## \*\*\* 1AC

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#### What is powering our laptops? The lights in this building? The air conditioner that keeps us cool and the elevators that carry us between floors? What sort of fuel is burning to keep the power plant running at peak capacity? Where is it from? Who--and what--is hurt by it?

#### Most everyone in current society is unable to answer these questions, because energy and electricity are *intangible* and *taken for granted*. We simply expect power to be there when we plug in to an outlet. We don’t worry about where it came from.

#### This is a direct result of the design of the *centralized energy system* on which modern society runs—we are distanced, geographically and emotionally, from the sources of electricity. This distance and the attendant intangibility of energy makes awareness and sustainability impossible.

Pierce and Paulos, 2010 [James Pierce, Eric Paulos, researcher and Cooper-Siegel Endowed Chair at the Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon University “Materializing energy”, <http://www.paulos.net/papers/2010/MaterializingEnergy_DIS2010.pdf>]

**THE INTANGIBILITY OF ENERGY** A common observation among designers and researchers interested in sustainability and energy is that energy is “invisible”. A number of research, design, and art projects have attempted to render “invisible” energy “visible” with a goal of promoting “energy awareness” and motivating energy conservation behavior (see, e.g., [22]). It has been argued that energy invisibility and energy unawareness are in fact two major consequences of material progress within the last century [28]. However, the energy we use daily to power our devices, homes, and cities is not simply perceptually invisible but also intangible. We are unaware of energy largely because it does not have (and is not designed to have) a strong tangible presence in our lives. The various material technologies that provide us with energy effectively distance us from the material production of energy and even the consumption of energy in many ways. Our relationship to electricity, for example, is limited primarily to plugging a cord into an outlet. Our relationship with energy as well as most infrastructural technologies supporting it may said to be constituted in what philosopher of technology Don Ihde describes as a background relation[10]. Through background relations, technologies are present to us only to the extent that they help shape the context of our experience; we do not directly and consciously experience them. In the remainder of this section we develop this notion of energy as intangible by investigating diverse conceptualizations of energy. Emerging through these investigations we propose the notion of *energy-as-materiality* and further outline a simple framework for designing interactions with energy-asmateriality involving *collecting*, *keeping*, *sharing*, and *activating* energy.

#### The environmental costs of the traditional power system-- from climate change to water pollution to air pollution—are massive but not accounted for. This destroys the environment and makes renewables economically uncompetitive.

Sovacool, 2009 [Benjamin, Energy Governance Program, Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore. Also, knocked Herndon out of the NDT his junior year. On vagueness. Siiiiiiiick. “Rejecting renewables: The socio-technical impediments to renewable electricity in the United States” Energy Policy 37 (2009) 4500–4513]

3. Economic impediments

While renewable power sources have social benefits, they are not without costs, and the existing system prices electricity in a manner that tends to favor conventional options. For most of its history, the American electric utility sector has focused on making electricity abundant and cheap with the assistance of regulators and politicians, who subsidize all forms of energy to shield consumers from the true costs of extraction, generation, distribution, and use. The environmental and social costs inherent with the existing system, therefore, have also become less and less noticeable. Many utilities endorse fossil and nuclear plants because they are able to pass most of the costs from these polluting power systems directly onto consumers and society at large. Renewable power sources, in contrast, provide public benefits that are not yet valued in the electricity market.

Because of this non-alignment between electricity's cost and price, utilities reject renewables and continue to rely on less efficient and more damaging generators that guarantee them future profits. When the principles of neoclassical economics were being formulated by Marshall (1890) and Pigou (1920), one of their central arguments was that all costs from a transaction had to be internalized (or taxed, to use Pigou's language). Otherwise, firms would always exploit the system to shift as many costs as they could to the public. About five decades later, Garrett Hardin developed the term “tragedy of the commons” to refer to how people (and firms) rationally externalize as many of the costs associated with their activities that they can. Examples of “the commons” for Hardin included agricultural grazing lands, the National Parks, free parking meters, and a thief robbing a bank. The commons in each instance – grass, land, parking spaces, other people's money – had a tendency to be exploited because the benefits of abusing them accrued to a small group of individuals, whereas the costs were distributed to everyone. Or, as Hardin (1968, p. 1245) noted, “we are locked into a system of fouling our own nest, so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.”

This situation has very real implications for the American electric utility sector. Fossil fuel and nuclear power plants are the nation's second largest users of water, produce millions of tons of solid waste, emit mercury, particulate matter, and other noxious pollutants into the atmosphere, and cause social inequity by exacerbating poverty. Yet in the current system, they do not have to pay for most of this damage. If they did have to fully internalize the costs of transportation, air pollution, water contamination, and land use (and, when applicable, damages such as injury and death), coal generation would cost 19.14 cents per kilowatt-hour (¢/kWh) more; oil and natural gas generation 12 ¢/kWh more; nuclear power 11.1 ¢/kWh more ( [Sovacool, 2008a] and [Sovacool, 2008b]) (see Fig. 3). Given that the average residential price of electricity in the United States for 2007 was about 10 ¢/kWh, the damages from these energy systems currently outweigh the amount that customers pay for them.

Put another way, in 2007 fossil fueled and nuclear power generators exacted about $420 billion in damages – excluding possible damages from climate change – that were not reflected in electricity prices, an amount $143 billion more than the $277 billion in revenues the American electricity industry reported for the same year. Consequently, forcing renewable power technologies to compete against conventional generators when the prices are so skewed in their favor is much like racing a tricycle against a Ferrari.

#### Those punished by this out of sight, out of mind energy policy are overwhelmingly minority populations—being black or latino is the BEST PREDICTOR for the proximity of a coal plant

Clark, 2008 [Catherine, MA in public Policy @ Oregon State, “Environmental Justice and Energy Production: Coal-Fired Power Plants in Illinois” http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/9770/clark-mpp.pdf?sequence=1]

This study finds that there is something different about the populations living very¶ near coal-fired power plants (within 10-, 20-, and 30- miles) from those living further¶ away. Population density, Cook County, Latinos, and African American populations are¶ the best predictors of the location of a coal-fired power plant in Illinois, even after¶ controlling for income and housing values. While these findings may seem to simply¶ reiterate the legacy problems of poor air quality in the cities, there is more to be¶ concluded. The problems of the urban area, the problems of energy, and the problems of¶ pollution are problems for everyone. Environmental justice is just another in the long list¶ of reasons to promote cleaner energy production for every American.

#### This is an issue of justice—minority communities bear the brunt of environmental damage with massive effects on health

Clark, 2008 [Catherine, MA in public Policy @ Oregon State, “Environmental Justice and Energy Production: Coal-Fired Power Plants in Illinois” http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/9770/clark-mpp.pdf?sequence=1]

Two grievances are particularly relevant today to encourage viewing energy¶ production through the justice perspective: the stagnation in U.S. national energy policy¶ and the negative health affects associated with coal-fired power plants. Resource¶ mobilization theory suggests that with these grievances properly framed, taken with an¶ upcoming window in national politics, it may be a propitious time to evolve the¶ movement’s agenda.

The stagnation in U.S. energy policy in reference to coal-fired power plants is¶ related to the Clean Air Act and its enforcement. The Environmental Protection Agency¶ (2008a) describes how the act was originally passed by Congress in 1970. The Clean Air¶ Act applied to, among other sources of air pollution, coal-fired power plants built after¶ 1970. It also included a “grandfather clause” that exempted existing coal-fired power¶ plants from being regulated under the act. The goal of Congress was to allow plants with¶ cleaner technology to replace old plants thereby cleaning up the air without an undo¶ burden on the energy industry or customers having to pay suddenly higher energy price

As new plants opened to replace old plants, more and more plants would be regulated by¶ and subject to the restrictions of the Clean Air Act (Hawkins, 2000).¶ However, a large number of the coal-fired power plants built before 1970 are still¶ in operation. Instead of not being regulated at all, they are regulated under the Clean Air¶ Act’s New Source Review program (NSR) (Rogers, 1990). When a grandfathered plant¶ is "modified," it becomes subject to the Clean Air Act. “Modification” is defined broadly¶ to include “any physical change or change in method of operation” that increases¶ emissions. The EPA rules, however, provide an exclusion for “routine maintenance,¶ repair, and replacement” (Hawkins, 2000). It is this exclusion that has allowed many old¶ coal-fired power plants to stay in operation emitting higher levels of pollution. It has¶ become the strategy of the power industry to use capital investments to upgrade existing¶ plants to run longer rather than having them retire and be replaced by newer more¶ efficient and cleaner plants (Hawkins, 2000). This problem may have been exacerbated¶ by the mid 1990’s push for electricity deregulation. Long (1997) and Coequyt and¶ Stanfield (1999) indicate that with individuals able to choose their own energy supplier,¶ many are choosing the least expensive. This moves an even greater demand for¶ electricity back to the oldest and dirtiest coal-fired power plants that are able to deliver a¶ cheap product at the expense of environmental concerns.¶ The second grievance is the possible negative health effects of living near a coalfired¶ power plant. Keating and Davis (2002) and Keating (2004) have studied the¶ connection between coal-fired power plants and African American and Latino¶ communities. They describe the most troublesome pollutants as ozone, sulfur dioxides,¶ particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and carbon dioxide. Particulate matter¶ comes in two forms: particulate matter 10 micrometers or less in diameter (PM10) and¶ particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (PM2.5, also known as fine¶ particulate matter). Mercury has only recently been limited and only for those plants¶ subject to the full Clean Air Act, and carbon dioxide is not currently regulated (EPA,¶ 2008b). The other pollutants listed above have been regulated as part of the Clean Air¶ Act for the past few decades. Keating and Davis (2002) describe that asthma attacks send¶ African Americans to the emergency room at three times the rate (174.3 visits per 10,000¶ persons) of whites (59.4 visits per 10,000 persons). African Americans are hospitalized¶ for asthma at more than three times the rate of whites (35.6 admissions per 10,000¶ population vs. 10.6 admissions per 10,000 population). More than fifty percent of¶ Latinos live in areas that violate the federal air pollution standards for ozone (Keating,¶ 2004). The health effects from dirty air may be exacerbated in poor and minority¶ communities where health coverage rates are low (Keating and Davis, 2002, Keating,¶ 2004).

Given these grievances, the resources currently available to the environmental¶ justice movement and its new agenda of global climate change, PERRO may be leading¶ the way for the movement to begin addressing energy production from a justice¶ perspective. This paper examines the claim of disproportionate siting of coal-fired power¶ plants in poor and minority communities in the state of Illinois by employing geographic¶ and regression analysis techniques.

#### This sort of environmental racism must be rejected as an incredibly virulent and dangerous form of institutional racism

Environmental Justice Network, No date [http://www.ejnet.org/ej/]

Definitions:

Environmental equity: Poison people equally  
Environmental justice: Stop poisoning people, period.

