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#### Focus on energy production produces chronic failure. Energy becomes an end-in-itself with no social or ethical guidance.

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 20-21] **[Gender paraphrased]**

The Technique of Modern Energy Governance While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul, 1964: 133- 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality. From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar, technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy's social project. As one observer has noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the "great paradox of the technological mystique [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical expertise." Even the vanguard of a sustainable energy transition seems swayed by the magnetism of technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics. Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford ( 1964). Governance "by the people" consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its operations. Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford suggests ( 1964: I) that the classical idea of democracy includes "a group of related ideas and practices ... [including] communal self-government ... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that affects the whole community." Modern conventional and sustainable energy strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being recognized as the emblems of modernist politics. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which "deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process, [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over physical nature, ultimately control over [hu]man[ity] himself, the chief purpose of existence" (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically and technologically unassailable.

#### Technocratic management makes extinction inevitable—no aff proposal can solve.

Crist 7 [Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech University, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” *Telos*, Volume 141, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Telos Press, p. 49-51]

If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution promoted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwillingness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these elements of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse underway—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conversion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to—with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and [end page 50] foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and second, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur.

Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manipulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended consequences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresentation and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user species; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

#### Critique is a prior question—starting with incentives dodges issues of social and environmental sustainability.

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 22-24]

Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major 'energy futures' under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new technologies-conventional or sustainable-that will govern the energy sector and accumulate capital mjght be described as centaurian technics21 in which the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high . technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities, contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere. Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson's assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the "cultural logic of late capitalism." Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is important-even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy visions equally presume that a social order governed by a 'democratic' ideal of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and social justice is studiously observed by both·proposals. Likewise, both agree to, or demur on, the question of capitalism's sustainability.22 Nothing is said on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be. If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct, then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of acquiescence to things as they are. Building an inquiry into energy as a social project will require the recovery of a critical voice that can interrogate, rather than concede, the discourse's current moorings in technological politics and capitalist political economy. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate an energy-society order in which energy systems evolve in response to social values and goals, and not simply according to the dictates of technique, prices, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to between 550Q and 900Q Fahrenheit (300Q and 500Q Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the lifeworld of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life . Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism are successfully declined. In L 928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965: 52) explained why the democratic-authoritarian bargain and Western capitalism should be rejected: God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts. Unless the capitalists of India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or being destroyed by them. As Gandhi's remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our political-economic problem. The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

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#### Counterplan: The United States federal government should adopt a policy that declares that the United States solely maintains nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond to nuclear attacks against ourselves, our forces, or our friends and allies. The United States federal government should establish a nitrogen fertilizer tax of 16 cents per pound of nitrogen, and use the revenue from that tax to provide loan guarantees for farmers to procure biocharcoal technology.

#### A fertilizer tax plus subsidy would incentivize farmers to shift to biochar.

Tom Konrad, 12/14/2009. PhD Mathematics @ Purdue, CFA, financial analyst, freelance writer, and policy wonk specializing in renewable energy and energy efficiency. “The Nitrogen-Biochar Link,” Clean Energy Wonk, http://cleanenergywonk.com/2009/12/14/the-nitrogen-biochar-link/.

Biochar, used as a soil amendment, improves water and nutrient uptake by plants. It has its greatest effects in poor soils, helping the plants access the nutrients that are available, and this effect can last for centuries after the soil has been amended with biochar. Biochar-ameneded soil should reduce the risks to farmers of using too little fertilizer, and hence reduce the incentive to over-apply, benefiting both the farmers and everyone else in the watershed. Studies suggest that fertilizer taxes are the most economically efficient way to reduce Nitrogen runoff. If such taxes were in place, farmers would have a stronger incentive to use biochar in order to make the most of the suddenly more expensive fertilizer. For environmentalists interested in reducing carbon emissions, this would have the added benefit of reducing nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from heavily fertilized soils, for an additional reduction of greenhouse emissions. Hence, [Biochar advocates](http://www.biochar-international.org/) should team up with groups concerned about the [fisheries](http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/05/0525_050525_deadzone.html) and health effects of runoff to advocate for higher taxes on nitrogen fertilizer. When farmers complain, perhaps we can buy them off by using the revenue for a biochar subsidy?

#### Studies show such a fertilizer tax could effectively reduce usage.

Pierre M ́erel, September 2011. Agricultural and Resource Economics @ UC Davis. “Inferring the Effects of Nitrogen Management Policies Using a Fully Calibrated Programming Model of California Agriculture,” asi.ucdavis.edu/research/nitrogen/nitrogen-faculty-workgroup-materials/Merel%20Final%20Report.pdf.

Our work addresses ex ante policy evaluation as it relates to nitrogen management in agriculture, in particular the reduction of nitrogen losses from field crops. We build a bio-economic model of crop production at the regional scale to predict the effects of nitrogen-related policies on agriculture and the environment. The model is calibrated against economic data on observed crop acreages and yields, as well as predetermined supply responses. In addition, crop-specific production functions are calibrated to exogenous agronomic information on yield responses to nitrogen and irrigation. Environmental outcomes are tracked using the biophysical model DAYCENT.¶ The model is applied to the study of a nitrogen tax in Yolo County, California, intended to mitigate non-point source nitrogen pollution from field crops. At low tax levels, the behavioral and environmental responses to the nitrogen tax appear to be largely due to the reduction in fertilizer use and irrigation on each crop. However, as the tax level increases, reductions in input intensities start to level out due to unfavorable yield effects, and acreage reallocation among crops begins to play a sizable part in the total response.¶ From a methodological standpoint, our study illustrates the need to accurately model input intensity adjustments in regional models of crop supply intended for agri-environmental policy analysis. From a policy standpoint, our study shows that sizable reductions in nitrogen application, and attendant reductions in nitrogen losses, can be achieved at the regional scale at a moderate social cost. Overall, the induced reduction in nitrate leaching appears larger than the reduction in nitrous oxide emissions.¶ Specific results: The study develops an economic model of nitrogen use at the regional scale, for use in ex ante agri-environmental policy evaluation. The model is based on the principles of positive mathematical programming (PMP), as outlined in Howitt (1995) and, more recently, M ́erel et al. (2011). As such, the model exactly replicates an observed acreage¶ 1allocation among activities, as well as an exogenous set of crop supply elasticities. The nov- elty of our approach lies in the fact that the model is also calibrated so as to replicate crop yield responses to irrigation and nitrogen application consistent with agronomic information obtained from the biophysical soil process model DAYCENT (Del Grosso et al., 2008). Con- sequently, our fully calibrated model is particularly fit for the analysis of policies that are likely to affect both acreage allocation and input intensity in multi-crop agricultural systems.¶ This paper is not the first one to recognize the need to better represent farmers’ input adjustment opportunities in programming models of agricultural supply, but it is the first one to propose a solution to the yield response calibration problem in the context of positive mathematical programming. Before us, Godard et al. (2008) have used local yield response curves derived from the biophysical model STICS (Brisson et al., 2003) to represent farmers’ nitrogen fertilizer application choice as a first stage to a linear programming representation of crop choice. Graveline and Rinaudo (2007) have exploited a yield response curve for corn to specify a discrete set of corn production activities in a pure linear programming framework. Our approach is different from these, as we focus on exact replication of observed economic behavior through non-linear PMP calibration, as opposed to constrained linear optimization. We also calibrate crop yield responses not only to nitrogen, but also irrigation, an important margin for the assessment of certain environmental outcomes such as nitrate leaching. Finally, we use the biophysical model to derive regional-level—as opposed to farm- level—yield response curves.¶ Our model is applied to field crop agriculture in Yolo County, California, to evaluate the economic and environmental effects of an exogenous increase in the price of nitrogen. A nitrogen tax represents a possible market-based instrument to help mitigate non-point source nitrogen pollution from agriculture. The effects of the tax on nitrate leaching and nitrous oxide (N2O) fluxes are tracked. The linkages between the agronomic model DAYCENT and the economic optimization model are depicted in figure 1.¶ To comprehend the effect of a nitrogen tax on behavioral and environmental outcomes, it is useful to decompose the total effect into its two elementary economic responses: an extensive margin effect, that is, the reallocation of acreage among crops, and an intensive margin effect, that is, the change in input intensity per acre, for a given crop. Both effects are operating simultaneously, and in our application the intensive margin effect, which has been overlooked in existing PMP studies (Helming, 1998), is likely to be large. Hence, to anticipate the full effect of a nitrogen tax policy, it is necessary to accurately model the intensive margin response, in addition to the extensive margin response.¶ Indeed, we find that at low to moderate tax levels, most of the environmental benefits of the policy arise from reductions in nitrogen and water application on each crop, with acreage reallocation playing a minor role. However, as tax levels rise, input intensity adjustments start to level out due to adverse yield effects, and acreage reallocation among crops starts to play a more significant role in the behavioral and environmental responses.¶ Table 1 reports the contributions of the input intensity and acreage reallocation effects to the total behavioral response, that is, the reduction in nitrogen application at the regional level. At the tax level of ¢4/lb N, the total reduction in nitrogen applied in Yolo is predicted to be 3.9%, and 3.3% is due to the input intensity effect. At the higher tax level of ¢16/lb N, the total effect is a reduction of N application by 12.8%, the contribution of the input intensity effect being 8.3%. As such, the relative importance of the acreage reallocation effect to the total effect is increasing with the tax level.1

#### Solves through sequestration without reducing coal emissions.

Technology Review, 4/26/2007. “The Case for Burying Charcoal,” published by MIT, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/407754/the-case-for-burying-charcoal/.

Several states in this country and a number of Scandinavian countries are trying to supplant some coal-burning by burning biomass such as wood pellets and agricultural residue. Unlike coal, biomass is carbon-neutral, releasing only the carbon dioxide that the plants had absorbed in the first place. But a new research [paper](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2007.01.012) published online in the journal Biomass and Bioenergy argues that the battle against global warming may be better served by instead heating the biomass in an oxygen-starved process called pyrolysis, extracting methane, hydrogen, and other byproducts for combustion, and burying the resulting carbon-rich char. Even if this approach would mean burning more coal--which emits more carbon dioxide than other fossil-fuel sources--it would yield a net reduction in carbon emissions, according to the analysis by [Malcolm Fowles](http://technology.open.ac.uk/tm/mf.htm), a professor of technology management at the Open University, in the United Kingdom. Burning one ton of wood pellets emits 357 kilograms less carbon than burning coal with the same energy content. But turning those wood pellets into char would save 372 kilograms of carbon emissions. That is because 300 kilograms of carbon could be buried as char, and the burning of byproducts would produce 72 kilograms less carbon emissions than burning an equivalent amount of coal. ¶ Such an approach could carry an extra benefit. Burying char--known as black-carbon sequestration--enhances soils, helping future crops and trees grow even faster, thus absorbing more carbon dioxide in the future. Researchers believe that the char, an inert and highly porous material, plays a key role in helping soil retain water and nutrients, and in sustaining microorganisms that maintain soil fertility. ¶ Johannes Lehmann, an associate professor of crops and soil sciences at Cornell University and an expert on char sequestration, agrees in principle with Fowles's analysis but believes that much more research in this relatively new area of study is needed. "It heads in the right direction," he says.¶ Interest in the approach is gathering momentum. On April 29, more than 100 corporate and academic researchers will gather in New South Wales, Australia, to attend the first international conference on black-carbon sequestration and the role pyrolysis can play to offset greenhouse-gas emissions. Lehmann estimates that as much as 9.5 billion tons of carbon--more than currently emitted globally through the burning of fossil fuels--could be sequestered annually by the end of this century through the sequestration of char. "Bioenergy through pyrolysis in combination with biochar sequestration is a technology to obtain energy and improve the environment in multiple ways at the same time," writes Lehmann in a research paper to be published soon in [Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment](http://www.frontiersinecology.org/). Fowles says that there would be an incentive for farmers, logging communities, and small towns to convert their own dedicated crops, agricultural and forest residues, and municipal biowaste into char if a high enough price emerged for the sale of carbon offsets. "Every community at any scale could pyrolyse its biowaste ... motivated by doing their bit against global warming," he says. Fowles believes that storing black carbon in soil carries less risk, would be quicker to implement, and could be done at much lower cost than burying carbon dioxide in old oil fields or aquifers. And he says the secondary benefits to agriculture could be substantial: "Biochar reduces the soil's requirement for irrigation and fertilizer, both of which emit carbon." Fowles adds that it has also been shown to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from decay processes in soil. This would include nitrous oxide, a potent greenhouse gas. "Biochar has been observed to reduce nitrous-oxide emissions from cultivated soil by 40 percent."

#### The counterplan solve prolif—a “sole purpose” declaration is key.

Blair et al. 8—Former professor of security studies @ Yale and Princeton University. Expert on U.S. and Russian security policies, nuclear forces and command-and-control systems [Bruce G. Blair (President of the World Security Institute), Thomas B. Cochran (Chair for nuclear policy @ Natural Resources Defense Council and senior scientist and director of its Nuclear Program), Jonathan Dean (Advisor on global security issues @ Union of Concerned Scientists), Steve Fetter (Dean of the School of Public Affairs @ University of Maryland), Richard L. Garwin (IBM fellow emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center w/ Ph.D. in physics from the University of Chicago), Kurt Gottfried (Emeritus professor of physics @ Cornell University), Lisbeth Gronlund (Senior scientist and codirector of the Global Security Program @ Union of Concerned Scientists and a research affiliate in the MIT Program in Science, Technology, and Society), Henry Kelly (President of the Federation of American Scientists and served as assistant director for technology in the White House Office of Science and Technology from 1993 to 2000), Hans M. Kristensen (Director of the Nuclear Information Project @ Federation of American Scientists), Robert Nelson (senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists), Robert S. Norris (senior research associate @ Natural Resources Defense Council), Ivan Oelrich (Vice president for strategic security programs @ Federation of American Scientists and professor in the Security Studies @ Georgetown University), Christopher Paine (Director of the Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council), Frank N. von Hippel (nuclear physicist and professor of public and international affairs @ Princeton University), David Wright (co-director and senior scientist of the Global Security Program @ Union of Concerned Scientists and a research affiliate of the MIT Program in Science, Technology, and Society, and Stephen Young (Washington representative and senior analyst in the Global Security Program @ Union of Concerned Scientists), Toward True Security: Ten Steps the Next President Should Take to Transform U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, February 2008]

1. The United States should declare that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to the use of nuclear weapons by another country.

