# 1NC

## 1

A. Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

B. They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action

C. You should vote negative:

Decisionmaking—debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

Dialogue. Debate’s critical axis is a form of dialogic communication within a confined game space.

Unbridled affirmation outside the game space makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

 Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

Decisionmaking skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and **implement an alternative politics.** The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a **substantive policy discussion.** Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an **institutional lever** with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list.

These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political **system as a whole**, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to **participate directly in politics themselves**; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48

Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy.

Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and **by producing a** modernization **plan itself**, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection.

III. Conclusion

The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the **objections against particular projects** was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general.

One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic.

Parliamentary Politics

In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to **formulate an alternative politics**, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.

Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program.

This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. **On the other hand**, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The **lively debate** stimulated by grassroots groups and parties **keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.**

Technical Debate

In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, **activists engaged in technical debate.** They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often **proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts** themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators.

The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to **challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making**. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria.

Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic.

In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56

In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the **contribution of grassroots** environmental **groups has been significant.** As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues **has been tremendous**.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 **Policy concessions** and new legal provisions for citizen participation **have not quelled grassroots action.** The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### Environment justice must be approached through CONCRETE POLICY analysis that WEIGHS disadvantages– only SWITCH SIDE works

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

More frequent resort to a rationalizing, if not solely economic, perspective would encourage minority and low-income citizens and community leaders to think more carefully about priority-setting and myriad tradeoffs. Might widespread successes of NIMBY (not in my back yard) initiatives keep older and dirtier pollution sources active longer and thus adversely affect minority and low-income persons living adjacent to those sources? By the same token, does local insistence on full treatment at some Superfund sites (that is, the obsession with Breyer's "last ten percent") mean that risks elsewhere that might have been addressed under a more limited or flexible regime will not get attended to at all? Such questions cannot be answered here, but the disinclination even to pose them is troubling. That a "nobody should suffer" position advocating maximum citizen engagement could have perverse effects will be painful for many even to consider. But honestly confronting the reality that no environmental amenity (with the possible exception of planetary gravity) is equally distributed may help make citizens more likely to ask hard questions about which inequities matter most. A more careful and comprehensive set of environmental equity comparisons than has been produced to date would probably conclude that there is reason for cheer on some fronts. After all, many Native Americans residing on tribal land, along with rural blacks, doubtless breathe far cleaner air than many far wealthier city dwellers. Of course, once broader social equity concerns—the real motivation for much environmental justice advocacy—are factored in, any clean air advantage may appear insignificant. If Albert Nichols is right that failure to set environmental priorities based on risk has only worsened the inequities faced by minority and low-income communities, then there is even more compelling reason for greater reliance on a rationalizing approach. Writes Nichols in a direct critique of Bullard: If we accept the argument that the existing (politicized] approach has paid insufficient attention to the health and environmental risks faced by minority communities, what does that then say about a risk-based alternative? A strategy that emphasized attacking the largest and most easily reduced risks first would appear to represent a major gain for minority communities. To the extent that such communities bear unusually high risks as a result of past discrimination or other factors, a risk-based approach would redirect more resources to these communities. Indeed, a risk-based approach would give highest priority to attacking precisely the kinds of problems that most concern Bullard.23 If conventional environmental justice advocacy cannot confront risk magnitudes honestly, it cannot help much in the assessment and management of tradeoffs, either of the risk/risk or risk/benefit varieties. The notion that attacking some risks may create others is largely foreign to environmental justice—beyond a fear that attacking the risk of poverty with industrial jobs may expose workers to hazardous conditions. A focus on community inclusion, although necessary to the ultimate acceptability of decisions, offers no automatic or painless way to sort through tradeoffs.24 When confronted with choices posing both risks and benefits— such as a proposed hazardous waste treatment facility that would create jobs, and impose relatively low risks, in a needy area—environmental justice offers, along with disgust that such horrendous choices exist, mainly community engagement and participation. But because such situations tend to stimulate multiple (and often harshly raised) local voices on both sides of the issue, activists are at pains to decide where (besides additional participation and deliberation) the community's interest lies. Because an activist group will be in close touch with both the fear of toxics and the hunger for economic opportunity, the organization itself may be torn. The locally one-sided issue presents far preferable terrain for activists. It should surprise no one that activists are anxious to deemphasize community-level disagreement of this sort. Nor is it surprising to learn from the head of a prominent environmental justice organization that her group tries to avoid situations that pose precisely these locally polarizing tradeoffs.25 Faced with such tensions, environmental justice partisans may simply retreat into cant, attacking a system that facilitates "environmental blackmail," allowing disadvantaged communities to become "hooked on toxics."26

## case

#### Alt fails and causes genocidal backlash

**Emery 7**, Phd, (Kathy, “ The Limits of Violent Resistance,” For the Western Edition, August 27, 2007 http://www.educationanddemocracy.org/Emery/westernedition/Sept07WestEd.pdf)

The August 15th editorial for SF Bayview concluded that the only way to stop gentrification in the Bayview is to “go to war.” Through all our marching and complaining and testifying at City Hall, our “City Fathers” still aren’t listening. At this point, sadly, I don’t think for a minute that anything is going to change if we continue to go the Martin route. I think we need **to channel Malcolm and the Panthers**—and start making some moves instead of making some noise. I need some soldiers on my side, and as much as I am sure that there are people who are willing to protest, I need some people next to me who are willing to go to war. By any means necessary. To me, the really sad thing, is that the editorialist, Ebony Sparks, believes that there are only two “routes” or means of opposition to the dominant/white power structure—that pursued by Martin Luther King Jr’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference or that pursued by Malcolm X and West Coast Black Panther Parties. Sparks apparently lumps the very different strategies employed by SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) and CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) into those employed by the SCLC and NAACP. She also assumes that “marching, and complaining and testifying” is what constitutes the full range of tactics employed by the SCLC. This could not be further from the truth. While I am completely sympathetic and share Sparks’ impatience with the lack of people power in the Bay Area, I think **she does not appreciate the severe limitations** and ramifications **of violent resistance to the powers-that-be**. In fact, any attempts to resist gentrification violently would be used as an excuse to make all the “undesirable” Bayview residents disappear that much more quickly. The state, especially **in the era of Homeland Security and the Patriot Act, can out-gun, out-infiltrate, and out-manipulate any individual or group of people. To “go to war” with City Hall is to attack it at it’s strongest point, a suicidal Pickett’s Charge,** if you will.

#### Their rev gets crushed

**Flaherty 5**

http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate\_insurgency.html

USC BA in International Relations, researcher in political affairs, activist and organic farmer in New Zealand

 In order to understand the national security implications of militant electronic piracy, an examination of conventional insurgency against the American Corporate State is necessary.

THE NATURE OF ARMED INSURGENCY AGAINST THE ACS Any violent insurgency against the ACS is sure to fail **and will only serve to enhance the state's power**. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, **Black Panthers,** Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the ACS has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The ACS attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could **ever** hope to attain.4 **This makes the ACS impervious to traditional insurgency tactics.**  - Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus The ACS employs a full time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are **unimaginable** to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have **no idea** of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS. The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS. Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, **all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement.** Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces. Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control. Letters-to-the-editor... Calls-to-elected-representatives... Waving banners... “Third” party political activities... Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones... Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations. It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways. If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins. But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

#### Util

Harries, 94 – Editor @ The National Interest

(Owen, Power and Civilization, The National Interest, Spring, lexis)

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?”, Lee immediately answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.