Environmental racism is the disproportionate impact of environmental hazards on people of color. [Environmental justice](http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.html) is the movement's response to environmental racism. "Environmental equity" is not environmental justice. "Environmental equity" is the government's response to the demands of the environmental justice movement. Government agencies, like the EPA, have been coopting the movement by redefining environmental justice as "fair treatment and meaningful involvement," something they consistently fail to accomplish, but which also falls far short of the [environmental justice](http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.html) vision. The environmental justice movement isn't seeking to simply redistribute environmental harms, but to abolish them.

A note on institutional racism...

The most significant problem facing people of color is the institutional and cultural racism which results in discrimination in access to services, goods and opportunities. Institutional racism involves polices, practices, and procedures of institutions that have a disproportionately negative effect on racial minorities' access to and quality of goods, services, and opportunities. Systemic racism is the basis of individual and institutional racism; it is the value system that is embedded in a society that supports and allows discrimination. Institutional and systemic racism establishes separate and independent barriers. Institutional racism does not have to result from human agency or intention. Thus, racial discrimination can occur in institutions even when the institution does not intend to make distinctions on the basis of race. In the context of racism, power is a necessary precondition for discrimination. Racism depends on the ability to give or withhold social benefits, facilities, services, opportunities etc., from someone who is entitled to them, and is denied on the basis of race, color or national origin. The source of power can be formal or informal, legal or illegal, and is not limited to traditional concepts of power. Intent is irrelevant; the focus is on the result of the behavior.

#### Moreover, this centralized energy system has created fuel poverty, where some people lack access to the heat and electricity that lets them survive the winter and live day to day. This is not just a failure to provide cheap energy, it is also a failure to recognize and listen to the needs of marginalized communities.

Walker and Day, 2012 [Gordon and Rosie, ¶ a Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, Lancaster,¶ b School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Fuel poverty as injustice: Integrating distribution, recognition and procedure in the struggle for affordable warmth, [Energy Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03014215)

[Volume 49](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03014215/49/supp/C), October 2012, Pages 69–75]

1. Introduction

Over the past 30 years in the UK, and increasingly in other countries, fuel poverty has become recognised as a distinct form of inequality and an unacceptable feature of 21st century living ( [[Boardman, 1991]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib1), [[Boardman, 2010]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib2) and [[Wilkinson et al., 2007]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib40)). Campaigners and advocacy groups have demanded that fuel poverty is acknowledged, measured, monitored and fundamentally addressed through policy responses and in their advocacy have enroled a language of rights, for example in the UK Rights to Warmth campaign.[1](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#fn1) Fuel poverty, in this way, has become a matter of justice, or of what constitutes the basic rights and entitlements of a sufficient and healthful everyday life. As Boardman plainly states, ‘everyone needs to purchase fuel to provide essential energy services, such as warmth, hot water and lighting. These are not discretionary purchases but absolute necessities’ ([Boardman, 2010](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib2), p. 48).

Whilst recognising that fuel poverty is in this way fundamentally a problem of distributive injustice, or the unequal distribution of access to essential energy services, we argue in this paper that there are other understandings of injustice which are also implicated and which play crucial roles in producing and sustaining distributional inequalities. Through analysis of the experience of fuel poverty advocacy and policy development in the UK we argue that work towards the resolution of fuel poverty needs to involve not only seeking a fairer distribution of access to essential energy services, but also the pursuit of fairness in procedural terms and in achieving the fundamental recognition of the diversities and needs of culturally marginalised and excluded social groups.

Our framework of analysis is informed by the body of academic work that has been interested in how justice is made sense of in real-world contexts ( [[Fraser, 1997]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib12), [[Fraser, 1999]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib13), [[Harvey, 1996]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib21), [[Schlosberg, 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib34), [[Schlosberg, 2007]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib35) and [[Young, 1990]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib41)). Whilst fuel poverty might conventionally be thought of as a matter of social justice, closely aligned to social inequalities more generally, it has also been included within an environmental justice framing (see [[Boardman et al., 1999]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib3), [[Friends of the Earth Scotland, 1999]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib17) and [[Lucas et al., 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib27)), connected to related questions of access to environmental resources and to the knock-on implications of environmental and climate policy. Analyses of the meaning of both social and environmental justice therefore provide useful insights to draw on. Our position in relation to this literature is that whilst distributive justice, or ‘who gets what’, is always central to justice claims, any analysis of what constitutes and crucially produces injustice is more complete and satisfactory when other concepts of justice – procedural and recognition-based – are also brought to bear. Within this line of thinking, procedure and recognition can each be seen as both a component and a condition of justice; separate forms and experiences of injustice in themselves, but deeply tied to distributional inequalities. As Schlosberg argues:

“These notions and experiences of injustice are not competing notions, nor are they contradictory or antithetical. Inequitable distribution, a lack of recognition and limited participation all work to produce injustice and claims for injustice” ([Schlosberg, 2004](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512000705#bib34), p. 529)

#### Provision of clean energy for all and necessary energy for those in need is a RIGHTS ISSUE that MUST be addressed—government policy can solve.

Bordman, 2012 [Brenda, Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford, UK , Energy Policy 49 (2012) 143–148]

4. Conclusion¶ To be able to be warm, to be free from intense worry about¶ paying the fuel bills, to be able to afford adequate hot water and¶ light—these are part of our human rights as enshrined in the UN’s¶ Declaration:¶ Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the¶ health and well-being of himself and of his family, including¶ food, clothing, housing and medical care y(UN, 1948, article¶ 25(1)).¶ Yet, fuel poverty is growing in many countries, partly because¶ of increased awareness, but primarily as a result of higher fuel¶ prices that are not offset by energy efficiency improvements in¶ the homes of the fuel poor. Governments have long recognised a¶ duty to help those on the lowest incomes with supplementary¶ funds. Now they need to both recognize and implement policies¶ that help those on the lowest incomes with capital expenditure¶ on greater energy efficiency in their homes.¶ At heart, reducing fuel poverty is about enabling people on low¶ incomes to be warm, comfortable and healthy. They can only¶ achieve this if they are able to purchase cheap heat and inexpen-¶ sive energy services. In the developing world this is often about¶ access to energy—for example about whether a community has a¶ supply of electricity or not. In the developed world it is about the¶ efficient delivery of energy services. In both cases, the underlying¶ issue is the level of capital expenditure targeted on energy use by¶ the poorest households.The causes and solutions to fuel poverty have been knownabout for over 20 years. The complexities of accurate delivery have been identified and now the overall housing, energy and climate change policy framework has been sketched in (Boardman, 2012). The penalties in terms of blighted lives and a diminished society have been confirmed and fuel poverty is recognised as a major public health issue.All the required technologies are there, though some need to become cheaper through wider take-up. The focus has to be on energy demand reduction—new supply cannot deliver warmer homes more cheaply. Many house holders have a sense of what they would like to happen, but do not have the capital, the knowledge or the confidence to proceed. Parliament in the UK has provided the legislative framework and the European Commission is beginning to tackle the issue. All that is now needed is for each government to introduce and deliver a comprehensive strategy to eradicate fuel poverty. There can be no justification for further delay in providing one of the most basic of human rights.

#### This relationship to the energy economy makes massive environmental destruction and species extinction inevitable because of pollution, resource competition, and global warming. Only a new energy paradigm focused on micro-generation can create change fundamental enough to avert disaster

Rifkin, 2012 [Jeremy Rifkin is president of the Foundation on Economic Trends and the bestselling author of nineteen books on the impact of scientific and technological changes on the economy, the workforce, society, and the environment. His books have been translated into more than thirty five languages and are used in hundreds of universities, corporations and government agencies around the world. His most recent books includeThe Third Industrial Revolution, The Empathic Civilization, The Hydrogen Economy, The European Dream, The End of Work, The Age of Access, and The Biotech Century. Jeremy Rifkin has been an adviser to the European Union for the past decade and is the principle architect of the European Union’s Third Industrial Revolution long-term economic sustainability plan.. “The third Industrial Revolution”. Feb 14th. <http://www.makingitmagazine.net/?p=4514>]

Our industrial civilization is at a crossroads. Oil and the other fossil fuel energies that make up the industrial way of life are dwindling, and the technologies made from and propelled by these energies are antiquated. The entire industrial infrastructure built on fossil fuels is aging and in disrepair. The result is that unemployment is rising to dangerous levels all over the world. Governments, businesses and consumers are awash in debt, and living standards are plummeting everywhere. A record one billion human beings – nearly one seventh of the human race – face hunger and starvation.

Worse, climate change from fossil fuel-based industrial activity looms on the horizon. Our scientists warn that we face a potentially cataclysmic change in the temperature and chemistry of the planet, which threatens to destabilize ecosystems around the world. We may be on the brink of a mass extinction of plant and animal life by the end of the century, imperilling our own species’ ability to survive. It is becoming increasingly clear that we need a new economic narrative that can take us into a more equitable and sustainable future.

A new convergence of communication and energy

By the 1980s, the evidence was mounting that the fossil fuel-driven industrial revolution was peaking and that human-induced climate change was forcing a planetary crisis of untold proportions. For the past 30 years, I have been searching for a new paradigm that could usher in a post-carbon era. I came to realize that the great economic revolutions in history occur when new communication technologies converge with new energy systems. New energy regimes make possible the creation of more interdependent economic activity and expanded commercial exchange, as well as facilitating more dense and inclusive social relationships. The accompanying communication revolutions become the means to organize and manage the new temporal and spatial dynamics that arise from new energy systems.

In the 19th century, steam-powered print technology became the communication medium to manage the coal-fired rail infrastructure and the incipient national markets of the First Industrial Revolution.  In the 20th century, electronic communications – the telephone and later, radio and television – became the communication medium to manage and market the oil-powered auto age and the mass consumer culture of the Second Industrial Revolution.

An “energy Internet”

In the mid-1990s, it dawned on me that a new convergence of communication and energy was in the offing. Internet technology and renewable energies were about to merge to create a powerful new infrastructure for a Third Industrial Revolution that would change the world. In the coming era, hundreds of millions of people will produce their own green energy in their homes, offices, and factories, and share it with each other in an “energy Internet,” just like we now create and share information online. The democratization of energy will bring with it a fundamental reordering of human relationships, impacting the very way we conduct business, govern society, educate our children, and engage in civic life.

**PLAN: The United States Federal Government should provide necessary financial incentives for community-planned solar and wind energy production.**

#### Momentum exists for a fundamental change in our energy system. Our policies need to stop supporting centralized elite, technocratic, corporate solutions and empower local community movements by encouraging smaller-scale generation and distribution of energy.

#### An *overt political challenge* is a necessary component of this strategy. The plan’s confrontation with status quo energy elites galvanizes movements and lends legitimacy to broader environmental movements.