Current U.S. policy is to retain the option of using nuclear weapons for military purposes other than deterring nuclear attack, including:

• Deterring, responding to, and even preempting conventional, chemical, or biological attacks

• Destroying chemical or biological agents

• Deterring or responding to other unspecified threats to U.S. vital interests

However, giving nuclear weapons roles beyond deterring nuclear attack is both unnecessary and counterproductive. Those roles add little or nothing to the deterrence of non-nuclear attacks provided by U.S. conventional forces or to the U.S. ability to counter or respond to such attacks. Moreover, maintaining and strengthening the firebreak against the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons is paramount to U.S. security. If U.S. policy treats nuclear weapons as a multipurpose arsenal, then other states will be more inclined to seek nuclear weapons. If the United States, with its unquestioned conventional superiority, acts as if it must rely on nuclear weapons to protect and defend its vital interests, then weaker states—particularly those not covered by U.S. security guarantees—will perceive a far greater need for such weapons. Indeed, implicit or explicit U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons may motivate nations to acquire nuclear weapons to deter the United States.33 These added roles for U.S. nuclear weapons also negate the nonproliferation benefits of U.S. “negative security assurances” that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories of the NPT.

Some believe that the consequences of attack from chemical and especially biological weapons could be so great that it is unwise to forgo the “sharp deterrence” provided by explicit threats to use nuclear weapons in response. Rather than promising never to use nuclear weapons first, these proponents advocate that the United States pledge not to initiate the use of “weapons of mass destruction,” by which they mean chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

However, chemical weapons do not belong in this category—their destructive capacity pales compared with that of nuclear weapons. Thus, it would be irresponsible for the United States to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack by chemical weapons. Biological weapons, in contrast, could, over time, kill as many people as nuclear weapons—if they are contagious and delivered effectively. However, the threat of a U.S. conventional response is likely to be as effective in deterring such attacks as an explicit U.S. nuclear threat. In any event, any marginal gain in deterrence against a biological attack would be offset by the incentive such a policy would provide hostile nations to acquire nuclear weapons.

Advocates of an explicit U.S. nuclear threat often claim that such a threat deterred Iraq’s use of chemical and biological weapons during the first Gulf War. However, President George H.W. Bush’s threat of “the strongest possible response” if Iraq used its chemical or biological weapons applied equally to the destruction of Kuwait’s oil fields, which Iraq did with impunity.34

U.S. officials threatened privately to escalate the war in ways that did not involve nuclear weapons if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons. Secretary of State James Baker warned the Iraqi foreign minister that the use of such weapons would lead the United States to seek to topple the Hussein regime.35 These threats were almost certainly an equally, if not more, potent deterrent compared with the nuclear threat. There is also evidence that U.S. air attacks impaired Iraq’s ability to deploy and use chemical and biological weapons. We do not know why Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons in that war. However, the balance of evidence does not support the conclusion that veiled U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons were the determining factor.

Nuclear threats are also unnecessary to deter non-nuclear attacks because U.S. conventional military strength far exceeds that of all potential adversaries, and will do so for the foreseeable future. The United States and its allies can rely on their combined conventional military strength to counter any non-nuclear threat to their security. Finally, practical political reasons preclude the use of nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks. Although one can imagine cases where domestic pressure for nuclear revenge might be strong, or where the use of nuclear weapons might reduce U.S. casualties and end a war more quickly, wise leaders would weigh these considerations against the grave damage that nuclear first use would do to U.S. security. In the short term, nuclear attacks could turn world opinion against the United States and render a collective response against an offender difficult or impossible. The long-term effects would be even more profound. Nuclear strikes would deal a fatal blow to U.S. leadership and alliances, wreck the nonproliferation regime, and spur other states to acquire nuclear weapons. While the United States has considered using nuclear weapons numerous times since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it has not done so, in part because of just such considerations.

Threatening to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks could also increase the pressure on the United States to follow through, even if that would be counter to U.S. interests, for two reasons. First, if the United States retains its first-use option, the military will maintain detailed contingency plans and standard operating procedures for such use, which could dominate thinking about how to respond in a crisis. Second, once policy makers threaten a nuclear response, they might worry about undermining U.S. credibility and resolve if they did not follow through, even if they believed that doing so would be unnecessary or imprudent.

The bottom line is that the marginal value of explicit threats to use nuclear weapons to respond to non-nuclear attacks is small, the wisdom of carrying out such threats is dubious, and the potential long-term security costs of making such threats is great. The United States should make clear that the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to nuclear attacks.

### 1NC—DA

#### Congress will avoid the fiscal cliff now.

**Postal 11/8**/12 Veteran reporter covering Washington, D.C. and federal insurance regulation

(Arthur Postal, Credit Union Times, Dealmakers at Work on Fiscal Cliff, <http://www.cutimes.com/2012/11/08/dealmakers-at-work-on-fiscal-cliff?ref=hp>)

Washington is again focusing on the so-called “fiscal cliff” now that the election is out of the way, and there is **strong evidence** of a “grand bargain” being agreed to by **Congress** and the **White House** by year-end in order to avert a dramatic impact on the economy.

President Obama signaled support for a compromise in accepting Mitt Romney’s concession early Wednesday, and on Wednesday, both Senate and House leaders made statements implying that talks are underway.

The issue boils down to the fact that, barring action, $668 billion in total spending cuts and tax increases will take effect Jan. 1, constituting 4% of total gross domestic product.

Also critical is that estate-tax policy will revert to 2001 levels if there is no action. If Congress fails to act, 14.7 million U.S. households would have a potential estate tax liability, according to LIMRA.

The **consensus** of congressional staffers is that there will be a one-year deal to avoid the huge year-end impact.

The sources say that this deal would include an agreed-upon deficit reduction number, including an agreement for tax reform that brings in revenues.

#### Capital is key.

**Kalab 11/8**/12 Shorenstein Center's Founding Director, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Press and Public Policy at Harvard, Scholar in Foreign Policy – Brookings

(Marvin, An Overture to Romney, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/11/08-romney-kalb>)

Conservative critics, gloomy after their candidate’s defeat, argue that President Obama, despite his impressive win in a struggling economy, has no mandate. **That is nonsense.** The president has a mandate, or, what former President George W. Bush referred to as “political capital,” to lead the way toward a political reconciliation over the nation’s impending fiscal cliff negotiations—and to do so now, while the glow of his victory still glitters in the political sunrise. **No one else can lead**, and no one else should lead.

In a way unique to Oval Office occupants, who have run their last political campaign, freshly liberated from normal political constraints, President Obama can now embark on this urgent task by dramatically widening the circle of his inner cabinet and inviting prominent Republicans to join it and, in this way, help him reach an unprecedented bipartisan compromise in the best interests of the country. One such Republican is Mitt Romney, the man he just beat. Though technically the head of his party, Romney is now a man without a job but a man who was, only a few days ago, close to being President-elect. Why not appoint Romney to replace Tim Geithner as Secretary of the Treasury?

This is not so wild an idea, though I can imagine, as you can, the obvious pitfalls. He has major disagreements with the president on economic policy, and he may yet dream about another run for the top job. In addition, Obama may already have promised the job to someone else.

But, if words still have meaning, and if the president remains fixed on striking a major deal before dreaded sequestration sinks its claws into the American economy, Obama is now in a position to make a bold move. The stage, in fact, is set.

#### Nuclear debates cost capital.

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Historically, nuclear energy has been entangled in **one of the most polarizing debates in this country**. Promoters and adversaries of nuclear power alike have accused the other side of oversimplification and exaggeration. For today’s industry, reassuring a **wary public** and nervous government regulators that **small reactors are completely safe** might not be the most promising strategy. People may not remember much history, but they usually do **remember who let them down before**. It would make more sense to admit that nuclear power is an inherently risky technology, with enormous benefits that might justify taking these risks. So instead of framing small reactors as qualitatively different and “passively safe,” why not address the risks involved head-on? This would require that the industry not only invite the public to ask questions, but also that they respond, even—or perhaps especially—when these questions cross preestablished boundaries. Relevant historical experience with small compact reactors in military submarines, for example, should not be off limits, just because information about them has traditionally been classified.

#### The impact is global econ collapse.

**Mandel 12** Syracuse Business News Examiner

(Harold, Fitch says fiscal cliff could set off global recession, <http://www.examiner.com/article/fitch-says-fiscal-cliff-could-set-off-global-recession>)

Money News has reported on September 27, 2012: "Fitch: US Fiscal Cliff Could Trigger Global Recession, Halve World Growth." Fitch Ratings said on Thursday that the unprecedented belt-tightening, which is known as the fiscal cliff that hangs over the United States could, at the very least, cut world growth in half in 2013. Fitch also said that the fiscal cliff could push the United States and possibly the world into recession.

The ratings agency stated, "The U.S. fiscal cliff represents the single biggest near-term threat to a global economic recovery." Fitch has gone on to warn, “A U.S. fiscal shock would be exported to the rest of the world via a sharply weaker U.S. dollar and asset prices, lower U.S. price and wage inflation and heightened risk of deflation, and the impact on commodity prices.” In the meantime leading U.S. executives have less confidence in the business outlook now than at any time in the past three years, with a primary reason being fear of gridlock in Washington over the fiscal deficit and tax policy. And so unless the fiscal cliff is confronted and avoided this could be bad news for everyone.

#### Nuclear war.

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(Geoffrey Kemp, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4)

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “**failed states**.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in **Pakistan** and its takeover by Muslim **extremists**, who then take possession of a large number of **nuclear weapons**. The danger of war between **India and Pakistan** increases significantly. **Iran**, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances **nuclear proliferation** in the **Middle East**, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear **terrorism** increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

### 1NC Solvency

#### Nuclear will remain uncompetitive for decades—our evidence cites industry leaders.

Hiltzik 11—Michael Hiltzik is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author who has covered business, technology, and public policy for the Los Angeles Times for twenty years, master of science degree in journalism from the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University [March 23, 2011, “A nuclear renaissance in U.S. was unlikely even before Japan disaster,” *LA Times*, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/23/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20110323]

To all those who may be concerned that the catastrophic events at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant will derail the heralded renaissance of nuclear power in the U.S., you can relax.

The reason is simple: There is no renaissance.

Not even Exelon Corp., the nation's biggest nuclear generation company, has been holding its breath for a surge in orders or appreciable increase in new generating capacity.

The reason has little to do with an unreasoning public's fear of nuclear meltdowns and radiation poisoning, and almost everything to do with pure economics. As John Rowe, Exelon's chairman and chief executive, told an audience at a Washington think tank two weeks ago, you can build a new natural gas plant for 40% less than a new nuclear plant, and the price of its fuel is at rock bottom.

"Natural gas is queen," he says. (To be fair, Exelon also makes a lot of money from gas.)

In recent years, nuclear energy has been promoted as a "green," or at least greenish, alternative to coal power and other fossil-fueled generation. That's been a potent selling point as concern has mounted over the latter's effect on climate change by the production of greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is burdened by its own environmental issues, including the dangers of radioactive release into the atmosphere, but the production of carbon dioxide isn't among them.

Yet the technology's potential as a weapon against global warming has been as oversold, just as its virtues as safe, clean and "too cheap to meter" were during its infancy in the 1950s. To realistically make a dent in climate change, nuclear plant construction would have to take off at such a rate that it would "pose serious concerns" for the availability of construction materials, properly trained builders and operating technicians, and safety and security oversight, as a report by the Council on Foreign Relations observed in 2007.

"For at least a couple of decades to come, nuclear will be very uncompetitive," the report's author, Charles D. Ferguson, told me this week. Ferguson is president of the Federation of American Scientists.

The ongoing disaster in Japan will exacerbate social concerns about nuclear waste disposal — the on-site storage of spent fuel, which is common at U.S. plants, has complicated the situation at Fukushima — as well as concerns about the safety and security of existing plants. But those concerns have existed for years, so the spectacle of the Japanese grappling with the consequences, graphic as it is, may not in itself affect public attitudes.

Talk of nuclear renaissance in the U.S. had been spurred by two developments. One was the dramatic improvement in the operating record of U.S. plants. In recent years the domestic nuclear industry had been operating at close to 90% of capacity, compared with the lousy 65% record it turned in during the 1970s. The change was the product partially of the industry's consolidation into a small number of specialty operators with nuclear expertise, and it tended to reduce the apparent cost of nuclear power to levels competitive with other sources.

But that also means that "people who advocate nuclear power have rose-colored glasses about its economics," says John E. Parsons of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the co-author of a 2009 update to a 2003 MIT report on the future of nuclear power.

Further encouragement came from the streamlining of U.S. licensing rules. The new procedure consolidates what formerly were separate construction and operating permits into one, removing the uncertainty that a utility might build an entire facility only to be denied permission to run it.

But no new plant has yet been approved under the new system, so plenty of uncertainty still exists. "An investor has to ask, 'Am I looking at a technology that works only when all the cards fall my way?'" Parsons says.

Despite expressions of support for nuclear power coming from political leaders, including President Obama, who is offering loan guarantees for new reactors, nuclear energy can't develop in a policy vacuum. One of the dismal ironies of the American energy program is that many of the same politicians standing foursquare behind nuclear power are also sworn opponents of policies such as a carbon tax, which would make nukes more competitive by raising the price of fossil-based alternatives.

