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#### Taoism

#### No one knows what is good and bad. Reject the aff’s judgments, even if we lose all life on earth

Kirkland 98 [Russell Kirkland, Associate Professor of Religion (and Asian Studies), “"Responsible Non-Action" In a Natural World: Perspectives from the Nei-Yeh, Chuang-Tzu, and Tao-Te Ching,” 1998, University of Georgia, http://kirkland.myweb.uga.edu/rk/pdf/pubs/ECO.pdf]

Why It Is Wrong to Resent Unexpected Changes In Chuang-tzu 18, we find two famous stories in which a man experiences a sudden and deeply personal transformation, a transformation that strikes others around him as deeply troubling.5 In one, the philosopher Hui-tzu goes to offer his sympathies to Chuang-tzu upon the event of the death of Chuang's wife. In the next story, a willow suddenly sprouts from the elbow of a fictional character. In each story, a sympathetic friend is shocked and dismayed to find that the first character in each story is not shocked and dismayed by the unexpected turn of events. In each story, the first character patiently and rationally explains the nature of life, and counsels his companion to accept the course of events that life brings to us, without imposing judgment as to the value of those events. In each case, the reader learns that it is foolish and inappropriate to feel emotional distress at such events, for a proper understanding of the real nature of life leads us to accept all events with the same equanimity, even those events that might have once sticken us as deeply distressing. In the Taoist classic Huai-nan-tzu, one finds a famous story of a man who suddenly finds himself the unexpected owner of a new horse. His neighbors congratulate him on his good fortune, until his son falls from the horse and breaks his leg. The man's neighbors then act to console him on his bad fortune, until army conscriptors arrive and carry off all the able-bodied young men, leaving the injured young man behind as worthless. The lesson of the story is that when an event occurs, we are quick to judge it as fortunate or unfortunate, but our judgments are often mistaken, as later events often prove.6 And one of the most heavily stressed lessons of the Chuang-tzu is that humans quickly judge events on the basis of what we accept on the basis of simplistic assumptions — e.g., that life is inherently better than death — and that the wise person learns to question and discard such assumptions, and forego such judgments regarding events. When Chuang-tzu's wife died, Chuang-tzu does not argue that the world is a better place for her absence, or that his life is improved by his sudden new freedom. In fact, there is no issue in the passage of whether the world is better off with Chuang-tzu's wife alive or dead. The only issue in the passage is that people are born and that people later die, and to ignore that basic fact would display culpable stupidity. The very same lesson is impressed upon the reader of the previous passage, regarding the sudden transformation of a character's elbow. What we are taught in that passage is that life is a process of ineluctable change and transformation, and that humans would be profoundly wrong and clearly silly to object to such change. Another element of the lesson is that the nature of human life is not separate from, or other than, the nature of nonhuman life. When one says that "life is ineluctable change, and we must accept such change with serenity," one is speaking about "life" in such a way that it clearly involves the lives of individual humans just as fully as it involves the events that occur in the broader world, and vice versa. Imagine the story of the death of Chuang-tzu's wife involving, instead, the death of the species we call whooping cranes: Chuang-tzu would, in that case, patiently point out to his deeply caring but deeply shallow friend that he had indeed felt grief to see such beautiful birds come to their end, but had gone on to engage in appropriate rational reflection upon the nature of life, and had come to accept the transitory nature of all such creatures, just as in the present story Chuang-tzu had come to accept the transitory nature of his own spouse. If one must learn to accept with serenity the death of someone we love, someone without whose life our own life would have never been what it is, wouldn't the author urge us to accept that the death of some birds, birds that have never played a role in our lives the way that one's deceased spouse had done, is an event that we should accept with equanimity? If change catches up with us, even to the extent that the planet that we live on should become permanently devoid of all forms of life, the response of the author of these passages would logically be that **such is the nature of things**, and that crying over such a sudden turn of events would be very silly indeed, like a child crying over a spilt glass of milk, or the death of some easily replaceable goldfish. The only reason that a child cries over the death of a goldfish is that he or she has become irrationally attached to that creature as it exists in its present form, and has formed an immature sentimental bond to it. As adults, we appreciate the color and motion of fish in our aquaria, but seldom cry over the death of one of its inmates: we know very well that to cry over the death of such a fish would be silly and a sign of juvenile behavior. As our children grow, we teach them, likewise, never to follow their raw emotional responses, but rather to govern their emotions, and to learn to behave in a responsible manner, according to principles that are morally correct, whether or not they are emotionally satisfying. If, for instance, one were to see a driver accidentally run over one's child or beloved, one's first instinct might be to attack the driver with a righteous fury, falsely equating emotional intensity and violent action with the responsible exercise of moral judgment. In general, we work to teach ourselves and each other not to respond in that way, to take a course of self-restraint, curbing emotion, lest it propel us into actions that will later, upon calm reflection, be revealed to have been emotionally satisfying but morally wrong. If I saw my child run down by a car, it might give me great emotional satisfaction to drag the driver from her car and beat her to death. But it might well turn out that she had in fact done nothing wrong, and had been driving legally and quite responsibly when a careless child suddenly ran into her path, giving her no time to stop or to evade the child. Because we have all learned that the truth of events is often not apparent to the parties that are experiencing them, we generally work to learn some degree of self-control, so that our immediate emotional reaction to events does not mislead us into a foolish course of action. Now if we take these facts and transfer them into our consideration of Chuang-tzu and Mencius on the riverbank, that episode should, logically, be read as follows. If Mencius feels an emotional urge to jump into the river to save the baby, his emotional response to the baby's presence there must be seen as immature and irresponsible. After all, one might muse, one never knows, any more than the man with the horse, when an event that seems fortunate is actually unfortunate, or vice versa. What if the baby in the water had been the ancient Chinese equivalent of Adolf Hitler, and the saving of young Adolf — though occasioned by the deepest feelings of compassion, and a deep-felt veneration for "life" — led to the systematic extermination of millions of innocent men, women, and children? If one knew, in retrospect, that Hitler's atrocities could have been totally prevented by the simple moral act of refraining from leaping to save an endangered child, would one not conclude, by sound moral reasoning, that letting that particular baby drown would have represented a supremely moral act? How, Chuang-tzu constantly challenges us, **how can we possibly know what course of action is truly justified?** What if, just for the sake of argument, a dreadful plague soon wipes out millions of innocent people, and the pathogen involved is soon traced back to an organism that had once dwelt harmlessly in the system of a certain species of bird, such as, for instance, the whooping crane? In retrospect, one can imagine, the afflicted people of the next century — bereft of their wives or husbands, parents or children — might curse the day when simple-minded do-gooders of the twentieth-century had brazenly intervened with the natural course of events and preserved the cursed specied of crane, thereby damning millions of innocents to suffering and death. We assume that such could never happen, that all living things are somehow inherently good to have on the planet, that saving the earthly existence of any life-form is somehow inherently a virtuous action. But our motivations in such cases are clearly, from a Taoist point of view, so shallow and foolish as to warrant no respect. If Mencius, or a sentimental modern lover of "life," were to leap into the river and save a floating baby, he or she would doubtless exult in his or her selfless act of moral heroism, deriving a sense of satisfaction from having done a good deed, and having prevented a terrible tragedy. But who can really know when a given event is truly a tragedy, or perhaps, like the horse that breaks a boy's leg, really a blessing in disguise. Since human wisdom, Chuang-tzu suggests, is inherently incapable of successfully comprehending the true meaning of events as they are happening, when can we ever truly know that our emotional urge to save babies, pretty birds, and entertaining sea-mammals is really an urge that is morally sound. The Taoist answer seems to be that we can never be sure, and **even if the extinction** of Chuangtzu's wife or of the whooping crane really **brought no actual blessing to the world, such events are natural and proper in the way of life itself, and to bemoan such events is to show that one is no more insightful about life than a child who sentimentally cries over the loss of a toy**, a glass of milk, a beloved pet, or even her mommy, run over by a drunken driver. The Taoist lesson seems, in this regard, to be the same in each case: things happen, and some things cause us distress because we attach ourselves sentimentally to certain people, objects, and patterns of life; when those people, objects, or patterns of life take a sudden or drastic turn into a very different direction, a mature and responsible person calms his or her irrational emotions, and takes the morally responsible course of simply **accepting the new state of things**.

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#### Financial incentives are rebates, grants, loans, Tax Incentives, green building incentives, and industrial recruitment. Distinct from Community Investment & Rules & regulations

#### The aff isn’t an example of a topical incentive

Gouchoe 2k—North Carolina State University, National Renewable Energy Laboratory [Susan, December 2000, Local Government and Community Programs and Incentives for Renewable Energy— National Report, http://seg.fsu.edu/Library/casestudy%20of%20incentives.pdf]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents a summary of the renewable energy programs and incentives of 45¶ communities in 23 states as collected and catalogued by the Interstate Renewable Energy¶ Council’s (IREC) Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE) project. Also included are summaries of state initiatives that impact implementation of renewable energy¶ technologies on the local level. Programs and incentives in this report include:

COMMUNITY INVESTMENT & AWARENESS PROGRAMS

v Renewable Energy Projects

v Education & Assistance

v Green Pricing Programs

v Green Power Purchasing

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

v Rebates, Grants, & Loans

v Tax Incentives

v Green Building Incentives

v Industrial Recruitment

RULES, REGULATIONS & POLICIES

v Solar & Wind Access

v Net Metering

v Construction & Design

v Contractor Licensing

v Equipment Certification

v Public Benefits Funds

v Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards

v Disclosure & Certification

Established in 1995, DSIRE is an ongoing project to summarize incentives, programs, and¶ policies for renewable energy. The project is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy’s¶ Office of Power Technologies and is managed by the North Carolina Solar Center. DSIRE on¶ Line makes the DSIRE database accessible via the web at:¶ http://www.ncsc.ncsu.edu/dsire.htm. The website is updated daily and includes search¶ capabilities for all incentives. In addition to state and local programs, the website features¶ utility programs and a searchable bibliography.

#### VOTE NEGATIVE

#### PREDICTABLE LIMITS—the word incentives in the resolution is modified by financial to make it manageable. Going beyond makes the topic unpredictable.

#### GROUND—financial incentives insure the aff has links to market disads and counterplans which are the only core negative ground across bi-directional energies. Holding the line key

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#### Obama will win but its close.

**Trippi 10/4** (Joe, Political Strategist, Ted Kennedy staffer, Will Romney take advantage of his second chance?, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/10/04/will-romney-take-advantage-his-second-chance/)

Today, Obama has formidable leads in national and swing state polls. My own estimate puts Obama just 5 Electoral College votes short of 270 and another four years in the White House.

So much for that referendum election, right?

Wrong.

Obama’s strength creates an ironic problem. As the media consumes poll after poll and begin to trumpet a perceived Obama victory, voters will be forced to confront the fact of his re-election. They will have to ask themselves one more time if this is what they want. At that point, this might no longer be a choice election, it would instead be **a referendum on the president** -- the race Romney has always wanted.

Should that moment happen, it would be the Romney campaign’s best shot at being able to turn the election around. If Romney's recent high profile speeches are any gauge, he might just have the message to make that happen.

Romney’s most powerful line of the entire campaign came during his speech at the Republican Convention when he said, "President Obama promised to begin to slow the rise of the oceans and to heal the planet. My promise is to help you and your family." That’s the type of message that can break through to voters but we hardly hear it.

In Wednesday night's debate, Romney not only delivered that type of message, he did so with the fire and confidence that could give voters confidence in his ability to bring about the change many claim to want. It was the type of performance that will give many voters pause when considering why this guy is down in so many polls.

Obama still has major advantages. The electoral map gives him many pathways to victory and runaway leads with women and Hispanics could serve as a firewall.

But with November 6 just over thirty days away, **this election is still up for grabs**. It might be too little too late for Romney or it could be the beginning of a comeback for the history books if he can start to connect the dots he laid out in the RNC speech and Wednesday night's debate. Either way, Romney will have been given a chance to argue this election on his terms. Whether he has what it takes to make the most of it the second time around is yet to be seen.

#### Nuclear alienates key constituent groups.

**Mick 6/19** (Jason Daily Tech, Obama Fights For Nuclear, Environmentalists Label Him a Shill http://www.dailytech.com/Obama+Fights+For+Nuclear+Environmentalists+Label+Him+a+Shill/article18781.htm)

Despite these small victories, President Obama's nuclear vision faces many impending obstacles.  Despite the fact that you could tear down one of the nation's old reactors, replace it with a dozen modern clean reactor designs and still have less net waste, some environmentalist groups remain adamantly opposed to new plant construction.  They have vowed to bury the bid for clean nuclear power under a flood of lawsuits.  If the suits succeed, they will raise the cost of nuclear so high, that it can't even compete with the most expensive forms of nuclear energy, like solar power.

And perhaps the biggest obstacle to Obama's nuclear vision will come in 2012.  That is the year when he will face reelection.  That may prove challenging given that one of his former key constituent groups—the environmental lobby—has become one of his staunchest critics.  Regardless, the U.S. is making its first true nuclear progress in 30 years, and that is among the many factors that will already make President Obama's presidency noteworthy.

#### Obama’s margin for error is small --- it costs him the election.

**TNF 12** (The New Fuelist, Obama’s tall environmental task in 2012 http://www.newfuelist.com/blog/obama-coal-regulations-keystone-pipeline)

In case you can’t see it, that’s a treacherous tightrope Barack Obama is walking on these days whenever he steps into the circus-like national energy and environmental policy debate. And his margin for political error on environmental issues will shrink even more during this election year. To avoid alienating environmentalists who supported him in 2008, he must not forget to occasionally—and substantially—lean to the left. But if he wants to hold on to coveted independent voters who are more worried about the slumping economy than they are about pollution, he must also periodically shift back to the middle and right.

The proposed Keystone XL pipeline embodies the President’s conundrum. From the right, calls for increased “energy security” and for the creation of (a disputed number) of pipeline-related jobs make it hard for him to say no. On the left, a large and organized anti-pipeline contingent has taken pains to turn the decision on the pipeline—which will carry crude made from Canadian oil sands, the extraction and production of which makes the fuel much more greenhouse gas-intense than conventional oil—into a political make-or-break for Obama on climate change.

The administration spent 2011 establishing what it must view as a politically necessary middle ground on the environment. It engineered a drastic ratcheting up of fuel efficiency standards for automakers, and sold it as a way to both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the burden on the consumer. It also introduced landmark regulations on air pollution from power plants, while placating utilities—and outraging many supporters—by delaying the EPA’s proposed tightening of the nation’s standards for smog. And it earned at least temporary relief from pressure to decide on the Keystone XL by punting the issue past the election, to 2013.

But it’s going to be tougher to maintain balance on the tightrope this year. Congressional Republicans, by demanding a much-earlier Obama decision on the Keystone XL in exchange for their support of the recent payroll tax extension, have hinted at their party’s desire to force the President’s hand on environmental issues. The GOP’s presidential nominee will undoubtedly attempt to paint Obama as an over-regulator and irrational environmentalist—an attack line which will warrant a defense. And therein lies Obama’s tall task: to defend his administration’s substantial forays into environmental regulation in terms that resonate with independents whose main concern is the economy—all while simultaneously ensuring that his frustrated environmentalist supporters don’t completely lose their patience.

#### Romney causes a nuclear use in Pakistan, a collapse of Russian relations, war with Iran, and China trade wars.

**Bandow 12** Senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan [Doug Bandow, 5-15-12, “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism]

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to **destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan**. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire **war with Iran** as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have **no choice** but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically **impossible.** Perceived American support for this creates **enormous hostility** toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But **treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one**. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as **a direct challenge**. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that **even paranoids have enemies**. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the **greatest danger** to America is the **blowback** that results from promiscuous intervention in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle. America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he is not qualified to be president. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney **sounds even worse.** His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

### 1NC—DA 2

#### Electricity demand is driving Natgas to a price equilibrium that is sustainable for producers

Santos 4/24/12—Independent trader, analyst and algorithmic trading expert w/16 years of experience [Pauol Santos, Natural Gas In 2012: Electric Generation Switch Implications, Seeking Alfa, April 24, 2012, pg. http://seekingalpha.com/article/524061-natural-gas-in-2012-electric-generation-switch-implications]

There are several important observations to be made from this table:

The increased demand from dispatch switching in electricity generation really eats up the increased production from the shale revolution. Not only does it do so, but it might be underestimated in this analysis, because of the distortion the unfavorable weather creates (the growth rate in natural gas usage would probably have been even greater under normal weather).

The natural gas production increase year-over-year is now disappearing because of the drop in rig counts. This happens against a backdrop of increased usage and thus hastens equilibrium in the market. Equilibrium will naturally be found at a higher price, because the rigs started going away at a higher price as well, and will require a higher price to come back.

The impact of lower or stagnated production against increasing demand is such that excluding the net imports, it's even likely that net withdrawals would result under a regular summer. With a hot summer—not modeled here—it would be likely that we'd see net withdrawals considering imports. Indeed, given the week-to-week variation in all the variables, such might happen even under a regular summer.