Scrase and Smith, 2009 [Ivan SCRASE Science and Technology Policy Research @ Sussex AND Adrian SMITH Science and Technology Policy Research @ Sussex ‘9 “The (non-)politics of managing low carbon socio-technical

Transitions” Environmental Politics 18 (5) p. 722-724]

Political strategies for transitions In the reflexive spirit TM calls for, it is worthwhile questioning the assumption in TM [transition management] (and this volume) that analysts should guide governments towards policies that avoid political fallout. Deciding between options remains, after all, a political calculation. Moreover, insights from the socio-technical transitions literature could equally be directed at entrepreneurs, consumers, communities, pressure groups and/or investors interested in low carbon transitions – governments will make few emissions cuts themselves: it is how they seek cuts by others that matters. Indeed, ‘government’ needs to be unpacked. One needs to consider, for example, whether a political strategy for transitions is to be developed by a political party while in office or opposition. Winning office on a platform that included low carbon transitions as a central political project would lend significant legitimacy to subsequent efforts. Approaching low carbon transitions as a political project suggests familiar strategies and tactics, such as creating large, powerful and well-funded institutions with a remit to pursue the project’s aims. Other institutions’ power might have to be curtailed, for example the power of government departments that have a close client relationship with powerful regime incumbents such as fossil energy companies. Steps could be taken to tie future governments into continuing the political project (Pierson 2000). The Climate Change Act in the UK, for example, commits UK governments to legally binding cuts in greenhouse gas emissions over the period up to 2050. This all implies a certain drive and readiness for conflict that bears little relation to TM’s implicit model of politics. The electricity regime in typical affluent democracies since the 1980s has had regulated competition as its main driver and organising principle. This is now perceived as problematic, and alternative agendas are being seriously considered (Scrase and MacKerron 2009). If the market model is rejected, governments face two options. They can either take a top-down policy approach that forces a transition to a low carbon society, or they can facilitate bottom-up momentum for change by empowering people to make their homes, communities and lifestyles sustainable. The former might take the form of a corporatist strategy in which governments accept that energy services will be supplied by a small number of large firms and try to enrol these firms to support and implement low carbon policies. Under such arrangements, however, governments would be under pressure to defend the interests of large energy companies, which implies that low carbon transition pathways are more likely to proceed by subsidising nuclear power and CCS than by supporting renewables. In contrast, the alternative pathway, which would make much greater use of distributed and micro-generation, implies breaking up the large energy companies and reducing dependence on the national grid for electricity supplies. This route would presuppose a groundswell of popular concern about climate change and a readiness to use new technologies to cut emissions, combined with policy frameworks that enable this rather than making local pioneers continually face impossible odds. The corporatist strategy would derive its power base from industry and experts, while the decentralising strategy would be based on popular engagement and democratic support. Despite TM’s emphasis on ‘niches’, in terms of political strategy it appears more closely aligned with corporatism than with radical decentralisation. The decentralisation pathway might make use of transitions analysis, but quite differently from the ways sketched above. Transition analysis would be directed at making it as easy as possible for individuals, families and communities to invest, organise, link into low carbon networks of one kind and another, and so on. It is difficult to square that with policy generated in technocratic arenas through appraisal and foresight exercises. Moreover, it implies high levels of political commitment to pressure energy regimes accordingly. This kind of political project, underpinned by choices between contending green pathways, lies beyond TM. Conclusion One can argue that TM is a procedural tool that can be put to use by many different players. Yet no tool is neutral, and we have to consider whether the nature of TM renders it susceptible to capture. Does emphasis on consensus amongst an elite vanguard, a niche-based momentum for change, and reliance on integration with more powerful policy domains, really challenge the structures that TM hopes to transform? Even though TM proclaims participatory and reflexive processes, the narrow power base of its transition arenas, coupled with a limited and largely implicit political strategy, forces it towards technocratic strategies. In principle, the open nature of TM and flexibility in purpose means that it might be possible to use it in ways that help empower people and facilitate a groundswell of bottom-up sustainability initiative (Seyfang and Smith 2007). There is certainly much to commend a multi-level, socio-technical analysis of how our needs are realised and how sustainable pathways might be realised in more democratic ways. But this would require a concomitant redistribution of resources to support the numerous, distributed and context-sensitive niches that would explore those visions and pathways. TM has been a remarkable success in casting existing policy measures in an informative new light. However, in the context of the typical affluent democracy it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the political strategies and tactics it advocates are inadequate for the task it has set itself. Yet the history of environmentalism reminds us that groups in society are perpetually trying to develop niche alternatives and pressure incumbent regimes in many different ways and with differing levels of agency and influence. A messy, informal transition politics already exists. In our view, this suggests possibilities for mobilisation in a political programme for low carbon transitions.

#### And, Government support is essential to the adoption of renewable tech—it LEADS to community and market acceptance. The negative’s complaints about “intermittency” aren’t failures of technology; they are failures of status quo political leadership. The plan’s STRONG SIGNAL at the POLICY LEVEL is key.

Wolsink, 2011 [Maarten, Maarten Wolsink∗

Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam,” The research agenda on social acceptance of distributed generation in smart

grids: Renewable as common pool resources” Elsevier Journal Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews]

3.2.1. Inadequate policies The challenges of implementing renewables demonstrate the importance of addressing the social acceptance and adoption of the crucial elements of smart microgrids. The deployment of renewables has progressed remarkably slowly in most countries. The development of a home market has emerged as a key factor in the advancement of the technology and the industry producing renewable energy generating units—wind turbines and PV units alike [45,46]. Most countries have policies and targets for deployment of renewables, but implementation is slow. For example, in the Netherlands none of the policy targets for wind power has ever been met [47,48]. Studies that compared the large differences in applying innovation in the electricity supply among various countries revealed that neither the availability of resources nor energy prices had a defining impact on implementation rates—this credit went to strong institutional factors [49–51]. In fact, the establishment of the necessary infrastructure in environmental governance is often not supported by existing institutions, and this explicitly includes the policy frameworks defined by the same governments [52].

Deployment of renewables faces many problems connected to social acceptance. In the concept of social acceptance of renewable energy innovations three dimensions are distinguished (Fig. 2): (1) socio-political acceptance concerns the acceptance of decisions about the institutional framework; this framework can in turn create favourable conditions or impede the acceptance in the other two dimensions: (2) community acceptance and (3) market acceptance [53].

3.2.2. Implementation framework Socio-political acceptance helps establish conducive conditions for implementing innovations. It is about the willingness among key stakeholders and policymakers to generate institutional changes and policies that create favourable conditions for new technologies (top of Fig. 2). Among other things this concerns the political and social willingness to price electricity accurately, in particular as related to all externalities of all the alternatives of power generation. As with stagnant deployment of renewables [55,56], fostering socio-political acceptance of the institutional changes needed for developing smart grids could turn out to be the main barrier.

Today’s power grids are highly centralised. The emergence of microgrids and DG runs counter to the existing system, which will institutionally impede socio-political acceptance. Regarding innovation, close connections of the sector‘s incumbents with policymakers induces strong inertia and retards the processes of innovation [57]. Advocates of incumbents often claim that renewable sources have failed to deliver on their promises and they emphasise the variability – ‘intermittancy’ – of the supply of these sources [58]. However, this is not a technological failure relating to their performance, but it is due to the lack of socio-political acceptance to include externalities in electricity prices [56]. As demonstrated by current experience, development is accelerated by the political and economic commitment to the application of instruments that incorporate the cost of renewables into energy tariffs and that fully opens up the grid for all actors interested in investing and operating renewables. Under this class of instruments (usually referred to as feed-in-tariffs), energy consumers pay for the power generated by renewables. Hence, consumers are paying for the kWhs they use, instead of taxpayers subsidizing installed capacity without a reference to actually generated power and use. Pioneering countries like Germany conferred crucial legitimacy and provided the first large industrial experience, allowing for economies of scale and learning through standardisation. The acceptance of such policy principles is furthering renewables implementation, particularly in the first phase of renewables development, as the model of large wind farm schemes generating significant revenues was demonstrated to be viable [59].

#### Energy must be rendered tangible via local generation. Doing so builds a bridge between “*energy awareness*”—the status quo where people know about environmental consequences but don’t change their behavior—and “*energy engagement*”, where we actively remake our lives towards sustainability.

#### This tangible engagement is the difference between shrilly shouting at people about energy and inviting and teaching them to change their lives. The aff is the key to guiding our relationship with energy and society towards a sustainable future.

Pierce and Paulos, 2010 [James Pierce, Eric Paulos, researcher and Cooper-Siegel Endowed Chair at the¶ Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon University “Materializing energy”, <http://www.paulos.net/papers/2010/MaterializingEnergy_DIS2010.pdf>]

Designing for energy engagement and attunementEnergy engagement could be a powerful way of transforming our relationships with energy in more meaningful and sustainable ways. In terms of materializing energy through engagement with energy devices, designers can aim to design technologies with and through which limiting the availability of energy is not perceived of as increased effort but rather as focal engagement. Consider a decentralized energy scenario in which a micro-wind generator is situated atop the roof of ones house or a local community wind farm is shared by members of a city. In this case, *shifting* [23] the practice of laundering to moments when the wind is blowing may be perceived not as unpleasant effortful engagement but rather as meaningful focal engagement with ones technology and electricity, home and community, wind and world. Similarly, microgenerated solar power could help mediate focal engagement with the sun and solar generated electricity leading to individuals turning off indoor lights when they are not being used. As suggested by one participant it could be like “tending to your solar garden.” In terms of rematerializing energy through reengagement with simpler things, designers can design for the replacement or displacement of energy-consuming devices in favor of rematerializing focal things such as hand tools that require only human bodily energy to function. To continue with the above examples, engagement with “local” wind and solar energy could promote displacing the automatic clothes dryer in favor of air drying clothes or displacing indoor lights during the daytime in favor of natural lighting. Services and systems could be cleverly designed to build on the engagement mediated by solar panels between individuals and the sun and the natural rhythms of the seasons, perhaps helping to rematerialize farming and passive solar heating practices.

We propose that one useful way of thinking about energy engagement is in relation to energy awareness, which is one of the most common strategies taken by interactive systems designers and researchers interested in energy and sustainability. This approach essentially aims to make people more cognitively aware of energy consumption, often through the use of “real-time” feedback and with a primary goal of directly or indirectly motivating conservation behavior. As a bridging concept between energy awareness and energy engagement we offer the notion of energy attunement, by which we mean to suggest approaching cognitive energy awareness as an experiential materialized presence of energy that invites focal engagement. As illustrated in the above examples and following the discussion in the introduction an important emerging opportunity area is designing for attunement to the collection of energy. Another important emerging area is energy demand response and smart-metering systems, suggesting designing for attunement to the *sharing* of energy. Speaking figuratively, the concept of energy attunement suggests a conceptual shift from shouting at people about energy to inviting them to be more in touch with energy. However, we also note that strong consideration must be given to the potential for any wellintentioned technological intervention to further separate our selves and our energy and to help sustain unsustainable practices. For example, consider the possibility that equipping homes with advanced energy sensing infrastructures for energy awareness or energy attunement could in fact maintain or increase the demand for energy consuming devices, which would then, of course, demand being sensed

CONCLUSIONWe have drawn from a diverse range of perspectives on materiality and energy in order to propose a more integrative perspective on *energy-as-materiality*. In doing so we have more explicitly drawn attention to the connections between energy and the material conditions of our designed and designing world. We have proposed and employed a design approach of *materializing energy* through the combination of design exploration and critical investigation. Throughout we have suggested energy as an exemplary “immaterial materiality”—as a very real matter that nonetheless often does not significantly and consciously matter to those who variously and inevitably demand and depend upon it. Indeed, the situation is as it is by design. As we have argued, energy is not simply something with which we are unaware, but energy is intangible, undifferentiated, and available; energy has been designed not to matter to us in these ways. What has changed is that we now realize the conditions that have been designed are unsustainable. Motivated by the aim of working towards the realization of a desirable and sustainable future, while at the same time struggling to determine what such a future could or should be, we have suggested ways of materializing energy that have variously sought to re-design energy as something more tangible, more differentiated, and less available. It is our hope and intention that both our broader approach of materializing energy and the specific concepts proposed will be of service to designers intent on designing sustainable interactive systems. Just as we recognize that we currently dwell and design in an unsustainable world of immaterial energy, and that this world designs us to treat energy as immaterial, we must also recognize that we can design our world to be otherwise.

