# 1NC

## 1

#### Production means extraction of gas

Barrett, JD – University of Oklahoma College of Law, ‘93

(Beverly M., 46 Okla. L. Rev. 745)

In such a royalty clause, as a precondition of sale, the oil and gas must be physically removed from the ground. n93 In fact, the oil and gas industry and most courts define production in terms of physical severance of the minerals from the ground. n94 When a pipeline makes take-or-pay payments, unless recoupment gas is physically taken, there is no production and thus no royalty owed. Obviously it would be easier to seek royalty payments under a royalty clause in which the terms "produced" or "production" are not used. n95

#### Oil drilling is distinct from production—the aff searches for energy, doesn’t produce it

Fairfax 99

<http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22839>

 RICHARD FAIRFAX, Director, Directorate of Compliance Programs

 OSHA has stated in previous interpretation letters that production facilities, including related oil, gas, and water separation facilities, are excluded from PSM coverage under the oil and gas well drilling and servicing exemption, 29 C.F.R. §1910.119(a)(2)(ii). Several factors, however, demonstrate that the conclusions reached in these letters are erroneous. As a result, these letters are hereby rescinded.The letters in question fail to take into account the distinction between wells in production and those undergoing initial drilling or in a servicing status.1 Production, as recognized by the petroleum industry, is a phase of well operations that deals with bringing well fluids to the surface, separating them, and then storing, gauging and otherwise preparing the product for the pipeline. This production phase occurs after a well has been drilled, completed, and placed into operation, or after it has been returned to operation following workover or servicing. A completed well includes a "Christmas tree" (control valves, pressure gauges and choke assemblies to control the flow of oil and gas) which is attached at the top of the well where pressure is expected. It is at this point, the top of the well, where the covered PSM process begins. The distance between separation equipment and the well is not a factor when determining PSM applicability for production facilities. Oil well drilling and servicing is distinct from production and covers activities related to the initial drilling of a well and later, maintenance work necessary to maintain or enhance production. Normally, such operations are occurring if a drilling rig or truck mounted rig or mast is present on the well. Oil well drilling and servicing includes the following activities: the actual drilling and associated activities of the well; Well completion activities (i.e. activities and methods necessary to prepare a well for the production of oil and gas). Well servicing (i.e. the maintenance work performedon an oil or gas well to improve or maintain the production from a formation already producing. Usually it involves repairs to the pump, rods, gas-lift valves, tubing, packers and so forth); and Workover activities (i.e. the performance of one or more of a variety of remedial operations on a producing oil well to try to increase production. Examples of workover operations include deepening, plugging back, pulling and resetting liners, squeeze cementing and so on. [FOOTNOTE] Two sources of recognition by the industry of this distinction can be found in A Primer of Oilwell Drilling, 5th Edition, Revised (published by the Petroleum Extension Service in cooperation with the International Association of Drilling Contractors) and A Primer of Oilwell Service, Workover, and Completion, 5th Edition (published by the Petroleum Extension Service in cooperation with the Association of Energy Service Companies)

#### Precision—technical definitions are the gold standard in energy debates

Brown, judge – Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, ‘59

(John R., “CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,” Dissenting Opinion, 266 F.2d 208; 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 5196; 10 Oil & Gas Rep. 601)

 Indeed, I do not think that my cautious Brothers would have undertaken this excursion had they not first have found (or assumed) a basis for considering production in its ordinary, common usage. For clearly, what the Court says does not follow if the term is used in the sense of the oil and gas field. For example, the Court states, 'In the ordinary language of purchase and sale of a product where it is in deliverable form the stream of gas is, in a sense, 'produced' at the latest after it has passed through the first master valve. \* \* \*.' Again, it states, 'but this does not change the fact that in the ordinary sense of the terms production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground where it is physically deliverable but then is shut in until delivery commences.'To support this approach, the Court frankly states that 'our duty here is not to determine what is generally understood in the industry, in the resolution of other relationships, is meant by 'production." It is, rather, the Court goes on to say 'to determine what Congress meant by the term.' Reading § 1(b) as though it contained only the first part of the sentence and disregarding [\*\*35] altogether the exclusionary phrases at its end, the Court then proceeds to find that the sole Congressional purpose was 'to regulate these interstate sales.' This causes the Court then to reject the industry context and adopt a construction of 'production' which 'is in line with ordinary non-technical usage' so that it will 'effectuate and not \* \* \* frustrate the purpose of the law.'.' The abundant legislative history canvassed by the many Supreme Court cases But Congress was not legislating in an atmosphere of 'ordinary non-technical usage reveals an articulate awareness of the complexities of this whole business. The object of § 1(b) was clearly to define the purpose to regulate [\*220] transportation and sale and companies engaged in such transportation or sale. This was done against the background fully known to Congress that at one end of the process was the production of the natural gas, that at the other end was the consumer, and in between were those who transported and distributed it. As pointed out in Part I above, the Court has been emphatic in ascribing an intention to Congress to exclude those matters which relate to the local production activities [\*\*36] traditionally reserved to states for their exclusive control.We are told that § 1(b) exclusion is a provision '\* \* \* that \* \* \* precludes the Commission from and control over the activity of producing or gathering natural gas. \* \* \*.' Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 1945, 324 U.S. 581, 603, 65 S.Ct. 829, 839, 89 L.Ed. 1206. Two years later this was reiterated in Interstate Natural Gas Company v. FPC, 1947, 331 U.S. 682, 690, 67 S.Ct. 1482, 1487, 91 L.Ed. 1742. 'Clearly, among the powers thus reserved to the States is the power to regulate the physical production and gathering of natural gas in the interests of conservation or of any other consideration of legitimate local concern. It was the intention of Congress to give the States full freedom in these matters.'Within another two years this was reemphasized in FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 1949, 337 U.S. 498, 509-13, 69 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 93 L.Ed. 1499. 'To accept these arguments springing from power to allow interstate service, fix rates and control abandonment would establish wide control by the Federal Power Commission over the production and gathering [\*\*37] of gas. It would invite expansion of power into other phases of the forbidden area. It would be an assumption of powers specifically denied the Commission by the words of the Act as explained in the report and on the floor of both Houses of Congress. The legislative history of this Act is replete with evidence of the care taken by Congress to keep the power over the production and gathering of gas within the states.'How Congress expected to preserve the absolute freedom of the States in matters concerning production unless that term was used in the context of that industry is nowhere made clear by my Brothers. If Congress were to adhere to its purpose, carefully to regulate some but not all of the natural gas moving of dedicated to move in interstate commerce, it was required to prescribe the boundary limits of each in terms of the business and industry to be regulated. That is the usual, not the extraordinary, principle of statutory construction long ago set forth in Unwin v. Hanson, (1891) 2 Q.B. 115, 119, approved in O'Hara v. Luckenback Steamship Co., 1926, 269 U.S. 364, 370-371, 46 S.Ct. 157, 160, 70 L.Ed. 313:'If the act is one [\*\*38] passed with reference to a particular trade, business, or transaction, and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business, or transaction, knows and understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning, though it may differ from the common or ordinary meaning of the words.'And see 50 Am.Jur., Statutes § 277 (1944).What is 'production of natural gas' is to be determined in the light of the actual substantive conditions and engineering-business requirements of that great field of scientific mechanical activity. Such activity is not to be assayed by Judges who, learned in the law, have naught but the limited technical experience and cumulative knowledge of the ordinary person.Judged by the standards of the industry, not only by what was said and uncontradicted, but by what was done on a large scale in this very field, the Commission could only find that all of Continental's facilities were essential to and a part of the production of gas. [\*221] IV.The Court's action and opinion is portentous. It is so precisely because it is based on an erroneous assumption and an equally [\*\*39] erroneous construction. It assumes that we are fact finders to supplant or supplement the expert agency. It finds the capacity to cope with this problem by relieving it of all technical complexities and casting it in the mold of the ordinary meaning of production.The Court finds 'that in the ordinary sense of the term production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground where it is physically deliverable \* \* \*.' (emphasis in the original) Tying this in to the point of delivery (at the very extreme end of Continental's 4-inch master value and at the very beginning of El Paso's swage), the Court has necessarily adopted the approach of the Commission that facilities for the sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission are those 'serving to contain the gas at the point of delivery.' That it means to champion this construction is likewise established by the Court's unqualified approval, both here and in Sun Oil Company v. FPC, 5 Cir., 1959, 266 F.2d 222, of J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 3 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 550, 556 and Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 10 Cir., 1957, 250 F.2d 61, 69, [\*\*40] the latter of which states: 'To us it is clear that facilities necessary to effect a sale of gas in interstate commerce are facilities used in interstate commerce and are within the jurisdiction of the Commission. This would seem to be the plain intent of section 7(c). The Third Circuit has so held in J. M. Huber Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 3 Cir., 236 F.2d 550, 556.'The vice of this rationale is compounded by the Court's interpretation of 'production' or 'production facilities' in terms of ordinary non-industry connotation. But even without this, if the test is to be stated in terms of that piece of equipment which is needed to effectuate the sale or contain the gas at the point of sale delivery, then there is in fact no physical limitation. In those terms the master valve (whether upper or lower, or both) does not alone contain the gas. The master valves are ineffective without the continuation of the leakproof surface casing, the production casing or many other parts of the well, all of which operate simultaneously and indispensably to bring and hold the gas under effective control.That is critical since § 7(c) requires certification [\*\*41] of facilities which are to be constructed or extended. And once a little intrusion is made into the forbidden 1(b) area of production, it is only logical to expect (and justify) application of the full reach of this concept. It stops in a given well where, but only where, the particular piece of equipment may be said to directly assist in the containment of the gas at delivery point. Worse, it means that by the force of § 7(c), the drilling and equipping of a new well could only be done by express approval of the Commission.We and all others have now firmly held that on the commencement of the first jurisdictional sale, the Commission's power attaches at least to the sale. The Court by our present opinion holds that simultaneously power attaches to some piece of gas well equipment. If the jurisdictional sale setting all of this Federal control in motion is in the common form of a long-term dedication-of-reserves- contract by which the mineral owner undertakes to develop a field and deliver all production to the long line pipe line purchaser, the result will be that the drilling of additional wells may not be done except on Commission terms and approval. In such [\*\*42] a situation the 'new' well would, of course, be the means by which to effectuate the sale of the gas. Since this would constitute 'the construction or extension of any facilities' for the sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and would result in the acquisition and operation of 'such facilities or extensions thereof,' it would, as § 7(c) demands, positively require that the Commission issue a certificate of public [\*222] convenience and necessity 'authorizing such acts or operation.'Combining this opinion and Sun Oil, this day decided, this Court binds a gas well owner to produce gas for as long as the Commission prescribes. Neither the length of the contract nor the production-nature of the facility by which the 'service' (sale) is performed are an effective limitation. Until nature shuts off the gas the Commission is the perpetual regulator from whose power the Commission's own brief says, '\* \* \* there is no \* \* \* hiding place.'Congress did not mean to invest its creature with these scriptural powers (Psalms 139:7, 8). Section 1(b) draws the line at production.

#### Limits—their interpretation allows affs that impact the entire energy sector

Sagar, PhD materials science, Oliver, PhD engineering, and Chikkatur, PhD physics, ‘5

(Ambuj, Hongyan, and Ananth, all three are research fellows – Kennedy School of Govt @ Harvard, 7 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 1)

The energy sector encompasses activities relating to the production, conversion, and use of energy. Energy production includes the extraction of primary energy forms such as coal, oil, and natural gas, or growing biomass for energy uses. Energy conversion pertains to the transformation of energy into more useful forms: this includes the refining of petroleum to yield products such as gasoline and diesel; the combustion of coal in power plants to yield electricity; the production of alcohol from biomass, etc. Energy end-use encompasses the final use of energy forms in industrial, residential, commercial, transportation and other end-uses.

## 2

#### Fiscal cliff negotiations will succeed now, but pre-election groundwork key

Jonathan Weisman, NYTimes, 10/1/12, Leaders at Work on Plan to Avert Mandatory Cuts, www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/us/senate-leaders-at-work-on-plan-to-avert-fiscal-cliff.html?\_r=2&hp&&pagewanted=all

Senate leaders are closing in on a path for dealing with the “fiscal cliff” facing the country in January, opting to try to use a postelection session of Congress to reach agreement on a comprehensive deficit reduction deal rather than a short-term solution.

Senate Democrats and Republicans remain far apart on the details, and House Republicans continue to resist any discussion of tax increases. But lawmakers and aides say that a bipartisan group of senators is coalescing around an ambitious three-step process to avert a series of automatic tax increases and deep spending cuts.

#### Plan unpopular - past votes prove

Goode 11

Darren Goode, staff writer, Politico, May 18, 2011, "Senate slams GOP drilling bill", http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55241.html

A Senate Republican offshore drilling bill died Wednesday due to opposition from Democrats and criticism from within the GOP that the measure didn't go far enough in enabling new production. The 42-57 vote left sponsors well short of the needed 60 for the motion to proceed to pass. Five Republicans voted no — Sens. Jim DeMint, Mike Lee, Richard Shelby, Olympia Snowe and David Vitter. No Democrats voted yes; Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus didn't vote.

#### Presidential leadership is key to a compromise – the alternative is the collapse of hegemony, a double-dip recession, and war in the Middle East

Hutchison, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the **dire consequences**, **America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff**, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, **unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement** on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk.

According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and **a** potentially **catastrophic blow to our** national defense and **security capabilities** in a time of increasing violence and danger.

All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve.

The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship.

Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. **Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year**.

The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. **We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings**. **In the absence of U.S. military leadership**, **upheaval in the Middle East would be worse**. **As any student of history can attest**, **instability does not confine itself to national borders**. **Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region**.

Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, **a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological** research, development and **advantage** - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.

Sequestration can still be avoided. **But that will require** leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Middle East goes nuclear

James A. **Russell,** Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

## 3

#### Obama win now by a decisive, but narrow margin

Mark Blumenthal, HuffPo, 10/1/12, New 2012 Polls Show Little Change In State Of Race , www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/01/2012-polls-obama-romney\_n\_1928472.html?utm\_hp\_ref=elections-2012

With attention turning to the first of three upcoming national debates, new polls show President Barack Obama continuing to hold a narrow lead over Republican nominee Mitt Romney, both nationwide and in the key battleground states that are likely to decide the election.

Two new national surveys released on Monday morning both show a slightly closer race than most other recent polls, although those new results are consistent with previous surveys from the same organizations, indicating that Obama's September lead is holding.

The new Washington Post/ABC News survey finds Obama leading by just 2 percentage points nationwide (49 percent to 47 percent) among the voters deemed most likely to vote. But that result was no different than their previous survey, taken just after the Democratic convention three weeks ago, which showed Obama with a 1-point edge (49 percent to 48 percent).

However, among all registered voters nationwide, the new Post/ABC poll shows Obama leading by 5 percentage points (49 percent to 44 percent), again the same margin as their survey found three weeks ago. The Post also reports that Obama's lead over Romney is larger (52 percent to 41 percent) among a subset of likely voters in swing states.

Similarly, a new Politico/George Washington University Battleground poll also finds Obama leading by 2 percentage points among likely voters (49 percent to 47 percent), a finding essentially unchanged from the 3-point Obama margin (50 percent to 47 percent) found in their previous survey.

The four results have been collectively more favorable to Romney than those produced by other recent national polls, and more importantly, they have shown no statistically meaningful trend in September. The HuffPost Pollster tracking model, which draws on all national and state-level polling and corrects for consistent "house effect" differences among pollsters, continues to give Obama a slightly larger, 4 percentage point lead over Romney.

Similarly, a handful of new statewide surveys released over the weekend shows results consistent with a 3- to 4-point Obama lead nationwide.

In Iowa, a new Des Moines Register Iowa poll found Obama leading by 4 percentage points (49 percent to 45 percent), exactly the same margin as the Pollster tracking model.

In Ohio, an automated recorded-voice survey by the Democratic-affiliated firm Public Policy Polling gives Obama a 4 percentage point advantage, while a new Columbus Dispatch mail-in survey gives Obama a 9-point lead. Not surprisingly, Obama's lead on the Pollster tracking model falls somewhere in between.

Finally, another new PPP poll from North Carolina shows a dead-even race, with each candidate at 48 percent -- again, consistent with a similarly close margin on HuffPost's tracking model. North Carolina has been the closest of the 50 states over the last three weeks.

Thus, the combination of national and statewide polling continues to show Obama leading Romney by statistically meaningful margins in all of the battleground states except North Carolina. Were he to carry all of the states where he is currently leading, Obama would win 332 electoral votes -- far more than the 270 needed to win. Romney currently leads in states accounting for 191 electoral votes.

Can Wednesday night's nationally televised debates between Obama and Romney, the first of three to be held between now and late October, be a "game changer" for Romney? Not likely, according to George Washington University political scientist John Sides.

"When it comes to shifting enough votes to decide the outcome of the election," Sides writes in the Washington Monthly, "presidential debates have rarely, if ever, mattered."

Sides cites research by political scientists Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien, who studied polling from every election from 1952 to 2008 and found that while debates sometimes nudge results, they rarely produce substantial changes in voter preferences. Erikson and Wlezien found that since 1960, the leader in the polling before the debates remained the leader after the debates.

The most significant before-and-after debate shift was toward Gerald Ford in his 1976 race against Jimmy Carter. However, as Erikson and Wlezien note, "Carter's support was in steady decline" during the final month of the race.

It is worth remembering that while Obama enjoys a statistically meaningful lead in national polling, his margin remains relatively modest compared to past elections. So while a "nudge" toward Romney on the order of what debates produced in 1980, 2000 or 2004 might not be enough to move Romney ahead, it could make for a much closer race.

#### The plan upsets Obama’s balancing act on energy, reduces environmentalist turnout critical to reelection

Schnur, 4-9

Dan Schnur, director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California; he served as the national communications director of Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2000, “The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline,” http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline.

The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor.

As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership.

There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling.

Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white.

Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline.

The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway.

He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country.

#### Romney win causes China-bashing – causes a trade war

Gerstein 11

(Josh, writer @ Politico, “The GOP's China syndrome”, 11/22/12, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/68952.html)

Mitt Romney says America is at war with China — a “trade war” over its undervalued currency. “They’re stealing our jobs. And we’re gonna stand up to China,” the former Massachusetts governor declared in a recent Republican presidential debate, arguing that the United States should threaten to impose tariffs on Chinese imports. When Romney steps on stage tonight for another debate, this one devoted to foreign policy, that kind of China-bashing is likely to be a favorite theme. With a moribund economy and relatively little traction for other international issues, the threat posed by cheap Chinese imports and Chinese purchases of U.S. debt is an irresistible target. The problem, China experts are quick to point out, is that those attacks often fly in the face of the business interests Republicans have traditionally represented, not to mention the record many of the candidates have either supporting trade with China — or actively soliciting it. Just last year, for example, Romney slammed President Barack Obama for growth-killing protectionism after he put a 35 percent tariff on Chinese tires because of a surge of cheap imports. And, Romney wrote in his book, “No Apology: The Case for American Greatness,” “Protectionism stifles productivity.” And though Texas Gov. Rick Perry predicted at a debate this month that “the Chinese government will end up on the ash heap of history if they do not change their virtues,” a picture posted on the Internet shows a smiling Perry on a trade mission to Shanghai and Beijing posing with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi after presenting him with a pair of cowboy boots. Nor has Perry been shy about encouraging Chinese investments in Texas: In October 2010, he appeared at the announcement of a new U.S. headquarters for Huawei Technologies to be located in Plano, Texas, despite lingering concerns among U.S. security officials that Huawei-made telecommunications equipment is designed to allow unauthorized access by the Chinese government. “There’s a certain pandering going on,” said Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who adds that the GOP rhetoric is squarely at odds with the views of the U.S. establishment, which believes a showdown with China over the trade issue “will make things worse, not better.” Not all of the 2012 GOP presidential hopefuls have taken to publicly pummeling Beijing. The only bona fide China expert in the group, former Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, has criticized Romney for being cavalier and simplistic in his talk of tariffs. “You can give applause lines, and you can kind of pander here and there. You start a trade war if you start slapping tariffs randomly on Chinese products based on currency manipulation,” Huntsman said at a recent debate. “That doesn’t work.” Former Sen. Rick Santorum also rejected the idea of slapping tariffs on Beijing if it won’t buckle on the currency issue. “That just taxes you. I don’t want to tax you,” Santorum said. Newt Gingrich says he wants to bring a world of hurt down on Beijing for alleged Chinese cyberattacks on the U.S. and theft of intellectual property, though he’s vague about how. “We’re going to have to find ways to dramatically raise the pain level for the Chinese cheating,” the former house speaker declares. And Herman Cain talks of a threat from China, but says the answer is to promote growth in the U.S. “China’s economic dominance would represent a national security threat to the USA, and possibly to the rest of the world,” Cain wrote in May in the Daily Caller. “We can outgrow China because the USA is not a loser nation. We just need a winner in the White House.” Romney’s rhetoric has been **particularly harsh**. “It’s predatory pricing, it’s killing jobs in America,” he declared at the CNBC debate earlier this month, promising to make a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization about China’s currency manipulation. “I would apply, if necessary, tariffs to make sure that they understand we are willing to play at a level playing field.” The Romney campaign insists those tariffs are entirely distinguishable from the tire duties Obama imposed in 2009. “The distinction between Obama’s tire action and what Gov. Romney is proposing is simple,” said a Romney aide who did not want to be named. “President Obama is not getting tough with China or pushing them unilaterally, he is handing out political favors to union allies. [Romney’s] policy focuses on fostering competition by keeping markets open and the playing field level.” Romney, who helped set up investment bank Bain Capital, has long been a favorite of Wall Street, so his stridency on the China trade issue has taken some traditional conservatives — for whom free trade is a fundamental tenet — by surprise. National Review said Romney’s move “risk[ed] a trade war with China” **and was “a remarkably bad idea.”** In fact, many business leaders give Obama good marks for his China policy. “What the Obama administration has done in not labeling China as a ‘currency manipulator’ is correct,” said one U.S. business lobbyist who closely follows U.S.-China trade issues and asked not to be named. “We’re very leery of a tit-for-tat situation,” he added, while acknowledging that the anti-China rhetoric is “good politics.”

