## \*\*\* 1NC

### 1NC—T

#### Restrictions are a limitation that prohibits an action. It excludes terms for acting

Court of Appeals 12 [STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION I, RANDALL KINCHELOE Appellant. vs. Respondent, BRIEF OF APPELLANT, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/a01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe's.pdf]

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put.

The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as;

To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

#### “On” means directly targeted at and focused on production

Oxford Dictionary online, 12 [The World’s most trusted Dictionary, <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/on>]

5. having (the thing mentioned) as a target, aim, or focus: *five* air raids on the city*,* thousands marching on Washington ,*her* eyes were fixed on his dark profile

#### Violation—the aff reduces a supervising term—not a restriction. Restrictions prohibit.

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 93 Howard v. Babcock, No. S027061. , SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, 6 Cal. 4th 409; 863 P.2d 150; 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80; 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6006; 28 A.L.R.5th 811; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8975; 93 Daily Journal DAR 15372, December 6, 1993, Decided , Rehearing Denied February 3, 1994, Reported at: 1994 Cal. LEXIS 534.

 [\*\*156] [\*\*\*86] Rule 1-500 provides: "(A) A member shall not be a party to or participate in offering or making an agreement, whether in connection with the settlement of a lawsuit or otherwise, if the agreement restricts the right of a [\*419] member to practice law, except that this rule shall not prohibit such an agreement which: [¶] (1) Is a part of an employment, shareholders', or partnership agreement among members provided the restrictive agreement does not survive the termination of the employment, shareholder, or partnership relationship; or [¶] (2) Requires payments to a member upon the member's retirement from the practice of law; or [¶] (3) Is authorized by Business and Professions Code sections 6092.5, subdivision (i) or 6093 [providing for authority of State Bar Court to impose conditions of probation on disciplined attorneys]. [¶] (B) A member shall not be a party to or participate in offering or making an agreement which precludes the reporting of a violation of these rules." 6

CA(4)(4) We are not persuaded that this rule was intended to or should prohibit the type of agreement that is at issue here. HN10 An agreement that assesses a reasonable cost against a partner who chooses to compete with his or her former partners does not restrict the practice of law. Rather, it attaches an economic consequence to a departing partner's unrestricted choice to pursue a particular kind of practice.

We agree with the Court of Appeal in Haight, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d 963, declaring HN11an agreement between law partners that a reasonable cost will be assessed for competition is consistent with rule 1-500. Rejecting an interpretation of rule 1-500 like that proffered by plaintiffs here, the court stated: "We do not construe rule 1-500 in such a narrow fashion. . . . The rule does not . . . prohibit a withdrawing partner from agreeing to compensate his former partners in the event he chooses to represent clients previously represented by the firm from which he has withdrawn. Such a construction represents a balance between competing interests. On the one hand, it enables a departing attorney to withdraw from a partnership and continue to practice law anywhere within the state, and to be able to accept employment should he choose to do so from any client who desires to retain him. On the other hand, the remaining partners remain able to preserve the stability of the law firm by making available the withdrawing partner's share of capital and accounts receivable to replace the loss of the stream of income from the [\*420] clients taken by the withdrawing partner to support the partnership's debts." (Haight, supra, at pp. 969-970.) Concluding that the agreement was not invalid on its face, the court held that the validity of the agreement depended on whether it "amounts to an agreement for liquidated damages or an agreement resulting in a forfeiture." (Id. at p. 972.)

#### VOTE NEG

#### LIMITS—the number of supervising terms is limitless—each one becomes an aff.

#### CORE GROUND—only insured ground is energy production—regulations mean they don’t have to produce more, just make it less regulated.

### 1NC—DA

#### Obama will win but its close.

**Trippi 10/4** (Joe, Political Strategist, Ted Kennedy staffer, Will Romney take advantage of his second chance?, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/10/04/will-romney-take-advantage-his-second-chance/)

Today, Obama has formidable leads in national and swing state polls. My own estimate puts Obama just 5 Electoral College votes short of 270 and another four years in the White House.

So much for that referendum election, right?

Wrong.

Obama’s strength creates an ironic problem. As the media consumes poll after poll and begin to trumpet a perceived Obama victory, voters will be forced to confront the fact of his re-election. They will have to ask themselves one more time if this is what they want. At that point, this might no longer be a choice election, it would instead be **a referendum on the president** -- the race Romney has always wanted.

Should that moment happen, it would be the Romney campaign’s best shot at being able to turn the election around. If Romney's recent high profile speeches are any gauge, he might just have the message to make that happen.

Romney’s most powerful line of the entire campaign came during his speech at the Republican Convention when he said, "President Obama promised to begin to slow the rise of the oceans and to heal the planet. My promise is to help you and your family." That’s the type of message that can break through to voters but we hardly hear it.

In Wednesday night's debate, Romney not only delivered that type of message, he did so with the fire and confidence that could give voters confidence in his ability to bring about the change many claim to want. It was the type of performance that will give many voters pause when considering why this guy is down in so many polls.

Obama still has major advantages. The electoral map gives him many pathways to victory and runaway leads with women and Hispanics could serve as a firewall.

But with November 6 just over thirty days away, **this election is still up for grabs**. It might be too little too late for Romney or it could be the beginning of a comeback for the history books if he can start to connect the dots he laid out in the RNC speech and Wednesday night's debate. Either way, Romney will have been given a chance to argue this election on his terms. Whether he has what it takes to make the most of it the second time around is yet to be seen.

#### Nuclear alienates key constituent groups.

**Mick 6/19** (Jason Daily Tech, Obama Fights For Nuclear, Environmentalists Label Him a Shill http://www.dailytech.com/Obama+Fights+For+Nuclear+Environmentalists+Label+Him+a+Shill/article18781.htm)

Despite these small victories, President Obama's nuclear vision faces many impending obstacles.  Despite the fact that you could tear down one of the nation's old reactors, replace it with a dozen modern clean reactor designs and still have less net waste, some environmentalist groups remain adamantly opposed to new plant construction.  They have vowed to bury the bid for clean nuclear power under a flood of lawsuits.  If the suits succeed, they will raise the cost of nuclear so high, that it can't even compete with the most expensive forms of nuclear energy, like solar power.

And perhaps the biggest obstacle to Obama's nuclear vision will come in 2012.  That is the year when he will face reelection.  That may prove challenging given that one of his former key constituent groups—the environmental lobby—has become one of his staunchest critics.  Regardless, the U.S. is making its first true nuclear progress in 30 years, and that is among the many factors that will already make President Obama's presidency noteworthy.

#### Obama’s margin for error is small --- it costs him the election.

**TNF 12** (The New Fuelist, Obama’s tall environmental task in 2012 http://www.newfuelist.com/blog/obama-coal-regulations-keystone-pipeline)

In case you can’t see it, that’s a treacherous tightrope Barack Obama is walking on these days whenever he steps into the circus-like national energy and environmental policy debate. And his margin for political error on environmental issues will shrink even more during this election year. To avoid alienating environmentalists who supported him in 2008, he must not forget to occasionally—and substantially—lean to the left. But if he wants to hold on to coveted independent voters who are more worried about the slumping economy than they are about pollution, he must also periodically shift back to the middle and right.

The proposed Keystone XL pipeline embodies the President’s conundrum. From the right, calls for increased “energy security” and for the creation of (a disputed number) of pipeline-related jobs make it hard for him to say no. On the left, a large and organized anti-pipeline contingent has taken pains to turn the decision on the pipeline—which will carry crude made from Canadian oil sands, the extraction and production of which makes the fuel much more greenhouse gas-intense than conventional oil—into a political make-or-break for Obama on climate change.

The administration spent 2011 establishing what it must view as a politically necessary middle ground on the environment. It engineered a drastic ratcheting up of fuel efficiency standards for automakers, and sold it as a way to both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the burden on the consumer. It also introduced landmark regulations on air pollution from power plants, while placating utilities—and outraging many supporters—by delaying the EPA’s proposed tightening of the nation’s standards for smog. And it earned at least temporary relief from pressure to decide on the Keystone XL by punting the issue past the election, to 2013.

But it’s going to be tougher to maintain balance on the tightrope this year. Congressional Republicans, by demanding a much-earlier Obama decision on the Keystone XL in exchange for their support of the recent payroll tax extension, have hinted at their party’s desire to force the President’s hand on environmental issues. The GOP’s presidential nominee will undoubtedly attempt to paint Obama as an over-regulator and irrational environmentalist—an attack line which will warrant a defense. And therein lies Obama’s tall task: to defend his administration’s substantial forays into environmental regulation in terms that resonate with independents whose main concern is the economy—all while simultaneously ensuring that his frustrated environmentalist supporters don’t completely lose their patience.

#### Romney causes a nuclear use in Pakistan, a collapse of Russian relations, war with Iran, and China trade wars.

**Bandow 12** Senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan [Doug Bandow, 5-15-12, “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism]

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to **destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan**. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire **war with Iran** as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have **no choice** but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically **impossible.** Perceived American support for this creates **enormous hostility** toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But **treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one**. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as **a direct challenge**. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that **even paranoids have enemies**. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the **greatest danger** to America is the **blowback** that results from promiscuous intervention in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle. America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he is not qualified to be president. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney **sounds even worse.** His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

### 1NC CP

#### Text: The Department of Energy should modify its regulation of [10 Code of Federal Regulations §810](http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title10/10cfr810_main_02.tpl) to end specific authorization requirements and impose deadlines to act on licensing requests.

#### Reforming “Part 810” allows the U.S. to recapture the nuclear market, and can be done through administrative changes that avoid political controversy.

Platts, 10/1/2012. “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149.

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

#### U.S. companies already produce superior technology—broad Part 810 export regulations crush U.S. market share and undermine focus on truly sensitive technologies.

NEI, Winter 2012. Nuclear Energy Institute. “U.S. Nuclear Export Rules Hurt Global Competitiveness,” <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/insight/insightwinter2012/us-nuclear-export-rules-hurt-global-competitiveness/>.

Today, U.S. dominance of the global nuclear power market has eroded as suppliers from other countries compete aggressively against American exporters. U.S. suppliers confront competitors that benefit from various forms of state promotion and also must contend with a U.S. government that has not adapted to new commercial realities. The potential is tremendous—$500 billion to $740 billion in international orders over the next decade, representing tens of thousands of potential American jobs, according to the [U.S. Department of Commerce](http://www.commerce.gov/). With America suffering a large trade deficit, nuclear goods and services represent a market worth aggressive action. However, antiquated U.S. government approaches to nuclear exports are challenging U.S. competitiveness in the nuclear energy market. New federal support is needed if the United States wants to reclaim dominance in commercial nuclear goods and services—and create the jobs that go with them. “The U.S. used to be a monopoly supplier of nuclear materials and technology back in the ’50s and ’60s,” said Fred McGoldrick, former director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the [State Department](http://www.state.gov/). “That position has eroded to the point where we’re a minor player compared to other countries.” America continues to lead the world in technology innovation and know-how. So what are the issues? And where is the trade? Effective coordination among the many government agencies involved in nuclear exports would provide a boost to U.S. suppliers. “Multiple U.S. agencies are engaged with countries abroad that are developing nuclear power, from early assistance to export controls to trade finance and more,” said Ted Jones, director for supplier international relations at NEI. The challenge is to create a framework that allows commercial nuclear trade to grow while ensuring against the proliferation of nuclear materials. “To compete in such a situation, an ongoing dialogue between U.S. suppliers and government needs to be conducted and U.S. trade promotion must be coordinated at the highest levels,” Jones said. Licensing U.S. Exports Jurisdiction for commercial nuclear export controls is divided among the Departments of [Energy](http://energy.gov/) and Commerce and the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission](http://www.nrc.gov/) and has not been comprehensively updated to coordinate among the agencies or to reflect economic and technological changes over the decades. The State Department also is involved in international nuclear commerce. It negotiates and implements so-called “[123 agreements](http://export.gov/civilnuclear/eg_main_022093.asp)” that allow for nuclear goods and services to be traded with a foreign country. The federal agencies often have different, conflicting priorities, leading to a lack of clarity for exporters and longer processing times for export licenses. “The U.S. nuclear export regime is the most complex and restrictive in the world and the least efficient,” said Jones. “Furthermore, it is poorly focused on items and technologies that pose little or no proliferation concern. By trying to protect too much, we risk diminishing the focus on sensitive technologies and handicapping U.S. exports.” A case in point is the Energy Department’s [Part 810 regulations](http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div5&view=text&node=10:4.0.2.5.23&idno=10). While 123 agreements open trade between the United States and other countries, Part 810 regulates what the United States can trade with another country. For certain countries, it can take more than a year to obtain “specific authorizations” to export nuclear items. Because other supplier countries authorize exports to the same countries with fewer requirements and delays, the Part 810 rules translate into a significant competitive disadvantage for U.S. suppliers. Today, 76 countries require a specific authorization, but DOE has proposed almost doubling that number—to include for the first time countries that have never demonstrated a special proliferation concern, that are already part of the global nuclear supply chain, and that plan new nuclear infrastructure. The proposed Part 810 rule would do nothing to reduce lengthy license processing times, said Jones. Other nuclear supplier countries impose strict guidelines on their licensing agencies for timely processing of applications. Equivalent licenses must be processed in fewer than nine months in France, fewer than 90 days in Japan and 15 days in South Korea. One possible solution, said McGoldrick, would be to set similar deadlines for issuance of licenses. U.S. agencies “could have deadlines set forth in the new [Part 810] regulations, which would give the relevant government agencies specified times in which to act on a license. Time could be exceeded only under certain circumstances,” said McGoldrick.

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#### Proliferation constructs the world in imperialist and Orientalist terms—this condemns the global South to violent intervention and discipline. The 1AC is part of a process of knowledge-creation that restricts our understanding of proliferation to Western ideology.

Behnke 2k—Andreas Behnke, Prof. of Poli Sci @ Towson [January, *International Journal of Peace Studies* 5.1, “Inscriptions of the Imperial Order,” http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol5\_1/behnke.htm]

David Mutimer (1997) has argued that the use of the metaphor 'proliferation' carries certain entailments. That is to say, it structures our understanding and handling of the problem. In particular, he refers to the "image of a spread outward from a point or source", and the "technological bias" introduced in the discourse (Mutimer 1997:201-2). As concerns the first point, 'proliferation' presupposes a center at which WMD are to be held and controlled, and from which these weapons disseminate into the body of the international society. To the extent that this process gets out of the center's control, certain measures have to be taken to 'suffocate', limit, or curb the 'spread' of these weapons. As concerns the second point, Mutimer (1997:203) points out the peculiar agency implied in the concept: "Notice that the weapons themselves spread; they are not spread by an external agent of some form - say, a human being or political institution". The fact that a large number of these weapons were actually 'spread' by Western states is consequently **hidden through this discursive structure**. These points are also relevant for the Mediterranean Initiative. We can add a third entailment to the list which appears through a critical reading of the NATO/RAND narrative. As the RAND authors (1998:15) observe, "The mere existence of ballistic missile technology with ranges in excess of 1,000 km on world markets and available to proliferators around the Mediterranean basin would not necessarily pose serious strategic dilemmas for Europe."

In fact, we might even agree with the neorealist proposition that 'more might be better', above all in terms of nuclear weapons. This is certainly the preferred solution of John Mearsheimer (1990) for the stabilization of European political order after the end of the cold war. After all, conventional wisdom has it that nuclear weapons and the threat of mutually assured destruction preserved stability and peace during the Cold War. The RAND authors, however, fail to grasp the irony in their identification of WMD proliferation, which ends up denying this central tenet of cold war strategy. According to them, "the WMD and ballistic missile threat will acquire more serious dimensions where it is coupled with a proliferator's revolutionary orientation. Today, this is the case with regard to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and arguably Syria" (RAND, 1998:16).

What preserved the peace during the cold war -- mutual deterrence -- is now re-written as a strategic problem:

As a result of proliferation trends, Europe will be increasingly exposed to the retaliatory consequences of U.S. and European actions around the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, including the Balkans. ... As a political threat and a weapon of terror capable of influencing the NATO decisionmaking during a crisis, their significance [of conventionally armed ballistic missiles] could be considerable (RAND, 1998:16).

Two implications of these arguments deserve elaboration. First, there is the reversal of the traditional relationship between WMD and rationality. For what makes the presence of WMD in the South so worrisome is the absence of the requirements of reason and rationality. Within NATO's discourse on the South, 'revolutionary orientation' accounts for the undesirability of distributing these weapons to such unfit hands. In order to qualify for their possession, reason and rationality must be present -- as they are obviously assumed to be in the West. The discourse of proliferation consequently produces a third entailment by constructing the relationship between West and South in **'orientalist'** terms. In this rendition, the South becomes the quintessential antithesis of the West, the site of irrationality, passion, and terror (Said, 1995). Within this site, different rules apply, which are not necessarily subject to Western ideals of enlightened reason. 'Proliferation' articulates a hierarchical structure in global politics, with the West as the privileged site of from which to surveil, **control**, and engage the **rest of the world**.

This privilege is further dramatized in the above complaint about the possibility of retaliation. For the South to achieve the possibility of influencing NATO decisionmaking is to violate the epistemic sovereignty of the West. 'U.S. and European actions' and interventions have to be unrestrained in order to constitute proper crisis management. NATO demands a docile subjectivity and accessible territory from the South, the latter's identity cannot be ascertained against the West. Its arms have to be surrendered, its retaliatory capabilities to be revoked.

'Information' is the third mode besides 'Securitization' and 'Proliferation' within which we can discern the subjugation of the South to the strategic Western gaze. A central purpose of the Mediterranean Initiative/Dialogue is to improve 'mutual understanding' and to 'dispel some of the misperceptions and apprehensions that exist, on both sides of the Mediterranean' (Solana, 1997a:5). And both the RAND Corporation and NATO put some emphasis on public information and perception. Yet the structure of this relationship proves to be unbalanced and virtually unilateral. As mentioned above, for NATO, the prime task is above all the "further refinement of its definition of security" (de Santis, 1998). The general identity of the South as a site of danger and insecurity is consequently never in question. Western perceptions are never problematized. Knowledge of the South is, it appears, a matter of matching more and better information with proper conceptual tools.

On the other hand, (mis)perceptions take the place of knowledge in the South.

NATO is perceived widely as a Cold War institution searching for a new enemy. That is why the best course to change the perception of NATO in these countries is to focus more on "soft" security, building mutual understanding and confidence before engaging in "hard" military cooperation. Measures should be developed with the aim of promoting transparency and defusing threat perceptions, and promoting a better understanding of NATO's policies and objectives (de Santis, 1998:34).

To interpret political misgivings about NATO and its post-cold war diplomacy as 'misperceptions' which can be put straight by "educat[ing] opinion-makers in the dialogue-countries"(RAND, 1998:75) tends to naturalize and objectify the Western rendition of NATO's identity. The possibility that from the perspective of the 'Southern' countries NATO's political and strategic design might look quite different is lost in this narrative. NATO's identity is decontextualized and objectified, the productive role of different cultural and strategic settings in the establishment of identities and formulation of interests denied. To maintain such a lofty position becomes more difficult if we let the Mediterranean participants voice their concerns openly. Far from being 'misperceptions and misunderstandings', these countries' less than enthusiastic attitudes towards NATO are based on, for instance, the establishment of powerful Western military intervention capabilities off their beaches. Also, NATO's attempts to institutionalize a military cooperation is interpreted as an attempt to gain a strategic foothold in the region in order to monitor the flow of missile technology and the possession of WMD (Selim 1998:12-14). In other words, we encounter rather rational and reasonable security political and strategic concerns. The fact that NATO is unwilling or unable to acknowledge their concerns once again demonstrates the 'imperial' nature of the purported dialogue.

Conclusion: The Imperial Encounter

In her exploration of Western representations of the South, Roxanne Doty (1996:3) describes the relationship between these two subjectivities as an "imperial encounter" which is meant "to convey the idea of asymmetrical encounters in which one entity has been able to construct 'realities' that were taken seriously and acted upon and the other entity has been **denied** equal degrees or kinds of **agency**". Her focus is on an aspect of power which has received increasing treatment within critical International Relations (IR) theory during the last years, that is, the power to define and articulate identities and to determine the relations between them.

As was argued above, the Western invention of the South during the cold war can be interpreted as an imperial gesture. The South was rendered into a West-in-the-making, with its own distinguished historical, cultural, and social features reduced to indicators of 'underdevelopment'. Ultimately, the narrative proclaimed, the South would become part of the Western 'Empire', the latter would be able to expand into 'barbaric' areas of the world -- provided it could win the war against Communism.

