# 1NC

## 1

A. Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg 8, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg 8, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

1. Dialogue. Debate’s critical axis is a form of dialogic communication within a confined game space.

Unbridled affirmation outside the game space makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

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taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

Dialogue is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

Morson 4

<http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331>

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

Decisionmaking skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics

Minteer 5, Human Dimensions of Biology Faculty – School of Life Sciences @ Arizona State University, ‘5

(Ben, “Environmental Philosophy and the Public Interest: A Pragmatic Reconciliation,” *Environmental Values* 14, p. 37–60)

The correct conclusion to draw here, however, is **not** that intrinsic value of nature claims are rendered irrelevant; rather, it is that they must be placed within a larger **normative and policy context** in order to be truly effective. While intrinsic value arguments **can certainly be a part of the reasoning process** that defines the public good in addressing serious environmental problems like anthropogenic global climate change, they will gain **more salience** and policy relevance, I believe, if they are advanced within the broader framework of public interest discourse. Among other things, this speaks to environmental philosophersʼ adoption of a more open and accommodating stance within environmental value discussions. Environmental philosophers should be prepared to make compelling and intelligent arguments for engaging in a truly democratic inquiry into the public interest in environmental policy debates, and these arguments should not entail an exclusivist or ideological endorsement of anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism as an absolutist metaphysical position. Moreover, there is ample room in the Deweyan model for environmentally-cast articulations of the public interest. For instance, environmental philosophers can inform public discussions of what is in the public interest by evoking environmental values that citizens share as a part of a common cultural inheritance, and to which large numbers of the public express loyalty (e.g., Sagoff 1988, Dunlap and Mertig 1992, Kempton et al. 1995). Philosophers, that is, can substantively flesh out the public interest by articulating widely shared environmental values in deliberative contexts as constituting the legitimate public interest in specific situations. Once more, there is no reason why this process is not open to claims supporting the intrinsic value of nature, since these now are properly viewed as reasons for the public interest in a certain context or issue, with the public interest offered as a normative justification for adopting a certain environmental policy. Although environmental ethicists (and environmentalists generally) cannot be guaranteed that our arguments will always carry the day, we should be supportive of efforts to give such claims a fair hearing, and confident enough of their validity and persuasiveness that we are willing to enter into public debate and ʻtake our chancesʼ. Likewise, we should also be willing to consider the possibility that, as difficult as it might be for a scholarly profession that prides itself on ʻgetting it rightʼ, we might sometimes be wrong.

The pragmatic, democratic view of the public interest I am defending here departs from many current environmental philosophersʼ presumptions that appeals to the public interest are necessarily antagonistic to the promotion of various environmentalist ends and the justification of robust environmental policy. For example, Holmes Rolston – perhaps the most prominent environmental philosopher writing today – suggested a few years ago that claims to democracy and public values in environmental cases will only result in a power struggle, one which may pretend to be democratic (or in the public interest) but will ultimately be determined by bargaining power and presumably, by unfettered economic might (Rolston 1998: 356). Rolstonʼs apparent adherence to the pluralist, interest-group model of democracy here renders him incapable of seeing how an alternative process of open deliberation and cooperative social inquiry can transform preferences and reveal shared public values able to justify preservationist, or at any rate non-exploitationist, environmental policies.

## 2

Their romantic call for more authentic personal relationships to the environment collapses into eco-romanticism

Locke 11

T Austin Locke, writer for plurality press, 2011 "The Romanticism of Deleuze and Guattari http://plurality-press.info/taustinlocke/the-romanticism-of-deleuze-and-guattari/

Of all those who sought to counteract the structuralist invasion envisioned by Derrida (2009) arguably the most creative, provocative and influential were Deleuze and Guattari. Their works permeate a vast range of discursive formations in a highly Deleuzian intersectory, affective and nomadic manner. Rhizomic thought, interconnected and heterogenic, escaping plotted points and formed order, establishing links to semiotic chains, decentralising and escaping the logos and arborescent systemic organization, has become the holy grail of intellectual endeavour in the epoch so brashly named postmodern. The widely cited speculation by Foucault that “one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian” (1970: 885) has not quite come to pass in physicality but the marks of the rhizomic way of thinking are quite clear be it in social theory, art or philosophy. But what has been achieved through their works, are they no more than the wistful musing’s of a couple of romantics? Or, is there something entirely new to be found in their quasi-cryptic writings which may appear as rambling nonsense?

The first issue to be raise would be that of what it means to be a romantic; at this spatio-temporal local western thought and art sought to shake of the rigidity of the modes of thought established in the enlightenment era. The sedentary, affirmative and objective approaches of enlightenment thinkers, partially personified by Hume and his demonstration of the importance of empirical induction (2008), were abandoned in favour of the subjective, creative and erratic. Art became a celebration of movement, journeys and quests replacing the rigid and static officiality of neo-classicalism. The essence of truth, spirit or humanity was no longer to be realised through pure reason or logic but from emotional, reflexive and personal experience. Nature was once again celebrated along with singularity and irrationality. Romanticism reacted to Enlightenment via inversion; the nature-culture dichotomy was turned on its head and man’s relation to animal celebrated.

This reaction, this inversion, may be where Deleuze and Guattari can be classified as romantics. As the Romanticists held up a mirror to Enlightenment, one may suggest Deleuze and Guattari held up a mirror to structuralism. The notion of “becoming-animal” (Deleuze & Guattari 2004) may be the most obvious example of their romanticism. Becoming is process, one with no start or end, it is rhizomic with no points only lines and no delimited existence; it is permanently in occurrence, in all singularities and multiplicities; it does not stratify or remain sedentary nor is it imagined or metaphysical, it is distinctly real; it holds no subject other than itself and cannot be taxonomically classified. Becoming is a “compositional unity” (Phillips 2006: 109), an event, an existence, it is never complete and never initiated, it holds “characteristic reversals between future and past, active and passive, cause and effect, more and less too much and not enough” (Deleuze 2003: 8) and it is always both extremities at once. Its existence is not defined through movement from one end of a binary opposition to another; from one point in an arborescent organisation to the next, it permeates all points, all binary distinctions simultaneously. The unity occurring in the displacement of water is a state of becoming, it is not attributable to the object or the water it is displacing both participate in an event, a becoming, two states both singularities and multiplicities affect one another causing synthesis in an incorporeal event. But the state of becoming located in the displacement of water is not a affective relation of just two, of just water or the object, they are in affective relations of becoming with an array of other assemblages, multiplicities and singularities and thus there is no start or end, only a middle; this is what is meant when I say becoming is rhizomic.

Becoming-animal is not a linear progression, or regression, “a becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit an identification … To become is not to progress or regress along a series.” (Deleuze & Guattari 2004: 262). In becoming-animal we see a “disjunctive synthesis” (Castro 2010: 226), an affective relation between singularities, it is a process of creative involution forming a new flow between terms and below assignable relations. Becoming does not reduce or produce and transcends schematized milieus. It operates both within, outside and beyond taxonomical classifications, the human becoming-animal does not turn into a beast, nor beast into human. By becoming-animal one must enter certain “assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari 2004: 267), complex webs of affective interaction between heterogeneous entities engaged in “relations of exteriority” (DeLanda 2011: 10), themselves becoming.

#### Eco-romanticism is violent and causes worse exploitation

Chaia **Heller 99**, faculty member of the Institute for Social Ecology, Ecology of Everyday Life, googlebooks

Ecological awareness of the planet peaked in 1972 when astronauts first photographed the planet, revealing thick furrows of smog encasing a blue and green ball. The world is dying', became the common cry as the planet, personified as 'Mother Earth', captured national, sentimental attention. Nature became rendered as a victimized woman, a Madonna-like angel to be idealized, protected, and 'saved' from society's inability to restrain itself. Decades later, we still witness popular expressions of the desire to protect 'nature'. As we observe each April on Earth Day, politicians, corporate agents, and environmentalists take their annual leap into the romantic, ecological drama, becoming 'eco-knights' ready to save helpless "lady nature' from the dragon of human irresponsibility. The cult of romantic love, which emerged first in the twelfth century poetry of the French troubadours of Longuedoc, still provides a cauldron of images and metaphors for today's depictions of nature.1 Contemporary Western representations of 'mother nature' emerged out of this "cult of the romantic" tradition based on a dialectic between an heroic savior and an ideal lover. Indeed, the metaphors and myths used to discuss ecological problems often find their origins within romantic literature. Yet despite its association with love, romanticism often shows its cool side when it surfaces within ecological discourse. While often expressing a desire to protect 'mother nature', it may ignore the social and political struggles of marginalized peoples. In particular, romantic ecology fails to challenge the ideologies and institutions of social domination that legitimize social injustice. Instead of challenging institutions and ideologies of domination within society in general, romantic ecology too often points its sword toward abstract dragons such as 'human nature', 'technology', or 'western civilization', all of which are held responsible for slaying "Lady Nature.\*' In turn, romantic ecology often veils a theme of animosity toward marginalized groups under a silk cloak of idealism, protection, and a promise of self-constraint. It not only refuses to make social liberation a priority, but in some cases, actually holds the oppressed responsible for the destruction of the natural world.

## adv 2

#### Their account of desire is hogwash – “vote for our good affect, reject their bad” is so reductive the concept becomes useless

Clare Hemmings 5, feminist theory prof at the London School of Economics, Invoking Affect, Cultural Studies Vol. 19, No. 5 September 2005, pp. 548 /567

While appreciative of a critical focus on the unusual, which is to say the non-socially-determined, not as a bid for group rights, but a bid for social transformation, I remain sceptical of what is often a theoretical celebration of affect as uniquely situated to achieve this end. This article explores my scepticism of such affective celebration through close engagement with Sedgwick’s (2003) and Massumi’s (2002) work on the subject. Both authors are well-respected contributors to contemporary cultural theory, and both have recently published monographs invoking affect as the way forward within that arena. For both authors it is affect’s difference from social structures that means it possesses, in itself, the capacity to restructure social meaning. But both authors are thereby presented with something of a problem. As prominent cultural theorists, they cannot fail to be aware of the myriad ways that affect manifests precisely not as difference, but as a central mechanism of social reproduction in the most glaring ways. The delights of consumerism, feelings of belonging attending fundamentalism or fascism, to suggest just several contexts, are affective responses that strengthen rather than challenge a dominant social order (Berlant 1997). Sedgwick and Massumi do both acknowledge this characteristic of affect in their work, but do not pursue it, interested instead as they both are in that ‘other affect’, the good affect that undoes the bad. It is difficult to maintain such an affective dichotomy of course, particularly in light of their own professed irritation with cultural theorists’ tendency to divide the world up into good and bad, repressive or subversive and so on, as I discuss in more detail below. But unfortunately neither author offers any explanation as to the relationship between these ‘two kinds’ of affect, which means the relationship remains dyadic.

