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#### Taoism

#### No one knows what is good and bad. Reject the aff’s judgments, even if we lose all life on earth

Kirkland 98 [Russell Kirkland, Associate Professor of Religion (and Asian Studies), “"Responsible Non-Action" In a Natural World: Perspectives from the Nei-Yeh, Chuang-Tzu, and Tao-Te Ching,” 1998, University of Georgia, http://kirkland.myweb.uga.edu/rk/pdf/pubs/ECO.pdf]

Why It Is Wrong to Resent Unexpected Changes In Chuang-tzu 18, we find two famous stories in which a man experiences a sudden and deeply personal transformation, a transformation that strikes others around him as deeply troubling.5 In one, the philosopher Hui-tzu goes to offer his sympathies to Chuang-tzu upon the event of the death of Chuang's wife. In the next story, a willow suddenly sprouts from the elbow of a fictional character. In each story, a sympathetic friend is shocked and dismayed to find that the first character in each story is not shocked and dismayed by the unexpected turn of events. In each story, the first character patiently and rationally explains the nature of life, and counsels his companion to accept the course of events that life brings to us, without imposing judgment as to the value of those events. In each case, the reader learns that it is foolish and inappropriate to feel emotional distress at such events, for a proper understanding of the real nature of life leads us to accept all events with the same equanimity, even those events that might have once sticken us as deeply distressing. In the Taoist classic Huai-nan-tzu, one finds a famous story of a man who suddenly finds himself the unexpected owner of a new horse. His neighbors congratulate him on his good fortune, until his son falls from the horse and breaks his leg. The man's neighbors then act to console him on his bad fortune, until army conscriptors arrive and carry off all the able-bodied young men, leaving the injured young man behind as worthless. The lesson of the story is that when an event occurs, we are quick to judge it as fortunate or unfortunate, but our judgments are often mistaken, as later events often prove.6 And one of the most heavily stressed lessons of the Chuang-tzu is that humans quickly judge events on the basis of what we accept on the basis of simplistic assumptions — e.g., that life is inherently better than death — and that the wise person learns to question and discard such assumptions, and forego such judgments regarding events. When Chuang-tzu's wife died, Chuang-tzu does not argue that the world is a better place for her absence, or that his life is improved by his sudden new freedom. In fact, there is no issue in the passage of whether the world is better off with Chuang-tzu's wife alive or dead. The only issue in the passage is that people are born and that people later die, and to ignore that basic fact would display culpable stupidity. The very same lesson is impressed upon the reader of the previous passage, regarding the sudden transformation of a character's elbow. What we are taught in that passage is that life is a process of ineluctable change and transformation, and that humans would be profoundly wrong and clearly silly to object to such change. Another element of the lesson is that the nature of human life is not separate from, or other than, the nature of nonhuman life. When one says that "life is ineluctable change, and we must accept such change with serenity," one is speaking about "life" in such a way that it clearly involves the lives of individual humans just as fully as it involves the events that occur in the broader world, and vice versa. Imagine the story of the death of Chuang-tzu's wife involving, instead, the death of the species we call whooping cranes: Chuang-tzu would, in that case, patiently point out to his deeply caring but deeply shallow friend that he had indeed felt grief to see such beautiful birds come to their end, but had gone on to engage in appropriate rational reflection upon the nature of life, and had come to accept the transitory nature of all such creatures, just as in the present story Chuang-tzu had come to accept the transitory nature of his own spouse. If one must learn to accept with serenity the death of someone we love, someone without whose life our own life would have never been what it is, wouldn't the author urge us to accept that the death of some birds, birds that have never played a role in our lives the way that one's deceased spouse had done, is an event that we should accept with equanimity? If change catches up with us, even to the extent that the planet that we live on should become permanently devoid of all forms of life, the response of the author of these passages would logically be that **such is the nature of things**, and that crying over such a sudden turn of events would be very silly indeed, like a child crying over a spilt glass of milk, or the death of some easily replaceable goldfish. The only reason that a child cries over the death of a goldfish is that he or she has become irrationally attached to that creature as it exists in its present form, and has formed an immature sentimental bond to it. As adults, we appreciate the color and motion of fish in our aquaria, but seldom cry over the death of one of its inmates: we know very well that to cry over the death of such a fish would be silly and a sign of juvenile behavior. As our children grow, we teach them, likewise, never to follow their raw emotional responses, but rather to govern their emotions, and to learn to behave in a responsible manner, according to principles that are morally correct, whether or not they are emotionally satisfying. If, for instance, one were to see a driver accidentally run over one's child or beloved, one's first instinct might be to attack the driver with a righteous fury, falsely equating emotional intensity and violent action with the responsible exercise of moral judgment. In general, we work to teach ourselves and each other not to respond in that way, to take a course of self-restraint, curbing emotion, lest it propel us into actions that will later, upon calm reflection, be revealed to have been emotionally satisfying but morally wrong. If I saw my child run down by a car, it might give me great emotional satisfaction to drag the driver from her car and beat her to death. But it might well turn out that she had in fact done nothing wrong, and had been driving legally and quite responsibly when a careless child suddenly ran into her path, giving her no time to stop or to evade the child. Because we have all learned that the truth of events is often not apparent to the parties that are experiencing them, we generally work to learn some degree of self-control, so that our immediate emotional reaction to events does not mislead us into a foolish course of action. Now if we take these facts and transfer them into our consideration of Chuang-tzu and Mencius on the riverbank, that episode should, logically, be read as follows. If Mencius feels an emotional urge to jump into the river to save the baby, his emotional response to the baby's presence there must be seen as immature and irresponsible. After all, one might muse, one never knows, any more than the man with the horse, when an event that seems fortunate is actually unfortunate, or vice versa. What if the baby in the water had been the ancient Chinese equivalent of Adolf Hitler, and the saving of young Adolf — though occasioned by the deepest feelings of compassion, and a deep-felt veneration for "life" — led to the systematic extermination of millions of innocent men, women, and children? If one knew, in retrospect, that Hitler's atrocities could have been totally prevented by the simple moral act of refraining from leaping to save an endangered child, would one not conclude, by sound moral reasoning, that letting that particular baby drown would have represented a supremely moral act? How, Chuang-tzu constantly challenges us, **how can we possibly know what course of action is truly justified?** What if, just for the sake of argument, a dreadful plague soon wipes out millions of innocent people, and the pathogen involved is soon traced back to an organism that had once dwelt harmlessly in the system of a certain species of bird, such as, for instance, the whooping crane? In retrospect, one can imagine, the afflicted people of the next century — bereft of their wives or husbands, parents or children — might curse the day when simple-minded do-gooders of the twentieth-century had brazenly intervened with the natural course of events and preserved the cursed specied of crane, thereby damning millions of innocents to suffering and death. We assume that such could never happen, that all living things are somehow inherently good to have on the planet, that saving the earthly existence of any life-form is somehow inherently a virtuous action. But our motivations in such cases are clearly, from a Taoist point of view, so shallow and foolish as to warrant no respect. If Mencius, or a sentimental modern lover of "life," were to leap into the river and save a floating baby, he or she would doubtless exult in his or her selfless act of moral heroism, deriving a sense of satisfaction from having done a good deed, and having prevented a terrible tragedy. But who can really know when a given event is truly a tragedy, or perhaps, like the horse that breaks a boy's leg, really a blessing in disguise. Since human wisdom, Chuang-tzu suggests, is inherently incapable of successfully comprehending the true meaning of events as they are happening, when can we ever truly know that our emotional urge to save babies, pretty birds, and entertaining sea-mammals is really an urge that is morally sound. The Taoist answer seems to be that we can never be sure, and **even if the extinction** of Chuangtzu's wife or of the whooping crane really **brought no actual blessing to the world, such events are natural and proper in the way of life itself, and to bemoan such events is to show that one is no more insightful about life than a child who sentimentally cries over the loss of a toy**, a glass of milk, a beloved pet, or even her mommy, run over by a drunken driver. The Taoist lesson seems, in this regard, to be the same in each case: things happen, and some things cause us distress because we attach ourselves sentimentally to certain people, objects, and patterns of life; when those people, objects, or patterns of life take a sudden or drastic turn into a very different direction, a mature and responsible person calms his or her irrational emotions, and takes the morally responsible course of simply **accepting the new state of things**.

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#### Financial incentives are rebates, grants, loans, Tax Incentives, green building incentives, and industrial recruitment. Distinct from Community Investment & Rules & regulations

#### The aff isn’t an example of a topical incentive

Gouchoe 2k—North Carolina State University, National Renewable Energy Laboratory [Susan, December 2000, Local Government and Community Programs and Incentives for Renewable Energy— National Report, http://seg.fsu.edu/Library/casestudy%20of%20incentives.pdf]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents a summary of the renewable energy programs and incentives of 45¶ communities in 23 states as collected and catalogued by the Interstate Renewable Energy¶ Council’s (IREC) Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE) project. Also included are summaries of state initiatives that impact implementation of renewable energy¶ technologies on the local level. Programs and incentives in this report include:

COMMUNITY INVESTMENT & AWARENESS PROGRAMS

v Renewable Energy Projects

v Education & Assistance

v Green Pricing Programs

v Green Power Purchasing

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

v Rebates, Grants, & Loans

v Tax Incentives

v Green Building Incentives

v Industrial Recruitment

RULES, REGULATIONS & POLICIES

v Solar & Wind Access

v Net Metering

v Construction & Design

v Contractor Licensing

v Equipment Certification

v Public Benefits Funds

v Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards

v Disclosure & Certification

Established in 1995, DSIRE is an ongoing project to summarize incentives, programs, and¶ policies for renewable energy. The project is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy’s¶ Office of Power Technologies and is managed by the North Carolina Solar Center. DSIRE on¶ Line makes the DSIRE database accessible via the web at:¶ http://www.ncsc.ncsu.edu/dsire.htm. The website is updated daily and includes search¶ capabilities for all incentives. In addition to state and local programs, the website features¶ utility programs and a searchable bibliography.

#### VOTE NEGATIVE

#### PREDICTABLE LIMITS—the word incentives in the resolution is modified by financial to make it manageable. Going beyond makes the topic unpredictable.

#### GROUND—financial incentives insure the aff has links to market disads and counterplans which are the only core negative ground across bi-directional energies. Holding the line key

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#### Obama will win but its close.

**Trippi 10/4** (Joe, Political Strategist, Ted Kennedy staffer, Will Romney take advantage of his second chance?, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/10/04/will-romney-take-advantage-his-second-chance/)

Today, Obama has formidable leads in national and swing state polls. My own estimate puts Obama just 5 Electoral College votes short of 270 and another four years in the White House.

So much for that referendum election, right?

Wrong.

Obama’s strength creates an ironic problem. As the media consumes poll after poll and begin to trumpet a perceived Obama victory, voters will be forced to confront the fact of his re-election. They will have to ask themselves one more time if this is what they want. At that point, this might no longer be a choice election, it would instead be **a referendum on the president** -- the race Romney has always wanted.

Should that moment happen, it would be the Romney campaign’s best shot at being able to turn the election around. If Romney's recent high profile speeches are any gauge, he might just have the message to make that happen.