#### All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved

**Cummisky, 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontologieal constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that 1 may still saw two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one. Then 1 cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But Similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the lass of the one, each is priceless: thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.\*

#### Environment’s getting better

Indur **Goklany 10**, policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU, “Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Part III — Have Higher US Population, Consumption, and Newer Technologies Reduced Well-Being?)”, April 24, <http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iii-have-higher-us-population-consumption-and-newer-technologies-reduced-well-being/#more-9194>

In my previous post I showed that, notwithstanding the Neo-Malthusian worldview, human well-being has advanced globally since the start of industrialization more than two centuries ago, despite massive increases in population, consumption, affluence, and carbon dioxide emissions. In this post, I will focus on long-term trends in the U.S. for these and other indicators. Figure 1 shows that despite several-fold increases in the use of metals and synthetic organic chemicals, and emissions of CO2 stoked by increasing populations and affluence, life expectancy, the single best measure of human well-being, increased from 1900 to 2006 for the US. Figure 1 reiterates this point with respect to materials use. These figures indicate that since 1900, U.S. population has quadrupled, affluence has septupled, their product (GDP) has increased 30-fold, synthetic organic chemical use has increased 85-fold, metals use 14-fold, material use 25-fold, and CO2 emissions 8-fold. Yet life expectancy advanced from 47 to 78 years. Figure 2 shows that during the same period, 1900–2006, emissions of air pollution, represented by sulfur dioxide, waxed and waned. Food and water got safer, as indicated by the virtual elimination of deaths from gastrointestinal (GI) diseases between 1900 and 1970. Cropland, a measure of habitat converted to human uses — the single most important pressure on species, ecosystems, and biodiversity — was more or less unchanged from 1910 onward despite the increase in food demand. For the most part, life expectancy grew more or less steadily for the U.S., except for a brief plunge at the end of the First World War accentuated by the 1918-20 Spanish flu epidemic. As in the rest of the world, today’s U.S. population not only lives longer, it is also healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite quantum improvements in diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) now occur 8–11 years later than a century ago. Consistent with this, data for New York City indicate that — despite a population increase from 80,000 in 1800 to 3.4 million in 1900 and 8.0 million in 2000 and any associated increases in economic product, and chemical, fossil fuel and material use that, no doubt, occurred —crude mortality rates have declined more or less steadily since the 1860s (again except for the flu epidemic). Figures 3 and 4 show, once again, that whatever health-related problems accompanied economic development, technological change, material, chemical and fossil fuel consumption, and population growth, they were overwhelmed by the health-related benefits associated with industrialization and modern economic growth. This does not mean that fossil fuel, chemical and material consumption have zero impact, but it means that overall benefits have markedly outweighed costs. The reductions in rates of deaths and diseases since at least 1900 in the US, despite increased population, energy, and material and chemical use, belie the Neo-Malthusian worldview. The improvements in the human condition can be ascribed to broad dissemination (through education, public health systems, trade and commerce) of numerous new and improved technologies in agriculture, health and medicine supplemented through various ingenious advances in communications, information technology and other energy powered technologies (see here for additional details). The continual increase in life expectancy accompanied by the decline in disease during this period (as shown by Figure 2) indicates that the new technologies reduced risks by a greater amount than any risks that they may have created or exacerbated due to pollutants associated with greater consumption of materials, chemicals and energy, And this is one reason why the Neo-Malthusian vision comes up short. It dwells on the increases in risk that new technologies may create or aggravate but overlooks the larger — and usually more certain — risks that they would also eliminate or reduce. In other words, it focuses on the pixels, but misses the larger picture, despite pretensions to a holistic worldview.

#### Militant anti-racist violence diverts the movement into patriarchal expressions of hypermasculinity

**Gaines 2**

 Professor, University of Michigan Ph.D. Brown, 1991 Other U of M Affiliation: Center for Afroamerican and African Studies (CAAS Field(s) of Study: U.S. and African American intellectual and cultural history; race and gender politics in post-World War II America; African American cultural production; the global dimensions of U.S. struggles over the meaning of citizenship

. Under Bambara's editorial guidance (she also contributed an introduction and three essays to the volume), The Black Woman contains pointed critiques of patriarchal articulations of **black militancy**. But in retrospect it was also part of that vast literature of the Black Power era whose purpose was to define the future objectives, strategies, and agendas of the black freedom move- ment. As such, Bambara's The Black Woman is an enduring work that can be read alongside Martin Luther King Jr.s aptly titled Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (1966). Indeed, in revolutionary commitment and analytical rigor, The Black Woman surpasses such influential texts as Harold Cruses Crisis of the Negro Intellectual (1968) and Stokely Carmichael's (Kwame Turk's) Black Power (1967). The black feminism generally on view in Bambara's essays and throughout the volume is informed by the revolutionary nationalism that looked to Third World liberation movements for inspiration. Bambara noted that members of black women's study groups "have begun correspondence with sisters in Vietnam, Guatemala, Algeria, [and] Ghana on the Liberation struggle and the Woman plank"23 This radical internationalism represented the commitment on the part of Bambara and many of her contributors to frame their analyses of patriarchy within their anti-imperialist, antiracist, and anticapitalist arguments. In fact, several contributors produced critiques of the romantic, adventurist version of internationalism deployed by black male militants who sought to restrict the role of black women to "having babies for the revolution " in the parlance of that era. As if to anticipate a wider audience than movement activists, the volume includes essays that, as Farah Griffin has observed, convey a more traditional gender politics of protection and respectability.24 There is even an essay, "The Black Revolution in America," by Grace Lee Boggs, the Detroit-based Chinese Ameri- can (though black by persuasion) activist, which takes an exclusive focus on the black movement, with virtually nothing to say of gender politics.'5 Ideological diversity notwithstanding, Bambara's project seeks to redefine in- ternationalism, as well as "the struggle," in more egalitarian democratic terms. Like most revolutionary nationalists of the period, Bambara and others drew on Fanon, but for the specific purpose of demonstrating how revolutionary move- ments fostered the abandonment of traditional gender roles for more equitable gender relations. In her characteristically witty and streetwise prose (reminiscent of the vernacular eloquence of Childress, Langston Hughes, or Malcolm X) Bambara posed a challenge to self-styled black militants: We'd better take the time to fashion revolutionary selves, revolutionary lives, revolutionary relationships. Mouth don't win the war. It don't even win the people. Neither does haste . . . Not all speed is movement. Running off to mimeograph a fuck whitey leaflet, leaving your mate to brood, is not revolu- tionary. Hopping a plane to rap to someone else's "community" while your son struggles with the Junior Scholastic assignment on the "Dark Conti- nent" is not revolutionary. Sitting around murder-mouthing incorrect nig- gers while your father goes upside your mother's head is not revolutionary. Mapping out a **building takeover** when your term paper is overdue and your scholarship is under review is not revolutionary. . . . If your house ain't in order, you ain't in order. It is so much easier to be out there than right here. The revolution ain't out there. Yet. But it is here. Should be.26 In a similar vein, Francee Covington's essay "Are the Revolutionary Techniques Employed in the Battle of Algiers Applicable to Harlem?" was a **critique** of the then fashionable concept of **armed struggle**. For Covington, the answer to the question posed by the title of her essay was emphatically negative. Reading Mao and Fanon on violence did not make one a revolutionary, and it did not take much reflection to realize that the application of urban guerilla tactics to U.S. cities was **suicidally unfeasible**.27 Elsewhere, in a sophisticated analysis of the commodification of militancy, Joyce Green pointed out the limitations of the hypermasculinity of some black men as merely so much posturing. "The reality is that the 'man, the honkie, the pig' cannot be destroyed by quoting Mao or by a Harlem riot. In fact, **these steps are insurance policies for the status quo**."28 **Not only did such black macho grandstanding titilate white television audiences, it aggravated tensions between black men and women in its refusal to tolerate much-needed internal criticism**.

#### Historically co-opted

**Wendt 7**

 ‘They Finally Found Out that We Really Are

Men’: Violence, Non-Violence and Black

Manhood in the Civil Rights Era

 Simon Wendt, ‘“They Finally Found Out that We Really Are Men”: Violence, Non-Violence and Black Manhood in the Civil Rights Era’

Gender & History, Vol.19 No.3 November 2007, pp. 543–564.

 Simon Wendt earned an M.A. in Afro-American Studies from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and holds a Ph.D. in modern history from the Free University of Berlin. Since July 2008, he is a research group leader in University of Heidelberg’s newly created Transcultural Studies Program, supervising several Ph.D. students who work on gender and nationalism in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Wendt’s research areas are African American history, gender and memory, nationalism, and the history of heroism and hero-worship in the United States. He has received numerous fellowships and awards, including the “Memphis State Eight” Paper Prize (2001), research fellowships from the German Historical Institute (2002, 2009), and the Presidents’ Memorial Award of the Louisiana Historical Association (2004). He is the author of The Spirit and the Shotgun: Armed Resistance and the Struggle for Civil Rights (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007). Wendt is currently working on a history of the Daughters of the American Revolution and a history of heroism from the Gilded Age to the Jazz Age.

 While activists eventually succeeded in convincing a number of southern blacks to use non-violence as a pragmatic tactic, the way in which southern black activists and Black Power militants interpreted their efforts to arm for protection indicates that **hegemonic ideals of manliness** remained powerful. Among southern blacks, the affirmation of manhood was largely a by-product of the physical necessity to confront racist attackers. Certain Black Power militants argued that blacks in urban areas would have to engage in similar activities to stop police brutality and other forms of racist oppression but, largely because of the difficulties that combating legalised state violence entailed, armed resistance during the Black Power era tended to remain confined to militant rhetoric and **served primarily as a symbol of militant black manhood**. This symbolism nurtured a positive black male identity but simultaneously tended to **legitimise the subordination of women** and alternative forms of masculinity.

