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#### Obama winning with betting markets – best predictors

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I don't like uncertainty. The current presidential polls -- Gallup with Romney leading by three percent, CBS with Obama up by two percent, aggregators split on whose nose is ahead -- are a hotbed of uncertainty. Fortunately there are veritable election oracles I can turn to instead: gamblers.

In 2004, Gallup failed to forecast the winner of the popular vote for president -- for the second straight election. Halfway through Election Day 2004, various exit polls showed Kerry with the lead. Meanwhile 91 percent of bettors on Betfair.com had their money on Bush. The betting markets also were correct on the winner in each of the 50 states.

Before the 2008 election, I spoke to Koleman Strumpf, a University of Kansas economics professor who tracks betting trends. "Relative to the polls, the betting markets have to think hard about what they're saying since they are putting their money at stake," he said. "Also polls tend to reflect what people are thinking at a given moment, versus a forecast of what will happen on election day -- post-convention bounces, for instance."

Added Paulick Report editor Ray Paulick, one of America's top horseracing handicappers and a political prediction markets aficionado, "Gamblers have more experience with cheaters. They take voter fraud into their metrics. Polls don't. Nor do polls take into account intangibles like how each state's secretary of state factors in or systems within a state designed to eliminate voters."

In 2008, 90 percent of gamblers correctly forecast an Obama victory. They were also on the money with 48 of 50 states.

Gamblers' success in this arena is nothing new. In presidential races beginning in 1896, the New York Times, Sun, and World provided daily betting quotes. The papers' sources were bookies who had agents at every stump and whistle-stop to gather intel and quantify popular sentiment. Between 1884 and 1940, the bettors erred on just one of sixteen elections, Wilson's 1916 upset of Hughes.

Ironically, polls sent gamblers to the sideline. "Prior to Gallup's introduction in 1936, newspapers had little to report about the election horse race other than the betting markets," Strumpf explains. "When scientific polls came along, newspapers had something to report other than markets they were oftentimes uncomfortable with."

The same discomfort led to states relegating such gamblers to outlaws. The Internet has given rise to new forums, however. As of this writing, betting at the three biggest prediction markets is as follows: Betfair has Obama with a 64 percent chance to win to Romney's 36 percent; Intrade has the president at 58 percent; and the Iowa Electronic Markets have the president at 59 percent. Oddschecker shows bookmakers to be even more bullish on Obama.

Why are the polls and gamblers so far apart?

"The answer highlights one of the main differences between the polls and markets like Intrade," Intrade's exchange operations manager Carl Wolfenden told me. "The polls ask who you're going to vote for -- a question that requires an emotional response. Intrade asks who you think will win -- a rational question that requires someone to look at the facts and real world events, such as polls, debates, speeches, gaffes, scandals and crises. One of these facts is the Electoral College, which isn't accounted for in polls."

Why the big lead for Obama?

"Our markets recognize that Romney probably needs to win Ohio to beat Obama," Wolfenden says. "And so the price for Obama to be reelected has closely tracked his probability of winning Ohio. So while Romney may lead in the polls, and he may have flipped a number of other key states -- such as Florida, Virginia, Colorado -- to his side of the ledger, our markets appear to believe that without Ohio he can't get it done."

Strumpf adds: "I think the big message in this election cycle is that polls are giving conflicting answers, and unless you are willing to look at several state-level polls, it is hard to make sense of it all. The prediction markets like Intrade cut through all this and give us a single number to focus on."

**The plan is massively unpopular.**

**Mariotte 12** [Michael, Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” Daily Kos -- June 5 -- http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say]

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.¶ Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”¶ This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.¶ Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.¶ Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.¶ But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today.¶ Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).¶ Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:¶ “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”¶ But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”¶ 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”

#### Small changes matter.

Silver 10/20 Elections Guru [nate Silver, Oct. 20: Calm Day in Forecast, but Volatility Ahead, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/oct-20-calm-day-in-forecast-but-volatility-ahead/>]

What makes this challenging is that although something like a half-point shift is hard to detect in the polls, it is also potentially meaningful given how late it is in the race and how close the contest is.

The most natural analogy might be to a baseball game. Scoring a run in the first inning is worth something, but it won’t shift the win probabilities all that much: there’s too much that can happen later on in the game.

We’re now in the political equivalent of the eighth inning, however. A run scored in the eight inning is potentially much more important than one in the first.

The reason I say “potentially” is that it makes a tremendous difference depending what the score is. In a blowout, the eighth inning won’t matter at all. A team down 9-1 is almost certainly going to lose; but so will one that gets a solo home run and trails 9-2 instead.

(The political equivalent: Walter Mondale, in 1984, improved to a 17-point deficit from a 20-point deficit in national polls after his first debate with Ronald Reagan. This may have helped him to carry his home state of Minnesota, and lose the Electoral College 525-13 rather than 535-3.)

But if the score is tied, or if it’s a one-run game, a run scored in the eighth will make a huge difference.

That’s where we find ourselves right now in the presidential race. This election is close and is likely to end up that way. There’s about a 50-50 chance that the election will end up within 2.5 percentage points, according to the forecast, against only a 15 percent chance that either candidate will win by five points or more.

For this reason, the percentage estimates in the forecast are likely to be volatile from here on out.

#### That flips the election.

Schnur 12 Dan Schnur, director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California; he served as the national communications director of Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2000, “The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline,” <http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/>

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline.

The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor.

As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership.

There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling.

Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white.

Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline.

The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway.

He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country.

#### Romney reinstates the Gag Rule

Bassett 12 Huffington Post Staff [Laura Bassett, Romney Reiterates: 'I'm A Pro-Life Candidate', http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/10/romney-pro-life-abortion\_n\_1955812.html]

After telling a reporter on Tuesday that he would not pursue any legislation to restrict abortion, Republican candidate Mitt Romney waved away suspicions Wednesday that his anti-abortion stance is wavering.

"I think I've said time and again, I'm a pro-life candidate," he told reporters at a campaign stop in Ohio according to a pool report. "I'll be a pro-life president. The actions I'll take immediately are to remove funding for Planned Parenthood. It will not be part of my budget."

The former Massachusetts governor also reiterated his plan to reinstate the "Global Gag Rule," which prevents non-governmental organizations overseas that receive U.S. aid money from counseling patients on or referring them to abortion services. The Hyde amendment already prevents those organizations from using U.S. money to pay for abortions.

Romney, who has called Roe v. Wade "one of the darkest moments in Supreme Court history," was forced to defend his anti-abortion position on Wednesday after he told the Des Moines Register on Tuesday, "There's no legislation with regards to abortion that I'm familiar with that would become part of my agenda." His campaign walked back his statement within two hours, saying that he would "of course" support legislation aimed at restricting access to abortion.

The Obama campaign accused Romney on Wednesday of being dishonest about his anti-abortion position in order to "close the deal" with female voters.

"He didn't soften these positions, he's trying to hide them," Stephanie Cutter, President Barack Obama's campaign manager, told reporters. "If people believe that he's changed his mind, they should go ahead and ask him."

#### Extinction.

Cote 4 (Robin, Author, Lecturer + member of non-profit The Life Center, "Overpopulation Equals Disaster," http://www.truth101.org/vs-overpopulation.html)

By their support of anti-choice laws, such as restrictions on foreign aid, (http://www.pro-truth.net/30-references.html#gag) and by their opposition to certain practices, the anti-abortion promoters deny sex education, birth control, and abortion to millions in third-world countries while the impoverished overpopulation in these countries is busy cutting down what’s left of the rain forests to feed still more unwanted children. The rain forests are not only the homes for most life forms on this planet, these forests are also an **essential requirement for a stable global environment**. In the developed countries, to accommodate the increasing population, people are busy building still more factories and cars which produce even more pollution. Pollution is destroying the ozone layer at a phenomenal rate and has already begun to produce an **irreversible, environmental disaster of as-yet unimaginable proportions**. **Outlawing abortion is like playing a variation of Russian roulette where it's your turn until the gun goes off.**

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#### Counterplan: The United States federal government should adopt a policy that declares that the United States solely maintains nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond to nuclear attacks against ourselves, our forces, or our friends and allies.

#### The counterplan solve prolif—a “sole purpose” declaration is key.

Blair et al. 8—Former professor of security studies @ Yale and Princeton University. Expert on U.S. and Russian security policies, nuclear forces and command-and-control systems [Bruce G. Blair (President of the World Security Institute), Thomas B. Cochran (Chair for nuclear policy @ Natural Resources Defense Council and senior scientist and director of its Nuclear Program), Jonathan Dean (Advisor on global security issues @ Union of Concerned Scientists), Steve Fetter (Dean of the School of Public Affairs @ University of Maryland), Richard L. Garwin (IBM fellow emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center w/ Ph.D. in physics from the University of Chicago), Kurt Gottfried (Emeritus professor of physics @ Cornell University), Lisbeth Gronlund (Senior scientist and codirector of the Global Security Program @ Union of Concerned Scientists and a research affiliate in the MIT Program in Science, Technology, and Society), Henry Kelly (President of the Federation of American Scientists and served as assistant director for technology in the White House Office of Science and Technology from 1993 to 2000), Hans M. Kristensen (Director of the Nuclear Information Project @ Federation of American Scientists), Robert Nelson (senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists), Robert S. Norris (senior research associate @ Natural Resources Defense Council), Ivan Oelrich (Vice president for strategic security programs @ Federation of American Scientists and professor in the Security Studies @ Georgetown University), Christopher Paine (Director of the Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council), Frank N. von Hippel (nuclear physicist and professor of public and international affairs @ Princeton University), David Wright (co-director and senior scientist of the Global Security Program @ Union of Concerned Scientists and a research affiliate of the MIT Program in Science, Technology, and Society, and Stephen Young (Washington representative and senior analyst in the Global Security Program @ Union of Concerned Scientists), Toward True Security: Ten Steps the Next President Should Take to Transform U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, February 2008]

1. The United States should declare that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to the use of nuclear weapons by another country.

Current U.S. policy is to retain the option of using nuclear weapons for military purposes other than deterring nuclear attack, including:

• Deterring, responding to, and even preempting conventional, chemical, or biological attacks

• Destroying chemical or biological agents

• Deterring or responding to other unspecified threats to U.S. vital interests

However, giving nuclear weapons roles beyond deterring nuclear attack is both unnecessary and counterproductive. Those roles add little or nothing to the deterrence of non-nuclear attacks provided by U.S. conventional forces or to the U.S. ability to counter or respond to such attacks. Moreover, **maintaining and strengthening the firebreak against the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons is paramount to U.S. security**. If U.S. policy treats nuclear weapons as a multipurpose arsenal, then other states will be more inclined to seek nuclear weapons. If the United States, with its unquestioned conventional superiority, acts as if it must rely on nuclear weapons to protect and defend its vital interests, then weaker states—particularly those not covered by U.S. security guarantees—will perceive a far greater need for such weapons. Indeed, implicit or explicit U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons may motivate nations to acquire nuclear weapons to deter the United States.33 These added roles for U.S. nuclear weapons also negate the nonproliferation benefits of U.S. “negative security assurances” that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories of the NPT.

Some believe that the consequences of attack from chemical and especially biological weapons could be so great that it is unwise to forgo the “sharp deterrence” provided by explicit threats to use nuclear weapons in response. Rather than promising never to use nuclear weapons first, these proponents advocate that the United States pledge not to initiate the use of “weapons of mass destruction,” by which they mean chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

However, chemical weapons do not belong in this category—their destructive capacity pales compared with that of nuclear weapons. Thus, it would be irresponsible for the United States to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack by chemical weapons. Biological weapons, in contrast, could, over time, kill as many people as nuclear weapons—if they are contagious and delivered effectively. However, the threat of a U.S. conventional response is likely to be as effective in deterring such attacks as an explicit U.S. nuclear threat. In any event, any marginal gain in deterrence against a biological attack would be offset by the incentive such a policy would provide hostile nations to acquire nuclear weapons.

Advocates of an explicit U.S. nuclear threat often claim that such a threat deterred Iraq’s use of chemical and biological weapons during the first Gulf War. However, President George H.W. Bush’s threat of “the strongest possible response” if Iraq used its chemical or biological weapons applied equally to the destruction of Kuwait’s oil fields, which Iraq did with impunity.34

U.S. officials threatened privately to escalate the war in ways that did not involve nuclear weapons if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons. Secretary of State James Baker warned the Iraqi foreign minister that the use of such weapons would lead the United States to seek to topple the Hussein regime.35 These threats were almost certainly an equally, if not more, potent deterrent compared with the nuclear threat. There is also evidence that U.S. air attacks impaired Iraq’s ability to deploy and use chemical and biological weapons. We do not know why Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons in that war. However, the balance of evidence does not support the conclusion that veiled U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons were the determining factor.

Nuclear threats are also unnecessary to deter non-nuclear attacks because U.S. conventional military strength far exceeds that of all potential adversaries, and will do so for the foreseeable future. The United States and its allies can rely on their combined conventional military strength to counter any non-nuclear threat to their security. Finally, practical political reasons preclude the use of nuclear weapons **in response to non-nuclear attacks**. Although **one can imagine cases where domestic pressure for nuclear revenge might be strong**, or where the use of nuclear weapons might reduce U.S. casualties and end a war more quickly, wise leaders would weigh these considerations against the grave damage that nuclear first use would do to U.S. security. In the short term, nuclear attacks could turn world opinion against the United States and render a collective response against an offender difficult or impossible. The long-term effects would be even more profound. Nuclear strikes would deal a **fatal blow to U.S. leadership and alliances, wreck the nonproliferation regime, and spur other states to acquire nuclear weapons**. While the United States has considered using nuclear weapons numerous times since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it has not done so, in part because of just such considerations.

Threatening to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks could also increase the **pressure on the U**nited States to follow through, even if that would be counter to U.S. interests, for two reasons. First, if the United States retains its first-use option, the **military** will maintain detailed contingency plans and standard operating procedures for such use, which could dominate thinking about how to respond in a crisis. Second, once **policy makers** threaten a nuclear response, they might worry about undermining U.S. credibility and resolve if they did not follow through, even if they believed that doing so would be unnecessary or imprudent.

The bottom line is that the marginal value of explicit threats to use nuclear weapons to respond to non-nuclear attacks is small, the wisdom of carrying out such threats is dubious, and the potential long-term security costs of making such threats is great. The United States should make clear that the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to nuclear attacks.