For example, here's Mitt Romney. In "No Apology," the book he published last year presumably as a manifesto for his 2012 presidential campaign, Romney says he doesn't understand why nuclear power is such a "boogeyman," because America's existing plants are "trouble-free." Romney contends that nuclear plants are economically unfeasible in the U.S. only because of our "interminable permitting, regulatory and legal delays."

Romney should listen more to fellow businessmen like Exelon's Rowe, who would tell him that the real reason is that gas generation is cheaper, thanks to pricing that ignores such external costs of gas as pollution and climate change. Yet in his book Romney condemns policies such as the carbon tax because it would "fatten government, harm employers and employees, and hurt consumers." You can't have it both ways, Mitt.

Romney defends the economics of nuclear power by observing that countries with major nuclear construction programs, such as China, seem to have solved the economic conundrum without much trouble. Yet even pro-nuclear experts here acknowledge that nuclear economics don't easily cross national borders. China, which has 13 operating nuclear plants and 30 under construction, has endowed its state-owned nuclear industry with heavy subsidies.

According to a report by the Federation of American Scientists, China's burgeoning demand for electrical power can't effectively be satisfied from its current main source, coal, which will face a depletion crisis around the end of this decade. That makes ramping up nuclear an urgent issue for China. But in the U.S., says Andrew Kadak, the former CEO of Yankee Atomic Power Co., a New England nuclear plant operator, "we don't have that urgency because natural gas is too cheap an alternative."

With the construction of plants still hampered by economics, nuclear utilities are devoting more attention to improving efficiencies and increasing the output of their existing plants, a process known as "uprating." But that amounts to treading water until the social and economic difficulties of nuclear power can be addressed. And they'll have to be addressed: "It's going to be very hard to reduce carbon dioxide if nuclear is out of the picture," MIT's Parsons says. But the first step is injecting realism into the discussion. Nuclear power may be necessary to our energy future, but it won't be our savior.

#### This card ends the debate---the aff cannot solve---neg on presumption

Lovins 10 AMORY B. LOVINS is Chair and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute "Nuclear Socialism" Weekly Standard, VOL. 16, NO. 06 Oct 25 www.weeklystandard.com/articles/nuclear-socialism\_508830.html?page=1

With such juicy incentives, why won’t private investors finance reactors? In 2005-08, with the strongest subsidies, capital markets, and nuclear politics in history, why couldn’t 34 proposed reactors raise any private capital? Because there’s no business case. As a recent study by Citibank U.K. is titled “New Nuclear—the Economics Say No.” That’s why central planners bought all 61 reactors now under construction worldwide. None were free-market transactions. Subsidies can’t reverse bleak fundamentals. A defibrillated corpse will jump but won’t revive.

American taxpayers already reimburse nuclear power developers for legal and regulatory delays. A unique law caps liability for accidents at a present value only one-third that of BP’s $20 billion trust fund for oil-spill costs; any bigger damages fall on citizens. Yet the competitive risks facing new reactors are uninsured, high, and escalating.

Since 2000, as nuclear power’s cost projections have more than tripled, its share of global electricity generation has fallen from 17 percent to 13 percent. That of cogeneration (making electricity together with useful heat in factories or buildings) and renewables (excluding big hydropower projects) rose from 13 percent to 18 percent.

These bite-sized, modular, quickly built projects—with financial risks, costs, and subsidies generally below nuclear’s and declining​—now dominate global power investments. Last year, renewables (wind, water, solar, geothermal), excluding large hydroelectric dams, attracted $131 billion of private capital and added 52 billion watts. Global nuclear output fell for the past three years, capacity for two.

#### Loan guarantees not enough – public opposition, economic risk and safety reviews prohibit expansion

Knowledge@Wharton 11—online business journal of the Wharton School at UPenn [March 30, 2011, “U.S. Energy Policy after Japan: If Not Nuclear, Then What?” http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2743]

Before the earthquake in Japan, a growing number of people were saying nuclear. Not only would it allow the United States to become more energy independent, but it would also lower greenhouse gas emissions, the industry argued. When measured by carbon footprint, nuclear is on par with solar, hydro, wind, biomass and geothermal, and in terms of the land use required, nuclear comes out ahead of other green energy sources, they say. For a 1,000 megawatt power plant, nuclear requires about one square mile of space, compared with 50 square miles for solar, 250 for wind and 2,600 for biomass.

But nuclear power plants are enormously expensive, costing as much as $2 billion to $6 billion to build, according to "Nuclear Energy Policy," a report from the Congressional Research Service. Financing new reactors is heavily dependent on loan guarantees from the federal government, which are highly controversial. To expand, the industry says it needs more than the $18.5 billion in loan guarantees the government currently allocates, which is enough for three or four reactors. Opponents argue that loan guarantees unfairly subsidize a mature industry and would be better spent elsewhere.

The debate in some other countries is less heated. Unlike the United States, which has significant natural resources, many other countries have fewer energy options and have made a strong commitment to nuclear power. They are unlikely to abandon it now, says Michel-Kerjan. France, for example, which turned to nuclear energy decades ago after suffering through an oil crisis, relies on nuclear for 80% of its power. Emerging economies such as China and India are also investing heavily in nuclear to cope with increasing energy demand.

Although many countries are reevaluating safety measures in the wake of Fukushima, few are likely to abandon plants that are already in the works, especially those with more modern designs. "So many countries are going to be very heavy on nuclear in the next 10 years," Michel-Kerjan suggests. "These are not small decisions. They're billions of dollars.... I don't see China or Brazil saying, 'Oh, we saw what happened in Japan. Let's forget about it.'"

A Decline in Public Support

Yet Fukushima has no doubt had an impact. Italy put a one-year moratorium on its plans to re-establish a nuclear energy program. Germany idled seven of its 17 nuclear reactors for safety checks as protesters clamor for an end to nuclear power. China, which had planned to quadruple its nuclear energy capacity by 2020, temporarily suspended all project approvals.

For projects in the United States, an uphill climb has become even steeper. According to a poll released March 21 from Pew Research Center, public support for the increased use of nuclear power has declined since the earthquake in Japan. More than half (52%) now oppose the increased use of nuclear power, while 39% favor it. That compares to 47% in favor and 47% opposed in October.

"As for the long-term prospects for the industry, I think the implications of Japan will be long-lasting," says Chris Lafakis, an energy economist at Moody's Analytics. It will be more difficult to get approval for a plant and more difficult to obtain financing. Although the federal government is pushing for loan guarantees, projects would still need support from a financial institution to get financed, he points out. "And the large banks are in no hurry to extend credit for a plant knowing the regulatory environment" and current public sentiment, he says. There may not be a "formal moratorium" against new nuclear power plants, "but I think there's an effective one."

Even before the Japanese earthquake, the nuclear industry was struggling to expand in the U.S. because of a sluggish economy and a sudden abundance of cheap natural gas. Based on recent shale discoveries, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates the country's recoverable shale gas resources are more than double the volume it assumed just one year ago.

"Cheap natural gas makes it difficult to pull the trigger on nuclear investment," Chris Hansen, director of strategy and initiatives at IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates, noted during a panel discussion at the Wharton Energy Conference in October 2010. "The outlook is that the 'Shale Gale' will really increase the chance for natural gas to grow its market share."

Japan's nuclear crisis will not create that much more additional delay, Hansen told Knowledge@Wharton in a follow-up interview. Low gas prices had already slowed down proposed projects because investors were hesitant to commit billions of dollars that might not pay off. Safety reviews will simply be added to an already delayed process. "I see market share in the U.S. probably eroding for the next 10 years," Hansen says. "All of the new build will be gas, so nuclear will slip."

Economics prevented the much-touted "nuclear renaissance" from ever taking hold in the United States, adds Debra K. Decker, a research associate with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. "Like all business, the nuclear business is about risks and returns," says Decker, who studies nuclear proliferation and proposals for reform. "The risk of getting approvals has been high enough in the United States, and the electricity business has been deregulated enough, that the risk-return ratio has not really supported new builds. When you factor in the high upfront capital costs of nuclear and the still relatively inexpensive gas and coal options, the economics are not there. Nuclear does not come out as an attractive option without supports."

#### Loan guarantees causes complacency and inefficiency undermining the tech

Loris 11 Nick Loris is an analyst at The Heritage Foundation. "Stop Picking Energy Winners and Losers with the Tax Code" www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/05/stop-picking-energy-winners-and-losers-with-the-tax-code

First, special tax credits for cherry-picked technologies artificially reduce the price for consumers. This makes them seem far more competitive than they actually are. Rather than increase competition, the artificial market distortion gives these technologies an unfair price advantage over other technologies. The more concentrated the subsidy or preferential treatment, the worse the policy is because the crowding-out effect for other technologies is larger.

If subsidized technologies are market viable, then the tax break merely offsets private-sector costs for investments that would have been made either way. This creates industry complacency and perpetuates economic inefficiency by disconnecting market success from production costs.

Furthermore, when the government becomes involved in the decision-making process, it increases the business incentive to send lobbyists to Capitol Hill to make their pitch why their industry needs those tax credits. Industries will plead that they need five years of tax credits then they’ll be good to go on their own. Five years later, they’re asking for five more years. These specific carve outs reduce the incentive for producers to be cost competitive with technologies that do not rely on help from the government.

#### The plans causes dependence and undermines incentives for innovation

Loris 11 Nicolas Loris is an analyst in the Heritage Foundation’s Roe Institute of Economic Policy Studies. "Power Down the Subsidies to Energy Producers" Aug 3 www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/08/power-down-the-subsidies-to-energy-producers

But the damage subsidies inflict on our economy extends well beyond direct costs. A special endorsement from the government artificially props up that technology. This reduces the incentive for the producer to become cost-competitive, stifles innovation and encourages government dependence.¶ The federal government has no business picking commercial winners and losers. That’s the job of the marketplace. Indeed, it’s doubly damaging when government decides to manipulate the market through subsidies, because government - almost invariably - picks losers. That’s not surprising, because companies that seek handouts most strenuously are those that cannot compete without them.

#### The distort market forces by driving capital away from competitive projects while undermining innovation incentives

Spencer 9 Jack Spencer, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies @ The Heritage Foundation, “The Problem with Increasing Energy Loan Guarantees,” 2/6 http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm2277.cfm

And that is the problem with loan guarantees: They distort normal market forces and encourage government dependence.¶ One problem with the larger national economic debate is the notion that money--or, more accurately, savings or capital--does not grow on trees. It comes from real people who have saved and invested and exists in finite amounts. By subsidizing a portion of the actual cost of a project through a loan guarantee, the government is actually distorting the allocation of resources by directing capital away from a more competitive project.¶ This signals to industry (be it nuclear, wind, clean coal, natural gas, or anything else) that it does not have to be competitive. It reduces incentives to manage risk and be independent, innovative, and efficient. The end result will be a new nuclear industry that is built for the short run and not sustainable.¶ While a loan guarantee may be good for the near-term interests of the individual guarantee recipient, it is not good for consumers, taxpayers, or long-term competitiveness.

#### That turns solvency

Spencer 9 Jack Spencer, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies @ The Heritage Foundation, “The Problem with Increasing Energy Loan Guarantees,” 2/6 http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm2277.cfm

They stifle competition and innovation both between sectors and within sectors. The loan guarantee artificially reduces the cost of capital, which allows a recipient to offer its product at below actual cost. This removes the incentive to look for less expensive or more competitive options. If a product is not competitive in a free market, then it should be allowed to adjust or fail. Part of the success of nuclear energy will depend on competition within the industry. While a utility might not be able to afford a single large reactor without subsidies, it might be able to afford multiple smaller rectors or a reactor based on some other technology. This would create competition, and the subsidized technologies would have to either reduce costs or lose market share. This competitive environment, with other energy sources and within the nuclear sector, would force the entire industry to become more efficient, innovative, and cost effective. They perpetuate the regulatory status quo. Nuclear energy could transform how the nation produces energy. But one of the big problems with the success of nuclear power in the United States is not that it lacks subsidies but that the regulatory environment for nuclear power does not promote growth, innovation, or competition.

### 1NC—Nat Gas

#### Manufacturing revival now

Ebinger et al. 12—Senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative @ Brookings [Charles Ebinger (Professor in energy economics @ Johns Hopkins and Georgetown), Kevin Massy (Director of the Energy Security Initiative @ Brookings) & Govinda Avasarala (Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative @ Brookings), “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, Policy Brief 12-01, MAY 2012

The shale gas boom has many industrial producers and chemical companies anticipating an increase in U.S. industrial and manufacturing competitiveness and petrochemicals production. A December 2011 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, conducted in association with the National Association of Manufacturers, notes an increase in U.S. manufacturing activity due to shale gas development and suggests one million additional manufacturing jobs could be created in EIA’s high shale gas recovery scenario (in which 50 percent more shale gas is recovered relative to the reference case) compared with its low shale recovery scenario (in which 50 percent less is recovered). 49 A particular area of interest is the resurgence in ethylene production and the manufacturing of ethylene-based goods in the United States. Ethylene, which is a principal component in a variety of goods ranging from anti-freeze to trash-bags, is produced from ethane, a byproduct of natural gas. Cheap domestic natural gas has provided chemical producers a global competitive advantage in ethane—and therefore ethylene—production, particularly compared with producers in Europe where ethylene is derived principally from naphtha, an oil-based product. Because crude oil prices have not dropped in parallel with gas prices in the United States, U.S. industrial producers are thus globally competitive again. As a result, a number of industrial producers are looking to reinvest in plants in the United States. 50 Bayer MaterialScience is opening an ethane cracker in West Virginia (the first cracker in the Marcellus) and Dow Chemical and Shell Chemical have announced plans to expand and open, respectively, crackers on the Gulf Coast. According to analysis by the American Chemistry Council (ACC), an industry trade association, a 25 percent increase in the supply of ethane in the United States could result in 17,000 direct new jobs in the chemical industry, 395,000 indirect jobs, and around $44 billion in additional federal, state, and local tax revenue over 10 years. 51 To achieve such returns ACC presumes an infusion of over $16 billion of private capital, and includes an assessment of induced impacts—“employment and output supported by the spending of those employed directly or indirectly by the sector.” While the ACC does not make explicit assumptions about the shape of the U.S. natural gas supply curve or the future price of natural gas, it also assumes sustained low gas prices, and resultantly high oil-to-gas price ratio. While some analysts may take legitimate issue with the assumptions behind the projected job-creation figures, it is clear that the U.S. petrochemical and manufacturing sector will be a prominent competitor and potential beneficiary of abundant domestic natural gas. In Part II, the study will analyze the impact of U.S. LNG exports on the potential for a “renaissance” in the industrial sector. Pg. 17-18

#### US decline will not spark wars.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

#### Latent power sustains hegemony

Wohlforth 7— Olin Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University [William, “Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis, [A Tilted Balance](http://www.harvardir.org/symposia/72/),” Vol. 29 (1), Spring]

US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from “imperial overstretch.” And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term “imperial overstretch” to describe the situation in which a state’s actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed “self-inflicted overstretch”—a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global “war” on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public’s perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China’s rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States—indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power.