#### Gender oppression turns their advocacy

**MATSUDA 91**

Mari J. Matsuda. Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law.

43 Stan. L. Rev. 1183

**These** three writers -- Parker, Inuzuka, and Trask -- **have found work in coalition painful.** Each describes the racism and condescension they have experienced. Each recounts the frustration that comes from trying to explain the most important aspects of one's life and creed to listeners who are ill-prepared to understand. Each suggests that **coalition has limits of both tolerance and utility**. **Why, then, given the frustration of coalition, do these women not retreat [\*1188] into racial separatism**? In the quest for a theoretical underpinning for social change movements, women of color have the choice of remaining in coalition or dispersing to do separate work. The emergence of feminist jurisprudence, critical race theory, critical legal studies, and the women of color and the law movement has raised fears of division and parochial separatism in the legal community. If it is so hard to work together, if the gulfs in experience are so wide, if the false universals of the modern age are truly bankrupt, what need binds us? What justifies unity in our quest for self-knowledge? My answer is that **we cannot, at this point in history, engage fruitfully in jurisprudence without engaging in coalition,** without coming out of separate places to meet one another across all the positions of privilege and subordination that we hold in relation to one another**.** II. THEORY OUT OF COALITION **Through** our sometimes painful work in **coalition we are beginning to form a theory of subordination**; a theory that describes it, explains it, and gives us the tools to end it. As lawyers working in coalition, we are developing a theory of law taking sides, rather than law as value-neutral. We imagine law to uplift and protect the sixteen-year-old single mother on crack rather than law to criminalize her. n18 **We imagine law to celebrate and protect women's bodies**; law to sanctify love between human beings -- whether women to women, men to men, or women to men, as lovers may choose to love; law to respect the bones of our ancestors; law to feed the children; law to shut down the sweatshops; **law to save the planet.** **This is the revolutionary theory of law that we are developing in coalition**, and I submit that it is both a theory of law **we can only develop in coalition, and that it is the only theory of law we can develop in coalition.**  A. Looking at Subordination From Inside Coalition When we work in coalition, as the writers in this symposium demonstrate, **we compare our struggles and challenge one another's assumptions**. **We learn of the gaps and absences in our knowledge. We learn a few tentative, starting truths**, the building blocks of a theory of subordination. **We learn that while all forms of oppression are not the same**, n19 **certain predictable patterns emerge**: -- All forms of oppression involve taking a trait, X, which often carries with it a cultural meaning, n20 and using X to make some group the "other" and to reduce their entitlements and power. [\*1189] -- All forms of oppression benefit someone, and sometimes both sides of a relationship of domination will have some stake in its maintenance. n21 -- All forms of oppression have both material and ideological dimensions. The articles on health, socioeconomics, and violence in this symposium show how subordination leaves scars on the body. n22 The damage is real. It is material. These articles also speak of ideology. Language, including the language of science, law, rights, necessity, free markets, neutrality, and objectivity can make subordination seem natural and inevitable, justifying material deprivation. -- All forms of oppression implicate a psychology of subordination that involves elements of sexual fear, need to control, hatred of self and hatred of others. As we look at these patterns of oppression, we may come to learn, finally and most importantly, that **all forms of subordination are interlocking and mutually reinforcing**. B. Ask the Other Question: **The Interconnection of All Forms of Subordination**  The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is through a method I call "**ask the other question**." **When I see something that looks racist, I ask, "Where is the patriarchy in this?"** When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, "Where is the heterosexism in this?" When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, "Where are the class interests in this?" **Working in coalition forces us to look for both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of domination, helping us to realize that no form of subordination ever stands alone.** n23 If this is true, we've asked each other, then isn't it also true that dismantling any one form of subordination is impossible without dismantling every other? And more and more, particularly in the women of color movement, the answer is that "**no person is free until the last and the least of us is free.**" In trying to explain this to my own community, I sometimes try to shake people up by suggesting that **patriarchy killed Vincent Chin**. n24 Most people [\*1190] think racism killed Vincent Chin. When white men with baseball bats, hurling racist hate speech, beat a man to death, it is obvious that racism is a cause. It is only slightly less obvious, however, when you walk down the aisles of Toys R Us, that little boys grow up in this culture with toys that teach dominance and aggression, while little girls grow up with toys that teach about being pretty, baking, and changing a diaper. And the little boy who is interested in learning how to nurture and play house is called a "sissy." When he is a little older he is called a "f--g." He learns that acceptance for men in this society is premised on rejecting the girl culture and taking on the boy culture, and I believe that this, as much as racism, killed Vincent Chin. I have come to see that homophobia is the disciplinary system that teaches men that they had better talk like 2 Live Crew or someone will think they "aren't real men," and I believe that this homophobia is a cause of rape and violence against women. I have come to see how that same homophobia makes women afraid to choose women, sending them instead into the arms of men who beat them. I have come to see how class oppression creates the same effect, cutting off the chance of economic independence that could free women from dependency upon abusive men. I have come to see all of this from working in coalition: from my lesbian colleagues who have pointed out homophobia in places where I failed to see it; from my Native American colleagues who have said, "But remember that we were here first," when I have worked for the rights of immigrant women; from men of color who have risked my wrath to say, "But racism is what is killing us. Why can't I put that first on my agenda?" The women of color movement has, of necessity, been a movement about intersecting structures of subordination. This movement suggests that **antipatriarchal struggle is linked to struggle against all forms of subordination**. **It has challenged communities of color to move beyond race alone** in the quest for social justice. C. Beyond Race Alone In coalition, we are able to develop an understanding of that which Professor Kimberle Crenshaw has called "inter-sectionality." n25 **The women of color movement has demanded that the civil rights struggle encompass more than anti-racism**. There are several reasons for this demand. **First**, and most obviously, **in unity there is strength**. **No subordinated group is strong enough to fight the power alone,** thus coalitions are formed out of necessity. n26 [\*1191] **Second, some of us have overlapping identities.** Separating out and ***ranking oppression* denies and excludes these identities** and ignores the valid concerns of many in our constituency. **To say that the *anti-racist struggle precedes all other struggles* denigrates the existence of the multiply oppressed**: women of color, gays and lesbians of color, poor people of color, most people of color experience subordination on more than one dimension. Finally, perhaps the most progressive reason for moving beyond race alone is that **racism is best understood and fought with knowledge gained from the broader anti-subordination struggle**. Even if one wanted to live as the old prototype "race man**," it is simply not possible to struggle against racism alone and ever hope to end racism.**  These are threatening suggestions for many of us who have worked primarily in organizations forged in the struggle for racial justice. Our political strength and our cultural self-worth is often grounded in racial pride. Our multi-racial coalitions have, in the past, succeeded because of a unifying commitment to end racist attacks on people of color. Moving beyond race to include discussion of other forms of subordination risks breaking coalition. Because I believe that **the most progressive elements of any liberation movement are those who see the intersections (and the most regressive are those who insist on only one axis**), I am willing to risk breaking coalition by pushing intersectional analysis. An additional and more serious risk is that intersectional analysis done from on high, that is, from outside rather than inside a structure of subordination, risks misunderstanding the particularity of that structure. Feminists have spent years talking about, experiencing, and building theory around gender. Native Americans have spent years developing an understanding of colonialism and its effect on culture. That kind of situated, ground-up knowledge is irreplaceable. A casual effort to say, "Okay, I'll add gender to my analysis," without immersion in feminist practice, is likely to miss something. Adding on gender must involve active feminists, just as adding on considerations of indigenous peoples must include activists from native communities. **Coalition is the way to achieve this inclusion**. It is no accident that women of color, grounded as they are in both feminist and anti-racist struggle, are doing the most exciting theoretical work on race-gender intersections. It is no accident that gay and lesbian scholars are advancing social construction theory and the analysis of sexuality in subordination. In raising this I do not mean that we cannot speak of subordination second-hand. Rather, I wish to encourage us to do this, and to suggest that **we can do this most intelligently in coalition, listening with special care to those who are actively involved in knowing and ending the systems of domination that touch their lives**.