#### That goes nuclear

Taaffe 5

(Peter Taaffe, general secretary of the Socialist Party of England and Wales, “China, A New Superpower?,” Socialist Alternative.org, Nov 1, 2005, pg. <http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/article11.php?id=30>)

While this conflict is unresolved, the shadow of a trade war looms. Some commentators, like Henry C.K. Liu in the Asia Times, go further and warn that "trade wars can lead to shooting wars." China is not the Japan of the 21st century. Japan in the 1980s relied on the U.S. military and particularly its nuclear umbrella against China, and was therefore subject to the pressure and blackmail of the U.S. ruling class. The fear of the U.S., and the capitalists of the "first world" as a whole, is that China may in time "out-compete" the advanced nations for hi-tech jobs while holding on to the stranglehold it now seems to have in labor-intensive industries. As the OECD commented recently: "In the five-year period to 2003, the number of students joining higher education courses has risen by three and a half times, with a strong emphasis on technical subjects." The number of patents and engineers produced by China has also significantly grown. At the same time, an increasingly capitalist China - most wealth is now produced in the private sector but the majority of the urban labor force is still in state industries - and the urgency for greater energy resources in particular to maintain its spectacular growth rate has brought it into collision on a world scale with other imperialist powers, particularly the U.S. In a new worldwide version of the "Great Game" - the clash for control of central Asia's resources in the nineteenth century - the U.S. and China have increasingly come up against and buffeted one another. Up to now, the U.S. has held sway worldwide due to its economic dominance buttressed by a colossal war machine accounting for 47% of total world arms spending. But Iraq has dramatically shown the limits of this: "A country that cannot control Iraq can hardly remake the globe on its own." (Financial Times) But no privileged group disappears from the scene of history without a struggle. Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. defense secretary, has stated: "Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: why this growing [arms] investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?" China could ask the same question of the U.S. In order to maintain its position, the U.S. keeps six nuclear battle fleets permanently at sea, supported by an unparalleled network of bases. As Will Hutton in The Observer has commented, this is not because of "irrational chauvinism or the needs of the military-industrial complex, but because of the pressure they place on upstart countries like China." In turn, the Chinese elite has responded in kind. For instance, in the continuing clash over Taiwan, a major-general in the People's Liberation Army baldly stated that if China was attacked "by Washington during a confrontation over Taiwan... I think we would have to respond with nuclear weapons." He added: "We Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all of the cities east of Xian. Of course, the Americans would have to be prepared that hundreds... of cities would be destroyed by the Chinese." This bellicose nuclear arms rattling shows the contempt of the so-called great powers for the ordinary working-class and peasant peoples of China and the people of the U.S. when their interests are at stake.

## 4

#### Offshore production is underpinned by a neoliberal logic of commodification that cannot reconcile or account for environmental degradation—the result is systemic destruction of ocean space

Martens ’11 (Emily, Masters’ Thesis paper at the University of Miami for a Master’s Degree in Geography and Regional Studies, overseen by Mazen Labban, Ph.D. and professor of Geography, Terri A. Scandura, Ph.D, Dean of the Graduate School, Jan Nijman, Ph.D. Professor of Geography, and Anna Zalik, Ph.D.,Professor of Environmental Sciences, York University, Toronto, “THE DISCOURSES OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE DEBATE OVER OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING POLICY IN FLORIDA,” http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa\_theses, AM)

The fusion of energy security and environmental protection concerns has since the energy and environmental crises of the 1970s forged a policy aimed at creating environmentally safe extraction and production processes. The emphasis on cheap energy resources, however, has come into contradiction with requirements of costly regulation and oversight practices that are thought to better ensure environmental security. The attempt to reconcile offshore drilling with concerns about environmental protection during the Nixon and Carter years was torn asunder by the hostility to regulation during the Reagan and Clinton years. As a result, a heated debate developed between proponents of offshore oil drilling who argue that (unregulated) offshore oil drilling — and expanded domestic oil production in general — ensures energy security by making the United States energy independent and opponents of offshore oil drilling who do not contest the goal of energy independence but who argue that this should not be at the expense of the protection of marine ecosystems and coastal economies from the destructive effects of offshore drilling, regulated or not. The debate, in other words, developed into a debate between a dominant discourse of energy security and a counter discourse of environmental security — at the core of it were questions of regulation as well as competing commercial interests. Though there are various actors and interests within each of these discourses, the primary tension between proponents and opponents of offshore oil drilling tends to reproduce the tensions embodied in the larger discourses of energy security and environmental security at different geographical scales. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the credence given to either one of these two security discourses at any given time is the result of broader socio-political forces and the changing ideologies within which they operate. Underlying both seemingly opposed discourses, however, is a common logic that informs the path they take and the language they use to establish legitimacy — the logic of the commodity — an abstract representation of space that supports this logic. This space, as Lefebvre (2007: 53) points out, “includes the ‘world of commodities’, its ‘logic’ and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and that of the political state”. As will be shown in the following chapters, each of these competing discourses has organized its arguments around the logics of capitalism to gain public support and federal and local state protections. This is not an arbitrary association but rather the result of specific political developments in the US that have shaped environmental concerns, and the environment, according to free market principles. Prior to the injection of neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization into the environment and discourses on the environment under the Reagan Administration, the Nixon and Carter Administrations were caught between an environmental movement, which attempted to create a new perspective from which human activity could be viewed in light of its often negative impacts on the environment – especially offshore oil drilling as a result of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill – and the volatility of the international oil market which threatened oil imports. The Nixon and Carter strategies attempted to balance the two agendas through the expansion of domestic oil production in tandem with regulations and oversight that would monitor the offshore oil industry’s compliance with environmental standards. This was thought and presented as a temporary measure. Ultimately the aim was to create alternative fuels in the not too distant future to replace oil, in light of evidence and concern that both the production and consumption of oil were proving to be detrimental to the environment which humans depended on for their own survival. Neoliberal restructuring under the Reagan Administration, however, promoted a market-based discourse of energy security above, or more precisely against the discourse of environmental security, advocating reduction of state oversights and reliance on market signals instead as the more efficient means to regulate offshore drilling. Environmental security, in the form of government oversight, became a threat to the accumulation of wealth — a source of insecurity. Instead, environmental security could be entrusted to the multiple interests operating in the free market. The argument rested on the neoliberal mantra that the government was not as efficient as private owners and the market in managing and protecting the environment. As a result, offshore oil drilling activity has since enjoyed lax regulatory oversight, while day-to-day oil pollution continues to disrupt various ecological and economic activities that share ocean space.

#### The system’s unsustainable – debt, offshoring, financialization, eco – only shift from EMPIRE to MULTITUDES averts extinction

Shor 10

<http://www.stateofnature.org/locatingTheContemporary.html>

Fran Shor teaches in the History Department at Wayne State University. He is the author of Dying Empire: US Imperialism and Global Resistance (Routledge 2010).

Attributing the debilitation of the U.S. economy to a mortgage crisis or the collapse of the housing market misses the truly epochal crisis in the world economy and, indeed, in capitalism itself. As economist Michael Hudson contends, "the financial 'wealth creation' game is over. Economies emerged from World War II relatively free of debt, but the 60-year global run-up has run its course. Financial capitalism is in a state of collapse, and marginal palliatives cannot revive it." According to Hudson, among those palliatives is an ironic variant of the IMF strategies imposed on developing nations. "The new twist is a variant on the IMF 'stabilization' plans that lend money to central banks to support their currencies - for long enough to enable local oligarchs and foreign investors to move their savings and investments offshore at a good exchange rate." The continuity between these IMF plans and even the Obama administration's fealty to Wall Street can be seen in the person of Lawrence Summers, now the chief economic advisor to Obama. As further noted by Hudson, "the Obama bank bailout is arranged much like an IMF loan to support the exchange rate of foreign currency, but with the Treasury supporting financial asset prices for U.S. banks and other financial institutions ... Private-sector debt will be moved onto the U.S. Government balance sheet, where "taxpayers" will bear losses." [4] So, here we have another variation of the working poor getting sapped by the economic elite! In fact, one estimate of U.S. federal government support to the elite financial institutions is in the range of $10 trillion dollars, a heist of unimaginable proportions. [5] Given the massive indebtedness of the United States, its reliance of foreign support of that debt by countries like China, which has close to $2 trillion tied up in treasury bills and other investments, a long-term crisis of profitability, overproduction, and offshoring of essential manufacturing, it does not appear that the United States and, perhaps, even the capitalist system can avoid collapse. Certainly, there are Marxist economists and world-systems analysts who are convinced that the collapse is inevitable, albeit it may take several generations to complete. The question becomes whether a dying system can be resuscitated or, if something else can be put in its place. One of the most prominent world systems scholars, Immanuel Wallerstein, puts the long-term crisis of capitalism and the alternatives in the following perspective: Because the system we have known for 500 years is no longer able to guarantee long-term prospects of capital accumulation, we have entered a period of world chaos. Wild (and largely uncontrollable) swings in the economic, political, and military situations are leading to a systemic bifurcation, that is, to a world collective choice about the kind of new system the world will construct over the next fifty years. The new system will not be a capitalist system, but it could be one of two kinds: a different system that is equally or more hierarchical and inequalitarian, or one that is substantially democratic and equalitarian. [6] What Wallerstein overlooks is the possibility that a global crisis of capitalism with its continuous overexploitation and maldistribution of essential resources, such as water, could lead to a planetary catastrophe. [7] While Wallerstein and many of the Marxist critics of capitalism correctly identify the long-term structural crisis of capitalism and offer important insights into the need for more democratic and equalitarian systems, they often fail to realize other critical predicaments that have plagued human societies in the past and persist in even more life-threatening ways today. Among those predicaments are the power trips of civilization and environmental destructiveness. Such power trips can be seen through the sedimentation of power-over in the reign of patriarchal systems and an evolutionary selection for that power-over which contaminates society and social relationships. Certainly, many of those predicaments can also be attributed to a 5000 year history of the intersection of empire and civilization. Anthropologist Kajsa Ekholm Friedman analyzes that intersection and its impact in the Bronze Age as an "imperialist project..., dependent upon trade and ultimately upon war." [8] However, over the long rule of empire and especially within the last 500 years of the global aspirations of various empires, "no state or empire," observes historian Eric Hobsbawm, "has been large, rich, or powerful enough to maintain hegemony over the political world, let alone to establish political and military supremacy over the globe." [9] While war and trade still remain key components of the imperial project today and pretensions for global supremacy persist in the United States, what is just as threatening to the world as we know it is the overexploitation and abuse of environmental resources. Jared Diamond brilliantly reveals how habituated attitudes and values precluded the necessary recognition of environmental degradation which, in turn, led to the collapse of vastly different civilizations, societies, and cultures throughout recorded history. [10] He identifies twelve contemporary environmental challenges which pose grave dangers to the planet and its inhabitants. Among these are the destruction of natural habitats (rainforests, wetlands, etc.); species extinction; soil erosion; depletion of fossil fuels and underground water aquifers; toxic pollution; and climate change, especially attributable to the use of fossil fuels. [11] U.S. economic imperialism has played a direct role in environmental degradation, whether in McDonald's resource destruction of rainforests in Latin America, Coca-Cola's exploitation of underground water aquifers in India, or Union Carbide's toxic pollution in India. Beyond the links between empire and environmental destruction, unless we also clearly understand and combat the connections between empire and unending growth with its attendant "accumulation by dispossession", we may very well doom ourselves to extinction. According to James Gustave Speth, Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, the macro obsession with growth is also intimately related to our micro habituated ways of living. "Parallel to transcending our growth fetish," Speth argues, "we must move beyond our consumerism and hyperventilating lifestyles ... This reluctance to challenge consumption has been a big mistake, given the mounting environmental and social costs of American "affluenza," extravagance and wastefulness." [12] Of course, there are significant class and ethnic/racial differences in consumerism and lifestyle in the United States. However, even more vast differences and inequities obtain between the U.S. and the developing world. It is those inequities that lead Eduardo Galeano to conclude that "consumer society is a booby trap. Those at the controls feign ignorance, but anybody with eyes in his head can see that the great majority of people necessarily must consume not much, very little, or nothing at all in order to save the bit of nature we have left." [13] Finally, from Vandana Shiva's perspective, "unless worldviews and lifestyles are restructured ecologically, peace and justice will continue to be violated and, ultimately, the very survival of humanity will be threatened." [14] For Shiva and other global agents of resistance, the ecological and peace and justice imperatives require us to act in the here and now. Her vision of "Earth Democracy" with its emphasis on balancing authentic needs with a local ecology provides an essential guidepost to what we all can do to stop the ravaging of the environment and to salvage the planet. As she insists, "Earth Democracy is not just about the next protest or next World Social Forum; it is about what we do in between. It addresses the global in our everyday lives, our everyday realities, and creates change globally by making change locally." [15] The local, national, and transnational struggles and visions of change are further evidence that the imperial project is not only being contested but also being transformed on a daily basis. According to Mark Engler, "The powerful will abandon their strategies of control only when it grows too costly for them to do otherwise. It is the concerted efforts of people coming together in local communities and in movements spanning borders that will raise the costs. Empire becomes unsustainable ... when the people of the world resist." [16] Whether in the rural villages of Brazil or India, the jungles of Mexico or Ecuador, the city squares of Cochabama or Genoa, the streets of Seattle or Soweto, there has been, and continues to be, resistance around the globe to the imperial project. If the ruling elite and many of the citizens of the United States have not yet accepted the fact that the empire is dying and with it the concentric circles of economic, political, environmental, and civilizational crises, the global multitudes have been busy at work, digging its future grave and planting the seeds for another possible world. [17]

#### Reject their neoliberal ideology – shifting the frame to CRITIQUE of broad structures INSTEAD of techno-production fixes is best EVEN IF they win some truth claims

Zehner 12

Green illusions,

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Since this book represents a critique of alternative energy, it may seem an unlikely manual for alternative-energy proponents. But it is. Building alternative-energy infrastructure atop America's present economic, social, and cultural landscape is akin to building a sandcastle in a rising tide. A taller sand castle won't help. The first steps in this book sketch a partial blueprint for making alternative-energy technologies relevant into the future. Technological development alone will do little to bring about a durable alternative-energy future. Reimagining the social conditions of energy use will. Ultimately, we have to ask ourselves if environmentalists should be involved in the business of energy production (of any sort) while so many more important issues remain vastly underserved. Over the next several decades, it's quite likely that our power production cocktail will look very much like the mix of today, save for a few adjustments in market share. Wind and biofuel generation will become more prevalent and the stage is set for nuclear power as well, despite recent catastrophes. Nevertheless, these changes will occur over time—they will seem slow. Every power production mechanism has side effects and limitations of its own, and a global shift to new forms of power production simply means that humanity will have to deal with new side effects and limitations in the future. This simple observation seems to have gotten lost in the cheerleading for alternative-energy technologies. The mainstream environmental movement should throw down the green energy pom-poms and pull out the bifocals. It is entirely reasonable for environmentalists to criticize fossil-fuel industries for the harms they instigate. It is, however, entirely unreasonable for environmentalists to become spokespeople for the next round of ecological disaster machines such as solar cells, ethanol, and battery-powered vehicles. Environmentalists pack the largest punch when they instead act as power production watchdogs (regardless of the production method); past environmentalist pressures have cleaned the air and made previously polluted waterways swimmable. This watchdog role will be vital in the future as biofuels, nuclear plants, alternative fossil fuels, solar cells, and other energy technologies import new harms and risks. Beyond a watchdog role, environmentalists yield the greatest progress when addressing our social fundamentals, whether by supporting human rights, cleaning up elections, imagining new economic structures, strengthening communities, revitalizing democracy, or imagining more prosperous modes of consumption. Unsustainable energy use is a symptom of suboptimal social conditions. Energy use will come down when we improve these conditions: consumption patterns that lead to debt and depression; commercials aimed at children; lonely seniors stuck in their homes because they can no longer drive; kids left to fend for themselves when it comes to mobility or sexuality; corporate influence trumping citizen representation; measurements of the nation's health in dollars rather than well-being; a media concerned with advertising over insight, and so on. These may not seem like environmental issues, and they certainly don't seem like energy policy issues, but in reality they are the most important energy and environmental issues of our day. Addressing them won't require sacrifice or social engineering. They are congruent with the interests of many Americans, which will make them easier to initiate and fulfill. They are entirely realistic (as many are already enjoyed by other societies on the planet). They are, in a sense, boring. In fact, the only thing shocking about them is the degree to which they have been underappreciated in contemporary environmental thought, sidelined in the media, and ignored by politicians. Even though these first steps don't represent a grand solution, they are necessary preconditions if we intend to democratically design and implement more comprehensive solutions in the future. Ultimately, clean energy is less energy. Alternative-energy alchemy has so greatly consumed the public imagination over recent decades that the most vital and durable environmental essentials remain overlooked and underfunded. Today energy executives hiss silver-tongued fairy tales about clean-coal technologies, safe nuclear reactors, and renewable sources such as solar, wind, and biofuels to quench growing energy demands, fostering the illusion that we can maintain our expanding patterns of energy consumption without consequence. At the same time, they claim that these technologies can be made environmentally, socially, and politically sound while ignoring a history that has repeatedly shown otherwise. If we give in to accepting their conceptual frames, such as those pitting production versus production, or if we parrot their terms such as clean coal, bridge fuels, peacetime atom, smart growth, and clean energy, then we have already lost. We forfeit our right to critical democratic engagement and instead allow the powers that be to regurgitate their own terms of debate into our open upstretched mouths. Alternative-energy technologies don't clean the air. They don't clean the water. They don't protect wildlife. They don't support human rights. They don't improve neighborhoods. They don't strengthen democracy. They don't regulate themselves. They don't lower atmospheric carbon dioxide. They don't reduce consumption. They produce power. That power can lead to durable benefits, but only given the appropriate context. Ultimately, it's not a question of whether American society possesses the technological prowess to construct an alternative-energy nation. The real question is the reverse. Do we have a society capable of being powered by alternative energy? The answer today is clearly no. But we can change that. Future environmentalists will drop solar, wind, biofuels, nuclear, hydrogen, and hybrids to focus instead on women's rights, consumer culture, walkable neighborhoods, military spending, zoning, health care, wealth disparities, citizen governance, economic reform, and democratic institutions. As environmentalists and global citizens, it's not enough to say that we would benefit by shifting our focus. Our very relevance depends on it.

## 5

#### The United States federal government should establish a Quadrennial Energy Review. In the Quadrennial Energy Review, the United States federal government should include a recommendation to substantially reduce restrictions on offshore natural gas production in the United States.

