# 1NC

## t

A. Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Nuclear power is fission in a reactor

EIA, US Energy Information Administration, no date

(“Glossary,” <http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm>)

Nuclear electric power (nuclear power):  Electricity generated by the use of the thermal energy released from the fission of nuclear fuel in a reactor.

Nuclear fuel:  Fissionable materials that have been enriched to such a composition that, when placed in a nuclear reactor, will support a self-sustaining fission chain reaction, producing heat in a controlled manner for process use.

Nuclear reactor:  An apparatus in which a nuclear fission chain reaction can be initiated, controlled, and sustained at a specific rate. A reactor includes fuel (fissionable material), moderating material to control the rate of fission, a heavy-walled pressure vessel to house reactor components, shielding to protect personnel, a system to conduct heat away from the reactor, and instrumentation for monitoring and controlling the reactor's systems.

#### Produce means generation of electricity

Ayres 73

Judge, Majority opinion

 SOUTHWESTERN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lewis P. CONGER et al., Defendants-Appellees No. 12150 Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit 280 So. 2d 254; 1973 La. App. LEXIS 6127

The word "develop" in La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19:1 must be considered synonymous with the word "produce" and hence refers to the production or generation of electricity.

C. You should vote negative:

Decisionmaking—debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

Dialogue. Debate’s critical axis is a form of dialogic communication within a confined game space.

Unbridled affirmation outside the game space makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of

Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have

taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

Dialogue is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

Morson 4

<http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331>

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

 Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

#### Independently, breaking a NEW K AFF destroys engagement. Even if we can debate them on an undisclosed topical aff or a previously run critical aff, the combination is impossible.

#### An open model creates the best politics and arguments

Torvalds and Diamond ‘1

[Linus (Creator of Linux) and David (freelance contributor to the New York Times and Business Week); “Why Open Source Makes Sense”; Educause Review; November/December; p. 71-2 //nick]

It's the best illustration of the limitless benefits to be derived from the open source philosophy. While the PC wasn't developed using the open source model, it is an example of a technology that was opened for any person or company to clone and improve and sell. In its purest form, the open source model allows anyone to participate in a project's development or commercial exploitation. Linux is obviously the most successful example. What started out in my messy Helsinki bedroom has grown to become the largest collaborative project in the history of the world. It began as an ideology shared by software developers who believed that computer source code should be shared freely, with the General Public License - the anticopyright - as the movement's powerful tool. It evolved to become a method for the continuous development of the best technology. And it evolved further to accept widespread market acceptance, as seen in the snowballing adoption of Linux as an operating system for web servers, and in its unexpectedly generous IPOs. What was inspired by ideology has proved itself as technology and is working in the marketplace. Now open source expanding beyond the technical and business domains. At Harvard University Law School, professors Larry Lessig (who is now at Stanford) and Charles Nesson have brought the open source model to law. They started the Open Law Project, which relies on volunteer lawyers and law students posting opinions and research on the project's Web site to help develop arguments and briefs challenging the United States Copyright Extension Act. The theory is that the strongest arguments will be developed when the largest number of legal minds are working on a project, and as a mountain of information is generated through postings and repostings. The site nicely sums up the trade off from the traditional approach: "**What we lose in secrecy, we expect to regain in depth of sources and breadth of argument."** (Put in another context: With a million eyes, all software bugs will vanish.) It's a wrinkle on how academic research has been conducted for years, but one that makes sense on a number of fronts. Think of how this approach could speed up the development of cures for diseases, for example. Or how, with the best minds on the task, international diplomacy could be strengthened. As the world becomes smaller, as the pace of life and business intensifies, and as the technology and information become available, people realise the tight-fisted approach is becoming increasingly outmoded. The theory behind open source is simple. In the case of an operating system - is free. Anyone can improve it, change it, exploit it. But those improvements, changes and exploitations have to be made freely available. Think Zen. The project belongs to no one and everyone. When a project is opened up, there is rapid and continual improvement. With teams of contributors working in parallel, the results can happen far more speedily and successfully than if the work were being conducted behind closed doors. That's what we experienced with Linux. Imagine: Instead of a tiny cloistered development team working in secret, you have a monster on your side. Potentially millions of the brightest minds are contributing to the project, and are supported by a peer-review process that has no, er, peer.

The first time people hear about the open source approach, it sounds ludicrous. That's why it has taken years for the message of its virtues to sink in. Ideology isn't what has sold the open source model. It started gaining attention when it was obvious that open source was the best method of developing and improving the highest quality technology. And now it is winning in the marketplace, an accomplishment has brought open source its greatest acceptance. Companies were able to be created around numerous value-added services, or to use open source as a way of making a technology popular. When the money rolls in, people get convinced. One of the least understood pieces of the open source puzzle is how so many good programmers would deign to work for absolutely no money. A word about motivation is in order. In a society where survival is more or less assured, money is not the greatest of motivators. It's been well established that folks do their best work when they are driven by a passion. When they are having fun. This is as true for playwrights and sculptors and entrepreneurs as it is for software engineers. The open source model gives people the opportunity to live their passion. To have fun and to work with the world's best programmers, not the few who happen to be employed by their company. Open source developers strive to earn the esteem of their peers. That's got to be highly motivating.

## case

#### Testing causes rapid arms races and global nuclear use

Rebecca Johnson 1, Executive Director – Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, “Bush Has Been Ditching Treaties Since He Came To Power He Must Be Stopped Before It's Too Late”, The Guardian, <http://www.georgewalkerbush.net/ditchingtreaties.htm>

Then they put private, commercial interests above implementing and verifying the treaties banning chemical, biological and toxin weapons, but I did not speak out because such weapons are too complicated for media coverage. Then they threatened the nuclear test ban treaty, and I did not speak out, because the United States is a major ally that I did not want to offend. Then the international arms control and non-proliferation regimes collapsed. Americans weren't bothered at first, for hadn't the government promised a super-sophisticated force field round the whole nation that no terrorist or missile would ever penetrate? So nuclear testing resumed in Nevada for new warheads to improve the kill prospects of missile interceptors and to penetrate deep into enemies' bunkers. India had been waiting for just such a go-ahead, and Pakistan soon followed; both raced to test warheads to fit on to missiles, upping the tension in Kashmir and along the borders with China. Free now to resume its own testing, China boosted its programme to modernise and increase the size of its small nuclear arsenal. Somewhat reluctantly, Russia followed. Moscow suspended all further reductions and cooperative security and safety programmes for its still-large nuclear arsenal and facilities. Within a few short years, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was just another discarded agreement. Many governments with nuclear power programmes developed nuclear weapons as well, while others fitted anthrax or sarin on to weapons, just in case. Most hadn't wanted to, but fearful that their neighbours would, all felt compelled. Regional rivalries grew quickly into major international problems. Alliances collapsed amid suspicion and recriminations. The burgeoning arms races even spread into outer space, threatening military surveillance, as well as public communication, entertainment and navigation. No one knew who had what. Deterrence was empty, as defence analysts calculated the advantages of the pre-emptive strike. In that terrified atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust, someone launched first. And then it was too late to speak out. The Republicans hadn't yet managed to get missile defence to work. Such a doomsday scenario is not so fanciful. On July 7, the New York Times announced that President Bush wants to ditch the comprehensive test ban treaty. A week before, the administration asked nuclear laboratories to work out how quickly the US could resume testing after its nine-year moratorium. If Bush were to back out of the test ban treaty or break the moratorium on nuclear testing - undertaken with China, Russia, Britain and France - he would also explicitly breach agreements made last May, when 187 countries negotiated measures to strengthen and implement the non-proliferation treaty.

#### The repression-lashout link has been disproven

Havi Carel 6, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, “Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger”, googlebooks

Secondly, the constancy principle on which these ideas are based is incompatible with observational data. Once the passive model of the nervous system has been discarded, there was no need for external excitation in order for discharge to take place, and more generally, "the behavioural picture seemed to negate the notion of drive, as a separate energizer of behaviour" {Hcbb. 1982. p.35). According to Holt, the nervous system is not passive; it does not take in and conduct out energy from the environment, and it shows no tendency to discharge its impulses. 'The principle of constancy is quite without any biological basis" (1965, p. 109). He goes on to present the difficulties that arise from the pleasure principle as linked to a tension-reduction theory. The notion of tension is "conveniently ambiguous": it has phenomenological, physiological and abstract meaning. But empirical evidence against the theory of tension reduction has been "mounting steadily" and any further attempts to link pleasure with a reduction of physiological tension are "decisively refuted" (1965, pp. 1102). Additionally, the organism and the mental system are no longer considered closed systems. So the main arguments for the economic view collapse, as does the entropic argument for the death drive (1965, p. 114). A final, more general criticism of Freud's economic theory is sounded by Compton, who argues, "Freud fills in psychological discontinuities with neurological hypotheses" (1981, p. 195). The Nirvana principle is part and parcel of the economic view and the incomplete and erroneous assumptions about the nervous system (Hobson, 1988, p.277). It is an extension ad extremis of the pleasure principle, and as such is vulnerable to all the above criticisms. The overall contemporary view provides strong support for discarding the Nirvana principle and reconstructing the death drive as aggression.

#### Chernus is archetypal psychology

Stuart Z. **Charne**, Rutgers, December **1991**, “Book Reviews,” Review of Religious Research, v. 33, no. 2, p. jstor

**This book demonstrates** many of **the** strengths and **weaknesses of psycho-historical interpretations**. Much of **the argument is carried by** suggestive **analogies and** heuristic **metaphors**, extended descriptions of suprapersonal entities like nations, cultures, and civilizations “as if’ they operated according to individual psychodynamics. **Chernus himself sprinkles disclaimers throughout his book denying that his interpretations are empirically verifiable or** indeed are **anything more than** useful **fictions** to stimulate thought. By the end of the book, however, Chernus’ commitment to a particular psychological and metaphysical perspective is more than metaphorical. **In his rush to reconnect to an archetypal world of symbols and images, he tends to be** somewhat **dismissive of more concrete political, economic, historical and scientific perspectives relating to nuclear arms.**

#### Archetypal psychology collapses into facism

**Kadmus**, author of dozens of articles on psychology and Jungian psychology expert, **1999**, “Critique of James Hillman’s Archetypal Psychology,” online: http://home.swipnet.se/~w-73784/hillmcrit.htm, accessed September 29, 2005

