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#### Restrictions are a limitation that prohibits an action. It excludes terms for acting

Court of Appeals 12 [STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION I, RANDALL KINCHELOE Appellant. vs. Respondent, BRIEF OF APPELLANT, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/a01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe's.pdf]

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put.

The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as;

To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

#### “On” means directly targeted at and focused on production

Oxford Dictionary online, 12 [The World’s most trusted Dictionary, <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/on>]

5. having (the thing mentioned) as a target, aim, or focus: *five* air raids on the city*,* thousands marching on Washington ,*her* eyes were fixed on his dark profile

#### Violation—the aff reduces a supervising term—not a restriction. Restrictions prohibit.

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 93 Howard v. Babcock, No. S027061. , SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, 6 Cal. 4th 409; 863 P.2d 150; 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80; 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6006; 28 A.L.R.5th 811; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8975; 93 Daily Journal DAR 15372, December 6, 1993, Decided , Rehearing Denied February 3, 1994, Reported at: 1994 Cal. LEXIS 534.

 [\*\*156] [\*\*\*86] Rule 1-500 provides: "(A) A member shall not be a party to or participate in offering or making an agreement, whether in connection with the settlement of a lawsuit or otherwise, if the agreement restricts the right of a [\*419] member to practice law, except that this rule shall not prohibit such an agreement which: [¶] (1) Is a part of an employment, shareholders', or partnership agreement among members provided the restrictive agreement does not survive the termination of the employment, shareholder, or partnership relationship; or [¶] (2) Requires payments to a member upon the member's retirement from the practice of law; or [¶] (3) Is authorized by Business and Professions Code sections 6092.5, subdivision (i) or 6093 [providing for authority of State Bar Court to impose conditions of probation on disciplined attorneys]. [¶] (B) A member shall not be a party to or participate in offering or making an agreement which precludes the reporting of a violation of these rules." 6

CA(4)(4) We are not persuaded that this rule was intended to or should prohibit the type of agreement that is at issue here. HN10 An agreement that assesses a reasonable cost against a partner who chooses to compete with his or her former partners does not restrict the practice of law. Rather, it attaches an economic consequence to a departing partner's unrestricted choice to pursue a particular kind of practice.

We agree with the Court of Appeal in Haight, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d 963, declaring HN11an agreement between law partners that a reasonable cost will be assessed for competition is consistent with rule 1-500. Rejecting an interpretation of rule 1-500 like that proffered by plaintiffs here, the court stated: "We do not construe rule 1-500 in such a narrow fashion. . . . The rule does not . . . prohibit a withdrawing partner from agreeing to compensate his former partners in the event he chooses to represent clients previously represented by the firm from which he has withdrawn. Such a construction represents a balance between competing interests. On the one hand, it enables a departing attorney to withdraw from a partnership and continue to practice law anywhere within the state, and to be able to accept employment should he choose to do so from any client who desires to retain him. On the other hand, the remaining partners remain able to preserve the stability of the law firm by making available the withdrawing partner's share of capital and accounts receivable to replace the loss of the stream of income from the [\*420] clients taken by the withdrawing partner to support the partnership's debts." (Haight, supra, at pp. 969-970.) Concluding that the agreement was not invalid on its face, the court held that the validity of the agreement depended on whether it "amounts to an agreement for liquidated damages or an agreement resulting in a forfeiture." (Id. at p. 972.)

#### VOTE NEG

#### LIMITS—the number of supervising terms is limitless—each one becomes an aff.

#### CORE GROUND—only insured ground is energy production—regulations mean they don’t have to produce more, just make it less regulated.

### 1NC ASPEC

#### Power in the federal government is divided into three branches—the affirmative does not specify

Rotunda 1 (18 Const. Commentary 319, “THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE POLITCAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, AND MORRISON,” lexis)

The Framers of our Constitution anticipated that a self-interested "federal majority" would consistently seek to impose more federal control over the people and the states. n10 Hence, they created a federal structure designed to protect freedom by dispersing and limiting federal power. They instituted federalism [\*321] chiefly to protect individuals, that is, the people, not the "states qua states." n11 The Framers sought to protect liberty by creating a central government of enumerated powers. They divided power between the state and federal governments, and they further divided power within the federal government by splitting it among the three branches of government, and they further divided the legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by splitting it between two Houses of Congress.

#### Voting Issue

#### One—negative ground—specification is key to generate specific uniqueness and link magnitude so generic energy production now doesn’t non-unique our disads. Gives us textual competition for counterplans and key to high tech solvency arguments

#### Two—education—specification is a prerequisite to energy policy.

Tomain 90—Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law [Tomain, Joseph P., “The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy” (1990), Faculty Articles and Other Publications, Paper 130, http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac\_pubs/130]

IV. CONCLUSION

The direct message of the dominant model is that United States energy policy is market driven. The implication of this message is equally clear. Given the structural setting of a complex policymaking process that is woven throughout government and is directly affected by the tensions created by separation of powers and federalism, no comprehensive national energy policy of any detail is likely to develop despite executive, legislative, or administrative desires to do so.

There are ideological and pragmatic reasons behind this conclusion. The first reason, grounded in the liberal tradition, is that the country is "generally suspicious" of central planning. Rather than have an imitation Japanese or European industrial policy, the United States economy continues to run on private competition. Granted, the government will attempt to halt large accumulations of corporate power through antitrust enforcement. Still, though, countervailing government control of the economy through heavy central planning is simply not an accepted way of doing business.

A second and corollary reason is that although government is used as a backstop to prevent large aggregations of corporate power, government will also promote and support competitive businesses. The New Deal was not so much an experiment in social policythough it was clearly that-as it was an example of the federal government stimulating the economy by getting business on its feet again.

Third, there is a commitment to the hard energy path of largescale, high-technology, capital intensive energy production. This commitment finds its roots in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. This history makes it difficult for policy makers and decision makers to design and implement alternative energy policies, thus putting the burden of change on proponents 'of alternatives.

Fourth, also echoing the liberal tradition, there is an underlying faith in the market. The country's efforts to achieve the virtues of the market-color blindness, individual liberty, eqmility, and technological innovations-may not reach a Utopian plateau, but government controls are worse approximations. The country's faith in the market forms the baseline, and government will only intervene if cracks in the baseline are perceived.

Thus the dominant model of U.S. energy policy is firmly based in the tenets of democratic capitalism: private ownership and production; competition; no overt central planning; wariness of monopoly; and government support of each of the other elements. The hope is that our national economy and our quality of life can flourish if (1) markets are relatively clear, (2) entry and exits are relatively inexpensive, and (3) corporate power is relatively dispersed. Indeed, the ideology of domestic energy policy rests upon the idea that inter-industry and intra-industry competition are highly desirable~' Moreover, such industrial pluralism ultimately serves the public interest by providing relatively abundant energy at relatively stable prices. Economic efficiency, economic growth, economies of scale, and a cautious eye on market power thus define the public interest in energy. So says the dominant model. What remains to be seen is whether the dominant model has significant longevity given contemporary concerns about the continued use of fossil fuels and environmental degradation. Before the environmental consequences of hard path energy production can be adequately addressed, however, the dominant structure of domestic energy policymaking and policy must be acknowledged. Hopefully, this article has provided that acknowledgement.

#### 2AC clarifications are too late—the 1AC plan is used to generate counterplan competition—2AC or CX clarification justifies aff conditionality and kills any neg predictability

### 1NC K

#### Focus on energy production produces chronic failure. Energy becomes an end-in-itself with no social or ethical guidance.

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 20-21] **[Gender paraphrased]**

The Technique of Modern Energy Governance While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul, 1964: 133- 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality. From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar, technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy's social project. As one observer has noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the "great paradox of the technological mystique [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical expertise." Even the vanguard of a sustainable energy transition seems swayed by the magnetism of technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics. Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford ( 1964). Governance "by the people" consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its operations. Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford suggests ( 1964: I) that the classical idea of democracy includes "a group of related ideas and practices ... [including] communal self-government ... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that affects the whole community." Modern conventional and sustainable energy strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being recognized as the emblems of modernist politics. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which "deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process, [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over physical nature, ultimately control over [hu]man[ity] himself, the chief purpose of existence" (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically and technologically unassailable.

#### Technocratic management makes extinction inevitable—no aff proposal can solve.

Crist 7 [Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech University, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” *Telos*, Volume 141, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Telos Press, p. 49-51]

If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution promoted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwillingness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these elements of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse underway—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conversion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to—with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and [end page 50] foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and second, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur.

Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manipulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended consequences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresentation and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user species; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

#### Critique is a prior question—starting with incentives dodges issues of social and environmental sustainability.

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 22-24]

Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major 'energy futures' under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new technologies-conventional or sustainable-that will govern the energy sector and accumulate capital mjght be described as centaurian technics21 in which the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high . technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities, contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere. Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson's assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the "cultural logic of late capitalism." Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is important-even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy visions equally presume that a social order governed by a 'democratic' ideal of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and social justice is studiously observed by both·proposals. Likewise, both agree to, or demur on, the question of capitalism's sustainability.22 Nothing is said on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be. If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct, then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of acquiescence to things as they are. Building an inquiry into energy as a social project will require the recovery of a critical voice that can interrogate, rather than concede, the discourse's current moorings in technological politics and capitalist political economy. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate an energy-society order in which energy systems evolve in response to social values and goals, and not simply according to the dictates of technique, prices, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to between 550Q and 900Q Fahrenheit (300Q and 500Q Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the lifeworld of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life . Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism are successfully declined. In L 928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965: 52) explained why the democratic-authoritarian bargain and Western capitalism should be rejected: God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts. Unless the capitalists of India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or being destroyed by them. As Gandhi's remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our political-economic problem. The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

### 1NC DA

#### Obama winning with betting markets – best predictors

THOMSON 10 – 24 – 12 has been a semi-pro baseball player in France, an editorial cartoonist for Newsday, and a reporter [Keith Thomson, How Gamblers -- History's Most Accurate Election Forecasters -- Are Betting on 2012, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-thomson/how-gamblers--historys-mo_b_2011534.html?utm_hp_ref=elections-2012>]

I don't like uncertainty. The current presidential polls -- Gallup with Romney leading by three percent, CBS with Obama up by two percent, aggregators split on whose nose is ahead -- are a hotbed of uncertainty. Fortunately there are veritable election oracles I can turn to instead: gamblers.

In 2004, Gallup failed to forecast the winner of the popular vote for president -- for the second straight election. Halfway through Election Day 2004, various exit polls showed Kerry with the lead. Meanwhile 91 percent of bettors on Betfair.com had their money on Bush. The betting markets also were correct on the winner in each of the 50 states.

Before the 2008 election, I spoke to Koleman Strumpf, a University of Kansas economics professor who tracks betting trends. "Relative to the polls, the betting markets have to think hard about what they're saying since they are putting their money at stake," he said. "Also polls tend to reflect what people are thinking at a given moment, versus a forecast of what will happen on election day -- post-convention bounces, for instance."

Added Paulick Report editor Ray Paulick, one of America's top horseracing handicappers and a political prediction markets aficionado, "Gamblers have more experience with cheaters. They take voter fraud into their metrics. Polls don't. Nor do polls take into account intangibles like how each state's secretary of state factors in or systems within a state designed to eliminate voters."

In 2008, 90 percent of gamblers correctly forecast an Obama victory. They were also on the money with 48 of 50 states.

Gamblers' success in this arena is nothing new. In presidential races beginning in 1896, the New York Times, Sun, and World provided daily betting quotes. The papers' sources were bookies who had agents at every stump and whistle-stop to gather intel and quantify popular sentiment. Between 1884 and 1940, the bettors erred on just one of sixteen elections, Wilson's 1916 upset of Hughes.

Ironically, polls sent gamblers to the sideline. "Prior to Gallup's introduction in 1936, newspapers had little to report about the election horse race other than the betting markets," Strumpf explains. "When scientific polls came along, newspapers had something to report other than markets they were oftentimes uncomfortable with."

The same discomfort led to states relegating such gamblers to outlaws. The Internet has given rise to new forums, however. As of this writing, betting at the three biggest prediction markets is as follows: Betfair has Obama with a 64 percent chance to win to Romney's 36 percent; Intrade has the president at 58 percent; and the Iowa Electronic Markets have the president at 59 percent. Oddschecker shows bookmakers to be even more bullish on Obama.

Why are the polls and gamblers so far apart?

"The answer highlights one of the main differences between the polls and markets like Intrade," Intrade's exchange operations manager Carl Wolfenden told me. "The polls ask who you're going to vote for -- a question that requires an emotional response. Intrade asks who you think will win -- a rational question that requires someone to look at the facts and real world events, such as polls, debates, speeches, gaffes, scandals and crises. One of these facts is the Electoral College, which isn't accounted for in polls."

Why the big lead for Obama?

"Our markets recognize that Romney probably needs to win Ohio to beat Obama," Wolfenden says. "And so the price for Obama to be reelected has closely tracked his probability of winning Ohio. So while Romney may lead in the polls, and he may have flipped a number of other key states -- such as Florida, Virginia, Colorado -- to his side of the ledger, our markets appear to believe that without Ohio he can't get it done."

Strumpf adds: "I think the big message in this election cycle is that polls are giving conflicting answers, and unless you are willing to look at several state-level polls, it is hard to make sense of it all. The prediction markets like Intrade cut through all this and give us a single number to focus on."

#### Small Changes Matter - Now is key – small shifts have big impacts

SILVER 10 – 20 – 12 Elections Guru [nate Silver, Oct. 20: Calm Day in Forecast, but Volatility Ahead, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/oct-20-calm-day-in-forecast-but-volatility-ahead/>]

What makes this challenging is that although something like a half-point shift is hard to detect in the polls, it is also potentially meaningful given how late it is in the race and how close the contest is.

The most natural analogy might be to a baseball game. Scoring a run in the first inning is worth something, but it won’t shift the win probabilities all that much: there’s too much that can happen later on in the game.

We’re now in the political equivalent of the eighth inning, however. A run scored in the eight inning is potentially much more important than one in the first.

The reason I say “potentially” is that it makes a tremendous difference depending what the score is. In a blowout, the eighth inning won’t matter at all. A team down 9-1 is almost certainly going to lose; but so will one that gets a solo home run and trails 9-2 instead.

(The political equivalent: Walter Mondale, in 1984, improved to a 17-point deficit from a 20-point deficit in national polls after his first debate with Ronald Reagan. This may have helped him to carry his home state of Minnesota, and lose the Electoral College 525-13 rather than 535-3.)

But if the score is tied, or if it’s a one-run game, a run scored in the eighth will make a huge difference.