Finally, this model, optimistic in its production projections and somewhat pessimistic in demand, still sees only a 1267 bcf net injection taking inventories to around 3800-3850 bcf at the peak of the injection cycle, far from the 4100-4400 that are considered the demonstrated and theoretical storage capacities. So there's not only a good chance that storage capacity won't be exhausted, but also a chance that the market will be surprised by how little gas will be injected (though at the start of the cycle there can still be a good deal of injection).

Conclusion

Due to the incredible impact the dispatch switching of coal-fired generation for natural gas generation is having on increased natural gas usage, as well as the impact the low prices are having on drilling for natural gas, the market might come into equilibrium sooner than previously expected, so natural gas prices recognizing this reality might have significant upside even before the end of 2012. 2013 now seems certain to have higher prices as well, something I had already speculated on before. Obviously higher prices will alleviate both of these developments, leading to less coal substitution and to a resumption in drilling—but still this implies an equilibrium at higher prices.

Given this conclusion, I took a small long position in natural gas October 2012 call options at the $2.50 strike.

The implications for coal stocks such as Peabody Energy ([BTU](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/btu)), Alpha Natural Resources ([ANR](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/anr)), CONSOL Energy ([CNX](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cnx)), Arch Coal ([ACI](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/aci)) and James River Coal ([JRCC](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jrcc)) depend on how much natural gas moves. The rise in natural gas prices might not be enough to impact coal substitution or prices significantly (anything less than a 40% pop doesn't change the equation much). Still, if a coal panic doesn't happen in the next two months, the sector should be broadly safer from there on.

The implications for natural gas producers are on the whole more directly positive as natural gas prices are predicted to move up, though natural gas producers heavily reliant on shale gas, such as Chesapeake ([CHK](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/chk)), might have trouble with the depletion rates.

#### Nuclear incentives discourage nat-gas investments—utilities will pursue fuel diversity if the price is right.

C2ES 12 [Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “NATURAL GAS IN THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR,” May 2012]

According to the latest Energy Information Administration (EIA) [Annual Energy Outlook](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/) (AEO), natural gas-fired generation is expected to be just over 25 percent of the total generation mix in 2020, rising to 27 percent in 2035.

Fuel diversity is an important consideration for utilities looking to reduce their reliance on any particular energy source. The trend away from coal toward greater reliance on natural gas creates a potential fuel diversity risk, especially considering the volatile price history of natural gas. Coal will continue to be a significant source of electricity in some regions and for some utilities, but other utilities look increasingly likely to be getting nearly all of their baseload generation from only two sources: natural gas and nuclear power.

Levelized cost (Figure 4) [represents](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo11/index.cfm) the present value of the total cost of building and operating a generating plant over an assumed financial life and duty cycle, converted to equal annual payments and expressed in terms of real dollars to remove the impact of inflation. It reflects overnight capital cost, fuel cost, fixed and variable O&M cost, financing costs, and an assumed utilization rate for each plant type. The availability of various incentives including state or [federal tax credits](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo11/index.cfm) can also impact the calculation of levelized cost. The [values shown](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo11/index.cfm) in the figure below do not incorporate any such incentives. Natural gas-fired combined-cycle generation technologies are projected to be the least expensive options in the coming years. Utilities looking at their bottom lines and public utility commissions looking for low-cost investment decisions will favor the construction of natural gas-fired technologies, leading to a greater reliance on natural gas in the coming years.

#### Nat gas is key to revitalize manufacturing

Magill 8/22/12 [Jim Magill, “Manufacturers, producers see different futures for US natural gas supplies,” Platts, 22 Aug 2012, http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/NaturalGas/6582012]

The rapid development of US shale natural gas resources has created an opportunity for the nation to establish a new energy paradigm, provided that the proper energy policies are put into place, speakers at the North American Prospect Expo said in Houston said Wednesday.

Jim Tramuto, vice president of Southwestern Energy, pointed to his company's success at tapping into the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, as an example of what shale gas producers in basins across the country have been able to accomplish in a few years.

"We have finally cracked the code," he said. "We are now up over 2 Bcf/d in the Fayetteville Shale. We've already produced over 2 Tcf of gas and this year alone we have drilled 450 wells in the Fayetteville Shale."

But he said the exploration-and-production industry's success in boosting US gas production has cut gas prices to a level that is unsustainable.

"We can produce it, but if we can't sell it and it's not used, we won't realize the return we all are expecting," he said. State and local politicians need to implement policies that serve to encourage the production of and foster the creation of markets for shale gas, he added.

The increase in US gas production has also led to the rebirth of the domestic chemical and manufacturing sectors, Ken Bromfield, North American commercial director with Dow Chemical, said.

"We have an unprecedented opportunity with shale gas to push the reset button on the US energy economy," he Psaid.
"Manufacturing is back," he added, saying industry has announced plans to build about $80 billion of projects in the next five years, as a result reasonably priced natural gas. Dow alone has announced $4 billion of new manufacturing projects, Bromfield said.

But he warned that this rosy scenario could be ruined by a rush to build new terminals for the export of liquefied natural gas. He said he favors policies that would encourage the use of gas to produce manufactured goods, which then could be exported at eight times the value than exporting the gas alone would bring.

On the sidelines of the conference, he told Platts that an effort to begin exporting large volumes of LNG could slow down the manufacturing renaissance.

Bromfield said Dow doesn't think that restricting LNG exports will hurt producers' profits. "We think that there's a demand [from] manufacturing that is already in progress and more is coming; that there can be an equilibrium point and we can have it all."

#### Manufacturing is key to the industrial commons.

Lind & Freedman 12—Policy Director of Economic Growth Program & Policy analyst in the Economic Growth Program @ New America Foundation [Michael Lind & Joshua Freedman “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future,” New America Foundation, April 2012]

Manufacturing creates an industrial commons, which spurs¶ growth in multiple sectors of the economy through linked industries. An “industrial commons” is a base of shared¶ physical facilities and intangible knowledge shared by a¶ number of firms. The term “commons” comes from communally-¶ shared pastures or fields in premodern Britain.

The industrial commons in particular in the manufacturing¶ sector includes not only large companies but also small and¶ medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 41 percent of the American manufacturing workforce and account for¶ 86 percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials, component parts, tools, and more are all interconnected; most of the time, Harvard Business¶ School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih point out,¶ these linkages are geographic because of the ease of interaction and knowledge transfer between firms.18 Examples of¶ industrial commons surrounding manufacturing are evident¶ in the United States, including the I-85 corridor from¶ Alabama to Virginia and upstate New York.19

Modern economic scholarship emphasizes the importance¶ of geographic agglomeration effects and co-location synergies.¶ 20 Manufacturers and researchers alike have long noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs when manufacturing¶ and R&D are located near each other: the manufacturer¶ benefits from the innovation, and the researchers¶ are better positioned to understand where innovation can be found and to test new ideas. While some forms of¶ knowledge can be easily recorded and transferred, much¶ “know-how” in industry is tacit knowledge. This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the¶ erosion of geographic linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation¶ ecosystem.

If an advanced manufacturing core is not retained, then¶ the economy stands to lose not only the manufacturing¶ industry itself but also the geographic synergies of the¶ industrial commons, including R&D. Some have warned that this is already the case: a growing share of R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the United States.21 In particular, a number of large U.S.¶ manufacturers have opened up or expanded R&D facilities¶ in China over the last few years. 22 pg. 4-5 //1nc

#### That sustains the earth’s carrying capacity

Wilson 6/9/12—Executive Director of the International Council for Science [Steven Wilson (PhD in Chemistry from University of Bristol and Former Director of Earth Observation, Director of Science and Innovation, and Director of Strategy and Partnerships @ UK Natural Environment Research Council), “Science is key to our sustainable future,” Al Jazeera, Last Modified: 09 Jun 2012 15:41, pg. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/20126211211472368.html>]

Paris, France—Scientific evidence for dangerous, long-term and potentially irreversible changes in the Earth's life support system is manifold. These changes threaten our sustainability and could bring forth a new global reality for people, nations, economies and our environment.

Science has sounded the alarm—notably through observations, modelling and predictions of unprecedented quality—and shown that the future wellbeing of humankind is at risk. We now need science to help identify whole system solutions—ones that look at the big picture and not just the parts—and for scientists to take a more pro-active role in informing the policy debate on these solutions.

Time is running out for us to meet the urgent challenge of global sustainability. We need to find solutions which de-couple our development from ever-increasing demands for non-renewable resources, forge a new era of equitable and sustainable balance between people and planet earth, and fully recognise that the Earth is a complex and interconnected system.

The transformation to sustainable development, which is likely to be equal in scale to the agrarian-industrial transition of the 18th and 19th centuries, will entail tough trade-offs. A dash to quick fix solutions to one problem without examining the impact of these decisions is a recipe for disaster. For example, just a few years ago, rising fuel prices sent policymakers searching for solutions. First generation biofuels were an easy fix and the subsidies rolled in. But this in turn fuelled rising global food prices, hitting some of the world's poorest people hardest.

To address these trade-offs explicitly, we need integrated knowledge from natural, social and engineering sciences to inspire innovative, holistic solutions, as well as new ways of measuring wealth, growth and wellbeing.

To better inform decisions, we urgently need more scientists to take an active role in public debate. The hallmark of science is objectivity, and this principle must always be our foundation. But now that global environmental change is threatening the Earth's carrying capacity, more scientists must take on a new role involving engagement with end-users of science. Scientists need to collaborate directly with people and business to ensure shared understanding of the new realities shaping our world, and help translate knowledge into action for sustainable development.

This will require nothing short of a new paradigm in the way that science engages with society.

This new, collaborative approach to research is already making an impact. In Kenya, the first ever community-based mangrove carbon credit project to win international accreditation has shown that the carbon storage potential of these forests can create wealth for local people. Elsewhere in Kenya, innovation for end-users has provided livestock insurance to farmers through satellite monitoring of rainfall in drought-prone rural areas. In Nicaragua, researchers are exploring how to implement "just ecosystem services" by involving locals in deciding who has access to forest services and who benefits.

Widespread societal engagement by scientists, leading to better public understanding of the scientific evidence and potential solutions will be an important factor in tackling the difficult decisions ahead. It will equally help shape future research agendas.

These topics will be on the table at the Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for Sustainable Development in Rio this June—co-organised by the International Council for Science (ICSU) in its role as the co-organiser of the Scientific and Technological Community Major Group in the Rio +20 negotiations.

The Forum will look at the greatest challenges facing our planet's carrying capacity: how to secure food and water supplies for the global population, how to provide energy in a green economy, how to adapt to a world of greater risk from climate change and disaster, how to ensure urban wellbeing and sustainable livelihoods which are more equitable and how to rethink social and economic models.

### 1NC CP

#### Text: The Department of Energy should modify its regulation of [10 Code of Federal Regulations §810](http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title10/10cfr810_main_02.tpl) to end specific authorization requirements and impose deadlines to act on licensing requests.

#### Reforming “Part 810” allows the U.S. to recapture the nuclear market, and can be done through administrative changes that avoid political controversy.

Platts, 10/1/2012. “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149.

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

#### U.S. companies already produce superior technology—broad Part 810 export regulations crush U.S. market share and undermine focus on truly sensitive technologies.

NEI, Winter 2012. Nuclear Energy Institute. “U.S. Nuclear Export Rules Hurt Global Competitiveness,” <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/insight/insightwinter2012/us-nuclear-export-rules-hurt-global-competitiveness/>.

Today, U.S. dominance of the global nuclear power market has eroded as suppliers from other countries compete aggressively against American exporters. U.S. suppliers confront competitors that benefit from various forms of state promotion and also must contend with a U.S. government that has not adapted to new commercial realities. The potential is tremendous—$500 billion to $740 billion in international orders over the next decade, representing tens of thousands of potential American jobs, according to the [U.S. Department of Commerce](http://www.commerce.gov/). With America suffering a large trade deficit, nuclear goods and services represent a market worth aggressive action. However, antiquated U.S. government approaches to nuclear exports are challenging U.S. competitiveness in the nuclear energy market. New federal support is needed if the United States wants to reclaim dominance in commercial nuclear goods and services—and create the jobs that go with them. “The U.S. used to be a monopoly supplier of nuclear materials and technology back in the ’50s and ’60s,” said Fred McGoldrick, former director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the [State Department](http://www.state.gov/). “That position has eroded to the point where we’re a minor player compared to other countries.” America continues to lead the world in technology innovation and know-how. So what are the issues? And where is the trade? Effective coordination among the many government agencies involved in nuclear exports would provide a boost to U.S. suppliers. “Multiple U.S. agencies are engaged with countries abroad that are developing nuclear power, from early assistance to export controls to trade finance and more,” said Ted Jones, director for supplier international relations at NEI. The challenge is to create a framework that allows commercial nuclear trade to grow while ensuring against the proliferation of nuclear materials. “To compete in such a situation, an ongoing dialogue between U.S. suppliers and government needs to be conducted and U.S. trade promotion must be coordinated at the highest levels,” Jones said. Licensing U.S. Exports Jurisdiction for commercial nuclear export controls is divided among the Departments of [Energy](http://energy.gov/) and Commerce and the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission](http://www.nrc.gov/) and has not been comprehensively updated to coordinate among the agencies or to reflect economic and technological changes over the decades. The State Department also is involved in international nuclear commerce. It negotiates and implements so-called “[123 agreements](http://export.gov/civilnuclear/eg_main_022093.asp)” that allow for nuclear goods and services to be traded with a foreign country. The federal agencies often have different, conflicting priorities, leading to a lack of clarity for exporters and longer processing times for export licenses. “The U.S. nuclear export regime is the most complex and restrictive in the world and the least efficient,” said Jones. “Furthermore, it is poorly focused on items and technologies that pose little or no proliferation concern. By trying to protect too much, we risk diminishing the focus on sensitive technologies and handicapping U.S. exports.” A case in point is the Energy Department’s [Part 810 regulations](http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div5&view=text&node=10:4.0.2.5.23&idno=10). While 123 agreements open trade between the United States and other countries, Part 810 regulates what the United States can trade with another country. For certain countries, it can take more than a year to obtain “specific authorizations” to export nuclear items. Because other supplier countries authorize exports to the same countries with fewer requirements and delays, the Part 810 rules translate into a significant competitive disadvantage for U.S. suppliers. Today, 76 countries require a specific authorization, but DOE has proposed almost doubling that number—to include for the first time countries that have never demonstrated a special proliferation concern, that are already part of the global nuclear supply chain, and that plan new nuclear infrastructure. The proposed Part 810 rule would do nothing to reduce lengthy license processing times, said Jones. Other nuclear supplier countries impose strict guidelines on their licensing agencies for timely processing of applications. Equivalent licenses must be processed in fewer than nine months in France, fewer than 90 days in Japan and 15 days in South Korea. One possible solution, said McGoldrick, would be to set similar deadlines for issuance of licenses. U.S. agencies “could have deadlines set forth in the new [Part 810] regulations, which would give the relevant government agencies specified times in which to act on a license. Time could be exceeded only under certain circumstances,” said McGoldrick.

### 1NC—Solvency

#### Nuclear will remain uncompetitive for decades—our evidence cites industry leaders.

Hiltzik 11—Michael Hiltzik is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author who has covered business, technology, and public policy for the Los Angeles Times for twenty years, master of science degree in journalism from the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University [March 23, 2011, “A nuclear renaissance in U.S. was unlikely even before Japan disaster,” *LA Times*, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/23/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20110323]

To all those who may be concerned that the catastrophic events at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant will derail the heralded renaissance of nuclear power in the U.S., you can relax.

The reason is simple: There is no renaissance.

Not even Exelon Corp., the nation's biggest nuclear generation company, has been holding its breath for a surge in orders or appreciable increase in new generating capacity.

The reason has little to do with an unreasoning public's fear of nuclear meltdowns and radiation poisoning, and almost everything to do with pure economics. As John Rowe, Exelon's chairman and chief executive, told an audience at a Washington think tank two weeks ago, you can build a new natural gas plant for 40% less than a new nuclear plant, and the price of its fuel is at rock bottom.

"Natural gas is queen," he says. (To be fair, Exelon also makes a lot of money from gas.)

In recent years, nuclear energy has been promoted as a "green," or at least greenish, alternative to coal power and other fossil-fueled generation. That's been a potent selling point as concern has mounted over the latter's effect on climate change by the production of greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is burdened by its own environmental issues, including the dangers of radioactive release into the atmosphere, but the production of carbon dioxide isn't among them.

Yet the technology's potential as a weapon against global warming has been as oversold, just as its virtues as safe, clean and "too cheap to meter" were during its infancy in the 1950s. To realistically make a dent in climate change, nuclear plant construction would have to take off at such a rate that it would "pose serious concerns" for the availability of construction materials, properly trained builders and operating technicians, and safety and security oversight, as a report by the Council on Foreign Relations observed in 2007.

"For at least a couple of decades to come, nuclear will be very uncompetitive," the report's author, Charles D. Ferguson, told me this week. Ferguson is president of the Federation of American Scientists.