#### No methane leaks

Cathles 12—Professor of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences @ Cornell University [Cathles, Lawrence M., Larry D. Brown (Professor of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences @ Cornell University), Milton Taam (Electric Software, Inc.), Andrew Hunter (Professor of chemical and Biological Engineering, Cornell University) "A commentary on "The greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas in shale formations" by R.W. Howarth, R. Santoro, and Anthony Ingraffea." Climatic Change, 2012, pg. http://cce.cornell.edu/EnergyClimateChange/NaturalGasDev/Documents/PDFs/FINAL%20Short%20Version%2010-4-11.pdf .

Howarth et al. were correct to highlight concerns that leakage of methane during production and transmission could significantly affect the greenhouse impact of natural gas, especially gas extracted from shales. And we concur with them that much better data is needed to monitor this leakage. However, our review of their own sources finds no evidence that gas is being vented directly into the atmosphere at rates that could justify their conclusions. In contrast their sources make clear that there are effective technologies to reduce methane emissions to the point they are an insignificant addition to methane’s greenhouse combustion footprint, if indeed this is not already the case. More reasonable estimates of production losses, and more appropriate bases of comparison (electricity and a 100 year GWP) show natural gas, including shale gas, has half to 1/3rd the greenhouse impact of coal, and thus remains an attractive transition fuel to low carbon alternatives.

#### No risk of extinction.

Lomborg 8—Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School [Bjorn, “Warming warnings get overheated,” The Guardian, August 15, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange]

These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren't for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a "catastrophe" and the beginning of the "extinction" of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners' scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland's ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world's coastal infrastructure and much of the world's farmland – "undoubtedly" causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years' time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell's claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

### 1NC—Prolif

#### US can’t lead—state run nuclear power will always win

Domenici and Miller 12[Pete, Former U.S. Senator and Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Dr Warren F, Former Department of energy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear energy, “Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets,” September, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Nuclear%20Report.PDF]

However, domestic exporters of U.S. nuclear technology, fuels, and services face a truly global and highly competitive market. Commercial nuclear technology is now available from a variety of suppliers, and there are many more companies, several of which have the direct backing of their country’s government, competing with U.S. firms. Industry and other stakeholders believe that U.S. nuclear technology companies are at a competitive disadvantage in international markets due to complex and overlapping federal regulations. Several presenters at the BPC Nuclear Initiative event noted that multiple federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce, DOe, and the Department of State have jurisdiction over commercial nuclear trade, global safety and security, and nonproliferation.

#### No widespread prolif

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [April 16, 2012, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show]

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### Prolif is super slow—empirics disprove their fear mongering.

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [May/June 2012, “Botching the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacques-e-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb?page=show]

The chronic problem of nuclear proliferation is once again dominating the news. A fierce debate has developed over how to respond to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear activities, which most experts believe are aimed at producing a nuclear weapon or at least the capacity to assemble one. In this debate, one side is pushing for a near-term military attack to damage or destroy Iran's nuclear program, and the other side is hoping that strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic will soften it up for a diplomatic solution. Both sides, however, share the underlying assumption that unless outside powers intervene in a dramatic fashion, it is inevitable that Iran will achieve its supposed nuclear goals very soon.

Yet there is another possibility. The Iranians had to work for 25 years just to start accumulating uranium enriched to 20 percent, which is not even weapons grade. The slow pace of Iranian nuclear progress to date strongly suggests that Iran could still need a very long time to actually build a bomb -- or could even ultimately fail to do so. Indeed, global trends in proliferation suggest that either of those outcomes might be more likely than Iranian success in the near future. Despite regular warnings that proliferation is spinning out of control, the fact is that since the 1970s, there has been a persistent slowdown in the pace of technical progress on nuclear weapons projects and an equally dramatic decline in their ultimate success rate.

The great proliferation slowdown can be attributed in part to U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts. But it is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. The harder politicians have pushed to achieve their nuclear ambitions, the less productive their nuclear programs have become. Meanwhile, military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program's worst enemies -- Iran's political leaders -- to hinder the country's nuclear progress all by themselves.

NUCLEAR DOGS THAT HAVE NOT BARKED

"Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion///

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Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb. And only one of the six states that failed -- Iraq -- had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### AT: Not Credible

#### Audience costs make it credible

Gerson 10—Michael S. Gerson is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses [“No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/No\_First\_Use.pdf]

The second argument against NFU is that it would not be believed, and therefore NFU would do nothing to improve the strategic equation.119 Despite China’s consistent commitment to NFU, for instance, there is considerable debate among scholars and policymakers about its validity, and Beijing has been somewhat ambiguous about the specific conditions under which NFU applies, especially regarding Taiwan.120 For some, the possibility that an NFU pledge would merely be dismissed as “cheap talk” that could be reversed if necessary effectively negates any strategic gain the United States might accrue from such a policy.

Skeptics of the believability of NFU underestimate the international and domestic audience costs incurred by a clear NFU commitment.121 By making an NFU policy public, perhaps in the form of a presidential press conference accompanied by a formal document, the United States would increase the credibility of NFU by tying its reputation to the sustainment of and adherence to the commitment. The objective would be to bolster the credibility of an NFU policy by ensuring that noncompliance would have unacceptably high political costs.

A violation of NFU would likely have substantial domestic, and especially international, political ramifications. Domestically, a president’s purposeful violation of an NFU pledge could incentivize the political opposition to rally strongly against the violation, providing an opportunity for vocal political opponents to generate attention and potentially bring independent voters and moderate members of the opposite political party into their camp. Internationally, breaking an NFU commitment risks damaging the United States’ reputation for honoring its commitments.122 If the United States were unwilling to adhere to its public policies regarding something as important as nuclear weapons, states might calculate that they could not trust the United States at its word. Such beliefs could weaken confidence in U.S. commitments to other unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral declarations and agreements; give states pause in considerations about entering into new agreements with the United States; and create strong doubts about the sincerity of future U.S. declaratory policies. In addition, the breach of NFU could undermine U.S. long-term security. Nuclear first use would signal that the United States believes that nuclear weapons have military utility and is willing to employ them regardless of the political costs, thereby potentially encouraging further proliferation in an attempt to deter future U.S. nuclear attacks.

To be sure, in the midst of an intense crisis U.S. decisionmakers, especially the president, would need to repeat and reinforce the commitment to NFU, lest an opponent fear that the United States could suddenly change its nuclear policy. During a severe crisis or a limited conventional conflict with a nucleararmed adversary, U.S. leaders would need to make frequent public statements that U.S. nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence of nuclear attacks, and nuclear retaliation would be swift and severe if the opponent chooses to use nuclear weapons. Even more important, in a crisis the United States would have to carefully coordinate its declaratory policy and actions, especially with regard to alerting nuclear forces. If in a crisis an opponent perceives the alert status of U.S. nuclear (and conventional) forces as too high, the leadership might be inclined to believe that NFU is a bluff and the United States is preparing for a possible first strike. Consequently, to enhance the credibility of NFU in a crisis, U.S. decisionmakers would need to pay careful attention to the alert status of both U.S. nuclear forces and those of the opponent and ensure that, at a maximum, the alert status of U.S. forces were raised on a tit-for-tat basis with the opponent. In such cases, the president could announce a decision to raise the alert level of U.S. forces as a reciprocal response to the adversary’s actions, while reinforcing the U.S. commitment to NFU.

### 2NC Solves Warming

#### It’s the closest we’ve got to a silver bullet.

Alok Jha, 3/13/2009. Green technology correspondent for the Guardian (UK). “'Biochar' goes industrial with giant microwaves to lock carbon in charcoal,” The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/mar/13/charcoal-carbon>.

Giant microwave ovens that can "cook" wood into charcoal could become our best tool in the fight against global warming, according to a leading British climate scientist. Chris Turney, a professor of geography at the University of Exeter, said that by burying the charcoal produced from microwaved wood, the carbon dioxide absorbed by a tree as it grows can remain safely locked away for thousands of years. The technique could take out billions of tonnes of CO2 from the atmosphere every year. Fast-growing trees such as pine could be "farmed" to act specifically as carbon traps — microwaved, buried and replaced with a fresh crop to do the same thing again. Turney has built a 5m-long prototype of his microwave, which produces a tonne of CO2 for $65. He plans to launch his company, Carbonscape, in the UK this month to build the next generation of the machine, which he hopes will process more wood and cut costs further. He is not alone in touting the benefits of this type of charcoal, known as biochar or biocharcoal. The Gaia theorist, James Lovelock, and Nasa's James Hansen have both been outspoken about the potential benefits of biochar, arguing that it is one of the most powerful potential solutions to climate change. In a recent paper, Hansen calculated that producing biocharcoal by current methods of burning waste organic materials could reduce global carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere by 8ppm (parts per million) over the next 50 years. That is the equivalent of three years of emissions at current levels. **Turney said biochar was the closest thing scientists had to a silver-bullet solution to climate change**. Processing facilities could be built right next to forests grown specifically to soak up CO2. "You can cut trees down, carbonise them, then plant more trees. The forest could act on an industrial scale to suck carbon out of the atmosphere." The biochar could be placed in disused coal mines or tilled into the ground to make soil more fertile. Its porous structure is ideal for trapping nutrients and beneficial micro-organisms that help plants grow. It also improves drainage and can prevent up to 80% of greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxides and methane from escaping from the soil. In a recent analysis of geo-engineering techniques published in the journal Atmospheric Chemistry, Tim Lenton, a climate scientist at the University of East Anglia, **rated producing charcoal as the best technological solution to reducing CO2 levels**. He compared it to other geo-engineering techniques such as dumping iron in oceans or seeding clouds to reflect the sun's radiation and calculated that by 2100 a quarter of the effect of human-induced emissions of CO2 could be sequestered with biochar production from waste organic matter, giving a net reduction of 40ppm in CO2 concentration. Johannes Lehmann of Cornell university has calculated that it is realistically possible to fix 9.5bn tonnes of carbon per year using biochar. The global production of carbon from fossil fuels stands at 8.5bn tonnes.

#### Solves methane—biochar increases soil efficiency, which decreases emissions.

John Gaunt and Johannes Lehmann, 2008. College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Cornell University. “Energy Balance and Emissions Associated with Biochar Sequestration and Pyrolysis Bioenergy Production,” Environ. Sci. Technol. 2008, 42, 4152–4158, http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es071361i.

Preliminary research (12) suggests that nitrous oxide (N2O) and **methane** (CH4) **emissions from soil may be significantly reduced by biochar application**. Rondon et al. (12) found that CH4 emissions were completely suppressed and N2O emissions were reduced by 50% when biochar was applied to soil. Yanai et al. (13) also found suppression of N2O when biochar was added to soil. The mechanisms by which N2O and CH4 emissions are reduced are not clear. However, the reduction in N2O emissions observed by these authors is consistent with the more widespread observation that fertilizer is used more efficiently by crops in situations where biochar is applied to soil.

### 1NC—No Water Wars

#### No water wars AND no impact to water scarcity

Allouche 11—Jeremy Allouche, research Fellow, water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, former professor—MIT, PhD in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies [“The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” *Food Policy*, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3–S8, Science Direct]

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ( [FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ( [Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ( [Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

### 2NC—Nat Gas

#### Economics slay the nuclear renaissance—natural gas competition and high start-up costs.

Bryce 11—Robert Bryce, author, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, his articles on energy, politics, and other topics have appeared in numerous publications, including the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Counterpunch*, and *Atlantic Monthly*. [March 14, 2011, “America's Nuclear Dead End,” The Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/14/american-nuclear-power-was-doomed-even-before-japan.html]

Here’s the truth, though: This much-ballyhooed nuclear renaissance was little more than a mirage. Love fission or hate it, the rebirth of America’s nuclear sector—with some 20 reactors reportedly planned for the next 15 to 20 years—was going nowhere fast. And this stillborn rebirth was readily apparent for months before the magnitude 9.0 earthquake and tsunami devastated northeastern Japan, damaging several of the country’s reactors and giving the world its worst nuclear crisis since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

Needless to say, the news from Japan, especially for hard-core nuclear advocates like me, depresses on many levels, as it will clearly slow down popular demand and give fresh fodder to anti-nuclear environmental groups, most notably, the Sierra Club and Greenpeace.

 “How can you compete with natural gas when it’s priced at less than $4?”

But the forces that already undermined the revival of America’s nuclear sector are largely economic, not political. The most formidable obstacle: the ongoing shale gas revolution. The ability of drillers to unlock vast quantities of natural gas has resulted in an avalanche of methane production and a resulting collapse in prices. Last year, U.S. gas production hit its highest level since 1973. And despite a very cold winter, natural-gas prices have generally stayed below $4 per thousand cubic feet, which is about half the level seen as recently as 2008.