That’s where we find ourselves right now in the presidential race. This election is close and is likely to end up that way. There’s about a 50-50 chance that the election will end up within 2.5 percentage points, according to the forecast, against only a 15 percent chance that either candidate will win by five points or more.

For this reason, the percentage estimates in the forecast are likely to be volatile from here on out.

**Plan drives a wedge into Obama’s base**

**Mick 6-19**-10 [Jason Daily Tech, Obama Fights For Nuclear, Environmentalists Label Him a Shill http://www.dailytech.com/Obama+Fights+For+Nuclear+Environmentalists+Label+Him+a+Shill/article18781.htm]

Despite these small victories, President **Obama's nuclear vision faces** many impending **obstacles**.  **Despite the fact that you could tear down one of the nation's old reactors, replace it with a dozen modern clean reactor designs and still have less net waste**, some **environmentalist groups remain adamantly opposed to new plant construction.  They have vowed to bury the bid for clean nuclear power under a flood of lawsuits.**  If the suits succeed, they will raise the cost of nuclear so high, that it can't even compete with the most expensive forms of nuclear energy, like solar power.

**And perhaps the biggest obstacle to Obama's nuclear vision will come in 2012**.  That is the year when he will face **reelection**.  That **may prove challenging given that one of his former key constituent groups -- the environmental lobby -- has become one of his staunchest critics**.  Regardless, the U.S. is making its first true nuclear progress in 30 years, and that is among the many factors that will already make President Obama's presidency noteworthy.

#### Enviro on the brink – flips the election

Schnur 12

Dan Schnur, director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California; he served as the national communications director of Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2000, “The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline,” <http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/>

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline.

The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor.

As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership.

There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling.

Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white.

Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline.

The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway.

He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country.

#### Obama win key to stop European missile defense – failure collapses Russias nuke deterrent and causes war

Levi 12

(David Meir, Prof of History @ San Jose State University and writes and lectures on Middle East topics, “Russia Wants Obama Re-Elected” May 11th, 2012, <http://frontpagemag.com/2012/david-meir-levi/russia-wants-obama-re-elected/>)

At an international conference on Thursday, May 3, organized at Russia’s initiative, the Russian delegates showed computer-generated images of a hypothetical Russian pre-emptive missile attack on segments of a missile defense shield and early warning system that the US and NATO want to put in place in Turkey, Rumania and Poland. Quite a scary threat from the former USSR’s 900-pound gorilla and one-time global nuclear super-power. NATO says that the missile defense system is meant to counter Iran’s threats of a WMD Shi’ite Armageddon. However, the Russians are not comforted, because they fear that the NATO anti-missile missiles could also be used to shoot down Russian nuclear-armed missiles aimed at the West; and such a potential threat from the west could “undermine their country’s nuclear deterrent[.]” The Russians organized the Thursday conference in order to place their threat on the table, loud and clear, and make public their demand that they get a written agreement that the West will never use its missiles against Russia. Currently, the USA and NATO have refused to put such a promise in writing, although Russia-NATO agreements on missile defense cooperation date back to 2010. The timing of this meeting is important. It comes shortly before a NATO conference due to take place in Chicago later this month at which NATO will publicize its success in getting its missile-defense system up and running. Russia’s pre-emptive threat of a missile war against the West if the West does not agree to its demands puts a big kink in the Chicago conference. But according to the Wall Street Journal article, **Russia’s** alarming **saber-rattling is** really **a façade to hide a “tacit agreement to put off serious talks until next year,” by which time Obama, if re-elected, could “clear the way for a deal” and work on Russia’s behalf against NATO to find ways to accommodate the Russian demands**. The Russian presenter on Thursday was direct and unambiguous that Russia prefers to work with Obama as a second-term president, and to cooperate with his vision of a “reset” in the USA- Russia relationship, rather than to joust with Romney whose election they feel will make things “surely … more difficult.” So what the Russians have actually said is: if you want to keep the Russian bear from getting aggressive, elect Obama, not Romney. This is an unusually overt attempt by a foreign power to influence American elections, but it is not surprising since Romney has been harshly critical of Obama’s “reset” vision. The Wall Street Journal made the obvious connection between this impasse and the “hot mic” incident in March where Obama told Russian Prime Minister Medvedev to tell Russian soon-to-be President Vladimir Putin to temporarily back off regarding this issue since Obama would have “more flexibility” to deal with it after the November 6 elections. As reporters gathered for a news conference in Seoul, South Korea, Obama leaned over to his Russian counterpart. Without realizing a microphone was open, he said: “This is my last election and after my last election I have more flexibility,” …referring to his ability to reach a deal with Russia on missile defense. Medvedev replied: “I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir,” a reference to the incoming Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Obama attempted to weasel out of the implications of his gaffe by explaining to reporters in Korea that arms control negotiations are extremely complex and require bipartisan cooperation in the U.S.; so they cannot be a public issue just months before presidential and congressional elections. But “I don’t think it’s any surprise that you can’t start that a few months before a presidential and congressional elections in the United States,” simply does not address the core problem. His intention to hide his willingness to be flexible toward Russia about Russian demands couched in cold-war terminology relating to the possibility of nuclear war bespeak his awareness that these intentions will not be acceptable to the American voting public; and this is all the more reason to make them public. Romney said it was alarming that Obama was “looking for greater flexibility where he doesn’t have to answer to the American people in his relations with Russia … [Russia is] without question our No. 1 geopolitical foe. They fight every cause for the world’s worst actor. The idea that he has more flexibility in mind for Russia is very, very troubling indeed.” The New York Times version of this issue made no mention of the “hot mic” incident but did point out that Russian leaders have refused Obama’s request that the Kremlin pressure Syria’s Bashar al-Assad to comply with the UN’s cease-fire plans. The Times also noted that Obama himself stalled the progress of the NATO plans for the early warning and missile defense system because he sought a “reset” in the USA’s relationship with Russia, and Russian concerns about the NATO early warning system were a stumbling block to Obama’s plans. Obama’s willingness to be flexible toward the Russian demands may stem in part from the desire to co-opt the Kremlin into pressuring Assad; but it also seems clear that Obama, not knowing that he was speaking to Medvedev in front of a hot microphone, did not want to let the American electorate know of his intentions for flexibility toward Russia regarding the NATO missile defense system impasse. In other words, his flexibility toward Russia, if it were made public, might hinder his re-election. And the Russians are not ungrateful. Obama’s pay-back for his willingness to be flexible next year is Russia’s endorsement of his re-election by telling the world, at this conference, that if the USA elects Romney, there might be war with Russia. An American special envoy to the Russian conference indicated that the American delegation was not sympathetic to the Russian demands and unwilling to offer the limitations that Russia wants. She stated: “There’s nothing I can imagine that will stop us making these deployments on time.” Well, actually there is: Obama’s re-election.

#### Extinction

Sharavin et al 7

(Major General Alexander Vladimirov, Vice President of the Military Expert Board; - Colonel General Vladimir Yesin, Senior Vice President of the Russian Academy of the Problems of Security, Defense, and Law; - Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems; and - Alexander Sharavin, Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Defense and Security, July 20)

Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that **continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals**. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion. Yesin: I'm firmly convinced that there will be no war as long as Russia retains the nuclear deterrent potential. If, however, a war between Russia and the United States breaks out (a war, not a petty local conflict), then it will end in a global Apocalypse. Vladimirov: Whatever the scenarios may be, I'm convinced that only one end is possible - our utter victory. This war will be an undisputable crime against mankind. It may only end in defeat of the United States of America. How can the Apocalypse be avoided? Sharavin: We should take care to avoid confrontations with the United States (try as I might, I cannot perceive a single valid reason for Russia to want a confrontation). And of course, Russia should concentrate on actual as opposed to virtual development of its Armed Forces. Ivashov: Russia should restore the might of its army and potential of its defense industry. It should concentrate on research into and design of new weapons. As for the national military doctrine, it should include a clause allowing for the use of nuclear arms against a full-scale aggression. Also importantly, Russia needs allies. Yesin: American ambitions should be firmly countered on the basis of Russian economic and military might. First and foremost, on the basis of the Russian nuclear forces. The existence of these forces is a guarantee that there will be no wars between Russia and the United States.

### 1NC—CP

#### COUNTERPLAN: The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission should waive regulations on staffing, manufacturing licensing, emergency planning zone, and safety for Small Modular Reactors to be consistent with the unique attributes of Small Modular reactors.

#### The counterplan solves all the aff—back-end waiver avoid the need to meet restrictions. Insures public engagement in environmental processes

GLICKSMAN & SHAPIRO 4 a. Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas Member Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation b. John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas Member Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation; University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest University School of Law [Robert L. Glicksman, Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through Incremental Adjustment, Kansas Law Review, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1179]

Reform of environmental and other regulation has been a popular topic for academics, think-tanks, and interested parties for the last two decades. Claiming that existing regulation is excessive and irrational, critics have successfully convinced Congress and the White House to implement a plethora of procedural requirements to analyze a proposed regulation before it is promulgated.I In our recent book, Risk Regulation at Risk,2 we argued that the previous initiatives address the possibility of regulatory failure on the wrong end of the regulatory policy implementation process. Current efforts to rationalize environmental and other health and safety regulation at the "front end" of the regulatory process are doomed to fail because of moral, methodological, and informational limitations.3 We suggested that one way of improving regulation would be to rely on incremental adjustments in regulation on the "back end" of the regulatory process.4 One important advantage of proceeding in this manner is that regulatory policy is adjusted in light of its actual impact, as compared to the significant guesswork that is required to use front-end analysis. In this manner, a back-end adjustment process is consistent with the pragmatic approach to public policy that we advocated in the book.5

This article addresses in more detail the potential of two types of back-end processes: (1) deadline extensions and (2) waivers, exceptions, and variances.6 Our analysis proceeds in three steps. Part II describes the almost exclusive focus of regulatory reformers on the front end of the process. Part III offers a close examination of five federal statutes that provide opportunities for the two types of adjustments we are studying. The results confirm our earlier assertion that Congress has authorized agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Interior Department to make these types of back-end adjustments available in a variety of contexts and for a variety of reasons.? Our analysis reveals that Congress has established six different grounds for back-end adjustment, and we assess the potential for each of these grounds to improve regulatory policy. Although we recommend the imposition of conditions on the issuance of some of these back-end adjustments, we find that these adjustments are generally consistent with the precautionary tilt of the statutes in which they are located because they still require the regulated entity to do the best it can to protect people and the environment. Where such protective mechanisms are absent, we urge that the statutes be amended to include them.

Part IV analyzes the procedures by which requests for back-end adjustments are currently processed. We find that agencies consider most applications for back-end adjustments using informal procedures that include public notice and solicitation of public comments, although in a few instances, more formal procedures apply. We favor the informal approach because it is an efficient way for agencies to respond to the issues raised by requests for back-end adjustments and because more elaborate procedures are not necessary to promote rational decisionmaking, given the nature of the issues likely to be raised in back-end adjustment proceedings. We are concerned, however, about the extent to which effective public participation will occur under these procedures. We therefore endorse two steps to enhance the transparency of back-end adjustment decision-making: the establishment of electronic reading rooms and the issuance by agencies of annual reports on back-end ad- justments.8 We argue that these two mechanisms will facilitate involvement by public interest groups and interested citizens by allowing them to prioritize the adjustment proceedings in which they wish to become involved. The result is likely to be enhanced agency accountability and reduced opportunities for agency abuse of the back-end adjustment process.

#### Counterplan avoids elections—won’t hold the president responsible, he can dodge

Mendelson 10—Professor of Law—University of Michigan Law School [Nina A. Mendelson, “Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 108, p.1127-1175, <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/108/7/mendelson.pdf>]

Even if presidential supervision of agency decisions is well known to the voting population, holding a President accountable for particular agency decisions is hard enough, given the infrequency of elections, the number of issues typically on the agenda at the time of a presidential election, presidencies that only last two terms, and presidential candidates who are vague about how the administrative state would run. 175 It is all the more difficult if the public does not know what influence the President may have had or may end up having on particular agency decisions. “To the extent that presidential supervision of agencies remains hidden from public scrutiny, the President will have greater freedom to [assist] parochial interests.” 176 Calling for greater disclosure to the electorate is not to say that majoritarian preferences should dictate agency decision making. Increasing transparency regarding presidential influence on a particular agency decision may or may not make agency decision making simply a “handmaiden of majoritarianism,” as Bressman suggests. 177 Instead, it could facilitate a public dialogue where citizens are persuaded that the decision made, though not the first-cut “majoritarian preference,” is still the correct decision for the country. By comparison, submerging presidential preferences undermines electoral accountability for agency decisions and reduces the chances of a public dialogue on policy. One might respond that the public already knows that the President appoints agency heads and can remove them, and that White House offices review significant agency rules before they are issued. And the public knows the content of the agency’s decision. Shouldn’t that be sufficient to ensure democratic accountability through the electoral process? 178 That level of knowledge might suffice, but only if the public perceives federal agencies as indistinguishable from the President. Voters are sophisticated enough to know, however, that agencies represent large and sometimes unresponsive bureaucracies, a view sometimes promoted by Presidents themselves. Presidents certainly do not consistently foster the view that executive branch agencies are under their complete control. Instead, they have been known to blame the agencies for unpopular decisions and to try to distance themselves. 179 Bressman gives the example of the second Bush Administration distancing itself from the IRS, while at the same time quietly pressuring the agency to revise a proposed rule requiring domestic banks to reveal the identity of all depositors, including foreign ones. 180 Administrators may also “take the fall” for an unpopular decision that is influenced by the White House, as EPA Administrator Johnson appeared to do in denying the California greenhouse gas waiver. 181 And as mentioned earlier, President Obama has selectively taken credit for federal agency actions relating to automotive greenhouse gas emissions, with his OMB only grudgingly backing an EPA proposed rule in response to political controversy. 182 Similarly, President George W. Bush distanced himself from an EPA report concluding that global warming was anthropogenic, even though that report had been reviewed by White House offices prior to its release. In answer to questions from reporters, President Bush commented, “I read the report put out by the bureaucracy.” 183 More recently, when news reports suggested that the White House was pressing the EPA to “edit” its climate change findings, the White House spokesman stated that the agency alone “ ‘determines what analysis it wants to make available’ in its documents.” 184 Finally, take the rash of resignations at the EPA in the mid-1980s, including Administrator Gorsuch and Assistant Administrator Lavelle, arising out of allegations of serious misconduct and conflicts of interest within the agency. President Reagan succeeded in distancing himself from the agency’s problems by presenting the agency as acting more or less independently. 185 Despite issuing directives, 186 Presidents certainly have a significant incentive to keep influence on agency decisions low-key and to maintain “deniability” with respect to agency actions. This minimizes the risk that influence can be characterized later as improperly motivated, that debate within the executive branch can fuel litigation over the ultimate decision, or that the President will have a political price to pay for guessing wrong about what option best serves the public interest. And, of course, keeping a low profile for presidential influence also allows more successful presidential pressure that is the result of presidential capture. 187 All this amounts to reduced electoral accountability for actions taken by administrative agencies. 188

### 1NC Econ

#### Empirics prove no war.

Miller 1—Morris Miller is an adjunct economics professor at the University of Ottawa [Jan.-Mar, 2001, “Poverty: A Cause of War?” *Peace Magazine*, http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v17n1p08.htm]

Economic Crises?