The ongoing disaster in Japan will exacerbate social concerns about nuclear waste disposal — the on-site storage of spent fuel, which is common at U.S. plants, has complicated the situation at Fukushima — as well as concerns about the safety and security of existing plants. But those concerns have existed for years, so the spectacle of the Japanese grappling with the consequences, graphic as it is, may not in itself affect public attitudes.

Talk of nuclear renaissance in the U.S. had been spurred by two developments. One was the dramatic improvement in the operating record of U.S. plants. In recent years the domestic nuclear industry had been operating at close to 90% of capacity, compared with the lousy 65% record it turned in during the 1970s. The change was the product partially of the industry's consolidation into a small number of specialty operators with nuclear expertise, and it tended to reduce the apparent cost of nuclear power to levels competitive with other sources.

But that also means that "people who advocate nuclear power have rose-colored glasses about its economics," says John E. Parsons of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the co-author of a 2009 update to a 2003 MIT report on the future of nuclear power.

Further encouragement came from the streamlining of U.S. licensing rules. The new procedure consolidates what formerly were separate construction and operating permits into one, removing the uncertainty that a utility might build an entire facility only to be denied permission to run it.

But no new plant has yet been approved under the new system, so plenty of uncertainty still exists. "An investor has to ask, 'Am I looking at a technology that works only when all the cards fall my way?'" Parsons says.

Despite expressions of support for nuclear power coming from political leaders, including President Obama, who is offering loan guarantees for new reactors, nuclear energy can't develop in a policy vacuum. One of the dismal ironies of the American energy program is that many of the same politicians standing foursquare behind nuclear power are also sworn opponents of policies such as a carbon tax, which would make nukes more competitive by raising the price of fossil-based alternatives.

For example, here's Mitt Romney. In "No Apology," the book he published last year presumably as a manifesto for his 2012 presidential campaign, Romney says he doesn't understand why nuclear power is such a "boogeyman," because America's existing plants are "trouble-free." Romney contends that nuclear plants are economically unfeasible in the U.S. only because of our "interminable permitting, regulatory and legal delays."

Romney should listen more to fellow businessmen like Exelon's Rowe, who would tell him that the real reason is that gas generation is cheaper, thanks to pricing that ignores such external costs of gas as pollution and climate change. Yet in his book Romney condemns policies such as the carbon tax because it would "fatten government, harm employers and employees, and hurt consumers." You can't have it both ways, Mitt.

Romney defends the economics of nuclear power by observing that countries with major nuclear construction programs, such as China, seem to have solved the economic conundrum without much trouble. Yet even pro-nuclear experts here acknowledge that nuclear economics don't easily cross national borders. China, which has 13 operating nuclear plants and 30 under construction, has endowed its state-owned nuclear industry with heavy subsidies.

According to a report by the Federation of American Scientists, China's burgeoning demand for electrical power can't effectively be satisfied from its current main source, coal, which will face a depletion crisis around the end of this decade. That makes ramping up nuclear an urgent issue for China. But in the U.S., says Andrew Kadak, the former CEO of Yankee Atomic Power Co., a New England nuclear plant operator, "we don't have that urgency because natural gas is too cheap an alternative."

With the construction of plants still hampered by economics, nuclear utilities are devoting more attention to improving efficiencies and increasing the output of their existing plants, a process known as "uprating." But that amounts to treading water until the social and economic difficulties of nuclear power can be addressed. And they'll have to be addressed: "It's going to be very hard to reduce carbon dioxide if nuclear is out of the picture," MIT's Parsons says. But the first step is injecting realism into the discussion. Nuclear power may be necessary to our energy future, but it won't be our savior.

#### SMRs have greater economic barriers than conventional reactors.

Lyman 11—Edwin Lyman is Senior Global Security Scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). He specialises in nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear power safety. He has published many articles in journals and magazines and written many reports. Lyman was president of the Nuclear Control Institute. He has a Ph.D. in physics from Cornell University. [July 14, 2011, Testimony of Dr. Edwin Lyman Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Union of Concerned Scientists “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors” Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear\_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf]

Some SMR vendors emphasize that their designs are “passively safe.” However, no credible reactor design is completely passive and can shut itself down and cool itself in every circumstance without need for intervention. Some reactor designs, large or small, have certain passive safety features that allow the reactor to depend less on operator action for a limited period of time following design-basis accidents. Small reactors may have an advantage because the lower the power of a reactor, the easier it is to cool through passive means such as natural convection cooling with water or even with air. However, accidents affecting multiple small units may cause complications that could outweigh the advantages of having lower heat removal requirements per unit. Moreover, passively safe reactors generally require some equipment, such as valves, that are designed to operate automatically but are not one hundred percent reliable.

Operators will always be needed to monitor systems to ensure they are functioning as designed, and to intervene if they fail to do so. Both passive systems and operator actions would require functioning instrumentation and control systems, which were unreliable during the severe accidents at Three Mile Island and Fukushima. Passive systems may not work as intended in the event of beyond-design-basis accidents, and as result passive designs should also be equipped with highly reliable active backup systems and associated instrumentation and control systems.

But more backup systems generally mean higher costs. This poses a particular problem for SMRs, which begin with a large economic disadvantage compared to large reactors.

According to the standard formula for economies of scale, the overnight capital cost per kilowatt of a 125 megawatt reactor would be roughly 2.5 times greater than that of a 1250 megawatt unit, all other factors being equal. Advocates argue that SMRs offer advantages that can offset this economic penalty, such as a better match of supply and demand, reduced up-front financing costs, reduced construction times, and an accelerated benefit from learning from the construction of multiple units. However, a 2007 paper by Westinghouse scientists and their collaborators that quantified the cost savings associated with some of these factors found that they could not overcome the size penalty: the paper found that at best, the capital cost of four 335 megawatt reactors was slightly greater than that of one 1340 megawatt reactor.1

#### NRC restrictions block SMRs.

Nick Cunningham, October 2012. Policy Analyst for Energy and Climate at the American Security Project. “Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power,” American Security Project, <http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200087%20-%20Small%20Modular%20Reactors.pdf>.

The most difficult challenge currently facing SMRs is the institutional barriers. Currently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not certified a single SMR design. Despite the variety of SMR designs from several nuclear vendors, the NRC has lacked sufficient human and technical capacity to license small modular reactors in the past.33 Even as policymakers have expressed greater interest in SMRs in recent years, the licensing process for a new design takes several years at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.34¶ Also, many regulations create a difficult environment for small reactors and favor large reactors. For example, the NRC requires 10 mile emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants,¶ making it difficult to site a small reactor near urban centers where it could be used for energy applications other than centralized electricity generation.35¶ SMRs will need to overcome this long history of institutional bias towards large reactors. As the most prominent licensing body for the nuclear industry worldwide, the NRC to a certain degree, shapes the global future for nuclear power. If the NRC does not lead on small modular reactors, it may be an uphill battle for the SMR industry.

#### Restrictions overwhelm financial incentives.

Jim Hopf, 10/25/2011. Senior nuclear engineer with more than 20 years of experience in shielding and criticality analysis and design for spent fuel dry storage and transportation systems. “[Roadblock in Congress for SMR Development](http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2011/10/25/congress-smr/),” ANS Nuclear Café, http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2011/10/25/congress-smr/.

As many have observed, the main barrier to the deployment of SMRs may not be a lack of government financial or R&D support, but instead the enormous amount of time and money required to get new reactor designs licensed by the NRC. Reactor licensing processes have been taking many years and costing more than a $100 million dollars. Even approving an exact copy of an already-licensed reactor design (for a new site) is projected to take more than two years.¶ Even SMRs that deploy conventional light-water technology (such as NuScale or mPower) can expect a long (~ 5 year) licensing process (starting in late 2012 or 2013). For non-conventional technologies like Hyperion, who knows how long it will take? The NRC has stated that non-conventional SMRs like Hyperion are not on its priority list right now, and that it will only consider such an application when a serious customer has been found (thus setting up a chicken-egg problem).¶ Other issues that may hold back SMRs include security and emergency planning/evacuation requirements, and per-reactor NRC fees. If the NRC is not willing to consider the SMRs’ lower potential radioactivity release, as well as the lower probability of such release, in setting these requirements, as well as scaling fees with reactor capacity, it may destroy SMRs’ economic viability.¶

#### SMRs won’t expand until we have a solution for spent fuel.

Nick Cunningham, October 2012. Policy Analyst for Energy and Climate at the American Security Project. “Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power,” American Security Project, <http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200087%20-%20Small%20Modular%20Reactors.pdf>.

Disposal of spent nuclear fuel has confounded the nuclear industry for decades and the problem of waste disposal will still need to be dealt with for SMRs. While large reactors suffer from the same problem, expanding the use of SMRs would mean waste from more reactor sites would need to be coordinated.38 The quantity of waste may not change, but a given amount of waste is easier to manage from one site, rather than multiple.¶ The problem of disposing nuclear waste is a serious one, and the lack of a solution despite 30 years of debate is troubling. In January 2010, President Obama setup a Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) to study the problem and to recommend actions to finally address the nuclear waste problem. The BRC recommended the establishment of a consent-based approach to siting a waste facility, the development of interim storage¶ 6facilities, the creation of a separate government entity tasked only with addressing nuclear waste, as well as several other recommendations.39 The recommendations will be difficult to pass through Congress, but until resolved, the nuclear waste problem will bedevil the entire nuclear industry, including SMRs.

#### Domestic markets don’t matter—U.S. companies will keep commercializing as long as they have export opportunities—new tech, including SMRs, continues coming along and the U.S. industry is strong now.

NYT, 3/30/2011. “Nuclear Industry Thrives in the U.S., but for Export,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/business/energy-environment/31NUKE.html?pagewanted=all.

THE American nuclear renaissance is going strong, even if hardly any nuclear reactors are being built in the United States. ¶ Japan’s continuing nuclear calamity has heightened concerns about the future of nuclear power and its safety, but in China, India and other regions, the push for nuclear power seems likely to continue to surge. Those are the countries that provide a strong market for the American companies that build nuclear reactors and their components. ¶ Ask Steven Haas. Since the day he was born, 27 years ago, nobody in this country has ordered and completed a nuclear plant. But there he was, one day recently, plugging circuit boards and other electronic components into a cabinet the size of an industrial refrigerator that was labeled “Sanmen.” That is the name of a twin-reactor plant in China that the Westinghouse Electric Company has been supplying with a design and major components. The cabinet was one of scores that will go into each reactor, allowing digital communications and control of equipment. ¶ After Sanmen, he said, will come Haiyang, another Chinese twin-reactor plant, and Vogtle 3 and 4 in the American state of Georgia, and V. C. Summer 2 and 3 in South Carolina. ¶ “And I think there’s other jobs coming,” he said, adding: “I hope so. If not, I won’t have a job.” ¶ But he probably will. In addition to the four units Westinghouse is supplying China, it is negotiating for 10 more. While the process has hit a pause amid the crisis in Japan, where an earthquake knocked out all cooling to six reactors, it seems bound to resume. The electricity demand of China, India and the Middle East grows unabated. ¶ And the Westinghouse design and another by [General Electric](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/general_electric_company/index.html?inline=nyt-org) are intended to provide “passive” methods of cooling a reactor in an emergency, by relying on natural forces like gravity and convection, with few or no power-operated valves, diesel generators and other safety systems that a tsunami or other hazard could knock out. ¶ For the United States, nuclear power has become an export industry. And here in western Pennsylvania, production is going full tilt. ¶ Westinghouse, which two years ago moved into a 750,000-square-foot office complex here, looks more and more like [Boeing](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/boeing_company/index.html?inline=nyt-org) or [General Motors](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/general_motors_corporation/index.html?inline=nyt-org), a company that designs crucial parts, makes some and farms out the manufacture of others, and integrates components from all over the world. The four Chinese reactors have generated about 5,000 jobs in the United States, at Westinghouse and related companies, said Aris Candris, chief executive of Westinghouse Electric. The company had hoped for many reactors to be under construction in this country by now, he said, but “overseas projects are growing a lot faster than we are and are picking up the slack.” ¶ The result is some odd alliances. For example, the United Arab Emirates last year picked a consortium led by South Korea to build four reactors in a contract valued at an estimated $20 billion. It could be worth more because it could lead to yet more reactors. ¶ About 20 percent of the “nuclear island,” meaning the reactor and immediately associated parts, will come from Westinghouse, according to a company spokesman, H. Vaughn Gilbert. The flip side is that some of the biggest parts of the Vogtle and Summer reactors will come from Japan Steel Works. American steel makers never developed the equipment needed for the next generation of nuclear plants because there has been no new construction here. ¶ But that is not to say that American technology lags; in fact, in some cases it exceeds anything available elsewhere. Take, for example, the reactor coolant pumps. In the Westinghouse design, the pumps pull water from the reactor vessel and push it through a web of tiny thin-walled pipes in heat exchangers, and then back to the vessel. Outside the tiny pipes, a second circuit of clean, uncontaminated water is boiled into steam, for use in making electricity. The design keeps the radioactive materials bottled up, but the pumps are one of the major causes of reactor shutdowns and maintenance headaches. ¶ So the Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company is building sealed pumps that are supposed to run maintenance-free for 60 years. Each is 23 feet tall, weighs almost 100 tons and pumps about 13,000 gallons of water a second. They sell for more than $10 million each, and there is nowhere else to buy them, the company says. ¶ “In the U.S., we have a need for energy, but it’s a lot harder to unify to do it,” said Gregory J. Hempfling, general manager of the plant. “The Chinese as a country were better able to unify their direction.” His company has 800 employees at the plant making the pumps; at any given time, 80 to 120 are working on the Chinese pumps. ¶ Other companies sell huge high-precision parts that will require service. Tyco International, for example, recently opened a $25 million lab in Mansfield, Mass., where it tests valves for nuclear plants. Most of the valves will go to Asia, said Patrick Decker, president of the company’s valve subsidiary, Tyco Flow Control. Each new reactor that uses the company’s valves pays $10 million to $30 million, “and there’s a service tail on this of a few million dollars a year,” he said, referring to follow-up work. The valves, precise and reliable, are specialty items that the company has a leg up in building. ¶ At a clean energy conference in Washington in January, [Jon M. Huntsman Jr.](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/jon_m_huntsman_jr/index.html?inline=nyt-per), then the American ambassador to China, said that he had recently run into Bill Gates in China. Mr. Gates is an investor in a new kind of reactor, part of a class called “small modular reactors,” that are intended to be affordable for smaller utilities and suitable for places where the need is for hundreds of megawatts, not thousands of megawatts. ¶ Mr. Gates is an investor with Nathan P. Myhrvold, the former chief technology officer at [Microsoft](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/microsoft_corporation/index.html?inline=nyt-org), in a company called TerraPower, which has developed a design for something called the traveling wave reactor. For the most part, it makes its fuel as it runs, taking extra neutrons released in the chain reaction and using them to turn a low-value form of uranium into plutonium, which is almost immediately consumed. The approach means that a country could have nuclear power without bothering with enrichment plants, which are a route to [nuclear weapons](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier). ¶ While the traveling wave is an American design, Mr. Huntsman noted, “right now the regulatory environment here in the United States means it would take decades just to certify. By partnering with the Chinese, they can move ahead and commercialize the technology around the world when it’s proven.” ¶ Babcock & Wilcox, another American company with a history of reactor construction, is working on a modular reactor of a more conventional design. It is supposed to be built entirely in a shop and shipped to the site, reducing the problems of quality control and skilled labor in remote locations. Its design is for a reactor that can stand alone or be installed in multiples up to 10, as demand grows. Its future may also be abroad, in places where putting a 1,000-megawatt reactor on a small grid would be like loading an elephant into a canoe, causing blackouts every time it shut down unexpectedly.

### 1NC—Warming

#### Nuclear too slow to solve warming—multiple factors

Froggatt and Schneider 10—\*Antony Froggatt is a Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House, London. For over 20 years he has worked extensively on EU energy policy for NGOs and think tanks and as a consultant to European governments, the European Commission and Parliament and commercial bodies. \*\*Mycle Schneider works as an independent international consultant on energy and nuclear policy, based in Paris. He is currently advising the USAID funded program ECO-Asia on energy efficiency and renewable energy policy. Between 1983 and April 2003, Mycle Schneider was executive director of the energy information service WISEParis and chief editor of the web-based Plutonium Investigation. Between 2000 and 2009 he has been an advisor to the German Environment Ministry. Since 2004 he has also been in charge of the Environment and Energy Strategies Lecture of the International Master of Science for Project Management for Environmental and Energy Engineering at the French école des Mines in Nantes, France. In 2006/2007 he was part of a consultants’ consortium that assessed nuclear decommissioning and waste-management funding issues on behalf of the European Commission. Mycle Schneider has provided information and consulting services to a large variety of clients, including the IAEA, Greenpeace International, UNESCO, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the European Commission, the European Parliament’s General Directorate for Research, and the French Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN). In 1997 he was honored with the Right Livelihood Award (“Alternative Nobel Prize”) together with Jinzaburo Takagi for their joint work on plutonium issues. [August 2010, “Systems for Change: Nuclear Power vs. Energy Efficiency+Renewables?” Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Brussels, http://www.boell.org/downloads/HBS-Frogatt\_web.pdf]

Lead times for scaling up new technologies, experiences and expectations

Nuclear power

Given the need for rapid emission reductions, the time needed to introduce new technologies on a mass scale is an important and highly underestimated factor. There are two major phases for the commissioning of new energy-generating facilities: the pre-development phase and construction.