#### And, The plan’s incentive for local renewable microgeneration creates a material and emotional interaction with energy that challenges the monolithic energy structure of the status quo and fosters a *broader* *discussion* and *participation* in discussions about energy. Awareness alone is insufficient—this sort of material engagement is a prerequisite to meaningful participation, and creates sustainable relationships to both the environment and society—we become aware of the ethical effects of our energy decisions

Pierce and Paulos, 2010 [James Pierce, Eric Paulos, researcher and Cooper-Siegel Endowed Chair at the¶ Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon University ”Designing for emotional attachment to energy” <http://www.jamesjpierce.com/publications/pierce-emotional_energy.pdf>]

4.2. Transforming our relationships with energy.One of the primary aims of our research is to promote sustainable everyday practices. This includes common acts of energy conservation, such as turning off lights and other devices when they are not being used. However, to a greater extent our concern is with creatively imagining and designing scenarios for transforming everyday practices for sustainability. Emerging wind and solar technologies, for example, are not simply ways of obtaining “clean” energy but also may potentially transform how we think about and relate to energy. Designing for individuals to be emotionally connected to their energy could promote new forms of care and maintenance over the technologies and energies required to sustain one’s self and community. Designing for emotional relationships with energy further may encourage “energy literacy” among the general public and help draw non-experts into debates about energy consumption and energy ethics.

4.3. Reifying energy**.** Explicitly designing for emotional attachment to energy also raises questions about how we should relate (and not relate) to energy. While increasing people’s attachment to energy could, on the one hand, lead to increased care and conservation of energy it might also lead to increased consumption and fetishization of energy. (See [1] for additional discussion around the potential “reification of energy”; also see Tony Fry for a discussion of “symbolic devaluation and the destruction of sign value” as a strategy for sustainable design [8].) Thus, while we argue that designing for emotional attachment to energy is a novel and important area for interaction designers to consider, we also argue that the ideas introduced here should be engaged with cautiously. We tend to view the notion of emotional attachment to energy as a useful counterpoint to the design of current interactions with energy, one that may serve as a conceptual lens for re-thinking how to design our relationships and interactions with and through energy in everyday life. Our work is not intended to replace our entire existing energy infrastructure, but rather to challenge this single, homogeneous energy landscape and to augment the range of experiences and interactions with energy. It is almost certainly inappropriate, for example, to design interactions with larger-scale domestic solar collection systems in the same way that we envisioned people might interact with the Energy Mementos. However, by considering emotional attachment to energy in the design of technologies such as domestic solar microgeneration systems, designers may encourage individuals to think about and use their “homeade energy” differently, potentially leading to more sustainable interactions and relationships with their energy and technology.

5. ConclusionsBuilding on a framework for approaching energy as materiality, we have discussed several design explorations around the theme of emotional attachment to energy. We have framed some emerging issues related to energy, emotion and interaction design by proposing a design strategy aimed at rendering energy more tangible and meaningful. Such a strategy goes beyond “energy awareness” toward promoting more involved and meaningful material engagement with energy. In future work we intend to further engage with design issues related to energy and materiality with the aim of redirecting everyday interactions and practices toward sustainability.

#### And, the plan encourages a set of technologies that mediates our relationship with energy in such a way that it directs it towards sustainability—the psychological effects of its integration create wholesale cultural change and awareness—we think about the social aspects and not just the technology

**Pierce and Paulos, 2010** [James Pierce, Eric Paulos, researcher and Cooper-Siegel Endowed Chair at the¶ Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon University “Materializing energy”, <http://www.paulos.net/papers/2010/MaterializingEnergy_DIS2010.pdf>]

Our approach is grounded in a belief that sustainable interaction design can benefit from and indeed likely requires substantially rethinking what energy is, how we use energy, and how we relate to and live with energy. Our work is in part critical in that we challenge unchallenged assumptions about energy in design. For example, approaches to designing behavioral interventions to promote domestic electricity conservation often implicitly assume if not explicitly take as a matter of immutable fact that electricity is readily and relatively cheaply available, that electricity is accessed through household outlets and delivered to us by large centralized systems of energy production and distribution, and that individuals are physically and emotionally distanced from the consumption and certainly the production of their electricity. While our approach is critical in challenging these types of assumptions it is also exploratory in the search for desirable sustainable alternatives. As such, our critical stances are taken as points of departure for conceptual exploration, material actualization, and theoretical articulation of such alternatives. Far from offering a single prescriptive design strategy or a set of clear and actionable “solutions”, what we are offering is perhaps most importantly an alternative of “energy alternatives” for design (as distinct from the technological panacea of “alternative energy”). While critical reflection and provocation are employed as methods as well as intended outcomes of our exploration and inquiry a potentially opposing goal underlies our work: to transform extraordinary scenarios of sustainability into the ordinary, and to allow radically sustainable ways of being to materialize as our normal ways of being.

Electrification: Dominant and emerging energy regimes In this paper we focus primarily but not exclusively on electricity as a form of energy of central importance in contemporary everyday life and society and of particular relevance to HCI and interaction design. Electrical devices and systems not only demand energy in order to operate but in operating as so are implicated in the enormous and everincreasing demand for energy. Further, interactive products and systems can be said to mediate our perceptions of and relationships with and within our world—and with energy.3 It follows that interactive technologies can be designed to mediate action and perception in sustainable or unsustainable ways. Particular attention is further made to emerging technologies with the strong potential to disrupt the current sociotechnical regimes of energy, technologies such as renewable microgeneration, microgrids, demand response systems, smart metering and dynamic pricing schemes to name but a few of the most prominent. While these types of interventions are often positioned as sustainable “solutions” less attention is paid to the potentially unsustainable structures these interventions might knowingly and unknowingly help sustain. We argue that designers and researchers of interactive systems should be mindful of the ways new technologies and the impetus surrounding them could be shaped to more profoundly reshape social expectations and practices in the direction of sustainability. For example, consider renewable microgeneration such as solar photovoltaic, wind, and combined heat and power generation. Environmental psychologist Patrick Devine-Wright articulates one vision of microgeneration and “decentralized” energy systems as sites for the emergence of new behavioral, social, and political paradigms of energy:

It is likely that decentralized generation from homes and buildings, along with local power plant such as small-scale wind farms or district heating systems with CHP plant, will represent very different contexts for energy behaviour in the future. Deployment of micro-generation and smart-metering technologies will transform buildings into power stations and offer unprecedented opportunities for ‘in sight and mind’ energy systems. These devices not only challenge accepted ways of imagining or talking about energy generation and supply, such as the utility of the concept of ‘power station’ in a decentralized energy future…but are also likely to substantially raise the salience of energy issues in everyday life, making people more aware of how heat and power is generated, supplied and consumed, and closing the current awareness gap between personal energy consumption and the consequences of such consumption for environmental problems such as climate change. [6, p. 72]

We offer this scenario of a “decentralized energy regime” 4 employing local and domestic renewable microgeneration as but one of many in which to consider reconsidering assumptions informing sustainable interaction design and HCI research, such as the assumption that there exists an ever-increasing (and unsustainable) demand for energy, or that it does not matter to people where their energy comes from. We believe that such a decentralized energy system is one important yet largely overlooked emerging context on which HCI and interaction design research and practice can focus and in doing so help shape emerging technologies in order to re-shape our material, social and cultural conditions into those capable of being sustained. 5

#### The plan’s flexible approach to generation emphasized local needs, ownership and control. This is an institutional change that challenges the central energy system by encouraging polycentric decision-making and empowering local actors at the expense of status quo energy elites—this can resolve issues like fuel poverty and differential distribution of environmental risk

Wolsink, 2011 [Maarten, Maarten Wolsink∗

Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam,” The research agenda on social acceptance of distributed generation in smart

grids: Renewable as common pool resources” Elsevier Journal Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews]

6. Concluding remarks

What are the social foundations of smart grids? They consist of decentralised socio-technical networks that underpin the electricity consumption of groups of consumers/end-users who are increasingly becoming autonomous. These socio-technical networks form a community that exhibits high levels of interaction and integration between the actors, while the social construction of smart metering is a key factor in determining the character of the smart grid. Most existing institutions, which are designed to support the centralised power supply system, will prove to be unfit for creating, operating, and managing microgrids within an integrated smart grid. This will likely impede the deployment of distributed generation, in particular renewable energy. Hence, such centralised institutions should be completely reshaped, as the deployment of renewables is a key to a low carbon energy provision. Critical to the development of decentralised renewable power generation is the possibility to optimise within the community on which the microgrid is based. Establishing such systems requires institutions that support mutual trust and trust in the governance frameworks [117] (see Section 4.1). Although the introduction of DisGenMiGrids has its specific system characteristics, the governance issue of how to escape from simplistic increasingly ineffective centralised institutions can be recognised more broadly. In fact the governance of emerging smart grids may become a textbook example of the new kind of environmental governance that is needed for escaping from the ‘carbon lock-in’ [23]. Such governance should move beyond existing hierarchies and beyond the ways of current separation of levels of decision-making about infrastructure and networks [118]. The highly related ways of thinking about centralisation, hierarchy, and scales of decision making must be reconsidered in most domains of environmental governance, but they are particularly crucial in managing renewables as a common good.

Looking at existing centralised power supply systems, it can be hypothesised that policies will tend to adopt a frame of generic, undifferentiated approach to promoting renewables. This creates the risk of standardising the initiatives, with frames that particularly frustrate the initiatives of the ‘early adopters’ who are essential ‘prime movers’ [119]. The problem is that ‘smart grids’ have become a buzz word, also embraced in policy circles and are considered an answer to many problems regarding increasing energy consumption, peak loads and renewables implementation. However, the proper view on the institutional changes that are needed to turn these promises into reality is lacking. On the one hand, there are large expectations about smart grids, and on the other there remains a complete lack of understanding of the need for institutional change required to establish them. Unrealistic expectations, especially the belief that smart grid programs will reduce power bills [65], will eventually lead to disappointment and will create distrust.