Some scholars have argued that it is not poverty, as such, that contributes to the support for armed conflict, but rather some catalyst, such as an economic crisis. However, a study by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik shows that this hypothesis lacks merit. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin American and Asia since World War II, they concluded that much of the conventional thinking about the political impact of economic crisis is wrong:

"The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... or (in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another)."

#### There is no causal relationship between the economy and conflict—the best study proves.

Brandt and Ulfelder 11—\*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. \*\*Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict. [April, 2011, “Economic Growth and Political Instability,” Social Science Research Network]

These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown.

Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis, and evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have hardly been studied in recent years, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression.

This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours is the first statistical study of this relationship to simultaneously address the possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date.

As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think these findings also help explain why the global recession of 2008–2010 has failed thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis.

#### US decline will not spark wars.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

#### They can’t overcome an ill-prepared workforce

**Ferris 8/22/**12—Writer based in Washington, DC [David Ferris, “Why Manufacturers Can't Find the Workforce They Need,” Workforce, Published: August 22, 2012, pg. http://tinyurl.com/8f8mjq3

As the economy begins to climb out of the Great Recession, one sector—manufacturing—finds itself in a predicament. The country is awash in unemployed workers, but few have the skills that factories really need.

This skills gap has been widening for decades, but trends are converging to make the crunch especially severe. Technology on the shop floor is evolving quickly. This means that factory jobs demand more math and science skills than most Americans possess. Meanwhile, young people have turned their backs on the factory; manufacturing ranks dead last among career choices for 18- to 24-year-olds, one survey shows.

U.S. manufacturers are in a dilemma partly of their own making. They are [the world's most productive](http://shopfloor.org/2011/03/u-s-manufacturing-remains-worlds-largest/18756), creating nearly 21 percent of the world's manufacturing output, and have done so by focusing on high-value, high-quality products stamped out on automated production lines. But, as [a recent article in the Atlantic points out](http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/01/making-it-in-america/8844/1/?single_page=true), manufacturing employment is lower than any time since the 1930s because the advanced factory has little need for entry-level workers with little education. Instead it needs tool-makers, millwrights and electronics technicians—exactly the kind of skills that the American education system no longer nurtures.

"It has been an emerging problem. We've seen it coming for the last three to five years, but now it's reaching critical mass. [Companies] just can't find the technological individuals who can do production to welding, the advanced skill sets," says Randy Wolken, the president of MACNY, a manufacturers' association in Central New York state. "For some companies it's a crisis, where they'll have 10 to 15 spots open despite high unemployment."

A 2011 survey of more than 1,100 manufacturing executives found that 67 percent had a serious lack of available and qualified workers, and that 56 percent expected the problem to worsen. The same survey said that 5 percent of manufacturing jobs are currently vacant because of a lack of qualified candidates. That translates to as many as 600,000 middle-class jobs with no one to work them.

Who is responsible for addressing this shortage is a matter of great debate. Colleges would have had to increase their graduation rates by 10 percent a year starting in 2008 through 2018 in order to meet America's overall need for highly educated workers, according to [a study](http://cew.georgetown.edu/jobs2018/) by the Georgetown Public Policy Institute. Six years from now, the study concluded, 63 percent of new jobs will need postsecondary instruction.

Some leading industry watchers, such as [Intel Corp. founder Andy Grove](http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_28/b4186048358596.htm) and [business school professor Peter Cappelli](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204422404576596630897409182.html), say that much of the blame for insufficient talent rests with the companies themselves, which have shown a lack of foresight and evaded responsibility for a problem that they fostered.

Manufacturers, like many companies in other sectors, have scaled back apprenticeship and training programs because the payoff is uncertain: Workers don't stick with one employer for decades like they used to, and a factory manager may sponsor a star employee's machine-tool course only to see that worker get lured away by a firm across town.

But it isn't merely a question of who provides the training. The chasm between employees' current abilities and the trigonometry, calculus and programming skills needed to run today's machines may just be too great.

"Taking an unskilled worker and turning him or her into a journeyman tradesman or CNC operator would literally take years," says Gerry Ledford, a business consultant to many large manufacturers, in an email. CNC operators are workers who oversee computer numerical control machines, which are sophisticated, automated tools for cutting, drilling and shaping material.

Combine the skills deficit with a graying workforce, where many technicians are in their 50s and contemplating retirement, and U.S. factories face a serious lack of manpower.

What's needed, Wolken says, is for America's youth to realize that the modern factory is not the greasy, smoke-belching assembly line of their grandparents' generation. Today's factories are clean, well-lit and full of expensive machines where computer skills can be put to use.

"We don't see a lot of understanding of what today's advanced manufacturing jobs are about, and administrators in schools mainly push [students] into colleges but don't tell them about these careers where you can start with a two-year technical degree or even a certificate right out of high school. They're not even aware of what a modern factory looks like," Wolken says.

There is no easy solution to America's manufacturing bind, experts say. But most agree that the country has to build a new educational-industrial complex, starting with partnerships between manufacturers and the local high schools and colleges that feed them.

### 1NC Prolif

#### Alt cause—export regulations

Platts, 10/1/2012. “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149.

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

\*\*\*Burdensome U.S. export regulations are the critical obstacle to nuclear leadership—the U.S. actually still has the supply chain, but massive delays in processing push countries away from the U.S.

#### No widespread prolif

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [April 16, 2012, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show]

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### Deterrence breakdowns don’t cause full-scale nuclear war

Waltz 3—Kenneth, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, p. 34-35

States are deterred by the prospect of suffering severe damage and by their inability to do much to limit it. Deterrence works because nuclear weapons enable one state to punish another state severely without first defeating it. "Victory," in Thomas Schelling's words, "is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy." 37 Countries armed only with conventional weapons can hope that their military forces will be able to limit the damage an attacker can do. Among countries armed with strategic nuclear forces, the hope of avoiding heavy damage depends mainly on the attacker's restraint and little on one's own efforts. Those who compared expected deaths through strategic exchanges of nuclear warheads with casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II overlooked the fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear worlds. 38

Deterrence rests on what countries can do to each other with strategic nuclear weapons. From this statement, one can easily leap to the wrong conclusion: that deterrent strategies, if they have to be carried through, will produce a catastrophe. That countries are able to annihilate each other means neither that deterrence depends on their threatening to do so nor that they will necessarily do so if deterrence fails. Because countries heavily armed with strategic nuclear weapons can carry war to its ultimate intensity, the control of force becomes the primary objective. If deterrence fails, leaders will have the strongest incentives to keep force under control and limit damage rather than launching genocidal attacks. If the Soviet Union had attacked Western Europe, NATO's objectives would have been to halt the attack and end the war. The United States had the ability to place thousands of warheads precisely on targets in the Soviet Union. Surely we would have struck military targets before striking industrial targets and industrial targets before striking cities. The intent to hit military targets first was sometimes confused with a war-fighting strategy, but it was not one. It would not have significantly reduced the Soviet Union's ability to hurt us. Whatever American military leaders thought, our strategy rested on the threat to punish. The threat, if it failed to deter, would have been followed not by spasms of violence but by punishment administered in ways that conveyed threats of more to come.

A war between the United States and the Soviet Union that got out of control would have been catastrophic. If they had set out to destroy each other, they would have greatly reduced the world's store of developed resources while killing millions outside of their own borders through fallout. Even while destroying themselves, states with few weapons would do less damage to others. As ever, the biggest international dangers come from the strongest states. Fearing the world's destruction, one may prefer a world of conventional great powers having a higher probability of fighting less- destructive wars to a world of nuclear great powers having a lower probability of fighting more-destructive wars. But that choice effectively disappeared with the production of atomic bombs by the United States during World War II.

#### Your authors overstate the risks and pace of Middle East proliferation

**Carpenter ‘7** (Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato, Mediterranean Quarterly, “Toward a Grand Bargain with Iran”, Vol. 18, Iss. 1, Project Muse)

Finally, those who favor a more confrontational policy toward Iran warn that if Tehran succeeds in its quest for nuclear weapons, other nations in the region will quickly do the same, creating an especially dangerous security environment. As in the case of concerns about possible blackmail, this fear has some validity. Because of the uncertain reliability of the protection afforded by the US umbrella for some US allies and client states in the Middle East, there is a very real prospect that if Iran develops a nuclear arsenal, sooner or later such countries as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey might follow suit. Indeed, Egypt may already be thinking along those lines. In late September, Gamal Mubarak, President Hosni Mubarak's son and political heir apparent, stated that his country needed to develop a nuclear program for power generation.19 Although he stressed that the program would be entirely peaceful, his proposal had all the earmarks of a hedging strategy. As we have seen with India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, "peaceful" nuclear programs can easily become the foundation for a nuclear weapons program. Whether additional proliferation would reach epidemic proportions and create the nightmare scenarios forecast by some analysts is uncertain. It is important to recall that pundits and even international relations experts have tended to overestimate both the probability and the extent of proliferation in the past. The conventional wisdom in the 1960s was that there would be as many as two dozen nuclear weapons powers within a generation.20 Similar predictions took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s.21 [End Page 22] Moreover, it is not an established fact that nuclear weapons in the hands of a larger number of nations would necessarily be a bad development. Indeed, some respected International Relations scholars have argued that nuclear proliferation might be stabilizing rather than destabilizing.22 Given its volatile political makeup, though, the Middle East is probably not the best region to test that thesis.

#### Prolif decreases the risk of war—robust statistical, empirical evidence proves.

Asal and Beardsley 7 (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” 44:2, Sage)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that **nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior**, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors—Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992)—and five nuclear actors—Gulf War (1990)—only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors—by extension, many general actors as well—experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. **All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities**. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), **it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons** can serve as a **deter**rent of **aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents**.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. **Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved**. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the outcomes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction. While dyadyear datasets have often been employed to similar ends, the key independent variable here, which is specific to crises as the unit of analysis, does not lend itself to a dyadic setup. Moreover, selection bias concerns are likely not valid in disputing the claims of this analysis. If selection bias were present, it would tend to bias the effect of nuclear weapons downward, because the set of observed crises with nuclear actors likely has a disproportionate share of resolved actors that have chosen to take their chances against a nuclear opponent. Despite this potential mitigating bias, the results are statistically significant, which strengthens the case for the explanations provided in this study.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### 2NC Godhaven

#### Technology can’t solve all environmental problems and masks the true problem of consumption.

Godhaven 9 [Merrick Godhaven is an environmental writer and activist. He co-authored the Corporate Watch report Technofixes: A Critical Guide to Climate Change Technologies. The Guardian, “Swapping technologies fails to address the root causes of climate change,” July 15, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2009/jul/15/technofix-climate-change]

Technology is part of the solution to climate change. But only part. Techno-fixes like some of those in the Guardian's Manchester Report simply cannot deliver the carbon cuts science demands of us without being accompanied by drastic reductions in our consumption. That means radical economic and social transformation. Merely swapping technologies fails to address the root causes of climate change. We need to choose the solutions that are the cheapest, the swiftest, the most effective and least likely to incur dire side effects. On all counts, there's a simple answer – stop burning the stuff in the first place. Consume less. There is a certain level of resources we need to survive, and beyond that there is a level we need in order to have lives that are comfortable and meaningful. It is far below what we presently consume. Americans consume twice as much oil as Europeans. Are they twice as happy? Are Europeans half as free? Economic growth itself is not a measure of human well-being, it only measures things with an assessed monetary value. It values wants at the same level as needs and, while it purports to bring prosperity to the masses, its tendency to concentrate profit in fewer and fewer hands leaves billions without the necessities of a decent life. Techno-fixation masks the incompatibility of solving climate change with unlimited economic growth. Even if energy consumption can be reduced for an activity, ongoing economic growth eats up the improvement and overall energy consumption still rises. We continue destructive consumption in the expectation that new miracle technologies will come and save us. The hope of a future techno-fix feeds into the pass-it-forward, do-nothing-now culture typified by targets for 2050. Tough targets for 2050 are not tough at all, they are a decoy. Where are the techno-fix plans for the peak in global emissions by 2015 that the IPCC says we need? Even within the limited sphere of technology, we have to separate the solutions from the primacy of profit. We need to choose what's the most effective, not the most lucrative. Investors will want the maximum return for their money, and so the benefits of any climate technologies will, in all likelihood, be sold as carbon credits to the polluter industries and nations. It would not be done in tandem with emissions cuts but instead of them, making it not a tool of mitigation but of exacerbation. Climate change is not the only crisis currently facing humanity. Peak oil is likely to become a major issue within the coming decade. Competition for land and water, soil fertility depletion and collapse of fisheries are already posing increasing problems for food supply and survival in many parts of the world. Technological solutions to climate change fail to address most of these issues. Yet even without climate change, this systemic environmental and social crisis threatens society, and requires deeper solutions than new technology alone can provide. Around a fifth of emissions come from deforestation, more than for all transport emissions combined. There is no technological fix for that. We simply need to consume less of the forest, that is to say, less meat, less agrofuel and less wood. Our level of consumption is inequitable. Making it universal is simply impossible. The scientist Jared Diamond calculates that if the whole world were to have our level of consumption, it would be the equivalent of having 72 billion people on earth. With ravenous economic growth still prized as the main objective of society by all political leaders the world over, that 72 billion would be just the beginning. At 3% annual growth, 25 years later it would be the equivalent of 150 billion people. A century later it would be over a trillion. Something's got to give. And indeed, it already is. It's time for us to call it a crisis and respond with the proportionate radical action that is needed. We need profound change – not only government measures and targets but financial systems, the operation of corporations, and people's own expectations of progress and success. Building a new economic democracy based on meeting human needs equitably and sustainably is at least as big a challenge as climate change itself, but if human society is to succeed the two are inseparable. Instead of asking how to continue to grow the economy while attempting to cut carbon, we should be asking why economic growth is seen as more important than survival.

### 2NC T/C—Economy/Growth

#### Sustainable, equal economic well-being requires a critique of consumption. Focus on increasing production hurts economic security and sufficiency.