CP solves:

#### Recommending plan mandates through a QER process solves—only the CP creates policy sustainability and private sector coordination that unlocks energy innovation

Moniz 12

Ernest Moniz, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Former Clinton Administration Under Secretary of the Department of Energy and as Associate Director for Science in the Office of Science and Technology Policy ; serves on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Spring 2012, Stimulating Energy Technology Innovation, Daedalus, Vol. 141, No. 2, Pages 81-93

It should come as no surprise that I do not have the answers for how the government should intersect the latter stages of the innovation process in a general sense. However, PCAST recommended a pragmatic approach to an integrated federal energy policy that would employ all the tools available to the government in a coherent way. Termed **the** Quadrennial Energy Review (**QER**), the process is necessarily complex, but **history suggests** that **anything short of a full multiagency effort is unlikely to provide a robust plan that accounts for the many threads of an energy policy**. Furthermore, a degree of analysis is required that has not been present in previous efforts.

Energy policy is derivative of many policies: environment, technology and competitiveness, diplomacy and security, natural resources, and land and food, among many others. Indeed, multiple agencies that are not labeled “energy” have major equities and long-held perspectives on key elements of energy policy. Often, the preferred policies for different agencies’ agendas conflict. Further, states and local governments play a strong role, for example with building codes, and their approaches can vary dramatically in different parts of the country; certainly, California’s energy policies have influenced the national market. The tools available to support innovation are also diverse, ranging from direct support of RD&D to a variety of economic incentives, regulation, standards, and federal procurement, among other instruments. Congress is equally fragmented: in the House of Representatives and Senate, many committees beyond those tasked with energy policy have equities that mirror those of the different executive agencies. **To overcome this fragmentation** of responsibilities and perspectives, and **especially if the goal is a plan that has staying power in advancing adoption and diffusion, PCAST recommended a QER process** to provide a multiyear roadmap that:

• lays out an integrated view of short-, intermediate-, and long-term objectives for Federal energy policy in the context of economic, environmental, and security priorities;

• outlines **legislative proposals** to Congress;

• puts forward anticipated Executive actions (programmatic, regulatory, fiscal, and so on) coordinated across multiple agencies;

• **identifies resource requirements** for the RD&D programs **and** for innovation **incentive programs**; and, most important,

• provides a strong analytical base.14

This is a tall order intellectually and organizationally. Several process elements are essential to fostering a chance for success. First, the Executive Office of the President (eop) must use its convening power to ensure effective cooperation among the myriad relevant agencies. However, the capacity to carry out such an exercise and to sustain it does not (and should not) reside in the eop. The doe is the logical home for a substantial Executive Secretariat supporting the eop interagency process that would present decision recommendations to the president. However, the scope of the analytical capability needed does not currently reside at the doe or any other agency. The doe needs to build this capability, presumably supplemented by contractor support to gather data, develop and run models, and carry out analysis, such as independent energy-system engineering and economic analysis. Market trends and prices would be part of the analysis, including international markets and robust analyses of uncertainty. The Energy Information Administration can help with some data gathering and models, but its independence from the policy function needs to be preserved. The national laboratories also lack this range of functions, and tasking them with providing the analytical support to the policy process would be regarded as a conflict of interest; their focus is best directed at research, invention, and technology transfer. Building this analysis capacity is a large job that will take time.

For the QER to succeed, the government must seek substantial input from many quarters in a transparent way; certainly, ongoing dialogue with Congress and the energy industry are essential. The good news is that members of Congress have supported the development of the QER as a way to present a coherent **starting point for congressional action across many committees.** A hope is that **Congress could then use the QER as a basis for** a four or five-year **authorization that would provide the private sector with the increased confidence needed to make sound clean energy investment decisions**.

Given the magnitude of the task, PCAST recommended in 2011 that the doe carry out a Quadrennial Technology Review (qtr)–a first step centered in a single department and focused on technology. The qtr resulted in a rebalancing of the R&D portfolio toward the oil dependence challenge through advanced vehicle development, particularly transportation electrification. The key now will be to extend the processes developed for the qtr to the multiagency QER, involving the eop in a leadership role. Taking the next steps in 2012 will maintain momentum and establish the capabilities needed for the QER by early 2015, the time frame recommended by PCAST.

While some may view 2015 as a frustratingly long time away, the alternative is to rely on wishes rather than analysis while failing to gain multiple perspectives in a fair and open manner. **Rushing the process will result in a poorly done job that will not accomplish** any of the **key** QER **goals**. Certainly, **it will not bring together succeeding administrations and Congresses around a** reasonably **shared vision** and set of objectives **that can accelerate innovation in service of national competitiveness and environmental and security goals. Continuing with fragmented** and economically inefficient **policies, technologies “du jour,” and frequent shifts will complicate private-sector decisions rather than facilitate innovation**. The government unavoidably plays a strong role in the innovation process, even when this is unacknowledged in policy and political debates. The issue now is to present both a set of principles and fact-based analyses supporting coordinated government-wide actions that earn decent buy-in from major stakeholders.

[Note: PCAST = President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology]

## prices

#### DOE will limit exports now – but domestic energy supply is key to their decision

Gas Business Briefing, daily news publication focusing on the North American natural gas industry, a subsidiary of Platts, a division of McGraw-Hill Companies and the acknowledged leader in energy news, 9/19/2012

(“DOE wrestling with capping LNG exports: attorney,” http://www.gasbb.com/?PageID=157&article\_id=6259, subscription required)

"**DOE is unlikely to approve the full range of exports because it is nervous about the effect**, **it is nervous about** the long-term viability of **production**," David Bloom, a partner at Mayer Brown, said on a webinar Tuesday.

DOE decides whether to allow companies to export US gas as LNG. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission then decides whether the terminals can be built, Gas Business Briefing notes.

While DOE must quickly approve exports to countries that have free trade agreements with the US, it can limit or reject non-FTA applications if it finds it's not in the public interest.

DOE has received 18 applications to export a combined 26.6 Bcf/d of gas as LNG to FTA countries and 13 applications to export a combined 18.7 Bcf/d to non-FTA countries.

The department has approved Cheniere Energy's Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana for non-FTA exports, but is delaying additional non-FTA approvals until it receives a **study on the domestic impact** of exports.

DOE on Monday said the study's release has been **pushed back until year-end**.

**The department will likely limit the volume of non-FTA exports**, Bloom said, and is still struggling to find a method to do so.

#### More production causes exports

Hargreaves, writer for CNNMoney, 3/14/2012

(Steve, “Sabine Pass natural gas plant, the next ‘Keystone,’” http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/14/news/economy/sabine-pass-natural-gas/index.htm)

**The whole reason the country is even talking about exporting natural gas is thanks to a recent boom in energy production**.

Thanks in part to new drilling technology and the expanded use of fracking, the United States produces 30% more natural gas and nearly that much more oil than it did in 2005. That's a big reason why natural gas prices are near 10-year lows.

America's oil boom - at a cost

**It's** also **the main reason why companies** like Cheniere **want to export** it. **In Asia and Europe natural gas commands up to five times the U.S. price**.

The gas can be liquefied, loaded onto a tanker here and sent anywhere around the world.

#### Exports offset natural gas from Russia

Ratner, specialist in Energy Policy at Congressional Research Service, et al, 2012

(Michael Ratner –, Paul Belkin – Specialist in European Affairs, Jim Nichol – Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Steven Woehrel – Specialist in European Affairs, March 13, 2012, Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification, Congressional Research Service, p. 25)

Possible U.S. LNG Exports: Pricing Not Volumes May Be Key

Proposed U.S. LNG export projects, if all were constructed today, would make the United States the second largest LNG exporter behind Qatar. The proposed projects are at various stages in the regulatory approval process. Nevertheless, analysts have already begun speculating on what a significant increase in U.S. LNG exports would mean to natural gas markets, especially to European markets. Any volumes of LNG from the United States would benefit the market, including Europe, by offering a new supplier to consumers. For parts of Europe, especially the Baltic region and Central Europe, where the United States enjoys strong and friendly relations, any decision to export U.S. LNG to that region would be welcomed as a potential offset to their dependence on Russian gas.

However, the bigger effect of U.S. entry into global LNG sales may be on pricing rather than supplies. The United States is one of the few countries that does not link its natural gas price to the price of oil and therefore may add to the pressure to delink the two commodities. Most natural gas sold in the world, by pipeline or as LNG, is sold under long-term contracts and indexed to the price of oil. Historically, the two commodities competed more directly in markets than they do today.

#### That destroys the Russian economy

Solomon, executive director of the non-governmental policy organization Energy Probe, 9/8/2012

(Lawrence, “Israel and Russia join forces over gas,” National Post, Canada, Lexis)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russia's economy descended into a decade of privation and chaos that Russians still recall with national shame. **Now Russia is back**, thanks to its emergence as an energy superpower. **Russia boasts Europe's fastest-growing economy** and its most potent military, both **due to its stranglehold over Europe's energy needs**. Loathe to lose either influence or sales in Europe, Russia keeps competitors at bay, as it did last year when it stymied a Turkish bid to build a competing natural gas pipeline to Europe.

#### Nuclear war

David, Prof Poli Sci – Johns Hopkins University, ‘99

(Steven, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb)

AT NO TIME since the civil war of 1918 -- 20 has Russia been closer to bloody conflict than it is today. The fledgling government confronts a vast array of problems without the power to take effective action. For 70 years, the Soviet Union operated a strong state apparatus, anchored by the KGB and the Communist Party. Now its disintegration has created a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. Unable to rely on popular ideology or coercion to establish control, the government must prove itself to the people and establish its authority on the basis of its performance. But the Yeltsin administration has abjectly failed to do so, and it cannot meet the most basic needs of the Russian people. Russians know they can no longer look to the state for personal security, law enforcement, education, sanitation, health care, or even electrical power. In the place of government authority, criminal groups -- the Russian Mafia -- increasingly hold sway. Expectations raised by the collapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed, and Moscow's inability to govern coherently raises the specter of civil unrest. If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

#### No price spike

Menza 12 (Justin Menza, News Writer at CNBC, Financial Journalist at UBS Investment Bank Sr. Financial Writer at Standard & Poor's , 8/22/2012, "No Spike in Natural Gas Looming: Boone Pickens", [www.cnbc.com/id/48752448/No\_Spike\_in\_Natural\_Gas\_Looming\_Boone\_Pickens](http://www.cnbc.com/id/48752448/No_Spike_in_Natural_Gas_Looming_Boone_Pickens))

The U.S. should continue to have a cheap energy advantage compared to the rest of the world, T. Boone Pickens, BP Capital founder, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box” on Wednesday. “There's going to be a fabulous opportunity for natural gas, but we're not there yet,” Pickens said. Pickens expects natural gas prices to climb to $4 by the end of the year, but no major price spike. “You can make money at $4,” he said, “Of course, it's going to be better than at $2 or $3, but you aren't going to get many wells drilled.” Instead, Pickens sees a greater chance of a spike in crude oil prices. He’s predicting $115 a barrel on West Texas Intermediate crude by year’s end. Flare ups in the Middle East could cause a spike, Pickens cautioned. “If (Israel) bombs Iran, you're going to have a spike up in oil price, there's no question about that, just because they bombed Iran, not because you're going to have a shortage of oil immediately,” he said. Nonetheless, the U.S. will continue to have the world’s cheapest energy. “U.S. crude is 15 percent cheaper than Brent North Sea crude oil, and natural gas is 75 percent cheaper than China, the Mideast, Japan, or wherever else,” Pickens said.

#### Squo solves manufacturing

Ignatius 12 (David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column and contributes to the PostPartisan blog. Ignatius joined The Post in 1986 as editor of its Sunday Outlook section. In 1990 he became foreign editor, and in 1993, assistant managing editor for business news. He began writing his column in 1998 and continued even during a three-year stint as executive editor of the International Herald Tribune in Paris. Earlier in his career, Ignatius was a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, covering at various times the steel industry, the Justice Department, the CIA, the Senate, the Middle East and the State Department. Ignatius grew up in Washington, D.C., and studied political theory at Harvard College and economics at Kings College, Cambridge., 5/4/2012, "An economic boom ahead?", www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/an-economic-boom-ahead/2012/05/04/gIQAbj5K2T\_story.html)

Energy security would be one building block of a new prosperity. The other would be the revival of U.S. manufacturing and other industries. This would be driven in part by the low cost of electricity in the United States, which West forecasts will be relatively flat through the rest of this decade, and one-half to one-third that of economic competitors such as Spain, France or Germany. The coming manufacturing recovery is the subject of several studies by the Boston Consulting Group. I’ll focus here on the most recent one, “U.S. Manufacturing Nears the Tipping Point,” which appeared in March. What’s happening, according to BCG, is a “reshoring” back to America of manufacturing that previously migrated offshore, especially to China. The analysts estimate that by 2015, China’s cost advantage will have shrunk to the point that many manufacturers will prefer to open plants in the United States. In the vast manufacturing region surrounding Shanghai, total compensation packages will be about 25 percent of those for comparable workers in low-cost U.S. manufacturing states. But given higher American productivity, effective labor costs will be about 60 percent of those in America — not low enough to compensate U.S. manufacturers for the risks and volatility of operating in China. In about five years, argue the BCG economists, the cost-risk balance will reach an inflection point in seven key industries where manufacturers had been moving to China: computers and electronics, appliances and electrical equipment, machinery, furniture, fabricated metals, plastics and rubber, and transportation goods. The industries together amounted to a nearly $2 trillion market in the United States in 2010, with China producing about $200 billion of that total. As manufacturers in these “tipping point” industries move back to America, BCG estimates, the U.S. economy will add $80 billion to $120 billion in annual output, and 2 million to 3 million new jobs, in direct manufacturing and spin-off employment. To complete this rosy picture, the analysts forecast that in about five years, U.S. exports will increase by at least $65 billion annually. Hold on, Dr. Pangloss. Those are just economists’ estimates. What do real manufacturers say? Well, BCG has some new numbers on that, too. In April, the consulting firm released a survey of executives at 106 U.S.-based companies with annual sales of more than $1 billion. Thirty-seven percent of them said they were planning to reshore manufacturing operations or “actively considering” the move. Among larger companies with sales of more than $10 billion, the positive response rose to 48 percent. Talking about American decline has become a national sport among policy intellectuals. The country still has severe political problems, but the numbers in these new studies make me wonder if some of the deep pessimism is misplaced.

#### Energy prices are irrelevant to manufacturing

Levi 12 (Michael A. Levi David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment, 5/7/2012, "Oil and Gas Euphoria Is Getting Out of Hand", blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/05/07/oil-and-gas-euphoria-is-getting-out-of-hand/)

But there is more. Ignatius’s column isn’t just about energy; it’s also about the resurgence of U.S. manufacturing. Here’s how he links the two: “Energy security would be one building block of a new prosperity. The other would be the revival of U.S. manufacturing and other industries. This would be driven in part by the low cost of electricity in the United States, which West forecasts will be relatively flat through the rest of this decade, and one-half to one-third that of economic competitors such as Spain, France or Germany.” Once again, these sorts of claims have become increasingly common. Indeed the quantitative assertions are perfectly plausible. But the big picture implications don’t make sense. As of 2010, total sales of U.S. manufactured goods were about five trillion dollars. At the same time, the sector spent about 100 billion dollars on energy. That’s a mere two percent of total sales. You could slash energy costs to zero, and it would barely move the needle for most U.S. manufacturers. There are, of course, exceptions, like some iron, steel, cement, and paper makers. But even these industries care about much more than their electricity prices. Will lower energy costs move things at the margin? Of course they will, and that’s good news. But they are nowhere close to what’s needed for U.S. manufacturing to broadly thrive.

#### Manufacturing loss inevitable

Thompson 12 (Derek Thompson is a senior editor at The Atlantic, where he oversees business coverage for the website., 3/9/2012, "Trade My Brain, Please! Why We Don't Need to 'Make Something' to Export It", [www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/trade-my-brain-please-why-we-dont-need-to-make-something-to-export-it/254274/](http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/trade-my-brain-please-why-we-dont-need-to-make-something-to-export-it/254274/))

The president is onto something. Exports matter. A good reason to fetishize manufacturing is right in the president's first line: "If we do stuff here, we can sell it there." As you might have caught on, I changed the word "make" in the president's speech to "do" in this paragraph, because we don't need to make something and put it in a box to sell it to foreigners. We can do stuff and sell it for foreign money, too. This sort of thing is called a "service exports." It means selling our work, or brains, and our resources to other countries. "Services exports" sounds like a rather silly or impossible thing -- like putting an American doctor in a small box, shipping him across the Pacific to hospital in Mumbai, and shipping him back with the rupees. In fact, services exports are much simpler than that. Simpler, even, than selling actual manufactured goods. If an Argentinian student goes to Harvard, that's an export. If a Korean uses a Kansas architect to design a building, that's an export. If Bain Capital advises a British investor getting in on a Moroccan start-up, that's an export. Perhaps service exports seem less "pure" than manufactured exports. In fact, there's a better case that the opposite is true. For any given "export dollar," service exports create a great share of what economists call "U.S. value added. That's a mouth-full, so you can call it "cold hard money in America." Think about a car shipped in a box from the United States to Spain. That's a U.S. export. But it's not a 100% U.S. product. The car parts might have come from one country, where they were fixed in Canada, taken south to be assembled in the United States, and shipped to Barcelona. The money made from the Spanish sale counts as a U.S. export, but the revenue is divided across the car's global supply chain. On the other hand, if a Barcelona family goes to Detroit for vacation, their euros stay in Detroit. "Business service exports had 95.6 percent U.S. value-added in 2004," the Brookings Metropolitan Policy program reported in a new study on exports. "Metropolitan areas specialized in services, such as Des Moines, Las Vegas, and Washington, D.C. tend to have higher shares of U.S. value-added in their exports than the rest of the largest 100 metro areas." The United States is the second or third largest total exporter, by various counts. But as a service exporter, we're the unambiguous world leader, commanding 14% of the world market, twice that of second-place Germany. In 2010, private services exports represented a third of U.S. exports, according to Brookings, and that number is going to keep growing. (As Scott Thomasson pointed out on Twitter, we even have a trade surplus with China.) An emphasis on exports is important because it keeps us competitive in a global market and brings in foreign money, which is especially useful for a slow economy. But we shouldn't just think of exports as stuff we can put into a box. We will continue to make things and put them in boxes and sell them in other countries. But 70% of the economy is employed in the services sector and there are five times more people working in professional services/education/leisure&hospitality than manufacturing today, and the ratio will probably grow in the next decade. We need to talk about those exporting industries, too. You don't need to make something to sell it "there."

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Morris Miller, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, ‘2K

(Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated.

Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

## warming

#### Takes at least five years to begin and has no impact on prices

CFAP 8 (Center for American Progress, 9/15/2008, "Ten Reasons Not to Expand Offshore Drilling", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/))

6. Production would be expensive, would not start for a long time, and would have no short-term effect on oil prices. The average oil field size in the OCS is smaller than the average in the Gulf of Mexico, which is already being developed. As a result, much of the oil in the OCS would be expensive to extract, and is only becoming attractive now as a result of high oil prices. According the Energy Information Administration, it would take at least five years for oil production to begin. EIA predicted that there would be no significant effect on oil production or price until nearly 20 years after leasing begins.

#### No drilling equipment

CFAP 8 (Center for American Progress, 9/15/2008, "Ten Reasons Not to Expand Offshore Drilling", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/))

7. There isn’t enough drilling equipment. Due to the high price of oil, existing drilling ships are “booked solid for the next five years,” and demand for deepwater rigs has driven up the price of such ships. Oil companies just don’t have the resources to explore oil fields in the OCS.