The end of the cold war saw this 'expansionist' logic give way to a exclusive posture. The relations between the West and the South are no longer mediated through time. Instead, a spatial differentiation now structures the imperial encounter, the South is no longer to be 'developed' and 'Westernized'. It is to be surveilled, controlled and disciplined, its 'spillage' of crisis and instability to be contained.

NATO's Mediterranean Initiative is a cornerstone in this new rendition. For while we so far cannot observe any direct military intervention by the Alliance in the Mediterranean region, NATO's discourse on the South in general, and the Initiative in particular render it accessible and available for such action. Strategic knowledge is produced as an expression of, and in anticipation of, strategic power. The 'self-determination' of NATO as a continuously capable and competent military agent is effected through a discourse that inscribes a particular, securitizing, strategic order upon the South, positing it as a site of danger, irrationality and insecurity against the West. In this context it is interesting to observe the exclusion of states from the Mediterranean Initiative that are not considered to be 'moderate, Western-looking [and] constructivist' (RAND 1998:57). This differentiation between insiders and outsiders appears to be based on the degree to which the respective countries are willing to subject themselves to the imperial encounter with the West, and to open themselves to the strategic gaze and control of NATO.

The imperial encounter is then made possible and supported by what one may call the Emperor's two bodies. On one hand, the West appears as a cultural identity among others, located in space (North of the Mediterranean) and time (in the post-cold war era). In this sense, the West is the entity that needs to be protected from the dangers and threats which 'spill over' from the South through adequate strategic means.

On the other hand, the West is presented as a 'site of knowledge', as the source or author of the proper and objective 'world-picture' that depicts the realities of post-cold war global politics. In this sense, the West becomes the metaphysical grounds from which knowledge can be gathered and disseminated. And in its different versions -- securitization, proliferation, and information -- this knowledge draws on and reproduces this metaphysics. There are consequently reasons to be skeptical about NATO's ability to conduct a 'dialogue' with an other it is unwilling to listen to.

#### The nuclear apartheid is a manifestation of racism—ensures genocide and war is inevitable.

Batur 7 [Pinar, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Sociology @ Vassar, *The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide*, Handbook of The Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 441-3]

War and genocide are horrid, and taking them for granted is inhuman. In the 21st century, our problem is not only seeing them as natural and inevitable, but even worse: not seeing, not noticing, but ignoring them. Such act and thought, fueled by global racism, reveal that racial inequality has advanced from the establishment of racial hierarchy and institutionalization of segregation, to the confinement and exclusion, and elimination, of those considered inferior through genocide. In this trajectory, global racism manifests genocide. But this is not inevitable. This article, by examining global racism, explores the new terms of exclusion and the path to permanent war and genocide, to examine the integrality of genocide to the frame-work of global antiracist confrontation. GLOBAL RACISM IN THE AGE OF “CULTURE WARS” Racist legitimization of inequality has changed from presupposed biological inferiority to assumed cultural inadequacy. This defines the new terms of impossibility of coexistence, much less equality. The Jim Crow racism of biological inferiority is now being replaced with a new and modern racism (Baker 1981; Ansell 1997) with “culture war” as the key to justify difference, hierarchy, and oppression. The ideology of “culture war” is becoming embedded in institutions, defining the workings of organizations, and is now defended by individuals who argue that they are not racist, but are not blind to the inherent differences between African-Americans/Arabs/Chinese, or whomever, and “us.” “Us” as a concept defines the power of a group to distinguish itself and to assign a superior value to its institutions, revealing certainty that **affinity with “them” will be harmful to its existence** (Hunter 1991; Buchanan 2002). How can we conceptualize this shift to examine what has changed over the past century and what has remained the same in a racist society? Joe Feagin examines this question with a theory of systemic racism to explore societal complexity of interconnected elements for longevity and adaptability of racism. He sees that systemic racism persists due to a “white racial frame,” defining and maintaining an “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 25). The white racial frame arranges the routine operation of racist institutions, which enables social and economic repro-duction and amendment of racial privilege. It is this frame that defines the political and economic bases of cultural and historical legitimization. While the white racial frame is one of the components of systemic racism, it is attached to other terms of racial oppression to forge systemic coherency. It has altered over time from slavery to segregation to racial oppression and now frames “culture war,” or “clash of civilizations,” to legitimate the racist oppression of domination, exclusion, war, and genocide. The concept of “culture war” emerged to define opposing ideas in America regarding privacy, censorship, citizenship rights, and secularism, but it has been globalized through conflicts over immigration, nuclear power, and the “war on terrorism.” Its discourse and action articulate to flood the racial space of systemic racism. Racism is a process of defining and building communities and societies based on racial-ized hierarchy of power. The expansion of capitalism cast new formulas of divisions and oppositions, fostering inequality even while integrating all previous forms of oppressive hierarchical arrangements as long as they bolstered the need to maintain the structure and form of capitalist arrangements (Batur-VanderLippe 1996). In this context, the white racial frame, defining the terms of racist systems of oppression, enabled the globalization of racial space through the articulation of capitalism (Du Bois 1942; Winant 1994). The key to understanding this expansion is comprehension of the synergistic relationship between racist systems of oppression and the capitalist system of exploitation. Taken separately, these two systems would be unable to create such oppression independently. However, the synergy between them is devastating. In the age of industrial capitalism, this synergy manifested itself imperialism and colonialism. In the age of advanced capitalism, it is war and genocide. The capitalist system, by enabling and maintaining the connection between everyday life and the global, buttresses the processes of racial oppression, and synergy between racial oppression and capitalist exploitation begets violence. Etienne Balibar points out that the connection between everyday life and the global is established through thought, making global racism a way of thinking, enabling connections of “words with objects and words with images in order to create concepts” (Balibar 1994: 200). Yet, global racism is not only an articulation of thought, but also a way of knowing and acting, framed by both everyday and global experiences. Synergy between capitalism and racism as systems of oppression enables this perpetuation and destruction on the global level. As capitalism expanded and adapted to the particularities of spatial and temporal variables, global racism became part of its legitimization and accommodation, first in terms of colonialist arrangements. In colonized and colonizing lands, global racism has been perpetuated through racial ideologies and discriminatory practices under capitalism by the creation and recreation of connections among memory, knowledge, institutions, and construction of the future in thought and action. What makes racism global are the bridges connecting the particularities of everyday racist experiences to the universality of racist concepts and actions, maintained globally by myriad forms of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Batur 1999, 2006). Under colonialism, colonizing and colonized societies were antagonistic opposites. Since colonizing society portrayed the colonized “other,” as the adversary and challenger of the “the ideal self,” not only identification but also segregation and containment were essential to racist policies. The terms of exclusion were set by the institutions that fostered and maintained segregation, but the intensity of exclusion, and redundancy, became more apparent in the age of advanced capitalism, as an extension of post-colonial discipline. The exclusionary measures when tested led to war, and genocide. Although, more often than not, genocide was perpetuated and fostered by the post-colonial institutions, rather than colonizing forces, the colonial identification of the “inferior other” led to segregation, then exclusion, then war and genocide. Violence glued them together into seamless continuity. Violence is integral to understanding global racism. Fanon (1963), in exploring colonial oppression, discusses how divisions created or reinforced by colonialism guarantee the perpetuation, and escalation, of violence for both the colonizer and colonized. Racial differentiations, cemented through the colonial relationship, are integral to the aggregation of violence during and after colonialism: “Manichaeism [division of the universe into opposites of good and evil] goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes” (Fanon 1963:42). Within this dehumanizing framework, Fanon argues that the violence resulting from the destruction of everyday life, sense of self and imagination under colonialism continues to infest the post-colonial existence by integrating colonized land into the violent destruction of a new “geography of hunger” and exploitation (Fanon 1963: 96). The “geography of hunger” marks the context and space in which oppression and exploitation continue. The historical maps drawn by colonialism now demarcate the boundaries of post-colonial arrangements. The white racial frame restructures this space to fit the imagery of symbolic racism, modifying it to fit the television screen, or making the evidence of the necessity of the politics of exclusion, and the violence of war and genocide, palatable enough for the front page of newspapers, spread out next to the morning breakfast cereal. Two examples of this “geography of hunger and exploitation” are Iraq and New Orleans.

#### The aff’s fantasy of control will only produce a “never-ending war” for security—blowback ensures efforts to create order out of disorder will fail.

Ritchie 11—Nick, PhD, Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies @ University of Bradford, Executive Committee of the British Pugwash Group and the Board of the Nuclear Information Service [“Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review” International Affairs Volume 87, Issue 2, Article first published online: 17 MAR 2011]

Third, the legitimating narrative of acting as a ‘force for good’ that emerged in the 1998 SDR to justify an expensive, expeditionary, war-fighting military doctrine in the name of ‘enlightened self-interest’ must be scrutinized. But the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality is highly questionable. From a critical perspective it can be argued that successive governments have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive and ‘good’ to generate support for ‘risk transfer’ military operations of choice that are presented as essential to the security of UK citizens but in fact **reproduce** a state-centric construction of a particular ‘national role’. This reflects Hirshberg’s contention that ‘the maintenance of a positive national self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the smooth, on-going functioning of the state’. 86 The notion that Afghanistan is a ‘noble cause’ for the British state reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and prestige and the **legitimating moral gloss** of the **‘force for good’** rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of ‘enlightened self-interest’ implies that the exercise of UK military force as a ‘force for good’ will lessen security risks to the British state and citizenry by resolving current security threats and pre-empting future risks. But, returning again to Iraq and Afghanistan, we must ask whether sacrificing solders’ lives, killing over 100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of women and children, destroying the immediate human security of several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and trauma, and **sparking long-term trends of** rising crime rates, property **destruction**, economic disruption, and deterioration of health-care resources and food production and distribution capabilities, all while **providing profits** for largely western corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private military contractors, constitutes being a ‘force for good’ when the outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best indeterminate. 88 The legitimacy of this question is reinforced by Curtis’s analysis of the deadly impact of British foreign policy since the 1950s. Curtis argues that ‘the history of British foreign policy is partly one of complicity in some of the world’s worst horrors … contrary to the extraordinary rhetoric of New Labour leaders and other elites, policies are continuing on this traditional course, systematically making the world more abusive of human rights as well as more unequal and less secure’. 89 Add to this the statistic that the UK was involved in more wars between 1946 and 2003 (21 in total) than any other state, and the ‘force for good’ rationale begins to unravel. 90 Furthermore, the militarized ‘force for good’ narrative encompasses the **active defence** of the ‘rules-based system’ as a global good. But it is clear that the current ‘rules-based **system’ of western-dominated multilateral institutions** and processes of global governance **does not work for billions of people or** for **planetary ecological systems**. The Human Development Reports produced by the United Nations Development Programme routinely highlight the global political and economic structures and systems that **keep hundreds of millions of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed.** 91 A stable ‘rules-based system’ is no doubt in the interests of UK citizens and the interests of global human society. With stability comes predictability, which can minimize uncertainty, risk and insecurity. But there is a **growing consensus** that long-term stability, particularly the **reduction of violent conflict**, will require **far greater political**, economic and environmental equity **on a global scale**, as advocated in the Department for International Development’s 2009 white paper on Eliminating world poverty. 92 An interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to stabilize and **transform the** rules-based **system into a more equitable form**. A growing literature now argues that prevailing **western approaches to** understanding, managing and ameliorating global **insecurity** and its violent symptoms are **inadequate and unsustainable**. They are proving, and will continue to prove, increasingly incapable of providing security for both the world’s poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the world’s elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive insecurity. 93 This is not to suggest that the UK should not exercise elements of national power to alleviate others’ suffering as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. Indeed, the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine sets out clearly the principle of conditional sovereignty and the grounds for legitimate intervention when a state cannot or will not protect its citizens from pervasive and severe harm. 94 More broadly, if we accept that in an increasingly complex, interdependent world the human security of UK citizens enmeshed in global networks of risk and opportunity is intertwined with the human security of others, particularly in conflict-prone regions often characterized by poverty, weak governance and underdevelopment, then actions to improve others’ long-term human security does constitute a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’. But we must question the assumption that war-fighting interventionist missions of choice do, in fact, serve the long-term human security interests of UK citizens as opposed to the interests of the state based on prevailing conceptions of national role. Utility of force Connected to this critique is a reappraisal of the utility of force within the conception of national security as global risk management, on two counts. First, security risks are increasingly likely to arise from a complex mixture of interdependent factors. Environmental, economic, military and political sources of insecurity could include the effects of climate change, mass poverty and economic injustice, global pandemic disease, mass migration and refugee flows, poor governance, weak and failing states, international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, the spread of WMD and advanced conventional military technologies, ethnic and sectarian nationalism, and competition over access to key resources such as oil and water. Future conflicts are therefore likely to be complex and diverse. They are unlikely to be susceptible to purely military solutions, and the use of military force in regional crises will be messy, indeterminate and of limited value and effectiveness. 95 It is not obvious that the armed forces have a significant war-fighting role to play in mitigating these risks, as opposed to supporting police, intelligence and security forces in countering terrorist plots—and possibly launching a limited, precision strike against WMD capabilities in the event of the extreme scenario of robust intelligence that a WMD attack is imminent. In fact, the 2009 National Security Strategy limited the role of the armed forces to ‘defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories’ (which one could qualify as ‘direct violent, or military, threats’) together with a contributory role in ‘tackling threats to our security overseas by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe’. 96 This broad but essentially supportive remit for the military was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy’s catalogue of priority risks. The three-tiered list enumerated 15 risks, which can be reduced to five: terrorism, civil emergencies, international crime, trade disputes and an attack by another state. 97 The role of military force is limited in all of these except the last, which remains by far the least likely. As Jenkins argues, almost none of the above is a threat. They are crimes, catastrophes, or, in the case of being ‘drawn in’ to a foreign conflict, a matter of political choice … as for the threat of conventional attack on the British Isles by another state, we can only ask who? The threat is so negligible as to be insignificant. It is like insuring one’s house for billions of pounds against an asteroid attack. 98 Bob Ainsworth, then Defence Secretary, seemed to grasp this in 2009, arguing that ‘our initial conclusions on the character of warfare should be first that international intervention will be more difficult not less. We will have to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security. And second, and related to this, that the timely application of soft power and methods of conflict prevention will be a high priority.’ 99 Yet the government also insists on maintaining an interventionist, expeditionary military doctrine and corresponding capabilities based on a seemingly unquestioned national security role as a ‘force for good’ in global risk management operations. Second, risk management through military intervention in a complex international security environment characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can generate **significant** negativefeedback, or ‘blowback’, from **unintended outcomes** that create more risk. This challenges notions of effective risk management and control through linear change via the exercise of military power. 100 In fact, as Williams argues, **the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky**: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision ‘**inevitably leads to a** loss of control’. 101 The danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical process **with no end in sight**. 102 Rogers, for example, presciently envisaged a post-9/11 ‘never-ending war’ of military-led risk mitigation generatingnew and potentially more dangerous **risks** deemed susceptible to further military solutions, and so on. 103 This risk is not limited to distant theatresof conflict, but also applies to the very ‘way of life’ the current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect, through the **erosion of civil liberties** and the **securitization of daily life.** There is a powerful argument that the exercise of UK military force for optional expeditionary war-fighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious doctrine that could **generate more**, and potentially **more lethal, risks than it resolves** or contains. Since absolute security cannot be achieved, the value of any potential, discretionary increment in UK security through the exercise of military force must take into account its political, economic and human cost. As Wolfers argues, ‘at a certain point, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it’, and the exercise of military force becomes ineffective or, worse, **wholly counterproductive.** 104 After following George W. Bush on a risky adventure into Iraq, the UK must question the effectiveness of a militarized ‘risk transfer’ strategy as the foundation for managing globalized security risks in relation to the long-term human security needs of British citizens.

#### The alternative is to critique the aff’s discourse. Rejecting their demand for immediate yes/no policy response is the only way to raise critical ethical questions about the racialized discourse and practice of IR.

Biswas 7—Shampa Biswas, Politics at Whitman [“Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” *Millennium* 36 (1) p. 117-125]

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order.

Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in *Orientalism* has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power.

Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking *politics* seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the *global* seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about *feeling and thinking globally* concretely, thoroughly and carefully.

IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’

One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13

While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of** ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

#### Appeal to specific nuclear technology magnifies the problem of authoritarian expertise. They depoliticize social choice about the purpose of technology.

Wynne 11—Brian Wynne Science Studies and Research Director of the Centre for the Study of Environmental Change @ Lancaster (UK) [*Rationality and Ritual* 2nd Edition p. 8-11] [Gender Paraphrased]

Such detachment of ambitious technological commitment from organized fantasy has to be a hope; but this hope also has to be interrogated, cold-bloodedly, carefully, and openly. As I tried to assert in this book, nuclear proponents including its scientists belied their own claims to objective hard-factual discipline, with their intense and unbridled emotional commitments clearly evident. These scientistic emotions (and their denial) manifested profound insecurities on the part of their agents, combined with an effective assumption of almost superhuman powers. Thus the mutual identification and reinforcement of nuclear technology with a culture of exaggeration is no less real and no less dangerous just because other technologies have also suffered from similar such idolatry in the past (Ezrahi, 1990) as well as since the 1980s. Although it was Lewis Strauss - a non-scientist head of the scientific body for both weapons and civil nuclear power, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) - who voiced in 1954 the infamous promise that his generation's children would enjoy 'electrical energy too cheap to meter' (Strauss, 1954; Weart, 1988, p166), what is notable is the refusal of any nuclear expert to refute such fatuous promises made in the public name of their science (Laurence, 1959, p251).10 If science claims the credit for the putative benefits from such technologies, as it does, then it cannot easily distance itself from the related discredits - nor from the arguments over which is which. Paradoxically, as nuclear energy prepares to return, society still has not come to terms with the cultural significance of its mass-destructive and apocalyptic military origins and consequences. With the failure of the Atoms for Peace programme and its global institutional UN 'safeguards' supposedly to arrest nuclear weapons proliferation (granted that it must have slowed it down), the systematic and sustained social unrealism of this 60-year commitment cannot but encourage a continuing sense of public unease and distrust of nuclear energy technologies, even if the reprocessing option is forestalled. The imagery of Figure 1 is referred to in Chapter 2 of the original book, but was not printed there. Looking back now, I realize I did not do justice to the issues it raised. Thanks to various theoretical, technological and public developments since then, it deserves fuller treatment now. The image is from a supplement on 'The Atomic Age' published by the Financial Times in 1956, at the birth of both the UK civil nuclear power programme (claimed to be the first in the world) and the UN global Atoms for Peace programme.11 This 50-page publication celebrated the Queen's forthcoming opening of the Calder Hall (Windscale) nuclear electricity (and weapons plutonium) reactors.12 This imagery did not just project nuclear technology as human perfection. It portrayed much more about the nuclear imagination and its mode of public communication and self-promotion, thus of nuclear technology's material social being. This includes its normative characterization (and performance, as explained below) of 'the public' which it imagined as part of the nuclear era. It emphasized the religious forces and feelings animating this science-inspired technology, the epitome of modern scientific rationality as public authority. The technology is shown not just as precise, pure, pristine and clinical. It is also hovering in its own superhuman realm, above the Earth and beyond mere human life, even surrounded by a glowing celestial halo. The text indicates an imagined (and desired) awestruck public: 'Millions of people ['mankind'] stand amazed at the prospect of heat light and power from a source that cannot even be seen.' There is not the slightest sense of a technology and its embodied science that envisages any hint of public engagement: indeed quite the opposite, only distant awe, exclusion and admiration. These extra-terrestrial, extra-social experts 'know best', not only about nuclear power, but about what is best for '[hu]mankind'. Public exclusion, subordination, passivization and alienation are here actively cultivated, through symbolic action. The Windscale book is about how this same kind of symbolic imagination of 'the public' was, through a participatory public inquiry, its report and parliamentary and media uptake, enacted into material performance in later policy culture and commitments. These processes, their forms of reason and discourse, can be said to have performed a particular imagination of their public, and encouraged the material enactment of that imagination into society. If we also refer back here to the practices of pollution management at the Windscale-Sellafield site, as reflected in Dunster's 1958 description earlier of how routine marine radioactive discharges were set, we can see in this account, and in the ensuing environmental contamination and human exposures from this, a performance of nuclear technology's imagined publics. We can see from not only the typical symbolism but also in corresponding material practices that as democratic participants, worthy of respectful recognition and to be given standing as part of the moral --community in which nuclear technology exists, effectively there is no public. It has been one of the most significant shifts of collective understanding amongst many - contributed by the late twentieth century social sciences and humanities, that symbolic actions carry corresponding changes in material social relations. Thus the normatively imposed social relations of technoscience here are not just symbolically projected, but also materially performed. In addition to the instances noted above, a further routinized example of the latter was the sustained extreme secrecy and misinformation that was practised by the UK nuclear authorities behind the scenes of this 1956 flood of positive publicity, and in imposed assumptions-in-practice about what people's concerns, needs and capacities are and should be. These were in no need of co ll ective negotiation; they were subsumed into the dominant assumed ontology. Inquiry inspector Mr Justice Parker's later empiricist framing and interpretation of the Windscale inquiry's conflicting ontological commitments, as these were embodied in the irreconcilable arguments of the parties but represented by him as measurable - and measured by him - against an empirically discoverable standard, did the same. Despite all the noise and fury of public debate and controversy, his discrete translations of expressed public concerns into his own terms were not subjected to any direct accountable scrutiny. Of course, his rational arguments in favour of THORP's approval were, but that is not what I am referring to here. This book still stands as a sole, modest and utterly marginal witness to this.