Barry 12—John Barry, Reader Politics @ Queen’s University (Belfast) [*The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability* p. 164-165]

I outline here how 'economic security' could be a replacement for economic growth, and present a green economic case for a new type of economy, in which redistribution and reducing socio-economic inequality are central (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). A model of green political economy cast in terms of 'economic security' has the advantage of presenting a positive and attractive discourse for addressing the problems of actually existing unsustainability. Using the language and analysis of economic security introduces a way of arguing and presenting the case for a less growth-orientated economy and high-consumption society, which at the same time aims to raise quality of life while lowering inequality. At the same time it is important (not least strategically) that a green critique of 'growth' should be viewed as a critique of orthodox and undifferentiated growth as measured by conventional economics. That is, lest a critique of economic growth be viewed as a critique of any and all types of growth, it is important to stress that greens reserve their critique for what Daly calls 'uneconomic growth' -the expansion of forms of activities which (after a threshold) undermine or compromise human flourishing. Thus, it is perfectly consistent for greens to criticize economic growth yet support growth in, for example, education, public health, public transport, or subsidized organic farming, but criticize the growth of consumerism, the quantity of arms and weapons an economy produces and trades, the size of domestic/household credit card debt. Thus, when I talk of 'economic growth' I am referring to 'undifferentiated, orthodox economic growth' as measured by conventional national accounting measurements such as GDP. One of the foci of analysis for green critiques of economic growth is consumerism, since consumerism has become a central driver and is functional for contemporary economic growth policies. As the current economic crisis aptly demonstrates, if (too many) people save rather than consume, the capitalist system becomes unstable and does not function. One of the critiques of consumerism is based on the notion that easy consumption 'devalues' that which is consumed- hence the disposable, banal, and ephemeral, but constantly repetitious character of modern consumerism. There is no sense of the fragility (despite the evident ephemerality) or any associated sense of preciousness attached to the mass produced goods and services consumed. Consumerism denotes an attitude towards that consumed of indifference, repetition, with little connection or meaningful connection made-one good or service is as good as another. The 'repressive tolerance' which defines the consumer experience and its associated highly disciplined subjectivities, was outlined by Marcuse (and others) over fifty years ago as characterizing modern Western capitalist societies (Marcuse, 1964). This still has analytical purchase and remains an apt description today of those societies. As Murray Bookchin points out, the judgement of a repressed psyche is not a good standard for determining what is 'good' and virtuous and what is not (Bookchin, 1982). One of the upshots of the analysis of vulnerability, developed in ohapter 2, for green politics is a reaffirmation of the need to examine issues of identity and the creation of new 'sustainability' and 'resilient' subjectivities, against the repressive tolerant. consumer identities which demarcate the limit of 'normal' and hence 'possible' or 'desirable' identities. Whether it is the putative identities and practices one can discern within the Transition movement, or the cultivation of virtue and certain character traits for green political and economic practices (such as 'green citizenship'), vulnerability and resilience are suggestive of specific types of virtue (such as compassion, care, courage, prudence, temperance, self-assuredness, steadfastness, sensuality, humility, and materiality-as opposed to 'materialism'). They also denote certain types of character traits, such as that of the 'pioneer' and 'dissident'. One thing is sure, in the creation of any sustainable and resilient economy, one that is adaptive, in the sense indicated in chapter 3, any putative 'greening' of production (through technology, for example) has to go hand in hand with a close reappraisal of consumption and consumerism, and the latter's function in being functional for and stimulating economic growth. As Princen et al. put it, 'Consumption becomes sacrosanct. If water supplies are tight, one must produce more water not consume less. If toxics accumulate, one must produce with fewer by-products-or even better, produce a cleanup technology rather than forego the production itself ... Production reigns supreme because consumption is beyond scrutiny' (Princen, Maniates, and Conca, 2002: 5; emphasis added). Like the sequestration of vulnerability, dependence, illness, and death, the growing opaqueness of the connections between production and consumption under global capitalism, globalized supply-chains and a global division of labour and so on, are also in need of critical examination.

### 2NC T/C—Resource Wars

#### Consumption makes resource wars inevitable—which is their internal link to china war.

Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through researching how societies change and evolve, *Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and Transformation of Our World*, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg. 185-6]

The financial and social inequality of the global economy is destabilizing and dangerous. 35 Growing income gaps between rich nations and poor nations and within countries like the United States, China and India can be managed as long as average incomes keep rising. But if shortages of essential goods and rising prices lower the standards of living of hundreds of millions of people — if people who are middle class today become poor tomorrow, and people who are poor today become hungry tomorrow — then there will be massive social unrest. In early 2008 rising food prices triggered protests and riots around the world. 36 Most people will tolerate bad government if they have economic security and hope for a better future. But if they lose that hope, then anger and despair can easily be channelled into intergroup violence and/or demands for radical political change. 37 While governments can use economic measures, laws and force to stabilize financial and political disturbances, there is little that they can do to solve problems caused by biophysical limits to growth and environmental degradation. Resource shortages restrict the supply of goods with the consequence that they must be rationed either with higher prices that make them unaffordable for poorer consumers, or by limiting availability — e.g. by turning off the supply of water or electricity for part of each day. Because resource shortages and other environmental problems cannot be resolved by the current global system, they are likely to be the root causes of increasing global economic crises. Countries are becoming increasingly concerned about their access to water, energy and mineral resources. For example, both China and India are making major investments in African resources: by 2010 China will probably be the continent’s major trading partner. 38 Fears of being excluded from critical supplies are leading to new strategic alliances and a new arms race — in 2007 the US, Japan, India, Australia and Singapore held joint naval exercises, while Russia and China held joint military exercises that were observed by the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). 39 The focus of this competition is control over the oil and gas resources of the Middle East and Central Asia — objectives clearly articulated by the former US Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book The Grand Chessboard. 40 We should not forget that competition over resources helped start two world wars. We are now in a situation that is similar to the years leading up to the First World War — while no country desires war, no major power believes that it can afford to be denied access to critical resources. This is the American dilemma in Iraq — political leaders do not want to stay and be bogged down in an unending war, and yet they are afraid that if they withdraw from the region they could lose access to vital energy supplies. 41 If global resource consumption continues to expand, competition over increasingly scarce resources will grow. The competition will initially be primarily political and economic in nature, but as prices rise and economies are destabilized, there will be more and more willingness to use military means to guarantee access to strategic resources. The danger is that at some point competition and confrontation will escalate into a war involving major powers armed with weapons of mass destruction.

### 2NC Framework

#### We must begin with a social critique and analysis of the modern energy regime. Ethical criticism of the existing energy regime cultivates alternatives to technocratic consumption.

Barry 12—John Barry, Reader Politics @ Queen’s University (Belfast) [*The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability* p. 284-290]

'Dissident' is perhaps a better and more accurate term to apply to greens than 'revolutionary', since while both share an opposition to the prevailing social order, revolutionary is clearly more antagonistic rather than agonistic, to use the terms indicated in chapter 7. Dissidents seek to direct a self transforming present in a more radical direction, whereas revolutionaries typically seek the complete destruction of the existing order and then the construction of a new one. Greens as dissidents also begin from an acceptance of the inevitability of key aspects of this transition-primarily around climate change and the end of the oil age-and thus see an answer to 'what is to be done?' in terms of managing and shaping that inevitable transition, rather than building/re-building. Dissident also seems less extreme and dogmatic in its critique and its demands, than those who advocate full-blown revolution. And given what was said in chapter 3 and elsewhere about the link between creativity, flexibility, and adaptive fitness, it would be odd for green politics to be dogmatic revolutionaries animated by a sense of the hopelessness of working within and through contemporary institutiohs or that there was nothing worth preserving within and from the contemporary social order. Green dissent could perhaps be (wrongly) described as somewhere on a continuum between 'reformism' and 'revolution', a form of 'creative adaptive management' to create collective resilience in the face of actually existing unsustainability.1 In his essay 'The Power of the Powerless', Vaclav Havel uses the story of a greengrocer who unthinkingly displays his 'loyalty' to the regime by displaying a Communist Party slogan in his shop. This the greengrocer does 'ritualistically, since this is the only way the regime is capable of acknowledging his display of loyalty' (Havel, 1978: 45). In a similar way, being a dutiful consumer and not questioning economic growth could also perhaps be regarded as the way in which loyalty to a dominant capitalist, consumer regime is ritualistically displayed, enacted, and affirmed. It is for this reason, if not only this reason, that one completely misunderstands consumerism, consumption, and being a 'consumer', if one views it solely individualistically as some economic-cum-metabolic act. As a public display of loyalty, consuming is first and foremost a collective act, an individual joining others in a shared activity and associated identity. So while critics such as Fromm are correct in highlighting the distinction in consumer culture between 'being' and 'having' (Fromm, 1976), what these analyses often miss is that consumption is also an act of' belonging' and identity affirmation (Keat, 1994; Jackson, 2009b).It is for this reason that a refusal to consume is so damaging to the modern political and economic order and why to consciously choose not to consume is perhaps one of the most politically significant acts one can do in a consumer society. And one that, the continual performance (or rather non-performance) of which, further marks one out as a dissident, part of 'the great refusal' to use Marcuse's term (Marcuse, 1964). That is, to question economic growth under consumer capitalism is to be 'disloyal' to the prevailing order. While for Havel living in what he calls the 'post-totalitarian' communist regime is 'living a lie', I do not want to go so far and say that life in contemporary consumer capitalist democracies is in the same way to 'live a lie'. Rather what I would like to dwell upon is Havel's notion of'living within the truth' and what this can offer for green dissidents. For Havel 'living within the truth ... can be any means by which a person or group revolts against manipulation: anything from a letter by intellectuals to a workers' strike, from a rock concert to a student demonstration, from refusing to vote in the farcical elections, to making an open speech at some official congress, or even a hunger strike' (Havel, 1986: 59-60). Though clearly written with the then communist regime in mind, Havel's call to 'live in truth' is equally pertinent to consumer capitalism. As he puts it: The profound crisis of human identity brought on by living within a lie, a crisis which in turn makes such a life possible, certainly possesses a moral dimension as well; it appears, among other things, as a deep moral crisis in society. A person who has been seduced by the consumer value system, whose identity is dissolved in an amalgam of the accoutrements of mass civilization, and who has not roots in the order of being, no sense of responsibility for anything higher than his or her own personal survival, is a demoralized person. The system depends on this demoralization, deepens it, is in fact a projection of it into society. (Havel, 1978: 62; emphasis added) Silence is of course a consequence and precondition for this demoralization, and what power requires under consumer capitalism is passive and silent acquiescence as much as active participation. For Havel the re-appropriation of individual responsibility is something to be actively striven for. This reverses or balances the usual focus on rights and freedoms with which often 'progressive' critiques of consumerism are couched. In Havel's response to what Tim Jackson amongst others has called 'The Age of Irresponsibility' (Jackson, 2009b ), also connects with some of the green republican arguments outlined in chapters 6 and 7, not least the stress on both the recovery of the good of politics and the centrality of the individual citizen as a moral being and not just or only a consumer (or producer/worker or investor). As Jackson notes, 'the "age of irresponsibility" is not about casual oversight or individual greed. The economic crisis is not a consequence of isolated malpractice in selected parts of the banking sector. If there has been irresponsibility, it has been much more systemic, sanctioned from the top, and with one clear aim in mind: the continuation and protection of economic growth' (Jackson, 2009b: 26; emphasis added). The struggle Havel describes from the 1968 'Prague Spring' between 'the system' and 'the aims of life' (Havel, 1978: 66) resonate green concerns of the degradation of natural life-supporting systems and the undermining of conditions promoting human conviviality, quality of life, and well-being (Barry, 2009b; De Geus, 2009, 2003; Jackson, 2009a). What Havel goes on to say about political change and strategy in the context of a consumer culture is pertinent and important for those seeking a transition away from unsustainability, 'Society is not sharply polarized on the level of actual political power, but ... the fundamental lines of conflict run right through each person' (Havel, 1978: 91; emphasis added). This is a profound point, namely that it is difficult, if not impossible, to simply analyse actually existing unsustainability as an oppressive totalitarian regime in which there is an identifiable 'them' dominating 'us'. Under consumer capitalism, debt-based consumption, and so on, we who live in these societies are all implicated in its continuation. And while of course there are identifiable groups and institutions (such as large corporations, financial wealth management firms, the leadership of mainstream political parties, key agencies of the nation state such as departments of finance, global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMP, and what Sklair has called the 'transnational capitalist class') who do benefit more from actually existing unsustainability, we have to face up to the fact that 'ordinary people', that is, everyone also contributes (unequally of course) to the 'mundane' operation of global capitalism and the exploitation of people and planet. The recognition of this is but another way of drawing attention to the fact that capitalism, the common sense of neoclassical economics, and so on have achieved 'full spectrum' domination of hearts and minds, such that capitalism, and realistic critiques of it, need to be viewed as cultural (and indeed psychological) projects. It is for this reason that I canvassed the Transition movement in chapter 3, since it adopts an explicitly cultural and psychological approach. Of course such cultural and psychological critical analyses are not exhausted by this movement and these cannot be a substitute for oppositional political struggle. This 'cultural turn' in green politics is, to my mind, linked to the 'postscarcity economics of sustainable desire' outlined in chapter 5, and is premised firmly on a notion of human flourishing that lies beyond production, 'supplyside' solutions, 'competiveness', and increasing 'labour productivity'. This notion of flourishing is not anti-materialist. Let me make that abundantly clear, it is not an ascetic renunciation of materialism for its own sake, as if material life is intrinsically unworthy or does not express valued modes of human being. Thus I do not accept the Fromm-inspired view that materialism or indeed material consumption is simply a mode of 'having' and not 'being'. After all, the critique should be directed at consumerism and overconsumption, not materialism or consumption per se. At a basic level one can see how communism and consumerism are two 'regimes of truth' -to return to the Foucauldian language used in chapter 4 imposing their version of the truth, exacting payment, compliance, and subjectivity from their client populations, quelling, distracting, and undermining dissidents, and using different but also some shared techniques to continue. And the appropriate dissident, progressive attitude, and strategy against both is, for Havel, ultimately an ethical one, an ethical and political life-affirming 'reconstitution of society' (Havel, 1978: 115). That Havel conceives consumer-capitalist and communist societies as comparable can be seen in his view that: traditional parliamentary democracies can offer no fundamental opposition to the autonomism of technological civilization, and the industrial-consumer society, for they, too, are being dragged helplessly along by it. People are manipulated in ways that are infinitely more subtle and refined than the brutal methods used in the post-totalitarian societies ... the omnipresent dictatorship of consumption, production, advertising, commerce, consumer culture, and all that flood of information. (Havel, 1978: 116; emphasis added) Some of the republican elements expressed in Havel's thought centre around 'responsibility' (Havel, 1986: 104). He maintains that the abdication of responsibility in the name of consumer choice-what I have elsewhere described as the reduction of political liberty to a consumer 'freedom of choice' (Barry, 2009a)-weakens the ethical and political capacities of citizens within liberal democracies. Liberal consumer-citizens then become 'victims of the same autonomism, and are incapable of transcending concerns about their own personal survival to become proud and responsible members of the polis, making a genuine contribution to the creation of its destiny' (Havel, 1978: 116; emphasis added). In this Havel is articulating concerns very close to the type of green republicanism outlined in this book. His concluding comments in The Power of the Powerless also offer suggestive lines for interpreting the Transition movement. In a passage focusing on the contours of what Havel calls the 'existential revolution' that is needed to renew the relationship of humans to the 'human order and cosmopolitan responsibility', Havel notes that the structures needed to make this happen 'should naturally arise from below as a consequence of authentic "selforganization"; they should derive energy from a living dialogue with the genuine needs from which they arise, and when these needs are gone, the structures should also disappear ... The decisive criterion of this "selfconstitution" should be the structure's actual significance and not just a mere abstract norm' (Havel, 1978: 119). A better description of the Transition movement's aims, motivations, and objectives would be hard to find. Havel goes on to describe these new, provisional, and practical structures 'postdemocratic'. He describes the outlines of these 'authentic' political structures in this manner: Do not these groups emerge, live, and disappear under pressure from concrete and authentic needs, unburdened by the ballast of hollow traditions? Is not their attempt to create an articulate form of 'living within the truth' and to renew the feeling of higher responsibility in an apathetic society really a sign of some rudimentary moral reconstitution? In other words, are riot these informed, non-bureaucratic dynamic and open communities that comprise the 'parallel polis' a kind of rudimentary prefiguration, a symbolic model of those more meaningful 'post-democratic' political structures that might become the foundation of a better society? (Havel, 1978: 120-121). Fundamental here, I think, is Havel's call to responsibility and struggle against the prevailing political order when it undermines quality of life, perpetuates injustice, or the denial or compromising of democratic norms. In a similar vein Carla Emery puts it eloquently, 'People have to choose what they're going to struggle for. Life is always a struggle, whether or not you're struggling for anything worthwhile, so it might as well be for something worthwhile' (in Astyk, 2008: 204). Or to phrase it differently: get busy living or get busy dying. WHAT IF WE ARE THE PEOPLE WE'VE BEEN WAITING FOR? 289 As argued throughout this book in facing the many challenges of the present time-climate change, peak oil, diminishing forms of social well-being, financial and economic crises, and the ecological liquidation of the foundations of life on the planet-the most important response needed is one which explicitly focuses on imagination and creativity. As W. B. Yeats (long before Barak Obama used a version of these sentiments) suggested, what is needed is for us 'to seek a remedy ... in audacity of speculation and creation' (Yeats, 1926). While 'another world is possible' it can only be possible if it is imagined, and perhaps one of the most persistent obstacles to the transition away from actually existing unsustainability apart from ignorance of the ecological and human costs of our capitalist-consumer way of life-is the stultifying grip of 'business as usual' and its limited and limiting horizons of possible futures for ourselves and our societies. In many respects, our collective inability to respond to 'limits to growth' is in large measure due to limits of creativity and imagination. We cannot, or find it very difficult, to imagine a different social order. For Richard Norgaard the answer to our present ecological predicament is as difficult to achieve as it is simple to express, 'We need a new life story. We need an overarching story that respects a diversity of life stories. Living the story of economic development is destroying humanity and nature and a good many other species along with us. We need a master story that puts our hope, compassion, brains, sociality, and diversity to new and constructive ends' (in Deb, 2009: xxiii). And if we follow Havel, it may be that this new story we need is already here, in the same sense that the eco-feminist Mary Mellor (Mellor, 1995) has persuasively written that the sustainable world, society, or mode of being is not some utopian 'there' but an already living, embodied, engendered 'here' in the reproductive and exploited labour of women, in the 'core' economic activity of caring and sharing and ... flourishing. The Polanyi-inspired attempt to 'reembed' the economy within human social relations can be viewed as a defensive move to protect community from both the formal market and the state. Such protective measures can include the expansion of the social economy, or the efforts by the Transition movement in seeking to disrupt, slow down and re-conceptualize the economy. Such reactive measures could all be thought of as seeking to defend and extend those sustainable practices in the here and now, that is, that already exist within 'actually existing unsustainability'. This is particularly the case with reproductive labour as outlined in this book. Actually it is the neoclassical economic view that is 'utopian' in promoting a fictitious and dangerous imaginary of human life lived at 365/24/7 speed and a way of life completely out of synch not just with human biological but also ecological time. And, it must be recalled, 'Mother Nature does not do bailouts'. As Havel suggests, 'For the real question is whether the "brighter future" is really always so distant. What if, on the contrary, it has been here for a long time already, and only our own blindness and weakness has prevented us from seeing it around us and within us, and kept us from developing it?' (Havel, 1978: 122). Now there's an intriguing set of concluding thoughts-what if not only the resilient, sustainable way of life is 'always already here', present, and available to us if we so choose-but also if it is indeed the case that 'we are the people we've been waiting for?' And what of the hard greens, where do they and their analysis fit within this book? For it is fair to say that they have been shadowing the book. While I discussed them briefly in the Introduction and made some casual comments about them and their diverse positions and prescriptions throughout, I have not met them head on as it were. So it would be fitting for me to offer my thoughts on the place and status of the hard green position. Are they basically correct? Do I agree with them (from the green republican acceptance of the time-bound and contingent character of all human creations, including civilizations and societies) that they have identified the beginning of the end of our existing capitalist, carbon-based civilization and societies? While I certainly admire their brutal honesty, I baulk at their jump from crisis to collapse, and then from collapse to violence and 'de-civilization' (Elias, 2000; Hine and Kingsnorth, 2010). Their political analyses echo (almost always unwittingly) the eco-authoritarian position of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The hard-green view in being so pessimistic means its pessimism precludes a view of politics as the 'art of the possible', and a view of the inevitability of collapse can and does lead to de-politicized or even anti-political responses. But surely the challenge, as outlined by the green republican project of this book, is to embrace new intelligibilities, ways of being, having, and doing, new identities and subjectivities, and new arts of life, all must be part of a project to avert collapse?2 This is, as I see it, the point of green republican politics as a form of 'anticipatory politics' to challenge the rule of the 'nee-liberal vulgate'. At this present moment, on the cusp of this 'Great Transition', what greens need is to cultivate critical awareness, opposition, and dissent, to have the courage of their convictions in analysing and resisting actually existing unsustainability, and outlining their vision for the transition to a better society, in part to engage, inform, and prepare citizens for the coming changes that will characterize the decades ahead. Greens need to be realistic and cleareyed in their disavowal of naive utopianism, but convinced of its basic conviction that another world is possible, necessary, and desirable. And while on quiet mornings we may hear it coming, its arrival, like all major transitions in human history, will demand political struggle. The battle for hearts, minds, and hands has begun, and my writing this book and you reading it are constitutive of that struggle.