Romney’s most powerful line of the entire campaign came during his speech at the Republican Convention when he said, "President Obama promised to begin to slow the rise of the oceans and to heal the planet. My promise is to help you and your family." That’s the type of message that can break through to voters but we hardly hear it.

In Wednesday night's debate, Romney not only delivered that type of message, he did so with the fire and confidence that could give voters confidence in his ability to bring about the change many claim to want. It was the type of performance that will give many voters pause when considering why this guy is down in so many polls.

Obama still has major advantages. The electoral map gives him many pathways to victory and runaway leads with women and Hispanics could serve as a firewall.

But with November 6 just over thirty days away, **this election is still up for grabs**. It might be too little too late for Romney or it could be the beginning of a comeback for the history books if he can start to connect the dots he laid out in the RNC speech and Wednesday night's debate. Either way, Romney will have been given a chance to argue this election on his terms. Whether he has what it takes to make the most of it the second time around is yet to be seen.

#### Nuclear alienates key constituent groups.

**Mick 6/19** (Jason Daily Tech, Obama Fights For Nuclear, Environmentalists Label Him a Shill http://www.dailytech.com/Obama+Fights+For+Nuclear+Environmentalists+Label+Him+a+Shill/article18781.htm)

Despite these small victories, President Obama's nuclear vision faces many impending obstacles.  Despite the fact that you could tear down one of the nation's old reactors, replace it with a dozen modern clean reactor designs and still have less net waste, some environmentalist groups remain adamantly opposed to new plant construction.  They have vowed to bury the bid for clean nuclear power under a flood of lawsuits.  If the suits succeed, they will raise the cost of nuclear so high, that it can't even compete with the most expensive forms of nuclear energy, like solar power.

And perhaps the biggest obstacle to Obama's nuclear vision will come in 2012.  That is the year when he will face reelection.  That may prove challenging given that one of his former key constituent groups—the environmental lobby—has become one of his staunchest critics.  Regardless, the U.S. is making its first true nuclear progress in 30 years, and that is among the many factors that will already make President Obama's presidency noteworthy.

#### Obama’s margin for error is small --- it costs him the election.

**TNF 12** (The New Fuelist, Obama’s tall environmental task in 2012 http://www.newfuelist.com/blog/obama-coal-regulations-keystone-pipeline)

In case you can’t see it, that’s a treacherous tightrope Barack Obama is walking on these days whenever he steps into the circus-like national energy and environmental policy debate. And his margin for political error on environmental issues will shrink even more during this election year. To avoid alienating environmentalists who supported him in 2008, he must not forget to occasionally—and substantially—lean to the left. But if he wants to hold on to coveted independent voters who are more worried about the slumping economy than they are about pollution, he must also periodically shift back to the middle and right.

The proposed Keystone XL pipeline embodies the President’s conundrum. From the right, calls for increased “energy security” and for the creation of (a disputed number) of pipeline-related jobs make it hard for him to say no. On the left, a large and organized anti-pipeline contingent has taken pains to turn the decision on the pipeline—which will carry crude made from Canadian oil sands, the extraction and production of which makes the fuel much more greenhouse gas-intense than conventional oil—into a political make-or-break for Obama on climate change.

The administration spent 2011 establishing what it must view as a politically necessary middle ground on the environment. It engineered a drastic ratcheting up of fuel efficiency standards for automakers, and sold it as a way to both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the burden on the consumer. It also introduced landmark regulations on air pollution from power plants, while placating utilities—and outraging many supporters—by delaying the EPA’s proposed tightening of the nation’s standards for smog. And it earned at least temporary relief from pressure to decide on the Keystone XL by punting the issue past the election, to 2013.

But it’s going to be tougher to maintain balance on the tightrope this year. Congressional Republicans, by demanding a much-earlier Obama decision on the Keystone XL in exchange for their support of the recent payroll tax extension, have hinted at their party’s desire to force the President’s hand on environmental issues. The GOP’s presidential nominee will undoubtedly attempt to paint Obama as an over-regulator and irrational environmentalist—an attack line which will warrant a defense. And therein lies Obama’s tall task: to defend his administration’s substantial forays into environmental regulation in terms that resonate with independents whose main concern is the economy—all while simultaneously ensuring that his frustrated environmentalist supporters don’t completely lose their patience.

#### Romney causes a nuclear use in Pakistan, a collapse of Russian relations, war with Iran, and China trade wars.

**Bandow 12** Senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan [Doug Bandow, 5-15-12, “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism]

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to **destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan**. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire **war with Iran** as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have **no choice** but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically **impossible.** Perceived American support for this creates **enormous hostility** toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But **treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one**. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as **a direct challenge**. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that **even paranoids have enemies**. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the **greatest danger** to America is the **blowback** that results from promiscuous intervention in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle. America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he is not qualified to be president. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney **sounds even worse.** His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

### 1NC DA 2

#### DOD is moving to a lighter and more agile force structure—2013 budget request is the first step in implementing that strategy.

Zee News 8/7/12 [“Curtailing of defence budget to throw new challenges: Panetta,” Zee News, Last Updated: Tuesday, August 07, 2012, 16:48, pg. http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/curtailing-of-defence-budget-to-throw-new-challenges-panetta\_792176.html

Asked to reduce the defence budget by USD 487 billion over the next decade, the Pentagon is faced with challenge to maintain a force strong enough to meet the challenges of the future, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has said.
"It is a period of great challenge for the Department, but we have also taken the mandate to reduce the defense budget by USD 487 billion over the next decade as an opportunity to build the force we need to confront the security threats and challenges of the future," Panetta said.
In his remarks to the Association of Defense Committees, Monterey, California, Panetta referred to the new defense strategy unveiled this year. That strategy consists of five key elements, he said.
"As we draw down from the wars, we will be smaller and leaner, but we must remain agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced. We will rebalance our global posture and presence to emphasise the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East," he said.

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"We will build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships elsewhere in the world. We must ensure we can quickly confront and defeat aggression from any adversary anytime, anywhere. "Finally, this can't simply be about cutting we have to make key investments in technologies and capabilities, including our industrial base," said the Defense Secretary.
Panetta said the Defense Department's budget request for 2013 was the first step in implementing this strategy.

#### They undermine that effort by trading off with modernization investments.

Parrish 5/10/12 [Karen Parrish, “Panetta, Dempsey: DOD Budget Request Reflects Tough Choices,” American Forces Press Service, May 10, 2012, pg. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116287

To meet those cuts, department senior leaders worked with President Barack Obama to craft a strategy outlining defense priorities, the secretary said. They then built a spending plan that both supports that strategy and meets the Budget control Act’s spending caps, he added.

“My concern is that if Congress now tries to reverse many of the tough decisions that we reached by adding several billion dollars to the president's budget request, then they risk not only potential gridlock … [but] they could force the kind of trade-offs that could jeopardize our national defense,” Panetta said.

The secretary described some of those trade-offs. If DOD leaders can’t retire aging ships and aircraft, he said, they will have to realize savings in areas such as modernization investment.

If the department can’t reduce force structure after 2014, “Congress would be forcing us to reduce readiness. We would have to cut training [and] we'd have to cut equipment,” Panetta added.

And if Congress limits the Pentagon’s ability to put military health care costs on what the secretary called a sustainable track, lawmakers would limit defense options to invest in “new technologies that we believe are critical to the force we need for the future,” he said.

Dempsey said he appreciates the difficulties lawmakers must contend with in managing military spending as U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan continues, and complex security challenges lie ahead.

The chairman said he and Panetta, along with the service chiefs and combatant commanders, faced the same issues when they prepared their budget request.

DOD’s spending plan “is a responsible investment in our nation’s security,” Dempsey said.

The challenge in finalizing defense funding is to “make sure our armed forces have what they need -- and no more than we need -- to keep America immune from coercion,” the chairman said.

DOD’s budget request reflects a carefully devised set of choices to sustain the joint force, Dempsey said.

Those choices, he added, reflect “the right mix among force structure, modernization, readiness, pay and benefits. Different choices will produce a different balance.”

#### The cuts risk nuke war—Modernization is key

Skelton 8/21/12—former chair of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee [Former U.S. Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., “Guest commentary: Defense cuts we can't afford,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 21, 2012 12:00 am, pg. http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/guest-commentary-defense-cuts-we-can-t-afford/article\_f82a499b-496f-59dd-b2ce-fa8a2cf593f6.html

Without a thorough study of the art of war and first-rate equipment, the U.S. military will be far less able to deter gathering conflicts or quickly resolve conflicts we are unable to avoid. The "Powell Doctrine" of only risking our troops when backed up by overwhelming force and a clear path to decisive victory could be at risk. With our unique portfolio of global responsibilities, we could find it difficult to simultaneously pursue terrorists, contain Iran and North Korea, counter a rising China, and deal with exploding hot spots like Syria today.

Those who say we can risk skipping one or two generations of military development are poor students of military history. America rose from a young, regional power to a formidable military force over the course of World War I alone. And Germany rose from the ashes of that war to threaten all of Europe in less than two decades.

Today, technology has accelerated the pace of change, and our adversaries are certainly not sitting on their hands. Russia and China are both building sixth-generation stealth fighters, while Iran and North Korea race to develop nuclear InterContinental Ballistic Missiles. The rise of cyber weapons puts America's highly networked economy and society at particular risk. We can choose to delay our defenses against these developing threats, but the threats themselves won't wait.

### 1NC—CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should establish a Private Finance Initiative to design, finance and build small modular nuclear reactors located on military installations in the United States. The initiative should guarantee a 30 year contract for operation and maintenance expenses.

#### A Private Finance Incentive is distinct from procurement and solves better

Dixon et al. 5—Chair in Sustainable Futures in the Built Environment @ University of Reading [Dr. Timothy Dixon, Gaye Pottinger (Senior Research Officer in the College of Estate Management @ University of Reading), Alan Jordan (Lecturer in the College of Estate Management @ University of Reading), “Lessons from the private finance initiative in the UK: Benefits, problems and critical success factors,” Journal of Property Investment & Finance 23. 5 (2005): 412-423]

Originally conceived as a means of reducing government borrowing and increasing investment in public infrastructure, PFI has increasingly come to be seen as a way of achieving better value for money from government procurement (Dixon et al, 2003a, b). Public sector construction and infrastructure projects have traditionally had a reputation for being poorly managed, leading to cost and time overruns and long-term technical problems (Graves and Rowe, 1999; Hobson, 1999; Allen, 2001; Mott MacDonald, 2002). For instance, a survey of public sector procurement by Graves and Rowe (1999) revealed that two-thirds of projects exceeded their programme and 75 percent of projects finished over budget. The central tenet of PFI is the transfer of risk from the public to the private sector. By achieving the correct allocation of risk, the government is able to treat public sector expenditure on PFI projects as off-balance sheet and thus, it does not score against public sector spending limits (Fox and Tort, 1999). The transfer of risk in PFI is based on the premise that where the private sector is judged better able to assume responsibilities for delivering public infrastructure and services, those responsibilities should be transferred from the public sector. It was envisaged that risk transfer would also have other, additional benefits for the public sector, including:

\* improved delivery of projects with respect to time, cost and quality;

\* elimination of over-specification;

\* improved maintenance of public infrastructure; and

\* better delivery of public services.