Instead, both authors negotiate a way out of their own uncomfortable critical position by turning the question of affective freedom back onto the cultural critic, leaving it up to her or him to decide whether the direction they wish to pursue is one of the pessimism of social determinism (including bad affect) or the optimism of affective freedom (good affect). Two points come to mind at this point. Firstly, this question to the critic is hardly an open one. ‘Wouldn’t you rather be free?’ can hardly elicit a negative response in anyone but the most hardened cultural theorist, whose hardness is indeed evidenced by that response. Secondly, as part of persuading the critic that the question is a valid one, both the ills of cultural theory to date and the restorative power of affect need to be overstated. My overarching contention in this article, then, is that while affect may be an interesting and valuable critical focus in context, it often emerges as a rhetorical device whose ultimate goal is to persuade ‘paranoid theorists’ into a more productive frame of mind.

#### There are no preconscious desires – the content of our arguments determines their affective value

Ruth Leys 11, humanities and history prof at Johns Hopkins, The Turn to Affect: A Critique, Critical Inquiry 37 (Spring 2011)

It is important to notice that Massumi imposes on Sturm’s experimental ﬁndings an interpretation motivated by a set of assumptions about the asignifying nature of affect. These assumptions drive his analysis of Sturm’s data in order to produce a distinction between, on the one hand, the conscious, signifying (“emotional” and intellectual) processes held to be captive to the ﬁxity of received meanings and categories and, on the other hand, the nonconscious affective processes of intensity held to be autonomous from signiﬁcation. Differently from Tomkins and Ekman but to the same end, Massumi conceptualizes affect as inherently independent of meaning and intention. What he and other affect theorists share with Tomkins and Ekman— hence also with Sedgwick and Smail—is a commitment to the idea that there is a disjunction or gap between the subject’s affective processes and his or her cognition or knowledge of the objects that caused them. The result is that the body not only “senses” and performs a kind of “thinking” below the threshold of conscious recognition and meaning but—as we shall see in a moment— because of the speed with which the autonomic, affective processes are said to occur, it does all this before the mind has time to intervene. And now the larger stakes of Massumi’s effort to distinguish “affect” from signiﬁcation begin to become clear. He is not interested in the cognitive content or meaning political or ﬁlmic or ﬁctional or artistic representations may have for the audience or viewer but rather in their effects on the subject regardless of signiﬁcation. The whole point of the turn to affect by Massumi and like-minded cultural critics is thus to shift attention away from considerations of meaning or “ideology” or indeed representation to the subject’s subpersonal material-affective responses, where, it is claimed, political and other inﬂuences do their real work. The disconnect between “ideology” and affect produces as one of its consequences a relative indifference to the role of ideas and beliefs in politics, culture, and art in favor of an “ontological” concern with different people’s corporeal affective reactions. We ﬁnd a similar disconnect between meaning and affect in Smail’s neurohistory, where, for example, gossip is said to have nothing to do with meaning, but is a “meaningless social chatter whose only function is the mutual stimulation of peace-and-contentment hormones. Gossip, in this model, remains important as a medium of communication,” as Smail observes, but what get communicated are not “primarily words and their meanings” but “chemical messengers.” 30 For both the affect theorists and Smail, then, political campaigns, advertising, literature, visual images, and the mass media are all mechanisms for producing such effects below the threshold of meaning and ideology. 31 In short, according to such theorists affect has the potential to transform individuals for good or ill without regard to the content of argument or debate. These are the reasons Massumi and the others are interested in scientiﬁc studies allegedly showing that affective processes and even a kind of intelligence go on in the body independently of cognition or consciousness and that the mind operates too late to intervene.

## adv 1

#### Rejection of state-engagement creates even more repressive order - this politics of extremes must be rejected

Zizek 04

Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in Ljubljana, 2004, Organs Without Bodies, p. 72-73

However, even if there is a grain of truth in the reproach of Deleuze’s “dualism,” and in the remark that the opposition(s) between nomadic and State, molecular and molar, and so forth is not simply the opposition between the Good (nomadic...) and the Evil (state. .), Deleuze is as far as possible from asserting any kind of complementarity between the two poles (in the sense that, while the molar State alone is oppressive, suffocating the flow of desire, the opposite extreme, as the total abolition of the State, would mean “regression” into the psychotic, self-destructive rage of the pure, pre-Oedipal flow of desire). So, what we ostensibly need is the right balance between the two. This is how, among others, Julia Kristeva reads and appropriates Deleuze: while praising his liberation of the creativity of desire from the constraints of State Power, she nonethe¬less warns of the destructive consequences of seeing in the State only a negative barrier to be abolished: to avoid direct self-destruction, the total revolutionary abolition of the (existing) State always reverts into a new Order, even more oppressive than the previous one. In this sense, Kristeva praises revolt—the liberation of the “wild” pre-Oedipal creative forces, the liberation that is not primarily political but more intimate, psychic, religious, artistic... —and condemns revolution as the installation of a new Order, the coagulation of the creative energies of the revolt.77 From a truly Hegelian, Deleuzian, and/or Lacanian approach (a strange series of equivalences indeed), this line of argumentation should be rejected in toto: true radicality does not consist in going to the extreme and destroying the system (i.e., in disturbing too much the balance that sustains it) but consists in changing the very coordinates that define this balance. Say, once we accept the social-democratic idea of the modern capitalist market economy cum welfare state, it is easy to claim that one should avoid both extremes (i.e., the total freedom of the market, on one hand, and excessive state intervention, on the other hand) and find the right balance between the two. However, the true revolution would consist in transforming the very overall balance of the social edifice, in enforcing a new structural principle of social life that would render the very field of the opposition between market and state obsolete. Or, let us take the platitude about the right balance between the permissive indulgence of spontaneity and the rigors of discipline. Revolution is not the assertion of spontaneity and rejection of every discipline but the radical redefi¬nition of what counts as true spontaneity or discipline. For instance, in the Kantian philosophical revolution, true (transcendental) spontaneity occurs not when I follow my natural instincts and needs but when I exercise my freedom, which means when I act against my “spontaneous” natural impulses.

#### The call for fluidarities is the worst kind of structuralism

Locke 11

T Austin Locke, writer for plurality press, 2011 "The Romanticism of Deleuze and Guattari http://plurality-press.info/taustinlocke/the-romanticism-of-deleuze-and-guattari/

Further to this observation it may be considered that the mode of thought developed by Deleuze and Guattari is in fact a romanticised, creative and poetic form of structuralism. Whilst their ontology may not simply invert the nature-culture dichotomy, it does constitute a new system of understanding, a mode of thought imposed upon reality. It can even be suggested that the conceptual framework laid down by Deleuze and Guattari is infact based upon alternate dichotomies or binary distinctions; re/deterritorialization, “the ontological opposition between being and becoming” (Žižek 2004:9) or “the Virtual and the Actual” (ibid: 4) could be cited as a demonstration of a mode of thought based upon dualities.

Whilst there are two complementary concepts throughout the works of Deleuze and Guattari, they do not constitute binary oppositions, at least in the structuralist sense. Structuralism and post-structuralism are both products of a certain strain of philosophy, a particular history of thought; they were formed from “the Western episteme” (Foucault 2002: 401), although one may locate many alternate influences such as Taoism. Deleuze and Guattari, like Lévi-Strauss and Aristotle before them, are seeking to understand reality, existence, the basis of human activity, the formation of knowledge. Despite these similarities, these concepts constructed, there remain some major differences between the structuralist and post-structuralist perspectives, when these differences are highlighted it can be shown that Deleuze and Guattari should not be considered romantics in the romanticist sense, but they can perhaps be considered creative romantics.

Structuralism creates an arborescent schema, singularities are placed within a systemic organization whereby the differential relations and functions of each are defined on the basis of their relation to one another. The difference of a point within the schema holds meaning only in relation to another; the cooked opposes the raw (Lévi-Strauss 1983), nature opposes culture, male opposes female. Further, beyond general categories, each singularity becomes defined in relation to its arborescent organisation to other singularities or general categories; “Structure is defined… by the nature of certain atomic elements which claim to account both for the formation of wholes and for the variation of their parts” (Deleuze 2004: 173). This order effectively creates a grid of similarity and difference upon which each point may be plotted, the cooked is defined as the negation of the raw, its meaning only holds in relation to another point within the schema. Each point within the structure is defined on its difference, or similarity, to another point; similarity and difference fall in on one another becoming the same notion. Similarity is merely defined as a lack of difference and difference as a lack of similarity.

The relationship between singularities and multiplicities are considered in terms of a Hegelian, Platonic or Peripatetic separation between the general and the particular. The ‘free-market’ becomes a general structure from which the individual free-markets are born. Such a separation develops a totality; it implies there is a structurally definable ideal type from which other free markets are derived. The particular is only definable in relation to the general, each individual instance possess characteristics of a universal general category. To take a minor example: a cat is defined first as an animal, it possesses characteristics of the general category animal, some but not all; next it is defined as a vertebrate, again it possesses certain characteristics of an ideal type, further it is defined as a mammal again possessing certain characteristics of the category mammal, this identification goes on until it is identified as a particular breed. Such means of classification again is based on a grid of difference and similarity defined by general categories. In short, structuralism only provides relational definitions obtained from a particular plane of immanence; difference and similarity are one and the same in structuralism, particular singularities and multiplicities become defined in relation to general essences which are in turn structurally constituted. Within the structuralist plane of immanence points within the arborescent organisation only have meaning through relation to one another or to an immutable universal category.