### AT: CTP/Spillover

#### Small momentum and change in language is the basis for large-scales social change.

Princen 10—Thomas Princen School of Natural Resources and Environment @ Michigan [*Treading Softly* p. 50-53]

A Crisis People won't change until there's a crisis. They're stuck in their ways. They're comfortable. They won't do anything, even with daily reports of melting ice and starving children. That's just human nature-selfish, greedy, short-sighted. It is true that when there is a crisis people come together. When the town floods, everyone pitches in to stack sandbags and evacuate the elderly. But to conclude that people will only act when there's a crisis defies logic-and a whole lot of history. I will give an example of such history, but first let's put the general point right up front: Fundamental social change starts with (1) a few committed people, (2) new understandings, and (3) small acts that eventually confront the structures of power. And for motive, fundamental change draws on people's basic need for meaning, engagement, and fairness. Take slavery. For the great bulk of human history, across cultures, from India and China to Europe and the Americas and Africa, slavery was a perfectly normal practice. Indeed, it was an institution-a set of widely shared norms and principles, rules and procedures. And what people back then shared-rulers and commoners alike-was the idea that some people, by virtue of birth or race or nationality, would be slaves. That's just the way it was, and everyone knew it; it was beyond questioning. Always has been, always will be. Then a dozen shopkeepers and clergy got together in a print shop in London in 1787 and said, in effect, no more; this is wrong; it must stop. So they set about gathering information on what was really happening on slave ships and on the plantations. They distributed brochures and pamphlets and lectured across England and abroad. And they introduced legislation in Parliament and lobbied parliamentarians. Maybe most significantly, they systematically undercut arguments defending the normalcy and necessity of slavery-the economic arguments (the British Empire and all who depend on it around the world will collapse), the political arguments (this is just an attempt by the opposition party to take control of the government), the moral arguments (the slaves rejoice when they leave the Dark Continent).1 Today we take the abolition of slavery to be perfectly reasonable, moral, inevitable. But notice that for the early abolitionists, there was no crisis: They were quite comfortable. Their country was riding high. Life was good. Those shopkeepers and clergy and a few noblemen simply concluded that slavery was wrong. Others might have foreseen slavery's demise due to economic trends or movements for democracy and individual rights. But for much of this early history of abolition, there was no crisis. Instead, a few people acquired new understandings, took a strong moral stance, and confronted power. They took on one of the most pervasive, most accepted, most "necessary" structures in human history-slavery. And they did not back down when defenders ridiculed them, when some claimed that the economy would collapse and people would be thrown out of work, that the empire required it. The abolitionists spoke truth to power. And the truth was that Britain and the world as a whole would do quite well without slavery. In fact, if one accepts the maxim that slavery degrades slave and slaveholder alike, Britain and the world did better without slavery. But notice: there was nothing normal or inevitable, and certainly nothing moral, about slavery. Today there is nothing normal or inevitable about unending growth on a finite planet. There is nothing normal or inevitable about 10 percent of the world's population holding 85 percent of global household wealth 2 while a billion or two struggle day to day just to survive. There is nothing normal or inevitable about knowingly degrading ecosystems, permanently extinguishing entire species, causing irreversible changes in climate, or dislocating millions of people by failing to stop the resultant rise in sea levels. And there is nothing normal or inevitable about justifying all this in the name of "economic growth" or "progress" or "consumer demand" or "efficiency" or "jobs" or "return on investment" or "global competitiveness." So yes, many people in advanced industrial countries are comfortable. They appear unlikely to change until a crisis affects them personally. They have done well by the current structures, economic and political. But just a bit of reflection, a glimmer of foresight, a glance at the biophysical trends, not to mention at financial trends where mounting debt threatens the entire confidence game, and the path's end point is clear: collapse. All the market forces and technological wizardry will not change some basic facts: we have one planet, one set of ecosystems, and one hydrologic cycle; and each of us has just one brain, one body, and one lifetime. Limits are real. If the current system cannot continue on one planet, just as slavery could not continue with trends in democracy and free markets and religious rights and human rights, then the action is with those with a bit of foresight, those with a vision of a different way of living on the planet, of living with nature, not against nature. The action is with those who can accept limits indeed, embrace them. So readers of this book, I assume, may be comfortable, but they are not content. They are looking ahead, they are concerned, they are looking for change. And they know that a fundamental shift is inevitable. They know that all systems, from organisms to ecosystems, from household economies to global economies, have limits. They are the ones preparing the way, laying the groundwork, devising the principles and, yes, the technologies and markets that will allow everyone to live within immutable ecological constraints. They are the ones making sure the sand and the sandbags are on hand so that others can pitch in when the time comes. They are the ones building the compost piles, collecting the information, experimenting with new forms of community, speaking truth to power. The others, the people who need a crisis to act, are not the leaders. They will eventually act, to be sure; they will act when personally threatened. But they will need guidance. They will need role models, concrete examples, opportunities to engage and do good as they protect themselves. And they will need enabling language. That's where the real leaders come in. And now is the time to prepare-not when the crisis hits home and hits hard. So make no mistake, some people will act when there's a crisis. But many others will be getting ready now. These are the concerned and committed, the "moral entrepreneurs" who are already discovering that acting now is very satisfying, very engaging. It's hard, yet at times quite simple.

### AT: Coal DA

#### Replacing every coal plant isn’t enough to solve—neither is the aff.

Rapier 12—Chief Technology Officer at Merica International—a Renewable Energy Company, Master’s in Chemical Engineering from Texas A&M University [March 15, 2012, Robert Rapier, Study: Eliminating Coal-Fired Power is Worth 0.2 Degrees in 100 Years, http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2012/03/05/study-eliminating-coal-fired-power-is-worth-0-2-degrees-in-100-years/]

Who could have dreamed solving climate change would be so easy? A new paper in Environmental Research Letters called “Greenhouse gases, climate change and the transition from coal to low-carbon electricity” concludes that replacement of all of the world’s currently operating coal-fired power plants — which produce about 40% of the world’s electricity — and replacing them with renewable energy would have an impact of 0.2 degrees Celsius 100 years from now.

Cherry-Picking Conclusions According to One’s Viewpoint

However, a number of climate change websites took away a very different message than I took away from the paper. Here is Joe Romm’s view:

Bombshell: You Can’t Slow Projected Warming With Gas, You Need ‘Rapid and Massive Deployment’ of Zero-Carbon Power

I seem to recall another “bombshell” that he recently reported upon on the same theme: Natural Gas Bombshell: Switching From Coal to Gas Increases Warming for Decades, Has Minimal Benefit Even in 2100. I debunked that by showing that in that particular study, every possible alternative — including wind power, solar power, and even simply shutting down all of the coal plants — was projected to increase global warming in the short term: BOMBSHELL: Solar and Wind Power Would Speed Up, Not Reduce, Global Warming.

But Joe is back with the hyperbolic titles and exaggerations (which I get into below), and he missed the biggest story in the paper.

Coal and Sunlight-Reflecting Pollutants

The subject of Romm’s earlier “natural gas bombshell” was a paper written by Tom Wigley that concluded that shutting down coal-fired power plants would cause the global temperature to increase in the short term because of the loss of sunlight-reflecting pollutants.

In that particular paper, Dr. Wigley modeled what would happen if coal-fired power was replaced with natural gas. He did indeed project short-term warming in that scenario, yet it was a result of the air becoming cleaner and allowing sunlight through as the coal was phased out. Thus, the media really got that story wrong, which was not about a deficiency of natural gas, but rather about the peculiarity of burning coal — that the particulate emissions reflect sunlight. Those who fixated on natural gas as the culprit could have written the same story about solar power — which the study’s author confirmed for me. Hence, I made that my “Bombshell” to illustrate the point.