#### A No-First-Use declaration strengthens anti-proliferation norms and gets modeled

Civiak 9—Consultant in Nuclear Weapons Policy w/ Ph.D. in physics from the University of Pittsburgh [Robert L. Civiak (Former Specialist in Energy Technology in the Science Policy Division of the Congressional Research Service (10 years) & Former Program and Budget Examiner with the Office of Management and Budget, primary responsible for oversight of the Department of Energy’s stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile (11 years)), Transforming the U.S. Strategic Posture and Weapons Complex: for Transition to a Nuclear Weapons-Free World, Prepared by the Nuclear Weapons Complex Consolidation (NWCC) Policy Network, April 2009]

In the near term, it is unlikely that we can eliminate the risk that more nations will acquire nuclear weapons. However, the assertive use of nuclear threats—as was the policy of the Bush Administration—is the wrong way to go about preventing the emergence of new nuclear weapons states. The existence of a huge U.S. nuclear arsenal has not deterred any potentially hostile nation from acquiring nuclear weapons. Threats of preemptive or preventive nuclear strikes on smaller opponents stoke fears of political coercion and conventional military attack under the cover of a nuclear umbrella. These fears feed, rather than quench, the desire for national nuclear deterrents. A world free of nuclear weapons offers the greatest hope of reducing nuclear insecurity and achieving the coordinated international action that is necessary to prevent other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. Until that can be achieved, it is in the interest of the United States to reduce the rhetoric and change the doctrine regarding potential first use of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear security politics of the Cold War consisted of attempting to “reassure” friends and foes alike that the U.S. would resort to the use of nuclear weapons to defend its allies from all forms of aggression. Now, to halt the global spread of nuclear weapons, the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states must do the opposite. They must work together to convince all nations, regardless of their ideological hue, that they will never become targets of nuclear attack if they adhere faithfully to the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons or assisting others to do so.

**The U**nited **S**tates **should eliminate nuclear threats** completely from its global military posture and forego integrating the potential use of nuclear weapons with strategies for use of conventional force. The United States must live up to its democratic ideals, defending its interests primarily by engaging other nations through negotiation and reciprocal accommodation, without invoking a nuclear “ace-in-the-hole.”

The United States must pursue a nuclear weapons policy directed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material. **We must lead** **in creating a global norm** in which no new nation feels a need for its own nuclear deterrent and nations already possessing nuclear weapons join us in radical stockpile reductions and deemphasizing the strategic importance of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the U.S. must respect the principles of the UN Charter and its constraints on the permissible uses of unilateral military force. This policy must reject any notion of an “exceptional” U.S. privilege, beyond the inherent right to self-defense enshrined in the Charter, to engage in the unilateral use of military force to further its interests or extinguish perceived threats anywhere on the globe.

Other than the use of nuclear weapons by others, the United States is not confronted by any credible threat to its security, or to that of its allies, which might require a threat of nuclear escalation to counter it. Therefore, the President and the Congress should declare, **without qualification**, that the United States will not be the first nation to use nuclear weapons in any future conflict. This “no first use” policy should be reflected in our nuclear force structure and readiness posture. U.S. nuclear forces should neither be structured nor postured for preemptive attacks against another nation’s nuclear forces. It should be the declared policy of the United States that its nuclear forces are only for the purpose of deterring a nuclear attack. Since many fewer nuclear weapons are needed for such a “minimum deterrence” strategy, President Obama should begin to implement large reductions in U.S. nuclear forces. Furthermore, the U.S. by its actions, as well as its words, must seek to devalue nuclear weapons as instruments of national security, while fostering the establishment of global and regional security arrangements to facilitate their complete elimination. The nuclear weapons posture of the United States **exerts a significant influence on nuclear weapons programs in other countries**. For example, we know from the history of nuclear weapons espionage and proliferation that **foreign nuclear establishments closely follow technical and policy developments regarding U.S. nuclear weapons** and the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. This is yet another reason for adopting the new paradigm for sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent outlined in this report, which limits changes to nuclear weapons.

Proliferation is also driven by regional anxieties and conflicts that are not directly linked to U.S. nuclear or conventional military capabilities. Regional tensions are a significant driver of nuclear weapons development in **South Asia**, the **Middle East**, and on the **Korea**n Peninsula. Resolving tension in those regions must be seen as an important aspect of the strategic posture and nuclear weapons strategy of our nation. This requires **adherence to** a set of **principles that will detach nuclear** forces and threats of **preemption from the process of resolving political and territorial disputes**. Only then can negotiations reach beyond issues of national survival and attempt to reconcile the specific conflicting objectives that are causing tension. Regional military imbalances should be dealt with through cooperative security negotiations and arrangements to reduce such threats, or if necessary by adjustments in our own and allied conventional forces, not by the threatened use of nuclear forces or strategies for preemptive or preventive nuclear attacks.

In an ideal world, the question, “what are nuclear weapons for?” would be moot. There would be no nuclear weapons. As we move toward that vision, the United States should view its nuclear weapons for one purpose and one purpose only—to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. The Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should structure U.S. nuclear forces and the weapons complex accordingly. Pg. 24-25

### 1NC—K

#### Attempts to order the world to avoid uncertainty produces utopian visions—embracing doubt creates radical democracy and avoids violence.

Stavrakakis 99—Yannis Stavrakakis, Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex [*Lacan and the Political*, p. 96-8]

The fear behind all these statements is common; it is that the stress on the political qua encounter with the real precludes the possibility of presenting a more or less stable (present or future) ground for ethics and democracy, that it undermines their universal character and the possibility of any final reconciliation at either the subjective or the social level. Frosh is summarising this fear à propos of the issue of human rights: ‘if humanism is a fraud [as Lacan insists] and there is no fundamental human entity that is to be valued in each person [an essence of the psyche maybe?], one is left with no way of defending the “basic rights” of the individual’ (Frosh, 1987:137). In the two final chapters of this book I shall argue that the reason behind all these fears is the continuing hegemony of an ethics of harmony. Against such a position the ethics of the real entails a recognition of the irreducibility of the real and an attempt to institutionalise social lack. Thus it might be possible to achieve an ethically and politically satisfactory institution of the social field beyond the fantasy of closure which has proved so problematic, if not catastrophic. In other words, the best way to organise the social might be one which recognises the ultimate impossibility around which it is always structured. What could be some of the parameters of this new organisation of the social in our late modern terrain? Ulrich Beck’s theory seems to be relevant in this respect. According to our reading of Beck’s schema, contemporary societies are faced with the return of uncertainty, a return of the repressed without doubt, and the inability of mastering the totality of the real. We are forced thus to recognise the ambiguity of our experience and to articulate an auto-critical position towards our ability to master the real. It is now revealed that although **repressing doubt and uncertainty can provide a temporary safety of meaning, it is nevertheless a dangerous strategy, a strategy that depends on a fantasmatic illusion**. This realisation, contrary to any nihilistic reaction, is nothing but the starting point for a new form of society which is emerging around us, together of course with the reactionary attempts to reinstate an ageing modernity:

Perhaps the decline of the lodestars of primary Enlightenment, the individual, identity, truth, reality, science, technology, and so on, is the prerequisite for the start of an alternative Enlightenment, one which does not fear doubt, but instead makes it the element of its life and survival.

 (Beck, 1997:161)

Is it not striking that Lacanian theory stands at the forefront of the struggle to make us change our minds about all these grandiose fantasies? Beck argues that such an openness towards doubt can be learned from Socrates, Montaigne, and others; it might be possible to add Lacan to this list. In other words, doubt, which threatens our false certainties, can become the nodal point for another modernity that will respect the right to err. Scepticism

 contrary to a widespread error, makes everything possible again: questions and dialogue of course, as well as faith, science, knowledge, criticism, morality, society, only differently…things unsuspected and incongruous, with the tolerance based and rooted in the ultimate certainty of error.

 (Beck, 1997:163)

In that sense, what is at stake in our current theoretico-political terrain is not the central categories or projects of modernity per se (the idea of critique, science, democracy, etc.), but their ontological status, their foundation. The crisis of their current foundations, weakens their absolutist character and creates the opportunity to ground them in much more appropriate foundations (Laclau, 1988a). **Doubts liberate; they make things possible**. First of all the possibility of a new vision for society. An anti-utopian vision founded on the principle ‘Dubio ergo sum’ (Beck, 1997:162) closer to the subversive doubtfulness of Montaigne than to the deceptive scepticism of Descartes. Although Lacan thought that in Montaigne scepticism had not acquired the form of an ethic, he nevertheless pointed out that

 Montaigne is truly the one who has centred himself, not around scepticism but around the living moment of the aphanisis of the subject. And it is in this that he is fruitful, that he is an eternal guide, who goes beyond whatever may be represented of the moment to be defined as a historical turning-point.

 (XI:223-4)

This is a standpoint which is both critical and self-critical: there is no foundation ‘of such a scope and elasticity for a critical theory of society (which would then automatically be a self-critical theory) as doubt’ (Beck, 1997:173). Doubt, the invigorating champagne of thinking, points to a new modernity ‘more modern than the old, industrial modernity that we know. The latter after all, is based on certainty, on repelling and suppressing doubt’ (ibid.: 173). Beck asks us to fight for ‘a modernity which is beginning to doubt itself, which, if things go well, will make doubt the measure and architect of its self-limitation and self-modification’ (ibid.: 163). He asks us, to use Paul Celan’s phrase, to ‘build on inconsistencies’. This will be a modernity instituting a new politics, a politics recognising the uncertainty of the moment of the political. It will be a modernity recognising the constitutivity of the real in the social. A truly political modernity (ibid.: 5). In the next two chapters I will try to show the way in which Lacanian political theory can act as a catalyst for this change. The current crisis of utopian politics, instead of generating pessimism, can become the starting point for a renewal of democratic politics within a radically transformed ethical framework.

#### The world is inevitably relativistic—refusal to accept difference causes escalation and war.

Rasch 3—William Rasch, Henry H. H. Remak Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University [“Human Rights as Geopolitics,” *Cultural Critique*, 54, 120-147]

In the past, we/they, neighbor/foreigner, friend/enemy polarities were inside/outside distinctions that produced a **plurality of worlds**, separated by physical and cultural borders. When these worlds collided, it was not always a pretty picture, but it was often possible to maintain the integrity of the we/they distinction, even to regulate it by distinguishing between domestic and foreign affairs. **If “they” differed, “we” did not always feel ourselves obliged to make “them” into miniature versions of “us,”** to Christianize them, to civilize them, to make of them good liberals. Things have changed. With a single-power global hegemony that is guided by a universalist ideology, all relations have become, or threaten to become, domestic. The inner/outer distinction has been transformed into a morally and legally determined acceptable/unacceptable one, and the power exists (or is thought to exist), both spiritually and physically, to eliminate the unacceptable once and for all and make believers of everyone. The new imperative states: the other shall be included. Delivered as a promise, it can only be received, by some, as an ominous threat. In his The Conquest of America, Tzvetan Todorov approaches our relationship to the “other” by way of three interlocking distinctions, namely, self/other, same/different, and equal/unequal. A simple superposition of all three distinctions makes of the other someone who is different and therefore unequal. The problem we have been discussing, however, comes to light when we make of the other someone who is equal because he is essentially the same. This form of the universalist ideology is assimilationist. It denies the other by embracing him. Of the famous sixteenth-century defender of the Indians, Bartolomé de Las Casas, Todorov writes, [his] declaration of the equality of men is made in the name of a specific religion, Christianity.... Hence, there is a potential danger of seeing not only the Indians' human nature asserted but also their Christian “nature.” “The natural laws and rules and rights of men,” Las Casas said; but who decides what is natural with regard to laws and rights? Is it not specifically the Christian religion? Since Christianity is universalist, it implies an essential non-difference on the part of all men. We see the danger of the identiWcation in this text of Saint John Chrysostrom, quoted and defended at Valladolid: “Just as there is no natural difference in the creation of man, so there is no difference in the call to salvation of all men, barbarous or wise, since God's grace can correct the minds of barbarians, so that they have a reasonable understanding.” Once again we see that the term “human” is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected. Regarding the relationship of difference and equality, Todorov concludes, “If it is [End Page 139] incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is a still greater one, for it consists in identifying the other purely and simply with one's own 'ego ideal' (or with oneself)” (1984, 165). Such identification is not only the essence of Christianity, but also of the doctrine of human rights preached by enthusiasts like Habermas and Rawls. And such identification means that the other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human.

And yet, despite—indeed, because of—the all-encompassing embrace, the detested other is never allowed to leave the stage altogether. Even as we seem on the verge of actualizing Kant's dream, as Habermas puts it, of “a cosmopolitan order” that unites all peoples and abolishes war under the auspices of “the states of the First World” who “can afford to harmonize their national interests to a certain extent with the norms that define the halfhearted cosmopolitan aspirations of the UN” (1998, 165, 184), it is still fascinating to see how the barbarians make their functionally necessary presence felt. John Rawls, in his The Law of Peoples (1999), conveniently divides the world into well-ordered peoples and those who are not well ordered. Among the former are the “reasonable liberal peoples” and the “decent hierarchical peoples” (4). Opposed to them are the “outlaw states” and other “burdened” peoples who are not worthy of respect. Liberal peoples, who, by virtue of their history, possess superior institutions, culture, and moral character (23-25), have not only the right to deny non-well-ordered peoples respect, but the duty to extend what Vitoria called “brotherly correction” and Habermas [called] “gentle compulsion” (Habermas 1997, 133). That is, Rawls believes that the “refusal to tolerate” those states deemed to be outlaw states “is a consequence of liberalism and decency.” Why? Because outlaw states violate human rights. What are human rights? “What I call human rights,” Rawls states, “are ... a proper subset of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical society” (Rawls 1999, 81). Because of their violation of these liberal rights, nonliberal, nondecent societies do not even have the right “to protest their condemnation by the world society” (38), and decent peoples have the right, if necessary, to wage just wars against them. Thus, liberal societies are not merely contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization; they become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. **Those found wanting are banished**, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty.

#### Disorder and insecurity are inevitable but efforts to control this will produce violence and extinction. The alternative is to affirm difference, accept doubt and admit that everything is dangerous—this breaks us out of the death cycle.

