY EROSION IN A HIGHLY PARTISAN AGE, 61 Duke L.J. 1671

The interchange-fee rulemaking experience illustrates how stakeholders in high-stakes rulemakings have begun going beyond the conventional responses to rulemaking initiatives by adopting a new toolbox of strategies better suited to the deeply divided political economy. If the players on one side of the policy debate perceive that they are unlikely to prevail in the administrative arena, they will move the implementation game to another arena - the White House, a congressional hearing, a political fundraising dinner, a think-tank white paper, talk-radio programs, attack advertising, telephone solicitation and "push polls," or Internet blogs. Many of these new venues were amply used in the battle that accompanied the interchange-fee rulemaking. In addition, although lawyers for the stakeholders employ the careful language of administrative law in arenas in which that language is expected, spokespersons and allies also employ the heated rhetoric of modern political discourse in arenas in which that language is more likely to succeed. This Part probes these, among other, contours of blood-sport rulemaking.

#### We have the best new studies

Thomas McGarity, Endowed Chair in Administrative Law, University of Texas School of Law, May 2012, ARTICLE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT: POLICY EROSION IN A HIGHLY PARTISAN AGE, 61 Duke L.J. 1671

In this Article, I raise the possibility that the nation has entered a period in which the population is so deeply divided about the proper role of government, regulated industries are so willing to spend millions of dollars to vindicate their interests, and political discourse is so unrestrained that an even more expansive model of implementation may be warranted, at least in the context of high-stakes rulemaking initiatives. n23 First, the implementation game has spread to arenas that are far less structured and far more political than the agency hearing rooms and appellate courtrooms of the past. Second, the roster of players has expanded beyond agency and OIRA staffs, advocates for the regulated industry and beneficiary groups, and congressional aides to include individuals and organizations with broad policy agendas, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, think tanks, grassroots organizations, media pundits, and Internet bloggers. Third, because many parties play the implementation game in multiple arenas, the game has become far more strategic and the range of allowable tactics has widened rather dramatically. Finally, in this deeply divided political economy, the players in the implementation game no longer make a pretense of separation between the domains of politics and administrative law, and they are far less restrained in the rhetoric they employ to influence agency policymaking. n24

In this new milieu, "winning" can mean more than compelling unreasonable delays in agency action, invoking APA procedures to impede the policymaking process, or persuading the agency to accept a particular position on the relevant law and facts. Winning can consist of extracting promises from nominees during the confirmation process, preventing the confirmation of disfavored nominees, or preventing the confirmation of any agency leaders until the administration has agreed to change the agency's decisionmaking structure. Winning can also mean incapacitating the agency by reducing its annual appropriation, repealing the agency's organic act, or whittling away its regulatory authority through rifle-shot riders attached to must-pass legislation. n25 The players are less reluctant to attack agencies and the statutes those agencies administer head on. The players launch their attacks much earlier in the evolution of regulatory programs, and they feel free to go beyond attacks on the agencies as institutions to launch ad hominem attacks on agency decisionmakers.

In short, I raise the possibility that, for some high-stakes rulemaking initiatives in some areas of regulation, implementation is not so much "politics by other means" as it is "politics as usual." And because politics is so very different from the deliberative, lawyer-dominated domain of traditional administrative law, the word "law" may no longer be an accurate descriptor. Former U.S. [\*1681] Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt referred in 2010 to federal regulation as a "kind of a blood sport" in which the regulated industries attempt "to make the particular agency" promulgating an unwelcome regulation "look stupid or inept or venal." n27 If the implementation of regulatory statutes has become a blood sport in important contexts, and if the goal of administrative law extends beyond ensuring procedural regularity to a concern about the effective implementation of legislation, then it would behoove administrative-law scholars to pay attention to the larger setting in which informal rulemaking now takes place and to begin thinking about the implications of these developments for the field.

#### Pc solves opposition

#### Here’s ev that assumes their warrants

Stirewalt, writer for Fox News, 1/7/2013

(Chris, “Obama Antagonizes with Hagel Pick,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/07/obama-antagonizes-with-hagel-pick/#ixzz2HIw1d0GW)

With Republicans still resentful of Hagel’s ostentatious opposition of Bush-era policies and support for Obama’s two presidential runs, confirmation would have been tricky enough. But the queasy feelings of pro-Israel Democrats on the tough-talking Vietnam vet will make it so much worse.

Maryland Sen. Ben Cardin, a dutiful Democrat if ever there was one, told the soon-to-be-former cable news network Current TV on Sunday that there are “some statements that [Hagel] needs to clarify” and called the nomination “controversial.”