However, that particular study didn’t actually model the temperature impact of shutting down coal plants and replacing them with anything other than natural gas. So, I posed the following question to Dr. Wigley:

What does the graph look like in 2100 if all coal-fired plants were replaced with zero emission sources (as the idealized study)? I am just wondering what the potential actually is. Are we talking about 1 or 2 degrees lower? I just have no idea of the relative context.

We had several email exchanges over his paper, and he said that my questions were intriguing and he would look into them. I never heard back from him on that, but this new paper answers the question.

Shuttering All the World’s Coal Plants Wouldn’t Do Much

The authors of this newest study modeled the replacement of coal-fired power plants with either natural gas, coal with carbon capture and storage, hydropower, solar PV, solar thermal, wind power, or nuclear power. You can see from Joe Romm’s headline how the story is being spun, but let’s break it down in a more objective fashion.

The following graphic from the paper tells the story. Pay particular attention to the temperature scale.

The graphic indicates — as Tom Wigley’s previous paper indicated but which was only reported relative to natural gas — that in every single case, it doesn’t matter what coal-fired power plants are replaced with, the temperature is projected to increase for almost the next 40 years. This is true even in the baseline “Conservation” case, which involves merely idling the coal-fired plants and not replacing them with anything.

The paper projects that if coal-fired power plants continue to operate, the expected temperature rise relative to the baseline (i.e., relative to the expected temperature increase from other sources) in 50 years is 0.15 degrees C, and in 100 years is about 0.33 degrees C. If coal is phased out and replaced with natural gas, the relative 50 and 100 year temperature rise is projected to be 0.14 degrees C and 0.24 degrees C, respectively. So the paper shows slightly less warming when natural gas is used, which Climate Progress Tweeted as “Switch from coal to natural gas would have zero effect on global temperatures by 2100” and included a link to Joe’s “bombshell.” That is obviously an exaggeration, as the graphic clearly shows that the effect is not zero. If it was, the natural gas line would overlay the coal line.

Shocking Implications

One shocking implication from the paper was the projection that hydropower would be worse than coal for the next 60 years. The study’s authors cited methane emissions from organic matter buried under water as the reason for this apparent anomaly. But that’s not the really shocking thing about the study for me.

The most shocking conclusion was the magnitude of the numbers we are talking about. Even if you could in theory shut down all of the coal-fired power plants in the world and replace them with wind, solar, and hydropower — in 50 years the projected temperature is only one-twentieth of a degree C cooler than the base case of continuing to use coal. In 100 years, if I could replace all global coal-fired power plants with firm, renewable power — the temperature is only projected to be about 0.2 degrees cooler than under the coal base case. And the way this is being spun is that the 0.09 degree reduction from switching to natural gas is equivalent to an effect of “zero”, but the 0.2 degree reduction in hypothetically replacing everything with wind and solar power 100 years from now is significant. About the natural gas case, Romm literally said the 0.09 degree lower temperature in switching to natural gas means that “natural gas is a bridge fuel to nowhere”, but the 0.2 degree lower temperature in switching to renewables is “the world’s only plausible hope to avert catastrophic temperature rise.”

Nuclear & Natural Gas to the Rescue — But Most Environmentalists Hate Them

A big irony here is that there are only two power sources that are today capable of achieving the study’s conclusion that we must rapidly replace coal-fired power plants: Nuclear power and natural gas. If people really believe that we must urgently address this issue — and they don’t believe that the change from going to natural gas is enough — that leaves nuclear power as the only option capable of achieving a rapid replacement.

Bear in mind that this is for a global replacement of coal — most of which is used in Asia. Good luck trying to sell China and India on a 0.2 degree temperature difference in 100 years if they quickly abandon their coal-fired power plants and replace them with wind power.

Conclusion: Study is a Major Downer for Activists Battling Climate Change

To be honest, if I was devoting my life to fighting against the threat of climate change, this would be one of the most depressing papers I have ever read. If we could convince everyone in the world to shut down their coal-fired power plants — which we can’t — and replace them with renewable power — which isn’t available in quantities sufficient to replace coal-fired power — then by the end of my life there would still be no statistically significant temperature change to even be able to tell if my life’s work was successful.

But let’s be realistic, shall we? The people who are concerned about global warming have dug in their heels over natural gas, and they are generally opposed to nuclear power. Because of the sheer impossibility that we will rapidly replace coal with wind and solar power (especially since “we” is the world), then we will in all likelihood be left with the status quo. As I have said before, emissions are much higher in Asia Pacific than they are in the U.S. and Europe combined, and they are rising rapidly. Unless we can figure out a way to convince them to develop without fossil fuels — something no country has done — then global carbon emissions will continue to rise. This is why — even though I accept the science behind climate change — it isn’ t my focus. I just don’t see how the West can possibly do anything about it.

### AT: Alt Links to Tech Good DA

#### Social critique of consumption creates genuine innovation. Focus on technological growth undermines creativity.

Barry 12—John Barry, Reader Politics @ Queen’s University (Belfast) [*The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability* p. 168-169]

Others, such as Alastair Macintyre have also noted some psychological cum ethical impacts of economic growth, particularly in relation to the types of identities, subjectivities, and character traits it requires and calls forth. According to Macintyre, 'modern societies recognize that acquisitiveness is a character trait indispensable to continuous and limitless economic growth, and one of their central beliefs is that continuous and limitless economic growth is a fundamental good. That a systematically lower standard of living ought to be preferred to a systematically higher standard of living is a thought incompatible with either the economics or the politics of peculiarly modem societies' (Macintyre, 1988: 112; emphasis added). This is an obvious but nonetheless important point. Namely, that a post-growth economy and society calls for 'non-acquisitive' identities and interests, or at least identities and interests that are not orientated towards orthodox economic growth and associated practices of passive consumerism. Of course there are those for whom economic insecurity is a positive and indeed necessary feature of modern capitalism. Schumpeter, for example, famously noted capitalism's 'creative destruction' by which he meant that, 'This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in' (Schumpeter, 1975: 82). But as the Foucauldian analysis in the last chapter suggested, this risk-taking is no longer limited to the 'entrepreneur' but is now a feature of every neo-liberal subject in contemporary capitalist societies (Mellor, 2010). For Schumpeter, and indeed other mainstream economists, a key feature of capitalism's productive dynamism is its inherent instability. Its very capacity to generate insecurity is a way of spurring innovation and entrepreneurialism; all with the aim, of course, of increasing production and consumption, profitability and therefore economic growth. Therefore, arguments for economic security run counter to this vision, both in questioning the means (creative destruction and manufactured and structurally maintained insecurity) and the ends (orthodox economic growth as measured by GDP). However, this does not necessarily mean (as critics are wont to point out) that a focus on economic security as a main objective of macroeconomic policy means an end to entrepreneurialism or innovation. It is a fair comment to make, and one any alternative to our current economic growth-focused model needs to take seriously. That is, how to ensure that stagnation and regress will not be the outcome of a post-growth economy. However, we have reasons for thinking that development 'comes from innovation, from consuming different things, rather than more of the same things' (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009: 221). And once one begins to free up key economic goals-such as 'innovation' from its technological-economic straightjacket, 'growth' from its reduction to material wealth or capital accumulation, 'work' from being identified solely with formally paid 'employment' and so on-there is reason to suppose that more, not less, innovation and creativity and innovation beyond technological or institutional spheres, will be the result of living in such a society, rather than stagnation or regress. In fact, such forms of innovation and creativity are necessary features and therefore 'required' for low-carbon, high well-being lives and communities, and not some 'added extra'. And they can be seen not only as forms of social innovation (Scott-Cato and Hillier, 2010) but can also take individual forms (Doran, 2010; Alexander, 2011).

### 2NC Climate Links

#### Universal framing of climate change eliminates political response in favor technological management. Their framing prevents changes in distribution and consumption required to cope with climate change.

Swyngedouw 10—Erik Swyngedouw, Geography @ Manchester [“Apocalypse Forever?: Post-political populism and the spectre of climate change” *Theory, Culture, and Society* 27 (2-3) p. 216-219]

The Desire for the Apocalypse and the Fetishization of CO2 It is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism. (Jameson, 2003: 73) We shall start from the attractions of the apocalyptic imaginaries that infuse the climate change debate and through which much of the public concern with the climate change argument is sustained. The distinct millennialist discourse around the climate has co-produced a widespread consensus that the earth and many of its component parts are in an ecological bind that may short-circuit human and non-human life in the not too distant future if urgent and immediate action to retrofit nature to a more benign equilibrium is postponed for much longer. Irrespective of the particular views of Nature held by different individuals and social groups, consensus has emerged over the seriousness of the environmental condition and the precariousness of our socio-ecological balance (Swyngedouw, forthcoming). BP has rebranded itself as ‘Beyond Petroleum’ to certify its environmental credentials, Shell plays a more eco-sensitive tune, eco-activists of various political or ideological stripes and colours engage in direct action in the name of saving the planet, New Age post-materialists join the chorus that laments the irreversible decline of ecological amenities, eminent scientists enter the public domain to warn of pending ecological catastrophe, politicians try to outmanoeuvre each other in brandishing the ecological banner, and a wide range of policy initiatives and practices, performed under the motif of ‘sustainability’, are discussed, conceived and implemented at all geographical scales. Al Gore’s evangelical film An Inconvenient Truth won him the Nobel Peace price, surely one of the most telling illustrations of how eco - logical matters are elevated to the terrain of a global humanitarian cause (see also Giddens, 2009). While there is certainly no agreement on what exactly Nature is and how to relate to it, there is a virtually unchallenged consensus over the need to be more ‘environmentally’ sustainable if disaster is to be avoided; a climatic sustainability that centres around stabilizing the CO2 content in the atmosphere (Boykoff et al., forthcoming). This consensual framing is itself sustained by a particular scientific discourse.1 The complex translation and articulation between what Bruno Latour (2004) would call matters of fact versus matters of concern has been thoroughly short-circuited. The changing atmospheric composition, marked by increasing levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, is largely caused by anthropogenic activity, primarily (although not exclusively) as a result of the burning of fossilized or captured CO2 (in the form of oil, gas, coal, wood) and the disappearance of CO2 sinks and their associated capture processes (through deforestation for example). These undisputed matters of fact are, without proper political intermediation, translated into matters of concern. The latter, of course, are eminently political in nature. Yet, in the climate change debate, the political nature of matters of concern is disavowed to the extent that the facts in themselves are elevated, through a short-circuiting procedure, on to the terrain of the political, where climate change is framed as a global humanitarian cause. The matters of concern are thereby relegated to a terrain beyond dispute, to one that does not permit dissensus or disagreement. Scientific expertise becomes the foundation and guarantee for properly constituted politics/ policies. In this consensual setting, environmental problems are generally staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind, announcing the premature termination of civilization as we know it and sustained by what Mike Davis (1999) aptly called ‘ecologies of fear’. The discursive matrix through which the contemporary meaning of the environmental condition is woven is one quilted systematically by the continuous invocation of fear and danger, the spectre of ecological annihilation or at least seriously distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. ‘Fear’ is indeed the crucial node through which much of the current environmental narrative is woven, and continues to feed the concern with ‘sustainability’. This cultivation of ‘ecologies of fear’, in turn, is sustained in part by a particular set of phantasmagorical imaginaries (Katz, 1995). The apocalyptic imaginary of a world without water, or at least with endemic water shortages, ravaged by hurricanes whose intensity is amplified by climate change; pictures of scorched land as global warming shifts the geopluvial regime and the spatial variability of droughts and floods; icebergs that disintegrate around the poles as ice melts into the sea, causing the sea level to rise; alarming reductions in biodiversity as species disappear or are threatened by extinction; post-apocalyptic images of waste lands reminiscent of the silent ecologies of the region around Chernobyl; the threat of peak-oil that, without proper management and technologically innovative foresight, would return society to a Stone Age existence; the devastation of wildfires, tsunamis, diseases like SARS, avian flu, Ebola or HIV, all these imaginaries of a Nature out of synch, destabilized, threatening and out ofcontrol are paralleled by equally disturbing images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2 into the atmosphere, deforesting the earth, etc. This is a process that Neil Smith appropriately refers to as ‘nature-washing’ (2008: 245). In sum, our ecological predicament is sutured by millennial fears, sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric and representational tactics, and by a series of performative gestures signalling an overwhelming, mind-boggling danger, one that threatens to undermine the very coordinates of our everyday lives and routines, and may shake up the foundations of all we took and take for granted. Table 1 exemplifies some of the imaginaries that are continuously invoked. Of course, apocalyptic imaginaries have been around for a long time as an integral part of Western thought, first of Christianity and later emerging as the underbelly of fast-forwarding technological modernization and its associated doomsday thinkers. However, present-day millennialism preaches an apocalypse without the promise of redemption. Saint John’s biblical apocalypse, for example, found its redemption in God’s infinite love. The proliferation of modern apocalyptic imaginaries also held up the promise of redemption: the horsemen of the apocalypse, whether riding under the name of the proletariat, technology or capitalism, could be tamed with appropriate political and social revolutions. As Martin Jay argued, while traditional apocalyptic versions still held out the hope for redemption, for a ‘second coming’, for the promise of a ‘new dawn’, environmental apocalyptic imaginaries are ‘leaving behind any hope of rebirth or renewal . . . in favour of an unquenchable fascination with being on the verge of an end that never comes’ (1994: 33). The emergence of newforms of millennialism around the environmental nexus is of a particular kind that promises neither redemption nor realization. As Klaus Scherpe (1987) insists, this is not simply apocalypse now, but apocalypse forever. It is a vision that does not suggest, prefigure or expect the necessity of an event that will alter history. Derrida (referring to the nuclear threat in the 1980s) sums this up most succinctly: . . . here, precisely, is announced—as promise or as threat—an apocalypse without apocalypse, an apocalypse without vision, without truth, without revelation . . . without message and without destination, without sender and without decidable addressee . . . an apocalypse beyond good and evil. (1992: 66) The environmentally apocalyptic future, forever postponed, neither promises redemption nor does it possess a name; it is pure negativity. The attractions of such an apocalyptic imaginary are related to a series of characteristics. In contrast to standard left arguments about the apocalyptic dynamics of unbridled capitalism (Mike Davis is a great exemplar of this; see Davis, 1999, 2002), I would argue that sustaining and nurturing apocalyptic imaginaries is an integral and vital part of the new cultural politics of capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007) for which the management of fear is a central leitmotif (Badiou, 2007). At the symbolic level, apocalyptic imaginaries are extraordinarily powerful in disavowing or displacing social conflict and antagonisms. As such, apocalyptic imaginations are decidedly populist and foreclose a proper political framing. Or, in other words, the presentation of climate change as a global humanitarian cause produces a thoroughly depoliticized imaginary, one that does not revolve around choosing one trajectory rather than another, one that is not articulated with specific political programs or socio-ecological project or revolutions. It is this sort of mobilization without political issue that led Alain Badiou to state that ‘ecology is the new opium for the masses’, whereby the nurturing of the promise of a more benign retrofitted climate exhausts the horizon of our aspirations and imaginations (Badiou, 2008; Žižek, 2008). We have to make sure that radical techno-managerial and socio-cultural transformations, organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute, are initiated that retrofit the climate (Swyngedouw, forthcoming). In other words, we have to change radically, but within the contours of the existing state of the situation—‘the partition of the sensible’ in Rancière’s (1998) words, so that nothing really has to change.