They can’t solve their impacts

Hallward 6

Peter Hallward, Professor in the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Middlesex University, London, 06, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, p. 7

To insist in this way on the logic of creation as the primary if not exclusive focus of Deleuze’s work is undeniably to simplify aspects of his thought. My goal in this hook is not to engage in the detailed analysis of particular sequences or problems in Deleuze’s texts, but to characterise the dominant movement of his philosophy as a whole. For the sake of clarity and economy this characterization will pay little attention to the complex¬ities of context or the occasional inconsistencies that must accompany the development of so large and wide-ranging a body of work. Despite these shortcomings, I think it’s fair to say that this approach remains broadly in line with Deleuze’s own way of reading other philosophers. Like Leibniz or Bergson, Deleuze assumes that every philosopher is animated by just one fundamental problem, and that to read a work of philosophy ‘does not consist in concluding from the idea of a preceding condition the idea of the follow¬ing condition, but in grasping the effort or tendency by which the following condition itself ensues from the preceding “by means of a natural force”’)7 Every ‘philosophy’s power is measured by the concepts it creates’, ‘concepts that impose a new set of divi¬sions on things and actions’. On the basis of the concepts they create, philosophers ‘subordinate and submit things to a question in such a way that, in this forced and con¬strained submission, things reveal to us an essence, a nature. The main virtue of the question to which Deleuze’s project will itself be submitted in the following pages may be to reveal in a somewhat unexpected way the degree to which his work, far from engaging in a description or transformation of the world, instead seeks to escape it. The Deleuze that has long fascinated and troubled me is neither a worldly nor even a ‘relational’ thinker. If (after Marx and Darwin) materialism involves accept¬ance of the fact that actual or worldly processes inflect the course of both natural and human history then Deleuze may not be a materialist thinker either. As Deleuze presents it, the destiny of thought will not be fundamentally affected by the mediation of society, history or the world; although Delenze equates being with the activity of creation, he orients this activity towards a contemplative and immaterial abstraction. More than a hundred and fifty years after Marx urged us to change rather than contemplate the world, Deleuze, like so many of his philosophical contemporaries, effectively recom¬mends instead that we settle for the alternative choice. The real preoccupation of this book concerns the value of this advice.

You should default to pragmatism – it’s the only way to determine the value of our micro-ethical acts

Miller 03

Christopher L. Miller, Yale University, 2003 "We Shouldn't Judge Deleuze and Guattari": A Response to Eugene Holland Research in African Literatures, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Autumn,), pp. 129-141 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3821254 .

Holland is unwilling to avow?he is in fact in headlong flight away from?the central contradiction of nomadology and of the Deleuze movement as a whole. On the one hand Deleuzians claim to have left human- ism and anthropocentrism entirelybehind. As Holland put it in an earlier article: in A Thousand Plateaus, "the last traces of humanism and anthropocentrism have disappeared" (HD 59; emphasis added). On the other hand, readers can see the indelible imprint of anthropocentrism and humanism on Deleuze and Guattari's own work. As I will argue below, Deleuzians sometimes contradict their own claim of complete detachment from the real and the actual.

The claim to have left the real, humanism, and anthropocentrism behind is precisely what I called into question in my essay; it is a claim that (still) does not bear much examination. Holland now wants to hide what he¶ actually promoted in his earlier work on A Thousand Plateaus: what he called the "remarkable contributions" of that book to a variety of fields including¶ "comparative anthropology" (H2 64). That statement is meaningless as anything less than an endorsement of the value of the representational, -¶ referential (or supposedly pseudo -representational, pseudo -referential) state ments made in A Thousand Plateaus about nomads, Africans, Asians, women,¶ sorcerers, and yes, Guinea and New Guinea. Absent some (implausible)¶ redefinition of comparative anthropology as "non-referential," which Hol?¶ land has not proposed, that unguarded statement gives the show away. As I¶ said in my essay, Deleuze and Guattari in fact could have abandoned the real¶ and the representational, but they chose not to. They insisted on "contact¶ with the real"?in what I call their referential tease. So they went to the¶ library in order to populate their works with nomads, "Negres," Indians,¶ Chinese, leopard-men, women, and wolves?"primitives" in their estima- tion, things they love! That choice has consequences which Holland does¶ not want to face. But to ignore those consequences, which were the subject of my essay, would be wrong. Mokhtar Ghambou's new work, which I will discuss below, makes this clear in a broader frame.

It is in the name of philosophy that Holland frames his defense of¶ A Thousand Plateaus: Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy is "the very process¶ of creative concept-construction" (H 164); therefore "we shouldn't judge Deleuze and Guattari on the 'accuracy' of their concept of nomads" (H¶ 164) .7Philosophy, in this view, is creative and non- or self-referential; Hol?¶ land quotes Deleuze's What is PhilosophyV."[T]he [philosophical] concept [...] has no reference; itisself-referentiaVH\*olland himself states: "The pur?¶ pose of philosophy is not to represent the world [...]" (H163). Philosophy is the very means by which the virtual is created and the real, the actual, and¶ the referential are left behind. Science, on the other hand, is referential. Holland writes: "Deleuze and Guattari are categorical: 'Nowhere do we claim for our concepts the title of science [. . .]'" (H 163).

But the problem is more complicated than a simple opposition between philosophy and science. If this binary opposition were the full extent of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy?even from their own standpoint, even from the standpoint of Deleuze's philosophy as a whole, philosophy would simply be transcendental, having no connection to the real world. But that is clearly not what Deleuze and Guattari (and Holland) claim. No, they want it both ways: for example, "To propose a 'pure idea' of nomads mixed with 'actual' information" (M 198). The Deleuzian framework stipulates a condition of some-detachment between the virtual and the real. This can be seen in Deleuze and Guattari's works, in Holland's essay, and in works by other Deleuzians. Holland, for example, states that concepts (which are virtual, philosophical) are derived from" the real and the historical, but through a process other than representation (H 164). There are, Hol? land writes, "numerous points of 'contact with the real'" (H 164) .9 Paul Patton, in his book Deleuze and thePolitical, initially asserts that Deleuze and Guattari's "work"?without qualification, their entire oeuvre "is couched entirelyinnon-subjectivist terms and efers only to abstract lines, movements and processes of various kinds" (3); yet several pages later he partially reat- taches their work to reality: "The idea that philosophy creates concepts that are inseparable from a form of lifeand mode of activity points to a constant dimension of Deleuze's conception of thought and philosophy. It implies that the test of these concepts is ultimately pragmatic: in the end, their value is determined by the uses to which they can be put, outside as well as within philosophy"10 So, in the Deleuzian universe, the "derivation" of the philosophical and the virtual from the real and the historical, and the continuation of contact between the two, will come and go. Now you see it, now you don't.11

#### Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide

Ridley, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, 2010

(Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet **average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times**. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. **But even if you break down the world into bits**, **it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955**. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, **the outcome for the world is** remarkably, astonishingly, **dramatically positive**. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. **Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951**. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. **The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000**. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. **Despite a doubling of the world population**, even **the raw number of people living in absolute poverty** (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) **has fallen since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

Environment is improving

Lomborg 11

Bjorn Lomborg, directs the Copenhagen Consensus Center and is the author of The Skeptical Environmentalist and Cool It, Newsweek, June 12, 2011, "A Roadmap for the Planet", http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/12/bjorn-lomborg-explains-how-to-save-the-planet.html#

Climate alarmists and campaigning environmentalists argue that the industrialized countries of the world have made sizable withdrawals on nature’s fixed allowance, and unless we change our ways, and soon, we are doomed to an abrupt end. Take the recent proclamation from the United Nations Environment Program, which argued that governments should dramatically cut back on the use of resources. The mantra has become commonplace: our current way of living is selfish and unsustainable. We are wrecking the world. We are gobbling up the last resources. We are cutting down the rainforest. We are polluting the water. We are polluting the air. We are killing plants and animals, destroying the ozone layer, burning the world through our addiction to fossil fuels, and leaving a devastated planet for future generations. In other words, humanity is doomed. It is a compelling story, no doubt. It is also fundamentally wrong, and the consequences are severe. Tragically, exaggerated environmental worries—and the willingness of so many to believe them—could ultimately prevent us from finding smarter ways to actually help our planet and ensure the health of the environment for future generations. Because, our fears notwithstanding, we actually get smarter. Although Westerners were once reliant on whale oil for lighting, we never actually ran out of whales. Why? High demand and rising prices for whale oil spurred a search for and investment in the 19th-century version of alternative energy. First, kerosene from petroleum replaced whale oil. We didn’t run out of kerosene, either: electricity supplanted it because it was a superior way to light our planet. For generations, we have consistently underestimated our capacity for innovation. There was a time when we worried that all of London would be covered with horse manure because of the increasing use of horse-drawn carriages. Thanks to the invention of the car, London has 7 million inhabitants today. Dung disaster averted. In fact, would-be catastrophes have regularly been pushed aside throughout human history, and so often because of innovation and technological development. We never just continue to do the same old thing. We innovate and avoid the anticipated problems. Think of the whales, and then think of the debate over cutting emissions today. Instead of singlemindedly trying to force people to do without carbon-emitting fuels, we must recognize that we won’t make any real progress in cutting CO2 emissions until we can create affordable, efficient alternatives. We are far from that point today: much-hyped technologies such as wind and solar energy remain very expensive and inefficient compared with cheap fossil fuels. Globally, wind provides just 0.3 percent of our energy, and solar a minuscule 0.1 percent. Current technology is so inefficient that, to take just one example, if we were serious about wind power, we would have to blanket most countries with wind turbines to generate enough energy for everybody, and we would still have the massive problem of storage. We don’t know what to do when the wind doesn’t blow. Making the necessary breakthroughs will require mass improvements across many technologies. The sustainable response to global warming, then, is one that sees us get much more serious about investment into alternative-energy research and development. This has a much greater likelihood of leaving future generations at least the same opportunities as we have today. Because what, exactly, is sustainability? Fourteen years ago, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development report “Our Common Future,” chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, provided the most-quoted definition. Sustainable development “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The measure of success, then, is whether or not we give future generations the same opportunities that we have had. This prompts the question: have we lived unsustainably in the past? In fact, by almost any measure, humans have left a legacy of increased opportunity for their descendants. And this is true not just for the rich world but also for developing countries. In the last couple of hundred years we have become much richer than in all previous history. Available production per capita—the amount that an average individual can consume—increased eightfold between 1800 and 2000. In the past six decades, poverty has fallen more than in the previous 500 years. This decade alone, China will by itself lift 200 million individuals out of poverty. While one in every two people in the developing world was poor just 25 years ago, today it is one in four. Although much remains to be done, developing countries have become much more affluent, with a fivefold increase in real per capita income between 1950 and today. But it’s not just about money. The world has generally become a much better educated place, too. Illiteracy in the developing world has fallen from about 75 percent for the people born in the early part of the 1900s to about 12 percent among the young of today. More and more people have gained access to clean water and sanitation, improving health and income. And according to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, the percentage of undernourished people in the developing world has dropped from more than 50 percent in 1950 to 16 percent today. As humans have become richer and more educated, we have been able to enjoy more leisure time. In most developed countries, where there are available data, yearly working hours have fallen drastically since the end of the 19th century: today we work only about half as much as we did then. Over the last 30 years or so, total free time for men and women has increased, thanks to reductions in workload and housework. Globally, life expectancy today is 69. Compare this with an average life span of 52 in 1960, or of about 30 in 1900. Advances in public health and technological innovation have dramatically lengthened our lives. We have consistently achieved these remarkable developments by focusing on technological innovation and investment designed to create a richer future. And while major challenges remain, the future appears to hold great promise, too. The U.N. estimates that over this century, the planet’s human inhabitants will become 14 times richer and the average person in the developing world a whopping 24 times richer. By the end of the century, the U.N. estimates we will live to be 85 on average, and virtually everyone will read, write, and have access to food, water, and sanitation. That’s not too shabby. Rather than celebrating this amazing progress, many find it distasteful. Instead of acknowledging and learning from it, we bathe ourselves in guilt, fretting about our supposed unsustainable lives. Certainly many argue that while the past may have improved, surely it doesn’t matter for the future, because we are destroying the environment! But not so fast. In recent decades, air quality in wealthy countries has vastly improved. In virtually every developed country, the air is more breathable and the water is more drinkable than they were in 1970. London, renowned for centuries for its infamous smog and severe pollution, today has the cleanest air that it has had since the Middle Ages. Today, some of the most polluted places in the world are the megacities of the developing world, such as Beijing, New Delhi, and Mexico City. But remember what happened in developed countries. Over a period of several hundred years, increasing incomes were matched by increasing pollution. In the 1930s and 1940s, London was more polluted than Beijing, New Delhi, or Mexico City are today. Eventually, with increased affluence, developed countries gradually were better able to afford a cleaner environment. That is happening already today in some of the richest developing countries: air-pollution levels in Mexico City have been dropping precisely because of better technology and more wealth. Though air pollution is by far the most menacing for humans, water quality has similarly been getting better. Forests, too, are regrowing in rich countries, though still being lost in poor places where slash-and-burn is preferable to starvation.