#### The critique is prior—proliferation discourse undercuts aff solvency by prioritizing supply-side solutions at the expense of addressing legitimate demand-side concerns.

Mutimer 94—David Mutimer is Deputy Director of YCISS and Associate Professor of Political Science at York University [August 1994, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, http://pi.library.yorku.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/10315/1415/YCI0074.pdf?sequence=1]

The Assembled Image

The image of PROLIFERATION knits together the metaphors of 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance' to shape the policy responses of the international community. The metaphors have certain entailments, which serve to highlight, downplay and hide aspects of the security environment. Thus, the policy responses which are being developed address primarily those aspects highlighted, while ignoring those downplayed and hidden. The image is of an autonomously driven process of spread, outward from a particular source or sources. It is an apolitical image, which strongly highlights technology, capability and gross accounts of number. As such, it is an image that masks the political interests of those supporting the present structure of proliferation control—a structure which strongly reflects this image and its entailments.

To begin with, the control efforts are classified by the technology of concern. Thus there are global instruments for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, of chemical and biological weapons, and a register of conventional arms. There is no global instrument for the control of the spread of missile technology, but the MTCR addresses this technology as a discrete problem, and is considering evolving into a global regime. There is thus little or no recognition in the practical response to PROLIFERATION that the spread of these technologies might all be part of a common 'security' problem. The security concerns which might drive states to acquire one or more of these technologies are hidden by the PROLIFERATION image. This division of the problem into discrete technologies persists, despite the fact that the connection among the various technologies of concern manifests itself in a number of ways. I will mention only two by way of illustration. The first is the common reference to biological weapons as "the poor man's atomic bomb". The implication of this phrase is that a state prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons—in this case for reasons of cost—could turn to biological weapons to serve the same purposes. The second example is of the links being drawn in the Middle East between Arab states' potential chemical arms, and Israel's nuclear arsenal. The Arab states are balking at ratifying the CWC until the Israeli nuclear arms are at least placed on the negotiating table. Conversely, supporters of the Israeli position can cite the Arab states' overwhelming conventional superiority as a justification for Israel's nuclear arms.

The common approach to 'controlling' proliferation across the technologies of concern is the limitation and even denial of the supply of technology. Each of the technologies of concern is addressed by at least one suppliers group, and the major Western suppliers maintain export controls to implement the groups' lists. Such an approach is clearly informed by the entailments of the PROLIFERATION image. Supplier controls respond to the 'spread outward from a source' entailment of 'proliferation'. They also reflect the ways in which both the metaphors of 'proliferation' and 'stability' highlight technology, by focussing solely on its nature and movement. In addition, these groups reflect the various entailments of 'stability' and 'balance' outlined above. They seek to prevent "excessive and destabilizing accumulations" of technologies through the application of their controls. Lost entirely in these practices are considerations of the political and economic underpinnings of security. These aspects are hidden by the image, and so are not addressed by the policy responses.

The relationship between these political interests, the policy responses and the metaphors of the PROLIFERATION image would form the subject of another paper, at the very least. However, it is not responsible to ignore entirely this relationship, and so I will provide an example by way of illustration. India stands as a leading opponent of the present approach to proliferation control, with its roots in technological denial. India represents a different set of interests from those of the northern states most concerned with PROLIFERATION as presently understood and practiced. For India, access to technology is vital, and the principle of discrimination between the have and have not states—enshrined most notably in the NPT, but seen throughout the non-proliferation measures for denying technologies' spread—is absolutely unacceptable. As such, the Indians reject the image of PROLIFERATION, and call rather for DISARMAMENT. This view is reflected in the following passage, quoted from a paper by the Indian Ambassador to Japan, who was previously the Indian representative on the Conference on Disarmament:

It would be futile to pretend that 1995 is 1970, that nothing has changed and nothing requires to be changed in the 1995 NPT. It would be a cruel joke on the coming generation to say that they will be safer with an indefinite extension of the 1970 NPT. 1995 presents an opportunity; there is great scope for non governmental agencies, intellectuals and academics, who believe in nuclear disarmament to work towards changing this mindset and spur governments in nuclear weapon countries to look at reality, to accept that there are shortcomings in the NPT and that nations, both within and outside the NPT have genuine concerns which need to be addressed in order to make the NPT universal, non discriminatory and a true instrument for nuclear disarmament. [Emphasis added.]66

There are three noteworthy elements of this plea for change. The first is that Ambassador Shah recognises the importance of changing the mindset toward the problem in order to effect change in the policy responses to that problem. This feature of his remarks relates to the second. Ambassador Shah casts his justification for alterations in the NPT as reflecting a changed reality—thereby attacking the naturalisation of the features of the world which are highlighted by the PROLIFERATION image, as reflected in the NPT. Finally, Ambassador Shah calls for the new NPT to be an instrument of 'nuclear disarmament', not non-proliferation. In other words, he recognises that there is a policy problem to be addressed, but it is not a PROLIFERATION problem—that is, a spread of weapons technology from those who have to those who do not presently have. Rather, the problem needs to be imagined as a (DIS)ARMAMENT problem—the possession of nuclear and other arms, regardless of who has them.

For the countries of the north, the indefinite extension of an unamended NPT is considered essential. The NPT is seen as the linchpin of the proliferation control effort, without which the entire edifice might fall. What Ambassador Shah's comments demonstrate, reflecting the position taken in India, is the way in which that effort, tied so closely to the entailments of the PROLIFERATION image, serves only a particular set of interests by highlighting only specific features of 'reality'. From where he sits, 'reality' provides Ambassador Shah with a different approach to the problem of nuclear (and other mass destruction) weapons, an approach better captured through an image of (DIS)ARMAMENT than one of PROLIFERATION.

### 1NC—Solvency

#### Nuclear will remain uncompetitive for decades—our evidence cites industry leaders.

Hiltzik 11—Michael Hiltzik is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author who has covered business, technology, and public policy for the Los Angeles Times for twenty years, master of science degree in journalism from the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University [March 23, 2011, “A nuclear renaissance in U.S. was unlikely even before Japan disaster,” *LA Times*, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/23/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20110323]

To all those who may be concerned that the catastrophic events at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant will derail the heralded renaissance of nuclear power in the U.S., you can relax.

The reason is simple: There is no renaissance.

Not even Exelon Corp., the nation's biggest nuclear generation company, has been holding its breath for a surge in orders or appreciable increase in new generating capacity.

The reason has little to do with an unreasoning public's fear of nuclear meltdowns and radiation poisoning, and almost everything to do with pure economics. As John Rowe, Exelon's chairman and chief executive, told an audience at a Washington think tank two weeks ago, you can build a new natural gas plant for 40% less than a new nuclear plant, and the price of its fuel is at rock bottom.

"Natural gas is queen," he says. (To be fair, Exelon also makes a lot of money from gas.)

In recent years, nuclear energy has been promoted as a "green," or at least greenish, alternative to coal power and other fossil-fueled generation. That's been a potent selling point as concern has mounted over the latter's effect on climate change by the production of greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is burdened by its own environmental issues, including the dangers of radioactive release into the atmosphere, but the production of carbon dioxide isn't among them.

Yet the technology's potential as a weapon against global warming has been as oversold, just as its virtues as safe, clean and "too cheap to meter" were during its infancy in the 1950s. To realistically make a dent in climate change, nuclear plant construction would have to take off at such a rate that it would "pose serious concerns" for the availability of construction materials, properly trained builders and operating technicians, and safety and security oversight, as a report by the Council on Foreign Relations observed in 2007.

"For at least a couple of decades to come, nuclear will be very uncompetitive," the report's author, Charles D. Ferguson, told me this week. Ferguson is president of the Federation of American Scientists.

The ongoing disaster in Japan will exacerbate social concerns about nuclear waste disposal — the on-site storage of spent fuel, which is common at U.S. plants, has complicated the situation at Fukushima — as well as concerns about the safety and security of existing plants. But those concerns have existed for years, so the spectacle of the Japanese grappling with the consequences, graphic as it is, may not in itself affect public attitudes.

Talk of nuclear renaissance in the U.S. had been spurred by two developments. One was the dramatic improvement in the operating record of U.S. plants. In recent years the domestic nuclear industry had been operating at close to 90% of capacity, compared with the lousy 65% record it turned in during the 1970s. The change was the product partially of the industry's consolidation into a small number of specialty operators with nuclear expertise, and it tended to reduce the apparent cost of nuclear power to levels competitive with other sources.

But that also means that "people who advocate nuclear power have rose-colored glasses about its economics," says John E. Parsons of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the co-author of a 2009 update to a 2003 MIT report on the future of nuclear power.

Further encouragement came from the streamlining of U.S. licensing rules. The new procedure consolidates what formerly were separate construction and operating permits into one, removing the uncertainty that a utility might build an entire facility only to be denied permission to run it.

But no new plant has yet been approved under the new system, so plenty of uncertainty still exists. "An investor has to ask, 'Am I looking at a technology that works only when all the cards fall my way?'" Parsons says.

Despite expressions of support for nuclear power coming from political leaders, including President Obama, who is offering loan guarantees for new reactors, nuclear energy can't develop in a policy vacuum. One of the dismal ironies of the American energy program is that many of the same politicians standing foursquare behind nuclear power are also sworn opponents of policies such as a carbon tax, which would make nukes more competitive by raising the price of fossil-based alternatives.

For example, here's Mitt Romney. In "No Apology," the book he published last year presumably as a manifesto for his 2012 presidential campaign, Romney says he doesn't understand why nuclear power is such a "boogeyman," because America's existing plants are "trouble-free." Romney contends that nuclear plants are economically unfeasible in the U.S. only because of our "interminable permitting, regulatory and legal delays."

Romney should listen more to fellow businessmen like Exelon's Rowe, who would tell him that the real reason is that gas generation is cheaper, thanks to pricing that ignores such external costs of gas as pollution and climate change. Yet in his book Romney condemns policies such as the carbon tax because it would "fatten government, harm employers and employees, and hurt consumers." You can't have it both ways, Mitt.

Romney defends the economics of nuclear power by observing that countries with major nuclear construction programs, such as China, seem to have solved the economic conundrum without much trouble. Yet even pro-nuclear experts here acknowledge that nuclear economics don't easily cross national borders. China, which has 13 operating nuclear plants and 30 under construction, has endowed its state-owned nuclear industry with heavy subsidies.

According to a report by the Federation of American Scientists, China's burgeoning demand for electrical power can't effectively be satisfied from its current main source, coal, which will face a depletion crisis around the end of this decade. That makes ramping up nuclear an urgent issue for China. But in the U.S., says Andrew Kadak, the former CEO of Yankee Atomic Power Co., a New England nuclear plant operator, "we don't have that urgency because natural gas is too cheap an alternative."

With the construction of plants still hampered by economics, nuclear utilities are devoting more attention to improving efficiencies and increasing the output of their existing plants, a process known as "uprating." But that amounts to treading water until the social and economic difficulties of nuclear power can be addressed. And they'll have to be addressed: "It's going to be very hard to reduce carbon dioxide if nuclear is out of the picture," MIT's Parsons says. But the first step is injecting realism into the discussion. Nuclear power may be necessary to our energy future, but it won't be our savior.

#### Nat gas blocks SMRs—even if the aff happens they won’t be commercially viable for 10 years. Other countries will take the lead.

Updegraff 12—Summary Prepared by Derek Updegraff, Rebecca Lordan, Pierce Corden citing Phillip O. Moor P.E., Consultant in nuclear technology, licensing, and business structuring and former Director of Project Management at GPU Nuclear, Chair of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) President’s Special Committee on SMR Licensing Issues [May 9, 2012, Small Modular Reactor Panel Discussion Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, https://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMR%20Briefing%20Summary.pdf]

In Moor’s view, economics is the key issue. Capital costs are being confirmed. If natural gas prices were to break ~$7‐8 per million British Thermal Units (MMBTU) (currently they are around $2.00/MMBTU in the US) or if carbon taxes are put into place, SMRs could become economically viable. In that case, loan guarantees or other forms of direct federal assistance for SMRs might not be necessary. However, even in this scenario, for the SMR market to take off, would still require NRC licensing changes and construction of demonstration plants to prove the plants can be made commercially viable. This process is expected to take 8‐10 years. Moor pointed out that China, India, and Russia are moving ahead with SMRs and suggests that the US might miss the chance to lead this market.

#### SMRs have greater economic barriers than conventional reactors.

Lyman 11—Edwin Lyman is Senior Global Security Scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). He specialises in nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear power safety. He has published many articles in journals and magazines and written many reports. Lyman was president of the Nuclear Control Institute. He has a Ph.D. in physics from Cornell University. [July 14, 2011, Testimony of Dr. Edwin Lyman Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Union of Concerned Scientists “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors” Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear\_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf]

Some SMR vendors emphasize that their designs are “passively safe.” However, no credible reactor design is completely passive and can shut itself down and cool itself in every circumstance without need for intervention. Some reactor designs, large or small, have certain passive safety features that allow the reactor to depend less on operator action for a limited period of time following design-basis accidents. Small reactors may have an advantage because the lower the power of a reactor, the easier it is to cool through passive means such as natural convection cooling with water or even with air. However, accidents affecting multiple small units may cause complications that could outweigh the advantages of having lower heat removal requirements per unit. Moreover, passively safe reactors generally require some equipment, such as valves, that are designed to operate automatically but are not one hundred percent reliable.

Operators will always be needed to monitor systems to ensure they are functioning as designed, and to intervene if they fail to do so. Both passive systems and operator actions would require functioning instrumentation and control systems, which were unreliable during the severe accidents at Three Mile Island and Fukushima. Passive systems may not work as intended in the event of beyond-design-basis accidents, and as result passive designs should also be equipped with highly reliable active backup systems and associated instrumentation and control systems.

But more backup systems generally mean higher costs. This poses a particular problem for SMRs, which begin with a large economic disadvantage compared to large reactors.

According to the standard formula for economies of scale, the overnight capital cost per kilowatt of a 125 megawatt reactor would be roughly 2.5 times greater than that of a 1250 megawatt unit, all other factors being equal. Advocates argue that SMRs offer advantages that can offset this economic penalty, such as a better match of supply and demand, reduced up-front financing costs, reduced construction times, and an accelerated benefit from learning from the construction of multiple units. However, a 2007 paper by Westinghouse scientists and their collaborators that quantified the cost savings associated with some of these factors found that they could not overcome the size penalty: the paper found that at best, the capital cost of four 335 megawatt reactors was slightly greater than that of one 1340 megawatt reactor.1

#### US can’t lead—state run nuclear power will always win

**Domenici and Miller 12** [Pete, Former U.S. Senator and Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Dr Warren F, Former Department of energy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear energy, “Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets,” September, <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Nuclear%20Report.PDF>]

However, domestic exporters of U.S. nuclear technology, fuels, and services face a truly global and highly competitive market. Commercial nuclear technology is now available from a variety of suppliers, and there are many more companies, several of which have the direct backing of their country’s government, competing with U.S. firms. Industry and other stakeholders believe that U.S. nuclear technology companies are at a competitive disadvantage in international markets due to complex and overlapping federal regulations. Several presenters at the BPC Nuclear Initiative event noted that multiple federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce, DOe, and the Department of State have jurisdiction over commercial nuclear trade, global safety and security, and nonproliferation.

### Econ

#### Manufacturing revival now due to nat gas

Ebinger et al. 12—Senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative @ Brookings [Charles Ebinger (Professor in energy economics @ Johns Hopkins and Georgetown), Kevin Massy (Director of the Energy Security Initiative @ Brookings) & Govinda Avasarala (Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative @ Brookings), “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, Policy Brief 12-01, MAY 2012

The shale gas boom has many industrial producers and chemical companies anticipating an increase in U.S. industrial and manufacturing competitiveness and petrochemicals production. A December 2011 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, conducted in association with the National Association of Manufacturers, notes an increase in U.S. manufacturing activity due to shale gas development and suggests one million additional manufacturing jobs could be created in EIA’s high shale gas recovery scenario (in which 50 percent more shale gas is recovered relative to the reference case) compared with its low shale recovery scenario (in which 50 percent less is recovered). 49 A particular area of interest is the resurgence in ethylene production and the manufacturing of ethylene-based goods in the United States. Ethylene, which is a principal component in a variety of goods ranging from anti-freeze to trash-bags, is produced from ethane, a byproduct of natural gas. Cheap domestic natural gas has provided chemical producers a global competitive advantage in ethane—and therefore ethylene—production, particularly compared with producers in Europe where ethylene is derived principally from naphtha, an oil-based product. Because crude oil prices have not dropped in parallel with gas prices in the United States, U.S. industrial producers are thus globally competitive again. As a result, a number of industrial producers are looking to reinvest in plants in the United States. 50 Bayer MaterialScience is opening an ethane cracker in West Virginia (the first cracker in the Marcellus) and Dow Chemical and Shell Chemical have announced plans to expand and open, respectively, crackers on the Gulf Coast. According to analysis by the American Chemistry Council (ACC), an industry trade association, a 25 percent increase in the supply of ethane in the United States could result in 17,000 direct new jobs in the chemical industry, 395,000 indirect jobs, and around $44 billion in additional federal, state, and local tax revenue over 10 years. 51 To achieve such returns ACC presumes an infusion of over $16 billion of private capital, and includes an assessment of induced impacts—“employment and output supported by the spending of those employed directly or indirectly by the sector.” While the ACC does not make explicit assumptions about the shape of the U.S. natural gas supply curve or the future price of natural gas, it also assumes sustained low gas prices, and resultantly high oil-to-gas price ratio. While some analysts may take legitimate issue with the assumptions behind the projected job-creation figures, it is clear that the U.S. petrochemical and manufacturing sector will be a prominent competitor and potential beneficiary of abundant domestic natural gas. In Part II, the study will analyze the impact of U.S. LNG exports on the potential for a “renaissance” in the industrial sector. Pg. 17-18

#### No economic collapse – government support, no great power conflict, low inflation, tech connectivity

**Zakaria 9** (Fareed, former columnist for Newsweek and editor of Newsweek International, he has recently announced a move to Editor-At-Large of Time, host of CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS, and a frequent commentator and author about issues related to international relations, trade and American foreign policy, “The Secrets of Stability,” December 12, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.html)

This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature. The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today. Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong. This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today, while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West. The second force for stability is the victory—after a decades-long struggle—over the cancer of inflation. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs and wages that you might have had in the future, inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your savings. In many countries in the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for many of the political dramas of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran. But then in 1979, the tide began to turn when Paul Volcker took over the U.S. Federal Reserve and waged war against inflation. Over two decades, central banks managed to decisively beat down the beast. At this point, only one country in the world suffers from -hyperinflation: Zimbabwe. Low inflation allows people, businesses, and governments to plan for the future, a key precondition for stability. Political and economic stability have each reinforced the other. And the third force that has underpinned the resilience of the global system is technological connectivity. Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. Today the information revolution has created a much more deeply connected global system. Managers in Arkansas can work with suppliers in Beijing on a real-time basis. The production of almost every complex manufactured product now involves input from a dozen countries in a tight global supply chain. And the consequences of connectivity go well beyond economics. Women in rural India have learned through satellite television about the independence of women in more modern countries. Citizens in Iran have used cell phones and the Internet to connect to their well-wishers beyond their borders. Globalization today is fundamentally about knowledge being dispersed across our world. This diffusion of knowledge may actually be the most important reason for the stability of the current system. The majority of the world's nations have learned some basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results. Despite all the turmoil of the past year, it's important to remember that more people have been lifted out of poverty over the last two decades than in the preceding 10. Clear-thinking citizens around the world are determined not to lose these gains by falling for some ideological chimera, or searching for a worker's utopia. They are even cautious about the appeals of hypernationalism and war. Most have been there, done that. And they know the price.