The government has, therefore, placed increasing emphasis on these benefits as justification for its use of PFI.

Under PFI, private sector consortia bid to design, finance, build and operate infrastructure on behalf of the public sector for periods of around 30 years. Consortia may also be asked to provide ancillary services or services direct to the public as part of the contract. In return, the public sector pays the private sector consortium a unitary payment for using the infrastructure and services. Unitary payments are usually structured so that the public sector can incentivise the consortium to perform by making deductions for late completion, poor quality infrastructure, or poor service provision. This way PFI projects are supposed to avoid many of the problems normally associated with conventional public sector procurement.

#### We solve without busting the budget

Chang et al. 99 [Ike Y. Chang, Steven Galing, Carolyn Wong, Howell Yee, Elliot I. Axelband, Mark Onesi & Kenneth R Horn, “Use of Public-Private Partnerships to Meet Future Army Needs,” Rand Corporation, Prepared for the United States Army by RAND's Arroyo, 1999

Access to Capital

Access to capital often means access to financing. In this case, the money would be used to help finance a collaborative effort. Access to capital is relevant to infrastructure, intellectual property, and financial arrangement PPPs.

The private sector often borrows money to finance its business expenses. Business expenses could include the expansion of a company's infrastructure, the development of intellectual property, or the launching of a new financial arrangement. A firm may enjoy excellent credit with one or more financial institutions that can extend loans to the company. These factors indicate that the private¶ sector may have access to capital that could be applied toward collaborative efforts that benefit the Army.

The amount the Army can spend on infrastructure is limited each year by its budget. The Army does not borrow money for infrastructure needs. Hence, the Army does not have the experience or the legal authority to access capital beyond its budgetary constraints. Therefore, in infrastructure PPPs, the Army should look to its private sector partner for at least some of the collaborative effort funds.

The Army's S&T budget has been decreasing and is likely to continue to decline. In addition, the Army funds its R&D based on the size of its budget. The Army does not borrow money to fund any project beyond what budget funds will provide for, regardless of how advantageous the project may seem. So the Army has only one source of R&D funds, and the level of those funds is often inadequate to pay for all the research the Army needs to reach its R&D goals. One way for the Army to leverage its R&D dollars is to enter into collaborative efforts with leading-edge firms that have access to capital and share¶ in the funding of dual-use research. 5 pg. 14-15

### 1NC—Solvency

#### Nuclear will remain uncompetitive for decades—our evidence cites industry leaders.

Hiltzik 11—Michael Hiltzik is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author who has covered business, technology, and public policy for the Los Angeles Times for twenty years, master of science degree in journalism from the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University [March 23, 2011, “A nuclear renaissance in U.S. was unlikely even before Japan disaster,” *LA Times*, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/23/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20110323]

To all those who may be concerned that the catastrophic events at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant will derail the heralded renaissance of nuclear power in the U.S., you can relax.

The reason is simple: There is no renaissance.

Not even Exelon Corp., the nation's biggest nuclear generation company, has been holding its breath for a surge in orders or appreciable increase in new generating capacity.

The reason has little to do with an unreasoning public's fear of nuclear meltdowns and radiation poisoning, and almost everything to do with pure economics. As John Rowe, Exelon's chairman and chief executive, told an audience at a Washington think tank two weeks ago, you can build a new natural gas plant for 40% less than a new nuclear plant, and the price of its fuel is at rock bottom.

"Natural gas is queen," he says. (To be fair, Exelon also makes a lot of money from gas.)

In recent years, nuclear energy has been promoted as a "green," or at least greenish, alternative to coal power and other fossil-fueled generation. That's been a potent selling point as concern has mounted over the latter's effect on climate change by the production of greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is burdened by its own environmental issues, including the dangers of radioactive release into the atmosphere, but the production of carbon dioxide isn't among them.

Yet the technology's potential as a weapon against global warming has been as oversold, just as its virtues as safe, clean and "too cheap to meter" were during its infancy in the 1950s. To realistically make a dent in climate change, nuclear plant construction would have to take off at such a rate that it would "pose serious concerns" for the availability of construction materials, properly trained builders and operating technicians, and safety and security oversight, as a report by the Council on Foreign Relations observed in 2007.

"For at least a couple of decades to come, nuclear will be very uncompetitive," the report's author, Charles D. Ferguson, told me this week. Ferguson is president of the Federation of American Scientists.

The ongoing disaster in Japan will exacerbate social concerns about nuclear waste disposal — the on-site storage of spent fuel, which is common at U.S. plants, has complicated the situation at Fukushima — as well as concerns about the safety and security of existing plants. But those concerns have existed for years, so the spectacle of the Japanese grappling with the consequences, graphic as it is, may not in itself affect public attitudes.

Talk of nuclear renaissance in the U.S. had been spurred by two developments. One was the dramatic improvement in the operating record of U.S. plants. In recent years the domestic nuclear industry had been operating at close to 90% of capacity, compared with the lousy 65% record it turned in during the 1970s. The change was the product partially of the industry's consolidation into a small number of specialty operators with nuclear expertise, and it tended to reduce the apparent cost of nuclear power to levels competitive with other sources.

But that also means that "people who advocate nuclear power have rose-colored glasses about its economics," says John E. Parsons of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the co-author of a 2009 update to a 2003 MIT report on the future of nuclear power.

Further encouragement came from the streamlining of U.S. licensing rules. The new procedure consolidates what formerly were separate construction and operating permits into one, removing the uncertainty that a utility might build an entire facility only to be denied permission to run it.

But no new plant has yet been approved under the new system, so plenty of uncertainty still exists. "An investor has to ask, 'Am I looking at a technology that works only when all the cards fall my way?'" Parsons says.

Despite expressions of support for nuclear power coming from political leaders, including President Obama, who is offering loan guarantees for new reactors, nuclear energy can't develop in a policy vacuum. One of the dismal ironies of the American energy program is that many of the same politicians standing foursquare behind nuclear power are also sworn opponents of policies such as a carbon tax, which would make nukes more competitive by raising the price of fossil-based alternatives.

For example, here's Mitt Romney. In "No Apology," the book he published last year presumably as a manifesto for his 2012 presidential campaign, Romney says he doesn't understand why nuclear power is such a "boogeyman," because America's existing plants are "trouble-free." Romney contends that nuclear plants are economically unfeasible in the U.S. only because of our "interminable permitting, regulatory and legal delays."

Romney should listen more to fellow businessmen like Exelon's Rowe, who would tell him that the real reason is that gas generation is cheaper, thanks to pricing that ignores such external costs of gas as pollution and climate change. Yet in his book Romney condemns policies such as the carbon tax because it would "fatten government, harm employers and employees, and hurt consumers." You can't have it both ways, Mitt.

Romney defends the economics of nuclear power by observing that countries with major nuclear construction programs, such as China, seem to have solved the economic conundrum without much trouble. Yet even pro-nuclear experts here acknowledge that nuclear economics don't easily cross national borders. China, which has 13 operating nuclear plants and 30 under construction, has endowed its state-owned nuclear industry with heavy subsidies.

According to a report by the Federation of American Scientists, China's burgeoning demand for electrical power can't effectively be satisfied from its current main source, coal, which will face a depletion crisis around the end of this decade. That makes ramping up nuclear an urgent issue for China. But in the U.S., says Andrew Kadak, the former CEO of Yankee Atomic Power Co., a New England nuclear plant operator, "we don't have that urgency because natural gas is too cheap an alternative."

With the construction of plants still hampered by economics, nuclear utilities are devoting more attention to improving efficiencies and increasing the output of their existing plants, a process known as "uprating." But that amounts to treading water until the social and economic difficulties of nuclear power can be addressed. And they'll have to be addressed: "It's going to be very hard to reduce carbon dioxide if nuclear is out of the picture," MIT's Parsons says. But the first step is injecting realism into the discussion. Nuclear power may be necessary to our energy future, but it won't be our savior.

#### SMRs have greater economic barriers than conventional reactors.

Lyman 11—Edwin Lyman is Senior Global Security Scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). He specialises in nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear power safety. He has published many articles in journals and magazines and written many reports. Lyman was president of the Nuclear Control Institute. He has a Ph.D. in physics from Cornell University. [July 14, 2011, Testimony of Dr. Edwin Lyman Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Union of Concerned Scientists “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors” Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear\_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf]

Some SMR vendors emphasize that their designs are “passively safe.” However, no credible reactor design is completely passive and can shut itself down and cool itself in every circumstance without need for intervention. Some reactor designs, large or small, have certain passive safety features that allow the reactor to depend less on operator action for a limited period of time following design-basis accidents. Small reactors may have an advantage because the lower the power of a reactor, the easier it is to cool through passive means such as natural convection cooling with water or even with air. However, accidents affecting multiple small units may cause complications that could outweigh the advantages of having lower heat removal requirements per unit. Moreover, passively safe reactors generally require some equipment, such as valves, that are designed to operate automatically but are not one hundred percent reliable.

Operators will always be needed to monitor systems to ensure they are functioning as designed, and to intervene if they fail to do so. Both passive systems and operator actions would require functioning instrumentation and control systems, which were unreliable during the severe accidents at Three Mile Island and Fukushima. Passive systems may not work as intended in the event of beyond-design-basis accidents, and as result passive designs should also be equipped with highly reliable active backup systems and associated instrumentation and control systems.

But more backup systems generally mean higher costs. This poses a particular problem for SMRs, which begin with a large economic disadvantage compared to large reactors.

According to the standard formula for economies of scale, the overnight capital cost per kilowatt of a 125 megawatt reactor would be roughly 2.5 times greater than that of a 1250 megawatt unit, all other factors being equal. Advocates argue that SMRs offer advantages that can offset this economic penalty, such as a better match of supply and demand, reduced up-front financing costs, reduced construction times, and an accelerated benefit from learning from the construction of multiple units. However, a 2007 paper by Westinghouse scientists and their collaborators that quantified the cost savings associated with some of these factors found that they could not overcome the size penalty: the paper found that at best, the capital cost of four 335 megawatt reactors was slightly greater than that of one 1340 megawatt reactor.1

#### NRC restrictions block SMRs.

Nick Cunningham, October 2012. Policy Analyst for Energy and Climate at the American Security Project. “Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power,” American Security Project, <http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200087%20-%20Small%20Modular%20Reactors.pdf>.

The most difficult challenge currently facing SMRs is the institutional barriers. Currently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not certified a single SMR design. Despite the variety of SMR designs from several nuclear vendors, the NRC has lacked sufficient human and technical capacity to license small modular reactors in the past.33 Even as policymakers have expressed greater interest in SMRs in recent years, the licensing process for a new design takes several years at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.34¶ Also, many regulations create a difficult environment for small reactors and favor large reactors. For example, the NRC requires 10 mile emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants,¶ making it difficult to site a small reactor near urban centers where it could be used for energy applications other than centralized electricity generation.35¶ SMRs will need to overcome this long history of institutional bias towards large reactors. As the most prominent licensing body for the nuclear industry worldwide, the NRC to a certain degree, shapes the global future for nuclear power. If the NRC does not lead on small modular reactors, it may be an uphill battle for the SMR industry.