#### Power density determines energy effectiveness—wind/solar fail

Hawkins, electrical engineering – Royal Military College of Canada and Queen’s University, engineering consulting – IBM and EDS, 2/20/’13

(Kent, “Power Density Separates the Wheat from the Chaff,” http://www.masterresource.org/2013/02/power-density-wheat-from-chaff/#more-24152)

“Power density (W/m2) is perhaps the most revealing variable in energetics…”[1]- Vaclav Smil

It may be a bit of an exaggeration to say that understanding power density may be all the average person requires to put our energy sources and needs into perspective, but there is some merit in this argument. Unfortunately, this view of energy matters remains little discussed, probably because it appears rather academic.

This post attempts to overcome this by further illustrating the concepts. It will also demonstrate how industrial-scale wind and solar PV electricity generation plants fail to meet this important, high-level standard of performance for electricity sources required by mankind, particularly in developed societies, but increasingly in developing and even undeveloped societies.

This is even without taking into account:

(1) The persistent erratic (short term – minutes) and unreliable (medium to long term – hours to days) nature of electricity production that wind and solar PV provide; (2) their high costs; and (3) many other considerations described here.

This is not to diminish the importance of these other matters, but the contemplation of them all together is fairly elaborate and perspective is easily lost.

In summary, power density is the “gold standard” as a high-level pass/fail measure of an energy source’s value to humanity.

Power Density

Vaclav Smil introduced power density concepts to MasterResource readers in this series. As defined in his comprehensive book on the subject, Energy in Nature and Society[2], power density is watts per square meter (W/m2). It has two components:

The earth’s surface area required to deliver our energy flow needs[3]

The power aspect, which is the measure of the ability of an energy source to provide the needed energy rate of flow, or flux (e.g., W = Wh/h, or joules per unit of time). Simply put, this is the rate at which the energy source allows access.

Power density also serves as a characteristic of the user environment.

To some, this concept may seem irrelevant, possibly interesting only to academics. They might say: Why can’t we just deal in watts and watt-hours? The answer is that these alone are incomplete considerations and misleading in assessing the value of energy sources for human well-being and advancement.

To others, power density might appear to be too reductive or simplified a consideration. After all, is there not a large energy potential in wind and solar resources, and is this fact alone not enough to justify harvesting it? The answer is the amount of energy available is only one factor. The other, arguably more important, is the inherent capability of the energy source to provide the needed flow of energy, that is its power component, in relation to the earth’s surface required to harvest it.

expanding the solar industry causes e-waste dumping

ISHAN NATH, Rhodes scholar and Stanford graduate – major in economics and Earth Systems and minor in mathematics, 10 [“Cleaning Up After Clean Energy: Hazardous Waste in the Solar Industry,” Stanford Journal of International Affairs, Volume 11, number 2, http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/pdf/Solar\_11.2.pdf]

These hopes for a viable source of renewable ¶ energy, however, have recently been tempered with a ¶ word of caution. Toxic waste, experts say, is something ¶ the solar industry must watch out for, as detailed by ¶ the watchdog nonprofit Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition ¶ (SVTC) in a widely circulated new report. Essentially, ¶ solar firms face two dilemmas concerning their ¶ hazardous chemicals. How can the production process ¶ ensure that panels are manufactured without leaking ¶ waste and how will they be disposed of after a lifetime ¶ of use? These concerns, though fairly manageable in ¶ and of themselves, exist in a complex international ¶ web of competing political, economic, and scientific ¶ interests. Given this complexity, most solar firms ¶ have focused on the more straightforward of the two ¶ problems: end-of-life recycling. But in creating a fairly ¶ solid foundation for addressing this issue, the industry ¶ has largely overlooked investigative reports revealing ¶ current problems with production waste, particularly ¶ pertaining to Chinese manufacturing. Until these ¶ concerns receive more attention, promises of panel ¶ recycling will quell any public anxiety, preventing the ¶ creation of necessary safeguards to stop rogue firms ¶ from unsafe manufacturing practices. To fully address ¶ its hazardous waste issues, the solar industry must move ¶ forward aggressively not only with its development of ¶ panel recycling programs, but also with steps to address ¶ more pressing issues in the production process.¶ The first question facing solar firms is how to ¶ address the prospect of used panels inundating landfills ¶ and leaching toxic waste into the environment. When ¶ a solar module outlives its usefulness 20 to 25 years ¶ after installation, its disposal must be carefully handled ¶ to avoid contamination from the enclosed chemicals. ¶ But, given examples from similar industries, there is no ¶ guarantee that this procedure will take place. More than ¶ two-thirds of American states have no existing laws ¶ requiring electronics recycling and the US currently ¶ exports 80 percent of its electronic waste (e-waste) ¶ to developing countries that lack infrastructure to ¶ manage it.¶ 1¶ Thus, by urging solar companies to plan ¶ for proper disposal of decommissioned panels, SVTC ¶ draws attention to an issue that currently remains ¶ unaddressed. The Coalition makes an appeal for ¶ legislation requiring Extended Producer Responsibility, ¶ which would force firms to take back and recycle their ¶ used products, but in the absence of such requirements, ¶ is the solar industry ready for the eventual onrush of ¶ solar panels?¶ 2¶ “I don’t think enough people are thinking ¶ about [recycling used solar panels],” said Jamie Porges, ¶ COO and Founder of Radiance Solar, an Atlantabased startup. “I’m sure there are people who have ¶ thought about it, but I don’t think there’s been enough ¶ open discussion and I haven’t heard a plan.”¶ 3¶ Another ¶ executive familiar with the solar industry frames the ¶ problem more urgently. Steve Newcomb, Founder and ¶ CEO of “One Block Off the Grid,” a firm that connects ¶ consumers with the solar industry, calls the issue of ¶ used solar modules “a big deal, and one that nobody’s ¶ thought a lot about yet.” If nothing is done, he warns, ¶ **the situation could escalate into “a major disaster.”¶** 4

E-waste dumping is environmentally unjust – hurts the poorest demographics in developing countries

Nicola Templeton, JD, Seattle University School of Law, 2009; BSc (Eng.), Chemical Engineering, 09 [“The Dark Side of Recycling and Reusing Electronics: Is Washington’s E-Cycle Program Adequate?” Seattle Journal for Social Justice Volume 7 Issue 2 Spring/Summer 2009 Article 21 4-16-2012]

Environmental degradation is the degradation of the quality of life.¶ 94¶ Exporting toxic e-waste is unfair because rather than the manufacturers, ¶ producers, and users bearing the true costs of their products, developing ¶ countries are forced to bear the environmental and health costs of toxic ewaste in exchange for desperately needed jobs, income, and foreign ¶ currency.¶ 95¶ This impedes economic growth and disproportionately burdens ¶ the poor; it is fundamentally unjust. ¶ E-waste trade is not a positive trade based on competitive advantage; ¶ rather it is an unjust exploitation of developing countries’ weak capacity for environmental and occupational regulation. Developing countries are far ¶ less equipped to effectively manage e-waste hazards in ways that protect ¶ human health and the environment than the countries that generate the ¶ waste.¶ 96¶ In fact, most developing countries have little or no control over ¶ disposal of hazardous wastes.¶ 97¶ Furthermore, many people working with ewaste have minimal education or are illiterate and lack basic knowledge of ¶ the dangers they are exposed to on a daily basis.¶ 98¶ ¶ The e-waste trade compromises the economic potential of developing ¶ countries, making it even more difficult for them to overcome their ¶ development hurdles. The toxic waste contaminates the soil, the ¶ groundwater, and the food-chain,¶ 99¶ which is especially harmful to these ¶ countries’ subsistence farmers and agrarian economies.¶ 100¶ In addition, the ¶ opportunity costs of resources redirected from education or infrastructure ¶ building to deal with ill-health that is caused by polluted water and food ¶ sources are significant. High percentages of children die before the age of ¶ five if water is not safe to drink and nutritious and affordable food is not ¶ available;¶ 101¶ thus, future generations that could be educated to build the ¶ economies of these countries are jeopardized. Moreover, unhealthy ¶ populations create weaker work forces, which are less able to contribute to ¶ growing the economies. ¶ Furthermore, the continued e-waste trade seems to contradict the United ¶ Nations’ impressive Millennium Development Goals of eradicating poverty, ¶ improving health and mortality rates, and ensuring environmental ¶ sustainability;¶ 102¶ this raises a question about the level of commitment to ¶ these goals. ¶ This section further illustrates the injustice of e-waste exports by ¶ describing the deleterious effects of e-waste sent to China for “recycling” ¶ and to Nigeria for “reuse.” Although specific conditions in these two ¶ countries are discussed, the horrors of “recycling” and “reuse” exports are ¶ by no means limited to these countries.¶ 103

**Capitalism solves war**

**Gartzke 7** (Eric, associate professor of political science and a member of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, “The Capitalist Peace”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, January 2007, Pp. 166–191)

If war is a product of incompatible interests and failed or abortive bargaining, peace ensues when states lack differences worthy of costly conflict, or when circumstances favor successful diplomacy. Realists and others argue that state interests are inherently incompatible, but this need be so only if state interests are narrowly defined or when conquest promises tangible benefits. Peace can result from at least three attributes of mature capitalist economies. First, the historic impetus to territorial expansion is tempered by the rising importance of intellectual and financial capital, factors that are more expediently enticed than conquered. Land does little to increase the worth of the advanced economies while resource competition is more cheaply pursued through markets than by means of military occupation. At the same time, development actually increases the ability of states to project power when incompatible policy objectives exist. Development affects who states fight (and what they fight over) more than the overall frequency of warfare. Second, substantial overlap in the foreign policy goals of developed nations in the post–World War II period further limits the scope and scale of conflict. Lacking territorial tensions, consensus about how to order the international system has allowed liberal states to cooperate and to accommodate minor differences. Whether this affinity among liberal states will persist in the next century is a question open to debate. Finally, the rise of global capital markets creates a new mechanism for competition and communication for states that might otherwise be forced to fight. Separately, these processes influence patterns of warfare in the modern world. Together, they explain the absence of war among states in the developed world and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace.