On Sunday morning, I discussed the economics of nuclear with a senior executive in the U.S. nuclear utility sector. He asked, “How can you compete with natural gas when it’s priced at less than $4?” The answer, said the executive, who asked that his name not be used because he was not authorized to speak the media, is, “you can’t.”

Indeed, last September, Exelon Corporation, one of the largest nuclear operators in the U.S., decided to delay construction of a planned two-reactor project in Texas. The company explained that natural-gas prices needed to be at least $8 for the project to make economic sense. Other officials in the nuclear sector have told me that natural-gas prices need to be above $7 for reactors to be economically viable.

Combine low natural-gas prices—which, by the way, are perhaps the only bright spot in an otherwise bleak commodities market)—and the high cost of a big new reactor, say, a Westinghouse AP1000, which may cost $5 billion to $7 billion, and the obstacles facing nuclear become even more obvious. Electric providers can build gas-fired generators much faster than new nuclear plants. Better still, they can do it for one-fifth the cost and avoid the nightmarish process of nuclear licensing and permitting. The myriad of utility regulators at the state level as well as the glacial pace of action at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have helped prevent the startup of a new nuclear plant in the U.S. since 1996.

The punch line is this: Long before we started hearing about the possibility of reactor meltdowns in Japan, it was obvious that for the foreseeable future, the U.S. electric sector would only build, at most, four reactors. Aside from two reactors (Summer 2 and 3) that may be built in South Carolina and two others (Vogtle 3 and 4) in Georgia, the U.S. nuclear sector has no solid prospects for new commercial reactor construction. And those four reactors are only economically viable because the companies pushing them are being allowed by those states’ regulators to recover the costs of the plants as they are being built. In other states, new reactor projects must prove their profitability and have power-purchase agreements before construction. As you might expect, even with government-backed loan guarantees, bankers aren’t rushing to finance bet-the-company-size construction projects with budgets of $10 billion to $14 billion for a plant with 2,000 megawatts of capacity that might not come online for a decade.

### AT: L.G. Solves Nuke Industry

#### Loan guarantees can’t solve economic risk—05 bill proves.

Blake 10—Mariah Blake is an editor at the Washington Monthly. Her work has also appeared in Christian Science Monitor and Foreign Policy. [January/February 2010, “The Bailout Goes Nuclear,” Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2010/01/bailout-nuclear]

The ceda provision builds on the work of Sen. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), who until his retirement in January 2009 was the Senate's most tireless nuclear crusader. During his reign as chairman of the energy committee from 2003 to 2007, he packed the committee staff with former nuclear-power lobbyists—a clique dubbed "the glow-in-the-dark crew" by some of their Senate colleagues—who shepherded through Congress the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Among other things, the bill provided $13 billion in nuclear subsidies and federal loan guarantees to cover 80 percent of the costs of building low-carbon nuclear technologies, including new reactors.

For any other industry, this would have been an enormous victory. But for nuclear, even these generous subsidies weren't enough. In July 2007, six of the nation's largest financial firms—including Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, and Goldman Sachs, companies hardly averse to risky investments—informed the DOE in a letter that nuclear projects would not find financing because they were too chancy. Unless, of course, the agency (which had interpreted the new law to mean 80 percent of project debt) would rewrite the rules so that 100 percent of the debt was covered—foisting almost all of the risk on taxpayers.

#### Loan guarantees can’t solve—uncertainty.

Sokolski 10—Testimony by Henry David Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and serves on the U.S. congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, to the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee [April 20, 2010, “Nuclear Power Federal Loan Guarantees: The Next Multi-Billion Dollar Bailout?” The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=39&tid=2]

C. The value of federal loan guarantees is so uncertain and the ability of the utilities to cover their risks with their own capital so low that even with loan guarantees, private investors are leery of putting their own money at risk. One of the worries Moody’s report, New Nuclear Generation: Ratings Pressure Increasing,” raised when it was released last June is that the loan guarantees that the federal government is offering to the nuclear industry are too conditional. Will loan guarantees apply to plants that the NRC has stopped construction for safety reasons? Will the loan guarantees only be paid after a utility project goes bankrupt or some time before? In the case of default, who has first call on the remaining assets – the US Treasury or other creditors (those that cover the required remaining 20 percent of the project’s capital costs)? What will the DoE assess the loan subsidy fee to be to cover the costs of such defaults? Will they assess this fee to be one or two percent of the loan, which the nuclear industry says it can tolerate or will the fees be higher? How much might the fees vary from project to project? Will the DoE continue to argue that this information is proprietary and must be kept from the public? Without clear answers to these and other questions, private investors (including the firms that might consume the electricity produced and are being asked to pay higher rates to help cover the unguaranteed portion of the financing) are unlikely to find proposed federal loan guarantees entirely comforting. A simple fix on this would be to have Congress demand that DoE supply Congress with the answers before authorizes such guarantees.

### LG Bad

#### Loan guarantees fail

Brailsford 12 BEATRICE BRAILSFORD is program director of the Snake River Alliance, “Nuclear Loan Guarantees: Good Energy Policy?” Aug 2012 http://snakeriveralliance.org/?p=2687

No nuclear loan guarantees have been finalized. Federal loan guarantees have not led to any new nuclear build. On the other hand, no nuclear project has been stopped solely because the DOE refused to guarantee a loan. Though nuclear power's economic survival continues because of a whole host of subsidies, the policy goal of the 2005 Energy Policy Act - innovative technologies producing low-carbon electricity - has not been met. But the program hasn't stalled because of the difficulties reaching agreement on loan terms, though those have clearly been substantial. Low natural gas prices and lower electricity demand have challenged all new generating capacity.

Nuclear power faces additional obstacles, and the nuclear road might just be too steep. We've spent decades trying to surmount some of nuclear power's endemic flaws: it has long project gestation time and high capital costs, its technology can lead to nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear pollution is very difficult to remediate. So far, no country on earth has fully resolved how to dispose of nuclear power's most dangerous waste. At the start of what nuclear proponents hoped would be a renaissance, a price on carbon seemed to be a realistic expectation. The Fukushima disaster shook confidence in nuclear power, as it should have. In the short term, at least, a recent court decision about waste disposal put new and renewing licenses on hold.

But the answer is not for the federal government to take a hands-off approach. What's at stake is too important: energy is a fundamental public good. But the answer isn't to make it easier to get nuclear loan guarantees, either. Though we've focused more here on the nuclear loan guarantee program, it's undeniable that the technology itself is the largest single challenge to renewed deployment of nuclear power. The answer may therefore be to back winning horses instead, technologies that reduce carbon and enhance US energy production.

General Electric promised subsidy-free nuclear power half a century ago. In July, its CEO, Jeff Immelt, acknowledged, "It's just hard to justify nuclear, really hard. Gas is so cheap and at some point, really, economics rule. So I think some combination of gas, and either wind or solar...that's where we see most countries around the world going."

### L.G. Bad—Default Rate

Ari Peskoe, associate in the law firm of McDermott Will and Emery LLP and focuses his practice on regulatory, legislative, compliance, and transactional issues related to energy markets, 4-20-2012, “A Solution Looking For a Problem: Building More Nuclear Reactors after Vogtle,” The Electricty Journal, vol 25 issue 3, Science Direct

Given the checkered history of reactor construction projects,56 private lenders are understandably skittish about lending billions of dollars to develop a new reactor. Construction of the Vogtle and SCANA reactors will be a critical test, and significant cost overruns on these two projects could doom the prospects for construction of additional reactors. Even if the construction of Vogtle and SCANA are on budget, it will likely still be difficult for future project developers to raise enough debt financing without government support.57 Federal loan guarantees shift “a large part of the learning costs and construction risks” from private lenders to the federal government by ensuring that lenders receive payment in the event that the developer defaults on repayments.58 Appropriations for the guarantees authorized by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 will soon run out, so future guarantees will require congressional action.59 Loan guarantees cost the federal government little or nothing unless there is an event of default.60 Creating a long-term guarantee program would be entirely consistent with the government's historic role in accepting risks and liabilities of nuclear power. Although it has not been implemented effectively, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 requires the DOE to transport nuclear waste from privately owned reactors to permanent government storage facilities.61 Concerned about a “cloud of bankruptcy” hanging over its operations,62 the nascent nuclear industry pushed Congress to pass the Price-Anderson Act in 1957, which indemnifies the industry against claims arising from a nuclear incident. Both the NWPA and the Price-Anderson Act socialize costs of nuclear energy. In the case of the NWPA, the industry pays the DOE a tenth of a penny for each kilowatt-hour of nuclear energy sold to fund waste disposal activities.63 The Price-Anderson Act also requires generators to contribute to a fund, but the federal treasury would likely cover much of the liabilities associate with a nuclear disaster.64

#### CBO estimates the default rate would be 50%—empirics prove loan guarantees fail for nuclear.

Blake 10—Mariah Blake is an editor at the Washington Monthly. Her work has also appeared in Christian Science Monitor and Foreign Policy. [January/February 2010, “The Bailout Goes Nuclear,” Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2010/01/bailout-nuclear]

Most of the industry is banking on a similar strategy—and in the climate legislation staggering through Congress, it just may have found the vehicle. Key Senate Democrats have signaled that they are willing to use nuclear subsidies as a bargaining chip to overcome Republican opposition. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the industry's main lobby, is pushing for at least $100 billion in federal loan guarantees—a dicey proposition given that the Congressional Budget Office has determined that the risk of default would be "well above 50 percent." This raises the question: Will the cost of passing a climate bill be a massive, taxpayer-funded nuclear bailout?

The public has rescued the industry once before. The last batch of reactors built in the US during the 1970s and '80s was plagued by a series of boondoggles, one of the most infamous being Long Island's Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, which took 20 years to build and cost $6 billion—more than 80 times the original estimate—but was never put into commercial operation. Similar debacles pushed utilities into bankruptcy, triggered the largest municipal bond default in US history, and helped cause a sixfold increase in wholesale electricity prices. The total cost to the public, in rate hikes and taxpayer bailouts, was more than $300 billion (in 2006 dollars), according to the Union of Concerned Scientists.

### No impact prolif

#### Deterrence breakdowns don’t cause full-scale nuclear war

Waltz 3—Kenneth, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, p. 34-35

States are deterred by the prospect of suffering severe damage and by their inability to do much to limit it. Deterrence works because nuclear weapons enable one state to punish another state severely without first defeating it. "Victory," in Thomas Schelling's words, "is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy." 37 Countries armed only with conventional weapons can hope that their military forces will be able to limit the damage an attacker can do. Among countries armed with strategic nuclear forces, the hope of avoiding heavy damage depends mainly on the attacker's restraint and little on one's own efforts. Those who compared expected deaths through strategic exchanges of nuclear warheads with casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II overlooked the fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear worlds. 38

Deterrence rests on what countries can do to each other with strategic nuclear weapons. From this statement, one can easily leap to the wrong conclusion: that deterrent strategies, if they have to be carried through, will produce a catastrophe. That countries are able to annihilate each other means neither that deterrence depends on their threatening to do so nor that they will necessarily do so if deterrence fails. Because countries heavily armed with strategic nuclear weapons can carry war to its ultimate intensity, the control of force becomes the primary objective. If deterrence fails, leaders will have the strongest incentives to keep force under control and limit damage rather than launching genocidal attacks. If the Soviet Union had attacked Western Europe, NATO's objectives would have been to halt the attack and end the war. The United States had the ability to place thousands of warheads precisely on targets in the Soviet Union. Surely we would have struck military targets before striking industrial targets and industrial targets before striking cities. The intent to hit military targets first was sometimes confused with a war-fighting strategy, but it was not one. It would not have significantly reduced the Soviet Union's ability to hurt us. Whatever American military leaders thought, our strategy rested on the threat to punish. The threat, if it failed to deter, would have been followed not by spasms of violence but by punishment administered in ways that conveyed threats of more to come.

A war between the United States and the Soviet Union that got out of control would have been catastrophic. If they had set out to destroy each other, they would have greatly reduced the world's store of developed resources while killing millions outside of their own borders through fallout. Even while destroying themselves, states with few weapons would do less damage to others. As ever, the biggest international dangers come from the strongest states. Fearing the world's destruction, one may prefer a world of conventional great powers having a higher probability of fighting less- destructive wars to a world of nuclear great powers having a lower probability of fighting more-destructive wars. But that choice effectively disappeared with the production of atomic bombs by the United States during World War II.

### AT: Methane Burps

#### Even a giant methane burp would have a miniscule effect

Gao et al. 12 [Xiang, Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, C. Adam Schlosser, Andrei Sokolov, Katey Walter Anthony, Qianlai Zhuang and David Kicklighter, “Permafrost, Lakes, and Climate-Warming Methane Feedback: What is the Worst We Can Expect?,” May, Report No 218, http://18.7.29.232/bitstream/handle/1721.1/70566/MITJPSPGC\_Rpt218.pdf?sequence=1]

Overall, these results present, for the ﬁrst time, a quantitative insight on the scale of the climate-warming feedback from permafrost thaw and subsequent CH4 lake emission. The increase in CH4 emission due to potential Arctic/boreal lake expansion represents a weak climate-warming feedback within this century. This is consistent with previous studies (Anisimov, 2007; Huissteden et al., 2011; Delisle, 2007) that also imply a small Arctic lake/wetland biogeochemical climate-warming feedback. Our experimental design does not explicitly consider the wetlands potential CH4-emissions response (Shindell et al., 2004). As previously noted, the additional saturated area projected by our model is characterized to be lake in terms of a CH4 emission source (to gauge an upper bound). Yet, in this way, if any presumed, additional lake area would alternatively be wetland, to ﬁrst order we still account for this in terms of a CH4-emission response. Our lake identiﬁcation scheme also does not explicitly consider lake thermodynamics or thermo-geomorphologic distinction (e.g. thermokarst). Further, buffering effects from near-surface drainage (Huissteden et al., 2011; Avis et al., 2011) are not explicitly considered, however these drainage effects would further weaken the already small feedback found. Other secondary factors not explicitly considered in this study include: the insulating properties of soil organic matter (Lawrence et al., 2008), the response of CH4 emission to soil-moisture dynamics, ﬁre disturbance, vegetation dynamics, as well as lake freeze-depth. Nevertheless, these considerations will likely not change our overall conclusion: the biogeochemical climate-warming feedback via boreal and Arctic lake methane emissions is relatively small, whether or not humans choose to constrain global emissions.