Der Derian 98—James Der Derian, Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts [“The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, Decentering Security,” *On Security*, ed: Lipschitz,]

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of “security.” In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida “as a series of substitutions of center for center” in a perpetual search for the “transcendental signified.” Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of “reflectivism,” to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: “As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.'“[8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a “security crisis” in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the “originary” form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an “alternative security.” An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that “questioning is the piety of thought.” Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that **everything is dangerous**, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and **to affirm the creative differences** which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, **the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical “other” of life, the terror of death which,** once generalized and nationalized**, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others—who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees**. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

### 1NC NRC Restrictions A/C

#### NRC restrictions are the single biggest roadblock for SMRs—delays, lack of human and technical capacity, and zoning restrictions.

Nick Cunningham, October 2012. Policy Analyst for Energy and Climate at the American Security Project. “Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power,” American Security Project, <http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200087%20-%20Small%20Modular%20Reactors.pdf>.

The most difficult challenge currently facing SMRs is the institutional barriers. Currently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not certified a single SMR design. Despite the variety of SMR designs from several nuclear vendors, the NRC has lacked sufficient human and technical capacity to license small modular reactors in the past.33 Even as policymakers have expressed greater interest in SMRs in recent years, the licensing process for a new design takes several years at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.34¶ Also, many regulations create a difficult environment for small reactors and favor large reactors. For example, the NRC requires 10 mile emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants,¶ making it difficult to site a small reactor near urban centers where it could be used for energy applications other than centralized electricity generation.35¶ SMRs will need to overcome this long history of institutional bias towards large reactors. As the most prominent licensing body for the nuclear industry worldwide, the NRC to a certain degree, shapes the global future for nuclear power. If the NRC does not lead on small modular reactors, it may be an uphill battle for the SMR industry.

#### NRC restrictions overwhelm government financial incentives.

Jim Hopf, 10/25/2011. Senior nuclear engineer with more than 20 years of experience in shielding and criticality analysis and design for spent fuel dry storage and transportation systems. “[Roadblock in Congress for SMR Development](http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2011/10/25/congress-smr/),” ANS Nuclear Café, http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2011/10/25/congress-smr/.

As many have observed, the main barrier to the deployment of SMRs may not be a lack of government financial or R&D support, but instead the enormous amount of time and money required to get new reactor designs licensed by the NRC. Reactor licensing processes have been taking many years and costing more than a $100 million dollars. Even approving an exact copy of an already-licensed reactor design (for a new site) is projected to take more than two years.¶ Even SMRs that deploy conventional light-water technology (such as NuScale or mPower) can expect a long (~ 5 year) licensing process (starting in late 2012 or 2013). For non-conventional technologies like Hyperion, who knows how long it will take? The NRC has stated that non-conventional SMRs like Hyperion are not on its priority list right now, and that it will only consider such an application when a serious customer has been found (thus setting up a chicken-egg problem).¶ Other issues that may hold back SMRs include security and emergency planning/evacuation requirements, and per-reactor NRC fees. If the NRC is not willing to consider the SMRs’ lower potential radioactivity release, as well as the lower probability of such release, in setting these requirements, as well as scaling fees with reactor capacity, it may destroy SMRs’ economic viability.¶

### 1NC Waste A/C

#### SMRs won’t expand until we have a solution for spent fuel.

Nick Cunningham, October 2012. Policy Analyst for Energy and Climate at the American Security Project. “Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power,” American Security Project, <http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200087%20-%20Small%20Modular%20Reactors.pdf>.

Disposal of spent nuclear fuel has confounded the nuclear industry for decades and the problem of waste disposal will still need to be dealt with for SMRs. While large reactors suffer from the same problem, expanding the use of SMRs would mean waste from more reactor sites would need to be coordinated.38 The quantity of waste may not change, but a given amount of waste is easier to manage from one site, rather than multiple.¶ The problem of disposing nuclear waste is a serious one, and the lack of a solution despite 30 years of debate is troubling. In January 2010, President Obama setup a Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) to study the problem and to recommend actions to finally address the nuclear waste problem. The BRC recommended the establishment of a consent-based approach to siting a waste facility, the development of interim storage¶ 6facilities, the creation of a separate government entity tasked only with addressing nuclear waste, as well as several other recommendations.39 The recommendations will be difficult to pass through Congress, but until resolved, the nuclear waste problem will bedevil the entire nuclear industry, including SMRs.

### Hege D

#### US decline will not spark wars.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

#### The only comprehensive study proves no transition impact.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.

First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.

Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.

Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. Pg. 9-10

### AT: Space I/L

#### This evidence is about debris taking out satellites—the aff doesn’t solve and the impact is inevitable

**Imburgia ‘11** (Lt. Col. and Judge Advocate in Air Force, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/Imburgia-FINAL-CR-pdf.pdf)

ABSTRACT In 2007, a Chinese anti-satellite missile destroyed an aging weather satellite, creating millions of pieces of space debris. In 2009, the collision of two satellites created thousands more. By 2010, more than 95 percent of all man-made objects in Earth’s orbit were debris. Such a sudden and massive addition to the space debris environment since 2007 poses a direct threat to operational satellites and continued space access. This in turn threatens U.S. national security, to which space access and use is vital. Unfortunately, future increases in the number of spacefaring nations and corresponding launches will only exacerbate this space debris threat. Some experts now fear that a chain reaction of space debris collisions threatening sustainable space access for centuries is unavoidable unless international action to minimize and remove the debris is soon taken. This Article argues that such international action should come in the form of a binding international space debris agreement, and puts forth the draft agreement at Annex A as a starting point for discussion.

### AT: Oil Depend

#### Voth concedes status quo solves --- SMRs are good but no ev they are necessary.

Voth ‘12 (Jeffrey M. Voth is the president of Herren Associates leading a team of consultants advising the federal government on issues of national security, energy and environment, health care and critical information technology infrastructure, George Washing University Homeland Security Policy Institute, “In Defense of Energy – A Call to Action”, <http://securitydebrief.com/2012/04/11/in-defense-of-energy-a-call-to-action/>, April 11, 2012, LEQ)

Last month, the Pentagon released its widely anticipated roadmap to transform operational energy security. As published in a [World Politics Review briefing](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11665/the-pentagon-must-internalize-energy-security-requirements), energy security has become a strategic as well as an operational imperative for U.S. national security. As tensions continue to escalate with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, it has become clear that the U.S. military urgently requires new approaches and innovative technologies to improve fuel efficiency, increase endurance, enhance operational flexibility and support a forward presence for allied forces while reducing the vulnerability inherent in a long supply-line tether. Assured access to reliable and sustainable supplies of energy is central to the military’s ability to meet operational requirements globally, whether keeping the seas safe of pirates operating off the coast of Africa, providing humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters in the Pacific or supporting counterterrorism missions in the Middle East.

From both a strategic and an operational perspective, the call to action is clear. Rapid employment of energy-efficient technologies and smarter systems will be required to transform the military’s energy-security posture while meeting the increasing electric-power demands required for enhanced combat capability. As recently [outlined by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yeh5c63tnWk), “Without improving our energy security, we are not merely standing still as a military or as a nation, we are falling behind.”

#### \*\*\*Wake’s Card Stops Here\*\*\*

[The implementation plan](http://energy.defense.gov/), issued by Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, outlines a multi-pronged strategy to reduce demand, secure diverse options beyond traditional fossil fuels, and build considerations for energy security into all military planning. The operational energy implementation plan also creates an executive board to oversee progress toward an energy secure force. Highlights of goals established by each service include:

Army to have 16 “[Net Zero](http://www.armyeitf.com/)” installations by 2020 and 25 by 2030;

Navy to [reduce fuel consumption](http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/energy/task-force-energy/) afloat by 15 percent by 2020;

Air Force to [increase aviation energy efficiency](http://www.safie.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-091208-026.pdf) by 10 percent by 2020; and

Marine Corps to [increase energy efficiency on the battlefield](http://www.marines.mil/community/Documents/USMC%20Expeditionary%20Energy%20Strategy%20%20Implementation%20Planning%20Guidance.pdf) by 50 percent by 2025.

In addition to working with the services to improve their consumption baselines, develop department-wide energy performance metrics, and identifying technology gaps, the implementation plan outlines recommendations in the following key areas:

[Improving operational energy](http://energy.defense.gov/OES_report_to_congress.pdf) security at fixed installations;

Promoting the development of [alternative fuels](http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66315);

Incorporating energy security considerations into [requirements and acquisitions](https://acc.dau.mil/ILC_EEK); and

Adapting [policy, doctrine, education, etc](http://energy.defense.gov/Memorandum_Supporting_The_Mission_with_Operational_Energy.pdf). to support reduced demand of energy.

Beginning with the clear vision of an energy-secure force outlined by the U.S. military leadership and cultural changes adopted by operational commanders, our military is beginning to embrace energy as a strategic resource. The Defense Department will need to extend strategic technology partnerships throughout the federal government and academia as well as with allied nations, including agreements with the newly established [Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy](http://arpa-e.energy.gov/) within the U.S. Department of Energy. Finally, aggressive legislative, acquisition and operational energy-security mandates will need to be enforced to support the Defense Department’s broader transformational objectives.

#### So does Freed --- all these cards are about existing DOD energy efficiency measures.

Freed ‘12 (Josh Freed, Vice President for Clean Energy, Third Way, “Improving capability, protecting 'budget”, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php>, May 21, 2012, LEQ)

As Third Way explains in a digest being released this week by our [National Security Program](http://www.thirdway.org/programs/national_security_program), the [Pentagon’s efforts](http://energy.defense.gov/Operational_Energy_Strategy_Implementation_Plan.pdf) to reduce energy demand and find alternative energy sources could keep rising fuel costs from encroaching on the budgets of other important defense programs. And the payoff could be massive. The Air Force has already been able to implement behavioral and technology changes that will reduce its fuel costs by $500 million over the next five years. The Army has invested in better energy distribution systems at several bases in Afghanistan, which will save roughly $100 million each year. And, using less than 10% of its energy improvement funds, the Department has begun testing advanced biofuels for ships and planes. This relatively small investment could eventually provide the services with a cost-effective alternative to the increasingly expensive and volatile oil markets.

These actions are critical to the Pentagon’s ability to focus on its defense priorities. As [Secretary Panetta recently pointed out](http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/05/03/1), he’s facing a $3 billion budget shortfall caused by “higher-than-expected fuel costs.” The Department’s energy costs could rise even further if action isn’t taken. DOD expects to spend $16 billion on fuel next year. The [Energy Information Administration predicts the price of oil will rise 23% by 2016](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er%282012%29.pdf), without a major disruption in oil supplies, like the natural disasters, wars, and political upheaval the oil producing states have seen during the last dozen years. Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s planned budget, which will remain flat for the foreseeable future, will require significant adjustment to the Department’s pay-any-price mindset, even if sequestration does not go into effect. Unless energy costs are curbed, they could begin to eat into other budget priorities for DOD.

In addition, the Pentagon’s own [Defense Science Board acknowledges that using energy more efficiently makes our forces more flexible and resilient in military operations](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA477619.pdf), and can provide them with greater endurance during missions. Also, by reducing energy demand in the field, [DOD can minimize the number of fuel convoys that must travel through active combat zones, reducing the chances of attack to avoiding casualties and destruction of material](http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/14/news/economy/military_energy_strategy/index.htm). At our domestic bases, DOD is employing energy conservation, on-site clean energy generation, and smart grid technology to prevent disruptions to vital activities in case the civilian grid is damaged by an attack or natural disaster. The bottom line is, developing methods and technologies to reduce our Armed Forces’ use of fossil fuels and increase the availability of alternative energy makes our military stronger. That’s why the Pentagon has decided to invest in these efforts. End of story.

#### \*\*\*Wake’s Card Ends Here\*\*\*

The Department’s efforts to reduce energy consumption and incorporate alternative **energy are just now hitting full stride**, after several years of setting up the offices and procedures that will be needed to accomplish its goals. But these efforts have **already produced tangible benefits** to military capability and cost-cutting. Because of their clearly-demonstrated value, DOD energy initiatives have (for the most part) been able to deflect a handful of attacks from politically-motivated opponents of clean energy. Congress should continue to support these initiatives, and provide the services with the tools they need to modernize their energy systems, improve capability, and cut costs.

#### They don’t solve --- internal links are about oil, SMRs produce electricity --- trades off at best with a small amount of diesel electric, not with tanks and planes.

### 1NC—Grid D

#### Reactors are still in the research stage—they are decades away from being deployable.

Anderson 10—Senior Engineer in the Integrated Applications Office @ National Renewable Energy Laboratory [Kate Anderson “SMALL NUCLEAR REACTORS,” White Paper, February 1, 2010]

Despite these benefits, small reactors have many challenges to overcome. A few designs are in the engineering phase and could be commercialized within a decade, but most designs are still in the research stage, and will require extensive engineering and demonstration before they are ready to be commercialized. The unique design features that make small reactors appealing, like passive safety systems and integral designs, require non-traditional components that will need to be fully developed, tested, and demonstrated. Additional developments in instrumentation and control will be needed for most small reactor designs. Designs that depart from the traditional light water reactortechnology may required significant material and fuel qualification as well, which could take 10-12 years or more.9 pg. 3-4

#### The system is robust—they have learned from past experiences.

Cauley 11—President and Chief Executive Officer North American Electric Reliability Corporation [Gerry Cauley, “HEADLINE: ELECTRIC GRID AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY,” Committee on House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power, CQ Congressional Testimony, May 31, 2011 Tuesday]

The electricity being used in this room right now is generated and transmitted in real time over a complex series of lines and stations from as far away as Ontario or Tennessee. As complex as it is, few machines are as robust as the bulk power system. Decades of experience with hurricanes, ice storms and other natural disasters, as well as mechanical breakdowns, vandalism and sabotage, have taught the electric industry how to build strong and reliable networks that generally withstand all but the worst natural and physical disasters while supporting affordable electric service. The knowledge that disturbances on the grid can impact operations thousands of miles away has influenced the electric industry culture of reliability, affecting how it plans, operates and protects the bulk power system.

#### Their solvency ev is industry cheerleading—diverse distributed sources solve better.

Lovins 10—Chair and Chief Scientist @ Rocky Mountain Institute [Amory B. Lovins (Experimental Physicist and Former professor of Advanced Energy Efficiency @ Stanford University) , “Lovins addresses New Nuclear Power for DOD (Q&A 3 of 3)” DOD Energy Blog, Wednesday, May 12, 2010, http://dodenergy.blogspot.com/2010/05/lovins-addresses-new-nuclear-power-for\_12.html]

Question 3: Are there any points in particular you'd like to call out re: the on nuclear energy generation potential for DOD?