#### War turns structural violence

Bulloch 8

Millennium - Journal of International Studies *May 2008 vol. 36 no. 3 575-595*

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But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

Deleuze and guattari are anti-scientific hacks

Jean **Bricmont 96**, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Louvain, “Science of Chaos or Chaos in Science?”, March 22, <http://arxiv.org/pdf/chao-dyn/9603009.pdf>

Finally, Gilles Deleuze and F´elix Guattari understood chaos as follows: “ On d´efinit le chaos moins par son d´esordre que par la vitesse infinie avec laquelle se dissipe toute forme qui s’y ´ebauche. C’est un vide qui n’est pas un n´eant, mais un virtuel , contenant toutes les particules possibles et tirant toutes les formes possibles qui surgissent pour disparaˆıtre aussitˆot, sans consistance ni r´ef´erence, sans cons´equence (Ilya Prigogine et Isabelle Stengers, Entre le temps et l’´eternit´e, pp. 162–163).”68 ([24]) Footnote: 68“Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder than by the infinite speed with which every form being sketched is dissipated. It is a vacuum which is not a nothingness, but a virtual , containing all possible particles and extracting all possible forms, which appear and disappear immediately, without consistence, nor reference, nor consequence.” Of course, Prigogine and Stengers are not responsible for these confusions (in that reference, they discuss the origin of the universe). But this illustrates the difficulties and the dangers of the popularization of science. Besides, Guattari wrote a whole book on “Chaosmose” ([48]), which is full of references to nonexistent concepts such as “nonlinear irreversibility thresholds” and “fractal machines”69.

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#### Dialogue more effectively captures their political strategy

Livingston 12

Alexander Livingston, Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University Volume 45, Number 3, 2012 "Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere"

A politics that addresses these microdeterminations, what Deleuze and Guattari call micropolitics, is more basic than deliberation because it concerns the boundaries of “the realm of the decidable.” The appeal of reason can only function within existing narrow and rigid boundaries. Strategic appeals to affect, however, can help close or expand this realm and open up new issues to deliberation and participation. In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari consider micropolitics as essentially underlying deliberation. Creative becoming, not practical reason, is at the heart of their vision of politics.

How does a democratic micropolitics, then, attempt to reshuffle the rigid segments of a stingy American public culture? Connolly argues that the only way we can achieve a “public ethos of pluralism” is by cultivating the “civic virtues” of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness (2005, 65). If the work of politics aspires to more than a further round in a vicious circle of existential revenge, citizens must first nurture an ethics of “micropolitical receptivity” to the interdependence of their conflicting identities claims in a complex, ever faster late-modern world (1999, 149). To this end, Connolly draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking to devise tactics and techniques of “nudging” or exerting “modest influence” on the visceral register of the self and of public culture more widely (2002, 77; 1999, 29). In some passages, Connolly describes this as the search for “more expansive modes of persuasion,” while in others he appeals to the force of a sort of “mystical experience” (1999, 8; 2002, 120). Yet this dependence on **Deleuze and Guattari’s “micropolitics”** draws Connolly away from his own best insights and leads him to marginalize the democratic core of a leftist response to an insurgent neoconservative micropolitics. [End Page 277]

Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy provides a powerful tool for theorizing the symbolic meanings and dispositions carried at visceral register of experience. While they do not frame their project in terms of embodied registers or the differential processing structures of brain, they provide an analogous conception of experience, drawing on Henri Bergson’s concept of “the virtual” (Bergson 1990; Deleuze 1988). Emotions, memory traces, infrasensible experiences, habitual gestures, and the unconscious exist “virtually,” such that we cannot always articulate them at the level of language, yet they play a role in shaping our higher-register experiences of the world. The virtual represents a lower register of experience than the conscious and reflective register of ideas, doctrines, and interests. To the extent that A Thousand Plateaus can be regarded as a text of political philosophy, it can be said to be a treatise concerned with political potential of this virtual register as both a site of subjectification and resistance.

Micropolitics is Deleuze and Guatarri’s name for this politics of the virtual. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of micropolitics in their analysis of political regimes. Against the received image of the state as a centralized, stable, and sovereign territorial entity, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the state is better described as a macropolitical assemblage that depends on more ubiquitous, fluid, and supple micropolitical assemblages. The molar organization of the state depends on a micro- or molecular organization of forces such as affects, moods, memories, and habits that sustain and propagate the state’s ends. “In short,” they write, “everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics” (1987, 213).

Despite appearances to the contrary, even the most monolithic and centralized assemblages of power, such as the state, are in fact fluid and lively micro-assemblages resonating together in an only relatively stable manner. Taking the stark example of the fascist state, Deleuze and Guattari make the case that it too is in fact only a decentered plurality that depends on the micropolitics that sustain it:

The concept of the totalitarian State applies only at the macropolitical level, to a rigid segmentarity and a particular mode of totalization and centralization. But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran’s fascism, fascism on [End Page 278] the Left and fascism on the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school, and office: every fascism is defined by a micro-black hole that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized central black hole.

(1987, 214)

Their redescription of these kinds of major assemblages of power in terms of their molecular makeup opens up a new strategic awareness of the multiple sites of rupture, destabilization, and transformation through which citizens can challenge them. The fact that the forces animating the macroregister of politics also animate the microregister means that there exists a sort of feedback loop between the two registers, such that action at one level makes for consequences at the other. Because power is not reducible to the authority of the state or any other macropolitical hegemon, local experiments and struggles by citizens, market forces, and media producers have broad cultural and institutional effects on.

To appraise Connolly’s turn to micropolitics it is important to understand what vision of political action follows from Deleuze and Guattari’s original formulation. For Deleuze and Guattari political action is fundamentally creative and reactive. Citizens act by unleashing new forces and energies that disrupt and deterritorialize received molar orders of power and desire. Social movements, thinkers, and dissidents create new practices, new identities, and new values that aim to transform established assemblages. This creative aspect of politics is the first step in destabilizing rigid and reified practices. Connolly calls the proliferation of these dynamic, creative movements the “politics of becoming” (1999, 47–72). To effectively decenter received identities, desires, and self-conceptions, however, these new values have to engage politically with the existing public culture that constrains them. Political theorists following Hegel have described this process as a dialogical struggle for recognition. Deleuze and Guattari, however, refuse the language of subjectivity and of subjects who seek to recognize one another and instead cast the struggle in posthumanist terms as “the flash of the war machine, arriving from without” (1987, 353).

Micropolitics as a model of political engagement is the combat of war machines, nomadic war machines versus the state’s appropriation of the war machine, war machines of the left against the resonance machines of the right. The war machine works through “secrecy, speed, and affect” and represents “another kind of justice” from law or the state. War as armed conflict itself is not necessarily the object of the war machine, but its desirable power of displacement “institutes an entire economy of violence, in [End Page 279] other words, a way of making violence durable, even unlimited.” The war machine is the weapon that the herd or the pack uses to create “smooth space” against the “striated space” of the state (1987, 356, 352, 396, 384). It is continually reconstituted by minorities populating the edges and fringes of the collective body of the state. With it, nomads and barbarians lay siege to the gates of empire.

What is this war machine? As Deleuze and Guattari explain, “An ‘ideological,’ scientific, or artistic movement can be a potential war machine, to the precise extent to which it draws, in relations to a phylum, a plane of consistency, a creative line of flight, a smooth space of displacement” (1987, 422–23). The promotion of creative forms of becoming rather than violence and armed conflict are the core concerns of a war machine. That said, Deleuze and Guattari’s bellicose language here seems both unfortunate and out of place in a text that otherwise advocates cautious and delicate experimentation. The language of the war machine and Deleuze and Guattari’s apparent praise of violence and another kind of justice seem difficult to square with the allegedly egalitarian credentials of micropolitics. The ability to create to new identities and values certainly is a kind of “force” that citizens have the power to unleash on society, and certainly it is this disclosive sense of “force” rather than a necessarily bellicose and violent one that Deleuze and Guattari have in mind. For these reasons Paul Patton (2000, 115–27) has argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the war machine would better be thought of as a “metamorphosis machine” with a lineage going back to Nietzsche’s reevaluation of all values rather than to Clausewitz’s concept of total war. Portrayed in these more gentle terms, micropolitics can be defended in the terms of Connolly’s pluralistic but critical liberalism. Patton gives the example of indigenous land claims as an instance of such a metamorphosis machine—creative political claims making—that destabilizes and transforms existing juridical structures of power and identity.