Quite **contrary to what H[illman]. infers, Jung's psychology is not about enforcing some ideas of goal-directedness onto the patient**, e.g, "the anima must be integrated," et cetera. Jung emphasizes that **it's necessary to look at the compensating contents within the unconscious. If the unconscious is not friendly towards starting analysis in the traditional form, it must be acknowledged**. For instance, if a patient needs to lie on the beach for a while since he is a workaholic, then it's necessary to listen to the unconscious and not force some rigid conceptions on the patient. The unconscious compensates the conscious standpoint - this is the key sentence to the understanding of analytical psychology. Comparatively, **Hillman's psychology must be branded as dogmatic. His psychology engenders an overestimation of the psychic images**. This would be typical for the puer aeternus who has a hard time adapting to everyday reality. In The Soul's Code H[illman]. speaks about the artistic demon in each of us and how we must try to find beauty around us, trying to love what we see. But this is nothing new. This is the well-known conception of the artist and the poet. Western society has always swarmed with these people who have a subjectivistic and romantic view of the world. Many of them continue all their life to live as puers, sitting under the oak tree, writing poetry. This is not wrong provided that it is done in unison with the unconscious. However, **in Jungian psychology there exist no patent truths. One must always regard the unconscious as a compensating force and** one must **approach life unbiased** and see what the unconscious has prepared beforehand. **Hillman shuns this apprehensive attitude towards the unconscious and, instead, builds a dogma out of a specific case**; the aesthetic conception. But this is merely the remedy in special cases and, perhaps, during a specific time within an individual's lifetime. Hillman's approach is dogmatic, something that Jung strongly rejects. In fact, **Hillman's notions are politically quite threatening and are close to the views of Josef** (Georg) **Lanz von Liebenfels who brought up Hitler on the notions of a "beautiful" and subjectivistic view of the world which would be created following the destruction of the existing society. Hillman says: "The calling from the eternal world demands that this world here be turned upside down,** to restore its nearness to the moon; lunacy, love, poetics" (Hillman, The Soul's Code, p.282). **Consequently, Hillman's notion of a poetic basis of mind, which looks upon everything with the eyes of imagination, is, potentially, quite evil. It is an unscientific viewpoint wherein all world pictures and human actions are expressions of subjective phantasies**. We live in a big phantasmagoria, so to speak. This is alluring to the artistic personality. The fanatic artist wants to create a phantasy world of his own rather than relating to objective, grey reality. Actually, **Hillman wants to take his archetypal psychology "out on the street" and make it a collective dogma**. Every man should become a poet who creates a phantasy-world for himself and thus make the world "beautiful and pleasant." This was actually the case during the Third Reich. Among the Nazi bigwigs were many artists who had thoroughly subjectivistic views of the world. The new world they wanted to create comprised of a beautiful aryan race, grand architecture in "Ceausescu" style, strange pagan rituals with elements from Norse mythology and freemasonry, et cetera… Here we have to realize that **the notion of likeness in psychology is not at all what the “same” notion meant in the ancient tradition from which archetypal psy­chology took it over**. It is not at all the same “likeness” as the Judeo-Christian idea of man having been created “in Our image and likeness” nor as the neopla­tonic idea of resemblances. **In those cases, it might** perhaps **be possible to speak of a direct connection**, inasmuch as with them there is a kind of analogia entis, an ontological continuity. Jung, too, might have been justly able to use the neoplatonic term likeness. For he had the archetypes-in-themselves (as problematic as they may be) of which our images and lived experience were their empirical manifestation. For him, **the “di­rect connection” would not have been between myth and our afflictions, but be­tween the archetypes-in-themselves and the archetypal image inherent in our af­flictions**. Likewise **the relation between myth and our complexes that Jung would** also **assert exists would** for him **be an indirect relation**, namely **one mediated by the archetypes-in-themselves**, inasmuch as these same archetypes-in-themselves were the factors that had given rise to the myths then, and give rise to our syn­dromes today. As with the Neoplatonists, **this way of thinking operated with a vertical relation and an ontological gradation or continuity. This is something to­tally different from the horizontal, “direct connection” between ancient Greek myths**

(i.e., tales positively given as texts, which are contents of our higher educa­tion) **and our syndromes. Jung’s “archetype-in-itself’ concept is expressly elimi­nated from archetypal psychology**, and the Neoplatonists’ metaphysic underlying their idea of likeness is rejected or at least left in suspension. With systematic determination **imaginal psychology shuns taking a philosophi­cal (ontological, metaphysical) stand to back up its use of the ancient idea of “likeness.” Its “resemblances” are not grounded in any ontological continuity be­tween different realms of being. But this does not stop imaginal psychology from making use of this theory. It enjoys the benefits this theory provides**, namely **the metaphysical (archetypal) aura and the feeling**-tone **of** dignity and **provenness** adhering to this old philosophical concept, **without subscribing to the metaphysics which alone was once able to authorize it**. Thus one might say that **imaginal psy­chology’s use of this theory** is playful, noncommittal, “post-modem,” a “language game,” whose grounding **is wanting**. What once was a metaphysical conception of reality has in fact (even though not in mente) been reduced to a mere formality, a method to be applied ad libitum for the pragmatic purpose of our making sense of our afflictions. The “Internet” version of the theory of resemblances.

#### Weakening weapons causes miscalculation and breaks down deterrence

John P. Caves 10, Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University, “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada514285>

Perceptions of a compromised U.S. nuclear deterrent as described above would have profound policy implications, particularly if they emerge at a time when a nucleararmed great power is pursuing a more aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and partners in its region in a bid to enhance its regional and global clout. ■ A dangerous period of vulnerability would open for the United States and those nations that depend on U.S. protection while the United States attempted to rectify the problems with its nuclear forces. As it would take more than a decade for the United States to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing events could preclude a return to anything like the status quo ante. ■ The assertive, nuclear-armed great power, and other major adversaries, could be willing to challenge U.S. interests more directly in the expectation that the United States would be less prepared to threaten or deliver a military response that could lead to direct conflict. They will want to keep the United States from reclaiming its earlier power position. ■ Allies and partners who have relied upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. nuclear protection as a foundation of their security could lose faith in those assurances. They could compensate by accommodating U.S. rivals, especially in the short term, or acquiring their own nuclear deterrents, which in most cases could be accomplished only over the mid- to long term. A more nuclear world would likely ensue over a period of years. ■ Important U.S. interests could be compromised or abandoned, or a major war could occur as adversaries and/or the United States miscalculate new boundaries of deterrence and provocation. At worst, war could lead to state-on-state employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more catastrophic than what nuclear-armed terrorists alone could inflict. Continuing Salience of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons, like all instruments of national security, are a means to an end— national security—rather than an end in themselves. Because of the catastrophic destruction they can inflict, resort to nuclear weapons should be contemplated only when necessary to defend the Nation’s vital interests, to include the security of our allies, and/or in response to comparable destruction inflicted upon the Nation or our allies, almost certainly by WMD. The retention, reduction, or elimination of nuclear weapons must be evaluated in terms of their contribution to national security, and in particular the extent to which they contribute to the avoidance of circumstances that would lead to their employment. Avoiding the circumstances that could lead to the employment of nuclear weapons involves many efforts across a broad front, many outside the military arena. Among such efforts are reducing the number of nuclear weapons to the level needed for national security; maintaining a nuclear weapons posture that minimizes the likelihood of inadvertent, unauthorized, or illconsidered use; improving the security of existing nuclear weapons and related capabilities; reducing incentives and closing off avenues for the proliferation of nuclear and other WMD to state and nonstate actors, including with regard to fissile material production and nuclear testing; enhancing the means to detect and interdict the transfer of nuclear and other WMD and related materials and capabilities; and strength ening our capacity to defend against nuclear and other WMD use. For as long as the United States will depend upon nuclear weapons for its national security, those forces will need to be reliable, adequate, and credible. Today, the United States fields the most capable strategic nuclear forces in the world and possesses globally recognized superiority in any conventional military battlespace. No state, even a nuclear-armed near peer, rationally would directly challenge vital U.S. interests today for fear of inviting decisive defeat of its conventional forces and risking nuclear escalation from which it could not hope to claim anything resembling victory. But power relationships are never static, and current realities and trends make the scenario described above conceivable unless corrective steps are taken by the current administration and Congress. Consider the challenge posed by China. It is transforming its conventional military forces to be able to project power and compete militarily with the United States in East Asia, 1 and is the only recognized nuclear weapons state today that is both modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces. 2 It weathered the 2008 financial crisis relatively well, avoiding a recession and already resuming robust economic growth. 3 Most economists expect that factors such as openness to foreign investment, high savings rates, infrastructure investments, rising productivity, and the ability to leverage access to a large and growing market in commercial diplomacy are likely to sustain robust economic growth for many years to come, affording China increasing resources to devote to a continued, broadbased modernization and expansion of its military capabilities. In contrast, the 2008 financial crisis was the most severe for the United States since the Great Depression, 4 and it led in 2009 to the largest Federal budget deficit—by far—since the Second World War 5 (much of which is financed by borrowing from China). Continuing U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are expensive, as will be the necessary refurbishment of U.S. forces when those con flicts end. Those military expenses, however, are expected to be eclipsed by the burgeoning entitlement costs of the aging U.S. “baby boomer” generation. 6 As The Economist recently observed: China’s military build-up in the past decade has been as spectacular as its economic growth. . . . There are growing worries in Washington, DC, that China’s military power could challenge America’s wider military dominance in the region. China insists there is nothing to worry about. But even if its leadership has no plans to displace American power in Asia . . . America is right to fret this could change. 7 As an emerging nuclear-armed near peer like China narrows the wide military power gap that currently separates it from the United States, Washington could find itself more, rather than less, reliant upon its nuclear forces to deter and contain potential challenges from great power competitors. The resulting security dynamics may resemble the Cold War more than the U.S. “unipolar moment” of the 1990s and early 2000s. Concerns about Longterm Reliability With continuing U.S. dependence upon nuclear forces to deter conflict and contain challenges from (re-)emerging great power(s), perceptions of the reliability, adequacy, and credibility of those forces will determine how well they serve those purposes. Perception is all important when it comes to nuclear weapons, which have not been operationally employed since 1945 and not tested (by the United States) since 1992, and, hopefully, will never have to be employed or tested again. If U.S. nuclear forces are to deter other nuclear-armed great powers, the individual weapons must be perceived to work as intended (reliability), the overall forces must be perceived as adequate to deny the adversary the achievement of his goals regardless of his actions (adequacy), and U.S. leadership must be perceived as prepared to employ the forces under conditions that it has communicated via its declaratory policy (credibility) These perceptions must be, of course, those of the leadership of adversaries that we seek to deter (as well as of the allies that we seek to assure), but they also need to be those of the U.S. leadership lest our leaders fail to convey the confidence and resolve necessary to shape adversaries’ perceptions to achieve deterrence. Weapons reliability is the essential foundation for deterrence since there can be no adequacy or credibility without it. Reliability is a serious emerging issue for U.S. nuclear weapons. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed, “No one has designed a nuclear weapon in the United States since the 1980s, and no one has built a new one since the early 1990s.” 8 Indeed, the United States is the only nuclear weapons state party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that does not have the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead. 9 Russia, China, and France currently are modernizing their nuclear weapons systems, and the United Kingdom has decided to replace its current Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines and is investing in the sustainment of its nuclear warhead maintenance and replacement capabilities. 10 In lieu of a nuclear weapons production infrastructure and nuclear testing, the United States relies upon its Stockpile Stewardship Program (utilizing computer simulation and component testing) to evaluate and validate the continued viability of existing warheads; service life extension programs to prolong the operational life of warheads (and delivery vehicles); and a stockpile of nonoperationally deployed warheads to provide spares for destructive component testing under the Stockpile Stewardship Program and a reserve to be pressed back into service to augment operationally deployed warheads, if deemed necessary. The Achilles’ heel of this current approach to ensuring the reliability of U.S. nuclear forces is the possible advent of critical systemic failure(s) in entire classes of aging warheads. That such failures could occur can be anticipated as a general matter for any aging system, particularly one that is no longer physically tested as a complete assembly. Specific failures, however, cannot be accurately forecast since the United States has no prior experience with warheads of this age. The potential for such failures emerging is increased by the relatively narrow performance margins to which the warheads were engineered by Cold War nuclear weapons designers tasked with maximizing the number and explosive power of warheads that could be delivered by a ballistic missile. 11 U.S. nuclear weapons scientists have warned of this problem for years. 12 The preceding administration proposed to address this problem by reconstituting and exercising the infrastructure needed to develop and produce nuclear weapons. The proposal involved both facilities (consolidation, refurbishment, and replacement), work force (maintenance of highly specialized nuclear weapons skills), and nuclear weapons design, development, and production work (for refurbishment and replacement of existing warheads). The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, which is responsible for the nuclear weapons infrastructure, expected that the infrastructure transformation plan could be implemented within its existing budget projections if the savings realized from the plan were allowed to be reinvested into the infrastructure. 13 While some aspects of the proposed new infrastructure have moved forward (for example, the National Ignition Facility), much of the plan has not because Congress has declined to provide the requisite funding.