## \*\*\* 1NR

### 1NR Overview

**The timeframe is a matter of weeks.**

**Craig 9/24/**12 Fox News Business Writer

(Victoria, “Fiscal Pitfalls Hinge on Gridlocked Congress” <http://www.foxbusiness.com/government/2012/09/20/fiscal-pitfalls-hinge-on-gridlocked-congress/>)

A fix for the national economy is not as simple as just passing a budget, or reducing government spending. And the risk is potential to seriously destabilize an economy that is already at a tipping point. If more than one credit ratings service decides to downgrade its outlook on the U.S., it not only spells trouble for lawmakers, but financial markets as well. In its report, Moody’s warns what follows multiple downgrades would be a very different scene than when S&P took action. That’s because money-markets funds and other investment tools hold only the highest quality bonds. But the report adds, “Even without any action by the ratings agencies, a failure to make progress toward fiscal sustainability would signal that policymakers will not act until the budget is out of control and the nation is in a serious financial crisis.” Holtz Eakin takes that one step further, describing what the bigger picture would look like in the absence of some kind of Congressional action. “It would be an unambiguously bad event in the financial markets,” Holtz-Eakin said. “We’ve seen turbulence in the past and Main Street’s unimmune. We’d have bad equity market performance, bond yields would go up, credit channels would be depressed. It would send us into another recession.” Still, no matter how you slice it, it seems the future of the economy all comes down to politics.

**This leads to short term global collapse rendering the AFF irrelevant.**

**Means 10/25/**12 Businessman, Former assistant to Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, Former economist at the U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare (Grady, “US economy on schedule to crash March 2014.” The Washington Times, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/25/us-economy-on-schedule-to-crash-march-2014/>)

Those wild and crazy Mayans put down their marker that the end of the world would occur on Dec. 21, 2012 — about two months from now. There is, of course, some small chance that they might be right. On the other hand, there is a very large probability that the real end of the world will occur around March 4, 2014.

The doomsday clock will ring then because the U.S. economy may fully crash around that date, which will, in turn, bring down all world economies and all hope of any recovery for the foreseeable future — certainly over the course of most of our lifetimes. Interest rates will skyrocket, businesses will fail, unemployment will go to record levels, material and food shortages will be rampant, and there could be major social unrest. Any wishful thinking that America is in a “recovery” and that “things are getting better” is an illusion.

The problem is not Medicare, which won’t quit on us for another six or seven years. Nor is it Social Security, which will not be fully bankrupt for another 15 years or so. The crisis is much more immediate and much more serious.

The central problem is that America is the bank of the world. What this means, simply, is that the dollar is the world’s currency (often termed the “reserve currency”). Throughout the world, nearly all traded goods, oil, major commodities, real estate, etc., are denominated in dollars. The world needs dollars, and the U.S. provides them and provides confidence that the dollar is the “safest” currency in the world. Countries get dollars by trading with us on attractive terms, which enables Americans to live very well. Countries support this system and cover their risk by investing in dollars through T-bill auctions and other mechanisms, which enables us to run budget deficits — up to a point.

The central issue is confidence in America, and the world is losing confidence quickly. At a certain point, soon, the United States will reach a level of deficit spending and debt at which the countries of the world will lose faith in America and begin to withdraw their investments. Many leading economists and bankers think another trillion dollars or so may do it. A run on the bank will start suddenly, build quickly and snowball.

At that point, we will need to finance our own deficit, and we will not be able to do so. We will raise bond rates to re-attract foreign investment, interest rates will go up, and businesses will fail. Unemployment will skyrocket. **The rest of the world will fully crash along with us**. Europe will continue to decline, and the euro will not replace the dollar. Russia will see a collapse in oil prices as market demand softens, and Russia will collapse along with it. China will find nowhere to export and also will collapse. The Russian and Chinese governments, which see all this coming and have been stockpiling gold to hedge against such a dollar collapse, will find that you cannot eat gold. There will be uprisings — think of the streets in Spain and Greece today — everywhere. Technological advances that traditionally drive productivity increases and economic growth will not be able to keep up with this collapse.

When might this all happen? Paul Volker indicates we might face a mess like this in the next year and a half. David Walker, former U.S. comptroller, i.e., the former chief accountant of the U.S. government, has suggested similar time frames for economic catastrophe. Most agree that the **budget sequestration** approach **won’t work** from either economic or political perspectives, and mindless across-the-board cuts in spending will only exacerbate a mess. The Federal Reserve’s third round of quantitative easing, in which we print money to buy our own bonds in order to goose economic and employment numbers, means we are floating our own debt, a good formula for sudden hyperinflation.

**It prevents nuclear plant construction.**

**Carbon Control News 8**

(October 10th, 2008)

For instance, the nuclear industry's hope for renaissance in the face of looming greenhouse gas regulations could be one the first causalities of the economic crisis. The nation's first application for the construction of a new nuclear reactor in over three decades, submitted by Maryland-based Constellation Energy, has already been delayed in part due to the company's financial ties to the now-bankrupt Lehman Brothers investment firm

**Fiat does not solve this --- it’s about company willingness to invest.**

**Sequestration turns hegemony.**

**Skelton 12** Partner with Husch Blackwell and former Chair of the House Armed Services Committee

(Ike Skelton, Skelton: Sequestration Means Cuts We Can't Afford, http://www.rollcall.com/issues/58\_23/Ike-Skelton-Sequestration-Means-Cuts-We-Cannot-Afford-217689-1.html)

Sequestration will also erode America's military superiority over the next decade by cutting even the most essential defense programs. Any military commander will tell you that our ability to dominate the battlefield is not only dependent on critical thinking but is fueled by superior aircraft, ships, weapons and intelligence. Sequestration would cripple each of these categories, virtually interfere with professional military education at our war colleges, ending the modernization of fighter jets, combat ships, helicopters, ground vehicles, drone aircraft and satellite technologies.

Without a thorough study of the art of war and first-rate equipment, the U.S. military will be **far less able to deter** gathering conflicts **or quickly resolve** those **conflicts** we are unable to avoid. The "Powell Doctrine" of risking our troops only when backed up by overwhelming force and a clear path to decisive victory could be at risk.

With our unique portfolio of global responsibilities, we could find it difficult to simultaneously pursue terrorists, contain Iran and North Korea, counter a rising China and **deal with exploding hot spots** such as Syria today.

Those that say we can risk skipping one or two generations of military development are poor students of military history. America rose from a young, regional power to a formidable military force over the course of World War I alone. And Germany rose from the ashes of that war to threaten all of Europe in less than two decades.

Today, technology has accelerated the pace of change, and our adversaries are certainly not sitting on their hands. Russia and China are both building sixth-generation stealth fighters, while Iran and North Korea race to develop nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. The rise of cyber weapons puts America's highly networked economy and society at particular risk. We can choose to delay our defenses against these developing threats, but the threats themselves won't wait.’

**Growth turns proliferation.**

**Schrage 9** (Michael J. Green and Steven P., Michael J. Green is Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Steven P. Schrage is the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a Former Senior Official with the US Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee, *It's not just the economy*, Available Online @ the Asian Times)

Dangerous states It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran have all intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of North Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to suggest either and much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system

**Growth turns the environment.**

**Friedman 5** (Benjamin M. Friedman, William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University, former Chair of the Department of Economics at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University, 2005 (“Growth and the Environment,” *The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth*, Published by Knopf Publishing Group, ISBN 0679448918, p. 380-382)

But it does not take much traveling around the world to discover that the places where pollution is greatest and environmental blight is most readily visible are not those with the highest living standards. Whether the issue is smoke in the air or germs in the water, or even just the discarded clutter and refuse accumulated from ongoing human habitation, countries, regions, and even individual cities where living standards are high in other respects rarely have the most pollution or present the worst eyesores. Within Europe, one of the greatest shocks to many people after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the stark gap in environmental standards between the former Soviet satellites and their higher-income neighbors just to the west, with whom the newly independent countries now sought to affiliate themselves economically and politically. Not until 1990 did the first eastern European country— the Czech Republic— introduce unleaded gasoline. Four years later it became the first to require catalytic converters on new automobiles. 30

In short, scale is not all that matters. As an economy develops, and the living standard of its people rises, the composition of economic activity typically changes as well. When an agricultural economy first develops a significant manufacturing capacity, many familiar kinds of pollution, especially those that result from burning coal and oil, increase. (Agricultural expansion often brings its own forms of pollution, however, especially from burning in order to clear land or from applying fertilizers to the soil.) But the [end page 380] service industries that normally emerge as incomes rise yet further mostly involve less pollution than does manufacturing. In the forty-two countries where per capita income today is below $2,000 (after allowing for international differences in purchasing power), on average only 43 percent of the economy’s production is in services. Where per capita income is between $2,000 and $8,000, the service sector share averages 54 percent. In the $8,000 to $20,000 range, it is 60 percent, and in the countries where per capita income is above $20,000 (there are twenty-three of them), the service sector on average accounts for 69 percent of total output. 31

This shift into services as incomes rise is not just a matter of moving manufacturing facilities “offshore.” If the composition of what a society consumes remained unchanged as living standards improved, and richer countries simply shifted their manufacturing operations to distant locations and correspondingly increased their reliance on imports, their doing so might help to contain their own pollution problem but it would make no difference on a global basis. Many services are not readily transportable, however, at least not across international lines. The service sector’s share of what the United States produces, for example, is nearly identical to the share of services in what the country consumes. Moreover, the shift in American production toward “cleaner” industries in recent decades, with the advance of free trade and the tightening of anti-pollution laws, has been matched by a shift to cleaner industries in what the United States imports. 32 Throughout the world, the increase in the share of services in overall economic activity as living standards rise mostly represents a change not just in what people make but also in what they consume.

Rising living standards also influence the technology by which economies produce. For example, roughly four-fifths of the world population’s total exposure to particulates in the air takes the form of smoke from indoor cooking fires, typically fueled by wood or coal or peat. 33 For the most part, this form of pollution does not result from any externality. The families that cook their food on these indoor fires expose themselves to smoke inhalation, but typically not others. Most of them have low incomes, and live in low-income countries. If their income were greater, they could afford to cook their food using some other technology.

The same influence of rising living standards on people’s choice of technology also applies, however, in settings in which externalities are the crux of the issue, so that the choices involved are matters of collective decision making— in other words, public policy: whether to allow the use of (cheaper) leaded gasoline, whether to require cars to carry (expensive) catalytic converters, whether to ban (cheaper) high-sulfur coal, whether to [end page 381] require (expensive) stack scrubbers for factories and utility plants. In each case, altering individuals’ or firms’ behavior in ways that reduce pollution imposes a cost. Just as families who have sufficient incomes typically choose not to live with the smoke created by cooking indoors over an open fire, societies where living standards are high can afford to bear some cost for limiting pollution, and most choose to do so. As a result, their incomes as conventionally measured are usually smaller than would otherwise be the case. But because they also care about the air they breathe and the water they drink, and perhaps also about the global climate and the preservation of species, they are nonetheless better-off.\*

### 2NC—UQ Wall

**Framing issue --- political capital controls uniqueness --- the more he has the more he can hold the line against the GOP.**

**Rowland 11/7**/12 Writer at the Boston Globe

(Christopher and Scott Helman, Economy kept Obama afloat, blocked Romney win, Boston Globe, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/11/07/economy-kept-obama-afloat-blocked-romney-win/GGjoaHhlk06KobPutBJoSP/story.html>)

Next up for Obama is proving to those voters that he can achieve results. That remains an exceedingly difficult task in a deeply divided capital, with Republicans retaining control of the House on Tuesday and Democrats staying in charge in the Senate. Latinos who voted for Obama in large numbers Tuesday will demand that he seriously pursue immigration reform. Hurricane Sandy’s devastating effects in New York and New Jersey have renewed calls to address climate change.

Most immediately, the president and Congress will have to deal with the looming “fiscal cliff’’ — a set of automatic budget cuts that were put in place by Washington leaders to extract themselves from the 2011 debt-ceiling standoff, combined with the expiration of the George W. Bush-era tax cuts.

Economists warn that the nation will slide into another recession if the president and Congress do not come up with a plan to avoid the sudden shock to the economy that would result. How these fiscal talks proceed will depend on how much political capital Obama is perceived to have gained in the election. He was narrowly winning the popular vote as the ballots were tallied into Wednesday. If Republicans see political danger in continuing to dig in their heels, will they be more willing to negotiate a tax overhaul that includes higher taxes for the wealthy?

**He has enough now.**

**Cohen 11/7**/12 Formerly the executive editor of The American Prospect, Cohn is currently a senior editor at The New Republic magazine

(Jonathan Cohn, Yes, Obama Won a Mandate, <http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/109818/obama-wins-four-more-years-mandate-agenda-validation-obamacare>)

But what about the next four years? Doesn’t Obama still need a governing plan? Sure. And if Obama has been relatively silent lately on some urgent issues—chief among them, climate change—he’s been quite clear when it comes to economic policy. He’s produced plans for strengthening the recovery. He’s laid out principles for reducing the deficit: Relatively modest reductions in spending coupled with higher taxes on the wealthy. And with the coming debate over the spending sequester and expiration of the Bush tax cuts, both set for January 2013, Obama will get a chance to apply those principles.