ABL: Yes. Two major technical task forces evaluating DoD's energy options have carefully considered the various nuclear technologies at diverse scales that were vigorously suggested to them. Both pointedly declined to recommend military pursuit of any nuclear technology to power facilities. My 1Q2010 Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) article "DoD's Energy Challenge as Strategic Opportunity" explains, with footnotes omitted:

"Nuclear power is sometimes suggested for land installations or even expeditionary forces, typically without discussing cost (grossly uncompetitive), modern renewables (typically much cheaper), operational reliability (usually needing 100% backup), or security. For these and other reasons, the 2008 DSB and JASON task forces didn’t endorse this option."

Some of the task forces' reasons are obvious. For isolated or grid-connected fixed installations, any mini-reactor would require 100% backup, as analysis of a Toshiba ~10-MWe unit proposed for the fly-in village of Galena, Alaska confirmed. Moreover, its economics would be dreadful. Unconservatively assuming the same $2,500/KWe capital cost at 10 MWe as at 50 MWe, a found that if the reactor (with capex upwards of 9¢/KWh) and its licensing (roughly comparable or larger under current rules), its installation and removal, and its decommissioning were all free, if O&M costs were half Toshiba's estimate for the 50-MWe design, and if NRC dropped the required security staffing from 34 to 4 guards, then the ~5–14¢/KWh operating cost alone might compete with diesel's, burning costly barged-in fuel; but to make even this work, the study had to make many absurd assumptions. I'm unaware of any remote installation for which a mini-reactor can be shown to be competitive.

Nor, inherently, can a mini-reactor's security of supply approach that of a properly designed network of diverse and distributed sources. The principles of resilient design, summarized in Ch. 13 of " Brittle Power", are no more compatible with a single power source than are the principles of least cost . Nuclear power does not earn a place in a "diversified" DOD energy supply portfolio simply by being different, any more than a financial portfolio should include one of everything on offer. Rather, a balanced portfolio includes only assets with a clear risk-and-return rationale.

The Naval situation is different, but not completely, as my JFQ article continued:

"After vast investment in hardware and a unique technical culture, nuclear propulsion has proven its merit in submarines and aircraft carriers. In 2006–09, Congressional enthusiasts announced supposed Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) findings that nuclear propulsion in new medium surface combatants could beat $70/bbl oil. However, the 2008 DSB task force discovered that NAVSEA’s actual finding ($75–225/bbl) had improperly assumed a zero real discount rate. A 3%/y real discount rate yielded a $132–345/bbl break even oil price; NAVSEA didn’t respond to requests to test the 7%/year real discount rate OMB probably mandates. Presumably the Secretary of Defense will reject this option and focus resources on making ships optimally efficient."

In short, as my JFQ article concluded, "The 2008 DSB and JASON studies are redirecting the military energy conversation from exotic, speculative, and often inappropriate supplies to efficient use, which makes autonomous in-theater supply important and often cost-effective...."

It's therefore disappointing to see that some in the Building, apparently unaware of the full competitive landscape, are now wasting still more time and money on nuclear power after both of DOD's advisory bodies rejected it for many compelling reasons. I hope the Congressionally mandated report the DOD Energy Blog mentions (4th paragraph: here), due 1 Jun 2010, will dig deeper than the current cheer-leading—originating ultimately from vendors desperate to find a cost-insensitive customer for technologies already rejected by the marketplace.

There you have it, sports fans. Amory's systems-based, economics-grounded response has substantially squelched my recently burgeoning enthusiasm for a new nuclear component to DOD's energy portfolio. I have to check my own cheer-leading tendencies sometimes. That said, if there's a man or woman among you who wants to attempt a public retort to these arguments, be my guest ... and good luck, you're going to need it!

### 1NC Prolif

#### US can’t lead—state run nuclear power will always win

Domenici and Miller 12[Pete, Former U.S. Senator and Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Dr Warren F, Former Department of energy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear energy, “Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets,” September, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Nuclear%20Report.PDF]

However, domestic exporters of U.S. nuclear technology, fuels, and services face a truly global and highly competitive market. Commercial nuclear technology is now available from a variety of suppliers, and there are many more companies, several of which have the direct backing of their country’s government, competing with U.S. firms. Industry and other stakeholders believe that U.S. nuclear technology companies are at a competitive disadvantage in international markets due to complex and overlapping federal regulations. Several presenters at the BPC Nuclear Initiative event noted that multiple federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce, DOe, and the Department of State have jurisdiction over commercial nuclear trade, global safety and security, and nonproliferation.

#### Alt cause—export regulations

Platts, 10/1/2012. “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149.

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

\*\*\*Burdensome U.S. export regulations are the critical obstacle to nuclear leadership—the U.S. actually still has the supply chain, but massive delays in processing push countries away from the U.S.

#### Dire proliferation predictions never come true – a nuclear Iran would establish stability in the region – empirically proved

Van Creveld 6 (Martin, Prof. Mil. Hist. – Hebrew U., The Forward, “Knowing Why Not To Bomb Iran Is Half the Battle”, 4-26, http://www.d-n-i.net/creveld/to\_bomb\_iran.htm)

The first and most obvious question is whether it is worth doing in the first place. Starting right after Hiroshima, each time a country was about to go nuclear Washington went out of its way to sound the alarm, warning of the dire consequences that would surely follow. From 1945 to 1949 it was the Soviet Union which, once it had succeeded in building nuclear weapons, was supposed to make an attempt at world conquest. In the 1950s it was America's own clients, Britain and France, who were regarded as the offenders and put under pressure. Between 1960 and 1993, first China, then Israel (albeit to a limited extent) and finally India and Pakistan were presented as the black sheep, lectured, put under pressure and occasionally subjected to sanctions. Since then, the main victim of America's peculiar belief that it alone is sufficiently good and sufficiently responsible to possess nuclear weapons has been North Korea. As the record shows, in none of these cases did the pessimists' visions come true. Neither Stalin, Mao nor any of the rest set out to conquer the world. It is true that, as one country after another joined the nuclear club, Washington's ability to threaten them or coerce them declined. However, nuclear proliferation did not make the world into a noticeably worse place than it had always been — and if anything, to the contrary. As Europe, the Middle East and South Asia demonstrate quite well, in one region after another the introduction of nuclear weapons led, if not to brotherhood and peace, then at any rate to the demise of large-scale warfare between states. Given the balance of forces, it cannot be argued that a nuclear Iran will threaten the United States. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's fulminations to the contrary, the Islamic Republic will not even be a threat to Israel. The latter has long had what it needs to deter an Iranian attack. Should deterrence fail, Jerusalem can quickly turn Tehran into a radioactive desert — a fact of which Iranians are fully aware. Iran's other neighbors, such as Russia, Pakistan and India, can look after themselves. As it is, they seem much less alarmed by developments in Iran than they do by those thousands of miles away in Washington.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### 2NC—Overview

#### Their evidence doesn’t assume its magnitude.

Otten 1 Professor of Emergency Medicine and Pediatrics at the University of Cincinnati [Edward Otten, 2000-2001, http://www.ecology.org/biod/population/human\_pop1.html]

The exponential growth of the human population, making humans the dominant species on the planet, is having a grave impact on biodiversity. This destruction of species by humans will eventually lead to a destruction of the human species through natural selection. While human beings have had an effect for the last 50,000 years, it has only been since the industrial revolution that the impact has been global rather than regional. This global impact is taking place through five primary processes: over harvesting, alien species introduction, pollution, habitat fragmentation, and outright habit destruction.

#### The population is stabilizing --- small changes matter

Powell 12 Harvard Gazette – Quoting the Head of the Laboratory of Populations at Columbia [Alvin Powell, A close eye on population growth, Harvard Staff Writer, <http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/10/a-close-eye-on-population-growth/>]

Projections that global population growth will level out in coming decades are not assured, an expert said Wednesday, adding that just a one-child difference in global fertility would mean an extra 10 billion people by century’s end.

“It matters enormously what we do right now,” said Joel Cohen, a professor at Rockefeller University and head of the Laboratory of Populations at Rockefeller and Columbia universities. “The world is not fixed. Demography is not destiny. We can influence the world of our children and grandchildren by what we do right now.”

At today’s rate, population would skyrocket by 2100, to 27 billion from today’s 7 billion, Cohen said. But growth has been slowing steadily in recent decades. Projections see the pace continuing to slow as it approaches the replacement growth rate of about 2.1 children per family, putting the world population between 9 billion and 10 billion by 2100.

But relatively small differences in fertility could dramatically change the outcome, Cohen said. A half-child reduction in the fertility rate would see global population peak and then fall back to 6 billion by 2100. A half-child increase in the rate would mean population would continue to climb, reaching some 16 billion by the end of the century.

#### Makes all their impacts inevitable.

Cassils 4 the Population Institute of Canada [Cassils J.A., Overpopulation, Sustainable Development, and Security: Developing an Integrated Strategy, Population and Environment, Volume 25, Number 3, January 2004 , pp. 171-194(24)

Nothing threatens the future of our species as much as overpopulation. Yet the very mention of this issue sends chills through the spines of many special interests who refuse to recognize our collective dilemma. Some poor nations with exploding populations charge racism, colonialism, imperialism, and demand aid, but do not deal with their overpopulation, deteriorating environment, and corruption. Feminists might ascribe blame to patriarchy, racism, and lack of rights for women. Human rights advocates might uphold the principle that each woman should have the right to determine how many children she bears. Most religions prefer to see human population increase, basing this view on ancient teachings created for another time and very different circumstances. Each one of these groups tries to define the world through their own specific special interest, losing the overall perspective.

The denial of the crucial importance of this issue is astounding. It is as if most people are saying: “Do not disturb our comfort, do not increase our anxiety by raising difficulties, do not make us rethink our beliefs.” It is time to tone down the squabbles and to develop a comprehensive strategy to address overpopulation. We humans have the intelligence and consciousness to deal with this serious problem, but, all too often, we delay acting until we find ourselves in the midst of a catastrophe. This paper favours “the precautionary principle” and the belief that it is in the general interest of humanity to act with anticipatory intelligence to avert potential disasters.

THE ISSUE

Each of the subjects mentioned in the title—population, sustainable development and security—have received considerable publicity in recent decades. All too often, they have been treated as disparate subjects when they are, in fact, very much interconnected. This paper accepts the following premises:

• overpopulation is the chief cause of ongoing ecological damage

• overpopulation is the fundamental cause of growing insecurity

• overpopulation is the prime reason that sustainable development remains beyond reach.

As population increased rapidly in the twentieth century, some eminent scientists alerted the public about the likely consequences to the health of all life on Earth. Rising consumption and the development of ever more powerful technologies magnify the negative impact of overpopulation on the biosphere. Given the huge benefits that would result from population reduction, one wonders why the issue has not been dealt with more effectively. If we humans reduce the global population to a fraction of its present level to, for example, two billion1 or the equivalent of the population of the Earth about 1930, it would provide extraordinary benefits. The quality of life of all people would soar. We would have all the advantages of modern technology but little, if any, environmental deterioration.

#### Reproductive freedom prevents extinction.

Sanger 4 [Alexander, The Chair of the International Planned Parenthood Council, Beyond Choice, Reproductive Freedom in the 21st Century, p. 72]

**Reproductive freedom is** not only important, it is **necessary for human existence**. To create and nurture life, humanity must have the right to get pregnant or not and give birth or not, when people choose to do so. These choices are the essence of human reproduction. The right to reproduce as one thinks best is what reproductive freedom is supposed to protect. While the movement to establish this freedom has been a major component of the women’s movement, it is not just a woman’s issue. Reproductive freedom concerns the entire human race. It impacts human health and survival and the improvement of the human condition. By exerting control over our biological destiny, we are insuring that destiny. The future of the human race has not been and can not be left to chance. **We have survived because we have taken control of our reproduction and our biological destiny**. **Reproductive rights are vital because they help insure the survival of humanity.**

#### Turns need for hegemony.

**Riche 4** Martha Farnsworth, former director of the US Census Bureau, Sept/Oct (http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/EP175K.pdf)

These arguments also reveal a conflict over what resources are worth investing in. Philip Longman, author of *The Coming Baby Bust,* is concerned that a smaller youth population will make **military actions more difficult** in most nations. It’s not just the numbers, he argues, but with only one or two children per family, parents will be less willing to put their children in harm’s way. And with more financial resources going to pensions and health care, governments will have less to spend on technologies designed to make fewer warriors more productive. **For planetary sustainability, this demographic change is probably positive**.