#### Gas increases warming - 3 independent studies

Tollefson 12

Jeff Tollefson, staff writer, Nature, February 7, 2012, "Air sampling reveals high emissions from gas field", http://www.nature.com/news/air-sampling-reveals-high-emissions-from-gas-field-1.9982

When US government scientists began sampling the air from a tower north of Denver, Colorado, they expected urban smog — but not strong whiffs of what looked like natural gas. They eventually linked the mysterious pollution to a nearby natural-gas field, and their investigation has now produced the first hard evidence that the cleanest-burning fossil fuel might not be much better than coal when it comes to climate change. Led by researchers at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the University of Colorado, Boulder, the study estimates that natural-gas producers in an area known as the Denver-Julesburg Basin are losing about 4% of their gas to the atmosphere — not including additional losses in the pipeline and distribution system. This is more than double the official inventory, but roughly in line with estimates made in 2011 that have been challenged by industry. And because methane is some 25 times more efficient than carbon dioxide at trapping heat in the atmosphere, releases of that magnitude could effectively offset the environmental edge that natural gas is said to enjoy over other fossil fuels. “If we want natural gas to be the cleanest fossil fuel source, methane emissions have to be reduced,” says Gabrielle Pétron, an atmospheric scientist at NOAA and at the University of Colorado in Boulder, and first author on the study, currently in press at the Journal of Geophysical Research. Emissions will vary depending on the site, but Pétron sees no reason to think that this particular basin is unique. “I think we seriously need to look at natural-gas operations on the national scale.” The results come as a natural-gas boom hits the United States, driven by a technology known as hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’, that can crack open hard shale formations and release the natural gas trapped inside. Environmentalists are worried about effects such as water pollution, but the US government is enthusiastic about fracking. In his State of the Union address last week, US President Barack Obama touted natural gas as the key to boosting domestic energy production. Lack of data Natural gas emits about half as much carbon dioxide as coal per unit of energy when burned, but separate teams at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, and at the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concluded last year that methane emissions from shale gas are much larger than previously thought. The industry and some academics branded those findings as exaggerated, but the debate has been marked by a scarcity of hard data. “It’s great to get some actual numbers from the field,” says Robert Howarth, a Cornell researcher whose team raised concerns about methane emissions from shale-gas drilling in a pair of papers, one published in April last year and another last month (R. W. Howarth et al. Clim. Change Lett. 106, 679–690; 2011; R. W. Howarth et al. Clim. Change in the press). “I’m not looking for vindication here, but [the NOAA] numbers are coming in very close to ours, maybe a little higher,” he says. Natural gas might still have an advantage over coal when burned to create electricity, because gas-fired power plants tend to be newer and far more efficient than older facilities that provide the bulk of the country’s coal-fired generation. But only 30% of US gas is used to produce electricity, Howarth says, with much of the rest being used for heating, for which there is no such advantage. On the scent The first clues appeared in 2007, when NOAA researchers noticed occasional plumes of pollutants including methane, butane and propane in air samples taken from a 300-metre-high atmospheric monitoring tower north of Denver. The NOAA researchers worked out the general direction that the pollution was coming from by monitoring winds, and in 2008, the team took advantage of new equipment and drove around the region, sampling the air in real time. Their readings led them to the Denver-Julesburg Basin, where more than 20,000 oil and gas wells have been drilled during the past four decades. Most of the wells in the basin are drilled into ‘tight sand’ formations that require the same fracking technology being used in shale formations. This process involves injecting a slurry of water, chemicals and sand into wells at high pressure to fracture the rock and create veins that can carry trapped gas to the well. Afterwards, companies need to pump out the fracking fluids, releasing bubbles of dissolved gas as well as burps of early gas production. Companies typically vent these early gases into the atmosphere for up to a month or more until the well hits its full stride, at which point it is hooked up to a pipeline. The team analysed the ratios of various pollutants in the air samples and then tied that chemical fingerprint back to emissions from gas-storage tanks built to hold liquid petroleum gases before shipment. In doing so, they were able to work out the local emissions that would be necessary to explain the concentrations that they were seeing in the atmosphere (see ‘A losing battle’). Some of the emissions come from the storage tanks, says Pétron, “but a big part of it is just raw gas that is leaking from the infrastructure”. Their range of 2.3–7.7% loss, with a best guess of 4%, is slightly higher than Corn­ell’s estimate of 2.2–3.8% for shale-gas drilling and production. It is also higher than calculations by the EPA, which revised its methodology last year and roughly doubled the official US inventory of emissions from the natural-gas industry over the past decade. Howarth says the EPA methodology translates to a 2.8% loss. The Cornell group had estimated that 1.9% of the gas produced over the lifetime of a typical shale-gas well escapes through fracking and well completion alone. NOAA’s study doesn’t differentiate between gas from fracking and leaks from any other point in the production process, but Pétron says that fracking clearly contributes to some of the gas her team measured.

#### Alt energy fails – it only encourages increased productionism

**Zehner 12**

Green illusions,

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Zehner primarily researches the social, political and economic conditions influencing energy policy priorities and project outcomes. His work also incorporates symbolic roles that energy technologies play within political and environmental movements. His other research interests include consumerism, urban policy, environmental governance, international human rights, and forgeries.

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If we were gunslingers, we'd be in trouble. Several sinister energy challenges are staring us down, but the productivists are asking us to choose our weapon from a rack of **toy guns**. The alternative-energy project's fundamental weakness lies in its failure to engage with obvious cultural factors such as **consumerism, corporatism, and middle-class desires.** Instead, we allow pundits to frame energy challenges as technological problems requiring a **technological fix.** Every day, media troupes relay news snippets touting the latest bio-eco-green energy sources—all designed to jury-rig a mode of life that is not optimal, desirable, or even affordable for most of the world's communities. The "energy crisis" is more cultural than technological in nature and the failure to recognize this has led to policies that have brought us no closer to an alternative-energy future today than we were in the 1960s when the notion was first envisaged.1 In fact, since the 1960s , humanity has become quite adept at intensifying large-scale risks through a variety of productivist pursuits. We've built neighborhoods deep in forests that are bound to catch on fire, we've built our cities right up to the banks of constricted rivers prone to flooding, we've erected tall buildings atop triggered faults, and so it's really no surprise that we've constructed an energy system pressed right up against the very limits of power production.2 Attempting to push these limits back by creating more power through alternative means is a **futile** endeavor, at least in the current sociopolitical environment of the United States. A growing population insisting on greater affluence will quickly fill any vacancy such maneuvers might pry open. This would not only expand overall energy risks but also increase the number of souls in danger when energy supplies inevitably waver again. This is what I call **the boomerang effect.** Energy Boomerang Effect A central project of this book is to interrogate the assumption that alternative energy is a viable path to prosperity. I have not only outlined the many side effects, drawbacks, risks, and limitations of alternative technologies but have also indicated that we cannot assume that shifting to them will lower our fossil-fuel use. Alternative-energy production expands energy supplies, placing downward pressure on prices, which spurs demand, entrenches energy-intensive modes of living, and finally brings us right back to where we started: high demand and so-called insufficient supply.3 In short, we create an **energy boomerang**—the harder we throw, the harder it will come back to hit us on the head. More efficient solar cells, taller wind turbines, and advanced biofuels are all just ways of throwing harder. Humans have been subject to the flight pattern of this boomerang for quite some time and there is no reason to suppose we have escaped its whirling trajectory today. In the existing American context, increasing alternative-energy production will not displace fossil-fuel side effects but will instead simply add more side effects to the mix (and as we have seen, there are plenty of alternative-energy side effects to be wary of). So instead of a world with just the dreadful side effects of fossil fuels, we will enter into a future world with the dreadful side effects of fossil fuel plus the dreadful side effects of alternative-energy technologies—hardly a durable formula for community or environmental prosperity. If we had different political, legal, and economic structures and backstops to assure that alternative-energy production would directly offset fossil-fuel use, these technologies might make more sense. But it will take years to institute such vital changes. Focusing our efforts on **alternative-energy production** now only serves to distract us from the **real job** that needs to be done. Worse yet, if fundamental economic, social, and cultural upgrades are not instituted, the project of alternative energy is bound to **fail,** which would likely lead to crippling levels of public cynicism toward future efforts to produce cleaner forms of power. As it stands now, even if alternative-energy schemes were **free,** they might still be too **expensive** given their extreme social costs and striking inability to displace fossil-fuel use. But as it turns out, they aren't free at all—they're enormously expensive.

#### Claims of eco-pocalypse are BLACKMAIL that obscure the ROOT CAUSE – only the ALTERNATIVE resolves the crisis

Smith 8

PhD Johns Hopkins 1982; Dist Prof) Political economy, urban social theory, space, nature-culture, history and theory of geography (nsmith@gc.cuny.edu) Prof. SmithNeil Smith was trained as a geographer and his research explores the broad intersection between space, nature, social theory and history. He teaches in urban anthropology, cultural anthropology and environmental anthropology, and directs the Center for Place Culture and Politics. His environmental work is largely theoretical, focusing on questions of the production of nature. His urban interests include long term research on gentrification, including empirical work in North America and Europe and a series of theoretical papers emphasizing the importance of patterns of investment and disinvestment in the the real estate market. He also writes more broadly on New York City, focusing especially on the "revanchist city" which has filled the vacuum left in the wake of liberal urban theory.

The point is most certainly not to diminish the extent of environmental crisis generated by a voracious capitalist consumption of the earth's resources, and nor is it to suggest that environmental issues are somehow secondary or that they require little or limited attention. Precisely the opposite. Rather, the point is to insist that responses to environmental crises are more likely to be successful to the extent that this crisis is accurately assessed. Here a left apocalypticism seriously misses the target. Insofar as global warming as a process is taken in isolation as the central environmental dilemma—and is thereby extracted from the processes of capital accumulation and the social relations of production which significantly provoke such climate change—the dynamics leading to global warming fall out of focus. "All hands on deck to reduce the carbon footprint" may salve the liberal conscience, but it is not an especially progressive political response to global warming insofar as it misconceives nature in narrowly use-value terms; in locating the solution in a diffuse voluntarism—have you planted a tree today to offset your drive to work?—it also implicitly supposes a diffuse responsibility and causation for the problem. This gets us only so far toward understanding the causes of global warming. Most of us do not have a choice but to consume some modicum of hydrocarbon fuels for travel, heating, cooking, electricity, and so forth—not because we choose to but because alternatives are prohibitively expensive or simply impossible. The lack of alternatives is anything but voluntaristic, driven instead by calculations of competitive profitability. Apocalypticism meets liberalism where the entire realm of value and exchange-value is left aside, and the resultant solutions to very real problems entirely fail to tackle the drive toward capital accumulation which, more than anything else, is responsible for producing the use-value landscape of global warming and environmental crisis more broadly.

#### They have no effect on CO2

Carnegie Institute 12

Carnegie Institute of Science, February 16, 2012, "Only the lowest CO2 emitting technologies can avoid a hot end-of-century", http://carnegiescience.edu/news/only\_lowest\_co2\_emitting\_technologies\_can\_avoid\_hot\_endofcentury

Washington, D.C.— Could replacing coal-fired electricity plants with generators fueled by natural gas bring global warming to a halt in this century? What about rapid construction of massive numbers of solar or wind farms, hydroelectric dams, or nuclear reactors—or the invention of new technology for capturing the carbon dioxide produced by fossil-fueled power plants and storing it permanently underground? Nathan Myhrvold of Intellectual Ventures teamed up with Carnegie Institution’s Ken Caldeira to calculate the expected climate effects of replacing the world’s supply of electricity from coal plants with any of eight cleaner options. The work was published online by Environmental Research Letters on February 16. When published, it will be available at http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/1/014019. In each case, Myhrvold and Caldeira found that to achieve substantial benefit this century, we would need to engage in a rapid transition to the lowest emitting energy technologies such as solar, wind, or nuclear power – as well as conserve energy where possible. The researchers found that it takes much longer to curtail the warming of the Earth than one might expect. And in the case of natural gas—increasingly the power industry’s fuel of choice, because gas reserves have been growing and prices have been falling—the study finds that warming would continue even if over the next 40 years every coal-fired power plant in the world were replaced with a gas-fueled plant. “There is no quick fix to global warming,” Caldeira said. “Shifting from one energy system to another is hard work and a slow process. Plus, it takes several decades for the climate system to fully respond to reductions in emissions. If we expect to see substantial benefits in the second half of this century, we had better get started now.” Researchers have previously conducted studies projecting the long-term climate effects of rolling out a single new energy technology. But this work from Myhrvold and Caldeira is the first to examine all the major candidate technologies for replacing coal power—including conservation—and to examine wide ranges of possible assumptions about both the emissions each technology generates and also the scope and duration of the build-out. “It takes a lot of energy to make new power plants—and it generally takes more energy to make those that use cleaner technology--like nuclear, solar, and wind--than it does to make dirty ones that burn coal and gas,” Myhrvold added. “You have to use the energy system of today to build the new-and-improved energy system of tomorrow, and unfortunately that means creating more emission in the near-term than we would otherwise. So we incur a kind of ‘emissions debt’ in making the transition to a better system, and it can take decades to pay that off. Meanwhile, the temperature keeps rising.” The study used widely accepted models relating emissions to temperature. The two researchers also drew on a rich literature of studies, called life-cycle analyses, that total up all the greenhouse gases produced during the construction and operation of, say, a natural gas plant or a hydroelectric dam or a solar photovoltaic farm. It also examined the potential that technological improvements, such as advances in carbon capture and storage or in solar panel efficiency, could have on outcomes. “It was surprising to us just how long it takes for the benefit of a switch from coal to something better to show up in the climate in the form of a slowdown in global warming,” Caldeira said. “If countries were to start right away and build really fast, so that they installed a trillion watts of gas-fired electricity generation steadily over the next 40 years,” Myhrvold said, “that would still add about half a degree Fahrenheit to the average surface temperature of the Earth in 2112—that’s within a tenth of a degree of the warming that coal-fired plants would produce by that year.”

Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

CO2 isn’t key

Watts, 25-year climate reporter, works with weather technology, weather stations, and weather data processing systems in the private sector, 7/25/’12

(Anthony, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/07/25/lindzen-at-sandia-national-labs-climate-models-are-flawed/>)

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Richard Lindzen, a global warming skeptic, told about 70 Sandia researchers in June that too much is being made of climate change by researchers seeking government funding. He said their data and their methods did not support their claims.

“Despite concerns over the last decades with the greenhouse process, they oversimplify the effect,” he said. “Simply cranking up CO2 [carbon dioxide] (as the culprit) is not the answer” to what causes climate change.

Lindzen, the ninth speaker in Sandia’s Climate Change and National Security Speaker Series, is Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology in MIT’s department of earth, atmospheric and planetary sciences. He has published more than 200 scientific papers and is the lead author of Chapter 7 (“Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks”) of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Third Assessment Report. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society.

For 30 years, climate scientists have been “locked into a simple-minded identification of climate with greenhouse-gas level. … That climate should be the function of a single parameter (like CO2) has always seemed implausible. Yet an obsessive focus on such an obvious oversimplification has likely set back progress by decades,” Lindzen said.

For major climates of the past, other factors were more important than carbon dioxide. Orbital variations have been shown to quantitatively account for the cycles of glaciations of the past 700,000 years, he said, and the elimination of the arctic inversion, when the polar caps were ice-free, “is likely to have been more important than CO2 for the warm episode during the Eocene 50 million years ago.”

There is little evidence that changes in climate are producing extreme weather events, he said. “Even the IPCC says there is little if any evidence of this. In fact, there are important physical reasons for doubting such anticipations.”

Lindzen’s views run counter to those of almost all major professional societies. For example, the American Physical Society statement of Nov. 18, 2007, read, “The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring.” But he doesn’t feel they are necessarily right. “Why did the American Physical Society take a position?” he asked his audience. “Why did they find it compelling? They never answered.”

Speaking methodically with flashes of humor — “I always feel that when the conversation turns to weather, people are bored.” — he said a basic problem with current computer climate models that show disastrous increases in temperature is that relatively small increases in atmospheric gases lead to large changes in temperatures in the models.

But, he said, “predictions based on high (climate) sensitivity ran well ahead of observations.”

Real-world observations do not support IPCC models, he said: “We’ve already seen almost the equivalent of a doubling of CO2 (in radiative forcing) and that has produced very little warming.”

He disparaged proving the worth of models by applying their criteria to the prediction of past climatic events, saying, “The models are no more valuable than answering a test when you have the questions in advance.”

Modelers, he said, merely have used aerosols as a kind of fudge factor to make their models come out right. (Aerosols are tiny particles that reflect sunlight. They are put in the air by industrial or volcanic processes and are considered a possible cause of temperature change at Earth’s surface.)

Then there is the practical question of what can be done about temperature increases even if they are occurring, he said. “China, India, Korea are not going to go along with IPCC recommendations, so … the only countries punished will be those who go along with the recommendations.”

He discounted mainstream opinion that climate change could hurt national security, saying that “historically there is little evidence of natural disasters leading to war, but economic conditions have proven much more serious. Almost all proposed mitigation policies lead to reduced energy availability and higher energy costs. All studies of human benefit and national security perspectives show that increased energy is important.”

He showed a graph that demonstrated that more energy consumption leads to higher literacy rate, lower infant mortality and a lower number of children per woman.

Given that proposed policies are unlikely to significantly influence climate and that lower energy availability could be considered a significant threat to national security, to continue with a mitigation policy that reduces available energy “would, at the least, appear to be irresponsible,” he argued.

Responding to audience questions about rising temperatures, he said a 0.8 of a degree C change in temperature in 150 years is a small change. Questioned about five-, seven-, and 17-year averages that seem to show that Earth’s surface temperature is rising, he said temperatures are always fluctuating by tenths of a degree.

Natural variability explains warming trends

Idso, director of envt science – Peabody Energy, PhD Geography – ASU, Idso, professor – Maricopa County Community College, and Idso, PhD botany – ASU, ‘12

(Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, “Northern Scandinavian Temperatures: It's a Whole New Ball Game,” CO2 Science Vol. 15, No. 30, July)

In a game-changing paper published in the online version of Nature Climate Change, Esper et al. (8 July 2012) provide convincing evidence that both the Medieval and Roman Warm Periods of 1000 and 2000 years ago, respectively, were warmer than the Current Warm Period has been to date, in spite of the fact that today's atmospheric CO2 concentration is some 40% greater than it was during those two earlier periods.

In setting the stage for their paradigm-altering work, the twelve researchers - hailing from Finland, Germany, Scotland and Switzerland - write that "solar insolation changes, resulting from long-term oscillations of orbital configurations (Milankovitch, 1941), are an important driver of Holocene climate," referencing the studies of Mayewski et al. (2004) and Wanner et al. (2008). In addition, they state that this forcing has been "substantial over the past 2000 years, up to four times as large as the 1.6 W/m2 net anthropogenic forcing since 1750," as suggested by the work of Berger and Loutre (1991). And on the basis of "numerous high-latitude proxy records," as they describe it, they note that "slow orbital changes have recently been shown to gradually force boreal summer temperature cooling over the common era," citing Kaufman et al. (2009).

Fast-forwarding to the present, Esper et al. describe how they developed "a 2000-year summer temperature reconstruction based on 587 high-precision maximum latewood density (MXD) series from northern Scandinavia," which feat was accomplished "over three years using living and subfossil pine (Pinus sylvestris) trees from 14 lakes and 3 lakeshore sites above 65°N, making it not only longer but also much better replicated than any existing MXD time series." Then, after calibrating the pine MXD series against regional June-July-August mean temperature over the period 1876-2006, they obtained their final summer temperature history for the period stretching from 138 BC to AD 2006, as depicted in the graph below.

As determined from the relationship depicted in the figure above, Esper et al. calculate a long-term cooling trend of -0.31 ± 0.03°C per thousand years, which cooling they say is "missing in published tree-ring proxy records" but is "in line with coupled general circulation models (Zorita et al., 2005; Fischer and Jungclaus, 2011)," which computational results portray, as they describe it: substantial summer cooling over the past two millennia in northern boreal and Arctic latitudes.

"These findings," as the European researchers continue, "together with the missing orbital signature in published dendrochronological records, suggest that large-scale near-surface air temperature reconstructions (Mann et al., 1999; Esper et al., 2002; Frank et al., 2007; Hegerl et al., 2007; Mann et al., 2008) relying on tree-ring data may underestimate pre-instrumental temperatures including warmth during Medieval and Roman times," although they suggest that the impacts of the omitted long-term trend in basic tree-ring data may "diminish towards lower Northern Hemisphere latitudes, as the forcing and radiative feedbacks decrease towards equatorial regions."

And so it is that the question for our day ought to be: Why was much of the CO2-starved world of Medieval and Roman times decidedly warmer (by about 0.3 and 0.5°C, respectively) than it was during the peak warmth of the 20th century? Clearly, the greenhouse effect of atmospheric CO2 - if it has not been grossly over-estimated - must currently be being significantly tempered by some unappreciated CO2- and/or warming-induced negative-feedback phenomenon (possibly of biological origin) to the degree that the basic greenhouse effect of earth's rising atmospheric CO2 concentration cannot fully compensate for the decrease in solar insolation experienced over the past two millennia as a result of the "long-term oscillations of orbital configurations" cited by Esper et al. (2012).