### AT: Specific Tech (Nuclear)

#### Appeal to specific nuclear technology magnifies the problem of authoritarian expertise. They depoliticize social choice about the purpose of technology.

Wynne 11—Brian Wynne Science Studies and Research Director of the Centre for the Study of Environmental Change @ Lancaster (UK) [*Rationality and Ritual* 2nd Edition p. 8-11] [Gender Paraphrased]

Such detachment of ambitious technological commitment from organized fantasy has to be a hope; but this hope also has to be interrogated, cold-bloodedly, carefully, and openly. As I tried to assert in this book, nuclear proponents including its scientists belied their own claims to objective hard-factual discipline, with their intense and unbridled emotional commitments clearly evident. These scientistic emotions (and their denial) manifested profound insecurities on the part of their agents, combined with an effective assumption of almost superhuman powers. Thus the mutual identification and reinforcement of nuclear technology with a culture of exaggeration is no less real and no less dangerous just because other technologies have also suffered from similar such idolatry in the past (Ezrahi, 1990) as well as since the 1980s. Although it was Lewis Strauss - a non-scientist head of the scientific body for both weapons and civil nuclear power, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) - who voiced in 1954 the infamous promise that his generation's children would enjoy 'electrical energy too cheap to meter' (Strauss, 1954; Weart, 1988, p166), what is notable is the refusal of any nuclear expert to refute such fatuous promises made in the public name of their science (Laurence, 1959, p251).10 If science claims the credit for the putative benefits from such technologies, as it does, then it cannot easily distance itself from the related discredits - nor from the arguments over which is which. Paradoxically, as nuclear energy prepares to return, society still has not come to terms with the cultural significance of its mass-destructive and apocalyptic military origins and consequences. With the failure of the Atoms for Peace programme and its global institutional UN 'safeguards' supposedly to arrest nuclear weapons proliferation (granted that it must have slowed it down), the systematic and sustained social unrealism of this 60-year commitment cannot but encourage a continuing sense of public unease and distrust of nuclear energy technologies, even if the reprocessing option is forestalled. The imagery of Figure 1 is referred to in Chapter 2 of the original book, but was not printed there. Looking back now, I realize I did not do justice to the issues it raised. Thanks to various theoretical, technological and public developments since then, it deserves fuller treatment now. The image is from a supplement on 'The Atomic Age' published by the Financial Times in 1956, at the birth of both the UK civil nuclear power programme (claimed to be the first in the world) and the UN global Atoms for Peace programme.11 This 50-page publication celebrated the Queen's forthcoming opening of the Calder Hall (Windscale) nuclear electricity (and weapons plutonium) reactors.12 This imagery did not just project nuclear technology as human perfection. It portrayed much more about the nuclear imagination and its mode of public communication and self-promotion, thus of nuclear technology's material social being. This includes its normative characterization (and performance, as explained below) of 'the public' which it imagined as part of the nuclear era. It emphasized the religious forces and feelings animating this science-inspired technology, the epitome of modern scientific rationality as public authority. The technology is shown not just as precise, pure, pristine and clinical. It is also hovering in its own superhuman realm, above the Earth and beyond mere human life, even surrounded by a glowing celestial halo. The text indicates an imagined (and desired) awestruck public: 'Millions of people ['mankind'] stand amazed at the prospect of heat light and power from a source that cannot even be seen.' There is not the slightest sense of a technology and its embodied science that envisages any hint of public engagement: indeed quite the opposite, only distant awe, exclusion and admiration. These extra-terrestrial, extra-social experts 'know best', not only about nuclear power, but about what is best for '[hu]mankind'. Public exclusion, subordination, passivization and alienation are here actively cultivated, through symbolic action. The Windscale book is about how this same kind of symbolic imagination of 'the public' was, through a participatory public inquiry, its report and parliamentary and media uptake, enacted into material performance in later policy culture and commitments. These processes, their forms of reason and discourse, can be said to have performed a particular imagination of their public, and encouraged the material enactment of that imagination into society. If we also refer back here to the practices of pollution management at the Windscale-Sellafield site, as reflected in Dunster's 1958 description earlier of how routine marine radioactive discharges were set, we can see in this account, and in the ensuing environmental contamination and human exposures from this, a performance of nuclear technology's imagined publics. We can see from not only the typical symbolism but also in corresponding material practices that as democratic participants, worthy of respectful recognition and to be given standing as part of the moral --community in which nuclear technology exists, effectively there is no public. It has been one of the most significant shifts of collective understanding amongst many - contributed by the late twentieth century social sciences and humanities, that symbolic actions carry corresponding changes in material social relations. Thus the normatively imposed social relations of technoscience here are not just symbolically projected, but also materially performed. In addition to the instances noted above, a further routinized example of the latter was the sustained extreme secrecy and misinformation that was practised by the UK nuclear authorities behind the scenes of this 1956 flood of positive publicity, and in imposed assumptions-in-practice about what people's concerns, needs and capacities are and should be. These were in no need of co ll ective negotiation; they were subsumed into the dominant assumed ontology. Inquiry inspector Mr Justice Parker's later empiricist framing and interpretation of the Windscale inquiry's conflicting ontological commitments, as these were embodied in the irreconcilable arguments of the parties but represented by him as measurable - and measured by him - against an empirically discoverable standard, did the same. Despite all the noise and fury of public debate and controversy, his discrete translations of expressed public concerns into his own terms were not subjected to any direct accountable scrutiny. Of course, his rational arguments in favour of THORP's approval were, but that is not what I am referring to here. This book still stands as a sole, modest and utterly marginal witness to this.

### 2NC—No War

#### Depressions force focus on internal problems—prevents military conflict.

Deudney 91—Daniel Deudney is Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton [April, 1991, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47.3, Proquest]

Poverty Wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil. then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are warprone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modein era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.”’” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930 increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem. Power Wars. A third scenario is that environmental degradation might cause war by altering the relative power of states; that is, newly stronger states may be tempted to prey upon the newly weaker ones, or weakened states may attack and lock in their positions before their power ebbs firther. But such alterations might not lead to war as readily as the lessons of history suggest, because economic power and military power are not as tightly coupled as in the past. The economic power positions of Germany and Japan have changed greatly since World War 11, but these changes have not been accompanied by war or threat of war. In the contemporary world, whole industries rise, fall, and relocate, causing substantial fluctuations in the economic well-being of regions and peoples without producing wars. There is no reason to believe that changes in relative wealth and power caused by the uneven impact of environmental degradation would inevitably lead to war. Even if environmental degradation were to destroy the basic social and economic fabric of a country or region, the impact on international order may not be very great. Among the first casualties in such country would be the capacity to wage war. The poor and wretched of the earth may be able to deny an outside aggressor an easy conquest, but they are themselves a minimal threat to other states. Contemporary offensive military operations require complex organizational skills, specialized industrial products and surplus wealth.

### Ext. Ferris—Workforce

#### Ill-prepared workforce will deter reshoring—Companies will stay overseas

**Manufacture This 7/10**/12 [The blog of the Alliance for American Manufacturing “Could reshoring be hindered by an ill-prepared workforce?,” 07/10/2012, pg. http://americanmanufacturing.org/blog/could-reshoring-be-hindered-ill-prepared-workforce

While a reshoring trend would certainly be exciting, not just for manufacturing companies, but also for unemployed manufacturing workers around the country, there is one major problem: a lack of workers.

This may sound unreasonable, given the 8.2% unemployment rate.  However, when companies began shipping jobs overseas, many community colleges gave up on trying to train future manufacturing workers.

Zhang spoke with Fred Gapasin, vice president of operations at Gigatronics, a company that manufactures microwave components:

(Gapasin) said he was looking for technicians who could repair the machines used by his company, but found the skill "a dying art" in the United States. Unable to find enough technicians, he said his company is considering a move to Singapore because that is where his competitors are based.”

Companies are increasingly finding the “Made in the USA” label to be an effective selling point, both in the United States and abroad, but now they’re faced with a workforce that may be underprepared for the work necessary.

## \*\*\* 1NR

**1NR---Slow**

**Prolif will be slow even in the new era.**

**Tepperman 9** (Jonathon, former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreig Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek, Newsweek, “Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb,” 44:154, 9-7, L/N)

The risk of an arms race--with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one--is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; **that's spread at glacial pace**." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors--Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say--might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

**No chain reactions. Prolif domino effects never materialize.**

**Alagappa 8** (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia,” Ed. Muthiah Alagappa, p. 521-522)

It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventive action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On the domino effect, India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that country's security concerns about the United States and Tehran's regional aspirations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S. Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in its political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. The point is that each country's decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. **Though appealing, the domino theory is not predictive;** often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia. In fact the so-called dominos became drivers of a vibrant Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that subregion (Lord 1993, 1996). **In the nuclear arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos**. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. **Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation**. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

**1NR---AT: Wars**

**Nuclear weapons reduce the risk and impact of nuclear war**

**Asal and Beardsley 7** (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior\*”, 44:2, Sage)

Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the ‘nuclear peace’.4 While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states. As Waltz argues, the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6–7) ‘Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war’ (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war than a world with only a few members.

**They’ll build small arsenals – five reasons – limited targets, fear of fallout, economic constraints, political rewards and opacity requirements**

**Seng 98** (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES,” p. 56-57)

Kenneth Waltz argues that leaders in all new nuclear states will build only small arsenals. His claim rests primarily on the assumption that all new nuclear states will believe they only need to threaten adversaries with the destruction of one or two cities to ensure stable deterrence, and that they subsequently will be reluctant to dedicate massive resources to building large nuclear arsenals.' My claim is less broad, and it concerns only stares in the developing world. I argue that conditions in the developing world are such that whether leaders think they need to be able to destroy only one city or believe they should have the capability to achieve complete societal destruction of an adversary, they very likely will judge that only very small nuclear arsenals are needed for the job. Moreover, because conditions are such that arsenal buildups will exact high economic, political and security costs on developing states, it is very unlikely they will build more weapons than they believe they need. What follows is an examination of the specific conditions on which these claims are based. There are five main reasons to expect small arsenals among nuclear states in the developing world. They include 1) the limited number of targets developing states will have to worry about, 2) fears concerning 'regional suicide' through nuclear fallout, 3) economic constraints related to nuclear production and military budgets, 4) the specific manner in which developing states reap political rewards and prestige from nuclear weapons development, and 5) the requirements of keeping nuclear arsenals opaque. These factors can carry a cumulative weight in developing state proliferators, which is to say that their cumulative effect may serve to constrain arsenal buildup when the individual effect of any one of them may not be sufficient. They also reinforce each other in important ways, meaning that if policymakers recognize the existence of one or some of the conditions they are likely to recognize most or all of them, and thus their cumulative weight is likely CO be felt. Not all the factors discussed here will apply to all proliferators and potential proliferators in the developing world; however, it is not necessary that they do. It is simply necessary that enough of the factors apply, or that one of them applies strongly enough, to generate the essential constraining effects. This is very likely to be the case in all developing world situations.

**1NR---AT: Horowitz**

**He concedes this is the focus of the study.**

**Horowitz 9** (Michael, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Pennsylvania, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “The Spread of NuclearWeapons and International Conflict Does Experience Matter?” 53:2, April, Sage)

The crux of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and international stability is whether nuclear weapons matter only because of the technologies involved—because a nuclear war would likely be so much more destructive than a conventional conflict—or whether there is something about proliferation that alters, perhaps temporarily, existing expectations about capabilities and resolve. The indeterminacy of much of the deterrence literature highlights the importance of rigorous testing (Downs 1989; George and Smoke 1989; Jervis 1989b). Scholars have disagreed, extensively, over how states in deterrence crises calculate the costs and benefits of different actions (Huth and Russett 1990, 466). Many scholars argue that nuclear proliferation is likely to lead to more international conflict, although some disagree.Waltz, for example, argues that nuclear weapons deter challengers and take escalation off the table, making disputes less likely. The balance of threat from nuclear escalation outweighs issue-specific calculations of interests. According to Waltz, the risk of nuclear escalation trumps any uncertainty generated by nuclear acquisition, making postproliferation conflicts less likely (Waltz 1995, 5-8). A simple measurement problem limits existing research on nuclear war; all observations after 1945 are censored and end in a condition of no nuclear war. However, it is possible to empirically evaluate the relevance of nuclear weapons in **military disputes short of war**. In disputes such as some of the U.S.–Soviet clashes in the Cold War, the issue of nuclear proliferation intersects with broader questions of learning and information.