According to CPR theory good governance is not only adaptive, but all decision-making is also highly polycentric, which refers to the many different centres of decision-making at different scales. By definition, the most essential dimensions of DisGen MiGrids should be decided upon in each microgrid community, but on larger scales generic rules should be created that allow diversity and further the creation of such communities. ‘Polycentric systems tend to enhance innovation, learning, adaptation, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales’ [120, p. 552]. At the start of the drafting of policies to develop and apply renewable energy, general social acceptance issues were taken for granted, lacked recognition and consequently were largely neglected [53]. Due to this neglect, their development has been fairly slow. Similar neglect of the factors that determine the social construction of distributed generation with microgrid configurations will also slow down such developments. Ultimately the danger is that it will impede the application of the most promising solutions for smart grid development.

## \*\*\* 2AC

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**If they win framework we still win --- energy policy advocacy is a tool not a trap --- we should build momentum and support for energy changes.**

**Shove & Walker 7** Elizabeth Sociology @ Lancaster Gordon Geography @ Lancaster “CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management” *Environment and Planning C* 39 (4)

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of ‘innovation studies’, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we’ve suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion.However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an ‘**illusion of agency’**, and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues ‘**illusions are productive** because they **motivate action** and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved’ (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the **dynamics of change**: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are **necessary to processes within**. This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

**FIRST --- state based support for environmental policy is critical --- only they have the power and legitimacy.**

**Barry & Eckersley 5** John Robyn Poli Sci @ Melbourne *Ecological Crisis and the state* p.x-xiii

Against the background of these developments, this book provides a revisionist intervention in the debates about the state and the global ecological crisis. Its primary audience is scholars, students, and activists interested in national and global environmental politics who consider the state to be a lost cause or who are deeply pessimistic about the prospects for state-based governance systems to redress the global ecological crisis. This current of pessimism has been particularly strong in ecoanarchist, bioregional, antiglobalization, and ecorealist literatures and movements, and it is also an implicit premise in the burgeoning new field of global political ecology. While we accept that there are many good reasons to be pessimistic about the ecological potential of states, our concern is that such pessimism too often becomes an excuse for political resignation to the idea of a weakened and ineffectual state, and to the idea that ecological degradation is inevitable. The animating idea of this book is to question this political resignation, to highlight the uneven and deeply contested role and character of the state in orchestrating and responding to economic and environmental pressures, and to explore some of the more hopeful signs and opportunities for ecological progress on the part of states at both the domestic and transnational levels. Our ultimate concerns are to discover to what extent it might be possible to "reinstate the state" as a facilitator of progressive environmental change rather than environmental destruction, to redress what we believe is a somewhat lopsided and unduly negative critique of the state by many radical political ecologists and radical environmental activists, and to develop a more nuanced and even-handed understanding of the ecological and democratic potential of states. However, questions concerning whether a nondominating state is feasible and conceivable, and the general legitimacy and future potential of the state, are also of major concern to political theorists and those concerned with progressive politics generally. Our scholarly intervention, then, is essentially a strategic one: to highlight and interrogate the multiple and sometimes fragmented dimensions of the state, both domestically and internationally, and to pinpoint where possible some promising sites of engagement and renewal. The contributors to this volume all proceed from a critical perspective and, despite their differences, are united in their effort to develop constructive insights for institutional and environmental policy reform, based on a critical assessment of the capacity and democratic potential of states as both individual governance structures and units in a broader structure of regional and international multilateral governance. Given our strategic concern to draw out the positive possibilities of the greening of the state in a global context, we deliberately avoided imposing a tight analytical template on the contributors. Restricting the focus to, say, the juridical/constitutional state, or to the economy and the state or the state system, or to the state's administrative or security apparatus would have foreclosed possible avenues of constructive inquiry by our contributors and defeated our purpose. Thus our collection is illustrative rather than exhaustive of the potential for state-based ecological renewal. We also wanted the volume to reflect a diversity of (broadly critical and constructive) understandings of the state that extend to scholarship in the fields of domestic policy, comparative politics, political economy (including international political economy), international relations, development studies, and political theory. Our purpose is not to discount other potential avenues of ecological reform beyond the state, such as grassroots community environmental initiatives, the development of green consumerism and green investment, environmental best practice on the part of businesses, or the development of alternative codes of practice on the part of transnational environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Rather, we are concerned to explore how states might better facilitate these and other initiatives (including hybrid state-nonstate initiatives) as part of a more concerted effort to orchestrate local and global ecological sustainability. So, while our primary focus of attention is the state, we also explore what might be called synergistic connections between state and nonstate actors, and how they might be promoted by states acting both individually and collectively. We do not want to be starry-eyed about the green potential of the modern state, and we acknowledge the significant political and structural barriers to its realization. But it would be a great pity if environmental activists and NGOs were to turn their backs on what still remains the primary and most pervasive form of political governance in the world today. Despite the changes wrought by globalization, democratic states still have more steering capacity and legitimacy to regulate the activities of corporations and other social agents along ecologically sustainable lines in more systematic ways than any nonstate alternative. Democratic states therefore emerge as the preeminent (although not necessarily exclusive) institution to assume the role of protecting public environmental goods such as human health, ecosystem integrity, biodiversity, and the global commons. This notion is somewhat reminiscent of the Hegelian notion of the state as the embodiment of public reason and ethics. This is a far cry from the liberal idea of the state as a neutral umpire, the anarchist idea of the state as an inherently oppressive institution, or the orthodox Marxist idea of the state as an instrument of the ruling class. Of course, states themselves are neither unitary entities nor moral subjects. They do not stand above civil society but rather are deeply fragmented entities that are enmeshed with civil society and the economy. And notions of public environmental goods remain deeply contested. It is therefore helpful to think of the state, nationally, as a "container of social processes," providing a set of a set of facilities "through which society can exercise some leverage upon itself. "1 Internationally, states act as the most significant nodes in a complex network of governance that depends on the legal systems of states. This book explores to what extent the ecological potential of states has been realized, how it might be realized, and what political and institutional changes might be necessary to move closer toward this green democratic regulatory ideal. Most books on the role of the state in environmental management and governance have focused on domestic policy or on regional/global policy and international regimes. This book offers a dual focus in order to direct attention to the kinds of mutually reinforcing ideas and practices that might produce (or impede) environmentally responsible practices in general. With these considerations in mind, we bring together domestically focused work in green political theory, environmental policy, and comparative politics with environmentally focused scholarship in international relations, international political economy, and regionalization to explore the existing and potential role of the state in securing environ- mental protection. Given the highly contested and culturally specific character of environmental values and goals, we have not sought to pin down the meanings of environmentally responsible, green, or ecological state in advance of the discussion. Rather, we have left this to the contributors to explore in the context of their own case studies and conceptual analyses.

**SECOND --- reformism is good --- in the context of distributed generation only institutional change can create momentum --- absent such a focus business as usual will persist.**

**Wolsink 11** (Maarten, Maarten Wolsink∗ Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam,” The research agenda on social acceptance of distributed generation in smart grids: Renewable as common pool resources” Elsevier Journal Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews)

2.4. Path dependency By replacing the conventional consumer-producer relationship with multipronged relationships – the consumer co-producing and supplying for partners in the microgrid as a distributed generator, and vice versa – **entirely new** relationships emerge. Also other relationships change: consumer-utility, consumer-grid manager, consumer-partners in the microgrid. However, these relationships are **not supported** by existing institutions in energy provision. Fundamentally, innovation is the introduction not of a new **technical** system but rather of a **socio-technical system** (STS). It is a combination of new scientific and technical as well as socio-economic and organisational components. Both components reflect new ideas and concepts on the proffered design of such new systems [38]. The existing patterns of behaviour and organisation are called ‘institutions’, and these ‘rules of the game’ [39, p. 4] include ‘standard operating procedures’ and ‘path dependency’ [40]. For infrastructure, there it is not only the institutionalised rules that count, there is also an already historically grown physical network in which much of the path-dependent thinking has materialised. This ‘hardware’ is not easily replaced by new infrastructure. This not only applies for the infrastructure for the energy flows, but also for the other flows in smart-grids, the information and data infrastructure. In information and data network infrastructure this is known as ‘installed base’ [41]. In power supply the existing infrastructure and routines of metering, data collection, and feedback to the customers may create such lock-ins.

All rules and infrastructure have emerged over time, but usually under different conditions, and the rules and operational standards have not been developed for the requirements of the innovation. Path dependency is often responsible for the unfavourable conditions that forestall the introduction of a new STS. This may easily lead to deadlocks in the development of the new system (known as an institutional lock-ins). Making energy supply systems that can work without adding to the carbon cycle faces all kinds of lock-ins [23]. Many of these situations are due to **ineffectiveness of policy** within the **institutional setting**. According to Heiman and Solomon [42] in the US renewable energy generation has to overcome infrastructural barriers – such as lack of storage capacity – but **even more important** are **institutional frameworks** such as price distortions, discriminatory transmission system access, and utility rates to covering the **additional expense** of renewable generation. The roots of such institutional conditions are complex, but they **must be analyzed** in order to find options for leveling out these barriers. Eventually, because these are institutions – patterns of behaviour viewed as ‘natural’ and perceived as determined by the ‘rules of the game’ – there are usually only **low levels** of **willingness** among **key actors** to accept **required changes** in this framework.