### 1NC—China

#### No regional rebalancing or security dilemmas—the only empirical data goes our way.

Fettweis 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Seattle, WA, September 2011, pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902154]

The final and in some ways most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the United States at the center of the current era of relative peace. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Kaplan and Kristol, “is American power.”68 This belief is a variant of what is known as the “hegemonic stability theory,” which proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability.

First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris: It overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global stability. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined belligerents. **The U.S. military** may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Self-policing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The five percent of the world’s population that lives in the United States simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so.

Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is magnified by hubris: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The ego-centric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, the United States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

Third, if U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of **trust** in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that would be **without precedent in** international **history**. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naiveté and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed it is hard to think of a similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests? It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the United States does. If there was danger out there, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower—if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction.

Furthermore, in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must not only be fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they must also trust that the hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently. As discussed above, the allies do not feel that the United States consistently demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look with confused eyes upon our behavior, and are unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly.

Finally, while believers in hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense fairly substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan.”73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in conflict and violence.

The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.74 No state believed that its security was endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No defense establishments were enhanced** to address power vacuums; **no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred** after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated.

These figures will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

However, two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if, as many suspect, this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending.75 Abandoning the mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

Second, it is also worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God’s gladiator on earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.

**No China war**

Goldstein 11 - Professor and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute @ US Naval War College [Dr. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US–China Security Relationship,” Survival | vol. 53 no. 2 | April–May 2011 | pp. 89–116

Weighed in the aggregate, China’s rise remains a peaceful process, and the record to date should engender significant confidence. Beijing has not resorted to a significant use of force against another state in more than three decades. Its deployments of troops as UN peacekeepers to hot spots such as Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have played a helpful role, as have the counter-piracy operations of its fleet in the Gulf of Aden. When dealing with weak and occasionally unstable states on its borders, such as Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, Beijing has not resorted to military intervention, nor even flexed its military muscles to gain advantage. Chinese maritime claims, whether in the South or the East China seas, are generally being enforced by unarmed patrol cutters, a clear signal that Beijing does not seek escalation to a major crisis on these matters. Contrary to the perception that China’s senior military officers are all irreconcilable hawks, one influential People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral recently said in an interview, with reference to lessons learned from recent border negotiations on China’s periphery: ‘If there are never any concessions or compromises, there is simply no possibility of reaching a breakthrough in border negotiations.’2 pg. 90

#### Prolif will be slow even in the new era.

Tepperman 9 (Jonathon, former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreig Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek, Newsweek, “Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb,” 44:154, 9-7, L/N)

The risk of an arms race--with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one--is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; **that's spread at glacial pace**." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors--Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say--might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### 2NC—SPF [K Prior]

#### Proliferation discourse spurs ineffective policies—focus on motives and actors, not on weapons.

Mutimer 94—David Mutimer is Deputy Director of YCISS and Associate Professor of Political Science at York University [August 1994, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, http://pi.library.yorku.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/10315/1415/YCI0074.pdf?sequence=1]

'Proliferation' in its base biological meaning then, refers to an autonomous process of growth and outward spread, internally driven but externally controlled. Danger arises when the controls fail and the natural proliferation of cells produces excessive reproduction.

The first step of the adoption of 'proliferation' as a metaphor for international security involved applying the term to the development of nuclear technology after the discovery of controlled fission in the United States' Manhattan Project. The United States' nuclear programme represented the source 'cell' or 'organism' from which the technology would spread. Such spread was a 'natural' process, and so scholars confidently predicted that there would be thirty or forty nuclear powers by 1980. Such a condition was considered dangerous, and undesirable, and so attempts were made to establish external controls on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These attempts resulted in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, which remains the principal mechanism of proliferation control. The development of nuclear technology was thus imagined in terms of the 'proliferation' metaphor. The first question to be asked is what are the implications of this image, with its understandings of autonomy, spread and external control, for the policy response to the development of nuclear technology? There are two crucial entailments of the proliferation metaphor as applied to nuclear weapons.

The first entailment is the image of a spread outward from a point, or source. Cell division begins with a single, or source cell, and spreads outward from there — in the case of a cancer, both to produce a single tumour and to create a number of separate tumours throughout the host body. Similarly, the 'problem' of proliferation is one of a source or sources 'proliferating', that is reproducing itself by supplying the necessary technology to a new site of technological application. This image highlights the transmission process from source to recipient, and entails policy designed to cut off the supply, restricting the technology to its source. Hence, the dominant response to nuclear proliferation is the creation of supplier groups, the Zangger Committee and the NSG, which seeks to 'control' the spread of nuclear technology. In other words, they attempt to provide "the checks and balances that normally ensure orderly" transfer, and prevent the spread of nuclear technology resulting in the "cancer" of weapons' proliferation. The image is repeated even in the more extreme proposals for policy. For example, former Prime Minster Trudeau proposed a scheme to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament for preventing weapons' spread. This scheme included two measures currently under consideration at the Conference on Disarmament, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and a Cutoff of Fissile Material Production. Trudeau's plan was known as the 'suffocation proposal'—firmly in keeping with the biological referent of proliferation. To stop, rather than control, reproduction by organisms, you need to 'suffocate' the progenitors.

The second entailment of the 'proliferation' metaphor for the problem of nuclear weapons spread is an extreme technological bias. Biological proliferation is an internally driven phenomenon, and so the image of 'Proliferation' applied to the development of nuclear technology highlights the autonomous spread of that technology, and its problematic weapons variant. As Frank Barnaby writes in a recent work, "A country with a nuclear power programme will inevitably acquire the technical knowledge and expertise, and will accumulate the fissile material necessary to produce nuclear weapons."50 In fact, the text from which this is drawn presents an interesting example of the autonomy of the 'proliferation' metaphor. The book is entitled How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-weapon proliferation in the 1990s. Notice that the weapons themselves spread, they are not spread by an external agent of some form—say a human being or human institution. Under most circumstances such a title would be unnoticed, for as Lakoff and Johnson argue, the metaphors are so deeply engrained in our conceptual system that they are not recognised as being metaphorical.

This image, by highlighting the technological and autonomous aspects of a process of spread, downplays or even hides important aspects of the relationship of nuclear weapons to international security. To begin with, the image hides the fact that nuclear weapons do not spread, but are spread—and in fact are spread largely by the western states. Secondly, the image downplays, to the point of hiding, any of the political, social, economic and structural factors which tend to drive states and other actors both to supply and to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, the image downplays the politics of security and threat, naturalising the 'security dilemma' to the point that it is considered as an automatic dynamic. The image of PROLIFERATION thus privileges a technical, apolitical policy, by casting the problem as a technical, apolitical one. The Non-Proliferation Treaty controls and safeguards the movement of the technology of nuclear energy. The supporting supplier groups jointly impose controls on the supply—that is the outward flow—of this same technology. The goal, in both cases, is to stem or, at least slow, the outward movement of material and its attendant techniques.

Such a policy is almost doomed to fail, however, for it downplays and hides the very concerns which motivate the agents of the process. Iraq was driven to acquire nuclear weapons, even in the face of NPT commitments, and so employed technology which is considered so outdated that it is no longer tightly controlled. This simply does not fit with the NPT-NSG-Zangger Committee approach. In addition, in order to gain the necessary material, the Iraqis needed access to external technology. Such technology was acquired by human agents acting for the Iraqi state and was acquired from other agents, who had their own motivational interests to provide the necessary technology. The technology does not 'spread' through some autonomous process akin to that causing a zygote to become a person, but rather they are spread, and so the agents involved are able to sidestep the technologically focussed control efforts.

The second step of this process, reimagining international security in the terms of PROLIFERATION following the end of the Cold War, adopts the policy entailments along with the underlying biological imagery. By using the PROLIFERATION image now to address biological and chemical weapons, missile technology and even conventional weapons, the international community is replicating the problematic policy solutions which highlight technology and hide politics and agency. Thus the NPT and its supplier groups are joined by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Australia Group, a supplier group which also oversees export controls on both chemical and biological weapons' technology. Missile technology is controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even conventional arms, the ones we might expect to be most closely related to understandings of politics, are conceived in terms of 'excessive and destabilising accumulations'. Once more, it is the weapons themselves, rather than the political agents acquiring and using them, which are the lexical focus of discussions of conventional arms. What is ignored by this policy approach is any suggestion that there are political interests or motivations at work, which may cause human institutions to act in ways which promote insecurity (which, in other words, destabilize). A good part of **the reason for this lack of understanding is that the image of the problem is one which downplays, and even hides, the involvement of the politics of human agency in both the acts of supply and acquisition**.

### AIAs Legit

#### The alternative can agree with the aff’s policy, but disagree with their justifications—

#### We should be analyzing the relationship between the plan and the advantages, not just the plan alone. *Policy stories*, like the 1ac institutionalize a particular understanding of both problems and solutions. Their advantage choices crowd out different policy practices and concepts.

Sending 4—Ole, Research Fellow @ Norweigan Inst. of Int’l Affairs [*Global Institutions & Development* eds. Morten Boas and Desmond McNeil p. 58-59]

Granted that the objectification and definition of a given phenomenon is open to a variety of normative and political considerations, it becomes interesting to explore how scientific knowledge constitutes a symbolic resource used by politically motivated actors. In order to justify and legitimize certain courses of action, and to render these possible and effective, scientific knowledge forms an important component both for efforts of persuading and mobilizing different groups, and for formulating and establishing policy practices. This can he grasped through the concept of poli1y stories. A policy story can be defined as follows: A set of factual, causal claims, normative principles and a desired objective, all of which are constructed as a more or less coherent argument a story which points to a problem to be addressed and the desirability and adequacy of adopting a specific policy approach to resolve it.

This conceptualization incorporates how politically motivated actors integrate scientifically produced imowledge in the form of facts, concepts or theories in order to i) convince others that a certain phenomenon is a problem, (ii) demonstrate that this problem is best understood in a certain way as shown by the facts presented, and (iii) link these factual claims to normative principles giving moral force to the argument that it should be resolved. This perspective thus subjects the factual dimensions of political processes to the interests and normative commitments of actors, in the sense that knowledge is used to justify and legitimize calls for adopting certain policies to resolve what is seen to be a problem that 'ought' to be resolved. The formulation is partly inspired by Rein and Schuss (1991. 265), who refer to problem-setting stories that 'link causal accounts of policy problems to particular proposals for action and facilitate the normative leap from "is" to 'ought"'. We depart from Rein and Schon's conception somewhat by emphasizing more strongly the factual claims (the characteristics of a phenomenon and normative principles (the morally' grounded principles used to legitimize the policy formulation invoked by actors as they define a problem and argue for a specific policy approach. The concept of policy stories seeks to capture how actors integrate knowledge claims into their politically charged arguments so as to 'frame' the issue under discussion. Because of the interlocking of the factual and normative dimension of policy making, a policy story, can be seen to create space for political agency. That is: a policy story serves by creating an argument grounded in a body of scientifically produced knowledge, to persuade and mobilize different groups as it represents a complete package: an authoritative problem-definition and a concomitant policy solution that is legitimized in both factual and normative terms. A policy story- that wins acceptance at the discursive level can be seen to define the terms of the debate for the establishment of policy and to de- legitimize competing conceptualizations and policy approaches. Through the political agency performed through a policy story it may come to dominate the policy field as it forms the central cognitive-normative organising device for specific formulation and establishment of policy within different organizations. In this way, the policy story' may over time attain a 'taken for granted' char- acter as it comes to structure, and reflect, policy practice. This process of stabilization is best described as a process of institutionalization. Following Scott, we can define institutionalization as a 'process by which a given set of units and a pattern of activities come so be normatively' and cognitively held in place, and practically taken for granted as lawful' Scott at al. 1994: 10). This latter feature is critical to the argument presented here. In the change from an argument for a specific policy approach to the establishment of that policy in practice, the policy story comes to define the cognitive-normative outlook of a policy regime. This can he defined as an interlock between the knowledge which underwrites the policy story, and the establishment in practice of the policy advocated in a policy story: That is: the knowledge that once formed part of an argument for a policy is now an integral part of the very rationality and identity' of the organization involved with managing this policy in practice. As such it becomes pact of the bundle of routines, rules, priorities and rationality of the organizations in the policy field see Douglas 1986; March and Olsen 1989: Scott and Meyer. 1994).

### AT: Universal Opposition

#### Saying they oppose all nuclear weapons is irrelevant. The script of nuclear arms control constructs the world in Orientalist terms—only the Western script of the 1AC makes norms appear universal.

Krause and Latham 98 [Keith Poli Sci @ Graduate Inst. of Int’l Studies (Geneva) and Andrew Poli Sci @ Macalester “Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control” *Contemporary Security Policy* 19 (1) p. 45-46]

It took about forty years to build a dense web of agreements and treaties, and to reach the point where European and transatlantic policy-makers could negotiate comprehensive agreements over conventional force deployments, or discuss such complex issues as a 'security architecture for the twenty-first century', without being blocked by misunderstanding and mistrust at every turn. As a result, it is not surprising that most of the 'models' policy-makers turn to as foundations for contemporary non- proliferation or security-building proposals have been derived from the East-West experience. Prominent examples include the lessons of the CSCE process and the concept of confidence building, the emphasis on formal negotiated agreements with effective verification, the focus on 'balance', 'parity' and crisis stabilizing measures, and the concentration on **particular types of weapon** and technologies.

There is, however, a tendency to forget how this state of affairs came about, and to leap to the end products of the process (architectures, security building, broad agreements), without paying attention to the scaffolding upon which such concepts were erected, or to the implicit baggage that such concepts carry. The Western NACD legacy was built upon a slowly created shared understanding that the East-West security dilemma needed to be addressed co-operatively, and upon a large body of negotiation, analysis and debate that created an **'epistemic community'** of experts who developed the essential basic concepts (such as arms control, deterrence, mutual assured destruction, parity, confidence building, transparency, verification) around which substantive agreements were constructed. A great deal of learning and adaptation took place on both sides in the negotiation and dialogue, and this learning was not confined to the narrow diplomatic circle of negotiators and policy-makers, but reached deep into the broader domestic political context and involved a wide range of relevant actors (bureaucracies, parliaments, interest groups).

There is also a tendency to forget that what we now call 'global' NACD norms and practices are in fact derived from, and reflective of, both the 'Western cultural account' in general and **Western security culture** in particular. The norms of Western security practice are **not simply 'rational' responses** to 'objective' threats. Rather, they are socially constructed 'scripts' that are embedded in a specific cultural context. Although these scripts have been universalized to a large degree, the process of diffusion has been neither uncomplicated nor linear. Within non-Western countries, the dominant Western cultural account competes and interacts with indigenous cultural accounts to produce a wide range of nation-specific security-building scripts which are then enacted by foreign policy officials. Thus it should come as no surprise that, even in this era of globalization, many non-Western states are ambivalent, antagonistic or resistant to 'global' norms. Nor should it be too surprising that Western arms control, non-proliferation and confidence-building processes or concepts have not necessarily taken root when they have been exported to different regional contexts, or to more multilateral forums. New cleavages and fissures have appeared, as demonstrated by the acrimony that surrounded the preparatory conferences for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the difficulties encountered in the creation of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the dissension concerning a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the complications that have emerged with an expanded membership in the MTCR, and the general weakness of measures to control conventional arms transfers. These examples reflect strongly diverging perceptions of the nature of the problem, the means to its solution, and the appropriate mechanisms to achieve greater regional and global security, but they are also in part a product of different 'security culture' orientations towards regional and international peace and security. Western policy-makers need to be cognisant of this fact if they are to avoid the tendency to interpret this lack of enthusiasm as being somehow 'irrational', 'sinister' or 'hostile'. Moreover, a clear acknowledgement of the way in which the central elements of the Western security culture are, bound by history and deeply held beliefs can alert policy-makers to the need to look for similar deeply- help beliefs or historical lessons that could be used to shape the evolution of NACD ideas in different regions and contexts.

### AT: Perm—Nuclearism

#### Their representations of nuclear war sustain the nuclear weapons complex—despite their efforts to disarm, they inadvertently reinforce the utility of nuclear weapons in the public’s mind. Focusing on particular instances of nuclearism allows the weapons complex to hang on to the concept of minimum deterrence and makes their impacts self-fulfilling.

Arkin 97— independent expert on defense and editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists [William, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March-April, http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1997/ma97/ma97arkin.html]

Even when under attack, the nuclear weapons enterprise is remarkably resilient. Fundamentally, nuclear weapons equal danger, which equals prominence, which equals funding, support, and prominence, which equals danger. Whether for military advocates and weapons designers who rely on government money or anti-nuclear pressure groups and arms control organizations dependent on foundation funds, this equation is unchanging. Of course danger always suggests terrible consequences, such as a Saddam Hussein getting a nuclear weapon or loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorists. Solutions, whether arms reduction treaties, cooperative threat reduction programs, counterproliferation strategies, or the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, promise relief-but never instant relief, mind you, or permanent relief. Nuclear professionals thus engage in a perilous balancing act. The problems associated with nuclear weapons are, of course, grave enough for the public to surrender control to the custodians. Yet the impression can never be conveyed that things are completely out of control. That would catch the public's full attention, cause general alarm, and perhaps disrupt the gloom-and-more-gloom cycle by forcing real change. Arms controllers and anti-nuclear advocates inadvertently sustain this same cycle. Though they spar with government custodians and unrepentant boosters, they are so wedded to the habit of declaring things forever on the brink that they come off as like-minded supporters of the relevance and utility of nuclear weapons. This odd devil's alliance between opposing camps bolsters the steady impression that a lot needs to be done. And yet, it is an unequal contest. The public-and the anti-nuclear community-has every right and duty to reveal the government's sluggishness or deceit, to complain that this or that facility isn't clean enough, or this or that warhead isn't safe enough, or this or that weapon is too expensive, or this or that plan isn't well thought out or executed efficiently enough. But invariably after the complaint is lodged there is the requisite back and forth and congressional hearings and blue-ribbon panels, and the bomb boosters win. Write another check and we will fix whatever needs fixing, say the custodians-stockpile stewardship miraculously costs more than the nuclear budget in the days of production and testing-and so the cycle continues. Butler is not the first nuclear figure to speak out against his former employer. He offers all of the logical and necessary steps needed to reduce the dangers associated with nuclear weapons. Yet there is something missing in terms of jolting us off of the treadmill. Cry wolf For 40 years, nuclear midnight meant just that: the end of it all. Today that definition is fuzzy, for there is life after midnight. Because the public no longer frets much about nuclear war and "the arms race," there is enormous and simultaneous competition from pro and anti-nuclear forces, both to prolong the public slumber and to capture the public's attention. Through it all, the two communities-myself included-thrive on bad news. On one side are the anonymous colonels, bureaucrats, and scientists at nuclear agencies, laboratories and "strategic" commands that populate study groups and committees. On the other side are arms controllers, diplomats, peaceniks, lobbyists, and busybodies who also populate study groups and committees. These otherwise disparate actors have never had more common ground than today. They may battle for the public's heart and mind, and disagree about policy alternatives and the velocity of change, but they remain equally addicted to a climate of disaster, particularly the spectre of a nuclear crisis triggered by rampant proliferation. The never-ending impulse to cry wolf-whether in the name of disarmament, stewardship, or renewal creates the self-fulfilling reality of crisis and danger. Inflated value is conferred upon nuclear materials and weapons, thereby creating artificial demand and undermining work towards reducing the "danger." The constant ticking of the clock contributes to a sense of doom, one that naturally conveys the message that the problems are so massive as to be unsolvable///