### AT: Oil Add on

**DOD won’t lose oil access—any alternative is less efficient**

Sarewitz, Co-Director – Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes, and Thernstrom, senior climate policy advisor – Clean Air Task Force, ‘12

(Daniel and Samuel, “Introduction,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, March)

Even so, given adequate forward planning, DoD has **little¶ reason to fear constraints on supply** of petroleum-based fuels¶ for several decades, perhaps many. A tightening international¶ oil market, resulting in continuing price increases, would pose¶ greater difficulties for other segments of the U.S. economy and¶ society, **and for other countries.** DoD’s expenditures on fuel **may¶ seem large**, but should be viewed in the context of other routine¶ expenditures. Even for the Air Force, the principal consumer with¶ its fleet of nearly 6,000 planes, fuel accounts for only around¶ one-fifth of operations and maintenance costs.12 In Afghanistan¶ and Iraq, fuel and water have made up 70 percent (by weight) of¶ the supplies delivered to forward areas.13 Transport convoys have¶ drawn frequent and deadly attacks, but the only way to reduce¶ risks, casualties, and delivery costs is to cut consumption (of¶ water as well as fuel)—**not something that alternative fuels can¶ promise.** Alternative fuels might have somewhat lower energy¶ densities than petroleum (less energy content per gallon or per¶ pound), meaning somewhat more fuel would have to be burned¶ for the same power output, but not higher (by any significant¶ amount). Indeed, **alternative fuels cannot promise performance¶ advantages of any sort.**

**No disruptions—multiple trends**

Alic, former tech and science consultant – Office of Technology Assessment, adjunt professor – Johns Hopkins SAIS, ‘12

(John, “Defense Department Energy Innovation: Three Cases,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, March)

Over 80 percent of the petroleum purchased and consumed¶ by the U.S. military consists of jet fuel designated JP-5 or JP-8;¶ diesel fuel makes up nearly all the rest.46 By volume, recent¶ purchases peaked in fiscal 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, then¶ declined even as rising oil prices pushed expenditures upward:¶ fuel doubled as a share of DoD outlays, from 1.5 percent to 3¶ percent, between fiscal years 2004 and 2008. Consumption did¶ not change much, but purchases rose from $7 billion (2004) to¶ $18 billion (2008). Prices then fell back somewhat, but in 2011¶ DoD paid more for jet fuel just as motorists did for gasoline.¶ Even so, the Energy Information Administration (EIA, part of the¶ Energy Department) predicts relatively flat oil prices over the next¶ quarter century, with inflation-adjusted prices in the range of¶ $120 per barrel.47¶ Oil prices respond almost instantaneously to international¶ political events (e.g., the threat of supply constrictions) and to¶ economic fluctuations affecting demand. A small number of big¶ suppliers—state-owned or state-controlled enterprises inside¶ and outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries¶ (OPEC), plus a handful of private multinationals—dominate¶ production. In recent years, most have appeared to pump¶ oil at or near capacity most of the time. By most indications,¶ Saudi Arabia alone retains the ability to affect prices by raising¶ or lowering output. Otherwise suppliers must act together to¶ set prices, and in recent years that has come to seem mostly a¶ theoretical possibility. Periodic fears of disruption linked with¶ political unrest or war have had greater effects, and sharp swings¶ in prices have been common, affected also by asynchronous¶ demand variations in major markets. **Price increases have been¶ moderated by declining energy intensity** (energy consumption¶ relative to economic output) **in most parts of the world.** This is¶ the principal reason EIA does not expect the long-term trend to¶ be sharply upward.¶ Acknowledging the more dramatic scenarios some analysts¶ put forward, **there seems little** in what is actually known about¶ world oil reserves and the workings of the international market **to¶ suggest that the U.S. military faces** either intolerably **burdensome¶ fuel costs or supply risks** in the foreseeable future. DoD buys¶ fuel alongside other purchasers. It is a big customer, but not¶ big enough to affect prices. Long-distance transport of crude¶ oil and refined products is **routine and inexpensive.** So long¶ as the world market remains effectively integrated, it would¶ take a massive injection of substitutable alternatives to affect¶ prices. Private investors, absent proven capability to produce¶ alternatives in substantial quantities at competitive costs—or a¶ package of subsidies such as those for domestic ethanol, perhaps¶ including binding price guarantees—will find little reason to¶ increase production capacity rapidly. Fuel is fuel, and as output¶ of substitutable alternatives builds it will simply flow into the¶ international market at prices little different from those for other¶ refined petroleum products.¶ Given U.S. dependence on imported oil, it is reliability of¶ supply, rather than pricing, that might seem the larger issue.¶ **But** again, **the market is international**; indeed, DoD buys much¶ of its fuel abroad—in recent years, something like half (box¶ 2.3). Innovations—perhaps sustainable biofuels—would, once¶ proven, migrate to the lowest-cost-production locations, many of¶ them presumably overseas. (The United States has no monopoly¶ on sunshine and arable land.) DoD and the government might¶ support innovation and subsidize production, but it would be¶ difficult to wall off domestic output without some compelling¶ national security rationale. Wartime supply interruptions¶ might be accepted as justifying government ownership and¶ reservation of output for the military, but not indefinite fears of¶ future interruptions. Private ownership coupled with domestic¶ production and export restrictions would more than likely be¶ seen as contravening bedrock principles of U.S. foreign economic¶ policy, which since World War II has been based on borders¶ nominally open to trade.

### 1NC—No Water Wars

#### No water wars AND no impact to water scarcity

Allouche 11—Jeremy Allouche, research Fellow, water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, former professor – MIT, PhD in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies [“The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” *Food Policy*, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3–S8, Science Direct]

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ( [FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ( [Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ( [Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

### 2NC—No Cyber War

#### No impact to a cyber-attack on the grid. Prefer our ev—their authors have an economic incentive to hype the threat.

Hallinan 12—Conn Hallinan is a Foreign Policy In Focus columnist [January 11, 2012, “Cyber War: Reality or Hype?” Foreign Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/articles/cyber\_war\_reality\_or\_hype]

But consider the sources for all this scare talk: Clarke is the chair of a firm that consults on cyber security, and McConnell is the executive vice-president of defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. Both are currently doing business with the Pentagon.

Arms giants like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and other munitions manufactures are moving heavily into the cyber security market. In 2010, Boeing snapped up Argon ST and Narus, two cyber security firms with an estimated value of $2.4 billion. Raytheon bought Applied Signal Technology, General Dynamics absorbed Network Connectivity Solutions, and Britain’s major arms firm, BAE, purchased Norkom and ETI.

“There is a feeding frenzy right now to provide products and services to meet the demands of governments, law enforcement, and the military,” says Ron Deibert, director of the Canada Center for Global Security Studies.

There are big bucks at stake. Between the Defense Department and Homeland Security, the United States will spend some $10.5 billion for cyber security by 2015. The Pentagon’s new Cyber Command is slated to have a staff of 10,000, and according to Northrop executive Kent Schneider, the market for cyber arms and security in the United States is $100 billion.

But is cyber war everything it’s cracked up to be, and is the United States really so behind the curve in the scramble to develop cyber weapons?

According to investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, the potential for cyber mayhem has “been exaggerated,” and the Defense Department and cyber security firms have blurred the line between cyber espionage and cyber war. The former is the kind of thing that goes on, day in and day out, among governments and industry, except its medium is the Internet. The latter is an attack on another country’s ability to wage war, defend itself, or run its basic infrastructure.

Most experts say the end-of-the-world scenarios drawn up by people like Clarke are largely fiction. How could an enemy shut down the U.S. national power grid when there is no such thing? A cyber attack would have to disrupt more than 100 separate power systems throughout the nation to crash the U.S. grid.

Most financial institutions are also protected. The one example of a successful cyber attack in that area was an apparent North Korean cyber assault this past March on the South Korean bank Nonghyup that crashed the institution’s computers. But an investigation found that the bank had been extremely remiss in changing passwords and controlling access to its computers. According to Peter Sommer, author of the OECD report Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk, the cyber threat to banks “is a bit of nonsense.”

However, given that many Americans rely on computers, cell phones, smart devices, and the like, any hint that an “enemy” could disrupt access to those devices is likely to get attention. Throw in some scary scenarios and a cunning enemy—China—and it’s pretty easy to make people nervous.

But contrary to McConnell’s statement, the United States is more advanced in computers than other countries in the world, and the charge that the country is behind the curve sounds suspiciously like the “bomber gap” with the Russians in the 1950s and the “missile gap” in the 1960s. Both were illusions that had more to do with U.S. presidential elections and arms industry lobbying than anything in the real world.

#### Cyberwar is hype

Rid 12—reader in war studies at King's College London, is author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" and co-author of "Cyber-Weapons." [March/April, 2012, Thomas Rid, “Think Again: Cyberwar,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full]

"Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us."

No way. "Cyberwar is coming!" John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt predicted in a celebrated Rand paper back in 1993. Since then, it seems to have arrived -- at least by the account of the U.S. military establishment, which is busy competing over who should get what share of the fight. Cyberspace is "a domain in which the Air Force flies and fights," Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne claimed in 2006. By 2012, William J. Lynn III, the deputy defense secretary at the time, was writing that cyberwar is "just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space." In January, the Defense Department vowed to equip the U.S. armed forces for "conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains -- land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace." Meanwhile, growing piles of books and articles explore the threats of cyberwarfare, cyberterrorism, and how to survive them.

**Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard**. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria.

### 1NC—Elections NB

#### Public supports NFU

Steinbruner and Gallagher 8 [John, director of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland and chairman of the board of directors for the Arms Control Association, and Nancy, research director at CISSM, “If You Lead, They Will Follow: Public Opinion and Repairing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship,” Arms Control Association, January/February]

Yet, should a leader choose the path of nuclear cooperation, our poll results indicate that he or she could draw on considerable political capital. Underlying opinion in both societies would welcome far more extensive nuclear restraint and far more meaningful reassurance than either government has been willing to discuss so far. Elected leaders who chose to develop more robust measures to reduce risks from legacy arsenals, new nuclear states, and potential proliferators could readily evoke broad public approval despite the resistance they might encounter in their security bureaucracies. The questions in our poll were developed by translating expert-level debates and proposals into terms that the average Russian and U.S. citizen could understand. Where we were looking for evidence of continuity or change in opinion over time, we repeated questions asked in a 2004 CISSM/PIPA poll, “Americans on WMD Proliferation.”[3] We also included questions to assess knowledge of and attitudes toward legacy agreements, proposed next steps, and innovative ideas for security arrangements that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War. The sample sizes were roughly comparable—1,247 in the United States and 1,601 in Russia—but we were able to ask a larger number of more detailed questions using an internet-based poll in the United States than we could through face-to-face interviews conducted in Russia.[4] At the most fundamental level, the vast majority of Americans and Russians think that nuclear weapons have a very limited role in current security circumstances and believe that their only legitimate purpose is to deter nuclear attack.

#### Bipartisan consensus amongst the US public for elimination of nuclear weapons—now is the time for change

Blair 7 [Bruce, President of the World Security Institute and former senior fellow in foreign policy for the Brookings Institute, “The Future of Nuclear Disarmament,” analysis of ‘Americans and Russians on Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Disarmament,’ a joint study by the Program on International Policy Attitudes and Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program, 11/9]

 The second aspect of the poll that I found striking is its bipartisanship. On nearly every question the opinion of Republicans and Democrats converge far more than I would have expected. For example, 75 percent of Republicans and 95 percent of Democrats think that the U.S. government should make it a top or important priority to take steps toward eliminating nuclear weapons. This bipartisan consensus—combined with the surprising amount of bilateral consensus, between Americans and Russians—on the big issues like global elimination, leads me to believe that the political moment is close at hand to make real progress on the nuclear agenda. After the changing of the guard in four of the P-5 nuclear states is completed next year, the time will be ripe to encourage the public to energetically express its opinion to their new leaders.

### AT: Not Credible

#### Audience costs make it credible

Gerson 10—Michael S. Gerson is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses [“No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/No\_First\_Use.pdf]

The second argument against NFU is that it would not be believed, and therefore NFU would do nothing to improve the strategic equation.119 Despite China’s consistent commitment to NFU, for instance, there is considerable debate among scholars and policymakers about its validity, and Beijing has been somewhat ambiguous about the specific conditions under which NFU applies, especially regarding Taiwan.120 For some, the possibility that an NFU pledge would merely be dismissed as “cheap talk” that could be reversed if necessary effectively negates any strategic gain the United States might accrue from such a policy.

Skeptics of the believability of NFU underestimate the international and domestic audience costs incurred by a clear NFU commitment.121 By making an NFU policy public, perhaps in the form of a presidential press conference accompanied by a formal document, the United States would increase the credibility of NFU by tying its reputation to the sustainment of and adherence to the commitment. The objective would be to bolster the credibility of an NFU policy by ensuring that noncompliance would have unacceptably high political costs.

A violation of NFU would likely have substantial domestic, and especially international, political ramifications. Domestically, a president’s purposeful violation of an NFU pledge could incentivize the political opposition to rally strongly against the violation, providing an opportunity for vocal political opponents to generate attention and potentially bring independent voters and moderate members of the opposite political party into their camp. Internationally, breaking an NFU commitment risks damaging the United States’ reputation for honoring its commitments.122 If the United States were unwilling to adhere to its public policies regarding something as important as nuclear weapons, states might calculate that they could not trust the United States at its word. Such beliefs could weaken confidence in U.S. commitments to other unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral declarations and agreements; give states pause in considerations about entering into new agreements with the United States; and create strong doubts about the sincerity of future U.S. declaratory policies. In addition, the breach of NFU could undermine U.S. long-term security. Nuclear first use would signal that the United States believes that nuclear weapons have military utility and is willing to employ them regardless of the political costs, thereby potentially encouraging further proliferation in an attempt to deter future U.S. nuclear attacks.

To be sure, in the midst of an intense crisis U.S. decisionmakers, especially the president, would need to repeat and reinforce the commitment to NFU, lest an opponent fear that the United States could suddenly change its nuclear policy. During a severe crisis or a limited conventional conflict with a nucleararmed adversary, U.S. leaders would need to make frequent public statements that U.S. nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence of nuclear attacks, and nuclear retaliation would be swift and severe if the opponent chooses to use nuclear weapons. Even more important, in a crisis the United States would have to carefully coordinate its declaratory policy and actions, especially with regard to alerting nuclear forces. If in a crisis an opponent perceives the alert status of U.S. nuclear (and conventional) forces as too high, the leadership might be inclined to believe that NFU is a bluff and the United States is preparing for a possible first strike. Consequently, to enhance the credibility of NFU in a crisis, U.S. decisionmakers would need to pay careful attention to the alert status of both U.S. nuclear forces and those of the opponent and ensure that, at a maximum, the alert status of U.S. forces were raised on a tit-for-tat basis with the opponent. In such cases, the president could announce a decision to raise the alert level of U.S. forces as a reciprocal response to the adversary’s actions, while reinforcing the U.S. commitment to NFU.

### 2NC—NFU Modeled

#### Unilateral NFU will be modeled

Feiveson & Hogendoorn 3—Co-director & Research Asst. in the Program on Science and Global Security @ Princeton University [Harold A. Feiveson (Senior research scientist @ Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University) & Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2003]

But for declaratory policies more generally (considering first the United States alone), in our view, the simplest, most direct, and most powerful approach is an unambiguous U.S. commitment not to use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances. The present formulation focusing on pledges to non-nuclear-weapon states may have seemed prudent when we were devising ways to persuade non-nuclear countries to agree to an indefinite extension of the NPT, or when we were concerned with Soviet aggression in Europe or elsewhere. But, such an approach is no longer necessary. To hold open the option for nuclear use against another nuclear weapon state is unnecessary and awkward, at a time when the United States is drawing closer to Russia and China, and U.S. relationships with India, Pakistan, or Israel are not conflictual. Even if not legally binding, strong, unhedged no-first-use commitments by the United States and other nuclear weapon states would strengthen the nonproliferation regime, and possibly also help set the stage for later, more binding, commitments.

It would be valuable for strong no-first-use commitments to be made by all the nuclear-weapon states, and one would hope that such commitments would follow a U.S. lead. But there is no reason for the United States to insist upon an international agreement before acting. The United States has undertaken unilateral initiatives in the past with the hope, later proven, that other states would follow suit—the most recent example being the 1991 decision by President George H.W. Bush to withdraw most U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from active deployment. In the case of a no-first-use pledge, a unilateral declaration by the United States would greatly increase pressure on other nuclear weapons states also to commit to no first use of nuclear weapons.