The stakes in this fight are large: Depending on the terms, they will define the scope of the federal government for at least a generation to come. And, unlike in recent fiscal debates, **Obama should have leverage**—more, perhaps, than at any time since the earliest days of his presidency. He can hold out in the debate over the sequester and Bush tax cuts, because the default action—doing nothing—is far worse for Republicans than it is for him. And with the newly elected Tammy Baldwin and Elizabeth Warren joining the reelected Sherrod Brown and Sheldon Whitehouse in the Senate, Obama should have a more unified and incrementally more liberal congressional party behind him. (Hopefully they will push Obama, even as they get his back.)

**It will pass ---**

**Momentum.**

**WSJ 11/9**/12 (Pressure Rises on Fiscal Crisis; White House, Lawmakers Try to Push Ahead Amid New Warnings Over Inaction, Paletta, Damian; Lee, Carol E; Bendavid, Naftali. Wall Street Journal (Online) [New York, N.Y] 09 Nov 2012: n/a)

Since Mr. Obama's election victory, White House and congressional leaders of both parties have taken a more conciliatory stance. That has stirred hopes of a bipartisan deficit-reduction deal among some--and agitated people in both parties who object to any compromise calling for higher tax revenues on one hand, and cuts to government entitlement programs on the other.

"Personally, I think the conditions are **exactly perfect** for us to move ahead with this **right now**," said Sen. Bob Corker (R., Tenn.), who won re-election Tuesday. "It is going to take the president being committed to doing this and sitting down and rolling up his sleeves and making it happen."

House Speaker John Boehner of Ohio in a conference call Wednesday told fellow Republicans to avoid drawing lines in the sand. "We don't want to box ourselves in, and we don't want to box the White House out," he said, according to someone familiar with the call.

**Boehner optimistic.**

**Davis 11/8**/12 USA Today Washington Bureau

(Susan Davis, Boehner sees short-term budget fix, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2012/11/08/boehner-outlines-session/1691661/>)

Boehner is proposing what he calls a short-term "bridge" that would extend all of the tax rates for one year and buy more time to overhaul the federal tax code. Boehner says that would increase revenue by closing tax loopholes, not by raising the rates individuals pay on their wages.

"There's a lot of ways you could do this that would allow the Congress to fix our tax code next year, look at real spending cuts and entitlement reforms that would produce what the president's called for — a balanced approach," he said.

No deal, Senate Democrats say. Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., outlined an opposing view: Democrats want an agreement to extend the Bush-era cuts on everyone except the top earners, and they want it done in the next 53 days. "Waiting for a month, six weeks, six months, that's not gonna solve the problem. We know what needs to be done," Reid said.

Boehner said his rank-and-file views heading over the cliff as "unacceptable," but he acknowledged there is no clear path forward for compromise. He was **optimistic** that a deal would be reached between himself, Reid and President Obama.

"I have no doubts that they're as interested in doing the will of the American people as I am," he said.

Obama is scheduled to make a statement about the fiscal situation at the White House Friday afternoon.

Boehner pledged to work with Obama to find consensus but offered a critical assessment of his re-election victory speech. "It sounded pretty good, but you know, I remember that speech from four years ago, and that sounded real good, too," he said. "I don't mean to seem harsh, but actions speak louder than words."

**Vote counts.**

**Becker 12** The Hill’s Finance & Economy Blog

(Bernie and Erik Wasson, GOP fears reelected Obama would have the upper hand on taxes, <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/domestic-taxes/251095-gop-fears-reelected-obama-would-have-leverage-to-raise-taxes>)

But Republicans are also eager to avoid the automatic spending cuts set to start in January that would slash heavily from defense and national security.

GOP defense hawks like Sen. John McCain (Ariz.) have sounded more open to using revenue increases to avoid those cuts. If more Republicans take that position, it could give Democrats the upper-hand in the lame-duck negotiations.

“In my view, their position becomes less and less defensible every day that goes on,” said Rep. Chris Van Hollen (Md.), the top Democrat on the House Budget Committee. “Because come January, unless they agree to provide tax relief to 98 percent of Americans, those taxes are going to go up.”

House GOP leaders would only need a small minority of their conference to pass any measure extending tax cuts up to $250,000 of family income, given that Democrats support that proposal.

And while members of the GOP rank-and-file on Friday said they remain steadfast against tax increases, some said the **votes would likely be there** if leadership needed them.

“I would not,” Rep. Tim Scott (R-S.C.) said when asked if the votes could be found to pass a high-end tax increase. “Enough [votes], probably.”

Top Republican officials say it is difficult to predict exactly what the political environment would look like in the immediate aftermath of an Obama victory. **The newly reelected president could**, for example, **use his moment of maximum leverage** to demand that Congress extend tax rates for the middle class, creating enormous pressure for Republicans coming off a loss at the polls.

### AT: Chait (GOP)

**The GOP will budge.**

**Corbin 11/8**/12 On Wall Street Staff Writer

**(**Kenneth Corbin, Fiscal Cliff Looms Large in 'Mother of All Lame-Duck Sessions' in Congress, http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/Fiscal-Cliff-Looms-Large-in-Mother-of-All-Lame-Duck-Sessions-in-Congress-2681772-1.html)

\*Andrew Friedman, principal at the policy-analysis shop Washington Update

Friedman, too, expects that the parties will be able to reach some sort of a deal, at least in the short term. He anticipates that Republicans will eventually give ground on the tax issue, taking the president's advisors at their word that Obama would veto any deficit plan that does not include higher taxes for the top earners.

But the threshold might move, he said, suggesting that instead of the $250,000 mark the president has proposed, they might find a compromise by allowing taxes to increase only for those earning $1 million or more.

"I think on balance we probably will avoid it," Friedman said. "I think the Republicans will ultimately agree to perhaps raise taxes above a certain income level, maybe $1 million, and keep taxes low on everyone else."

He pointed to comments that House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) made on Wednesday that held the door open to increasing revenues as part of a deficit-reduction plan, though Boehner qualified his remarks, saying, "We're willing to accept new revenue, under the right conditions." He called for an overhaul of the tax code patterned after the 1986 Tax Reform Act that would cut "special-interest loopholes and deductions" to create a "fairer, simpler, cleaner tax code."

### AT: Friedman (Punt)

**Wont punt and still triggers the link**

**Raju 11/7**/12 Politico Staff

(Manu Raju, Harry Reid agenda: Filibuster crackdown, tax increases, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83514.html>)

Sen. Harry Reid embraced his role as a more empowered Senate majority leader Wednesday, calling for a major fiscal deal in the lame duck session while vowing a new push on immigration reform and an overhaul of filibuster rules in the new Congress.

He also promised not to “mess with Social Security” as negotiations begin on fiscal reform.

Speaking at a packed news conference on Capitol Hill, Reid laid out an ambitious agenda for 2013 after his party’s surprisingly decisive Senate victories and President Barack Obama’s reelection bid, saying the public gave Democrats a new mandate to raise taxes on wealthy families as part of a major year-end fiscal deal. While Reid said he’s not going to “draw lines in the sand” ahead of the year-end fiscal cliff, he insisted on higher revenues.

**Reid has good reason to feel ambitious**. After a year of gloomy predictions for Democratic Senate candidates, the party may increase it’s majority from 53 seats to 55 seats — a stunning accomplishment considering how many of Reid’s colleagues were considered vulnerable.

 “The president campaigned around the country saying, ‘We know what the problems are with this fiscal problem. We just need some revenue,’” Reid said. “That was the issue. The mandate was look at all the exit polls, look at all the polling, the vast majority of the American people, rich, poor, everybody agrees that the rich — richest of the rich have to help a little bit.”

With Washington facing potentially devastating tax hikes and spending cuts in less than two months, **Reid said he was not in favor of punting** until the next Congress by passing a short-term extension.

“I’m not for kicking the can down the road,” said Reid, who spoke with Obama Tuesday night. “I think **we’ve done that far too much**. I think we know what the issue is. We need to solve that issue. Waiting for a month, six weeks, six months, that’s not gonna solve the problem. We know what needs to be done. I think that we should just roll up our sleeves and get it done.”

House Speaker John Boehner, whom Reid spoke with Wednesday morning, has said tax hikes on the rich would not pass his chamber. But Reid said the burden was on the GOP to cut a deal.

“Well, the Republicans have to make the choice. We’re willing to work something out. We’re willing to work it out sooner rather than later. I don’t know how they think they benefit by waiting until sequestration [automatic defense cuts] kicks in,” he said.

### AT: Kawa (Obama)

**Delay is worse.**

**Bowels 11/8** Served as chief of staff to Clinton and was co-chair of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform

(Erskine, Going over the fiscal cliff is a losing bet for the nation, <http://www.star-telegram.com/2012/11/08/4399456/going-over-the-fiscal-cliff-is.html>)

With President Barack Obama at the helm for four more years and a strengthened Democratic majority in the Senate, and with the Republicans decidedly in control of the House of Representatives, both sides may now feel emboldened to pursue their party's preferences.

Rarely has it been this clear, however, that elected leaders need to come together to address our nation's rising federal debt.

Important decisions need to be made in the next two months to address the "fiscal cliff." Both sides will have to come together in the spirit of good governance to replace the abrupt and mindless spending cuts and tax increases set to take effect Jan. 1 with a gradual and intelligent deficit reduction plan.

**Many partisans on both sides seem to think they have the upper hand.** Democrats see the threat of large defense cuts and massive tax increases as a way to force tax increases for the rich.

Republicans see large domestic spending cuts, tax increases on poor and middle-income Americans, and the need to increase the debt ceiling as their own leverage points.

There has even been talk of going over the fiscal cliff to potentially strengthen each side's bargaining position. Going over the cliff, though, would mean betting the country on the hope that the other side will back down before it is too late. **That's a bet we shouldn't take**.

Going over the fiscal cliff would mean allowing a massive and immediate cut to nearly every major government agency and activity, including those vital to our national security or economic growth. It would mean a large and immediate tax increase on nearly all Americans, not just the highest earners. It would mean a double-dip recession at a time when the economy is still weak and many Americans are struggling to find work.

Simply punting on the fiscal cliff and continuing to add to the debt **would be an even bigger mistake**. It would show markets we cannot put our financial house in order. Instead of using this moment as leverage to score political points, our elected leaders should seize the opportunity to finally address the long-term imbalance between government spending and revenue and to prevent a future debt-induced economic crisis.

### AT: Thumpers

**Negotiations are already happening.**

**Politico 11/8**/12 Washington Staff

(Behind Boehner's new tone, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83608.html>)

Since Boehner gave the speech, Rep. Kevin McCarthy and his whip operation have called more than 120 House Republicans to gauge their reaction. By week’s end, they’ll have reached out to the entire House Republican Conference. When they return, McCarthy will meet with small groups of Republicans to feel them out for opposition.

At the staff level, the talks have **actually begun**. Boehner’s policy director, Brett Loper, has met informally with the Obama administration. Top aides to Boehner and Reid have also quietly huddled.

Inside Boehner’s operation, planning for these talks began in September on the second floor of the Capitol.

Boehner chief of staff Mike Sommers, Loper and Dave Schnittger — a Boehner hand from the Ohio Republican’s early days in D.C. — took to the famous “Board of Education” room to begin planning for two scenarios: a Romney win and an Obama victory.

**It's the immediate focus.**

**Reuters 11/7**/12

(As Fiscal Cliff fast approaches, Obama reaches out to Romney to help break Congress gridlock, <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/11/07/as-fiscal-cliff-fast-approaches-obama-reaches-out-to-romney-to-help-break-congress-gridlock/>)

The **immediate focus** for Obama and U.S. lawmakers will be to deal with the “fiscal cliff,” a mix of tax increases and spending cuts due to extract some $600 billion from the economy at the end of the year barring a deal with Congress. Economists warn it could push the United States back into recession.

House Majority Leader John Boehner moved swiftly on the fiscal cliff issue, saying he would issue a statement on it on Wednesday, citing “the need for both parties to find common ground and take steps together to help our economy grow and create jobs, which is critical to solving our debt.”

Concern about U.S. fiscal problems after Obama’s re-election contributed to a decline in global financial markets. World shares turned lower and Wall Street stocks, which had been expected to rise on relief over the clear election outcome, opened lower partly due to fears over economic weakness in Europe.

### AT: PC Irrelevant

**Political scientists and experts agree it’s relevant.**

**Beckman 10** Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine

(Matthew N., 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 50)

However, many **close observers** of the presidential–congressional relationship have long cited pre-voting bargaining across Pennsylvania Avenue as being **substantively important**. For example, discussing President Eisenhower’s legislative record in 1953, CQ staffers issued a caveat they have often repeated in the years since:¶ The President’s leadership often was tested beyond the glare spotlighting roll calls. . . . Negotiations off the floor and action in committee sometimes are as important as the recorded votes. (CQ Almanac 1953, 77)¶ **Many a political scientist has agreed**. Charles Jones (1994), for one, wrote, “However they are interpreted, roll call votes cannot be more than they are: one form of floor action on legislation. If analysts insist on scoring the president, concentrating on this stage of lawmaking can provide no more than a partial tally” (195). And Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher (1990) note that even if they ultimately are reflected in roll-call votes, “many important decisions in Congress are made in places other than floor votes and recorded by means other than roll calls . . . ” (68).

**Capital is the greatest predictor of agenda success.**

**Light 99** Paulette Goddard Professor of Public Service, New York University; Founding Director, Brookings Center for Public Service; Senior Adviser, National Commission on the Public Service; Senior Adviser, Brookings Presidential Appointee Initiative

(Paul C., “The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton”, 3rd Edition, p. 24-25)

Call it push, pull, punch, juice, power, or clout – they all mean the same thing. The **most basic** and **most important** of all presidential resources is capital. Though the internal resources time, information, expertise, and energy all have an impact on the domestic agenda, the President is **severely limited** without capital. And capital is **directly linked** to the congressional parties. While there is little question that bargaining skills can affect both the composition and the success of the domestic agenda, without the necessary party support, no amount of expertise or charm can make a difference. Though bargaining is an important tool of presidential power, it does not take place in a neutral environment. Presidents bring certain advantages and disadvantages to the table.