Patton’s attempt to fold Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the war machine back into a liberal politics of accommodation may be a promising adaptation of the concept, but it misses a key element of Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of micropolitics: conflict. The nomadic war machine is fundamentally an oppositional and reactive force that seeks to break down and deterritorialize existing assemblages and orders.11 Micropolitics aims to destabilize and transform subconscious, unreflective, and affective sensibilities that hinder the creative becoming of new identities and values. Unlike a struggle for recognition, this process of transformation [End Page 280] is not primarily a dialogical or reciprocal enterprise in which the two parties exchange claims and concerns and attempt to forge some common ground. Instead, the war machine comes from outside and attacks. Activists create war machines to be “plugged” into other collective machines and orders of discourse.12 A machine, an order, a structure is destabilized by attacking the intensive energies and affects that sustain it. Deleuze and Guattari capture this prioritization of conflict in their distinction between two uses of conceptual innovations, what they call weapons and tools (1987, 393–403). Weapons are inventions used to disrupt and attack. A tool, by contrast, is an invention that builds and sustains common shelters and structures. A war machine uses weapons as projectiles to lay siege to the state. The tool is something they associate with the drudgery of exploited labor and the apparatus of capture. The war machine seeks to undermine the regime of tools through the mobilization of affects as projectiles. “Weapons are affects and affects weapons” (1987, 400). Micropolitics concerns conflict at the level of affect, disposition, sensibility, ethos. But might not democracy as a practice of self-government that involves both conflict and cooperation require a more careful balance of affective weaponry and reflective and thoughtful tools?13

Deliberative Democracy and the Rhizomatic Public Sphere

## at: we meet

Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Most precise

Sinha 6

<http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/>

Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries on 7 November, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 4695 of 2006 PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors. RESPONDENT: M/s. Asian Food Industries DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17008 of 2006] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17558 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J :

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus:

"It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

## at: desire first

#### We resolve the impact—collective decision-making allows us to overcome hidden desires

Livingston 12

Alexander Livingston, Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University Volume 45, Number 3, 2012 "Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere"

The informal and diffuse network of information that spans from labor meetings to church groups to book clubs to blogs to newspapers to PTA meetings and to dissident groups carries our reasons across multiple testing sites where they are subject to uptake, rejection, or transformation, only to be recirculated again. This public exchange of reasons has the important epistemic function of improving the quality of the reasons we use to justify our interests and decisions, but the more crucial function is its critical one. The articulation and contestation of reasons in the public sphere is a motor for self-reflection. It is this function, the self-critical and self-reflection function of exposure to diverse and impersonal reasons in a public sphere, that deliberative democracy values. While the media-saturated public sphere trades in low-involvement advertising and affective manipulation, it also and more importantly can be a means of provoking us to reflect on our received identities and interests.20 These epistemic and critical functions of the public sphere come together to provide a democratic resource for inciting self- and collective transformation in novel and potentially emancipatory ways. Seen as a molecular interplay of constantly flowing, shifting, and transforming reasons and self-understandings that provokes new and creative (but reflective) becomings that help us cope with the challenges of political community, the circulation of ordinary talk in the public sphere is Deleuzian. The public sphere is an example of micropolitics par excellence.

Once we introduce this institution of the public sphere into the discussion, we avail ourselves of a democratic alternative to Connolly’s politics of “cultural-corporeal infusion.” The task of generating resonance for a leftist politics can be divorced from the idea of manipulating visceral responses in favor of a politics that experiments with how reasons resonate in the public sphere, that is, with how they might function to provoke self-reflection. Reasons resonate when they make some claim on the moral and conceptual imaginary of their audience. That is to say, their resonance is not a feature of their logical structure but rather of the receptivity of the audience to them. A reason resonates when its audience considers it what William [End Page 286] James called a “live” hypothesis, “one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed” (1967, 717).

## ressentiment

Maintaining game rules is not the type of consensus they critique

Tally, English – Texas State University, ‘7

(Robert T, “The Agony of the Political,” Post Modern Culture 17.2)

Mouffe's image of a we/they politics in which collective identities vie with one another for hegemony looks a bit like organized sports. Consider the football game: rival sides squared off in a unambiguously agonistic struggle for dominance, with a clear winner and loser, yet agreeing to play by certain shared rules, and above all unwilling to destroy the sport itself (i.e., the political association) in order to achieve the side's particular goals. Football teams have no interest in dialogue, and the goal is not consensus, but victory. The winner is triumphant, and the loser must regroup, practice, and try again later. A clearly defined "we" will fight against the "they," but the aim is to win, not to destroy "them" or the sport itself. But, noteworthy in the extended metaphor, some organizing body (rarely democratic) has established the rules and standards by which the sport is played. The players have no say in how the game is structured.

If the sports analogy seems too facile, consider Mouffe's own characterization. Responding to the "fundamental question for democratic theory" (i.e., how to maintain antagonism in politics without destroying political association), Mouffe answers that it requires distinguishing between the categories of "antagonism" (relations between enemies) and "agonism" (relations between adversaries) and envisaging a sort of "conflictual consensus" providing a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered "legitimate enemies." Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. Adversaries do fight--even fiercely--but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, and accepted as legitimate perspectives. (52)

Play ball! Of course this means that, if the opposition party--oh, let's go ahead and call them the Reds--wishes to change the relations of power, it must do so within the political framework (e.g., legislative body or rules of the game). To be outside of the framework is to not be playing the game at all.

A better model might be that of games on the playground. On the playground, children both organize and play games, often coming up with and changing the rules as they go along. Their power relations are constantly adjusted, modified so as to make the game more fair ("you get a head start"), more safe ("no hitting"), more interesting ("three points if you can make it from behind that line"), and so on. The overall structure of the game does not necessarily change, but the specifics of how the game is played can vary. This is not a utopian vision, obviously. The power relations on display at most playgrounds are not the most salutary. But this model at least provides an image of what a radical version of Mouffe's agonistic, democratic politics might look like. How this would work outside the playground, in a global political context, is a different question. Can we get the world's diverse "teams" together on the same playground? Would a multipolar world system enable multiple grounds for playing? Who would or would not be allowed to play? Who would decide?

These practical questions are exceedingly tough to answer. The agonistic model of politics requires an arena where contestants can hold competitions. It requires rules that may be altered but that also must be in place in order to know what game is being played. And it requires a system that allows the sport to continue when particular games end. (That is, the winner cannot cancel further contests, a problem that has plagued nascent democracies.) A radical democracy founded on adversarial politics cannot simply replicate existing structures of liberal, parliamentary democracy. It must change the game.

## at: reasonability

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

## at: consensus bad

Dialogue is the opposite of consensus---avoiding clash means that they create immediate consensus b/c we can’t CONTEST. That encourages MONOLOGUE due to lack of preparation, and creates consensus by necessity because our answers suck. A centerred dialogue is the best middle ground between staleness and limitless truisms

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of

Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have

taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor.

As mentioned, the project started out with a set of relatively loosely formulated assumptions on the educational value of a particular game scenario on parliamentary elections. Thus, I assumed that the game design should be “realistic” in order to support the development of student competencies within the context of Danish upper secondary education. During my design interventions with The Power Game, I realised that my initial assumptions were inadequate when trying to understand the complex interplay between the intentions of the game design and how the design was adapted by the participating teachers and students. In order to analyse and contextualise my empirical data, I developed a more detailed theoretical and analytical framework for understanding the meaningmaking processes of educational gaming, which I have summarised below. First of all, the educational use of games should be understood in relation to how particular games are enacted in actual contexts. Thus, instead of playing “the definition game”, and trying to define the essence or ontology of games, this thesis presents a more pragmatic approach to the study of actually playing educational games. More specifically, I have identified a series of game elements – scenarios, goals, outcomes, rules, roles, resources and dialogue – which are all relevant for understanding the interplay between a particular game design and the educational context in which it is enacted. These game elements also reflect how games and education represent different traditions of knowledge, which involve a range of partially overlapping assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Barth, 2002). Finally, both games and education create specific criteria for validating particular forms of knowledge. In this way, educational gaming represents a tension between two different traditions of knowledge which I have captured in the term playful knowledge. In order to further describe and understand the different knowledge aspects of educational gaming, this thesis takes a sociocultural approach to playing, learning, thinking and meaning-making within The Power Game by combining the theoretical perspectives of pragmatism, dialogism and interactionism (cf. chapter 4). Thus, the assertions of the debate game are understood as a scenario-based inquiry where teachers and students try to unfold the election scenarios in relation to real and imagined outcomes. Similarly, the social organisation of the election scenario is understood as different forms of social interaction between the game participants – i.e. in terms of roles and generalised perspectives. Moreover, the representational modes of the game scenario are conceptualised as different aspects of discourse, which implies mutually responsive speaker-hearer relationships within the dialogical space of a parliamentary debate. 293 The main point here is that the educational use of The Power Game – and other games – only becomes meaningful in relation to particular forms of agency, i.e. how the election scenario is actually played out by the social actors of a gaming encounter. Thus, the inquiry, interaction and discourse of educational gaming should be understood in relation to concrete forms of social action. By studying and analysing how the game scenario was enacted, I have tried to avoid reducing games to essentialist worlds or deterministic designs for learning, which presuppose a rationalist model of social action. Obviously, the process of facilitating and playing The Power Game involved several constraints such as a limited time frame, narrowly defined goals (winning/losing) and more or less fixed rules of relevance and irrelevance. In this way, the interpretive framing of the game sessions was clearly dominated by strategic forms of interaction (Goffman, 1969). But the game sessions were also characterised by playful, creative and contingent forms of inquiry, since it was impossible – and ultimately undesirable – to fully predict the actual outcomes of the election scenario (Dewey, 1916). Similarly, by viewing the election scenario from a dialogical perspective, I analysed how the discursive positionings between the game participants involved centrifugal/centripetal tensions between open-ended (dialogical) and fixed (monological) forms of meaning (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986). Thus, any form of educational gaming involves negotiation of interpretations of what should and what should not count as valid knowledge within a particular game session. Combined, pragmatism, interactionism and dialogism represent three complimentary perspectives, which I have used to analytically foreground (and background) various aspects of educational gaming – both in relation to the knowledge aspects of the situated gaming encounter and the wider educational context.

## at: dialogue inevitable

Contestability is key to dialogue—endorsing the aff as an a priori stance makes that impossible

Livingston 12

Alexander Livingston, Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University Volume 45, Number 3, 2012 "Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere"

Tactics and techniques alone are insufficient for reinvigorating democracy in our late-modern world. Cooperation, deliberation, and collective action are needed first and foremost. But does Connolly really frame the [End Page 288] distinction between the two in such stark terms? Surely this way of putting the point must overstate the case. As I have mentioned, he issues a number of caveats that stress that he is not to be taken as suggesting that he sees no value in deliberation or public reason. As we have also seen, however, the power of dialogue and mutual understanding can have little place in his vision of politics owing his critique of intellectualism and his Deleuzian micropolitics. He foregrounds the multiple registers of thinking, an ethics of self-care, and a micropolitics of manipulation, all the while downplaying the issues of the public sphere, publicity, and political dialogue. But there is another theme lurking in the background of Connolly’s texts. Behind the celebration of ethics and micropolitics there are vague but regular appeals to another ingredient in his ethos of pluralism. It is something he refers to, all too in often in passing, as negotiation (1999, 35, 92, 143, 186; 2002, 138; 2005, 65, 123–26).21

An ethos of pluralism may come about through tactical interventions into the visceral but also through a modus vivendi negotiated between interdependent parties who honor different “final moral sources.” In negotiation, the parties bring their comprehensive conceptions to bear on issues of political disagreement. According to Connolly, negotiation is a conception of political dialogue that abstains from hiding behind a privileged Kantian account of right that magically floats above the messy world of competing conceptions of the good. Rather, it takes place between the unavoidable conceptions of the good that citizens bring to politics. This thick negotiation means that deeply held convictions about religion, the good, and so on are put on the table and are opened up to the scrutiny and critique of others. To endure the agon of opening oneself up in this way, all parties need to acknowledge the “comparative contestability” of their fundaments; that is, citizens need to acknowledge that their conception of the good is just one among others and that they have no special privilege or insight that would make it right for them to impose their understanding of the good on others (1999, 8). Trying to reach some understanding across these differences, in a situation in which the interdependence of identities and interests is not something abstracted from deliberation but the very substance of it, is the hard work of an agonistic democratic politics. Shared understandings or consensus are of course not the likely outcome of this sort of negotiation, but good negotiation will make for revised self-understandings and maybe even some sort of self-transformation of the participants involved. Good negotiation, as Connolly calls it, shares information, challenges prejudices, and produces [End Page 289] a degree of mutual respect, or rather an affirmation of “ comparative contestability,” when agreement is not possible. That is, good negotiation is good deliberation.