**Our argument is comparative --- reformism is empirically more successful than revolutionary withdrawal.**

**Kazin 11** (Michael, History @ Georgetown, *Has the US Left Made a Difference*, *Dissent* Spring p. 52-54)

But when political radicals made a big difference, they generally did so as decidedly **junior** **partners** in **a coalition driven by establishment reformers**. **Abolitionists** did not achieve their goal until midway through the Civil War, when Abraham Lincoln and his fellow Republicans realized that the promise of emancipation could speed victory for the North. **Militant unionists** were not able to gain a measure of power in mines, factories, and on the waterfront until Franklin Roosevelt needed labor votes during the New Deal. Only when Lyndon Johnson and other liberal Democrats conquered their fears of disorder and gave up on the white South could the black freedom movement celebrate passage of the civil rights and voting rights acts. For a political movement to gain **any major goal,** it needs to win over a section of the governing elite(it doesn’t hurt to gain support from some wealthy philanthropists as well). Only on a handful of occasions has the Left achieved such a victory, and never under its own name. The divergence between political marginality and cultural influence stems, in part, from the kinds of people who have been the mainstays of the American Left. During **just one period** of about four decades—from the late 1870s to the end of the First World War— could radicals authentically claim to represent more than a tiny number of Americans who belonged to what was, and remains, the majority of the population: white Christians from the working and lower-middle class. At the time, this group included Americans from various trades and regions who condemned growing corporations for controlling the marketplace, corrupting politicians, and degrading civic morality. But this period ended after the First World War—due partly to the epochal split in the international socialist movement. Radicals lost most of the constituency they had gained among ordinary white Christians and have never been able to regain it. Thus, the wageearning masses who voted for Socialist, Communist, and Labor parties elsewhere in the industrial world were almost entirely lost to the American Left—and deeply skeptical about the vision of solidarity that inspired the great welfare states of Europe. Both before and after this period, the public face and voice of the Left emanated from an **uneasy alliance**: between men and women from elite backgrounds and those from such groups as Jewish immigrant workers and plebeian blacks whom most Americans viewed as dangerous outsiders. This was true in the abolitionist movement—when such New England brahmins as Wendell Phillips and Maria Weston Chapman fought alongside Frederick Douglass and Sojourner Truth. And it was also the case in the New Left of the 1960s, an unsustainable alliance of white students from elite colleges and black people like Fannie Lou Hamer and Huey Newton from the ranks of the working poor. It has always been difficult for these top and- bottom insurgencies to present themselves as plausible alternatives to the major parties, to convince more than a small minority of voters to embrace their program for sweeping change. Radicals did help to catalyze mass movements. But furious internal conflicts, a penchant for dogmatism, and hostility toward both nationalism and organized religion helped make the political Left a taste few Americans cared to acquire. However, some of the same qualities that alienated leftists from the electorate made them pioneers in generating an alluringly rebellious culture. Talented orators, writers, artists, and academics associated with the Left put forth new ideas and lifestyles that stirred the imagination of many Americans, particularly young ones, who felt stifled by orthodox values and social hierarchies. These ideological pioneers also influenced forces around the world that adapted the culture of the U.S. Left to their own purposes—from the early sprouts of socialism and feminism in the1830s to the subcultures of black power, radical feminism, and gay liberation in the 1960s and 1970s. Radical ideas about race, gender, sexuality, and social justice did not need to win votes to become popular. They just required an audience. And leftists who were able to articulate or represent their views in creative ways often found one. Arts created to serve political ends are always vulnerable to criticism. Indeed, some radicals deliberately gave up their search for the sublime to concentrate on the merely persuasive. But as George Orwell, no aesthetic slouch, observed, “the opinion that art should have nothing to do with politics is itself a political attitude.” In a sense, the radicals who made the most difference in U.S. history were **not that radical at all**. What most demanded, in essence, was the fulfillment of two ideals their fellow Americans already cherished: individual freedom and communal responsibility. In 1875, Robert Schilling, a German immigrant who was an official in the coopers, or caskmakers, union, reflected on why socialists were making so little headway among the hard-working citizenry: ….everything that smacks in the least of a curtailment of personal or individual liberty is most obnoxious to [Americans]. They believe that every individual should be permitted to do what and how it pleases, as long as the rights and liberties of others are not injured or infringed upon. [But] this personal liberty must be surrendered and placed under the control of the State, under a government such as proposed by the social Democracy. Most American radicals grasped this simple truth. They demanded that the promise of individual rights be realized in everyday life and encouraged suspicion of the words and power of all manner of authorities—political, economic, and religious. Abolitionists, feminists, savvy Marxists all quoted the words of the Declaration of Independence, the most popular document in the national canon. Of course, leftists did not champion self-reliance, the notion that an individual is entirely responsible for his or her own fortunes. But they did uphold the modernist vision that Americans should be free to pursue happiness unfettered by inherited hierarchies and identities. At the same time, the U.S. Left—like its counterparts around the world—struggled to establish a new order animated by a desire for social fraternity. The labor motto “An injury to one is an injury to all” rippled far beyond picket lines and marches of the unemployed. But American leftists who articulated this credo successfully did so in a patriotic and often religious key, rather than by preaching the grim inevitability of class struggle. Such radical social gospelers as Harriet Beecher Stowe, Edward Bellamy, and Martin Luther King, Jr., gained more influence than did those organizers who espoused secular, Marxian views. Particularly during times of economic hardship and war, radicals promoted collectivist ends by appealing to the wisdom of “the people” at large. To gain a **sympathetic hearing**, the Left always had to demand that the national faith apply equally to everyone and oppose those who wanted to reserve its use for privileged groups and undemocratic causes. But it was not always possible to wrap a movement’s destiny in the flag. “America is a trap,” writes the critic Greil Marcus, “its promises and dreams…are too much to live up to and too much to escape.”

### 2ac—Second K

**They treat whiteness as purely negative --- their discourse attaches whiteness intrinsically to hierarchy rather than difference --- this is a historical oversimplification.**

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In a quiet office at a Washington think tank, a balding white man with a Ph.D composes a tract on the biologically-determined intellectual inferiority of blacks. Out on a Brooklyn street, as black demonstrators march through a segregated white enclave, white residents yell racist epithets. In a suburban Virginia church, an evangelical Protestant minister preaches to a largely white, overwhelmingly middle-class audience. At an urban college campus in California, whites and blacks, Latinos and Asians, sit side-by-side in the overcrowded classroom, and in their own separate groups in the cafeteria. As they drive home to their segregated neighborhoods, they pump the same high-volume hip-hop sounds through their car speakers. A few miles up the interstate, neo-Nazis train at a private ranch. A few miles the other way, a multiracial garment workers' union is being organized; a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit are Asians and Latinos, but there are some whites. Among the organizers, one of the most effective is a young white woman who speaks good Spanish. How can we make sense of the highly variable "whiteness" of these rather emblematic characters? How does the contemporary US racial order locate white identities? Indeed, how viable is white identity? Is whiteness merely the absence of "color," **the sign of "privilege**"? Is it, in other words, **a purely negative signifier**? Or is it possible to view white identities more positively, to **see whiteness in terms of "difference**" perhaps, but **not in terms of racial domination, supremacy, or hierarchy**? In this essay I look at US racial politics and culture as they shape the status of whites. In other words, I begin from the premise that it is no longer possible to assume a "normalized" whiteness, whose invisibility and relatively monolithic character signify immunity from political or cultural challenge. An alternative perspective is demanded, one which begins from a recognition of white racial dualism. My discussion of this theme, in the next section of this essay, is an extension to whites of the Duboisian idea that in a racist society the "color line" fractures the self, that it imposes a sort of schizophrenia on the bearers of racialized identities, which forces them to see themselves simultaneously from within and without. Du Bois of course intended this analysis to explain problems of black politics and culture at the turn of the 20th century; it was a time when few publically questioned the normalization of whiteness. I extrapolate his idea to whites at the end of the 20th century; today, I suggest, whiteness has been deeply fissured by the racial conflicts of the post-civil rights period. Since the 1960s contemporary racial discourse has been unable to function as a logic of racial superiority and justified exclusion. Therefore it has been forced into rearticulations, representations, reinterpretations of the meaning of race and, perforce, of whiteness. In the following section of this paper I analyze the new politicization of whiteness which has taken shape particularly in the post-civil rights era -- the period since the ambiguous victory of the civil rights movement in the mid-1960s. Here we discuss the reasons why, contrary to the racially egalitarian thrust of the civil rights "revolution," the significance of white identity was reinterpreted and repoliticized -- largely in a reactionary direction -- in the wake of the 1960s. I identify several factors contributing to this shift: the erosion of traditional ethnicities, the decline of class-based politics, and the elaboration of right-wing racial ideologies able to rearticulate some of the 1960s movement demands in a discourse of conservatism and "color-blindness." Next, I analyze the range of white racial projects that the contemporary politics of racial dualism generates. My account of racial projects, as developed in earlier work, focuses on the relationship between representation and structure. Therefore in this investigation I look for distinct views on the meaning of whiteness. How do these interpretations link to political positions, policies, and programs? I discuss a series of racial projects that span the political continuum, and develop some critical perspectives on the "left" or "progressive" projects. In the final section, I focus on the future of whiteness in the US, and sketch out some elements of what a potential anti-racist politics for whites might look like. Whiteness as Racial Dualism Once, US society was a nearly monolithic racial hierarchy, in which everyone knew "his" place. Today, nobody knows where he or she fits in the US racial order. Thirty years after the enactment of civil rights legislation, agreement about the continuing existence of racial subordination has vanished. The

meaning of race has been deeply problematized. Why? Because the legacy of centuries of white supremacy lives on in the present, despite the partial victories of the 1960s. Because the idea of "equality," it turned out, could be reinterpreted, rearticulated, reinserted in the business-as-usual framework of US politics and culture. Because that framework is extremely resilient and able to absorb political challenges, even fundamental and radical ones. Because the outlawing of formal discrimination, which was a crucial and immediate objective of the 1960s movements, did not mean that informal racist practices would be eradicated, or indeed even that anti-discrimination laws would be seriously enforced. And yet it would be inaccurate to say that the movement failed. In virtually every area of social life, the impact of the postwar racial mobilizations is plain to see (Jaynes and Williams 1989). Although in some sectors, like housing desegregation, massive efforts to transform an entrenched and complex pattern of racial discrimination were largely (though not entirely) defeated (Massey and Denton 1993), in other areas -- for example the desegregation of the armed forces (Moskos 1988, Butler 1980) -- really remarkable change occurred. More relevant to this article, white racial attitudes shifted drmatically in the postwar period. As the definitive work on the subject put it: [S]egregation of and discrimination against black people were supported as principles by a majority of white Americans in the early 1940s, and no doubt in the preceding decades. By the early 1970s, however, support for overt discrimination in employment had nearly vanished..., and in most other public spheres of life -- public accommodations, public transportation, and even public schools -- the proportion of the white population insisting on segregation in principle was both small and shrinking (Schuman et al 1985, 193; emphasis original). "In principle." In practice, however, research demonstrates a continuing [W]hite reluctance to accept the implementation of policies intended to change race relations; reluctance on the part of whites to enter social settings (e.g., schools) in which blacks are the majority; continuing discriminatory behavior by whites, especially in areas involving close personal contact; conflicting beliefs of whites with regard to the values of equality and individualism...(Jaynes and Williams, eds. 1989, 116). So, monolithic white supremacy is over, yet in a more concealed way, white power and privilege live on. The overt politics of racial subordination has been destroyed, yet it is still very possible to "play the racial card" in the political arena. Racially-defined minorities are no longer subject to legal segregation, but they have not been relieved of the burdens of discrimination, even by laws supposedly intended to do so. Whites are no longer the official "ruling race," yet they still enjoy many of the privileges descended from the time when they were. In this situation the old recipes for racial equality, which involved creation of a "color-blind" society, have been transformed into formulas for the maintenance of racial inequality. The old programs for eliminating white racial privilege are now suspected of creating nonwhite racial privilege. The welfare state, once seen as the instrument for overcoming poverty and social injustice, is now accused of fomenting these very ills. Therefore, not only blacks (and other racially-identified minorities), but also whites, now experience a division in their racial identities. On the one hand, whites inherit the legacy of white supremacy, from which they continue to benefit. But on the other hand, they are **subject to the moral and political challenges** posed to that inheritance by the partial but real successes of the black movement (and affiliated movements). These movements advanced a countertradition to white supremacy, one which envisioned a radicalized, inclusive, participatory democracy, a substantively egalitarian economy, and a nonracial state. They deeply affected whites as well as blacks, exposing and denouncing often unconscious beliefs in white supremacy, and demanding new and more respectful forms of behavior in relation to nonwhites. Just as the movements partially reformed white supremacist institutions, so they partially transformed white racial consciousness. Obviously, they did not destroy the deep structures of white privilege, but they did make counterclaims on behalf of the racially excluded and subordinated. As a result, white identities have been displaced and refigured: they are now contradictory, as well as confused and anxiety ridden, to an unprecedented extent. It is this situation which can be described as white racial dualism.[1]