The pre-development phase can include a wide variety of consultations and potentially involves obtaining the necessary construction and operating licenses, local and national consent, as well as raising the financing package. In some cases, the deployment of a new technology may be sped up as generic safety assessments are made, or alternatively, the pre-development phase may take longer due to local site conditions or new issues coming to light. The IEA has estimated a pre-development phase of approximately eight years for nuclear power.53 However, this includes the time it takes to gain political approval and it assumes an existing industrial infrastructure, workforce and regulatory regimes. In the case of the United Kingdom, then Prime Ministry Tony Blair announced that nuclear power was “back with vengeance” in May 2006, but it was some years before the pre-development phase for nuclear power even began.

Nuclear power has a history of delays in construction, and analysis undertaken by the World Energy Council54 has shown the global trend in increased construction times for nuclear reactors. The significant increase in construction times from the late 1980s until 2000 was in part due to changes in political and public views of nuclear energy following the Chernobyl accident, with subsequent alterations in the regulatory requirements. As we have shown in the World eNuclear Industry Status Report 2009,55 calculating a global average construction time – it would be around nine years for the 16 most recent grid connections – does not make much sense because of the differences between countries. The construction period for four reactors started up in Romania, Russia and Ukraine lasted between 18 and 24 years. In contrast, it took hardly more than five years on average to complete the 12 units that were connected to the grid in China, India, Japan and South Korea.

Increases in construction times can be seen in various countries across the world. In Germany, in the period from 1965 to 1976, construction took 76 months, increasing to 110 months in the period from 1983 to 1989. In Japan average construction time in the period from 1965 to 2004 was in the range of 44 to 51 months. Finally in Russia, the average construction time from 1965 to 1976 was 57 months, then from 1977 to 1993 it was between 72 and 89 months, but the four plants that have been completed since then have taken around 180 months (15 years),56 due to increased opposition following the Chernobyl accident, economic constraints and the political changes after 1992.

The first of the latest design of reactors, the so-called Generation III+ reactors, is under construction in Finland.58 At the time of the ordering of Olkiluoto-3 in December 2003, the contract called for the plant to be on-line by 1 May 2009. However, the latest completion date is now at least three and a half years late and close to 100% over budget (current estimates suggest that by completion, the total will reach €5.7 billion or more, compared to an original estimate of €3 billion). The second Generation III+ reactor, also an EPR as in Finland, is under construction in France. After three years of construction, Flamanville-3 is now officially at least two years behind planning and €2 billion over budget. As a consequence of the building problems, the credit agency Standard & Poor’s downrated nuclear builder AREVA.59

Given the complexities and costs associated with construction, reactors tend to be built in series rather than parallel, i.e., constructors will wait until one reactor is completed until starting the next. Consequently, it will take a number of additional years for a new fleet of reactors to be fully operational.

#### 2. Negative feedbacks solve

Singer et al. 11 [S Fred, PhD, a distinguished atmospheric physicist and first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, Craig Idso, editor of the online magazine CO2 Science and author of several books and scholarly articles on the effects of carbon dioxide on plant and animal life, Robert M Carter, marine geologist and research professor at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report]

In the 2009 NIPCC report, Idso and Singer (2009) discussed the plausibility of a multistage negative feedback process whereby warming-induced increases in the emission of dimethyl sulfide (DMS) from the world‘s oceans tend to counteract any initial impetus for warming. The basic tenet of this hypothesis is that the global radiation balance is significantly influenced by the albedo of marine stratus clouds (the greater the cloud albedo, the less the input of solar radiation to the Earth‘s surface). The albedo of these clouds, in turn, is known to be a function of cloud droplet concentration (the more and smaller the cloud droplets, the greater the cloud albedo and the reflection of solar radiation), which is dependent upon the availability of cloud condensation nuclei on which the droplets form (the more cloud condensation nuclei, the more and smaller the cloud droplets). And in completing the negative feedback loop, the cloud condensation nuclei concentration often depends upon the flux of biologically produced DMS from the world‘s oceans (the higher the sea surface temperature, the greater the sea-to-air flux of DMS).

Since the publication of the 2009 NIPCC report, additional empirical evidence has been found to support the several tenets of the DMS feedback process. Qu and Gabric (2010), for example, introduce their contribution to the subject by stating, ―dimethylsulfide (DMS) is the main volatile sulfur [species] released during the formation and decay of microbial ocean biota and ―aerosols formed from the atmospheric conversion of DMS to sulfate and methanesulfonic acid can exert a climate cooling effect directly by scattering and absorbing solar radiation and indirectly by promoting the formation of cloud condensation nuclei and increasing the albedo of clouds, thus reflecting more solar radiation back into space.

Working with climate and DMS production data from the region of the Barents Sea (70–80°N, 30– 35°E) obtained over the period 1998 to 2002, Qu and Gabric employed a genetic algorithm to calibrate chlorophyll-a measurements (obtained from SeaWiFS satellite data) for use in a regional DMS production model. Then, using GCM temperature outputs for the periods 1960–1970 (pre-industry CO2 level) and 2078–2086 (triple the pre-industry CO2 level), they calculated the warming-induced enhancement of the DMS flux from the Barents Sea region. The two researchers report, ―significantly decreasing ice coverage, increasing sea surface temperature and decreasing mixed-layer depth could lead to annual DMS flux increases of more than 100% by the time of equivalent CO2 tripling (the year 2080). In commenting on their findings, they state, ―such a large change would have a great impact on the Arctic energy budget and may offset the effects of anthropogenic warming that are amplified at polar latitudes. What is more, they write, ―many of these physical changes will also promote similar perturbations for other biogenic species (Leck et al., 2004), some of which are now thought to be equally influential to the aerosol climate of the Arctic Ocean. Thus it can be appreciated that DMS production in a warming world—especially when augmented by analogous biogenic phenomena—may provide a large moderating influence on the primary impetus for warming that is produced by mankind‘s emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.

Kim et al. (2010) write that DMS ―represents 95% of the natural marine flux of sulfur gases to the atmosphere (Bates et al., 1992; Liss et al., 1997), and they say it ―may be oxidized to form non sea-salt sulfate aerosols, which are known to act as cloud condensation nuclei and thereby exert a cooling effect by absorbing or scattering solar radiation. They cite Charlson et al. (1987), who first described the intriguing and important chain of events. They also note ―DMS is generated by intracellular or extracellular enzymatic cleavage of DMSP [dimethylsulfoniopropionate] by DMSP-lyase, which is synthesized by algae and bacteria, following DMSP secretion from producer cells or release following autolysis or viral attack, while noting that ―grazing activity can also result in DMSP conversion to DMS if DMSP and DMSP-lyase are physically mixed following grazing, citing Stefels et al., 2007, and Wolfe and Steinke, 1996.

Working in the coastal waters of Korea from 21 November to 11 December 2008, the 14 Korean scientists utilized 2,400-liter mesocosm enclosures to simulate, in triplicate, three sets of environmental conditions—an ambient control (~400 ppm CO2 and ambient temperature), an acidification treatment (~900 ppm CO2 and ambient temperature), and a greenhouse treatment (~900 ppm CO2 and ~3°C warmer-than-ambient temperature)—and within these mesocosms they initiated phytoplankton blooms by adding equal quantities of nutrients to each mesocosm on day 0. For 20 days thereafter they measured numerous pertinent parameters within each mesocosm. This work revealed, as they describe it, that ―total accumulated DMS concentrations (integrated over the experimental period) in the acidification and greenhouse mesocosms were approximately 80% and 60% higher than the values measured in the control mesocosms, respectively, which they attribute to the fact that, in their experiment, ―autotrophic nanoflagellates (which are known to be significant DMSP producers) showed increased growth in response to elevated CO2 and ―grazing rates [of microzooplankton] were significantly higher in the treatment mesocosms than in the control mesocosms. In the concluding paragraph of their paper, they write, ―the key implication of our results is that DMS production resulting from CO2-induced grazing activity may increase under future high CO2 conditions, concluding that ―DMS production in the ocean may act to counter the effects of global warming in the future.

#### 3. No risk of extinction.

Lomborg 8—Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School [Bjorn, “Warming warnings get overheated,” The Guardian, August 15, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange]

These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren't for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a "catastrophe" and the beginning of the "extinction" of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners' scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland's ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world's coastal infrastructure and much of the world's farmland – "undoubtedly" causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years' time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell's claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

### 1NC—Grid

#### “Disconnect fees” and grid access deals prevent them from solving

Snider 12—E&E reporter [Annie Snider, “Clean energy doesn't always bring security for military,” Greenwire, Friday, January 27, 2012, pg. http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/01/27/1]

There is a technological fix: a switch that would let the base disconnect from the grid and keep the solar panels up, shouldering some of the backup power burden that currently falls to the base's diesel generators when commercial power goes out.

But Nellis has not implemented that fix. Nor has the Navy at the Naval Air Weapons Station in China Lake, Calif., where a 270-megawatt geothermal plant makes it the only military installation that produces more power than it uses. Nor have many other U.S. military bases that are quickly amassing fields of solar panels and wind turbines.

To be sure, the idea of using renewable energy to power critical missions wasn't on the Pentagon agenda when the Nellis and China Lake projects were built in 2007 and 1987, respectively. But today, as the Defense Department undertakes a massive effort to build renewable energy generation for "energy security," there is still no overarching requirement that such power sources be able to support vital national missions if the local power goes out.

"It's not energy security if you've got renewable generation that you cannot access if the grid goes down," said Scott Sklar, a 40-year veteran of the renewable power field and a frequent consultant for the military.

Cost is often cited as a barrier for DOD not having the proper grid-access deals or technologies. Utilities charge a "disconnect fee" for the right to drop off the grid and continue generation during a power outage. The fees vary, but military energy managers say they are sizeable enough to affect a project's overall financials.

Money's a problem for the military. Although officials see a security value to on-base power production, renewable energy projects are legally required to yield more in savings over their lifetime than they cost to build. Projects often meet that requirement with thin margins.

"If our leadership determines to us that there is a financial value to energy security, then that will be used in our evaluation of price," said Steve Dumont, an energy manager for the Air Force Command that oversees Nellis. "It's really a policy issue."

And that is the rub: DOD rules and guidance are largely driven by mandates for expanding the use of renewable energy and improving energy efficiency rather than operational need.

Pentagon policymakers have been awakened in recent years to the vulnerability of bases that rely on commercial power, but as they start to devise new standards for renewable power, they must navigate regulatory mazes that vary from state to state. States have authority over utilities, and many utilities must be dealt with individually.

Meanwhile, in the absence of orders from headquarters, base energy managers are left to make their own decisions. That is complicated by turnover on those posts and a lack of training and experience.

The result is expensive, labor-intensive projects -- some funded with federal taxpayers' cash, others by developers -- that meet federal green-energy mandates but provide little security benefit to the military.

As Pentagon officials, especially civilian appointees, raise the profile of the military's renewable energy ambitions, uniformed commanders are beginning to speak out about the problem.

Capt. Jeffrey Dodson, commander of the Navy's China Lake installation, raised the issue at a well-attended energy security event at the Pentagon this fall.

"What people don't realize is the electrons from ... geothermal don't come to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake. It goes onto the grid," he told top Pentagon brass and civilian appointees. "That's one of the main limitationsfrom an operator perspective."

#### Their solvency ev is industry cheerleading—diverse distributed sources solve better.

Lovins 10—Chair and Chief Scientist @ Rocky Mountain Institute [Amory B. Lovins (Experimental Physicist and Former professor of Advanced Energy Efficiency @ Stanford University) , “Lovins addresses New Nuclear Power for DOD (Q&A 3 of 3)” DOD Energy Blog, Wednesday, May 12, 2010, http://dodenergy.blogspot.com/2010/05/lovins-addresses-new-nuclear-power-for\_12.html]

Question 3: Are there any points in particular you'd like to call out re: the on nuclear energy generation potential for DOD?

ABL: Yes. Two major technical task forces evaluating DoD's energy options have carefully considered the various nuclear technologies at diverse scales that were vigorously suggested to them. Both pointedly declined to recommend military pursuit of any nuclear technology to power facilities. My 1Q2010 Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) article "DoD's Energy Challenge as Strategic Opportunity" explains, with footnotes omitted:

"Nuclear power is sometimes suggested for land installations or even expeditionary forces, typically without discussing cost (grossly uncompetitive), modern renewables (typically much cheaper), operational reliability (usually needing 100% backup), or security. For these and other reasons, the 2008 DSB and JASON task forces didn’t endorse this option."

Some of the task forces' reasons are obvious. For isolated or grid-connected fixed installations, any mini-reactor would require 100% backup, as analysis of a Toshiba ~10-MWe unit proposed for the fly-in village of Galena, Alaska confirmed. Moreover, its economics would be dreadful. Unconservatively assuming the same $2,500/KWe capital cost at 10 MWe as at 50 MWe, a found that if the reactor (with capex upwards of 9¢/KWh) and its licensing (roughly comparable or larger under current rules), its installation and removal, and its decommissioning were all free, if O&M costs were half Toshiba's estimate for the 50-MWe design, and if NRC dropped the required security staffing from 34 to 4 guards, then the ~5–14¢/KWh operating cost alone might compete with diesel's, burning costly barged-in fuel; but to make even this work, the study had to make many absurd assumptions. I'm unaware of any remote installation for which a mini-reactor can be shown to be competitive.

Nor, inherently, can a mini-reactor's security of supply approach that of a properly designed network of diverse and distributed sources. The principles of resilient design, summarized in Ch. 13 of " Brittle Power", are no more compatible with a single power source than are the principles of least cost . Nuclear power does not earn a place in a "diversified" DOD energy supply portfolio simply by being different, any more than a financial portfolio should include one of everything on offer. Rather, a balanced portfolio includes only assets with a clear risk-and-return rationale.

The Naval situation is different, but not completely, as my JFQ article continued:

"After vast investment in hardware and a unique technical culture, nuclear propulsion has proven its merit in submarines and aircraft carriers. In 2006–09, Congressional enthusiasts announced supposed Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) findings that nuclear propulsion in new medium surface combatants could beat $70/bbl oil. However, the 2008 DSB task force discovered that NAVSEA’s actual finding ($75–225/bbl) had improperly assumed a zero real discount rate. A 3%/y real discount rate yielded a $132–345/bbl break even oil price; NAVSEA didn’t respond to requests to test the 7%/year real discount rate OMB probably mandates. Presumably the Secretary of Defense will reject this option and focus resources on making ships optimally efficient."

In short, as my JFQ article concluded, "The 2008 DSB and JASON studies are redirecting the military energy conversation from exotic, speculative, and often inappropriate supplies to efficient use, which makes autonomous in-theater supply important and often cost-effective...."

It's therefore disappointing to see that some in the Building, apparently unaware of the full competitive landscape, are now wasting still more time and money on nuclear power after both of DOD's advisory bodies rejected it for many compelling reasons. I hope the Congressionally mandated report the DOD Energy Blog mentions (4th paragraph: here), due 1 Jun 2010, will dig deeper than the current cheer-leading—originating ultimately from vendors desperate to find a cost-insensitive customer for technologies already rejected by the marketplace.

There you have it, sports fans. Amory's systems-based, economics-grounded response has substantially squelched my recently burgeoning enthusiasm for a new nuclear component to DOD's energy portfolio. I have to check my own cheer-leading tendencies sometimes. That said, if there's a man or woman among you who wants to attempt a public retort to these arguments, be my guest ... and good luck, you're going to need it!

#### US decline will not spark wars—theory and the empirical record prove.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

### AT: SCS

**Potential economic destruction deters war**

Creehan 12– Senior Editor of the SAIS Review of International Affairs [Sean Creehan, “Assessing the Risks of Conflict in the South China Sea,” SAIS Review, Volume 32, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2012, pp. 125-128

Regarding Secretary Clinton’s first requirement, the risk of actual closure of the South China Sea remains remote, as instability in the region would affect the entire global economy, raising the price of various goods and commodities. According to some estimates, for example, as much as 50 percent of global oil tanker shipments pass through the South China Sea— that represents more than three times the tanker traffic through the Suez Canal and over five times the tanker traffic through the Panama Canal.4 It is in no country’s interest to see instability there, least of all China’s, given the central economic importance of Chinese exports originating from the country’s major southern ports and energy imports coming through the South China Sea (annual U.S. trade passing through the Sea amounts to $1.2 trillion).5 Invoking the language of nuclear deterrence theory, disruption in these sea lanes implies mutually assured economic destruction, and that possibility should moderate the behavior of all participants. Furthermore, with the United States continuing to operate from a position of naval strength (or at least managing a broader alliance that collectively balances China’s naval presence in the future), the sea lanes will remain open. While small military disputes within such a balance of power are, of course, possible, the economic risks of extended conflict are so great that significant changes to the status quo are unlikely. Pg. 126

## \*\*\* 2NC

### AT: Water Add on

#### Trade policy is more important than production chain for nuclear leadership.

NEI, June 2012. Nuclear Energy Institute. “Improved Policies for Commercial Nuclear Trade Will Create American Jobs,” http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/policybrief/improved-policies-for-commercial-nuclear-trade-will-create-american-jobs.