#### Key to prevent great power wars

Morgan and Paul 9

Patrick Morgan, UC Irvine Peace Research Professor, Global Peace and Conflict Studies Center Director, and Paul, McGill University IR Professor, 2009, Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the global age p 9-11

Among the great powers (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council), nuclear weapons are largely seen as a hedge against the emergence of great-power conflict in the future. The great-power relationships in the post-cold war era are characterized by "recessed general deterrence," or dissuasion, in which states do not expect immediate militarized conflict, but weapons are kept in the background as insurance given the inherent uncertainties of world politics. The end of the cold war witnessed substantial changes in the deterrence dynamics involving great powers, and, as a result, general deterrence and dissuasion became operational concepts. Although they do maintain large arsenals, neither the United States nor Russia is presumed to hold automatic launch-on-warning attack plans anymore, although some of the elements of the previous era are continuing. In addition, they have reduced the number of weapons they possess, although the numbers still exceed a minimum nuclear deterrence posture. The three other old nuclear powers - China, the United Kingdom, and France - also have been maintaining their smaller arsenals, but this might change as Chinese nuclear force modernization plans come to fruition in the coming decades. The logic behind the maintenance of nuclear capabilities is that the great powers want to be prepared in case their relations deteriorate in the future. Nuclear capability can also be construed as an assurance against the expansionist pathologies of great powers as described in perspectives such as offensive realism. Moreover, uncertainties in Russia and China give pause to western nuclear powers, while, for Moscow, the fear of American influence in its former spheres in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the cardinal source of anxiety. For the rising power, China, nuclear weapons offer a major insurance against direct assault on its strategic sphere, allowing it to rise peacefully. Nuclear weapons also offer a limited but crucial deterrent against potential conflict escalation between the United states and China involving Taiwan. The great-power deterrence calculations are thus based on "recessed general deterrence" as well as "existential deterrence": no immediate expectations of war exist among them. However, as Patrick Morgan states, "if serious conflicts emerge again, then deterrence will be in vogue-if not, at least for a lengthy period, then deterrence will operate offstage, held in reserve, and will not be the cornerstone of security management for the system." this does not mean that the relations in the US-Russia and US-China dyads would remain the same in the long run. Power transition has invariably been turbulent in the international system, and herein lies the role that nuclear weapons may play in deterring a transition war. US-Russia relations could deteriorate, and deterrence could become more relevant if tensions build up over the establishment of missile defense in Eastern Europe and over Russian efforts to repudiate major arms-control agreements in its effort to regain its lost superpower status. As discussed in Morgan and Paul's chapter in this volume, nuclear deterrence in this context has offered the major powers greater maneuverability. It has allowed the major power states to sustain the credentials as system managers and has prevented the emergence of active security dilemmas among them that can be caused by conventional arms races and technological breakthroughs. Absent the fear of existential wars, the potentially rival states have engaged in greater economic interactions. The increasing trade relations between the United States and China and China and India, an emerging power, suggest that general nuclear deterrence may offer economic spin-off benefits. To some extent, the stability in relations among the great powers, with no war in sight between them, points to the pacifying role that nuclear weapons may be playing, although other causes are present as well. In that sense, nuclear weapons may act as crucial factors in preventing a power-transition war akin to those that the world experienced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For Russia, the superpower that declined, nuclear deterrence offers an opportunity not to be excessively alarmed by the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

#### The death drive’s a useless label

Havi Carel 6, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, “Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger”, googlebooks

Freud introduces the death drive in order to explain all behaviour that is not in accordance with the pleasure principle. He does so by offering a theoretical construct in the form of an aggressive drive but also posits the Nirvana principle as the aim of all organic systems to rid themselves of excitation and strive towards complete rest. This leads to contradictory formulations of the death drive. Part of the function of the death drive is to unify a variety of aggressive phenomena such as destructiveness, sadism, masochism and hate. But Freud is also proposing a more general metaphysical speculation about life as a conflict between life and death drives. This position raises serious problems: 1. Positing the death drive reduces all forms of aggression to one source. Could a single drive explain all types of aggression and destructiveness? Or are there vital details in the individual origins and characteristics of each aggressive phenomenon that are subsumed by the reductive hypothesis of the death drive? 2. Even if we were to accept such a reductive concept, its explanatory value is not clear. What does the notion of the death drive add to the already unifying concept of aggression? Assembling various forces under the auspices of the death drive makes it an unstable category whose meaning can only be derived from the specific context of its application. The death drive has no autonomous meaning. Since the death drive derives its meaning from the concrete situation, it does not contribute to an understanding of the given phenomenon (aggression or destructiveness). Rather, it is the death drive that gets explained by its instances, but it ultimately lacks autonomous content. Freud subsumes under the concept of the death drive two essentially contradictory tendencies: the Nirvana principle striving to eliminate all tension, and aggression creating tension. How can the death drive explain both the tendency towards elimination of tension and aggression that increases tension? A more specific problem is that of masochism (discussed in The Economic Problem of Masochism). If masochism is a manifestation of the death drive as self-directed aggression aiming at unpleasure, how does that square with Freud's view that the death drive is equivalent to the Nirvana principle, which aims to discharge all tension? Freud's attempts to posit a two-drive model arc unsuccessful both theoretically and empirically. Is there really a difference between Eros and Thanatos? If so, why do they keep collapsing into one another?

#### Their account of violence is super reductive and can’t be solved

Havi Carel 6, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, “Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger”, googlebooks

The notion of the death drive is on the one hand too wide, explaining all types of aggression as well as the putative urge towards complete rest. This leads the notion to be economically incoherent, as will be discussed in the next section. But a prior point must be examined: are all types of aggression the same? Freud suggests a positive answer, but as a psychological taxonomy this approach seems to erase important differences. For example, if both sadism and masochism stem from the same aggressive source, should they be classified as belonging to the same group? Should they be clinically approached in a similar fashion? The answer to both these questions seems to be no. The problems and symptoms characterising sadism are very different from the ones characterising masochism, as is their treatment. Another example, group aggression and individual aggression: should we attempt to describe or treat the two as belonging to the same cluster? Again, the answer seems to be negative. As to the second point, one could justifiably ask: what does the death drive mean? Because it is so general, the notion of the death drive is vague. The death drive cannot explain a given situation because it itself becomes meaningful only as a collection of situations. On Freud's account, any behaviour meriting the adjective 'aggressive' arises from the death drive. If we take a certain set of aggressive behaviours, say, sadistic ones, the death drive would come to signify this set. If we take another set of masochistic behaviours, the death drive would mean this set. As it stands, the significance of the notion seems entirely dependent on the observed phenomenon. If Freud were never to meet any masochists, would his notion of the death drive exclude masochism? Any science relying on observation and empirical data relics on this data and should be willing, in principle, to modify and update its concepts in accordance with new empirical observations. The opening paragraph of Instincts and Their Vicissitudes describes this process. We have often heard it maintained that sciences should be built up on clear and sharply defined basic concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with such definitions. The true beginning of scientific activity consists rather in describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group, classify and correlate them. Even at the stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying certain abstract ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from somewhere or other but certainly not from the new observations alone [...]. They must at first necessarily possess some degree of indefiniteness; there can be no question of any clear delimitation of their content. So long as they remain in this condition, we come to an understanding about their meaning by making repeated references to the material of observation from which they appear to have been derived, but upon which, in fact, they have been imposed <SK 14:1U;GW 10:210). This seems to be a sophisticated, fruitfully flexible approach. But in the case of the death drive, it seems to be too flexible. There is no initial restriction on the type of behaviour that could be classified as aggressive or as lowering tension. Hence we find sadism and masochism, passive-aggressive and substance-induced aggression, aggression displayed in group situation and aggressive fantasy, all tied to the death drive as their source. By analogy, any behaviour that leads to discharge of energy or lowering of tension would be in accordance with the Nirvana principle. One way of responding to this issue is by applying the term 'aggression\* purely descriptively. Karli, for example, proposes the following definition: aggression means, "threatening or striking at the physical or psychic integrity of another living being" (Karli, 1991, p. 10). He sees the danger in the shift from using aggression descriptively to attributing to it an explanatory and causal role. When accorded a causal role, aggression is reified and becomes a natural entity, a danger that can be avoided by using the term strictly descriptively. This suggestion makes a lot of sense, but it would be unacceptable for Freud. For he is proposing a metaphysical view, which cannot be taken to be purely descriptive, because it is embedded in a physicalist view of the drives as elements connecting body and psyche, and is meant to have an explanatory and causal role in the explanation of behaviour. Although Freud would reject the purely descriptive use of the concept of aggression, this suggestion will be useful when we discuss the reconstruction of the death drive. As to the third point, it seems that the explanatory value of the death drive is not satisfactory. Because of the two problems set out above - the excessive promiscuity of the notion of aggression and the fact that it irons significant differences between the various phenomena — its explanatory value is limited The concept as presented by Freud does allow too much in and lumps together behaviours and tendencies whose differences are significant. In this sense, those rejecting the death drive as an unhelpful speculation are justified in their criticism.