### AT: Iran Prolif DA

#### NFU musters a more effective and tougher multilateral response against Iran—solves prolif

Sagan 9—Professor of Political Science @ Stanford University [Scott D. Sagan, Co-Director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Case for No First Use,” Survival | vol. 51 no. 3 | June–July 2009 | pp. 163–182]

A US no-first-use declaration would also enhance US non-proliferation objectives by increasing international diplomatic support for tougher diplomatic measures against potential proliferators. Recent attempts to use coercive diplomacy against Iran illustrate the point///

. Bush and Cheney repeatedly hinted in 2006 and 2007, by noting that ‘all options are on the table’, at US plans to use military force to attack Iran’s nuclear programme if diplomatic efforts and UN sanctions failed to persuade Tehran to give up its uraniumenrichment and other facilities. In April 2006, journalist Seymour Hersh sparked an international controversy by reporting that the US contingency attack plans that had been sent to the White House included the option of using tactical nuclear weapons to destroy Iranian underground facilities.28 At a press conference on 18 April 2006, Bush pointedly left open the possibility that his statements were meant to include the option of a preventive first strike with nuclear weapons: Q: Sir, when you talk about Iran, and you talk about how you have diplomatic efforts, you also say all options are on the table. Does that include the possibility of a nuclear strike? Is that something that your administration will plan for? THE PRESIDENT: All options are on the table.29 It is not clear whether Bush was engaging in coercive diplomacy, following the ‘calculated ambiguity’ nuclear doctrine, or whether he was simply following the script laid out in his notes. In response to this pressconference comment, however, Iran’s UN ambassador, Javad Zarif, immediately protested, in a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, against what he called ‘a tacit confirmation of the shocking news on the administration’s possible contemplation of nuclear strikes against certain targets in Iran’.30 British Foreign Minister Jack Straw also joined the debate, answering ‘yes’ when a BBC reporter asked him if the UK government would ‘unequivocally say we want nothing to do with this’ if the United States attacked Iran, and adding that ‘the idea of a nuclear strike on Iran is completely nuts’.31 The point is not that potential veiled US nuclear threats were in any way the cause of Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme, which began long before the Bush administration took office. But US nuclear threats, intentional or not, both play into the hands of domestic forces in Iran that favour developing nuclear weapons and reduce international diplomatic support for coercive diplomatic efforts to pressure Iran to end its defiance of UN Security Council resolutions requiring suspension of its enrichment programme. If the United States were to adopt a no-first-use doctrine, the temptation for US politicians to resort to veiled nuclear threats as part of coercive diplomacy against Iran or other potential proliferators would be reduced, as would the ability of Tehran to claim it faces nuclear threats. Pg. 174-175

#### NFU solves Iranian proliferation

Sagan 6 [Scott D., Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006]

Most important, however, would be a reduction in the security threat that the United States poses to Iran. Given the need for Washington to have a credible deterrent against, say, terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran, it would be ill advised to offer Tehran a blanket security guarantee. But more limited guarantees, such as a commitment not to use nuclear weapons and other commitments of the type offered North Korea under the Agreed Framework, could be effective today. They would reassure Tehran and pave the way toward the eventual normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations while signaling to other states that nuclear weapons are not the be all and end all of security. None of this will happen, however, if U.S. officials keep threatening to topple the Iranian government. In any final settlement, Tehran will need to agree to freeze its nuclear program and end its support for terrorism, and Washington -- along with China, Russia, and the EU-3 -- must issue a joint security guarantee that respects Iran's political sovereignty, thus committing the United States to promote democracy only by peaceful means. Peaceful coexistence does not require friendly relations, but it does mean exercising mutual restraint. Relinquishing the threat of regime change by force is a necessary and acceptable price for the United States to pay to stop Tehran from getting the bomb.

#### NFU’s solve

Goldemberg 6 [Jose, Secretary for the environment for the Brazilian state of Sao Paulo. He has served as the country's secretary of state for science and technology as well as minister of education and was also president of the Brazilian Association for the Advancement of Science. Arms Control Today, Lexis]

In the Middle East, only political agreements and solid no-first-use guarantees from nuclear powers in that region might change Iran’s attitude and behavior. It is clear that Tehran’s program is dictated mostly by internal political considerations, particularly perceived security needs, because it is difficult to justify a large nuclear program for civilian purposes in Iran on the basis of economic grounds. If the world community wants to slow Iran ’s drive to acquire such weapons, it would be best to focus on altering these underlying security concerns rather than traditional nonproliferation tools..

### AT: Deterrence DA [Generic]

#### No link—first use isn’t credible.

Gerson 10—Michael S. Gerson is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses [“No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/No\_First\_Use.pdf]

Beyond specific military rationales, opponents of NFU also contend that the United States should retain the first-use option simply because keeping it on the table will make adversaries cautious. The ever-present possibility of nuclear escalation, the argument goes, will induce restraint and discourage military adventurism. In promulgating these kinds of arguments, however, analysts overstate the benefits for the United States and downplay the risks. A core element of U.S. nuclear declaratory and operational policy is that it must be both credible and stable. Current and potential adversaries (and allies) must believe that the United States has both the necessary military capabilities and political resolve to act on its threats, and, equally important, U.S. nuclear policy and posture must not unnecessarily frighten or provoke states such that they undertake measures that increase the possibility of nuclear use. Crafting U.S. nuclear policy and force posture has always required striking a delicate balance between credibility and stability, because efforts to increase one might simultaneously decrease the other.83

With regard to credibility and stability, a U.S. nuclear declaratory policy that includes the option to use nuclear weapons first is either not credible, in which case it adds nothing to the security of the United States or its allies; or, if it is credible, it is potentially dangerous against nuclear-armed states because it risks creating instabilities in an intense crisis that increase the chances of nuclear use.

Credibility

The threat to use nuclear weapons first may lack credibility in the minds of many current and potential adversaries. The first-use option can contribute to deterrence and security only if the opponent believes that there is at least some reasonable chance that the United States might actually use nuclear weapons first. In today’s international security environment, no state can doubt that the United States possesses sufficient nuclear capabilities to inflict severe costs, but a state reasonably could question whether the United States has the requisite political resolve to use nuclear weapons first, especially over stakes that do not directly threaten U.S. national security interests.84

The incredibility of U.S. first-use threats rests on several grounds. First, as discussed above, there are no realistic military contingencies that would require the first use of nuclear weapons. Absent a compelling military need to use nuclear weapons first, U.S. nuclear threats are unnecessary and will therefore lack credibility. Conversely, U.S. conventional capabilities are highly credible and have been demonstrated in numerous post–Cold War operations to be more than sufficient to inflict substantial costs, and it is unlikely that an opponent would believe that the United States would use nuclear weapons if there were effective conventional options. In fact, the emphasis in recent years on developing a new generation of high-precision, long-range conventional weapons—exemplified by the U.S. military’s Prompt Global Strike mission, which seeks to develop conventional capabilities that can strike targets anywhere in the world within one hour85—demonstrates how hard the United States is working to preclude having to use nuclear weapons in any contingency short of a response to a nuclear attack.

Second, there are potentially significant political costs to the United States for using nuclear weapons first, especially regarding U.S. efforts to lead the charge against nuclear proliferation, and these costs diminish the credibility of U.S. first use.86 Given that the United States has traditionally been the most globally active nation in the realm of nonproliferation, the threat to use nuclear weapons first and risk undermining U.S. leadership of the NPT regime, legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons, and potentially spurring further proliferation will likely ring hollow. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to reconcile its first use of nuclear weapons with continued leadership on nonproliferation. Despite the national and international security benefits of U.S. activism against the further spread of nuclear weapons, an unintended consequence of these efforts has likely been to further weaken the credibility of U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons first.

Third, whereas implicit or explicit nuclear threats from rogue states have some inherent credibility because of the belief that these regimes are fanatical and risk acceptant—that is why, after all, they are rogues—in the nuclear realm the United States is generally perceived to be rational, risk averse, and sensitive to civilian casualties and other collateral damage.87 These beliefs reduce the credibility of first-use threats by further strengthening the view that U.S. political leaders are bound by the “nuclear taboo,” a normative constraint against using nuclear weapons that emerged after World War II.88 For the United States, the nuclear taboo influences the range of military options considered by decisionmakers by imposing criteria of proportionality and domestic and international legitimacy on the use of force, and such constraints are not lost on current and potential adversaries.89 Unlike rogue states, the United States does not readily benefit from the “rationality of irrationality,”90 which increases the credibility of nuclear threats by convincing decisionmakers that the opponent might not make logical cost-benefit calculations, and therefore might not be constrained by the logic of appropriateness on which the nuclear taboo depends. Despite the contention of one high-level advisory panel to U.S. Strategic Command arguing that “it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational or cool-headed,” and that “the fact that some elements may appear to potentially be ‘out of control’ can be beneficial,” U.S. policymakers have been reluctant to send these kinds of signals in the nuclear arena since the end of the Cold War.91

### Debris

#### Aff doesn’t solve- need space debris removal

**Imburgia ‘11** (Lt. Col. and Judge Advocate in Air Force, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/Imburgia-FINAL-CR-pdf.pdf)

A. Cleaning Up the Junk Undoubtedly, technological accomplishments in the area of space debris removal are necessary to solve this problem. “Despite natural clearing, deorbiting, and debris mitigation measures, the [space debris] population is growing and so is the risk of collisions.” 306 NASA scientists J.C. Liou and Nicholas Johnson believe that space debris mitigation measures will not be enough to constrain Earth’s space debris population. 307 Instead, they argue that only “the removal of existing [space debris] can prevent future problems for research in and commercialization of space.” 308 The European Space Agency agrees. According to its 2009 “Key Findings from the 5th European Conference on Space Debris,” the European Space Agency believes that space debris mitigation is not enough to maintain a safe space debris environment; active debris removal from orbit is the necessary next step. 309 Because removal of debris is the only longterm solution, implementing a binding international treaty on this issue can only assist in drawing attention to the need for costeffective debris-removal techniques. 310 Legal necessity can sometimes be the mother of invention

### Ext Cauley—99% reliable

#### The grid is 99.999% reliable.

Joskow 11—Professor of Economics @ MIT [Paul L. Joskow, “Creating a Smarter U.S. Electricity Grid,” October 2011, MIT CEEPR: A Joint Center of the Department of Economics, MIT Energy Initiative and MIT Sloan School of Management, CEEPR WP 2011-021]

Despite this complex operational management structure, the U.S. transmission system is presently very reliable. While good comprehensive numbers are not available, it is extremely rare that retail consumers lose power because of failures of equipment or ¶ operating errors on the high voltage transmission system. EPRI (2011a, p.2.1) estimates ¶ that U.S. power systems achieve 99.999% reliability at the high voltage (bulk) ¶ transmission network level and that over 90% of the outages experienced by retail ¶ customers are due to failures on the distribution system, not the transmission system (EPRI (2011a, p. 6.1). However, when a rare major failure does occur on the high voltage transmission network, as with the 2003 Midwest-Northeast blackout when 50 million customers were affected with outages that lasted up to a couple of days, the associated costs can be quite high. Pg. 18

### 2NC Export Controls

#### U.S. companies already produce superior technology—broad Part 810 export regulations crush U.S. market share.

NEI, Winter 2012. Nuclear Energy Institute. “U.S. Nuclear Export Rules Hurt Global Competitiveness,” <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/insight/insightwinter2012/us-nuclear-export-rules-hurt-global-competitiveness/>.

Today, U.S. dominance of the global nuclear power market has eroded as suppliers from other countries compete aggressively against American exporters. U.S. suppliers confront competitors that benefit from various forms of state promotion and also must contend with a U.S. government that has not adapted to new commercial realities. The potential is tremendous—$500 billion to $740 billion in international orders over the next decade, representing tens of thousands of potential American jobs, according to the [U.S. Department of Commerce](http://www.commerce.gov/). With America suffering a large trade deficit, nuclear goods and services represent a market worth aggressive action. However, antiquated U.S. government approaches to nuclear exports are challenging U.S. competitiveness in the nuclear energy market. New federal support is needed if the United States wants to reclaim dominance in commercial nuclear goods and services—and create the jobs that go with them. “The U.S. used to be a monopoly supplier of nuclear materials and technology back in the ’50s and ’60s,” said Fred McGoldrick, former director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the [State Department](http://www.state.gov/). “That position has eroded to the point where we’re a minor player compared to other countries.” America continues to lead the world in technology innovation and know-how. So what are the issues? And where is the trade? Effective coordination among the many government agencies involved in nuclear exports would provide a boost to U.S. suppliers. “Multiple U.S. agencies are engaged with countries abroad that are developing nuclear power, from early assistance to export controls to trade finance and more,” said Ted Jones, director for supplier international relations at NEI. The challenge is to create a framework that allows commercial nuclear trade to grow while ensuring against the proliferation of nuclear materials. “To compete in such a situation, an ongoing dialogue between U.S. suppliers and government needs to be conducted and U.S. trade promotion must be coordinated at the highest levels,” Jones said. Licensing U.S. Exports Jurisdiction for commercial nuclear export controls is divided among the Departments of [Energy](http://energy.gov/) and Commerce and the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission](http://www.nrc.gov/) and has not been comprehensively updated to coordinate among the agencies or to reflect economic and technological changes over the decades. The State Department also is involved in international nuclear commerce. It negotiates and implements so-called “[123 agreements](http://export.gov/civilnuclear/eg_main_022093.asp)” that allow for nuclear goods and services to be traded with a foreign country. The federal agencies often have different, conflicting priorities, leading to a lack of clarity for exporters and longer processing times for export licenses. “The U.S. nuclear export regime is the most complex and restrictive in the world and the least efficient,” said Jones. “Furthermore, it is poorly focused on items and technologies that pose little or no proliferation concern. By trying to protect too much, we risk diminishing the focus on sensitive technologies and handicapping U.S. exports.” A case in point is the Energy Department’s [Part 810 regulations](http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div5&view=text&node=10:4.0.2.5.23&idno=10). While 123 agreements open trade between the United States and other countries, Part 810 regulates what the United States can trade with another country. For certain countries, it can take more than a year to obtain “specific authorizations” to export nuclear items. Because other supplier countries authorize exports to the same countries with fewer requirements///

 and delays, the Part 810 rules translate into a significant competitive disadvantage for U.S. suppliers. Today, 76 countries require a specific authorization, but DOE has proposed almost doubling that number—to include for the first time countries that have never demonstrated a special proliferation concern, that are already part of the global nuclear supply chain, and that plan new nuclear infrastructure. The proposed Part 810 rule would do nothing to reduce lengthy license processing times, said Jones. Other nuclear supplier countries impose strict guidelines on their licensing agencies for timely processing of applications. Equivalent licenses must be processed in fewer than nine months in France, fewer than 90 days in Japan and 15 days in South Korea. One possible solution, said McGoldrick, would be to set similar deadlines for issuance of licenses. U.S. agencies “could have deadlines set forth in the new [Part 810] regulations, which would give the relevant government agencies specified times in which to act on a license. Time could be exceeded only under certain circumstances,” said McGoldrick.