**Their starting point understands all existing white racial projects as coded forms of white supremacy. The 1AC develops an alternative starting point that recognizes distinct white racial projects.**

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Yet it would be **inaccurate** to describe the racial reaction of the post-civil rights era as **merely a new form of "coded" white supremacy**. A crucial aspect of its success was its ability to reinterpret some of the 1960s movements' most cherished demands in a conservative and individualistic discourse focused on formal equality. This was in fact a legitimate rendition of certain movement positions, which were selected, to be sure, from a generally more radical movement discourse, but not invented out of whole cloth. The frequent reference made on the right to Dr. King's phrase about "the content of their character, not the color of their skin" (Steele 1990), for example, demonstrates the possibility of rearticulating movement claims in a more pacific direction, and not coincidentally, in a direction far more palatable to whites. The neoconservative rearticulation of 1960s movement demands in the form of the "color-blind" ideal of what a racially egalitarian society would look like thus served several purposes: it did in fact embody a certain current in movement thinking; it described the limited but real accomplishments of integration, accommodation, and tolerance that were achieved in the post-1960s period; it offered a concrete vision of how US society might get "beyond race"; it allowed society's inevitable failure to do this on a large scale to be blamed on "race radicals" and "separatists," who insisted on cultivating a "victim mentality"; and, as I have mentioned, it provided a fig leaf with which to cover over the unpleasant fact that widespread discrimination, and indeed unreconstructed white supremacist attitudes, remained. \*\*\* Thus from the late 1960s on, white identity has been reinterpreted, rearticulated in a dualistic fashion: on the one hand egalitarian, on the other hand privileged; on the one hand individualistic and "color-blind," on the other hand "normalized" and white. Nowhere is this new framework of the white "politics of difference" more clearly on display than in the reaction to affirmative action policies of all sorts (in hiring, university admissions, federal contracting, etc.). Assaults on these policies, which have been developing since their introduction as tentative and quite limited efforts at racial redistribution (Johnson 1967, but see also Steinberg 1994), are currently at hysterical levels. These attacks are clearly designed to effect ideological shifts, rather than to shift resources in any meaningful way. They represent whiteness as disadvantage, something which has few precedents in US racial history (Gallagher 1995). This imaginary white disadvantage -- for which there is almost no evidence at the empirical level -- has achieved widespread popular credence, and provides the cultural and political "glue" that holds together a wide variety of reactionary racial politics. White Racial Projects Both the onset of white racial dualism and the new politicization of whiteness in the post-civil rights era reflect the fragmentation of earlier concepts of white racial identity and of white supremacy more generally. In their place, a variety of concepts of the meaning of whiteness have emerged. How can we analyze and evaluate in systematic fashion this range of white racial projects? As I have argued elsewhere (Winant 1994, Omi and Winant 1994), the concept of **racial projects** is crucial to understanding the **dynamics of racial formation in contemporary society**. In this approach, the **key element** in racial formation is the link between signification and structure, between what race means in a particular discursive practice and how, based upon such interpretations, social structures are racially organized. The link between meaning and structure, discourse and institution, signification and organization, is concretized in the notion of the racial project. To interpret the meaning of race in a particular way at a given time is at least implicitly, but more often explicitly, to propose or defend a certain social policy, a particular racialized social structure, a racial order. The reverse is also true: in a highly racialized society, to put in place a particular social policy, or to mobilize for social or political action, is at least implicitly, but more often explicitly, to articulate a particular set of racial meanings, to signify race in certain ways. Existing racial projects can be classified along a political spectrum, according to explicit **criteria** drawn from the meaning **each project attaches to "whiteness**." Such a classification will necessarily be somewhat schematic, since in the real world of politics and culture ideas and meanings, as well as social practices, tend to overlap in unpredictable ways. Nevertheless, I think it would be beneficial to attempt to sort out **alternative conceptions of whiteness**, along with the politics that both flow from and inform these conceptions. This is what I attempt here, focusing on five key racial projects, which I term far right, new right, neoconservative, neoliberal, and new abolitionist.

**This turns the alternative --- their understanding demands repudiation that is bound to fail.**

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Nevertheless, the neoliberal project does undertake a crucial task: the construction of a transracial political agenda, and the articulation of white and minority interests in a **viable strategic perspective**. This is something which has been missing from the US political scene since the enactment of civil rights legislation thirty years ago. THE ABOLITIONIST PROJECT Drawing their inspiration from W.E.B. Du Bois and James Baldwin, the social historians who have provided the core insights of the abolitionist project stress the "invention of whiteness" as a pivotal development in the rise of US capitalism. They have begun a process of historical reinterpretation which aims to set race -- or more properly, the gestation and evolution of white supremacy -- at the center of US politics and culture. Thus far, they have focused attention on a series of formative events and processes: the precedent of British colonial treatment of the Irish (Allen 1994, Ignatiev 1995); the early, multiracial resistance to indentured servitude and quasi-slavery, which culminated in the defeat of Bacon's Rebellion in late 17th century Virginia; the self-identification of "free" workers as white in the antebellum North (Roediger 1991); and the construction of a "white republic" in the late 19th century (Saxton 1990). These studies, in some cases quite prodigious intellectual efforts, have had a significant impact on how we understand not only racial formation, but also class formation and the developing forms of popular culture in US history. What they reveal above all is how crucial the construction of whiteness was, and remains, for the development and maintenance of capitalist class rule in the US. Furthermore, these studies also show how the meaning of whiteness, like that of race in general, has time and again proved flexible enough to adapt to shifts in the capitalist division of labor, to reform initiatives which extended democratic rights, and to changes in ideology and cultural representation. The core message of the abolitionist project is the imperative of repudiation of white identity and white privilege, the requirement that "the lie of whiteness" be exposed. This rejection of whiteness on the part of those who benefit from it, this "new abolitionism," it is argued, is a precondition for the establishment of substantive racial equality and social justice -- or more properly, socialism -- in the US. Whites must become "race traitors," as the new journal of the abolitionist project calls itself. Its motto: "Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity." How is this rejection of whiteness to be accomplished? Both analytical and practical measures are envisioned. On the intellectual level, the abolitionist project invites us to contemplate the emptiness, indeed vacuity, of the white category: It is not merely that whiteness is oppressive and false; it is that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false.... It is the empty and terrifying attempt to build an identity based on what one isn't and on whom one can hold back (Roediger 1994, 13; emphasis original). In short, **there is no white culture, no white politics, no whiteness, except in the sense of distancing and rejection of racially-defined "otherness**." On the practical level, the argument goes, whites can become "race traitors" by rejecting their privilege, by refusing to collude with white supremacy. When you hear that racist joke, confront its teller. When you see the police harassing a nonwhite youth, try to intervene or at least bear witness. In short, recognize that white supremacy depends on the thousands of minute acts that reproduce it from moment to moment; it must "deliver" to whites a sense of their own security and superiority; it must make them feel that "I am different from those "others." Single gestures of this sort, Race Traitor's editors say, ...would [not] in all likelihood be of much consequence. But if enough of those who looked white broke the rules of the club to make the cops doubt their ability to recognize a white person merely by looking at him or her, how would it affect the cops' behavior (Editorial 1993, 4-5)? Thus the point is not that all whites recognize the lie of their privilege, but that enough whites do so, and act out their rejection of that lie, to disrupt the "white club's" ability to enforce its supremacy. It is easy to sympathize with this analysis, at least up to a point. The postwar black movement, which in the US context at least served as the point of origin for all the "new social movements" and the much-reviled "politics of identity," taught the valuable lesson that politics went "all the way down." That is, meaningful efforts to achieve greater social justice could not tolerate a public/private, or a collective/individual distinction. Trying to change society meant trying to change one's own life. The formula "the personal is political," commonly associated with feminism, had its early origins among the militants of the civil rights movement (Evans 1980). The problems come when deeper theoretical and practical problems are raised. Despite their explicit adherence to a "social construction" model of race (one which bears a significant resemblance to my own work), theorists of the abolitionist project do not take that insight as seriously as they should. They employ it chiefly to argue against biologistic conceptions of race, which is fine; but they fail to consider the complexities and rootedness of social construction, or as we would term it, racial formation. Is the social construction of whiteness so flimsy that it can be repudiated by a mere act of political will, or even by widespread and repeated