As of June 2012, 30 countries operate 436 reactors for electricity generation, and 65 reactors are under construction in 14 countries. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the global export market for commercial nuclear materials, reactors, major components and equipment grew from $6.2 billion in 1994 to $16.1 billion in 2008.1¶ The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that the international nuclear market, including fuel and services, will expand to $500 billion to $740 billion over the next 10 years. Every $1 billion of exports represents 5,000 to 10,000 jobs. The commercial nuclear market is expected to remain robust in expanding economies such as China and India. Other nations are exploring nuclear energy as a way to provide elec- tricity for their growing economics. U.S. companies face varied obstacles in exporting nuclear technologies: poor coordination among numer- ous federal agencies involved, an inefficient licensing process and limited options for financing exports. Making matters worse, the global playing field is far from level. “Some of the largest markets for nuclear goods and services, such as France, Russia and South Korea, have significant barriers to entry for U.S. companies because of the presence of a state-owned competitor,” according to a 2010 report by the GAO.¶ The United States has the world’s largest commercial nuclear program, with 104 operating reactors provid- ing clean, safe, reliable electricity for one in five homes and businesses. The industry boasts world-class safety practices, nuclear products and nuclear services. **Yet without supportive trade policies, U.S. companies have difficulty holding their own in the global nuclear market. Even as our nation’s commercial nuclear supply chain continues to grow and add jobs,** the United States remains a net importer of the nuclear tech- nology it originally developed.2 U.S. trade policies must be reformed **so the United States can reclaim its position as a world leader in nuclear technologies**.

**Odds of the war going nuclear are ZERO. Their high probability assessment is media hype**

**Enders 02** [David, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” Michigan Daily, 1/30. http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely.]

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted." The world"s two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous. "The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said. "Watching the evening news**,** CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said. Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war. "India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous." Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal. "American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."But the low probability of nuclear war does not mean tensions between the two countries who have fought three wars since they were created in 1947 will not erupt. "The possibility of conventional war between the two is higher. Both sides are looking for ways out of the current tension," Lieberthal said.

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\* Ashutosh Varshney - Professor of Political Science and South Asia expert at the University of Michigan

\* Paul Huth – Professor of International Conflict and Security Affairs at the University of Maryland

\* Kenneth Lieberthal - Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan

**No water wars – other tensions overwhelm.**

**Victor ’07** (David G., professor of law at Stanford University, November/December. “What resource wars?” National Interest. Ebsco.)

While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that **water wars don't happen**--usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny--the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces.

### 2NC T—No Purchase O/V

#### Predictable Limits— that outweighs, it allows in depth research, better neg strats, and improves the overall quality of clash and debate. The only check on the resolution is limiting the aff to a list of financial incentives to increase production. Allowing aff flex on the mechanism makes the topic unmanageable, [insert list of possible affs here derived from the aff’s non-T mechanism]. Broadly defining incentives makes more than 40 mechanisms topical.

Moran 86—non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development and holds the Marcus Wallenberg Chair at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University(Theodore, Investing in Development: New Roles for Private Capital?, p. 29—googlebooks)

Guisinger finds that if “incentives” are broadly defined to include tariffs and trade controls along with tax holidays, subsidized loans, cash grants, and other fiscal measures, they comprise more than forty separate kinds of measures. Moreover, the author emphasizes, the value of an incentive package is just one of several means that governments use to lure foreign investors. Other methods—for example, promotional activities (advertising, representative offices) and subsidized government services—also influence investors’ location decisions. The author points out that empirical research so far has been unable to distinguish the relative importance of fundamental economic factors and of government policies in decisions concerning the location of foreign investment—let alone to determine the effectiveness of individual government instruments.

### AT: Webb

#### Webb includes PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS because in Canada they often are given with a condition to do something else. That makes them a financial incentive. NOT the procurement, but the EXTERNAL MOTIVATION. Plus, its Canadian

Webb 93—lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)—italics in the original

At the same time, Canadian governments make use of many financial incentives to encourage private sector compliance with public policies. As used here, incentives qualify as examples of the State's "fingers." Contrary to the impression given by the strong-thumbs-no-fingers aphorism, the position taken here is that in fact there are many fingers being used by the federal government, but often they operate outside of the glare of public scrutiny and effective control. Fingers can be less clumsy than thumbs, and are capable of probing where thumbs cannot go -- for example, the federal government can 8 and has created many incentive programs which directly affect matters of provincial legislative jurisdiction9 whereas it can only establish traditional regulatory regimes in relation to federal legislative heads of power.10 Incentives often take the form of funds which have "strings attached" -- for example, in the case of certain incentive programs involving contributions11 for economic development, and procurement contracts 12 it is not uncommon to find stipulations that recipients establish employment equity plans, or meet environmental requirements.13 Certainly, incentives have been used in Canada to achieve policy objectives where it is difficult to imagine coercive sanctions being employed: for example, threats of fines or imprisonment to achieve research and development, to increase the birth rate, to stimulate the Canadian art and film sector, or mining exploration might raise hackles, yet each of these contexts attracts financial incentives.14 Moreover, just as the fingers work well in tandem with thumbs, so too it is not uncommon to find financial incentives used in conjunction with coercive instruments. For example, there are incentives to abate pollution or to hire disadvantaged groups, offered at the same time as traditional pollution control and anti-discrimination regimes are in place.15

#### Procurement is a non-financial incentive.

Czinkota et al 9—Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69—google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. Fiscal incentives are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

### AT: Procurement

#### AND—it expressly excludes INVESTMENTS via things like purchases. Later concludes that PURCHASES aren’t topical

Gouchoe 2k—North Carolina State University, National Renewable Energy Laboratory [Susan, December 2000, Local Government and Community Programs and Incentives for Renewable Energy— National Report, http://seg.fsu.edu/Library/casestudy%20of%20incentives.pdf]

Green Power Purchasing

Municipalities and local government agencies can play a critical role in promoting renewable energy technologies by buying electricity from renewable resources. Local governments can use their buying power to provide a market for renewables just as many have done for recycled materials through city green procurement requirements. At the very least, this can mean buying green power for municipal buildings, streetlights, water pumping stations and the like. Many local governments in California have taken this approach. Some local governments have the authority to aggregate the electricity loads of the entire community to purchase green power, or even to join with other communities or government agencies to form an even larger green power-purchasing block. This provision in electricity restructuring laws is known as "Community Choice.” Two states, Massachusetts and Ohio, allow this type of “opt-out” aggregation. That is, citizens or businesses who wish not to participate can choose their own energy supplier. The Cape Light Compact, the first Community Choice effort in Massachusetts, is discussed in this report.

#### Second, Funds are only CONTINGENTLY committed. Purchasing means paying for, that is distinct. They are a reward offered

Dictionary.Com [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/incentive]

in·cen·tive

noun

1.

something that incites or tends to incite to action or greater effort, as a reward offered for increased productivity.

#### 3. Mandates aren’t an incentive

Benson 7—J.D, University of Iowa (Christine C., Winter, “STUDENT NOTE: Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: The Varied Success of Biofuel Incentive Policies in the United States and the European Union”, 16 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 633, Lexis Law)

There are two main ways a government can promote an industry requiring support to survive and prosper. A government may use financial incentives to reduce costs to the industry at one or several points in the chain of production. n139 A government may also use regulatory mandates to impose a minimum usage requirement for certain products produced by the industry. n140

Both the United States and the EU have implemented mandates in regard to biofuels. n141 Mandates are structured goals that a government lays out for an industry to accomplish, and a government usually provides a date by which those goals should be met. n142 Mandates allow a government to define and promote a structured policy, and financial incentives provide the [\*650] means of assistance for implementing that policy. n143 Therefore, mandates are usually accompanied by some type of financial incentive. n144

Financial incentives take many forms. Loans, grants, production payments, tax credits or deductions, and tax exemptions all provide some type of financial assistance. n145 Loans and grants generally promote the development of an industry's infrastructure, research, and development. n146 Tax incentives are generally more focused on promoting long-term production of a product. n147 This Note focuses only on tax incentives, not loan and grant programs, for biofuels in the United States and the EU.

### SMR Fails—Nat Gas

#### Nat gas blocks SMRs—even if the aff happens they won’t be commercially viable for 10 years. Other countries will take the lead.

Updegraff 12—Summary Prepared by Derek Updegraff, Rebecca Lordan, Pierce Corden citing Phillip O. Moor P.E., Consultant in nuclear technology, licensing, and business structuring and former Director of Project Management at GPU Nuclear, Chair of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) President’s Special Committee on SMR Licensing Issues [May 9, 2012, Small Modular Reactor Panel Discussion Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, https://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMR%20Briefing%20Summary.pdf]

In Moor’s view, economics is the key issue. Capital costs are being confirmed. If natural gas prices were to break ~$7‐8 per million British Thermal Units (MMBTU) (currently they are around $2.00/MMBTU in the US) or if carbon taxes are put into place, SMRs could become economically viable. In that case, loan guarantees or other forms of direct federal assistance for SMRs might not be necessary. However, even in this scenario, for the SMR market to take off, would still require NRC licensing changes and construction of demonstration plants to prove the plants can be made commercially viable. This process is expected to take 8‐10 years. Moor pointed out that China, India, and Russia are moving ahead with SMRs and suggests that the US might miss the chance to lead this market.

### 2NC—Prefer Pessimism

#### Default to pessimistic cost predictions—bias and empirics

Rosenkranz 10—Dr. Gerd Rosenkranz, holder of a doctorate in material science and graduate engineer in the field of metallurgy, completed his postgraduate studies in communication science and worked as a journalist for national daily and weekly newspapers for 20 years; at last until 2004 five years as editor for the Berlin office of the news magazine *Der Spiegel* specialised in environment and energy policy. Since October 2004 he is head of the department politics and public relations of Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V. (German Environmental Aid) in Berlin. [September 2010, “Myths about nuclear energy,” Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, European Union, Brussels, http://www.boell.org/downloads/Rozenkrant\_UK\_web.pdf]

This has in no way halted the continual decline of nuclear energy that has been taking place for decades. In the USA eight years of aggressive pro-nuclear power politics under the Bush administration did not lead to the building of one new project. In Western Europe there are merely two construction sites. Nevertheless, studies have been launched since decades with the purpose of demonstrating the ability of new nuclear power plants to compete against other technologies for generating electricity. The drawback of these studies is that while at best their authors and sponsors believe the forecasts, potential investors do not. This is the first reason why there is so much uncertainty about the true costs of a new generation of reactors. There are no reliable data on the large overall cost pools, especially the costs relating to construction, financing, disposal and dismantling – due to the fact that nearly all the published estimates are evaluated by analysts with considerable scepticism. And this in turn is due to the fact that all these figures as a rule originate from constructors who want to sell the reactors or from governments, associations or lobby groups intent on gaining public support for the unpopular idea of nuclear energy by promoting at the very least the expectation of low electricity prices.

However, beyond these matters of self interest there are also problems from an objective perspective. Because each new series of reactor constructions so far has had to face the consequences of huge delays, costly compensation for ‘teething problems’ and lengthy periods of shut down, potential investors regard the ever optimistic prognoses of the builders of new reactors with the utmost discomfort. Their experience: for half a century the nuclear power industry has always been high on promises but short on delivery. In the USA almost half of the orders for over 250 reactors were later cancelled, mainly because the costs of the power plants eventually put into operation had on average more than doubled. The magazine *Forbes* called the collapse of the US nuclear industry in the middle of the 80s “the greatest management catastrophe in economic history”. Of the 1,000 nuclear power stations the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had expected in the 70s for the turn of the century only about 13% were built. Reactor constructors in Western Europe and in the state economies of Eastern Europe also experienced similar situations.

There can be no reliable predictions as to the performance of a new power plant. This applies even more to the new types of reactors based on mainly untried technology. According to an analysis published in the summer of 2009, the New York rating agency, Moody’s, expects electricity supply companies supporting plans for the construction of new nuclear power plants to be routinely downgraded owing to the incalculable risks involved. Whereas new technologies – also those outside the field of power plant technology – normally move relatively continuously and predictably along a ‘learning curve’ with ever decreasing prices, reactor manufacturers after more than half a century since the start of commercial nuclear fission start over and over again. Therefore in the 1970s and 1980s reactor manufacturers built increasingly bigger reactors in the hope that they would produce, on the whole, cheaper electricity than smaller units. However, switching to economics of scale has not solved the problem. A trend towards less costly reactors has been an unfulfilled promise of reactor manufacturers for decades. Nuclear power remains a high risk technology not only considered from the safety point of view but also from the financial one.

### AT: DOD Exempt

#### AND—DOD won’t choose to exempt themselves—it would force them to accept liability when they don’t have sufficient personnel or expertise to regulate nuclear power.

Marcus King, LaVar Huntzinger, and Thoi Nguyen, March 2011. CNA Environment and Energy Team, Resource Analysis Division. “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” <http://www.cna.org/research/2011/feasibility-nuclear-power-us-military>.

The most basic licensing issue relates to whether NRC will have jurisdiction over potential nuclear reactor sites or whether DoD could be self-regulating. Our conversations with NRC indicate it is the only possible licensing authority for reactors that supply power to the com- mercial grid. However, DOE and DoD are authorized to regulate mission critical nuclear facilities under Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act. There is some historical precedent for DoD exercising this authority. For example, the Army Nuclear Program was granted exception under this rule with regard to the reactor that operated aboard the Sturgis barge in the 1960s and 1970s [44].¶ **It seems unlikely that DoD would pursue exemption under Section 91b in the future**.10 Regulating power plants is a function that lies beyond DoD's core mission. The Department and the military ser- vices are unlikely to have personnel with sufficient expertise to act as regulators for nuclear power plants, and it could take considerable time and resources to develop such expertise. **Without NRC oversight DoD would bear all associated risks**.

### 2NC—Even if Fast

#### Even if we could build 100 reactors in 2 decades, it still wouldn’t be enough to solve warming—prefer comparative evidence.

Madsen and Dutzik 9—\*Travis Madsen has worked with Frontier Group since 2002. His work has won coverage in a wide variety of local and national media outlets, including the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, and the *Los Angeles Times*. Prior to joining Frontier Group in 2002, Travis completed a fellowship at the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group. Travis holds a bachelors degree in molecular biology and chemistry from the University of Colorado. \*\*Tony Dutzik is senior policy analyst with Frontier Group, specializing in energy, transportation and climate policy. He is the author of more than three dozen Frontier Group reports on these and other topics, and his research has received national media attention, gaining coverage in the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the Philadelphia Inquirer and other major media outlets. He holds a Master's degree in print journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Science degree in public service from Penn State University. [November 2009, “Generating Failure How Building Nuclear Power Plants Would Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming,” Environment America Research & Policy Center, http://www.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/Generating-Failure---Environment-America---Web\_0.pdf]

Even Without Delays, the Nuclear Path Is Too Slow to Keep Global Warming Emissions Within Budget

Even with generous assumptions about speed and effectiveness, building 100 new reactors in the United States by 2030 will not reduce global warming pollution fast enough to keep our carbon emissions within budget – and therefore not fast enough to meet our goals for limiting the consequences of global warming.

First, assume that the nuclear industry can deliver on its ambitious timelines and successfully complete 100 new reactors (about 100 gigawatts of generation capacity) in two decades. Then, assume that every kilowatt-hour of nuclear power would displace coal, the largest source of carbon-intensive power generation. Finally, assume that next-generation nuclear reactors operate at an average of 90 percent of full capacity – an upper-bound estimate from a group of nuclear technology experts.106 Under these best-case conditions, building 100 active nuclear reactors could prevent more than 750 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (MMTCO2) pollution in 2030. Overall power plant emissions would be 20 percent below 2005 levels.

However, these nuclear reactors would not be able to reduce emissions while they are under construction. In other words, the nuclear path delivers a late start in cutting pollution. As a result, building 100 new reactors could only reduce cumulative power plant emissions of global warming pollution by 12 percent over the next two decades compared to doing nothing. (See Figure 5.) On this path, America would still exceed its 2010-2050 electric power emissions budget by 2025 – 25 years too soon. (See “Setting a Carbon Budget for the United States” on page 13 for a brief explanation of the source of the budget line represented in Figure 5.)

In conclusion, building 100 new nuclear reactors by 2030 would be too little, too late when it comes to preventing global warming pollution. By leading to a higher and later peak in emissions, using nuclear power as a primary strategy to address global warming would ensure that the United States exceeds its 2010-2050 power plant emissions budget. As a result the nuclear path would cut into what little margin of error we have, increasing the risk of catastrophic global warming.