. Butler describes the mind-numbing nuclear business and the unfortunate prolongation of Cold War policies, yet he intentionally avoids condemning anyone, an unfortunate oversight. As principal overseer of the nuclear establishment for many years, he says he fought against the Cold War nuclear mindset, and even ended some careers prematurely. But who are the faceless and too-powerful covert decision-makers who have outlived the general and continue to nurture and safeguard their blessed weapon? Isn't it time to ask who agitates against nuclear disarmament? The way things really work is that lab scientists, defense program bureaucrats, science advisers to the commanders of the unified commands, and nuclear specialists on military staffs manufacture "needs" and develop nuclear "requirements." One may hail their Cold War devotion and commitment on behalf of the bomb, but the unfortunate legacy is an enduring process by which nuclear requirements persist due to inertia. It is bottom-up rather than top-down policy. In choosing not to criticize the nuclear establishment, Butler allows these pro-nuclear forces to hide behind service, hardly ever facing up to their spellbound dedication to the bomb, never having to acknowledge their corrosive role in ultimately undermining the universal task-which is bringing the bomb under control. Organically withering The assumption was once that weapons modernization was an automatic process. The labs would by necessity get the money to build new warheads to replace outmoded ones; the next model of missile or bomber would certainly be developed to supplant the obsolete. But now that the political situation has changed, no one officially wants any complications or problems associated with anything that smacks of nuclear weapons being "new" or "modernized" or "improved." Absent a frank statement of the permanence of nuclear weapons that is fundamental to current U.S. policy, the real intentions remain opaque. Decisions are masked by stewardship and talk of "hedges" and "contingencies." Nuclear disarmament is thwarted by "supreme national interest" escape clauses that, in the end, connote continued utility for nuclear weapons. And the bomb wins. It is no wonder that the fight over the nuclear future is again becoming ferocious. The believers pounce on the weaknesses of the White House and attempt to turn the nuclear debate into a partisan battle. Unlike the Democrats, they say with scorn, Republicans are not about to leave the nation vulnerable by engaging in nuclear disarmament. What is most striking about the four-score list of retired generals and admirals who joined Butler and retired Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster in calling for a renewed commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons is not the weight of the names but the absence of the two most prominent military officers in American society: Gens. Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. The bomb evidently still has plenty of friends. When writing of the pro-nuclear constituency, a tone of ridicule comes easily. I could describe the kookier efforts of nuclear scientists and apparatchiks-from neutron bombs to mini-nukes. I could make fun of the vocabulary, from mushroom clouds, to Davy Crocketts, red beards, broken arrows, and peacekeepers. I could recount the dark side-the tests at Bikini, the human radiation experiments, Silkwood, Thule, Palomares, Rocky Flats. This is a history and geography that makes the nuclear elite wince. While ridicule is great for sound bites, it alienates not just the custodians but the arms control community as well. The arms controllers are hampered by their own Cold War history, when they pushed for incremental change to lessen the danger of global nuclear war, always mindful not to challenge the fundamental existence of nuclear weapons. Today, they struggle to be "relevant" and helpful. Yet in their unreformed reverence for the bomb in its deterrent role, they delude themselves into thinking that incremental change could lead to an Eden of "minimum deterrence." However, if nuclear weapons ever were relevant and kept the peace, it was because they were very much in evidence, because nuclear adversaries were conscious of one another's potential inclination to use them. As the weapons declined in number, in the extent of deployment, and in prominence, they lost that very intrusive quality. Nuclear weapons are intrinsically colossal in their demands. In the nuclear realm, minimum anything is not possible, while the state of nuclear dominance is unacceptable. As the Cold War struggled through its final decade, the arms control establishment gained the grudging acquiescence of nuclear advocates, men and women who have always known that nuclear weapons can only survive if they are relatively invisible. Get nuclear weapons off the front pages, whether through secrecy or arms control treaties-that was the way to keep control of the machine and to insure modernization and advance. But that was yesterday. Today nuclear weapons are virtually invisible. So much so that ordinary people just don't pay any attention to them anymore. In fact, all of the evidence points to the undeniable conclusion that the nuclear era is over and nuclear weapons are organically withering on the vine. But we'd never know it. A governmental commitment to nuclear disarmament would be irrelevant, of course, if the nuclear weapons enterprise were satisfied to completely wither away. But it isn't. And so on top of the we-need-nukes-because-nukes-exist conundrum, there is the self-interest of organizations and industries wedded to the bomb. Any commitment to abolition is rejected on the basis of technical impossibility. Which is to say that the very scientists and engineers who constructed and controlled tens of thousands of warheads for 50 years seemingly cannot put their minds to undoing it all. Their modesty is increasingly transparent. Yet this cycle will not be broken solely through caution and a Butler-esque professional courtesy that avoids naming names, a politeness that never condemns the anti-disarmament forces that still grind away just as vigorously as Butler did when he worked his way up in the nuclear enterprise. Nuclear disarmament will not occur just because well-meaning scientists, bureaucrats and military officers chip away at the grotesque arithmetic, "revise" the war plan to make it more humane, repair the most egregious excesses. Butler is dead-on, of course, in saying that a real commitment to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is essential. But while he came out of the trance and is now speaking up, his failure to point fingers does not really explain the dynamics of the final battle. The anonymity of the problem he describes is completely at odds with the gravity of the issues he says are at stake. Little noticed during the Christmas season was the response of Gen. Eugene Habiger, the current head of U.S. Strategic Command, to the generals' and admirals' initiative. Calling the weapons a "viable part" of U.S. national security strategy, Habiger told Defense Daily that he would undertake a spread-the-message strategy, personally visiting members of Congress one-on-one to promote his product. "I will tell them that we've got a sharp team of superstars and that we are committed to making sure our national strategy of deterrence is viable and credible," he said. "I hope eventually we come to zero nuclear weapons, but we need to do it in a prudent manner so that we don't compromise national security," he continued. "We can't afford another Pearl Harbor-with nuclear weapons." Habiger's justification for the bomb should remind everyone that Butler and his colleagues are the exception and not the rule. The bomb survives all attempts to dominate it. Reduced in numbers, its essential quality remains intact, resistant to partial solutions and a quiet retirement.

### AT: Case Outweighs

#### Bracket off and reject their risk assessment claims—they are shaped by orientalism.

Saunders 5 [Rebecca Comparative Lit @ Illinois St., “Risky Business: Edward Said as Literary Critic” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle Eas p. 529-532]

Risk-free ethics, like all protection from risk, are a class privilege. As Deborah Lupton puts it, “The disadvantaged have fewer opportunities to avoid risks because of their lack of resources compared with the advantaged”; “people’s social location and their access to material resources are integral to the ways in which they conceptualize and deal with risk.”22 Or, as Ulrich Beck argues, “Poverty attracts an unfortunate abundance of risks. By contrast, wealth (in income, power or education) can purchase safety and freedom from risk.”23 Thus when we endorse a risk-free ethics, we should bear in mind that members of social groups with less to lose and more to gain are more likely to engage in risky behaviors than are members of more secure and privileged social groups. Moreover, as Mary Douglas has argued at length, risk is a forensic resource and, much like the “danger” she elaborated in her early work, functions as a means of social control. “Anthropologists would generally agree,” she writes, “that dangers to the body, dangers to children, dangers to nature are available as so many weapons to use in the struggle for ideological domination.”24 These weapons are sharpened, she argues, by Western societies’ association of risk assessment with scientific neutrality. Along similar lines, Nick Fox contends that “risk analysis is a deeply political activity. The identification of hazards (and the consequent definition of what is a risk) can easily lead to “the valorization of certain kinds of living over others.”25 The identification of “risk groups” deemed to be threatening to the social order—the unemployed, criminal, insane, poor, foreign—are a common technology for establishing boundaries between self and other, the normal and the pathological, that is, for securing that “formidable battery of distinctions” Said analyzes between “ours and theirs, proper and improper,” higher and lower, colonial and native, Western and Eastern.26 In a fascinating article on debates over native title in Australia, Eva Mackey demonstrates both the way in which political actors deploy a rhetoric of risk, danger, and threat and the uses of risk management to imperial hegemony. Not only have newspaper headlines “presented native title as an issue that has brought the nation to the brink of a dangerous abyss, to the point of destruction,” but the Howard government “constructs native title as a danger and risk to the ‘national interest,’ particularly a risk to competitiveness, opportunities, and progress. The entire anti-native title lobby have all stated . . . that the uncertainty over native title is dangerous for investment and economic competitiveness.”27 As Mackey points out, these notions of danger imply “a normative, non-endangered state,” and it is through ideas of the normal and deviant that institutional power is maintained.28 A related argument articulated by governmentality theorists is that modern societies normalize risk avoidance and pathologize risk taking, represent the former as rational and mature, the latter as irrational and childish— oppositions that, again, are familiar to any student of colonial discourse.29 These oppositions are buttressed by an elaborate apparatus of expert knowledge produced by disciplines such as engineering, statistics, actuarialism, psychology, epidemiology, and economics, which attempt to regulate risk through calculations of probability and which view the social body as “requiring intervention, management and protection so as to maximize wealth, welfare and productivity.”30 Knowledge produced about probability is then deployed as counsel to individuals about how to conduct their lives. As Lupton contends: “In late modern societies, not to engage in risk avoiding behavior is considered ‘a failure of the self to take care of itself—a form of irrationality, or simply a lack of skillfulness’ (Greco 1993). Risk-avoiding behavior, therefore, becomes viewed as a moral enterprise relating to issues of self-control, self-knowledge and self-improvement.”31 This is a characteristic of neoliberal societies that Pat O’Malley, Franc¸ois Ewald, and others refer to as the “new prudentialism.”32 To recognize that risk is a form of social control, and that risk taking is more necessary to certain classes than to others, is also to recognize that risk is not an objective entity or preexisting fact but is produced by specific cultural, political, and institutional contexts, as well as through competing knowledges. “To call something a risk,” argues Douglas, “is to recognize its importance to our subjectivity and wellbeing.” 33 Anthony Giddens, similarly, contends that “there is no risk which can be described without reference to a value.”34 In a frequently cited passage, Ewald writes, “Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event.”35 Indeed, this is precisely the unconscious of risk-management technologies, which assume both that risks are preexistent in nature and that individuals comport themselves in strict accordance with a “hedonic calculus.” 5 3 1 Also embedded within this insurantial unconscious is the fact that, as Fox puts it, “The welladvertised risk will turn out to be connected with legitimating moral principles.”36 If postcolonial studies, as I am arguing, should more rigorously interrogate risk-avoidance strategies (including those that repress or discipline the foreignness in language) on their political, class, and ideological investments, it should also recognize the degree to which risk management (no doubt among modernity’s most wildly optimistic formulations) indulges in a fantasy of mastery over uncertainty. In risk-management discourses, risk has taken on the technical meaning of a known or knowable probability estimate, contrasted with uncertainty, which designates conditions where probabilities are inestimable or unknown. This transformation of the unknown into a numerical figure, a quantification of nonknowledge that takes itself for knowledge, attempts to master whatever might be undesirable in the unknown (i.e., the future) by indemnifying it in advance—and thereby advertising its own failure. I believe it could be demonstrated, moreover, were we to trace the genealogy of this fantasy, that it coincides at crucial moments with the history of colonization. The notion of risk, first used in relation to maritime adventures, arises contemporaneously with modern imperialism, to describe the hazards of leaving home. With industrial modernity, and particularly the rise of the science of statistics in the nineteenth century, it took on themien of instrumental reason and the domination of nature, nuances that bear an unmistakable resemblance to the logics of concurrent colonial enterprises.37 This fantasy of mastery is also a suppression of possibility; in most instances, risk avoidance is an (implicit or explicit) maintenance of dominant values. Risk taking, by contrast, is the condition of possibility of possibility— that is, of change. It is perhaps no surprise that one’s political position is the strongest predictor of his/her attitude toward risk. Risk, as we have seen, is regularly formulated as that which threatens the dominant order (conceived on the level of a society, a colonial regime, or a global economic order). That threat, of course, is the “danger” of transformation, of reorganized social and ideological hierarchies, redistributed economic and cultural capital, renovated geopolitical relations—in short, precisely the kinds of transformation called for by much of postcolonial studies. Risk, including the risk of errors in meaning, may be necessary to any social change, that is, to engaging in the kind of oppositional criticism Said advocates: “Criticism must think of itself,” he writes, “as constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny, domination, and abuse.”38 The necessity of risk to change (and the craven conformism of risk avoidance) is a principle Friedrich Nietzsche elaborates in Beyond Good and Evil, where, critiquing the “timidity of morality,” he calls for a new species of philosophers, willing to risk untruth, uncertainty, even ignorance, thinkers willing to inhabit “the dangerous maybe.”39 Nietzsche was also prescient in recognizing that “howmuch or how little is dangerous to the community . . . now constitutes the moral perspective; here, too, fear is again themother ofmorals.”40 More recently, philosophers such as Derrida and John D. Caputo (explicitly taking up Nietzsche’s vocation) have argued that change, indeed social responsibility itself, inevitably demands a wager on uncertain possibilities (or, in Derridean terms, the “aporia”). “Let us not be blind,” writes Derrida, “to the aporia that all change must endure. It is the aporia of the perhaps, its historical and political aporia. Without the opening of an absolutely undetermined possible, without the radical abeyance and suspense marking a perhaps, there would never be either event or decision. . . . no decision (ethical, juridical, political) is possible without interrupting determination by engaging oneself in the perhaps.”41 On similar grounds, Caputo argues for “the suspension of the fine name of ethics in the name of obligation” and contends that “to speak of being against ethics and deconstructing ethics is to own up to the lack of safety by which judging is everywhere beset. . . . to admit that ‘obligation’ is not safe, that ethics cannot make it safe, that it is not nearly as safe as ethics would have us believe.”42

### AT: Threat Con Good

#### Threat construction privileges ethnocentric thinking and increases proclivity for war—empirical psychological research proves.

Willer and Feinberg 8—Dr. Robb Willer is Assistant Professor of Sociology @ UC Berkeley and Matthew Feinberg is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Psychology @ UC Berkeley [“The Political Psychology of National Security, War, and Civil Liberties” http://www.americanenvironics.com/PDF/AE%20NSHR%20LIT%20REVIEW.pdf]

A central tenet of the progressive agenda is to oppose and work to prevent unnecessary wars. This is a challenge, as public opinion on foreign policy has been combustible, reactionary, and easily manipulated since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. American progressives concerned with deterring future wars, such as a possible military 6 strike against Iran, may find useful political psychology research on the psychological roots of support for war. A thorough understanding of the psychological and social bases of war support may offer some building blocks for a political agenda designed to intelligently confront and undermine support for unnecessary wars in the future. Below we review relevant research on why people support war and other military engagements. Our review is broad, but it focuses most of al;l on the roles of “fear and loathing,” perceptions of threat, and inter-group prejudice on support for military action. Perhaps more than any other factor, perceptions of threat and feelings of endangerment are strong predictors of support for war. This notion stems from research and theory that associate the perception of threat, especially threat from an out-group, with an increased likelihood of aggressive and militant stances (Gordon and Arian 2001; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; McFarland 2005). For instance, “Integrated Threat Theory” (Stephan and Stephan 2000) and “Social Identity Theory” (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986) both predict that feeling threatened by some out-group leads individuals to have heightened levels of out-group hostility and to support (or engage in) conflict with that out-group. For example, Oswald found a positive association between feelings of threat and anti-Arab hostility (2005). In that study, perceptions of threat were tapped using a five-item scale that measured participants’ sense of fear and vulnerability toward terrorist attacks. The strongest relationship was for the following item: “I feel personally at risk for being a victim of a terrorist attack.” Along those lines, perceived threat of terrorism among Americans, specifically, leads to support for war — especially wars targeting Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East. Some previous research has directly examined the link between perceived threat of terrorism and support for militant attitudes, policies, and leaders (Arian 1989; Friedland and Merari 1985; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav 2005; Kam and Kinder 2007; Landau, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen et al. 2004; Willer 2004). For example, Huddy et al. (2005) found that Americans who viewed terrorism as a major threat were significantly more likely to support the George W. Bush administration’s foreign policy, one associated with preemptive war. A variable closely linked to these perceptions of threat – in fact, believed to be motivated by the desire for increased security and reduced threat – is right wing authoritarianism (RWA), which has been associated with support for militancy and war (Altemeyer 1988; Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991). Duckitt (2001) and Altemeyer (1998) argue that feelings of fear and endangerment are the foundations of authoritarian attitudes. In turn, abundant research has linked RWA with support for military action (Cohrs and Moschner 2002; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, and Kielman 2005; Crowson, Debacker, and Thoma 2005, 2006; Doty, Winter, Peterson, and Kemmelmeier 1997; Feldman and Stenner 2008; Izzett 1971; McFarland 2005). Furthermore, certain worldviews related to feeling threatened lead to support for war. For instance, chronic perceptions of the world as a hostile, distrustful, and corrupt place have been linked to increased aggressiveness and authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, and Birum 2002; Bonanno and Jost 2006; Miller, Lynam, and Leukefeld 2003; Willer, Feinberg, and Laurison 2008). Consistent with this, research using the “Belief in a Dangerous World” scale has shown that perceptions of a hostile world lead to authoritarian attitudes and derogation of out-groups (Altemeyer 1988; Duckitt et al. 2002), which, as mentioned above, have been linked to aggressive and violent attitudes toward out-groups, including support for war (e.g., Altemeyer 1988; Duckitt 2001; McFarland 2005). Furthermore, Willer et al. (2008) found that those who view others generally as untrustworthy are significantly more likely to support war. There is also some research that examines the origins of perceived threat and, most specifically, right wing authoritarianism. Those high in RWA are believed to have had much harsher and more punitive (i.e., threatening) upbringings that emphasized strict adherence to rules and norms (Duckitt 2001). In fact, it is theorized that authoritarian attitudes manifest themselves in order to help combat the perpetual sense of threat and insecurity that was instilled during childhood. Inter-group prejudice and the related construct of ethnocentrism are also major contributing factors to support for war. Ethnocentrism is the belief that one’s own group and that group’s culture are superior to all others (Kam and Kinder 2007). Kam and Kinder (2007) used a direct measure of ethnocentrism and found it to be a robust predictor of support for war in Iraq. However, inter-group prejudice and ethnocentrism is more often operationalized in past research on war in other forms. The most common way of operationalizing them is by using the “Social Dominance Orientation” (SDO) scale. High SDO individuals tend to perceive the world as highly competitive and hierarchical, believing that certain groups of people (especially their own group) are inherently better than others and should dominate lesser groups in society (Duckitt 2001; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, Malle 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). High SDO individuals are driven by in-group dominance motives to establish and maintain power over other groups. Furthermore, having a high SDO likely stems from having a tough-minded, power-hungry personality, and from viewing the world as a “competitive jungle” that is ruthless and zero-sum (Duckitt 2001; Duckitt et al. 2002; but see also Jost and Thompson 2000 for a more complex view). The properties of social dominance orientation are explained by “Social Dominance Theory” which contends that societies develop ideologies, or “legitimizing myths,” that provide justification for, and help maintain, group inequalities. Individuals high in SDO are much more likely to ascribe to these legitimizing myths and feel comfortable with prejudicial attitudes toward supposedly inferior groups. Along these lines, researchers have identified SDO as a foundational ideology behind prejudice (e.g., Duckitt 2001; Duckitt et al. 2002; Duckitt and Sibley 2007) and have empirically associated SDO with various forms of discrimination, including anti-black racism, antiArab racism, negative attitudes toward Middle Easterners, negative attitudes toward miscegeny, U.S. dominance over other nations, cultural elitism, and opposition to women’s and gay rights (Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, and Leeson 2006; Pratto et al. 1994). Research on SDO has shown that it is also predictive of support for war and war related activities. Specifically, in past studies SDO was positively correlated with prowar attitudes and support for the US-led wars in Afghanistan and both wars in Iraq (Cohrs et al. 2005; Crowson et al. 2006; Heaven et al. 2006; McFarland 2005; Pratto et al. 1994), as well as support for the idea of going to war in pursuit of perceived national economic interests, such as oil prices (Pratto et al. 1994). More recent research based on American Environics data from the spring of 2007 shows that SDO also predicts support among Americans for a military attack on Iran (Willer et al. 2008). However, the militancy of those high in SDO disappears entirely for – and may even correlate 10 negatively with – support for wars framed as humanitarian (e.g. military efforts to prevent genocide) (McFarland and Matthews 2005; Pratto et al. 1994; but see also Cohrs et al. 2005). These findings suggest that SDO is related to pro-war attitudes, but only if those wars are perceived as dominance oriented.

### 2NC Link—Supply/Export Control

#### Supply groups dichotomize the First and Third world—this results in racist policing.

Mutimer 2k—David Mutimer is Deputy Director of YCISS and Associate Professor of Political Science at York University [*The Weapons State*, ch. 5, “Entailing Self and Other,” pg. 96-97]

The central practices of supplier groups and their attendant export controls construct a core set of inside states, those sufficiently responsible and mature to take it upon themselves to judge the behavior of other states and sanction them for troubling activities. That set overlaps notably with the club of advanced industrial States of the North. There is also a clear move from within this privileged group to draw in the old East and to reconstruct (or rebuild, as efforts at transition are often called) those countries as part of that inside. Outside this privileged core States are gathered into regions, each of which is expected to remain stable through the balancing of power. Proliferation, that autonomous process the image constructs, can upset these balances—nuclear weapons give certain States disproportionate power and thus destabilize entire regions; even conventional arms can be acquired in sufficient quantities to be excessive and destabilizing. If states act in such a way that they upset or threaten to upset these balances, they are rogues, outlaws, immature or backward states unwilling to conform to the rules of civilized behavior.