Coming from Cardin, ranked in the 10 most liberal senators by National Journal, that’s the equivalent of a cannon shot across Obama’s bow.

**It will take lots of time and effort to drag Hagel**, **opinionated and confrontational**, **across the finish line**. **The president can get it done**, **but the ordeal will be frightful and expend plenty of political capital**.

## pc theory = true

#### Political capital is finite and drives decisionmaking

**Schier 9**, Professor of Poliitcal Science at Carleton, (Steven, "Understanding the Obama Presidency," The Forum: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Berkely Electronic Press, <http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol7/iss1/art10>)

 In additional to formal powers, a president’s informal power is situationally derived and highly variable. Informal power is a function of the “political capital” presidents amass and deplete as they operate in office. Paul Light defines several components of political capital: party support of the president in Congress, public approval of the presidential conduct of his job, the President’s electoral margin and patronage appointments (Light 1983, 15). Richard Neustadt’s concept of a president’s “professional reputation” likewise figures into his political capital. Neustadt defines this as the “impressions in the Washington community about the skill and will with which he puts [his formal powers] to use” (Neustadt 1990, 185). In the wake of 9/11, George W. Bush’s political capital surged, and both the public and Washington elites granted him a broad ability to prosecute the war on terror. By the later stages of Bush’s troubled second term, beset by a lengthy and unpopular occupation of Iraq and an aggressive Democratic Congress, he found that his political capital had shrunk. Obama’s informal powers will prove variable, not stable, as is always the case for presidents. Nevertheless, he entered office with a formidable store of political capital. His solid electoral victory means he initially will receive high public support and strong backing from fellow Congressional partisans, a combination that will allow him much leeway in his presidential appointments and with his policy agenda. Obama probably enjoys the prospect of a happier honeymoon during his first year than did George W. Bush, who entered office amidst continuing controversy over the 2000 election outcome. Presidents usually employ power to disrupt the political order they inherit in order to reshape it according to their own agendas. Stephen Skowronek argues that “presidents disrupt systems, reshape political landscapes, and pass to successors leadership challenges that are different from the ones just faced” (Skowronek 1997, 6). Given their limited time in office and the hostile political alignments often present in Washington policymaking networks and among the electorate, presidents must force political change if they are to enact their agendas. In recent decades, Washington power structures have become more entrenched and elaborate (Drucker 1995) while presidential powers – through increased use of executive orders and legislative delegation (Howell 2003) –have also grown. The presidency has more powers in the early 21st century but also faces more entrenched coalitions of interests, lawmakers, and bureaucrats whose agendas often differ from that of the president. This is an invitation for an energetic president – and that seems to describe Barack Obama – to engage in major ongoing battles to impose his preferences.

#### Presidents perceive their capital as finite – our theory is true in practice

**Marshall and Prins 11**, BRYAN W. MARSHALL Miami University BRANDON C. PRINS University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September) 2011

We argue that the more important effect of Congress occurs because presidents anticipate how the use of force may affect the larger congressional environment in which they inevitably have to operate (Brulé, Marshall, and Prins 2010). It may be true that presidents consider the chances that Congress will react to a specific use of force with countervailing tools, but even more importantly they anticipate the likelihood that a foreign conflict may damage (or advantage) their political fortunes elsewhere—in essence, the presidential calculus to use force factors in how such actions might shape their ability to achieve legislative priorities. To be clear, presidents can and do choose to use force and press for legislative initiatives in Congress. Taking unilateral actions in foreign policy does not preclude the president from working the legislative process on Capitol Hill. However, political capital is finite so spending resources in one area lessens what the president can bring to bear in other areas. That is, presidents consider the congressional environment in their decision to use force because their success at promoting policy change in either foreign or domestic affairs is largely determined by their relationship with Congress. Presidents do not make such decisions devoid of calculations regarding congressional preferences and behavior or how such decisions may influence their ability to achieve legislative objectives. This is true in large part because presidential behavior is motivated by multiple goals that are intimately tied to Congress. Presidents place a premium on passing legislative initiatives. The passage of policy is integral to their goals of reelection and enhancing their place in history (Canes-Wrone 2001; Moe 1985). Therefore, presidents seek to build and protect their relationship with Congress.

## winners win

#### Winners win is wrong -- Obama votes neg

Jackie Calmes, NYTimes, 11/12/12, In Debt Talks, Obama Is Ready to Go Beyond Beltway, mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/politics/legacy-at-stake-obama-plans-broader-push-for-budget-deal.xml

That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies - in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.

George C. Edwards III, a leading scholar of the presidency at Texas A & M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama's presidency is titled "Overreach," said, "He didn't understand the limits of what he could do."