**Politicians believe capital matters, so it does.**

**Schier 11** Professor of Political Science at Carleton College

(Dorothy H. and Edward C., Professor of Political Science at Carleton College, “The Contemporary Presidency: The Presidential Authority Problem and the Political Power Trap”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume 41, Issue 4, pages 793–808, December 2011)

The concept of political capital captures many of the aspects of a president's political authority. Paul Light defines several components of political capital: party support of the president in Congress, public approval of the president's conduct of his job, the president's electoral margin, and patronage appointments (Light 1999, 15). Light derived this list from the observations of 126 White House staff members he interviewed (1999, 14). His indicators have two central uses. First, Light's research reveals that they are central to the “players' perspective” in Washington. That is, **those “in the game” view these items as crucial for presidential effectiveness**. Second, they relate to many central aspects of political authority as defined by Skowronek. So on both theoretical and practical levels, the components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. The data here will reveal that presidents over the last 70 years have suffered from a trend of declining levels of political capital, a trend that is at the heart of their political authority problem. Many scholars have examined particular aspects of presidential political capital, from congressional support (for example, Bond and Fleisher 1992, 2000; Mayhew 2005; Peterson 1993) to job approval (Brace and Hinckley 1991; Kernell 1978; Nicholson Segura and Woods 2002). From these, we know that presidential job approval is influenced by economic performance, tends to drop over time, and that divided government can boost job approval. Also, job approval and control of Congress by fellow partisans boosts presidential success in floor votes but does not produce more important legislation than does periods of divided government. These “micro” findings, however, comport with a “macro trend” of declining presidential political capital over time. This analysis explores that macro trend and relates it to previous micro findings.

### 2NC—Link Wall

**Its politically are politically nuclear.**

**Fairley 10**IEEE Spectrum

(Peter, May, “Downsizing Nuclear Power Plants”, [spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/downsizing-nuclear-power-plants/0](http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/downsizing-nuclear-power-plants/0))

However, there are political objections to SMRs. Precisely because they are more affordable, they may well increase the risk of proliferation by bringing the cost and power output of nuclear reactors within the reach of poorer countries.¶ Russia’s first SMR, which the nuclear engineering group Rosatom expects to complete next year, is of particular concern. The Akademik Lomonosov is a floating nuclear power plant sporting two 35-MW reactors, which Rosatom expects to have tethered to an Arctic oil and gas operation by 2012. The reactor’s portability prompted Greenpeace Russia to call this floating plant the world’s most dangerous nuclear project in a decade. SMRs may be smaller than today’s reactors**. But, politically** at least, **they’re just as nuclear.**

**Introduction of a contentious policy issue triggers the link.**

**AP 10/1**/12 Associated Press via the Australian

(Investors eye the 'fiscal cliff' as Barack Obama's poll numbers improve, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/us-election/investors-eye-the-fiscal-cliff-as-barack-obamas-poll-numbers-improve/story-fn95xh4y-1226485913043>)

What many in the market worry about isn't that high earners may pay more in taxes if Mr Obama wins. They worry that federal spending cuts and tax hikes scheduled for 2013 will kick in on January 1 and start pulling the country into another recession. The higher taxes and lower spending would total $600 billion. They take effect automatically unless Congress and the White House reach a deal before then.

If he's re-elected, Mr Obama will still face a House of Representatives controlled by Republicans the rest of the year. And the new Congress that takes office in January may have a Republican House, too. Investors says that's likely to set up a budget battle similar to August of last year, which ended with the country losing its top credit rating and panicked investors fleeing the stock market.

"**If you have any kind of gridlock, you run the risk of inaction**," says Tom Simons, a market economist at the investment bank Jefferies. "This is a situation where inaction is the worst outcome."

Mr Obama and others like former President Bill Clinton have expressed the belief that House Republicans could be more cooperative once the election is over.

"They'll be faced with determining whether we get a recession or not," says Jeff Kleintop, chief market strategist at LPL Financial.

Most on Wall Street think Congress and Mr Obama would eventually manage to at least postpone some of impending tax and spending changes before this year is out.

The Congressional Budget Office recently laid out the grim consequences of such an event - often compared to dropping off a "fiscal cliff." Starting January 1, tax cuts signed by President George W. Bush expire as do Mr Obama's cuts to payroll taxes. Federal spending on defence and other domestic programs will drop, while emergency unemployment benefits run out.

The combined effect off all these changes would shrink the economy nearly 3 per cent at an annual rate in the first half of next year, the CBO estimates, and push unemployment up to 9.1 per cent by the fall. The unemployment rate was 8.1 per cent in August. Recent surveys of businesses suggest the threat is already weighing on the minds of executives when they're making hiring and spending plans.

For the world's biggest money managers, the fiscal cliff now ranks as the greatest hazard to the global economy, according to Bank of America's most recent fund manager survey. It topped the European debt crisis, a collapse in Chinese real estate and even a war between Israel and Iran.

The danger looms so large to most investors that they believe Washington will find a way to escape it.

"Ultimately, I think a deal gets done, but it's just a question of how long it takes to get there," Mr Kleintop says. "By no means is it going to be an easy process. Gridlock means there's a greater chance that this drags on into next year."

Analysts at investment firms have kept a close eye on polling numbers and especially on the Intrade, an online marketplace where members can trade predictions on events like elections. Polls show voters leaning toward Mr Obama in key swing states. On Intrade, the odds have swung strongly in Mr Obama's direction, jumping to a 76 per cent chance of re-election, up from 51 per cent at the start of September.

Intrade markets put the chance that Republicans will retain control the House at 74 per cent.

If these forecasts prove right, the balance of power in Washington would remain the same. Democrats keep the White House and a slim majority in the Senate, and Republicans keep the House.

What troubles investors is that the same elected officials who fought over raising the debt ceiling last year could be taking up the same task again while debating how best to manoeuvre around the fiscal cliff. Treasury officials have estimated that Congress won't have to raise the debt limit until January.

Expect to see a replay of the debt-ceiling fight, says Ian Lyngen, a senior government bond strategist at CRT Capital. Except that this time what's at stake is the country's borrowing limit and a recession.

"I'm sure it's going to go just like it did last time - very messy," Mr Lyngen says.

In one dizzying stretch that August, the Dow Jones industrial average dropped 2,000 points in three weeks.

"And don't forget," Mr Lyngen adds, "that ultimately got resolved."

The widespread belief on Wall Street is that Congress and Mr Obama will start negotiations over raising the debt limit and pushing back the fiscal cliff when they return in late November - the so-called lame-duck session, because newly elected members of Congress will not have taken their seats.

Twists in the talks will likely rattle markets as the new year approaches. But if stocks do fall sharply, investors expect that would push Republicans and Democrats to reach a deal.

"Ugly negotiations in the lame-duck session could really throw the market for a loop," says Mr Kleintop. "It could be a painful process for investors."

### 2NC—Impact D

**They say no war --- but intelligence experts and history disprove.**

**Schrage 9** (Michael J. Green and Steven P., Michael J. Green is Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Steven P. Schrage is the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a Former Senior Official with the US Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee, *It's not just the economy*, Available Online @ the Asian Times)

Facing the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts at the **World Bank** and the US **C**entral **I**ntelligence **A**gency are just beginning to contemplate the ramifications for international stability if there is not a recovery in the next year. For the most part, the focus has been on fragile states such as some in Eastern Europe. However, the Great Depression taught us that a downward global economic spiral can even have jarring impacts on **great powers**. It is no mere **coincidence** that the last great global economic downturn was followed by the most destructive war in human history. In the 1930s, economic desperation helped fuel **autocratic regimes** and protectionism in a downward economic-security death spiral that engulfed the world in conflict. This spiral was aided by the preoccupation of the United States and other leading nations with economic troubles at home and insufficient attention to working with other powers to maintain stability abroad. Today's challenges are different, yet 1933's London Economic Conference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading to next month's London Group of 20 (G-20) meeting. There is no question the United States must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its economy. But the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the Barack Obama administration and realize that economics and security are intertwined in most of the critical challenges we face.

### 2NC—Manufacturing

**Fiscal cliff collapses the Euro-Zone**

**Dadush 11/7**/12 Served as the World Bank's Director of International Trade and Before that as Director of Economic Policy.

U.S. fiscal cliff risks dragging global economy into darkness, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/07/business/opinion-dadush-obama-economy/index.html>

Fiscal cliff awaits Obama and the world

If the U.S. falls off this fiscal cliff into recession, the outlook for the **world economy**, already gloomy, will darken further.

The task of **keeping the euro-zone afloat**, amid scared investors and depression-level unemployment in Spain and Greece, will become even harder.

The risk of a renewed global banking crisis triggered by sovereign defaults in Europe would escalate sharply. Nor could the U.S. or Europe deploy the policy arsenal they possessed in 2008 to right the ship -- their fiscal and monetary bullets have been spent.

Confronted with this dire alternative, Obama will have to compromise by accepting a program of long-term cuts in social programs while Republicans accept phased tax increases -- both departing from their diametrically opposed electoral platforms.

As a minimum, this compromise will include a claw back of the payroll tax reduction, and of extended unemployment benefits as well as some expenditure cuts, adding up to 1% to 2% of U.S. GDP in 2013.

**Partial collapse triggers war, collapses the EU.**

**Scott 12** Professor of international financial systems @ Harvard Law School

(Hal S. Scott (Director of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation), “The Global (Not Euro-Zone) Crisis,” New York Times, August 15, 2012, pg. http://tinyurl.com/9nonqa2)

The euro-zone crisis has striking parallels with our experience in **two world wars**, when the United States mistakenly calculated that Europe could solve its own foreign policy problems and that Americans were immune from the consequences of the Continent’s failure to do so.

Europe’s failure **twice plunged the world into war**. In today’s globalized economic world, Europe’s failure to resolve its financial crisis could plunge the world into economic chaos. This is a global crisis — not a euro-zone crisis — and we must take international action to deal with it. , “

One **fundamental parallel** with the two world wars is the tension between Germany and other European states. While successfully integrated into Europe, Germany remains the Continent’s most powerful economic force, with higher productivity and economic growth rates and lower inflation than the other major European countries, including France, Italy, Spain and Britain. In the periods leading up to the world wars, Germany’s neighbors rightly feared and deeply resented German military power. Today, they fear German economic power even while they plead with Germany to come to their aid.

Germany can only go so far in bailing out Europe. The cost of recapitalizing European banks (despite overly optimistic stress tests), including those in Germany, is estimated to be €420 billion under an adverse scenario, just for non-performing loans. The cost of marking down — let alone writing off — sovereign debt would be much greater. As of last November, 20 of the largest banks in the European Union carried $4.2 trillion in PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) sovereign debt, about seven times the amount of their $620 billion in equity.

The amount of potential budget support for countries with unsustainable debt is also substantial, up to €1.4 trillion for 2012 and 2013, excluding any support for Greece. This does not count losses of the European Central Bank from its operations to bring down the yield on new sovereign debt issuance.

Bailing out Europe is beyond the practical capacity of Germany, whose G.D.P. is approximately €2.6 trillion, a level that is far from assured as Europe crumbles around it.

Just as importantly, Germany faces severe political constraints on rescuing Europe. The German government is fortunate that the pro-European Social Democrat opposition party has not attacked its economic support for Europe. But Chancellor Angela Merkel faces deep divisions within her own party, fueled by the constant negative drumbeat of the Bundesbank. If Germany does too much for Europe it could sink Merkel. If Germany does too little for Europe, it could cause **deep resentment** from those it refused to help.

Too big a reparation burden on Germany after World War I contributed to the rise of the Nazis; in contrast, after World War II, we used the international approach of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe. Instead of placing another impossible burden on Germany, we must again take international action.

Various solutions to Europe’s problems that do not depend entirely on Germany are being considered in Europe while the rest of the world gives counsel from the sidelines, but these proposed solutions are insufficient and uncertain. Debt can be restructured, as with Greece, but this makes future borrowing more expensive, negatively impacts bank capital and risks contagion. Moreover, this does not address the root cause of the crisis — uncompetitive economies and overspending. Banks can raise some additional capital, but not nearly enough. Austerity measures are politically difficult to sustain and, for those who believe in stimulus, counter-productive for economic growth.

The European Central Bank can finance countries unable to borrow at affordable rates but this raises the specter of inflation and increases the debt burden of the sovereigns they are financing.

The option of using exchange-rate adjustment, by abandoning the euro straightjacket of immutable fixed exchange rates, is beset by operational problems. The effective re-denomination of debt and temporary capital controls would require international approval.

More fundamentally, it is feared that **even a partial euro-zone breakup** could be the start of the end of the European Union, a **major step backward** from decades of integration.

**Extinction.**

**Bruton 1** Former Irish Prime Minister

(John, Report before the Joint Committee on European Affairs, Parliament of Ireland, October, http://www.irlgov.ie/committees-02/c-europeanaffairs/future/page1.htm)

2.5 As the Laeken Declaration put it, "Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation" adding that Europe must exercise its power in order "to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development". 2.6 Only a strong European Union is big enough to create a space, and a stable set of rules, within which all Europeans can live securely, move freely, and provide for themselves, for their families and for their old age. Individual states are too small to do that on their own. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with the globalized **human diseases**, such as AIDS and tuberculosis. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with **globalized criminal conspiracies**, like the Mafia, that threaten the security of all Europeans. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalized **environmental threats**, such as global warming, which threaten our continent and generations of its future inhabitants. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalized **economic forces**, which could spread recession from one country to another and destroy millions of jobs. Only a strong European Union is big enough to regulate, in the interests of society as a whole, the activities of profit seeking private corporations, some of which now have more spending power than many individual states. 2.7 These tasks are too large for individual states.