The proliferation image creates two clear lines of difference. The first marks the distinction between those who can be trusted to make the rules—signaled by inclusion in the ranks of suppliers—and those who must follow the rules—the recipients. The second line marks those who do follow the rules from those who refuse—the rogues from the herd, the outlaws from the law-abiding. This second line marks the emergence of an enemy in this discourse of military security, for it is rogue behavior that poses a threat, that causes concern to those who make the rules. Thus the recipients are accepted as part of the community of the law-abiding and thus have access to prized technology the suppliers can provide. The recipients, however, are also potential rogues. Their behavior must be policed through export control and compliance monitoring to ensure that they conform to the rules and do not become rogues. This policing gives in to the temptation of othering difference Connolly discussed. Not only are those not included in the supplier groups to be marked as different, but they are to be labeled as potential enemies and sanctioned as such.

The proliferation image constructs states in the Third World as outsiders. Even if they do not become rogues, they are not permitted inside the privileged Northern club; if they do behave in ways that cause concern to the privileged, they are labeled enemy and heavily sanctioned. Not surprisingly, not all Third World states are entirely happy with the “proliferation” construction. Iran, for example, finds itself abiding by the rules of NPT membership, rules that are supposed to guarantee its access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, its behavior—in this case, the domestic politics of government—causes concern among members of the supplier groups, and so it is sanctioned. India has established itself as the preeminent critic of the proliferation discourse in the Third World. India does not accept the problem as it has been constructed by the insiders, and it does not accept the practices to which the construction has given rise. In Chapter 6 I examine the alternative framings produced in this resistance and elsewhere to see the possible objects and i

### AT: Permutation

#### 3. Any inclusion of the proliferation metaphor makes confronting unequal power relations impossible.

Mutimer 94—David Mutimer is Deputy Director of YCISS and Associate Professor of Political Science at York University [August 1994, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, http://pi.library.yorku.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/10315/1415/YCI0074.pdf?sequence=1]

A second important entailment of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors is that they highlight numerical capabilities, while downplaying qualitative capabilities, and hiding other aspects of security—even aspects of the military other than equipment. This entailment is rooted both in the experiential basis of the metaphors and in their use during the Cold War. 'Balance' is by and large a quantitative, not qualitative characteristic—on a scale, a kilo of feathers will balance a kilo of lead. In particular, the accounting of numbers of various kinds, though notably money, involves the metaphor of 'balance'. Thus it should not be surprising that the application of the balance metaphor to the relationships of arms leads to a focus on numerical capabilities. The experience of superpower arms negotiation was in large measure guided by attempts to achieve 'essential equivalences'—in the number of launchers, the number of warheads, the throw weight of missiles, or the number of tanks.

What gets downplayed by the numerical entailment of these metaphors is the variation in capability among different weapons and weapon systems. This can be seen in the present proliferation control systems. The MTCR identifies technologies of concern by range and payload, entirely ignoring the reliability of the weapons, and even their accuracy (which is generally well measured)—in other words, ignoring most of what determines whether a weapon will be delivered on target by a given missile. Similarly, the UN Arms Register records weapons in seven categories, so that, for example, all 'tanks' are counted together. Thus, in the first reporting cycle, the United Kingdom included several pieces of obsolete equipment that were transferred for display in museums. The comments that allow the Register's users to realise that these entries are museum pieces were purely voluntary. For example, Britain reported two exports of tanks. Six tanks were sent to Switzerland, and were marked "Obsolete equipment for museums", while 25 were reported sent to Nigeria. Nothing more than that 25 tanks were sent was reported by the UK, and so the character of these weapons is still formally opaque.60

While it is unfortunate that the numerical entailment of the balance metaphor downplays the quality of arms, it is much more problematic that it hides entirely aspects of the security problem other than arms—be this military doctrine and policy, or the more general politics of security.61 Indeed, the entailments of 'stability' and 'balance' in this context tend to reinforce the autonomous, technological character of the problem which is entailed by the 'proliferation' metaphor. Technology 'spreads' through some natural process. We can count the occurrence of this spread, so that we know where the technology is accumulating. We may even be able to control this autonomous process. However, it is these accumulations, if we do not prevent them, which can then 'upset' balances; in the words of Resolution 46/36L: "excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international security."

There is a third, and rather ironic, entailment to the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors—they can lead to the promotion of the spread of nuclear weapons to a greater number of states. The logic of the 'balance' between the superpowers, it has been argued, is that mutual assured destruction with nuclear weapons introduces a caution conducive to 'stability'. If the metaphors of the Cold War are adopted to imagine the new international security environment, there seems little way to escape the conclusions of this argument, that nuclear weapons can be stabilisers. Indeed, it has led John Mearsheimer to argue:

If complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe proves unavoidable, the West faces the question of how to maintain peace in a multipolar Europe. Three policy prescriptions are in order.

First, the United States should encourage the limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. The best hope for avoiding war in post-Cold War Europe is nuclear deterrence; hence some nuclear proliferation is necessary to compensate for the withdrawal of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals from Central Europe. [Emphasis added.]62

As part of the 'managed proliferation' of nuclear weapons in Europe, Mearsheimer suggests provision of nuclear arms to Germany. On this and on other points Mearsheimer's argument has been widely, and justifiably, attacked. But what is interesting about it is the way in which it makes the entailments of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors so clear. What is important is to assure that the numbers of weapons are distributed so that the balance among them is stable — regardless of who holds the weapons. The problems of history and politics which would be raised by German nuclear weapons are blithely ignored, because the metaphors informing Mearsheimer's conceptualisation hide them entirely. Most of us are sufficiently sensitive to these problems that Mearsheimer's argument is jarringly uncomfortable. However, the problem persists in all uses of the PROLIFERATION image, and yet it is only when the problems are as dramatic as in this case that the implications of the image are widely rejected.

In the title of his article, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", Mearsheimer also indicates the final entailment of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors—they are inherently conservative. It is not an accident that it was a conservative alliance facing a revolutionary challenge that formulated the practice we now call the balance of power. Nor is it an accident that the changes in Eastern Europe, while welcomed in the West on democratic grounds, were feared for their capability to introduce 'instability'.63 When a 'balance' is 'stable', an asymmetrical alteration to either side introduces instability. Thus once a stable balance is achieved, the metaphor highlights the importance of the maintenance of the status quo.

The conservative bias of the metaphors is problematic, even within the limited confines of a proliferation problem. The goal of policy makers seems clearly to be the reduction of weapons and their related technologies—at least in the arsenals of others! The image, however, which is informing the policy response to the problem, provides no support for reduction once a stable balance is achieved. There can be no guarantee that any reduction in arsenals, even a 'symmetrical' reduction, would produce a similarly stable balance at the lower levels of arms. Indeed, building on the received wisdom of the Cold War, there might even be a case to be made for high levels of arms, as a 'balance' at high levels is more resistant to small changes—that is, it is more 'stable'.

### AT: We’re not Racist

#### Racist intent is irrelevant—the aff’s “proliferation metaphor” entails a normative commitment to racist power relations.

Biswas 1 (Shampa Biswas, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA , 2001, “Nuclear Apartheid” as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?” *Alternatives* 26.4, 485—522)

It is interesting here that the “self” (that opposes Fundamentalism) is clearly named—it is “democracy’ Democracy here becomes the marker of a common (modern) civilizational boundary that the BJP shares with the West in the act of’ naming the common enemy—(anti— modern) “Islamic fundamentalism.” An article in the BJP—published newsmagazine BJP Today titled The Fundamentalists [sic] Threat to USA,” which identifies the growing recognition within the United States of the emerging Muslim terrorist threat,87 is designed to more explicitly mark out this Islamic threat that plagues both the West and India. Further, in “naming” this threat, the words used sometimes are familiar and evocative: Another article says that “the emerging reality is that India is being gradually encircled by a hostile Islamic Fundamentalist arc which besides being a security threat. Is a civilizational challenge as well.”8’5 The ghost of Huntington is unmistakable. The article goes on to say that mobilizing international opinion on this set re is imperative. 89 Clearly, international/Western opinion is more easily mobilized by tapping into Western fears and apprehensions, and doing so in a language that is familiar. These fears and apprehensions come from a racist discourse, fairly widespread in Western media, policymaking, and sometimes academic representations of the Islamic threat, the Muslim terrorist, the oppressed woman in veil, and so on. If race. as invoked through the nuclear—apartheid position, constitutes India through juxtaposition against a neocolonial West, race in the global discourse on Islam serves to constitute Hindu India as aligned with the West. Both strategies, however, work to effect closure on a hegemonic vision of the Indian nation that serves particular interests. International relations in general, and security studies more specifically’. have tended to privilege the “problem of order over the “concern for justice.” Coining from a critical perspective, Simon Dalby points out that national security is in general premised on the “desirability of order, and hence has often been “a conservative formulation, equating the political status quo with desirable order.”9 This political status quo has been somewhat unsettled by the dissolution o the Soviet threat: the primary bipolar balance-of-power framework that for so long dominated security studies has been rendered obsolete in the post—Cold War period. In the words of another critical security-studies scholar, David Mutimer proliferation is a problem enunciated to fill the gap left by the Cold War.”’1 Examining the use of the dominant metaphors that structure thinking about global security issues, Mutimer has shown how the increasing salience of the “proliferation issue’ in the post-Cold War world builds on underlying anxieties about instability and disorder; so that the very use of the metaphor of proliferation entails a conservative normative commitment to tête maintenance of stable and balanced orders—a commitment that naturalizes a particular set of relations of power and interest, privileging those who are able to set the metaphorical agenda, and render invisible the political basis of their claims.” This article has attempted to demonsrtate that taking the “nuclear apartheid” argument seriously is to reveal that underlying this fear of proliferation is a series of racialized constructions of Third World people. With the discrediting of scientific racism and with the increasing recognition by scholars of race that “color” is not necessarily the prime index or the only marker of racialization. it may not be entirely surprising that the question of race in global politics has been so intractable. Yet many scholars have argued that contemporary racism exists in a far more invidious form precisely because it often rejects a biologized concept of race in favor of culturalist forms, or what has been called the “new racism.” The invidiousness of such racism lies in that it often exists without making any explicit reference to race, so that it has been said that we now live in a world with “at lot of racism hut very few racists. If the process of racialization and racism—a process of hierarchieation, inferiorization, and subordination of racialized group’—can use all kinds of signifiers or markers, a biological and cultural tracing of its operations in global politics requires innovative conceptual lenses and new analytical tools. However. “race,” as Roxanne Doty points out, “has most fundamentally been about being human. Racist discourses historically have constructed different kinds and degrees of humanness through representational practices that have claimed to be and have been accepted as ‘true’ and accurate representations of ‘reality.” This article has argued that if one takes “rationality” as fundamental to what makes us fully human—the premise of most Enlightenmentinspired narratives—fears of proliferation that rely on presuppositions of the irrationality of “others” draw on racist discourses that deny a degree of humanity to “others” in the very constitution of the “self” as human. However, this article is also premised on the claim that rather than a generalized formulation of a singular, monolithic racism, it is more useful to talk of historical racisms, examining processes of racializations in the contexts in which they exist. Hence, in addition to the construction of a racialized Third World in nuclear proliferation discourses, I have also examined the racializations of religious and other minorities in the BJPs discourses of the Hindu/Indian nation as well as the operations of a racist global discourse on Islam and Muslims that serves this project.

### AT: Hegemony

#### Hegemony projects our anxiety and paranoia onto the world—creates self-fulfilling prophecies that make war inevitable—all of their arguments are ideologically loaded—this evidence will smoke them

Hoggett and Clarke 4—\*prof of politics and co-dir. of Center for Psycho-Social Studies, U West England, Degree in social psychology, U Sussex, AND \*\*Dr. Simon Clarke—prof of psycho-social studies and co-dir. of the center [“The Empire of Fear: The American Political Psyche and the Culture of Paranoia,” http://www.btinternet.com/~psycho\_social/Vol5/JPSS5-PHSC1.htm]