#### Best SYNTHESIS of studies disproves environmental racism

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

Christopher Boerner and Thomas Lambert have observed that many studies suffer from severe methodological difficulties or are too limited in scope to reliably indicate broader patterns.66 Indeed, once contrary findings and thoughtful criticisms are taken adequately into account, even a reasonably generous reading of the foundational empirical research alleging environmental inequity along racial lines must leave room for profound skepticism regarding the reported results. Taken as a whole this research offers, at best, only tenuous support for the hypothesis of racial inequity in siting or exposure, and no insight into the crucial issues of risk and health impact.

#### Best studies disprove – scale of analysis

Kevin 97

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As one commentator concluded, "notwithstanding the growing significance of the environmental justice movement, few rigorous studies have been conducted that satisfactorily establish a statistically significant correlation between a community's race and socioeconomic status and its exposure to disproportionate environmental risks or impacts." n61 There are sufficiently important methodological problems with some of the more prominent studies that many environmental justice advocates rely upon to warrant caution in accepting claims of disproportionality at face value. A study by Douglas Anderton, et. al (Anderton Study) of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities in the United States that opened for business prior to 1990 and were still open in 1992, and about which data could be found on the level of census [\*134] tracts (about eighty-five percent of such facilities), came to very different conclusions than the UCC and other studies cited by many environmental justice advocates. n62 The Anderton Study found that there were no statistically significant differences between the percentages of Blacks and Hispanics in census tracts with TSDFs and in tracts without such facilities. n63 In other words, there was no correlation between the presence of these minority groups and the presence of a TSDF. n64 The study also found that there were statistically significant correlations between the presence of a TSDF and the following socioeconomic factors: lower employment rate of males, employment in industrial occupations and lower housing values, as compared with non-TSDF tracts. n65 Of these factors, "the most significant and consistent effect on TSDF location of those [factors] ... considered is that TSDFs are located in areas with larger proportions of workers employed in industrial activities, a finding that is consistent with a plausibly rational motivation to locate near other industrial facilities or markets." n66 The discrepancies between the results of the Anderton Study and the findings of the UCC Study stem from the differences in geographic units of analysis chosen by the researchers. n67 The zip code areas used in the UCC Study are larger than the census tracts used in the Anderton Study. The use of these larger units increases the percentage of Blacks in particular. The Anderton Study found that when census tracts within a two and a half mile radius of TSDFs were aggregated, the percentage of black residents was greater than the percentage of Blacks in census tracts containing TSDFs. n68 [\*135] There are no firm guidelines on how to define the geographic extent of areas that are potentially affected, in terms of health, property values and other indicators, by the presence of TSDFs. However, it is likely that data derived from census tracts produce more defensible statistical results than do data based on zip code areas. Accordingly, it is likely that the Anderton Study is more reliable than the UCC Study. n69 Census tracts are designed to be homogeneous with respect to population characteristics, economic status and living conditions. n70 In contrast, zip code areas are basically geographic designations, intended to maximize the transportation efficiency of postal deliveries. n71 Thus, any homogeneity within zip codes is fortuitous, rather than being present by design. Assuming that greater impacts are experienced by individuals closer to a TSDF, census tracts containing a TSDF would logically bear the greatest potential burdens. If there is no correlation between minority populations and TSDFs within census tracts, then the core environmental justice arguments that minorities are targeted for the siting of TSDFs and that minorities disproportionately bear the burdens of such siting are weakened. If a larger percentage of minorities are found within a radius of several miles of TSDFs than is found in the national population, this is arguably due to the larger percentages of minorities in industrial areas in general, which occurs regardless of the presence of TSDFs.

#### ! Lack of data orientation makes environmental justice counterproductive

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

For environmental justice to contribute measurably to public health in low-income and minority communities, it would almost certainly have to stress an epidemiologic perspective (even in connection with regulatory matters) to a far greater extent than is currently the case. Activism would have to begin with effects and then support honest, analytically defensible assessments of causal factors. But given the overriding concern with citizen mobilization and participation, the continuing focus on citizen fears and frustrations, and the strong incentives for those persons engaged in this activity to continue it, any such shift in perspective would be difficult to achieve.

#### Chicken egg dilemma disproves eco-racism

Glasgow 5

oshua Glasgow is a J.D. candidate at the Yale Law School, class of 2006, and will serve as a law clerk for the Honorable Judge Carlos Lucero of the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit next year. Mr. Glasgow received a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Buffalo.

13 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 69

NOT IN ANYBODY'S BACKYARD? THE NON-DISTRIBUTIVE PROBLEM WITH ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

In a series of articles, Vicki Been set forth a particularly powerful critique of environmental justice studies. n29 Been notes that most studies examined the contemporary makeup of a neighborhood impacted by a LULU, not its makeup at the time of siting. n30 This method ignores the possibility that a LULU would lower nearby housing prices, causing affluent residents to move away. These residents would be replaced by lower-income individuals, attracted by the lower housing prices. As a result of these market dynamics, even LULUs located in a wealthy neighborhood could later become surrounded by the poor. n31 This "chicken-or-the-egg" dilemma has plagued the environmental justice literature. n32

#### The media crushes solvency

**Flaherty 5**

http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate\_insurgency.html

USC BA in International Relations, researcher in political affairs, activist and organic farmer in New Zealand, In order to understand the national security implications of militant electronic piracy, an examination of conventional insurgency against the American Corporate State is necessary.

 ACS Full-Spectrum PSYOP Dominance

The ACS wields the most powerful weapon of political control the world has **ever** seen: the mass media. This is the corporate state's **trump card** against leaderless resistance movements which are impossible to infiltrate and compromise by counter-insurgency teams. The appearance of legitimacy is all that matters in a low intensity conflict, and the ACS, with the corporate media running continuous propaganda and perception management campaigns, represents the final solution to what the public will view as legitimate.5 All anti-corporate/anti-government political activism will be portrayed by the ACS as lunatic muckraking and a potential hotbed of terrorism. All violent insurgency activities will be portrayed as terrorist acts. (Some criminal activity is now considered terrorism by the ACS.) The behavior of the ACS will be represented as just, measured and prudent, regardless of the ghastly nature of its atrocities. The general population will be bombarded with images, sound bites and articles about the threats posed by the “terrorists.” In other words, the population, rather then fearing the state and its continuous cryptofascist operations and more overt international war crimes and economic exploitation, will come to view the insurgents as a **threat** and the ACS as their **savio**r. The ACS can punctuate the point by unleashing false flag terror incidents on the population while conveniently blaming any organization it wishes, including other states.6 **The general population will respond by supporting: foreign wars, the diminution of individual rights, and legislation and funding that adds to the power of the corporate state.** Some simple analogies might help to clarify the realities facing an armed insurgency in the United States. Could a 5 year old beat a university mathematics professor in a mathematics contest? Could an ape beat a grand champion at chess? Could a high school basketball team beat the Los Angeles Lakers at basketball? Could an armed insurgency overthrow the American Corporate State? The obvious answer to all of these questions is: NO.

# 2NC

## at: we meet

Restriction is a direct governmental limitation

IMF, 10

Prepared by the Legal Department of the IMF, 12/31, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=1034-%2860/27%29

The guiding principle in ascertaining whether a measure is a restriction on payments and transfers for current transactions under Article VIII, Section 2, is whether it involves a **direct governmental limitation** on the availability or use of exchange as such.

## 2nc at: state/roleplaying bad

Dialogic democracy is the best way to dismantle racism—our vision of debate is the opposite of exclusion

Gooding-Williams 3

 Race, Multiculturalism and Democracy

Robert Gooding-Wiliams

 Robert Gooding-Williams (Ph.D., Yale, 1982) is the Ralph and Mary Otis Isham Professor of Political Science and the College. He is also a Faculty Associate of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory and an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture. His areas of interest include Du Bois, Critical Race Theory, the History of African-American Political Thought, 19th Century German Philosophy (especially Nietzsche), Existentialism, and Aesthetics (including literature and philosophy, representations of race in film, and the literary theory and criticism of African-American literature). Before coming to the University of Chicago he taught at Northwestern University (1998-2005), where he was Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Alice Berline Kaplan Center for the Humanities (2003-2005), Adjunct Professor of African American Studies, and an affiliate of the Program in Critical Theory. Before coming to Northwestern he taught at Amherst College (1988-98), where he was Professor of Black Studies and the George Lyman Crosby 1896 Professor of Philosophy, and at Simmons College (1983-88), where he taught philosophy and directed the program in Afro-American Studies.