"They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we'd build this advancing-tide theory of legislation," Mr. Edwards said. "And that was very naïve, very silly. Well, they've learned a lot, I think."

"Effective leaders," he added, "exploit opportunities rather than create them."

The budget showdown is an opportunity. But like many, it holds risks as well as potential rewards.

"This election is the second chance to be what he promised in 2008, and that is to break the gridlock in Washington," said Kenneth M. Duberstein, a Reagan White House chief of staff, who voted for Mr. Obama in 2008 and later expressed disappointment. "But it seems like this is a replay of 2009 and 2010, when he had huge majorities in the House and Senate, rather than recognizing that 'we've got to figure out ways to work together and it's not just what I want.' "

For now, at least, Republican lawmakers say they may be open to raising the tax bill for some earners. "We can increase revenue without increasing the tax rates on anybody in this country," said Representative Tom Price, Republican of Georgia and a leader of House conservatives, on "Fox News Sunday." "We can lower the rates, broaden the base, close the loopholes."

The challenge for Mr. Obama is to use his postelection leverage to persuade Republicans - or to help Speaker John A. Boehner persuade Republicans - that a tax compromise is in their party's political interest since most Americans favor compromise and higher taxes on the wealthy to reduce annual deficits.

Some of the business leaders the president will meet with on Wednesday are members of the new Fix the Debt coalition, which has raised about $40 million to urge lawmakers and their constituents to support a plan that combines spending cuts with new revenue. That session will follow Mr. Obama's meeting with labor leaders on Tuesday.

His first trip outside Washington to engage the public will come after Thanksgiving, since Mr. Obama is scheduled to leave next weekend on a diplomatic trip to Asia. Travel plans are still sketchy, partly because his December calendar is full of the traditional holiday parties.

Democrats said the White House's strategy of focusing both inside and outside of Washington was smart. "You want to avoid getting sucked into the Beltway inside-baseball games," said Joel Johnson, a former adviser in the Clinton White House and the Senate. "You can still work toward solutions, but make sure you get out of Washington while you are doing that."

The president must use his leverage soon, some Democrats added, because it could quickly wane as Republicans look to the 2014 midterm elections, when the opposition typically takes seats from the president's party in Congress.

## link

#### Most recent evidence

Holt, President of the Consumer Energy Alliance, 1/7/2013

(David, “Energy in the Next 4 Years,” <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2013/01/whats-ahead-in-2013-for-energy.php>)

Given the partisan divide in Congress, enactment of significant energy or environmental **legislation dealing with key issues such as** energy efficiency, Renewable Fuels Standard reform, and **offshore development**, will be extremely difficult and Congressional oversight of the federal regulatory agencies will be highly partisan and largely ineffective.

#### Oil spoils destroy any support

Joyce 10 (Christopher Joyce is a correspondent on the science desk at NPR. His stories can be heard on all of NPR's news programs, including NPR's Morning Edition, All Things Considered, and Weekend Edition., 5/1/2010, "Offshore Drilling Loses Support After Gulf Oil Spill", www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126511355)

Days into the oil spill, President Obama said he still supports offshore drilling so long as it's done responsibly and doesn't damage the environment. That view is becoming increasingly unpopular. For California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, the Gulf spill fails on both counts. Schwarzenegger recently announced that he's yanking approval of an offshore drilling project along his coastline because he no longer believes the assurances of the oil industry. "Despite those studies and support," the governor says, "all of you have seen, when you turn on the television, the devastation in the Gulf. And I'm sure that they also were assured that it was safe to drill. That will not happen here in California." It was in California in 1969 that the mother of all U.S. rig spills occurred, just off the coast of Santa Barbara. Images of oil-soaked birds and beaches helped launch Earth Day and the modern environmental movement. Another hotspot in the offshore drilling debate is Florida. The state Legislature is weighing a measure to open up new areas for offshore drilling. Some Floridians had come around to the idea because of the country's dependence on foreign oil, says Susan Glickman, a consultant for the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy. But the spill appears to have trumped that concern: "There has been a definite switch in positions for some and a hardening of positions for others against drilling, which for a brief period of time was enjoying some increase in public support and political support. But that is evaporating rather quickly," Glickman says. Among the converts who've turned against offshore drilling is Florida Gov. Charlie Crist. He flew over the oil spill and decided Florida wasn't ready for new drilling. Debating Offshore Drilling In The Climate Bill In Washington, expanded offshore drilling has won backing from quite a few stalwart environmentalists in the Senate, who are pushing a new energy and climate bill up a very steep hill. The bill offers support for more offshore drilling and new nuclear power plants as a sweetener to win votes from skeptics, who say the bill will raise consumers' energy costs. Former Colorado Sen. Tim Wirth, who now heads the United Nations Foundation, says he expects the oil spill to upset the political apple cart in the Senate. "I think that there will be a number of coastal people who were previously supporting the bill who will want provisions related to aggressive drilling taken out of the bill," says Wirth. Wirth says other senators who were on the fence are now likely to jump off and not support any new drilling.