### 2NC—No Impact

#### Reject their try or die impact framing—they cherry-pick the worst case scenarios and assume they are likely—every scientific study concludes that the likelihood of such devastation is virtually zero

Eastin et al. 11 [Josh, Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington, Reiner Grundmann and Aseem Prakash, “The two limits debates: “Limits to Growth” and climate change,” Futures, February, Vol 43, Issue 1, pp. 16-26, ScienceDirect]

And Hjerpe and Linnér point out, ‘The IPCC ‘describes scenarios as ‘alternative images of how the future might unfold … to analyze how driving forces may influence future emission outcomes’ (…), i.e., they are not designed to provide blueprints for the future. The IPCC … emphasizes that neither probability nor desirability is attached to the various scenario families … The future evolution of society is recognized as an uncertain process of interaction between, for example, demographic development, socio-economic development, and technological change.’ [[50]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328710000352#bib47)

There is no probability assigned to the various scenarios which opens the way for decision makers to pick the one that aligns with their preconceptions. In this sense, both LtG and IPCC have used scenarios in order to communicate the possibility of a dystopian future, not as a prediction, but as a reminder that something needs to be done urgently if we are to prevent the worst.

### 2NC—No Extinction

#### Adaptation means no catastrophic impact to warming

Kenny 12 [April 9, 2012, Charles, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, and author, most recently, of Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More., “Not Too Hot to Handle,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/09/not\_too\_hot\_to\_handle?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

But for all international diplomats appear desperate to affirm the self-worth of pessimists and doomsayers worldwide, it is important to put climate change in a broader context. It is a vital global issue -- one that threatens to slow the worldwide march toward improved quality of life. Climate change is already responsible for more extreme weather and an accelerating rate of species extinction -- and may ultimately kill off as many as 40 percent of all living species. But it is also a problem that we know how to tackle, and one to which we have some time to respond before it is likely to completely derail progress. And that's good news, because the fact that it's manageable is the best reason to try to tackle it rather than abandon all hope like a steerage class passenger in the bowels of the Titanic.

Start with the economy. The Stern Review, led by the distinguished British economist Nicholas Stern, is the most comprehensive look to date at the economics of climate change. It suggests that, in terms of income, greenhouse gasses are a threat to global growth, but hardly an immediate or catastrophic one. Take the impact of climate change on the developing world. The most depressing forecast in terms of developing country growth in Stern's paper is the "A2 scenario" -- one of a series of economic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts created for the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It's a model that predicts slow global growth and income convergence (poor countries catching up to rich countries). But even under this model, Afghanistan's GDP per capita climbs sixfold over the next 90 years, India and China ninefold, and Ethiopia's income increases by a factor of 10. Knock off a third for the most pessimistic simulation of the economic impact of climate change suggested by the Stern report, and people in those countries are still markedly better off -- four times as rich for Afghanistan, a little more than six times as rich for Ethiopia.

It's worth emphasizing that the Stern report suggests that the costs of dramatically reducing greenhouse-gas emissions is closer to 1 (or maybe 2) percent of world GDP -- in the region of $600 billion to $1.2 trillion today. The economic case for responding to climate change by pricing carbon and investing in alternate energy sources is a slam dunk. But for all the likelihood that the world will be a poorer, denuded place than it would be if we responded rapidly to reduce greenhouse gases, the global economy is probably not going to collapse over the next century even if we are idiotic enough to delay our response to climate change by a few years. For all the flooding, the drought, and the skyrocketing bills for air conditioning, the economy would keep on expanding, according to the data that Stern uses.

And what about the impact on global health? Suggestions that malaria has already spread as a result of climate change and that malaria deaths will expand dramatically as a result of warming in the future don't fit the evidence of declining deaths and reduced malarial spread over the last century. The authors of a recent study published in the journal Nature conclude that the forecasted future effects of rising temperatures on malaria "are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the changes observed since about 1900 and about two orders of magnitude smaller than those that can be achieved by the effective scale-up of key control measures." In other words, climate change is and will likely remain a small factor in the toll of malaria deaths into the foreseeable future.

What about other diseases? Christian Zimmermann at the University of Connecticut and Douglas Gollin at Williams evaluate the likely impact of a 3-degree rise in temperatures on tropical diseases like dengue fever, which causes half a million cases of hemorrhagic fever and 22,000 deaths each year. Most of the vectors for such diseases -- mosquitoes, biting flies, and so on -- do poorly in frost. So if the weather stays warmer, these diseases are likely to spread. At the same time, there are existing tools to prevent or treat most tropical diseases, and Zimmerman and Gollin suggest "rather modest improvements in protection efficacy could compensate for the consequences of climate change." We can deal with this one.

It's the same with agriculture. Global warming will have many negative (and a few positive) impacts on food supply, but it is likely that other impacts -- both positive, including technological change, and negative, like the exhaustion of aquifers-- will have far bigger effects. The 2001 IPCC report suggested that climate change over the long term could reduce agricultural yields by as much as 30 percent. Compare that with the 90 percent increase in rice yields in Indonesia between 1970 and 2006, for example.

Again, while climate change will make extreme weather events and natural disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect on global quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow. That's because, as Matthew Kahn from Tufts University has shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster is in a rich country. The more money that people and governments have, the more they can both afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like flood defenses that lower death tolls.

Let's also not forget how human psychology works. Too many environmentalists suggest that dealing with climate change will take immediate and radical retooling of the global economy. It won't. It is affordable, practical, and wouldn't take a revolution. Giving out the message that the only path to sustainability will require medieval standards of living only puts everyone else off. And once you've convinced yourself the world is on an inevitable course to disaster if some corner of the U.S. Midwest is fracked once more or India builds another three coal-fueled power plants, the only logical thing to do when the fracking or the building occurs is to sit back, put your Toms shoes on the couch, and drink micro-brewed herbal tea until civilization collapses. Climate change isn't like that -- or at the very least, isn't like that yet.

So, if you're really just looking for a reason to strap on the "end of the world is nigh" placards and go for a walk, you can find better excuses -- like, say, the threat of global thermonuclear war or a rogue asteroid. The fight to curb greenhouse gas emissions is one for the hard-nosed optimist.

## \*\*\* 1NR

**They Cite: Kagan & O’Hanlon**

**Kagan and O’Hanlon’s methodology should be rejected—they’re just neocon hacks that recycle the same tired war propaganda.**

Justin Raimondo, Editorial Director of *Antiwar.com*, contributing editor for *The American Conservative*, senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute, Adjunct Scholar with the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007 (“Invade Pakistan?,” *AntiWar.com*, November 22nd, Available Online at http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2007/11/21/invade-pakistan/, Accessed 09-07-2010)

That’s the hallmark of the Kagan-O’Hanlon method, which is also the methodology of the neoconservatives, whose arguments they **synopsize** and **sell** to policymakers as products of the "bipartisan center": **conflating wildly disparate elements** and somehow **always linking them all to al-Qaeda**. That has been the **modus operandi of the War Party** from the very beginning of this increasingly ugly episode in American history. Iraq was said to be in cahoots with Osama. Then it was Iran, according to such impeccable sources as Michael Ledeen. As I’ve remarked before, **they don’t even have to produce fresh war propaganda**: all they have to do is substitute Pakistan or Iran where it used to say Iraq, and they have **a pro-war talking point**, **good as new**.

**1NR—Overview**

**Romney undermines Afghan stability.**

**Crowley 12** (Michael – senior correspondent at TIME Magazine, Romney’s Radical Position on Afghanistan, Swampland at TIME Magazine, p. http://swampland.time.com/2012/04/18/romneys-radical-position-on-afghanistan/)

In its story today about Mitt Romney’s rather opaque views about Afghanistan, the New York Times mentions, almost in passing, something important that has drawn strangely little attention: Romney opposes talking to the Taliban. That’s a relatively extreme position. For some time now, it’s been **widely accepted within the foreign policy establishment** that **any realistic endgame in Afghanistan** will involve some kind of negotiated peace deal with our enemies in Afghanistan. (Hillary Clinton has called the approach, “Fight, talk and build.”) Talks have been underway for months, and while they have been halting, superficial, and at times tragicomic, they’re not very controversial anymore, as this 2011 RAND paper explains: In early 2010, when the [RAND paper's] authors began to participate in exploratory discussions… regarding the possibility of a negotiated peace in Afghanistan, the very concept of talking to the enemy was controversial in official circles and little discussed beyond them. The objective of a negotiated peace has since been firmly embraced by both the Afghan and American governments, supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and endorsed by most of Afghanistan’s neighbors. On the main issue that most Americans think about–troop levels and withdrawal deadlines–Romney’s rhetoric suggests mostly subtle differences with Obama. Romney whacks Obama for being too open about his intentions for exiting the country, and implies he’ll listen more closely to the military’s advice, but he doesn’t disavow Obama’s 2014 goal for ending America’s combat role in the country. Rejecting peace talks, by contrast, is a **game-changer**. It casts into doubt all our assumptions about the war–including that 2014 deadline. “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban,” Romney has said. But we’ve been trying to do that for an awfully long time, with awfully limited results. That’s why even people like George W. Bush’s last national security adviser, Steve Hadley, say things like this: U.S. political leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, and our military commanders, have consistently argued that the conflict in Afghanistan will not end by military means alone. The elimination of al Qaeda’s safe havens and the establishment of **long-term peace and security in Afghanistan and the region** — the key U.S. national security objectives — **is best assured by a sustainable political settlement that strengthens the Afghan state** so that it can assume greater responsibility for addressing the country’s security and economic challenges.

**Nuclear war.**

**Miller 12** (Paul D. – former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Bush and Obama, assistant professor of the International Security affairs at the National Defense University, director for the Afghanistan-Pakistan program at the college of International Security Affairs, It’s Not just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region, World Affairs Journal, p. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/it%E2%80%99s-not-just-al-qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region)

The Afghanistan Study Group, a collection of scholars and former policymakers critical of the current intervention, argued in 2010 that al-Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan and is unlikely to return, even if Afghanistan reverts to chaos or Taliban rule. It argued that three things would have to happen for al-Qaeda to reestablish a safe haven and threaten the United States: “1) the Taliban must seize control of a substantial portion of the country, 2) Al Qaeda must relocate there in strength, and 3) it must build facilities in this new ‘safe haven’ that will allow it to plan and train more effectively than it can today.” Because all three are unlikely to happen, the Study Group argued, al-Qaeda almost certainly will not reestablish a presence in Afghanistan in a way that threatens US security. In fact, none of those three steps are necessary for al-Qaeda to regain its safe haven and threaten America. The group could return to Afghanistan even if the Taliban do not take back control of the country. It could—and probably would—find safe haven there if Afghanistan relapsed into chaos or civil war. Militant groups, including al-Qaeda offshoots, have gravitated toward other failed states, like Somalia and Yemen, but Afghanistan remains especially tempting, **given the network’s familiarity with the terrain and local connections**. Nor does al-Qaeda, which was never numerically overwhelming, need to return to Afghanistan “in strength” to be a threat. Terrorist operations, including the attacks of 2001, are typically planned and carried out by very few people. Al-Qaeda’s resilience, therefore, means that stabilizing Afghanistan is, in fact, necessary even for the most basic US war aims. The international community should not withdraw until there is an Afghan government and Afghan security forces with the will and capacity to deny safe haven without international help. Setting aside the possibility of al-Qaeda’s reemergence, the United States has other important interests in the region as well—notably preventing the Taliban from gaining enough power to destabilize neighboring Pakistan, which, for all its recent defiance, is officially a longstanding American ally. (It signed two mutual defense treaties with the United States in the 1950s, and President Bush designated it a major non-NATO ally in 2004.) State failure in Pakistan brokered by the Taliban could mean regional chaos and a possible loss of control of its nuclear weapons. Preventing such a catastrophe is clearly a vital national interest of the United States and cannot be accomplished with a few drones. Alarmingly, Pakistan is edging toward civil war. A collection of militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), among others, are fighting an insurgency that has **escalated dramatically** since 2007 across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan. According to the Brookings Institution’s Pakistan Index, insurgents, militants, and terrorists now regularly launch more than one hundred and fifty attacks per month on Pakistani government, military, and infrastructure targets. In a so far feckless and ineffectual response, Pakistan has deployed nearly one hundred thousand regular army soldiers to its western provinces. At least three thousand soldiers have been killed in combat since 2007, as militants have been able to seize control of whole towns and districts. Tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians and militants—the distinction between them in these areas is not always clear—have been killed in daily terror and counterterror operations. The two insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. Defeating the Afghan Taliban would give the United States and Pakistan momentum in the fight against the Pakistani Taliban. A Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, on the other hand, will give new strength to the Pakistani insurgency, which would **gain an ally** in Kabul, **safe haven to train and arm and** from which to **launch attacks into Pakistan, and a huge morale boost** in seeing their compatriots win power in a neighboring country. Pakistan’s collapse or fall to the Taliban is (at present) unlikely, but the implications of that scenario are so dire that they cannot be ignored. Even short of a collapse, increasing chaos and instability in Pakistan could give cover for terrorists to increase the intensity and scope of their operations, perhaps even to achieve the cherished goal of stealing a nuclear weapon. Although our war there has at times seemed remote, Afghanistan itself occupies crucial geography. Situated between Iran and Pakistan, bordering China, and within reach of Russia and India, **it sits on a crossroads of Asia’s great powers**. This is why it has, since the nineteenth century, been home to the so-called Great Game—in which the US should continue to be a player. Two other players, Russia and Iran, are aggressive powers seeking to establish hegemony over their neighbors. Iran is seeking to build nuclear weapons, has an elite military organization (the Quds Force) seeking to export its Islamic Revolution, and uses the terror group Hezbollah as a proxy to bully neighboring countries and threaten Israel. Russia under Vladimir Putin is seeking to reestablish its sphere of influence over its near abroad, in pursuit of which it (probably) cyber-attacked Estonia in 2007, invaded Georgia in 2008, and has continued efforts to subvert Ukraine. Iran owned much of Afghan territory centuries ago, and continues to share a similar language, culture, and religion with much of the country. It maintains extensive ties with the Taliban, Afghan warlords, and opposition politicians who might replace the corrupt but Western-oriented Karzai government. Building a stable government in Kabul will be a small step in the larger campaign to limit Tehran’s influence. Russia remains heavily involved in the Central Asian republics. It has worked to oust the United States from the air base at Manas, Kyrgyzstan. It remains interested in the huge energy reserves in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russia may be wary of significant involvement in Afghanistan proper, unwilling to repeat the Soviet Union’s epic blunder there. But a US withdrawal from Afghanistan followed by Kabul’s collapse would likely embolden Russia to assert its influence more aggressively elsewhere in Central Asia or Eastern Europe, especially in the Ukraine. A US departure from Afghanistan will also continue to resonate for years to come in the strength and purpose of NATO. Every American president since Harry Truman has affirmed the centrality of the Atlantic Alliance to US national security. The war in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Alliance’s first out-of-area operation in its sixty-year history, was going poorly until the US troop surge. Even with the limited success that followed, allies have complained that the burden in Afghanistan has been distributed unevenly. Some, like the British, Canadians, and Poles, are fighting a shooting war in Kandahar and Helmand, while others, like the Lithuanians and Germans, are doing peacekeeping in Ghor and Kunduz. The poor command and control—split between four regional centers—left decisionmaking slow and poorly coordinated for much of the war. ISAF’s strategy was only clarified in 2008 and 2009, when Generals David McKiernan and Stanley McChrystal finally developed a more coherent campaign plan with counterinsurgency-appropriate rules of engagement. A bad end in Afghanistan could have dire consequences for the Atlantic Alliance, leaving the organization’s future, and especially its **credibility as a deterrent to Russia, in question**. It would not be irrational for a Russian observer of the war in Afghanistan to conclude that if NATO cannot make tough decisions, field effective fighting forces, or distribute burdens evenly, it cannot defend Europe. The United States and Europe must prevent that outcome by salvaging a credible result to its operations in Afghanistan—one that both **persuades Russia that NATO is still a fighting alliance** and preserves the organization as a pillar of US national security.

**Independently causes Russian belligerence in Ukraine – that's Miller. Goes nuclear.**

**Kingston 9** (Brian, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs – CIFP, “Ukraine: A Risk Assessment Report”, p. <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1214.pdf>)

Russia: Russia seeks to influence the weakened Ukraine, **inflaming ethnic-Russian separatism**; Crimea declares independence; Ukraine resists, perhaps seeing an external war as a distraction from internal strife; Russia comes to the aid of Crimea/ethnic-Russians resulting in open warfare between Russia and Ukraine. The West: The West also suffers from the global recession, but (perhaps following a period of inward looking protectionism) realizes that it cannot allow Russian success in Ukraine; **open hostilities erupt between Russian and NATO forces triggering World War III and the strong possibility of nuclear war**, or at least the drawing in of many other countries.