# 2NC

## Warming

## drill fail

#### Prefer our ev—most OCS land has been open for drilling and it’s idle

**CBO 12** (Congressional Budget Office, August 2012, "Potential Budgetary Effects of Immediately Opening Most Federal Lands to Oil and Gas Leasing", [www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12\_Oil-and-Gas\_Leasing.pdf](http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12_Oil-and-Gas_Leasing.pdf))

Leasing Offshore Federal Lands The geographic scope of leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf has changed often over the past few decades.3 CBO anticipates that, under current law, DOI will offer leases for most of the acreage in the OCS over the next several decades. Until the early 1980s, DOI offered leases in all of the OCS, including the areas off the Atlantic, Pacific, and Florida coasts. In 1990, after the Congress imposed a series of temporary restrictions, President George H.W. Bush withdrew large portions of the OCS in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the eastern Gulf of Mexico from the leasing program. Those restricted areas were subsequently expanded by President Clinton. Then, in 2008, President George W. Bush narrowed the restrictions to include only areas that had been designated as National Marine Sanctuaries. In 2010, President Obama removed Alaska’s Bristol Bay area from the leasing program until the end of June 2017. Since 2008, policies on leasing in the Atlantic and Pacific OCS have varied, reflecting differences between the two most recent Administrations. In January 2009, DOI issued a proposed five-year plan that included lease sales in the Atlantic and Pacific OCS for the 2010–2015 period. The program proposed in June 2012 does not include an option for sales in those areas between 2012 and 2017. Neither plan involved the areas in the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the Florida coast in which leasing is now prohibited until the end of June 2022.4 Other than the temporary ban on leasing in the eastern Gulf of Mexico, there currently are no statutory restrictions on OCS leasing. Decisions about leasing are made administratively—in consultation with industry and the states—for five-year periods. Leases cannot be offered for areas that are not included in a five-year plan, but the available regions may change whenever a new plan is adopted. The next plan is expected to go into effect in August 2012 and will extend for five years unless a future Administration chooses to restart the process before that plan expires. Historical experience suggests that only a fraction of the leases awarded in the OCS will eventually be brought into production. Almost 60 percent of the OCS leases issued in the Gulf of Mexico through 2007 either expired or were relinquished without producing any oil or natural gas.5 CBO estimates that almost 90 percent of the 2011 OCS production was from leases issued before 2001, reflecting the long lead times associated with exploring and developing oil and gas fields. 6

#### Not enough refineries

CFAP 8 (Center for American Progress, 9/15/2008, "Ten Reasons Not to Expand Offshore Drilling", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/))

8. We can’t refine the oil we would extract. In a June speech, President George W. Bush noted that, “Refineries are the critical link between crude oil and the gasoline and diesel fuel that drivers put in their tanks.” Yet refineries are already so stretched that last year, the United States had to import almost 150 million barrels of gasoline. The Wall Street Journal reported oil companies are not building new refineries because it would be bad for their bottom line: “Building a new refinery from scratch, Exxon believes, would be bad for long-term business.”

#### Technical barriers

**CBO 12** (Congressional Budget Office, August 2012, "Potential Budgetary Effects of Immediately Opening Most Federal Lands to Oil and Gas Leasing", [www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12\_Oil-and-Gas\_Leasing.pdf](http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12_Oil-and-Gas_Leasing.pdf))

Offshore Leasing For this analysis, CBO used EIA’s estimates of the potential for new areas to produce oil or gas after 2022. EIA expects that any initial production from newly opened areas in the Atlantic, Pacific, and eastern Gulf of Mexico would be far less than is produced by current operations in the Gulf of Mexico (see Figure 2). In its Annual Energy Outlook 2011, EIA estimated that if leasing commenced in those OCS regions by 2023, production through 2035 would amount to around 0.35 billion BOE—or about 3 percent of the 13.5 billion BOE that the agency projected would be produced from federal leases in the Gulf of Mexico over that 13-year period.17 EIA’s estimates reflect its assumption that “local infrastructure issues and other potential nonfederal impediments are resolved.”18 In CBO’s view, such factors probably would slow or limit production, as they sometimes have in the past. The federal government has spent about $1.5 billion to compensate firms for leases that were canceled or relinquished because of state or local concerns about oil and gas development off the coasts of California, North Carolina, and Florida and in Bristol Bay in Alaska.19 According to DOI, 24 localities in California have “enacted ordinances that either bar the construction of onshore support facilities for offshore oil and gas development or subject the approval of such facilities to a vote by local citizens.”20 Any development in the Atlantic OCS would involve siting and building new pipelines and related onshore facilities, which would require approval by state and local authorities. Other technical complications and economic factors add to the uncertainty surrounding forecasts of production in new areas of the OCS. DOI’s resource assessments suggest that much of the undiscovered oil in the eastern Gulf of Mexico is located in ultradeep water—water that is more than 2,400 meters (about 7,900 feet) deep—where few leases can be brought into production in any year because of the cost and complexity of their development. 21 Other factors could slow production in new areas, including the need for exploratory drilling and the expectation that most of the fields will be relatively small.22 Historically, production facilities have been installed at a slower pace in the California OCS than in the Gulf of Mexico.23

#### Not enough ships to drill offshore – kills solvency

Mouawad and Fackler 8 (Jad Mouawad is the airline correspondent for The New York Times. From 2004 to 2010, he covered the global energy industry, reporting on oil and gas developments around the world, OPEC politics, and renewable energy.Before joining The Times, he was a reporter for Bloomberg News in Paris for four years, writing about business, telecom, and the Middle East. Mr. Mouawad was born in Beirut, Lebanon. He graduated from Brown University in 1995 and later earned a master's degree in political science from the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris. and Martin Fackler was named Tokyo bureau chief of The New York Times in 2009. Previously, he had been foreign correspondent covering business and economics for the Tokyo bureau since October 2007, and before that, had served as a contract writer for The Times since July 2005.Before joining The Times, Mr. Fackler was a reporter for the Tokyo bureau of The Wall Street Journal. In this role, he covered banking, trade, energy policy and diplomacy. In 2005, he was also part of team whose coverage of the Indian Ocean tsunami was awarded the Society of Publishers in Asia award., 6/19/2008, "Dearth of Ships Delays Drilling of Offshore Oil", www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/business/19drillship.htm?\_r=4)

As President Bush calls for repealing a ban on drilling off most of the coast of the United States, a shortage of ships used for deep-water offshore drilling promises to impede any rapid turnaround in oil exploration and supply. In recent years, this global shortage of drill-ships has created a critical bottleneck, frustrating energy company executives and constraining their ability to exploit known reserves or find new ones. Slow growth in oil supplies, at a time of soaring demand, has been a major factor in the spike of oil and gasoline prices. Mr. Bush called on Congress Wednesday to end a longstanding federal ban on offshore drilling and open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge for oil exploration, arguing that the steps were needed to lower gasoline prices and bolster national security. But even as oil trades at more than $135 a barrel — up from $68 a year ago — the world’s existing drill-ships are booked solid for the next five years. Some oil companies have been forced to postpone exploration while waiting for a drilling rig, executives and analysts said. Demand is so high that shipbuilders, the biggest of whom are in Asia, have raised prices since last year by as much as $100 million a vessel to about half a billion dollars. “The crunch on rigs is everywhere,” said Alberto Guimaraes, a senior executive at Petrobras, the Brazilian oil company that has discovered some of the most promising offshore oil but has been unable to get at it. “Almost 100 percent of the oil companies are constrained in their investment program because there is no rig available,” he said. As a result, drilling costs for some of the newest deepwater rigs in the Gulf of Mexico — the nation’s top source of domestic oil and natural gas supplies — have reached about $600,000 a day, compared with $150,000 a day in 2002.

## AT: "Bridge Fuel"

#### Nothing to transition too

Boomgaard 12

Joe Boomgaard, Staff writer, MiBiz, May 21, 2012, "Will cheap natural gas go down in flames?", http://www.mibiz.com/news/energy/19671-will-cheap-natural-gas-go-down-in-flames.html

Others see natural gas as a cleaner "bridge" fuel as the country weans itself off coal. Nally said he'd have to see some significant developments before he could see the nation giving up gas-fired baseload generation. "They talk about it as a bridge fuel, but a bridge to what? Wind is intermittent. Solar is intermittent. There isn't that technology, renewable-wise, available to us today that we could shift into that we could use to serve the needs of the people in Holland. That bridge might be a bit longer than some people might hope," Nally said.

#### AND, They reduce renewables

Harris 12

Richard Harris, Staff Writer, NPR, February 2, 2012, "Could Cheap Gas Slow Growth Of Renewable Energy?", http://www.npr.org/2012/02/02/146297284/could-cheap-gas-slow-growth-of-renewable-energy

From an environmental perspective, natural gas could help transition our economy from fossil fuels to clean energy. It's often portrayed as a bridge fuel to help us through the transition, because it's so much cleaner than coal and it's abundant. But Jacoby says that bridge could be in trouble if cheap gas kills the incentive to develop renewable industry. "You'd better be thinking about a landing of the bridge at the other end. If there's no landing at the other end, it's just a bridge to nowhere," he says.

#### Energy companies won't allow a transition - we're stuck

Lesser 12

Adam Lesser, staff writer, GigaOM, technology news source, May 27, 2012, "How the natural gas craze will impact renewable energy", http://gigaom.com/cleantech/how-the-natural-gas-craze-will-impact-renewable-energy-2/

But all was not lost. Carter Bales, who founded environmentally focused private equity firm NewWorld Capital and who has authored a number of analyses on climate change for McKinsey and Foreign Affairs, stood up and pointed out that “what we have today is low cost energy [natural gas]….which is good. As a consequence renewables are not likely to develop when energy gets as cheap as you’re making it.” And referencing the accumulation of greenhouse gases, he added, “natural gas is half the carbon of coal. When we are burning natural gas, we are cooking ourselves a bit more slowly, but we’re clearly cooking ourselves.” And that’s where the rub is. Natural gas is often described as a bridge fuel to get us through the transition from fossil fuels to renewables. But it’s clear that for guys like McClendon and Pickens, it’s not a bridge fuel, it’s an abundant natural resource found on every continent that they hope will dominate the 21st century, as much as oil dominated the 20th century.

## Prices

## Russia – Overview 2NC

#### Causes a US-Russia war

Stephen J. **Cimbala**, May 200**7**. Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. “Russia's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Realistic or Uncertain?” Comparative Strategy 26.3, Ebsco.

War between Russia and America is unlikely, but misunderstanding and misperception with respect to their military ends and means are not. U.S. nuclear modernization plans impact on Russian perceptions of their great-power status and vice versa. The U.S. has a shared interest with Russia in the avoidance of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation. This is especially the case given Russia’s proclivities for nervous behavior during crises and its threat perceptions still blinkered by Cold War defeat and NATO expansion. Reassurance is an important component of both American and Russian conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia must be reassured that NATO is not expanding for the purpose of shrinking Russia to pre-Petrine dimensions. As well, the U.S. has a security interest in maintaining a stable east and central Eurasia. That means, among other things, a viable Russian state not torn apart by regional or internal wars.

#### Only scenario for extinction

Nick **Bostrom**, 200**2**. Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale. "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently.

## Russia – AT: No U.S.-Russia War

#### Putin key to contain nationalism

Weir, writer – CSM, 1/25/’12

(Fred, “Vladimir Putin's presidential campaign and ethnic Russian nationalism”)

While analysts say many of Putin's ideas sound OK, a few are head-scratchers, such as his call for a crackdown on internal migrants whose behavior displays an "inappropriate, aggressive, defiant, or disrespectful" attitude toward the culture and customs of the majority. "This behavior should be met with a legal, but harsh response," he wrote.

"One has an unpleasant reaction to this article," says Lev Ponomaryov, head of For Human Rights, a Moscow-based grassroots movement. "Some of it sounds like cheap populism aimed at stealing the thunder of nationalist groups who are now in opposition to his regime."

Putin's logic is not fully spelled out, leaving dangerous ambiguities, Mr. Ponomaryov adds. "For example, his idea that Russians are, historically, the 'state-forming' people could be interpreted different ways, and could be easily abused. It could become a rationale for having more ethnic Russians in high posts, for instance. If we heard these words out of the mouth of an avowed nationalist politician, it [would] be truly scary," Mr. Ponomaryov says.

On the other hand, Putin attacked key some Russian nationalist positions, including the demand that the Russian government cut off economic subsidies to the impoverished North Caucasus. Putin ridiculed that idea, which is strongly supported by popular blogger and opposition leader Alexei Navalny, as the kind of destructive thinking that led straight to the collapse of the Soviet Union two decades ago.

"Putin's basic idea is that different nations can exist [within Russia], but there is no chance for them to enjoy self-determination. Also, Russia should be as big as possible," says Nikolai Petrov, an expert with the Carnegie Center in Moscow.

"It's basically a position in favor of imperialism and Russian chauvinism, and that will appeal to nationalists.… Putin is trying to play the nationalist card, but mainly to keep it from slipping out of his control."

#### They’ll invade Alaska—triggers war

Shahi, reporter – the Sunday Indian, 3/3/’12

(Saurabh, <http://www.thesundayindian.com/en/story/Vladimir-Zhirinovsky-A-clown-or-a-Neo-Fascist/117/31070/>)

In an election that is simultaneously being labelled “boring” and “pre-decided”, there is at least someone who makes for an interesting copy. Vladimir Zhirinovsky is not new to the Russian political landscape. In fact, among the fellow contenders his political capital appears to be the oldest. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia that he represents was the first political party to be allowed during the later days of Glasnost. It was variously suggested that the party was the brainchild Communist Party and KGB. Zhirinovsky was its first presidential candidate and has been losing elections since then, with an exception of 2004 when he declined the candidature in favour of his bodyguard.

An animated nationalist, he is infamous for slandering his political opponents, instigating physical brawls in the parliament and diatribes against the West in general and Jews in particular. His hatred for Israel is only surpassed by his hatred for Britain whom he accuses of every major war that has been fought in the 20th century. Zhirinovsky caters to the right-wing crowd and knows how to offer fodder for domestic consumption. In this regard, he is not different from other right-wing loose heads of Europe. However, what makes him a class apart is the seriousness and conviction with which he makes most of his assertions. Even the choicest mention of such comments can fill a broadsheet; a few nerve-wrecking ones can be quoted here. In the past, he has advocated using tactical nuclear weapons against Chechens, forcibly annexing Alaska from the US and putting the Ukrainians away and legalizing polygamy.

## AT: Prices Will Converge / No Exports Materialize

#### Exports will happen – prices won’t converge

Levi, senior fellow for energy and environment at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2012

(Michael, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project, a program of the Brookings Institution, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads\_and\_links/06\_exports\_levi.pdf)

Yet despite extraordinary differences between U.S., European, and Asian gas markets, spot prices in all three have largely tracked each other for twenty years—and all three have also tracked the price of oil (Figure 1). While Figure 1 primarily shows spot prices, most natural gas trade in Europe and Asia does not occur on spot markets. Economists generally believe, however, that spot and contract prices cannot diverge much over the medium and long run, since those bound by contracts will insist on renegotiating. This intuition is reinforced by comparing U.K. spot prices and German import prices (which are dominated by contracts) in Figure 1.

**The historical relationships between the three** markets, however, **appear to have broken down around 2009**. U.S. natural gas output is on the rise as a result of breakthroughs in shale gas production. Total U.S. natural gas production rose from 23.5 trillion cubic feet in 2006 to 28.6 trillion cubic feet in 2011, equivalent to 78 billion cubic feet each day (EIA 2012b). This flood of production has depressed natural gas prices in the United States. Yet, since exports from the United States to Europe and Asia are generally not allowed, overseas prices have not followed.

It is this difference in prices that has sparked interest in U.S. LNG exports: before prices in the three markets blew wide apart, there was no economic incentive for anyone to build an LNG export facility in the United States. If a situation resembling the historical relationship returns, opportunities for exports will vanish.

Economists expect prices for commodities in a competitive environment to converge with the marginal cost of supplying them over the medium term. For natural gas this could mean ample low-priced competition from traditional suppliers within a few years, making U.S. LNG exports uneconomic. Several Middle Eastern producers have marginal costs of production close to zero (excluding shipping), either because natural gas is easy to extract or because it is a byproduct of oil production. Russian and Caspian gas generally costs more than Middle Eastern gas to produce, but, given sufficient pipeline infrastructure, delivering it could be much cheaper than shipping LNG.

**Yet there is good reason to believe that prices will not converge any time soon**. Global natural gas production is highly concentrated, and strategic producers, including Qatar and Russia, appear to restrain production for export; they would rather sell less gas at higher prices than more gas at lower ones. This restraint is not necessarily explicit: by simply insisting on linking gas prices to oil prices, they implicitly constrain supply by throttling demand. In addition, directing marginal production to subsidized domestic markets can keep export prices high.

## Low Prices 🡪 Exports

#### Low prices create political will for exports

Dlouhy, staff writer for the Houston Chronicle, 8/7/2012

(Jennifer, “Oil patch lawmakers implore DOE to fast-track LNG exports,” http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/08/07/oil-patch-lawmakers-implore-doe-to-fast-track-lng-exports/)

Nearly four dozen Republican and Democratic lawmakers from oil patch states today implored the Obama administration to **swiftly approve plans to export liquefied natural gas**. **The bipartisan push comes as a glut of domestic natural gas keeps prices low** and has sent energy companies scrambling to find new markets for the fossil fuel. In a letter to Energy Secretary Steven Chu, the oil-patch lawmakers said exports are necessary to continue fostering development in Texas, Louisiana and other states that have long shipped gas via pipelines to other parts of the country that historically weren’t producing the fossil fuel themselves. A boom in extracting natural gas from dense shale rock formations nationwide means that those areas historically served by pipelines and far-flung resources now can get the fuel much closer to home. “Large portions of the country which were previously served by our region via pipeline now have a closer commodity at hand,” said the 44 lawmakers, led by Rep. Gene Green, D-Houston, and Rep. James Lankford, R-Okla. “As such, without the ability to market to international customers, this could have a severe impact on production in our states.” “Our region and our country need an outlet for natural gas production,” the lawmakers added. Letter signers included 10 Democrats and 34 Republicans from Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas and Oklahoma. The Texans included Democrats Gene Green, Al Green and Sheila Jackson Lee, as well as Republicans Joe Barton, Kevin Brady, John Carter, John Culberson, Blake Farenthold, Bill Flores, Kay Granger, Ralph Hall, Pete Sessions and Pete Olson. In July, a separate coalition of lawmakers from shale gas producing states in the Northeast urged Chu to speed up approvals of proposed LNG export facilities.

## price spikes

#### decreased demand shields a shock

Hurdle 12 (Jon Hurdle, Reporter at AOL Energy, Reporter at Reuters energy., 8/14/2012, "What is Set to Drive Natural Gas Prices Lower?", aol.com/2012/08/14/what-is-set-to-drive-natural-gas-prices-lower/)

Prices for natural gas are headed lower after a hot summer showed signs of the first boost in pricing for the fuel on which the US energy sector is increasingly relying. With the approaching end of the cooling season and continued strong supply from domestic gas producers, prices are likely to revert to their earlier trading range between $2 and $3 per million BTU, predicted Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, a Massachusetts consultancy. New evidence on bulging US inventories of natural gas, coupled with abundant supply and the approaching end of the summer cooling season, suggests prices will resume their downward path after a brief spike driven by power-sector demand. The amount of gas in underground storage exceeded 3,000 billion cubic feet in June, the highest ever for the month, resulting in the smallest inventory increase between April and June – when stocks begin to build ahead of the upcoming winter – since 2000, the US Energy Information Administration said. The modest increase, of only 565 bcf, was also caused by strong demand from the power sector in response to high demand for electricity to power air conditioners during an unusually hot US summer. That pushed natural gas futures prices to $3.214 per million BTU at the end of July, their highest since December last year, after hitting a decade-low of $1.907 in April. High inventory levels will persist during the "injection season" which runs from April to October, the EIA said in a report on August 8. The agency forecast gas stocks will rise to a record high of almost 4,000 bcf by Nov. 1, leaving the seasonal increase at only 1,477 bcf, the lowest since 1991. Warm Winters Mean Full Inventories Inventories were already unusually full at the start of the injection season because of reduced demand for heating gas in the exceptionally warm 2011-12 winter. That, coupled with the modest addition so far this season, has left underground storage capacity about 75 percent full, a level not normally seen until late August or early September, the EIA said. "The slow start to the injection season reflects record-high inventories at the end of this winter, leaving less space to be filled, and a large increase in natural gas use by the U.S. electric sector for power generation," the EIA said. Although the number of active drilling rigs has dropped sharply this year in response to falling dry-gas prices, production has continued to grow because of gas supply associated with more lucrative oil and liquids development, and because existing gas wells have not depleted as quickly as expected, Michael Lynch said. Despite the recent low prices, U.S. dry-gas output rose 5 percent in the first half of 2012 compared with the year-ago period, the EIA said in a separate report, citing research from Bentek Energy. The growth was largely driven by the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and surrounding states, where production almost doubled in the 12 months to June 2012 and now contributes 9 percent of national production. Plentiful supply, coupled with high inventories and mild winter weather, resulted in price declines of up to 49 percent during the first half of 2012 compared with a year earlier, the EIA said. Although prices rebounded to the high $2 range by the end of June, they are not likely to top $3 again for the foreseeable future because of increasing production and weak residential demand growth in the sluggish economy, Lynch said. Gas at $2-3 will likely persuade more power generators to scrap old coal plants in favor of cleaner gas, but that may not be enough to buoy prices much above their current range, given record inventories and, in the short term, declining demand for air conditioning.