 Issue

Constellations

Volume 5, Issue 1, pages 18–41, March 1998

 I begin with the assumption that fostering the capacity for democratic deliber- ation is a central aim of public education in a democratic society.531 also follow a number of contemporary political theorists in supposing that democratic deliber- ation is a form of public reasoning geared towards adducing considerations that all parties to a given deliberation can find compelling.54 On this view, successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them, so that they can formulate reasons (say for implementing or not implementing a proposed policy) that will be generally acceptable despite those differences.55 In the words of one theorist, "[deliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view, to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground."56 Lorenzo Simpson usefully glosses the pursuit of mutual understanding when he writes that it requires "a 'reversibility of perspectives,' not in the sense of my collapsing into yon or you into me, but in the sense that I try to understand - but not necessarily agree with - what you take your life to be about and you do the same for me . . . [i]n such a . . . mutual understanding you may come to alter the way in which you understand yourself and I . . . may find that listening to you leads me to alter my self-understanding."57 According to Simpson, the search for common ground need not leave us with the convictions with which we began. On the contrary, the process of democratic deliberation can be a source of self-trans- formation that enriches one's view of the issues at hand and even alters one's conception of the demands of social justice.58 In multicultural America, multicultural public education is a good that promotes mutual understanding across cultural differences, thereby fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation. In essence, multi- cultural education is a form of pedagogy whereby students study the histories and cultures of differently cultured fellow citizens, many of whose identities have a composite, multicultural character. More exactly, it is a form of cross-cultural hermeneutical dialogue, and therefore a way of entering into conversation with those histories and cultures.59 By disseminating the cultural capital of cross- cultural knowledge, multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives." By facilitating mutual understanding, it can help them to shape shared vocabularies for understanding their moral and cultural identities and for finding common ground in their deliberations.60 By strengthening a student's ability to reverse perspectives, multicultural education may bolster her disposition to engage the self-understandings of differ- ently cultured others, even if the particulars of her multicultural education have not involved an engagement with the cultures of precisely those others (consider, e.g., someone whose multicultural education has included courses in Asian- American literatures, but who knows nothing of American Latino subcultures). Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to **reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others"** in just the way that the cultivation of an athletic skill (e.g., the ability to "head" a soccer ball) tends to reinforce one's inclination to participate in the sports for which having that skill is an advantage (e.g. playing soccer). In the case of multicultural education, one cultivates a skill which is **motivationally conducive** to the sort of mutual understanding that is crit- ical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy in a multicultural society.61 Let me summarize my argument so far. In contrast to Schlesinger. who yearns for a society 111 which the understanding of key political ideals remains immune from deliberative debate animated by cultural and other group differences, I have been suggesting that deliberative debate of this sort is an appropriate medium for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals. I have also been arguing (1) that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America entails a commitment to promoting the mutual understanding of differences through cross-cultural dialogue and (2) that such a commitment justifies the institution of multicultural education. The promotion of mutual understanding avoids Schlesinger's and Asante's kitsch, because it is not predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or ethnic identity in the face of cultural and social complexity. Indeed, the ideal of mutual understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that cross-cultural educational insights, since they can effect changes in the self-understandings of persons who have benefitted from a multicultural education, may alter and further complicate those persons' identities, perhaps making them more multicultural. In what follows, I further explore the implications of this ideal by proposing that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural education that is, specifically race-conscious.

Lack of preparation turns debate into a monologue, which doesn’t have emancipatory potential—a balanced debate is crucial to combat white supremacy

Walsh, University of Wisconsin-Madison political science professor, ‘8

[Katherine Cramer, *Talking about Race : Community Dialogues and the Politics of Difference*, elibrary, 197-199, ISBN: 9780226869070, accessed 2-19-10, mss/ras]

 The investigations of intergroup dialogue in this study nevertheless present reasons to be cautious about how useful deliberative approaches can be in the realm of race relations. Even in these dialogues, not all participants are scrutinized to the same degree. These dialogues are a site in which conventional notions of authority are contested, but they seem at times to confer legitimacy on people of color without simultaneously requiring whites to assume an equal role in the exchange. In order for these dialogues to serve as a site in which motives and perceptions are open to scrutiny by listeners, everyone needs to contribute—people of dominant racial categories as well as people from marginalized racial groups. As suggested in the previous chapter, if whites mainly listen and only people of color speak, then the dialogues are not actually an exchange or a collective attempt to move a community forward.24 If only members of marginalized racial groups take on the role of speaker and are seldom in the role of listener, this may not constitute power over the conversation so much as a peculiar status. In such a situation, only their views—not the views of members of dominant racial groups—are subject to scrutiny. This reduces the potential of this public talk to serve as community- and actionproducing discussion. As Susan Bickford explains, Exempting some from listening (either implicitly or explicitly) can stifle the vitality of political interaction, and could also result in a kind of patronizing hierarchy of citizenship: certain citizens cannot be expected to exercise certain responsibilities and thus are somehow lacking, not wholly mature citizens. ... If I regard you as exempted from listening because of your oppression, I certainly am not regarding you as a partner in political action. It is as though I am doing something for you, rather than our acting together—or on a collective level, as though we are letting them into our public, rather than creating one together through speaking and listening.25 Intergroup dialogue needs to be civil enough for people to talk and share views. But for it to constitute a joint project, a credible joint attempt by people to understand their community and take steps to improve it, it has to involve the scrutiny of all participants.

Turns the case—only dialogue and decision-making allows long-term challenges to black oppression

Gooding-Williams 3

 Race, Multiculturalism and Democracy

Robert Gooding-Wiliams

 Robert Gooding-Williams (Ph.D., Yale, 1982) is the Ralph and Mary Otis Isham Professor of Political Science and the College. He is also a Faculty Associate of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory and an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture. His areas of interest include Du Bois, Critical Race Theory, the History of African-American Political Thought, 19th Century German Philosophy (especially Nietzsche), Existentialism, and Aesthetics (including literature and philosophy, representations of race in film, and the literary theory and criticism of African-American literature). Before coming to the University of Chicago he taught at Northwestern University (1998-2005), where he was Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Alice Berline Kaplan Center for the Humanities (2003-2005), Adjunct Professor of African American Studies, and an affiliate of the Program in Critical Theory. Before coming to Northwestern he taught at Amherst College (1988-98), where he was Professor of Black Studies and the George Lyman Crosby 1896 Professor of Philosophy, and at Simmons College (1983-88), where he taught philosophy and directed the program in Afro-American Studies.

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 Consider, for example, the view held by many (though not all) African Americans that the (comparatively) low, average socioeconomic status of African-Americans, because it is due to the cumulative effects of racial slavery and antiblack racism, is an injustice for which African Americans deserve compensation. Some white Americans will dismiss this assertion of injustice, largely because they are "reluctant to see the present social plight of blacks as the result of American slavery."65 Still, were these whites to learn something of American racial slavery and of its impact 011 African-American life, they could begin to see that the argument for reparations is plausible, and begin to share with the African-Americans who advance that argument a common moral ground for further deliberations, hi other words, through the study of African American social history, they could begin to acknowledge the cogency of the considerations in light of which many African-American black persons, in reflecting on that history, have insisted that being black in America involves collective injustice. Supposing that they augmented this study with inquiry into the central themes of African-American political thought66 (as it has evolved, say from the writings of Martin Delaney to those of Martin King), they could enlarge the common ground by beginning to recognize the range and force of African-American perspectives oil other race-related issues.