## \*\*\* 1NR

### 1NR—Russia

#### AND—the threshold is small—indifference towards RUSSIA has a high probability of escalating to nuclear use

Krieger & Starr 12—President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation & Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility [David Krieger & Steven Starr, “A Nuclear Nightmare in the Making: NATO, Missile Defense and Russian Insecurity,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, January 03, 2012 http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db\_article.php?article\_id=321]

This is a dangerous scenario, no matter which NATO we are talking about, the real one or the hypothetical one.  Continued US indifference to Russian security concerns could have dire consequences: a breakdown in US-Russian relations; regression to a new nuclear-armed standoff in Europe; Russian withdrawal from New START; a new nuclear arms race between the two countries; a breakdown of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty leading to new nuclear weapon states; and a higher probability of nuclear weapons use by accident or design.  This is a scenario for nuclear disaster, and it is being provoked by US hubris in pursuing missile defenses, a technology that is unlikely ever to be effective, but which Russian leaders must view in terms of a worst-case scenario.

In the event of increased US-Russian tensions, the worst-case scenario from the Russian perspective would be a US first-strike nuclear attack on Russia, taking out most of the Russian nuclear retaliatory capability.  The Russians believe the US would be emboldened to make a first-strike attack by having the US-NATO missile defense installations located near the Russian border, which the US could believe capable of shooting down any Russian missiles that survived its first-strike attack.

The path to a US-Russian nuclear war could also begin with a conventional military confrontation via NATO. The expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia has created the potential for a local military conflict with Russia to quickly escalate into a nuclear war.  It is now Russian policy to respond with tactical nuclear weapons if faced with overwhelmingly superior conventional forces, such as those of NATO.   In the event of war, the “nuclear umbrella” of NATO guarantees that NATO members will be protected by US nuclear weapons that are already forward-based in Europe.

#### Their Miller and Turkish weekly evidence don’t assume the change Romney will create—his rhetoric creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of aggression

Bandow 12—Senior Fellow at CATO [Doug Bandow, 4/23/12, Romney and Russia: Complicating American Relations, National Interest, p. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/romney-russia-complicating-american-relationships-6836]

Mitt Romney has become the inevitable Republican presidential candidate. He’s hoping to paint Barack Obama as weak, but his attempt at a flanking maneuver on the right may complicate America’s relationship with Eastern Europe and beyond. Romney recently charged Russia with being America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” As Jacob Heilbrunn of National Interest pointed out, this claim embodies a monumental self-contradiction, attempting to claim “credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the one hand [while] predicting dire threats from Russia on the other.” Thankfully, the U.S.S.R. really is gone, and neither all the king’s men nor Vladimir Putin can put it back together. It is important to separate behavior which is grating, even offensive, and that which is threatening. Putin is no friend of liberty, but his unwillingness to march lock-step with Washington does not mean that he wants conflict with America. Gordon Hahn of CSIS observes: Yet despite NATO expansion, U.S. missile defense, Jackson-Vanik and much else, Moscow has refused to become a U.S. foe, cooperating with the West on a host of issues from North Korea to the war against jihadism. Most recently, Moscow agreed to the establishment of a NATO base in Ulyanovsk. These are hardly the actions of America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s charge is both silly and foolish. This doesn’t mean the U.S. should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Moreover, treating Moscow like a foe will make Russia more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union—and especially Washington’s determination to continue expanding NATO. After all, if another country ostentatiously called the U.S. its chief geopolitical threat, ringed America with bases, and established military relationships with areas that had broken away from the U.S., Washington would not react well. It might react, well, a lot like Moscow has been reacting. Although it has established better relations with the West, Russia still might not get along with some of its neighbors, most notably Georgia, with its irresponsibly confrontational president. However, Washington should not give Moscow additional reasons to indulge its paranoia.

#### The GOP guarantees Romney will be conservative and will drive his agenda

Weisman And Steinhauser 12 [April 15, 2012, Jonathan and Jennifer, GOP in Congress would obstruct Romney shift to center, Contra Costa Times, p. http://www.contracostatimes.com/news/ci\_20405073/gop-congress-would-obstruct-romney-shift-center]

If Mitt Romney is considering a quick pivot to the center as he heads into the general election, he will find an imposing impediment: fellow Republicans in the House. As Congress was set to reconvene on Monday, House Republicans said Romney could go his own way on smaller issues that may help define him as separate from his congressional Republican counterparts. But, they said, he must understand that they are driving the policy agenda for the party now. "We're not a cheerleading squad," said Rep. Jeff Landry, an outspoken freshman from Louisiana. "We're the conductor. We're supposed to drive the train." With Rep. Paul D. Ryan's budget plan, Republicans have already set the agenda on the key issue that divides the two parties in an age of austerity: how to manage the federal budget and its related entitlement programs. Romney has eagerly embraced it, campaigning with Ryan by his side, and calling him "bold and brilliant." But a disagreement between the parties over spending levels has paved a path for the sort of clash that led to the near shutdown of the government last year, and it could leave Romney in the position of having to choose between a loud public battle and a budget compromise with Democrats in the closing weeks of the fall campaign. Romney, a former Massachusetts governor, and House Republicans diverge on some legislative issues -- notably what to do about Chinese currency manipulation, an issue that has become a centerpiece of the Romney campaign. And that could further highlight the differences within the Republican Party. In 1999, as House Republicans grappled with far more modest spending cuts, George W. Bush was able to underscore his claim to "compassionate conservatism" by denouncing House efforts. "I don't think they ought to balance their budget on the backs of the poor," he said Sen. Roy Blunt of Missouri, a Republican House leader at the time, recalled that as a "defining moment" for the Bush campaign -- one that blindsided Republicans. As Romney's designated liaison to congressional Republicans, Blunt said that one of his jobs was to make sure no one is surprised like that again. In the past two weeks, he has set up meetings between Romney's policy shop and key representatives and staff. They included a meeting between Romney and Ryan, as well as one between the Romney staff and the Republican Study Committee, a group of the most conservative House members. "There will be issues where the governor needs to steer his own course, no doubt about that," Blunt said. "My biggest interest is that they have all the information they need to have." Congress returns this week after a two-week recess, the first time it convenes since Romney emerged as the presumed nominee. Both chambers are expected to move quickly to take up a variety of fiscal measures, with the Republican-controlled House voting on small-business tax cuts and beginning planning sessions on a tax overhaul, and with the Senate, controlled by Democrats, bringing to the floor the so-called Buffett Rule, which would raise the minimum effective tax rate for the wealthy. Undoubtedly, House Speaker John Boehner and Rep. Eric Cantor, the majority leader, will move mountains to make sure House Republicans and the Romney campaign speak and act in lockstep toward the greater goal of defeating President Barack Obama in November and retaining the House. At the same time, Obama has shown a desire to take advantage of the public's low regard for Congress by likening Romney's agenda to that of House Republicans. But Romney may learn the lesson that has been imparted to Boehner throughout the 112th Congress -- that the most conservative members will steer their own course, and loudly. Freshmen as well as veteran members of the Republican Study Committee, led by Rep. Jim Jordan of Ohio, have shown no hesitation to buck the leadership. And Romney has even less leverage with them.

### AT: Wont Do

#### He says he will.

ROMNEY 11 Next President of the U.S. in the world of the Aff [Mitt Romney, My Pro-Life Pledge, <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/269984/my-pro-life-pledge-mitt-romney>]

I am pro-life and believe that abortion should be limited to only instances of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother.

I support the reversal of Roe v. Wade, because it is bad law and bad medicine. Roe was a misguided ruling that was a result of a small group of activist federal judges legislating from the bench.

I support the Hyde Amendment, which broadly bars the use of federal funds for abortions. And as president, I will support efforts to prohibit federal funding for any organization like Planned Parenthood, which primarily performs abortions or offers abortion-related services.

I will reinstate the Mexico City Policy to ensure that nongovernmental organizations that receive funding from America refrain from performing or promoting abortion services, as a method of family planning, in other countries. This includes ending American funding for any United Nations or other foreign assistance program that promotes or performs abortions on women around the world.

#### It was a Reagan and Bush policy so he will.

Roylance 12 [Deseret News Staff, Susan Roylance, Families Around the World: Romney commits to defund United Nations Population Fund, Planned Parenthood, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705399188/Romney-commits-to-defund-United-Nations-Population-Fund-Planned-Parenthood.html?pg=2]

In a speech before CPAC Friday, Mitt Romney announced steps he would take against abortion, inluding cutting off federal funds to Planned Parenthood, if elected president.

“Mine will be a pro-life presidency,” he said. “On day one, I will reinstate the Mexico City policy. I will cut off funding for the United Nations Population Fund, which supports China’s barbaric One Child Policy.”

The Mexico City policy prohibits funding organizations that promote abortion in other countries.

UNFPA spokesman Omar Gharzeddine denied Romney's accusation that UNFPA promotes China's coercive family planning.

Gharzeddine said the UN Population Fund “promotes voluntary family planning and human rights in more than 150 countries, including China. It does not support coercion in family planning, coercive abortions or forced sterilizations anywhere in the world.”

He also said UNFPA “highly appreciates the political and financial support of the United States.”

But Jeanne Head, National Right to Life vice president for International Affairs, responded to KSL in support of Romney's claim: “There is no doubt that the United Nations Population Fund participates in the management of China's one-child population control policy which has resulted in countless forced abortions throughout the country. Sadly, right this very minute, the United States government is providing funding to the UNFPA.”

Congressman Chris Smith, R-New Jersey, also said he believes the UN Population Fund supports China's one child policy. He recently traveled to China to investigate and reported his findings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in October.

China's “one child per couple policy is the most egregious systematic attack on mothers ever," he said before the House committee."Yet the UNPFA incorporates and defers to that policy in its programs.”

The Mexico City policy, also known as the "Global Gag Rule," was originally enacted by President Ronald Reagan, has been through a series of rescissions and adoptions in the past three decades — depending on the current US president's party affiliation. President Bill Clinton rescinded the policy; President George W. Bush adopted it again, but President Barack Obama, during his first week in office, rescinded it yet again.

#### It will be via an XO

Marsh 10/10 Veteran political analyst and author of "The Hillary Effect." [Taylor Marsh, Romney Would Reinstate Gag Rule, Leave Dirty Work of Stripping Women’s Rights to Congress, <http://www.taylormarsh.com/blog/2012/10/romney-would-reinstate-gag-rule-leave-dirty-work-of-stripping-womens-rights-to-congress/>]

“Mitt Romney is proudly pro-life, and he will be a pro-life president.” – Andrea Saul, Romney press secretary

THIS IS a thing of beauty. It also has a ring of truth to it. He’d reinstate the so-called Mexico City Policy, but isn’t interested in pushing abortion from the White House. But you can bet he’d support and sign all legislation limiting a woman’s self-determination.

Do I really need to explain the types of judges Mitt Romney would appoint to the Supreme Court, with his conservatism going well beyond women’s rights?

However, it was the remaining item Mitt Romney needed to address, what I wrote before the first debate he needed to do to further send a message to women.

From an interview in Iowa:

Mitt Romney today said no abortion legislation is part of his agenda, but he would prohibit federally-funded international nonprofits from providing abortions in other countries.

“There’s no legislation with regards to abortion that I’m familiar with that would become part of my agenda,” the GOP presidential candidate told The Des Moines Register’s editorial board during a meeting today before his campaign rally at a Van Meter farm.

But by executive order, not by legislation, he would reinstate the so-called Mexico City policy that bans U.S. foreign aid dollars from being used to do abortions, he said.

### AT: Link UQ

#### Obama backing off nuclear.

Skutnik 10/22 Assistant Professor of Nuclear Engineering at Tennessee[Steve Skutnik, “Does nuclear lack a natural constituency?,” 10/22, <http://theenergycollective.com/skutnik/133191/does-nuclear-lack-natural-constituency>]

Or, more importantly, if support for nuclear was more than token for both candidates, why is it exactly than in Romney's 21-page energy plan, the proposals for nuclear come down to a single bullet point: "Revitalize nuclear power by equipping the NRC to approve new designs and to license approved reactor designs on approved sites within two years." (How this will be accomplished is left as an exercise for the reader). Note the striking absence of any mention of small modular reactors and their potential to revitalize export-driven manufacturing in the U.S., or even such basic measures as reforming antiquated laws restricting vitally-needed foreign investment in new domestic nuclear capacity - nuclear, it would seem, is an afterthought. Nor is it any better with Obama, where his campaign's "issues" site for energy lists oil exploration and (inexplicably) clean coal (one gets the feeling we're actually back in the Bush years), but fails to even mention nuclear. The very fact that the Romney campaign would speak effusively of renewables as an improbable part of a vague, "all-of-the-above" energy strategy while Obama bafflingly promotes both fossil exploration and dubious "clean coal" technology (see also, vaporware) point to an effort to reach voters not on the rational basis of carefully-considered energy policy, but rather, in a word, pandering. (Yes, quel surprise indeed coming from a political campaign). So why is this? Because again, by and large for the public, I am largely convinced that support for particular energy sources comes not from their practical value but from what these represent. It is immaterial as to whether availability and diffusivity inherently limit the ability of renewables to produce electricity at the large, consistent scales required to power modern civilization - because these sources, at their core, represent aspirational goods which somehow magically disconnect environmental consequences from energy. Fossil resources represent abundance - an energy abundance which can be found here at home, supporting an economic fantasy of "energy independence" powered by domestic, low-cost energy sources (to which environmental concerns are ancillary). What brings this charade crashing down is the dissonance with how each of these sides deals with the issue of nuclear. If the latter camp truly cared about abundance, nuclear would plausibly be of co-equal priority - uranium resources are relatively abundant in the U.S., and most of the uranium it imports are from friendly countries like our neighbors to the north. Further, nuclear is relatively cheap - particularly once plants are built - and those plants can supply energy for entire generations at tiny marginal costs. Thus, if it was simply about energy abundance, one would expect more than simple tepid support - one should see more folks like Lamar Alexander exhorting the country to double our current fleet by building a hundred new nuclear reactors. But they don't. Instead we are given platitudes extolling the virtues of abundant natural gas and coal - not uranium. Meanwhile, as to the former crowd that values minimizing environmental impacts, it is immaterial as to what backs up intermittent sources (i.e., it's the same resources in which they claim they are attempting to displace). If the plausible goal were to eliminate CO2 and air pollution as much as possible, one would think that nuclear, given its high capacity and availability, would be at the vanguard of the movement. And yet it is shockingly absent - instead, once again, natural gas and ephemeral promises of "clean coal" (which, in fairness, is probably more about a cynical electoral sop to coal-producing states than it is a serious policy proposal) take the fore. Constantly we hear from these same people theoretically devoted to the cause of creating a clean energy future about the virtue and necessity of natural gas as a "bridge" fuel - as if carbon-free nuclear energy simply did not exist. (Or as if natural gas did not pose a far more substantial risk in terms of deaths per unit energy produced). What nuclear seems to lack here is the existence of a natural constituency Again, look at what a rational examination of the expressed interests of our two major constituencies above should theoretically produce - nuclear, by all accounts, should be a hands-down consensus winner. Yet instead it is relegated to scarcely a mention in high-profile debates. Again, it is far better for nuclear not to exist solely in the thrall of one ideological pole, given the ease at which it can be marginalized on a partisan basis. But perhaps the bigger issue now is that nuclear, enjoying a broad but shallow public consensus, finds itself politically homeless.