#### SMRs won’t expand until we have a solution for spent fuel.

Nick Cunningham, October 2012. Policy Analyst for Energy and Climate at the American Security Project. “Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power,” American Security Project, <http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200087%20-%20Small%20Modular%20Reactors.pdf>.

Disposal of spent nuclear fuel has confounded the nuclear industry for decades and the problem of waste disposal will still need to be dealt with for SMRs. While large reactors suffer from the same problem, expanding the use of SMRs would mean waste from more reactor sites would need to be coordinated.38 The quantity of waste may not change, but a given amount of waste is easier to manage from one site, rather than multiple.¶ The problem of disposing nuclear waste is a serious one, and the lack of a solution despite 30 years of debate is troubling. In January 2010, President Obama setup a Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) to study the problem and to recommend actions to finally address the nuclear waste problem. The BRC recommended the establishment of a consent-based approach to siting a waste facility, the development of interim storage¶ 6facilities, the creation of a separate government entity tasked only with addressing nuclear waste, as well as several other recommendations.39 The recommendations will be difficult to pass through Congress, but until resolved, the nuclear waste problem will bedevil the entire nuclear industry, including SMRs.

### China

#### US can’t lead—state run nuclear power will always win

**Domenici and Miller 12** [Pete, Former U.S. Senator and Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Dr Warren F, Former Department of energy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear energy, “Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets,” September, <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Nuclear%20Report.PDF>]

However, domestic exporters of U.S. nuclear technology, fuels, and services face a truly global and highly competitive market. Commercial nuclear technology is now available from a variety of suppliers, and there are many more companies, several of which have the direct backing of their country’s government, competing with U.S. firms. Industry and other stakeholders believe that U.S. nuclear technology companies are at a competitive disadvantage in international markets due to complex and overlapping federal regulations. Several presenters at the BPC Nuclear Initiative event noted that multiple federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce, DOe, and the Department of State have jurisdiction over commercial nuclear trade, global safety and security, and nonproliferation.

#### Alt cause—export regulations

Platts, 10/1/2012. “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149.

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

\*\*\*Burdensome U.S. export regulations are the critical obstacle to nuclear leadership—the U.S. actually still has the supply chain, but massive delays in processing push countries away from the U.S.

#### War in the Congo disproves your impact -- it drew in all regional powers and international interests—didn’t go nuclear or escalate

Porteous 4(Tom, London director of Human Rights Watch and syndicated columnist, writer and analyst who has worked for the BBC and the U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, October. “Resolving African Conflicts.” http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr\_01\_porteos.html)

If a storm can be described as perfect, then the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) in the second half of the 1990s was the “perfect war”. Precipitated by the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the fall of the West’s client kleptocrat, President Mobutu, and his rotten state, the war in DR Congo was dubbed Africa’s First World War. It directly involved the armed forces of six neighbouring states. It drew in factions and rebel groups from other African wars, the remnant armies of defunct neighbouring regimes, and the usual crowd of international profiteers, would-be peacemakers and humanitarians. It was closely connected with armed conflicts in several neighbouring countries, including those in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, and Angola. According to one estimate published in 2003 the war may directly and indirectly have caused the deaths of over 4 million people in DR Congo since 199As has become increasingly common in Africa the victims were almost all civilians. The war in DR Congo was but one demonstration of the emptiness of the promises of a post Cold War political and economic renaissance for Africa. There was, it is true, the remarkable transition from apartheid to majority rule in South Africa in 199There were also instances of handover to multiparty civilian rule in former one-party or military-ruled states like Ghana, Tanzania, Senegal, Mali, Zambia, Malawi, and even Nigeria. But by the end of the 1990s, any political and economic progress since the end of the Cold War had been overshadowed by a series of old and new wars that now engulfed many parts of the continent and were tipping whole regions further into instability and poverty.

**No china war**

Creehan 12– Senior Editor of the SAIS Review of International Affairs [Sean Creehan, “Assessing the Risks of Conflict in the South China Sea,” SAIS Review, Volume 32, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2012, pp. 125-128

Regarding Secretary Clinton’s first requirement, the risk of actual closure of the South China Sea remains remote, as instability in the region would affect the entire global economy, raising the price of various goods and commodities. According to some estimates, for example, as much as 50 percent of global oil tanker shipments pass through the South China Sea— that represents more than three times the tanker traffic through the Suez Canal and over five times the tanker traffic through the Panama Canal.4 It is in no country’s interest to see instability there, least of all China’s, given the central economic importance of Chinese exports originating from the country’s major southern ports and energy imports coming through the South China Sea (annual U.S. trade passing through the Sea amounts to $1.2 trillion).5 Invoking the language of nuclear deterrence theory, disruption in these sea lanes implies mutually assured economic destruction, and that possibility should moderate the behavior of all participants. Furthermore, with the United States continuing to operate from a position of naval strength (or at least managing a broader alliance that collectively balances China’s naval presence in the future), the sea lanes will remain open. While small military disputes within such a balance of power are, of course, possible, the economic risks of extended conflict are so great that significant changes to the status quo are unlikely. Pg. 126

### 1NC Grid [Nukes]

#### No risk of the impact—Energy Security Case Studies solve

Stockton 11—Assistant Secretary of Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs @ Department of Defense [Paul Stockton, “HEADLINE: ELECTRIC GRID AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY,” Committee on House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power, CQ Congressional Testimony, May 31, 2011 Tuesday]

Homeland Defense Energy Security Case Studies

I initiated a series of regional Energy Security Case Studies in January 2010 to address the policy and technical issues necessary to mitigate the risks of longterm electric power outages to clusters of Department of Defense and Defense Industrial Base sites. The Energy Grid Security Executive Council provides oversight of this effort. The case studies are consistent with requirements under Section 335 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act and a 2008 Defense Science Board Report recommendation that the Department of Defense take actions to "island" installations from the commercial electric power grid.

The case studies are an attempt to analyze the impact of an extended power outage and the potential range of feasible Department of Defense and interagency solutions, much like an analysis of alternatives. The studies are intended to help set the stage for defining the size and scope of the issue and to help facilitate the requirements process. They will help define where Department of Defense's prudent investments should end and where commercial and civil authorities, responsibilities and investments should begin. The case studies approach is designed to provide greater electric power security to a region by separating key elements of generation and distribution infrastructure from the grid as an independent operating unit or "island". The island would be capable of generating and distributing electric power if the grid (outside the region) is disrupted for either short or extended periods of time.

The first of three Case Studies was initiated in May 2010 in the Norfolk, Virginia region. The Navy's Dahlgren Mission Assurance Division completed the assessment phase (the first of three phases) for the Norfolk case study on May 13th. The Norfolk Region Assessment Phase recommended two risk mitigation approaches for operating electrical systems in support of the identified critical Department of Defense missions for extended electrical power outages.

The two mitigation approaches identified include working with the local utility to establish a load management schematic to ensure both critical Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense assets (such as life safety and supporting infrastructure) have sustained stable power in the event the load exceeds available generation. The study also recommends a second approach that separates the mission critical functions, those identified during the mission analysis, from the commercial grid and establishes separate microgrids using an integrated network of back-up generators on the installation. This enable Department of Defense to manage the load and generation within the microgrids, ensure constant and stable power to critical Department of Defense missions and reduce the overall load in the region providing the utility provider with additional flexibility stabilizing the grid and providing power to the community. Pursuing both mitigation approaches optimizes management of electric power for critical Department of Defense missions, supporting infrastructure and broader community needs. There are several potential options for finding a balance between commercially-generated and government- generated power on the installations that will be explored.

The Mission Assurance Division recently initiated phase II (solutions refinement) to refine the recommended mitigation approaches and develop a technically relevant and feasible mitigation plan. A second case study is underway at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, with a set of preliminary findings and recommendations due in July 2011. A third case study is in the initial planning stages and will include a cluster of Defense Industrial Base facilities in Texas. All case studies are pursuing the goal of mitigating the risks to Department of Defense missions caused by long-term electric power outages. The end state is a comprehensive, adaptable, and repeatable methodology to identify high-order commercial electric power- related risks on a regional basis throughout the United States and develop and implement appropriate mitigation solutions.

#### Squo solves better—it allows for short-term collaboration with utilities.

Stockton 11—Assistant Secretary of Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs @ Department of Defense [Paul Stockton, “HEADLINE: ELECTRIC GRID AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY,” Committee on House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power, CQ Congressional Testimony, May 31, 2011 Tuesday]

The Department of Defense fully recognizes the strategic importance of mitigating the growing risks to the commercial electric power grid, and therefore, the Department is taking affirmative steps internally and externally. Senior leaders are re-focusing some of the Department's energy security efforts.

Although there are steps the Department can and should take on its own to improve resilience and continuity of operations, achieving more comprehensive electric grid security to ensure critical Department of Defense missions is not something the Department of Defense can do acting alone. Meeting and securing the Department of Defense's critical electric power needs in an interdependent and increasingly complex risk environment requires a broad scope of collaborative engagement between government and industry stakeholders whose roles and responsibilities in power grid security and resiliency are distributed and shared. While there are maintenance and on-site power surety efforts that need some new focus, for the Department of Defense to succeed in this challenge, leadership and support from industry representatives and interagency partners at various levels of government are imperative.
The Department of Defense is collaborating with the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and industry representatives, namely the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, in these matters. For example, we are planning to develop a combined kinetic and cyber threat-based scenario for the U.S. electric power grid that could be applied on a regional scale throughout the country and be used to support the development of a new system "design basis" for building additional resilience in the U.S. electric power grid. We are also working with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation on planning a case study of a military installation for analysis, paired up with the local utility provider to determine what can be done in the short- term to mitigate electric power vulnerabilities and risks.

The Department is also participating in exercises such as the recent National Level Exercise-11 exercise and upcoming Departments of Homeland Security, Energy and Defense sponsored Secure Grid 2011 and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation's GridEx 2011.

These partnerships will help the Department of Defense achieve greater energy grid security and resiliency and help mitigate the risks to critical Department of Defense installations and facilities of commercial power outages.

#### The system is robust—they have learned from past experiences.

Cauley 11—President and Chief Executive Officer North American Electric Reliability Corporation [Gerry Cauley, “HEADLINE: ELECTRIC GRID AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY,” Committee on House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power, CQ Congressional Testimony, May 31, 2011 Tuesday]

The electricity being used in this room right now is generated and transmitted in real time over a complex series of lines and stations from as far away as Ontario or Tennessee. As complex as it is, few machines are as robust as the bulk power system. Decades of experience with hurricanes, ice storms and other natural disasters, as well as mechanical breakdowns, vandalism and sabotage, have taught the electric industry how to build strong and reliable networks that generally withstand all but the worst natural and physical disasters while supporting affordable electric service. The knowledge that disturbances on the grid can impact operations thousands of miles away has influenced the electric industry culture of reliability, affecting how it plans, operates and protects the bulk power system.