#### Aff would be too long term

**LeVine 12** (Steve LeVine, is the author of The Oil and the Glory and a longtime foreign correspondent, Foreign Policy, March 19, 2012, "What the laws of oil say about the U.S. presidential campaign", <http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/18/what_the_laws_of_oil_say_about_the_us_presidential_campaign>)

According to Chevron's Kurt Glaubitz, we are talking "a decade from now. It's to make the right policy decisions so we can develop those for future generations." In that context, I asked Glaubitz what Chevron would do if Obama unleashed every property it sought to unmitigated drilling. His reply is illuminating: Even if Obama tomorrow opens up the [Outer Continental Shelf], the next step in the process is the comprehensive valuation of the resource potential, and that's really the seismic work, so there would be a lot of crews that would be active in conducting the seismic surveys in probably the most prospective areas. I think as a nation we have a pretty good idea as to what those areas look like. And you've got to interpret the seismic data, and then you have to have a lease round. And then there's going to be companies that will obtain leased acreage positions. And then they'll do further seismic work, and exploration work, and eventually drill wells, and then if those wells are successful, then move into production. So even by opening up the [Outer Continental Shelf] tomorrow, it's not going to resolve our energy situation for quite some time. And that's also why we believe we need to begin the process now.

No risk of volatility – game-changers in supply and demand solve

Staple, CEO American Clean Skies Foundation, and Szydlowski, President & CEO of the Bipartisan Policy Center, March 2011

(Gregory and Norm, “TASK FORCE ON ENSURING STABLE NATURAL GAS MARKETS,” http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/63704\_BPC\_web.pdf)

The findings and recommendations in this report reflect optimism that the robust supply horizon for natural gas presents fresh opportunities—not only to move beyond prior market concerns but **to develop new tools for managing price uncertainty**. **Fundamental changes in the domestic supply and demand balance for natural gas**, **including an unprecedented level of available storage and import capacity**, should allow markets to function more efficiently and fluidly in the future. This should create more favorable investment conditions and **significantly dampen the potential for destructive cycles of price volatility and market instability**.

Prefer our ev—consensus

Staple, CEO American Clean Skies Foundation, and Szydlowski, President & CEO of the Bipartisan Policy Center, March 2011

(Gregory and Norm, “TASK FORCE ON ENSURING STABLE NATURAL GAS MARKETS,” http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/63704\_BPC\_web.pdf)

The Task Force on Ensuring Stable Natural Gas Markets (hereafter “Task Force”) was jointly convened by the Bipartisan Policy Center and the American Clean Skies Foundation in March 2010 to examine historic causes of instability in natural gas markets and to explore potential remedies. The membership of the Task Force is unique in its diversity and unique in the sense that it brings together key stakeholders from both sides of the supply–demand equation. Individual Task Force members are listed in the Preface; they represent natural gas **producers**, **transporters** and **distributors**, **consumer groups** and large **industrial users**, as well as **independent experts**, **consumer advocates**, **state regulatory commissions** and **environmental groups**.

Prices are fine for at least five years

Kasey, writer for The State Journal (West Virginia), 9/14/2012

(Pam, “US natural gas production on track to top 2011 record in 2012,” http://www.statejournal.com/story/19544273/us-natural-gas-production-on-track-to-top-2011-record-in-2012)

**Despite low prices**, **U.S. natural gas producers are on track in 2012 to top their record 2011 production**.

Gas produced in the first six months of 2012 came to 11.9 trillion cubic feet, or tcf, compared with 11.2 tcf in the first six months of 2011, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Total production in 2011 of 23 tcf exceeded 2010 production by 7.8 percent and topped the previous record, set in 1973, of 21.7 tcf.

**Volume has been higher in every month of 2012 compared with 2011**. The monthly average for January through June 2012 was 1.98 tcf, compared with the 2011 average of 1.92 tcf — putting the industry on track to produce 23.8 tcf this year.

Daily production has topped 65 billion cubic feet per day, or bcfd, this year, compared with 63 bcfd in 2011.

Prices dipped to a decade low below $2 per million British thermal units in April and, at under $3, **remain low**.

But industry executives have explained to The State Journal in the past that **leases typically are constructed with five-year expirations**, putting time pressure on producers and **creating a long lag in price responsiveness**. Contracts for the use of drilling rigs, often set up on an annual basis, also **make nimble response to low prices difficult**.

## AT: Manufacturing I/L

#### No real benefit - energy equals 2 percent of manufacturing costs

LeVine 12

Steve LeVine, the author of The Oil and the Glory and a longtime foreign correspondent, Foreign Policy, May 9, 2012, "Is energy independence all it's cracked up to be?", http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/09/is\_energy\_independence\_all\_its\_cracked\_up\_to\_be

Levi also challenges an assertion, made most prominently by Citigroup's Ed Morse, that cheap natural gas prices will lead to a gigantic U.S. manufacturing and industrial revival. Manufacturers spend just 2 percent of total sales on energy, says Levi. Any benefit from lower gas prices will be only at the margins of the chemical, steel, cement and paper-making industries, he argues.

#### Barely moves the economic needle

Levi 12

Michael Levi, Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment, Council on Foreign Relations, May 7, 2012, "Oil and Gas Euphoria Is Getting Out of Hand", http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/05/07/oil-and-gas-euphoria-is-getting-out-of-hand/

Once again, these sorts of claims have become increasingly common. Indeed the quantitative assertions are perfectly plausible. But the big picture implications don’t make sense. As of 2010, total sales of U.S. manufactured goods were about five trillion dollars. At the same time, the sector spent about 100 billion dollars on energy. That’s a mere two percent of total sales. You could slash energy costs to zero, and it would barely move the needle for most U.S. manufacturers. There are, of course, exceptions, like some iron, steel, cement, and paper makers. But even these industries care about much more than their electricity prices. Will lower energy costs move things at the margin? Of course they will, and that’s good news. But they are nowhere close to what’s needed for U.S. manufacturing to broadly thrive.

## 2NC Manufacturing – Inev

#### Manufacturing can never fully rebound

Bergstrand 12 (Jeffrey Bergstrand, professor of finance at the University of Notre Dame, is an expert on international trade., 2/17/2012, "Nostalgia for factory jobs that will never come back", [www.cnn.com/2012/02/17/opinion/bergstrand-factory-nostalgia/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/17/opinion/bergstrand-factory-nostalgia/index.html))

The heyday of manufacturing, the block-long plants that produce not just tangible goods, but big, heavy ones like cars, gave us economic stability once; it can do it again. On Wednesday, President Obama spoke at the Master Lock factory in Milwaukee and said, "What's happening in Detroit can happen in other industries. What happens in Cleveland and Pittsburgh and Raleigh and Milwaukee, that's what we've got to be shooting for, is to create opportunities for hardworking Americans to get in there and start making stuff again and sending it all over the world -- products stamped with three proud words: Made in America." But as with most nostalgic visions, this one doesn't reflect economic realities. First, it's understandable why we have a romantic association with manufacturing. "Factory nostalgia" is economically legitimate, because it harkens back to the period of the greatest growth in the U.S. economy in history, basically 1950 to 1973. During that period, there was growth not just in production, but in real household incomes, which is something we have seen little of for the last 40 years. This gave rise to a burgeoning, powerful middle class, and more than that, a sense that all of America shared in the economic boom, with the assembly line tethering us like an anchor to shared prosperity. Compare this image to the more recent service-based economy. The source of the common bond -- the assembly line -- is gone. Instead, people are tied to their own education, their own human capital. Because of that, they're more stand-alone. And so since 1973, we face this widening inequality, partly because our incomes are more tied to individuals, and individuals are different. There's a huge variance across their abilities and educations, and incomes are tied directly to those things. And this situation creates the political tension we face in America; consequently, we long for manufacturing because we associate that with the strength of the middle class. But can we go back to the assembly line? To answer that, there is another important factor to keep in mind. The enormous growth from 1950-73 wasn't entirely of our own making. It was partly due to our own initiative and education, but we also must remember that in 1950, Japan, Germany, Britain and France were all leveled because of World War II. We had no competition. Today, not only are all those countries competing against us, but so are China, India and other countries in South America and Africa -- countries with very large and growing populations. It's not the same game, and in that sense, we're naïve to think we can repeat the '50s and '60s if we just pull our bootstraps up. The world was much different then. Further, there's a very important caveat to people who respond that we should just close our borders and make everything here. As an economic policy, that belief will only serve to hurt standards of living here and globally. There is a large body of evidence that shows that economic growth comes from three things: good geography, sound institutions and strong trade partnerships with the rest of the world. So, going back to closing the borders will only hurt us in the long run. Despite the recent, well-publicized successes in U.S. auto manufacturing, what is happening in the American economy is not the reversal of a trend toward declining manufacturing. Rather, it's a slowing down of the rate of loss of manufacturing, or almost a stabilization of the decline of manufacturing in this country. For the last 25 - 30 years, companies moved manufacturing to China where labor costs were considerably less and there existed an enormous consumer market. But the subsequent rapid per capita income growth in China has meant a rise in the relative price of their labor, so the cost differential is being alleviated. This cost differential is being further narrowed by China once again allowing its currency to gain in value compared to the U.S. dollar. Once that differential diminishes, the rate of manufacturing decline has to slow. However, this does not signal that "in-sourcing" or "re-shoring" is on the rise in America. Low-technology manufacturing is not anything we will ever get back to permanently. It's just too costly to produce here, and even if China becomes less attractive, there's still Latin America, and much of Asia and Africa. Going forward for decades, we simply don't have a comparative advantage in producing low-technology manufactured goods.

#### Manufacturing decline inevitable and no impact – it’s because the economy is changing not offshoring

Worstall 12 (Tim Worstall, I'm a Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, a writer for Forbes on business and technology and strangely, one of the global experts on the metal scandium, one of the rare earths. An odd thing to be but someone does have to be such and in this flavour of our universe I am., 7/13/2012, "What Is It With This Nostalgia For Manufacturing Jobs?", [www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/07/13/what-is-it-with-this-nostalgia-for-manufacturing-jobs/](http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/07/13/what-is-it-with-this-nostalgia-for-manufacturing-jobs/))

I have to admit that I just don’t get it. Why is it that so many people are nostalgic for the days of mass employment in manufacturing? More, why is it that even generally bright and well informed people just cannot understand that those days are never coming back? Even someone like Felix Salmon just doesn’t seem to understand: US manufacturing in fact is extremely competitive on a global scale; the problem is that output has lagged productivity improvements, with the result that we’re making more stuff with ever fewer people. This is not a problem. Making more stuff with fewer people means that the people freed up can go and do something else. Run insurance exchanges for Obamacare for example. Think the basics through here. At date one we need 40 people to do the manufacturing we want to have done. At date two we need only 30 because of that rising productivity. This means we now have 10 people who can go and do something else other than manufacturing. We, as a society, are now richer by that extra production of whatever it is plus the manufactures. Requiring less human labour to do something is a good thing. Further, Salmon isn’t actually correct in his facts: There’s no particular reason why that should be the case: when manufacturers in China and Germany become more efficient, that’s their sign to employ more people, rather than fewer. As each employee becomes increasingly profitable, it makes perfect sense to keep on adding more employees. Or at least it does in some countries. In the US, by contrast, capital is cheap and plentiful, and there’s much more incentive here to replace people with capital goods wherever possible. I’m sorry but this just isn’t true. Germany has been shedding manufacturing workers as one of his own commenters shows Salmon. Also, it is not that capital is cheap in the US: it’s much cheaper in China than it is in the US at present. It is that US labour is expensive. This is also a good thing: expensive labour means that workers have high wages, rather one of the things that we’re trying to engineer in an economy. But there’s more! Manufacturing is shrinking as a portion of the economy in every country. Further, every country is shedding manufacturing jobs: yes, even China. The jobs are not being offshored to Mars, they’re being destroyed by rising productivity. It is simply true that the amount of labour we need to manufacture things is falling faster than the amount of things we want manufactured is rising. We shouldn’t be afraid of this: we should welcome it rather. For this is what has happened with agriculture over the past 300 years. We used to need 90% of the population working in the fields to feed 100% of the population. Now we use between 1 and 2% of the population to feed the 100%. We used to use 30-50% of the population working in factories to make the physical goods we wanted. Now we need under 10% (this does change depending upon country) and falling. It won’t be long, probably not in my lifetime but quite possibly in your, that working in manufacturing will be like doing so in agriculture. A slightly odd thing that some 1 or 2% of the population does. Everyone else will be in services of some kind. I’m really sorry but I simply do not understand all of these people nostalgic for some past and vanishing world. Manufacturing as a source of mass employment is just never coming back: get used to the idea.

## no war – 2nc

#### No diversionary wars – prefer our evidence

Fravel, Associate Prof Poli Sci, Security Studies Program – MIT, ‘10

(M. Taylor, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” *Security Studies*, 19:2, 307 – 341)

Yet despite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive. Quantitative studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of u.s. behavior7 and in cross-national studies.8 By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.9 Indeed, the gap between the intuition underlying diversion as a motive for conflict and existing quantitative research that Jack Levy noted in 1989 continues to characterize this research program today.10

Given the mixed empirical results in recent quantitative research, this article offers a different type of test of the diversionary hypothesis. In particular, I extend efforts to employ case study methods to test the hypothesis systematically and against alternative explanations in specific episodes of historical interest.11 Adopting a modified “most likely” approach to theory testing pioneered by Harry Eckstein, I examine two cases that should be easy for diversionary theory to explain: Argentina's 1982 seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus. In these episodes, high levels of domestic political unrest preceded the escalation of salient disputes that leaders could manipulate to rally public support or demonstrate their competence as statesmen.

These cases should be homeruns for the diversionary hypothesis, but they are in fact quite difficult for it to explain. In these cases, the relationship between domestic political conflict and dispute escalation is weak at best, as the onset and magnitude of social unrest was only linked loosely with decisions to use force. Leaders' statements and reasoning provide little evidence for diversion as a central motivation for escalation. Instead, a standard realist model of international politics and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy offer a more compelling explanation of Argentine and Turkish decision making.12 Leaders in both states chose force in response to external threats to national interests, not internal threats to their political survival.

## econ k

#### Their econ impact justifies imperialist lashout to remake the world in the image of market liberalization

Lipschutz ‘95, Professor of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, On Security, pg 15-17)

Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the Cold War. In order to establish a “secure” global system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a global system of economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this system.43 One consequence, of this project was the globalizations of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important: the idea was that economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world.44 This would make the world safe and secure for the Untited States inasmuch as it would all be the self, so to speak. The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and societies of the countries being transformed, making their citizens less secure. The process thereby **transformed them into the very enemies we feared so greatly**. In Iran, for example, the Shah’s efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but so, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on Persian Gulf oil. Islamic “fundamentalism,” now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers’ worst nightmares made real,45 although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Islamic movements might never have acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American “security.” The ways in which the **framing of threats** is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and “economic security.” What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: “Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence”) shows how strategic economic interdependence – a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle – undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that *have* been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this “new security dilemma,” as Crawford has stylzed it? How can a state generate the conditions for legitimizing various forms of intervention into this process? Clearly, it is not enough to invoke the mantra of “competitiveness”; competition *with* someone is also critical. In Europe, notwithstanding budgetary stringencies, state sponsorship of cutting-edge technological R&D retains a certain, albeit declining, legitimacy in the United States, absent a persuasive threat, this is much less the case (although the discourse of the Clinton Administration suggests that such ideological restraints could be broken). Thus, it is the hyperrealism of Clyde Prestowitz, Karel Van Wolferen, and Michael Crichton, imagining a Japan resurgent and bent anew on (non) Pacific conquest, that provides the cultural materials for new economic policies. Can new industrialized enemies be conjured into existence so as to **justify new cold wars** and the remobilization of capital, under state direction, that must follow? Or has the world changed too much for this to happen again?

#### Causes invisible violence and suffering on the periphery

Neocleous ‘8 (Mark, Prof. of Government at Brunel, Critique of Security, AM)

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘**economic well-being’**, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance **helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process** and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people **to** **the desire to shape the world** in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently **violent strategy**. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; **the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence**.

**===MARKED===**

 This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘**every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’**.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. **The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers.** John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure **of six million people killed** – **and this is a minimum ﬁgure**. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, **the security policy of the world’s only superpower** in its current ‘war on terror’ **is** still **underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’.** The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justiﬁcation for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of con tainment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.

## 2nc no impact

#### Their laundry list of vague impacts is academic junk – conflicts can’t just emerge

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed.

That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before.

Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination.

Overestimating Our Importance

One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case.55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57

It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated.

In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

## 1nc competitiveness

#### Competitiveness makes environmental and economic collapse and resource wars inevitable

Bristow ’10(School of City & Regional Planning, Cardiff University) (Gillian, Resilient regions: re-‘place’ing regional competitiveness, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2010, 3, 153–167)

In recent years, regional development strategies have been subjugated to the hegemonic discourse of competitiveness, such that the ultimate objective for all regional development policy-makers and practitioners has become the creation of economic advantage through superior productivity performance, or the attraction of new ﬁrms and labour (Bristow, 2005). A major consequence is the developing ‘ubiquitiﬁcation’ of regional development strategies (Bristow, 2005; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). This reﬂects the status of competitiveness as a key discursive construct (Jessop, 2008) that has acquired hugely signiﬁcant rhetorical power for certain interests intent on reinforcing capitalist relations (Bristow, 2005; Fougner, 2006). Indeed, the competitiveness hegemony is such that many policies previously considered only indirectly relevant to unfettered economic growth tend to be hijacked in support of competitiveness agendas (for example Raco, 2008; also Dannestam, 2008). This paper will argue, however, that a particularly narrow discourse of ‘competitiveness’ has been constructed that has a number of negative connotations for the ‘resilience’ of regions. Resilience is deﬁned as the region’s ability to experience positive economic success that is socially inclusive, works within environmental limits and which can ride global economic punches (Ashby et al., 2009). As such, resilience clearly resonates with literatures on sustainability, localisation and diversiﬁcation, and the developing understanding of regions as intrinsically diverse entities with evolutionary and context-speciﬁc development trajectories (Hayter, 2004). In contrast, the dominant discourse of competitiveness is ‘placeless’ and increasingly associated with globalised, growth-ﬁrst and environmentally malign agendas (Hudson, 2005). However, this paper will argue that the relationships between competitiveness and resilience are more complex than might at ﬁrst appear. Using insights from the Cultural Political Economy (CPE) approach, which focuses on understanding the construction, development and spread of hegemonic policy discourses, the paper will argue that the dominant discourse of competitiveness used in regional development policy is narrowly constructed and is thus insensitive to contingencies of place and the more nuanced role of competition within economies. This leads to problems of resilience that can be partly overcome with the development of a more contextualised approach to competitiveness. The paper is now structured as follows. It begins by examining the developing understanding of resilience in the theorising and policy discourse around regional development. It then describes the CPE approach and utilises its framework to explain both how a narrow conception of competitiveness has come to dominate regional development policy and how resilience inter-plays in subtle and complex ways with competitiveness and its emerging critique. The paper then proceeds to illustrate what resilience means for regional development ﬁrstly, with reference to the Transition Towns concept, and then by developing a typology of regional strategies to show the different characteristics of policy approaches based on competitiveness and resilience. Regional resilience Resilience is rapidly emerging as an idea whose time has come in policy discourses around localities and regions, where it is developing widespread appeal owing to the peculiarly powerful combination of transformative pressures from below, and various catalytic, crisis-induced imperatives for change from above. It features strongly in policy discourses around environmental management and sustainable development (see Hudson, 2008a), but has also more recently emerged in relation to emergency and disaster planning with, for example ‘Regional Resilience Teams’ established in the English regions to support and co-ordinate civil protection activities around various emergency situations such as the threat of a swine ﬂu pandemic. The discourse of resilience is also taking hold in discussions around desirable local and regional development activities and strategies. The recent global ‘credit crunch’ and the accompanying in-crease in livelihood insecurity has highlighted the advantages of those local and regional economies that have greater ‘resilience’ by virtue of being less dependent upon globally footloose activities, hav-ing greater economic diversity, and/or having a de-termination to prioritise and effect more signiﬁcant structural change (Ashby et al, 2009; Larkin and Cooper, 2009). Indeed, resilience features particular strongly in the ‘grey’ literature spawned by thinktanks, consul-tancies and environmental interest groups around the consequences of the global recession, catastrophic climate change and the arrival of the era of peak oil for localities and regions with all its implications for the longevity of carbon-fuelled economies, cheap, long-distance transport and global trade. This popularly labelled ‘triple crunch’ (New Economics Foundation, 2008) has power-fully illuminated the potentially disastrous material consequences of the voracious growth imperative at the heart of neoliberalism and competitiveness, both in the form of resource constraints (especially food security) and in the inability of the current system to manage global ﬁnancial and ecological sustainability. In so doing, it appears to be galvinising previously disparate, fractured debates about the merits of the current system, and challenging public and political opinion to develop a new, global concern with frugality, egalitarianism and localism (see, for example Jackson, 2009; New Economics Foundation, 2008).