#### No one likes the plan

Bryan Walsh, TIME Senior editor, 11/9/11, Why Obama’s Offshore Drilling Plan Isn’t Making Anyone Happy, http://science.time.com/2011/11/09/why-obamas-offshore-drilling-plan-isnt-making-anyone-happy/#ixzz26snhDbbI

Nonetheless, Obama has set a target of reducing U.S. oil imports by a third by 2025, and greater domestic oil production is going to have to be a part of that—including oil from the Arctic. Unfortunately for the President, no one’s likely to cheer him. Conservatives and the oil industry won’t be happy until just about every square foot of the country is available for drilling—though it is worth noting that oil production offshore has actually increased under Obama—and environmentalists aren’t going to rally to support any sort of expanded drilling. With energy, as with so many other issues for Obama, it’s lonely at the center.

## at: mcconnel

#### Mcconell ev says he pushed the plan but it quote

failed on the Senate floor by a vote of 42-57

#### no ev saying he’s no supporting Hagel now

#### they selectively cut Halperin

#### here’s the paragraphs before and after their card that say Dems are just as important

Mark Halperin 1-7, Time, “Team Hagel Versus Team Anti-Hagel”, <http://thepage.time.com/2013/01/07/team-hagel-versus-team-anti-hagel/>

The potential swing point in this fight would be if a Democratic senator came out in opposition to Hagel. The current post-Thomas dynamic in most nominations is for senators, regardless of party, to keep their powder dry until confirmation hearings are underway. If that pattern holds, both sides are likely to be fighting a meta-war until February.

The two most important senators in this nomination right now are McConnell and McCain. If Hagel has their support, he should be home free. If he loses one or both of them, and even a single Democrat, the dynamics become more challenging for the White House.

## hagel key

#### Provides political cover for larger Pentagon reforms

Thompson 1-7

Mark Thompson, 1-7-2013, “President Obama To Tap Ex-GOP Senator Chuck Hagel to Run Pentagon,” Time, http://nation.time.com/2013/01/07/president-obama-to-tap-ex-gop-senator-chuck-hagel-to-run-pentagon/

Hagel would be the first Defense Secretary since the late Caspar Weinberger, Defense chief in the Reagan Administration, to have worn a U.S. military uniform in combat — and the first enlisted man. That gives him instant credibility. Hagel “led an infantry squad in Vietnam during the bloody fighting following the Tet offensive,” Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said of him at a Memorial Day service last May. “Like millions of our generation, he demonstrated bravery, patriotism and heroism on the battlefield.”¶ With his Hagel pick following Panetta’s Democratic interregnum, Obama gets Republican cover to try to retool the Pentagon. That will include its missions as well as its business dealings. If he wants to, with Hagel in charge of the Defense department, Obama will be able to press for more substantial changes than he could with a Democrat sitting in that huge E-ring office. (Atlantic contributing editor Yochi Dreazen recently wrote about this strange state of affairs.)¶ But Hagel has never seemed to harbor a sense that it is the mission of the U.S. — or its military — to spread democracy around the world. “Militaries are built to fight and win wars, not bind together failing nations,” he wrote in 2006. “We are once again learning a very hard lesson in foreign affairs: America cannot impose a democracy on any nation — regardless of our noble purpose.” That echoes Obama’s thinking on the topic.¶ Former Senator Cohen applauds Obama’s pick and dismisses concerns that he will make bad policy. “You want a Secretary of Defense to be strong-minded,” Cohen says. “But he has to understand that this is not about Chuck Hagel, because he is not going to determine policy in the Middle East or with Iran. That’s the call of the President.”¶ Cohen, a onetime GOP Senator from Maine, embraces the idea of having a Republican Defense Secretary in a Democratic President’s Cabinet, especially when military spending cuts are looming. “You’re picking the best person to handle the job who can build a consensus on Capitol Hill, basically,” he says of the key challenge Hagel faces. “Having a Republican when you’re downsizing sends the message that we’re going to do this on a nonpartisan basis, with this man who has a military background, a war hero, Purple Hearts, etc.”¶ Cohen adds that while the Democratic Party is unfairly portrayed as being weak on defense, the Hagel nomination gives Obama some political cover. “Having a Republican there when you’re downsizing really takes away the issue of, There go the Democrats again,” he says.