#### No impact to sabotage

Newitz 10 [ANNALEE NEWITZ, The US electrical grid is too crappy to be vulnerable to terrorist attack, say physicists,” IO9, October 13, 2010 8:30 AM, pg. http://io9.com/5662593/the-us-electrical-grid-is-too-crappy-to-be-vulnerable-to-terrorist-attack-say-physicists]

Last year, network theorists published some papers suggesting that terrorists could take down the entire US electrical grid by attacking a small, remote power station. But new research shows that network theory models, which great for analyzing many complex systems, don't work for patchwork systems like the US electrical grid. Basically, the grid was set up so haphazardly that you'd have to take out a major node before you'd affect the entire thing. (Want to see a map of the US electrical grid? Check out this one on NPR.)

Science Daily sums up:

[The] electric grid is probably more secure that many people realize — because it is so unpredictable. This, of course, makes it hard to improve its reliability (in another line of research, [study co-author Paul] Hines has explored why the rate of blackouts in the United States hasn't improved in decades), but the up-side of this fact is that it would be hard for a terrorist to bring large parts of the grid down by attacking just one small part.

The researchers based their conclusions on real-world data from the power grid in the eastern U.S.

#### “Disconnect fees” and grid access deals prevent them from solving

Snider 12—E&E reporter [Annie Snider, “Clean energy doesn't always bring security for military,” Greenwire, Friday, January 27, 2012, pg. http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/01/27/1]

There is a technological fix: a switch that would let the base disconnect from the grid and keep the solar panels up, shouldering some of the backup power burden that currently falls to the base's diesel generators when commercial power goes out.

But Nellis has not implemented that fix. Nor has the Navy at the Naval Air Weapons Station in China Lake, Calif., where a 270-megawatt geothermal plant makes it the only military installation that produces more power than it uses. Nor have many other U.S. military bases that are quickly amassing fields of solar panels and wind turbines.

To be sure, the idea of using renewable energy to power critical missions wasn't on the Pentagon agenda when the Nellis and China Lake projects were built in 2007 and 1987, respectively. But today, as the Defense Department undertakes a massive effort to build renewable energy generation for "energy security," there is still no overarching requirement that such power sources be able to support vital national missions if the local power goes out.

"It's not energy security if you've got renewable generation that you cannot access if the grid goes down," said Scott Sklar, a 40-year veteran of the renewable power field and a frequent consultant for the military.

Cost is often cited as a barrier for DOD not having the proper grid-access deals or technologies. Utilities charge a "disconnect fee" for the right to drop off the grid and continue generation during a power outage. The fees vary, but military energy managers say they are sizeable enough to affect a project's overall financials.

Money's a problem for the military. Although officials see a security value to on-base power production, renewable energy projects are legally required to yield more in savings over their lifetime than they cost to build. Projects often meet that requirement with thin margins.

"If our leadership determines to us that there is a financial value to energy security, then that will be used in our evaluation of price," said Steve Dumont, an energy manager for the Air Force Command that oversees Nellis. "It's really a policy issue."

And that is the rub: DOD rules and guidance are largely driven by mandates for expanding the use of renewable energy and improving energy efficiency rather than operational need.

Pentagon policymakers have been awakened in recent years to the vulnerability of bases that rely on commercial power, but as they start to devise new standards for renewable power, they must navigate regulatory mazes that vary from state to state. States have authority over utilities, and many utilities must be dealt with individually.

Meanwhile, in the absence of orders from headquarters, base energy managers are left to make their own decisions. That is complicated by turnover on those posts and a lack of training and experience.

The result is expensive, labor-intensive projects -- some funded with federal taxpayers' cash, others by developers -- that meet federal green-energy mandates but provide little security benefit to the military.

As Pentagon officials, especially civilian appointees, raise the profile of the military's renewable energy ambitions, uniformed commanders are beginning to speak out about the problem.

Capt. Jeffrey Dodson, commander of the Navy's China Lake installation, raised the issue at a well-attended energy security event at the Pentagon this fall.

"What people don't realize is the electrons from ... geothermal don't come to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake. It goes onto the grid," he told top Pentagon brass and civilian appointees. "That's one of the main limitationsfrom an operator perspective."

#### Reactors are still in the research stage—they are decades away from being deployable.

Anderson 10—Senior Engineer in the Integrated Applications Office @ National Renewable Energy Laboratory [Kate Anderson “SMALL NUCLEAR REACTORS,” White Paper, February 1, 2010]

Despite these benefits, small reactors have many challenges to overcome. A few designs are in the engineering phase and could be commercialized within a decade, but most designs are still in the research stage, and will require extensive engineering and demonstration before they are ready to be commercialized. The unique design features that make small reactors appealing, like passive safety systems and integral designs, require non-traditional components that will need to be fully developed, tested, and demonstrated. Additional developments in instrumentation and control will be needed for most small reactor designs. Designs that depart from the traditional light water reactortechnology may required significant material and fuel qualification as well, which could take 10-12 years or more.9 pg. 3-4

#### US decline will not spark wars—theory and the empirical record prove.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

#### The Gulf will remain strategically important to the US – Independence doesn’t solve

**McNally 11** - President @ The Rapidan Group [Robert McNally, “Subject: "Changing Energy Markets and U.S. National Security" Hearing of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, CQ Congressional Testimony, December 16, 2011 Friday

But the good news must be viewed in perspective. Our energy security is and will remain strongly linked to trends and developments in the global oil market, **not just our import share**. We are and will remain vulnerable to price shocks caused by tightening global supply-demand fundamentals and geopolitical disruptions anywhere in the global oil market. And the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf region and its enormous, low-cost hydrocarbon reserves is likely to grow in the coming decades as **Asia taps them to fuel growth**. Our geopolitical and homeland security interests will remain closely bound to the security of the Persian Gulf region, the **sea-lanes** to and from it, and the ability to prevent Gulf countries from **spending their windfalls** on threats to US and global security. //1nc Defense

## 2NC

### 2NC—AT: Perm Do CP

#### 2. Procurements are investments—the counterplan is an expense funded out of the O&M budget. There is a fundamental difference between the two based on what gets funded and the appropriation account it is funded from—understanding the difference is critical to topic education on DOD financial incentives

DoD Financial Management Regulation 8 [“SUMMARY OF MAJOR CHANGES TO DOD 7000.14-R, VOLUME 2A, CHAPTER 1,” Volume 2A, Chapter 1, 􀃋October 2008, pg. http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/02a/02a\_01.pdf

0102 FUNDING POLICIES

010201. Criteria for Determining Expense and Investment Costs

A. Appropriation accounts form the structure for the President’s budget request and are the basis for congressional action. The appropriations are further organized into budget activities of appropriations with programs, projects or activities of similar purposes. To support management of the Department of Defense’s programs, projects or activities, resource requirements should be organized and categorized consistently within the appropriation and budget activity structure. The following sections provide guidance for categorizing resource requirements into the various appropriations.

B. Basic Distinctions Between Expense and Investment Costs. The criteria for cost definitions consider the intrinsic or innate qualities of the item such as durability in the case of an investment cost or consumability in the case of an operating cost and the conditional circumstances under which an item is used or the way it is managed. In all cases where the definitions appear to conflict, the conditional circumstances will prevail. The following guidance is provided to determine whether a cost is either an expense or an investment. All costs are classified as either an expense or an investment.

1. Expenses are the costs incurred to operate and maintain the organization, such as personal services, supplies, and utilities.

2. Investments are the costs that result in the acquisition of, or an addition to, end items. These costs benefit future periods and generally are of a long-term character such as real property and personal property.

C. Policy for Expense and Investment Costs

1. DoD policy requires cost definition criteria that can be used in determining the content of the programs and activities that comprise the Defense budget. The primary reasons for these distinctions are to allow for more informed resource allocation decisions and to establish criteria for determining which costs are appropriate to the various defense appropriations.

2. The cost definition criteria contained in this policy are only applicable to the determination of the appropriation to be used for budgeting and execution. Cost definitions for accounting purposes are contained in Volume I of this regulation.

3. Costs budgeted in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel appropriations are considered expenses. Costs budgeted in the Procurement and Military Construction appropriations are considered investments. Costs budgeted in the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and Family Housing appropriations include both expenses and investments. Pg. 1-13

#### 4. Procurement is a purchase by the government—the perm severs the upfront invest by the government

Pachter 4—Partner with Smith Pachter McWhorter¶ &Allen PLC [John S. Pachter, “WHAT IS A PROCUREMENT? AND WHY CAN'T DoD AND¶ THE COURTS GET IT STRAIGHT?,” Public Contract Law Journal—Vol. 34, No. 1 e Fall 2004

"Procurement" means a contract for acquisition of supplies or services "by and for the use of the Federal Government" using appropriated funds.' It seems so simple. If a contract does not involve both (1) an acquisition "by and¶ for the use of the Federal Government" and (2) appropriated funds, it is not a "procurement." Yet the Government has persuaded the courts that certain¶ contracts meeting neither of these two elements are nevertheless "procurement"¶ contracts. Pg. 2

#### 5. PFI uses private sector funds—it is not procurement.

Jankowski 6—Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy [Patrick Jankowski, Matthew Lehmann (Lieutenant in the United States Navy), & Michael P. McGee (Lieutenant in the United States Navy), “Financing the DOD Acquisition Budget: ¶ Innovative Uses of Public-Private Partnerships,” MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT, NAVAL ¶ POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, June 2006]

In recent years federal agencies who control vast real estate portfolios have had good luck with “outleases” and “share-in-savings contracts.” Outleasing involves leasing underutilized properties to private industry. Share-in-savings contracts, on the other hand is a method in which the government pays back the contractor over time utilizing the savings generated by the product. However, DOD is generally more concerned with warfighting capability which does not normally equate to operating efficiencies. Therefore, of the options listed by the GAO, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) or Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) seems to be the most promising for procurement of new capabilities. A Public-Private Partnership is a situation where private industry is brought in to help finance, or finance and run new government procurement programs. A Private Finance Initiative is a form of PPP where the private sector takes on the risk of financing the government project. Private industry can provide a deluge of capital and management expertise that government agencies do not possess and could not purchase with limited near term budget authority. The DOT found:

Expanding the private sector role allows the public agencies to tap private sector technical, management and financial resources in new ways to achieve certain public agency objectives such as greater cost and schedule certainty, supplementing in-house staff, innovate technology applications, specialized expertise or access to private capital (DOT 1). Pg. 4

#### 6. The risk taker and mode of delivery makes the counterplan distinct

Low 9—Defence Science & Technology Agency [Low Hong Kuan, “Public-Private Partnerships in Defense Acquisition Programs—Defensible?,” Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, December 2009

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) described¶ PPPs as “situated between traditional procurement and full private provision” (OECD,¶ 2008, p. 21). According to OECD (2008), the distinguishing factors are risk transfer and¶ mode of delivery. In the case of traditional procurement, the government is wholly responsible for the entire spectrum of acquisition activities—from cradle to grave—¶ involving:

• Design: based on requirements (quality and quantity) identified by the¶ government. Design is performed in-house, outsourced, or jointly¶ developed with the private sector.

• Build: comprises procurement of goods (capital assets) and related¶ services from the private sector.