#### Causes trade wars and protectionism—destroys economy and technological development

Krugman ‘94,PhD (Paul, Nobel Prize winning Economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics, and an op-ed columnist for The New York Times) March/April Foreign Affairs “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession” l/n

A much more serious risk is that the obsession with competitiveness will lead to trade conflict, perhaps even to a world trade war. Most of those who have preached the doctrine of competitiveness have not been old-fashioned protectionists. They want their countries to win the global trade game, not drop out. But what if, despite its best efforts, a country does not seem to be winning, or lacks confidence that it can? Then the competitive diagnosis inevitably suggests that to close the borders is better than to risk having foreigners take away high-wage jobs and high-value sectors. At the very least, the focus on the supposedly competitive nature of international economic relations greases the rails for those who want confrontational if not frankly protectionist policies. We can already see this process at work, in both the United States and Europe. In the United States, it was remarkable how quickly the sophisticated interventionist arguments advanced by Laura Tyson in her published work gave way to the simple-minded claim by U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor that Japan's bilateral trade surplus was costing the United States millions of jobs. And the trade rhetoric of President Clinton, who stresses the supposed creation of high-wage jobs rather than the gains from specialization, left his administration in a weak position when it tried to argue with the claims of NAFTA foes that competition from cheap Mexican labor will destroy the U.S. manufacturing base.

## heg

#### We would never cut DOD, but those are inev anyway

Mandelbaum, professor and director, American foreign policy – Johns Hopkins SAIS, 8/9/’11

(Michael, “America's Coming Retrenchment,” Foreign Affairs)

Even if the triggering mechanism is avoided, spending on defense and on other aspects of U.S. foreign policy will decline over the next decade. The scale of deficit reduction required to put the country on solid fiscal footing is so large that it must involve both limits on Social Security and Medicare, despite the Democrats’ determination to preserve these programs intact, and increases in taxes in some form, despite the Republicans’ determination to prevent this. When Americans are paying more to their government and getting less from it, they will not be as generous in supporting the United States’ global role as they have been in recent decades.

Defense budgets will contract for two other reasons. First, the sense of external threat that the country felt throughout the Cold War and after 9/11 has ebbed. Americans’ support for defense spending depends on how threatened they feel. For the moment, at least, the world does not seem particularly threatening. Second, the politics of the federal budget do not favor the Department of Defense, which cannot count on either political party to protect its share of federal spending. No major part of the Democratic coalition makes foreign and security policy a high priority. The Republican coalition does include national security hawks, who are committed to a large military and a robust foreign policy. But there are two other parts of the Republican coalition. Social conservatives are indifferent in these matters, and proponents of small government and low taxes -- now the most influential members of the coalition because they express the views of the Tea Party movement -- are willing to sacrifice defense spending for the sake of their principal goals.

#### We will lose to China – internal contradictions make US power unsustainable

Petras 10

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/war-with-china-the-dangers-of-a-global-conflagration/>

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As in the past, a declining imperial power faced with profound internal imbalances, a loss of competitiveness in merchandise trade and an overdependence on financial activities looks to political retribution, military alliances and trade restrictions to slow its demise.[49] Propaganda, whipping up chauvinist emotions by scapegoating the rising new imperial state and forging military alliances to “encircle” China have absolutely no impact. They have not stopped all of China’s neighbors from expanding economic ties with it. There are no prospects that this will change in the near future. China will push ahead with double digit growth. The US Empire will continue to wallow in chronic stagnation, unending wars and increased reliance on the tools of political subversion, promoting separatist regimes which predictably collapse or are overthrown. The US unlike the established colonial powers of an earlier period cannot deny China access to strategic raw materials as was the case with Japan. We live in a post-colonial world where the vast majority of regimes will trade and invest with whoever pays the market price. China, unlike Japan, depends on securing markets via economic competitiveness – market power – not military conquest. Unlike Japan it has a vast multitude of workers; it need not conquer and exploit foreign colonized labor. China’s market driven empire building is attuned to modern times, driven by an elite free to engage the world on its own terms, unlike the US plagued by financial speculators who eat away and erode the economy, ravaging industrial centers and turning abandoned houses into parking lots.

#### US hegemony structurally unsustainable

Petras 10

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/war-with-china-the-dangers-of-a-global-conflagration/>

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The US has a trade deficit with at least 91 other countries besides China, demonstrating that the problem is embedded in the structure of the US economy. Any punitive measure to restrict China’s exports to the US will only increase Washington’s deficit with other competitive exporters. A decline of US imports from China will not result in an increase for US manufacturers because of the under-capitalized nature of the latter, directly related to the pre-eminent position of finance capital in capturing and allocating savings. Moreover, “third countries” can re-export Chinese made products, putting the US in the unenviable position of starting trade wars across the board or accepting the fact that a finance –commercial led economy is not competitive in today’s world economy. China’s decision to incrementally divert its trade surplus from the purchase of US Treasury notes to more productive investments in developing its “hinterland” and to strategic overseas ventures in raw materials and energy sectors will eventually force the US Treasury to raise interest rates to avoid large scale flight from the dollar. Rising interest rates may benefit currency traders, but could weaken any US recovery or plunge the country back into a depression. Nothing weakens a global empire more than having to repatriate overseas investments and constrain foreign lending to bolster a sliding domestic economy. The pursuit of protectionist policies will have a major negative impact on US MNC in China since the bulk of their products are exported to the US market: Washington will cut its nose to spite its face. Moreover, a trade war could spill over and adversely affect US auto corporations producing for the Chinese market. GM and Ford are far more profitable in China than the US where they are running in the red[44]. A US trade war will have an initial negative impact on China until it adjusts and takes advantage of the potential 400 million consumers in the vast interior of the country. Moreover, Chinese economic policymakers are rapidly diversifying their trade toward Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and even in the EU. Trade protectionism may create a few jobs in some uncompetitive manufacturing sectors in the US but it may cost more jobs in the commercial sector (Wal-Mart) which depends on low priced items to low income consumers. The bellicose trade rhetoric on Capitol Hill and confrontational policies adopted by the White House are dangerous posturing, designed to deflect attention from the profound structural weaknesses of the domestic foundations of the empire. The deeply entrenched financial sector and the equally dominant military metaphysic which directs foreign policy have led the US down the steep slope of chronic economic crises, endless costly wars, deepening class and ethno-racial inequalities as well as declining living standards. In the new competitive multi-polar world order, the US cannot successfully follow the earlier path of blocking a rising imperial power’s access to strategic resources via colonial dictated boycotts. Not even in countries under US occupation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can the White House block China from signing lucrative investment and trade deals. With countries in the US sphere of influence, like Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the rate of growth of trade and investment with China far exceeds that of the US. Short of a full scale unilateral military blockade, the US cannot contain China’s rise as a world economic actor, a newly emerging imperial power. The major weakness in China is internal, rooted in class divisions and class exploitation, which the currently entrenched political elite profoundly linked through family and economic ties, might ameliorate but cannot eliminate[45]. Up to now China has been able to expand globally through a form of “social imperialism”, distributing a portion of the wealth generated overseas to a growing urban middle class and to upwardly mobile managers, professionals, real estate speculators and regional party cadre. In contrast the US, military directed overseas conquests have been costly with no economic returns and with long term damage to the civilian economy both in its internal and external manifestations. Iraq and Afghanistan do not reward the imperial treasury in anyway comparable to what England plundered from India, South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a world increasingly based in market relations, colonial style wars have no economic future. Huge military budgets and hundreds of military bases and military based alliances with neo-colonial states are the least efficient means to compete successfully in a globalized market place. That is the reason why the US is a declining empire and China, with its market driven approach is a newly emerging empire of a ‘new sort’ (sui generis).

# 1NR

## overview

#### Neoliberal accumulation reduces global growth while eroding US relative advantage through overexploitation and outsourcing

**de Graaff and van Apeldoorn ’10** (Nana, and Bastian, both from VU University in Amsterdam, “Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism: Anatomy of a Failed Hegemonic Project and the Future of US Geopolitics,” Critical Sociology 37(4) 403– 427, AM)

However, as the 20th century came to a close the contradictions and limits of the neoliberal globalization project became increasingly manifest. In particular we identify the following sets of contradictions. First, within different national state-society complexes, and arguably above all in the USA (see Harvey, 2003: 15–17), neoliberalism – as it promotes the commodification of everything, bringing more and more areas of social life under the discipline of markets and of capital – tends to engender an atomization and social disintegration to such an extent as to undermine the social order that sustains capital accumulation. Increasingly this has engendered awareness, also on the part of various elites, that these centrifugal forces somehow have to be contained. Second, and related to this fundamental social contradiction, since the end of the 1990s the political limits of neoliberalism have increasingly manifested themselves. What increasingly amounted to a transnational revolt against the discipline imposed by neoliberal globalization – or what Harvey (2003: 162–180) calls resistance against ‘accumulation by dispossession’ – takes on many different shapes and identities: from Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution; to the alter-globalization movement, and arguably also to some forms of radical political Islam. The transnational hegemony of neoliberalism has been weakening as a result. Thus Van der Pijl (2006: 405) is probably right in arguing that ‘[t]he neoliberal programme of the West, run aground across the globe, but tenaciously pursued nevertheless, has conjured up its own nemesis, which instills fear into ruling classes’. We may add here that the US ruling class in particular has reason to be the most fearful, as it has the most to lose. Third, neoliberal globalization produces new geo-economic and geopolitical tensions as the dynamics of global capital accumulation shift the centre of gravity of the global economy away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific. This historic shift may be seen as the price of the success of the very project of neoliberal globalization and how it has spread capitalist growth beyond the capitalist heartland. As described by both Arrighi (2005) and by Harvey (2003) the global process of endless capital accumulation, with US capital in the lead since the early 20th century, involves a process of constant geographical expansion as (surplus) capital needs to find new profitable outlets, especially in order to overcome capitalism’s chronic tendency to produce crises of over-accumulation. However, as Harvey explains, his ‘spatial fix’ as a way to resolve capitalism’s inner contradictions **only reproduces these contradictions on a bigger geographical scale,** as the export of capital creates ‘new spaces of capital accumulation [that] will ultimately generate surpluses and will seek ways to absorb them through geographical expansions’ (Harvey, 2003: 120). Whereas the capitalist growth generated by US capitalist expansion in such regions as Western Europe and Japan has not led to a successful challenge to US hegemony, arguably the more recent rise of East Asia, and especially China (Arrighi, 2005: 74–80) is of a different order, and has created rival centres of accumulation threatening the geopolitical and geo-economic preeminence of the US. The above outlined social, political and geopolitical contradictions and tensions became apparent before the manifestation of arguably the most fundamental contradiction of neoliberalism, which is that its finance-led accumulation strategy has produced enormous riches for a global rentier class that has effectively restored capitalist class hegemony under its leadership (Duménil and Levy, 2001), but is ultimately unable to sustain capitalist accumulation in the longer run. But, although with the burst of the dot com bubble and the subsequent recession, the limits of financialization became visible already shortly after the turn of the millennium, it was still at that time most of all the political project of neoliberalism – rather than its underlying accumulation strategy – that had entered into a hegemonic crisis (cf. Paul, 2007). It is this hegemonic crisis, we argue, that enabled the rise of an alternative hegemonic project.

#### Short-term price spikes are produced by speculators and cartels that are intrinsic to the system

Oliveros ’12(Benjie, managing editor of Bulatlat, a socialist/alternative online news site, “The invisible hand of monopolies”, <http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/02/27/the-invisible-hand-of-monopolies/>)

Pump prices of gasoline in the US has increased by 30 percent in the last two months to reach $3.52 a gallon. (This amounts to P150.51 a gallon or P37.63 a liter, much lower than Philippine oil prices.) US consumers fear that it would reach $4 a gallon. (P171 a gallon or P42.76 a liter) And yet, demand for oil in the US is at a 15-year low. Because of low demand, oil companies have been shutting down large refineries in the US. According to a report written by Matthew Philips “Angry About High Prices, Blame Shuttered Oil Refineries,” which was published by Bloomberg Businessweek, since December, the US has lost from four to five percent of its refining capacity. However, this hardly affected the supply of oil because, according to a report “Spiking Gas Prices: GOP Sides with Big Oil Again” published by www.opposingviews.com, the number of oil drilling rigs in the US quadrupled during the last three years. The number of its working oil and gas drilling rigs topped that of the world combined. So demand for oil is low and the supply has considerably increased. The blame could not rest on increasing production costs either. In fact, according to the same report, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, BP, Chevron and Shell racked up a combined profit of $137 billion in 2011 even if they produced four percent less oil. Thus, if the demand for oil in the US is low but supply is increasing, who or what is to blame for the spike in oil prices? I could think of two reasons. First, oil, aside from gold, is the current commodity of choice for speculators. In a May 2008 article published on the website “Geopolitics – Geoeconomics,” by F William Engdahl, he said, “As much as 60% of today’s crude oil price is pure speculation driven by large trader banks and hedge funds.” He cited a June 2006 report of the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations entitled “The Role of Market Speculation in rising oil and gas prices,” which revealed that “…there is substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the large amount of speculation in the current market has significantly increased prices.” The same US Senate report also discovered that a lot of companies trading in the oil futures market are not actually producers or users of oil. Who are these speculators? The same article identified Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, as the two leading energy trading firms, as well as Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase. Speculators have been taking advantage of tensions in Syria and Iran by frantically trading in the oil futures market – the New York Mercantile Exchange for light, sweet crude and the ICE futures for Brent crude, as well as the Dubai Mercantile Exchange – thereby pushing spot prices up. This has also been the case in 2008 when speculators took advantage of the unrest in the Middle East, Sudan, Venezuela and Pakistan even if no supply shocks actually happened. Second, what we are experiencing is the invisible hand of the oil monopolies – the biggest of which are Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and BP, with Chevron Texaco on fourth – that control the supply and dictate the prices of oil, and are the biggest winners in the spikes in oil prices. What is true in oil likewise applies in other commodities. Speculation and the invisible hand of monopolies play a major role in determining prices. Adam Smith must be turning in his grave. But mainstream economists and governments still refuse to look beyond their archaic, albeit rehashed, theories, which they label as new.

#### Market signals are pointing away from the OCS (SEE: Low prices – how great was the 2nc on this?), but the obsession with consumption hides the rational choice to consume less

Foster and McChesney 12

<http://monthlyreview.org/2012/05/01/the-endless-crisis>

John Bellamy Foster (born August 19, 1953) is a professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review. His writings focus on the political economy of capitalism and economic crisis, ecology and ecological crisis, and Marxist theory. He has published over one hundred articles, written and edited over a dozen books, given over one hundred conference papers and invited lectures all around the world, and received numerous awards and honors. His work is published in at least twenty-five languages. Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject.[1]

Robert Waterman McChesney is an American professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the Gutgsell Endowed Professor in the Department of Communication. His work concentrates on the history and political economy of communication, emphasizing the role media play in democratic and capitalist societies. McChesney has a particular interest in the state of journalism, and the relationship of media systems and structures to effective self-governance. He is the co-founder of Free Press, a national media reform organization. McChesney also hosts the “Media Matters” weekly radio program every Sunday afternoon on WILL-AM radio; it is the top-rated program in its time slot in the Champaign-Urbana area.[citation needed]

Since these theories of monopolistic competition challenged the notion of a freely competitive system, threatening the whole structure of orthodox economics, they were shunted aside—in an early version of the economics of innocent fraud—into a marginal realm within economics. A set of exceptions to perfect competition was recognized, but this was treated as outside the general model of the economy, which remained a world of perfect and pure competition. At the same time, economists introduced intermediary notions such as “workable competition” (a vague notion that in practice effective competition somehow continued) together with the idea of a new competition geared less to price competition than to innovation, i.e., the perennial gale of Schumpeterian “creative destruction.” Imperfect competition theory itself was reshaped to conform to the needs of economic orthodoxy. Hence, the notion of “monopolistic competition” was redefined simply to relate to conditions where numerous small firms were able to exploit favorable locations or product differentiation, while excluding oligopoly (the typical case) from the concept. Chamberlin himself was driven to object that oligopoly had been the starting point for monopolistic competition theory and its exclusion from the theory of monopolistic competition was absurd. “Monopolistic competition,” he complained, was “converted from an almost universal phenomenon, which it surely is…to the relatively unimportant one of differentiated products in the restricted case of ‘large numbers.’”59 Competition was therefore redefined in public discourse to mean “workable competition” as a vague analogue to perfect competition, while economists in their basic models continued to hold onto the abstract notion of perfect and/or pure competition. Instances of oligopolistic rivalry—i.e., the intense battles between quasi-monopolistic firms over markets, product differentiation, and low cost position (but seldom encompassing price cutting in final consumption markets)—were often erroneously treated as if they exemplified Smithian competition. Orthodox figures such as Milton Friedman meanwhile continued to argue that oligopolistic rivalry was the very antithesis of competition. It is this confused situation that gives rise to the ambiguity of competition.60 As Munkirs stated in The Transformation of American Capitalism: “Within the business community and the economics profession, [John Maurice] Clark’s concept of ‘workable competition’ and Schumpeter’s ‘gales of creative destruction’ were christened ‘the new competition.’ Simply by assigning a new meaning to the term competition, the ill effects of monopolistically competitive market structures were defined out of existence. Yet the real world does exist.”61 In contrast, radical and Marxian thinkers were dedicated to a realistic historical outlook, and, as they had no reason to hold on to the notion of free competition where it contradicted such reality, continued to analyze the growing role of monopoly in the modern economic system. For economist Rudolf Hilferding in Austria and Germany, such monopolization was characterized as the growth of “finance capital.”62 Lenin, following Hilferding, wrote of what he called “the monopoly stage of capitalism”—seeing this as the basis of modern imperialism.63 The iconoclastic U.S. economist Thorstein Veblen developed an early theory of monopoly capitalism as part of his critique of “absentee ownership.”64 Within the terrain of critical economics from the 1930s to ‘70s, Kalecki and Josef Steindl developed theories of the widening degree of monopoly and its relation to maturity and stagnation.65 The purpose of Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital, which drew much of its inspiration from Kalecki and Steindl, was “to begin the process of systematically analyzing monopoly capitalism on the basis of the experience of the most developed monopoly capitalist society”—the United States.66 Likewise such works as Harry Magdoff’s Age of Imperialism (1969), James O’Connor’s The Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973), and Harry Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974) relied on the concept of monopoly capital.67 Our own line of inquiry in this book builds on such analyses, attempting to understand the current phase of monopoly-finance capital, in which stagnation and financialization have emerged as interrelated trends on a global scale. Here the paradox of an economy where financialization rather than capital accumulation has now become the motor of the system is explored.

## rob

#### Framework is wrong—debate spaces should prioritize engagement in civil society in order to build momentum for social transformation—solves warming better than state engagement

Byrne et al 8

Byrne, et al., 2008.

In Peter Droege eds. Urban Energy Transition: From Fossil Fuels to Renewable Power.

Oxford, UK: Elsevier Pps.27-53.

As illustrated above, climate sustainability *cannot* succeed without robust participation by

the US. Yet, US national policy is built on inaction and delay of the type modelled above

This raises a fundamental political problem: how shall the world community interact with

American society to address the need for significant and rapid action.