Rereading his comments on resonance machines from the perspective of his comments on negotiation gives a different impression of how Connolly thinks a transformative democratic politics ought to function. That is, folding the politics of affective infusion into an agonistic but respectful process of negotiation begins to look a lot more like the redescriptive politics of the public sphere proposed by deliberative democracy. The generous ethos of public engagement Connolly champions as negotiation, then, appears to be an instance of deliberative democracy, not an alternative or even a supplement to it. However, his account of negotiation is incomplete as it stands. Connolly’s negotiation captures the normative concerns of deliberative democracy but lacks the accompanying explanatory function of a critical theory of deliberative democracy. Where are the fora of this negotiation if not in the public sphere, and how do these moments of responsive negotiation add up to displace the stingy sensibility that has puts a strangle hold on a more civil and egalitarian public ethos? Without a revised account of how negotiation contributes to a democratic public sphere—through participating in it, drawing on it as a resource, transforming its subjectless claims, and being transformed by them in turn—negotiation lacks the critical resources to mobilize a democratic left today. Torn between the adversarial and manipulative politics of war machines on one side and an ethically sensitive negotiation that seeks understandings and mutual respect on the other, Connolly’s recipe for a democratic reinvigoration of the left oscillates back and forth between a worrisome politics that would subvert popular reflection and a dialogical art that would provoke it. A critical theory of the public sphere, however, closes this gap and finds room for both power and legitimacy, strategy and communication, within a sociologically complex defense of a radical alternative: deliberative democracy. [End Page 290]

## at: limits bad

Refusing limits is totalitarian – endless criticism will crowd out diversity and radical change

Feldman, Assoc Prof Management Policy – Case Western U, ‘98

(Steven P, “Playing with the Pieces: Deconstruction and the Loss of Moral Culture,” *Journal of Management Studies* Vol. 35 Iss. 1, p. 59-79)

Cultural authority imposes upon its members the awesome dichotomy between a meaningful and a meaningless life (Rieff, 1987). Postmodernists, in scorning cultural authority, are opposing the dynamics of culture. Culture opposes the primacy of possibility -- that is, the ability of man/woman to express everything and therefore nothing. Culture acts through authority to narrow possible meanings. Narrowing meaning is the dynamic of culture. Without this dynamic, culture cannot exist. This is not totalitarian oppression. Totalitarianism operates to destroy meaning in order to annihilate even the possibility of principled resistance. That is what is totalizing about totalitarianism (Arendt, 1950).

Authority, on the contrary, is always given, or it is fraudulent (Rieff, 1985). Authority is given not because people are dupes, tricked into controlling themselves for some systemic conspiracy, but because through the hierarchical ordering of culture they find their way to purposeful behaviour (Durkheim, [1925] 1973) and a feeling of self-respect that makes life meaningful and worthwhile(Cooley, 1922; Rieff, 1985; Sullivan, 1950).

Authority, then, is essential to culture. It protects social life from the primacy of possibility that surrounds every culture. Possibility is the opposite of cultural authority. Cultural diversity cannot be an unlimited goal; its limitation is the central problem of culture (Plato, 1968). No culture can tolerate unlimited diversity without being destroyed. Diversity can only exist inside a culture as a limited range of possibility. Without this 'imaginary wall', individual and social purpose is impossible (Durkheim, [1925] 1973). Deprivation must be the first and final function of culture. Likewise, a culture composed of continuous criticism cannot possibly carry out its meaning--defining function. To exist, culture must in some respects remain beyond criticism. The notion of being beyond criticism is unthinkable to the modern mind, with its depthless distrust of authority. This is why faith is not even conceived of as a possibility in the modern--postmodern debate between realism and relativism. The repression of faith evidences not only the endless transitional condition of modern social life, but precisely the fallacy of postmodern 'openness'. Complete openness, like complete individuality, is impossible.

Postmodernism is, ironically, an example of cultural repression. To be meaningful, culture must repress what it is not. Postmodernism must repress the idea of faith, because the mere idea of being beyond doubt is contradictory to the postmodern vision of cultural openness. This is why the postmodern discussion stops at belief: belief can be doubted, faith cannot. Herein lies the problem of management ethics. Without a collective capacity for enduring commitment, management ethics becomes vulnerable to the endless rationalizations of the critical intellect. Parker's (1995b) ambivalent search for truth (faith) was intolerable to the critical intellects of his colleagues. Where Parker sought truth, they could only feel/see power: '[W]here, oh where, is some recognition of the role of power?' (Carter, 1995, p. 574). Power is to criticism what truth is to faith. Only truth can stabilize a management ethics.

## creativity

#### Constraints make creativity possible—eliminating rules makes their form of opposition to structure meaningless

Armstrong 2000

Paul B. Armstrong, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223

Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking. 8 Iser shares Lyotard's concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard's endorsement of the "sublime"--the pursuit of the "unpresentable" by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms--is undermined by contradictions, however, which Iser's explication of play recognizes and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser's sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries depends on and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. [End Page 220]

The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play.

Iser's notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser's analysis of "regulatory" and "aleatory" rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, "permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own" (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and open-ended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity.

## at: fed bad

Studies prove that engagement with the government is critical to reform success

Rootes, Centre for the Study of Social and Political Movements – School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research @ University of Kent, ‘13

(Christopher, “From local conflict to national issue: when and how environmental campaigns succeed in transcending the local,” Environmental Politics Vol. 22, Issue 1, p. 95-114)

In all three cases, the national salience of the issue varied over time. Local campaigns against road-building only achieved national prominence from 1991 to 1996. Campaigns against waste incineration achieved national salience only briefly (in 2000–2002). Campaigns against airport expansion remained mostly local until 2007, when the issue became a national and party-political one. A common factor in the periods of salience of campaigns against roads and airports was the existence of policies of **national government upon which mobilisation could be focused** and around which local campaigners could seek non-local allies. In the case of waste incineration, by contrast, because government never explicitly endorsed incineration as its preferred strategy for waste but merely listed it among the available options considered preferable to landfill, local campaigners always struggled to generalise their battle beyond particular struggles against individual developers or waste authorities. Only briefly, when government appeared resignedly to accept the inevitability of incineration, and in the spotlight of publicity attracted by the Byker ash scandal, did Greenpeace and national political parties take up the issue, only to abandon it as government policy was clarified to promote recycling and composting rather than incineration.

In none of these cases was it local campaigners themselves who succeeded in elevating their concerns to the status of national issues. Nevertheless, without local protests, it is unlikely that the more general issues would have achieved the salience they did. Local contention was a necessary but not sufficient condition of the national problematisation of the issues, but the existence of contentious government policies and the intervention of non-local actors were also necessary in order to render those issues nationally salient. 16

In all three cases, national environmental NGOs played crucial roles in networking otherwise isolated local campaigners, but the intensity of their efforts varied according to the national salience of the issue. 17 The principal exception was FoE. With its broad range of policy concerns, FoE, fundamentally opposed to the Thatcher government's transport policies, played an important role in translating anti-roads protests into a national issue, and was a long-standing source of support for anti-incineration campaigners, initially from the standpoint of its broader concern with air pollution, and later in line with its campaign to promote recycling. The interventions of Transport 2000 to network anti-roads campaigners through ALARM UK and, later, in the establishment of AirportWatch, were directly tied to its concern to influence salient national public policy. Greenpeace's support for anti-roads protesters was relatively inconspicuous, perhaps because transport was not then one of its campaign priorities. Its support for local anti-incinerator campaigners was intermittent, waxing when Greenpeace perceived the possible emergence of waste incineration as a highly salient national policy issue, and waning when it became clear that government would not prioritise incineration as a means of waste management. Greenpeace did, however, take action against aviation in its own name, and from 2008, in collaboration with local campaigners (Price 2012), made opposition to Heathrow expansion a national campaign priority. 18 It also supported the translocal direct action network, Plane Stupid, when, even while government policy remained ambiguous, increasing concern with climate change made expansion of aviation especially contentious.

Party politics only briefly figured in the politics of waste, but it was a sustained undercurrent in contention over roads, with Labour clearly preferring investment in rail to road-building, less because of any influence of anti-roads campaigners than because of its traditional commitment to public transport and links to transport workers' unions. Only in the case of airports did a clear party political divide emerge that might be attributed to the impact of local campaigners, but the clarity of this link owes much to the electoral cycle and the need of a low-polling Conservative party to capture marginal seats close to London's airports if it were to gain office. The ‘success’ of anti-aviation campaigners may well prove limited to the particular focuses of contention – the London airports – rather than to the wider issue of increased reliance on aviation and its implications for climate change.

In general, where national policy frameworks are broad and ambiguous, local implementation and campaigns against it cannot easily invoke or decide universal principles, networking remains tentative and national environmental NGO involvement is limited; the outcomes of local campaigns may vary, but change in national policy rarely results.

Because local campaigns defend particular places, they are vulnerable to the charge that they are ‘just NIMBY’. But any defence of general principle must, in the real world of campaigning, involve defence of the particular; particular campaigns raise general issues and many local campaigns are or become much more than NIMBY defences of the particular (Rootes 2007b).

Climate change provides local environmental campaigners with a new frame that provides effective bridging not merely between the local and the national but between the local and the global (Rootes 2006). It has not been equally helpful to all campaigners, but it has added a useful arrow to the quivers of anti-roads campaigners, and has been a boon to anti-airports campaigners. For those struggling against waste incinerators, however, it has been less helpful. Although climate change provided anti-incineration campaigners with new universal arguments that environmental NGOs could support without jeopardising their scientific credentials, and raised the bar for proponents of new waste incinerators, it also (at least partially) validated the claims of advocates of ‘energy-from waste’ that waste incineration might contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by substituting for fossil fuels.