• Finance: entails sourcing and obtaining the requisite funding by the¶ government, either from its revenue collection, increased taxation, or¶ issuing bonds.

• Operate: entails the delivery of services generated by the capital assets¶ comprising maintenance, upgrade, and disposal. Typically, these activities¶ are carried out through a combination of in-house efforts and outsourcing.

In a traditional procurement, the government bears the risk in the service delivery.¶ At the opposite end of the continuum from traditional procurement is full privatization— where the private sector fully takes over the role of the government in the DBFO¶ activities in providing the services (including free rein to set the prices) to the end users¶ directly. The government is thus out of the picture and the private sector bears the service ¶ delivery risk. In the middle of the continuum are PPPs, where the private sector essentially takes over all the DBFO activities. The key distinction from privatization is¶ the “partial” involvement of government throughout the DBFO (i.e., in setting the quality¶ and quantity requirement, in ensuring private sector compliance to agreed output¶ specification, and in negotiating for the prices of services provided by the private sector¶ using the capital assets). The comparison is illustrated in Table 1 using a hypothetical¶ case of an air-grading program for the selection of candidates for a military pilot training program:

Having differentiated PPPs from both traditional procurement and privatization, there is one last thing to note regarding PPP terminology for the purpose of interpreting¶ 6¶ the global PPP movement. Specifically, there are 14 documented variations of PPPs¶ (OECD, 2008). In each of these variations, the existence and degree of the DBFO¶ characteristics vary. Pg. 3 AT: Do CP

#### 7. The lit identifies the counterplan as an alternative to appropriated funds—you should preserve this ground to reward us for our in-depth research on the DOD purchasing process and to encourage this type of research in the future.

Summers & Miguel 7—Lecturer in Financial Management @ Naval Postgraduate School & Professor of Financial Management @ Naval Postgraduate School [Donald E. Summers (LtCol, USMC (Ret) & Dr. Joseph G. San Miguel, “Budget Scoring: An Impediment to Alternative Financing,” Naval Postgraduate School, NPS-GSBPP-07-011, 6 September 2007

In an era of limited resources, limited access to appropriated funds and ¶ growing mission demands, the Department of Defense (DoD) must consider alternative forms of financing, including leases and public-private partnerships ¶ (PPPs), to fund necessary mission requirements. This research examines the ¶ budgetary treatment, or “scoring,” of these financial arrangements by the Office of ¶ Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the ¶ House and Senate Budget Committees. Every piece of congressional legislation ¶ must be scored in accordance with the federal budget process. Scoring legislation is ¶ the process of tracking budget authority, projecting future federal outlays based on ¶ the budget authority, and recording the actual obligations and outlays in budget ¶ execution. The scoring process can greatly affect a bill’s ability to be passed based ¶ on the determinations made by the CBO or Congressional Budget Committees. Pg. xiii

### 2NC Solvency—Cutting-Edge Tech

#### Private firms provide access to cash and cutting-edge tech

Chang et al. 99 [Ike Y. Chang,¶ Steven Galing,¶ Carolyn Wong,¶ Howell Yee,¶ Elliot I. Axelband,¶ Mark Onesi &¶ Kenneth R Horn, “Use of¶ Public-Private¶ Partnerships to¶ Meet Future¶ Army Needs,” Rand Corporation, Prepared for the United States Army by RAND's Arroyo, 1999

Private firms are likely to contribute to PPPs with marketing expertise, access to capital, access to leading-edge technology, and operating expertise. Marketing is the art of selling a product or service. It¶ usually involves combining product/service use analysis with pricing,¶ promotion, place, and targeted consumers. Access to capital means¶ access to money. In this case, the money would be used to help¶ finance a collaborative effort. Access to leading-edge technology¶ means that the most modern technology will be used in research¶ efforts to advance the state of the art. Operating expertise is the know-how to manage land and/or facilities efficiently. Pg. xix

### 2NC Solvency—Innovation

#### This is an advantage for the CP—PPPs are better at assessing leading-edge tech

Chang et al. 99 [Ike Y. Chang,¶ Steven Galing,¶ Carolyn Wong,¶ Howell Yee,¶ Elliot I. Axelband,¶ Mark Onesi &¶ Kenneth R Horn, “Use of¶ Public-Private¶ Partnerships to¶ Meet Future¶ Army Needs,” Rand Corporation, Prepared for the United States Army by RAND's Arroyo, 1999

Access to Leading-Edge Technology

Access to leading-edge technology ensures that the most modern technology will be used in research efforts to advance the state of the art. Access to leading-edge technology is an advantage that can be leveraged by intellectual property PPPs.

The private sector holds the lead in many technologies that are of Army interest. Examples include textiles and information technologies such as telecommunications. Research units at commercial firms are usually aware of the latest technical developments in their field, have the most advanced equipment to conduct R&D, and are cognizant of what their competitors are researching.

In contrast, the Army is often not aware of the latest developments in certain fields, doesn't always have access to the most advanced equipment, and doesn't have the time or resources to keep current on private-sector R&D efforts. Through PPPs, the Army can gain better access to the entire body of private-sector knowledge, equipment, and know-how without investing additional dollars to gain it. Clearly, in dual-use fields where the private sector holds the technological lead, it makes sense for the Army to look to its private partner¶ to provide access to leading-edge technology. Pg. 15

### 2NC Solvency—R&D

#### PPP boosts R&D

Chang et al. 99 [Ike Y. Chang,¶ Steven Galing,¶ Carolyn Wong,¶ Howell Yee,¶ Elliot I. Axelband,¶ Mark Onesi &¶ Kenneth R Horn, “Use of¶ Public-Private¶ Partnerships to¶ Meet Future¶ Army Needs,” Rand Corporation, Prepared for the United States Army by RAND's Arroyo, 1999

Our previous research has shown that the Army has significant opportunities to more effectively achieve its R&D goals through collaboration with the private sector.¶ 12 We have also shown how the Army¶ can effectively implement a collaborative R&D policy.¶ 13¶ The discussion above shows that the private sector has the financial means¶ to perform collaborative research with the Army. In addition, PPPs¶ can benefit the Army by creating opportunities for it to leverage its¶ resources, creating new assets or increasing the value of existing assets, or generating a revenue stream. PPPs also improve the Army's¶ ability to do leading-edge research by retaining self-supporting research installations that would under BRAC/sell be permanently lost¶ to the Army. In short, PPPs can be used to accomplish many Army¶ military objectives. In this report, we will specifically examine how¶ PPPs can help the Army gain benefits through infrastructure, intellectual property, and financial arrangements. Pg. 9

### 2NC—AT: “Say No”

#### 3. We are a more powerful incentive than the plan.

Gardner 8—Captain in the US Air Force [Christopher P. Gardner, “Balancing Government Risks with Contractor Incentives in Performance-Based Logistics Contracts,” THESIS, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management, AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, AFIT/GLM/ENS/08-2, March 2008]

It is important to understand the impact that financial and operational risk have on PBL contract decisions. “The tradeoff of these two kinds of risk is central to the logic of PBL outsourcing. PBL contracts are almost always offered across multiple years (lowering financial risk for the vendor), with the expectation that the vendor will assume some degree of operational risk (Doerr et al., 2005).” As discussed previously, long-term relationships are at the core of a successful PBL strategy. To take this further, contracts offered across multiple years may be the best existing incentive for vendors to provide the best weapon system support possible. “Rewarding contractors with long-term relationships may provide a more powerful incentive than extra profit. Surely, extra profit is important to a business in reaching short-term goals. Profit earned over an extended period, however, is better aligned with the longer strategic goals of a firm, and therefore exerts greater influence on shaping contractor performance (Stevens and Yoder, 2005).” Pg. 14

#### 4. They ignore the value of profit stability and marketing.

Gardner 8—Captain in the US Air Force [Christopher P. Gardner, “Balancing Government Risks with Contractor Incentives in Performance-Based Logistics Contracts,” THESIS, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management, AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, AFIT/GLM/ENS/08-2, March 2008]

It can be argued that the DoD’s compelling reasons to partner are to improve service to its customers, the warfighters, and to improve asset performance and cost efficiencies. By employing the PBL strategy, the DoD aims not only to better meet the needs of the operational end-users by improving system performance and readiness (as indicated in the aforementioned definitions of PBL), but also to minimize the total system life cycle costs and logistics footprints associated with those systems (DoDD 5000.1, 2003). On the other hand, private companies are driven to partner with DoD by the prospective benefits of profit stability/growth and marketing advantage. Profit stability is obviously important for any firm that exists to make money, and this is what makes contract duration so important to firms that participate in performance-based partnerships with the government. Profitability is enhanced by long-term volume commitments for products, services, or both (Noordewier et al., 1990). It could also be stated that potential marketing advantage acts as a driver for defense contractors. National defense requirements have created a market for industrial opportunities that exists nowhere else. Military specifications allow a firm such as Boeing, which develops and produces both commercial and military aircraft, to showcase their most sleek and powerful aircraft designs, enhancing their marketing mix. Pg. 11-12

### 2NC—Overview

#### AND, perception of decline risks global security recalculations—it makes prolif and major wars inevitable

Lieberthal & O'Hanlon 12—Foreign policy scholars @ Brookings Institution [Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal (Professor of Poli Sci @ [University of Michigan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Michigan)) & Dr. Michael O'Hanlon (Lecturer of Poli Sci @ [Princeton University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton_University)), “The real national security threat: America's debt,” Los Angeles Times, July 3, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703,0,1409615.story]

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

#### Now is key—modernization is necessary to stave off the readiness crisis.

Graham 8/21/12—Research co-ordinator for national security and foreign policy @ The Heritage Foundation [Owen Graham, “U.S. military in danger of returning to a ‘hollow force’” The Record, August 21, 2012, pg. http://www.therecord.com/print/article/783701]

After 10 years of war and major wear and tear on military equipment, the military is in dire shape and needs to be modernized. While defence expenditures did rise after 9/11, they were largely spent on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan — not on modernization (i.e., new planes, ships or weapon systems).

The U.S. military is facing a readiness crisis, one confronting not only its soldiers but also pushing its military equipment to the breaking point. Across all services, readiness problems are worsening. Breakdowns are happening more frequently. The Navy deploys ships that are barely able to sail, and members of the army have had to tape body armour to their SUVs. The U.S. military needs to be modernized, not subjected to additional cuts.

### 2NC Impact—Miscalc

#### Their tradeoffs risk miscalculated wars—our internal link outweighs their link turns.

Gates 11—US Secretary of Defense [Robert M. Gates, “Notre Dame Commencement,” Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, IN, Sunday, May 22, 2011, pg. http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1568]

The problems we as a nation are grappling with are well-known: steep fiscal imbalances and mounting debt, which could develop into a deep crisis for our country.  At the same time, we face a complex and unpredictable international security environment that includes a major war in Afghanistan, winding up the war in Iraq, revolution throughout the Middle East, new rising powers, nuclear proliferation in Iran and Korea, the continued threat of terrorism, and more.