#### Representations of nuclear war are key broad based activism

Susan T. **Fiske**, Department of Psychology, Tobin Hall, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, **1987**, “People's Reactions to Nuclear War: Implications for Psychologists” American Psychologist Issue: Volume 42(3), March 1987, p 207–217

As defined here, even the antinuclear activist's typical activities are few and modest: writing congressional representatives and donating money to an antinuclear group. Nevertheless, this is far more than the average person does and far more than people's usual levels of political activity. Even this humble degree of antinuclear protest is worth examining. Factors that motivate antinuclear protest most centrally include an extreme chronic salience of the issue and an unusual sense of political efficacy, as well as some attitudinal and demographic factors. Chronic personal salience of the nuclear issue clearly distinguishes the activist. Antinuclear activists report frequently thinking about the issue (Fiske et al., 1983; Hamilton, Chavez, & Keilin, 1986; Pavelchak & Schofield, 1985), on the order of several minutes a day. Having the issue on their minds apparently creates **detailed and concrete images of nuclear war** (Fiske et al., 1983; Milburn & Watanabe, 1985) like those mentioned earlier: images of **dismembered bodies, people screaming, buildings on fire, miles of rubble, and barren landscapes**. Presumably, their uniquely salient concreteimages **are motivating for antinuclear activists**. Moreover, **the combination of high perceived severity and high perceived likelihood of nuclear war is a good predictor of intent to become involved in antinuclear activity** (Wolf et al., 1986). A strong sense of political efficacy also distinguishes the activist (Garrett, 1985; Flamenbaum, Hunter, Silverstein, & Yatani, 1985; Hamilton et al., 1985; Milburn & Watanabe, 1985; Oskamp et al., 1985; Tyler & McGraw, 1983); this is true of political activists in general (Nie & Verba, 1975). The antinuclear activist believes that nuclear war is preventable, not inevitable, and that citizens working together can influence government action to decrease the chance of a nuclear war. **The** antinuclear **activist is** specifically **motivated by a sense of personal** political **capability combined with a belief in the efficacy of political action** (Wolf et al., 1986). The correlation between political efficacy and behavioral intent is substantial by social science standards (Schofield & Pavelchak, 1984; Wolf et al., 1986). Moreover, although activists believe that governments create the risk of nuclear war, they also believe that citizens can and should be responsible for preventing it (Tyler & McGraw, 1983). Not surprisingly, **considering their strong** sense of **political efficacy, antinuclear activists tend to participate in other types of political activity as well** (Fiske et al., 1983; Milburn & Watanabe, 1985; Oskamp et al., 1985). Thus, their antinuclear activity is not a special case.

#### The alt is silence, which is worse

Millicent **Lenz**, Assis. Prof Science and Policy @ SUNY, **1990**, Nuclear Age Literature for Youth, p. 9-10

A summary of Frank’s thought in “Psychological Determinants of the Nuclear Arms Race” notes how all **people have difficulty grasping the magnitude and immediacy of** the threat of **nuclear arms** and this psychological unreality is a basic obstacle to eliminating that threat. Only events that people have actually experienced can have true emotional impact. **Since** Americans have escaped the devastation of nuclear weapons on their own soil and “**nuclear weapons poised for annihilation in distant countries cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched,” we find it easy to imagine ourselves immune** to the threat. Albert Camus had the same phenomenon in mind when he wrote in his essay *Neither Victims nor Executioners* of the inability of most people really to *imagine* other people’s death (he might have added “or their own”). Commenting on Camus, David P. Barash and Judith Eve Lipton observed that **this distancing from death’s reality is** yet another aspect of our **insulation from life’s most basic realities**. “We make love by telephone, we work not on matter but on machines, and **we kill** and are killed **by proxy. We gain in cleanliness, but lose in understanding.” If we are to** heed Camus’s call to **refuse to be either the victims of violence** like the Jews of the Holocaust, **or the perpetrators of it like the Nazi executioners** of the death camps, **we must revivify the imagination of what violence really entails.** It is here, of course, that the literature of nuclear holocaust can play a significant role. Without either firsthand experience or vivid imagining, it is natural, as Frank points out, to deny the existence of death machines and their consequences. In psychiatric usage denial means to exclude from awareness, because “letting [the instruments of destruction] enter consciousness would create too strong a level of anxiety or other painful emotions.” In most life-threatening situations, an organism’s adaptation increases chances of survival, but ironically, **adapting** ourselves **to nuclear fear is counterproductive. We only seal our doom** more certainly. The repressed fear, moreover, takes a psychic toll.

#### No empirical basis for applying psychology to state action

Epstein, senior lecturer in government and IR – University of Sydney, ‘10

(Charlotte, “Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics,” European Journal of International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

One key advantage of the Wendtian move, granted even by his critics (see Flockhart, 2006), is that it simply does away with the level-of-analysis problem altogether. If states really are persons, then we can apply everything we know about people to understand how they behave. The study of individual identity is not only theoretically justified but it is warranted. This cohesive self borrowed from social psychology is what allows Wendt to bridge the different levels of analysis and travel between the self of the individual and that of the state, by way of a third term, ‘group self’, which is simply an aggregate of individual selves. Thus for Wendt (1999: 225) ‘the state is simply a “group Self” capable of group level cognition’. Yet that the individual possesses a self does not logically entail that the state possesses one too. It is in this leap, from the individual to the state, that IR’s fallacy of composition surfaces most clearly.

Moving beyond Wendt but maintaining the psychological self as the basis for theorizing the state

Wendt’s bold ontological claim is far from having attracted unanimous support (see nota­bly, Flockhart, 2006; Jackson, 2004; Neumann, 2004; Schiff, 2008; Wight, 2004). One line of critique of the states-as-persons thesis has taken shape around the resort to psy­chological theories, specifically, around the respective merits of Identity Theory (Wendt) and SIT (Flockhart, 2006; Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 2005) for understanding state behav­iour.9 Importantly for my argument, that the state has a self, and that this self is pre-social, remains unquestioned in this further entrenching of the psychological turn. Instead questions have revolved around how this pre-social self (Wendt’s ‘Ego’) behaves once it encounters the other (Alter): whether, at that point (and not before), it takes on roles prescribed by pre-existing cultures (whether Hobbessian, Lockean or Kantian) or whether instead other, less culturally specific, dynamics rooted in more universally human char­acteristics better explain state interactions. SIT in particular emphasizes the individual’s basic need to belong, and it highlights the dynamics of in-/out-group categorizations as a key determinant of behaviour (Billig, 2004). SIT seems to have attracted increasing interest from IR scholars, interestingly, for both critiquing (Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 1995) and rescuing constructivism (Flockhart, 2006).

For Trine Flockart (2006: 89–91), SIT can provide constructivism with a different basis for developing a theory of agency that steers clear of the states-as-persons thesis while filling an important gap in the socialization literature, which has tended to focus on norms rather than the actors adopting them. She shows that a state’s adherence to a new norm is best understood as the act of joining a group that shares a set of norms and val­ues, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What SIT draws out are the benefits that accrue to the actor from belonging to a group, namely increased self-esteem and a clear cognitive map for categorizing other states as ‘in-’ or ‘out-group’ members and, from there, for orientating states’ self–other relationships.

Whilst coming at it from a stance explicitly critical of constructivism, for Jonathan Mercer (2005: 1995) the use of psychology remains key to correcting the systematic evacuation of the role of emotion and other ‘non-rational’ phenomena in rational choice and behaviourist analyses, which has significantly impaired the understanding of inter­national politics. SIT serves to draw out the emotional component of some of the key drivers of international politics, such as trust, reputation and even choice (Mercer, 2005: 90–95; see also Mercer, 1995). Brian Greenhill (2008) for his part uses SIT amongst a broader array of psychological theories to analyse the phenomenon of self–other recog­nition and, from there, to take issue with the late Wendtian assumption that mutual recognition can provide an adequate basis for the formation of a collective identity amongst states.

The main problem with this psychological turn is the very utilitarian, almost mecha­nistic, approach to non-rational phenomena it proposes, which tends to evacuate the role of meaning. In other words, it further shores up the pre-social dimension of the concept of self that is at issue here. Indeed norms (Flockhart, 2006), emotions (Mercer, 2005) and recognition (Greenhill, 2008) are hardly appraised as symbolic phenomena. In fact, in the dynamics of in- versus out-group categorization emphasized by SIT, language counts for very little. Significantly, in the design of the original experiments upon which this approach was founded (Tajfel, 1978), whether two group members communicate at all, let alone share the same language, is non-pertinent. It is enough that two individuals should know (say because they have been told so in their respec­tive languages for the purposes of the experiment) that they belong to the same group for them to favour one another over a third individual. The primary determinant of individual behaviour thus emphasized is a pre-verbal, primordial desire to belong, which seems closer to pack animal behaviour than to anything distinctly human. What the group stands for, what specific set of meanings and values binds it together, is unimportant. What matters primarily is that the group is valued positively, since posi­tive valuation is what returns accrued self-esteem to the individual. In IR Jonathan Mercer’s (2005) account of the relationship between identity, emotion and behaviour reads more like a series of buttons mechanically pushed in a sequence of the sort: posi­tive identification produces emotion (such as trust), which in turn generates specific patterns of in-/out-group discrimination.

Similarly, Trine Flockhart (2006: 96) approaches the socializee’s ‘desire to belong’ in terms of the psychological (and ultimately social) benefits and the feel-good factor that accrues from increased self-esteem. At the far opposite of Lacan, the concept of desire here is reduced to a Benthamite type of pleasure- or utility-maximization where mean­ing is nowhere to be seen. More telling still is the need to downplay the role of the Other in justifying her initial resort to SIT. For Flockhart (2006: 94), in a post-Cold War con­text, ‘identities cannot be constructed purely in relation to the “Other”’. Perhaps so; but not if what ‘the other’ refers to is the generic, dynamic scheme undergirding the very concept of identity. At issue here is the confusion between the reference to a specific other, for which Lacan coined the concept of *le petit autre*, and the reference to *l’Autre*, or Other, which is that symbolic instance that is essential to the making of *all* selves. As such it is not clear what meaning Flockhart’s (2006: 94) capitalization of the ‘Other’ actually holds.

The individual self as a proxy for the state’s self

Another way in which the concept of self has been centrally involved in circumventing the level-of-analysis problem in IR has been to treat the self of the individual as a proxy for the self of the state. The literature on norms in particular has highlighted the role of individuals in orchestrating norm shifts, in both the positions of socializer (norm entre­preneurs) and socializee. It has shown for example how some state leaders are more sus­ceptible than others to concerns about reputation and legitimacy and thus more amenable to being convinced of the need to adopt a new norm, of human rights or democratization, for example (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2001). It is these specific psychological qualities pertaining to their selves (for example, those of Gorbachev; Risse, 2001) that ultimately enable the norm shift to occur. Once again the individual self ultimately remains the basis for explaining the change in state behaviour.

To summarize the points made so far, whether the state is literally considered as a person by ontological overreach, whether so only by analogy, or whether the person stands as a proxy for the state, the ‘self’ of that person has been consistently taken as the reference point for studying state identities. Both in Wendt’s states-as-persons thesis, and in the broader psychological turn within constructivism and beyond, the debate has con­sistently revolved around the need to evaluate which of the essentialist assumptions about human nature are the most useful for explaining state behaviour. It has never ques­tioned the validity of starting from these assumptions in the first place. That is, what is left unexamined is this assumption is that what works for individuals will work for states too. This is IR’s central fallacy of composition, by which it has persistently eschewed rather than resolved the level-of-analysis problem. Indeed, in the absence of a clear dem­onstration of a logical identity (of the type A=A) between states and individuals, the assumption that individual interactions will explain what states do rests on little more than a leap of faith, or indeed an analogy.