**Horowitz cites 3 empirical studies—this evidence indicts every one of them. Empirics go our way.**

**Sechser 9** (Todd, Assistant Prof. Politics – UVA and PhD Pol.. Sci. – Stanford, in “Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations”, Ed. John A. Hird, Peter M. Haas and Beth McBratney, p. 169-171)

The evidence in the previous section tells against the view that the spread of nuclear weapons engenders instability. Yet proliferation pessimists nonetheless point to a very large body of empirical support for their arguments. Through years of painstaking archival research, scholars such as Bruce G. Blair (1994), Peter D. Feaver (1997), and especially Scott D. Sagan (1993) have amassed an extraordinary collection of "near-catastrophes"—incidents that almost resulted in nuclear accidents or outright nuclear war—that occurred in the United States, China, India, Pakistan, and elsewhere during the Cold War and afterward. Sagan and Josh Weddle, for instance, write of military officers who sought to provoke war with aspiring nuclear rivals, organizational missteps that inadvertently left nuclear forces vulnerable to attack, and blunders that nearly led to accidental nuclear detonations or launches. 3 While doubtless worrisome, nuclear near-misses are insufficient to corroborate proliferation pessimism because they provide no information about the risk of actual accidents. Consider the following analogy. Imagine that an insurance company official is assigned to evaluate the accident risk for cars that use a particular brand of tires. After interviewing customers who have used these tires for many years, she writes a report concluding that clients using the tires in the future will suffer a high risk of accidents. She bases her conclusion on reports that customers' cars sometimes skidded while taking tight turns or when stopping rapidly, although none of the customers in her study ever experienced an actual crash. Would the researcher's conclusion be a reasonable inference from her data? It would not. The reason is that in the researcher's sample, experiencing skidding—that is, a "near-accident"—was not in fact associated with a higher likelihood of an actual accident. Cars that skidded had exactly the same likelihood of being involved in a crash—zero—as those that did not skid. Without having studied any actual crashes, the researcher can draw no inferences about the relationship between skidding and accidents. It may seem like common sense to assume that skidding cars have a greater likelihood of crashing, but intuition is no substitute for empirical data. Indeed, just the opposite might be true: perhaps skidding provides such a jolt to drivers that they become more cautious and attuned to road conditions as a result of the skid, thereby making a subsequent crash less likely. So it is with the study of nuclear proliferation. Since none of the close calls in the sample collected by proliferation pessimists led to an actual nuclear detonation, it is inappropriate to infer that close calls raise the likelihood of nuclear accidents. 4 The only conclusion supported by such data is that states possessing nuclear weapons have a greater likelihood of near- misses than nonnuclear states. But near-misses, while dramatic and unnerving, are ultimately of little consequence if they never escalate to outright catastrophes.

**1NR---AT: Below**

**Their examples don’t apply. Military officers won’t favor preemption.**

**Lavoy 95** (Peter, Assistant Prof. National Security Affairs – Naval Postgraduate School, Security Studies, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation”, Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer, p. 720-721)

Sagan argues that military training and logic predispose military officers to favor preventive war in the following ways. Military officers are likely to see war as inevitable; they usually distrust nonmilitary approaches to international conflict; they are likely to neglect the nonmilitary costs and consequences of preventive war; and they usually favor offensive doctrines and decisive operations over protracted or delayed conflicts7. 5Although Sagan provides only anecdotal evidence in support of these controversial generalizations about military thinking, let us suppose that he is correct - suppose that military officers do favor preventive war. It is quite another matter to expect these officers to favor preventive war against nuclear targets (where the cost of failure could be exorbitant), or to expect their civilian leaders to authorize such risky military conduct. In anticipation of these points, Sagan relates several episodes in which u.s. military officers planned and seriously advocated preventive-war options to destroy the emergent nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union during the first decade of the cold war. Although Truman and Eisenhower ultimately ruled against these measures, Sagan believes that these cases support his argument about the biases of military organizations in favor of preventive nuclear war. This leads him to expect that such attacks will be carried out in the future by states having weak civilian control over their militaries. There are two problems with this argument. The first concerns Sagan's extrapolation of military roles from the U.S. experience to the context of new nuclear states. Even if we accept that U.S. military officers are biased in favor of preventive options, it does not follow that other militaries will share this bias. As Richard Betts relates, "statesmen and soldiers are partners in preventing war and fighting it." Since the primary job of civilian authorities in the United States is to ensure that deterrence does not fail, military officials plan ways to limit damage and win the war if deterrence does fail!' Not all countries around the world have the luxury of dividing these roles in this manner. In countries with weak civilian control - the countries with which Sagan is especially concerned - military officers assume many of the duties that civilians perform in the United States and in other nations in which civilian control is strict. Consider the case of Pakistan. Apart from the traditional military duties of recruitment, training, discipline, and strategic planning, Pakistan's military leadership plays an active part in deciding when, where, and how to use military force. Because Pakistani military officers assume much of the responsibility for ensuring the country's national security and well-being, they display few of the biases Sagan observes among American officers. Pakistani officers do not see war with India as inevitable; they do not distrust nonmilitary approaches to international conflict; and they do not neglect the nonmilitary costs and consequences of preventive war. The second problem with Sagan's argument about preventive war lies with his inductive analysis of the new nuclear states themselves. Sagan cites the pre-nuclear case of Pakistan to illustrate his concern about preventive war among new nuclear states. He rightly observes that the 1965 war between Pakistan and India began as a Pakistani attempt to wrest control of Indian-held Kashmir before India's rearmament effort - which began after India's loss to China in the 1962 Himalayan border war - would forever shift the regional balance of power. A deal with the Soviet Union to build on Indian soil an assembly factory for MiG aircraft and the prospect that India might also receive American F- 104s convinced President Ayub Khan and his young foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to take preventive military action against India." In the end, however, Pakistan's Operation Grand Slam was a failure. Pakistan never again attempted a preventive military campaign against India. 80 Why, then, does Sagan fear preventive military attacks by Pakistan against Indian nuclear facilities in the future?

**1NR---AT: Knopf**

**Lots of historical disproof**

**Alagappa 8** (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa, p. 522)

The prospect of military action to destroy nuclear weapons and facilities in East and South Asia has declined markedly. The Soviet Union contemplated preventive military action against China's nuclear facilities in 1969, but the United States refused to support such action. Several years ago there was concern that India might attack Pakistan's nuclear installations. Even if this was a serious possibility, its probability has declined sharply. The two countries entered into an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. This agreement held even during the crisis situations in the 1999-2002 period. Since then, India and Pakistan have taken additional measures to prevent an accidental outbreak or escalation of conflict. More germane to the contemporary context is the emphasis in the U.S. 2002 Nuclear Posture Review on offensive military action against rogue states. The United States seriously contemplated a preventive strike against North Korea's nuclear weapon facilities during the first nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1993-94 (Perry 2006). And the George W. Bush administration threatened preventive action against North Korea during its first term. 3 However, that policy has lost traction and has no support among states in Northeast Asia, including U.S. allies. Neighboring countries oppose any preventive strike, fearing that it could result in a general war that would have negative consequences for their own national security and regional stability. Although the United States has the military capability to undertake such an action it is unlikely to act without the support of its regional allies. The force option is still on the table, but the approach to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem has decidedly shifted to the diplomatic arena.

**1NR---AT: Edelman**

**Dire proliferation predictions never come true – a nuclear Iran would establish stability in the region – empirically proved**

**Van Creveld ‘6** (Martin, Prof. Mil. Hist. – Hebrew U., The Forward, “Knowing Why Not To Bomb Iran Is Half the Battle”, 4-26, http://www.d-n-i.net/creveld/to\_bomb\_iran.htm)

The first and most obvious question is whether it is worth doing in the first place. Starting right after Hiroshima, each time a country was about to go nuclear Washington went out of its way to sound the alarm, warning of the dire consequences that would surely follow. From 1945 to 1949 it was the Soviet Union which, once it had succeeded in building nuclear weapons, was supposed to make an attempt at world conquest. In the 1950s it was America's own clients, Britain and France, who were regarded as the offenders and put under pressure. Between 1960 and 1993, first China, then Israel (albeit to a limited extent) and finally India and Pakistan were presented as the black sheep, lectured, put under pressure and occasionally subjected to sanctions. Since then, the main victim of America's peculiar belief that it alone is sufficiently good and sufficiently responsible to possess nuclear weapons has been North Korea. As the record shows, in none of these cases did the pessimists' visions come true. Neither Stalin, Mao nor any of the rest set out to conquer the world. It is true that, as one country after another joined the nuclear club, Washington's ability to threaten them or coerce them declined. However, nuclear proliferation did not make the world into a noticeably worse place than it had always been — and if anything, to the contrary. As Europe, the Middle East and South Asia demonstrate quite well, in one region after another the introduction of nuclear weapons led, if not to brotherhood and peace, then at any rate to the demise of large-scale warfare between states. Given the balance of forces, it cannot be argued that a nuclear Iran will threaten the United States. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's fulminations to the contrary, the Islamic Republic will not even be a threat to Israel. The latter has long had what it needs to deter an Iranian attack. Should deterrence fail, Jerusalem can quickly turn Tehran into a radioactive desert — a fact of which Iranians are fully aware. Iran's other neighbors, such as Russia, Pakistan and India, can look after themselves. As it is, they seem much less alarmed by developments in Iran than they do by those thousands of miles away in Washington.

**1NR---AT: Org Theory**

**Org theory doesn’t apply to new powers. Small arsenals and no alert.**

**Goldstein 2k** (Avery, Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Penn., “Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century”, p. 277-278)

Third, nuclear optimists assert that states with the resources to develop and deploy a nuclear arsenal will also possess the rudimentary organizational and technological capabilities necessary to maintain control over what are likely to be relatively small numbers of weapons. And because these weapons are not only a regime's most prized military asset, but one whose possession and possible use by renegade officers, criminals, or terrorists could invite catastrophic retaliatory punishment, the state will have powerful incentives to devise the means for ensuring such contro1.34 Bruce Blair and Scott Sagan, disagreeing with such optimism, have described how bureaucratic routines designed to cope with the unforgiving realities of nuclear war increase the risk that any nuclear use will be spasmodic rather than carefully managed." Their work suggests a terrifying loss of control once the dynamics of escalation begin. Optimists offer two countervailing considerations. One is that the pessimists may be correct in their characterization of the organizational risks when the linked adversaries were the overarmed Cold War superpowers, but wrong to impose their logic on other nuclear states. For states other than the superpowers, the small size of the arsenals, along with simple doctrines for weapons use, render irrelevant many of the organizational pathologies that the pessimists detail. The other optimist counter is that fear of the very dynamic the pessimists describe may well be an important consideration discouraging leaders from greatly easing tight peacetime controls, even in a crisis, lest they set in motion standard operating procedures that prove irreversible. Fearing even a small probability of inadvertent disaster discourages recklessness in confrontations among nuclear-armed states. Doubt about one's actual ability to manage alerted nuclear forces, or to exercise sustained positive control over the use of nuclear weapons in a military conflict, like doubt about an adversary's actual ability and willingness to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike, tips the balance further in the direction of war avoidance and encourages a reluctance to loosen controls.37

**No impact to org theory.**

**Madson 6** (Peter, Graduate Student – Naval Postgraduate School, Masters Thesis, “THE SKY IS NOT FALLING: REGIONAL REACTION TO A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN”, STINET, p. 9)

The negative side of the Pessimists debate is that it is based upon theory without a factual basis to support its ultimate conclusions. Certainly, there have been instances in which nuclear weapons have nearly been used in conflict, but the taboo against their use remains in place. There could be a nuclear war, intended or otherwise tomorrow; however, history, and the threat that if there was the consequences would be vast, argues against it. Nuclear conflict cannot happen through graduated steps─the weapons either have or have not been used. Theorizing about what might happen because of societal, organizational, or institutional standards is useful for adding additional security to ensure that accidents do not happen. On the other hand, these factors do not explain completely, with historical events to back them up, how the spread of nuclear weapons is inherently dangerous.

**Adaptive learning solves – new powers will learn from US mistakes building modest arsenals with tight command systems**

**Chellaney 95** (Brahma, Prof. – New Delhi Center for Policy Research, Security Studies, “Naivete and Hypocrisy: Why Antiproliferation Zealotry Does Not Make Sense”, Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer, p. 780-81)

To apply such logic (or lack of it) to possible developments in other parts of the world would be a grave error. New nuclear states are likely to pursue modest, programs and goals and be contented with minimal deterrent arsenals. The three quasi-nuclear-weapons states - India, Israel, and Pakistan - for example, have pursued strategies of minimum deterrence. This is reflected in their willingness to embrace a global fissile cut-off and a comprehensive test ban. These two proposed measures will impose quantitative and qualitative caps, respectively, on the nuclear programs of these countries and ensure that they do not go beyond minimal deterrent levels. New nuclear states, obviously, will have the advantage that they can learn from the mistakes of the established nuclear powers. Only in recent years have these powers removed sections of their arsenals from full alert and adopted new targeting strategies to avert an accidental launch. New nuclear states could seek deterrence without fusing the warheads to the missiles or even keeping the warheads in fully assembled form. For deterrence to work, a nation does not need to have a launch-on-warning strategy, only the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary. As Waltz points out, a state could take its time to respond to an attack. If security interests of a nation can be served by an operational capability to ready nuclear weapons within a day or even hours, it would reduce or eliminate the onerous responsibilities involved in servicing and maintaining nuclear weapons and replacing decaying material. More importantly, it would obviate some of the critical safety-related organizational problems Sagan is concerned about. Only now are the big powers realizing that deactivating nuclear weapons does not compromise deterrence. The basic requirements of minimum deterrence can be met by a new proliferator in a way that does not, from an organizational approach, lead to deterrence failure or an accidental or unauthorized launch of a weapon, or invite a preventive strike by an adversary. Sagan's use of the United States as a case study to illustrate the problems supposedly inherent in building stable deterrence is analogous to the use of Western deterrence theory to understand developments elsewhere in the world. Sagan contends that if those problems existed in the United States, with its highly professional military and strong civilian authority, there are bound to be even more acute in other countries. Not necessarily. Much of the world does not have the extraordinarily high urban crime rate of the United States, whose police force unquestionably is very professional. A new nuclear state may decide to build only two to three dozen nuclear weapons and disperse them widely without weakening its political command and control and ensuring that at least a few weapons would survive a first strike by a potential adversary. New nuclear states are unlikely to fit into the traditional Western deterrence paradigm. The Indian, Israeli, and Pakistani nuclear-weapons programs and strategies, for example, cannot be easily explained with the aid of Western deterrence logic and theory.

**1NR---BioShift**

**Solving nuclear prolif causes a shift to bio-weapons**

**Cordesman 2k** [Anthony, Senior Fellow for Strategic Assessment – CSIS, Federal News Service, 3-28, L/N]

New, critical technologies are escaping our control One of the problems I have noticed in US government efforts to analyze proliferation is that they focus on past and current threats. As result, our studies tend to give primary weight to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Advances in genetic engineering, biotechnology, medicine, pharmaceuticals, and food processing, however, are making it progressively easier to manufacture biological weapons **with nuclear lethalities**, to do so under breakout conditions, and do so with little or no warning of the precise nature of the threat. The engines and guidance systems needed for cruise missiles are becoming industrial devices like GPS, sensor-triggered fuses, cluster munitions, drones, crop sprayers, cellular phones interaction with the steady growth in global commerce, shipping, and labor migration to make covert and proxy attacks steadily more effective. Ironically, controlling ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons alone tends to simply push proliferation into other weapons systems and modes of delivery.

**Bioweapons are comparatively worse than nuclear war—causes extinction and turns the case**

**Singer 1**— Clifford Singer, Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign [Spring 2001, “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P\_XIII/Singer.htm]

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a **dominant** civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a socalled nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in **even a full scale nuclear exchange** at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years.

There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is [[1]](#footnote-1)achieved.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)