Concern with climate change itself has stimulated local environmental activism, notably around energy conservation and renewable energy projects, but climate change has not been a grassroots issue struggling to find a presence at the national level but a universal one that emerged at national and transnational levels and only subsequently stimulated efforts, often top-down, to mobilise local communities in support of the campaigns of national environmental NGOs or to demand local implementation of national policies (Rootes 2012).

Conclusion

Local grievances are ubiquitous, local conflicts scarcely less so, and local mobilisations and campaigns of varying degrees of scale and intensity are common. Most such local struggles are the small change of history; played out in local arenas, only in aggregate, if at all, do they rise above the mundane drama by which society and politics are reproduced to effect significant changes in policy and politics. Local campaigns may raise fundamental issues of life and death for communities, but they are often crushed beneath the steamroller of a developmental rationale that sets economic advantage against and above environmental amenity. Yet some do succeed in transcending the constrictions of the local. In examining recent mobilisations in England, I have outlined the conditions that have facilitated the translation of some local concerns into national issues, paying particular attention to the role of national policies as stimuli to and targets for translocal mobilisations, and of national NGOs in facilitating the networking of local campaigns. If, by successfully taking their concerns to the national stage, local campaigners have sometimes succeeded in defending local environmental amenity, the sobering fact remains that their successes are less the products of their own efforts than they are the outcomes of policies, priorities and calculations of competitive advantage among more powerful, non-local actors.

## at: tinnell

Engagement with technocracy is key to decisionmaking—it doesn’t turn us into passive consumers—rejection fails to change the system

Jiménez-Aleixandre, professor of education – University of Santiago de Compostela, and Pereiro-Muñoz High School Castelao, Vigo (Spain), ‘2

(Maria-Pilar and Cristina, “Knowledge producers or knowledge consumers? Argumentation and decision making about environmental management,” International Journal of Science Education Vol. 24, No. 11, p. 1171–1190)

If science education and environmental education have as a goal to develop **critical thinking and** to promote **decision making**, it seems that the acknowledgement of a variety of experts and expertise is of relevance to both. Otherwise citizens could be unable to challenge a common view that places economical issues and technical features over other types of values or concerns. As McGinn and Roth (1999) argue, citizens should be prepared to participate in scientific practice, to be involved in situations where science is, if not created, at least used. The assessment of environmental management is, in our opinion, one of these, and citizens do not need to possess all the technical knowledge to be able to examine the positive and negative impacts and to weigh them up.

The identification of instances of scientific practice in classroom discourse is difficult especially if this practice is viewed as a complex process, not as fixed ‘steps’. Several instances were identified when it could be said that students acted as a knowledge-producing community in spite of the fact that the students, particularly at the beginning of the sequence, expressed doubts about their capacities to assess a project written by experts and endorsed by a government office. Perhaps these doubts relate to the nature of the project, a ‘real life’ object that made its way into the classroom, into the ‘school life’. As Brown et al. (1989) point out, there is usually a difference between practitioners’ tasks and stereotyped school tasks and, it could be added, students are not used to being confronted with the complexity of ‘life-size’ problems. However, as the sequence proceeded, **the students assumed the role of experts**, exposing inconsistencies in the project, offering alternatives and discussing it with one of its authors. The issue of expertise is worthy of attention and it needs to be explored in different contexts where the relationships among technical expertise, values hierarchies and possible biases caused by the subject matter could be unravelled. One of the objectives of environmental education is to empower people with the capacity of decision making; for this purpose the acknowledging of multiple expertise is crucial.

# 1NR

## usfg

USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2K <http://encarta.msn.com>

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

Government is not the people

Costello and Thomas ‘2K

(George A. and Kenneth R., Congressional Research Service, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution~preamble/#annotations>)

Article Text I Annotations We the People of the United States. in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish *this Constitution* for the United States of America. Annotations PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE PREAMBLE Although the preamble is not a source of power for any department of the Federal Government, 1 the Supreme Court has often referred to it as evidence of the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution. 2 "Its true office," wrote Joseph Story in his COMMENTARIES, "is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to create them. For example, the preamble declares one object to be, 'to provide for the common defense.'

## switch side

Only switching sides produces an energy dialogue that activates critique

Stevenson, PhD, senior lecturer and independent consultant – Graduate School of the Environment @ Centre for Alternative Technology, ‘9

(Ruth, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, p. 512-526)

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, **encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus.** Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69).

Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.

Switching sides is the opposite of nihilism

Day, Prof Speech – U Wisconsin Madison, ‘66

(Dennis G, The Central States Speech Journal, p. 13-14, February)

The analysis of the ethics of democratic debate presented in this paper supports the position that educational debate is consistent with the highest ethic of public debate and suggests that it is an effective pedagogical practice for preparing students to meet their decision-making responsibilities. Debating both sides teaches students to discover, analyze, and test all the arguments, opinions, and evidence relevant to decision on a resolution. In addition, it provides an opportunity for students to substantiate for themselves the assumption that "truthful" positions may be taken on both sides of controversial questions. The ethics of public debate require full expression, and this is what the practice of debating both sides provides. While educational debate which permits students to debate only one side of a resolution does not violate the ethics of public debate, neither does it teach the positive ethical obligation inherent in debate. Murphy and others have argued that students can gain an understanding of the "opposition" through "analyzing and briefing" both sides of a question without giving verbal expression to both sides. Murphy himself, however, in another, and perhaps more thoughtful, moment observed:

Through the ages the debater has made his contribution to keeping the lanes of truth open by enforcing a doctrine of "both sides." We no longer think, however, that analyzing lines of argument in order to accept or reject them is a large enough goal, . . . A statement by Karl Mannheim gives us a doctrine more in keeping with modern thought: "See reality with the eyes of acting human beings; . . . understand even . . . opponents in the light of their actual motives and their position."35

To discover the truth which democratic debate can provide we must attend "equally and impartially to both sides . . . to see the reasons of both in the strongest light."3s One side debating does not meet this ethical obligation. Debating both sides, however, prepares students to contribute maximally to the democratic solution of conflict. Leonard Cottrell has observed:

One of the deepest problems of modern society is to deal with the profound and dangerous cleavages that threaten the basic consensus on which the society rests. . . . A democratic solution of the problem requires that the citizens interacting in their roles as members of opposing groups become increasingly able to take the roles of their opponents. It is only through this ability that integrative solution of conflict rather than armed truces can be arrived at.37

## rules bad

#### Zero risk of ressentiment – affirming a normative plan and calling for change in policy is life affirming

Todd **May 5**, philo prof at Clemson, “To change the world, to celebrate life”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol 31, nos 5–6, 517–531

What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault’s work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both MerleauPonty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it.

## affect

#### We as consumers are constrained in our choices by imperfect information and limited alternatives, not only does that prove the value of policy scrutiny, it also necessitates some analysis of macroeconomic factors in addition to choice

Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh 10, Department of Spatial Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute, Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”, Ecological Economics, Elsevier

Supporters of this strategy have the hope that frugality (voluntary restraint or simplicity) will drive consumption down. As identiﬁed in the literature on environmental psychology, some people are indeed able to apply voluntary restrictions to their consumption behavior which are environmentally motivated (Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, forthcoming). The question is of course how environmentally effective this is, and in particular whether one can safely assume this to work for a signiﬁcant proportion of all consumers. Only looking at shopping malls, television, roads and airports should make one very skeptical about this. One can anyway wonder whether it is realistic or even fair to ask from the median consumer that s/he gives up the luxuries of modern life, to in some way go back in time. It is unlikely that hunter-gatherers or Henri David Thoreau (“Walden”) can serve as a role model for them.

The other extreme is (equal) individual quota on consumption, perhaps for a range of heavily environmentally damaging goods and services (notably gasoline), to realize consumption degrowth in an equitable manner. However, this resembles too much a communist society which will undoubtedly be difﬁcult to obtain political support for. A problem with focusing directly on consumption degrowth is that it may activate a rebound mechanism. Especially a voluntary reduction of consumption of certain types of goods and services may well lead to an increase in other types of consumption since disposable income will remain the same. Alternatively, it may lead to savings, which in turn implies more money being available for others to borrow and spend (van den Bergh, forthcoming). Generally, people are boundedly rational and lack the necessary information to make decisions that will effectively reduce environmental pressure. Against this background, I think there is much to say in favor of the traditional policy perspective that product and service prices need to reﬂect much better environmental and climate externalities, which will then force people to change their behavior as well as control or minimize rebound effects (van den Bergh, forthcoming). Without such pricing of environmental externalities associated with all (indirect) production and consumption, it would be virtually impossible for consumers to know or judge which consumption goods and services are relatively much or little polluting. This illustrates the essential informative role of environmental regulation through prices (taxes, levies or tradable permits).

The focus on the size of total consumption underrates the importance of shifting from dirty to cleaner consumption. Stringent environmental (price) regulation will considerably alter the composition of consumption. The relevance of changing the composition of both production and consumption was translated into the notion of “selective growth,” popular in the Netherlands during the 1970s after the Club of Rome's publication on the limits to growth. In line with this, a logical and more desirable aim than general (consumption) degrowth would be “selective degrowth.” Of course, in the process the scale of consumption is likely to be affected as well. But whether consumption degrowth will be the outcome should not really matter and certainly not be set as an ex ante goal, also because of the before mentioned measurement problem associated with it.

## e-waste da

#### They say that’s not what they do, because e-waste isn’t intrinsic to energy construction – that’s our argument! State regulations on corporate solar production could be altered to prevent unrestrained waste dumping, but that requires citizen engagement to get the law changed – it’s a reason micro-politics is ecologically hampered in its goals if it refuses the grapple with usfg technocracy

Jess Kamen, Politico, 11 [“E-Waste bill gains broad support,” Basal Action News, July 13, http://ban.org/ban\_news/2011/111307\_e\_waste\_bill\_gains\_broad\_support.html]

The push for a federal e-waste law is partly a response to a hodgepodge of state laws that vary widely in their approach. Some 25 states have laws that limit or prohibit the land disposal of toxic electronics materials.¶ The problem is that states can't control what happens to e-waste after it leaves their borders.¶ "There are a number of efforts to divert e-waste out of the trash and into the hands of recyclers, and states are really leading that charge - but what good is all the effort if it's just going to be dumped overseas?" said Barbara Kyle, national coordinator for the Electronics TakeBack Coalition.¶ "States can't stop the exportation of waste to developing countries - that's up to the federal government," she added.¶ Several major electronics-makers have lined up behind the legislation, including Hewlett-Packard, Apple, Samsung and Dell. Some of the firms said they already have policies prohibiting the export of e-waste.¶ "As an industry leader in product life cycle improvements, HP does not allow the export of e-waste from developed countries to developing countries," said Ashley Watson, vice president and chief ethics and compliance officer at HP.