**Bandow says Romney would start Chinese currency wars – turns China war.**

**Landy 7**—Director Of Research And Strategy At The Atlantic Media Company, Publisher Of The Atlantic Monthly, National Journal, And Government Executive Magazines [Ben Landy, April 3, 2007, http://chinaredux.com/2007/04/03/protectionism-and-war/#comments]

The greatest threat for the 21st century is that these economic flare-ups between the US and China will not be contained, but might spill over into the realm of military aggression between these two world powers. Economic conflict breeds military conflict. The stakes of trade override the ideological power of the Taiwan issue. China's ability to continue growing at a rapid rate takes precedence, since there can be no sovereignty for China without economic growth. The United States' role as the world's superpower is dependent on its ability to lead economically. As many of you will know from reading this blog, I do not believe that war between the US and China is imminent, or a foregone conclusion in the future. I certainly do not hope for war. But I have little doubt that protectionist policies on both sides greatly increase the likelihood of conflict **far more than** increases in military budgets and anti-satellite tests.

**Romney guts the EPA.**

**Rettig 11** (Jessica—US News, “EPA Budget and Power Under Attack from Republicans”, 7/8, <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/07/08/epa-budget-and-power-under-attack-from-republicans?PageNr=2>)

Republicans, in the past, have labeled the EPA's proposed rules on greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act as a backdoor way around the failure of **cap-and-trade legislation** in Congress in 2009, which was intended by its supporters as a way to address climate change. According to Manik Roy, vice president of federal government outreach at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, despite what some members of Congress say, the EPA is simply following orders according to Congress' authorization of the Clean Air Act and subsequent Supreme Court rulings which upheld the EPA's authority over greenhouse gases. Moran told reporters Thursday that Democrats are "going to have to fight" to keep Republicans from using riders to block EPA's rules. During the budget showdown in the spring, Republicans were nearly able to leverage a ban on the EPA's power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, like carbon dioxide, but eventually lost that battle. As this funding fight unfolds, the EPA also looms as a possible issue in the 2012 presidential election. Already Minnesota GOP Rep. Michele Bachmann, an avowed climate skeptic who is widely seen as having entered the top tier of candidates, has come out strong against the EPA as the "job-killing organization of America." She even suggested that she'd try to abolish it if in office. [See our cartoons on the 2012 GOP field.]But even with a more moderate candidate like former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney, who has said he thinks climate change should be addressed, the stakes for the EPA could **still be significant**, especially if the issue of the agency's budget is the focus. **Any potential Republican** administration would be less likely than President Obama to back the EPA's **funding and regulatory power**. In that case, the debate over the EPA and climate change would not be whether climate change is a problem, but what the EPA should to do about it, says Roy. Still, even in the face of scrutiny, EPA administrator Lisa Jackson rolled out an additional interstate pollution rule on coal plants under the Clean Air Act Thursday and is poised to continue to implement rules on climate change as planned.

**EPA solves warming.**

**Parenti 10** (Christian (writer for the Nation) April 2010 NPR "The Nation: The Case for EPA Action")

On April 1 the Environmental Protection Agency established rules restricting greenhouse gas emissions from cars and trucks, starting in 2012. This is the first of what could become a sweeping series of regulations stemming from the agency's conclusion that greenhouse gases harm human health. If the EPA were to act robustly, it could achieve significant and immediate greenhouse gas emissions reductions using nothing more than existing laws and current technology. Doing so would signal to a waiting world that America is serious about addressing climate change. But a dangerous assault on the agency is gathering momentum in Congress, corporate boardrooms, the media and the courts. The swarm of counterattacks all seek to strip the EPA of its power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources like coal-fired power plants. Some legislative proposals would even undo the EPA's finding that greenhouse gases are hazardous, taking the EPA out of the climate fight altogether. Wonkish at first glance, the fight over EPA rulemaking may be the most important environmental battle in a generation. The UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says rich countries like the United States must cut emissions 25 to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020--only ten years away--and thereafter make precipitous cuts to almost zero emissions. If we don't act now, average global temperatures will likely increase by more than 2 degrees Celsius and trigger self-compounding runaway climate change, resulting in a massive rise in sea levels, devastated agriculture and attendant social chaos. Not one of the climate change bills up for discussion meets this threshold, and it is looking increasingly unlikely that Congress will be able to pass any comprehensive climate change legislation this session. The failures of Congress and the harrowing facts of climate science mean that aggressive and immediate EPA action is essential. From a legal perspective, the EPA has all the tools it needs to respond adequately to the climate crisis. In fact, "the United States has the strongest environmental laws in the world," says Kassie Siegel, an attorney with the Center for Biological Diversity. The center specializes in suing the government when it violates green laws. "We don't need new legislation. The Clean Air Act can achieve everything we need: a 40 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions over 1990 levels by 2020." The two most important things the EPA can do are to halt any permitting of new coal-fired power plants--about fifty new plants are seeking approval--and to force all existing coal-fired facilities to make the technologically feasible switch to natural gas. If this "fuel switching" happened, total nonvehicle US emissions would be reduced by 13 percent or more in a matter of a year or two, say various experts. Natural gas is generally half as polluting as coal. But in the case of old, inefficient coal-fired plants, switching to gas can reduce emissions by as much as two-thirds. And there is plenty of natural gas: discoveries have glutted the market, and prices are down more than 60 percent from their recent peak. Gas is not a solution; it merely offers a realistic "bridging fuel" as we move toward power generated from wind, solar, geothermal and hydro sources. Perhaps the most far-reaching impact of EPA regulation would be to put a de facto price on carbon by leveling fines on greenhouse gas polluters. Such penalties could reach thousands per day, per violation. If targets for emissions reductions are tough enough, few coal plants will be able to meet them and will instead pay fines--what amounts to a carbon tax. Then a cheap source of energy would become expensive, which would drive investment away from fossil fuels toward carbon-neutral forms of energy. At first, President Obama seemed ready to use executive power to do an end run around a sclerotic Congress, when he authorized the EPA to start regulating greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. Obama was merely complying with the law: the EPA has been mandated to act since 2007, when the Supreme Court ruled, in Massachusetts v. EPA, that the agency should determine whether greenhouse gases threaten our health. The Bush administration refused to use this authority, but when Obama took office he allowed the EPA to do its job again. This past December the EPA published a science-based "endangerment finding," which found that CO2 and five other greenhouse gases are, in fact, dangerous to human life. Once the EPA issues an endangerment finding, it is legally bound to promulgate regulations to address the problem; the first of these were the vehicle emissions reductions announced on April 1. Now the EPA is following up by drafting regulations for stationary greenhouse gas sources. Called a tailoring rule, it will stipulate when, where and how greenhouse gas pollution must be controlled. At first the agency said it would regulate facilities emitting 25,000 tons or more of greenhouse gases per year. But pressure from fossil fuel industries and Congress has caused the EPA to backpedal to a threshold of 75,000 tons per year, a limit the EPA could raise to 100,000 tons by the time its tailoring rule is finalized. In February, Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia sent a letter urging EPA administrator Lisa Jackson to delay the implementation of greenhouse gas point source review. Signing on with Rockefeller were seven other Democratic senators, all but one from the nation's top coal-producing states. In response, Jackson pushed back any new regulations until 2011--conveniently after this fall's midterm election. Rockefeller wasn't satisfied and has since introduced legislation seeking to suspend EPA action until after 2012. Because the tailoring rule is not yet final, the whole issue of stationary source regulation could get put off indefinitely, or be pre-empted by climate change legislation that strips the EPA of its regulatory powers. The fight over the EPA's role goes back to 1997, when President Clinton signed, but could not get the Senate to ratify, the Kyoto Protocol. Searching for a way around the Senate's blockade, Clinton's EPA administrator, Carol Browner--now director of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy--took the position that the EPA was already authorized to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the 1970 Clean Air Act. Soon a coalition of green groups, including Greenpeace and the Center for Biological Diversity, petitioned the EPA to start taking action. The specter of muscular regulations from the EPA caused near-panic among major polluters. In late 1999 the American Petroleum Institute, the trade association of the oil and gas industry, called a meeting of major industrial corporations; twenty-eight executives attended, representing the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, as well as the aluminum, airline, chemical, electrical power, aerospace, cement, fertilizer, coal and oil industries. The leaked minutes of that meeting revealed a plan to spin the issue of EPA regulation in the media, to fight it in the courts and push legislation that would strip the EPA of regulatory power. The executives also agreed to pressure the EPA directly to reject the petition filed by the green groups. The plan worked; Browner backed off. Then the Bush administration stacked the EPA's ranks with fossil fuel-loving loyalists. When climate change regulation again became an issue in 2009, the industry's counterattack was already in place. Thus, both the House climate bill (Waxman-Markey, which passed in June 2009) and the Senate bill (Kerry-Lieberman-Graham, still under consideration) contain language restricting the EPA's power to control greenhouse gas pollution from stationary sources. Now even more toxic legislation is gathering support. Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska--aided by corporate lobbyists like Jeffrey Holmstead, formerly with the Bush EPA and now head of environmental strategies for the lobbying firm Bracewell & Giuliani, and Roger Martella Jr., a partner at Sidley Austin--has written a resolution that would overturn the EPA's original greenhouse gas endangerment finding. Alaska is a big oil, gas and coal producer, and Murkowski is one of the top recipients of petroleum industry campaign donations. So far this year she has received $188,000; only two senators, Democrat Blanche Lincoln and Republican David Vitter, have received more oil and gas money than Murkowski. Murkowski's resolution was introduced January 21 under the little-used Congressional Review Act, which means it needs only fifty-one votes to pass and cannot be blocked from a vote by Senate majority leader Harry Reid. Although it is called a "resolution of disapproval," it would have the force of law. So far forty other senators are on board, including three Democrats--Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas and Ben Nelson of Nebraska. In the House, Joe Barton, a Republican from Texas, has written a companion resolution of disapproval. Not surprisingly, Barton is tight with polluters; over the past two decades he has received more than $2.7 million in direct campaign contributions from electrical utilities and the petroleum industry. Obama would, by all accounts, veto the Murkowski or Barton bill. But their point is not so much to gut the EPA in Congress as it is to intimidate, delay, confuse and blunt into irrelevance any EPA action. Other pushbacks are taking the form of lawsuits and petitions from the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and fossil fuel lobbies. Fifteen states have filed suits seeking to block the EPA's endangerment ruling, and at least seventeen state legislatures have seen bills introduced to strip EPA powers. None of these efforts are likely to achieve their stated goals, but they are all part of a right-wing and corporate strategy to send a message to Obama and the Senate, where real EPA-stripping could happen if Kerry-Lieberman-Graham passes. Behind much of this state-level pressure is money from Charles and David Koch, petroleum magnates who are increasingly notorious for funding far-right ventures such as FreedomWorks, a tea party organizer, and think tanks that traffic in climate-change denial. One of their organizations, Americans for Prosperity, is running a Regulation Reality Tour, which is trying to whip up outrage about the "EPA's power grab." Part of this Astroturf campaign involves political theater: fake "carbon cops" in little green Smart cars with flashing lights pull out badges and issue citations for carbon "crimes" like mowing a lawn. But green groups are organized to fight back and are having some success, as witnessed by the EPA's recently issued regulations under the Clean Water Act, which will sharply curtail mountaintop removal [see Eshelman, page 17]. Unfortunately, many big environmental groups in Washington have not made defending the EPA a priority. Most endorsed Waxman-Markey, and in late March twenty of the biggest groups came out in support of the still-unpublished Kerry-Lieberman-Graham bill. Those groups included the Alliance for Climate Protection, Environment America, the League of Conservation Voters, Environmental Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, Blue Green Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, Center for American Progress Action Fund and Union of Concerned Scientists. The Sierra Club has switched to defending the EPA and opposing any climate change bill that strips the agency of its power; other environmental groups may soon follow. So where is the Obama administration? The president says he prefers climate legislation to EPA regulation. That is an unnecessary concession; Obama does not need to wait for Congress. In this situation, American politics is not hostage to an obstructionist right-wing fringe or the lack of a sixty-vote supermajority. Existing laws allow--even require--broad and robust action. Throughout American history the executive branch has steadily been accruing power. Before the 1930s presidents rarely proposed legislation. Even LBJ worried that his phone calls to lobby senators could violate the "separation of powers doctrine." Nixon created the EPA in 1970 precisely to concentrate more power in the hands of the executive. He gathered up all the existing environmental programs, gave them no extra money and put them in one agency, which answered to a director appointed by the president. The Bush administration practically searched the vest pockets of bureaucrats to find ways (often illegal) to enhance presidential prerogatives. And the current president? "Obama, like Bush before him, is happy to assert unlimited executive authority when it comes to the war on terror, detention without trial, warrantless wiretapping," says Brendan Cummings, senior counsel at the Center for Biological Diversity. "But when it comes to addressing global warming, he refuses to use his clear and lawful executive power to reduce greenhouse pollution to protect people and the planet." "Heading into an election, I think, the administration is very leery of offending powerful corporate interests," says Tyson Slocum of Public Citizen. "That is especially true when those corporate interests make campaign expenditures in swing states." Other greens agree. "At stake in the fight over the EPA's ability to address global warming pollution is not only the president's environmental record but really the core promise of his presidency, to change the way Washington works," says Kert Davies, director of research at Greenpeace USA. "The year behind us on energy and climate policy shows what you get when the Obama administration's seeming compulsion for compromise meets the entrenched power of the coal, oil and nuclear industries." Tragically, climate change is not an issue where compromise will work. Bad healthcare bills can be improved; but on the climate front, time has run out. Atmospheric CO2 concentrations are at 390 parts per million and need to go back to 350 ppm. Already, oyster farms in the Pacific Northwest are in decline because of ocean acidification caused by climate change. Last year many Midwestern crops were too rain-soaked to harvest. Drought, likely linked to climate change, is battering much of Latin America, Africa and Asia. Everywhere signs of nature's unraveling are evident. Allowing Congress to strip the EPA of its review powers or letting the administration dither away its responsibility to act boldly would be a disaster. The EPA is our last, best hope.

**1NR—UQ O/w**

**Shifts are still possible.**

**Silver 9/24** Election Guru [Nate Silver, The Statistical State of the Presidential Race, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/the-statistical-state-of-the-presidential-race/>]

Thus, although a shift of several percentage points in Mr. Romney’s favor **is far from impossible**, **or even all that unlikely**, this also looks like a year in which volatility in the polls might be lower than average. Third-party candidates are playing only a minor role this year, there are few undecideds and the late-stage movement in the polls has been on a secular downward trend over the past two decades.

Furthermore, there tends to be less movement in the polls in reasonably close elections than in blowouts, when the trailing candidate can sometimes receive a dead-cat bounce, or when the front-runner’s advantage grows from large to larger if the trailing candidate’s supporters are too despondent to turn out, as may have been the case for Walter Mondale’s Democrats in 1984.

And indeed, volatility has been low throughout the campaign. Just as in the stock market, past volatility seems to predict future volatility in the polls.

So this is why, despite the importance of the big picture, we will also need to sweat the small stuff this week. It seems plausible that by seven days from now, the consensus of data could point toward anything from Mr. Obama being a two-point favorite (about where the race was before the conventions) to being as much as six points ahead (as some of his stronger state polls seem to imply). Likewise, he could be at anywhere from about 47 percent of the vote (if his numbers recede from a convention bounce) to 50 percent (if his bounce holds and he inches forward as undecided voters commit.)

This makes an enormous amount of difference. Based on the way that our forecast model calculates it, a candidate ahead by two percentage points at this stage would be about a two-to-one favorite to win — odds that Mr. Romney might have to accept at this stage, improving his position enough to make further gains later. But a candidate ahead by six points would have around a 90 percent chance of victory.

**Especially after the debate**

**Reuters 10/4** Romney gains ground on Obama after strong debate, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/us-usa-campaign-poll-idUSBRE8931E420121004

Republican presidential challenger Mitt Romney gained ground on Democratic President Barack Obama after a strong performance in their first debate heading into the November 6 election, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll taken after their prime-time face-off.

Romney is now viewed positively by 51 percent of voters, the first time he has enjoyed a net positive in the U.S. presidential race, the poll found. Obama's favorability rating remained unchanged at 56 percent, according to the poll.

Romney moved ahead of the president on several core issues after Wednesday's debate, which was widely seen as a victory for the Republican candidate.

Voters now see Romney as a better bet to boost the economy, spur job creation and manage the budget deficit, the poll found. He narrowed Obama's advantage on taxes, the Social Security retirement program and the Medicare health insurance program for the elderly and disabled.

Romney's strong performance could make the race more competitive, Ipsos pollster Cliff Young said.

"If he has more debates like this, is able to push through his message and target undecideds, we might see movement in voting intention, but he needs a lot more of this," Young said.

Obama and Romney have two more debates before the election.

The poll found that Obama's 7 percentage point advantage over Romney had narrowed to a lead of 5 percentage points, 48 percent to 43 percent.

The online poll surveyed 536 registered voters on Wednesday and Thursday after the debate. It has a credibility interval of 4.8 percentage points.

**Margins are close enough for voter switch to matter.**

**Business Insider 10/3** [You Have To Watch The Debate Tonight — Because It Really Will Matter, http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-romney-debates-will-matter-election-time-date]

In some elections, the presidential debates might be a meaningless ritual that does little to change the scope of the campaign.