#### The aff’s invocation of religion without God inscribes divinity with worldly meaning and knowability, stripping it of the very thing that makes the eternal divine

Jeffrey **Fisher 1**, Visiting Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Carroll University, “The Theology of Dis/similarity: Negation in Pseudo-Dionysius”, The Journal of Religion, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 529-548

However, while Dionysius relies heavily on negative theology, he moves decisively beyond the Aristotelian/Plotinian tradition, certainly as we see it in Gregory"' Consider first the sheer scope of Dionysius's negativity: "Arid the fact that the transcendent Godhead [urtep navxa deotn^/quae est super omnia Deitas] is one and triune must not be understood in any of our typical senses.... no unity or trinity, no number or oneness, no fruitfulness, indeed, nothing that is or is known can proclaim that hiddenness beyond every mind and reason of the transcendent Godhead [ujiEp^e6rnxo<;/superdeitatis] which transcends every being.... we cannot even call it by the name of goodness."17 He denies unity and trinity, even the principle of fecundity under the name of the Good. Gregory, for all his negativity and resistance to closure, as in the doctrine oiepeklasis, would not go so far. Dionysius's negation of unity does not reduce to transcendent trinity, nor his negation of trinity to transcendent unity. Note well that the phrase, "of the transcendent Godhead," translates "tmep£eoTT|TO<;," a resounding rejection of god-language. Dionysius's willingness to deploy such language relates to the semiotic principle at work, a forceful elaboration of the second Parmenidean hypothesis. Negations do not convert simply to affirmations, even of transcendent versions of the negated quality.18 Furthermore, Dionysius argues that, while there are more and less anagogically appropriate metaphors, and ultimately they are all equally (in)valid, neither are they really any more or less valid than negations; they simply function in different capacities.19 God's absolute transcendence defies even the apophatic way, which principle Dionysius affirms as he denies his denials: "There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it. Darkness and light, error and truth— it is none of these. It is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is both beyond every assertion being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and, by virtue of its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of every limitation, beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every denial."20 Stephen Gersh suggests that the result is a synthesis of the two Parmenidean hypotheses in a third, which consists of a tension between the affirmative and negative principles." This is perhaps the only practical way of understanding the radicality of Dionysius's negativity, a negativity so absolute as to swallow even itself. If we take it seriously, the double- or hyper-negative move leaves us at a theological impasse. Either we allow that God can neither be identified with nor distinguished from even such generic and fundamental categories as being and nonbeing, or we begin to do theology all over again to rescue God from the threat of nonbeing, or to rescue creation from the threat of losing its creator. Dionysius gambles with high stakes, risking nihilism on the one hand and the semantic reinscription of affirmative theology on the other. He engages in a deconstructive maneuver both daring and deft: opening the door to nihilism while at the same time refuting even that form of closure to the mystical project.

#### Every time religion is humanized through a process of naming, God ceases to be God, there are no ethics, and salvation is denied

Siebren **Miedema 1** – date inferred, theology prof at Free University Amsterdam, “Jacques Derrida's Religion With/Out Religion And The Im/Possibility Of Religious Education”, <http://old.religiouseducation.net/member/02_papers/Miedema%20_Biesta.pdf>

Silesius wants to free himself from a fully positive or kataphatic affirmation in his speaking about God. He also wants to free himself from such a kataphatic affirmation in terms of Christianity. His search can be interpreted as deconstruction, the concern for the openness towards the otherness of God, as the impossible i.e. the 'one' who cannot be forseen as possibility, the incalculable, the unpredictable and the 'one' who cannot be completely filled-in. The alterity of God drives every human search, without ever finding the concrete locus in a particular religious tradition, a philosophical or theological system or in this man or this group in such a way that we can say "Here is the otherness or the alterity of God". However, this coming of the otherness of God is for Derrida the potential or the source for ethics and morals, and for every religious and philosophical hope. Here Derrida uses the terms messianic or messianicity (but without messianism!). This [messianicity] would be the opening to the future or the coming of the other as the advent of justice, but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic prefiguration. The coming of the other can only merge as a singular event when no anticipation sees it coming, when the other and death - and radical evil - can come as surprise at any moment (...) . The messianic exposes itself to absolute surprise and, even if it takes the phenomenal form of peace or of justice, it ought, exposing itself so abstractly, be prepared (waiting without awaiting itself) for the best as for the worst, the one never coming without opening the possibility of the other. At issue there is a 'general structure of experience'. (Derrida 1998, 17-18). What does Derrida mean with the expression ' sauf le nom'? Is it his contention that we also give up the name of God? In a sense the name of God is also always a chance, an openness and a possibility of the impossible. But it is not an esse, an essentialist entity. So, the name does not refer to a fixed thing, but is standing for an arrival, a coming and for an event [evenement, venir] . To lose the name is quite simple to respect is: as name. That is to say, to pronounce it, which comes down to traversing it toward the other, the other whom it names and who bears it. To pronounce it without pronouncing it. To forget it by calling it, by recalling it (to oneself), which comes down to calling or recalling the other... (Derrida 1995, 58) Saving the name can prepare us - and only that for the unforeseeable in-coming (invention) of the otherness of God. With such an inventionalist view of the in-coming of the alterity of God, essentialist and conventionalist approaches respectively in favour of unchanging essences and ageless traditions (see Caputo 1997, 42) are no longer adequate.

#### Only our radical break from meaning-laden normative theology can properly un-describe Godliness

Jeffrey **Fisher 1**, Visiting Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Carroll University, “The Theology of Dis/similarity: Negation in Pseudo-Dionysius”, The Journal of Religion, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 529-548

The principle of Dionysius's theological semiotics is his concept of "dis- similar similarity," or simply "dissimilarity."24 He explains: Since the way of negation appears to be more suitable to the realm of the divine and since the positive affirmations are always unfitting to the hiddenness of the inexpressible, a manifestation through dissimilar shapes is more correctly to be applied to the invisible. So it is that scriptural writings, far from demeaning the ranks of heaven actually pay them honor by describing them with dissimilar shapes so completely at variance with what they really are that we come to dis- cover how those ranks, so far removed from us, transcend all materiality.\_\_\_Of course, one must be careful to use the similarities as dissimilarities, as discussed, to avoid one-to-one correspondences, to make the appropriate adjustments as one remembers the great divide between the intelligible and the perceptible." An unbridgeable gap persists between even the "most God-like" symbol and God. Precisely the dissimilarity of everything to God enables everything to be similar to God.2" Anything can mean God because nothing can mean God. This statement is also convertible to: everything simultaneously both "means" God and does not mean God, "for the very same things are both similar and dissimilar to God."27 In any name of God there is an irreducible "something else," an other, which can never be captured or delineated, making it finally indescribable. Theological language, in this sense, fails altogether. Dionysius simultaneously confirms and denies the emptiness of theological language with his declaration that "human souls possess reason and with it they circle in discourse around the truth of things."28 There is in this phrase a heliotropic nuance we must later consider in more detail, which suggests that the Other orders reality in spite (or because) of its alterity.29 However, the clearly dominant theme of the metaphor is the metaphorical indomitability of God. Human beings, attempting to "zero in" on God, multiply metaphor upon metaphor in an endless cycle. Why? Each symbol is of necessity derived from another symbol; in a sense, there is nothing else for a sign to signify but another sign: "omne symbolum de svmbolo."30

# 2NC

## No Regulations – 1NC

Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

 "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

## reason

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

## at: resolved before colon

Only after the colon matters

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2k

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go one…If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, beginning the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

Resolved means enact policy

Words and Phrases 1964Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

## at: government = people

USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2K <http://encarta.msn.com>

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

Government is not the people

Costello and Thomas ‘2K

(George A. and Kenneth R., Congressional Research Service, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution~preamble/#annotations>)

Article Text I Annotations We the People of the United States. in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish *this Constitution* for the United States of America. Annotations PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE PREAMBLE Although the preamble is not a source of power for any department of the Federal Government, 1 the Supreme Court has often referred to it as evidence of the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution. 2 "Its true office," wrote Joseph Story in his COMMENTARIES, "is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to create them. For example, the preamble declares one object to be, 'to provide for the common defense.'

## turns nukes

Public engagement and d-making turn the whole case

Sydney D. Drell, Ph.D. and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 1993, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Physics and Arms Control, The American Institute of Physics, p. 194-196

I see a pattern in this mixed record of the past. The atmospheric test ban treaty and the ABM debate that culminated in SALT I are two major successes in American nuclear-weapons policy. Further, the MX program has been restructured and sharply cut back from the original plans. It is notable that these results were achieved with vigorous and constructive public participation and support. By contrast, the development of the H-bom and of MIRVs greatly increased the devastating potential and the threat posed by our nuclear weapons. As such, they may be considered failures of our nuclear weapons policy. Although there may have been no feasible alternative to developing the H-bomb, we didn’t try to head it off. I find it significant that these technical escalations were undertaken without public involvement or debate, and also without a serious effort at negotiating them away. Another serious setback, after years of negotiating, was the Senate’s failure to ratify the SALT II treaty because of a similar lack of an involved public constituency. On March 23, 1983, President Reagan described to the nation his vision of the future in which we are protected against nuclear weapons by a space-age defense, popularly labeled ‘Star Wars,’ and no longer have to live in a balance of terror. We are, therefore, encountering once again major decisions that will determine the course of our nuclear weapons policy until the end of the century and beyond. These decisions present challenges and opportunities to our citizens, scientists, and government. The good news is that this issue is itself not shrouded in secrecy or ignored in the shadows of apathy – to the contrary. In the press, in the churches, in civic organizations, in universities, and in the political arena, a process of education about deterrence has begun in earnest, and nuclear weapons policy is commanding priority attention at this time. There now exists an active and concerned arms-control constituency ready to participate in a national debate that we all should welcome – scientists, government, and citizens alike. As a result of this public-inspired debate, Star Wars is still undergoing tough, critical scrutiny, including in particular its technical prospects and its impact on arms-control progress. And certainly the president, when he gave his speech in 1983, did not expect to find himself in 1987 with only half the money he wanted to get. The public arms-control constituency created during the past few years must continue to grow and prove that it is enduring, informed, constructive, and energetic and that it has a broad political base. To endure, it must have a clear and understandable goal. This means going beyond a freeze, which was an important goal in building a constituency but was inadequate to sustain it. The public must also be informed. It must have a realistic sense that there are no easy, absolute solutions – not in the short term. We must keep working at the issue to make it become part of the public agenda through public education, public outreach, and meetings with our elected officials. We can make sure that public officials know that this is one of the issues on which they are going to be elected or not elected. It is effective to choose a few issues and to be very well informed about them, so that one does not get caught out or discredited as a result of using shallow overgeneralizations, and then to hold to those positions like a bulldog. And one should avoid spending all of one’s time in talking with like0-minded friends. It is important to spend time reasoning with those who hold opposing views. The public constituency must also be constructive. The attitude must be one that takes other people’s argument seriously, recognizes that opponents feel deeply about what they believe , and engages in civilized, constructive debate. The public arms-control constituency must be energetic. Every citizen has his or her talents. Consequently, different people are going to be effective in different ways: in the electoral process, though public outreach, or through active research on the issues. Finally, it is important to seek a broad political base – that is, not simply from the left or the right. Support will be required from a broad spectrum of the public. Public involvement in arms-control issues is not only useful, it is essential. We have had no progress without it. Stimulated by the involvement of the public, we negotiated and ratified SALT I. Without it, we ended up with MIRVs and failed to ratify SALT II.