acts aimed at rejecting white privilege? I think not; whiteness may not be a legitimate cultural identity in the sense of having a discrete, "positive" content, but it is certainly an overdetermined political and cultural category, having to do with socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, ideologies of individualism, opportunity, and citizenship, nationalism, etc. Like any other complex of beliefs and practices, "whiteness" is imbedded in a highly articulated social structure and system of significations; **rather than trying to repudiate it**, **we shall have to rearticulate it**. That sounds like a daunting task, and of course it is, but it is not nearly as impossible as erasing whiteness altogether, as the abolitionist project seeks to do. Furthermore, because whiteness is a relational concept, unintelligible without reference to nonwhiteness -- note how this is true even of Roediger's formulation about "build[ing] an identity based on what one isn't" -- that rearticulation (or reinterpretation, or deconstruction) of whiteness can begin relatively easily, in the messy present, with the recognition that whiteness already contains substantial nonwhite elements. Of course, that recognition is only the beginning of a large and arduous process of political labor, which I shall address in the concluding section of this paper. Notwithstanding these criticisms of the abolitionist project, we consider many of its insights to be vital components in the process of reformulating, or synthesizing, a progressive approach to whiteness. Its attention is directed toward prescisely the place where the neo-liberal racial project is weak: the point at which white identity constitutes a crucial support to white supremacy, and a central obstacle to the achievement of substantive social equality and racial justice. CONCLUDING NOTES: WHITENESS AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS In a situation of racial dualism, as Du Bois observed more than 90 years ago, race operates both to assign us and to deny us our identity. It both makes the social world intelligible, and simultaneously renders it opaque and mysterious. Not only does it allocate resources, power, and privilege; it also provides means for challenging that allocation. The contradictory character of race provides the context in which racial dualism -- or the "color-line," as Du Bois designated it, has developed as "the problem of the 20th century." So what's new? Only that, as a result of incalculable human effort, suffering, and sacrifice, we now realize that these truths apply across the board. Whites and whiteness can no longer be exempted from the comprehensive racialization process that is the hallmark of US history and social structure. This is the present-day context for racial conflict and thus for US politics in general, since race continues to play its designated role of crystallizing all the fundamental issues in US society. As always, we articulate our anxieties in racial terms: wealth and poverty, crime and punishment, gender and sexuality, nationality and citizenship, culture and power, are all articulated in the US primarily through race. So what's new? It's the problematic of whiteness that has emerged as the principal source of anxiety and conflict in the postwar US. Although this situation was anticipated or prefigured at earlier moments in the nation's past -- for example, in the "hour of eugenics" (Stepan 1991, Kevles 1985, Gould 1981) -- it is far more complicated now than ever before, largely due to the present unavailability of biologistic forms of racism as a convenient rationale for white supremacy.[7] Whiteness -- visible whiteness, resurgent whiteness, whiteness as a color, whiteness as difference -- this is what's new, and newly problematic, in contemporary US politics. The reasons for this have already emerged in my discussion of the spectrum of racial projects and the particular representations these projects assign to whiteness. Most centrally, the problem of the meaning of whiteness appears as a direct consequence of the movement challenge posed in the 1960s to white supremacy. The battles of that period have not been resolved; they have not been won or lost; however battered and bruised, the demand for substantive racial equality and general social justice still lives. And while it lives, the strength of white supremacy is in doubt. The racial projects of the right are clear efforts to resist the challenge to white supremacy posed by the movements of the 1960s and their contemporary inheritors. Each of these projects has a particular relationship to the white supremacist legacy, ranging from the far right's efforts to justify and solidify white entitlements, through the new right's attempts to utilize the white supremacist tradition for more immediate and expedient political ends, to the neoconservative project's quixotic quest to surgically separate the liberal democratic tradition from the racism that traditionally underwrote it. The biologistic racism of the far right, the expedient and subtextual racism of the new right, and the bad-faith anti-racism of the neoconservatives have many differences from each other, but they have at least one thing in common. They all seek to maintain the long-standing association between whiteness and US political traditions, between whiteness and US nationalism, between whiteness and universalism. They all seek in different ways to preserve white identity from the particularity, the difference, which the 1960s movement challenge assigned to it. The racial projects of the left are the movements' successors (as is neoconservatism, in a somewhat perverse sense). Both the neoliberal racial project and the abolitionist project seek to fulfill the movement's thwarted dreams of a genuinely (i.e., substantively) egalitarian society, one in which significant redistribution of wealth and power has taken place, and race no longer serves as the most significant marker between winners and losers, haves and have nots, powerful and powerless. Although they diverge significantly -- since the neoliberals seek to accomplish their ends through a conscious diminution of the significance of race, and the abolitionists hope to achieve similar ends through a conscious reemphasizing of the importance of race -- they also have one very important thing in common. They both seek to rupture the barrier between whites and racially-defined minorities, the obstacle which prevents joint political action. They both seek to associate whites and nonwhites, to reinterpret the meaning of whiteness in such a way that it no longer has the power to impede class alliances. Although the differences and indeed the hostility -- between the neoliberal and abolitionist projects, between the reform-oriented and radical conceptions of whiteness -- are quite severe, we consider it vital that adherents **of each project recognize that they hold part of the key to challenging white supremacy** in the contemporary US, and that their counterpart project holds the other part of the key. Neoliberals rightfully argue that a pragmatic approach to transracial politics is vital if the momentum of racial reaction is to be halted or reversed. Abolitionists properly emphasize challenging the ongoing commitment to white supremacy on the part of many whites. Both of these positions need to draw on each other, not only in strategic terms, but in theoretical ones as well. The recognition that racial identities -- all racial identities, including whiteness -- have become implacably dualistic, could be far more liberating on the left than it has thus far been. For neoliberals, it could permit and indeed justify an acceptance of race-consciousness and even nationalism among racially-defined minorities as a necessary but partial response to disenfranchisement, disempowerment, and superexploitation. There is no inherent reason why such a political position could not coexist with a strategic awareness of the need for strong, class-conscious, transracial coalitions. We have seen many such examples in the past: in the anti-slavery movement, the communist movement of the 1930s (Kelley 1994), and in the 1988 presidential bid of Jesse Jackson, to name but a few. This is not to say that all would be peace and harmony if such alliances could come more permanently into being. But there is no excuse for not attempting to find the pragmatic "common ground" necessary to create them. Abolitionists could also benefit from a recognition that on a pragmatic basis, whites can ally with racially-defined minorities without renouncing their whiteness. If they truly agree that race is a socially constructed concept, as they claim, abolitionists should also be able to recognize that racial identities are not either-or matters, not closed concepts that must be upheld in a reactionary fashion or disavowed in a comprehensive act of renunciation. To use a postmodern language I dislike: racial identities are deeply "hybridized"; they are not "sutured," but remain open to rearticulation. "To be white in America is to be very black. If you don't know how black you are, you don't know how American you are" (Thompson 1995, 429).

**There is an external impact --- our pedagogical method is necessary to address issues like the environment, trade, and militarism that *exceed* whiteness. Their root cause representations reduce all these to products of whiteness instead of dealing with their full complexity.**

**Yudice 95** George Latin American & Caribbean Studies; Spanish & Portuguese Languages and Literatures; Social and Cultural Analysis @ Princeton “Neither Impugning nor Disavowing Whiteness Does a Viable Politics Make: The Limits of Identity Politics” in *After Political Correctness* eds. Christopher Newfield and Ronald Strickland p. 279-281

It is arguments such as those of SWOP and Ganados del Valle, not simply the claim that **all we need to fight is white, Eurocentric cultural imperialism**, that have the power to incorporate the white middle and working classes into struggles led by coalitions that include people of color and that benefit the citizenry rather than capitalist corporations. Whites must feel that they have a stake in the politics of multiculturalism and not simply see themselves as a backdrop against which subordinated groups take on their identity. The question may be raised whether the rearticulation of whiteness and the incorporation of whites into struggles over resource distribution do not lead to the deconstruction of other racial and identity groupings and thus weaken the basis on which people of color in the United State" have waged their politics. **Rearticulating whiteness does not necessarily lead to a weakening of the identity of people of color and other oppressed groups**, but it does create the possibility that many more issues will be perceived no longer as exclusively "white" concerns but also as matters of importance to ethnoracially and sexually minoritized groups and vice versa. Shifting the focus of struggle from identity to. resource distribution will also make it possible to engage such seemingly nonracial issues as the environment, the military, the military-industrial complex, foreign aid, and free-trade agreements as matters impacting local identities and thus requiring a global politics that works outside of the national frame,

Of course, such a politics is meaningless unless it can be **articulated among diverse constituencies and to the location of power and capital in the state**. In City of Quartz, Mike Davis has mapped the ways in which urban ethnoracial politics and a myriad of global forces brokered by the US. state are imbricated:

The privatization of the architectural public realm, moreover, is shadowed by parallel restructurings of electronic space, as heavily policed, pay-access "information or- ders:' elite data-bases and subscription cable services appropriate part of the invisible agora. Both processes, of course, mirror the deregulation of the economy and the re- cession of non-market entitlement. 63

The erosion of public space, the bunkerization of the wealthy, the segregation of ethnoracial groups, the political economy of drugs, the expendability of youth, the absolute permeation of everyday life by consumerism from the richest to the poorest, even a religious schism between right-to-lifers (Archbishop Mohanty) and Christian liberationists (Father Olivares)----all of these phenomena are shaped by global forces that **greatly *exceed*** although they certainly do not exclude the question of whiteness.///

It is incumbent upon multiculturalists and identity- politics activists, if we are going to make a difference, to take our politics beyond, without **placing all the blame** on or fostering disavowal of, the **white (straw)man** at which we have aimed so many of our efforts. I CAN'T IMAGINE EVER WANTING TO BE WHITE. This statement makes me think, but it does not encourage me to imagine; in fact, it admits to a failure of the imagination. But why not imagine the circumstances under which one might want to be white-or black, or brown, or queer, or none of the above?

## \*\*\* 1AR

### 1AR—Framework

#### Turn—policy debate solves spectator phenomenon and increases education.

Joyner 99—Christopher C. Joyner, Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University [Spring 1999, 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377, Lexis]

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense. A debate exercise is particularly suited to an examination of United States foreign policy, which in political science courses is usually studied from a theoretical, often heavily realpolitik perspective. In such courses, international legal considerations are usually given short shrift, if discussed at all. As a result, students may come to believe that international law plays no role in United States foreign policy-making. In fact, serious consideration is usually paid by government officials to international law in the formulation of United States policy, albeit sometimes ex post facto as a justification for policy, rather than as a bona fide prior constraint on consideration of policy options. In addition, lawyers are prominent advisers at many levels of the foreign-policy-making process. Students should appreciate the relevance of international law for past and current US actions, such as the invasion of Grenada or the refusal of the United States to sign the law of the sea treaty and landmines convention, as well as for [\*387] hypothetical (though subject to public discussion) United States policy options such as hunting down and arresting war criminals in Bosnia, withdrawing from the United Nations, or assassinating Saddam Hussein.

#### The preservation of equal ground and compliance with agreed upon topic norms is crucial to instill an ethic of tolerance and respect. The idea that the 1AC is more important than giving the other side a chance to talk is the root of bigotry and intolerance, turning their offense.

Muir 93—Department of Communications at George Mason [Star A. Muir, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, Gale Academic Onefile]

Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. The willingness to recognize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a degree of credibility, is a value fostered by switch-side debate: Alternately debating both sides of the same question . . . inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance toward differing points of view. To be forced to debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer. 5' The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who become **intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted.**""\* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance. At a societal level, the **value of tolerance** is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. . . . the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race. . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error."\*' At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage in self-refiective questioning, to reason dialogically and dialectically, and to "reconstruct alien and opposing belief systems empathically."\*- Our system of beliefs is, by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Role playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain such insight. Only an activity that requires the defense of both sides of an issue, moving beyond acknowledgement to exploration and advocacy, can engender such powerful role playing. Redding explains that "debating both sides is a special instance of role-playing,""" where debaters are forced to empathize on a constant basis with a position contrary to their own. This role playing, Baird agrees, is an exercise in reflective thinking, an engagement in problem solving that exposes weaknesses and strengths,\*\* Motivated by the knowledge that they may debate against their own case, debaters constantly pose arguments and counter-arguments for discussion, erecting defenses and then challenging these defenses with a different tact."\*' Such conceptual flexibility, Paul argues, is essential for effective critical thinking, and in turn for the development of a reasoned moral identity. A final point about relativism is that switch-side debate encourages fairness and equality of opportunity in evaluating competing values. Initially, it is apparent that **a priori fairness is a fundamental aspect of games** and gamesmanship."\* Players in the game should start out with equal advantage, and the rules should be construed throughout to provide no undue advantage to one side or the other. Both sides, notes Thompson, should have an equal amount of time and a fair chance to present their arguments. Of critical importance, he insists, is an equality of opportunity."\*^ Equality of opportunity is manifest throughout many debate procedures and norms. On the question of topicality—whether the affirmative plan is an example of the stated topic—the issue of "fair ground" for debate is explicitly developed as a criterion for decision. Likewise, when a counterplan is offered against an affirmative plan, the issue of coexistence, or of the "competitiveness" of the plans, frequently turns on the fairness of the affirmative team's suggested "permutation" of the plans. In these and other issues, the value of fairness, and of equality of opportunity, is highlighted and clarified through constant disputation. The point is simply that debate does teach values, and that these values are instrumental in providing a hearing for alternative points of view. Paying explicit attention to decision criteria, and to the division of ground arguments (a function of competition), effectively renders the value structure pluralistic, rather than relativistic.