In this election, the presidential debates will matter. In this election, Mitt Romney has a chance to start a comeback. In this election, President Barack Obama has a chance to cement himself as the probable victor.

**That's because this election is still extremely close**. Obama is up just 3 points in the Real Clear Politics average of national polls — 4 points in Wednesday's Gallup daily tracking poll — **and it doesn't take a major event to swing polls 3 points.**

Debates are a major part of the campaign — they can swing the race much more than 3 points. In an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll released Tuesday, 72 percent of respondents said the debates would be at least "somewhat" important in how they vote in November.

According to Gallup, 15 percent of declared Obama or Romney supporters said they could switch their vote, which is a higher percentage of "undecideds" than most polls find. And in a Washington Post poll, 83 percent of voters said they were interested in the debates.

**1NR—L/w**

**Anti-nuclear environmentalist groups take every advantage to protest nuke power --- the plan sets them off.**

**Gamble 11**. [Jack, nuclear industry engineer, “Antinuclear Activists Will Try to Equate Hiroshima with Fukushima” Nuclear Fissionary -- July 25 -- http://nuclearfissionary.com/2011/07/25/antinuclear-activists-will-try-to-equate-hiroshima-with-**fukushima/?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+NuclearFissionary+%28Nuclear+Fissionary%29]**

But that won’t stop the antinuclear fear mongers from writing editorials and planning protests of nuclear power on the 66th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing on August 6, 2011.¶ What better way to manipulate the headlines than to put their fear mongering spin on a historical anniversary? This is exactly what they’ve done with Hurricane Katrina, the BP Oil Spill, wildfires, floods, 9/11, and any other major events for the last few decades. When you have no shame and sell fear for a living, I suppose there is little standing in your way.

**Public perception is what’s key --- the short-term nature of the link outweighs their long-term link turns.**

**Duffy 12**. [Bobby, MD of Ipsos MORI Social Research Institue, “After Fukushima Public Opinion is Still Unclear on Nuclear Power” Huffington Post -- November 3 -- http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/bobby-duffy/fukushima-public-opinion-nuclear\_b\_1335016.html]

As with all aspects of opinions and policy on energy, the drivers are as varied as the social, political and economic contexts of different countries. It is also partly because people themselves are balancing competing concerns.¶ Five factors come out consistently as the key issues on energy for the public: ahead of everything is cost, then four concerns - CO2 emissions, security of supply or dependence on other countries, the threat of nuclear disasters and the need for investment in renewables - all vie for the next most important.¶ But even here the challenge for policy-makers is that it's not actual dependency, reliability of renewable sources or real risks of nuclear disaster that drives public opinion, it is perceptions of them. Just to take the example of dependency on other countries, you might expect that high dependency countries would support nuclear more, as dependency is something people would generally like to avoid and nuclear power supply is at least within national control.

**Their link turns assume squo levels of nuke power – the world of the AFF is massively unpopular – how the question is asked is key.**

**Mariotte 12** [Michael, Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” Daily Kos -- June 5 -- http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say]

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.¶ Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”¶ This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.¶ Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.¶ Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.¶ But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today.¶ Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).¶ Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:¶ “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”¶ But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”¶ 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”

Link alone turns the case – public opposition undermines investment.

**C**ivil **S**ociety **I**nstitute, 3/7/**2012** (Survey: Americans Not Warming Up to Nuclear Power One Year After Fukushima, p. http://www.civilsocietyinstitute.org/media/030712release.cfm)

Peter **Bradford, former member of the** United States **Nuclear Regulatory Commission**, former chair of the New York and Maine utility regulatory commissions, **and currently adjunct professor at Vermont Law** School on "Nuclear Power and Public Policy, **said: "This survey is** another piece of **bad** news **for new nuclear construction** in the U.S. **For an industry completely dependent on political support** in order **to gain access to the** taxpayers' wallets (through **loan guarantees** and other federal subsidies) **and the consumers' wallets (through rate guarantees** to cover even canceled plants and cost overruns), **public skepticism of this magnitude is a** near **fatal flaw**. The nuclear industry has spent millions on polls telling the public how much the public longs for nuclear power. Such polls never ask real world questions linking new reactors to rate increases or to accident risk. **Fukushima has made the links to risk much clearer in the public mind**. This poll makes the consequences of that linkage clear."

And it prevents deployment of SMRs.

**I**nternational **T**rade **A**dministration, February **2011** (The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, Department of Commerce, p. 7)

**One** additional **obstacle** is beyond the scope of this report but **could play a significant role in whether SMRs are commercially deployed: public opinion**. To the extent that **the smaller profile of SMRs results in their deployment closer to population centers, public opposition to their deployment might rise**. Deployment at existing sites, or in industrial applications away from residential areas, however, might minimize the impact of public opinion. Education about the safety features of SMRs and nuclear reactors in general could also ameliorate this concern.

**Independents up for grabs.**

**Mellman 9/18**. [Mark, president of The Mellman Group and has worked for Democratic candidates and causes since 1982, "Whither the independents" The HIll -- thehill.com/opinion/columnists/mark-mellman/250253-whither-the-independents]

Every national poll in the last week (save the reliably Republican Rasmussen) has shown the president leading within a fairly narrow band — 1 to 6 points — averaging to a 3-point Obama advantage. For those interested in where the race stands, it’s a clear and consistent message.¶ For those focused on the internal dynamics of the election, the picture is anything but clear with respect to one of the most important segments of the electorate — independents. There has rightly been tremendous focus on this group, as it will likely determine the outcome. Given the (usually reported) Democratic advantage in party identification, the president could probably still prevail if he lost independents, but he cannot afford to lose them by too much.¶ So where do things stand with this vital group of voters? Take your pick. (Hat tip to the always-astute Jon Cohen, the Washington Post’s polling director, for alerting me and others to the discrepancies.)¶ The same polls that reveal relative consistency overall contain extraordinary variation when it comes to the votes of independents. The CNN/ORC poll, which has Obama ahead by 6 overall, says he is losing independents by a vast 14 points. Rasmussen, which claims the president is behind overall by 1, has him down a lesser, but still large, 10 points among independents. The CBS/New York Times poll puts Obama ahead by 3 overall, but behind by 6 among independents. The Esquire/Yahoo Poll finds the president ahead by 4 overall, but says he leads with independents by a wide 11-point margin, while Fox suggests Obama is ahead by 5 points, both overall and with independents.¶ Of course, there is a middle ground between the extremes. Gallup and the Investor’s Business Daily/Christian Science Monitor/TIPP poll say the president is leading by 3 and 2 points, respectively, but both find him tied among independents.¶ In this confusing mishmash of data, it is worth noting that two of the polls with very discrepant results were conducted by the same firm, increasing our bewilderment. ¶ More importantly, there is little consistent relationship between findings about the race overall and the vote among independents across these polls. The survey that has the president faring best overall has him doing worst among independents.

**Independents hate plan.**

**Shahan 12**. [Zach, Site Director & Publishing Services Manager at Important Media, “76% of Americans Want Clean Energy Instead of Nuclear, Natural Gas, & Coal” Clean Technica -- May 15 -- http://nuclear-news.info/2012/06/04/usa-public-opinion-wants-clean-energy-connects-nuclear-with-corrupt-politics/]

The ORC International survey, conducted for the nonprofit and nonpartisan Civil Society Institute (CSI), found that 76% of Americans (58% of Republicans, 83% of Independents, and 88% of Democrats) want to see ”a reduction in our reliance on nuclear power, natural gas and coal, and instead, launch a national initiative to boost renewable energy and energy efficiency.” (And who knows what the remaining 24% are smoking?)¶ Not only that, the public has clearly picked up on the fact that corrupt politics is a key reason we don’t have more of that. 82% of Americans (69% of Republicans, 84% of Independents, and 95% of Democrats) agree with this statement: “The time is now for a new, grassroots-driven politics to realize a renewable energy future.

**They’re key.**

**Woodruff 12**. [Judy, Journalist, “Woodruff: Will Independents Return to Obama in 2012?” PBS -- February 29 -- http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/02/woodruff-will-independents-return-to-obama-2012.html]

There's a lot of talk thrown around in every election about the influence of independents -- voters who are registered as neither Democrat nor Republican or who swing back and forth. To listen to some pundits (even this reporter has been guilty of this), independent voters hold awesome power in close elections. This may be one election when that conventional wisdom holds up. With a stubbornly polarized atmosphere and partisans on each side fiercely holding to the candidates in their party, the role played by swing voters becomes even more significant. In recent years, independents have made up about 30 percent of the electorate. Republicans and Democrats split most of the other 70 percent, leaving a little room for minority parties. In 2008, President Obama won 52 percent of independent voters, helping propel him to the presidency. This year, there's good reason to believe those same voters who sided with Obama -- rather than the 44 percent of independents who went with Sen. John McCain -- will determine the outcome. First, it's safe to assume almost all self-described Republicans and Democrats will vote for their party's candidate. And it's almost as safe to assume that the McCain independents in 2008 will be reluctant to switch to Obama four years later. That leaves the focus on the Independents who swung to Obama four years ago. They are the subject of a paper by two policy analysts at the Third Way, a Washington, D.C.-based centrist think tank. According to Michelle Diggles and Lanae Erickson, the Obama independents of 2008 have certain qualities that may help us understand which way they'll go in 2012. Diggles and Erickson identify 10 qualities in particular but stress four. First, Obama independents are the most moderate segment of the electorate. Second, they are true swing voters in that nearly half of them did not vote for the Democratic candidate in 2004. Third, they look like the U.S. in that they include more women and are more racially diverse than McCain independents. Fourth, they are secular and attend church less often. With growing signs that independent voters may make up the highest proportion of the electorate since 1976, all eyes are on these prized citizens. But as Diggles and Erickson note: "Not all independents are the same, and the real showdown for 2012 is over who will win the Obama independents." They said that if Obama can win the majority of them, he will win re-election. But if he does no better among them than Democrats did in the 2010 congressional elections when a quarter of the Obama independents voted Republican, the story could be different. Watching how Obama appeals to this crucial voting group is one story we plan to watch throughout this exciting election.

**Obama has a huge lead with women now.**

**Yanover 9-19**. [Yori, journalist, "With Romney Stuck Practically Everywhere, It’s Obama’s Race to Lose" Jewish Press -- www.jewishpress.com/news/yoris-daily-news-clips/with-romney-stuck-practically-everywhere-its-obamas-race-to-lose/2012/09/19/]

And the final blow to the Romney campaign: a poll released last week by CBS News and The New York Times showed Obama with a 53% -41% lead among women.¶ This national average of a 12% lead grows to as much as 14% and 16% among women in states like Virginia, where recent anti-abortion legislation by Republican lawmakers and governors have convinced women that they must vote for Obama despite everything else, to preserve their reproductive rights. The Democrats have been as effective on convincing women Obama will protect their right to an abortion as they have been at warning elderly voters that Ryan will take away their medicate and social security.

**Women hate nuke power.**

**Newport 12**. [Frank, PhD, Editor in Chief, “Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After Fukushima” Gallup -- March 26 -- http://www.gallup.com/poll/153452/Americans-Favor-Nuclear-Power-Year-Fukushima.aspx]

Although Republicans continue to be more supportive than Democrats of the use of nuclear energy, these political differences are dwarfed by the 30-point gender gap in views on nuclear energy. Men are more likely than women to be Republicans, but politics alone do not explain the gap in support for nuclear energy between men and women. Something about nuclear energy apparently strikes a strongly negative chord in the minds of the nation's women, making them one of the few demographic segments of any type in which opposition to nuclear power is higher than 50%.

**They’re key to swing states.**

**Casserly 12**. [Meghan, staff writer, “Where women matter most in election 2012” Forbes -- June 7 -- http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2012/06/07/election-2012-mitt-romney-obama-women-battleground-states/]

But why is the female vote so attractive to presidential candidates? According to Dianne Bystrom, the director of the Carrie Chapman Catt Center for Women and Politics at Iowa State University, the reason the gender gap is so important isn’t the popularity points, but the fact that more women are registered to vote than men in most states, and a much higher female turnout rate at the polls. “It’s sheer numbers,” she says. In the 2008 election, 60.4% of the female population over the age of 18 showed up at the polls. Men? Just under 56%. In plainer terms, 10 million more women than men voted. Quite simply: more female voters=more female power, particularly in battleground states.¶ Swing states, or the undecided “battleground” states that don’t historically vote with a specific party, are traditionally where candidates spend the most time eating pancakes, shaking hands and kissing babies and old people, particularly towards the end of campaign season. At this point, notes Susan Carroll, a senior scholar at the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University, we begin to hear a lot of talk about “soccer moms.” Why’s that? As elections draw near, the few remaining undecided voters become priority. According to Carroll, “It’s traditionally the case that these voters are women.”¶ Presidential candidates, then, must be ready to snap them up—at town hall meetings and barbecue joints where they attempt to speak with female voters on the issues they weigh the most important. “The set of issues tend to be the same but the priorities men and women give them are different,” says Carroll, who says that men weigh the economic debt at a top priority where women tend to hold healthcare and education in high regard. “Women voters are incredibly important at the end of an election cycle,” she says, “They’re the voters who are up for grabs and candidates are prepared to win them over on the issues that matter most.”¶ And so, in battleground states where women out-vote men in the hundreds of thousands, the female voice becomes even more powerful than that of her sisters in solidly blue or red states. With that in mind, Obama and Romney would be smart to court Pennsylvanian women over New Yorkers, Floridians over Oklahomans. “Of course women are targeted,” says Bystrom. “When you look at the difference between the number of men and number of women, there are simply more women to woo.” For their ease (and yours, as it’s forever important for a women to known her own value—and that of her vote), we’ve crunched the Census data on the gender divide on voting in the most contentious states this fall.

**1NR—Impact**

**Studies prove—politicians will follow their election agendas**

**Bernstein 12** [Jonathan, writer for the Washington Monthly and a political scientist, “Campaign Promises,” Jan/Feb 2012, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january_february_2012/features/campaign_promises034471.php>]

I suspect that many Americans would be quite skeptical of the idea that elected officials, presidents included, try to keep the promises they made on the campaign trail. The presumption is that politicians are liars who say what voters want to hear to get elected and then behave very differently once in office. The press is especially prone to discount the more extreme positions candidates take in primaries on the expectation that they will “move to the center” in the general election. Certainly everyone can recall specific examples of broken promises, from Barack Obama not closing Gitmo to George W. Bush and “nation building” to, well, you may remember this from the Republican National Convention in 1988: And I’m the one who will not raise taxes. My opponent, my opponent now says, my opponent now says, he’ll raise them as a last resort, or a third resort. But when a politician talks like that, you know that’s one resort he’ll be checking into. My opponent won’t rule out raising taxes. But I will. And the Congress will push me to raise taxes, and I’ll say no, and they’ll push, and I’ll say no, and they’ll push again, and I’ll say, to them, “Read my lips: no new taxes.” Political scientists, however, have been studying this question for some time, and what they’ve found is that out-and-out high-profile broken pledges like George H. W. Bush’s are the exception, not the rule. That’s what two book-length studies from the 1980s found. Michael Krukones in Promises and Performance: Presidential Campaigns as Policy Predictors (1984) established that about 75 percent of the promises made by presidents from Woodrow Wilson through Jimmy Carter were kept. In Presidents and Promises: From Campaign Pledge to Presidential Performance (1985), Jeff Fishel looked at campaigns from John F. Kennedy through Ronald Reagan. What he found was that presidents invariably attempt to carry out their promises; the main reason some pledges are not redeemed is congressional opposition, not presidential flip-flopping. Similarly, Gerald Pomper studied party platforms, and discovered that the promises parties made were consistent with their postelection agendas. More recent and smaller-scale papers have confirmed the main point: presidents’ agendas are clearly telegraphed in their campaigns. Richard Fenno’s studies of how members of Congress think about representation are relevant here, even though his research is based on the other side of Pennsylvania Avenue. Fenno, in a series of books beginning with Home Style in 1978, has followed members as they work their districts, and has transcribed what the world looks like through politicians’ eyes. What he has found is that representatives and senators see every election as a cycle that begins in the campaign, when they make promises to their constituents. Then, if they win, they interpret how those promises will constrain them once they’re in office. Once in Washington, Fenno’s politicians act with two things in mind: how their actions match the promises they’ve made in the previous campaign; and how they will be able to explain those actions when they return to their district. Representation “works,” then, because politicians are constantly aware that what they do in Washington will have to be explained to their constituents, and that it will have to be explained in terms of their original promises. Of course, there’s more to it than that; at the presidential level, one of the key ways that campaigns constrain presidents is that the same people who draft the candidate’s proposals usually wind up working on those same issue areas in the White House or the relevant departments and agencies, and they tend to be highly committed to the ideas they authored. And don’t sell short the possibility that candidates themselves are personally committed to the programs they advocate—either because those issues sparked their interest in politics to begin with (and that’s why they were advocating them on the campaign trail), or because it’s just a natural human inclination to start believing your own rhetoric.