#### Specifically true of SMR’s.

Somsel 10/13 Nuclear Engineer – American Thinker Contributor[Joseph Somsel, “Obama's War on Nuclear Power,” <http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/10/obamas_war_on_nuclear_power.html#ixzz2ANPdx7qn>]

One bright spot was to be the DoE's continued support for the development of what are called "small modular reactors." These are to be much smaller than current reactors and passively safe. Supposedly, these features will allow easier, quicker construction and an opening into markets too small for traditional designs. Some think government interest is focused on independent power supply for military bases, for which these reactors would be well-suited. However, the applications for developmental cost-sharing are languishing, awaiting DoE's overdue approval. Cynical observers would predict that no announcement will occur until after the election. The Obama administration has more to lose politically from approval from its environmentalist base than it could possibly gain from nuclear supporters.

The U.S. government's response to the nuclear problems at Fukushima, if well-meaning, have not been particularly cogent or stellar.  First, the U.S. industry has been substantially better-prepared than its Japanese counterpart, so some of the rather obvious problems at Fukushima have already been addressed here.  After the 9/11 terrorist attacks flying large aircraft into buildings, the U.S. industry embarked on an internal program to prepare for such extreme plant damage.  Still, there was a clearly political rush to get something done by the first anniversary of the event last March.

One of the three orders issued by the NRC to U.S. industry last March was for additional spent fuel pool monitoring instruments.  One can sense that this was required to save face for the aforementioned Chairman Jaczko, who infamously acted like a chicken with its head cut off during the Fukushima event, publicly worrying about their spent fuel racks being uncovered and the spent fuel "burning" in free air.  The smell of leadership panic was in the air.  Fifty years of professional consideration and practice have previously shown no basis for these additional instruments.  At least they will be cheap and not get in the way -- we hope.

Other orders from the NRC remain "quick fixes" without a comprehensive technical acknowledgement yet of the complexity of the situation and the eventual required integration of the technical solutions required.  In other words, I'll bet we have to eventually go back and backfit the backfits.

While it remains an essentially political decision as to the allocation of resources for public safety, as an engineer and a citizen, one could hope for a more efficient process.  Few of us want to waste resourcesm, but if the public wants to spend money on making nuclear power plants safer yet, so be it.  Perhaps this is not a complaint one can squarely lay on the doorstep of President Obama, but a more professional and sober appointee to the chairmanship of the NRC could have made the process of responding to the Fukushima event more rational and productive.

From one end of the nuclear power process (uranium mining) to the other (waste disposal), and throughout the sensitive stages in between (financing, licensing, and upgrading), the Obama administration has made decisions that retard the production of nuclear power, hurt our balance of payments, and increase the cost of electricity.  Like the administration's war on coal and their opposition to fracking, their disdain for cheap, plentiful energy for the American economy ultimately hurts the American people.

#### Rhetoric proves.

Levine 9/7 (Gregg; Contributing Editor and Former Managing Editor – Firedoglake and Contributing Writer for Truthout, “Obama Drops Nuclear from Energy Segment of Convention Speech,” <http://capitoilette.com/2012/09/07/obama-drops-nuclear-from-energy-segment-of-convention-speech/>)

President Obama no longer promises to “safely harness nuclear power”–that likely would have sounded like a cruel joke in a world now contaminated by the ongoing Fukushima disaster–but beyond that, he does not promise anything about nuclear power at all. There was no platitude, no carefully crafted signal to the industry that has subsidized much of Obama’s political career, no mention of nuclear power whatsoever.

That is not to say that the entire 2012 Democratic National Convention was a nuclear-free zone. A few hours before the president took the stage at the Time Warner Cable Arena, James Rogers, co-chair of the Charlotte host committee, and oh, by the way, CEO of Duke Energy, stepped to the lectern and endorsed Obama’s “all of the above” energy “strategy” (they keep using that word; I do not think it means what they think it means):

 We need to work even harder toward a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy. That means we need to invest heavily in new zero-emission power sources, like new nuclear, wind and solar projects, as well as new technologies, like electric vehicles.

Well, if you are looking for a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy, you need look no further than nu–wait, what? If you are looking for those three features in an energy future, it is hard to imagine a worse option than the unsustainably expensive, chronically unreliable and dangerously dirty nuclear power plant. And, as has been discussed here many times, nuclear is not a zero-emission source, either. The massive carbon footprint of the nuclear fuel lifecycle rivals coal, and that doesn’t even consider the radioactive isotopes that facilities emit, even when they are not encountering one of their many “unusual events.”

But the CEO of the Charlotte-based energy giant probably has his eyes on a different prize. Rogers, who has been dogged by questions about a power grab after Duke’s merger with Progress Energy and his lackluster performance as fundraiser-in-chief for the DNC, sits atop a company that operates seven US nuclear power plants, and is partners in a plan to build two new AP1000 reactors in Cherokee County, South Carolina.

That last project, which is under active review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, awaiting a combined construction and operating license, is one of a small handful of proposed new nuclear facilities currently scrambling for financing. The South Carolina plant, along with a pair of reactors in Georgia, two slated for a different site in South Carolina, and possibly one more in Tennessee, represent what industry lobbyists like to call the “nuclear renaissance.”

But completion of any of the above is nowhere close to guaranteed, and even if some of these reactors are eventually built, none will be able to generate even one kilowatt of commercial power until years after President Obama completes his sought-after second term.

Which, if you really care about America’s energy future, is, of course, all for the better. As even James Rogers noted in his speech (and he gets props for this):

 [W]e cannot lose sight of energy efficiency. Because the cleanest, most efficient power plant is the one we never have to build.

That Duke’s CEO thought to highlight efficiency is interesting. That President Obama, with his well-documented ties to the nuclear industry, chose not to even mention nuclear power is important.

### 1NR—UQ Wall

#### Ahead – swing states

Silver 10/27 Oct. 26: State Poll Averages Usually Call Election Right, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/27/oct-26-state-poll-averages-usually-call-election-right/>

The FiveThirtyEight forecast model has found the past several days of battleground state polling to be reasonably strong for Barack Obama, with his chances of winning the Electoral College increasing as a result. The intuition behind this ought to be very simple: Mr. Obama is maintaining leads in the polls in Ohio and other states that are sufficient for him to win 270 electoral votes.

Friday featured a large volume of swing state polling, including three polls of Ohio, each of which showed Mr. Obama ahead by margins ranging from two to four percentage points.

### AT: Sandy

#### 2. Sandy freezes uniqueness – post the storm will be huge.

WASHINGTON POST 10 – 29 – 12 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/10/29/hurricane-sandy-freezes-2012-race-in-place/>

Hurricane Sandy freezes 2012 race in place

Hurricanes dominating the news is nothing new, but the timing of Sandy — it will make landfall just eight days before a presidential election — presents a unique set of challenges for both President Obama and former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney.

Theories abound as to how Sandy could impact this contest. Some argue it could aid Obama as he will be front and center over the next few days fulfilling his duties as president rather than looking like a candidate. Others note that Democrats rely on early voting far more than do Republicans, and widespread power outages and damage left in the wake of the storm could keep some voters at home in the runup to the election — a possibility that top Obama advisor David Axelrod expressed concern about Sunday.

Speculation aside, there’s one thing that Hurricane Sandy has already done — and will continue to do for at least the early part of this week: freeze the race in place.

There will be nothing — repeat: nothing — on cable television over the next several days other than images of Sandy churning it’s way up the East Coast. (Yes, residents of everywhere not in the path of the storm, we know that it’s not a big story for you. But the storm is headed toward Washington and New York City, two of the country’s biggest media centers. It’s just a fact.)

What that wall-to-wall coverage of the storm will bump off the air, of course, is the wall-to-wall coverage of the campaign that would have been there if not for Sandy. (All of the reporters who were being added for the final week of the election will now be diverted to cover the path of Sandy.) And it will force the two candidates and their campaigns to be far less aggressive in their scheduling and messaging than they normally would be in the race’s last days. Can you imagine if you are seeing footage of homes destroyed and then commercials air that savage either Obama or Romney? Not exactly what you want to see at that moment.

The cumulative effect will be to preserve the race as it was towards the end of last week — a dead heat nationally with President Obama clinging to a swing state edge. What remains to be seen is when/if things return to normal before Nov. 6, and if they do, what the two campaigns do in what will be a very short window before voters’ vote.

#### 3. only impacts states that are locked Obama regardless

REUTERS 10 – 26 – 12, “UPDATE 1-Hurricane Sandy rains on U.S. presidential campaign”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/26/usa-campaign-weather-idUSL1E8LQF8G20121026

Election officials said they would do everything possible to ensure that voting goes on, even if problems from the storm persisted until Nov. 6.¶ "I have heard from some states like Virginia and Maryland that they are definitely working on contingency plans for problems that may arise as a result of the storm," said Kay Stimson, communications director for the National Association of Secretaries of State.¶ "They are always preparing for any kinds of problems, any thing that could arise that could potentially pose problems for elections," she said.¶ The rules for rescheduling voting in case of bad weather vary from state to state.¶ Virginia election officials said they were monitoring the situation and encouraging in-person absentee voting - the form of early voting allowed in the state - to continue as long as conditions remained safe.¶ In heavily Democratic Maryland, which Obama is expected to carry easily, the state of emergency declared by Governor Martin O'Malley would allow for changes, if necessary, including the postponement of the election in all or part of the state.

### 1NR—Link Wall

**Anti-nuclear environmentalist groups take every advantage to protest nuke power --- the plan sets them off.**

**Gamble 11**. [Jack, nuclear industry engineer, “Antinuclear Activists Will Try to Equate Hiroshima with Fukushima” Nuclear Fissionary -- July 25 -- http://nuclearfissionary.com/2011/07/25/antinuclear-activists-will-try-to-equate-hiroshima-with-**fukushima/?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+NuclearFissionary+%28Nuclear+Fissionary%29]**

But that won’t stop the antinuclear fear mongers from writing editorials and planning protests of nuclear power on the 66th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing on August 6, 2011.¶ What better way to manipulate the headlines than to put their fear mongering spin on a historical anniversary? This is exactly what they’ve done with Hurricane Katrina, the BP Oil Spill, wildfires, floods, 9/11, and any other major events for the last few decades. When you have no shame and sell fear for a living, I suppose there is little standing in your way.

**Public perception is what’s key --- the short-term nature of the link outweighs their long-term link turns.**

**Duffy 12**. [Bobby, MD of Ipsos MORI Social Research Institue, “After Fukushima Public Opinion is Still Unclear on Nuclear Power” Huffington Post -- November 3 -- http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/bobby-duffy/fukushima-public-opinion-nuclear\_b\_1335016.html]

As with all aspects of opinions and policy on energy, the drivers are as varied as the social, political and economic contexts of different countries. It is also partly because people themselves are balancing competing concerns.¶ Five factors come out consistently as the key issues on energy for the public: ahead of everything is cost, then four concerns - CO2 emissions, security of supply or dependence on other countries, the threat of nuclear disasters and the need for investment in renewables - all vie for the next most important.¶ But even here the challenge for policy-makers is that it's not actual dependency, reliability of renewable sources or real risks of nuclear disaster that drives public opinion, it is perceptions of them. Just to take the example of dependency on other countries, you might expect that high dependency countries would support nuclear more, as dependency is something people would generally like to avoid and nuclear power supply is at least within national control.

**Link alone turns the case – public opposition undermines investment.**

**C**ivil **S**ociety **I**nstitute, 3/7/**2012** (Survey: Americans Not Warming Up to Nuclear Power One Year After Fukushima, p. <http://www.civilsocietyinstitute.org/media/030712release.cfm>)

Peter Bradford, former member of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, former chair of the New York and Maine utility regulatory commissions, and currently adjunct professor at Vermont Law School on "Nuclear Power and Public Policy, said: "This survey is another piece of bad news for new nuclear construction in the U.S. For an industry completely dependent on political support in order to gain access to the taxpayers' wallets (through loan guarantees and other federal subsidies) and the consumers' wallets (through rate guarantees to cover even canceled plants and cost overruns), public skepticism of this magnitude is a near fatal flaw. The nuclear industry has spent millions on polls telling the public how much the public longs for nuclear power. Such polls never ask real world questions linking new reactors to rate increases or to accident risk. Fukushima has made the links to risk much clearer in the public mind. This poll makes the consequences of that linkage clear."

**And it prevents deployment of SMR’s.**

**I**nternational **T**rade **A**dministration, February **2011** (The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, Department of Commerce, p. 7)

One additional obstacle is beyond the scope of this report but could play a significant role in whether SMRs are commercially deployed: public opinion. To the extent that the smaller profile of SMRs results in their deployment closer to population centers, public opposition to their deployment might rise. Deployment at existing sites, or in industrial applications away from residential areas, however, might minimize the impact of public opinion. Education about the safety features of SMRs and nuclear reactors in general could also ameliorate this concern.