It would be a mistake, of course, to think that multiculturalism needs to be race-conscious only when addressing the self-understandings of black persons or, by analogy the self-understandings of racially classified but non-black "persons of color." America is also a nation of racially classified whites and white persons; and white personliood, we know, cuts across ethnic lines. Again, by analogy to blacks who become black persons, whites who become white persons let their descriptions of themselves as white matter to the ways in which they live their lives. David Roediger's work on the racial formation of Irish-American workers is relevant here, as it provides a model for historical inquiry that illuminates the social construction and etlmic cultural significance of white racial identities.67 Also important, in this context, is Toni Morrison's book. Playing in the Dark. Reflecting 011 the nature of American literature, Morrison writes: that cultural identities are formed and informed by a nation's literature, and... what seemed to be 011 the 'mind' of the literature of the United States was the selfconscious construction of the American as a new white man. Emerson's call for this new man 111 'The American Scholar" indicates the deliberateness of the construction the conscious necessity for establishing the difference. But the writers who responded to this call, accepting or rejecting it. did not look solely to Europe to establish a reference for difference. There was a very theatrical difference underfoot. Writers were able to celebrate and deplore an identity already existing or rapidly taking a form that was elaborated through racial difference. That difference provided a huge payout of sign, symbol, and agency in the process of organizing, separating, and consolidating identity . . .6S

 For Morrison, reading American writers after Emerson (e.g.. Poe and Twain) is a matter of engaging complicated constructions of white racial identities implicated in a racial ideology ("American Africanism" is Morrison's phrase) that assigns multiple meanings to the African presence in America. Self-consciously constructing a literature in light of descriptions of themselves as white, the "founding writers of young America" were white persons (in my sense of the term) for whom the figure of the black African became a "staging ground and arena for the elaboration of the quintessential American identity."® For my purposes, Morrison's short study is valuable, because it affords some excellent examples of the ways multicultural inquiry can explore the cultural construction of white racial identities and their connection to the promotion of racial ideologies. In America, multicultural education cannot avoid race, because socially constructed racial identities - those of black persons and white persons alike come into view 110 matter what class or ethnic perpsective one occupies in crosscultural deliberations. And while one ought not to conflate multiculturalism with struggles against racism and economic injustice, or promote it as a substitute for such straggles, multicultural education, by being race conscious, can contribute to an understanding of the issues posed by these struggles.70

## 2nc at: roleplay bad

Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

That allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. ‘No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below

## at: roleplay = passivity

DEBATE roleplay specifically activates agency

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of

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taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

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professor.

 Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

PRECONDITION for education

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

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 4.2.1. Play and imagination

Among educational theorists, John Dewey is well-known for stressing the learning potential of play and game activities within education (Makedon, 1993; Vaage, 2000). Thus, Dewey devotes an entire chapter in Democracy and Education to “Play and Work in the Curriculum”. In tune with the main argument presented throughout the book, he begins the chapter by noting that it is “desirable” that education, as such, starts “from and with the experience and capacities of learners” (Dewey, 1916: 202). This can be done through the “the introduction of forms of activity, in play and work, similar to those in which children and youth engage outside of school” (Dewey, 1916: 202). Dewey makes no fundamental distinction between play and work activities, as they “both involve ends consciously entertained and the selection and adaptation of materials and processes designed to affect the desired ends” (Dewey, 1916: 210). Thus, play and work mostly differ in terms of “timespans”, which “influence the directness of means and ends” (Dewey, 1916: 210). In this sense, play and work activities simply represent two different aspects on a continuum of meaningful relations between ends and means. This assertion also goes against the commonsensical notion that play is goal-free or is an end in itself. In summary, Dewey views play as being meaningful, goal-oriented, and interestbased. Moreover, play is free and plastic as it is both directed toward present and future (projected) activities (cf. chapter 2). However, in order to realise the educational value of play it is necessary to understand play as an imaginative activity (Dewey, 1916: 245). Play activities are too important to be reduced to a purely developmental phenomenon among children: It is still usual to regard this [imaginative] activity as a specially marked-off stage of childish growth, and to overlook the fact that the difference between play and what is regarded as serious employment should be not a difference between the presence and absence of imagination, but a difference in the materials with which imagination is occupied (Dewey, 1916: 245). In this way, play is closely linked with the imagination, which is “the medium of realization of every kind of thing which lies beyond the scope of direct physical response” (Dewey, 1916: 245). Put differently, Dewey’s conception of imagination represents “the capacity to concretely perceive what is before us in light of what could be” (Fesmire, 2003: 65). Thus, the educational value of play activities must be based on the understanding that: The imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement. The educative value of manual activities and of laboratory exercises, as well as of play, depends upon the extent in which they aid in bringing about a sensing of the meaning of what is going on. In effect, if not in name, they are dramatizations. Their utilitarian value in forming habits of skill to be used for tangible results is important, but not when isolated from the appreciative side. Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it (Dewey, 1916: 245-6; my emphasis added). Play activity as such is no guarantee for avoiding “mechanical methods in teaching” (Dewey, 1916: 245). Thus, the value of educational gaming is entirely dependent upon whether the imaginative aspects of play are able to support students understanding of “what is going on”. In this way, imaginative play allows meaning to be created through “dramatizations” of particular aspects of knowledge. Consequently, the presumably distinct categories of imagination and reality represent a subtle continuum of finely graded experience as human beings do not experience reality directly but always through symbols, language, and social interaction (Waskul & Lust, 2004

# 1NR

## at: “die for the revolution!”

#### Independently liberty first causes atrocities

Mohawk, Associate Professor of History @ SUNY Buffalo, ‘2K

(John C, Utopian Legacies, p. 4-5)

People who believe that they are acting on a plan to solve all of the humankind’s problems think they are on a kind of sacred mission, even when the origin of their inspiration is secular in nature and makes no claim to intervention by a higher power. Although adherents may have only a vague idea about how the utopia will come about or what it will be like when it arrives, utopian movements often stimulate high levels of enthusiasm and a widely shared sense of being a “chosen people” with a special destiny. People caught up in such movements tend to be intolerant of others who are not part of this projected destiny, who do not believe in the same things, and are not expected to share in the future benefits. One reason for the popularity of these movements is that they exalt the importance of the group, praise their imagined superior qualities and future prospects, and urge that, relative to other peoples, they are special and more deserving. This pattern of self-aggrandizement has often proven popular and energizing. It contains a message that others who are not special or chosen are without significant value and may be treated accordingly. This kind of intolerance can result in the denial of rights, including the right to live, to hold property, to vote, or to hold professional licenses, if the inspired group has the power to do these things. A scornful indifference to these unbelieving and unentitled others can manifest as racism and/or ethnocentrism. Such intolerance has been known to lead to crimes against humanity, including systematic acts of genocide.

#### We link turn it – more life, more liberty – solves asthma and every other risk to well-being

Saul D. Alinsky, Activist, Professor, and Social Organizer with International Fame, Founder of the Industrial Areas Foundation, Rules for Radicals, 71, p. 24-27

We cannot think first and act afterwards. From the moment of birth we are immersed in action and can only fitfully guide it by taking thought. Alfred North Whitehead That perennial question, “Does the end justify the means?” is meaningless as it stands; the real and only question regarding the ethics of means and ends is, and always has been, “Does this particular end justify this particular means?” Life and how you live it is the story of means and ends. The end is what you want, and the means is how you get it. Whenever we think about social change, the question of means and ends arises. The man of action views the issue of means and ends arises. The man of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and strategic terms. He has no other problem; he thinks only of his actual resources and the possibilities of various choices of action. He asks of ends only whether they are achievable and worth the cost; of means, only whether they will work. To say that corrupt means corrupt the ends is to believe in the immaculate conception of ends and principles. The real arena is corrupt and bloody. Life is a corrupting process from the time a child learns to play his mother off against his father in the politics of when to go to bed; he who fears corruption fears life. The practical revolutionary will understand Geothe’s “conscience is the virtue of observers and not of agents of action”; in action, one does not always enjoy the luxury of a decision that is consistent both with one’s individual conscience and the good of [hu]mankind. The choice must always be for the latter. Action is for mass salvation and not for the individual’s personal salvation. He who sacrifices the mass good for his personal conscience has peculiar conception of “personal salvation”; he doesn’t care enough for people to be “corrupted” for them. The men [and women] who pile up the heaps of discussion and literature on the ethics of means and ends—which with rare exception is conspicuous for its sterility—rarely write about their won experiences in the perpetual struggle of life and change. They