The image of Prometheus has often been used as a metaphor to describe the conjoining of capitalist and technological development, something which has unleashed processes of modernisation, the like of which have never been seen before (Landes 1969). The metaphor of `Prometheus Unbound’, once used by Shelley as descriptor for the Industrial Revolution in the 19th Century, now seems an apt image for American economic, military and cultural power at the beginning of the new century. Prometheus represents humanity’s freedom to rebel against the God’s, a rage against the arbitrary finality of mortality. But whilst Prometheus is noble hubris and grandiosity also mark his stance – the creations of his imagination will displace the divine. Therefore, like other less clamorous and dynamic narcissants, the Promethean is one also contemptuous of limits and incapable of (inter)relations. Alone in a world of his own creation. In her classic paper on narcissism Joan Riviere (1936) insists `we should not be deceived by the positive aspects of narcissism but should look deeper, for the depression that will be found to underlie it’ (p.368). Fear is now an abiding, pervasive and dominant affect in American life and has been since the Second World War. However this relates to a paradox that the ancient Greeks knew so well. Lying at the very heart of the hubris of an individual or nation that believes in its omniscience lies fear, fear of its own capacity for self-annihilation. Speaking of the narcissistic character, Rivierre noted that ultimately this individual lives in `fear of his own suicide or madness’; this is the essence of what she calls his depressive anxiety. It is necessary therefore to focus upon this dark side of the new Promethean for this is a figure wracked by guilt and anxiety concerning the destructive consequences of his creative powers. First there is internal destruction. In a recent bestseller, The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things, Barry Glassner (1999) investigates a range of social anxieties which have beset the American psyche, from panics about smack and gunslinging black teenagers to scares about satanic abuse and internet addiction. The book is a rich description of some of the fears that haunt the contemporary American psyche but it is ultimately disappointing for it offers little insight into the deeper cultural anxieties that the American media so cleverly exploits. What Glassner highlights, without ever examining, is the internal destruction consequent upon the American mode of development. The USA is a grossly unequal society and one in which structural inequality remains steadfastly mapped onto questions of race and class. Right at the end of his book Glassner briefly examines the source of the moral panics he has described, suggesting that they are `oblique expressions of concern about problems Americans know to be pernicious but have not taken decisive action to quash – problems such as hunger, dilapidated schools, gun proliferation, and deficient health care for much of the US population’ (Glassner p.209). No more vivid expression of this social divisiveness can be found than in statistics regarding prison populations. According to recent Home Office (2000) figures, Britain, the worst offender in Europe, has a prison population of 72,000, equivalent to 139 per 100,000 people (Norway has 59). But the US tops the table with 686 per 100,000 (compared to China’s 111 and Brazil’s 133). The US prison population currently stands at 1.96 million people, an astronomical figure, the overwhelming proportion of whom are black men, and the US government spends more on imprisonment than on higher education! Contrary to the belief that the US exemplifies an effective multicultural society what we see is a severely restricted multiculturalism in which racial divisions, focusing upon the exclusion of African-Americans and Latinos, are more entrenched than ever. This has led some commentators to suggest that the US’s failure to understand global inequality and its incomprehension at the rage that many peoples feel towards it is an expression of its own inability to understand the sharpness of its own internal differences (Shapiro 2003). But social disintegration in the US is not just mapped along racial lines. As the effects of decades of neo-Liberal social and fiscal policies accumulate it is increasingly clear that in the US the concept of a `safety net’, central to the post-war settlement in western type democracies, has all but disappeared. As a consequence, and this has been glimpsed in some of Richard Sennett’s (1998) recent work, failure can now have catastrophic psychological and material effects even upon the American middle classes. The result seems to be a form of `moral isolationism', which is spreading through American society, a feeling that there is no-one and no-thing to rely upon. And whilst associationism, despite Putnam’s (2000) gloomy prognostications, still seems to be a strong feature of civic culture in the USA, with a few exceptions, such as strong faith communities, this offers little consolation when the chips are really down. In the absence of collective solutions to shared risk Americans fall back upon themselves. But this is not healthy individualism but social anomie, an isolationism fueled by those survival anxieties which were first glimpsed by Christopher Lasch (1985). There exists a second reservoir of guilt and anxiety, which is intimately connected to the destructive creativity of the American Prometheus. This can be traced back to the hideous and monstrous child that America, more than any other, nurtured from conception through to realisation. A monstrous child, Little Boy by name, which was unleashed upon the ordinary civilians of Hiroshima. The first of countless thousands of such children which, along with consequences of other monstrous biological and chemical conceptions, now constitute the exterminating logic of modernity. Let us not forget who unleashed the first Weapon of Mass Destruction and the imprint that this act must have left upon the collective psyche of the perpetrator. Within a few years a whole genre of sci-fi American B movies, paperbacks and comics was flourishing in which the theme of mutation was a constant motif (Jancovich 1996). This was the return of the repressed, or, rather, the annihilated. A whole culture of paranoia was developing; partly fueled by the Cold War, a culture that remains a potent dimension of the American psyche to this day. Richard Hofstadter (1979) described how this culture of paranoia infused American politics. Describing the paranoid style of the American politician, Hofstadter argues that whilst retaining some of the characteristics of the clinical paranoiac - overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose, and apocalyptic in expression – this character does not perceive that the hostile and conspiratorial world is necessarily directed at him. Rather he sees all that is bad and evil directed at his nation, his culture and his way of life (Hofstadter, p.4). This has been typical of new right politics for many years and, for example, has resulted in persecutory immigration policies designed to protect ways of life that are often fictitious and based in phantasy. In a recent essay, Jason Cowley (2001) argues that this culture, despite its religiosity, ‘is essentially an entertainment culture, addicted to narratives of catastrophe’ in everything from film right through to computer games. Sat astride the pinnacle of this culture is Tom Clancy, the best-selling, Reagan-adoring writer of fiction such as the Sum of all Fears which presciently described the hijacking by Arab militants of civilian planes which were then used as weapons against the American people. Fiction becomes fact. America looks into the mirror of the world and sees an enemy, an enemy which if not contained will spread. Thus the `domino theory’, given vivid expression by Harry.S. Truman who succeeded Roosevelt as US President in 1944, a `theory’ which justified American intervention in Greece, Turkey and countless Latin American countries during the Cold War, inspired the Vietnam tragedy and now `the War on Terror’ in which a febrile Islam is imagined to be spreading rhizome-like around the edges of the `free world’. But who is this enemy if not Thanatos, Little Boy and all his heirs, the dark echoes of the idealisation of the American way of life - a variety and quantity of weapons of mass destruction which are now, like China’s citizens, almost beyond enumeration? In 2000 American defence expenditure stood at $295bn, this exceeded the combined expenditure of the rest of the world by almost $30bn. This year, 2003, it is set to rise by a further 14%, the biggest leap in over two decades, as a new generation of tactical nuclear weaponry, outlined in Rumsfeld’s `nuclear posture review’ of the previous year, is actively contemplated by the National Nuclear Security Agency (Guardian 2003). Despite the caution of John Quincy Adams, America’s sixth president, not to go `in search of monsters to destroy’, Rumsfeld and Co. are clearly bent on fostering the conditions that will keep this species sustainable for decades to come (and the US defence industry by the way). Such an overwhelming degree of military superiority betrays not just the extent of American ambitions for global hegemony but also the extent of America’s fear. Returning to Riviere, she notes how depressive anxiety gives rise to its own special defence, the manic defence. In place of vulnerability there is omnipotence and specifically an attitude of contempt and depreciation for the relationships upon which the narcissist depends. Listening to Richard Perle and other architects of the Project for the New American Century this contempt – for the United Nations, `Old Europe’ and countries which cannot or will not embrace the neo-conservative brand of modernisation – is explicit and worn with smirking pride. Contemplating the demise of the UN after the war on Iraq, Perle notes that `whilst the chatterbox on the Hudson will continue to bleat’ what will die `is the fantasy of the UN as the foundation of the new world order’ (Perle 2003). He then unleashes an apparently clinical demolition of the repeated failure of the Security Council to act against breaches of international law without providing even the faintest of hints that in truth it has been the US which has most consistently used its veto on the Security Council – nine times in all since 1990 against the four vetos cast by the other four members combined during the same period. And whilst we’re on the subject of inaction in the face of breaches of international law we’d do well to remember that over the last thirty years the USA has vetoed 34 UN resolutions on Israel and has consistently supported Israel’s routine violations of UN resolution 242 to which the US is a signatory. What we have here is both cold cunning – there is no room for the UN as a countervailing source of authority in `the Project’ – and a paranoia about the world which has become so routine that it is not even aware of itself. Allusions to `threat’ and `security’ run like a thread throughout the brief manifesto of the Project, that is, its `Statement of Principles’. But what makes this paranoia, instead of a rational fear response to the real threats that exist to American hegemony around the world? The massive overkill, the self-fulfilling nature of so many American interventions, the uncanny knack that American foreign policy has displayed of making its worst fears come true, the classic paranoid conviction that one is the misunderstood victim and never the perpetrator, the complete inability to perceive how ones own ‘defensive actions’ are experienced by the other as provocation and threat – wherever we look, the ‘arms race’ with the Soviet Union, the run-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, fear of communist contagion in S.E Asia and Latin America, the current ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘containment’ of N.Korea we see the same mixture of provocation, ineptness and misunderstanding. In his recent book on paranoia, David Bell (2003) notes how the fears that the paranoid is subject to are the echo of what has become alien(ated). In this way Melanie Klein adds a twist to our understanding of alienation by insisting that what we project into the world forever threatens to return and haunt us. Bell notes how films such as Alien and The Conversation vividly depict this. Indeed Klein argues that through projective identification the other can become subject to control by self, in subtle ways becoming nudged and coerced into enacting what is put into them. In this way paranoia can become self-fulfilling and it really does seem as if the world is out to get you. God’s chosen people Estimates suggest that well over 60% of the citizens of the USA engage in religious worship on a regular basis – in Britain the figure is more like 7%. Christian fundamentalism has become particularly powerful in the USA since the late 1960’s, perhaps as the backlash towards 60’s `godlessness’. But these fundamentalist movements seem to be simply the tip of the iceberg that is modern American religiosity. Indeed, as Karen Armstrong (2001) noted, the concept of `fundamentalism’ was first coined to characterise the emergence of charismatic religious movements in N.America at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact God and America have walked hand in hand ever since the Founding Fathers. This has found a powerful and consistent expression in the politics of the United States, and particularly in its foreign policy, where analysts have coined the phrase `American exceptionalism’ to describe the belief that `the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role to play in human history’ (McCrisken 2001). Almost from the beginning of the occupation by European settlers N.America has been construed as a promised land and its citizens a chosen people. The New World was, in this sense contrasted with the Old, a world of famine, war and intolerance from which many of these settlers had fled. McCrisken provides countless indications of this exceptionalist belief system from George Washington to Bill Clinton but all are characterised by certain common suppositions – that America is the land of the free, that its intentions are inherently benevolent, that inside every non-American there is an American struggling to get out and, perhaps most importantly given the War on Terror and the occupation of Iraq, that the US is the embodiment of universal human values based on the rights of all mankind – freedom, democracy and justice. Weinberg (1935) described this in terms of the belief in `manifest destiny’ which gave successive administrations in the nineteenth century the sense of America’s special mission to bring freedom to the peoples of the world, as in the Mexican War or the Spanish-American War which led to the `liberation’ of Cuba. Today the sense of manifest destiny is no less strong but now it is garbed in the cloak of ‘modernisation’ – the belief that all societies pass through certain stages of development (from traditional to modern) and that the West, and particularly the United States, is the common endpoint towards which all peoples must irresistibly move. Of course, this is Fukuyama’s `end of history’ and it is perhaps no surprise to find him to be (along with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz & Co.) one of the 25 signatories to the Statement of Principles (written in June 1997) of the Project for the New American Century – the neo-Conservative manifesto which now directs American and British foreign policy. The point about all this is that this very idealisation of America by Americans, its self-identification with virtue, contributes enormously both to its innocence and to its arrogance. There is often a real generosity of spirit and a friendly naivete which strikes the non-American (at least the English ones) when encountering an American citizen. One thinks of the countless jokes about the American as an `innocent abroad’ captured in the image of the gawping American tourist. But there is also the arrogance added to this, an arrogance which leads even hard nosed strategists to assume that invading troops need know nothing about the peoples that they are about to `liberate’, a mistake which had tragic consequences in Somalia and is now being repeated in Iraq. Moreover this is an arrogance which leaves Americans with such a strong sense that they have virtue on their side, and it is this that has provided the fertile ground for the splitting and paranoia which has been such a feature of the American view of the world since the Second World War. Again, if we return to Hofstadter's ideas about American politics we can see this paranoid belief in a vast and sinister conspiracy which is set out to undermine and destroy a way of life. Indeed for Hofstadter, ‘the paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this conspiracy in apocalyptic terms - he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always manning the barricades of civilization’ (Hofstadter 1979, p.29). Three decades on and this still sounds very familiar. One thinks of the `fighting talk’ of George Bush in the war on Iraq, in the fight against the Axis of Evil, and the struggle against global terrorism - fighting terror with terror, the talion morality of the paranoid schizoid position, destroying and re-creating political systems, acting as the purveyor of civilization to the world. This then, is a world in which American society has been called upon to resist the spreading evils, first of communism, now of militant Islam. Moreover, it has been this splitting of good and evil which fueled the rise of McCarthyism in the 1950’s and which is threatening American civil liberties today. Injured narcissism In 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms' Melanie Klein (1946) describes the destructive and controlling nature of the narcissistic state of mind. A typical feature of paranoid object relations is their narcissistic nature, for in reality the objects to which the paranoid individual or group relates are representations of their alienated selves. Moreover the narcissistic relationship has strong obsessional features, and in particular the need to control others, to remain omnipotent and all powerful. David Bell develops this theme in his commentary on Mike Davis’s recent NLR article (Davis 2001) in which he notes that the resort, following September 11th, to increasingly pervasive forms of security and control within the USA actually contributes the very anxiety these measures seek to address. Bell argues, `the grandiose demand for complete security creates ever more, in our minds, enemies endowed with our own omnipotence who are imagined as seeking to control us’ (Bell, p.37). But what happens when this narcissism is injured, omnipotence punctured? In the real world, as opposed to the world of the imaginary, this attitude of omnipotence is repeatedly subject to disconfirmation. McCrisken (2003) refers to the `Vietnam syndrome’ as a defining element of American foreign policy since the 1970’s, something which formed the backdrop to the first Gulf War through which it reached a partial and incomplete resolution. Vietnam was a trauma for the USA in two ways. The American claim to have a monopoly on virtue was destroyed by successive scandals, atrocities and outrages, in fact they were revealed to be as savage as any other occupying power. Jean-Paul Sartre (1968) famously argued that the war waged by America on Vietnam was implicitly genocidal. Indeed for Sartre, the war in Vietnam signified a new stage in the development of imperialism - 'it is the greatest power on earth against a poor peasant people. Those who fight it are living out the only possible relationship between an over-industrialized country and an under-developed country, that is to say, a genocidal relationship implemented through racism' (p.42). Worse still, they lost the war, against one of the most economically backward societies imaginable the might of American military power came to nought. The impact of Vietnam was such that the USA virtually avoided direct military involvement for twenty five years, preferring indirect involvement (encouraging and equipping Iraq versus Iran, Afghanistan versus the Soviet Union) or direct engagement in situations such as tiny Grenada where they could hardly lose. The Vietnam Syndrome also encouraged the development of an approach to warfare which gave maximum emphasis to the use of air power and the avoidance of ground troops, something exemplified by the intervention in Kosovo and, later, Afghanistan. We can also understand the Vietnam Syndrome in terms of Freud’s work on trauma and his notions of repetition and working through. Trauma (whether loss of limb or sexual abuse) is an attack upon the narcissistic organisation of the psyche/body, it is experienced as loss which is irreparable. But loss can be managed sufficiently for a life to move on, and for this to occur a place in the psyche/culture needs to be found in which some of the shock, rage, horror and grief can be addressed symbolically. And for a while in the 1970’s elements of the liberal American intelligentsia were able to initiate such a process through critical self-analysis, literature, film and music. But a quite different response, based upon a manic form of denial, was waiting in the wings. Freud notes how a child may engage in the repetition of traumatic experience in an attempt to magically overcome it by reversing the subject/object relationship, by becoming master rather than victim. But this is a ‘working through’ by enactment, an attempt to ‘act upon’ reality rather than understand it. Thus the `action movie’ and the `action hero’ of the Hollywood movies which began in the 1970’s featuring Schwarzenegger, Jean Claude Van Damme, and, later, Bruce Willis. But, more seriously, we can also see the same process of ‘working through’ in terms of the search to re-enact in reverse the humiliation of Vietnam but this time with the US as master. The first Gulf War only partially accomplishes this, Saddam remains unfinished business for many of the neo-conservatives gathering with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in the late 1990’s. It is in this context that we can understand September 11th . For September 11th was a second huge narcissistic injury for the USA and the current war on Iraq is a further attempt at ‘working through’. As by now is absolutely clear (and openly admitted by Wolfowitz) the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq was the pretext for an intervention which had quite different motives. These motives were partly strategic (oil, the need to find an alternative to Saudi Arabia as a forward base for US forces in the region) but they were also partly simply about the reassertion of American power against a more fulfilling target than the Taliban in Afghanistan. They set about `finishing the job’ begun by Bush Snr and achieving `closure’, closing the narcissistic wound opened up by Vietnam and never properly healed. Psychotic Anxieties, Splitting and September 11th If we think psychoanalytically about the events leading up to the war on Iraq, then the starting point is the twin towers - September 11th . Its not easy to forget the horror of that day. There was no absence of bodies then. Horrific scenes of people jumping out of windows, running for life, mangled and dismembered corpses. On September 11th we witnessed true annihilation, not a film, just annihilation. As Cowley (2001) acutely observed, `Islamic terrorists appropriated the destructive impulses of American entertainment culture, making of a nation’s apocalyptic fantasies a terrifying actuality, as if they were attempting to speak to the Americans in their own language’. This was a massive attack on the security of the American nation. As Hanna Segal (2002) noted, the trauma of the terrorist attack had an added dynamic 'the crushing realisation that there is somebody out there who actually hates you to the point of annihilation'. It is now commonplace to say that the USA lost its innocence on September 11th. But what it really lost was its embrace of the imaginary. Until that day the American psyche had been consumed by a helpless fascination with a fictional threat, or rather a series of fictional threats; on September 11th they received the shock of the real. `Welcome to the world’ some people said. Suddenly Americans became as vulnerable as the rest of us. The immediate response to September 11th was bewilderment and incredulity. Again, as Segal noted, the question on most American lips was `why’? It is a common reaction for people in trauma situations to think that people are out to get them, ‘in the case of the terrorist attacks it is actually a true fact. One’s worst nightmares come true’. Segal added another dimension - the symbolism of the twin towers and the Pentagon. This is very important if we are to try and understand the meanings and motivations behind the war on Iraq. So, the symbolism equates to ‘we are all-powerful, with our weapons, finance, high tech - we can dominate you completely’. The suicide bombers destroyed this omnipotence. As Segal noted: we were pushed into a world of terror versus terror, disintegration and confusion. The shock was followed by mourning and barely contained anxiety. The president of the United States of America appeared on global television networks as `the child adult’, a little boy lost. At first he seemed quite inadequate to the part that was being demanded of him. It almost looked like he wanted to run – asking, `why me’? For weeks the USA was gripped by a wave of panics about anthrax and other impending attacks. But traces of American triumphalism were being quickly reasserted. The flags which, from Maine to Arizona, first hung from poles and windows in grief quickly transmuted into a sign of strength and resolution, and later, to bellicosity. This other mood could also be discerned in homage to the courage of fire crews and emergency service personnel and to the passengers who overcame the hi-jackers on the fourth plane (`let’s roll’). But rage took time to gather. Many liberals and leftists in Europe anticipated an outpouring of vengeful rhetoric from the Republicans, but it did not come. Rather, the response was surprisingly measured and multilateral. And whilst many opposed the war of the `coalition against terror’ against Afghanistan, at least the connection with September 11th seemed obvious – Al Quaeda was clearly being protected by the Taliban regime. It was only when this phyric victory had been swiftly achieved that a shift, symbolised by the `Axis of Evil’ speech in January 2002, into a more paranoid and in-your-face triumphalist discourse began. The question of weapons of mass destruction became central to the moral and ethical charge for war. Was there any proof of their existence? The weapons inspectors could find none, yet we were told time after time that clear evidence existed, even though the documents cited had very little credibility. Again, as Hofstadter noted, the typical procedure of higher paranoid scholarship is to start by accumalating facts, or what appear to be facts to establish 'proof' that a conspiracy exists - the paranoid mentality seeks a coherence that reality cannot provide. Indeed for Hofstadter, `what distinguishes the paranoid style is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts (though it is occasionally true that in his extravagant passion for facts the paranoid occasionally manufactures them), but rather the curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical point in the recital of events.’ (Hofstadter 1979, p.39). The deployment of reason and strategic cunning becomes unpinned by the apocalyptic vision of paranoid politics. Destroying the Bad Object Classically, in a paranoid schizoid state, manic defenses are called into play. The splitting of good and bad, processes of idealisation and denigration, as we have seen, lead us to perceive the world in dichotomous relationships between good and bad. The bad object/other becomes the fixation point of our anger, fear, rage and paranoia. Excessive projection leaves the individual in mortal fear of an attack from the bad object. Thus we try and destroy this object, lest it comes back to destroy us. The question arises though, as to what happens when these destructive forces are unable to find a satisfactory object. Despite the measured and multi-lateral nature of the intervention there was still something murderous and retaliatory about the attack on the people of Afghanistan. An attack based in the talion morality of the paranoid schizoid position - an eye for an eye. The problem with the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban was there was no sense of gratification and the lust to get equal was never satisfied. There are several reasons for this. First, the bombing of Afghanistan simply wasn’t enough to either exact revenge, or to demonstrate the power of the Apocalypse - you cannot bomb the stone age back into the stone age even though, as Sartre (1968, p.40) had noted over thirty years earlier, this had already been attempted in Vietnam with disastrous effects. Second, Bin Laden disappeared, vaporised - there was no bad object to destroy. Finally, the exercise of military might, of unadulterated power had nothing to be powerful over - power only exists if people are the objects of that power. Instead we seemed to have an increasingly paranoid American population and its government on the one hand and disappearing enemy bodies on the other. And then came the `Axis of Evil’ speech and a further ratcheting up of the spiral of splitting, projection, paranoid phantasy, and defensive offence. White House rhetoric began providing florid depictions of a world divided between good and evil in which there was no `in between’, `you are either with us or you are against us’. Fakhry Davids (2002) notes that the events of September 11th were brought home vividly to us by the wall to wall media coverage - the shocking images of the planes crashing into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, and then its collapse. Psychically unbearable events, argues Davids, call into play powerful defences whose aim is to protect us from perceived danger. For Davids, the extent to which the event has been reframed in stereotyped racist terms is apparent everywhere, ‘the problem has now been reduced to a conflict between the enlightened, civilised, tolerant, freedom loving, clean living democrat versus the bearded, robed, Kalashnikov bearing bigoted, intolerant, glint in the eye fundamentalist fanatic, or viewed from the other side, the humble believer with God on his side versus the infidel armed with all the worldly might of the devil’ (Davids 2002, p.362). For Davids, it is difficult for us to find neutral ground - you are either with us, or against us - which side are you on? This reduction of a complex situation into black and white, good and bad is a paranoid solution to intense anxiety which reinforces the self-idealisation which we have seen lies at the heart of American exceptionalism. As Davids notes, such a world view makes us feel that we know who we are, and may justify actions that make us feel better. The problem is that we don’t face the problem. There have been many arguments about why America and Britain decided to wage war on Iraq. All quite plausible in their own right - Saddam the evil dictator, Saddam the murderer of his own people, then there are the economic, the oil, the money to be made from reconstructing the country, the geo-political, securing the middle east - stopping a snowball of violence, and of course harbouring the terrorist. Then of course there are the weapons of mass destruction, yet to be found, despite the documentation of the paranoid conspirators. All these explanations contribute to a fuller picture, but as David Hare (2003) recently wrote, the main motivation behind this war was a simply assertion of American power, ‘the feral pleasure of the flex’. Uppity Saddam had dared to piss on the boots of Uncle Sam. A lesson in respect was due. An annihilatory lesson aimed at the global (and not just Islamic) psyche. But we’ve been here before. This is Sartre (1968, p.42) again on Vietnam, `when a peasant falls in his rice paddy, mowed down by a machine gun, everyone of us is hit…. The group which the United States wants to intimidate and terrorize by way of the Vietnamese nation is the human group in its entirety’. Not just an attack but an annihilatory one aimed at the Iraqi body, its government, its history and its country – an attempt at vaporisation - an apocalyptic vision - such is the style of paranoid politics. And for a while the world did look on in shock and awe. Empty Boots, Empty Tanks, Empty Buildings According to Baudrillard (1994), `Coppola makes his films like the Americans make war… with the same immoderation, the same excess of means, the same monstrous candour… and the same success. The war as entrenchment, as technological and psychedelic fantasy, the war as a succession of special effects, the war becomes film even before being filmed… a test site, a gigantic territory in which to test their arms, their methods, their power.’ America had a choice after September 11th. It could have joined much of the rest of the world in its shared sense of vulnerability and interdependence. But, once more, America chose denial and magic. Denial of the real and a manic reassertion of omnipotence. The war on Iraq was a demonstration of pure and total power. It became sanitised as a film of all the elements that might obstruct or resist power. There were no bodies, just empty tanks, boots and buildings that were endlessly pounded as a demonstration of shock andawe. The Iraqi bodies disappeared, the presidential guard disappeared and then Saddam disappeared, as did the mighty Republican Guard and, oh yes, it seems so have the weapons of mass destruction. Peter Preston (2003) commented along similar lines, `the missing link, for those of us watching far away is death: the bodies of the men and women who have died’. Preston argued that the televised war turned away from the reality of the situation. Nobody wanted to see dead bodies, wounded soldiers or civilians suffering. We can watch the bombs falling, but not see the effect - ‘the dead become undead for photographic purposes’. In Britain, the first time we saw blood and bodies, despite the apocalyptic first night of the cruise missiles, was a report by John Simpson two weeks into the war. Simpson (2003) was with a convey of Kurdish fighters and American special forces when they came under attack from American warplanes: "This is just a scene from hell here. All the vehicles on fire. There are bodies burning around me, there are bodies lying around, there are bits of bodies on the ground. This is a really bad own goal by the Americans" . The very graphic images were even worse, broadcast on BBC television - blood dripping down the windscreen of a vehicle while the reporter sat inside. The cameraman wiping blood from the lens of the camera with his fingers. It was as if the full horror of war had suddenly hit the world. We could at last see the very symbolic and sickening images of a real, as opposed to a hyperreal war. It is paradoxical that there has been more emphasis on casualties since the end of the war. Some conclusions The destruction of the world trade centre was a terrible event in world history, a terrible shock to the American psyche and brought terrible traumas to the ordinary citizens of New York. For the USA as the only world power, the bubble was burst. Coppolla wasn’t there, or even Bruce Willis to protect the ordinary person in the street - the terrorists struck at the very heart of America. The tables, however, were turned and the Middle East temporarily succumbed to the (film) show of power (with no casualties), the show that should have protected the twin towers but didn’t. The problem is we cannot have war without bodies - and there cannot be power without being in relation to the other. Despite the fact the neo-Conservatives were itching to take on Saddam before Bush even got into office, despite the fact that for some of these strategists September 11th was therefore both a shock and an opportunity sent from heaven, despite the long period of military preparation and the diplomatic side-show conducted by that naïve Mr Blair that accompanied it, despite all this the occupation of Iraq looks like being a piece of inept foreign policy making in the best traditions of American irrationalism. Little thought appears to have been given to what happens once the military occupation was achieved, to the problem of law and order or to reviving the basic infrastructure. Little thought appears to have been given to the possibility that armed Saddam loyalists might `melt’ into the night in order to fight a sustained campaign of sabotage and guerilla warfare or that the repressed Shias might quickly fill the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Baathists and look to their theocratic Shia neighbours in Iran as guide and model. Little thought seems to have been given to an exit strategy and, as the situation deteriorates, the obvious solution – call for the UN to pick up the pieces – can only be reached for if an enormous chunk of humble pie is swallowed. Besides, the Project for the New American Century is not concerned to restore any legitimacy to this `Old World’ institution. To return to more or less where we began, it is impossible to stress enough the narcissistic and fearful character of contemporary American power. This is a power based in a paranoid syle of politics and expressed from a seemingly omnipotent position. Five decades of a growing ascendancy have encouraged the fantasy that there really are no limits, a delusional belief system has become corroborated by reality. Well almost. God’s chosen people really have acquired a technical, military and economic superiority, which seems to make interdependence unnecessary. But this is the problem of the narcissant, the attack upon relatedness. That America can destroy (like in Afghanistan) there can be no doubt, but it has little or no capacity to build or create beyond that which can be included within a commodified mode of relatedness – it has lost the capacity to rebuild states or civil societies (witness the continued degradation of the former Soviet Bloc). America, the Empire of Fear, now stands as the major threat to global society.