( ) Now is a key time for our discussion of nuclear issues – debates in a university setting are critical components of shaping policy during a critical window of opportunity for change

Douglas B. Shaw, 3-26-2009, “The Role of Higher Education,” Nukes on a Blog, http://nukesonablog.blogspot.com/2009/03/role-of-higher-education-in.html

Ploughshares Fund President Joseph Cirincione gave a rousing and incisive presentation to an audience of fifty at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs last night on the topic of “Barack Obama’s New Nuclear Policy.” Highlighting the importance of what the New York Times editorial page had earlier in the day called a “Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms,” Mr. Cirincione described the extraordinary political momentum in the United States and internationally, the activity of new and important validators (including George Shultz, Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and Bill Perry) of moving toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, the agenda and team that the Obama Administration has put in place to lead a transformation of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, and the challenges this transformation will face in the window of a year or two in which the conditions remain right to make it happen. On nuclear weapons policy, he observed, “this Administration is going to be characterized as a struggle between the transformationalists and the incrementalists.” Mr. Cirincione offered specific thoughts about the role that universities can and should play in the debate over the future of nuclear weapons policy, nonproliferation, and disarmament. First, he observed the extraordinary contribution of Stanford University, where faculty members George Shultz and Bill Perry have convened an ongoing discussion among scholars and practitioners about “Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” under the heading of “Reykjavik Revisited,” recalling the summit meeting between then U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1986. Mr. Cirincione pointed out that “this whole movement was hatched at a university.” Universities “change the paradigm; you change the way people are thinking about this,” argued Mr. Cirincione, who also encouraged universities to support scholars with breakthrough ideas and to do serious research in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. He emphasized that universities should provide fora for public debate on nuclear weapons policy, including opposing viewpoints, and also provide venues for U.S. Government officials to connect with the public. Finally, Mr. Cirincione included students specifically in his call to “get involved” and make political leaders care about nuclear weapons policy. He encouraged students to use the newer media – including blogs, Facebook, and twitter – to tell others what they’re thinking and “demand that your professors organize more meetings….join Global Zero…there are a hundred things that you can do about this.”

Public engagement on nuclear issues holds policymakers accountable

Stimson Center, 2001, “Beyond Deterrence,” http://www.stimson.org/n2d2/?sn=n22001110726

Ironically, a full decade out since the end of the Cold War, many Americans believe that much of the heavy lifting for dealing with the legacy of the Cold War has been done. They no longer sense the dangers of nuclear weapons as they did during the Cold War, when the reality is that nuclear dangers are more clear and present now than ever before. Thus, most Americans are not tuned in to the debates over the nuclear posture of the United States, let alone Russia or China, or whether or how missile defenses can be injected into the global security calculus. Consequently, policymakers either ignore or discount the American people on these critically important issues. To date, they have not had to pay a political price for doing so. Policymakers, then, are free to pursue policies for which they will not be held accountable. Few, if any, US senators who voted against the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 believed that there would be political consequences for doing so, despite overwhelming public support for the treaty. The public, then, through the efforts of this report and others like it, must be informed and fully engaged in the discussions on these very pivotal issues. The role of the public then, is to ask for explanations and justification for having these weapons, and at what levels, from its national leaders. Without this input and feedback from the public, not only is the discussion on these issues conducted within the halls of Congress, the scope of the discussions is limited to the opinions of a handful of lawmakers who follow the issues. Most importantly, not until Americans insist they be heard and accounted for on nuclear policy issues will policymakers begin to be held accountable for not acting on the need for bold steps to leverage existing opportunities to reduce nuclear dangers. These matters are far too important to the lives of all Americans to have decisions and policies made by so few policymakers who act with political impunity.

Our framework is key to foregrounding public debate on nuclear issues – only way to create real change in the nuclear weapons establishment

David Krieger, Pres. NAPF, and Richard Falk, I Law Prof @ Princeton, 10-20-2009, “President Obama and a Nuclear Weapons-Free World,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/10/20\_krieger\_falk\_dialogue.php?krieger

Krieger: So that leaves us with an important question: Whether it’s possible to generate such a citizen movement around this issue? Of course, that’s the reason for being of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and we’ve struggled with generating such a movement for 27 years and continue to struggle with it. I sense that Obama’s rhetoric has made our job somewhat easier because it has alerted people to the possibility that there may be some hope. I think the years of Bush and to a lesser extent also Clinton before him, were on the side of the scale that tipped toward despair. When you tip toward despair of change, it’s very difficult to engage people in action. So now, with Obama, because of his rhetoric, we have a better chance to build a movement from below. But, as you know, it’s a difficult challenge to get people to directly confront nuclear issues and believe that they can have an effective voice in those issues. Even for civil society groups, like ours, that have been engaged for nearly three decades, it’s not so easy to believe that we can have a strong influence on policy, partly for the reasons you mentioned earlier having to do with the entrenched bureaucracy that surrounds this issue and seeks to maintain at least some level of superiority, if not dominance, with regard to maintaining the weapons. Falk: Yes, I think it is difficult, but unless that difficulty is overcome I think we have to guard ourselves against an orgy of wishful thinking because over this kind of issue it’s very difficult to achieve meaningful change unless there is a sufficiently altered climate of opinion in the society. Some of that has occurred, as you point out, but I think there’s a long way to go. It’s not an issue that currently is very high on the public’s agenda. There are other concerns that seem more immediate, and pressing, and in the past when the nuclear issue has become briefly prominent, the prominence has resulted from fear rather than hope. I don’t know how strong a political pillar hope is as the basis of change. I’m not sure about fear either, which evinces concern but not often any transformative actions. When one considers where and when change does occur and where and when it does not occur, it seems to me to be very dependent on some kind of significant mobilization of civil society that exerts pressure on the government and alters the way in which political officials in positions of responsibility understand and interpret these kinds of issues, and how they weigh the political consequences of their various policy options.

## 2nc at: roleplay bad

Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

## at: meaning/language hard

#### Dialogism creates meaning grounded in COMMUNITY—like debate, that avoids their DAs and prevents a slide into complete relativism which causes of violence

Iwanicki, associate professor of literary and rhetorical theory – Western Illinois University, ‘3

(Christine E., “Living Out Loud within the Body of the Letter: Theoretical Underpinnings of the Materiality of Language,” College English, Vol. 65, No. 5, p. 494-510)

Bakhtin's view of language contrasts with the view presented by Derrida under the rubric of differance. Derrida notes: "The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be presenti n and of itself, referring only to itself" (Positions2 6). Differance indicates a sense of movement and transfer within language. Thus, language is al-ways dynamic and capricious. Perhaps, therefore, it is only language that is always already present. For the text, finally, serves as the material "venue" or "site" of lin-guistic interplay. Derrida observes: Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each "element"-phoneme or grapheme-being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces. (26)

Still, Derrida's emphasis on "differences and traces of traces" suggests the impalpability that sometimes characterizes his conception of language. In this way, Derrida takes on a rhetoric of indeterminacy characterized by an emphasis on free play, ab-sence, infinity, dislocation, chance, uncertainty, rupture, decentering, erasure, dis-continuity, displacement-all of the buzzwords that add up to the shadowy appearance and disappearance of "traces of traces." In light of some of the unresolved issues with which Derrida leaves us, and in view of the sense of bodily materiality found in feminist postmodern work, I feel the need to return to Bakhtin's version of the materiality of language, which takes shape through concepts such as dialogism, heteroglossia, and answerability. As Bakhtin argues throughout his oeuvre, **any linguistic activity presupposes a condition of "answerability**." Rather than turning the self-other encounter that underlies all linguistic activity into a trope predicated on mysterious notions of alterity and paradox-in the way that Derrida's difference does-Bakhtin's work acknowledges the transitivity and sense of mutual implication in the self-other dynamic. He writes in his long essay, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity": There is one thing that, indubitably, has essential significance for us here: the actual, concrete axiological experiencing of another human being within the close whole of my own unique life, within the actual horizon of my own life, has a twofold character, because I and the others-we move on different planes of seeing and evaluating (not abstract, but actual, concrete, evaluating), and, **in order to transpose us to a single, unified plane**, I must take a stand axiologically outside my own life and perceive myself as an other among others. (59)

In this passage, Bakhtin conceptualizes the self-other dynamic in terms that are ex-plicitly material and physical. His perspective attempts to move beyond the superficial tropology of intersubjectivity by insisting upon a notion of intersubjectivity grounded in the "inner and outer body." In "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Bakhtin considers the place of the material body in the history of Western philosophical theory. He anticipates Michel Foucault's reflections on the discursive "disciplining" of the body in works such as Madness and Civilization (1961), The Birth of the Clinic (1963), Discipline and Punish (1975), and The History of Sexuality (1976). Unlike Foucault's, however, Bakhtin's concentration on the body does not focus on discourse's constitution, mastery, and regulation of the body. Instead, Bakhtin uses the body as a means of indicating the **material basis of intersubjectivity.** This sense of intersubjectivity is realized through the notions of "co-experience" and "expressive aesthetics." Bakhtin's early work on the self-other dynamic seeks to demarcate and explain divisions between the self's "inner" and "outer" body and its relation to the other. Bakhtin's attention to the body, as Michael Holquist points out in his introduction to Art and Answerability, is an effort on Bakhtin's part in the early twentieth century to engage "the new problems raised by theoretical physics and the new physiology [... by considering] how mind relates to body, and how physical matter relates to such apparently immaterial entities as relations between things" (xv). As Holquist observes, the most salutary feature of Bakhtin's approach is his refusal to embrace the disembodied view of language I associate with Derrida and-to some extent as well-with Saussure's deci-sion to make the distinction between langue and parole the foundation of his contribution to the philosophy of language in the early twentieth century. Like Bakhtin, I think **it is important to acknowledge the dialogical aspect of human existence.** As Michael Holquist explains in Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World, Bakhtin negotiates the individual-social question by viewing the individual and the social not as mutually exclusive terms but as mutually implicated ones:

One wayi n whicht he uniquenesso f my placei n life mayb e judgedi s by the unique-ness of the death that will be mine. However, this uniqueness-in what only appears to be a paradox-is shared. We shalla ll die, buty ou cannotd ie in my place,a nym ore than you can live from that site. And of course the reverse is also true: I cannot be in the unique place you occupy in the event of existence. (24) By virtue of the concept of heteroglossia, Bakhtin sees dialogism as involving the intermingling of languages. He observes in his essay "Discourse in the Novel": The word in language is half someone else's[ emphasis added].I t becomes" one's own" only when the speakerp opulatesi t with his own intention,h is own accent,w hen he appropriatesth e word,a daptingit to his own semantica nde xpressivein tention.P rior to this momento f appropriation,th e word [ . .] existsi n other people'sm ouths,i n other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions: it is from there that one must take the word, and make it one's own [...]. Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker's intentions; it is populated-overpopulated-with the intentions of others. Expropriating it , forcing it to submitt o one'so wn intentionsa nd accents, is a difficult and complicated process. (293-94) Bakhtin's claim that words are inevitably "half someone else's" recalls David Bleich's notion of "new and used" language. As Bleich puts it in The Double Perspec-tive, "Our aim is to understand how all sentences are, at one and the same time 'new' and 'already' used, and that the reasons for this simultaneity are traceable to the **social circumstances of language use**, or, in the other term I have been using, the institutions of literacy" (87). When Bleich posits this phenomenon of "new" and "used" language, he wants to focus attention on the psychosocial, intersubjective contexts in which language use always occurs. In his discussion of the "syntactical" and "dialectical" way in which language use occurs, Bleich conceives language use as an event that has both a nominative and a communicative function. Using the sub-ject-predicate structure of the sentence as a model, Bleich notes that "[s]entences have two parts, the subject and predicate, each dependent on one another, but not arranged symmetrically in the sentence: each part has a different role, but when the sentence is considered as a whole, its two parts are implicated in one another" (97). In conceiving of the naming operation of language in this way, Bleich describes a dynamic that drives both the psychology of language use and the operation of language as a communicative phenomenon. That is, language operates according to a logic that observes principles of reciprocity, mutuality, and reversibility. Furthermore, because at the same time, as Bleich puts it, "every word always counts" (111), lan-guage is sensitive to the effects of paraphrase and synonymity. That is, the fact that language has reciprocal and reversible properties does not necessarily translate into a license for the ad hoc interchangeability of all words or sentences. In keeping with Susan Handelman's discussion of the conception of language in the Rabbinic tradi-tion, we must remember that "the name, indeed, is the real referent for the thing, its essential character" (32). When language is viewed in this way, its asymmetrical, yet reciprocal, properties come into sharper focus. Each "thing" in the world-whether we take "thing" to refer to a material object or a word-in-use-has both a collective (or generic) and an individual, specific, and local status. Yet while some "things" might seem to resemble each other, they are never the "same thing." A sufficient sense of "difference" inheres in each object and phenomenon, thereby constituting the groundwork for what we understand as "the individual." At the same time, how-ever, each "thing" is **not so uniquely constituted** as to prohibit levels of relatedness from fleshing out its connection to other "things."

A good example of this phenomenon is the reference work known as a thesau-rus. In A Teacher'I ntroductionto Deconstruction, Sharon Crowley cites the thesaurus as an illustration of Derrida's notion of the "supplement," a concept with simulta-neous connotations of "addition" and "substitution." Crowley defines supplementa-tion as "one movement of differance"a nd then notes: The notionso f supplementationan dd ifferance, infact,p roblematizeth e assumption that synonyms-names which exactly substitute for other names-can be found in languagea t all. Roget'sT hesauruspr ovidesa splendide xampleo f the supplementary movemento f language, insofara s its listso f supposedlys imilart ermsa ctuallyd emon-strateh ow wordsd ifferf romo ne another, proliferatingn ew shadeso f meaningi n the process. (56) Thus, the notion of the synonym emerges as an example of the principle of the simultaneity of sameness and difference in language-of asymmetry, yet reciprocity. In The DoubleP erspective, Bleich goes on to extend this concept of asymmetry and reciprocity beyond an analysis of the sentence to the psychosocial conditions that drive people's use of language. He explains: Just as the wordst hemselves" count,"e ach speaker" countso n" each word and de-pendso nt he other'su sageb y virtueo f eacho ne'sp regivend ependencyo n others.O ne cannotg et out of countingo n others'u sages[ .. .]. Any misunderstandingor dispute aboutw ordsi s inseparablefr om disputesa boutr elatedness.(1 11-12) In this passage, Bleich describes the language process by using the trope of interde-pendency. While I have noted that there are similarities between Bakhtin's and Bleich's conceptualizations of language use, a key difference emerges in the moods that each one associates with people's language activities. For example, Bakhtin comes across, at times, as more inclined to conceptualize the intersubjective language scene as a site ofstruggle rather than of cooperation and reciprocity. And with this emphasis on struggle, perhaps we have come full circle, returning to the loudness, the tension, and anxieties about social change that were expressed in the Bunker household. Admittedly, communication is an endeavor fraught with challenges. In this con-nection, I am reminded of the tale of the Tower of Babel in the book of Genesis. "The whole world spoke the same language, using the same words [.. .]. Then the Lord said [...] 'Let us go down and there confuse their language, so that one will not understand what another one says"' (Gen. 11:1, 6-7). Among the many accounts in myth and history that seek to explain the origins of the plethora of world languages, the tale of the Tower of Babel is memorable for its elements of anger and punish-ment. God disrupts a seemingly halcyon existence typified by monoglossia when the people dare to "build ourselves a city and a tower with its top in the sky, and so make a name for ourselves; otherwise we shall be scattered all over the earth" (Genesis 11:4). As it turns out, the people's ambition, industry, and desire for notoriety pro-voke God's wrath, resulting in diaspora and the loss of their common language. The story of the Tower of Babel continues to exert a powerful hold on the human imagi-nation. Phenomena such as gender problems (as demonstrated most vividly in Deborah Tannen's work) and geopolitical disputes often have been interpreted in the light of a diagnosis of linguistic dysfunction: literally or figuratively, people's failure to "speak the same language" is cited as a cause of conflict and misunder-standing in everyday life. Not every instance of language use, however, results in the rancorous cacophony that took place in the Bunker household. And in fairness to the show, not every episode of All in the Family was a clinic in literally "living out loud." Moments of profound human connection and quiet, simple understanding also occurred in the lives of the characters. These, too, are forms of "living out loud," and they are "forms of life." In PhilosophicalIn vestigations,o ne of Wittgenstein's most important points was to reject the notion of a "private language," the existence of which he doubted because he came to conceive of language as a rule-governed system. As Avrum Stroll notes: "**A linguistic rule is an instruction about how to use various elements of a language.** As such, it can be understood by anyone and therefore is public [...]. If there were a 'private language,' there would be no meaningful distinction between correctly and incorrectly following a rule" (641). Thus, Wittgenstein's rejection of the solipsism implicit in the idea of a "private language" represents a vital contribution to the materiality of language. Stroll highlights Wittgenstein's preoccupation in PhilosophicalIn vestigationsw ith the theme of "ordinaryl ife." By making a case for the notion that "all of us are reared in a community in which we learn to recognize certain persons (our parents and others), learn to speak a language, and eventually come to participate unselfconsciously in a wide range of human interactions, prac-tices, and institutions" (Stroll 642-43), Wittgenstein's succinct phrase "form of life" encompasses a dynamic way of viewing the place of language in the scope of everybody's "real" experiences.

The work begun by Bakhtin and Wittgenstein emphasizes the pertinence of Michel Foucault's question, "What does it matter who is speaking?" ("What" 141). No doubt a humanist, liberatory educator such as Paulo Freire would have responded that it matters a good deal who is speaking. Only when we conclude that it does not matter who is speaking, or when we declare that we do not want to know who is speaking, or that we cannot find out who is speaking-only in these cases does an oppressive situation result. Interestingly, Foucault's point in "What Is an Author?" seems to be at odds with an observation he makes in another work, The Archaeology of Knowledge, which dates from roughly the same time period (1969). In TheA rchae-ologyo f Knowledge, Foucault raises questions about the rights, powers, and privileges that apparently confer upon some people the opportunity to speak within a given society: Who, amongt he totalityo f speakingin dividuals,is accordedt he rightt o use this sort of language[ i.e., a specificd iscoursew ithin a specificd iscursivep aradigm]?W ho is qualifiedt o do so?W ho derivesf romi t his own specialq uality, his prestige,a ndf rom whom, in return,d oes he receivei f not the assurance, at least the presumptionth at what he says is true?W hat is the statuso f the individualsw ho-alone-have the right, sanctionedb y law or tradition,j uridicallyd efinedo r spontaneouslya ccepted, to proffers ucha discourse?(5 0) In this passage, Foucault suggests that to be interested in who is speaking is not such a specious concern after all. This question "Who is speaking?" serves as a vital touch-stone for a materialist concept of language and of the pedagogical practices that can be derived from such a view of language. In order to recognize the heteroglossia that traverses the classroom, teachers and students alike must be willing to ask, "Who is speaking?" even before they ask, "What is being said and why?" To ask "Who is speaking?" reveals a concern with the sociopolitical situatedness of speakers, writ-ers, interpreters, and interlocutors. This concern, in turn, emphasizes the interrelationships between the private and the public, between the individual and the collective, and the ways in which these terms are always mutually implicated. To neglect the importance of "Who is speaking?" is to make invisible not just the physical body of the speaker, but the body of the letter as well. A materialist view of language amounts to more than just the "trace of a trace," to use Derrida's parlance. As Paulo Freire contends, to be able to name one's world is to be able "at least to some degree" to understand one's situation in it, and to understand how one is positioned in relation-ship to others. In short, a materialist view of language seeks to restore the palpability and social consequentiality of language that some language philosophers for centu-ries have ignored or diminished.

As Berel Lang notes, the Nazi decision to use the word Endlosung ("Final Solution") as the touchstone of its genocide plan marks a moment when language was purposely severed from its human and material context. Lang says that the Endlosung established itself as such a superseding social and political goal that it rationalized and permitted the perversion of the rules of language, and this perversion permeated Nazi society. Actually rather than taking place behind closed doors, the Nazi effort to stifle dissenting voices was open, normalized, and institutionalized. If we do not want something this nefarious to happen again, **we must choose to live out loud as loudly as possible in the midst of the body of the letter.**

#### Speech communities enable provisionally fixed meaning – GOOD IS GOOD ENOUGH

Lakoff 01

 Robin Tolmach Lakoff (born 1942) is a professor of linguistics at the University of California, Berkeley.

 The Language War, p. 12-13

 On one side are the deconstructionists, for instance Jacques Derrida and his followers. In its strongest form, deconstructionism asserts the un- decidability of meaning in any text. Neither the original author nor any subsequent reader holds the key to "the" meaning of anything. Anyone who claims that power can do so only through the illegitimate exercise of political superiority or brute force. This is a highly subversive posi- tion, denying as it does the legitimacy of both political and cultural au- thority, and thus has been the target of much conservative critique of the "liberal" or "radical" university (see Chapters t and 3). These critics feel betrayed, having been brought up with the comforting certainty that all was knowable, you just had to know someone who knew. If you were the right kind of person, that could be you! In any case meaning is stable and determinate. Life is serene. But neither deconstructionist chaos nor authoritarian certitude represents the commonsense world that readers and hearers know. When competent speakers engage in any kind of discourse, they form ideas in their minds about what it means and respond accordingly. Sometimes, to be sure, later evidence reveals that an interpretation is at odds with an intention, with resultant embarrassment. But more often there is suffi- cient consensus for the discourse to proceed to a satisfactory conclusion: "good enough" understanding. That commonsense consensus matches Stanley Fish's (1980) idea of the "interpretive community." As in literature, so in communication more generally: we understand what we encounter based on shared con- texts and experiences. In its most obvious form, a linguistic interpretive community is a "speech community,\*\* defined as consisting of everyone who, in some sense, "speaks the same language."3

## at: fairness/predictability = elitist

Predictability maintains meaningful politics and empathy even if their DA is correct

Massaro, Prof Law – Florida, ’89

(Toni M, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099)

Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. 52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [\*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. 53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations.