are strangers, moreover, to the burdens and problems of operational responsibility and the unceasing pressure for immediate decisions. They are passionately committed to a mystical objectivity where passions are suspect. They assume a nonexistent situation where man suspect. They assume a nonexistent situation where men dispassionately and with reason draw and devise means and ends as if studying a navigational chart on land. They can be recognized by one of two verbal brands; “We agree with the ends but not the means,” or “This is not the time.” The means-and-end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means. The means-and-ends moralists, constantly obsessed with the ethics of the means used by the Have-Nots against the Haves, should search themselves as to their real political position. In fact, they are passive—but real—allies of the Haves. They are the ones Jacques Maritain referred to in his statement, “The fear of soiling ourselves by entering the context of history is not virtue, but a way of escaping virtue.” These non-doers were the ones who chose not to fight the Nazis in the only way they could have been fought; they were the ones who drew their window blinds to shut out the shameful spectacle of Jews and political prisoners being dragged through the streets; they were the ones who privately deplored the horror of it all—and did nothing. This is the nadir of immorality. The most unethical of all means is the nonuse of any means. It is this species of man how so vehemently and militantly participated in that classically idealistic debate at the old League of Nations on the ethical differences between defensive and offensive weapons. Their fears of action drive them to refuge in an ethics so divorced from the politics of life that it can apply only to angels, not to men. The standards of judgment must be rooted in the whys and wherefores of life as it is lived, the world as it is, not our wished-for fantasy of the world as it should be. I present here a series of rules pertaining to the ethics of means and ends: first, that one’s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one’s personal interest in the issue. When we are not directly concerned our morality overflows; as La Rochefoucauld put it, “We all have strength enough to endure the misfortunes of others.” Accompanying this rule is the parallel one that one’s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one’s distance from the scene of conflict. The second rule of the ethics of means and ends is that the judgment of the ethics of means is dependent upon the political position of those sitting in judgment. If you actively opposed the Nazi occupation and joined the underground Resistance, then you adopted the means of assassination, terror, properly destruction, the bombing of tunnels and trains, kidnapping, and the willingness to sacrifice innocent hostages to the end of defeating the Nazis. Those who opposed the Nazi conquerors regarded the Resistance as a secret army of selfless, patriotic idealists, courageous beyond expectation and willing to sacrifice their lives to their moral convictions. To the occupation authorities, however, these people were lawless terrorists, murders, saboteurs, assassins, who believed that the end justified the means, and were utterly unethical according to the mystical rules of war. Any foreign occupation would so ethically judge its opposition. However, in such conflict, neither protagonist is concerned with any value except victory. It is life or death.

#### Revolutionary Puritanism leads to Stalinism, Che proves

**Brull 10/12/10**

http://web.overland.org.au/2010/12/the-communist-puritan-it-is-good-to-die-for-the-revolution/

 Michael Brull blogs on Israel, Palestine, and media discussion of related issues on the Independent Australian Jewish Voices website. He now has a blog where he will comment on other matters at http://michaelbrull.wordpress.com/

 Che did not appreciate what he saw as the bureaucratic privileges he encountered in his visits to the Soviet Union. He was more impressed by Maoist China, especially their understanding of **the need for ‘sacrifice’**, which was ‘fundamental to a communist education’ (p 574). What sort of sacrifice does he mean? Essentially, it meant serving the new state with the same fervour as Che. Che thought that ‘even if the Cubans should disappear from the face of the earth because an **atomic war is unleashed** in their names ... **they would feel completely happy and fulfilled’ knowing the triumph of the revolution.** (p 455) Anderson does not note any polls on which this view is based. It seems to me perhaps a little unlikely that millions of people would be pleased to be killed for the sake of his glorious revolution. Even though Cuba brought the world closer to **nuclear annihilation** than at any other point in history, Che welcomed the prospect: ‘Thousands of people will die everywhere, but the responsibility will be theirs [the imperialists], and their people will also suffer ... But that should not bother us.’ Cubans would ‘fight to the last man, to the last woman, to the last human being capable of holding a gun’. (p 571) Which brings us to Che’s underlying values. One of Che’s most famous quotes is that ‘the true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love’. Yet it may be more fair to say that Che’s ‘true revolutionary’ is guided by something a little different. Anderson identifies a ‘prime element’ of the qualities Che thought necessary for the future great battle against imperialism: ‘a relentless hatred of the enemy, impelling us above and beyond the natural limitations that man is heir to, and transforming him into an effective, violent, seductive and cold killing machine. Our soldiers must be thus: a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy.’ (p 687) Che’s central motivation in life appears not to have been love or compassion. It was, above all, hatred – hatred of ‘the great enemy of mankind: the United States of America.’ (p 688) Years of fighting guerrilla warfare against ‘the great enemy’ helped make Che the cold, ruthless killing machine that he considered ideal. **The result** was that **after Che overthrew a cruel dictatorship, he helped install a new one.** Shortly after the revolution, Castro began closing down dissenting newspapers (pp 433–4, 451). Che had openly opposed a free press for years. When witnessing the overthrow of democracy in Guatemala by the US, he explained why he didn’t support democracy either: ‘This is a country where one can expand one’s lungs and fill them with democracy. There are dailies here run by United Fruit, and if I were Arbenz I’d close them down in five minutes, because they’re shameful and yet they say whatever they want’ (p 127). Imagine the horror of living in a country where one breathes in democracy! Che, however, took charge of the trials of alleged counter-revolutionaries. The spectacle of these public trials and executions overwhelmingly appalled all independent witnesses and foreign journalists (p 372). But Che was a killing machine, deaf to the pleas for compassion, or procedural fairness. He explained that ‘revolutions are ugly but necessary, and part of the revolutionary process is justice at the service of future justice.’ (p 436) If **judicial murder** is ugly, at least we can presume it was **for a greater cause**: the **Maoist tyranny** that Che thought ideal. This should be stressed: Che was not guided by love, and he does not seem to have thought that a goal like trying to make the world happier would have been worthwhile, despite his youthful reading of the social philosophy of Bertrand Russell. It is also a shame he did not read Russell’s critique of the Bolsheviks. One of Russell’s many pertinent insights was his observation that ‘the hopes which inspire Communism are, in the main, as admirable as those instilled by the Sermon on the Mount, but they are held as fanatically, and are likely to do as much harm. ... [F]rom men who are more anxious to injure opponents than to benefit the world at large no great good is to be expected.’ Eduardo Galeano described Che as ‘the most puritanical of the Western revolutionary leaders’ (p 575). This is eminently fair. Anderson writes that Che’s ‘workweek lasted from Monday through Saturday, including nights, and on Sunday mornings he went off to do voluntary labour. Sunday afternoons were all he spared for his family.’ (p 536) While some may admire Che for how hard he worked, he apparently thought the ideal society would be motivated by the same religious fervour: constant, joyless sacrifice for the revolution. He explained that after the revolution, the New Man ‘becomes happy to feel himself a cog in the wheel ... creating a sufficient quantity of consumer goods for the entire population’. Russell, on the other hand, condemned the ‘sacrifice of the individual to the machine that is the fundamental evil’ of capitalism. Emma Goldman likewise complained of the ‘fatal’ crime of capitalism, ‘turning the producer into a mere particle of a machine, with less will and decision than his master of steel and iron’. One recalls the saying that under capitalism man exploits man, but under communism, it’s the complete opposite. Che’s contempt for mere people manifested itself in his cruelty towards the people he knew, and also to those he didn’t. Visiting a literacy program for peasants, he saw one man who hadn’t made much progress. Che publicly insulted him with such spite that he reduced the humiliated peasant to tears (pp 537–8). Illustrative of his fanatical zeal, Che helped design a 32-storey bank. However, he thought it should go without an elevator (Che could get by without an elevator: why not everyone else?). And they could ‘eliminate at least half ’ of the bathrooms. ‘But in revolutions,’ he was told, ‘people go to the bathroom just as much as before it.’ ‘Not the new man,’ said Che. ‘He can sacrifice.’ (pp 431–2) And sacrifice he must. For Che’s puritanical vision must be imposed; **all must sacrifice for the revolution.** Before Che was executed, he declared: ‘Shoot, coward, you are only going to kill a man.’ (p 710) Che could finally make the ultimate sacrifice for the vision he lived for. It’s just a shame that his vision was so inhumane. While Che’s hatred and fanaticism may have made him a gifted guerrilla, they did not help create a more just society.