Understandably, attention has been focused on US intransigence in UNFCCC treaty

negotiations. Our argument here should not be construed as, in any sense, a call for diminished

pressure on US national policy and its leadership. As we discuss below, however,

there is evidence of a sizeable and growing divide between American national policy and

civil society. This divide offers a second response to the political problem: engagement

of American communities prepared to participate in the repair of the atmospheric commons.

The politics of this strategy are merited not only by the possibility of overcoming

US national governmental inaction, but it may also more properly locate the ground and

momentum of the social change needed to halt the warming risk. As evident in the discussion

below, major reductions in CO2 emissions require community transformation.

National and international reduction targets and corresponding commitments of funds to

support social action are essential components of greenhouse politics, but these agendas can

neither embody the diversity of strategic actions needed, nor can they stand for community

will and action - the crucible of transformative change. Indeed, what we describe here as a

civil revolt against national policy underscores the incompleteness of nationally and internationally

organized politics, even when the challenge is surely global in character.

#### Only risk of a link turn—tech fixes create scientific authoritarianism—only the alt enables deliberative citizenship

Byrne and Toly 6

<http://seedconsortium.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/45925604/Byrne_etal.pdf>

Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Established in 1980 at the University of Delaware, the Center is a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy. CEEP is led by Dr. John Byrne, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University. For his contributions to Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1992, he shares the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with the Panel's authors and review editors.

The Technique of Modern Energy Governance While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul, 1964: 133 – 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality. From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar, technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical expertise.” Even the vanguard of a sustainable energy transition seems swayed by the magnetism of technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics. Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people” consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its operations. Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being recognized as the emblems of modernist politics. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which “deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process, [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over physical nature, ultimately control over man himself, the chief purpose of existence” (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically and technologically unassailable.

## perm

#### Pragmatism is the real illusion – if we win SUSTAINABILITY, it turns pragmatism back on them

Blackwater 12

<http://monthlyreview.org/2012/06/01/the-denialism-of-progressive-environmentalists>

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Conclusion: Calling Out Crackpot Realism The supposed trump card of Nordhaus and Shellenberger, and all such progressive environmentalists, is their purported realism. In practice this is simple conformity with the interests of the dominant economic and political power structures of the day. This means acceding to the related imperatives of financialized capitalism: accepting that both opportunities for growth be continually expanded, and that the self-identification of the electorate as materialistic consumers be fostered and pandered to—even if that means occluding the grounds for collective action. It is in these terms that they attempt to redefine environmentalism, and in the process disparage the efforts of all environmentalists whose arguments pose uncomfortable challenges to the status quo. They characterize all who are not with them as utopians, for them the ultimate in damning with faint praise. Mixed into the realism of the progressive environmentalist is a love of power. It stands to reason, they believe, that anyone who does not work within the terms set by the powerful will never share in power, and is therefore a fool. They regard the green movement as a whole precisely as the wider New Democrat/New Labour mentality regards the left as a whole: well-meaning, woolly, oppositionalist, self-indulgent, self-defeating, and pathetic. Ideologically pure the others may be; yet if they sincerely cared about the interests they said they were fighting for, they ought to fall into line, however much they might detest it, behind the realists who might actually wield some practical influence. There is no alternative. At other times less crude versions of this doctrine, especially ones which promised real hope of reforming the system from within and of gaining power to change power, have had much to recommend them; this is the foundation for the historic successes of social democracy. But things are different now. Above all, in this context, environmental limits preclude continuation of the status quo. Progressive environmentalists pride themselves on their realism and in being intimates of the power structures of the present. However, those same structures are doomed to collapse, and belief in them is only sustained by denial, so this realism is in fact the very height of fantasy—“crackpot realism,” to adapt the phrase C. Wright Mills used to describe the mentality of the Cold War.12 The strategy for those who wish to reply to Nordhaus and Shellenberger and to marginalize them as spokesmen for the environmental movement ought to be clear—turn the tables on them by emphasizing the self-contradictions, simplistic fantasy, and the sheer insubstantiality of their thought. And to emphasize the important fact: it is too late to play games.

#### Demanding continued consumption at all costs makes democratic debate impossible

Byrne et al 9

[http://bst.sagepub.com/content/29/2/81.full.pdf+html](http://bst.sagepub.com/content/29/2/81.full.pdf%2Bhtml)

Paradigm Shift Shedding the institutions that created the prospect of climate change will not happen on the watch of the green titans or extra large nuclear power. The modern cornucopian political economy fueled by abundant, carbon-free energy machines will, in fact, risk the possibility of climate change continually because of the core properties of the modern institutional design. Although the abundant energy machine originated and matured in the United States and industrial Europe, the logic of unending growth built into the modern model has promoted its global spread. Today, both extra-large nuclear power and industrial-scale renewables are at the forefront of the trillion dollar clean energy technology development and transfer process envisioned for the globe (International Energy Agency, 2006). Nuclear energy is seen as offering unlimited potential for rapid development in India and China, while large-scale renewables seamlessly fit into existing international financial aid schemes. A burgeoning renewables industry boasts economic opportunities in standardization and certification for delivering green titans to developing countries. If institutional change is to occur, if energy-society relations are to be transformed, and if the threat of global warming is to be earnestly addressed, we will have to design and experiment with alternatives other than these. Given the global character of the challenge, cookie cutter counter-strategies are certain to fail. Often, outside the box alternatives may not be sensible in the modern context. Like a paradigm shift, we need ideas, and actions guided by them, which fail in one context (here, specifically, the context of energy obesity) in order hopefully to support the appearance of a new context. The concept and practice of a sustainable energy utility is offered in this spirit.11 The sustainable energy utility (SEU) involves the creation of an institution with the explicit purpose of enabling communities to reduce and eventually eliminate use of obese energy resources and reliance on obese energy organizations. It is formed as a nonprofit organization to support commons energy development and management. Unlike its for-profit contemporaries, it has no financial or other interest in commodification of energy, ecological, or social relations; its success lies wholly in the creation of shared benefits and responsibilities. The SEU is not a panacea nor is it a blueprint for fixing our energy-carbon problems. It is a strategy to change energy-ecology-society relations. It may not work, but we believe it is worth the effort to invent and pursue the possibility. There should be little doubt about the difficulty of the task. Regimes develop through the interplay of technology and society over time, rather than through prescribed programs. They alter history and then seek to prevent its change, except in ways that bolster regime power. Of specific importance here, obese utilities will not simply cede political and economic success to an antithetical institution—the SEU. That is why change is so hard to realize. Shifting a society towards a new energy regime requires diverse actors working in tandem, across all areas of regime influence. Economic models, political will, social norm development, all these things must be shifted, rather than pulled, from the current paradigm. The SEU constructs energy–ecology-society relations as phenomena of a commons governance regime. It explicitly reframes the preeminent obese energy regime organization—the energy utility—in the antithetical context of using less energy. And, when energy use is needed, it relies on renewable sources available to and therefore governable by the community of users (rather than the titan technology approach of governance by producers). In contrast to the cornucopian strategy of expanding inputs in an effort to endlessly feed the obese regime, the SEU focuses on techniques and social arrangements which can serve the aims of sustainability and equity. It combines political and economic change for the purpose of building a postmodern energy commons; that is, a form of political economy that relies on commons, rather than commodity, relations for its evolution. Specifically, it uses the ideas of a commonwealth economy and a community trust to achieve the goal of postmodern energy sustainability.

## at: t wars

#### No unique cause collapse is inevitable

#### No impact

Love ‘8 (Thomas, professor of Anthropology and Environmental Studies at Linfield College, Oregon. He specializes on rural livelihood in the Peruvian highlands and adjacent Amazonia, as well as in his native US Pacific Northwest. His current focus is on the social and cultural implications of oil consumption patterns in these regions, “Anthropology and the fossil fuel era,” ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 24 No 2, April 2008, AM)

Peak oil pessimists envision a return to harsh preindustrial agrarian conditions. Some rely on Joseph Tainter’s (1988) work, which represented collapse of complex societies as an economizing strategy: the marginal costs of maintaining complexity simply become no longer worthwhile to bear. Yet the spectre of marauding bands of starving urbanites need not materialize. Recent research suggests that humans are genetically predisposed to fairness, even at cost to ourselves: think of the normative pressure among foragers toward generalized reciprocity (Heinrich et al. 2004, Richerson and Boyd 2005). This would suggest that powerdown could be managed if the burden of reducing consumption were shared more or less fairly, as is indeed evident in experiences of scarcity in the industrial countries during the Great Depression and World War II as well as the daily burden of living on a low energy budget for the world’s poor majority. Economic contraction would encourage ethnogenesis and cultural diversification, making use of known and new cultural materials. But how might emerging local communities protect local adaptations from the corrosive effects of corporate-driven, mass media-propagated high consumption?

#### Apocalyptic scenario planning in energy policy is a form of emergency logic engineered to uphold consumption

Labban 12

Preempting Possibility: Critical Assessment of the IEA's World Energy Outlook 2010

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WEO 2010 projections are framed by a geography that reifies the world as six overlapping regions structured by three binaries: OECD and non-OECD; OPEC and non-OPEC; Annex 1 and non-Annex 1. This functional geography is produced and underpinned by the IEA's idealized market which is emptied of political power and whose unevenness is flattened into perfect symmetry that defines most countries of the world by what they are not. Regardless of their respective political economic power, governments are organized in a functional taxonomy that classifies them according to their position in the IEA's schema of market-based sustainability. Governments are reduced to technocracies, governance to enabling the market to promote sustainability. A ‘sustainable energy future’ demands that governments provide incentives and reduce risk to private investors and financial institutions. An unfettered market, where financiers can pursue guaranteed returns with minimum risk, will deliver economic growth and environmental security — and the more the market is reproduced at new material and social levels, the more growth and better security. This is where the passive-aggressive logic of finance meets the blackmail of environmental catastrophe: large investments are needed to curb greenhouse emissions, and the alternative to an attractive investment climate everywhere is a global climate warmer by 6° C and an atmospheric accumulation of 42.6 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalents by 2035. In this apocalyptic imaginary, as Swyngedouw (2010) would call it, governments have to act now — there is no time to contemplate alternative socio-environmental futures and to question the inequality, injustice and violence that underpin continued economic growth and market expansion under the present conditions. There is an emergency that requires entrusting the management of our collective socio-ecological predicament to the anti-democratic techno-managerial apparatuses of states, intergovernmental organizations, corporations and banks. Political debate about the implications of market-led governance to democracy is foreclosed by scenarios in which agency is divided between governments as active enablers and investors as passive actors in a self-reproducing market. The scenarios of WEO 2010 reveal the inability of its authors to imagine a future substantially and qualitatively different from the present as much as a desire to ensure that the present persists in the future. For all the enthusiasm about a ‘revolution in the energy system’, the IEA is averse to any real revolution that would transform environmental governance and produce different forms of government in which people democratically dispose of resources and energies. By bringing the apocalyptic future into the present, WEO 2010 scenarios ensure that such revolutions do not happen and that the energy system in the future only functions better than it does today to fuel the expansion of capitalism and bring more people into its fold. Revolution in the energy system means nothing without a revolution that would turn the question of energy into a question of equality and justice, and this requires reclaiming from the technocratic managerial class the task — the responsibility — of thinking the unthinkable: democratic and egalitarian energy futures.

#### 2. Epistemology—the cult of productionism CROWDS OUT other options through insistence on POLICY

Zehner 12

Green illusions,

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Zehner primarily researches the social, political and economic conditions influencing energy policy priorities and project outcomes. His work also incorporates symbolic roles that energy technologies play within political and environmental movements. His other research interests include consumerism, urban policy, environmental governance, international human rights, and forgeries.

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Perhaps it's all too easy for us to miss the limitations of alternative energy as we drop to our knees at the foot of the clean energy spectacle, gasping in rapture. The spectacle has become a divine deity around which duty-bound citizens gravitate to chant objectives without always reflecting upon fundamental goals. This oracle conveys a ready-made creed of ideals, objectives, and concepts that are convenient to recite. And so these handy notions inevitably become the content of environmental discourse. In a process of self-fashioning, environmentalists offer their arms to the productivist tattoo artist to embroider wind, solar, and biofuels into the subcutaneous flesh of the movement. These novelties come to define what it means to be an environmentalist.1 Environmentalists aren't the only ones lining up for ink. Peer pressure is a formidable power, and there's no reason to assume that rational adults are above its dealings. Every news article, environmental protest, congressional committee hearing, textbook entry, and bumper sticker creates an occasion for the visibility of solar cells, wind power, and other productivist technologies. Numerous actors draw upon these moments of visibility to articulate paths these technologies ought to follow.2 First, diverse groups draw upon flexible clean-energy definitions to attract support. Then they roughly sculpt energy options into more appealing promises—not through experimentation, but by planning, rehearsing, and staging demonstrations. Next, lobbyists, strategic planners, and pr teams transfer the promises into legislative and legal frameworks and eventually into necessities for engineers to pursue. A consequence of this visibility-making is the necessary invisibility of other options. There's only so much room on the stage.

#### 3. Unsustainability—ideas now enable action later

Zehner 12

Green illusions,

Ozzie Zehner is the author of Green Illusions and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. His recent publications include public science pieces in Christian Science Monitor, The American Scholar, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The Humanist, The Futurist, and Women’s Studies Quarterly. He has appeared on PBS, BBC, CNN, MSNBC, and regularly guest lectures at universities. Zehner’s research and projects have been covered by The Sunday Times, USA Today, WIRED, The Washington Post, Business Week and numerous other media outlets. He also serves on the editorial board of Critical Environmentalism.

Zehner primarily researches the social, political and economic conditions influencing energy policy priorities and project outcomes. His work also incorporates symbolic roles that energy technologies play within political and environmental movements. His other research interests include consumerism, urban policy, environmental governance, international human rights, and forgeries.

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Are the first steps in this book sufficient to create such a compelling American model? No. They're simply a start. Nevertheless, I never intended to write a grand narrative. Frankly, I'm not so sure it would be worth reading if I did. But what if I had attempted to do so? What could I have drawn upon? I might have launched directly into the gut of environmental ethics, American religion, and knowledge frameworks by quoting Lynn White, who argued in the 1960s: "More science and more technology are not going to get us out of the present ecological crisis until we find a new religion, or rethink the one we have." I could have scripted an impassioned introduction drawing upon writers such as Bill McKibben, Vandana Shiva, Joseph Stiglitz, James Lovelock, and Raj Patel.5 And there are the many thinkers featured in the volume Moral Ground: Ethical Action for a Planet in Peril to consider as well.6 I could then have tempered their optimism by quoting cantankerous theorists such as, Curtis White, author of The Middle Mind: Why Americans Don't Think for Themselves and The Barbaric Heart: Faith, Money, and the Crisis of Nature; James Howard Kunstler, author of The Long Emergency, Chris Hedges, author of American Fascists; and John Michael Greer, author of The Ecotechnic Future? Or I could have featured the more scientific sobrieties of Elizabeth Kolbert, author of Field Notes from a Catastrophe, or Fen Montaigne, author of Eraser's Penguins.8 Alternately, I could have opted for an equally provocative (and ideologically charged) beginning by framing imperialism as the root of our environmental problems and quoting documentary filmmaker Philippe Diaz who claims: "The first resource we took was the land, and when you take the land away from the people, you create the slave. . . . How did these small countries like Great Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium become these huge empires with almost no resources whatsoever? Well, by taking by force, of course, resources from the South."9 I might have drawn upon any number of historians, anthropologists, and social scientists who maintain that over the past five hundred years, we've become more efficient at performing these extractions, primarily through the economic instruments we call privatization, debt service, and free trade (as well as through good old-fashioned force and intimidation). From there, I could have quoted the activist Derrick Jensen, who observes, Once a people have committed (or enslaved) themselves to a growth economy, they've pretty much committed themselves to a perpetual war economy, because in order to maintain this growth, they will have to continue to colonize an ever-wider swath of the planet and exploit its inhabitants.. .. The bad news for those committed to a growth economy is that it's essentially a dead-end street: once you've overshot your home's carrying capacity, you have only two choices: keep living beyond the means of the planet until your culture collapses; or proactively elect to give up the benefits you gained from the conquest in order to save your culture.10 To extend his affront to growthism, I could have drawn upon insight from Daniel Quinn, Donella H. Meadows, the antics of The Yes Men, and solutions from the multiauthored volume Alternatives to Economic Globali{ation.u This approach would have formed a springboard to consider inequality. I might even have chosen to characterize America as a young dynasty system. I could have started by featuring thinkers who point out that this dynasty system has actually increased prosperity for all Americans, not just the rich. Next I could have featured social scientists who argue that while Americans have traditionally idealized storylines portraying the social and economic mobility among classes, the American socioeconomic system today is actually quite rigid—where and to whom you are born is becoming an ever more accurate predictor of future prosperity. I may have argued that unequal structures of material wealth, power, and dynastic pressure pose distinct challenges to strengthening environmental fundamentals. These themes get fleshed out in Winner-Take-All Politics by Paul Pierson and Jacob S. Hacker, The Spirit Lev elby Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, Griftopia by Matt Taibbi, and by a wide range of political scientists in the book Inequality and American Democracy.1Z Next I could have pointed to those theorists who argue that extreme capitalism cannot coexist with a durable environmental movement. Among them is James Gustave Speth, author of The Bridge at the End of the World, who admits that his conclusion, "after much searching and considerable reluctance, is that most environmental deterioration is a result of systemic failures of the capitalism that we have today and that long-term solutions must seek transformative change in the key features of this contemporary capitalism."13 Another moderate voice I could have chosen to highlight is John Perkins, a self-described "economic hit man" who was a gear in this machinery for a decade, a position he describes in several books on the topic. In a recent interview, he insisted, "I don't think the failure is capitalism, I think it is a specific kind of capitalism that we've developed in the last thirty or forty years, particularly beginning with the time of Reagan and Milton Friedman's economic theories, which stress that the only goal of business is to maximize profits, regardless of the social and environmental costs and not to regulate businesses at all ... and to privatize everything so that everything is run by private business."14 Today it is difficult to imagine that through the first hundred years of America's adolescence the government required corporations to apply for charters detailing how the company served the public good. Every ten years or so, the charters would come up for renewal and if the company's directors could not prove that the company was serving the public interest, the government revoked their charter and disbanded the company. That changed in the late i 88os, when the U.S. Supreme Court started to treat corporations more like individuals. Numerous thinkers analyze the corporation's rise from a wide array of vantage points. Among them are Joel Bakan, author of The Corporationy Naomi Klein, author of The Shock Doctrine; Carl Safina, author of The View from Laiy Point; as well as many volumes by David Harvey, Sam Smith, Slavoj Zizek, and of course the public intellectual, Noam Chomsky.1' These critiques would have opened up room to imagine new forms of democracy, community, and economy, such as those envisioned in Kirkpatrick Sale's Human Scale and William A. Shutkin's The Land That Could Be}6 Instead of negotiating that thicket of leftist thorns, I might have chosen to avoid it by paddling my grand narrative through the varied seductions of technology itself. I could have started by discussing Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, cautioning how technological adoration might overcome our capacity to think.17 Or I might have chosen E. M. Forster's novella The Machine Stops, written over a hundred years ago with spine-tingling premonition.18 I could have moved on to discuss the symbolism of environmental initiatives by drawing on Yanow Dvora's How Does a Policy Mean?, Charles Lindblom's Inquiry and Change, and Neil Postman's books Building a Bridge to the 18th Century and Amusing Ourselves to DeathI might have chosen to investigate the interstitial forces between society and technology more broadly, as portrayed by thinkers such as David Nye, Andrew Feenburg, Sherry Turkle, Michel Foucault, and Thomas Kuhn.20 Many others are featured in the edited volume Technology and Society: Building Our Sociotechnical Future.u I could even have focused on the specific blend of social, personal, and technological challenges to achieving a truly sustainable energy system. But that excellent book, Sustainable Energy Consumption and Society, has already been written by David Goldblatt.22 In anticipation of those who might say that any grand narrative challenging established conceptions of capitalism, growth, inequality, consumption, and governance is but a dreamy impracticality, I might have gone so far as to quote the stalwart Milton Friedman, who observed: "Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas

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that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable."23 On more likely, I might simply have quoted Gar Alperovitz, who reminds us in his book America Beyond Capitalism that "fundamental change—indeed, radical systemic change—is as common as grass in world history." And finally, in the epilogue, I might even have attempted to trick you into reading a "further readings" list by couching it in terms of a grand narrative.