While the challenges I’ve described are unique to this moment in history, their scale is no greater than others this country has dealt with and successfully overcome.  We have battled slavery and intolerance in our own society, and on the global stage prevailed against Nazi Germany and Soviet Communism.  We have seen periods of painful economic collapse give way to renewed and unprecedented prosperity.  Our progress has been sometimes unsteady, and sometimes too slow.  Winston Churchill purportedly said during World War II, “you can always count on the Americans to do the right thing—after they’ve tried everything else.”

But our national story has been, and still is, the envy of the world.  Indeed, the death of Osama Bin Laden after a decade-long manhunt by the United States reminded us earlier this month that, as President Obama said, when faced with tough times “we do not falter.  We don’t turn back.  We pick ourselves up and we get on with the hard task of keeping our country strong and safe.”

Still, we cannot assume, because things have worked out in the past, that the problems we face will eventually solve themselves.  We need the active involvement of our best, most honest citizens, to make our democracy work—whether as candidates for public office, as civil servants, as members of our armed forces or other roles.

And no matter how many smart or talented individuals make up our government, in order to make progress in confronting our most pressing problems, we need leaders able to make tough choices and to work together.  President Kennedy, who in the early 1960s inspired so many young people—like me—to public service, was fond of pointing out that, in the mid-19th century, some of the finest statesmen this nation has ever produced served in Congress.  Men of prodigious talent such as Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, Thomas Hart Benton and Stephen Douglas, among others.  Yet Kennedy would note that this group, despite their profound integrity and skill and intelligence, could not ultimately stave off a bloody, and ruinous, civil war.

Today, we face challenges that do not threaten America’s unity and very existence as directly­­­­­­­­­­­, but they are in some ways just as complex.  And if there’s consensus in Washington on one thing, it is that we cannot put off dealing with this crisis any longer.  But going forward, we must be clear-eyed about the fact that there are no painless answers.

As we make the tough choices needed to put this country’s finances in order and to secure our future prosperity—including the sacrifices that will be required of all Americans—there will undoubtedly be calls to shrink America’s role in the world—for us to sharply reduce our international commitments and the size and capabilities of our military.  I would like to address these calls, in this place and at this time.

A recurring theme in America for nearly a century has been a tendency to conclude after each war that the fundamental nature of man and the iron realities of nations have changed.  That history in all of its unpredictable and tragic dimensions has come to a civilized end.  That we will no longer have to confront foreign enemies with size, steel, and strength.  Another tendency, repeated over the last century, has been for Americans repeatedly to avert our eyes in the belief that remote events elsewhere in the world need not engage this country—from the assassination of an Austrian archduke in unknown Bosnia–Herzegovina in 1914 to the rise of a group called the Taliban in Afghanistan and their alliance with an organization called Al Qaeda in the 1990s.  The lessons of history tell us we must not diminish our ability or our determination to deal with the threats and challenges on the horizon, because ultimately they will need to be confronted.

If history—and religion—teach us anything, it is that there will always be evil in the world, people bent on aggression, oppression, satisfying their greed for wealth and power and territory, or determined to impose an ideology based on the subjugation of others and the denial of liberty to men and women.  More than any other Secretary of Defense, I have been a strong advocate of soft power—of the critical importance of diplomacy and development as fundamental components of our foreign policy and national security.  But make no mistake, the ultimate guarantee against the success of aggressors, dictators, and terrorists in the 21st century, as in the 20th, is hard power –the size, strength, and global reach of the United States military.

Beyond the current wars, our military credibility, commitment, and presence are required to sustain alliances, to protect trade routes and energy supplies, and to deter would-be adversaries from making the kind of miscalculations that so often lead to war.

All of these things happen mostly out of sight and out of mind to the average American, and thus are taken for granted.  But they all depend on a properly armed, trained and funded American military, which cannot be taken for granted.

Now to be sure, a strong military cannot exist without a strong economy underpinning it.  At some point fiscal insolvency at home translates into strategic insolvency abroad.  As part of America getting its financial house in order, the size of our defense budget must be addressed.  That means culling more bureaucratic excess and overhead, taking a hard look at personnel and costs, and reexamining missions and capabilities to separate the desirable or optional from the essential.  Throughout this process we should keep in mind historian Donald Kagan’s observation that the preservation of peace depends upon those states seeking that goal having both the preponderant power and the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve it.  And we must not forget what Winston Churchill once said, that “the price of greatness is responsibility…the people of the United States cannot escape world responsibility.”

#### They risk wars with Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.

Rubin 8/30/12—Resident scholar @ American Enterprise Institute and Senior lecturer @ Naval Postgraduate School [[Michael Rubin](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/author/michael-rubin/), "[Will Congress Take Military into the 1970s?](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/08/30/will-congress-take-military-into-the-1970s/),” Commentary, 08.30.2012—1:15 PM, pg. http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/08/30/will-congress-take-military-into-the-1970s/

If entitlements are cutback, we know what will happen: the economy will expand and charities and faith communities will pick up the slack; the government will still care for the most needy. If the U.S. ability to project its power is reduced to beneath even Carter administration standards, then the world in which we function will be far different. This may be the Obama administration’s goal. After all, as the Foundation for Defense of Democracy’s Cliff May notes, the scariest statement to which the mainstream media has given short shift was his promise to then-Russian President Medvedev to pursue [even more devastating cutbacks](http://townhall.com/columnists/cliffmay/2012/08/16/obamas_future_flexibility/page/full/) once he no longer has to stand for election.

There will be no savings: When enemies perceive the United States as weak, they act. And—be they Russia, North Korea, China, or Iran—the United States has no shortage of adversaries.

### 2NC Impact—Nuke Modernization

#### 2013 budget funds nuke modernization that is key to deter nuke use and reassure allies.

Marshall 12 [Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., “Stratcom Chief Discusses U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Force,” American Forces Press Service, May 30, 2012, pg. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116551]

WASHINGTON, May 30, 2012—Air Force Gen. Robert Kehler, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, described the shaping of the nation’s nuclear strategic force in the current global environment during remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations here today.

“Really, of all the important mission responsibilities assigned to the United States Strategic Command by the president, none is more important than our responsibility to deter a strategic attack on the United States and our allies and partners,” Kehler said.

Deterrence and assurance “have been part of the national lexicon for well over half a century, and for many of those decades, strategic deterrence focused solely on leveraging U.S. nuclear capabilities to deter a massive nuclear or conventional attack on the U.S. or our allies,” he said.

Kehler noted the era of “one size fits all” deterrence passed with the end of the Cold War. In today’s world, some regimes, such as those in North Korea and Iran, as well as terrorist groups are said to be seeking to acquire nuclear arms and possibly other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

“Strategic deterrence and assurance remain relevant concepts today, but we are shaping those concepts toward a broader array of individual actors, each with their own unique context,” the general explained. What Kehler called tailored deterrence requires a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of today’s multi-faceted threats and the decision-making processes of threatening regimes and groups.

“To be sure, deterrence is still fundamentally about influencing an actor’s decisions,” Kehler said. “It is about a solid policy foundation, it is about credible capabilities, it is about what the U.S. and our allies, as a whole, can bring to bear in both a military and non-military sense."

Kehler pointed out deterrence planning and forces must fit today’s unique global security environment, which he described as an enormously complex and uncertain world that includes nuclear weapons and nuclear armed states “where several of those nuclear armed states are modernizing both their arsenals and their delivery systems,” he added. “The threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the growing potential for disruption or attack through cyberspace and the danger of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of violent extremists.”

Kehler said this is the context for today’s nuclear deterrence and pointed to the Nuclear Posture Review which recognized the need to maintain a capable force and modern infrastructure for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The general quoted the remarks of former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates: “‘As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal to maintain strategic stability with other major nuclear powers, deter potential adversaries, and reassure our allies and partners of our security commitments to them.’” The new U.S. defense strategy released in January contains similar language, Kehler said, but noted “This is not your father’s nuclear-deterrent force.”

The United States has witnessed an impressive 67-year period without nuclear use, Kehler said, noting the nation has regularly adjusted its nuclear capabilities to match U.S. national security needs in the global environment. Some of these adjustments made over the years, he said, include reduction of the number of ballistic missile submarines, conversion of four Ohio-class submarines to carry conventional cruise missiles, and affirmation of the B-1 bomber’s non-nuclear role, among other changes.

“In total, our [nuclear weapons] stockpile is down 70 percent from the day the Berlin Wall fell. These are significant changes. At each decision point along the way, the U.S. carefully accounted for potential impacts on deterrent capability and strategic stability,” he added.

Kehler said the end result is a smaller force still capable of deterring adversaries and assuring allies of U.S. capability to maintain strategic stability in a future crisis. He also noted President Barack Obama’s Fiscal Year [2013] Budget “continues to sustain the essential investment to keep the nuclear deterrent force able and ready to do its job.”

### 2NC Link—New Spending

#### And trade-offs are guaranteed—their spending must be offset.

Serbu 12 [Jared Serbu, “Panetta to Congress: Don't mess with my budget,” Federal News Radio, Friday—5/11/2012, http://www.federalnewsradio.com/394/2861074/Panetta-to-Congress-Dont-mess-with-my-budget]

Panetta warned lawmakers that tinkering with DoD's budget plan is a recipe for stalemate with the Senate and will have negative consequences for national security.

"The Department of Defense is not going to support additional funds that come at the expense of critical national security priorities," he said. "If members of Congress try to restore their favorite programs without regard to an overall strategy, the cuts will have to come from areas that impact overall readiness. There's no free lunch here."

The remarks at a Pentagon news conference came hours after the House panel approved its version of the 2013 Defense authorization bill. The panel's chairman, Buck McKeon (R-Calif.), has been [extremely critical](http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=394&sid=2786080) of DoD's plan to reduce spending by $487 billion over the next 10 years despite having voted in favor of the 2011 Budget Control Act that mandated the spending reductions.

Every extra dollar must have an offset

Given the parameters of the deficit-cutting legislation lawmakers passed last year, the military must cut $487 billion from national security programs one way or another, Panetta argued.

"Every dollar that is added by Congress will have to be offset somewhere. And if for some reason they don't want to comply with the Budget Control Act, they'd certainly be adding to the deficit, which certainly puts our national security even further at risk," he said.

## 1NR

### Solvency

#### AND—DOD won’t choose to exempt themselves—it would force them to accept liability when they don’t have sufficient personnel or expertise to regulate nuclear power.

Marcus King, LaVar Huntzinger, and Thoi Nguyen, March 2011. CNA Environment and Energy Team, Resource Analysis Division. “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” <http://www.cna.org/research/2011/feasibility-nuclear-power-us-military>.

The most basic licensing issue relates to whether NRC will have jurisdiction over potential nuclear reactor sites or whether DoD could be self-regulating. Our conversations with NRC indicate it is the only possible licensing authority for reactors that supply power to the com- mercial grid. However, DOE and DoD are authorized to regulate mission critical nuclear facilities under Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act. There is some historical precedent for DoD exercising this authority. For example, the Army Nuclear Program was granted exception under this rule with regard to the reactor that operated aboard the Sturgis barge in the 1960s and 1970s [44].¶ It seems unlikely that DoD would pursue exemption under Section 91b in the future.10 Regulating power plants is a function that lies beyond DoD's core mission. The Department and the military ser- vices are unlikely to have personnel with sufficient expertise to act as regulators for nuclear power plants, and it could take considerable time and resources to develop such expertise. Without NRC oversight DoD would bear all associated risks.