## \*\*\* 1NR

**2NC Overview**

**And, here’s some evidence to substantiate our limits claims—the NRC made a list of things that “restrict” energy production:**

**Mikes America, 2011** [Mike has experience in politics and government at every level from the Court House to the White House where he worked for President Reagan. His profile picture is his douche looking self shaking Reagan’s douchey hand. “Documenting Obama's Plan to Restrict American Energy Development and Make Gas More Expensive ¶“ http://mikesamerica.blogspot.com/2011/03/documenting-obamas-plan-to-restrict.html]

The **N**atural **R**esources **C**ommittee in the U.S. House of Representatives has compiled a lengthy list which documents the many steps the Obama Administration has taken to **restrict** oil and gas development.

**Some of these might be topical AFFs, most of them are a disaster for the topic—let evidence about ON, the preposition involved, be the judge**

**NRC 12** [http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410]

Costing American Jobs, Increasing Energy Prices

Since taking office, President Obama and his Administration have actively blocked, hindered and delayed American energy production. With gasoline prices quickly headed to $4 per gallon, the Obama Administration must abandon their policies and regulations that are costing American jobs, increasing energy prices, hurting families, harming our economy and threatening our national security by deepening our dependence on foreign energy.

Quick Links: [2009](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#2009) | [2010](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#2010) | [2011](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#2011) | [2012](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#2012)

| 2009 |  |
| --- | --- |
| February 4th | [Withdrew](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=134670) areas offered for 77 oil and gas leases in Utah that could cost American taxpayers millions in lost lease bids, production royalties, new jobs and the energy needed to offset rising imports of oil and natural gas. According to a [Uintah County commissioner](http://westernenergyalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/BLM-did-not-improperly-rush-canceled-Utah-leases-IG-report-finds.pdf), this prevented the creation of approximately 3,000 jobs.  |
| February 10th | [Delayed](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=134669) for six months the development of the new 5-year leasing program for offshore drilling that would have created new jobs, produced more American-made energy, and made us less dependent on foreign oil.  |
| February 25th | [Delayed](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=134651) the new round of oil shale research, demonstration, and development (RD&D) leases that would help advance American technology and create high-tech jobs in Colorado, Wyoming and Utah. According to a study prepared for The National Energy Technology Laboratory, over 350,000 jobs would be created by the development of our oil shale resources.  |
| February 26th | [Introduced](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=134632) a budget that contains page after page of taxes on American energy totaling more than $31 billion and included a cap-and-trade national energy tax that could cost the average American family over $3,100 a year.  |
| April 17th | [Listed](http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/0EF7DF675805295D8525759B00566924) carbon dioxide as a hazardous pollutant, opening the door for the regulation of all CO2 emissions under the Clean Air Act.  |
| April 27th | The Environmental Protection Agency [ordered the cancellation](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53R4FL20090428) of a permit for a Navajo Nation power plant that Navajo leadership called the most important development project the tribe has ever undertaken. The plant was expected to create 400 permanent jobs and generate $50 million per year in revenue.  |
| June 29th | The Interior Department established new solar reserve areas under the premise of prioritizing solar development, but the actual result was the closing of all but two percent of federal lands from renewable energy development. This was done without public comment. The Department left open only [670,000 acres](http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/newsroom/2009/june/NR_0629_2009.html) of the nearly [30 million acres](http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/renewable_energy.html) of land with solar potential.  |
| July 20th | [Blocked](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=139641) new uranium mining for two years on one million acres of land in Arizona.  |
| October 8th | Issued a final report on the Utah oil and natural gas leases, [offering only 17 of the 77 leases](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=149382). In November, the Institute for Energy Research [found](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2009/11/24/actions-speak-louder-than-words/) that the Administration has leased less acreage than any other on record. (See [February 4, 2009](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#Feb42009)) |
| October 20th | [Announced](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=150715) a new round of oil shale RD&D Leases that included job-destroying variable terms, royalty rates, and lease sizes. (See [February 25, 2009](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#Feb252009))  |
| 2010 |  |
| January 6th | [Implemented](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=165190) numerous new hurdles to the leasing and development of new oil and natural gas on onshore federal lands.  |
| January 26th | MMS [announced](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2610221420100126) it would delay the Virginia offshore lease sale scheduled for November 2011.  |
| January 28th | [Announced](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=168232) the results of the most recent round of oil shale RD&D leases, which resulted in an 85% reduction in industry interest under the terms proposed by the Department. (See [October 20, 2009](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#Oct202009))  |
| February 1st | [Released](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=168487) the FY 2011 budget proposal that included nearly [$40 billion in direct tax and fee increases](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=174396) on American energy production, which would increase gasoline and energy prices for American families and businesses. |
| February 17th | Department of Energy [notified](http://hastings.house.gov/media/pdfs/021710%20-%20DOE%20Reprogramming%20Letter%20to%20EW.pdf) Congress that it would reprogram $115 million Congress appropriated to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process, and instead use it to terminate the only national repository for spent nuclear fuel under current law.  |
| March 3rd | Department of Energy [filed](http://hastings.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=199058) a motion to permanently abandon Yucca Mountain – the nation’s repository for high-level spent nuclear fuel under current law – jeopardizing the future of nuclear energy.  |
| March 12th | [Withdrew](http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/editorial/gazette-opinion/article_bb25685e-33df-11df-ae5a-001cc4c002e0.html) 61 oil and natural gas leases in Montana as part of a lawsuit settlement over climate change.  |
| March 31st | [Ignoring](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=179309) statutory law, the Bureau Of Land Management agreed to settle a lawsuit out of court regarding the use of an “extraordinary circumstances” provision when using “categorical exclusions” for new oil and gas leases as defined by Section 390 in the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005.  |
| March 31st | [Announced](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=179211) a new offshore drilling plan that [closed](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=179299) large portions of our offshore areas from future energy production.  |
| May 6th | Issued a moratorium on all new drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, creating further economic devastation and costing up to [12,000](http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/reports/documents/drillingmoratorium.pdf) jobs according to the Administration’s own estimates.  |
| May 17th | Bureau of Land Management [finalized](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=186056) rules, first announced by Secretary Salazar on January 6, 2010, to establish more government hurdles to onshore oil and natural gas production on federal lands.  |
| May 28th | Officially lifted the moratorium on shallow water drilling – yet continued to slow-walk the issuing of permits, creating a de facto moratorium. (See [May 6, 2010](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#May62010))  |
| June 15th | In an Oval Office [address](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=191058) on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, President Obama continued to push for implementation of a job destroying cap-and-trade national energy tax.  |
| July 12th | [Issued](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=197545) a new moratorium on deepwater drilling after the first moratorium was struck down in federal court. (See [May 6, 2010](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#May62010))  |
| July 19th | President’s Ocean Policy Taskforce [issued](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=198995) final recommendations on implementing a Federally-controlled system of ocean zoning that could lock up huge areas of the ocean to energy development.  |
| October 12th | Lifted the deepwater drilling moratorium – yet continued to keep the de facto moratorium in place by slow-walking the issuing of permits. (See [May 6, 2010](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#May62010))  |
| October 14th | Bureau of Ocean Energy Management issued an [interim safety rule](http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/2010-25256.htm) for the Gulf of Mexico, which stated that OPEC could offset a decrease in Gulf of Mexico deepwater production as a result of the Administration’s de facto moratorium.  |
| November 18th | An Interior Department presentation [showed](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=215415) that they plan to postpone new lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico until 2012.  |
| November 30th | Interior Department [announced](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=216485) it would consider proposals to regulate hydraulic fracturing on public lands – a technique currently regulated by states that is responsible for tremendous growth in natural gas production.  |
| December 1st | Effectively [reinstated](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=216586) the ban on offshore drilling, placing the entire Pacific Coast, the entire Atlantic Coast, the Eastern Gulf and parts of Alaska off limits to future energy production until 2017 at the earliest.  |
| December 23rd | Interior Department [announced](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=218645) a new “Wild Lands” Secretarial Order that could place hundreds of millions of acres of public lands off-limits to American energy production.  |
| 2011 |  |
| January 14th | [Retroactively](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703583404576079792048919286.html) pulled a permit for a West Virginia coal mine, costing 250 American jobs.  |
| February 2nd | Federal Judge [finds](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=223501) the Interior Department in contempt of court for continuing to slow-walk Gulf of Mexico drilling permits. (See [October 12, 2010](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#Oct122010)) |
| February 14th | [Released](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=225077) the FY 2012 budget proposal that includes over $60 billion in direct tax and fee increases on American energy production, which would raise gasoline and energy costs for all Americans.  |
| February 15th | [Announced](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=225238) further delays to U.S. oil shale production by deciding to re-review the current rules for commercial oil shale leasing.  |
| February 17th | Federal Judge [orders](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=225694) the Obama Administration to act on five pending deepwater permits within 30 days.  |
| February 28th | [Issued](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=226621) a token deepwater permit, over four months after the moratorium was officially lifted. But continued to slow-walk permits, keeping the de facto moratorium in place and leaving thousands of Americans out of work.  |
| March 4th | Rather than end the de facto moratorium, the Administration filed an appeal to a Federal Court [ruling](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=225694) that ordered them to act on stalled deepwater permits. (See [February 17, 2011](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#Feb172011))  |
| June 20th | [Announced](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=247637) six-month extension of a ban on uranium mining in Arizona. The mining of this land could have produced thousands of high paying, family wage jobs. The U.S. currently remains 90% dependent on foreign sources of uranium. |
| October 26th | Secretary Salazar announces plan to [merge](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=266260) BLM and OSM, an action that could move the coal mining industry one step closer to extinction and cause energy costs to skyrocket.  |
| 2012 |  |
| January 9th | [Imposed](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=274183) 20-year ban on uranium mining on one million acres of Federal land. The mining of this land could have produced thousands of high paying, family wage jobs. The U.S. currently remains 90% on foreign sources of uranium. (See [June 20, 2011](http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=15410#Jun202011))  |
| January 12th | [Released](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=274750) draft action plan to move forward with the President’s goal of mandatory ocean zoning. The policy could place huge portions of the ocean off limits to commercial and recreational activity.  |
| January 16th | [Rejected](http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-administration-to-reject-keystone-pipeline/2012/01/18/gIQAPuPF8P_story.html) TransCanada’s application to build the Keystone XL Pipeline. This project would have created tens of thousands of jobs and transported nearly a million barrels of oil a day into the U.S. |
| February 3rd | [Announced](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=278055) a draft Bureau of Land Management plan to close over a million acres of public land in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming to oil shale development. |
| February 13th | [Released](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=280172) a FY 2013 budget that includes $45 billion in tax and fee increases on American energy production and [shows](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=280349) declining revenues from offshore drilling. |

### F/X Card

#### Making production tough, expensive, or unlikely isn’t a prohibition—that’s our 1nc Evidence—here’s more

Caiaccio 94 [Kevin, “Howard v. Babcock, the Business of Law Versus the Ethics of Lawyers: Are Noncompetition Covenants among Law Partners against Public Policy,” 28 Ga. L. Rev. 825 (1993-1994), Hein Online]

While the Howard court acknowledged the enforceability of some law practice covenants under the Business Code, the key issue became whether the agreement, which called for the loss of 82.5% of net profits by the departing partners, was one that "restricted" [\*820] the practice of law. n95 The court essentially adopted the Haight court approach, stating that a reasonable cost imposed on a departing partner does not restrict the practice of law. n96 The court labeled the cost a mere "economic consequence" to an "unrestricted choice." n97 The majority in Howard reasoned that such a construction was consistent with Rule 1-500 and that this construction struck a balance between competing interests. n98 According to the court, this interpretation allowed a departing partner to practice law anywhere in the state and represent any of the former firm's clients who were willing to follow. n99 The departing partner would, however, have to compensate the firm for its loss of income. Therefore, the court remanded for a factual determination as to whether the loss of withdrawal benefits constituted liquidated damages or an unacceptable penalty. n100

The majority opinion justified this break with years of nationwide precedent by reasoning that "a revolution in the practice of law has occurred." n101 This "revolution" required the "economic interests of the law firm to be protected as they are in other business enterprises." n102 The court supported its recognition of a "revolution" by noting the increased propensity of law firms--even large, seemingly stable firms--to split up as partners grab clients on the way out. n103 As a result, noncompetition agreements have become common, despite the near universal recognition by courts and ethics committees that such agreements are unenforceable. n104 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the pervasiveness of lateral hiring, even among high-level partners, has undermined the assumption that firms are stable institutions. n105 The court concluded that,

 [\*821] due to these "sweeping changes" in the profession, the per se rule banning noncompetition agreements among law partners should be abolished. n106

The court then addressed some of the arguments made by the dissent and by other courts upholding the ban. According to the majority of the court, two primary arguments exist in support of the ban: (1) an attorney should have the freedom to practice law where and for whom he or she pleases, n107 and (2) clients are not commodities and should have the freedom to choose representation. n108 The majority argued that these freedoms are merely "theoretical" because they are routinely circumscribed. n109 For example, attorneys, like other professionals, may be fired or forced out by their partners despite the wishes of the client. n110 Similarly, an attorney is not required to accept representation of every client that seeks services, and a lawyer may even be required to decline representation of a prospective client if a conflict of interest exists. n111 In fact, an attorney has many grounds to justify terminating a relationship with a client. n112 Finally, the majority noted that, in civil cases, clients have no "right" to an attorney at all. n113 Thus, these "freedoms," upon which the per se rule is justified, are in fact already limited. n114

The court proceeded a step further, arguing that permitting restrictive covenants may even serve the client. According to the court, the ban promoted a "culture of mistrust" and damaged the stability of law firms. n115 Partners may be reluctant to refer clients to or support the practice of their fellow partners if fear persists that a partner may leave with those clients at any time. n116 The court concluded that the changing nature of the business of law, the permissibility of such covenants in other [\*822] professions, and the undesirable promotion of the culture of mistrust required the abolition of the per se ban on lawyer restrictive covenants. n117 The court remanded the case to the trial court for analysis under the test of reasonableness applicable to all restrictive covenants. n118

Justice Kennard, the sole dissenting justice, made several arguments in support of the per se ban. First, Kennard offered a different interpretation of Rule 1-500 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, arguing that the rule was unambiguous: agreements that restrict competition are unethical. n119 She criticized the majority's argument as flawed because it interpreted "restrict" to mean "prohibit" and claimed that a reasonable cost was not a restriction. n120 According to the dissent, this interpretation does not give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. n121 In their ordinary meaning, restrict and prohibit are not synonymous; a price as high as 82.5% of net profits certainly constitutes a restriction. n122 Therefore, the partnership agreement violated the clear meaning of the rule.

In support of this interpretive argument, the dissent cited the "discussions" that accompany the Rules and "provide guidance for interpretation." n123 The discussions accompanying Rule 1-500, which the majority ignored, were unequivocal:

$ (Rule 1-500$ ) permits a restrictive covenant in a law corporation, partnership, or employment agreement. The law corporation shareholder, partner, or associate may agree not to have a separate practice during the existence of the relationship; however, upon termination of the relationship (whether voluntary or involuntary), the member is free to practice law without any contractual restriction . . . . n124

According to the dissent, the court should not have endorsed an interpretation completely inconsistent with this unambiguous commentary. n125

Second, the dissent argued that, despite the majority's perceived "revolution" in the practice of law, n126 the law is still primarily a profession, and lawyers should continue to strive for the highest ethical standards. n127 Although no one in the private sector could continue to practice law without a profit, an attorney has a very high fiduciary duty. This duty often requires an attorney to place the interest of a client above her own interest. Therefore, the client's right to choose representation is paramount to the interests of the attorney. n128 Enforcing covenants not to compete, on the other hand, would subordinate the client's rights to the monetary interests of established firms. n129

Next, the dissent attacked the argument that, since noncompetition agreements are enforceable in other professions, lawyers should not be treated differently. n130 According to the dissent, the ethics rules of other professions are not helpful because "the nature, ideals, and practices of the various professions are different." n131 Notwithstanding the rules with respect to other professions, lawyers should strive to obtain the highest ethical standards because "ethics is not a subject in which the objective is to achieve consensus at the level of the lowest common denominator." n132 [\*824]

Finally, the dissent noted that the purpose of ethics regulations is to protect the public, not the monetary interests of law firms. n133 According to the dissent, the majority subordinated the rights of clients and lawyers to the business interests of firms and justified this erosion of ethics standards by concluding that these rights are merely "theoretical" because they are already circumscribed. n134 The dissent strenuously disagreed with the majority's conclusion, arguing that this analysis was irrelevant. The issue in this case was not whether a partner may be forced out of a law firm, nor whether a conflict of interest existed; n135 the issue was whether the defendant-law firm could "prevent a willing attorney from representing a willing client." n136 Therefore, the majority's analysis on this point was merely "rationalization, not reasoning." n137

The dissent concluded that the court should not promote the weakening of ethical standards and that the integrity of the legal profession demanded upholding the per se ban on covenants not to compete between law partners. n138

IV. Analysis and Recommendations

Although the Howard court set out persuasive policy reasons for abolishing the per se ban on lawyer restrictive covenants, the majority's reasoning contained several flaws. First, the court misconstrued the meaning of the ethics rule: under the majority's interpretation, the rule prohibits only outright bans on competition. In reaching this conclusion, the court violated several rules of statutory construction. Second, the court failed to recognize the need to articulate a new standard for law partners. Instead, the court held that agreements between law partners should be analyzed under the "rule of reason" test applicable to ordinary business partnerships. This Comment contends that the rules of ethics, as currently written, mandate a higher standard for attorneys than for other types of partners. In abrogating the per se ban, courts should interpret the rule in a manner that balances the changing nature of the practice of law with the competing ethical considerations.

a. proper construction of the rules of professional conduct

The Howard court began its analysis by examining the California Business and Professions Code, which expressly permits reasonable restrictive covenants among business partners. n139 The court noted that this provision had long applied to doctors and accountants and concluded that the general language of the statute provided no indication of an exception for lawyers. n140 After reaching this conclusion, however, the court noted that, since it had the authority to promulgate a higher standard for lawyers, the statute alone did not necessarily control, n141 and the court therefore proceeded to examine the California Rules of Professional Conduct. n142 The court avoided the apparent conflict between the business statute and the ethics rule by undertaking a strained reading of the rule. In essence, the court held that the word "restrict" referred only to outright prohibitions, and that a mere "economic consequence" does not equal a prohibition. n143

**1NR—We Meet**

#### A. Regulations is a broader category—sometimes it includes restrictions, but not necessarily so. Treating these affs as topical links to all of our limits arguments—EPA proves

EPA 5 [Effluent Guidelines—Aquatic Animal Production Industry—Final Technical Development Document, CHAPTER 1 LEGAL AUTHORITY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/aquaculture/upload/2005\_09\_01\_guide\_aquaculture\_add\_chapter1\_508.pdf]

A number of states and territories were found to have regulations and permits regarding pesticide use in aquaculture, including Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Guam, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia. These regulations address pesticides and include the following issues: use and application; restrictions; record-keeping; waste collection; storage; labeling requirements; and certification, licensing, and registration.

#### C. They are distinct—restrictions are rules—regulations are different. Traffic example proves—a Traffic Regulation is a way to control the flow of traffic, while a RESTRICTION is a legal constraint on traffic.

Dawson 11—Chief Editor of Difference Between, graduate in Electronic Engineering [Olivia Dawson, submitted by Aron, Difference between Rules and Regulations, 2/10/11, http://www.differencebetween.com/difference-between-rules-and-vs-regulations/]

Rules vs Regulations

Rules and Regulations are two words that are often confused since they appear to mean the same. Strictly they do not mean the same. There is in fact some difference between them in terms of their usage and connotations.

One of the main differences between rules and regulations is that by rules you restrict and by regulations you control certain procedures. By ‘traffic regulations’ you tend to understand that the traffic is controlled by certain procedures. By ‘traffic rules’ you tend to understand that you should follow certain restrictions when it comes to moving in a traffic.

A regulation becomes a legal rule. For example a regulation issued by a local government or an administrative agency becomes a legal rule. It becomes a restriction that has legal force. On the other hand a rule is traditionally defined as “Generally an established and authoritative standard of principle; a general norm mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of situation”.

It is important to note that in legal translation the word ‘regulation’ is used to denote a set of rules that have legal connotations. Regulations are official in use whereas rules are not official in use. Regulations pertain to a workplace such as an office or a firm. On the other hand rules pertain to games, sports and the like.