My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. 54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas.

Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. 55

As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [\*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, 56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.

Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. 57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. 58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.

A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity -- "law for law's sake" -- because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [\*2113] party to follow them. 59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. 60

## at: dialogue inevitable

RULES of DIALOGUE are key – bad T interpretations make the dialogue TERRIBLE even if it’s TECHNICALLY a dialogue

Bostad 4

[http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language,%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf](http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language%2C%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf)

 Finn Bostad is Associate Professor of Applied Linguistics at The Norwegian

University of Science and Technology in the field of human communication

and new technology. He has run and worked on national and university

projects on meaning-making in Internet environments, published

internationally on electronic discourse, and supervised a research programme

on ICT and learning at the Norwegian University of Science and

Technology. He is currently researching multimedia semiotics.

 Very often a dialogue exists only if the persons involved in the communication act observe and respect some rules of dialogism, and some of these main ‘rules’ or principles may be a mutual trust or reciprocity (Rommetveit 1992), a sharing of power and comprehension that gives everybody an equal opportunity to have his or her voice heard. In addition there must be a conscious effort on the part of the participants to achieve something together and actively participate in the process of negotiating meaning that a dialogue is. Negotiated meaning, or understanding, grows out of the response as ‘[u]nderstanding and response are dialectically merged and mutually condition each other; one is impossible without the other’ (Bakhtin 1981: 282). It is possible to generate a long catalogue of such principles, which Linell does in his work (Linell 1998). There is also a wide range of dialogical varieties from, at the one end, a top-down monologue where one party dominates communication and leaves no room for sharing and participation, to, at the other end, a communicative event where power and dominance is more or less equally shared between the participants. In this near ideal situation there is no real centre of power, but a sharing of it.

# 1NR

## psyche

#### You should have a super high threshold for applying chernus’ model to other countries or states or political decision-makers because there is zero evidence or historical examples for how conclusions reached about analysands scale up the extremely complex apparatus that governs whether or not a weapon gets fired

**Sharpe**, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, **‘10**

(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of **criticism, as a reductive passing over** the **empirical and analytic distinctness of** the **different** object **fields in complex societies.**

In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also **always in danger of passing over** the **salient differences** and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology.

We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a **multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary** critical **theory** that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. **It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines**, most of **whom** today **pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy,** neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

#### Threat construction isn’t sufficient to cause wars

**Kaufman**, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, **‘9**

(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

#### If their theory of repression and metaphor is true, their explanation is backward – talking about the specter of nuclear fear is a therapeutic act that brings it to bear and banishing it is worse for lashout

Joanna **Macy**, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, **1995**, Ecopsychology

**There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion,** popular in New Age circles, **that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As** Carl **Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.”** But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.

#### Quietism aka wishing away our impact because the link turn asserts terminal uq is repression that causes war

Robert Jay **Lifton**, Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at City University of New York, Spring **2001**, “Illusions of the second nuclear age” World Policy Journal. New York: Spring 2001. Vol. 18, Iss. 1; pg. 25, 6 pgs ProQuest

The trouble is that in other ways **the dangers associated with nuclear weapons are greater than ever**: the continuing weapons-- centered policies in the United States and elsewhere; the difficulties in controlling nuclear weapons that exist under unstable conditions (especially in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet Union);2 and the eagerness and potential capacity of certain nations and "private" groups to acquire and possibly use the weapons. In that sense, the **nuclear quietism is perilous**. Or, to put the matter another way, **we no longer manifest an appropriate degree of fear in relation to** actual **nuclear danger. While fear in itself is hardly to be recommended as a guiding human emotion, its absence in the face of danger can lead to catastrophe**. We **human** animals have built-in fear reactions in response to threat. These **reactions help us to protect ourselves**-to step back from the path of a speeding automobile, or in the case of our ancestors, from the path of a wild animal. **Fear can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies**: whether for minimizing vulnerability to attacks by wild animals, or for more complex contemporary threats. **Through fear, ordinary people can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least for limiting the scope of violence**. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf of preventing large-scale conflict, **a tinge of fear-sometimes more than a tinge-can enable each to feel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure**.

#### The alt doesn’t spillover or solve other countries’ nuclear posture

James G. **Blight** –Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts – American Psychologist –Volume 42, Issue 1, 19**87** – obtained via CSA Illumina Database

Let us begin with the policy-relevant question: What is to be done about the problem thus formulated by nuclear depth psychologists deeply pathological superpower relationship, which drives an arms race, which, in turn, drives the risk of nuclear war ever higher ? There has been no shortage of solutions. Indeed, the recent great and general awakening among psychologists to the prospect of a major nuclear war has sparked an unprecedented, creative explosion of "solutions." Yet many of these are difficult to take seriously, because they are either impossibly ambitious or pitifully inconsequential. Among those least likely to succeed are a call for what amounts to a worldwide political revolution (*Kovel*, 1983), a worldwide transformation in our patterns of behavior (Skinner, 1982), or the initiating of meetings between American and Soviet psychologists (Klineberg, 1984). It is not that such proposals are necessarily or intrinsically bad. The point is that either the probability of their occurrence is so low or the probability of their having any noticeable effect on U.S.-Soviet nuclear policy is so vanishingly small, that they cannot begin to satisfy the members of a group like the nuclear depth psychologists, who seem universally to believe that risk of nuclear war is much too high at present and is rising fast. The point has been made poignantly by Wagner (1985). In a useful, critical review of psychological approaches to reducing the risk of nuclear war, he admired that the solutions put forward are too often "overwhelming and paralyzing" (p. 533). "Where we go," he said, " . . . is unclear" (p. 533). And so it is.

## deterrence

#### Solves escalation of impacts

Robinson 1

Paul Robinson, Sandia National Lab President and Director, 2001, "Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the 21st Century," <http://www.nukewatch.org/importantdocs/resources/pursuing_a_new_nuclear_weapons_p.html>

Let me first stress that nuclear arms must never be thought of as a single “cure-all” for security concerns. For the past 20 years, only 10 percent of the U.S. defense budget has been spent on nuclear forces. The other 90 percent is for “war fighting” capabilities. Indeed, conflicts have continued to break out every few years in various regions of the globe, and these nonnuclear capabilities have been regularly employed. By contrast, we have not used nuclear weapons in conflict since World War II. This is an important distinction for us to emphasize as an element of U.S. defense policy, and one not well understood by the public at large. Nuclear weapons must never be considered as war fighting tools. Rather we should rely on the catastrophic nature of nuclear weapons to achieve war prevention, to prevent a conflict from escalating (e.g., to the use of weapons of mass destruction), or to help achieve war termination when it cannot be achieved by other means, e.g., if the enemy has already escalated the conflict through the use of weapons of mass destruction. Conventional armaments and forces will remain the backbone of U.S. defense forces, but the inherent threat to escalate to nuclear use can help to prevent conflicts from ever starting, can prevent their escalation, as well as bring these conflicts to a swift and certain end. In contrast to the situation facing Russia, I believe we cannot place an over-reliance on nuclear weapons, but that we must maintain adequate conventional capabilities to manage regional conflicts in any part of the world. Noting that the U.S. has always considered nuclear weapons as “weapons of last resort,” we need to give constant attention to improving conventional munitions in order to raise the threshold for which we would ever consider nuclear use. It is just as important for our policy makers to understand these interfaces as it is for our commanders. Defenses Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to strictly consider “defensive” tactics and armaments, I believe it is important for the United States to consider a continuum of defensive capabilities, from boost phase intercept to terminal defenses. Defenses have always been an important element of war fighting, and are likely to be so when defending against missiles. Defenses will also provide value in deterring conflicts or limiting escalations. Moreover, the existence of a credible defense to blunt attacks by armaments emanating from a rogue state could well eliminate that rogue nation’s ability to dissuade the U.S. from taking military actions. If any attack against the U.S., its allies, or its forces should be undertaken with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, there should be no doubt in the attacker’s mind that the United States might retaliate for such an attack with nuclear weapons; but the choice would be in our hands. If high effectiveness defenses can be achieved, they will enhance deterrence by eliminating an aggressor’s confidence in attacking the U.S. homeland with long-range missiles, and thus make our use of nuclear weapons more credible (if the conflict could not be terminated otherwise.) Whereas, nuclear weapons should always remain weapons of last resort, defensive systems would likely be our weapons of first resort. Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Strategic Tool? Throughout my career, I have had the opportunity to participate in a number of “war games” in which the roles and uses of nuclear weapons had to be faced in scenarios that imagined military conflicts developing between the U.S. and other potential adversaries. The totality of those games brought new realizations as to the role and purpose of nuclear weapons, in particular, how essential it is that deterrence be tailored in a different way for each potential aggressor nation. It also seemed abundantly clear that any use of nuclear weapons is, and always will be, strategic. Thus, I would propose we ban the term “nonstrategic nuclear weapons” as a non sequitur. The intensity of the environment of any war game also demonstrates just how critical it is for the U.S. to have thought through in advance exactly what messages we would want to send to other nations (combatants and noncombatants) and to “history,” should there be any future use of nuclear weapons—including threatened use—in conflicts. Similarly, it is obvious that we must have policies that are well thought through in advance as to the role of nuclear weapons in deterring the use of, or retaliating for the use of, all weapons of mass destruction. Let me then state my most important conclusion directly: I believe nuclear weapons must have an abiding place in the international scene for the foreseeable future. I believe that the world, in fact, would become more dangerous, not less dangerous, were U.S. nuclear weapons to be absent. The most important role for our nuclear weapons is to serve as a “sobering force,” one that can cap the level of destruction of military conflicts and thus force all sides to come to their senses. This is the enduring purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. I regret that we have not yet captured such thinking in our public statements as to why the U.S. will retain nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone of our defense policy, and urge that we do so in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. Nuclear deterrence becomes in my view a “countervailing” force and, in fact, a potent antidote to military aggression on the part of nations. But to succeed in harnessing this power, effective nuclear weapons strategies and policies are necessary ingredients to help shape and maintain a stable and peaceful world.

## 2NR

Hanghoj is about all forms of debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of

Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have

taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor

A number of other debate formats and genres exist besides adversarial debate. *The Power Game*, for example, does not facilitate adversarial debate but rather *parliamentary debate* because it builds upon the shared ground rules and speech genres of professional political discourse in relation to a Danish election campaign (Mercer, 1995; cf. chapter 6). Thus, instead of limiting debate games to a particular debate format, I define debate *games broadly as staged debates where participants have to represent, present and debate various ideological positions according to knowledge-specific criteria for validation within the dialogical game space.*