Lobe, Washington bureau chief for the Inter Press Service, 5/9/2012

(Jim, “Hagel Update: Crocker Endorses Hagel, Flournoy Signed PNAC Letter,” http://www.lobelog.com/hagel-update-crocker-endorses-hagel-flournoy-signed-pnac-letter/)

Meanwhile, outgoing Democratic Rep. Barney Frank denounced Hagel in categorical terms based on the comments he made about Amb. Hormel’s nomination back in 1998. As noted by other commentators, Frank had spoken out in favor of Hagel as a prospective Pentagon chief when his name first surfaced, and frankly, his opposition now seems somewhat bizarre, particularly given Hormel’s acceptance of Hagel’s apology. Andrew Sullivan is particularly good on this. But what also seems bizarre about Frank’s denunciation is his nearly three-year-old campaign, along with Ron Paul, to make serious cuts — the degree contemplated by the sequester — to the defense budget over the next ten years. I would imagine that **few people would be better placed to sell such cuts politically than Hagel**, **a former Republican Senator and two-time Purple Heart recipient**? Certainly, **neither of the two candidates tipped as alternatives to Hagel** — Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter or former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy — **would have the political credibility to do the job**, especially **with a Republican-dominated House**. The facts that neither one has actually served in the military and that both have long worked and, to some extent, depended for their professional advancement on the “military-industrial complex”, make it far less likely that they would be willing to seriously challenge that complex’s interests. **Hagel**, **on the other hand**, **has precisely the independence and political stature to do so**. So the question is whether Frank considers an obnoxious 15-year-old statement for which Hagel has tendered an (accepted) apology more important than reducing the defense budget by a meaningful amount? It’s very difficult to figure out unless 1) the Massachusetts congressman considers the apology insincere, or, as M.J. Rosenberg suggested to Phil Weiss, that he is doing the bidding of the Israel lobby which had tried (for the most part unsuccessfully) to mobilize LGBT groups against Hagel’s nomination.

#### H’e smore important than obmaa

Tomasky, writer for the Daily Best, 1/7/2013

(Michael, “The Hagel Nomination,” <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/07/the-hagel-nomination.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+thedailybeast%2Farticles+%28The+Daily+Beast+-+Latest+Articles%29>)

I'd bet this is the main reason why Obama wants a Republican. Making defense cuts a part of **any budget/sequester deal is a must**. Obama can't afford a secdef who talks the way Leon Panetta talked, about how this or that cut would be devastating. **Hagel probably won't do that because a Republican can more credibly stand up and say no**, **we don't need X weapon system or two more carriers or whatever it is than a Democrat can**.

# 2NR

## 2nr

#### Link outweighs uq because fence-sitters are key

The Hill 1/9/2013

(http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/276195-hagel-backers-confident-nominee-will-be-confirmed-#ixzz2HUbJgWXe)

**The race is on to win over** the Chuck **Hagel fence-sitters**.

Supporters of President Obama’s nominee to lead the Pentagon say they’re encouraged that most of the Senate has yet to take a position on the former Republican senator’s confirmation.

Hagel backers say undecided Democrats such as Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.) **are unlikely to buck their own president’s nominee and will support Hagel in the end**.

“Dems will ultimately come around because it would look beyond terrible to have a wartime [Defense secretary] barely confirmed, and **Obama will ask them to support this publicly and privately**,” said one defense analyst who works closely with Congress.

#### Dems still support – it’s enough

Madison, writer for CBS News, 1/7/2013

(Lucy, “Amid building tension, Obama nominates Hagel as defense secretary,” <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57562507/amid-building-tension-obama-nominates-hagel-as-defense-secretary/>)

Democrats are not without their own concerns about Hagel: In addition to being a Republican, he has been criticized for making anti-gay remarks in the late '90s. He also authored a resolution opposing the Kyoto climate change treaty in 1997.

Still, there are no indications that a significant contingent of Senate Democrats will go up against Mr. Obama to oppose Hagel's nomination. Sen. Ben Cardin, D-Md., said today that while Mr. Obama's decision was "controversial," he believes that **Hagel will ultimately make it through the process**.

"I think it will be controversial," Cardin said today in an appearance on Current TV's "Bill Press Show."

"There are some statements that Senator Hagel has made that he needs to clarify. And we'll see how the confirmation process proceeds if he's nominated. But it will be controversial."

Asked if he thought Hagel would be confirmed, Cardin said, "the answer is yes, I think he probably will," but that "**It's not a foregone conclusion**."