#### Sacrifical revolutionary ethics are a death wish that culminates in extinction

**Bolch and Lyons 93**

 Apocalypse not: science, economics, and environmentalism (Google eBook)

 Ben W. Bolch is Robert D. McCallum Distinguished Professor of Economics at Rhodes College, in Memphis, Tennessee

 Anna Bramwell and others have drawn attention to the environ- mental movement's death wish.15 Why would a movement advo- cate policies that have been characterized as nothing less than "A War against Fire"16 and that would surely destroy itself and much of the world's population at the same time? The present size of the planet's population is predicated on the technology and market mechanisms now in place, and their destruction would destroy a large segment of mankind. We cannot return to a "small and beauti- ful" world, a tribal world free of the difficulties of modern society, because to do so would be suicide. Yet, as we find in reading the literature on the religious aspects of Utopian movements such as environmentalism, a death wish is far from uncommon. Michael Novak, with characteristic clarity, explains the death wish best when he points out the elemental fact that **Utopian social- ist movements are, at root, wars against individualism**—they are **crusades aimed at the elimination of the self.** Such Utopian move- ments are akin to romantic love, and like Romeo and Juliet, the myth of romantic love has perhaps its best ending in the glorious embrace of death. Furthermore, **The privileged heroes of the socialist imagination are mar- tyrs who die for the revolution.** Not their success, but their self-immolation, is held in highest honor. For no one dares to say in what socialist success consists. ... As its inner will is the wish for self-immolation, so it longs for death, in which every human being is uniform. . . . [Finally, some). . . may be, for their own good, consigned to annihi- lation, in order to cleanse the earth.17

## at: proves state bad

#### It’s an even-if statement – if their impact is true, the aff causes more violence and the squo is preferable – there are no counter-examples

John W. Sherman **‘6**

– Professor of History and Director of the MA Program in History at Wright State University “Comparing Failed Revolutions” Wright State University. *Latin American Research Review* 41.2 (2006) 260-268

The overwhelming majority of revolutionary movements in the postwar era have been crushed by the State. Employing an ever-increasing arsenal of sophisticated surveillance and intelligence technology, military and security apparatuses have easily outgunned and dismantled insurgencies in nearly all urban settings. Rural insurgencies have proven more resilient, but since the mid-1980s even these have greatly waned. The resource curve for the powers-that-be has been particularly striking since the early 1980s, when hefty increases in funding under Ronald Reagan helped bring on-line a host of new technologies—digital-based, satellite-interfaced surveillance systems, path-breaking communications interception, and highly proficient night-vision and detection equipment, among them. If successful revolution was made difficult with the advent of better transportation infrastructure and communications in the late nineteenth century, today it is all but impossible. Even rural insurgencies can now be fairly easily snuffed out, especially when the State has no qualms about exterminating part of the civilian populace in the process. Torture, too, is integral to information-gathering—for the simple fact that it works. Finally, the power of mass media, especially the statistical analysis of polling data coupled with television, has equipped the State with a level of refined propaganda that could have made Josef Goebbels blush.

There is, in the contemporary age, a revolutionary dialectic. When insurgent forces rouse a populace with promises of liberation and carry out their first acts of redemptive violence, they invariably trigger a massive retaliatory strike on the part of the State (which often employs at this juncture unsavory characters and allows for acts of sadism). This, in turn, produces a revolutionary surge, as the populace is alienated by the initial bloodletting and aligns with the revolutionaries in a quest for self-defense and empowerment. The problem, of course, is that modern revolutionaries have neither the military resources nor the organizational sophistication to arm an entire populace. Finding themselves at the mercy of a brutal military, with no options, civilians will inevitably swing back **[End Page 261]** into line with those in power as their only means of survival. As they do so, the authorities will reign in the most unsavory and sadistic, even while employing selective violence to eradicate the revolutionaries themselves. In the midst of this counterrevolutionary project the organized political Left is invariably annihilated, leaving a country even more vulnerable to political manipulation and economic exploitation than it was before the revolution began. In this way, failing insurgencies are actually beneficial to North Americans and others who have money in a world of tremendous economic disparity.

This dialectic has been played out in various degrees in Colombia, El Salvador, and Chiapas—three places where insurrections have failed in recent decades. Analysis of an emerging body of historical and political scholarship, however, suggests that both the dialectic and the inherent shortcomings of revolution in the modern age are still not fully appreciated.

## util

#### Util accommodates rights

Shaw, 99 – Professor of Philosophy @ San Jose State

(William H, Contemporary Ethics, p.185-186)

One of the most widespread criticisms of utilitarianism is that it cannot take rights seriously enough. Generally speaking, rights take precedence over considerations of immediate utility. They limit or restrict direct appeals to welfare maximization. For example, to have a right to free speech means that one is free to speak one's mind even if doing so will fail to maximize happiness because others will dislike hearing what one has to say. The right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself entails that it would be wrong to force a criminal defendant to testify against himself even if the results of doing so would be good. If rights are moral claims that trump straightforward appeals to utility," then utilitarianism, the critics argue, cannot meaningfully respect rights because their theory subordinates them to the promotion of welfare. However, the criticism that utilitarianism cannot do right by rights ignores the extent to which utilitarianism can, as discussed in Chapter 5, accommodate the moral rules, principles, and norms other than welfare maximization that appear to constitute the warp and woof of our moral lives. To be sure, utilitarians look at rights in a different light than do . moral theorists who see them as self-evident or as having an independent deontic status grounded on non-utilitarian considerations. For utilitarians, it is not rights, but the promotion of welfare, that lies at the heart of morality. Bentham was consistently hostile to the idea of natural rights, in large measure because he believed that invoking natural rights was only a way of dressing up appeals to intuition in fancy rhetoric. In a similar vein, many utilitarians today believe that in both popular and philosophical discourse people are too quick to declare themselves possessors of all sorts of putative rights and that all too frequently these competing claims of rights only obscure the important, underlying moral issues.

#### And there’s no link to the citizen, non-citizen distinction – that’s a product of flawed ethics

Dworkin, 77 – Professor of Philosophy @ NYU (Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 274-275)

Utilitarian arguments of policy, however, would seem secure from that objection. They do not suppose that any form of life is inherently more valuable than any other, but instead base their claim, that constraints on liberty are necessary to advance some collective goal of the community, just on the fact that that goal happens to be desired more widely or more deeply than any other. Utilitarian arguments of policy, therefore, seem not to oppose but on the contrary to embody the fundamental right of equal concern and respect, because they treat the wishes of each member of the community on a par with the wishes of any other, with no bonus or discount reflecting the view that the member is more or less worthy of concern, or his views more or less worthy of respect, than any other.

#### No tyranny of majority

Shaw, 99 – Professor of Philosophy @ San Jose State

(William H, Contemporary Ethics, p. 13)

Actions affect people to different degrees. Your playing the stereo loudly might bring slight pleasure to three of your neighbors, cause significant discomfort to two others who do not share your taste in music or are trying to concentrate on something else, and leave a sixth person indifferent The utilitarian theory is not that each individual votes on the basis of his or her happiness or unhappiness with the majority ruling, but that we add up the various pleasures or pains, however large or small, and go with the action that results in the greatest net amount of happiness. Because any action will affect some people more strongly than others, utilitarianism is not the same as majority rule. For example, in the United States today it would probably increase overall happiness to permit homosexuals to marry, even though the thought of their doing so makes many heterosexuals slightly uncomfortable. This is because such a policy would affect the happiness or unhappiness of the majority only slightly, if at all, while it would profoundly enhance the lives of a small percentage of people. Even if banning homosexual marriages makes most people happy, it doesn't bring about the most happiness.As quoted earlier, Bentham famously said that the utilitarian standard is the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Although often repeated, this formulation is misleading. The problem is that it erroneously implies that we should maximize two different things: the amount of happiness produced and the number of people made happy.' Correctly understood, utilitarianism tells us to do only one thing, maximize happiness. Doing what makes the most people happy usually produces the most happiness, but it may not - as the example of homosexual marriages illustrates. For utilitarianism, it is the total amount of happiness, not the number of people whose happiness is increased, that matters.

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## at: we solve

#### overwhelming firepower

**Curtner the Pig King, 95**

 DANIEL D. CURTNER, MAJ, USA

B.A., Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio, 1981

 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA299367&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

 No direct threat to constituted government is currently posed by any of these groups. However, their future potential as catalysts for social disorder is great and can not be discounted. They periodically surface as a result of some localized act of violence, but mostly they lie fallow waiting for the tide of disorder to sweep over the nation. **Government Force – Ready or Not?** In the face of violence and disorder, government forces must be prepared to respond to these new dangers. As seen in chapter 4, **the government has tools to apply to fix the outbreak of violence. Available assets and public law are sufficient to deal with a range of threats be they internal conflict, insurgency, or warfare**.

#### Government wins: mercenaries and internal support

**The Ghost 4/22/10**

Editorialist and essayist on domestic insurgency within the United States

http://blogs.alternet.org/theghost/2010/04/22/the-u-s-military-vs-the-militias-who-would-really-win/

Of course, the government of the United States has other advantages that it would bring to a war with the militias. Unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, American soldiers fighting a guerilla war against militia insurgents would speak the same language as the local population, understand its culture and generally be of the same religious persuasion. In addition, the federal government has significant intelligence gathering capabilities (and not just military intelligence capabilities, either; the FBI is excellent at this as well) and talented personnel who could infiltrate militia groups. The federal government also has the ability to hire the mercenaries of companies like Xe Services – formerly **Blackwater,** of course – if they need additional manpower. Also, it is unlikely that the militias would find any major state sponsors for their insurgency. Too many other countries are either allied with the United States, dependent upon American support or owed too much money by us for them to support the overthrow of the American government.