#### DOD SMRs would still be subject to design licensing.

William A. Macon Jr., 10/28/2009. Nuclear engineer assigned to the U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency, “Nuclear Power Plants on Military Installations,” https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B83Q27\_xggOTMDUwYTdlMjctNDgxMC00NzAxLWI4M2UtZTZkNDYzNzE0MzJi/edit?hl=en]

New reactor concepts for military applications will likely involve new and unproven designs. The NRC has historically focused on light-water reactor designs and would have to develop new licensing requirements and processes for the new technologies. To meet the statutory requirement of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to complete construction and operation of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) by FY2021, the NRC estimated in 2008 that it would take 5 years to develop necessary analytical tools, data, and other regulatory infrastructure (e.g., regulatory guides, standard review plan, etc.) for confirmatory safety analyses and license review, and another 4-5 years to conduct the licensing review. DOD may be able to justify a faster safety review process for small military reactors under a national security and/or homeland defense priority, but again there is no guarantee that the NRC would expedite reviews unless all stakeholders are willing to move forward to support the ESGs and other national goals.

#### Procurement is exclusively purchasing.

Schwartz 10—Specialist in Defense Acquisition @ Congressional Research Service [Moshe Schwartz, “Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process,” Congressional Research Service, April 23, 2010

The Department of Defense (DOD) purchases goods and services from contractors to support¶ military operations. Any purchase of a good or service by DOD is defined as a procurement. In¶ contrast, the term defense acquisition is a broader term that applies to more than just the purchase or procurement, of an item or service; the acquisition process encompasses the design, engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment, and disposal of weapons or related items purchased from a contractor.1 DOD’s acquisition system is highly complex (see Appendix A), and does not always produce systems that meet anticipated cost or performance expectations. Pg. 1

#### Your author concedes lack of solution to waste blocks nuclear expansion. Also cites a handful of other alt-causes.

Cullinane 11—Staff at House Foreign Affairs Committee. Graduate student at the Institute of World Politics (Scott, America Falling Behind: The Strategic Dimensions of Chinese Commercial Nuclear Energy, 9/28/11, www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=118%3Acontent&id=319%3Aamerica-falling-behind-the-strategic-dimensions-of-chinese-commercial-nuclear-energy&tmpl=component&print=1&page=&option=com\_content&Itemid=376)

Prudent actions for US government include:¶ • Build a permanent storage facility, either at Yucca Mountain or elsewhere, to dispose of nuclear waste material. The lack of a permanent storage area is a limiting factor on any expansion of domestic nuclear power plants. ¶ • Streamline the licensing and authorization process for new reactors. Some recent progress has been made in this area, but more can be done to improve efficiencies. ¶ • Continue to build on the incentives for the construction of nuclear power plants that were put in place by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.¶ • Re-write US export controls to guard against PRC industrial espionage, improve US counterintelligence in places of nuclear research, and confront problems associated with deemed-export at US research institutions. ¶ • Invest in nuclear energy research, specifically in safer more efficient reactors that reduce the upfront costs that often hamper nuclear power plant construction. Small reactors or modular construction represent two areas with good potential. ¶ • Create a whole of government strategy for the construction and export of nuclear reactors and related equipment. ¶

### Advantage 1

#### 2. Smart grids solve—they will create isolated energy islands.

MarketWatch 12 [“Smart Grid Technology May Help Sustain Vital Social Services During Blackouts,” July 9, 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/smart-grid-technology-may-help-sustain-vital-social-services-during-blackouts-2012-07-09]

WASHINGTON, July 9, 2012 /PRNewswire via COMTEX/ -- 'Keeping the lights on' can be a challenge during extreme weather and other disasters like those affecting the East Coast of the U.S. this summer, but real options may be available to avoid some of the power-related crises that follow upon such events. Leading researchers from Carnegie Mellon University suggest that rethinking the solution to sustaining electric power--namely, starting small--could keep critical services going, even when the high-voltage 'grid' is crippled. It is worth noting that the U.S. military is already taking steps to protect its power supplies in the event of a massive grid failure by adopting small, local energy technologies, and California Governor Jerry Brown recently announced that he wants 12,000 megawatts of such power supplies in his state.

This natural disaster demonstrated that, despite ongoing efforts to improve electric power transmission reliability, the risk of prolonged regional blackouts remains a significant concern. To combat future widespread and extended power outages, Carnegie Mellon University researchers have devised a strategy to use local distributed electricity generation, distribution automation, and smart meters to form small electricity "islands" that would support critical social services in the event of a substantial disruption resulting from extreme weather, terrorism, or other causes.

Distributed generation (DG) collects and distributes electricity from many small energy sources rather than relying on large centralized power facilities. Carnegie Mellon University researchers Anu Narayanan and M. Granger Morgan examined the incremental cost of adding DG units and smart meters to a hypothetical community of 5,000 households covering an area of 5 km2. The research was conducted with funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and Carnegie Mellon University. The study, titled "Sustaining Critical Social Services During Extended Regional Power Blackouts," appears in the July 2012 issue of Risk Analysis, published by the Society for Risk Analysis.

Under normal operation, large centralized utility generators send electricity along a high-voltage transmission system to a low-voltage distribution system that ultimately delivers power to homes, schools, police stations and other local consumers. An extreme disturbance such as a hurricane can disrupt the high-voltage transmission system and eliminate power to entire regions. Under the Narayanan and Morgan strategy, electricity circuits would be manually or automatically rerouted to form isolated energy islands powered by local DG units. To achieve a "smart grid" DG system, utility companies would need to install smart meters that can efficiently disconnect non-critical loads, add automated components to reroute electricity circuits, and upgrade fault-handling equipment and control software to ensure the smaller grid's reliability.

#### The grid is 99.999% reliable.

Joskow 11—Professor of Economics @ MIT [Paul L. Joskow, “Creating a Smarter U.S. Electricity Grid,” October 2011, MIT CEEPR: A Joint Center of the Department of Economics, MIT Energy Initiative and MIT Sloan School of Management, CEEPR WP 2011-021]

Despite this complex operational management structure, the U.S. transmission system is presently very reliable. While good comprehensive numbers are not available, it is extremely rare that retail consumers lose power because of failures of equipment or ¶ operating errors on the high voltage transmission system. EPRI (2011a, p.2.1) estimates ¶ that U.S. power systems achieve 99.999% reliability at the high voltage (bulk) ¶ transmission network level and that over 90% of the outages experienced by retail ¶ customers are due to failures on the distribution system, not the transmission system (EPRI (2011a, p. 6.1). However, when a rare major failure does occur on the high voltage transmission network, as with the 2003 Midwest-Northeast blackout when 50 million customers were affected with outages that lasted up to a couple of days, the associated costs can be quite high. Pg. 18

### Advantage 2

#### Reforming “Part 810” allows the U.S. to recapture the nuclear market, and can be done through administrative changes that avoid political controversy.

Platts, 10/1/2012. “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149.

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

#### U.S. companies already produce superior technology—broad Part 810 export regulations crush U.S. market share and undermine focus on truly sensitive technologies.

NEI, Winter 2012. Nuclear Energy Institute. “U.S. Nuclear Export Rules Hurt Global Competitiveness,” <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/insight/insightwinter2012/us-nuclear-export-rules-hurt-global-competitiveness/>.

Today, U.S. dominance of the global nuclear power market has eroded as suppliers from other countries compete aggressively against American exporters. U.S. suppliers confront competitors that benefit from various forms of state promotion and also must contend with a U.S. government that has not adapted to new commercial realities. The potential is tremendous—$500 billion to $740 billion in international orders over the next decade, representing tens of thousands of potential American jobs, according to the [U.S. Department of Commerce](http://www.commerce.gov/). With America suffering a large trade deficit, nuclear goods and services represent a market worth aggressive action. However, antiquated U.S. government approaches to nuclear exports are challenging U.S. competitiveness in the nuclear energy market. New federal support is needed if the United States wants to reclaim dominance in commercial nuclear goods and services—and create the jobs that go with them. “The U.S. used to be a monopoly supplier of nuclear materials and technology back in the ’50s and ’60s,” said Fred McGoldrick, former director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the [State Department](http://www.state.gov/). “That position has eroded to the point where we’re a minor player compared to other countries.” America continues to lead the world in technology innovation and know-how. So what are the issues? And where is the trade? Effective coordination among the many government agencies involved in nuclear exports would provide a boost to U.S. suppliers. “Multiple U.S. agencies are engaged with countries abroad that are developing nuclear power, from early assistance to export controls to trade finance and more,” said Ted Jones, director for supplier international relations at NEI. The challenge is to create a framework that allows commercial nuclear trade to grow while ensuring against the proliferation of nuclear materials. “To compete in such a situation, an ongoing dialogue between U.S. suppliers and government needs to be conducted and U.S. trade promotion must be coordinated at the highest levels,” Jones said. Licensing U.S. Exports Jurisdiction for commercial nuclear export controls is divided among the Departments of [Energy](http://energy.gov/) and Commerce and the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission](http://www.nrc.gov/) and has not been comprehensively updated to coordinate among the agencies or to reflect economic and technological changes over the decades. The State Department also is involved in international nuclear commerce. It negotiates and implements so-called “[123 agreements](http://export.gov/civilnuclear/eg_main_022093.asp)” that allow for nuclear goods and services to be traded with a foreign country. The federal agencies often have different, conflicting priorities, leading to a lack of clarity for exporters and longer processing times for export licenses. “The U.S. nuclear export regime is the most complex and restrictive in the world and the least efficient,” said Jones. “Furthermore, it is poorly focused on items and technologies that pose little or no proliferation concern. By trying to protect too much, we risk diminishing the focus on sensitive technologies and handicapping U.S. exports.” A case in point is the Energy Department’s [Part 810 regulations](http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div5&view=text&node=10:4.0.2.5.23&idno=10). While 123 agreements open trade between the United States and other countries, Part 810 regulates what the United States can trade with another country. For certain countries, it can take more than a year to obtain “specific authorizations” to export nuclear items. Because other supplier countries authorize exports to the same countries with fewer requirements and delays, the Part 810 rules translate into a significant competitive disadvantage for U.S. suppliers. Today, 76 countries require a specific authorization, but DOE has proposed almost doubling that number—to include for the first time countries that have never demonstrated a special proliferation concern, that are already part of the global nuclear supply chain, and that plan new nuclear infrastructure. The proposed Part 810 rule would do nothing to reduce lengthy license processing times, said Jones. Other nuclear supplier countries impose strict guidelines on their licensing agencies for timely processing of applications. Equivalent licenses must be processed in fewer than nine months in France, fewer than 90 days in Japan and 15 days in South Korea. One possible solution, said McGoldrick, would be to set similar deadlines for issuance of licenses. U.S. agencies “could have deadlines set forth in the new [Part 810] regulations, which would give the relevant government agencies specified times in which to act on a license. Time could be exceeded only under certain circumstances,” said McGoldrick.